VOLUME 4, NUMBER 29, JULY 19, 1993

1.  Fundamentals of Security for A New Pacific Community -- President 
2.  U.S.-South Korean Relations -- President Clinton, South Korean 
President Kim 
3.  Fact Sheet:  U.S.-Korea Relations
4.  Country Profile:  South Korea
5.  Meeting the Challenge of International Terrorism -- Timothy E. Wirth
6.  Fact Sheet:  Alien Smuggling Policy
7.  Treaty Actions
8.  What's in Print:  Foreign Relations of the United States


Fundamentals of Security for A New Pacific Community
President Clinton
Address before the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, 
South Korea, July 10, 1993

Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker, leaders of the National Assembly, and 
members of all political parties here present, joined together in our 
common devotion to democracy.

It is a great honor for me to be here today with my wife, with the 
United States Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and with 
other military and political leaders from our government in this great 
hall of democracy.

I first visited your beautiful capital city 5 years ago.  Since then, 
Korea's energy and culture have shown themselves in many new ways.  Your 
bustling capital has continued to grow.  Your economy has continued to 
expand.  Your nation hosted the Olympics and has taken its place as a 
full member of the United Nations.  You have established new ties to 
Russia and to China.  But no achievement is more important than the 
consolidation of your democracy with the election of a bold democrat, 
President Kim Young Sam. 

Geography has placed our two nations far apart, but history has drawn us 
close together.  Ours is a friendship formed in blood as our troops 
fought shoulder to shoulder in defense of freedom.  Then, as Korea's 
economy became the miracle on the Han, we built an economic partnership 
that today exceeds $30 billion in fairly well-balanced trade.  Today, 
Korea's democratic progress adds yet another bond of shared values 
between our two peoples.

When President Truman sent American troops to Korea's defense 43 years 
ago, he said he aimed to prove that, and I quote:  "Free men under God 
can build a community of neighbors working together for the good of 
all."  Our efforts together since then have benefited all our peoples--
not only the people of our own countries but, in the Asian Pacific 
region, all who seek to live in peace and freedom.  

Our relationship has made this region more secure, more prosperous, and 
more free.  Now with the Cold War over and profound changes sweeping 
throughout your country, this whole populous region, and, indeed, 
throughout the world, we must create a new vision of how we, as a 
community of neighbors, can live in peace.

I believe the time has come to create a new Pacific community built on 
shared strength, shared prosperity, and a shared commitment to 
democratic values.

Security for a New Pacific Community:  Four PrioritiesToday I want to 
discuss the fundamentals of security for that new Pacific community and 
the role the United States intends to play.  I had the opportunity just 
a few days ago at the G-7 summit in Tokyo to travel to Waseda University 
to talk about the economic aspects of that new partnership.  And I think 
clearly all the economic reforms that we can make will benefit a great 
market system like Korea.

But we must always remember that security comes first.  Above all, the 
United States intends to remain actively engaged in this region.  
America is, after all, a Pacific nation.  We have many peoples from all 
over Asia now making their home in America, including more than 1 
million Koreans.  We have fought three wars here in this century.  We 
must not squander that investment.

The best way for us to deter regional aggression, perpetuate the 
region's robust economic growth, and secure our own maritime and other 
interests is to be an active presence.  We must and we will continue to 

To some in America, there is a fear that America's global leadership is 
an outdated luxury we can no longer afford.  Well, they are wrong.  In 
truth, our global leadership has never been a more indispensable or a 
more worthwhile investment for us.  So long as we remain bordered by 
oceans and powered by trade and so long as our flag is a symbol of 
democracy and hope to a fractious world, the imperative of America's 
leadership will remain.  

I believe there are four priorities for the security of our new Pacific 

First, a continued American military commitment to this region;

Second, stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass 

Third, new regional dialogues on the full range of our common security 
challenges; and

Last, support for democracy and more open societies throughout this 

A Continued U.S. Military Presence in the Region

The bedrock of America's security role in the Asian Pacific must be a 
continued military presence.  In a period of change, we need to preserve 
what has been reliable.  Today we, therefore, affirm our five bilateral 
security agreements with Korea, with Japan, with Australia, with the 
Philippines, and with Thailand.

Those agreements work because they serve the interests of each of the 
states.  They enable the U.S. armed forces to maintain a substantial 
forward presence.  At the same time, they have enabled Asia to focus 
less energy on an arms race and more energy on the peaceful race toward 
economic development and opportunity for the peoples of this region.

The contributions Japan and Korea made to defray the cost of stationing 
our forces underscores the importance of that presence to both of those 
countries.  There is no better example of that commitment than our 
alliance with your nation.  As the Cold War recedes into history, a 
divided Korea remains one of its most bitter legacies.  Our nation has 
always joined yours in believing that one day Korea's artificial 
division will end.

We support Korea's peaceful unification on terms acceptable to the 
Korean people.  And when the reunification comes, we will stand beside 
you in making the transition on the terms that you have outlined.  But 
that day has not yet arrived.  The demilitarized zone still traces a 
stark line between safety and danger.  North Korea's million men in 
arms, most stationed within 30 miles of the DMZ, continue to pose a 
threat.  Its troubling nuclear program raises questions about its 
intentions.  Its internal repression and irresponsible weapons sales 
show North Korea is not yet willing to be a responsible member of the 
community of nations.  

So let me say clearly, our commitment to Korea's security remains 
undiminished.  The Korean Peninsula remains a vital American interest.  
Our troops will stay here as long as the Korean people want and need us 
here.  We lost tens of thousands of America's best in Korea's mountains 
and mud and sky.  But Korea lost millions.  That sacrifice affirmed some 
old truths:  Vulnerability invites aggression; peace depends upon 
deterrence.  We cannot forget those lessons again.  

And so it is throughout the region.  Our commitment to an active 
military presence remains.  Our mutual agreement with the Philippines to 
close our bases there should not be cause for Asian alarm.  The larger 
picture tells a different story.  We have obtained increased access for 
our forces throughout Southeast Asia to facilitate our presence and, if 
necessary, to project our forces beyond the region.  

Here in Korea we have frozen American troop withdrawals and are 
modernizing Korean and American forces on the peninsula.  We have 
deployed to Japan the Belleau Wood Amphibious Group and the U.S.S. 
Independence Battle Group, the largest and most modern in the world.  
These are not signs of disengagement.  These are signs that America 
intends to stay.

New Efforts Against Proliferation Of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The second security priority for our new Pacific community is to combat 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.  
We cannot let the expanding threat of these deadly weapons replace the 
Cold War nightmare of nuclear annihilation.  And today, that possibility 
is too real.

North Korea appears committed to indiscriminate sales of the Scud 
missiles that were such a source of terror and destruction in the 
Persian Gulf.  Now it is developing, testing, and looking to export a 
more powerful missile with a range of 600 miles or more--enough for 
North Korea to threaten Osaka or for Iran to threaten Tel Aviv. 

We have serious concerns as well about China's compliance with 
international standards against missile proliferation.  And since both 
you and we are attempting to engage China in a more extensive trade 
relationship, I hope together we can have a positive influence against 
that development.

The Pacific nations simply must develop new ways to combat the spread of 
biological, chemical, and missile technologies.  And in the coming 
weeks, the U.S. will propose new efforts aimed at that goal.  But no 
specter hangs over this peninsula or this region more darkly than the 
danger of nuclear proliferation.  Nearly 160 nations have now joined to 
resist that threat through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--the 
most universally supported treaty in all history.

Now, for the first time since that treaty was open for signatures, one 
of its members has threatened to withdraw.  Our goals remain firm.  We 
seek a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and robust global rules against 
proliferation.  That is why we urge North Korea to reaffirm its 
commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; to fulfill its full-scope 
safeguards obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
including IAEA inspections of undeclared nuclear sites; and to implement 
bilateral inspections under the South-North Nuclear Accord.

Our goal is not endless discussions but certifiable compliance.  North 
Korea must understand our intentions.  We are seeking to prevent 
aggression, not to initiate it.  And so long as North Korea abides by 
the UN Charter and international non-proliferation commitments, it has 
nothing to fear from America.

The U.S. has worked to bring North Korea back within the fold of nuclear 
responsibility.  But your nation, too, has a critical role to play.  The 
future of this peninsula is for you and North Korea to shape.  The 
South-North Nuclear Accord you negotiated goes even further than 
existing international accords.  It not only banishes nuclear weapons 
from the peninsula, it also bans the production of nuclear materials 
that could be used to make those weapons.  We urge full implementation 
of this pathbreaking accord, which can serve as a model for other 
regions of nuclear tension.

New Regional Dialogues on Common Security Challenges
Even as we address immediate concerns such as proliferation, we must 
also have a vision of how we will meet the broader challenges of this 
era.  That is what I sought to create during the recently concluded G-7 
talks--for example, by proposing new ways to focus on new problems, such 
as the slow pace of job creation in the G-7 countries.  And it is why I 
have proposed a NATO summit so that we can adapt that institution to new 
times and new challenges.

In both Asia and Europe, the dominant unitary threat of Soviet 
aggression has disappeared.  In both regions, the end of the Cold War 
has allowed a host of problems to emerge or to reappear, such as ancient 
ethnic rivalries, regional tensions, flows of refugees, and the 
trafficking of deadly weapons and dangerous drugs.

In Europe, these changes require us to adapt an existing security 
institution--NATO.  In the Pacific, no such institution exists.  
Moreover, since the Asian Pacific faces no unitary threat, there is no 
need for us to create one single alliance.  The challenge for the Asian 
Pacific in this decade, instead, is to develop multiple new arrangements 
to meet multiple threats and opportunities.  These arrangements can 
function like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing 
protection and together covering the full body of our common security 

Some new arrangements may involve groups of nations confronting 
immediate problems.  This is the model we pursued to address North 
Korea's nuclear program.  Our two nations worked not only with each 
other but also with Japan and with others who could bring their 
influence to bear.  

Other arrangements may involve peace-keeping, such as the massive and 
promising UN effort to support reconciliation in Cambodia.  Still others 
may pursue confidence-building measures to head off regional or 
subregional disputes.  

We also need new regional security dialogues.  This month's ASEAN post-
ministerial conference in Singapore, which the United States will 
attend, offers an immediate opportunity to further such a dialogue.  
Korea can play a vital role in the region's new arrangements, for it 
stands at the center of Northeast Asia, within 2 hours by air from 
Singapore, Tokyo, Beijing, and Vladivostok. 

The many economic discussions within the region also can play a role.  
By lowering barriers to trade and investment, we can generate jobs; ease 
regional tensions; and, thus, enhance regional security.  That is why I 
welcome the new dialogue for economic cooperation our two nations are 
launching on this visit.  And that is why I announced in Japan that I 
would like to host an informal economic conference among APEC's leaders 
following the ministerial meeting in Seattle, Washington, this fall.

The goal of all these efforts is to integrate, not isolate, the region's 
powers.  China is a key example.  We believe China cannot be a full 
partner in the world community until it respects human rights and 
international agreements on trade and weapon sales.  But we also are 
prepared to involve China in building this region's new security and 
economic architectures.  We need an involved and engaged China, not an 
isolated China. 

Some in the U.S. have been reluctant to enter into regional security 
dialogues in Asia.  They fear it would seem a pretext for American 
withdrawal from the area.  But I see this as a way to supplement our 
alliances and forward military presence, not to supplant them.

These dialogues can ensure that the end of the Cold War does not provide 
an opening for regional rivalries, chaos, and arms races.  They can 
build a foundation for our shared security well into the 21st century. 

Supporting Democracy and Democratic Movements
Ultimately, the guarantee of our security must rest in the character and 
the intentions of the region's nations themselves.  That is why our 
final security priority must be to support the spread of democracy 
throughout the Asian Pacific.  Democracies not only are more likely to 
meet the needs and respect the rights of their people, they also make 
better neighbors.  They do not wage war on each other, practice 
terrorism, generate refugees, or traffic in drugs and outlaw weapons.  
They make more reliable partners in trade and in the kind of dialogues 
we announced today.  

Today, some argue democracy and human rights are somehow unsuited to 
parts of Asia, or that they mask some cultural imperialism on the part 
of the West.  My ear is drawn instead to more compelling voices--to Chai 
Ling, who proclaimed democracy's spirit at Tiananmen Square; to Aung San 
Suukyi, whose eloquent opposition to repression in Burma has stirred the 
entire world; to Boris Yeltsin, who is leading Russia toward becoming a 
great democratic power on the Pacific; and to your own President Kim and 
others in this multi-party assembly who have helped democracy flower 
here in the land of the morning calm.

You are truly an example to people all over the Asian Pacific region, 
because you have had the courage to confront the issues of political 
reform and economic reform, to ask the hard questions of yourselves, and 
to have the public debates necessary when people honestly seek to 
improve and open their society and move forward.  And I salute you on 
behalf of freedom-loving people everywhere in the world.  

To be sure, every nation must retain its own culture, and we will all 
struggle about what it means to define that.  But Korea proves that 
democracy and human rights are not Western imports.  They flow from the 
internal spirit of human beings, because they reflect universal 

Now we must respond to those aspirations throughout this region.  We 
must support the non-governmental organizations that seek to strengthen 
Asia's building blocks of civic society, such as open elections, trade 
unions, and a free press.  And we must deploy accurate news and 
information against Asia's closed societies.  I have proposed creating 
an Asian democracy radio for this purpose, and I look forward to its 
establishment in the near future.  

Two hundred and seventeen years ago, America's founders declared the 
rights of self-government to be God-given and, therefore, inalienable.  
Today, here on Asian soil, let us together reaffirm that declaration--
not only as an article of faith but as a sturdy building block in our 
region's shared security.

This, then, is our nation's vision for security in the new Pacific 
community:  a continued United States military presence, new efforts to 
combat proliferation, new regional security dialogues, and vigorous 
support for democracies and democratic movements.  These elements of 
security can help create a Pacific region where economic competition is 
vigorous but peaceful; where diverse nations work as partners to improve 
their shared security; and where democracy, as well as balanced military 
strength, takes its place as a guardian of our security.

We will not realize every aspect of that vision overnight, nor will the 
new Pacific community come to pass without great effort.  But neither of 
our nations is a stranger to hard work.

I think, in particular, of the image of your great long-distance runner, 
Hwang Yung Cho, who endured that final steep hill in Barcelona to 
capture the gold in the marathon in the 1992 Olympics.  His energy and 
perseverance captured the spirit of the Korean people, who have not only 
endured but prospered through a long, hard, and challenging history.  We 
respect that spirit.  We honor your values.  We have stood shoulder to 
shoulder with you in days past, and so it shall be in the days ahead.  
The struggle for freedom and democracy and opportunity is, indeed, a 
marathon.  Let us run the race together.  Thank you very much.  (###)


U.S.-South Korean RelationsPresident Clinton, South Korean President 
KimOpening remarks at a news conference following a meeting in Seoul, 
South Korea, July 10, 1993

President Kim.   Today, President Clinton and I had very useful 
discussions of the wide-ranging issues of mutual concern for about 11/2 
hours.  I was deeply impressed by President Clinton, who is playing a 
leadership role in maintaining world peace and coping with new 
challenges in the post-Cold War era. 

In today's meeting, President Clinton and I discussed current 
international political situations, including the new post-Cold War 
situation in Northeast Asia.  We also had wide-ranging consultations on 
how to further develop the Korea-U.S. partnership in the areas of 
politics, security, economy, and trade. 

In particular, we had an in-depth discussion on North Korea's nuclear 
development program.  And we shared the view that this issue poses a 
serious threat, not only to peace on the Korean Peninsula, but also to 
the security of Northeast Asia and the world as a whole.

Also, we expressed our satisfaction over the close coordination between 
our two countries in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue.  Most 
importantly, we confirmed that, through this process, we should continue 
to encourage North Korea to remain within the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime and to implement faithfully these inspection responsibilities 
with the IAEA mechanism.

We also reconfirmed that through effective mutual inspections by the two 
Koreas themselves, the denuclearization declaration should be fully 
implemented, leading eventually to the resolution of North Korea's 
nuclear issue.

We will, therefore, continue our efforts to persuade North Korea to 
remove suspicion over its nuclear program.  The next round of U.S.-North 
Korean contacts will be held in a few days.  And at the same time, we 
will keep the door open for South-North dialogue.

In case, however, North Korea does not demonstrate different attitudes 
toward the resolution of the nuclear issue, in spite of our sincere 
efforts, then the international community will inevitably have to come 
up with appropriate countermeasures to deal with the issue.

President Clinton renewed the firm commitment of the United States to 
the defense and security of the Republic of Korea and reassured that any 
further reduction of U.S. forces in Korea would be made only after the 
uncertainties surrounding North Korea's nuclear program have been 
thoroughly examined.  

President Clinton and I noted with satisfaction the amicable trade 
relations between our two countries and concurred that the measures the 
Korean Government is taking to liberalize and internationalize this 
economy under the new economic policy will help further expand and 
develop our bilateral trade relations.  More specifically, President 
Clinton and I agreed on the need to develop a future-oriented economic 
partnership between our two countries.  And for this purpose, we have 
agreed to launch a new bilateral forum for consultation, named the 
Dialogue for Economic Cooperation. 

Within this framework, the two countries will discuss various ways to 
enhance bilateral economic cooperation and address the issues of 
economic deregulation as it affects economic relations between our two 
countries.  Also, we shared the hope that the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations would be concluded before the end of 
this year to help revitalize the world economy.  And we have agreed to 
work together to achieve that goal. 

As staunch friends and allies, the Republic of Korea and the United 
States have maintained a close and cooperative relationship during the 
last several decades.  Our countries will continue to expand this 
relationship to make it into a lasting and comprehensive partnership 
based upon the common ideals of democracy in the fields of politics, 
national security, economy, trade, culture, and academic exchanges.

I'm entirely satisfied with the result of our summit meeting, and I'm 
fully convinced that today's meeting will mark the first of many 
fruitful occasions of such consultations between President Clinton and 
me in the future.  Thank you very much.  President Clinton.  Thank you 
very much.  First, let me thank President Kim for his warm welcome and 
for his very accurate summary of the discussions that we have just held.  
I would simply like to highlight a couple of points.  

First, we reviewed our mutual efforts to ensure the security and peace 
of the people living on the Korean Peninsula.  And I reassured President 
Kim of my commitment to ensure that the United States continues to play 
its historic role. 

We devoted particular attention to the issue of North Korea's nuclear 
program and agreed to continue our very close cooperation in dealing 
with this matter.  This program is of great concern not only to the 
United States and the Republic of Korea, but to all in this region.  We 
agreed to consult closely on our joint efforts to achieve a full 
resolution of this issue, and we are resolute to take additional steps 
if they are required. 

I did reaffirm my strong intention to have no further reduction in our 
military presence in this region, as long as there is any outstanding 
question of security regarding this issue.  President Kim and I also 
discussed the importance of working together to expand trade through the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization, and the meetings we will 
have there in [Seattle] Washington this fall.  

I thanked President Kim for his support of the results of the G-7 
conference just concluded in Tokyo, for his support of the Uruguay Round 
of the world trade negotiations, and for the announcement of the new 
dialogue for economic cooperation to resolve the outstanding issues 
between our two countries and to build even stronger economic 
cooperation between us.

Finally, I want to express my appreciation to President Kim for his 
personal lifetime devotion to the cause of democracy and for the very 
good example that the anti-corruption and deregulation campaigns here 
set for all of Asia, and indeed, for budding democracies throughout the 
world.  I believe that this is the sort of example we need more of.  

And finally, let me say I appreciate the visit that we had.  I think we 
established a very good personal relationship and a very good bond 
between our two countries.  I look forward to further talks, and the 
President has accepted my invitation to visit the United States later 
this year, so we will have another chance to work on these issues 
personally. (###)


Fact Sheet:  U.S.-Korea Relations

President Clinton made his first official visit to South Korea on July 
10-11, 1993.  He met with President Kim Young Sam to discuss bilateral 
and regional issues of concern.

Since the 1950s, the relationship between the United States and South 
Korea--the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.)--has developed into one of the 
most important in Asia.  Two of its central aspects are the issues of 
security and of economics and trade.  While security is a prime concern 
and the United States remains committed to maintaining peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula, economics and trade are becoming ever 
more important in the U.S.-Korea relationship.

The U.S. agreed in the 1954 U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defense Treaty to help 
the Republic of Korea defend itself from external aggression.  In 
support of that commitment, the U.S. maintains about 37,000 service 
personnel in Korea, including the Army's Second Infantry Division and 
several Air Force tactical squadrons.  To coordinate operations between 
these units and the 650,000-strong Korean armed forces, a combined 
forces command (CFC) was established in 1978. 

Several aspects of the security relationship are changing as the U.S. 
moves from a leading to a supporting role.  South Korea has agreed to 
pay more of the U.S. defense costs, to fund relocation of the large U.S. 
headquarters garrison to Yongsan from Seoul, and to accept changes in 
the CFC structure.  The United States and Korea have agreed to the 
transfer of peacetime operational control to Korea.

The United States supports direct, government-to-government talks 
between the authorities of South and North Korea.  The U.S. believes 
that the fundamental decisions on the future of the Korean Peninsula 
must be made by the Korean people themselves.

Korea is now the United States' seventh-largest trading partner, and the 
U.S. seeks to further develop mutually beneficial economic relations by 
striving for greater access to Korea's expanding market and improved 
investment opportunities for U.S. business.  Although the Korean 
bureaucracy has been reluctant to abandon industrial protection and the 
state-directed policy which played an important role in the country's 
industrialization, President Kim's economic reform plans mark a dramatic 
departure toward a more liberal, market-based economic system.  Korean 
leaders seem determined to successfully manage the complex economic 
relationship with the United States and to take a more active role in 
international economic forums as a major trading nation.  (###)

South Korea's Foreign Relations
South Korea is committed to peaceful settlement of international 
differences and is becoming more active in international affairs.  It 
joined the UN, along with North Korea, in 1991, and is active in most UN 
specialized agencies.  South Korea has made efforts to join or 
participate actively in many other international forums, ranging from 
the Antarctic Treaty to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development.  It has diplomatic relations with 148 countries and an even 
broader network of trading relationships.  

Korea's economic growth, energy requirements, and need for basic raw 
materials and for markets have given economic considerations high 
priority in the country's foreign policy.  In light of these concerns, 
Korean diplomacy in recent years has concentrated on broadening its 
international base of support with Third World nations, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, and Middle Eastern states.  Korea wants to 
participate actively in Pacific Basin economic affairs.

A 1965 treaty normalized relations between Japan and Korea, and the two 
nations have developed an extensive relationship centering on mutually 
beneficial economic activity.  Although the legacy of historic 
antipathies has at times impeded cooperation, relations at the 
government level have improved steadily and significantly in the past 
several years.

The R.O.K.'s pursuit of wide-ranging relations with former and current 
communist nations has met with notable success.  In February 1989, 
Hungary became the first communist nation to establish full diplomatic 
relations with the R.O.K.  The R.O.K. now has diplomatic relations with 
Russia and all Eastern and Central European countries except Albania.  
In early 1991, the R.O.K. and People's Republic of China exchanged trade 
offices, and the two countries established diplomatic relations in 
August 1992.

South Korea has hosted a series of prestigious international events, 
including the 1988 Summer Olympics.  (###)


Country Profile:  South Korea
Official Name:  Republic of Korea

Area:  98,500 sq. km. (38,000 sq. mi.); about the size of Indiana. 
Cities:  Capital--Seoul (10 million). Other major cities--Pusan (3.5 
million), Taegu (2 million), Inchon (1.4 million).
Terrain:  Partially forested mountain ranges separated by deep, narrow 
valleys; cultivated plains along the coasts, particularly in the west 
and south. 
Climate:  Temperate.

Nationality:  Noun and adjective--Korean(s).
Population (1992):  44 million.
Annual growth rate:  1%.
Ethnic groups:  Korean; small Chinese minority.
Religions:  Buddhism, Christianity, Shamanism, Confucianism.
Language:  Korean.
Education (1992):  Years compulsory--6.  Attendance--Of those eligible, 
99% attended middle school, 94% attended high school.  Literacy--98%.
Health (1992):  Infant mortality rate--23/1,000.  Life expectancy--67 
yrs. male, 73 yrs. female.
Work force (17 million, 1992):  Services--52%.  Industry--27%.  

Type:  Republic with powers shared between the president and the 
legislature.Independence:  August 15, 1948.
Constitution:  July 17, 1948; last revised 1987.Branches:  Executive--
president (chief of state).  Legislative--unicameral 
National Assembly.  Judicial--Supreme Court and appellate courts, 
Constitutional Court.
Subdivisions:  9 provinces, 6 administratively separate cities (Seoul, 
Pusan, Inchon, Taegu, Kwangju, Taejon).
Political parties:  Government party--Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). 
Opposition party--Democratic Party (DP).
Suffrage:  Universal at 20.
Flag:  Centered on a white field is the ancient Chinese symbol of yin 
and yang; at each corner of the white field is a different trigram of 
black bars.

GNP (1992 est.):  $372 billion.  Annual growth rate (1992 est.):   4.4%. 
Per capita GNP (1992):  $6,761. Natural resources:  Limited coal, 
tungsten, iron ore, limestone, kaolinite, and graphite.Agriculture 
(including forestry and fisheries):  Products--rice, barley, vegetables.  
Arable land--22% of land area.Mining and manufacturing:  Textiles, 
footwear, electronics and electrical equipment, shipbuilding, motor 
vehicles, petrochemicals, industrial machinery.Trade (1992):  Exports--
$77 billion: manufactures, textiles, ships, electronics, footwear, 
steel.  Major markets--U.S., Japan, European Community, Middle East.  
Imports--$82 billion:  crude oil, food, machinery and transportation 
equipment, chemicals and chemical products, base metals and articles.  
Major suppliers--Japan, U.S., Middle East.

Principal Government Officials
President--Kim Young SamPrime Minister--Hwang In SungMinister of Foreign 
Affairs--Han Sung JooAmbassador to the United States--Han Seung Soo 


Meeting the Challenge of International Terrorism Timothy E. Wirth, 
Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, 
International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, July 13, 1993

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:  Thank you for inviting me to 
testify today on the terrorism threat facing us.  I appreciate this 
opportunity to continue the dialogue the State Department has had with 
this committee concerning the vexing problem of international terrorism.

The past several months have brought more than their share of dramatic 
terrorism-related events.  Even since the Department's last testimony on 
this issue before your committee in March, we have seen  Iraq's attempt 
to kill former President Bush, the arrests of suspects planning to blow 
up the UN headquarters and other facilities in New York City, 
coordinated incidents by Kurds in European cities, the burning of a 
Turkish hotel with the loss of 40 lives, and continuing violence by 
groups such as the PIRA in the United Kingdom and the ETA in Spain.

This spate of domestic and international terrorist attacks has raised 
terrorism concerns to the forefront in many countries.  More directly, 
the World Trade Center bombing and the threat of attacks against the 
United Nations headquarters, against tunnels leading to New York, and 
against Senator D'Amato and others have brought the terrorist threat 
home to us in the United States.  Naturally these developments cannot 
help but make us wonder about what may happen next.  As a government and 
people, we also have to consider what else can be done against the 
terrorist threat:  How best can we protect our society without 
generating a sense of panic that may well further the terrorists' goals 
of disrupting and sapping confidence in our institutions?

The terrorist threat will not go away.  It takes too many forms, there 
are too many potential criminals seeking publicity for their views, and 
their weapons are often rudimentary and widely available.  This should 
not, however, be cause for despair.  There are steps we and other 
governments can take together to counter the threat posed by terrorists.

I look forward to discussing the Administration's counter-terrorism 
policies and programs with you in my testimony and in responding to your 
questions.  I propose to first examine emerging trends in terrorism, and 
our strategies to combat those threats, and then to discuss areas in 
which the essential partnership between the Congress and the executive 
branch to counter terrorism can be strengthened.

The Present and FutureIn 1992, there were a total of 361 acts of 
international terrorism--the lowest level in 17 years.  Through May of 
this year, our preliminary figures show that there have been 115 
incidents of international terrorism, as compared to 144 for the similar 
period in 1992.  These statistics are subject to revision, and do not 
include the spate of anti-Turkish incidents undertaken by the Kurdish 
Workers Party (PKK) in late June.  Casualties of terrorism have 
increased dramatically, however, because of the number of persons 
injured in the World Trade Center bombing.  

American citizens and property remain the principal targets of 
terrorists throughout the world.  Nearly 40%  of last year's incidents 
were directed at U.S. targets.  We expect that trend to continue this 
year and into the future.  The U.S. influence in economic, cultural, 
political, and military terms is so much greater than any other nation 
that we inevitably represent a high-profile target to terrorists around 
the world.

Regrettably, while the number of overall terrorist incidents is down, 
the first 6 months of 1993 have seen a surge in terrorist 
"spectaculars."  Terrorists, as we all know, seek publicity.  Those 
behind the World Trade Center bombing, Iraq's attempt to kill former 
President Bush, and the recent and chillingly coordinated wave of 
Kurdish attacks across Europe sought the headlines.  We condemn such 
heinous attacks and the resort to violence against innocent people.

Making accurate predictions about future trends in terrorism is 
difficult.  Terrorism is often cyclical in nature; as old passions and 
groups fade, often we see new factors, new groups, and new "causes" 
emerge to produce deadly terrorist attacks.  Assessing where terrorism 
will come from in the future is difficult, and experts disagree, but 
there is little dispute that we will be dealing with terrorists and 
their crimes for years to come.

Terrorism, at its most basic, is an attempt to change, through violence 
and intimidation, the practices and policies of people and governments.  
We are not going to yield to this.  To do so only encourages future 

The Clinton Administration is committed to exerting strong and steady 
leadership in a rapidly changing world.  History has taught us that the 
United States and all nations can meet that challenge by maintaining a 
commitment to democratic institutions and the rule of law.  Promoting 
democratic governments and institutions that are fully accountable to 
their citizens is our most basic tool for advancing free markets and our 
long-term national security and addressing the great and complex global 
issues of our time.  Democracy does not sponsor terrorism.  It is no 
accident that states that do--Iraq, Iran, Libya--are also among the most 
repressive for their own citizens.  

Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that the Clinton Administration will 
remain vigilant in countering whatever threats may be posed by 
international terrorists to U.S. interests.  

Working in close consultation with the Congress, successive 
Administrations have developed a set of principles which continue to 
guide us as we counter the threat posed by terrorists.  I can assure you 
that the Clinton Administration:

--  Will make no concessions to terrorists;--  Will continue to apply 
increasing pressure to state sponsors of terrorism;--  Will forcefully 
apply the rule of law to international terrorists; and--  Will help 
other governments improve their capabilities to counter the threats 
posed by international terrorists.

Countering terrorism is, of course, more than a matter of policies.  It 
is the effective, day-to-day implementation of those policies that is so 
important.  The Clinton Administration is committed to an effective and 
interagency approach to combating terrorism.  Every day, officials at 
State, Justice, Defense, the CIA, and FBI cooperate closely in an 
ongoing effort against the threats posed by international terrorists.  
Indicative of these close working relationships is the presence here 
today of the witness from the FBI, Mr. Harry Brandon.

We clearly recognize that countering the threat of terrorism does not 
consist solely of applying the rule of law, or bringing intelligence or 
diplomacy to bear on the problem, or resorting to military might.  
Instead, our approach is and will be an interagency one.  This ensures 
that all of our efforts are coordinated, and brings to bear the best 
capabilities of our government and its people as we jointly deal with 
the threat.

Emerging Threats
The post-Cold War international environment is simultaneously less and 
more hospitable for terrorists.  Terrorists no longer enjoy safehaven, 
or receive support in Eastern Europe.  Moscow has reduced the flow of 
arms to several of the six nations--Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, and Syria--that we identify as state sponsors of terrorism.

At the same time, however, state sponsorship of terrorism remains a 
significant growing threat to American interests and nationals.  Iran 
continues to sponsor international terrorism, maintains its unacceptable 
fatwa against Salman Rushdie, and represents a significant terrorist 
threat to American interests. Iraq, despite the requirements imposed by 
the United Nations, regularly engages in terrorism against UN relief 
operations and, most dramatically, tried to kill former President Bush.  
Libya refuses to comply with the requirements imposed by the UN Security 
Council in light of its clear responsibility for the bombings of Pan Am 
flight 103 and UTA 772.  Syria continues to allow terrorist groups to 
maintain offices and training sites in territory it controls.  

As we look toward emerging threats, we must also recognize that long-
suppressed ethnic and religious-based conflicts may lead to new violent 
expressions, such as we are already seeing in the Balkans.  We need to 
be alert to the possible emergence of international terrorism from such 
ethnic conflicts.  

In the Middle East and North Africa, new and radical groups such as 
Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad and the FIS in Algeria have 
emerged in recent years, invoking Islamic ideology, but using terrorist 
tactics to advance their extremist agendas.

In Egypt, the Islamic Group, the group with whom Sheikh Omar Abdurrahman 
is so closely involved, has undertaken violent attacks on Egyptian 
officials, secular intellectuals, and foreign tourists in an effort to 
destabilize the Mubarak Government.   I would like to take this 
opportunity to congratulate Egypt on its forthright decision to seek the 
extradition of the Sheikh to stand trial for attacks he inspired while 
still in Egypt.  Tough decisions such as that made by Egypt demonstrate 
the worldwide recognition that applying the rule of law is one of the 
most effective means possible to confront the threat posed by terrorism.

The misuse of Islamic political rhetoric by these groups should not 
cause us to confuse in our own minds terrorism and Islam.  Our problem 
is not, of course, with Islam or with people who practice that religion.  
It is, instead, with the use of violence and terrorism by any person, 
regardless of religion, national origin, or ethnicity.

Even with Iran, the most active state sponsor of terrorism, we have made 
clear that it is unacceptable behavior--not the religious nature of the 
regime--that is the source of our concerns.  Drawing a distinction 
between behavior and religion also helps defeat the Iranian desire to 
lead Islamic opinion and draw lines of confrontation between Islam and 
the West.

Countering the Threat
Our counter-terrorism strategy has three key elements--to implement our 
policy of  "no concessions," to keep pressure on state sponsors, and to 
apply the rule of law.  These basic policies have served us well in the 
past, and will do so in the future.  Our strategy applies equally well 
to groups such as the Abu Nidal Organization, or a small and unnamed 
group which may come together to undertake only a single attack.

Terrorists, whether from the Provisional Irish Republic Army (PIRA), 
Sendero Luminoso, or a more loosely organized group such as the group 
that appears responsible for the World Trade Center bombing, always have 
had the advantage of being able to take the initiative in selecting the 
timing and choice of targets.  It is unfortunately true that terrorists 
have to be successful or lucky only occasionally to gain international 
attention.  That is one reason that gathering intelligence is so 
essential to frustrating the work of terrorists.  In this regard, the 
efforts by the FBI to infiltrate the group planning to undertake a 
savage series of attacks in New York will serve as a landmark example of 
the importance of intelligence in interdicting terrorist operations.

Improving our intelligence capabilities is a major part of our response.  
Another major element of our counter-terrorism policy is a firm 
response.  When President Clinton ordered the cruise missile strike 
against the headquarters of Iraq's intelligence service, he delivered a 
firm, proportional, and necessary response to the continuing threat 
against the United States posed by Iraq, as shown by the outrageous 
Iraqi attempt against the life of former President Bush.  The strike 
demonstrated that the Clinton Administration will respond vigorously, 
decisively, and effectively to the terrorist threat around the world.

International Cooperation
Increasingly, governments are willing to join in steps against state 
sponsors of terrorism and the groups they support.  An outstanding 
example of international cooperation is the UN Security Council 
condemnation of Libya for the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings.  The 
passage of landmark UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 is a 
significant indication of this changed attitude.

Until Libya complies fully with the requirements imposed by the Security 
Council, these sanctions will remain in place.  Indeed, the sanctions 
may be strengthened if that nation continues to refuse to comply with 
the legitimate conditions imposed by the Security Council.

Let me assure you that I, personally, continue to work closely with our 
British and French allies on this issue.  I met in Paris just 2 weeks 
ago with my counterparts from these nations to discuss additional 
sanctions on Libya.  All three governments have gone on record that new 
and tougher sanctions should be considered if Libya does not comply with 
the Council's demands. Libya would be well advised not to misjudge our 

Department of State Organization
Mr. Chairman, the State Department has the lead role in dealing with 
international terrorism overseas, and does so through an interagency 
coordinating mechanism.  The Justice Department has a similar lead role 
in terrorism issues occurring within the United States.

In confronting international terrorism overseas, we recognize that 
terrorists do not just engage in acts that are purely political; there 
are criminal aspects to their activities. Hijacking or bombing an 
aircraft or planting a bomb in a marketplace is a crime no matter what 
the motivation.  Furthermore, some terrorist groups which do not enjoy 
state sponsorship have tried to develop independent means of support.  
Some groups have resorted to crimes such as bank robbery or extortion, 
while others, particularly in the Andean region, have developed close 
working relationships with drug dealers.

When the transition team began to work at the State Department, it was 
struck by the number of small, independent offices and bureaus that had 
been established to deal with problems such as narcotics and terrorism.  
Many of these offices enjoyed direct access to the Secretary but were 
part of a complex and ineffective management structure.  One step toward 
rationalizing this process is to form a new Bureau for Narcotics, 
Terrorism, and Crime (NTC).

Under the reorganization plan, the NTC bureau will be under my direction 
as the Under Secretary for Global Affairs.  The reorganization will 
ensure that the range of issues associated with terrorism, including 
narcotics and international crime, will have my personal attention.  I 
strongly believe that this synergistic approach will make our counter-
terrorism policies and programs more effective, particularly in this 
hemisphere, where a combination of criminal activity, narcotics 
trafficking, and terrorism threatens the growth of fragile, democratic 

I recognize that there have been concerns expressed about the 
reorganization.  Mr. Chairman, I would like to assure you and your 
colleagues that there will be no diminution of the U.S. Government's 
commitment to countering terrorism.  I can, and do, bring counter-
terrorism matters directly to the Secretary and others in the 
Administration.  I am and will remain available to the Congress on this 
important issue.  I will continue to provide that leadership under the 
proposed reorganization.  Besides offering management rationality, this 
reorganization also offers significant benefits by improving 
coordination in our international efforts to train personnel in anti-
terrorism and counter-narcotics capabilities.  In addition, this 
reorganization allows us to apply the "lessons learned" from one 
strategy to counter similar problems in another type of criminal 

Congressional Action
Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of my testimony, I mentioned the need to 
strengthen further the partnership between the executive and legislative 
branches as we jointly combat terrorism.  There are a number of 
legislative initiatives which need action during this session, and I 
would hope that   you and your colleagues could help us in the executive 
branch by providing   for prompt congressional action on these 
important, yet relatively non-controversial, initiatives.  Our counter-
terrorism priorities include the following:

--  The President, last month, signed documents transmitting to Congress 
the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, a new international convention dealing with detecting and 
controlling plastic explosives.  

After the December 1988 destruction of Pan Am flight 103 by a plastic 
explosives bomb, the United States and other nations agreed to identify 
chemical marking agents which could be incorporated into plastic 
explosives during the manufacturing stage in order to make these 
explosives detectable.  Our aim was to develop an international 
agreement which would help prevent bombings using plastic explosives.  
As a result, this international agreement was completed in Montreal in 
1991.  It has been signed by the United States and 50 other nations.  
The Administration is seeking urgent Senate action on this agreement.

--  We also seek congressional action, this year, on implementing 
legislation for two important counter-terrorism treaties:  the Protocol 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Aviation, and the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Attacks Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.

These treaties extend the "prosecute or extradite" principle embodied in 
previous multilateral anti-terrorism treaties to attacks on airports 
serving civilian aviation and to attacks on civilian shipping and 
offshore platforms.  These treaties were prompted by the 1985 Rome and 
Vienna airport attacks and the hijacking of the Achille Lauro passenger 

The Senate gave its advice and consent to these international 
conventions in 1989, but approval of the implementing legislation was 
delayed because it was incorporated into the Omnibus Crime Bill.  The 
Clinton Administration included the counter-terrorism legislation in its 
proposed State Department Authorization Bill for Fiscal Years 1994-95.

I understand that during its markup last month, your full committee felt 
it could not act on the treaty legislation and the other counter-
terrorism provisions, because of jurisdictional issues with the 
Judiciary Committee.  I hope your committee, and perhaps those who also 
serve on the Judiciary Committee, can be helpful in securing final 
approval for this implementing legislation--the absence of which 
prevents U.S. accession to these important international agreements.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, before turning to your 
questions, I would like to emphasize our commitment to the long-term 
struggle against terrorism.  As both President Clinton and Secretary 
Christopher have made clear, the issue of domestic and international 
terrorism is a high priority for this Administration.  Obviously, there 
are no magic solutions to this problem.  Instead, working in a close 
partnership with the Congress, we must and will maintain our vigilance, 
increase and adjust our capabilities, and further develop cooperation to 
help ensure the safety of Americans and American interests throughout 
the world.

We need and appreciate your continued support. (###)


Fact Sheet:  Alien Smuggling Policy

Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Washington, DC, June 18, 1993.

President Clinton has approved a plan of action to combat the smuggling 
of aliens into the United States by organized crime syndicates.  The 
plan, which will bring together 12 agencies in a new effort to control 
alien smuggling, responds to a problem which has existed for almost 2 
years and which, until now, has been dealt with on an ad hoc basis.  The 
plan will:

--  Strengthen law enforcement efforts;-- Combat smuggling operations at 
the source;--  Interdict and redirect smuggling ships in transit; and--  
Expedite processing of entry claims and return economic migrants 
smuggled into the United States.

Since August 1991, authorities have documented organized criminal 
activity in at least 14 boat-smuggling incidents involving the direct 
discharge of aliens into the United States.  Migrants and their families 
have pledged as much as $30,000 per person to criminal syndicates who 
force the aliens to travel to the United States in conditions that range 
from deplorable to life-threatening.  Criminal elements then place 
arriving migrants in slave-like conditions of indentured servitude until 
they can pay off the debts incurred for the ocean passage to America.

Deterring this transport in human cargo is a priority issue for the 
Clinton Administration.  An inter-agency group, chaired by the Domestic 
Policy Council and the National Security Council, has been engaged in an 
intensive effort to address large-scale smuggling of illegal arrivals by 
boat.  The group includes representatives from the Departments of 
Justice, Transportation, Labor, State, and Defense, as well as the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Coast Guard, and the 
intelligence community.  The plan, approved by the President, addresses 
this new smuggling scheme in multiple ways and includes active 
participation of all involved agencies.

Law enforcement efforts in the United States will be strengthened.

--  The Department of Justice will increase its investigative efforts 
and actively review prosecution strategies to combat alien smuggling by 
organized crime.

--  The Department of Justice also will support legislation to increase 
criminal and civil penalties for alien smugglers, expand investigative 
and seizure authorities, and add alien smuggling as a RICO predicate.

--  The Department of Labor will review labor law enforcement activities 
targeted to deter the employment of aliens smuggled into the United 
States by organized crime.

Smuggling operations will be combatted at their source.

--  The Department of State will work with source nations to establish 
common policies to suppress the operation of criminally sponsored alien 

--  The U.S. intelligence community will focus on efforts to improve 
U.S. ability to collect information and intelligence concerning the 
operations of smuggling rackets.

--  The U.S. Information Agency will coordinate overseas information 
programs to discourage participation of economic migrants in criminal 
syndicate smuggling.

--  The Department of State will approach the relevant international 
organizations and flag countries registering the vessels used by 
smugglers to require more rigorous standards for flagging and more 
rigorous enforcement of international standards for the safety of life 
at sea.

Measures will be taken to interdict and redirect smuggling ships in 

--  The Department of State also will approach flag states of smuggling 
vessels to secure cooperation in punishing smugglers, in receiving 
smuggling ships, and in arranging for the disposition of migrants, 
including both repatriation and protection of political refugees.

--  The Coast Guard, with Department of Defense support, will direct 
U.S. interdiction efforts at sea, board suspect vessels when authorized, 
and, if practical, escort them to flag states or the nearest non-U.S. 
port, assuming host nation concurrence.

--  The U.S. intelligence community will increase its efforts to locate 
criminal smugglers and smuggling ships.

Procedures relating to the processing of entry claims and the return of 
economic migrants smuggled into the United States will be modified.

--  The Immigration and Naturalization Service will, in most 
circumstances, detain aliens who enter the United States in conjunction 
with criminal smuggling activities.

--  The Department of Justice, in coordination with the Department of 
State, will propose legislation for expedited exclusion procedures for 
individuals who arrive at U.S. ports of entry without proper 

--  Pending new legislation, the Department of Justice, consistent with 
due process and existing laws, will expedite the adjudication of entry 
claims raised by migrants who are the victims of organized criminal 
smuggling schemes.

With this plan, the United States signals its abhorrence of the 
trafficking in human beings for profit and its determination to combat 
this illegal activity.  At the same time, the U.S. reaffirms its 
commitment to safeguarding the protection of bona fide refugees.  (###)


Treaty Actions


Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and 
stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on 
their destruction.  Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 
1972.  Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975.  TIAS 8062; 26 UST 
583.Accessions deposited:  Albania, June 3, 1992; Equatorial Guinea, 
July 29, 1992; Suriname, Apr. 9, 1993; Estonia, June 21, 
1993.Successions deposited:  Slovenia, Aug. 20, 19921; Slovak Republic, 
Jan. 1, 1993; Croatia, Apr. 28, 19932.

Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works.  
Revised at Paris July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 28, 1979.  Entered into 
force for the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-27.Accession 
deposited:  Saint Lucia, May 21, 1993.

Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space 
and under water.  Done at Moscow Aug. 5, 1963.  Entered into force Oct. 
10, 1963.  TIAS 5433; 14 UST 1313.Accession deposited:  Suriname, Apr. 
9, 1993.Successions deposited:  Croatia, effective Oct. 8, 1991; Slovak 
Republic, effective Jan. 1, 1993.

Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.  Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970.  TIAS 
6839; 21 UST 483.Accession deposited:  St. Kitts & Nevis, Mar. 22, 
1993.Successions deposited:  Croatia, June 29, 1992; Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, effective Jan. 1, 1993.

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.  
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.  Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for 
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970.  TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.Accession deposited:  
Saint Lucia, May 21, 1993.

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications.  
Adopted at Paris Dec. 3, 1958.  Entered into force Nov. 23, 1961; for 
the U.S. June 9, 1968.  TIAS 6438; 19 UST 4449.Acceptance deposited:  
Lithuania, Mar. 10, 1993.

Seabed Disarmament
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and 
in the subsoil thereof.  Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. 11, 
1971.  Entered into force May 18, 1972.  TIAS 7337; 23 UST 
701.Successions deposited:  Croatia, June 23, 19932; Slovak Republic, 
June 10, 1993.3Accession deposited:  Latvia, Aug. 3, 1992; Slovenia, 
Apr. 7, 1993.1

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the 
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies.  Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Jan. 27, 1967.  
Entered into force Oct. 10, 1967.  TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410.Succession  
deposited:  Slovak Republic, effective Jan. 1, 1993. 

United Nations
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of 
Justice.  Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945.  Entered into force 
Oct. 24, 1945.  TS 993; 59 Stat. 1031.Admitted to membership:  
Macedonia, Apr. 7, 1993.

United Nations Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 
with annexes.  Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.  Entered into force June 
21, 1985.  TIAS 1985.  Accession deposited:  Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, May 27, 1993.

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.  
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.  Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for 
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970.  TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.Accession deposited:  
Saint Lucia, May 21, 1993.

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.  Done at Washington 
Oct. 11, 1947.  Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950.  TIAS 2052; 1 UST 
281.Accessions deposited:  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, June 
1, 1993; Kazakhstan, May 5, 1993.


Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 22, 1992, concerning the 
provision of assistance related to the establishment of export control 
systems to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from 
the Republic of Belarus.  Signed at Minsk Apr. 29, 1993.  Entered into 
force Apr. 29, 1993.

El Salvador
Agreement concerning the establishment of an Americas Fund and 
Administering Commission.  Signed at Washington June 18, 1993.  Enters 
into force when the parties have exchanged notes indicating that all of 
their domestic legal requirements have been met.

Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the fields of mining, 
mineral processing, materials, science and related environmental 
technology.  Signed at Washington June 3, 1993.  Entered into force June 
3, 1993.

Investment incentive agreement.  Signed at Paramaribo May 28, 1993.  
Enters into force on date on which the Government of Suriname 
communicates to the U.S. that all necessary legal requirements have been 

Agreement for cooperative research and development efforts in the fields 
of aircrew protection and performance, with annexes.  Signed at 
Stockholm Apr. 23, 1993.  Entered into force Apr. 23, 1993.

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters, with attachments.  
Signed at Bangkok Mar. 19, 1986.  Entered into force June 10, 
1993.Instruments of ratification exchanged:  June 10, 1993.

United Nations
Agreement concerning the provision of assistance on a reimbursable basis 
in support of the United Nations operation in Somalia, with related 
annex.  Signed at Washington and New York May 4 and 6, 1993.  Entered 
into force May 6, 1993.

1  Effective June 25, 1991.
2  Effective Oct. 8, 1991.
3  Effective Jan. 1, 1993. (###)


What's in Print

Foreign Relations of the United States

The Department of State has released Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1958-1960, Volume VII, Parts 1 and 2 (Western Europe and 

This volume documents the difficulties faced by the United States during 
the late 1950s in ensuring the political and economic independence of 
Western Europe and Canada.

During the last years of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 
Administration, U.S. foreign policy was aimed at providing military 
support for the states of Western Europe and fostering economic 
cooperation and interdependence.  Although the attempts by U.S. leaders 
to accomplish these goals were often frustrated, the threat of further 
communist expansion in Europe continued to wane.  President Eisenhower 
participated in the heads of state and government meeting convened in 
Paris in December 1959, thus highlighting the importance of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  The U.S. supported the efforts of 
the West European states to create and expand regional economic and 
political organizations such as the European Economic Community and the 
Western European Union.

U.S. policy toward the nations comprising the Western Alliance addressed 
particular bilateral issues.  In France, the coming to power of Charles 
de Gaulle in 1958 and the U.S. response to his proposal to establish a 
U.S.-U.K.-French worldwide triumvirate were the main issues faced  by 
U.S. policymakers.  The stability of the Italian Government dominated 
U.S. discussions with Italian leaders.  The "special relationship" 
between the United States and the United Kingdom, badly strained after 
the Suez crisis, was strengthened, and the two long-time allies dealt 
successfully with many global problems.

Despite some anti-Americanism in Canada at the end of the 1950s, the 
United States achieved a growing degree of cooperation with its northern 
neighbor, especially in the areas of development of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway and the workings of various joint economic, political, and 
military boards.

Prepared by the Department of State's Office of the Historian, these two 
volumes are the most recently published portions of the official record 
of U.S. foreign policy.  There are more than 70 volumes documenting the 
foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administration.

Volume VII, Part 1 (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02349-1; ISBN 0-16-037993-8) 
may be purchased for $35 and Volume VII, Part 2 (GPO Stock No. 044-000-
02350-4; ISBN 0-16-038007-3) may be purchased for $38 from the 
Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954.  
To FAX orders, call (202) 512-2250.  Visa and MasterCard are accepted.  
For further information, contact Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor of 
the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-1133.  (###)


To the top of this page

Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives 1993 Issues|| Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives|| Index of "Briefings and Statements"
Index of Electronic Research Collections ERC Reference Desk || Alphabetic Index || Sitemap || ERC Homepage
Last modified: Jun. 3, 1999
Designed by: Lin Dou