US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 30, JULY 26, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  The Governor's Island Accord:  A Victory For Diplomacy and Democracy 
in Haiti -- Secretary Christopher
2.  USAID and Foreign Aid Reform Deputy Secretary Wharton
3.  Report of the El Salvador Panel -- Secretary Christopher
4.  UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 851 on Angola -- Madeleine K. 
Albright, UNSC Resolution 
5.  Presidential Delegation to Hanoi
6.  U.S.-North Korea Talks on the Nuclear Issue -- Press Statement, 
Robert L. Gallucci  
7.  Situation in Azerbaijan
8.  Eighth Report on War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia


ARTICLE 1:

The Governor's Island Accord:  A Victory for Diplomacy And Democracy in 
Haiti
Secretary Christopher
Opening remarks at a news conference with UN/OAS Special Envoy Dante 
Caputo and U.S. Special Adviser on Haiti Lawrence Pezzullo, Washington, 
DC, July 19, 1993

Within the first few days of his Administration, President Clinton 
announced that his first goal with respect to Haiti was the restoration 
of democracy.  In March, he met with President Aristide and personally 
reaffirmed our commitment to the return of constitutional government and 
the return of President Aristide to Haiti through a negotiation 
sponsored by the United Nations and the Organization of American States.  
At about the same time, I appointed Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo to 
coordinate our efforts to assist in those negotiations.

I am pleased to say that the goal announced by President Clinton is now 
within reach, in large measure due to the tireless efforts of Mr. Caputo 
and Ambassador Pezzullo.  I want to personally congratulate Mr. Caputo 
on a successful negotiation to resolve the Haitian crisis; it is an 
example of a splendid diplomatic endeavor.

The Governor's Island accord is a sound agreement that provides for a 
peaceful transition to constitutional rule and for President Aristide's 
return to Haiti.  The accord is a victory not only for the Haitian 
people but for the international community as well.

This unprecedented agreement is the result not only of close cooperation 
between the United Nations and the OAS but also of the diplomatic skill 
and perseverance of Mr. Caputo and Mr. Pezzullo; the strong support of 
the Canadian, French, Venezuelan and U.S. Governments; and, most 
importantly, the leadership and cooperation of the Haitian parties.  I 
want to extend my congratulations to all the institutions, governments, 
and individuals who played key roles in bringing about the success we 
have achieved so far--a good example of the emerging era of multilateral 
diplomacy.

While we can and should be proud of what the international community has 
done, our work is certainly not yet over.  The Governor's Island accord 
is the first crucial step--but let me emphasize that it is only the 
first step.

Mr. Caputo has just returned from negotiations in New York, where he 
successfully reached agreement with Haitian parliamentary and political 
leaders to implement the accord.  We support their decisions to invite 
President Aristide to appoint, as soon as possible, a prime ministerial 
candidate for their ratification--which would be an immediate step to 
return Haiti to constitutional government.  Once the new prime minister 
has taken office, the international community must be ready to assist 
the new government in preparing the way for the return of President 
Aristide on October 30.

I want to reaffirm President Clinton's commitment to back this agreement 
to the fullest.  We are preparing to participate in a program of 
economic and technical assistance in coordination with the United 
Nations, the Organization of American States, and other donors.  As the 
President recently announced, we have redirected $37.5 million from 
other programs in the region for use in Haiti.  These funds will be used 
to help the new government clear its arrears to the international 
financial institutions so that they can resume lending to Haiti.  We are 
also planning to begin high-impact programs to put Haitians back to work 
rebuilding their devastated economy.

The stability of a new Haitian democracy will rest not only on economic 
progress but also on strengthening democratic institutions.  We and the 
United Nations Development Program are coordinating a comprehensive 
program to bolster Haiti's justice system.  In that way, we can ensure 
that democracy has a chance to grow and thrive in Haiti.  The UN and the 
OAS are also planning to assist Haiti in creating a new civilian police 
force and helping to professionalize the Haitian military.  We look to 
President Aristide to approve, at the earliest moment, the terms under 
which these programs and the other security measures will operate.  
These initiatives will help create the peaceful climate needed for the 
political transition to occur.

The United States, the United Nations, and the Organization of American 
States will carefully monitor the agreement over the coming months.  The 
international sanctions will be suspended once the new prime minister 
assumes office.  But let me stress that the international community is 
prepared to reimpose the sanctions should anyone derail the 
implementation of the agreement reached at Governor's Island.

With strong international support and the good faith efforts of all 
Haitians, I am sure that the Governor's Island accord will succeed in 
restoring constitutional government and returning President Aristide to 
office through a peaceful transition.  The accord will protect the 
rights of all Haitians and form the basis for a durable democratic 
system.  It can also improve the lives of the people of Haiti, who have 
for so long been kept in abject poverty through a succession of despotic 
leaders.  Thank you very much. (###)


ARTICLE 2:

USAID and Foreign Aid Reform
Deputy Secretary Wharton
Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, 
Trade, Oceans and Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Washington, DC, July 14, 1993

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:  I am pleased to appear before 
you today, along with USAID Administrator Brian Atwood, to discuss the 
details of his efforts to reinvigorate USAID and the broader issue of 
foreign aid reform.

Mr. Atwood will address the details of the fiscal year 1994 budget, as 
well as his intent to reinvigorate USAID through a top-to-bottom 
examination of its organization, structure, and management practices.  
My comments will focus on the broader policy recommendations of the 
inter-agency task force to reform USAID.

During his confirmation hearing before the full committee last January, 
Secretary Christopher responded to questions about the future of foreign 
aid by stating he would ask me to examine the goals and objectives of 
USAID to determine whether they remained relevant in the post-Cold War 
era.  At my own confirmation hearing, I expressed my enthusiasm for 
undertaking this assignment.  Issues relating to economic development 
have been at the core of my academic and professional life since my 
association with Nelson Rockefeller's pioneering technical assistance 
efforts in Latin America in the late 1940s.  

I have been involved in the evolution of U.S. foreign assistance 
programs, both directly and as a keen observer, for more than four 
decades.  At this crucial point in our history, with the imperatives of 
the Cold War behind us, the chance to step back and evaluate the future 
of foreign assistance is, in a very real sense, an opportunity I have 
prepared for all of my professional life.  I, nevertheless, undertook 
this project knowing how important and complex the issues are, 
particularly as we simultaneously search for ways to reduce the federal 
deficit.

Secretary Christopher and I originally hoped to complete this review in 
approximately 90 days.  However, we both believed strongly that we 
needed to fully involve the new USAID Administrator in this effort.  
Since Mr. Atwood was not confirmed until early May, the process has 
required a longer period of time.

I began the review process by creating a task force composed of 
representatives from each of the departments and agencies responsible 
for programs in the Function 150 international affairs budget.  Thirty-
five officials ultimately participated on the task force, including 
representatives from the Office of Management and Budget, the National 
Security Council, and the National Economic Council.

Mr. Atwood and I also met with Members of Congress and staff, as well as 
with some representatives of outside groups concerned with the future of 
foreign aid, in order to obtain additional viewpoints.  We also 
benefited from the large number of studies and reports on reforming 
foreign aid that have been written since 1989.  Based on these 
resources, we prepared a draft report in early June.  While there was a 
consensus on many of the recommendations, there was also spirited 
discussion and debate.  As chairman of the task force, I assume 
responsibility for the contents of the report.  

After sharing the draft report with the Secretary of State and the 
National Security Adviser, we agreed to circulate the USAID core of the 
draft report to the chairmen and ranking members of the relevant 
oversight committees.  We have received many valuable comments in this 
process, and I view today's hearing as another important part of our 
consultations with the Congress.  I am pleased that the members of this 
committee have had the opportunity to review this report before the 
hearing.  We want the views of those concerned with the future of 
foreign assistance to be adequately considered in the preparation of the 
final report.

Simultaneous with our internal primary review of USAID, a Presidential 
Review Directive (PRD 20) was issued on March 8 calling for an 
assessment of all international programs of the U.S. Government. USAID, 
of course, is only one of many entities engaged in implementing U.S. 
foreign policy under the Foreign Assistance Act and through the 
international foreign assistance budget, known as Function 150.  Others 
include bilateral economic and military assistance, support for 
multilateral development banks, UN organizations, and trade and 
investment promotion.  

With respect to USAID, the PRD set forth two specific objectives for the 
Department of State to consider:  1) the structure and function of 
USAID, including its relationship to the Department of State; and, 2) 
the Department's responsibility to evaluate the Function 150 budget 
account under the Foreign Assistance Act.  

Thus, the work already begun within the Department was both germane and 
complementary to the PRD effort.  The draft report we are discussing 
today, however, addresses only the first objective of the PRD process:  
namely, the recommended future of USAID.  The extremely important issue 
of coordination of all foreign assistance programs is still under review 
by the PRD inter-agency working group, as are the issues relating to the 
other agencies and programs funded under the 150 account, such as the 
Economic Support Fund, or ESF, and the multilateral development banks.  
The State Department, of course, is contributing its views to this 
effort.  

Therefore, while our current draft report does not specifically offer 
recommendations on budget, planning, and program coordination, I assure 
the subcommittee that we are very much aware of the importance of the 
issue.  Moreover, we believe that the recommendations in our draft would 
place a restructured USAID and its new mission in a position to be fully 
compatible with any necessary coordination requirements of the total 
foreign assistance program.  

Let me now address some of our report's major conclusions.

Does USAID Have a Role In the Post-Cold War Era?

The essential first question we had to ask ourselves was whether foreign 
assistance, and particularly the type of development assistance that 
USAID can offer, continues to be essential in the post-Cold War era.  
Our task force concluded unanimously that foreign assistance, in the 
light of new international realities and challenges, remains a 
fundamental cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and is just as important, 
if not more so, than it ever was.  

President Clinton has defined three areas of vital U.S. interest to 
which effectively managed foreign assistance can make a major 
contribution.

National Security.  Despite the collapse of international communism and 
related threats of aggression and destabilization, there remains the 
harsh reality of armed conflicts and violence.  These have the potential 
to escalate into major transnational conflagrations, threatening our 
citizens and vital interests and breeding terrorist acts that affect us 
at home and abroad.  Some of these conflicts stem from ethnic and 
religious differences, but many result from economic stress and 
injustice.  To the extent that instability results from poverty, 
inequality of political and economic access, and societal 
transformation--as it often does--effective development assistance helps 
reduce tensions that breed violent conflict.  USAID can assist peaceful 
reconstruction and development in these cases and thereby further our 
national security objectives.  

Economic Revitalization.  The challenge is to contribute to a growing, 
prosperous international economy while rebuilding our own at home.  
Emerging economies represent tremendous potential growth and new 
markets.  Participating in their growth expands the market for our goods 
through trade and investment.  It also creates U.S. jobs, enhances the 
supply of consumable goods, and improves the flow of strategic material.  
President Clinton has emphasized that "winning" this battle need not be 
a zero-sum game:  Assisting economies to thrive abroad promotes peace, 
jobs, stabilization, a demand for U.S. products and services, and higher 
living standards for all.

Promotion of Democracy.  Economic development works best in 
participatory democracies.  The United States has a fundamental self-
interest in the creation of a well-functioning "international community" 
characterized by shared democratic values and ideals and relative 
political stability within countries and regions.  Democracy has taken 
hold worldwide, but its roots in many countries are still shallow.  
Programs designed to support and strengthen citizen-based institutions 
can help meet our national interest by strengthening emerging 
democracies.

To protect and advance these basic national interests, our foreign 
policy and assistance programs must recognize that U.S. domestic 
strength is fundamental to achieving our objectives.  We cannot succeed 
in isolation.  There are unbreakable links between our domestic 
economic, social, and political health and that of the rest of the 
world.  To advance our own economic and political objectives, we must 
expand U.S. participation in a growing international economy. USAID has 
been at the forefront of promoting democracy and furthering market 
economies in other countries.

As the world's remaining superpower, the United States is in an 
unprecedented position to exercise enlightened world leadership on 
global issues at a time when there is a great need for such leadership.  
The loss of a common ideological enemy has freed tremendous resources 
for more positive use by the industrialized world.  But without strong 
U.S. leadership during this time of sluggish economic performance and 
new security challenges, there is a risk of a return to a system of 
international relations based on isolationism and mercantilism.  The 
basic sources of leadership will continue to be the size and health of 
our own economy, the power and readiness of our military forces, and our 
willingness to engage on international issues, especially in a manner 
that is perceived as far-sighted and constructive.  

Our leadership must also rest on the pursuit of our most enduring 
values:  respect for and protection of individual human rights; strong 
reliance on private initiative to enhance social well-being; the fair 
rule of law; and responsive, participatory civilian governance.  The 
challenge to U.S. leadership is to maintain peace and stability by 
nurturing democracy, preserving the global environment, maintaining a 
strong military capability, and strengthening the international trading 
system.  

The United States does not hold the solution to every world problem.  
Yet our nation possesses attributes that grow out of our long democratic 
heritage:  compassion, enlightened self-interest, a willingness to 
share, and a deep respect for the human dignity of all people.  These 
instincts provide the foundation for U.S. support for foreign 
assistance.  

USAID:  Abolish or Reform?

In agreement that foreign assistance remains vital to our national 
interests, the task force next turned to the question of whether a 
revitalized and redirected USAID was best suited to carry out 
development aspects of the total mission or whether some other entity 
could perform the role better.  The task force considered several 
options, including abolishing the agency, merging it into the Department 
of State, or dispersing its functions to other departments and agencies.  
This last alternative included a sub-option of retaining a smaller, 
successor agency to operate a sustainable development program primarily 
through non-governmental organizations and grantees.  

Another option argued that USAID should limit its mandate to disaster 
relief and leave long-term development to multilateral agencies.  The 
task force, however, saw a clear need for a discrete, national 
development agency to carry out programs which multilateral 
organizations cannot provide.

--  First and foremost, USAID provides a direct linkage between U.S. 
foreign policy goals in our bilateral relations.  Multilateral agencies 
do not necessarily reflect U.S. foreign policy in their programs and 
activities.

--  USAID can work with governments and non-governmental organizations, 
reaching out effectively to grass-roots recipients.  Multilateral 
organizations, especially international financial institutions, deal 
almost exclusively with foreign governments.  

--  The local expertise in USAID's field missions provides a rare 
ability to develop programs targeted to local needs.  

--  USAID leads in democracy-building, family planning, and environment 
issues--areas where multilateral organizations have been less active.  

--  Finally, USAID guarantees that the development programs funded by 
the U.S. reflect the values of the American people.

As a result of the above discussion, the overwhelming consensus was that 
USAID, as an agency, remains strongly viable and that its problems stem 
less from where its functions are located than from an unfocused 
mandate, over-regulation, and poor management.  

Mr. Atwood will describe, in his testimony, how he intends to carry out 
a top-to-bottom examination of the organization and structure of USAID 
and its management practices.  I believe he has already infused USAID 
with new and vigorous leadership.  In light of this and the realization 
that merging USAID into State or dispersing its functions would not 
resolve the regulatory and administrative burdens under which USAID 
programs must operate, the task force concluded that the best option 
regarding the organization and structure of USAID is to work with 
Congress to simplify and clarify USAID's statutory mandate and allow the 
new Administrator time to improve USAID's internal management practices 
and structure through administrative action. 

New Goals and Objectives

After concluding that continuing a strong foreign assistance program is 
in the U.S. economic and security interest and that USAID as an 
institution can be reformed to successfully achieve our foreign 
assistance and foreign policy objectives, the task force examined the 
relevance of USAID's existing statutory goals and objectives in the 
current world context.  In common with practically every recent study of 
foreign aid, the task force concluded that USAID has too many statutory 
goals and objectives and lacks a clear vision that reflects U.S. 
national interests in the post-Cold War era.

For example, the 1989 Task Force on Foreign Assistance of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs identified 33 independent statutory goals 
and objectives and 75 priority areas that USAID must pursue in designing 
its assistance programs.  Increasing percentages of aid have also been 
earmarked in authorization and appropriations legislation for specific 
programs, countries, or geographic regions.  In FY 1993, for example, 
approximately 57% of development assistance, 84% of the Economic Support 
Fund, and 96% of Foreign Military Financing are earmarked.

This is not to say that all of USAID's problems are externally generated 
or need legislation to be corrected.  Even with appropriate statutory 
goals, USAID will not succeed if it is poorly managed--and the agency 
currently has serious internal problems.

For example, USAID's fiscal and personnel resources are spread too thin.  
USAID currently maintains a field presence--at least one permanent 
employee--in 99 different countries, of which 52 represent either a 
fully staffed mission or a regional office, normally with a staff of 12 
or more Americans.  USAID also operates programs with no permanent staff 
in 
an additional 26 countries, not including countries receiving disaster 
relief or PL 480 food aid.

In addition, USAID currently has a portfolio of 2,226 active projects, a 
substantial majority of which are designed and implemented--because of 
limited permanent staff--through a complex and cumbersome system of 
grants and contracts, each subject to the full panoply of federal 
procurement regulations and financial oversight.

In regard to management of its headquarters operations, the task force 
noted two principal conclusions of the Commission on Foreign Assistance 
Management, established under the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act 
of 1991:  USAID has too many layers of management between the 
Administrator and field programs, and USAID has suffered from a lack of 
strong and consistent leadership.

The commission's report also documented an observation, concurred in by 
the task force, that the process of designing and implementing policy 
within USAID is diffuse and uncoordinated.  Central direction and 
monitoring and compliance of clearly understood agency-wide assistance 
policies is lacking.

As noted above, many of these problems can be resolved through 
administrative action; others will require the help of Congress.  The 
task force believes the Administration and the Congress, working 
together, can produce the reforms that will revitalize USAID.  What is 
required is that we design the agency for success, show confidence that 
it can be effective by giving it the breathing space to operate, and 
then hold it fully accountable for results.  To give USAID this 
breathing space, the task force believes its overseas assistance 
programs should be based on a new statutory policy framework 
encompassing the following four broad strategies.

Promoting Sustainable Economic Growth and Development.  This strategy is 
the linchpin for successfully reaching overall policy goals--both 
foreign and domestic.  Sustainable development calls for a long-term 
participatory process, with particular focus on the disadvantaged 
majority, that provides opportunities for the citizens of assisted 
countries to improve their incomes and the quality of their lives.   
Sustainable development targets the elimination of hunger, poverty, 
illness, and ignorance while protecting the environment.  It involves 
enhancing human capital by expanding educational opportunities to all 
segments of society, reducing the rate of population growth, extending 
improvements in health and nutrition, and expanding the capabilities of 
women.  Sustainable development also depends upon the elimination of 
obstacles to participation and creation of opportunities that will allow 
all people to be more productively engaged in building their country's 
economy.

Building Democratic Participation in Development.  The United States 
stands for the universal proposition that all people are created equal.  
Democratic societies foster, inter alia, pluralism, freedom of 
expression and association, an electoral system, the rule of law, and 
the protection of individual human rights.  Encouraging democratization 
requires using foreign aid to promote "good governance" in other nations 
and to create an environment where democratic values are understood and 
utilized in policy and decision-making processes at all levels. 

Administrator Atwood has already begun to strengthen the agency's 
capacity to support and deepen democracy, making it an integral part of 
its sustainable development mission.  He has asked that USAID staff 
develop project approaches for each of the components or "sectors" of 
democratic development work:  civil society; intermediary organizations; 
political, electoral, and governmental institutions; judicial reforms; 
civil-military relations; and free press.  These approaches will be 
integrated into strategic country and regional plans incorporating all 
the other disciplines of development work--economics, agriculture, 
environment, population, health--in a mutually reinforcing framework.

Addressing Global Issues.  National boundaries do not contain the 
effects of contagious diseases, environmental degradation, or narcotics 
trafficking.  We can, however, cooperate with others to deal with these 
problems to minimize their negative impacts--in the developing world and 
in the United States.

For example, addressing environmental concerns in developing countries 
will lessen the negative effects on the economies and well-being of 
neighboring populations.  AIDS is another global scourge that is 
potentially preventable or containable.  High fertility rates in 
developing countries threaten efforts to improve family health, 
nutrition, and access to social services and to protect the environment.  
Population pressures also result in large-scale, unwanted migration and 
exacerbate refugee problems.  A worldwide effort is needed to bring the 
benefits of voluntary family planning to all developing countries.

Responding to Emergency Humanitarian Needs.  Decisive humanitarian 
actions to respond to natural or man-made disasters often limit long-
term damage and costs to people in critical need.  The alternative costs 
of neglect are often greater, particularly when such situations become 
destabilizing and lead to open conflict and civil strife.  USAID must go 
beyond traditional disaster relief--food and shelter--and develop a 
rapid-response, nation-building capacity to help societies that have 
fallen into conflict and anarchy or where there is a severe threat to 
their stability.

USAID should be positioned to provide limited resources for specifically 
identified short-term needs, distinct from long-term development 
efforts.  This includes ready-to-deploy programs to observe elections, 
strengthen institutions of civil society, conduct civic education, 
strengthen judicial systems, and undertake other "nation-building" 
activities in conjunction with the UN, other international 
organizations, and U.S. or multilateral peace-keeping forces.

The task force report argues that by pursuing these four strategies, 
USAID's bilateral development programs can contribute to an ever-
widening community of stable, prospering, democratic nations; expanded 
markets for mutually beneficial commerce; and the prevention and 
containment of conflicts.  

The task force endorsed the new approach of the FY 1994 budget for the 
Function 150 international affairs account, which regrouped the current 
programs by major foreign policy objectives rather than by agency.  This 
approach highlighted the Administration's foreign assistance objectives.  
The FY 1994 budget identified the foreign policy priorities as:

--  Building democracy in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere;

--  Promoting and maintaining peace, including peace-keeping operations, 
non-proliferation and arms control, Middle East peace talks, and defense 
cooperation and regional security;

--  Promoting economic growth and sustainable development through 
bilateral development programs--encompassing developing human capital, 
building markets and income opportunities, expanding science and 
technology, and building institutions--as well as multilateral 
development programs and promotion of U.S. businesses abroad;

--  Addressing global problems, particularly environmental degradation, 
narcotics, terrorism, rapid population growth, and AIDS; and 

--  Providing humanitarian assistance, including disaster relief and aid 
for refugees.

These priorities closely track the major program categories identified 
by the task force.

New Legislation for a New Vision

At his April 29, 1993, confirmation hearing before this committee, USAID 
Administrator Atwood described his new vision for USAID--a vision that 
recognizes that direct participation of people in solving their own 
problems is critical to overcoming poverty, hunger, disease, and 
illiteracy.  This new vision recognizes that the challenges posed to 
global stability--unrestrained population growth, environmental 
degradation, and economic deprivation--are people problems, the 
solutions for which can be developed only by including people themselves 
directly in the development process.  To design people-oriented 
programs, USAID will increase the involvement of non-governmental 
organizations--including private voluntary organizations, cooperatives, 
and credit unions--to the extent possible.  USAID will also continue to 
draw on the wealth of experience in American universities to carry out 
its new mandate.

The task force believes that realizing this vision requires new charter 
legislation--legislation that describes USAID's post-Cold War national 
mission with clearly stated priorities and gives USAID essential program 
and management flexibility.  The task force also recognizes that USAID, 
through internal reform, also must become a more flexible, streamlined 
agency if it is to produce tangible results and be held accountable for 
the success or failure of its programs.  The task force identified 19 
specific organizational and administrative changes which USAID should 
make in order to carry out its new mandate and operate more efficiently.  
Fortunately, many of these changes to the USAID organization can be made 
internally without the need for legislative action, and Mr. Atwood will 
be describing some of these changes in his testimony.  

A crucial element in buttressing this flexibility and accountability, 
however, will be the cooperation of the Congress in freeing USAID from 
earmarked programs and unnecessary and restrictive oversight procedures.  
Agreement with the Congress on a clear, simplified, and unencumbered 
statutory framework for development assistance will create a renewed, 
more cooperative relationship between USAID and the Congress on the use 
of foreign assistance funds.

This will free USAID to design, and be held accountable for, bilateral 
development programs that respond to the development needs in recipient 
countries.  And it will allow USAID to use development funds in those 
countries and in those sectors that offer the most promise for USAID 
described in our report.  For Congress, this shared purpose and the 
administrative steps that USAID will take to implement it would limit 
the need for detailed earmarking which have inhibited USAID's ability to 
achieve its development objectives.

One advantage of this streamlining will be the increased flexibility of 
matching programs with the unique needs and conditions of each nation.  
As countries approach levels of sustainable development, new 
institutional arrangements that encourage the phased withdrawal of 
USAID's involvement and the increased involvement of other domestic 
technical, trade, and investment agencies are required.  Improved 
management of this transition--from developing country status to that of 
fully advanced status--maximizes the payoff from development assistance 
and provides greater opportunity for expanded U.S. foreign trade and 
investment.

As I noted at the outset, regardless of which agency or department is 
responsible for which function, all economic assistance efforts, which 
together have the common goal of advancing the economic interests of the 
United States, need to be coordinated within the executive branch to 
ensure maximum effectiveness.  To use our scarce resources more 
efficiently, the Function 150 account should be cast to reflect the 
major foreign policy objectives of the various assistance programs so as 
to delineate the true resource flows and improve accountability.  

The USAID Administrator should also continue to report to the President 
through the Secretary of State and receive policy guidance from the 
Secretary.  There should also be strengthened interaction at the most 
senior levels--Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary, USAID 
Administrator--to improve and speed decision-making and to encourage 
greater cooperation at all levels.

Finally, and most important, the reform proposals contained in the task 
force draft report reflect the Clinton Administration's broader foreign 
policy approach--an approach of consultation, coordination, and shared 
responsibility with our allies.  In the post-Cold War era, the 
Administration is seeking close cooperation and agreement with its 
natural allies--the advanced democratic nations and those nations which 
share our values.  

This approach should logically be extended to our work of assisting 
sustainable development in countries striving to attain a better life 
for their people.  What we do to support development in any region or 
specific countries must be done as part of a broader attack on the 
problems impeding progress, orchestrated in meetings with other donors 
and stressing our areas of comparative advantage while leaving to others 
what they can do best.

Within this broader, coordinated effort to spur development, our 
intention should be to do our fair share.  We should assist people and 
countries in need and do what we can to help them attain sustainable 
progress.  The American people have always been willing to do their 
share to help others in need, and we have been a recognized leader in 
providing aid in recent decades.1  We should not withdraw from this 
responsibility, tied as it is to our own national interest and our 
American sense of humanity.  We should work closely with other donors, 
helping to shape the future--a future in which we have the most to offer 
and much to gain.

What's New in This Framework?

How will the new policy framework and recommendations achieve the 
desired effectiveness and tangible results?  What is new about this 
framework for USAID?  There are several answers.

First, USAID's activities are being refocused to reflect the new foreign 
policy objectives of this Administration.   The FY 1994 international 
affairs budget, the Function 150 account, was specifically recast this 
year to reflect more clearly the new Administration's foreign policy 
objectives.  

Second, streamlining and focusing USAID on the areas where it has 
historically developed the greatest competence and strength--overcoming 
the basic human afflictions of hunger, ignorance, environmental 
degradation, and disease--will allow USAID to do what it has learned to 
do best.  Recent changes in world affairs have enhanced our comparative 
advantage as a foreign assistance leader in these areas.  What is new 
and important are the opportunities these changes present if USAID 
institutes major reforms in setting priorities and carries them out with 
new vision and effectiveness.  This can only be achieved if significant 
improvements are made in the areas of excessive oversight and 
administrative execution.  

Third, with the end of the Cold War, promoting sustainable development 
has become a more prominent national objective, bridging domestic and 
foreign policy.  The major commitment to assist the development of 
democracy and a market economy is just as valid in a Russia and a 
Guatemala as it is in a Haiti and a Cambodia.  USAID's mix of policy 
recommendations and technical assistance will be different for the 
traditional developing countries compared with our more advanced 
partners, but the overarching goal of engaging them in an expanding 
global market economy will be the same.

Fourth, USAID will give much greater priority to leveraging multilateral 
cooperation.  Expanding the involvement of other donor groups not only 
serves the objective of more cost-effective assistance but has the 
additional benefit of strengthening cooperation among the community of 
democratic nations that contribute the bulk of the world's development 
assistance.  USAID will also promote the creation and revitalization of 
regional and international development organizations required to 
coordinate and address a growing list of global issues.  

Fifth, and finally, the new framework and focus recognizes that there is 
a fundamental and crucial foreign policy role to be played by bilateral 
foreign assistance in the furtherance of our national interests.  
Pursuing this goal requires a USAID which is flexible, responsive, and, 
above all, focused.  The various changes recommended will produce a 
reinvigorated and reformed USAID uniquely capable of achieving our 
foreign policy objectives.

Conclusion

I hope that our draft report will serve as the basis for continued 
consultations with the Congress on the role and direction of USAID and, 
in turn, may result in general support of the need for, and perhaps the 
substance of, new charter legislation.  In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the 
task force recommends a two-pronged approach to reform of USAID and its 
bilateral development programs.

First, USAID must receive leadership that reflects its important role in 
achieving our foreign policy and foreign assistance goals.  This 
includes the top-to-bottom review and improvement of USAID's structure 
and management practices that Mr. Atwood has promised, some of which he 
will describe in his testimony today.  

Second, we must work with the Congress to simplify and clarify USAID's 
statutory mandate.  USAID should be given new flexibility through the 
reduction or elimination of the costly and inefficient process of 
earmarking.  USAID's new mandate should focus on participatory programs 
leading to sustainable economic development, expanding democracy, and 
addressing global issues while responding to international disasters and 
other urgent humanitarian crises.

I believe the draft report of the task force lays out a comprehensive 
new framework for USAID in the post- Cold War era.  We want to work with 
the Congress to make that vision a reality.  (###)


ARTICLE 3:

Report of the El Salvador Panel 
Statement by Secretary Christopher, released by the Office of the 
Spokesman, Washington, DC, July 15, 1993.

This morning I received the report of the panel on El Salvador which I 
appointed on March 24.  I want to express my gratitude for the thorough 
and conscientious efforts of the panel, composed of two of our most 
distinguished retired career ambassadors--George S. Vest and Richard W. 
Murphy--and Professor I.M. (Mac) Destler of the University of Maryland, 
who served as the panel's academic adviser.

The report, issued today, is the result of a 3-month, comprehensive 
assessment of how the Department of State and the Foreign Service 
handled human rights issues involving El Salvador from 1980 to 1991.  As 
I directed, the panel examined the State Department's professional 
performance and makes recommendations on how the Department can better 
handle human rights issues in a manner consistent with our nation's 
values and the Department's highest professional standards.  As 
directed, the report is not a review of the wisdom of previous 
Administrations' Central American policy, and it is limited to the 
activities of the State Department and the Foreign Service.

I am carefully reviewing the report and its recommendations.  One of the 
report's key recommendations is that the vast bulk of the record on 
human rights in El Salvador be declassified to the maximum degree 
possible as soon as possible.  I have ordered that this process, already 
begun at my previous instruction, be accelerated and completed on an 
expedited basis.  I will be acting on the panel's other recommendations 
promptly.  (###)


ARTICLE 4:

UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 851 on Angola
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution


Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
before the UN Security Council, New York City, July 15, 1993.

Mr. President, my government applauds the efforts of Ms. Margaret 
Anstee, who labored tirelessly as the Secretary General's previous 
Special Representative, to attempt to bring peace to Angola.  We applaud 
as well the energetic efforts of the newly appointed Special 
Representative, Dr. Beye, who has worked since his appointment to revive 
both humanitarian assistance deliveries and face-to-face negotiations 
between the parties.  The July 12 agreement on emergency aid between 
UNITA and the UN is a hopeful sign that the need to deal with the 
humanitarian problems facing Angola has been acknowledged.  We continue 
to support the efforts of the UN to bring the conflict in Angola to a 
peaceful conclusion.

We also applaud and support the UN effort to alleviate the humanitarian 
suffering in Angola.  We continue to be gravely concerned about the 
plight of the people of Angola.  In this context, we call on UNITA to 
refrain from military action and return to the peace process.  We also 
recognize the costs of continued conflict for the people of Angola and 
the international community.

We must also note that it is only logical that we will not be able to 
agree to increase the strength of UNAVEM until conditions have been 
established that will make exercise of its mandate feasible.  
Furthermore, before agreeing to additional commitments, we will need to 
have the Secretariat's clear advice on the costs involved and their 
duration.

Mr. President, UN peace-keeping has become a growth industry.  But 
before we can effectively meet the increased demands, we must understand 
the needs of those demanding our services and how our scarce resources 
are being employed.  Our goal is to retool the peace-keeping machinery 
so as to meet the new demand.  Until then, we must ensure that our 
limited supply is used to best effect.


Resolution 851 (July 14, 1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 
March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November 
1992, 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993, 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993, 823 
(1993) of 30 April 1993 and 834 (1993) of 1 June 1993,

Having considered the further report (S/26060 and Add. 2) of the 
Secretary-General dated 12 July 1993,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 
8 June 1993 (S/25899),

Welcoming the Declaration on the Situation in Angola adopted by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) at its Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session (S/26076), and the 
Resolution on the Situation in Angola adopted by the Council of 
Ministers of the OAU at its Fifty-Eighth Ordinary Session (S/26081),

Welcoming also the joint statement issued in Moscow on 8 July 1993 by 
the representatives of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United 
States of America, the three observer States to the Angolan peace 
process  (S/26064),

Noting the Special Declaration on Angola adopted by the World Conference 
on Human Rights in Vienna,

Expressing grave concern at the deterioration of the political and 
military situation, and noting with consternation the further 
deterioration of an already grave humanitarian situation,

Deeply concerned that the peace talks remain suspended and that a cease-
fire has not been established,

Welcoming and supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and his 
Special Representative aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan 
crisis through negotiations,

Emphasizing the importance of a continued and effective United Nations 
presence in Angola with a view to fostering the peace process and 
advancing the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial 
integrity of Angola,

1.   Welcomes the further report of the Secretary-General dated 12 July 
1993 and decides to extend the existing mandate of the United Nations 
Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for a period of two months until 
15 September 1993;

2.   Reiterates its readiness to consider taking action promptly, at any 
time within the period of the mandate authorized by this resolution, on 
the recommendation of the Secretary-General to expand substantially the 
United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress 
in the peace process;

3.   Stresses the importance of the functions of good offices and 
mediation by UNAVEM II and the Special Representative, with the goal of 
restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process for the full 
implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

4.   Reiterates its demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of 
the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the "Acordos de 
Paz";

5.   Condemns UNITA for continuing military actions, which are resulting 
in increased suffering to the civilian population of Angola and damage 
to the Angolan economy and again demands that UNITA immediately cease 
such actions;

6.   Also condemns UNITA's repeated attempts to seize additional 
territory and its failure to withdraw its troops from the locations 
which it has occupied since the resumption of the hostilities, and 
demands once again that it immediately do so and agree without delay to 
return its troops to United Nations-monitored areas as a transitional 
measure pending full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

7.   Reaffirms that such occupation is a grave violation of the "Acordos 
de Paz" and is incompatible with the goal of peace through agreements 
and reconciliation;

8.   Stresses the fundamental need to re-initiate without delay the 
peace talks under United Nations auspices with a view to the immediate 
establishment of a cease-fire throughout the country and the full 
implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the 
Security Council;

9.   Takes note of statements by UNITA that it is prepared to resume 
peace negotiations and demands that UNITA act accordingly;

10.  Welcomes the continued disposition of the Government of Angola to 
reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict in conformity with the 
"Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

11.  Urges all States to refrain from any action which directly or 
indirectly could jeopardize the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz", 
especially from providing any form of direct or indirect military 
assistance to UNITA, or any other support to UNITA inconsistent with the 
peace process;

12.  Expresses its readiness to consider the imposition of measures 
under the Charter of the United Nations, including a mandatory embargo 
on the sale or supply to UNITA of arms and related materiel and other 
military assistance, to prevent UNITA from pursuing its military 
actions, unless by 15 September 1993 the Secretary-General has reported 
that an effective cease-fire has been established and that agreement has 
been reached on the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and 
relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

13.  Recognizes the legitimate rights of the Government of Angola and in 
this regard welcomes the provision of assistance to the Government of 
Angola in support of the democratic process;

14.  Welcomes the steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement the 
emergency humanitarian assistance plan;

15.  Takes note of statements by UNITA that it will cooperate in 
ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all 
Angolans and demands that UNITA act accordingly;

16.  Calls upon all Member States, United Nations agencies and non-
governmental organizations to respond swiftly and generously to the 
Secretary-General's appeal in implementation of the above-mentioned plan 
and to accord or increase humanitarian relief assistance to Angola, and 
encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to 
continue to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

17.  Demands that UNITA continue to extend its cooperation in ensuring 
the immediate evacuation of foreign nationals and their family members 
from Huambo and other locations occupied by UNITA;

18.  Reiterates its strong condemnation of the attack by UNITA forces, 
on 27 May 1993, against a train carrying civilians, and reaffirms that 
such criminal attacks are clear violations of international humanitarian 
law;

19.  Reiterates also its appeal to both parties strictly to abide by 
applicable rules of international humanitarian law, including to 
guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the civilian 
population in need, and commends in particular the efforts of the 
Secretary-General and his Special Representative to establish agreed 
humanitarian relief corridors;

20.  Reiterates its appeal to both parties to take all necessary 
measures to ensure the security and safety of UNAVEM II personnel as 
well as of the personnel involved in humanitarian relief operations;

21.  Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the 
situation warrants, and in any case before 15 September 1993, a report 
on the situation in Angola with his recommendation for the further role 
of the United Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime, to keep 
the Council regularly informed of developments;

22.  Requests also the Secretary-General to submit as soon as possible 
the budgetary implications of bringing UNAVEM II up to its full strength 
as mandated in resolution 696 (1991) of 
30 May 1991;

23.  Decides to remain seized of the matter.

VOTE:  15-0.  (###)


ARTICLE 5:

Presidential Delegation to Hanoi
Statement released by the presidential delegation, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 
17, 1993.

The Presidential delegation to Hanoi, led jointly by Deputy Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs Hershel Gober, Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, and Assistant to the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. Michael Ryan, has completed its 
meetings in Hanoi and departs for a brief visit to Ho Chi Minh City 
before returning to Washington, DC.   As stated in the White House press 
statement of July 12, 1993, the purpose of the delegation's mission was 
to stress the need for further progress on unresolved POW/MIA issues.  

Participating in the delegation were leaders from the four largest 
American veterans organizations:  Mr. John Sommer of the American 
Legion, Mr. Allen Kent of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Mr. David Givans 
of the Disabled American Veterans, and Mr. Robert Jones of the AMVETS.  
The National League of Families of American Prisoners of War and Missing 
in Action in Southeast Asia also was invited to participate but, due to 
its annual meeting in Washington, was unable to send a representative.

While in Hanoi, the delegation met with General Secretary Do Muoi, 
Minister of Defense Doan Khue, Interior Minister Bui Thien Ngo, Acting 
Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai, Vietnam 
Veterans Association head General Tran Van Quang, and other 
representatives of agencies in charge of veterans affairs for the 
Ministry of National Defense and the Disabled Veterans Society.  All 
talks were  conducted in a cordial and straightforward manner.  Each 
side had the opportunity to present clearly its views.  The delegation 
also received a letter to President Clinton from President Le Duc Anh, 
which it will carry back to Washington.

The delegation also met with and was briefed by the U.S. personnel of 
the Hanoi detachment of our Joint Task Force--Full Accounting.  The 
entire delegation, including the representatives of our veterans 
organizations, was impressed by the dedication, hard work, and expertise 
of all these individuals.

In these meetings with Vietnamese officials, the delegation stressed 
President Clinton's message from his July 2 statement that any further 
steps in relations between our two nations depend on tangible progress 
on the outstanding, unresolved POW/MIA cases.  Specifically, the 
delegation reiterated the need for efforts by Vietnam in four main 
areas:

--  Remains--concrete results from efforts on their part to recover and 
repatriate American remains;

--  Discrepancy cases--continued resolution of 92 discrepancy cases and 
remaining live sighting investigations;

--  Trilateral cooperation--further assistance in implementing 
trilateral investigations along the Vietnam-Laos border; and

--  Archives--accelerated efforts to provide all POW/MIA-related 
documents that will provide answers to individual cases.

In our meetings, we received assurances of Vietnam's intention to work 
cooperatively in all areas that we identified in order to make progress.  
Emphasizing the importance the U.S. attaches to treatment of veterans 
from all sides, the delegation informed the Vietnamese officials with 
whom they met that, as a humanitarian gesture to assist Vietnam in 
accounting for its personnel, the United States would provide microfilm 
copies of over 3 million pages of documents which our forces captured 
during the war.  This collection contains information on Vietnamese 
military units, captured diaries, unit action reports, and other data.  
The first portion of these documents was turned over to Vietnamese 
representatives at the Joint Archive Center.

To support American citizens--including families of our missing and the 
Vietnam veterans who have been invited by the Vietnamese Government to 
visit Vietnam--and to facilitate and further strengthen our POW/MIA 
effort in Vietnam, the U.S. delegation proposed sending three State 
Department personnel to Hanoi on a temporary basis to work closely with 
our Joint Task Force personnel.  These officers would free up our Joint 
Task Force personnel to concentrate exclusively on POW/MIA accounting.  
U.S. and Vietnamese officials are discussing the modalities of this 
arrangement.

The delegation also raised the issue of human rights and emphasized the 
importance President Clinton and the American people attach to this 
matter.  Vietnamese officials indicated that they have an open attitude 
to discussing this subject along with other subjects.

In keeping with the central theme of this visit--which is to increase 
progress on POW/MIA accounting--the U.S. delegation will visit Ho Chi 
Minh City on July 17 and 18.  While there, the delegation will meet with 
officials involved in the POW/MIA accounting process.  The delegation  
will also visit two projects of particular humanitarian concern to the 
United States:  a center providing prostheses to all veterans who are in 
need and the Amerasian Transit Center.

The U.S. delegation greatly appreciated the courtesies extended to them 
by the Vietnamese Government and the opportunity to meet with very 
senior Vietnamese officials. (###)


ARTICLE 6:

U.S.-North Korea Talks on the Nuclear Issue
Press Statement (text agreed by the D.P.R.K. and U.S. delegations)
Text of statement by the U.S. delegation to the U.S.-D.P.R.K. talks on 
the nuclear issue, released in Geneva, July 19, 1993 (an identical 
statement was issued by the D.P.R.K. delegation).

The delegations of the United States and the DPRK met from July 14-19, 
1993, in Geneva for a second round of talks on resolving the nuclear 
issue.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, joint 
USA/DPRK press statement.

For its part, the USA specifically reaffirmed its commitment to the 
principles on assurances against the threat and use of force, including 
nuclear weapons.

Both sides recognize the desirability of the DPRK's intention to replace 
its graphite moderated reactors and associated nuclear facilities with 
light water moderated reactors.  As part of a final resolution of the 
nuclear issues, and on the premise that a solution related to the 
provision of light water moderated reactors (LWRs) is achievable, the 
USA is prepared to support the introduction of LWRs and to explore with 
the DPRK ways in which LWRs could be obtained.

Both sides agreed that full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards 
is essential to accomplish a strong international nuclear non-
proliferation regime.  On this basis, the DPRK is prepared to begin 
consultations with the IAEA on outstanding safeguards and other issues 
as soon as possible.

The USA and DPRK also reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of 
the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula.  The DPRK reaffirms that it remains prepared to begin the 
North-South talks, as soon as possible, on bilateral issues, including 
the nuclear issue.

The USA and the DPRK have agreed to meet again in the next two months to 
discuss outstanding matters related to resolving the nuclear issue, 
including technical questions related to the introduction of LWRs, and 
to lay the basis for improving overall relations between the DPRK and 
the USA.


Robert L. Gallucci
Unilateral U.S. statement by the U.S. representative to the U.S.-
D.P.R.K. talks on the nuclear issue, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Political-Military Affairs Robert L. Gallucci, Geneva, 
July 19, 1993.

You have all seen the press statement agreed by the U.S. and D.P.R.K. 
delegations.  I would like to present the U.S. view of this important 
issue and where negotiations stand.

As the President recently indicated, the D.P.R.K. nuclear program 
represents a grave threat to international security and the non-
proliferation regime.  Our talks in Geneva are part of a steady and 
determined effort by the international community and the United States 
to resolve the nuclear issue and reinforce security in the region.

Our objective is to achieve a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and a strong, 
global non-proliferation regime.  We want the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea to remain in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, comply with 
IAEA fullscope safeguards, and fully implement the North-South 
declaration on denuclearization.  In our meetings last month in New 
York, the D.P.R.K. agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT.  This 
was a positive step.  In keeping with its status as an NPT party, we 
continue to expect the D.P.R.K. to accept regular IAEA inspections.

At this round of talks, we achieved three further steps toward a 
resolution of the nuclear issue.

First, the D.P.R.K. has agreed to begin consultations with the IAEA on 
outstanding safeguards issues, including the IAEA's requests for 
additional information and visits to additional sites.  The question of 
access to these sites remains a critical issue for resolving 
international concerns about the D.P.R.K.'s nuclear program, and we urge 
the D.P.R.K. to reach agreement with the IAEA without delay.

Second, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has agreed to resume 
discussions as soon as possible with the Republic of Korea on the 
implementation of the North-South denuclearization declaration and other 
bilateral issues.  The Republic of Korea has also said it is ready for 
this dialogue.  Accordingly, we look to the two Koreas to reach 
agreement on implementing an effective bilateral inspection regime.

Third, the D.P.R.K. announced that it is prepared to abandon its 
graphite moderated reactors and associated facilities in favor of light 
water reactors (LWRs), which are less suitable for nuclear weapons 
material production.  In the next round of U.S.-D.P.R.K. talks, we have 
agreed to include discussions on this issue.  While we support the 
conversion to LWRs as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue, 
it is understood that the U.S. cannot engage in any peaceful nuclear 
cooperation with the D.P.R.K. or support others in assisting the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea until the D.P.R.K. has 
unambiguously complied with its non-proliferation obligations, including 
the NPT, IAEA, and the bilateral North-South declaration.

Obviously, sale of a power reactor would also involve complex financial 
and legal matters which would have to be addressed at an appropriate 
time in the future.  Nonetheless, we believe that our long-term non-
proliferation objectives will be served by beginning to explore ways for 
the D.P.R.K. to make a conversion to LWRs once the D.P.R.K. is in full 
compliance with its non-proliferation obligations.

In the course of our discussions, both sides reaffirmed the principles 
of the June 11, 1993, joint U.S.-D.P.R.K. press statement.  The 
principles referred to in this statement and its reaffirmation in Geneva 
are based on U.S. obligations under the UN Charter.  These obligations 
commit us to refrain from the threat or use of force against another 
country, except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations.  Obviously, these principles preserve our 
obligation and ability to assist the Republic of Korea in its self-
defense, including the right to conduct defensive exercises.

As we have said, the United States is prepared to continue its dialogue 
with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as long as we are making 
progress to resolve the nuclear issue.  Based on the outcome of this 
round of discussions, we have agreed to meet again in the next 2 months 
to continue our efforts to resolve the nuclear issue.  In this regard, I 
would add that since the D.P.R.K. has said it will begin talks with the 
IAEA and the Republic of Korea as soon as possible, we would not expect 
to begin a third round of U.S. talks with the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea until serious discussions with the IAEA and the 
Republic of Korea are underway.  We have also made it clear that our 
dialogue cannot continue if the D.P.R.K. withdraws from the NPT, engages 
in additional reprocessing, or fails to accept regular IAEA inspections 
necessary to maintain the continuity of safeguards. (###)


ARTICLE 7:

Situation in Azerbaijan
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, July 
16, 1993.

The Department of State is deeply disturbed by Azerbaijani parliamentary 
resolutions adopted on July 16 calling for the arrest of several former 
Azerbaijani Government officials.  Former Parliamentary Speaker Isa 
Gambar has already been arrested pursuant to these resolutions.  These 
officials are being blamed for the crisis created in Azerbaijan when 
government troops sought to disarm rebellious forces in Ganje.  We 
strongly condemn these parliamentary resolutions.

We have continually raised with Parliamentary Speaker Aliyev the 
importance we place on democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule 
of law.  Mr. Aliyev has given us his assurances that he also supports 
democracy in Azerbaijan, and we urge him to demonstrate that commitment 
by adhering to democratic principles and international norms.  We remind 
Mr. Aliyev that Azerbaijan's commitment to these democratic principles 
will be a determining factor in the quality of our bilateral relations. 
(###)

ARTICLE 8:

Eighth Report on War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia
Following is the text of the Supplemental United States Submission of 
Information to The United Nations Security Council In Accordance with 
Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 
(1992), dated June 17, 1993.

Editor's Note:  This report contains graphic descriptions.

This is the eighth submission by the United States Government of 
information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 
(1992) relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia.  As in our previous reports, we have focused on 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with 
Resolution 771, have provided information that is "substantiated," that 
is, which rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or 
that includes detail sufficient for corroboration.

As with previous reports, we have tried to ensure that our collection 
effort has been even-handed and aimed at gathering information on crimes 
committed by all parties to the conflict. It should be noted, however, 
that access to independent sources within the territory of the Republics 
of Serbia and Montenegro has proved very difficult, due to limitations 
imposed by authorities in those areas.

We have tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other 
countries and non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit 
reports pursuant to Resolutions 771 and 780.  We have not repeated 
individual accounts listed under one category, such as "willful 
killing," in other categories, such as "torture."  The United States has 
further information substantiating the incidents included in this 
report, which we will make available on a confidential basis directly to 
the Commission of Experts, established under Security Council Resolution 
780 or, as appropriate, to the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, 
established under Security Council Resolution 827.

Resolution 827, which was adopted since our last submission, ensures 
that the UN Commission of Experts continues to pursue its work of 
conducting investigations, establishing a data base, and preparing 
evidence during the interim period before the appointment of the 
Tribunal's Prosecutor and the hiring of staff to begin authoritative 
investigations and preparations for trial of persons responsible for 
violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia.  
We urge other countries to continue to submit information on a regular 
basis to the Commission during this interim period and to join us in 
making financial contributions to the Commission to facilitate its 
important work.

In accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution 780, the United States 
intends to continue providing information that comes into our 
possession.  As in our previous reports, the notations at the end of 
each of the items indicate the source from which the information was 
drawn.

Former Yugoslavia:  Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
Eighth Submission

Willful Killing

Apr-May 93:  Bosnian Croatian and Muslim forces attacked civilians of 
each other's ethnic group in Vitez, executing entire families in their 
homes, from April 15, 1993, for about a week.  According to the British 
commander of the UN troops:

The soldiers have seen some things that will mark them for life--
children held in the arms of their mothers and both of them shot.  
Reports of atrocities are correct.  Whole families have been killed.  We 
do not know who is doing this--the bodies do not have names on them.

In Vitez, Bosnian Croat soldiers went from house to house executing 
Muslims.  Some women were murdered as they were taking in the laundry.  
Multiple rapes by Bosnian Croat soldiers in the Vitez area have also 
been confirmed.  A 36-year-old Muslim refugee, who was shot in the arm, 
said, "They are shooting every day, every hour, every moment."

On the outskirts of Travnik, a Muslim military police unit attacked 
Croatian civilians, driving them from their homes.

In Konjic, Croat militiamen engaged in house-to-house fighting.

In Santici, Bosnian Croat gunmen killed villagers and livestock; they 
burned houses and the village mosque.  An UNPROFOR officer described the 
activity:

Fifteen or twenty (Bosnian Croat militiamen) lobbed grenades through the 
front windows of Muslim houses, then waited for the people to bolt out 
the door, and shot them.

In Ahinici, UNPROFOR officials discovered charred bodies in Muslim homes 
that had been torched by Bosnian Croat gunmen.  As of May 4, the Ahinici 
death toll had reached 103.  According to the EC Monitoring Mission in 
Zenica,  "It was a large-scale massacre, organized and well planned."  
(The Washington Post, The New York Times, London Press Association, 
Paris AFP) 

24 Apr 93:  Residents of Miletici, a village located north of Vitez and 
consisting of 11 houses, were attacked by a band of locally based 
Muslims.

The Miletici village men attempted to defend their houses and, during 
the short and mismatched gun battle, killed one of the "mujahideen" 
soldiers. According to eyewitnesses interviewed by a UNHCR field worker:

The (Muslim) gunmen maintained that each one of them was worth five 
villagers.  They'd already killed one, so they took four men between the 
ages of 20 and 40 into a house, held them there, tied up the rest of the 
villagers, [then] returned to the house to torture and execute the four 
men.
(Department of State, Reuters)

May 92-Apr 93:   Two Muslim former soldiers, aged 25 and 33, were 
released on April 21, 1993, after having been in a series of Serbian 
camps since their capture on May 30, 1992.  Both had admitted  to being 
soldiers when they were captured.

After their capture, the men were first sent to a camp in Vlasenica, 
called Susica, where they were held for only a few days before being 
transferred to a prison in the same town, where they remained for 2 
months.  They were then sent to a camp in Batkovic, where they remained 
for 1 month, then to two different camps in Doboj, where they were held 
for 6 months, until March 2, 1993.  Finally, they were sent to a camp in 
Bijeljina, until their release on April 21.

The witnesses said Batkovic was the worst of the camps in which they had 
been held.  There had been about 1,600 prisoners in Batkovic when they 
arrived, all of them from northeastern Bosnia.  A number of children and 
elderly men were moved out of the camp in closed trucks after it was 
announced there would be an ICRC visit to the camp.

Beatings were common at Batkovic.  Zulfo Saracevic, aged 55, died of 
beatings.  A jeweler from Bijelina died after 3 nights of beatings, the 
purpose of which was to get him to tell where he had hidden gold and 
jewelry.  Several elderly men died from the bad conditions at the camp.  
One of the witness's cousins died of gangrene in a leg wound for which 
he [had] received no medical care.

On several occasions, they and other prisoners were forced to remove 
their clothes and perform sex acts on each other and on some of the 
guards.  The two witnesses named the three worst guards, all Serbs from 
the Bijeljina area.

The witnesses, however, said that the very worst abuses were committed 
by a fellow Muslim prisoner from Gornja Tuzla, whose nickname was 
"Pupa."  They described this Muslim as a "trustee" similar to the 
"Kapos" in German camps during World War II.  The witnesses said that 
they had encountered other Muslim prisoners serving in the same capacity 
in other camps in which they had been held.

The two camps in Doboj were located in a commercial warehouse and in a 
warehouse at the Bare barracks.  The men were not registered with the 
ICRC in either camp; the ICRC was not permitted to visit either camp 
during their time there.  There were approximately 100 detainees in the 
2 camps who were used as laborers to dig military trenches.

The witnesses said that two Serb camp managers in Doboj were "good men" 
who did not allow abuse of the prisoners.  On weekends, however, when 
these two managers went home to visit their families, the prisoners were 
beaten.  Those beatings were perpetrated by Serb prisoners who often 
received gifts, including alcohol, from their relatives on weekends.  
The Serb guards allowed these beatings, but apparently did not 
participate.   (Department of State)

Jul-Aug 92:  A 30-year-old Bosnian Croatian from Brisevo witnessed the 
July 1992 movement of JNA forces through the area south of Prijedor and 
west of Ljubija.  Meeting little or no resistance, these forces moved 
through each town and forced out the remaining inhabitants.

For about 4 days, JNA forces positioned mobile antiaircraft weapons on 
the top of a ridge about 21/2 kilometers east of Ljubija.  Anti-aircraft 
guns were used to fire on unarmed refugees fleeing along the east slope 
of the ridge.

In mid-August, a bus arrived from Ljubija with about 20 Muslim 
prisoners, some from the area of Carakovo, southwest of Prijedor.  They 
were removed from the bus with their hands tied behind their necks with 
wire and escorted by about 10 guards with assault weapons.  After their 
hands were freed, the prisoners were forced to dig a pit.

The guards beat and shot them, then pushed their bodies into the pit.  
Before departing, the guards covered the bodies in the pit with dirt.  
During the last half of August, the witness could see human hands and 
feet protruding from the mound.

On about August 24, the area of Brisevo southwest of Prijedor was under 
attack by Yugoslav army mortars. After the mortar attack, infantry 
troops moved from village to village indiscriminately seeking out and 
killing inhabitants.  Most people were hiding from the shelling in their 
basements, where the soldiers killed them.  Muslims buried about 70 
bodies, all of which had suffered multiple bullet wounds.  The following 
is a list of the locations of the graves of some of these 70 victims:

      A. In Dimaci, on the west side of the paved road, alongside a 
small creek flowing toward Begac on the sloping field below the house of 
Stipe Dimaca.  This grave contained the badly burned bodies of two males 
and one female.

      B. In Mlinari, on the west side of the paved road from Dimaci to 
Buzuci, 10 meters behind the house of Ivitsa Mlinar.  This grave 
contained six bodies, at least two of which were males.

     C. About 400 meters west of Mlinari towards Groarac, a grave 
contained 4 male bodies with multiple bullet wounds.  In the same 
immediate area, about 10 meters from the well near the house of Marko 
Busuk, three males were buried.  One had been severely tortured, and his 
eyes gouged out.  The other two were invalids who had been shot.

     D. On the east side of the paved road from Dimaci to Buzuci, 
approximately 150 meters northwest of the site described above in C, was 
the grave of a woman.

      E. On the west bank of the Stare Nitsa, about 450 meters 
downstream from the grave described in F, uphill from an old water mill, 
and among some young "breza" trees, an unidentified man.

      F. The grave of Ilija Atlija, about 400 meters southwest of the 
grave site described above in E, on the north side of the Stare Nitsa 
stream, 5 meters to the right of the front of the house of Ilija Atlija.

      G. The grave of a man who died from knife wounds, located across 
the road from a small church that had burned, 300 meters from where the 
stream joins the road, and behind the house of Jozo Jakara.

     H. The site of 2 graves, 200 meters from the road south of Lisina 
near the house of Sreco Ivandic.  One grave held the remains of four 
males and one female; the other contained the bodies of three males and 
one female.  The two graves were about 70 meters apart.

     I. Graves of two 16-year-old males, located on the Zunica Ravana 
road northwest of Buzuci, near the church, along a small stream flowing 
30 meters from the house of Kata Zunica.  One boy was buried on the 
south side of the stream; the other buried on its north side.  Their 
bodies bore identification stating they were from Rizvanovici.  
(Department of State)

6 Aug 92:  A Muslim from Sanski Most witnessed the arrival at Manjaca 
camp of a convoy carrying 1,300 prisoners from Omarska, and the murder 
of 15-20 of these men during the lunch hour.  Camp guards beat the men 
to death with wooden boards, bats, and thick electrical cables.  Three 
of the victims were stabbed repeatedly and their throats were cut.  The 
witness identified Jakupovic and Dedo Crnalnic as two of the casualties.  
(Department of State)

Jul-Aug 92:   A 26-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Donja Puharska, a suburb 
of Prijedor, Bosnia, was imprisoned in Omarska camp on July 13, 1992, 
and transferred to Manjaca camp on August 6, where he remained until 
December 19.

On July 13, all of Muslim men remaining in Donja Puharska were arrested 
and taken to the Omarska camp.  On July 21, the witness was transferred 
to a building called the "White House," where he was kept for 7 days.  A 
Serbian irregular came into the White House on July 26 and declared that 
he had come from the front, where nine Serbian soldiers had been killed.  
The irregular stated that three Muslim men would be killed for each of 
the Serbian soldiers and that he would return at midnight to kill them.

He returned after midnight with a soldier and a truck.  The irregular 
and the soldier entered the room where the 50-60 men were held, grabbed 
one prisoner, and took him outside.  The prisoners heard the sounds of 
beating and screams for help.  The two men returned and grabbed another 
prisoner and the same thing happened.  The irregular and the soldier 
came back and took one man each time until they had taken 27 prisoners.  
At 5 am, they came and asked for four volunteers to load the dead bodies 
on the truck.

On July 27, the witness was called out by two soldiers and taken for 
interrogation to an upstairs room in the same building, where five men 
beat him with objects that included a policeman's stick, a whip, a 
rubber stick, a square metal stick, and a metal ball on a chain.  The 
man with the metal stick kept hitting the witness on the legs, and after 
a while, his legs grew numb and he felt no pain in them.

Omarska camp contained a building called the "Red House," where victims 
were killed with knives.  The witness saw dead bodies outside the Red 
House each day, some missing arms or legs, and said the stench was 
unbearable.

On August 6, some of the prisoners were transferred by bus to a camp in 
Manjaca.  Upon arrival, the witness saw guards kill a man named Dzusin.  
The guards had called him from the bus, took him about 10 meters away, 
made him kneel, and cut his throat.  (Department of State)

Jul 92:  A 45-year-old Muslim witnessed, from his house in Visegrad, the 
systematic butchering of about 450 Muslims on a bridge over the Drina 
River.

On July 11, 1992, a Volkswagen Passat drove backwards onto the "stone 
bridge" over the Drina and stopped in the middle.  The blue-gray car, 
which had come from the direction of the city center, was crammed with 
six Muslims and at least one armed Serb.  Another group of Chetniks was 
already waiting for them on the bridge.

The man in charge of this group was a well-known Serb from Arandjelovac 
or Kraljevo, Serbia.  He announced over a megaphone to "Muslims hiding 
in the surrounding woods" that they would have a "bloody bajram 
(holiday), Balkan style."  He also announced that "every Serb who 
protects a Muslim will be killed immediately," and that for every Serb 
killed by a Muslim, a thousand Muslims would be sacrificed.

The group then cut off the heads of the six prisoners, a process that 
took about three minutes.  The time was about 4:15 pm.  They threw the 
bodies into the Drina River.  About a half hour later, a van arrived 
with another eight Muslims.  They were killed in the same manner.  Women 
and children were included in a third group that was brought to the 
bridge about 7 pm.  The killing went on through much of the night.

The massacre continued the following day.  Victims included a dentist 
named Dervis, Alia Selac, and Alia's father.  At least 20 Chetniks 
participated in the slaughter on the second day.  The witness estimates 
at least 450 people were killed on the bridge over 3 or 4 days.   
(Department of State)

Jul 92 :  A 68-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Lakat, Bosnia, witnessed the 
killing of 19 elderly Bosnian Muslims in Borci and on Borasnica 
mountain, near Konjic, by Bosnian Serb forces on July 9-10, 1992.

On June 28, the Bosnian Muslim residents of Lakat fled their village.  
Only 20 elderly Bosnian Muslim men and women residents chose to remain.  
On the morning of July 8, two Bosnian Serbs, also from Lakat, announced 
that remaining Bosnian Muslims would be evacuated by bus to Buscak where 
they would be exchanged.  That evening, they were put on a military 
truck destined for Pridvorci.

Two armed guards were stationed in the back of the truck with the 
prisoners.  After going through Pridvorci, the truck continued north for 
another 10 kilometers to Luka where they stopped.  The prisoners were 
transferred to a 2 ton truck that took them to Borci where the prisoners 
were put in the basement of a building.  There had been three other 
Bosnian Muslim prisoners inside the basement.

The next morning, July 9, the door to the basement was opened and the 
prisoners were ordered to come out in pairs.  After the first 2 
prisoners walked out, they were met by 10 guards who beat them and 
questioned them about the whereabouts of their sons.  The second pair of 
prisoners, including Osman Demic, was then called.  During the 
questioning, his right ear was cut off, and the other prisoner was 
beaten unconscious.

Then the third pair was called out.  Halil Golos was one of these men.  
During the questioning, one of his ears was cut off.  From the next 
pair, Salko Demic was beaten to death.  From the following pair, Ahmed 
Hrnicic was also beaten to death.  After all the prisoners had been 
questioned, those who were still alive were taken back to the basement.  
That same night, four guards returned to the basement and removed Ibro 
Kajan, his wife Hava Kajan, and Osman Demic.  Once outside, the three 
were lined up and executed.

On the morning of July 10, the prisoners were removed from the basement 
and ordered to load the bodies of Salko Demic, Ahmed Hrnicic, Osman 
Demic, Ibro Kajan, and Hava Kajan onto the back of a waiting truck.  The 
guards ordered all to lie down in the back of the truck.  The guards 
killed 80-year-old Urija Golos because she did not lie down quickly 
enough.

The two vehicles then traveled about 15 kilometers to Borasnica Mountain 
(Borasnica Planina) in Konjic County (Konjic Obcine), where they stopped 
on the road.  The prisoners were ordered to throw all the bodies down 
from the vehicle, and then to get out and carry the bodies off the road.  
When all the bodies and prisoners were about 25 meters from the road, 
the guards opened fire on the prisoners, killing all except the witness, 
who they presumed was also dead.  (Department of State)

Jun-Aug 92:   A 38-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Gacko, Bosnia, was 
interned by Bosnian Serb forces at Bileca camp until August 18, 1992.

On June 1, Bosnian Serb forces detained about 110 Bosnian Muslim and 
Croatian males in Gacko, Bosnia, until June 5, when they were 
transferred to the processing center located in the basement of the 
Samacki Hotel on the southeast end of Gacko.

On June 18, after Bosnian Serb forces had announced that the Bosnian 
Muslim and Croatian residents could leave the town, a convoy with 
approximately 100 men, women, and children left Gacko and headed toward 
neighboring Montenegro.  Approximately 7 kilometers south of Gacko, near 
the Kosuta Motel in Zborna Gomila, the convoy was intercepted by Serbian 
irregulars from the White Eagles paramilitary organization.  All able-
bodied males were segregated from the rest of the convoy and ordered to 
lie down on the road.  They were searched individually for valuables.  
The women and children were then loaded on several military trucks and 
returned to Gacko. The men were placed on two military trucks and taken 
to the Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) building in Gacko.  After 
the prisoners were interrogated and tortured by two inspectors, they 
were transferred to the basement of Samacki Hotel.

The witness identified the following prisoners who were killed at the 
processing center in the Samaki Hotel from June 18 to July 1:  Osman 
Omanovic, about 60, from Domanovic; Mirsad Dzeko, about 35, from Gacko; 
Arif Jaganjac, about 60, from Gacko; Miralem Voloder, about 32, from 
Gacko; Edin Sahovic, about 37, from Gacko; Latif Halilovic, about 42, 
worked in Gacko; Aziz Fazlagic, about 41, from Gacko.

On July 1, about 140 detainees were loaded onto 4 military trucks.  
While they were boarding the trucks, 55-year-old Aziz Hasanbegovic, who 
was unable to get on the truck because of his weight, was shot and 
killed.  Two other prisoners were also killed: 33-year-old Senad Memic 
from Gacko, whose throat was slashed; and 17-year-old Enver Redzovic, 
from Gacko, who was stabbed in the stomach.  Their bodies were loaded 
onto the trucks.

The convoy with the prisoners arrived in Bileca about 2 hours later.  
Prisoners were forced to walk between two rows of guards who beat them 
as they passed.  Prisoners were placed in one of the basements where 
another group of approximately 200 prisoners were already confined.  
Prisoners were not fed or allowed to go to the restrooms for the next 3 
days.  They were indiscriminately beaten every day with large wooden and 
metal sticks by groups of some 10 guards until the guards tired and 
could no longer beat them.

The following prisoners were beaten to death between July 2-4:  Sabit 
Saric, about 52, from Gacko; Sevko Catovic, about 28, from Gacko; Adem 
Ramic, about 70, from Gacko; Zecer Krvavac, about 80, from Gacko.

On August 10, the prisoners were taken upstairs for an interview 
conducted by Radivoje Gutic, from the Bosnian Serbian News Agency (SRNA) 
and Fnu Vulacic, from Belgrade Television, in the presence of Red Cross 
officials.  Days prior to this interview, the prisoners were allowed for 
the first time to take a shower and shave.  After the interview was 
over, the prisoners were taken to the interrogation and torture room and 
were tortured for telling the truth about the conditions and treatment 
received at the camp.  These tortures continued until August 18, when 
378 prisoners from the camp were exchanged in Stolac, Bosnia.  
(Department of State)

May-Aug 92:   A 35-year-old Muslim from Prijedor was held prisoner by 
Bosnian Serbs from May 30 until August 13, 1992, nearly all of that time 
at Omarska camp.

Upon his arrival at Omarska on May 30, he and his fellow prisoners were 
immediately ordered to stand with their hands against a wall while they 
were beaten with sticks and other objects.  At the beginning of his 
captivity, the witness regularly saw people beaten badly, often until 
they died, near the entrance of the camp's administration building.

The worst beatings occurred after Serbs from the area were killed in 
combat.  Following the death of six local Chetniks, for example, guards 
put a mixture of oil and water on the ground to trip up prisoners. Those 
who fell were beaten badly.

One evening, about halfway through his stay at Omarska, the witness saw 
a prisoner in the kitchen standing on a chair and complaining about 
Chetniks.  A Serb soldier, after warning him to sit down, shot into the 
crowd, killing the man and wounding four other prisoners.  The witness 
said he could identify the guard who had done the shooting.

During his imprisonment, the witness saw at least 10-15 prisoners beaten 
to death between the interrogation area of the second floor of the 
administration building and the building's entrance.  One of the 
victims, Rizah Hadzalic, was a personal acquaintance.  Every night 
people were taken out of their bunk facilities:  5, 10, sometimes 15.  
Some came back badly beaten; many never came back.  (Department of 
State)

May-Jul 92:   A 30-year-old Muslim was evicted from his family home in 
Kozarac by Serb militia on May 26, 1992.

On the way from Kozarac to imprisonment at Trnopolje, a group of Serbs 
threatened to kill him, his father, his brother, and three neighbors.  
The Serbs lined them against a building wall and cocked their rifles, 
but were stopped by an anonymous Serb commander.  Instead of being shot, 
they were beaten--in the case of the witness, until his ribs were 
broken.  Later along the route, the witness tried to help an elderly 
woman who could no longer walk.  A Serb soldier ordered him to let her 
go, and then shot the woman to death.

Also along the route, inside Kozarac, the witness saw armed Serbs, whom 
he knew, gun down the following five men:  Ismet Karabasic, Sejdo 
Karabasic, Ekrem Karabasic (all brothers), Ekrim Basic, and Edin Basic.

The witness was held inside a school in Trnopolje from where he 
regularly observed, through a window, guards taking women from a movie 
theater.  During both the day and the evening, on at least 20 different 
occasions, he saw the women taken either to the courtyard or to the 
playing field where they were raped.  The men were usually drunk.  He 
said that there were many witnesses who could see what was happening.  
The women usually were returned afterward to the movie house.  
(Department of State)

Jun 92:  A 44-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Vlasenica, Bosnia, who was 
captured by Serbian forces on June 24, 1992, in Vlasenica, was sent to a 
prison camp in the Susica River valley where he witnessed numerous 
atrocities committed by local Bosnian Serb troops.  The witness knew 
several key personalities at the camp responsible for atrocities.  He 
was later transferred to a prison in Batkovic on June 30, where he 
remained until February 20, 1993.

On April 17, 1992, the first Serbian troops entered the village of 
Vlasenica.  The troops that initially occupied the village were from 
Novi Sad, Serbia, and were led by an unidentified lieutenant colonel who 
held a megaphone and demanded that all Muslim residents surrender their 
weapons, and insisted that no harm would come to them.

The troops from Novi Sad left on May 2, when Bosnian Serb troops from 
Sekovici, Bosnia, took over the town.  Local Serbian troops from 
Vlasenica also assisted the other troops with the occupation of their 
village.  Over the course of 5 weeks, the troops captured residents of 
Vlasenica at random, took them to the police station for beatings, and 
then released them.

On June 24, local Serbian troops evacuated about 50 Muslim families who 
lived on a street in Vlasenica called Ulica Zarka Vukovica.  After the 
evacuation, five houses were set ablaze and the men, women, and children 
were forced to walk to a prison camp in the Susica River valley, located 
a few hundred meters from the town's main street.  The camp was located 
on the west side of the highway leading to Han Pijesak.  Soon after the 
residents from Vlasenica arrived on June 24, Durmo Handzic and Asim 
Zildzic, who had been taken to the camp earlier, died from injuries 
sustained from beatings suffered on June 22.

In the early morning hours of June 26, a reign of terror began at the 
Susica camp.  At 1 am, two Serbian guards entered the warehouse and 
forced four men, including Muharam Kolarevic and Rasid Ferhatbegovic, 
outside.  Immediately thereafter, four gun shots were heard outside the 
warehouse accompanied by screaming from the four men.  At 1:30 am, two 
Serbian brothers from Vlasenica went into the warehouse and took three 
women away and raped them.  Soon after daybreak, two brothers were 
selected to dispose of the four corpses.  The men buried the victims in 
a grave near the camp.

Food was virtually non-existent at Susica camp.  Each person was given 
only one slice of bread for a 24-hour period.  As the summer progressed, 
soup was occasionally given in addition to bread.  Prisoners commonly 
lost consciousness from malnutrition.  No exception was made for women 
or children.  The witness's 65-year-old uncle died of starvation.  
Prisoners who had to use the bathroom were forced to run to a toilet 
outside; another prisoner was given a stick and forced to beat the 
individuals while they were defecating or urinating.

On June 30, several prisoners were moved from the Susica camp to one in 
Batkovic, located approximately 10 kilometers north of Bijeljina, 
Bosnia.  As the men from Susica got off the bus, they were beaten.  From 
the very first day, everyone was subjected to harsh beatings.  Many of 
the guards at Batkovic were brutal men, but the witness identified one 
of the worst, the man who killed Zulfo Hadziomerovic on July 4 by 
beating him to death.  This guard used the stock of his machine gun to 
beat the prisoner about 10 times on that day.   (Department of State)

May-Jul 92:   A 31-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor, Bosnia, was a 
prisoner at Keraterm camp from May 31 to August 5, 1992.

On May 31, about 300 Muslim men were arrested in a new section of 
Prijedor located along the road to Bosanski Novi.  Five buses took them 
at first to Omarska camp, then to Keraterm camp.

The harassment and beatings of prisoners began on June 2.  Each night, 
prisoners were taken out, beaten, and killed.  Guards would come into 
the rooms, fire their rifles at the ceiling, and force some prisoners to 
swallow the empty shells of 7.62mm ammunition.  During the day, the 
guards took the prisoners outside and made them walk on all fours and 
bark like dogs.  The prisoners had to take off their clothes and sit on 
bottles.  A particular guard, whom the witness identified, supervised 
these "games," and laughed.

On July 26, the witness saw buses loaded with people drive through the 
gate.  The people were told to get off the buses and were separated into 
two groups.  Each group had to go to a grass-covered area at the end of 
the building and form a circle.  Camp guards were reinforced by a 
busload of Chetniks who beat the men with bats wrapped in barbed wire 
and with broken bottles.

This continued for the rest of the night.  Then the metal door to Room 
Three was closed and the soldiers fired inside the room.  The prisoners 
panicked, pressed against the locked door, opened it, and ran outside, 
where they were machine-gunned.  The massacre continued until 5 am the 
next day.

At 11 am on July 27, a truck came for the bodies of both the dead and 
those that were still living.  Seventy volunteers were taken to load the 
massacred people on the truck.  There were 170 dead and 47 still alive.  
The dead were loaded first; the injured were loaded on top of them.

At 4:30 am on July 28, the guards fired again into Room Three and killed 
27 men.  Banja Luka television reported that evening that there had been 
an escape attempt at Keraterm and that 27 prisoners were shot dead while 
trying to escape.  On August 5, Keraterm was closed and the witness was 
returned to Prijedor where he remained until January 12, 1993.  
(Department of State)

May-Aug 92:   A 34-year-old Bosnian Muslim told of his experiences at 
the Keraterm and Omarska camps from late May to August 1992.

On May 26, Bosnian Serb soldiers arrested the witness on the road to 
Prijedor.  They brought him to Keraterm for 3 days, then to Omarska.  
Upon his arrival at Omarska camp, he saw the beating death of 38-year-
old Ahiz Dedic, a Muslim ex-policeman, by two men from a Bosnian Serb 
special unit.  After his own torture the next day--he was beaten until 
he fainted--the witness watched five Chetniks stab Ikrem Alic to death.

The witness was moved to the "electricians' house" from where, about a 
month later, he watched as a man with his hands against the wall of 
another nearby building was beaten by camp guards until he almost fell.  
One of the guards then took a running jump from several meters, pouncing 
on the man's back and knocking him down.  He then turned the victim 
over, cut his ears off, and then cut his throat.  Another guard turned 
and killed the man with his revolver.

The witness saw about 30 men killed during his stay at Omarska.  Among 
the victims whose names he knew were:  Muharem Kahrimanovic, 
Emir Karabasic, Jasmin Hrnic, Avdo Mujkanovic, Islam Bahonjic, and 
Imeoca Grozdanic.

The most sadistic killings were of Hrnic and Karabasic.  In the course 
of a horrible beating, they were forced to bite off each other's sexual 
organs.  Before the final death blows, they were also forced to drink 
motor oil and chew on dead pigeons.

At the end of August or beginning of September, the witness was taken to 
Manjaca camp, where he spent half a month.  During the trip, he 
witnessed the beating deaths of Nezir Krak and Dedo Crnic; he identified 
their killer.  Outside Banja Luka, Serb children were encouraged to 
board the bus and beat the prisoners.  (Department of State)

May-Jul 92:   A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the ethnic 
cleansing of Kozarac and the Prijedor area from May 26 until his capture 
3 days later.  From his place of hiding in the woods, he witnessed the 
killing of Hasan and Zejna Alic; she was shot in the breast, her husband 
in the head.  Two days later, the witness saw the same killer stab a 
young man, force him to walk away, and then shoot him.

The witness and his friends were captured by Chetniks in the nearby 
woods on or about May 29.  One of the young Serbs who caught him was a 
school friend who personally took charge of the witness and his brother, 
and arranged for them to change into civilian clothes taken from a 
nearby house.  His Serb friend warned the two brothers not to admit to 
Serb prison authorities that they had been "fighters."

The witness was taken to Keraterm for the first night, then to Omarska.  
Upon arrival, he witnessed the killing of a detainee by a former taxi 
driver whom he identified.  On June 1, he watched as a member of the 
"taxi driver's band" killed a Muslim named Jasmin Velic with a pickax.  
He also witnessed the slow death of Hasic Eno, who had been stabbed in 
the back and took 5 days to die.

During the witness' second month at Omarska, Azur Jakupovic arrived as a 
prisoner.  With a ring in his nose (the kind used for pigs) and attached 
to a chain, Jakupovic was dragged into camp on his hands and knees by a 
young Serb soldier.  The victim was naked from the waist up, which 
revealed a bloody Serb cross carved in his back.  The guards announced 
to Muslim onlookers that this was the way Serbia's enemies would look.  
Jakupovic was then tossed onto a burning stack of truck tires, where he 
died.

The witness said that such killings were often observed by three senior 
camp officials, from the second floor of the administration building.  
He identified these camp officials.  (Department of State)

May-Jun 92:  A 26-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Divic, Bosnia, witnessed 
the ethnic cleansing of his village and atrocities in a Celopek 
detention facility, where he was detained from May 29 through June 29, 
1992.

On May 29, all 174 male citizens of Divic were taken by bus to a movie 
theater that was part of a cultural center being used as a prison in the 
village of Celopek, located 7 kilometers north of Zvornik.

On June 7, two Serbian soldiers from Kraljevo murdered Suljeman Kapidzic 
and Ramo Alihodzic as an example to all prisoners of what would happen 
if they didn't pay the guards 2,000 German marks immediately.  The men 
collected amongst themselves enough German marks to pay the price.

On June 10, a 35-year-old Serbian soldier took seven pairs of fathers 
and sons from the group and forced them to walk onto the stage of the 
theater and disrobe.  He forced the seven pairs to perform fellatio on 
one another while the other men were required to watch.  While this was 
happening on the stage, the same soldier took Sakib Kapidzic and Zaim 
Pezerovic from the audience and ordered the men under his command to 
beat them until they were unconscious, and then ordered his men to stab 
their victims to death.

The soldier then took a semi-automatic rifle and shot randomly at the 
men on the stage and into the audience.  He also approached a 16-year-
old boy, Damir Bikic, and asked him to point out his father in the 
audience.  He asked the father if he had any other male offspring.  When 
the father replied that he did not, the soldier put a rifle in the boy's 
mouth and killed him.  In this sequence of events, this particular 
soldier killed 10 men.  (Department of State)

May-Jun 92:  A 31-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the JNA attack in 
late May 1992, the subsequent ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population 
of Sanski Most, Bosnia, and the destruction of their property.  The 
witness spent 50 days as a prisoner in Sanski Most and then was 
imprisoned at the detention camp in Manjaca until mid-December 1992.

Between May 23 and 24, the JNA and its military police arrested the 
Muslim officials in the city government and members of the Muslim 
intelligentsia.  On May 25 and 26, the JNA units attacked Muslims in 
Sanski Most by throwing grenades in their homes in the Muslim section, 
Mahala, and by firing at the houses with automatic weapons.  This lasted 
1 day, during which 11 persons were shot to death in a house on Muhici 
Street that belonged to a man named Hilmija.  Of these, three were 
women, one of whom was pregnant, and five were young boys.

The men were taken to the local school; women and children were 
transported to Velika Kladusa.  After the "cleansing," the Serbs 
continued to throw grenades into the houses, then burned them.  The 
ruins were leveled with bulldozers.  Local Serb platoon leaders, whom 
the witness identified, used their soldiers to carry out the 
destruction.

The men from the Muslim section of Sanski Most were held prisoner in the 
local school for 50 days, where there were 1,200 men and no toilet 
facilities.  The men were beaten continuously and forced to beat each 
other.  Frequently, Serbian irregulars armed with knives came to the 
school and demanded to kill the prisoners, but police guards would not 
let them in.  (Department of State)

19 May 92:  A 60-year-old Bosnian Muslim described the massacre of 
Muslim prisoners at a hunting lodge.

Bosnian Serbs in Metaljka detained the witness and drove him to the 
Mostina detention facility, a hunting lodge in the woods between 
Metaljka and Cajnice.  There were 50 Muslim men held inside the lodge 
and another 6 held  in a shipping container to which the witness was 
brought.

A Serb from the village of Stakorina, whom he identified, entered the 
lodge at about 5 pm and opened fire on the prisoners.  The witness heard 
the firing last for about 10 minutes, then heard the man exit the lodge 
and continue shooting into the air until someone told him to calm down.  
He responded, "Take me down to Cajnice so I can kill them all."

He did not come to the shipping container where the witness was 
detained.  (Department of State)

9 May 92:  A Bosnian Muslim from Brcko witnessed the slaying of 
prisoners by Serbian guards at Luka camp on or about May 9, 1992.

Immediately upon his arrival at Luka, the witness saw a Chetnik beat and 
kill two men from Zvornik.  The incident happened at the door of the 
camp's warehouse, where the "in-processing" was taking place.  The 
witness had been standing about 15 meters from the shooting.

The next day, the same man who had shot the men from Zvornik drove into 
camp with a woman named Ahmetovic, the sister of a Muslim ex-policeman 
whose whereabouts he was demanding to know.  The Chetnik pulled the 
woman from the car and beat her with a truncheon, asking again where her 
brother was hiding.  After about 10 minutes, he took a shovel and hit 
her twice in the head, killing her.

During the same day, the witness also saw another Serb soldier beat and 
kill a 35-year-old Muslim man named Sead Cerimagic.  The witness watched 
a total of five men get the same treatment from this soldier within an 
hour.  (Department of State)

May 92:  A 65-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Grapska, Bosnia, witnessed 
Serb irregular forces enter Sjenina and Grapska in May 1992, during 
which time residents were ordered to report to the hospital basement.  
Fearing internment, residents fled to the woods.  Later, as they 
returned to their homes, they were rounded up by the irregular forces.

The soldiers ordered about 45 of them to dig a fresh grave in a cemetery 
near the mosque.  Some of the victims attempted to resist, but were shot 
on the spot.  Those who dug the grave were subsequently killed with 
automatic weapons and pushed into the grave.  After the massacre, the 
grave was filled in and leveled with earthmoving equipment.

Residents were told they would be taken to Doboj on buses, but were 
force-marched instead.  Individuals periodically were pulled out of the 
march column, taken a short distance away, and shot.  (Department of 
State)

Apr-May 92:   A 64-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the April 8, 1992, 
ethnic cleansing of Zvornik by Serbian irregular forces units, which was 
organized by the Zvornik chief of police.

The Chetniks burned about 200 houses.  As people were forced out of 
their houses, they were directed to stay in a group in front of a large 
house.  Most of the Chetniks wore scarves or ski masks to hide their 
faces.  Two unidentified Muslim men were taken behind a house and shot.  
Two other Muslim men, Hammed Cirak and Salikh Dagdagan, were killed in 
their homes, after which the corpses were brought out and burned.  In 
all, about 76 people were killed, mostly in their basements.  Those who 
were gathered together were told that younger males must either join the 
Serbian forces, leave, or be shot.  Elderly men, women, and children 
were allowed to stay.

After a few days, the elderly men from the Kula area were allowed to 
return to their houses.  In mid-April, Serbian forces began using a 
bulldozer to dig large pits in the Muslim cemeteries southwest of 
Zvornik proper.  The witness saw buses and trucks dumping an 
undetermined number of bodies into these pits up to three times a day.  
One of the cemeteries was called Kazambase.  He often saw trucks loaded 
with bodies in Maly Zvornik, in the area of the stone quarry near the 
Drina Hotel.

In May, Chetnik forces moved into Djulci.  They shot 10 residents on 
sight as they moved into town, as well as another 50 people who had been 
hiding in a garage.  (Department of State)

Torture of Prisoners

Dec 92:  A 24-year-old Bosnian of mixed Croatian Muslim background, from 
Banja Luka, reported that he had been hiding in his apartment for 8 
months when he decided on December 25, 1992, to risk going outside.  The 
witness took some comfort from the Serb mayor of Banja Luka's Christmas 
greeting to all Croats.

The witness was picked up almost immediately during a roundup of 
military age men by Serb military police on a bridge in the city 
district of Mejdan.  Two of the bearded Chetniks started beating and 
verbally abusing him after asking him why he was not fighting.

The witness was taken to a bus loaded with other prisoners.  As 
prisoners were brought on to the bus, each was beaten with a truncheon.  
All the prisoners had their valuables taken from them.  There were four 
buses carrying a total of about 200 prisoners.  The families who 
gathered around the buses were told their men would be back in an hour.

The buses stopped at a police station and at a military camp on the way 
to Manjaca.  At both places, the men were beaten and interrogated.  The 
witness identified several guards who beat prisoners regularly at 
Manjaca camp, from which he was released the next month.  (Department of 
State)

Jun-Jul 92 :  A 45-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Sanski Most witnessed 
the arrival at Manjaca camp of several convoys:

On June 17, a group of 40-45 persons from Sanski Most arrived and were 
all beaten once they dismounted the trucks that had transported them.

On June 28, a group of 20-25 prisoners arrived, were beaten, and were 
immediately put in isolation.

On July 7, a group of about 550 persons was brought to Manjaca camp in 
two trailer trucks and a 3-ton truck.  About 24 were already dead when 
the trucks were unloaded.

The witness singled out the Manjaca "policemen" as the most cruel of the 
guard contingents.  The witness was beaten daily and kept in solitary 
confinement.  He recalls being beaten approximately 20 times.  One of 
his beatings lasted from 4 pm until 9:30 pm. The witness identified many 
of the sadistic guards, including one nicknamed "Kostolomac" (or bone 
breaker).  (Department of State)

Abuse of Civilians In Detention Centers

26 Mar 93:   According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
during a visit on March 31 to Bosnian Serb-controlled Batkovic camp, 
delegates of the ICRC were informed that 17 detainees might have lost 
their lives on March 26 when the vehicle transporting them for work at 
the front was ambushed.  Three surviving detainees were able to speak in 
private with the ICRC delegates.

The ICRC has observed in the past that detainees were being forced to 
work at the front line.  The ICRC noted that to send detainees into a 
combat zone where they might come under fire is a violation of the 
provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.  The ICRC also 
reminded the parties to the conflict that they are responsible at all 
times for the detainees' safety, and that it is prohibited to compel 
detainees to do work of a military nature or destined to serve a 
military purpose.  (International Committee of the Red Cross)

May-Jun 92:  A 26-year-old Muslim, along with family members, was 
evicted from her family home in Kozarac by Serb militia on May 25, 1992.

After having been held 3 nights in a school in Trnopolje, she was moved 
to a local private Muslim home.  In June, she was able to visit the 
school each day to bring food to her husband and brother.  During these 
visits, she regularly saw Serbs who had been neighbors roaming the camp 
(the school and its grounds) and beating prisoners.  The first person on 
a list of Serbs she identified as participants in those beatings was 
once a classmate of hers.

On her last night in Trnopolje, about June 25, she and other women and 
children were moved to the movie theater.  There were about 500 to 600 
women and children inside.  At about 10 pm, two men arrived and picked 
out three women.  There were about 10 other Serb men waiting for them 
outside.  At about 6 or 7 am, one of three women returned to the movie 
theater, holding the wall with one hand and her stomach with the other, 
bent over, with a swollen face and black and blue marks, and crying.  
The other two women were never seen again.  (Department of State)

Impeding Delivery of Food And Medical Supplies to the Civilian 
Population

11 Jun 93:   Bosnian Croat forces set up roadblocks and mines on a 
mountain road going through Nova Bila, stalling a humanitarian aid 
convoy that was moving east from central Bosnia.  According to an 
UNPROFOR spokesperson, " The ill-fated convoy then met with further 
resistance when 24 of the trucks were stopped at Nova Bila and hit by 
mortars."  (Reuters)

1 Jun 93:  Bosnian Serb forces turned back UNHCR humanitarian aid 
convoys for the eastern Bosnian enclaves of Gorazde and Srebrenica.  The 
Srebrenica convoy was stopped at the border crossing at Zvornik without 
explanation; the Gorazde convoy was stopped by local Bosnian Serb 
officials in Sekovici who told them "to get the hell out."

Bosnian Serb forces surrounding Srebrenica continued to prevent access 
by UN specialists to the town's water purification system.  The regular 
water supply was contaminated and could not be restored without such 
access, and springs were running dry.  (Department of State)

May-Jun 93:   Renegade forces of Bosnian Croat and Muslim armies have 
planted mines along roads used primarily for humanitarian aid convoys 
and journalists.  (The Washington Times)

28 May 93:   Bosnian Muslim gunmen fired on a humanitarian aid convoy of 
Russian vehicles and drivers on the road between Pale and Sarajevo.  
(Department of State)

24 May 93:  Bosnian Croat gunmen prevented a UN humanitarian aid convoy 
from delivering food to the Muslim village of Kruscica.  The convoy was 
forced to return to Vitez, where it had distributed food to Croats 
earlier in the day.  (Reuters)

20 May 93:  Bosnian Muslim forces barred an UNPROFOR convoy access to 
the Croatian village of Kostajnica, in the Konjic district.  The convoy 
was required to return to Jablanica.  (Department of State)

17 May 93:  Bosnian Serb forces fired on Muslims attempting to collect 
air-dropped humanitarian aid supplies inside a UN-declared safe area in 
eastern Bosnia.  According to a spokesperson for UNPROFOR:

In Srebrenica, air-dropped relief bundles have been landing near the 
line of confrontation and Serb forces have fired upon some residents as 
they tried to retrieve them.  (Reuters)

13 May 93:  Bosnian Croat forces barred the UNHCR from delivering food 
and other supplies to about 1,475 Muslim civilians detained at Rodic 
military camp, near the Mostar heliodrome.  The Bosnian Croats on May 9, 
1993, had forcibly transported more than 1,000 Muslim women and children 
out of Mostar.

Conditions at the camp were extremely uncomfortable but not life-
threatening.  While isolated cases of abuse appear to have occurred 
during detention, most detainees volunteered that they were being 
treated well by their jailers, even describing them as kindly and 
concerned for the detainees' welfare.  In general, the main difficulties 
facing the detainees were extreme overcrowding, insufficient food, and 
inadequate hygiene.  (Department of State, The New York Times, Los 
Angeles Times)

12 May 93:  An UNPROFOR helicopter was struck by a single small arms 
round from an unknown location following the evacuation of some 35 
wounded from Zepa, forcing it to make an emergency landing about 7 
kilometers east of Trodor.  (Department of State)

11 May 93 :  A Spanish UNPROFOR lieutenant was seriously wounded in the 
neck, arms, and leg while trying to move blood and medical supplies into 
Mostar during fighting between Bosnian Croatians and Muslims.  (Reuters)

10 May 93:  Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) assaulted a UNHCR humanitarian 
assistance convoy in Prozor.  HVO soldiers pulled the Bosnian drivers 
from their trucks and beat them.  Four drivers were injured and six 
vehicles were damaged extensively.  (Department of State)

27 Apr 93:  Unidentified forces wounded a British aid worker and a 
Bosnian driver when they shelled a humanitarian assistance convoy 3 
kilometers north of Visoko on the road to Zenica.  The shelling also 
damaged another truck in the convoy, which was returning empty from 
Tuzla.  (Paris AFP)

30 Apr 93:  Bosnian Serb forces continued to prohibit doctors from 
entering Srebrenica, and specifically turned back a team of physicians 
from Medecins Sans Frontieres, which had attempted to accompany a UNHCR 
convoy.  The medical situation in Srebrenica deteriorated; scabies was 
rampant, particularly among children.  (Department of State)

19 Apr 93:  A UNHCR humanitarian assistance convoy was stoned while 
traveling through Bosnian Serb-held territory on the way to Srebrenica.  
Despite protective steel grills over the windshields, several truck 
windshields were broken and two drivers were injured. UNHCR reported 
that blocks weighing 15-20 pounds were thrown at the trucks.

In recent instances, Bosnian Serb police have stood by and watched as 
youths pelted the UNHCR trucks from elevated embankments as they drove 
past.  UN convoys going to Tuzla also encountered instances of stoning.  
(Department of State)

Deliberate Attacks On Non-Combatants

8 Jun 93:  Bosnian Muslim militiamen fired machine guns at Bosnian Croat 
civilians as they ran from their homes in Guca Gora, a village northeast 
of Travnik, according to UN peace-keeping officials.  UN troops saw 
Muslims shooting civilians as they fought from house to house, and 
confirmed that hundreds of Croat civilians had died as a result of the 
Muslim action.  A UN spokesperson said:

There is strong evidence of atrocities.  For example, a door forced, 
apparently kicked open, and the civilian occupant found dead in the 
garden, shot in the head.  (Department of State, The Washington Post, 
The New York Times, Reuters)

4 Jun 93 :  A mortar attacked 1 of 4 buses carrying 95 Muslim and 
Croatian men, women, and children to Tuzla, at a Croatian forces 
checkpoint south of Vitez, in an area where Muslims and Croatians were 
fighting each other.  The mortar killed two of the passengers and 
injured an Austrian humanitarian aid worker, Jasmin Arzberger. (Reuters)

2 Jun 93:  An unidentified sniper killed Dominique Lonneux, a Belgian 
journalist working for a Mexican television service, while he was 
traveling with a UN humanitarian aid convoy that was traveling near 
Dreznica, outside Mostar.  The car in which Lonneux was traveling was 
clearly marked "TV."  (Paris AFP)

1 Jun 93 :  Bosnian Serb mortar crews shelled a soccer game in the 
Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja where about 200 Bosnians, celebrating a 
Muslim holiday, were watching the game.  The attack killed at least 11 
people and wounded at least 80, about 25 of whom received life-
threatening injuries.

Bosnian Serbs shelled a 12-truck humanitarian aid convoy carrying food 
and heading for Maglaj, killing five--including two Danish drivers--and 
wounding seven, some seriously.  According to an UNPROFOR statement:

Three things are very clear.  This has been a deliberate attack on a 
UNHCR convoy.  The attack was from the direction of Serbian-held 
territory, and tank rounds were used.

Snipers seriously wounded two French soldiers who were guarding Sarajevo 
airport; one sustained serious head injuries.  (Department of State, The 
Washington Post, The New York Times, Paris AFP, Los Angeles Times, The 
Washington Times)

29 May 93:  A gang of about 30 gunmen, wearing Bosnian Army uniforms 
with Muslim insignia, shot and killed three Italian humanitarian 
assistance workers on the road between Gorni Vakuf and Novi Travnik, 
northeast of Split, at a place known as the "fish hatchery."

They were in a group of five Italians who had been transporting food in 
Bosnia with the Food for Aid organization, and were pulled from their 
vehicles and robbed.  The two survivors stated, on June 1 in Grnica, 
that the gunmen had fired at their feet as they ran from the ambush.  
The perpetrators of this crime are still unknown.  (Department of State, 
The Washington Times, Reuters, API)

21 May 93:  Bosnian Serb forces fired on Sarajevo, killing 4 people and 
wounding more than 30, many of them children.  The wounded included 
Deputy Prime Minister Zlatko Lagumdzija, who was shot in the leg.  (API, 
Reuters)

25 Apr 93:  A UN Security Council mission to Srebrenica called the 
Muslim enclave "an open jail" where Serbian forces were planning "slow-
motion genocide."  Serbian nationalist forces had cut off water and 
electricity supplies to Srebrenica, reportedly in retaliation for 
similar actions against Serbian villages earlier in the war, when the 
Muslims still controlled the source.  (The New York Times)

22 Apr 93:  Gunfire from Croat troops near Gospic killed a Slovak member 
of UNPROFOR and wounded another peace-keeper.  Another attack hit a 
Czech and Slovak UNPROFOR control point near Licki Osik.  Fog made it 
difficult to determine whether this shelling had come from either the 
Croatian or Serbian forces.  (API, Paris AFP)

16 Apr 93:  Unknown assailants launched a mortar attack that killed a 
Ukrainian soldier with the UN peace-keeping force while he was on patrol 
in the Grahoviste district of Sarajevo.  (Reuters)

12 Apr 93:  Serb nationalist forces shelled Srebrenica twice on April 
12, once from 2:15 pm to 3:20 pm, and the second time from 3:50 pm to 
4:10 pm.  Most or all of the dead were civilians, including 15 children.

Rounds fell first at the north end of town and proceeded toward the 
south end of town.  At least 14 children were found dead in the school 
yard, where they had been playing football.

During the next barrage of direct shelling, a child of about 6 years of 
age was decapitated.  The UNHCR representative who witnessed these 
attacks said:

I will never be able to convey the sheer horror of the atrocity I 
witnessed on April 12.  Suffice it to say that I did not look forward to 
closing my eyes at night for fear that I would relive the images of a 
nightmare that was not a dream.

As of April 13, total casualties in the town of Srebrenica were 56 dead 
and approximately 100 wounded.  A senior UN official in Zagreb called 
the Srebrenica shelling a violation of international conventions 
prohibiting attacks on civilian targets.  "It is an atrocity," he said.  
(Department of State, API, The Washington Post, The New York Times)

Other, Including Mass Forcible Expulsion, Deportation of Civilians, Mass 
Graves, and Wanton Destruction of Property

9 Jun 93:  Bosnian Serbs have detained hundreds of Croat males from the 
Travnik area at Manjaca camp.  (Department of State)

20 May 93:  UN personnel discovered that both Bosnian Croats and Muslims 
were practicing ethnic cleansing in the southern Bosnian city of Mostar.  
According to a UNHCR spokesperson:

Most of the ethnic cleansing is being done by the Croats, (but) there is 
evidence of Croatians being forced out of the Muslim area in Mostar 
also.  
(Paris AFP)

11 May 93:  Bosnian Croat forces used a large military ambulance--marked 
with the distinctive red cross--to move more than a dozen armed soldiers 
and a recoilless rifle into the Mostar area.   (The New York Times)

11 May 93:  Bosnian Serb forces reopened a former prison camp, the 
ceramics factory at Keraterm, where they detained a large group of 
Muslim men from Prijedor.  A Serbian civil servant, who had confirmed 
the action, said the Muslims were to be used as hostages in case of U.S. 
military intervention.  After a few days, some of the men were released 
after relatives had paid a ransom; many more reportedly remained.  
(Department of State, Hamburg DPA)

7 May 93:  Bosnian Serbs blew up the 1587 Ferhad-Pasha mosque and the 
1587 Arnaudija mosque, both located in Banja Luka.  Yugoslav President 
Cosic issued a statement calling the bombing an "act of barbarity" and 
"the final warning to all reasonable and responsible people on all 
warring sides to act resolutely, immediately, and with all means at 
their disposal to stop the war and destruction."  (The New York Times)

May 93:  According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the 
civilian population in Banja Luka is under constant pressure by armed 
groups who repeatedly beat, rob, and threaten persons belonging to 
minorities.  The houses of such persons in Banja Luka and nearby 
villages are regularly attacked and burned by uncontrolled elements.

On May 2, a local Red Cross office in Banja Luka was destroyed by fire.  
On May 6, three mosques in Banja Luka were severely damaged by 
explosives.  (International Committee of the Red Cross)

3 May 93:  Bosnian Serbs expelled about 230 Muslim men, women, and 
children from Banja Luka.  The Muslims, who were sent by bus through the 
Serbian lines at Turbe to Travnik, were required to pay 100 German marks 
for each adult and 50 marks for each child prior to departure, and to 
sign away all their property.  (Reuters, Paris AFP)

Mar 93:  After having been detained in Bosnian Serb camps almost 
continuously from May through September 1992, a 42-year-old Bosnian 
Muslim was released upon the intervention of an influential Serbian 
friend.

The witness was not permitted to return to his home in Brcko, which had 
been "cleansed" of Muslims and Croatians, but forced to move to 
Bijeljina where he resided until mid-March 1993.

During this time, Bosnian Serb military and civilian authorities 
exercised great pressure on the Muslim and Croatian population to 
resettle elsewhere.  All Muslims lost their jobs and were subject to a 
curfew and to searches of their homes.  They had no income and were not 
allowed to sell any of their property.

On March 14, 1993, 2 days before the witness' departure from the area, 
the Serbs blew up all six mosques in Bijeljina, completely destroying 
them.  Subsequently, they removed all the remains and plowed over the 
area.  By chance, the BBC learned of the razing of the mosques and was 
able to film the debris of one before it could be cleared away.  
(Department of State)

1992-93:  A 42-year-old Muslim described the leaders of the "exchange 
committee" for prisoners of war and civilian prisoners in Brcko.

The witness also described "mafia-like" organizations run by the 
"Arkanovci" to enrich themselves.  One group, for example, controlled 
the bridge over the Sava River in Bosanska Raca, located 20 kilometers 
north of Bijeljina, where they demanded payment of 500-800 German marks 
for each Bosnian who wanted to cross the bridge to Serbia.  Groups of 
other military irregulars operated similar "services" across the Drina 
River, east of Bijeljina.

In addition to controlling the bridges, Serbians also operated small 
boats.  For a fee of up to 1,000 German marks for each person, and with 
the knowledge of local authorities, Muslims willing to resettle were 
transported across the river by the Serbs.  Each group of Serbs (the 
"Arkanovci,"  "Draganovci", etc. ) controlled their own territory and 
refrained from infringing on the territory of others.  Under the guise 
of aiding the "voluntary resettlement" of the Muslims, Serbs robbed them 
of their last coin.  Many people at all levels were involved in these 
practices.  (Department of State)

May-Jun 92:  A 45-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the ethnic cleansing 
of Sanski Most.

Serbian authorities expelled all Bosnian Muslims from the local police 
forces by April 1992.  Similarly, the locally stationed JNA detachments 
were purged of Muslims.  By sometime in April, the Serbian-controlled 
militia demanded that all Sanski Most inhabitants turn in their weapons 
to the police.

On May 26-28, 1992, Sanski Most was subjected to intense bombardment.  
Up to 400 buildings were destroyed and all the mosques were dynamited.  
On May 27, the bombardment temporarily stopped and Muslims were told to 
gather in a field so they could be "protected" from the incoming fire.  
Approximately 2,000 people left their houses, reported to the 
authorities, and went to a sports arena.  Once there, they were told to 
return to their homes and raise white flags over their houses to show 
they had no weapons and had "surrendered."  About 3,000 Muslims were 
displaced in this phase of "cleansing."

The witness described some of the detention facilities in Sanski Most:  
the Betoniarka concrete factory, the Hasan Kikic school, the Gradska 
Dworana (used to house women), the Narodni Front school, and the Krinc 
factory.  Additionally, people were locked in pigsties.

Up to four shifts of guards worked each day at Betoniarka, where the 
witness was detained.  He recognized men from the civil militia, the 
Serbian reservist militia, and paramilitary groups, who administered 
beatings continuously.  Some names of victims of these beatings were 
read off lists, others were former inhabitants from villages where Serbs 
had suffered casualties, and some were victims of private vendettas.  
(Department of State)

May 92:  A 60-year-old Bosnian Muslim described the ethnic cleansing of 
his village of Borajno, which is located in the Cajnice district.

On May 10, Serbian forces from Plejvlja, across the border in 
Montenegro, came to Borajno asking everyone to surrender their weapons.  
On May 16, the soldiers ordered the Muslims to move to the other side of 
the village, at which time the Serbs bombed the empty houses.  The next 
morning, the soldiers began shooting in the air and, by 3 pm, the 
commander of one of the local Serbian units ordered the Muslims to leave 
the village.

The villagers ran into the woods.  Immediately thereafter, the Serbian 
forces started bombing the woods from the mountains.  The witness was 
able to return to Borajno on May 18, but he found the village deserted.  
(Department of State)

Apr-May 92:  A 50-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the occupation of 
Doboj by some of Arkan's paramilitary groups.  Some of these troops were 
native Serbs; others were from the Knin region in Croatia.

When the paramilitary forces first took over Doboj, they set up 
artillery next to the health center and shelled the city's two mosques 
and Roman Catholic church, setting them on fire.  They ordered Croats 
and Muslims to remain indoors while they searched their homes, often 
arresting the men.  The soldiers "inflicted terrible beatings" on some 
residents, and looted and burned during their forays, which continued 
until August. (Department of State)

Apr 92:  A Bosnian Muslim in her mid-thirties witnessed the bombardment 
of Zvornik by Yugoslav National Army (JNA) forces, the Serbs' rounding 
up of Muslim citizens, and their looting of Muslim homes.

In the beginning of April, the Serbian community began evacuating many 
of its citizens from Zvornik. On April 8, the witness saw Serbian 
snipers shooting at Muslim homes from apartments that had been vacated 
by local Serbs.  JNA forces placed barricades in town.

The witness spent that night with a Serbian friend who had decided not 
to evacuate.  During the night, JNA forces stationed in Celopek and 
Serbia proper bombed Zvornik.  The next morning, the "Arkanovci" came by 
each house requesting to see people's identification.  She witnessed 
Serbian soldiers driving through town in large trucks collecting Muslims 
out of the basements to which they had fled.  The Muslims were put on 
the trucks with their hands above their heads.  (Department of State) 
(###)

For the texts of the first seven reports, see the following issues of 
Dispatch:

Vol. 3, No. 39, p. 732;
Vol. 3, No. 44, p. 802;
Vol. 3, No. 46, p. 825;
Vol. 3, No. 52, p. 917;
Vol. 4, No. 6, p. 75;
Vol. 4, No. 15, p. 243; and
Vol. 4, No. 16, p. 257.

For the text of Resolution 771, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 33, p. 652 or 
Dispatch Supplement Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 44. 

For  the text of Resolution 780, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769.

For  the text of Resolution 827, see Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 23, p. 418. 
(###)

(END OF DISPATCH VOL. 4, NO 30)

To the top of this page


Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives 1993 Issues|| Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives|| Index of "Briefings and Statements"
Index of Electronic Research Collections ERC Reference Desk || Alphabetic Index || Sitemap || ERC Homepage
Last modified: Jun. 3, 1999
Designed by: Lin Dou