US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 30, JULY 26, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. The Governor's Island Accord: A Victory For Diplomacy and Democracy
in Haiti -- Secretary Christopher
2. USAID and Foreign Aid Reform Deputy Secretary Wharton
3. Report of the El Salvador Panel -- Secretary Christopher
4. UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 851 on Angola -- Madeleine K.
Albright, UNSC Resolution
5. Presidential Delegation to Hanoi
6. U.S.-North Korea Talks on the Nuclear Issue -- Press Statement,
Robert L. Gallucci
7. Situation in Azerbaijan
8. Eighth Report on War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia
ARTICLE 1:
The Governor's Island Accord: A Victory for Diplomacy And Democracy in
Haiti
Secretary Christopher
Opening remarks at a news conference with UN/OAS Special Envoy Dante
Caputo and U.S. Special Adviser on Haiti Lawrence Pezzullo, Washington,
DC, July 19, 1993
Within the first few days of his Administration, President Clinton
announced that his first goal with respect to Haiti was the restoration
of democracy. In March, he met with President Aristide and personally
reaffirmed our commitment to the return of constitutional government and
the return of President Aristide to Haiti through a negotiation
sponsored by the United Nations and the Organization of American States.
At about the same time, I appointed Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo to
coordinate our efforts to assist in those negotiations.
I am pleased to say that the goal announced by President Clinton is now
within reach, in large measure due to the tireless efforts of Mr. Caputo
and Ambassador Pezzullo. I want to personally congratulate Mr. Caputo
on a successful negotiation to resolve the Haitian crisis; it is an
example of a splendid diplomatic endeavor.
The Governor's Island accord is a sound agreement that provides for a
peaceful transition to constitutional rule and for President Aristide's
return to Haiti. The accord is a victory not only for the Haitian
people but for the international community as well.
This unprecedented agreement is the result not only of close cooperation
between the United Nations and the OAS but also of the diplomatic skill
and perseverance of Mr. Caputo and Mr. Pezzullo; the strong support of
the Canadian, French, Venezuelan and U.S. Governments; and, most
importantly, the leadership and cooperation of the Haitian parties. I
want to extend my congratulations to all the institutions, governments,
and individuals who played key roles in bringing about the success we
have achieved so far--a good example of the emerging era of multilateral
diplomacy.
While we can and should be proud of what the international community has
done, our work is certainly not yet over. The Governor's Island accord
is the first crucial step--but let me emphasize that it is only the
first step.
Mr. Caputo has just returned from negotiations in New York, where he
successfully reached agreement with Haitian parliamentary and political
leaders to implement the accord. We support their decisions to invite
President Aristide to appoint, as soon as possible, a prime ministerial
candidate for their ratification--which would be an immediate step to
return Haiti to constitutional government. Once the new prime minister
has taken office, the international community must be ready to assist
the new government in preparing the way for the return of President
Aristide on October 30.
I want to reaffirm President Clinton's commitment to back this agreement
to the fullest. We are preparing to participate in a program of
economic and technical assistance in coordination with the United
Nations, the Organization of American States, and other donors. As the
President recently announced, we have redirected $37.5 million from
other programs in the region for use in Haiti. These funds will be used
to help the new government clear its arrears to the international
financial institutions so that they can resume lending to Haiti. We are
also planning to begin high-impact programs to put Haitians back to work
rebuilding their devastated economy.
The stability of a new Haitian democracy will rest not only on economic
progress but also on strengthening democratic institutions. We and the
United Nations Development Program are coordinating a comprehensive
program to bolster Haiti's justice system. In that way, we can ensure
that democracy has a chance to grow and thrive in Haiti. The UN and the
OAS are also planning to assist Haiti in creating a new civilian police
force and helping to professionalize the Haitian military. We look to
President Aristide to approve, at the earliest moment, the terms under
which these programs and the other security measures will operate.
These initiatives will help create the peaceful climate needed for the
political transition to occur.
The United States, the United Nations, and the Organization of American
States will carefully monitor the agreement over the coming months. The
international sanctions will be suspended once the new prime minister
assumes office. But let me stress that the international community is
prepared to reimpose the sanctions should anyone derail the
implementation of the agreement reached at Governor's Island.
With strong international support and the good faith efforts of all
Haitians, I am sure that the Governor's Island accord will succeed in
restoring constitutional government and returning President Aristide to
office through a peaceful transition. The accord will protect the
rights of all Haitians and form the basis for a durable democratic
system. It can also improve the lives of the people of Haiti, who have
for so long been kept in abject poverty through a succession of despotic
leaders. Thank you very much. (###)
ARTICLE 2:
USAID and Foreign Aid Reform
Deputy Secretary Wharton
Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy,
Trade, Oceans and Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, July 14, 1993
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am pleased to appear before
you today, along with USAID Administrator Brian Atwood, to discuss the
details of his efforts to reinvigorate USAID and the broader issue of
foreign aid reform.
Mr. Atwood will address the details of the fiscal year 1994 budget, as
well as his intent to reinvigorate USAID through a top-to-bottom
examination of its organization, structure, and management practices.
My comments will focus on the broader policy recommendations of the
inter-agency task force to reform USAID.
During his confirmation hearing before the full committee last January,
Secretary Christopher responded to questions about the future of foreign
aid by stating he would ask me to examine the goals and objectives of
USAID to determine whether they remained relevant in the post-Cold War
era. At my own confirmation hearing, I expressed my enthusiasm for
undertaking this assignment. Issues relating to economic development
have been at the core of my academic and professional life since my
association with Nelson Rockefeller's pioneering technical assistance
efforts in Latin America in the late 1940s.
I have been involved in the evolution of U.S. foreign assistance
programs, both directly and as a keen observer, for more than four
decades. At this crucial point in our history, with the imperatives of
the Cold War behind us, the chance to step back and evaluate the future
of foreign assistance is, in a very real sense, an opportunity I have
prepared for all of my professional life. I, nevertheless, undertook
this project knowing how important and complex the issues are,
particularly as we simultaneously search for ways to reduce the federal
deficit.
Secretary Christopher and I originally hoped to complete this review in
approximately 90 days. However, we both believed strongly that we
needed to fully involve the new USAID Administrator in this effort.
Since Mr. Atwood was not confirmed until early May, the process has
required a longer period of time.
I began the review process by creating a task force composed of
representatives from each of the departments and agencies responsible
for programs in the Function 150 international affairs budget. Thirty-
five officials ultimately participated on the task force, including
representatives from the Office of Management and Budget, the National
Security Council, and the National Economic Council.
Mr. Atwood and I also met with Members of Congress and staff, as well as
with some representatives of outside groups concerned with the future of
foreign aid, in order to obtain additional viewpoints. We also
benefited from the large number of studies and reports on reforming
foreign aid that have been written since 1989. Based on these
resources, we prepared a draft report in early June. While there was a
consensus on many of the recommendations, there was also spirited
discussion and debate. As chairman of the task force, I assume
responsibility for the contents of the report.
After sharing the draft report with the Secretary of State and the
National Security Adviser, we agreed to circulate the USAID core of the
draft report to the chairmen and ranking members of the relevant
oversight committees. We have received many valuable comments in this
process, and I view today's hearing as another important part of our
consultations with the Congress. I am pleased that the members of this
committee have had the opportunity to review this report before the
hearing. We want the views of those concerned with the future of
foreign assistance to be adequately considered in the preparation of the
final report.
Simultaneous with our internal primary review of USAID, a Presidential
Review Directive (PRD 20) was issued on March 8 calling for an
assessment of all international programs of the U.S. Government. USAID,
of course, is only one of many entities engaged in implementing U.S.
foreign policy under the Foreign Assistance Act and through the
international foreign assistance budget, known as Function 150. Others
include bilateral economic and military assistance, support for
multilateral development banks, UN organizations, and trade and
investment promotion.
With respect to USAID, the PRD set forth two specific objectives for the
Department of State to consider: 1) the structure and function of
USAID, including its relationship to the Department of State; and, 2)
the Department's responsibility to evaluate the Function 150 budget
account under the Foreign Assistance Act.
Thus, the work already begun within the Department was both germane and
complementary to the PRD effort. The draft report we are discussing
today, however, addresses only the first objective of the PRD process:
namely, the recommended future of USAID. The extremely important issue
of coordination of all foreign assistance programs is still under review
by the PRD inter-agency working group, as are the issues relating to the
other agencies and programs funded under the 150 account, such as the
Economic Support Fund, or ESF, and the multilateral development banks.
The State Department, of course, is contributing its views to this
effort.
Therefore, while our current draft report does not specifically offer
recommendations on budget, planning, and program coordination, I assure
the subcommittee that we are very much aware of the importance of the
issue. Moreover, we believe that the recommendations in our draft would
place a restructured USAID and its new mission in a position to be fully
compatible with any necessary coordination requirements of the total
foreign assistance program.
Let me now address some of our report's major conclusions.
Does USAID Have a Role In the Post-Cold War Era?
The essential first question we had to ask ourselves was whether foreign
assistance, and particularly the type of development assistance that
USAID can offer, continues to be essential in the post-Cold War era.
Our task force concluded unanimously that foreign assistance, in the
light of new international realities and challenges, remains a
fundamental cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and is just as important,
if not more so, than it ever was.
President Clinton has defined three areas of vital U.S. interest to
which effectively managed foreign assistance can make a major
contribution.
National Security. Despite the collapse of international communism and
related threats of aggression and destabilization, there remains the
harsh reality of armed conflicts and violence. These have the potential
to escalate into major transnational conflagrations, threatening our
citizens and vital interests and breeding terrorist acts that affect us
at home and abroad. Some of these conflicts stem from ethnic and
religious differences, but many result from economic stress and
injustice. To the extent that instability results from poverty,
inequality of political and economic access, and societal
transformation--as it often does--effective development assistance helps
reduce tensions that breed violent conflict. USAID can assist peaceful
reconstruction and development in these cases and thereby further our
national security objectives.
Economic Revitalization. The challenge is to contribute to a growing,
prosperous international economy while rebuilding our own at home.
Emerging economies represent tremendous potential growth and new
markets. Participating in their growth expands the market for our goods
through trade and investment. It also creates U.S. jobs, enhances the
supply of consumable goods, and improves the flow of strategic material.
President Clinton has emphasized that "winning" this battle need not be
a zero-sum game: Assisting economies to thrive abroad promotes peace,
jobs, stabilization, a demand for U.S. products and services, and higher
living standards for all.
Promotion of Democracy. Economic development works best in
participatory democracies. The United States has a fundamental self-
interest in the creation of a well-functioning "international community"
characterized by shared democratic values and ideals and relative
political stability within countries and regions. Democracy has taken
hold worldwide, but its roots in many countries are still shallow.
Programs designed to support and strengthen citizen-based institutions
can help meet our national interest by strengthening emerging
democracies.
To protect and advance these basic national interests, our foreign
policy and assistance programs must recognize that U.S. domestic
strength is fundamental to achieving our objectives. We cannot succeed
in isolation. There are unbreakable links between our domestic
economic, social, and political health and that of the rest of the
world. To advance our own economic and political objectives, we must
expand U.S. participation in a growing international economy. USAID has
been at the forefront of promoting democracy and furthering market
economies in other countries.
As the world's remaining superpower, the United States is in an
unprecedented position to exercise enlightened world leadership on
global issues at a time when there is a great need for such leadership.
The loss of a common ideological enemy has freed tremendous resources
for more positive use by the industrialized world. But without strong
U.S. leadership during this time of sluggish economic performance and
new security challenges, there is a risk of a return to a system of
international relations based on isolationism and mercantilism. The
basic sources of leadership will continue to be the size and health of
our own economy, the power and readiness of our military forces, and our
willingness to engage on international issues, especially in a manner
that is perceived as far-sighted and constructive.
Our leadership must also rest on the pursuit of our most enduring
values: respect for and protection of individual human rights; strong
reliance on private initiative to enhance social well-being; the fair
rule of law; and responsive, participatory civilian governance. The
challenge to U.S. leadership is to maintain peace and stability by
nurturing democracy, preserving the global environment, maintaining a
strong military capability, and strengthening the international trading
system.
The United States does not hold the solution to every world problem.
Yet our nation possesses attributes that grow out of our long democratic
heritage: compassion, enlightened self-interest, a willingness to
share, and a deep respect for the human dignity of all people. These
instincts provide the foundation for U.S. support for foreign
assistance.
USAID: Abolish or Reform?
In agreement that foreign assistance remains vital to our national
interests, the task force next turned to the question of whether a
revitalized and redirected USAID was best suited to carry out
development aspects of the total mission or whether some other entity
could perform the role better. The task force considered several
options, including abolishing the agency, merging it into the Department
of State, or dispersing its functions to other departments and agencies.
This last alternative included a sub-option of retaining a smaller,
successor agency to operate a sustainable development program primarily
through non-governmental organizations and grantees.
Another option argued that USAID should limit its mandate to disaster
relief and leave long-term development to multilateral agencies. The
task force, however, saw a clear need for a discrete, national
development agency to carry out programs which multilateral
organizations cannot provide.
-- First and foremost, USAID provides a direct linkage between U.S.
foreign policy goals in our bilateral relations. Multilateral agencies
do not necessarily reflect U.S. foreign policy in their programs and
activities.
-- USAID can work with governments and non-governmental organizations,
reaching out effectively to grass-roots recipients. Multilateral
organizations, especially international financial institutions, deal
almost exclusively with foreign governments.
-- The local expertise in USAID's field missions provides a rare
ability to develop programs targeted to local needs.
-- USAID leads in democracy-building, family planning, and environment
issues--areas where multilateral organizations have been less active.
-- Finally, USAID guarantees that the development programs funded by
the U.S. reflect the values of the American people.
As a result of the above discussion, the overwhelming consensus was that
USAID, as an agency, remains strongly viable and that its problems stem
less from where its functions are located than from an unfocused
mandate, over-regulation, and poor management.
Mr. Atwood will describe, in his testimony, how he intends to carry out
a top-to-bottom examination of the organization and structure of USAID
and its management practices. I believe he has already infused USAID
with new and vigorous leadership. In light of this and the realization
that merging USAID into State or dispersing its functions would not
resolve the regulatory and administrative burdens under which USAID
programs must operate, the task force concluded that the best option
regarding the organization and structure of USAID is to work with
Congress to simplify and clarify USAID's statutory mandate and allow the
new Administrator time to improve USAID's internal management practices
and structure through administrative action.
New Goals and Objectives
After concluding that continuing a strong foreign assistance program is
in the U.S. economic and security interest and that USAID as an
institution can be reformed to successfully achieve our foreign
assistance and foreign policy objectives, the task force examined the
relevance of USAID's existing statutory goals and objectives in the
current world context. In common with practically every recent study of
foreign aid, the task force concluded that USAID has too many statutory
goals and objectives and lacks a clear vision that reflects U.S.
national interests in the post-Cold War era.
For example, the 1989 Task Force on Foreign Assistance of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs identified 33 independent statutory goals
and objectives and 75 priority areas that USAID must pursue in designing
its assistance programs. Increasing percentages of aid have also been
earmarked in authorization and appropriations legislation for specific
programs, countries, or geographic regions. In FY 1993, for example,
approximately 57% of development assistance, 84% of the Economic Support
Fund, and 96% of Foreign Military Financing are earmarked.
This is not to say that all of USAID's problems are externally generated
or need legislation to be corrected. Even with appropriate statutory
goals, USAID will not succeed if it is poorly managed--and the agency
currently has serious internal problems.
For example, USAID's fiscal and personnel resources are spread too thin.
USAID currently maintains a field presence--at least one permanent
employee--in 99 different countries, of which 52 represent either a
fully staffed mission or a regional office, normally with a staff of 12
or more Americans. USAID also operates programs with no permanent staff
in
an additional 26 countries, not including countries receiving disaster
relief or PL 480 food aid.
In addition, USAID currently has a portfolio of 2,226 active projects, a
substantial majority of which are designed and implemented--because of
limited permanent staff--through a complex and cumbersome system of
grants and contracts, each subject to the full panoply of federal
procurement regulations and financial oversight.
In regard to management of its headquarters operations, the task force
noted two principal conclusions of the Commission on Foreign Assistance
Management, established under the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act
of 1991: USAID has too many layers of management between the
Administrator and field programs, and USAID has suffered from a lack of
strong and consistent leadership.
The commission's report also documented an observation, concurred in by
the task force, that the process of designing and implementing policy
within USAID is diffuse and uncoordinated. Central direction and
monitoring and compliance of clearly understood agency-wide assistance
policies is lacking.
As noted above, many of these problems can be resolved through
administrative action; others will require the help of Congress. The
task force believes the Administration and the Congress, working
together, can produce the reforms that will revitalize USAID. What is
required is that we design the agency for success, show confidence that
it can be effective by giving it the breathing space to operate, and
then hold it fully accountable for results. To give USAID this
breathing space, the task force believes its overseas assistance
programs should be based on a new statutory policy framework
encompassing the following four broad strategies.
Promoting Sustainable Economic Growth and Development. This strategy is
the linchpin for successfully reaching overall policy goals--both
foreign and domestic. Sustainable development calls for a long-term
participatory process, with particular focus on the disadvantaged
majority, that provides opportunities for the citizens of assisted
countries to improve their incomes and the quality of their lives.
Sustainable development targets the elimination of hunger, poverty,
illness, and ignorance while protecting the environment. It involves
enhancing human capital by expanding educational opportunities to all
segments of society, reducing the rate of population growth, extending
improvements in health and nutrition, and expanding the capabilities of
women. Sustainable development also depends upon the elimination of
obstacles to participation and creation of opportunities that will allow
all people to be more productively engaged in building their country's
economy.
Building Democratic Participation in Development. The United States
stands for the universal proposition that all people are created equal.
Democratic societies foster, inter alia, pluralism, freedom of
expression and association, an electoral system, the rule of law, and
the protection of individual human rights. Encouraging democratization
requires using foreign aid to promote "good governance" in other nations
and to create an environment where democratic values are understood and
utilized in policy and decision-making processes at all levels.
Administrator Atwood has already begun to strengthen the agency's
capacity to support and deepen democracy, making it an integral part of
its sustainable development mission. He has asked that USAID staff
develop project approaches for each of the components or "sectors" of
democratic development work: civil society; intermediary organizations;
political, electoral, and governmental institutions; judicial reforms;
civil-military relations; and free press. These approaches will be
integrated into strategic country and regional plans incorporating all
the other disciplines of development work--economics, agriculture,
environment, population, health--in a mutually reinforcing framework.
Addressing Global Issues. National boundaries do not contain the
effects of contagious diseases, environmental degradation, or narcotics
trafficking. We can, however, cooperate with others to deal with these
problems to minimize their negative impacts--in the developing world and
in the United States.
For example, addressing environmental concerns in developing countries
will lessen the negative effects on the economies and well-being of
neighboring populations. AIDS is another global scourge that is
potentially preventable or containable. High fertility rates in
developing countries threaten efforts to improve family health,
nutrition, and access to social services and to protect the environment.
Population pressures also result in large-scale, unwanted migration and
exacerbate refugee problems. A worldwide effort is needed to bring the
benefits of voluntary family planning to all developing countries.
Responding to Emergency Humanitarian Needs. Decisive humanitarian
actions to respond to natural or man-made disasters often limit long-
term damage and costs to people in critical need. The alternative costs
of neglect are often greater, particularly when such situations become
destabilizing and lead to open conflict and civil strife. USAID must go
beyond traditional disaster relief--food and shelter--and develop a
rapid-response, nation-building capacity to help societies that have
fallen into conflict and anarchy or where there is a severe threat to
their stability.
USAID should be positioned to provide limited resources for specifically
identified short-term needs, distinct from long-term development
efforts. This includes ready-to-deploy programs to observe elections,
strengthen institutions of civil society, conduct civic education,
strengthen judicial systems, and undertake other "nation-building"
activities in conjunction with the UN, other international
organizations, and U.S. or multilateral peace-keeping forces.
The task force report argues that by pursuing these four strategies,
USAID's bilateral development programs can contribute to an ever-
widening community of stable, prospering, democratic nations; expanded
markets for mutually beneficial commerce; and the prevention and
containment of conflicts.
The task force endorsed the new approach of the FY 1994 budget for the
Function 150 international affairs account, which regrouped the current
programs by major foreign policy objectives rather than by agency. This
approach highlighted the Administration's foreign assistance objectives.
The FY 1994 budget identified the foreign policy priorities as:
-- Building democracy in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere;
-- Promoting and maintaining peace, including peace-keeping operations,
non-proliferation and arms control, Middle East peace talks, and defense
cooperation and regional security;
-- Promoting economic growth and sustainable development through
bilateral development programs--encompassing developing human capital,
building markets and income opportunities, expanding science and
technology, and building institutions--as well as multilateral
development programs and promotion of U.S. businesses abroad;
-- Addressing global problems, particularly environmental degradation,
narcotics, terrorism, rapid population growth, and AIDS; and
-- Providing humanitarian assistance, including disaster relief and aid
for refugees.
These priorities closely track the major program categories identified
by the task force.
New Legislation for a New Vision
At his April 29, 1993, confirmation hearing before this committee, USAID
Administrator Atwood described his new vision for USAID--a vision that
recognizes that direct participation of people in solving their own
problems is critical to overcoming poverty, hunger, disease, and
illiteracy. This new vision recognizes that the challenges posed to
global stability--unrestrained population growth, environmental
degradation, and economic deprivation--are people problems, the
solutions for which can be developed only by including people themselves
directly in the development process. To design people-oriented
programs, USAID will increase the involvement of non-governmental
organizations--including private voluntary organizations, cooperatives,
and credit unions--to the extent possible. USAID will also continue to
draw on the wealth of experience in American universities to carry out
its new mandate.
The task force believes that realizing this vision requires new charter
legislation--legislation that describes USAID's post-Cold War national
mission with clearly stated priorities and gives USAID essential program
and management flexibility. The task force also recognizes that USAID,
through internal reform, also must become a more flexible, streamlined
agency if it is to produce tangible results and be held accountable for
the success or failure of its programs. The task force identified 19
specific organizational and administrative changes which USAID should
make in order to carry out its new mandate and operate more efficiently.
Fortunately, many of these changes to the USAID organization can be made
internally without the need for legislative action, and Mr. Atwood will
be describing some of these changes in his testimony.
A crucial element in buttressing this flexibility and accountability,
however, will be the cooperation of the Congress in freeing USAID from
earmarked programs and unnecessary and restrictive oversight procedures.
Agreement with the Congress on a clear, simplified, and unencumbered
statutory framework for development assistance will create a renewed,
more cooperative relationship between USAID and the Congress on the use
of foreign assistance funds.
This will free USAID to design, and be held accountable for, bilateral
development programs that respond to the development needs in recipient
countries. And it will allow USAID to use development funds in those
countries and in those sectors that offer the most promise for USAID
described in our report. For Congress, this shared purpose and the
administrative steps that USAID will take to implement it would limit
the need for detailed earmarking which have inhibited USAID's ability to
achieve its development objectives.
One advantage of this streamlining will be the increased flexibility of
matching programs with the unique needs and conditions of each nation.
As countries approach levels of sustainable development, new
institutional arrangements that encourage the phased withdrawal of
USAID's involvement and the increased involvement of other domestic
technical, trade, and investment agencies are required. Improved
management of this transition--from developing country status to that of
fully advanced status--maximizes the payoff from development assistance
and provides greater opportunity for expanded U.S. foreign trade and
investment.
As I noted at the outset, regardless of which agency or department is
responsible for which function, all economic assistance efforts, which
together have the common goal of advancing the economic interests of the
United States, need to be coordinated within the executive branch to
ensure maximum effectiveness. To use our scarce resources more
efficiently, the Function 150 account should be cast to reflect the
major foreign policy objectives of the various assistance programs so as
to delineate the true resource flows and improve accountability.
The USAID Administrator should also continue to report to the President
through the Secretary of State and receive policy guidance from the
Secretary. There should also be strengthened interaction at the most
senior levels--Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary, USAID
Administrator--to improve and speed decision-making and to encourage
greater cooperation at all levels.
Finally, and most important, the reform proposals contained in the task
force draft report reflect the Clinton Administration's broader foreign
policy approach--an approach of consultation, coordination, and shared
responsibility with our allies. In the post-Cold War era, the
Administration is seeking close cooperation and agreement with its
natural allies--the advanced democratic nations and those nations which
share our values.
This approach should logically be extended to our work of assisting
sustainable development in countries striving to attain a better life
for their people. What we do to support development in any region or
specific countries must be done as part of a broader attack on the
problems impeding progress, orchestrated in meetings with other donors
and stressing our areas of comparative advantage while leaving to others
what they can do best.
Within this broader, coordinated effort to spur development, our
intention should be to do our fair share. We should assist people and
countries in need and do what we can to help them attain sustainable
progress. The American people have always been willing to do their
share to help others in need, and we have been a recognized leader in
providing aid in recent decades.1 We should not withdraw from this
responsibility, tied as it is to our own national interest and our
American sense of humanity. We should work closely with other donors,
helping to shape the future--a future in which we have the most to offer
and much to gain.
What's New in This Framework?
How will the new policy framework and recommendations achieve the
desired effectiveness and tangible results? What is new about this
framework for USAID? There are several answers.
First, USAID's activities are being refocused to reflect the new foreign
policy objectives of this Administration. The FY 1994 international
affairs budget, the Function 150 account, was specifically recast this
year to reflect more clearly the new Administration's foreign policy
objectives.
Second, streamlining and focusing USAID on the areas where it has
historically developed the greatest competence and strength--overcoming
the basic human afflictions of hunger, ignorance, environmental
degradation, and disease--will allow USAID to do what it has learned to
do best. Recent changes in world affairs have enhanced our comparative
advantage as a foreign assistance leader in these areas. What is new
and important are the opportunities these changes present if USAID
institutes major reforms in setting priorities and carries them out with
new vision and effectiveness. This can only be achieved if significant
improvements are made in the areas of excessive oversight and
administrative execution.
Third, with the end of the Cold War, promoting sustainable development
has become a more prominent national objective, bridging domestic and
foreign policy. The major commitment to assist the development of
democracy and a market economy is just as valid in a Russia and a
Guatemala as it is in a Haiti and a Cambodia. USAID's mix of policy
recommendations and technical assistance will be different for the
traditional developing countries compared with our more advanced
partners, but the overarching goal of engaging them in an expanding
global market economy will be the same.
Fourth, USAID will give much greater priority to leveraging multilateral
cooperation. Expanding the involvement of other donor groups not only
serves the objective of more cost-effective assistance but has the
additional benefit of strengthening cooperation among the community of
democratic nations that contribute the bulk of the world's development
assistance. USAID will also promote the creation and revitalization of
regional and international development organizations required to
coordinate and address a growing list of global issues.
Fifth, and finally, the new framework and focus recognizes that there is
a fundamental and crucial foreign policy role to be played by bilateral
foreign assistance in the furtherance of our national interests.
Pursuing this goal requires a USAID which is flexible, responsive, and,
above all, focused. The various changes recommended will produce a
reinvigorated and reformed USAID uniquely capable of achieving our
foreign policy objectives.
Conclusion
I hope that our draft report will serve as the basis for continued
consultations with the Congress on the role and direction of USAID and,
in turn, may result in general support of the need for, and perhaps the
substance of, new charter legislation. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the
task force recommends a two-pronged approach to reform of USAID and its
bilateral development programs.
First, USAID must receive leadership that reflects its important role in
achieving our foreign policy and foreign assistance goals. This
includes the top-to-bottom review and improvement of USAID's structure
and management practices that Mr. Atwood has promised, some of which he
will describe in his testimony today.
Second, we must work with the Congress to simplify and clarify USAID's
statutory mandate. USAID should be given new flexibility through the
reduction or elimination of the costly and inefficient process of
earmarking. USAID's new mandate should focus on participatory programs
leading to sustainable economic development, expanding democracy, and
addressing global issues while responding to international disasters and
other urgent humanitarian crises.
I believe the draft report of the task force lays out a comprehensive
new framework for USAID in the post- Cold War era. We want to work with
the Congress to make that vision a reality. (###)
ARTICLE 3:
Report of the El Salvador Panel
Statement by Secretary Christopher, released by the Office of the
Spokesman, Washington, DC, July 15, 1993.
This morning I received the report of the panel on El Salvador which I
appointed on March 24. I want to express my gratitude for the thorough
and conscientious efforts of the panel, composed of two of our most
distinguished retired career ambassadors--George S. Vest and Richard W.
Murphy--and Professor I.M. (Mac) Destler of the University of Maryland,
who served as the panel's academic adviser.
The report, issued today, is the result of a 3-month, comprehensive
assessment of how the Department of State and the Foreign Service
handled human rights issues involving El Salvador from 1980 to 1991. As
I directed, the panel examined the State Department's professional
performance and makes recommendations on how the Department can better
handle human rights issues in a manner consistent with our nation's
values and the Department's highest professional standards. As
directed, the report is not a review of the wisdom of previous
Administrations' Central American policy, and it is limited to the
activities of the State Department and the Foreign Service.
I am carefully reviewing the report and its recommendations. One of the
report's key recommendations is that the vast bulk of the record on
human rights in El Salvador be declassified to the maximum degree
possible as soon as possible. I have ordered that this process, already
begun at my previous instruction, be accelerated and completed on an
expedited basis. I will be acting on the panel's other recommendations
promptly. (###)
ARTICLE 4:
UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 851 on Angola
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution
Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
before the UN Security Council, New York City, July 15, 1993.
Mr. President, my government applauds the efforts of Ms. Margaret
Anstee, who labored tirelessly as the Secretary General's previous
Special Representative, to attempt to bring peace to Angola. We applaud
as well the energetic efforts of the newly appointed Special
Representative, Dr. Beye, who has worked since his appointment to revive
both humanitarian assistance deliveries and face-to-face negotiations
between the parties. The July 12 agreement on emergency aid between
UNITA and the UN is a hopeful sign that the need to deal with the
humanitarian problems facing Angola has been acknowledged. We continue
to support the efforts of the UN to bring the conflict in Angola to a
peaceful conclusion.
We also applaud and support the UN effort to alleviate the humanitarian
suffering in Angola. We continue to be gravely concerned about the
plight of the people of Angola. In this context, we call on UNITA to
refrain from military action and return to the peace process. We also
recognize the costs of continued conflict for the people of Angola and
the international community.
We must also note that it is only logical that we will not be able to
agree to increase the strength of UNAVEM until conditions have been
established that will make exercise of its mandate feasible.
Furthermore, before agreeing to additional commitments, we will need to
have the Secretariat's clear advice on the costs involved and their
duration.
Mr. President, UN peace-keeping has become a growth industry. But
before we can effectively meet the increased demands, we must understand
the needs of those demanding our services and how our scarce resources
are being employed. Our goal is to retool the peace-keeping machinery
so as to meet the new demand. Until then, we must ensure that our
limited supply is used to best effect.
Resolution 851 (July 14, 1993)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24
March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November
1992, 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993, 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993, 823
(1993) of 30 April 1993 and 834 (1993) of 1 June 1993,
Having considered the further report (S/26060 and Add. 2) of the
Secretary-General dated 12 July 1993,
Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on
8 June 1993 (S/25899),
Welcoming the Declaration on the Situation in Angola adopted by the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) at its Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session (S/26076), and the
Resolution on the Situation in Angola adopted by the Council of
Ministers of the OAU at its Fifty-Eighth Ordinary Session (S/26081),
Welcoming also the joint statement issued in Moscow on 8 July 1993 by
the representatives of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United
States of America, the three observer States to the Angolan peace
process (S/26064),
Noting the Special Declaration on Angola adopted by the World Conference
on Human Rights in Vienna,
Expressing grave concern at the deterioration of the political and
military situation, and noting with consternation the further
deterioration of an already grave humanitarian situation,
Deeply concerned that the peace talks remain suspended and that a cease-
fire has not been established,
Welcoming and supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and his
Special Representative aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan
crisis through negotiations,
Emphasizing the importance of a continued and effective United Nations
presence in Angola with a view to fostering the peace process and
advancing the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",
Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial
integrity of Angola,
1. Welcomes the further report of the Secretary-General dated 12 July
1993 and decides to extend the existing mandate of the United Nations
Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for a period of two months until
15 September 1993;
2. Reiterates its readiness to consider taking action promptly, at any
time within the period of the mandate authorized by this resolution, on
the recommendation of the Secretary-General to expand substantially the
United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress
in the peace process;
3. Stresses the importance of the functions of good offices and
mediation by UNAVEM II and the Special Representative, with the goal of
restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process for the full
implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";
4. Reiterates its demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of
the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the "Acordos de
Paz";
5. Condemns UNITA for continuing military actions, which are resulting
in increased suffering to the civilian population of Angola and damage
to the Angolan economy and again demands that UNITA immediately cease
such actions;
6. Also condemns UNITA's repeated attempts to seize additional
territory and its failure to withdraw its troops from the locations
which it has occupied since the resumption of the hostilities, and
demands once again that it immediately do so and agree without delay to
return its troops to United Nations-monitored areas as a transitional
measure pending full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";
7. Reaffirms that such occupation is a grave violation of the "Acordos
de Paz" and is incompatible with the goal of peace through agreements
and reconciliation;
8. Stresses the fundamental need to re-initiate without delay the
peace talks under United Nations auspices with a view to the immediate
establishment of a cease-fire throughout the country and the full
implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the
Security Council;
9. Takes note of statements by UNITA that it is prepared to resume
peace negotiations and demands that UNITA act accordingly;
10. Welcomes the continued disposition of the Government of Angola to
reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict in conformity with the
"Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council;
11. Urges all States to refrain from any action which directly or
indirectly could jeopardize the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",
especially from providing any form of direct or indirect military
assistance to UNITA, or any other support to UNITA inconsistent with the
peace process;
12. Expresses its readiness to consider the imposition of measures
under the Charter of the United Nations, including a mandatory embargo
on the sale or supply to UNITA of arms and related materiel and other
military assistance, to prevent UNITA from pursuing its military
actions, unless by 15 September 1993 the Secretary-General has reported
that an effective cease-fire has been established and that agreement has
been reached on the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and
relevant resolutions of the Security Council;
13. Recognizes the legitimate rights of the Government of Angola and in
this regard welcomes the provision of assistance to the Government of
Angola in support of the democratic process;
14. Welcomes the steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement the
emergency humanitarian assistance plan;
15. Takes note of statements by UNITA that it will cooperate in
ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all
Angolans and demands that UNITA act accordingly;
16. Calls upon all Member States, United Nations agencies and non-
governmental organizations to respond swiftly and generously to the
Secretary-General's appeal in implementation of the above-mentioned plan
and to accord or increase humanitarian relief assistance to Angola, and
encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to
continue to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance;
17. Demands that UNITA continue to extend its cooperation in ensuring
the immediate evacuation of foreign nationals and their family members
from Huambo and other locations occupied by UNITA;
18. Reiterates its strong condemnation of the attack by UNITA forces,
on 27 May 1993, against a train carrying civilians, and reaffirms that
such criminal attacks are clear violations of international humanitarian
law;
19. Reiterates also its appeal to both parties strictly to abide by
applicable rules of international humanitarian law, including to
guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the civilian
population in need, and commends in particular the efforts of the
Secretary-General and his Special Representative to establish agreed
humanitarian relief corridors;
20. Reiterates its appeal to both parties to take all necessary
measures to ensure the security and safety of UNAVEM II personnel as
well as of the personnel involved in humanitarian relief operations;
21. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the
situation warrants, and in any case before 15 September 1993, a report
on the situation in Angola with his recommendation for the further role
of the United Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime, to keep
the Council regularly informed of developments;
22. Requests also the Secretary-General to submit as soon as possible
the budgetary implications of bringing UNAVEM II up to its full strength
as mandated in resolution 696 (1991) of
30 May 1991;
23. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
VOTE: 15-0. (###)
ARTICLE 5:
Presidential Delegation to Hanoi
Statement released by the presidential delegation, Hanoi, Vietnam, July
17, 1993.
The Presidential delegation to Hanoi, led jointly by Deputy Secretary of
Veterans Affairs Hershel Gober, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, and Assistant to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. Michael Ryan, has completed its
meetings in Hanoi and departs for a brief visit to Ho Chi Minh City
before returning to Washington, DC. As stated in the White House press
statement of July 12, 1993, the purpose of the delegation's mission was
to stress the need for further progress on unresolved POW/MIA issues.
Participating in the delegation were leaders from the four largest
American veterans organizations: Mr. John Sommer of the American
Legion, Mr. Allen Kent of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Mr. David Givans
of the Disabled American Veterans, and Mr. Robert Jones of the AMVETS.
The National League of Families of American Prisoners of War and Missing
in Action in Southeast Asia also was invited to participate but, due to
its annual meeting in Washington, was unable to send a representative.
While in Hanoi, the delegation met with General Secretary Do Muoi,
Minister of Defense Doan Khue, Interior Minister Bui Thien Ngo, Acting
Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai, Vietnam
Veterans Association head General Tran Van Quang, and other
representatives of agencies in charge of veterans affairs for the
Ministry of National Defense and the Disabled Veterans Society. All
talks were conducted in a cordial and straightforward manner. Each
side had the opportunity to present clearly its views. The delegation
also received a letter to President Clinton from President Le Duc Anh,
which it will carry back to Washington.
The delegation also met with and was briefed by the U.S. personnel of
the Hanoi detachment of our Joint Task Force--Full Accounting. The
entire delegation, including the representatives of our veterans
organizations, was impressed by the dedication, hard work, and expertise
of all these individuals.
In these meetings with Vietnamese officials, the delegation stressed
President Clinton's message from his July 2 statement that any further
steps in relations between our two nations depend on tangible progress
on the outstanding, unresolved POW/MIA cases. Specifically, the
delegation reiterated the need for efforts by Vietnam in four main
areas:
-- Remains--concrete results from efforts on their part to recover and
repatriate American remains;
-- Discrepancy cases--continued resolution of 92 discrepancy cases and
remaining live sighting investigations;
-- Trilateral cooperation--further assistance in implementing
trilateral investigations along the Vietnam-Laos border; and
-- Archives--accelerated efforts to provide all POW/MIA-related
documents that will provide answers to individual cases.
In our meetings, we received assurances of Vietnam's intention to work
cooperatively in all areas that we identified in order to make progress.
Emphasizing the importance the U.S. attaches to treatment of veterans
from all sides, the delegation informed the Vietnamese officials with
whom they met that, as a humanitarian gesture to assist Vietnam in
accounting for its personnel, the United States would provide microfilm
copies of over 3 million pages of documents which our forces captured
during the war. This collection contains information on Vietnamese
military units, captured diaries, unit action reports, and other data.
The first portion of these documents was turned over to Vietnamese
representatives at the Joint Archive Center.
To support American citizens--including families of our missing and the
Vietnam veterans who have been invited by the Vietnamese Government to
visit Vietnam--and to facilitate and further strengthen our POW/MIA
effort in Vietnam, the U.S. delegation proposed sending three State
Department personnel to Hanoi on a temporary basis to work closely with
our Joint Task Force personnel. These officers would free up our Joint
Task Force personnel to concentrate exclusively on POW/MIA accounting.
U.S. and Vietnamese officials are discussing the modalities of this
arrangement.
The delegation also raised the issue of human rights and emphasized the
importance President Clinton and the American people attach to this
matter. Vietnamese officials indicated that they have an open attitude
to discussing this subject along with other subjects.
In keeping with the central theme of this visit--which is to increase
progress on POW/MIA accounting--the U.S. delegation will visit Ho Chi
Minh City on July 17 and 18. While there, the delegation will meet with
officials involved in the POW/MIA accounting process. The delegation
will also visit two projects of particular humanitarian concern to the
United States: a center providing prostheses to all veterans who are in
need and the Amerasian Transit Center.
The U.S. delegation greatly appreciated the courtesies extended to them
by the Vietnamese Government and the opportunity to meet with very
senior Vietnamese officials. (###)
ARTICLE 6:
U.S.-North Korea Talks on the Nuclear Issue
Press Statement (text agreed by the D.P.R.K. and U.S. delegations)
Text of statement by the U.S. delegation to the U.S.-D.P.R.K. talks on
the nuclear issue, released in Geneva, July 19, 1993 (an identical
statement was issued by the D.P.R.K. delegation).
The delegations of the United States and the DPRK met from July 14-19,
1993, in Geneva for a second round of talks on resolving the nuclear
issue.
Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, joint
USA/DPRK press statement.
For its part, the USA specifically reaffirmed its commitment to the
principles on assurances against the threat and use of force, including
nuclear weapons.
Both sides recognize the desirability of the DPRK's intention to replace
its graphite moderated reactors and associated nuclear facilities with
light water moderated reactors. As part of a final resolution of the
nuclear issues, and on the premise that a solution related to the
provision of light water moderated reactors (LWRs) is achievable, the
USA is prepared to support the introduction of LWRs and to explore with
the DPRK ways in which LWRs could be obtained.
Both sides agreed that full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards
is essential to accomplish a strong international nuclear non-
proliferation regime. On this basis, the DPRK is prepared to begin
consultations with the IAEA on outstanding safeguards and other issues
as soon as possible.
The USA and DPRK also reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of
the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. The DPRK reaffirms that it remains prepared to begin the
North-South talks, as soon as possible, on bilateral issues, including
the nuclear issue.
The USA and the DPRK have agreed to meet again in the next two months to
discuss outstanding matters related to resolving the nuclear issue,
including technical questions related to the introduction of LWRs, and
to lay the basis for improving overall relations between the DPRK and
the USA.
Robert L. Gallucci
Unilateral U.S. statement by the U.S. representative to the U.S.-
D.P.R.K. talks on the nuclear issue, Assistant Secretary of State for
Political-Military Affairs Robert L. Gallucci, Geneva,
July 19, 1993.
You have all seen the press statement agreed by the U.S. and D.P.R.K.
delegations. I would like to present the U.S. view of this important
issue and where negotiations stand.
As the President recently indicated, the D.P.R.K. nuclear program
represents a grave threat to international security and the non-
proliferation regime. Our talks in Geneva are part of a steady and
determined effort by the international community and the United States
to resolve the nuclear issue and reinforce security in the region.
Our objective is to achieve a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and a strong,
global non-proliferation regime. We want the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea to remain in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, comply with
IAEA fullscope safeguards, and fully implement the North-South
declaration on denuclearization. In our meetings last month in New
York, the D.P.R.K. agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. This
was a positive step. In keeping with its status as an NPT party, we
continue to expect the D.P.R.K. to accept regular IAEA inspections.
At this round of talks, we achieved three further steps toward a
resolution of the nuclear issue.
First, the D.P.R.K. has agreed to begin consultations with the IAEA on
outstanding safeguards issues, including the IAEA's requests for
additional information and visits to additional sites. The question of
access to these sites remains a critical issue for resolving
international concerns about the D.P.R.K.'s nuclear program, and we urge
the D.P.R.K. to reach agreement with the IAEA without delay.
Second, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has agreed to resume
discussions as soon as possible with the Republic of Korea on the
implementation of the North-South denuclearization declaration and other
bilateral issues. The Republic of Korea has also said it is ready for
this dialogue. Accordingly, we look to the two Koreas to reach
agreement on implementing an effective bilateral inspection regime.
Third, the D.P.R.K. announced that it is prepared to abandon its
graphite moderated reactors and associated facilities in favor of light
water reactors (LWRs), which are less suitable for nuclear weapons
material production. In the next round of U.S.-D.P.R.K. talks, we have
agreed to include discussions on this issue. While we support the
conversion to LWRs as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue,
it is understood that the U.S. cannot engage in any peaceful nuclear
cooperation with the D.P.R.K. or support others in assisting the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea until the D.P.R.K. has
unambiguously complied with its non-proliferation obligations, including
the NPT, IAEA, and the bilateral North-South declaration.
Obviously, sale of a power reactor would also involve complex financial
and legal matters which would have to be addressed at an appropriate
time in the future. Nonetheless, we believe that our long-term non-
proliferation objectives will be served by beginning to explore ways for
the D.P.R.K. to make a conversion to LWRs once the D.P.R.K. is in full
compliance with its non-proliferation obligations.
In the course of our discussions, both sides reaffirmed the principles
of the June 11, 1993, joint U.S.-D.P.R.K. press statement. The
principles referred to in this statement and its reaffirmation in Geneva
are based on U.S. obligations under the UN Charter. These obligations
commit us to refrain from the threat or use of force against another
country, except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations. Obviously, these principles preserve our
obligation and ability to assist the Republic of Korea in its self-
defense, including the right to conduct defensive exercises.
As we have said, the United States is prepared to continue its dialogue
with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as long as we are making
progress to resolve the nuclear issue. Based on the outcome of this
round of discussions, we have agreed to meet again in the next 2 months
to continue our efforts to resolve the nuclear issue. In this regard, I
would add that since the D.P.R.K. has said it will begin talks with the
IAEA and the Republic of Korea as soon as possible, we would not expect
to begin a third round of U.S. talks with the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea until serious discussions with the IAEA and the
Republic of Korea are underway. We have also made it clear that our
dialogue cannot continue if the D.P.R.K. withdraws from the NPT, engages
in additional reprocessing, or fails to accept regular IAEA inspections
necessary to maintain the continuity of safeguards. (###)
ARTICLE 7:
Situation in Azerbaijan
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, July
16, 1993.
The Department of State is deeply disturbed by Azerbaijani parliamentary
resolutions adopted on July 16 calling for the arrest of several former
Azerbaijani Government officials. Former Parliamentary Speaker Isa
Gambar has already been arrested pursuant to these resolutions. These
officials are being blamed for the crisis created in Azerbaijan when
government troops sought to disarm rebellious forces in Ganje. We
strongly condemn these parliamentary resolutions.
We have continually raised with Parliamentary Speaker Aliyev the
importance we place on democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule
of law. Mr. Aliyev has given us his assurances that he also supports
democracy in Azerbaijan, and we urge him to demonstrate that commitment
by adhering to democratic principles and international norms. We remind
Mr. Aliyev that Azerbaijan's commitment to these democratic principles
will be a determining factor in the quality of our bilateral relations.
(###)
ARTICLE 8:
Eighth Report on War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia
Following is the text of the Supplemental United States Submission of
Information to The United Nations Security Council In Accordance with
Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780
(1992), dated June 17, 1993.
Editor's Note: This report contains graphic descriptions.
This is the eighth submission by the United States Government of
information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771
(1992) relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia. As in our previous reports, we have focused on
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with
Resolution 771, have provided information that is "substantiated," that
is, which rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or
that includes detail sufficient for corroboration.
As with previous reports, we have tried to ensure that our collection
effort has been even-handed and aimed at gathering information on crimes
committed by all parties to the conflict. It should be noted, however,
that access to independent sources within the territory of the Republics
of Serbia and Montenegro has proved very difficult, due to limitations
imposed by authorities in those areas.
We have tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other
countries and non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit
reports pursuant to Resolutions 771 and 780. We have not repeated
individual accounts listed under one category, such as "willful
killing," in other categories, such as "torture." The United States has
further information substantiating the incidents included in this
report, which we will make available on a confidential basis directly to
the Commission of Experts, established under Security Council Resolution
780 or, as appropriate, to the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal,
established under Security Council Resolution 827.
Resolution 827, which was adopted since our last submission, ensures
that the UN Commission of Experts continues to pursue its work of
conducting investigations, establishing a data base, and preparing
evidence during the interim period before the appointment of the
Tribunal's Prosecutor and the hiring of staff to begin authoritative
investigations and preparations for trial of persons responsible for
violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia.
We urge other countries to continue to submit information on a regular
basis to the Commission during this interim period and to join us in
making financial contributions to the Commission to facilitate its
important work.
In accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution 780, the United States
intends to continue providing information that comes into our
possession. As in our previous reports, the notations at the end of
each of the items indicate the source from which the information was
drawn.
Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
Eighth Submission
Willful Killing
Apr-May 93: Bosnian Croatian and Muslim forces attacked civilians of
each other's ethnic group in Vitez, executing entire families in their
homes, from April 15, 1993, for about a week. According to the British
commander of the UN troops:
The soldiers have seen some things that will mark them for life--
children held in the arms of their mothers and both of them shot.
Reports of atrocities are correct. Whole families have been killed. We
do not know who is doing this--the bodies do not have names on them.
In Vitez, Bosnian Croat soldiers went from house to house executing
Muslims. Some women were murdered as they were taking in the laundry.
Multiple rapes by Bosnian Croat soldiers in the Vitez area have also
been confirmed. A 36-year-old Muslim refugee, who was shot in the arm,
said, "They are shooting every day, every hour, every moment."
On the outskirts of Travnik, a Muslim military police unit attacked
Croatian civilians, driving them from their homes.
In Konjic, Croat militiamen engaged in house-to-house fighting.
In Santici, Bosnian Croat gunmen killed villagers and livestock; they
burned houses and the village mosque. An UNPROFOR officer described the
activity:
Fifteen or twenty (Bosnian Croat militiamen) lobbed grenades through the
front windows of Muslim houses, then waited for the people to bolt out
the door, and shot them.
In Ahinici, UNPROFOR officials discovered charred bodies in Muslim homes
that had been torched by Bosnian Croat gunmen. As of May 4, the Ahinici
death toll had reached 103. According to the EC Monitoring Mission in
Zenica, "It was a large-scale massacre, organized and well planned."
(The Washington Post, The New York Times, London Press Association,
Paris AFP)
24 Apr 93: Residents of Miletici, a village located north of Vitez and
consisting of 11 houses, were attacked by a band of locally based
Muslims.
The Miletici village men attempted to defend their houses and, during
the short and mismatched gun battle, killed one of the "mujahideen"
soldiers. According to eyewitnesses interviewed by a UNHCR field worker:
The (Muslim) gunmen maintained that each one of them was worth five
villagers. They'd already killed one, so they took four men between the
ages of 20 and 40 into a house, held them there, tied up the rest of the
villagers, [then] returned to the house to torture and execute the four
men.
(Department of State, Reuters)
May 92-Apr 93: Two Muslim former soldiers, aged 25 and 33, were
released on April 21, 1993, after having been in a series of Serbian
camps since their capture on May 30, 1992. Both had admitted to being
soldiers when they were captured.
After their capture, the men were first sent to a camp in Vlasenica,
called Susica, where they were held for only a few days before being
transferred to a prison in the same town, where they remained for 2
months. They were then sent to a camp in Batkovic, where they remained
for 1 month, then to two different camps in Doboj, where they were held
for 6 months, until March 2, 1993. Finally, they were sent to a camp in
Bijeljina, until their release on April 21.
The witnesses said Batkovic was the worst of the camps in which they had
been held. There had been about 1,600 prisoners in Batkovic when they
arrived, all of them from northeastern Bosnia. A number of children and
elderly men were moved out of the camp in closed trucks after it was
announced there would be an ICRC visit to the camp.
Beatings were common at Batkovic. Zulfo Saracevic, aged 55, died of
beatings. A jeweler from Bijelina died after 3 nights of beatings, the
purpose of which was to get him to tell where he had hidden gold and
jewelry. Several elderly men died from the bad conditions at the camp.
One of the witness's cousins died of gangrene in a leg wound for which
he [had] received no medical care.
On several occasions, they and other prisoners were forced to remove
their clothes and perform sex acts on each other and on some of the
guards. The two witnesses named the three worst guards, all Serbs from
the Bijeljina area.
The witnesses, however, said that the very worst abuses were committed
by a fellow Muslim prisoner from Gornja Tuzla, whose nickname was
"Pupa." They described this Muslim as a "trustee" similar to the
"Kapos" in German camps during World War II. The witnesses said that
they had encountered other Muslim prisoners serving in the same capacity
in other camps in which they had been held.
The two camps in Doboj were located in a commercial warehouse and in a
warehouse at the Bare barracks. The men were not registered with the
ICRC in either camp; the ICRC was not permitted to visit either camp
during their time there. There were approximately 100 detainees in the
2 camps who were used as laborers to dig military trenches.
The witnesses said that two Serb camp managers in Doboj were "good men"
who did not allow abuse of the prisoners. On weekends, however, when
these two managers went home to visit their families, the prisoners were
beaten. Those beatings were perpetrated by Serb prisoners who often
received gifts, including alcohol, from their relatives on weekends.
The Serb guards allowed these beatings, but apparently did not
participate. (Department of State)
Jul-Aug 92: A 30-year-old Bosnian Croatian from Brisevo witnessed the
July 1992 movement of JNA forces through the area south of Prijedor and
west of Ljubija. Meeting little or no resistance, these forces moved
through each town and forced out the remaining inhabitants.
For about 4 days, JNA forces positioned mobile antiaircraft weapons on
the top of a ridge about 21/2 kilometers east of Ljubija. Anti-aircraft
guns were used to fire on unarmed refugees fleeing along the east slope
of the ridge.
In mid-August, a bus arrived from Ljubija with about 20 Muslim
prisoners, some from the area of Carakovo, southwest of Prijedor. They
were removed from the bus with their hands tied behind their necks with
wire and escorted by about 10 guards with assault weapons. After their
hands were freed, the prisoners were forced to dig a pit.
The guards beat and shot them, then pushed their bodies into the pit.
Before departing, the guards covered the bodies in the pit with dirt.
During the last half of August, the witness could see human hands and
feet protruding from the mound.
On about August 24, the area of Brisevo southwest of Prijedor was under
attack by Yugoslav army mortars. After the mortar attack, infantry
troops moved from village to village indiscriminately seeking out and
killing inhabitants. Most people were hiding from the shelling in their
basements, where the soldiers killed them. Muslims buried about 70
bodies, all of which had suffered multiple bullet wounds. The following
is a list of the locations of the graves of some of these 70 victims:
A. In Dimaci, on the west side of the paved road, alongside a
small creek flowing toward Begac on the sloping field below the house of
Stipe Dimaca. This grave contained the badly burned bodies of two males
and one female.
B. In Mlinari, on the west side of the paved road from Dimaci to
Buzuci, 10 meters behind the house of Ivitsa Mlinar. This grave
contained six bodies, at least two of which were males.
C. About 400 meters west of Mlinari towards Groarac, a grave
contained 4 male bodies with multiple bullet wounds. In the same
immediate area, about 10 meters from the well near the house of Marko
Busuk, three males were buried. One had been severely tortured, and his
eyes gouged out. The other two were invalids who had been shot.
D. On the east side of the paved road from Dimaci to Buzuci,
approximately 150 meters northwest of the site described above in C, was
the grave of a woman.
E. On the west bank of the Stare Nitsa, about 450 meters
downstream from the grave described in F, uphill from an old water mill,
and among some young "breza" trees, an unidentified man.
F. The grave of Ilija Atlija, about 400 meters southwest of the
grave site described above in E, on the north side of the Stare Nitsa
stream, 5 meters to the right of the front of the house of Ilija Atlija.
G. The grave of a man who died from knife wounds, located across
the road from a small church that had burned, 300 meters from where the
stream joins the road, and behind the house of Jozo Jakara.
H. The site of 2 graves, 200 meters from the road south of Lisina
near the house of Sreco Ivandic. One grave held the remains of four
males and one female; the other contained the bodies of three males and
one female. The two graves were about 70 meters apart.
I. Graves of two 16-year-old males, located on the Zunica Ravana
road northwest of Buzuci, near the church, along a small stream flowing
30 meters from the house of Kata Zunica. One boy was buried on the
south side of the stream; the other buried on its north side. Their
bodies bore identification stating they were from Rizvanovici.
(Department of State)
6 Aug 92: A Muslim from Sanski Most witnessed the arrival at Manjaca
camp of a convoy carrying 1,300 prisoners from Omarska, and the murder
of 15-20 of these men during the lunch hour. Camp guards beat the men
to death with wooden boards, bats, and thick electrical cables. Three
of the victims were stabbed repeatedly and their throats were cut. The
witness identified Jakupovic and Dedo Crnalnic as two of the casualties.
(Department of State)
Jul-Aug 92: A 26-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Donja Puharska, a suburb
of Prijedor, Bosnia, was imprisoned in Omarska camp on July 13, 1992,
and transferred to Manjaca camp on August 6, where he remained until
December 19.
On July 13, all of Muslim men remaining in Donja Puharska were arrested
and taken to the Omarska camp. On July 21, the witness was transferred
to a building called the "White House," where he was kept for 7 days. A
Serbian irregular came into the White House on July 26 and declared that
he had come from the front, where nine Serbian soldiers had been killed.
The irregular stated that three Muslim men would be killed for each of
the Serbian soldiers and that he would return at midnight to kill them.
He returned after midnight with a soldier and a truck. The irregular
and the soldier entered the room where the 50-60 men were held, grabbed
one prisoner, and took him outside. The prisoners heard the sounds of
beating and screams for help. The two men returned and grabbed another
prisoner and the same thing happened. The irregular and the soldier
came back and took one man each time until they had taken 27 prisoners.
At 5 am, they came and asked for four volunteers to load the dead bodies
on the truck.
On July 27, the witness was called out by two soldiers and taken for
interrogation to an upstairs room in the same building, where five men
beat him with objects that included a policeman's stick, a whip, a
rubber stick, a square metal stick, and a metal ball on a chain. The
man with the metal stick kept hitting the witness on the legs, and after
a while, his legs grew numb and he felt no pain in them.
Omarska camp contained a building called the "Red House," where victims
were killed with knives. The witness saw dead bodies outside the Red
House each day, some missing arms or legs, and said the stench was
unbearable.
On August 6, some of the prisoners were transferred by bus to a camp in
Manjaca. Upon arrival, the witness saw guards kill a man named Dzusin.
The guards had called him from the bus, took him about 10 meters away,
made him kneel, and cut his throat. (Department of State)
Jul 92: A 45-year-old Muslim witnessed, from his house in Visegrad, the
systematic butchering of about 450 Muslims on a bridge over the Drina
River.
On July 11, 1992, a Volkswagen Passat drove backwards onto the "stone
bridge" over the Drina and stopped in the middle. The blue-gray car,
which had come from the direction of the city center, was crammed with
six Muslims and at least one armed Serb. Another group of Chetniks was
already waiting for them on the bridge.
The man in charge of this group was a well-known Serb from Arandjelovac
or Kraljevo, Serbia. He announced over a megaphone to "Muslims hiding
in the surrounding woods" that they would have a "bloody bajram
(holiday), Balkan style." He also announced that "every Serb who
protects a Muslim will be killed immediately," and that for every Serb
killed by a Muslim, a thousand Muslims would be sacrificed.
The group then cut off the heads of the six prisoners, a process that
took about three minutes. The time was about 4:15 pm. They threw the
bodies into the Drina River. About a half hour later, a van arrived
with another eight Muslims. They were killed in the same manner. Women
and children were included in a third group that was brought to the
bridge about 7 pm. The killing went on through much of the night.
The massacre continued the following day. Victims included a dentist
named Dervis, Alia Selac, and Alia's father. At least 20 Chetniks
participated in the slaughter on the second day. The witness estimates
at least 450 people were killed on the bridge over 3 or 4 days.
(Department of State)
Jul 92 : A 68-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Lakat, Bosnia, witnessed the
killing of 19 elderly Bosnian Muslims in Borci and on Borasnica
mountain, near Konjic, by Bosnian Serb forces on July 9-10, 1992.
On June 28, the Bosnian Muslim residents of Lakat fled their village.
Only 20 elderly Bosnian Muslim men and women residents chose to remain.
On the morning of July 8, two Bosnian Serbs, also from Lakat, announced
that remaining Bosnian Muslims would be evacuated by bus to Buscak where
they would be exchanged. That evening, they were put on a military
truck destined for Pridvorci.
Two armed guards were stationed in the back of the truck with the
prisoners. After going through Pridvorci, the truck continued north for
another 10 kilometers to Luka where they stopped. The prisoners were
transferred to a 2 ton truck that took them to Borci where the prisoners
were put in the basement of a building. There had been three other
Bosnian Muslim prisoners inside the basement.
The next morning, July 9, the door to the basement was opened and the
prisoners were ordered to come out in pairs. After the first 2
prisoners walked out, they were met by 10 guards who beat them and
questioned them about the whereabouts of their sons. The second pair of
prisoners, including Osman Demic, was then called. During the
questioning, his right ear was cut off, and the other prisoner was
beaten unconscious.
Then the third pair was called out. Halil Golos was one of these men.
During the questioning, one of his ears was cut off. From the next
pair, Salko Demic was beaten to death. From the following pair, Ahmed
Hrnicic was also beaten to death. After all the prisoners had been
questioned, those who were still alive were taken back to the basement.
That same night, four guards returned to the basement and removed Ibro
Kajan, his wife Hava Kajan, and Osman Demic. Once outside, the three
were lined up and executed.
On the morning of July 10, the prisoners were removed from the basement
and ordered to load the bodies of Salko Demic, Ahmed Hrnicic, Osman
Demic, Ibro Kajan, and Hava Kajan onto the back of a waiting truck. The
guards ordered all to lie down in the back of the truck. The guards
killed 80-year-old Urija Golos because she did not lie down quickly
enough.
The two vehicles then traveled about 15 kilometers to Borasnica Mountain
(Borasnica Planina) in Konjic County (Konjic Obcine), where they stopped
on the road. The prisoners were ordered to throw all the bodies down
from the vehicle, and then to get out and carry the bodies off the road.
When all the bodies and prisoners were about 25 meters from the road,
the guards opened fire on the prisoners, killing all except the witness,
who they presumed was also dead. (Department of State)
Jun-Aug 92: A 38-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Gacko, Bosnia, was
interned by Bosnian Serb forces at Bileca camp until August 18, 1992.
On June 1, Bosnian Serb forces detained about 110 Bosnian Muslim and
Croatian males in Gacko, Bosnia, until June 5, when they were
transferred to the processing center located in the basement of the
Samacki Hotel on the southeast end of Gacko.
On June 18, after Bosnian Serb forces had announced that the Bosnian
Muslim and Croatian residents could leave the town, a convoy with
approximately 100 men, women, and children left Gacko and headed toward
neighboring Montenegro. Approximately 7 kilometers south of Gacko, near
the Kosuta Motel in Zborna Gomila, the convoy was intercepted by Serbian
irregulars from the White Eagles paramilitary organization. All able-
bodied males were segregated from the rest of the convoy and ordered to
lie down on the road. They were searched individually for valuables.
The women and children were then loaded on several military trucks and
returned to Gacko. The men were placed on two military trucks and taken
to the Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) building in Gacko. After
the prisoners were interrogated and tortured by two inspectors, they
were transferred to the basement of Samacki Hotel.
The witness identified the following prisoners who were killed at the
processing center in the Samaki Hotel from June 18 to July 1: Osman
Omanovic, about 60, from Domanovic; Mirsad Dzeko, about 35, from Gacko;
Arif Jaganjac, about 60, from Gacko; Miralem Voloder, about 32, from
Gacko; Edin Sahovic, about 37, from Gacko; Latif Halilovic, about 42,
worked in Gacko; Aziz Fazlagic, about 41, from Gacko.
On July 1, about 140 detainees were loaded onto 4 military trucks.
While they were boarding the trucks, 55-year-old Aziz Hasanbegovic, who
was unable to get on the truck because of his weight, was shot and
killed. Two other prisoners were also killed: 33-year-old Senad Memic
from Gacko, whose throat was slashed; and 17-year-old Enver Redzovic,
from Gacko, who was stabbed in the stomach. Their bodies were loaded
onto the trucks.
The convoy with the prisoners arrived in Bileca about 2 hours later.
Prisoners were forced to walk between two rows of guards who beat them
as they passed. Prisoners were placed in one of the basements where
another group of approximately 200 prisoners were already confined.
Prisoners were not fed or allowed to go to the restrooms for the next 3
days. They were indiscriminately beaten every day with large wooden and
metal sticks by groups of some 10 guards until the guards tired and
could no longer beat them.
The following prisoners were beaten to death between July 2-4: Sabit
Saric, about 52, from Gacko; Sevko Catovic, about 28, from Gacko; Adem
Ramic, about 70, from Gacko; Zecer Krvavac, about 80, from Gacko.
On August 10, the prisoners were taken upstairs for an interview
conducted by Radivoje Gutic, from the Bosnian Serbian News Agency (SRNA)
and Fnu Vulacic, from Belgrade Television, in the presence of Red Cross
officials. Days prior to this interview, the prisoners were allowed for
the first time to take a shower and shave. After the interview was
over, the prisoners were taken to the interrogation and torture room and
were tortured for telling the truth about the conditions and treatment
received at the camp. These tortures continued until August 18, when
378 prisoners from the camp were exchanged in Stolac, Bosnia.
(Department of State)
May-Aug 92: A 35-year-old Muslim from Prijedor was held prisoner by
Bosnian Serbs from May 30 until August 13, 1992, nearly all of that time
at Omarska camp.
Upon his arrival at Omarska on May 30, he and his fellow prisoners were
immediately ordered to stand with their hands against a wall while they
were beaten with sticks and other objects. At the beginning of his
captivity, the witness regularly saw people beaten badly, often until
they died, near the entrance of the camp's administration building.
The worst beatings occurred after Serbs from the area were killed in
combat. Following the death of six local Chetniks, for example, guards
put a mixture of oil and water on the ground to trip up prisoners. Those
who fell were beaten badly.
One evening, about halfway through his stay at Omarska, the witness saw
a prisoner in the kitchen standing on a chair and complaining about
Chetniks. A Serb soldier, after warning him to sit down, shot into the
crowd, killing the man and wounding four other prisoners. The witness
said he could identify the guard who had done the shooting.
During his imprisonment, the witness saw at least 10-15 prisoners beaten
to death between the interrogation area of the second floor of the
administration building and the building's entrance. One of the
victims, Rizah Hadzalic, was a personal acquaintance. Every night
people were taken out of their bunk facilities: 5, 10, sometimes 15.
Some came back badly beaten; many never came back. (Department of
State)
May-Jul 92: A 30-year-old Muslim was evicted from his family home in
Kozarac by Serb militia on May 26, 1992.
On the way from Kozarac to imprisonment at Trnopolje, a group of Serbs
threatened to kill him, his father, his brother, and three neighbors.
The Serbs lined them against a building wall and cocked their rifles,
but were stopped by an anonymous Serb commander. Instead of being shot,
they were beaten--in the case of the witness, until his ribs were
broken. Later along the route, the witness tried to help an elderly
woman who could no longer walk. A Serb soldier ordered him to let her
go, and then shot the woman to death.
Also along the route, inside Kozarac, the witness saw armed Serbs, whom
he knew, gun down the following five men: Ismet Karabasic, Sejdo
Karabasic, Ekrem Karabasic (all brothers), Ekrim Basic, and Edin Basic.
The witness was held inside a school in Trnopolje from where he
regularly observed, through a window, guards taking women from a movie
theater. During both the day and the evening, on at least 20 different
occasions, he saw the women taken either to the courtyard or to the
playing field where they were raped. The men were usually drunk. He
said that there were many witnesses who could see what was happening.
The women usually were returned afterward to the movie house.
(Department of State)
Jun 92: A 44-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Vlasenica, Bosnia, who was
captured by Serbian forces on June 24, 1992, in Vlasenica, was sent to a
prison camp in the Susica River valley where he witnessed numerous
atrocities committed by local Bosnian Serb troops. The witness knew
several key personalities at the camp responsible for atrocities. He
was later transferred to a prison in Batkovic on June 30, where he
remained until February 20, 1993.
On April 17, 1992, the first Serbian troops entered the village of
Vlasenica. The troops that initially occupied the village were from
Novi Sad, Serbia, and were led by an unidentified lieutenant colonel who
held a megaphone and demanded that all Muslim residents surrender their
weapons, and insisted that no harm would come to them.
The troops from Novi Sad left on May 2, when Bosnian Serb troops from
Sekovici, Bosnia, took over the town. Local Serbian troops from
Vlasenica also assisted the other troops with the occupation of their
village. Over the course of 5 weeks, the troops captured residents of
Vlasenica at random, took them to the police station for beatings, and
then released them.
On June 24, local Serbian troops evacuated about 50 Muslim families who
lived on a street in Vlasenica called Ulica Zarka Vukovica. After the
evacuation, five houses were set ablaze and the men, women, and children
were forced to walk to a prison camp in the Susica River valley, located
a few hundred meters from the town's main street. The camp was located
on the west side of the highway leading to Han Pijesak. Soon after the
residents from Vlasenica arrived on June 24, Durmo Handzic and Asim
Zildzic, who had been taken to the camp earlier, died from injuries
sustained from beatings suffered on June 22.
In the early morning hours of June 26, a reign of terror began at the
Susica camp. At 1 am, two Serbian guards entered the warehouse and
forced four men, including Muharam Kolarevic and Rasid Ferhatbegovic,
outside. Immediately thereafter, four gun shots were heard outside the
warehouse accompanied by screaming from the four men. At 1:30 am, two
Serbian brothers from Vlasenica went into the warehouse and took three
women away and raped them. Soon after daybreak, two brothers were
selected to dispose of the four corpses. The men buried the victims in
a grave near the camp.
Food was virtually non-existent at Susica camp. Each person was given
only one slice of bread for a 24-hour period. As the summer progressed,
soup was occasionally given in addition to bread. Prisoners commonly
lost consciousness from malnutrition. No exception was made for women
or children. The witness's 65-year-old uncle died of starvation.
Prisoners who had to use the bathroom were forced to run to a toilet
outside; another prisoner was given a stick and forced to beat the
individuals while they were defecating or urinating.
On June 30, several prisoners were moved from the Susica camp to one in
Batkovic, located approximately 10 kilometers north of Bijeljina,
Bosnia. As the men from Susica got off the bus, they were beaten. From
the very first day, everyone was subjected to harsh beatings. Many of
the guards at Batkovic were brutal men, but the witness identified one
of the worst, the man who killed Zulfo Hadziomerovic on July 4 by
beating him to death. This guard used the stock of his machine gun to
beat the prisoner about 10 times on that day. (Department of State)
May-Jul 92: A 31-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor, Bosnia, was a
prisoner at Keraterm camp from May 31 to August 5, 1992.
On May 31, about 300 Muslim men were arrested in a new section of
Prijedor located along the road to Bosanski Novi. Five buses took them
at first to Omarska camp, then to Keraterm camp.
The harassment and beatings of prisoners began on June 2. Each night,
prisoners were taken out, beaten, and killed. Guards would come into
the rooms, fire their rifles at the ceiling, and force some prisoners to
swallow the empty shells of 7.62mm ammunition. During the day, the
guards took the prisoners outside and made them walk on all fours and
bark like dogs. The prisoners had to take off their clothes and sit on
bottles. A particular guard, whom the witness identified, supervised
these "games," and laughed.
On July 26, the witness saw buses loaded with people drive through the
gate. The people were told to get off the buses and were separated into
two groups. Each group had to go to a grass-covered area at the end of
the building and form a circle. Camp guards were reinforced by a
busload of Chetniks who beat the men with bats wrapped in barbed wire
and with broken bottles.
This continued for the rest of the night. Then the metal door to Room
Three was closed and the soldiers fired inside the room. The prisoners
panicked, pressed against the locked door, opened it, and ran outside,
where they were machine-gunned. The massacre continued until 5 am the
next day.
At 11 am on July 27, a truck came for the bodies of both the dead and
those that were still living. Seventy volunteers were taken to load the
massacred people on the truck. There were 170 dead and 47 still alive.
The dead were loaded first; the injured were loaded on top of them.
At 4:30 am on July 28, the guards fired again into Room Three and killed
27 men. Banja Luka television reported that evening that there had been
an escape attempt at Keraterm and that 27 prisoners were shot dead while
trying to escape. On August 5, Keraterm was closed and the witness was
returned to Prijedor where he remained until January 12, 1993.
(Department of State)
May-Aug 92: A 34-year-old Bosnian Muslim told of his experiences at
the Keraterm and Omarska camps from late May to August 1992.
On May 26, Bosnian Serb soldiers arrested the witness on the road to
Prijedor. They brought him to Keraterm for 3 days, then to Omarska.
Upon his arrival at Omarska camp, he saw the beating death of 38-year-
old Ahiz Dedic, a Muslim ex-policeman, by two men from a Bosnian Serb
special unit. After his own torture the next day--he was beaten until
he fainted--the witness watched five Chetniks stab Ikrem Alic to death.
The witness was moved to the "electricians' house" from where, about a
month later, he watched as a man with his hands against the wall of
another nearby building was beaten by camp guards until he almost fell.
One of the guards then took a running jump from several meters, pouncing
on the man's back and knocking him down. He then turned the victim
over, cut his ears off, and then cut his throat. Another guard turned
and killed the man with his revolver.
The witness saw about 30 men killed during his stay at Omarska. Among
the victims whose names he knew were: Muharem Kahrimanovic,
Emir Karabasic, Jasmin Hrnic, Avdo Mujkanovic, Islam Bahonjic, and
Imeoca Grozdanic.
The most sadistic killings were of Hrnic and Karabasic. In the course
of a horrible beating, they were forced to bite off each other's sexual
organs. Before the final death blows, they were also forced to drink
motor oil and chew on dead pigeons.
At the end of August or beginning of September, the witness was taken to
Manjaca camp, where he spent half a month. During the trip, he
witnessed the beating deaths of Nezir Krak and Dedo Crnic; he identified
their killer. Outside Banja Luka, Serb children were encouraged to
board the bus and beat the prisoners. (Department of State)
May-Jul 92: A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the ethnic
cleansing of Kozarac and the Prijedor area from May 26 until his capture
3 days later. From his place of hiding in the woods, he witnessed the
killing of Hasan and Zejna Alic; she was shot in the breast, her husband
in the head. Two days later, the witness saw the same killer stab a
young man, force him to walk away, and then shoot him.
The witness and his friends were captured by Chetniks in the nearby
woods on or about May 29. One of the young Serbs who caught him was a
school friend who personally took charge of the witness and his brother,
and arranged for them to change into civilian clothes taken from a
nearby house. His Serb friend warned the two brothers not to admit to
Serb prison authorities that they had been "fighters."
The witness was taken to Keraterm for the first night, then to Omarska.
Upon arrival, he witnessed the killing of a detainee by a former taxi
driver whom he identified. On June 1, he watched as a member of the
"taxi driver's band" killed a Muslim named Jasmin Velic with a pickax.
He also witnessed the slow death of Hasic Eno, who had been stabbed in
the back and took 5 days to die.
During the witness' second month at Omarska, Azur Jakupovic arrived as a
prisoner. With a ring in his nose (the kind used for pigs) and attached
to a chain, Jakupovic was dragged into camp on his hands and knees by a
young Serb soldier. The victim was naked from the waist up, which
revealed a bloody Serb cross carved in his back. The guards announced
to Muslim onlookers that this was the way Serbia's enemies would look.
Jakupovic was then tossed onto a burning stack of truck tires, where he
died.
The witness said that such killings were often observed by three senior
camp officials, from the second floor of the administration building.
He identified these camp officials. (Department of State)
May-Jun 92: A 26-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Divic, Bosnia, witnessed
the ethnic cleansing of his village and atrocities in a Celopek
detention facility, where he was detained from May 29 through June 29,
1992.
On May 29, all 174 male citizens of Divic were taken by bus to a movie
theater that was part of a cultural center being used as a prison in the
village of Celopek, located 7 kilometers north of Zvornik.
On June 7, two Serbian soldiers from Kraljevo murdered Suljeman Kapidzic
and Ramo Alihodzic as an example to all prisoners of what would happen
if they didn't pay the guards 2,000 German marks immediately. The men
collected amongst themselves enough German marks to pay the price.
On June 10, a 35-year-old Serbian soldier took seven pairs of fathers
and sons from the group and forced them to walk onto the stage of the
theater and disrobe. He forced the seven pairs to perform fellatio on
one another while the other men were required to watch. While this was
happening on the stage, the same soldier took Sakib Kapidzic and Zaim
Pezerovic from the audience and ordered the men under his command to
beat them until they were unconscious, and then ordered his men to stab
their victims to death.
The soldier then took a semi-automatic rifle and shot randomly at the
men on the stage and into the audience. He also approached a 16-year-
old boy, Damir Bikic, and asked him to point out his father in the
audience. He asked the father if he had any other male offspring. When
the father replied that he did not, the soldier put a rifle in the boy's
mouth and killed him. In this sequence of events, this particular
soldier killed 10 men. (Department of State)
May-Jun 92: A 31-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the JNA attack in
late May 1992, the subsequent ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population
of Sanski Most, Bosnia, and the destruction of their property. The
witness spent 50 days as a prisoner in Sanski Most and then was
imprisoned at the detention camp in Manjaca until mid-December 1992.
Between May 23 and 24, the JNA and its military police arrested the
Muslim officials in the city government and members of the Muslim
intelligentsia. On May 25 and 26, the JNA units attacked Muslims in
Sanski Most by throwing grenades in their homes in the Muslim section,
Mahala, and by firing at the houses with automatic weapons. This lasted
1 day, during which 11 persons were shot to death in a house on Muhici
Street that belonged to a man named Hilmija. Of these, three were
women, one of whom was pregnant, and five were young boys.
The men were taken to the local school; women and children were
transported to Velika Kladusa. After the "cleansing," the Serbs
continued to throw grenades into the houses, then burned them. The
ruins were leveled with bulldozers. Local Serb platoon leaders, whom
the witness identified, used their soldiers to carry out the
destruction.
The men from the Muslim section of Sanski Most were held prisoner in the
local school for 50 days, where there were 1,200 men and no toilet
facilities. The men were beaten continuously and forced to beat each
other. Frequently, Serbian irregulars armed with knives came to the
school and demanded to kill the prisoners, but police guards would not
let them in. (Department of State)
19 May 92: A 60-year-old Bosnian Muslim described the massacre of
Muslim prisoners at a hunting lodge.
Bosnian Serbs in Metaljka detained the witness and drove him to the
Mostina detention facility, a hunting lodge in the woods between
Metaljka and Cajnice. There were 50 Muslim men held inside the lodge
and another 6 held in a shipping container to which the witness was
brought.
A Serb from the village of Stakorina, whom he identified, entered the
lodge at about 5 pm and opened fire on the prisoners. The witness heard
the firing last for about 10 minutes, then heard the man exit the lodge
and continue shooting into the air until someone told him to calm down.
He responded, "Take me down to Cajnice so I can kill them all."
He did not come to the shipping container where the witness was
detained. (Department of State)
9 May 92: A Bosnian Muslim from Brcko witnessed the slaying of
prisoners by Serbian guards at Luka camp on or about May 9, 1992.
Immediately upon his arrival at Luka, the witness saw a Chetnik beat and
kill two men from Zvornik. The incident happened at the door of the
camp's warehouse, where the "in-processing" was taking place. The
witness had been standing about 15 meters from the shooting.
The next day, the same man who had shot the men from Zvornik drove into
camp with a woman named Ahmetovic, the sister of a Muslim ex-policeman
whose whereabouts he was demanding to know. The Chetnik pulled the
woman from the car and beat her with a truncheon, asking again where her
brother was hiding. After about 10 minutes, he took a shovel and hit
her twice in the head, killing her.
During the same day, the witness also saw another Serb soldier beat and
kill a 35-year-old Muslim man named Sead Cerimagic. The witness watched
a total of five men get the same treatment from this soldier within an
hour. (Department of State)
May 92: A 65-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Grapska, Bosnia, witnessed
Serb irregular forces enter Sjenina and Grapska in May 1992, during
which time residents were ordered to report to the hospital basement.
Fearing internment, residents fled to the woods. Later, as they
returned to their homes, they were rounded up by the irregular forces.
The soldiers ordered about 45 of them to dig a fresh grave in a cemetery
near the mosque. Some of the victims attempted to resist, but were shot
on the spot. Those who dug the grave were subsequently killed with
automatic weapons and pushed into the grave. After the massacre, the
grave was filled in and leveled with earthmoving equipment.
Residents were told they would be taken to Doboj on buses, but were
force-marched instead. Individuals periodically were pulled out of the
march column, taken a short distance away, and shot. (Department of
State)
Apr-May 92: A 64-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the April 8, 1992,
ethnic cleansing of Zvornik by Serbian irregular forces units, which was
organized by the Zvornik chief of police.
The Chetniks burned about 200 houses. As people were forced out of
their houses, they were directed to stay in a group in front of a large
house. Most of the Chetniks wore scarves or ski masks to hide their
faces. Two unidentified Muslim men were taken behind a house and shot.
Two other Muslim men, Hammed Cirak and Salikh Dagdagan, were killed in
their homes, after which the corpses were brought out and burned. In
all, about 76 people were killed, mostly in their basements. Those who
were gathered together were told that younger males must either join the
Serbian forces, leave, or be shot. Elderly men, women, and children
were allowed to stay.
After a few days, the elderly men from the Kula area were allowed to
return to their houses. In mid-April, Serbian forces began using a
bulldozer to dig large pits in the Muslim cemeteries southwest of
Zvornik proper. The witness saw buses and trucks dumping an
undetermined number of bodies into these pits up to three times a day.
One of the cemeteries was called Kazambase. He often saw trucks loaded
with bodies in Maly Zvornik, in the area of the stone quarry near the
Drina Hotel.
In May, Chetnik forces moved into Djulci. They shot 10 residents on
sight as they moved into town, as well as another 50 people who had been
hiding in a garage. (Department of State)
Torture of Prisoners
Dec 92: A 24-year-old Bosnian of mixed Croatian Muslim background, from
Banja Luka, reported that he had been hiding in his apartment for 8
months when he decided on December 25, 1992, to risk going outside. The
witness took some comfort from the Serb mayor of Banja Luka's Christmas
greeting to all Croats.
The witness was picked up almost immediately during a roundup of
military age men by Serb military police on a bridge in the city
district of Mejdan. Two of the bearded Chetniks started beating and
verbally abusing him after asking him why he was not fighting.
The witness was taken to a bus loaded with other prisoners. As
prisoners were brought on to the bus, each was beaten with a truncheon.
All the prisoners had their valuables taken from them. There were four
buses carrying a total of about 200 prisoners. The families who
gathered around the buses were told their men would be back in an hour.
The buses stopped at a police station and at a military camp on the way
to Manjaca. At both places, the men were beaten and interrogated. The
witness identified several guards who beat prisoners regularly at
Manjaca camp, from which he was released the next month. (Department of
State)
Jun-Jul 92 : A 45-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Sanski Most witnessed
the arrival at Manjaca camp of several convoys:
On June 17, a group of 40-45 persons from Sanski Most arrived and were
all beaten once they dismounted the trucks that had transported them.
On June 28, a group of 20-25 prisoners arrived, were beaten, and were
immediately put in isolation.
On July 7, a group of about 550 persons was brought to Manjaca camp in
two trailer trucks and a 3-ton truck. About 24 were already dead when
the trucks were unloaded.
The witness singled out the Manjaca "policemen" as the most cruel of the
guard contingents. The witness was beaten daily and kept in solitary
confinement. He recalls being beaten approximately 20 times. One of
his beatings lasted from 4 pm until 9:30 pm. The witness identified many
of the sadistic guards, including one nicknamed "Kostolomac" (or bone
breaker). (Department of State)
Abuse of Civilians In Detention Centers
26 Mar 93: According to the International Committee of the Red Cross,
during a visit on March 31 to Bosnian Serb-controlled Batkovic camp,
delegates of the ICRC were informed that 17 detainees might have lost
their lives on March 26 when the vehicle transporting them for work at
the front was ambushed. Three surviving detainees were able to speak in
private with the ICRC delegates.
The ICRC has observed in the past that detainees were being forced to
work at the front line. The ICRC noted that to send detainees into a
combat zone where they might come under fire is a violation of the
provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. The ICRC also
reminded the parties to the conflict that they are responsible at all
times for the detainees' safety, and that it is prohibited to compel
detainees to do work of a military nature or destined to serve a
military purpose. (International Committee of the Red Cross)
May-Jun 92: A 26-year-old Muslim, along with family members, was
evicted from her family home in Kozarac by Serb militia on May 25, 1992.
After having been held 3 nights in a school in Trnopolje, she was moved
to a local private Muslim home. In June, she was able to visit the
school each day to bring food to her husband and brother. During these
visits, she regularly saw Serbs who had been neighbors roaming the camp
(the school and its grounds) and beating prisoners. The first person on
a list of Serbs she identified as participants in those beatings was
once a classmate of hers.
On her last night in Trnopolje, about June 25, she and other women and
children were moved to the movie theater. There were about 500 to 600
women and children inside. At about 10 pm, two men arrived and picked
out three women. There were about 10 other Serb men waiting for them
outside. At about 6 or 7 am, one of three women returned to the movie
theater, holding the wall with one hand and her stomach with the other,
bent over, with a swollen face and black and blue marks, and crying.
The other two women were never seen again. (Department of State)
Impeding Delivery of Food And Medical Supplies to the Civilian
Population
11 Jun 93: Bosnian Croat forces set up roadblocks and mines on a
mountain road going through Nova Bila, stalling a humanitarian aid
convoy that was moving east from central Bosnia. According to an
UNPROFOR spokesperson, " The ill-fated convoy then met with further
resistance when 24 of the trucks were stopped at Nova Bila and hit by
mortars." (Reuters)
1 Jun 93: Bosnian Serb forces turned back UNHCR humanitarian aid
convoys for the eastern Bosnian enclaves of Gorazde and Srebrenica. The
Srebrenica convoy was stopped at the border crossing at Zvornik without
explanation; the Gorazde convoy was stopped by local Bosnian Serb
officials in Sekovici who told them "to get the hell out."
Bosnian Serb forces surrounding Srebrenica continued to prevent access
by UN specialists to the town's water purification system. The regular
water supply was contaminated and could not be restored without such
access, and springs were running dry. (Department of State)
May-Jun 93: Renegade forces of Bosnian Croat and Muslim armies have
planted mines along roads used primarily for humanitarian aid convoys
and journalists. (The Washington Times)
28 May 93: Bosnian Muslim gunmen fired on a humanitarian aid convoy of
Russian vehicles and drivers on the road between Pale and Sarajevo.
(Department of State)
24 May 93: Bosnian Croat gunmen prevented a UN humanitarian aid convoy
from delivering food to the Muslim village of Kruscica. The convoy was
forced to return to Vitez, where it had distributed food to Croats
earlier in the day. (Reuters)
20 May 93: Bosnian Muslim forces barred an UNPROFOR convoy access to
the Croatian village of Kostajnica, in the Konjic district. The convoy
was required to return to Jablanica. (Department of State)
17 May 93: Bosnian Serb forces fired on Muslims attempting to collect
air-dropped humanitarian aid supplies inside a UN-declared safe area in
eastern Bosnia. According to a spokesperson for UNPROFOR:
In Srebrenica, air-dropped relief bundles have been landing near the
line of confrontation and Serb forces have fired upon some residents as
they tried to retrieve them. (Reuters)
13 May 93: Bosnian Croat forces barred the UNHCR from delivering food
and other supplies to about 1,475 Muslim civilians detained at Rodic
military camp, near the Mostar heliodrome. The Bosnian Croats on May 9,
1993, had forcibly transported more than 1,000 Muslim women and children
out of Mostar.
Conditions at the camp were extremely uncomfortable but not life-
threatening. While isolated cases of abuse appear to have occurred
during detention, most detainees volunteered that they were being
treated well by their jailers, even describing them as kindly and
concerned for the detainees' welfare. In general, the main difficulties
facing the detainees were extreme overcrowding, insufficient food, and
inadequate hygiene. (Department of State, The New York Times, Los
Angeles Times)
12 May 93: An UNPROFOR helicopter was struck by a single small arms
round from an unknown location following the evacuation of some 35
wounded from Zepa, forcing it to make an emergency landing about 7
kilometers east of Trodor. (Department of State)
11 May 93 : A Spanish UNPROFOR lieutenant was seriously wounded in the
neck, arms, and leg while trying to move blood and medical supplies into
Mostar during fighting between Bosnian Croatians and Muslims. (Reuters)
10 May 93: Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) assaulted a UNHCR humanitarian
assistance convoy in Prozor. HVO soldiers pulled the Bosnian drivers
from their trucks and beat them. Four drivers were injured and six
vehicles were damaged extensively. (Department of State)
27 Apr 93: Unidentified forces wounded a British aid worker and a
Bosnian driver when they shelled a humanitarian assistance convoy 3
kilometers north of Visoko on the road to Zenica. The shelling also
damaged another truck in the convoy, which was returning empty from
Tuzla. (Paris AFP)
30 Apr 93: Bosnian Serb forces continued to prohibit doctors from
entering Srebrenica, and specifically turned back a team of physicians
from Medecins Sans Frontieres, which had attempted to accompany a UNHCR
convoy. The medical situation in Srebrenica deteriorated; scabies was
rampant, particularly among children. (Department of State)
19 Apr 93: A UNHCR humanitarian assistance convoy was stoned while
traveling through Bosnian Serb-held territory on the way to Srebrenica.
Despite protective steel grills over the windshields, several truck
windshields were broken and two drivers were injured. UNHCR reported
that blocks weighing 15-20 pounds were thrown at the trucks.
In recent instances, Bosnian Serb police have stood by and watched as
youths pelted the UNHCR trucks from elevated embankments as they drove
past. UN convoys going to Tuzla also encountered instances of stoning.
(Department of State)
Deliberate Attacks On Non-Combatants
8 Jun 93: Bosnian Muslim militiamen fired machine guns at Bosnian Croat
civilians as they ran from their homes in Guca Gora, a village northeast
of Travnik, according to UN peace-keeping officials. UN troops saw
Muslims shooting civilians as they fought from house to house, and
confirmed that hundreds of Croat civilians had died as a result of the
Muslim action. A UN spokesperson said:
There is strong evidence of atrocities. For example, a door forced,
apparently kicked open, and the civilian occupant found dead in the
garden, shot in the head. (Department of State, The Washington Post,
The New York Times, Reuters)
4 Jun 93 : A mortar attacked 1 of 4 buses carrying 95 Muslim and
Croatian men, women, and children to Tuzla, at a Croatian forces
checkpoint south of Vitez, in an area where Muslims and Croatians were
fighting each other. The mortar killed two of the passengers and
injured an Austrian humanitarian aid worker, Jasmin Arzberger. (Reuters)
2 Jun 93: An unidentified sniper killed Dominique Lonneux, a Belgian
journalist working for a Mexican television service, while he was
traveling with a UN humanitarian aid convoy that was traveling near
Dreznica, outside Mostar. The car in which Lonneux was traveling was
clearly marked "TV." (Paris AFP)
1 Jun 93 : Bosnian Serb mortar crews shelled a soccer game in the
Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja where about 200 Bosnians, celebrating a
Muslim holiday, were watching the game. The attack killed at least 11
people and wounded at least 80, about 25 of whom received life-
threatening injuries.
Bosnian Serbs shelled a 12-truck humanitarian aid convoy carrying food
and heading for Maglaj, killing five--including two Danish drivers--and
wounding seven, some seriously. According to an UNPROFOR statement:
Three things are very clear. This has been a deliberate attack on a
UNHCR convoy. The attack was from the direction of Serbian-held
territory, and tank rounds were used.
Snipers seriously wounded two French soldiers who were guarding Sarajevo
airport; one sustained serious head injuries. (Department of State, The
Washington Post, The New York Times, Paris AFP, Los Angeles Times, The
Washington Times)
29 May 93: A gang of about 30 gunmen, wearing Bosnian Army uniforms
with Muslim insignia, shot and killed three Italian humanitarian
assistance workers on the road between Gorni Vakuf and Novi Travnik,
northeast of Split, at a place known as the "fish hatchery."
They were in a group of five Italians who had been transporting food in
Bosnia with the Food for Aid organization, and were pulled from their
vehicles and robbed. The two survivors stated, on June 1 in Grnica,
that the gunmen had fired at their feet as they ran from the ambush.
The perpetrators of this crime are still unknown. (Department of State,
The Washington Times, Reuters, API)
21 May 93: Bosnian Serb forces fired on Sarajevo, killing 4 people and
wounding more than 30, many of them children. The wounded included
Deputy Prime Minister Zlatko Lagumdzija, who was shot in the leg. (API,
Reuters)
25 Apr 93: A UN Security Council mission to Srebrenica called the
Muslim enclave "an open jail" where Serbian forces were planning "slow-
motion genocide." Serbian nationalist forces had cut off water and
electricity supplies to Srebrenica, reportedly in retaliation for
similar actions against Serbian villages earlier in the war, when the
Muslims still controlled the source. (The New York Times)
22 Apr 93: Gunfire from Croat troops near Gospic killed a Slovak member
of UNPROFOR and wounded another peace-keeper. Another attack hit a
Czech and Slovak UNPROFOR control point near Licki Osik. Fog made it
difficult to determine whether this shelling had come from either the
Croatian or Serbian forces. (API, Paris AFP)
16 Apr 93: Unknown assailants launched a mortar attack that killed a
Ukrainian soldier with the UN peace-keeping force while he was on patrol
in the Grahoviste district of Sarajevo. (Reuters)
12 Apr 93: Serb nationalist forces shelled Srebrenica twice on April
12, once from 2:15 pm to 3:20 pm, and the second time from 3:50 pm to
4:10 pm. Most or all of the dead were civilians, including 15 children.
Rounds fell first at the north end of town and proceeded toward the
south end of town. At least 14 children were found dead in the school
yard, where they had been playing football.
During the next barrage of direct shelling, a child of about 6 years of
age was decapitated. The UNHCR representative who witnessed these
attacks said:
I will never be able to convey the sheer horror of the atrocity I
witnessed on April 12. Suffice it to say that I did not look forward to
closing my eyes at night for fear that I would relive the images of a
nightmare that was not a dream.
As of April 13, total casualties in the town of Srebrenica were 56 dead
and approximately 100 wounded. A senior UN official in Zagreb called
the Srebrenica shelling a violation of international conventions
prohibiting attacks on civilian targets. "It is an atrocity," he said.
(Department of State, API, The Washington Post, The New York Times)
Other, Including Mass Forcible Expulsion, Deportation of Civilians, Mass
Graves, and Wanton Destruction of Property
9 Jun 93: Bosnian Serbs have detained hundreds of Croat males from the
Travnik area at Manjaca camp. (Department of State)
20 May 93: UN personnel discovered that both Bosnian Croats and Muslims
were practicing ethnic cleansing in the southern Bosnian city of Mostar.
According to a UNHCR spokesperson:
Most of the ethnic cleansing is being done by the Croats, (but) there is
evidence of Croatians being forced out of the Muslim area in Mostar
also.
(Paris AFP)
11 May 93: Bosnian Croat forces used a large military ambulance--marked
with the distinctive red cross--to move more than a dozen armed soldiers
and a recoilless rifle into the Mostar area. (The New York Times)
11 May 93: Bosnian Serb forces reopened a former prison camp, the
ceramics factory at Keraterm, where they detained a large group of
Muslim men from Prijedor. A Serbian civil servant, who had confirmed
the action, said the Muslims were to be used as hostages in case of U.S.
military intervention. After a few days, some of the men were released
after relatives had paid a ransom; many more reportedly remained.
(Department of State, Hamburg DPA)
7 May 93: Bosnian Serbs blew up the 1587 Ferhad-Pasha mosque and the
1587 Arnaudija mosque, both located in Banja Luka. Yugoslav President
Cosic issued a statement calling the bombing an "act of barbarity" and
"the final warning to all reasonable and responsible people on all
warring sides to act resolutely, immediately, and with all means at
their disposal to stop the war and destruction." (The New York Times)
May 93: According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
civilian population in Banja Luka is under constant pressure by armed
groups who repeatedly beat, rob, and threaten persons belonging to
minorities. The houses of such persons in Banja Luka and nearby
villages are regularly attacked and burned by uncontrolled elements.
On May 2, a local Red Cross office in Banja Luka was destroyed by fire.
On May 6, three mosques in Banja Luka were severely damaged by
explosives. (International Committee of the Red Cross)
3 May 93: Bosnian Serbs expelled about 230 Muslim men, women, and
children from Banja Luka. The Muslims, who were sent by bus through the
Serbian lines at Turbe to Travnik, were required to pay 100 German marks
for each adult and 50 marks for each child prior to departure, and to
sign away all their property. (Reuters, Paris AFP)
Mar 93: After having been detained in Bosnian Serb camps almost
continuously from May through September 1992, a 42-year-old Bosnian
Muslim was released upon the intervention of an influential Serbian
friend.
The witness was not permitted to return to his home in Brcko, which had
been "cleansed" of Muslims and Croatians, but forced to move to
Bijeljina where he resided until mid-March 1993.
During this time, Bosnian Serb military and civilian authorities
exercised great pressure on the Muslim and Croatian population to
resettle elsewhere. All Muslims lost their jobs and were subject to a
curfew and to searches of their homes. They had no income and were not
allowed to sell any of their property.
On March 14, 1993, 2 days before the witness' departure from the area,
the Serbs blew up all six mosques in Bijeljina, completely destroying
them. Subsequently, they removed all the remains and plowed over the
area. By chance, the BBC learned of the razing of the mosques and was
able to film the debris of one before it could be cleared away.
(Department of State)
1992-93: A 42-year-old Muslim described the leaders of the "exchange
committee" for prisoners of war and civilian prisoners in Brcko.
The witness also described "mafia-like" organizations run by the
"Arkanovci" to enrich themselves. One group, for example, controlled
the bridge over the Sava River in Bosanska Raca, located 20 kilometers
north of Bijeljina, where they demanded payment of 500-800 German marks
for each Bosnian who wanted to cross the bridge to Serbia. Groups of
other military irregulars operated similar "services" across the Drina
River, east of Bijeljina.
In addition to controlling the bridges, Serbians also operated small
boats. For a fee of up to 1,000 German marks for each person, and with
the knowledge of local authorities, Muslims willing to resettle were
transported across the river by the Serbs. Each group of Serbs (the
"Arkanovci," "Draganovci", etc. ) controlled their own territory and
refrained from infringing on the territory of others. Under the guise
of aiding the "voluntary resettlement" of the Muslims, Serbs robbed them
of their last coin. Many people at all levels were involved in these
practices. (Department of State)
May-Jun 92: A 45-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the ethnic cleansing
of Sanski Most.
Serbian authorities expelled all Bosnian Muslims from the local police
forces by April 1992. Similarly, the locally stationed JNA detachments
were purged of Muslims. By sometime in April, the Serbian-controlled
militia demanded that all Sanski Most inhabitants turn in their weapons
to the police.
On May 26-28, 1992, Sanski Most was subjected to intense bombardment.
Up to 400 buildings were destroyed and all the mosques were dynamited.
On May 27, the bombardment temporarily stopped and Muslims were told to
gather in a field so they could be "protected" from the incoming fire.
Approximately 2,000 people left their houses, reported to the
authorities, and went to a sports arena. Once there, they were told to
return to their homes and raise white flags over their houses to show
they had no weapons and had "surrendered." About 3,000 Muslims were
displaced in this phase of "cleansing."
The witness described some of the detention facilities in Sanski Most:
the Betoniarka concrete factory, the Hasan Kikic school, the Gradska
Dworana (used to house women), the Narodni Front school, and the Krinc
factory. Additionally, people were locked in pigsties.
Up to four shifts of guards worked each day at Betoniarka, where the
witness was detained. He recognized men from the civil militia, the
Serbian reservist militia, and paramilitary groups, who administered
beatings continuously. Some names of victims of these beatings were
read off lists, others were former inhabitants from villages where Serbs
had suffered casualties, and some were victims of private vendettas.
(Department of State)
May 92: A 60-year-old Bosnian Muslim described the ethnic cleansing of
his village of Borajno, which is located in the Cajnice district.
On May 10, Serbian forces from Plejvlja, across the border in
Montenegro, came to Borajno asking everyone to surrender their weapons.
On May 16, the soldiers ordered the Muslims to move to the other side of
the village, at which time the Serbs bombed the empty houses. The next
morning, the soldiers began shooting in the air and, by 3 pm, the
commander of one of the local Serbian units ordered the Muslims to leave
the village.
The villagers ran into the woods. Immediately thereafter, the Serbian
forces started bombing the woods from the mountains. The witness was
able to return to Borajno on May 18, but he found the village deserted.
(Department of State)
Apr-May 92: A 50-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the occupation of
Doboj by some of Arkan's paramilitary groups. Some of these troops were
native Serbs; others were from the Knin region in Croatia.
When the paramil