US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 26, JUNE 28, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. U.S.-Mexican Relations and NAFTA: The Opportunity of a Generation--
Secretary Christopher
2. Fact Sheet: U.S.-MexicoBinational Commission
3. Fact Sheet: International Boundary and Water Commission
4. A Strong United Nations Serves U.S. Security Interests -- Madeleine
K. Albright
5. Myths of Peace-keeping -- Madeleine K. Albright
6. UN Security Council Resolution 837 on Somalia
7. Democratic Elections in Burundi
8. UN Security Council Resolution 841 On Crisis in Haiti
9. Fact Sheet: Diplomatic Immunity
10 Department Statements
Uzbekistan: U.S. Foreign Service National Beaten and Detained
Malawi's Referendum
Nigeria: Presidential Election
(###)
ARTICLE 1:
U.S.-Mexican Relations and NAFTA: The Opportunity of a Generation
Secretary Christopher
Statement at the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission meeting, Washington,
DC, June 21, 1993
I want to welcome everyone here today--Foreign Secretary Solana, all our
Mexican friends, my colleagues from the Cabinet and throughout our
government.
This is our Administration's first Binational Commission meeting, and
our first chance to discuss the relationship between Mexico and the
United States on a comprehensive basis. I hope that our Mexican friends
will understand that I am directing my remarks not only to you and to
the Mexican people, but to the people of the United States as well.
American foreign policy begins with Mexico and Canada. With these two
nations in particular, foreign policy concerns are domestic concerns.
In our relations with Mexico, the fundamental interests of both nations
converge: economic growth and immigration; border security and drug
trafficking; environmental protection and working conditions.
Today, at this 10th BNC meeting, members of President Clinton's Cabinet
and our Mexican counterparts are working to strengthen our cooperation
on these and other issues.
Let me mention someone who is not here today: President Salinas. His
leadership and vision have helped to forge the most productive ties the
United States and Mexico have ever enjoyed. As President Clinton has
made clear, our challenge is to strengthen and deepen the partnership
that so clearly benefits the people of both our nations.
Together, and in conjunction with Canada, we can meet this challenge by
moving forward with the North American Free Trade Agreement. Our
Administration intends to seek and win congressional approval later this
year so that the agreement can go into effect, on schedule, on January
1, 1994.
NAFTA is in the national interest of the United States. For over half a
century, every American President--Democratic and Republican alike--has
stood for closer cooperation and for more open trade through the
hemisphere, beginning with Mexico. Now the leaders and people of Mexico
are embracing historic reform--economic and political--to open their
country to the global economy.
For both nations, this is an historic opportunity that must not be lost.
Through the NAFTA agreement, the United States has a once-in-a-
generation chance to open up a new frontier of trade with our neighbor
to the south. With Mexico, we share the longest land border in the
world between a developed and developing nation. The economic growth of
this great developing nation to our south is good for our nation's
prosperity and good for our security.
I am confident that when the American people and the Congress hear the
debate and consider what is at stake in NAFTA, they will give it their
strong support.
Some voices are telling the American people that the way to prosper is
to close our borders, to retreat behind walls of high tariffs and trade
barriers. In American history, we have rejected such advice time and
time again.
The American people realize that our interest lies in an open,
competitive international marketplace. We have reason to be confident
of our strengths. We are the number one global exporter. We have the
most productive labor force. Our high technology is the envy of the
world. Given an open market, our workers and companies can compete and
win.
Our experience with Mexico proves just that. Since Mexico began to open
its markets in the last decade, our trade balance has improved steadily.
In 1990, we registered our first trade surplus with Mexico in a decade--
and we sustained surpluses the last two years in a row. In 1992, we
exported over $40 billion worth of goods and services to Mexico--more
than double our exports five years ago.
Some say that there is no constituency in the United States for NAFTA.
They overlook the fact that our ex-ports to Mexico now sustain the jobs
of approximately 700,000 Americans. And the U.S. jobs supported by
exports to Mexico are good jobs--paying about 12% more than the U.S.
national average. NAFTA will lower U.S. and Mexican trade barriers even
further--and allow trade to grow even more. We estimate that NAFTA will
generate an increase of 200,000 jobs in the United States.
NAFTA is not an us-versus-them issue, where Mexico's gain is our loss.
Americans know that we can't prosper if our trading partners stagnate.
No nation has done more than Mexico to open its markets in recent years.
Mexico is our fastest-growing export market--buying two-thirds of its
imports here in the United States. Last month, Mexico replaced Japan as
the second largest purchaser of our manufacturing products. As a
percentage of per capita income, Mexicans spend over seven times more on
U.S. goods and services than Europeans or Japanese. And as Mexican
incomes go up, they will likely buy even more from us.
By spurring economic growth in Mexico, NAFTA will give Mexico greater
capacity to make progress on issues involving the quality of life on
both sides of the border.
Our environmental cooperation with Mexico has deepened substantially in
the last five years. The U.S.-Mexico Integrated Border Environmental
Plan, an unprecedented $1 billion environmental initiative, is designed
to clean up the border, to conserve resources and to undertake joint
water treatment projects from California to Texas. We are cooperating
on air pollution, rain forest preservation and other projects.
Mexico is also taking strong steps on its own. There are now four times
as many trained Mexican environmental inspectors patrolling the border
as there were in 1990. But we must do more together to protect the
environment--and we will.
Cooperation on labor standards and workplace health and safety is also
intensifying. Seminars are being held with employers and unions in
specific industries in Mexico. Best practices are being shared. And we
are addressing child labor concerns.
Mexico recognizes that illegal narcotics is a shared problem that can
only be solved through close cooperation. President Salinas tripled
Mexico's antidrug budget, tackled the related problem of corruption and
took on the drug barons. Mexico's most notorious drug traffickers are
now behind bars. This is breakthrough progress--but we can't let up now.
In the spirit of the broader cooperation that NAFTA envisions, we are
negotiating supplemental agreements to strengthen environment and labor
standards. These agreements are crucial in two respects. First, they
offer the means to achieve real progress in raising these standards that
are so vital to the people of both our countries. Second, these
agreements must show that just as the United States takes seriously the
enforcement of its standards in these areas, so does Mexico.
We also must consider the relationship between NAFTA and illegal
immigration. President Salinas has said that "more jobs will mean
higher wages in Mexico, and this in turn will mean fewer migrants to the
United States and Canada."
Let me be clear with respect to immigration. People who have emigrated
to the U.S. from Mexico have immeasurably enriched our country. Legal
migration from Mexico and other nations will continue to make an
important contribution to American diversity and democracy. At the same
time, the U.S. is committed to reducing illegal immigration. A growing
Mexican economy will reduce that pressure.
Our partnership with Mexico is also dedicated to the collective defense
of democracy and human rights. Just two weeks ago, Mexico and the
United States together took the lead in calling for immediate action by
the OAS to stand by democracy in Guatemala. Our cooperation made a
difference--and today Guatemala is standing firm as a free nation.
Mexico and the United States came together in the same spirit of trust
and friendship to support a successful, negotiated conclusion to the war
in El Salvador. NAFTA will further solidify our cooperation on these
vital issues of concern to our two nations and the entire hemisphere.
Our cooperation extends beyond these issues, and beyond Mexico.
Throughout this hemisphere, we are working in an atmosphere of mutual
respect on the great challenges of the nineties. We are working to stop
the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We are combatting narco-
trafficking. The Clinton Administration is making a new commitment to
work with our neighbors to protect the environment and address
population growth. On all these issues, the United States and the
nations of Latin America can make real progress if we work in
partnership.
President Clinton strongly endorses the goal of linking the democracies
of the Americas through free trade. From the Caribbean to Cape Horn,
nation after nation is removing barriers to foreign investment and
trade. Free markets and free trade do far more than any aid program to
create real growth and upward mobility--and the prosperity that is vital
to the strength and success of democracy.
In concluding, let me emphasize that the vote of the Congress on NAFTA
will be the most important signal the United States sends to Mexico and
all of Latin America in this decade.
In domestic terms, NAFTA is a test of our confidence. It will measure
whether Americans believe in our ability to compete in open markets--or
whether we will shrink from that challenge and be passive in the face of
a changing global economy.
In foreign policy terms, NAFTA is the opportunity of a generation. It
is a test of America's willingness to cooperate across a diverse range
of issues with Mexico--and with our other democratic neighbors to the
south.
Given a clear choice, the American people will choose to compete in the
international economy, not cower from it. They will support the cause
of democracy in the Americas, not turn away from it.
I am confident that when this Commission meets next year, NAFTA will be
in force in the United States, Mexico and Canada. And I am confident
that we will be on the way to building a Western Hemisphere community of
nations linked by democratic values and open markets.
Thank you very much. (###)
ARTICLE 2:
Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission
Overview
The U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission is a forum established by the two
countries to allow for regular exchanges at the Cabinet level on a wide
range of issues critical to U.S.-Mexico relations.
Development of the BNC
Presidents Carter and Lopez Portillo established the precursor to the
Binational Commission (BNC) in May 1977 to provide better coordination
in U.S.-Mexico relations. Then called the U.S.-Mexico Consultative
Mechanism, it had three broad working groups--political, social, and
economic--and subgroups within each of these. At the first meeting in
May 1978, Secretary of State Vance and Mexican Secretary of Foreign
Relations Roel met in Mexico with the chairmen of the working groups to
review the first year's progress.
In February 1979, the two Presidents agreed to reorganize and strengthen
the Consultative Mechanism. The working groups were realigned and
broadened to provide an improved forum for discussion and understanding.
The presidents later reaffirmed the Consultative Mechanism during their
September 1979 meeting in Washington, DC.
The Binational Commission was established in 1981 by Presidents Reagan
and Lopez Portillo to serve as a forum for meetings between Cabinet-
level officials from both countries. The new BNC was envisioned as a
simple, flexible tool that would meet once or twice annually, with
counterparts exchanging an action agenda of topics requiring attention.
One of the early, temporary action groups formed in November 1981, the
Border Relations Action group, met twice and carried out several on-site
investigations and technical-level consultations and submitted
recommendations to the two governments.
BNC Structure
This year's BNC meeting is the 10th since 1981. The meeting has become
a day-long conference chaired by the U.S. Secretary of State and the
Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations. Each delegation includes 11
Cabinet-level officials and other agency chiefs. Meeting in plenary
sessions and working groups, they discuss a complex and diverse range of
bilateral issues which have international and domestic impact.
The number of groups has grown steadily, especially during the past 3
years, as education and culture, agriculture, housing and urban
development, labor, transportation, and science and technology have been
added. In preparing for the BNC, each group develops an agenda which
serves as the basis of working group discussions. In some years,
bilateral agreements are signed.
Summary of June 1993 Meeting
In plenary sessions and working groups, delegates will discuss the broad
range of issues, including trade, environment and labor cooperation,
anti-narcotics issues, business and finance, and cooperation along our
shared border. U.S. and Mexican officials will sign three agreements,
two in the area of communications and one in education:
-- An agreement to protect U.S. communications from interference by a
new satellite service being introduced by Mexico. This agreement covers
the use of the 17.7 to 17.8 GHz band by terrestrial, fixed, point-to-
point relay systems in the U.S. and broadcasting satellite services
(BSS) which are to be used by Mexico. The U.S. will use another band
for BSS.
-- A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission and the Mexican Communications Secretariat
expanding the radio frequency bands available for cellular radio
services in the border areas. This MOU will be incorporated into a
government-to-government agreement once negotiations are completed on
other issues.
-- Annex 3 to the 1990 Education Memorandum of Understanding. Annex 3
will stress cooperation in: education-to-work transition, early
childhood, teaching of the Spanish language and Mexican culture, English
and the American culture, education by satellite and radio, education
for pre-venting drug abuse, and educational research. (###)
Consultative Mechanism Meeting Dates
May 1977
May 1978
BNC Meeting Dates
November 1981
November 1982
April 1983
April 1984
July 1985
January 1987
August 1989
August 1990
September 1991
June 1993
1993 BNC Working Groups
Migration and Consular Affairs Financial Cooperation
Trade and Investment
Business Development, Fisheries, and Tourism
Agriculture
Environmental Cooperation
Education and Cultural Affairs
Legal Affairs and Anti-Narcotics Cooperation
Bilateral Relations:
Border Cooperation Subgroup
Science and Technology Subgroup
Housing and Urban Development
Labor
Transportation
ARTICLE 3:
Fact Sheet: International Boundary and Water Commission
Background
On March 1, 1889, the United States and Mexican Governments signed a
convention agreeing to establish the International Boundary Commission.
Under the Water Treaty of 1944, it was reconstituted and designated the
International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico
(IBWC). The Commission, called Comision Internacional de Limites y
Aguas (CILA) in Spanish, is widely recognized as a model of effective
international cooperation which has set a standard for the rest of the
world. The IBWC consists of U.S. and Mexican sections, each headed by a
Commissioner. The present U.S. Commissioner is Dr. Narendra N. Gunaji,
and the Mexican Commissioner is Ing. Arturo Herrera Solis.
IBWC Projects and Achievements
The Commission's work to divide and share the use of international
waters has benefited people in both countries economically and socially.
The IBWC has settled many difficult U.S.-Mexico boundary and water
problems.
-- It cut through flood-created bends in the Rio Grande to create
regular river channels, exchanging territory between the two countries
in the process. The main example of this was the 1967 settlement at
what became the Chamizal National Memorial near El Paso-Ciudad Juarez.
-- It has constructed and operated other flood control and water
conservation projects along the Rio Grande and the Tijuana River,
including two major dams on the Rio Grande--Falcon and Amistad. These
projects have protected thousands of lives and provided water for
valuable crops.
-- It helped resolve the international Colorado River salinity problem
in 1973.
-- It has built and maintained monuments on the land boundary and on
international bridges.
Most recently, the Commission has contributed to public health in both
countries by working with their environmental agencies to resolve border
sanitation problems. Such projects provide important and long-term
solutions to the four major sanitation problems along the border.
-- In October 1992, the two governments approved an IBWC conceptual
agreement on long-term measures to correct pollution in the New River at
Mexicali-Calexico.
-- The IBWC has completed a land pipeline and is designing a U.S.-
Mexican sewage treatment plant in south San Diego as well as an ocean
pipeline to treat and dispose of Tijuana sewage not covered by Tijuana's
sewage system.
-- The IBWC has completed a major expansion of the international
wastewater treatment plant at Nogales, Arizona, and is exploring other
ways to improve Mexican and U.S. sanitation infrastructure in that area.
-- The IBWC is midway through construction of a jointly funded sewage
treatment plant in Nuevo Laredo to improve the quality of Rio Grande
waters. It also is leading a binational toxicity survey of the Rio
Grande and is planning a similar comprehensive survey of the quality of
border groundwaters. (###)
ARTICLE 4:
A Strong United Nations Serves U.S. Security Interests
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations
Address before the Council on Foreign Relations' Conference on
Cooperative Security and the United Nations, New York City, June 11,
1993
Thank you very much, Alton Frye. Having spent many years on the other
side of the podium, I must say that I am delighted to have made it to
this side. It is always an honor and a pleasure to join discussions at
the Council--not only because every Council member is honored to address
one's colleagues, but also because I believe that my stimulating new
life has given me some new insights I am delighted to share.
The theme of the Council's Conference, "Cooperative Security and the
United Nations," is indeed one of the most pressing foreign policy
issues facing our country--and very much in need of the thoughtful
attention of people like you. The urgency comes about for three
reasons:
First, the Cold War's end has removed the restraining, stabilizing
effect of the East-West nuclear stand-off. Pent up, often violent
pressures for change have been released--placing the United Nations in
the center of the effort to guide and safeguard a suddenly chaotic
world.
Second, as the world's sole remaining superpower, leading economy, and
foremost democracy, as well as the biggest donor to UN peace-keeping, it
is the United States that will greatly influence what security role the
United Nations will take on.
And third, it is also a fact that peace-keeping costs--roughly $1
billion for us in 1993--must have deep support in Congress and in the
public at large if they are going to be sustained. That means we must
be extremely clear about how the UN serves U.S. security interests.
Let me use my time this evening to discuss as directly as I can two
questions that are at the heart of the U.S. relationship to the UN in
the post-Cold War era: first, why is a strong United Nations critical
to U.S. security, and second, how and in what direction should the UN
contribution to global security be strengthened?
So, why is a strong United Nations critical to U.S. security? The
collapse of Soviet communism, apart from being the most positive
development of the 20th century, has left us with a dilemma. We are
being importuned--by allies and former foes alike--to intensify our
global security leadership at the very time when the enemy is much
harder to identify, when our vital interests are threatened in more
subtle and remote ways, and when our own budget is so strained.
As a professor, I am wary of historic parallels. So let me indulge a
bit and say that the last time we were in this situation was the decade
following the First World War. Then, the lack of an obvious threat
helped us to rationalize non-participation in the League of Nations. Of
course, the League was structurally flawed anyway. But our absence was
symptomatic: behind it was a conceptual failure to explain, and a
political failure to support, effective engagement in a world that
seemed to have no "clear and present danger." The challenge facing U.S.
security policy today is uncannily similar, and leaves us with what I
call the two ostriches problem. One ostrich would rather not see any
predators and plunges its head into the sand. The other hears the
clamor of friends in need and miseries to assuage, and runs off in all
directions at once.
Between self-absorption, with ruinous consequences for the rest of the
world, and hyper-activity with equally ruinous consequences for
ourselves and others, there is a third alternative--an alternative that
husbands American resources and promotes American and global interests
in a just and orderly world. It is called multilateral action. As
Secretary of State Christopher has said,
We cannot let every crisis become a choice between inaction or American
intervention. The world looks to us for leadership. Thus, the
alternatives boil down to how the United States will lead: alone; at
the head of a coalition; or working multilaterally to share the burden
with others.
A Principled International Community
Let me try out a thought with you: a principled international
community. Collective security will make it possible for us to share
our global security burden. But the idea of collective security is more
than a fiscal expedient. It flows from a mutuality of interests--
commercial, financial, cultural, ecological, political, and security-
related--that affect our daily lives. In short, it is in our interest
to shape a world that is more than an agglomeration of states, but is,
in fact, a principled community.
As I see it, the obligation to work toward such a community isn't
something we elect to do because we are good guys. It is forced on us
by several imperatives. Let me mention five tonight.
The first, reflected in the title of this conference, is the strategic
imperative to cooperate. Many threats are so geographically diffuse
that it is well beyond our own or our allies' resources to counter them.
Supportive actions from a vast number of countries are essential, and
this is exactly what the UN sanctions regimes against Iraq, Libya, and
Serbia-Montenegro have achieved. Indeed, without the tourniquet on
Iraqi imports, I think it is safe to say that Iraq's military force
structure and nuclear weapons potential would soon again be a subject of
grave concern.
The second imperative is legitimacy. Most countries, most of the time,
find that when they respect international law the benefits far outweigh
the costs. Thus, when the Security Council adopts a mandatory
resolution, or the IAEA authorizes an inspection under its statute, the
resultant actions carry an incomparable measure of political legitimacy.
For example, without virtually occupying much of Iraq, it is
inconceivable that the United States could have conducted the kind of
intrusive inspections routinely performed by the UN Monitoring
Commission. It is equally inconceivable that the front-line states in
the Balkans--especially Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, and now
Macedonia--would have opted to apply trade sanctions on Serbia-
Montenegro, without the combination of legal pressure and political
support conferred by Security Council sanctions resolutions. And it is
virtually certain that without the political support expressed in the
use-of-force resolution against Iraq, Saddam would have been able to
carry out his grisly terrorist threat against U.S. soldiers, civilians,
and facilities.
A third factor is the economic imperative of burden-sharing. We have a
national security interest in containing and, wherever possible,
resolving regional conflicts. Whether measured in arms proliferation,
refugees on our shores, the destabilization of allies, or loss of
exports, jobs, or investments, the cost of runaway regional conflicts
sooner or later comes home to America. In 1993, the United Nations will
spend over $3 billion to stem or stop those conflicts, and we will pay
one-third of that. But without the United Nations, both the costs and
the conflict would be far greater.
Yet a fourth imperative, which could be called the appropriate-redress-
grievance imperative, has emerged in the last few years. The Cold War's
end freed a host of dissatisfied parties--particularly in Europe and
Eurasia--to pursue the redress of economic, national, ethnic, racial,
religious, and other grievances. Left unchecked, these forces will
surely convulse much of Europe and Eurasia in conflict. The potential
to destabilize the heart of Europe, or to trigger use of nuclear or
other weapons of mass destruction, or to spread genocide is one we
cannot accept. There is really only one antidote. It is to extend to
all parties the promise of principled change and to sharply penalize
those who refuse. Only the international community has the collective
moral authority, and the physical and financial resources, for such a
critical task.
And fifth, the Western democracies face what I would call a "fairness"
or an "equity" imperative. The equity imperative says this: If the
Security Council is to speak and act on behalf of the entire world
community, its efforts cannot be confined to only those issues of
greatest consequence to its richer members. Indeed, the United Nations'
ambitious engagement in Somalia, so critical for humanitarian reasons,
also sends this important political message: We must be selective, and
carefully save the United Nations' resources, but not by closing the
Security Council door.
The factors which I have set out make it clear that the process in which
we are engaged is not simply an exercise in altruistic morality. To me,
there is no such thing as disinterested involvement in the international
community. We are and will remain involved because we must continue to
try to build an international system in which our experiment in
democracy and social pluralism can continue to flourish. As we proceed
to preserve and protect what we have, we ought to make clear who we are
and what we stand for. There will always be a strong ideological
component to American foreign policy. We would be foolish to suppress
it. It is what makes us different, and what others admire about us.
At the same time, America's overriding interest in creating this new
community does not mean it is America's responsibility to right every
wrong in the world. Instead, our goal is to foster the development of a
community capable of easing, if not terminating, the abominable
injustices and conditions that still plague civilization, because only
in such a community can America flourish. If this is considered naive
idealism, I plead guilty.
Having laid out to you some reasons why I think a strong United Nations
is critical to U.S. security, let me launch into the second part of my
talk: How and in what way should the United Nations' role in global
security be strengthened?
If, in fact, a more principled international community is starting to
take shape, where do we fit in? Because this international community so
reflects American values, ideology, and economic interests, we have a
motive and an opportunity to establish some "Rules of the Game.'' The
UN is the best repository of those rules, and the United States is their
most able patron.
But rules aren't rules if they're not enforced. This does not require
that we serve as the world's policeman, only that there should be
policemen and that we take a hand in assuring their effectiveness.
A central foreign policy goal of the Administration is, therefore, to
help create safeguards for a principled inter- national community which
more evenly distributes the burden of its defense while preserving our
role in its leadership. So, we in the United States must work
energetically to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations and other
multilateral organizations to conduct peace-keeping, preventive
diplomacy, peace-making, peace enforcement, humanitarian security, and
similar operations.
Fixing United Nations Peace-keeping
In recent years, UN peace-keeping and related missions have increased at
a dizzying pace. In 1987, there were five peace-keeping missions, three
of which had existed for decades. They were staffed by fewer than
10,000 UN troops or military observers at a total cost of $233 million.
Today there are 13 missions, over 75,000 troops, and the price tag is
over $3 billion. Yet, amazingly, there are roughly the same number of
permanent headquarters staff as there were in 1987.
This small staff has done a remarkable job of adjusting, both to the new
work load and the conceptual changes in peace-keeping mandates. But
they have had to rely on ad hoc arrangements. We all bear a large
measure of responsibility for this situation, because we all have failed
to ensure that the United Nations has the capacity to fulfill the great
and growing tasks we assign to it.
Through his 1992 report "An Agenda for Peace," the Secretary- General
launched the UN community on the path of peace-keeping reform. And, he
has begun to take a number of useful organizational steps. These are
most welcome. However, to address the systemic challenges facing the
Secretary-General, we need the active assistance of member states.
Our government is nearing completion of an internal review of U.S.
support for UN peace-keeping, and we will soon be able to share our
proposals with the Secretary-General and other member states. This
summer, we will try to build a base of support for several far-reaching
reforms that could be pursued this year.
Before outlining for you some of our general thinking, let me offer a
bit of diagnosis. If I had to choose a single word to evoke the
problems of UN peace-keeping, it would be "improvisation." It may
surprise you--it certainly surprised me--to learn that each time the
United Nations has conducted 28 peace-keeping operations since 1948, it
has started from scratch. A kind of programmed amateurism shows up
across the board:
-- In the near total absence of contingency planning;
-- In hastily recruited, ill-equipped and often unprepared troops and
civilian staff;
-- In lift arrangements cobbled together on a wing and a prayer;
-- In procurement processes that require long lead-times for urgently
needed equipment;
-- In the absence of knowledge about available forces and capabilities;
-- In the lack of troop training standards or standard operating
procedures for troops in the field or under fire;
-- In the lack of centralized command and control;
-- In the absence of standard budgeting techniques and cost factors;
-- In the Byzantine and drawn-out budgetary decision-making process;
-- And in the lack of a durable financial basis for starting and
sustaining peace-keeping operations.
The list could be longer, but I think you get the point. The problems
are comprehensive except in one vital respect: the peace-keeping staff,
however small, is superlative.
Last month, at U.S. and Russian initiative, the Security Council took an
extremely important step by requesting the Secretary-General to present
a report this September containing specific new proposals for reform.
The Council's suggestions included:
-- Creation of a plans and current operations directorate;
-- Notification to the UN of forces or capabilities that member states
could make available for peace-keeping or humanitarian operations;
-- A reserve stock of commonly used equipment; and
-- Standardization of peace-keeping procedures.
Perhaps the most important sentence in the Security Council statement
was that all member states "make participation in and support for
international peace-keeping a part of their foreign and national
security policy." That is the key point: preventing and settling
international conflict is not a matter of casual interest. For
ourselves and the other members of the United Nations, it is a critical
interest.
I believe that the time has come to commit the political, intellectual,
and financial capital that UN peace-keeping and our security deserve.
Let me describe a few priority areas for change.
Operations
The United Nations has neither the resources nor the internal
organization to plan, prepare, organize, deploy, direct, and service
peace-keeping missions. We favor a substantial enlargement and
reorganization of the peace-keeping headquarters staff--and the creation
of a permanent foundation for rapid 24-hour communication, intelligence,
lift, recruitment, training, and the full spectrum of in-theater
logistical support.
Budget
Peace-keeping costs are billed by the mission, a time-consuming process
out of sync with our own and many others' legislative appropriation
cycles. This makes planning nearly impossible, and results in a cash
flow crisis--which means late deployments and long delays in
reimbursements to contributors. We are studying ways to deal with this
vexing and dangerous situation. One possible solution is to create a
unified UN peace-keeping budget accompanied by an enlarged contingency
fund for unforeseen missions. While such a fund would have to be
adjusted annually, it would give the Secretary-General a better planning
basis and reduce the need for member states to keep returning to their
legislature for additional finance.
Cost Control
As the number and size of peace- keeping missions have grown, so have
the United Nations' cash requirements. Yet the UN does not have the
resources or skilled staff needed to manage and oversee increasingly
complicated peace-keeping budgets. The U.S. and other large donors
should support creation of a cadre of highly qualified budget experts
for this purpose, as well as the introduction of special budgeting
techniques. We also will urge the UN to implement its plan for a peace-
keeping inspectorate to monitor actual expenditures. The United Nations
must institute more regular and timely cost accounting procedures to
ensure that money is being spent wisely.
Finance
As peace-keeping costs spiral upward, some member states resist paying
for new missions, while others, like Russia, can no longer meet existing
obligations. The result is that we are approaching a crisis point, in
which UN intervention, desirable for policy reasons, cannot be
undertaken for fiscal reasons. That is why we intend, over the coming
months, to work with other member states to explore the fullest possible
range of steps to place peace-keeping on a sound and durable long-term
basis.
Conclusion
I want to leave time for your questions and comments, so let me close by
returning to a point I tried to make in the beginning. The end of the
Cold War has profoundly benefited Americans in two respects: our
country is protected by a wider margin of security than we have enjoyed
for most of this century; and the emerging post-Cold War world
increasingly reflects and indeed aspires to American values and ideals.
These two facts give us the motive and the opportunity to help secure a
principled international community for the enjoyment and protection of
future generations. Yet these alone are not enough. If we want to
ensure that the cauldron of instabilities bubbling up on nearly every
other continent do not prevent us from pursuing the global interest that
I have described tonight, then we must act. For as a people, we must
also have a vision of the community we want to live in and the will to
bring it to life. (###)
ARTICLE 5:
Myths of Peace-keeping
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations
Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security,
International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, June 24, 1993
M r. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a
great pleasure to appear before you again. During my last visit to this
subcommittee, on May 3, we discussed the American stake in a system of
collective security. Much has occurred since early May to make that
subject even more relevant today. I am submitting for the record my
speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on June 11 [see p. 461]
because its discussion of collective security and UN reform should be of
particular interest to this subcommittee.
Today, however, I want to review peace-keeping operations in Somalia,
Cambodia, and Mozambique and describe recent Security Council action on
Haiti. But I want to spend some time dispelling what I believe are some
serious misperceptions about UN peace- keeping and the U.S. role in it.
Let me begin by noting that I have spoken in other forums in recent
weeks about four categories of states that are emerging at the United
Nations. They include:
-- A significant number of states that have a stake in the United
Nations and the international community as a whole;
-- Emerging democracies trying to play a constructive role but
struggling with internal political and economic turmoil;
-- Other states and factions that are at war with international norms
and institutions and which I call the "defiant regimes"; and finally,
-- The failed societies--the ones where effective government has
collapsed, or anarchy reigns, or the economy is hopeless, or a
humanitarian calamity overwhelms the country and the people are sliding
into an abyss. These failed societies cry out for help from the
international community.
Much of our credibility as a superpower--and we must, in my view, remain
one--will depend upon our ability to manage our approach to these four
groups. Though sometimes we will act alone, our foreign policy will
necessarily point toward multilateral engagement. But unless the United
States also exercises leadership within collective bodies like the
United Nations, there is a risk that multilateralism will not serve our
national interest well--in fact, it may undermine our interests.
These two realities--multilateral engagement and U.S. leadership within
collective bodies--require an "assertive multilateralism" that advances
U.S. foreign policy goals. Preventive diplomacy is the linchpin of
assertive multi-lateralism. We are going to have to open our minds to
broader strategies in multilateral forums. We need to project our
leadership where it counts long before a smoldering dispute has a chance
to flare into the crisis of the week. But we have inherited many
conflicts that the United Nations is deeply involved in resolving. In
recent weeks several failed societies have required assertive
multilateral action in the interests of their people and of
international peace and security.
Somalia
In Somalia, the United Nations took over from the U.S.-led UNITAF
operation on May 4. From a peak of 25,800 American troops in mid-
January, the U.S. contingent now comprises a ground logistics force of
about 3,000 troops in the UN peace-keeping force in Somalia, UNOSOM II,
and a separate quick reaction force of about 1,100 troops. The total
multinational force in UNOSOM II is currently about 20,000 troops from
22 countries. The United Nations has troop commitments from additional
countries which should permit it to reach its target of about 28,000
troops by the end of July.
The U.S. role thus has been vastly reduced. Other nations' troops carry
the greater burden on the ground, as the events of the last 2 weeks have
clearly shown. A true multinational coalition of forces has gathered
under the UN flag. Rather than pay most of the cost--as we did for the
UNITAF operation--the United States now will pay its share of the
regular assessment for the UN peace-keeping force.
The brutal attack on UN troops on June 5 left 23 Pakistani peace-keepers
dead and 59 wounded. Three American soldiers also were wounded. This
occurred while the UN troops were carrying out operations specifically
within their mandate authorized in Security Council Resolution 814 of
March 26. The Security Council determined, in Resolution 837 on June 5
[see p. 467], that law and order must be restored in Mogadishu and that
the perpetrators of the killings of June 6 be apprehended, detained, and
prosecuted. The UN envoy in Somalia, Admiral Jonathan Howe, issued an
arrest warrant for General Aideed in connection with the shooting of
Pakistani troops.
The unprecedented and decisive actions of UNOSOM II since June 12
against General Aideed's armed militia, their arms depots, and their
strongholds were essential for the restoration of law and order in
Mogadishu; the elimination of heavy weapons in the Mogadishu area; the
resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries; the eventual resumption of
discussion on political reconciliation; and the fulfillment of
Resolution 837's mandate.
U.S. forces participated in the UN action with critical air and limited
ground support. We can all be proud of our soldiers' measured and
professional performance as part of the UN operation. About 1,400 UN
peace-keepers from four other countries--Morocco, Pakistan, Italy, and
France--were heavily engaged on the ground earlier this month. Four
Moroccans and one Pakistani lost their lives, and dozens of peace-
keepers were wounded.
If General Aideed and other perpetrators of the June 5 killings are
apprehended, the Security Council will ensure that they are held
accountable under the rule of law. In any event, the arrest warrant
against General Aideed greatly restricts his mobility and effectiveness
as a rogue leader, something I believe the vast majority of Somalis
desperately want. As Admiral Howe has aptly stated, "People are sick of
rule by the gun and extortion." As UNOSOM II succeeds in disarming
factions and heavy weapons are destroyed, the average Somali will be
able to participate, without fear, in re-creating a civil society.
UNOSOM's prospects for promoting a durable political settlement will
then improve.
There may well be further challenges to the authority of the UN peace-
keeping force in Somalia. Rebuilding Somali society and promoting
democracy in that strife-torn nation are difficult endeavors. But after
the enormous effort made by the United States and other nations in the
UNITAF operation to reverse famine in Somalia, it would be folly now to
permit conditions to deteriorate again. Had there not been a UN
response to the June 5 killings, the UN's credibility in Somalia would
have been fatally undermined.
Cambodia
The UN-organized elections in Cambodia were remarkably successful, with
a 90% turnout of the registered voters. The UN peace-keeping operation
in Cambodia (UNTAC) deserves considerable credit for this success. We
believe that the Cambodian people have spoken with unmistakable clarity
in saying they want an end to warfare. They want peace. The process of
reconciliation has already begun. I sincerely hope we have finally
reached a stage where Cambodia is beginning to emerge from the category
of "failed societies."
At our initiative, the Security Council recently endorsed the results of
the election, which has been certified as free and fair by the United
Nations, and requested UNTAC to continue to play its role during the
transition period in accordance with the Paris agreements. The Council
also requested the Secretary-General to report by mid-July on the
possible future role for the United Nations and its specialized agencies
after UNTAC's mandate expires.
The newly elected constituent assembly has begun its work of drawing up
a constitution, and will transform itself into a legislative assembly
with the establishment of a new government for Cambodia. We believe
Prince Sihanouk is playing a vital and constructive role working with
the leaders of the political par- ties that won seats in the elections.
Last weekend, the government party (CPP) and the royalist opposition
(FUNCINPEC) tentatively agreed to a power-sharing arrangement during
the transition period.
Cambodia and the United Nations have now entered a critical stage in the
transition to peace and democracy. There remains a serious risk that
the Khmer Rouge will continue attempting to disrupt the peace process.
The elected Cambodian leaders must ultimately decide on the composition
of their own government. It is difficult, however, to see how the
international community could support a government that included the
Khmer Rouge or others who would seek to disrupt the peace process by
means of violence.
We have come so far in Cambodia and it is essential that we stand by the
Cambodian people and UNTAC and give democracy a chance to work there.
We should anticipate that the United Nations will need to respond
quickly and decisively to any attempt by any party to reverse the
historic achievement of the elections. Finally, we must also work with
the United Nations and others to create the economic and social
conditions under which peace and democracy can flourish.
Mozambique
The United Nations is also involved in moving war-torn Mozambique toward
lasting peace and multi-party democracy. The ambitious UN peace-keeping
operation in Mozambique (OMUMOZ) is charged with coordinating several
major aspects of the transition to peace, including monitoring of the
cease-fire, demobilization of combatants, preparation for and monitoring
of elections, and the crucial humanitarian assistance effort. Despite
some early administrative and logistical problems, the UN operation is
now fully operational, with over 6,000 "blue helmet" forces deployed
from two dozen countries.
We have been encouraged by the commitment of the government and RENAMO
to uphold the cease-fire. However, we are concerned about delays in
beginning the all-important demobilization process. We are urging both
parties to overcome differences over details, so that demobilization
can begin smartly, and preparations can get underway for elections,
which are expected to be held before October 1994.
The United States participates actively in three UN-chaired commissions
overseeing implementation of the Mozambique peace agreement. We are
working with the UN Secretariat to determine what types of assistance
the United States can provide at this very important time. We are
encouraged that this is a devastated society that can be resurrected, in
large part because of a viable peace-keeping presence.
Haiti
The people of Haiti have waited a long time for the re-establishment of
a democratic government. The international community's political will
to press for a settlement to restore democracy was evidenced in the
tough UN sanctions resolution (841) that went into effect yesterday [see
p. 469]. The Security Council acted to stop the flow of oil and arms to
Haiti through mandatory, legally binding, worldwide sanctions. The
resolution breaks new ground in a number of areas. This is the first
time UN sanctions of this kind have been imposed on a country in this
hemisphere. It is the first time Chapter VII sanctions have been
imposed on a country not in civil conflict or at war with a neighbor.
And it marks a new level of cooperation between the United Nations and a
regional organization--in this case the Organization of American States.
The United States
is committed to seeing that international oil suppliers comply fully
with Resolution 841.
Some Myths About UN Peace-keeping
These four examples alone show the complexities and modern requirements
of UN peace-keeping and enforcement actions. There are many more. But
I want to focus now on some misperceptions about the United Nations and
peace-keeping that continue to shape--erroneously in my opinion--our
public discourse on this country's role in the United Nations. There
are, in short, myths about the United Nations that need to be exposed
before they lead us in the wrong direction during this turbulent new era
of world politics:
Myth No. 1: UN peace-keeping has nothing to do with U.S. national
interest. I trust that my testimony before this subcommittee on May 3
dispensed with this myth. Peace-keeping has become instrumental in
meeting three fundamental imperatives of our national interest:
economic, political, and humanitarian. The world continues to be a
dangerous place.
And yet consider for a moment what the world and the U.S. defense
budgets would be today if there were no UN peace-keeping operations and
the resultant power vacuums invited intervention by neighbors or would-
be regional powers. Increasingly, we are faced with an often violent
eruption of local or regional disputes that require the world's
attention. And it is in this new world that peace-keeping and the
modern responsibilities of collective security are essential to our
security.
Myth No. 2: When the United Nations takes over a security operation,
the United States can bail out. When the refrain is, "Let the UN handle
it," that cannot mean a "pass" for the United States. This country is a
part of the United Nations--in fact we are and should remain a very
senior partner--and our participation and leadership are vital to its
work. The alternatives--blissful isolation or costly duty as the
world's cop--are unrealistic and unacceptable. The Somalia operation is
a good example of how a continued U.S. role--minor compared to our
initial UNITAF deployment--is part and parcel of letting "the UN" handle
it.
Myth No. 3: Peace-keeping operations are consensual, avoid risks, and
only prolong conflicts between governments. Many peace-keeping
operations, particularly today in connection with failed societies, are
deployed into internal conflicts or anarchy, and thus are not dependent
on conventional notions of consent from each warring party. Nor, by any
measure, are peacekeeping operations risk-free: 925 peace-keeping
soldiers have been killed in action in the course of UN history, and 528
of those have died in on-going operations; 53 British, 49 French, 43
Irish, 35 Canadians, and 10 Americans have died in the line of duty. In
the former Yugoslavia, 43 peace-keepers have been killed; 186 peace-
keepers have sacrificed their lives in Cyprus. The Somalia massacre of
June 5 was a stark reminder of how exposed some peace-keepers are in the
very hostile environments into which they are deployed.
Half (14) of the 28 UN peace-keeping operations in UN history have been
terminated, most within 1 or 2 years of their creation. While some
peacekeeping operations may indeed encourage stalemate, the alternative
often would be a bloody and costly conflict--with severe risks of
escalation--that no one desires.
Myth No. 4: Peace-keeping is too expensive and ridden with fraud and
mismanagement. I have testified and spoken out often about the ad hoc
approaches that dominate peace-keeping operations. "Improvisation" is
the single word that might best evoke the problems of peace-keeping.
And while the potential for fraud and mismanagement exists, as it does
in any large organization, the most pressing problems in UN peace-
keeping relate to the sheer improvisational character of the system.
This produces major gaps in institutional capacity on one hand and
inefficiencies on the other. In fact, the small peace-keeping staff at
UN headquarters is superlative, and steps are now being taken to
increase its size and effectiveness. The millions that are spent on
peace-keeping operations--totaling more than $3 billion in 1993--must be
measured against the much higher costs that result if conflicts are left
to fester and explode.
I would like to add that the Administration is taking the lead to
enhance UN peace-keeping through implementation of important initiatives
at the United Nations and within our own government. On May 28, the
Security Council reached consensus on a list of peace-keeping reforms,
and plans for implementing them will be reported to us by the Secretary-
General in September. Within our government the Administration has been
conducting an intensive inter-agency review since February of both the
U.S. role in peace-keeping and the planning and managerial capabilities
of the United Nations for peace-keeping. We anticipate that review
process to be concluded soon. Finally, in September we hope there will
be a ministerial-level session of the Security Council to review peace-
keeping.
Myth No. 5: The U.S. domestic agenda prevents us from leading and
shaping a free and secure world. This is faulty logic at best, and
disastrous public policy at worse. The stability of the world economy
and of regional and world politics is deeply integrated with U.S.
interests and our economy. If we pursue a domestic agenda with blinders
on, refusing to recognize the carnage to our left and the distant
conflict to our right, eventually the cost of that disengagement, at a
minimum, will be an additional financial burden we must bear. More
likely, the costs will include U.S. forces with attendant potential loss
of life. President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have always
recognized that the foreign agenda is inseparable from the domestic
agenda. The sooner we all grasp that fundamental fact the sooner we
will recognize UN peace-keeping as one small, but important, piece in
the overall effort to achieve global stability and prosperity and to
advance democracies and their typically market-oriented economies.
All of this points to the fact that we are engaged in a great dialogue,
the conclusion of which no one can yet predict with certainty. In our
effort to plot what role the United States should fill in this new era,
we cannot abandon the responsibilities of a superpower. We cannot apply
"old think" to how we judge peace-keeping operations and missions today
and into the future. A whole new platter of issues confronts
contributing nations, including deployments into internal conflicts and
to protect humanitarian aid convoys. We need more minds pole-vaulting
over the conventions of the past and directing this nation's power into
the 21st century. (###)
ARTICLE 6:
UN Security Council Resolution 837 on Somalia
Resolution 837
(June 6, 1993)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of
17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992,
775 (1992) of August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 and 814 (1993)
of 26 March 1993,
Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,
Gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by forces
apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against the
personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) on 5
June 1993,
Strongly condemning such actions, which directly undermine international
efforts aimed at the restoration of peace and normalcy in Somalia,
Expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result of these criminal
attacks,
Reaffirming its commitments to assist the people of Somalia in re-
establishing conditions of normal life,
Stressing that the international community is involved in Somalia in
order to help the people of Somalia who have suffered untold miseries
due to years of civil strife in that country,
Acknowledging the fundamental importance of completing the comprehensive
and effective programme for disarming all Somali parties, including
movements and factions,
Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would
contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and
political settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's
political institutions and economy,
Condemning strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the
USC/SNA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel,
Recalling the statement made by its President on 31 March 1993 (S/25493)
concerning the safety of United Nations forces and personnel deployed in
conditions of strife and committed to consider promptly measures
appropriate to the particular circumstances to ensure that persons
responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against United
Nations forces and personnel are held to account for their actions,
Taking note of the information provided to the Council by the Secretary-
General on 6 June 1993,
Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace
and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Strongly condemns the unprovoked armed attacks against the personnel
of UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been part of a
calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent
by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate as provided for
in resolution 814 (1993);
2. Expresses its condolences to the Government and people of Pakistan
and the families of the UNOSOM II personnel who have lost their lives;
3. Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the early implementation of
the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions,
in accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of the report of the Secretary-
General of 3 March 1993, and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems
that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II;
4. Demands once again that all Somali parties, including movements and
factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the
agreements they concluded at the informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali
Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their
agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of
Disarmament (S25169, annex III);
5. Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution
814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible
for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including
against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to
establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia,
including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest
and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;
6. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to enquire into the
incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional
leaders involved;
7. Encourages the rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II
contingents to meet the full requirements of 18,000 men, all ranks, as
well as equipment, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report
(5/25354);
8. Urges Member States to contribute, on an emergency basis, military
support and transportation, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks
and attack helicopters, to provide UNOSOM II the capability
appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in
the accomplishment of its mandate;
9. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the
Council on the implementation of the present resolution, if possible
within seven days from the date of its adoption;
10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
VOTE: 15-0. (###)
ARTICLE 7:
Democratic Elections in Burundi
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, June
7, 1993.
The U.S. Government congratulates the people of Burundi on the
successful completion of their first democratic elections since
independence in 1962. The June 1 presidential elections, in which they
expressed freely and fairly their choice, represent a triumph of the
democratic process.
The U.S. Government commends President Buyoya for his strong leadership
of Burundi in renouncing the violent past and creating a new nation
founded on peace, reconciliation, and democracy. We congratulate
President-elect Ndadaye on his selection, and we look forward to
strengthening the good relationship between our two countries as he
continues the historic task of making Burundi a free and democratic
nation. We commend the Burundi people and the security forces for the
calm and orderly atmosphere both during and following the elections.
The U.S. Government wishes to assure the Burundi people of its continued
support for their democratic and economic reforms and wishes them peace
and prosperity as they unite behind their new democratically elected
government. (###)
ARTICLE 8:
UN Security Council Resolution 841 On Crisis in Haiti
Resolution 841
(June 16, 1993)
The Security Council,
Having received a letter from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to
the President of the Council dated 7 June 1993 (S/25958) requesting that
the Council make universal and mandatory the trade embargo on Haiti
recommended by the Organization of American States,
Having also heard a report of the Secretary-General on 10 June 1993
regarding the crisis in Haiti,
Noting resolutions MRE/RES.1/91, MRE/RES.2/91, MRE/RES.3/92 and
MRE/RES.4/92, adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of
American States, and resolution CP/RES.594 (923/92) and declarations
CP/Dec.8 (927/93), CP/Dec.9 (931/93) and CP/Dec.10 (934/93) adopted by
the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,
Noting in particular resolution MRE/RES.5/93 adopted by the Foreign
Ministers of the Organization of American States in Managua, Nicaragua,
on 6 June 1993,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 46/7 of 11 October 1991, 46/138
of 17 December 1991, 47/20 A of 24 November 1992, 47/143 of 18 December
1992 and 47/20 B of 23 April 1993,
Strongly supportive of the continuing leadership by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the
Organization of American States and of the efforts of the international
community to reach a political solution to the crisis in Haiti,
Commending the efforts undertaken by the Special Envoy for Haiti of the
United Nations and Organization of American States Secretaries-General,
Mr. Dante Caputo, to establish a political dialogue with the Haitian
parties with a view to resolving the crisis in Haiti,
Recognizing the urgent need for an early, comprehensive and peaceful
settlement of the crisis in Haiti in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations and international law,
Also recalling the statement of 26 February 1993 (S/25344), in which the
Council noted with concern the incidence of humanitarian crises,
including mass displacements of population, becoming or aggravating
threats to international peace and security,
Deploring the fact that, despite the efforts of the international
community, the legitimate Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
has not been reinstated,
Concerned that the persistence of this situation contributes to a
climate of fear of persecution and economic dislocation which could
increase the number of Haitians seeking refuge in neighbouring Member
States and convinced that a reversal of this situation is needed to
prevent its negative repercussions on the region,
Recalling, in this respect, the provisions of Chapter VIII of the
Charter of the United Nations, and stressing the need for effective
cooperation between regional organizations and the United Nations,
Considering that the above-mentioned request of the Permanent
Representative of Haiti, made within the context of the related actions
previously taken by the Organization of American States and by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, defines a unique and exceptional
situation warranting extraordinary measures by the Security Council in
support of the efforts undertaken within the framework of the
Organization of American States, and,
Determining that, in these unique and exceptional circumstances, the
continuation of this situation threatens international peace and
security in the region,
Acting, therefore, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations,
1. Affirms that the solution of the crisis in Haiti should take into
account the above-mentioned resolutions of the Organization of American
States and of the General Assembly of the United Nations;
2. Welcomes the request of the General Assembly that the Secretary-
General take the necessary measures in order to assist, in cooperation
with the Organization of American States, in the solution of the crisis
in Haiti;
3. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 5 to 14 below,
which are consistent with the trade embargo recommended by the
Organization of American States, shall come into force at 00.01 EST on
23 June 1993 unless the Secretary-General, having regard to the views of
the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, has
reported to the Council that, in light of the results of the
negotiations conducted by the Special Envoy for Haiti of the United
Nations and Organization of American States Secretaries-General, the
imposition of such measures is not warranted at that time;
4. Decides that if, at any time after the submission of the above-
mentioned report of the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General, having
regard to the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of
American States, reports to the Council that the de facto authorities in
Haiti have failed to comply in good faith with their undertakings in the
above-mentioned negotiations, the provisions set forth in paragraphs 5
to 14 below shall come into force immediately;
5. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their
nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or
aircraft, of petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related
materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military
vehicles and equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the
aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories, to any
person or body in Haiti or to any person or body for the purpose of any
business carried on in or operated from Haiti, and any activities by
their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated
to promote such sale or supply;
6. Decides to prohibit any and all traffic from entering the territory
or territorial sea of Haiti carrying petroleum or petroleum products, or
arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, police equipment and spare
parts for the aforementioned, in violation of paragraph 5 above;
7. Decides that the Committee established by paragraph 10 below may
authorize on an exceptional case-by-case basis under a no-objection
procedure the importation, in non-commercial quantities and only in
barrels or bottles, of petroleum or petroleum products, including
propane gas for cooking, for verified essential humanitarian needs,
subject to acceptable arrangements for effective monitoring of delivery
and use;
8. Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds
derived from property, (a) of the Government of Haiti or of the de facto
authorities in Haiti, or (b) controlled directly or indirectly by such
Government or authorities or by entities, wherever located or organized,
owned or controlled by such Government or authorities, shall require all
persons and entities within their own territories holding such funds to
freeze them to ensure that they are not made available directly or
indirectly to or for the benefit of the de facto authorities in Haiti;
9. Calls upon all States, and all international organizations, to act
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution,
notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or
imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or
any licence or permit granted prior to 23 June 1993;
10. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional
rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of
all the members of the Council to undertake the following tasks and to
report on its work to the Council with its observations and
recommendations:
(a) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 below;
(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the motion
taken by them concerning the effective implementation of this
resolution;
(c) To consider any information brought to its attention by States
concerning violations of the measures imposed by this resolution and to
recommend appropriate measures in response thereto;
(d) To consider and decide expeditiously requests for the approval of
imports of petroleum and petroleum products for essential humanitarian
needs in accordance with paragraph 7 above;
(e) To make periodic reports to the Security Council on information
submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the present resolution,
identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels,
reported to be engaged in such violations;
(f) To promulgate guidelines to facilitate implementation of this
resolution;
11. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee
established by paragraph 10 in the fulfilment of its tasks, including
supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in
pursuance of the present resolution;
12. Calls upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities
violating the measures imposed by this resolution and to impose
appropriate penalties;
13. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 16 July
1993 on the measures they have initiated for meeting the obligations set
out in paragraphs 5 to 9 above;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance
to the Committee established by paragraph 10 and to make the necessary
arrangements with the Secretariat for this purpose;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council,
not later than 15 July 1993, and earlier if he considers it appropriate,
on progress achieved in the efforts jointly undertaken by him and the
Secretary-General of the Organization of American States with a view to
reaching a political solution to the crisis in Haiti;
16. Expresses its readiness to review all the measures in the present
resolution with a view to lifting them, if, after the provisions set
forth in paragraphs 5 to 14 have come into force, the Secretary-General,
having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization
of American States, reports to the Council that the de facto authorities
in Haiti have signed and have begun implementing in good faith an
agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide;
17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
VOTE: 15-0. (###)
ARTICLE 9:
Fact Sheet: Diplomatic Immunity
Background
Diplomatic immunity is a principle of international law by which certain
foreign government officials are not subject to the jurisdiction of
local courts and other authorities. The concept of immunity began with
ancient tribes. In order to exchange information, messengers were
allowed to travel from tribe to tribe without fear of harm. They were
protected even when they brought bad news. Today, immunity protects the
channels of diplomatic communication by exempting diplomats from local
jurisdiction so that they can perform their duties with freedom,
independence, and security. Diplomatic immunity is not meant to benefit
individuals personally; it is meant to ensure that foreign officials can
do their jobs. Under the concept of reciprocity, diplomats assigned to
any country in the world benefit equally from diplomatic immunity.
Legal Framework
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 codified most modern diplomatic
and consular practices, including diplomatic immunity. More than 160
nations, including the United States, are parties to these treaties.
The conventions provide immunity to persons according to their rank in a
diplomatic mission or consular post and according to the need for
immunity in performing their duties. For example, diplomatic agents and
members of their immediate families are immune from all criminal
prosecution and most civil law suits. Administrative and technical
staff members of embassies have a lower level of immunity. Consular
officers serving in consulates throughout the country have an even lower
level of immunity. Members of an embassy's service staff and consular
employees are immune only for acts performed as part of their official
duties.
The United States considers the Vienna conventions particularly
important because of the large number of American diplomatic and
consular personnel stationed in countries where judicial systems are
very different and less protective of individual rights than our own or
where unfriendly governments might use their police authorities to
harass American diplomats and their families. Failure by U.S.
authorities to uphold the Vienna conventions would complicate U.S.
diplomatic relations and could lead to harsher treatment in foreign
courts of U.S. personnel abroad.
Abuses of Diplomatic Immunity
Under the Vienna conventions, all persons entitled to immunity have the
obligation and duty to respect the laws and regulations of the host
country. Immunity is not a license to commit a crime, and violations of
the law are not condoned. In the United States, any time a person with
immunity is alleged to have committed a crime, the Department of State
advises his or her government of the incident and, where prosecution
would be the normal procedure, requests a waiver of the alleged
offender's immunity so that the case may be heard in the appropriate
U.S. court. If immunity is not waived, the Department of State may, in
serious cases, order the withdrawal of the offender from the United
States. In the case of an offense committed by a member of a diplomat's
family, the diplomat and his or her entire family may be expelled.
Diplomatic visas of serious offenders are canceled, and their names are
entered into a worldwide lookout system to keep them from returning to
the United States.
The Department of State's Office of Protocol works with the injured
parties and the foreign government to secure restitution in those cases
where criminal incidents have resulted in injuries to individuals. The
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 and related regulations require that
before a person with immunity can obtain license plates for a vehicle,
he or she must have liability insurance. Anyone injured in an
automobile accident by a person with immunity may bring direct action
against the vehicle's insurer in U.S. District Court. In addition,
diplomats do not have a right to endanger public safety by driving a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or by disregarding the
rules of the road. Police stop them and, if they are intoxicated,
prevent them from driving. Police issue citations for driving offenses
and the Department of State revokes drivers' permits for any persons
found to be unsafe drivers or who continually abuse driving regulations.
Furthermore, some countries follow the practice of investigating, and,
if appropriate, taking legal action against their own diplomats who are
accused of breaking a host country's laws.
In those cases where immunity prevents civil suits, the Department of
State works to settle the matter and mediates disputes in an effort to
find a mutually satisfactory solution.
The vast majority of persons entitled to some form of diplomatic
immunity are law-abiding people. Only a few ever run afoul of the law.
Unfortunately, those few who do exhibit egregious behavior draw the
attention of the public and the media and damage the reputation of the
entire group. (###)
ARTICLE 10:
Department Statements
Uzbekistan: U.S. Foreign Service National Beaten and Detained
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, June
18, 1993.
The Department of State is deeply concerned about recent actions by the
Government of Uzbekistan which threaten prospects for improvement in our
bilateral relations. On May 25, officers of the National Security
Service (NSS), the local successor to the KGB, beat and detained a U.S.
embassy Foreign Service national employee at Tashkent International
Airport while performing her official duties. On that same day, our
embassy in Tashkent sent the Government of Uzbekistan a diplomatic note
protesting the incident, which occurred in the presence of a U.S.
Government official.
We expected the Uzbekistan Government to honor its commitments to human
rights and to normal diplomatic practice and to respond to our note in a
forthcoming and confidential manner. Instead, the Uzbekistan Government
chose to respond on June 15 by publishing an article on the incident in
all the major daily newspapers in Uzbekistan. The article openly
alleges that the U.S. embassy misrepresented the facts of the beating
and detention, and even jokes about the injuries suffered by our
employee. The article was signed by the head of the Uzbek Foreign
Ministry's press office, and, thus, we view it as official government
policy.
Our embassy in Tashkent continues to raise both the May 25 incident and
its subsequent handling with the Government of Uzbekistan in the
strongest possible terms. In response to this situation, the U.S.
Government has determined that as long as U.S. employees are being
harassed and beaten by the Uzbek authorities, it would be entirely
inappropriate to engage in activities from which Uzbek officials would
benefit. Therefore, the U.S. has terminated a visit of Uzbek
parliamentarians currently in progress. We are also reviewing our other
bilateral activities with Uzbekistan to determine their appropriateness
in light of current circumstances. In our conversations with the Uzbeks
on this matter, we continue to insist that there be a full and fair
inquiry and that justice be served so that we can put this issue behind
us and put our relationship on a more normal, positive path.
Malawi's Referendum
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, June
18, 1993.
The United States Government has followed closely the progress toward a
democratic system that Malawians have made in recent months. In that
regard, we are particularly impressed by the exemplary conduct of all
sectors of Malawian society during Monday's national referendum on the
country's political future. By a nearly two-to-one margin, Malawians
voted to replace one-party rule with a multi-party political system. We
believe this result represents a significant victory for democratization
and for the future of Malawi.
The United States Government welcomes President Banda's acceptance of
the result and his decision to implement it promptly. We urge the
government and opposition to continue their constructive dialogue in
planning the next steps to multi-partyism and subsequent national
elections.
With Monday's vote, the people of Malawi made their country the latest
example of the democratization process that is reshaping Africa. The
United States looks forward to working with the government and the
opposition as they implement the decision of the electorate.
Nigeria: Presidential Election
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, June
23, 1993.
The United States deplores the outrageous decision of Nigeria's military
regime to annul the results of the June 12 presidential election and
cancel the transition to elected civilian rule. According to
independent Nigerian monitoring groups and outside observers, the
election was orderly, fair, and free from any serious irregularities.
The Nigerian press, public, and leading civilian politicians view the
election as the most successful in Nigeria's history and have called
upon the military to release and respect the results. We remain
concerned about the continuing repression of the press and democratic
forces.
The United States Government has strongly and consistently supported the
restoration of civilian rule in Nigeria and calls upon the military
regime to hand over power to the duly elected civilian leadership on
August 27, 1993, in keeping with its previously announced transition
plan. The failure on the part of the military regime to respect the
will of the Nigerian people and transition to democracy will have
serious implications for U.S.-Nigerian relations.
We are in the process of reassessing our relations with Nigeria. There
are various options available for responding. We are closely examining
each one to see whether employing it might help the Nigerian people
successfully express their political will. All aspects of our bilateral
relations, including our $22.8 million in bilateral assistance, are
currently under review. (###)
END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 26
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