US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 26, JUNE 28, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS


ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  U.S.-Mexican Relations and NAFTA:  The Opportunity of a Generation-- 
Secretary Christopher
2.  Fact Sheet:  U.S.-MexicoBinational Commission
3.  Fact Sheet:  International Boundary and Water Commission 
4.  A Strong United Nations Serves U.S. Security Interests -- Madeleine 
K. Albright 
5.  Myths of Peace-keeping -- Madeleine K. Albright
6.  UN Security Council Resolution 837 on Somalia
7.  Democratic Elections in Burundi 
8.  UN Security Council Resolution 841 On Crisis in Haiti 
9.  Fact Sheet:  Diplomatic Immunity
10  Department Statements 
          Uzbekistan:  U.S. Foreign Service National Beaten and Detained
          Malawi's Referendum
          Nigeria:  Presidential Election
(###)


ARTICLE 1:

U.S.-Mexican Relations and NAFTA:  The Opportunity of a Generation
Secretary Christopher
Statement at the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission meeting, Washington, 
DC, June 21, 1993

I want to welcome everyone here today--Foreign Secretary Solana, all our 
Mexican friends, my colleagues from the Cabinet and throughout our 
government.

This is our Administration's first Binational Commission meeting, and 
our first chance to discuss the relationship between Mexico and the 
United States on a comprehensive basis.  I hope that our Mexican friends 
will understand that I am directing my remarks not only to you and to 
the Mexican people, but to the people of the United States as well.

American foreign policy begins with Mexico and Canada.  With these two 
nations in particular, foreign policy concerns are domestic concerns.  
In our relations with Mexico, the fundamental interests of both nations 
converge:  economic growth and immigration; border security and drug 
trafficking; environmental protection and working conditions.

Today, at this 10th BNC meeting, members of President Clinton's Cabinet 
and our Mexican counterparts are working to strengthen our cooperation 
on these and other issues.

Let me mention someone who is not here today:  President Salinas.  His 
leadership and vision have helped to forge the most productive ties the 
United States and Mexico have ever enjoyed.  As President Clinton has 
made clear, our challenge is to strengthen and deepen the partnership 
that so clearly benefits the people of both our nations.

Together, and in conjunction with Canada, we can meet this challenge by 
moving forward with the North American Free Trade Agreement.  Our 
Administration intends to seek and win congressional approval later this 
year so that the agreement can go into effect, on schedule, on January 
1, 1994.

NAFTA is in the national interest of the United States.  For over half a 
century, every American President--Democratic and Republican alike--has 
stood for closer cooperation and for more open trade through the 
hemisphere, beginning with Mexico. Now the leaders and people of Mexico 
are embracing historic reform--economic and political--to open their 
country to the global economy.

For both nations, this is an historic opportunity that must not be lost.

Through the NAFTA agreement, the United States has a once-in-a-
generation chance to open up a new frontier of trade with our neighbor 
to the south.  With Mexico, we share the longest land border in the 
world between a developed and developing nation.  The economic growth of 
this great developing nation to our south is good for our nation's 
prosperity and good for our security.

I am confident that when the American people and the Congress hear the 
debate and consider what is at stake in NAFTA, they will give it their 
strong support.

Some voices are telling the American people that the way to prosper is 
to close our borders, to retreat behind walls of high tariffs and trade 
barriers.  In American history, we have rejected such advice time and 
time again.

The American people realize that our interest lies in an open, 
competitive international marketplace.  We have reason to be confident 
of our strengths.  We are the number one global exporter.  We have the 
most productive labor force.  Our high technology is the envy of the 
world.  Given an open market, our workers and companies can compete and 
win.  

Our experience with Mexico proves just that.  Since Mexico began to open 
its markets in the last decade, our trade balance has improved steadily.  
In 1990, we registered our first trade surplus with Mexico in a decade--
and we sustained surpluses the last two years in a row.  In 1992, we 
exported over $40 billion worth of goods and services to Mexico--more 
than double our exports five years ago.

Some say that there is no constituency in the United States for NAFTA.  
They overlook the fact that our ex-ports to Mexico now sustain the jobs 
of approximately 700,000 Americans.  And the U.S. jobs supported by 
exports to Mexico are good jobs--paying about 12% more than the U.S. 
national average.  NAFTA will lower U.S. and Mexican trade barriers even 
further--and allow trade to grow even more.  We estimate that NAFTA will 
generate an increase of  200,000 jobs in the United States.  

NAFTA is not an us-versus-them issue, where Mexico's gain is our loss.  
Americans know that we can't prosper if our trading partners stagnate.  
No nation has done more than Mexico to open its markets in recent years.  
Mexico is our fastest-growing export market--buying two-thirds of its 
imports here in the United States.  Last month, Mexico replaced Japan as 
the second largest purchaser of our manufacturing products.  As a 
percentage of per capita income, Mexicans spend over seven times more on 
U.S. goods and services than Europeans or Japanese.  And as Mexican 
incomes go up, they will likely buy even more   from us.

By spurring economic growth in Mexico, NAFTA will give Mexico greater 
capacity to make progress on issues involving the quality of life on 
both sides of the border.

Our environmental cooperation with Mexico has deepened substantially in 
the last five years.  The U.S.-Mexico Integrated Border Environmental 
Plan, an unprecedented $1 billion environmental initiative, is designed 
to clean up the border, to conserve resources and to undertake joint 
water treatment projects from California to Texas.  We are cooperating 
on air pollution, rain forest preservation and other projects.

Mexico is also taking strong steps on its own.  There are now four times 
as many trained Mexican environmental inspectors patrolling the border 
as there were in 1990.  But we must do more together to protect the 
environment--and we will.

Cooperation on labor standards and workplace health and safety is also 
intensifying.  Seminars are being held with employers and unions in 
specific industries in Mexico.  Best practices are being shared.  And we 
are addressing child labor concerns.

Mexico recognizes that illegal narcotics is a shared problem that can 
only be solved through close cooperation.  President Salinas tripled 
Mexico's antidrug budget, tackled the related problem of corruption and 
took on the drug barons.  Mexico's most notorious drug traffickers are 
now behind bars. This is breakthrough progress--but we can't let up now.

In the spirit of the broader cooperation that NAFTA envisions, we are 
negotiating supplemental agreements to strengthen environment and labor 
standards.  These agreements are crucial in two respects.  First, they 
offer the means to achieve real progress in raising these standards that 
are so vital to the people of both our countries.  Second, these 
agreements must show that just as the United States takes seriously the 
enforcement of its standards in these areas, so does Mexico.

We also must consider the relationship between NAFTA and illegal 
immigration.  President Salinas has said that "more jobs will mean 
higher wages in Mexico, and this in turn will mean fewer migrants to the 
United States and Canada."

Let me be clear with respect to immigration.  People who have emigrated 
to the U.S. from Mexico have immeasurably enriched our country.  Legal 
migration from Mexico and other nations will continue to make an 
important contribution to American diversity and democracy.  At the same 
time, the U.S. is committed to reducing illegal immigration.  A growing 
Mexican economy will reduce that pressure.

Our partnership with Mexico is also dedicated to the collective defense 
of democracy and human rights.  Just two weeks ago, Mexico and the 
United States together took the lead in calling for immediate action by 
the OAS to stand by democracy in Guatemala.  Our cooperation made a 
difference--and today Guatemala is standing firm as a free nation.

Mexico and the United States came together in the same spirit of trust 
and friendship to support a successful, negotiated conclusion to the war 
in El Salvador.  NAFTA will further solidify our cooperation on these 
vital issues of concern to our two nations and the entire hemisphere.

Our cooperation extends beyond these issues, and beyond Mexico.  
Throughout this hemisphere, we are working in an atmosphere of mutual 
respect on the great challenges of the nineties.  We are working to stop 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  We are combatting narco-
trafficking.  The Clinton Administration is making a new commitment to 
work with our neighbors to protect the environment and address 
population growth.  On all these issues, the United States and the 
nations of Latin America can make real progress if we work in 
partnership. 

President Clinton strongly endorses the goal of linking the democracies 
of the Americas through free trade.  From the Caribbean to Cape Horn, 
nation after nation is removing barriers to foreign investment and 
trade.  Free markets and free trade do far more than any aid program to 
create real growth and upward mobility--and the prosperity that is vital 
to the strength and success of democracy.

In concluding, let me emphasize that the vote of the Congress on NAFTA 
will be the most important signal the United States sends to Mexico and 
all of Latin America in this decade.

In domestic terms, NAFTA is a test of our confidence.  It will measure 
whether Americans believe in our ability to compete in open markets--or 
whether we will shrink from that challenge and be passive in the face of 
a changing global economy.

In foreign policy terms, NAFTA is the opportunity of a generation.  It 
is a test of America's willingness to cooperate across a diverse range 
of issues with Mexico--and with our other democratic neighbors to the 
south.

Given a clear choice, the American people will choose to compete in the 
international economy, not cower from it.  They will support the cause 
of democracy in the Americas, not turn away from it.

I am confident that when this Commission meets next year, NAFTA will be 
in force in the United States, Mexico and Canada.  And I am confident 
that we will be on the way to building a Western Hemisphere community of 
nations linked by democratic values and open markets.

Thank you very much.  (###)


ARTICLE 2:


Fact Sheet:  U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission

Overview
The U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission is a forum established by the two 
countries to allow for regular exchanges at the Cabinet level on a wide 
range of issues critical to U.S.-Mexico relations.

Development of the BNC
Presidents Carter and Lopez Portillo established the precursor to the 
Binational Commission (BNC) in May 1977 to provide better coordination 
in U.S.-Mexico relations.  Then called the U.S.-Mexico Consultative 
Mechanism, it had three broad working groups--political, social, and 
economic--and subgroups within each of these.  At the first meeting in 
May 1978, Secretary of State Vance and Mexican Secretary of Foreign 
Relations Roel met in Mexico with the chairmen of the working groups to 
review the first year's progress.

In February 1979, the two Presidents agreed to reorganize and strengthen 
the Consultative Mechanism.  The working groups were realigned and 
broadened to provide an improved forum for discussion and understanding.  
The presidents later reaffirmed the Consultative Mechanism during their 
September 1979 meeting in Washington, DC.

The Binational Commission was established in 1981 by Presidents Reagan 
and Lopez Portillo to serve as a forum for meetings between Cabinet-
level officials from both countries.  The new BNC was envisioned as a 
simple, flexible tool that would meet once or twice annually, with 
counterparts exchanging an action agenda of topics requiring attention.  
One of the early, temporary action groups formed in November 1981, the 
Border Relations Action group, met twice and carried out several on-site 
investigations and technical-level consultations and submitted 
recommendations to the two governments.

BNC Structure
This year's BNC meeting is the 10th since 1981.  The meeting has become 
a day-long conference chaired by the U.S. Secretary of State and the 
Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations.  Each delegation includes 11 
Cabinet-level officials and other agency chiefs.  Meeting in plenary 
sessions and working groups, they discuss a complex and diverse range of 
bilateral issues which have international and domestic impact.

The number of groups has grown steadily, especially during the past 3 
years, as education and culture, agriculture, housing and urban 
development, labor, transportation, and science and technology have been 
added.  In preparing for the BNC, each group develops an agenda which 
serves as the basis of working group discussions.  In some years, 
bilateral agreements are signed.

Summary of June 1993 Meeting
In plenary sessions and working groups, delegates will discuss the broad 
range of issues,  including trade, environment and labor cooperation, 
anti-narcotics issues, business and finance, and cooperation along our 
shared border.  U.S. and Mexican officials will sign three agreements, 
two in the area of communications and one in education:

--  An agreement to protect U.S. communications from interference by a 
new satellite service being introduced by Mexico.  This agreement covers 
the use of the 17.7 to 17.8 GHz band by terrestrial, fixed, point-to-
point relay systems in the U.S. and broadcasting satellite services 
(BSS) which are to be used by Mexico.  The U.S. will use another band 
for BSS.

--  A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission and the Mexican Communications Secretariat 
expanding the radio frequency bands available for cellular radio 
services in the border areas.  This MOU will be incorporated into a 
government-to-government agreement once negotiations are completed on 
other issues.

--  Annex 3 to the 1990 Education Memorandum of Understanding.  Annex 3 
will stress cooperation in:  education-to-work transition, early 
childhood, teaching of the Spanish language and Mexican culture, English 
and the American culture, education by satellite and radio, education 
for pre-venting drug abuse, and educational research. (###)



Consultative Mechanism Meeting Dates
May 1977
May 1978
BNC Meeting Dates
November 1981
November 1982
April 1983
April 1984
July 1985
January 1987
August 1989
August 1990
September 1991
June 1993
1993 BNC Working Groups
Migration and Consular Affairs Financial Cooperation
Trade and Investment
Business Development, Fisheries, and Tourism
Agriculture
Environmental Cooperation
Education and Cultural Affairs
Legal Affairs and Anti-Narcotics Cooperation
Bilateral Relations:
    Border Cooperation Subgroup
    Science and Technology Subgroup
Housing and Urban Development
Labor
Transportation 


ARTICLE 3:


Fact Sheet:  International Boundary and Water Commission

Background
On March 1, 1889, the United States and Mexican Governments signed a 
convention agreeing to establish the International Boundary Commission.  
Under the Water Treaty of 1944, it was reconstituted and designated the 
International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico 
(IBWC).  The Commission, called Comision Internacional de Limites y 
Aguas (CILA) in Spanish, is widely recognized as a model of effective 
international cooperation which has set a standard for the rest of the 
world.  The IBWC consists of U.S. and Mexican sections, each headed by a 
Commissioner.  The present U.S. Commissioner is Dr. Narendra N. Gunaji, 
and the Mexican Commissioner is Ing. Arturo Herrera Solis.  

IBWC Projects and Achievements
The Commission's work to divide and share the use of international 
waters has benefited people in both countries economically and socially.  
The IBWC has settled many difficult U.S.-Mexico boundary and water 
problems.

--  It cut through flood-created bends in the Rio Grande to create 
regular river channels, exchanging territory between the two countries 
in the process.  The main example of this was the 1967 settlement at 
what became the Chamizal National Memorial near El Paso-Ciudad Juarez.

--  It has constructed and operated other flood control and water 
conservation projects along the Rio Grande and the Tijuana River, 
including two major dams on the Rio Grande--Falcon and Amistad.  These 
projects have protected thousands of lives and provided water for 
valuable crops.

--  It helped resolve the international Colorado River salinity problem 
in 1973.

--  It has built and maintained monuments on the land boundary and on 
international bridges.

Most recently, the Commission has contributed to public health in both 
countries by working with their environmental agencies to resolve border 
sanitation problems.  Such projects provide important and long-term 
solutions to the four major sanitation problems along the border.

--  In October 1992, the two governments approved an IBWC conceptual 
agreement on long-term measures to correct pollution in the New River at 
Mexicali-Calexico.

--  The IBWC has completed a land pipeline and is designing a U.S.-
Mexican sewage treatment plant in south San Diego as well as an ocean 
pipeline to treat and dispose of Tijuana sewage not covered by Tijuana's 
sewage system.

--  The IBWC has completed a major expansion of the international 
wastewater treatment plant at Nogales, Arizona, and is exploring other 
ways to improve Mexican and U.S. sanitation infrastructure in that area.

--  The IBWC is midway through construction of a jointly funded sewage 
treatment plant in Nuevo Laredo to improve the quality of Rio Grande 
waters.  It also is leading a binational toxicity survey of the Rio 
Grande and is planning a similar comprehensive survey of the quality of 
border groundwaters. (###)


ARTICLE 4:


A Strong United Nations Serves U.S. Security Interests
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations
Address before the Council on Foreign Relations' Conference on 
Cooperative Security and the United Nations, New York City, June 11, 
1993

Thank you very much, Alton Frye.  Having spent many years on the other 
side of the podium, I must say that I am delighted to have made it to 
this side.  It is always an honor and a pleasure to join discussions at 
the Council--not only because every Council member is honored to address 
one's colleagues, but also because I believe that my stimulating new 
life has given me some new insights I am delighted to share.

The theme of the Council's Conference, "Cooperative Security and the 
United Nations," is indeed one of the most pressing foreign policy 
issues facing our country--and very much in need of the thoughtful 
attention of people like you.  The urgency comes about for three 
reasons:

First, the Cold War's end has removed the restraining, stabilizing 
effect of the East-West nuclear stand-off.  Pent up, often violent 
pressures for change have been released--placing the United Nations in 
the center of the effort to guide and safeguard a suddenly chaotic 
world.

Second, as the world's sole remaining superpower, leading economy, and 
foremost democracy, as well as the biggest donor to UN peace-keeping, it 
is the United States that will greatly influence what security role the 
United Nations will take on.

And third, it is also a fact that peace-keeping costs--roughly $1 
billion for us in 1993--must have deep support in Congress and in the 
public at large if they are going to be sustained.  That means we must 
be extremely clear about how the UN serves U.S. security interests.

Let me use my time this evening to discuss as directly as I can two 
questions that are at the heart of the U.S. relationship to the UN in 
the post-Cold War era:  first, why is a strong United Nations critical 
to U.S. security, and second, how and in what direction should the UN 
contribution to global security be strengthened?

So, why is a strong United Nations critical to U.S. security?  The 
collapse of Soviet communism, apart from being the most positive 
development of the 20th century, has left us with a dilemma.  We are 
being importuned--by allies and former foes alike--to intensify our 
global security leadership at the very time when the enemy is much 
harder to identify, when our vital interests are threatened in more 
subtle and remote ways, and when our own budget is so strained.

As a professor, I am wary of historic parallels.  So let me indulge a 
bit and say that the last time we were in this situation was the decade 
following the First World War.  Then, the lack of an obvious threat 
helped us to rationalize non-participation in the League of Nations.  Of 
course, the League was structurally flawed anyway.  But our absence was 
symptomatic:  behind it was a conceptual failure to explain, and a 
political failure to support, effective engagement in a world that 
seemed to have no "clear and present danger."  The challenge facing U.S. 
security policy today is uncannily similar, and leaves us with what I 
call the two ostriches problem.  One ostrich would rather not see any 
predators and plunges its head into the sand.  The other hears the 
clamor of friends in need and miseries to assuage, and runs off in all 
directions at once. 

Between self-absorption, with ruinous consequences for the rest of the 
world, and hyper-activity with equally ruinous consequences for 
ourselves and others, there is a third alternative--an alternative that 
husbands American resources and promotes American and global interests 
in a just and orderly world.  It is called multilateral action.  As 
Secretary of State Christopher has said,

We cannot let every crisis become a choice between inaction or American 
intervention.  The world looks to us for leadership.  Thus, the 
alternatives boil down to how the United States will lead:  alone; at 
the head of a coalition; or working multilaterally to share the burden 
with others.

A Principled International Community
Let me try out a thought with you:  a principled international 
community.  Collective security will make it possible for us to share 
our global security burden.  But the idea of collective security is more 
than a fiscal expedient.  It flows from a mutuality of interests--
commercial, financial, cultural, ecological, political, and security-
related--that affect our daily lives.  In short, it is in our interest 
to shape a world that is more than an agglomeration of states, but is, 
in fact, a principled community.

As I see it, the obligation to work toward such a community isn't 
something we elect to do because we are good guys.  It is forced on us 
by several imperatives.  Let me mention five tonight.

The first, reflected in the title of this conference, is the strategic 
imperative to cooperate.  Many threats are so geographically diffuse 
that it is well beyond our own or our allies' resources to counter them.  
Supportive actions from a vast number of countries are essential, and 
this is exactly what the UN sanctions regimes against Iraq, Libya, and 
Serbia-Montenegro have achieved.  Indeed, without the tourniquet on 
Iraqi imports, I think it is safe to say that Iraq's military force 
structure and nuclear weapons potential would soon again be a subject of 
grave concern.

The second imperative is legitimacy.  Most countries, most of the time, 
find that when they respect international law the benefits far outweigh 
the costs.  Thus, when the Security Council adopts a mandatory 
resolution, or the IAEA authorizes an inspection under its statute, the 
resultant actions carry an incomparable measure of political legitimacy.

For example, without virtually occupying much of Iraq, it is 
inconceivable that the United States could have conducted the kind of 
intrusive inspections routinely performed by the UN Monitoring 
Commission.  It is equally inconceivable that the front-line states in 
the Balkans--especially Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, and now 
Macedonia--would have opted to apply trade sanctions on Serbia-
Montenegro, without the combination of legal pressure and political 
support conferred by Security Council sanctions resolutions.  And it is 
virtually certain that without the political support expressed in the 
use-of-force resolution against Iraq, Saddam would have been able to 
carry out his grisly terrorist threat against U.S. soldiers, civilians, 
and facilities. 

A third factor is the economic imperative of burden-sharing.  We have a 
national security interest in containing and, wherever possible, 
resolving regional conflicts.  Whether measured in arms proliferation, 
refugees on our shores, the destabilization of allies, or loss of 
exports, jobs, or investments, the cost of runaway regional conflicts 
sooner or later comes home to America.  In 1993, the United Nations will 
spend over $3 billion to stem or stop those conflicts, and we will pay 
one-third of that.  But without the United Nations, both the costs and 
the conflict would be far greater.

Yet a fourth imperative, which could be called the appropriate-redress-
grievance imperative, has emerged in the last few years.  The Cold War's 
end freed a host of dissatisfied parties--particularly in Europe and 
Eurasia--to pursue the redress of economic, national, ethnic, racial, 
religious, and other grievances.  Left unchecked, these forces will 
surely convulse much of Europe and Eurasia in conflict.  The potential 
to destabilize the heart of Europe, or to trigger use of nuclear or 
other weapons of mass destruction, or to spread genocide is one we 
cannot accept.  There is really only one antidote.  It is to extend to 
all parties the promise of principled change and to sharply penalize 
those who refuse.  Only the international community has the collective 
moral authority, and the physical and financial resources, for such a 
critical task. 

And fifth, the Western democracies face what I would call a "fairness" 
or an "equity" imperative.  The equity imperative says this:  If the 
Security Council is to speak and act on behalf of the entire world 
community, its efforts cannot be confined to only those issues of 
greatest consequence to its richer members.  Indeed, the United Nations' 
ambitious engagement in Somalia, so critical for humanitarian reasons, 
also sends this important political message:  We must be selective, and 
carefully save the United Nations' resources, but not by closing the 
Security Council door.

The factors which I have set out make it clear that the process in which 
we are engaged is not simply an exercise in altruistic morality.  To me,  
there is no such thing as disinterested involvement in the international 
community.  We are and will remain involved because we must continue to 
try to build an international system in which our experiment in 
democracy and social pluralism can continue to flourish.  As we proceed 
to preserve and protect what we have, we ought to make clear who we are 
and what we stand for.  There will always be a strong ideological 
component to American foreign policy.  We would be foolish to suppress 
it.  It is what makes us   different, and what others admire about us.

At the same time, America's overriding interest in creating this new 
community does not mean it is America's responsibility to right every 
wrong in the world.  Instead, our goal is to foster the development of a 
community capable of easing, if not terminating, the abominable 
injustices and conditions that still plague civilization, because only 
in such a community can America flourish.  If this is considered naive 
idealism, I plead guilty.

Having laid out to you some reasons why I think a strong United Nations   
is critical to U.S. security, let me launch into the second part of my 
talk:  How and in what way should the United  Nations' role in global 
security be strengthened?

If, in fact, a more principled international community is starting to 
take shape, where do we fit in?  Because this international community so 
reflects American values, ideology, and economic interests, we have a 
motive and an opportunity to establish some "Rules of the Game.''  The 
UN is the best repository of those rules, and the United States is their 
most able patron.

But rules aren't rules if they're not enforced.  This does not require 
that we serve as the world's policeman, only that there should be 
policemen and that we take a hand in assuring their effectiveness.

A central foreign policy goal of the Administration is, therefore, to 
help create safeguards for a principled inter- national community which 
more evenly distributes the burden of its defense while preserving our 
role in its leadership.  So, we in the United States must work 
energetically to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations and other 
multilateral organizations to conduct peace-keeping, preventive 
diplomacy, peace-making, peace enforcement, humanitarian security, and 
similar operations.

Fixing United Nations Peace-keeping
In recent years, UN peace-keeping and related missions have increased at 
a dizzying pace.  In 1987, there were five peace-keeping missions, three 
of which had existed for decades.  They were staffed by fewer than 
10,000 UN troops or military observers at a total cost of $233 million.  
Today there are 13 missions, over 75,000 troops, and the price tag is 
over $3 billion.  Yet, amazingly, there are roughly the same number of 
permanent headquarters staff as there were in 1987.

This small staff has done a remarkable job of adjusting, both to the new 
work load and the conceptual changes in peace-keeping mandates.  But 
they have had to rely on ad hoc arrangements.  We all bear a large 
measure of responsibility for this situation, because we all have failed 
to ensure that the United Nations has the capacity to fulfill the great 
and growing tasks we assign to it.

Through his 1992 report "An Agenda for Peace," the Secretary-  General 
launched the UN community on the path of peace-keeping reform.  And, he 
has begun to take a number of useful organizational steps.  These are 
most welcome.  However, to address the systemic challenges facing the 
Secretary-General, we need the active assistance of member states.

Our government is nearing completion of an internal review of U.S. 
support for UN peace-keeping, and we will soon be able to share our 
proposals with the Secretary-General and other member states.  This 
summer, we will try to build a base of support for several far-reaching 
reforms that could be pursued this year.

Before outlining for you some of our general thinking, let me offer a 
bit of diagnosis.  If I had to choose a single word to evoke the 
problems of UN peace-keeping, it would be "improvisation."  It may 
surprise you--it certainly surprised me--to learn that each time the 
United Nations has conducted 28 peace-keeping operations since 1948, it 
has started from scratch.  A kind of programmed amateurism shows up 
across the board:

--  In the near total absence of contingency planning;
--  In hastily recruited, ill-equipped and often unprepared troops and 
civilian staff;
--  In lift arrangements cobbled together on a wing and a prayer;
--  In procurement processes that require long lead-times for urgently 
needed equipment;
--  In the absence of knowledge about available forces and capabilities;
--  In the lack of troop training standards or standard operating 
procedures for troops in the field or under fire;
--  In the lack of centralized command and control;
--  In the absence of standard budgeting techniques and cost factors;
--  In the Byzantine and drawn-out budgetary decision-making process;
--  And in the lack of a durable financial basis for starting and 
sustaining peace-keeping operations.

The list could be longer, but I think you get the point.  The problems 
are comprehensive except in one vital respect:  the peace-keeping staff, 
however small, is superlative.

Last month, at U.S. and Russian initiative, the Security Council took an 
extremely important step by requesting the Secretary-General to present 
a report this September containing specific new proposals for reform.  
The Council's suggestions included:

--  Creation of a plans and current operations directorate;

--  Notification to the UN of forces or capabilities that member states 
could make available for peace-keeping or humanitarian operations;

--  A reserve stock of commonly used equipment; and

--  Standardization of peace-keeping procedures.

Perhaps the most important sentence in the Security Council statement 
was that all member states "make participation in and support for 
international peace-keeping a part of their foreign and national 
security policy."  That is the key point:  preventing and settling 
international conflict is not a matter of casual interest.  For 
ourselves and the other members of the United Nations, it is a critical 
interest.

I believe that the time has come to commit the political, intellectual, 
and financial capital that UN peace-keeping and our security deserve.  
Let me describe a few priority areas for change.

Operations
The United Nations has neither the resources nor the internal 
organization to plan, prepare, organize, deploy, direct, and service 
peace-keeping missions.  We favor a substantial enlargement and 
reorganization of the peace-keeping headquarters staff--and the creation 
of a permanent foundation for rapid 24-hour communication, intelligence, 
lift, recruitment, training, and the full spectrum of in-theater 
logistical support.

Budget
Peace-keeping costs are billed by the mission, a time-consuming process 
out of sync with our own and many others' legislative appropriation 
cycles.  This makes planning nearly impossible, and results in a cash 
flow crisis--which means late deployments and long delays in 
reimbursements to contributors. We are studying ways to deal with this 
vexing and dangerous situation.  One possible solution is to create a 
unified UN peace-keeping budget accompanied by an enlarged contingency 
fund for unforeseen missions.  While such a fund would have to be 
adjusted annually, it would give the Secretary-General a better planning 
basis and reduce the need for member states to keep returning to their 
legislature for additional finance.

Cost Control
As the number and size of peace- keeping missions have grown, so have 
the United Nations' cash requirements.  Yet the UN does not have the 
resources or skilled staff needed to manage and oversee increasingly 
complicated peace-keeping budgets.  The U.S. and other large donors 
should support creation of a cadre of highly qualified budget experts 
for this purpose, as well as the introduction of special budgeting 
techniques.  We also will urge the UN to implement its plan for a peace-
keeping inspectorate to monitor actual expenditures.  The United Nations 
must institute more regular and timely cost accounting procedures to 
ensure that money is being spent wisely.

Finance
As peace-keeping costs spiral upward, some member states resist paying 
for new missions, while others, like Russia, can no longer meet existing 
obligations.  The result is that we are approaching a crisis point, in 
which UN intervention, desirable for policy reasons, cannot be 
undertaken for fiscal reasons. That is why we intend, over the coming 
months, to work with other member states to explore the fullest possible 
range of steps to place peace-keeping on a sound and durable long-term 
basis.

Conclusion
I want to leave time for your questions and comments, so let me close by 
returning to a point I tried to make in the beginning.  The end of the 
Cold War has profoundly benefited Americans in two respects:  our 
country is protected by a wider margin of security than we have enjoyed 
for most of this century; and the emerging post-Cold War world 
increasingly reflects and indeed aspires to American values and ideals.  
These two facts give us the motive and the opportunity to help secure a 
principled international community for the enjoyment and protection of 
future generations.  Yet these alone are not enough.  If we want to 
ensure that the cauldron of instabilities bubbling up on nearly every 
other continent do not prevent us from pursuing the global interest that 
I have described tonight, then we must act.  For as a people, we must 
also have a vision of the community we want to live in and the will to 
bring it  to life. (###)


ARTICLE 5:


Myths of Peace-keeping
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations
Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, 
International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, June 24, 1993

M r. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a 
great pleasure to appear before you again.  During my last visit to this 
subcommittee, on May 3, we discussed the American stake in a system of 
collective security.  Much has occurred since early May to make that 
subject even more relevant today.  I am submitting for the record my 
speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on June 11 [see p. 461] 
because its discussion of collective security and UN reform should be of 
particular interest to this subcommittee.

Today, however, I want to review peace-keeping operations in Somalia, 
Cambodia, and Mozambique and describe recent Security Council action on 
Haiti.  But I want to spend some time dispelling what I believe are some 
serious misperceptions about UN peace- keeping and the U.S. role in it.  

Let me begin by noting that I have spoken in other forums in recent 
weeks about four categories of states that are emerging at the United 
Nations.  They include:

--  A significant number of states that have a stake in the United 
Nations and the international community as a whole;

--  Emerging democracies trying to play a constructive role but 
struggling with internal political and economic turmoil;

--  Other states and factions that are at war with international norms 
and institutions and which I call the "defiant regimes"; and finally,

--  The failed societies--the ones where effective government has 
collapsed, or anarchy reigns, or the economy is hopeless, or a 
humanitarian calamity overwhelms the country and the people are sliding 
into an abyss.  These failed societies cry out for help from the 
international community.

Much of our credibility as a superpower--and we must, in my view, remain 
one--will depend upon our ability to manage our approach to these four 
groups.  Though sometimes we will act alone, our foreign policy will 
necessarily point toward multilateral engagement.  But unless the United 
States also exercises leadership within collective bodies like the 
United Nations, there is a risk that multilateralism will not serve our 
national interest well--in fact, it may undermine our interests.

These two realities--multilateral engagement and U.S. leadership within 
collective bodies--require an "assertive multilateralism" that advances 
U.S. foreign policy goals.  Preventive diplomacy is the linchpin of 
assertive multi-lateralism.  We are going to have to open our minds to 
broader strategies in multilateral forums.  We need to project our 
leadership where it counts long before a smoldering dispute has a chance 
to flare into the crisis of the week.  But we have inherited many 
conflicts that the United Nations is deeply involved in resolving.   In 
recent weeks several failed societies have required assertive 
multilateral action in the interests of their people and of 
international peace and security.

Somalia
In Somalia, the United Nations took over from the U.S.-led UNITAF 
operation on May 4.  From a peak of 25,800 American troops in mid-
January, the U.S. contingent now comprises a ground logistics force of 
about 3,000 troops in the UN peace-keeping force in Somalia, UNOSOM II, 
and a separate quick reaction force of about 1,100 troops.  The total 
multinational force in UNOSOM II is currently about 20,000 troops from 
22 countries.  The United Nations has troop commitments from additional 
countries which should permit it to reach its target of about 28,000 
troops by the end of July.

The U.S. role thus has been vastly reduced.  Other nations' troops carry 
the greater burden on the ground, as the events of the last 2 weeks have 
clearly shown.  A true multinational coalition of forces has gathered 
under the UN flag.  Rather than pay most of the cost--as we did for the 
UNITAF operation--the United States now will pay its share of the 
regular assessment for the UN peace-keeping force.

The brutal attack on UN troops on June 5 left 23 Pakistani peace-keepers 
dead and 59 wounded.  Three American soldiers also were wounded.  This 
occurred while the UN troops were carrying out operations specifically 
within their mandate authorized in Security Council Resolution 814 of 
March 26.  The Security Council determined, in Resolution 837 on June 5 
[see p. 467], that law and order must be restored in Mogadishu and that 
the perpetrators of the killings of June 6 be apprehended, detained, and 
prosecuted.  The UN envoy in Somalia, Admiral Jonathan Howe, issued an 
arrest warrant for General Aideed in connection with the shooting of 
Pakistani troops.

The unprecedented and decisive actions of UNOSOM II since June 12 
against General Aideed's armed militia, their arms depots, and their 
strongholds were essential for the restoration of law and order in 
Mogadishu; the elimination of heavy weapons in the Mogadishu area; the 
resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries; the eventual resumption of 
discussion on political reconciliation; and the fulfillment of 
Resolution 837's mandate.

U.S. forces participated in the UN action with critical air and limited 
ground support.  We can all be proud of our soldiers' measured and 
professional performance as part of the UN operation.  About 1,400 UN 
peace-keepers from four other countries--Morocco, Pakistan, Italy, and 
France--were heavily engaged on the ground earlier this month.  Four 
Moroccans and one Pakistani lost their lives, and dozens of peace-
keepers were wounded.

If General Aideed and other perpetrators of the June 5 killings are 
apprehended, the Security Council will ensure that they are held 
accountable under the rule of law.  In any event, the arrest warrant 
against General Aideed greatly restricts his mobility and effectiveness 
as a rogue leader, something I believe the vast majority of Somalis 
desperately want.  As Admiral Howe has aptly stated, "People are sick of 
rule by the gun and extortion."  As UNOSOM II succeeds in disarming 
factions and heavy weapons are destroyed, the average Somali will be 
able to participate, without fear, in re-creating a civil society. 
UNOSOM's prospects for promoting a durable political settlement will 
then improve.

There may well be further challenges to the authority of the UN peace-
keeping force in Somalia.  Rebuilding Somali society and promoting 
democracy in that strife-torn nation are difficult endeavors.  But after 
the enormous effort made by the United States and other nations in the 
UNITAF operation to reverse famine in Somalia, it would be folly now to 
permit conditions to deteriorate again.  Had there not been a UN 
response to the June 5 killings, the UN's credibility in Somalia would 
have been fatally undermined.

Cambodia
The UN-organized elections in Cambodia were remarkably successful, with 
a 90% turnout of the registered voters.  The UN peace-keeping operation 
in Cambodia (UNTAC) deserves considerable credit for this success.  We 
believe that the Cambodian people have spoken with unmistakable clarity 
in saying they want an end to warfare.  They want peace.  The process of 
reconciliation has already begun.  I sincerely hope we have finally 
reached a stage where Cambodia is beginning to emerge from the category 
of "failed societies."

At our initiative, the Security Council recently endorsed the results of 
the election, which has been certified as free and fair by the United 
Nations, and requested UNTAC to continue to play its role during the 
transition period in accordance with the Paris agreements.  The Council 
also requested the Secretary-General to report by mid-July on the 
possible future role for the United Nations and its specialized agencies 
after UNTAC's mandate expires.

The newly elected constituent assembly has begun its work of drawing up 
a constitution, and will transform itself into a legislative assembly 
with the establishment of a new government for Cambodia.  We believe 
Prince Sihanouk is playing a vital and constructive role working with 
the leaders of the political par- ties that won seats in the elections.  
Last weekend, the government party (CPP) and the royalist opposition 
(FUNCINPEC) tentatively agreed to   a power-sharing arrangement during 
the transition period.  

Cambodia and the United Nations have now entered a critical stage in the 
transition to peace and democracy.  There remains a serious risk that 
the Khmer Rouge will continue attempting to disrupt the peace process.  
The elected Cambodian leaders must ultimately decide on the composition   
of their own government.  It is difficult, however, to see how the 
international community could support a government that included the 
Khmer Rouge or others who would seek to disrupt the peace process by 
means of violence.

We have come so far in Cambodia and it is essential that we stand by the 
Cambodian people and UNTAC and give democracy a chance to work there.  
We should anticipate that the United Nations will need to respond 
quickly and decisively to any attempt by any party to reverse the 
historic achievement of the elections.  Finally, we must also work with 
the United Nations and others to create the economic and social 
conditions under which peace and democracy can flourish. 

Mozambique
The United Nations is also involved in moving war-torn Mozambique toward 
lasting peace and multi-party democracy.  The ambitious UN peace-keeping 
operation in Mozambique (OMUMOZ) is charged with coordinating several 
major aspects of the transition to peace, including monitoring of the 
cease-fire, demobilization of combatants, preparation for and monitoring 
of elections, and the crucial humanitarian assistance effort.  Despite 
some early administrative and logistical problems, the UN operation is 
now fully operational, with over 6,000 "blue helmet" forces deployed 
from two dozen countries.

We have been encouraged by the commitment of the government and RENAMO 
to uphold the cease-fire.  However, we are concerned about delays in 
beginning the all-important demobilization process.  We are urging both 
parties to overcome differences over details, so that demobilization 
can begin smartly, and preparations can get underway for elections, 
which are expected to be held before October 1994.

The United States participates actively in three UN-chaired commissions 
overseeing implementation of the Mozambique peace agreement.  We are 
working with the UN Secretariat to determine what types of assistance 
the United States can provide at this very important time.  We are 
encouraged that this is a devastated society that can be resurrected, in 
large part because of a viable peace-keeping presence.

Haiti
The people of Haiti have waited a long time for the re-establishment of 
a democratic government.  The international community's political will 
to press for a settlement to restore democracy was evidenced in the 
tough UN sanctions resolution (841) that went into effect yesterday [see 
p. 469].  The Security Council acted to stop the flow of oil and arms to 
Haiti through mandatory, legally binding, worldwide sanctions.  The 
resolution breaks new ground in a number of areas.  This is the first 
time UN sanctions of this kind have been imposed on a country in this 
hemisphere.  It is the first time Chapter VII sanctions have been 
imposed on a country not in civil conflict or at war with a neighbor.  
And it marks a new level of cooperation between the United Nations and a 
regional organization--in this case the Organization of American States.  
The United States
is committed to seeing that international oil suppliers comply fully 
with Resolution 841.

Some Myths About UN Peace-keeping
These four examples alone show the complexities and modern requirements 
of UN peace-keeping and enforcement actions.  There are many more.  But 
I want to focus now on some misperceptions about the United Nations and 
peace-keeping that continue to shape--erroneously in my opinion--our 
public discourse on this country's role in the United Nations.  There 
are, in short, myths about the United Nations that need to be exposed 
before they lead us in the wrong direction during this turbulent new era 
of world politics:

Myth No. 1:  UN peace-keeping has nothing to do with U.S. national 
interest.  I trust that my testimony before this subcommittee on May 3 
dispensed with this myth.  Peace-keeping has become instrumental in 
meeting three fundamental imperatives of our national interest:  
economic, political, and humanitarian.  The world continues to be a 
dangerous place.

And yet consider for a moment what the world and the U.S. defense 
budgets would be today if there were no UN peace-keeping operations and 
the resultant power vacuums invited intervention by neighbors or would-
be regional powers.  Increasingly, we are faced with an often violent 
eruption of local or regional disputes that require the world's 
attention.  And it is in this new world that peace-keeping and the 
modern responsibilities of collective security are essential to our 
security.

Myth No. 2:  When the United Nations takes over a security operation, 
the United States can bail out.  When the refrain is, "Let the UN handle 
it," that cannot mean a "pass" for the United States.  This country is a 
part of the United Nations--in fact we are and should remain a very 
senior partner--and our participation and leadership are vital to its 
work.  The alternatives--blissful isolation or costly duty as the 
world's cop--are unrealistic and unacceptable.  The Somalia operation is 
a good example of how a continued U.S. role--minor compared to our 
initial UNITAF deployment--is part and parcel of letting "the UN" handle 
it.

Myth No. 3:  Peace-keeping operations are consensual, avoid risks, and 
only prolong conflicts between governments.  Many peace-keeping 
operations, particularly today in connection with failed societies, are 
deployed into internal conflicts or anarchy, and thus are not dependent 
on conventional notions of consent from each warring party.  Nor, by any 
measure, are peacekeeping operations risk-free:  925 peace-keeping 
soldiers have been killed in action in the course of UN history, and 528 
of those have died in on-going operations;  53 British, 49 French, 43 
Irish, 35 Canadians, and 10 Americans have died in the line of duty.  In 
the former Yugoslavia, 43 peace-keepers have been killed;  186 peace-
keepers have sacrificed their lives in Cyprus.  The Somalia massacre of 
June 5 was a stark reminder of how exposed some peace-keepers are in the 
very hostile environments into which they are deployed.

Half (14) of the 28 UN peace-keeping operations in UN history have been 
terminated, most within 1 or 2 years of their creation.  While some  
peacekeeping operations may indeed encourage stalemate, the alternative 
often would be a bloody and costly conflict--with severe risks of 
escalation--that no one desires.

Myth No. 4:  Peace-keeping is too expensive and ridden with fraud and 
mismanagement.  I have testified and spoken out often about the ad hoc 
approaches that dominate peace-keeping operations.  "Improvisation" is 
the single word that might best evoke the problems of peace-keeping.  
And while the potential for fraud and mismanagement exists, as it does 
in any large organization, the most pressing problems in UN peace-
keeping relate to the sheer improvisational character of the system.  
This produces major gaps in institutional capacity on one hand and 
inefficiencies on the other.  In fact, the small peace-keeping staff at 
UN headquarters is superlative, and steps are now being taken to 
increase its size and effectiveness.  The millions that are spent on 
peace-keeping operations--totaling more than $3 billion in 1993--must be 
measured against the much higher costs that result if conflicts are left 
to fester and explode.  

I would like to add that the Administration is taking the lead to 
enhance UN peace-keeping through implementation of important initiatives 
at the United Nations and within our own government.  On May 28, the 
Security Council reached consensus on a list of peace-keeping reforms, 
and plans for implementing them will be reported to us by the Secretary-
General in September.  Within our government the Administration has been 
conducting an intensive inter-agency review since February of both the 
U.S. role in peace-keeping and the planning and managerial capabilities 
of the United Nations for peace-keeping. We anticipate that review 
process to be concluded soon.  Finally, in September we hope there will 
be a ministerial-level session of the Security Council to review peace-
keeping.

Myth No. 5:  The U.S. domestic agenda prevents us from leading and 
shaping a free and secure world.  This is faulty logic at best, and 
disastrous public policy at worse.  The stability of the world economy 
and of regional and world politics is deeply integrated with U.S. 
interests and our economy.  If we pursue a domestic agenda with blinders 
on, refusing to recognize the carnage to our left and the distant 
conflict to our right, eventually the cost of that disengagement, at a 
minimum, will be an additional financial burden we must bear.  More 
likely, the costs will include U.S. forces with attendant potential loss 
of life.  President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have always 
recognized that the foreign agenda is inseparable from the domestic 
agenda.  The sooner we all grasp that fundamental fact the sooner we 
will recognize UN peace-keeping as one small, but important, piece in 
the overall effort to achieve global stability and prosperity and to 
advance democracies and their typically market-oriented economies.

All of this points to the fact that we are engaged in a great dialogue, 
the conclusion of which no one can yet predict with certainty.  In our 
effort to plot what role the United States should fill in this new era, 
we cannot abandon the responsibilities of a superpower.  We cannot apply 
"old think" to how we judge peace-keeping operations and missions today 
and into the future.  A whole new platter of issues confronts 
contributing nations, including deployments into internal conflicts and 
to protect humanitarian aid convoys.  We need more minds pole-vaulting 
over the conventions of the past and directing this nation's power into 
the 21st century. (###)


ARTICLE 6:


UN Security Council Resolution 837 on Somalia

Resolution 837
(June 6, 1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 
17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 
775 (1992) of August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 and 814 (1993) 
of 26 March 1993,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by forces 
apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against the 
personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) on 5 
June 1993,

Strongly condemning such actions, which directly undermine international 
efforts aimed at the restoration of peace and normalcy in Somalia,

Expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result of these criminal 
attacks,

Reaffirming its commitments to assist the people of Somalia in re-
establishing conditions of normal life,

Stressing that the international community is involved in Somalia in 
order to help the people of Somalia who have suffered untold miseries 
due to years of civil strife in that country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of completing the comprehensive 
and effective programme for disarming all Somali parties, including 
movements and factions,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would 
contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and 
political settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's 
political institutions and economy,

Condemning strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the 
USC/SNA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel,

Recalling the statement made by its President on 31 March 1993 (S/25493) 
concerning the safety of United Nations forces and personnel deployed in 
conditions of strife and committed to consider promptly measures 
appropriate to the particular circumstances to ensure that persons 
responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against United 
Nations forces and personnel are held to account for their actions,

Taking note of the information provided to the Council by the Secretary-
General on 6 June 1993,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace 
and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.  Strongly condemns the unprovoked armed attacks against the personnel 
of UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been part of a 
calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent 
by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate as provided for 
in resolution 814 (1993);

2.  Expresses its condolences to the Government and people of Pakistan 
and the families of the UNOSOM II personnel who have lost their lives;

3.  Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the early implementation of 
the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions, 
in accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of the report of the Secretary-
General of 3 March 1993, and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems 
that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II;

4.  Demands once again that all Somali parties, including movements and 
factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the 
agreements they concluded at the informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali 
Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their 
agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of 
Disarmament (S25169, annex III);

5.  Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 
814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible 
for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including 
against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to 
establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, 
including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest 
and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;

6.  Requests the Secretary-General urgently to enquire into the 
incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional 
leaders involved;

7.  Encourages the rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II 
contingents to meet the full requirements of 18,000 men, all ranks, as 
well as equipment, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report 
(5/25354);

8.  Urges Member States to contribute, on an emergency basis, military 
support and transportation, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks 
and attack helicopters, to provide UNOSOM II the capability 
appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in 
the accomplishment of its mandate;

9.  Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the 
Council on the implementation of the present resolution, if possible 
within seven days from the date of its adoption;

10.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

VOTE:  15-0.  (###)


ARTICLE 7:


Democratic Elections in Burundi
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, June 
7, 1993.

The U.S. Government congratulates the people of Burundi on the 
successful completion of their first democratic elections since 
independence in 1962.  The June 1 presidential elections, in which they 
expressed freely and fairly their choice, represent a triumph of the 
democratic process.

The U.S. Government commends President Buyoya for his strong leadership 
of Burundi in renouncing the violent past and creating a new nation 
founded on peace, reconciliation, and democracy.  We congratulate 
President-elect Ndadaye on his selection, and we look forward to 
strengthening the good relationship between our two countries as he 
continues the historic task of making Burundi a free and democratic 
nation.  We commend the Burundi people and the security forces for the 
calm and orderly atmosphere both during and following the elections.

The U.S. Government wishes to assure the Burundi people of its continued 
support for their democratic and economic reforms and wishes them peace 
and prosperity as they unite behind their new democratically elected 
government. (###)


ARTICLE 8:


UN Security Council Resolution 841 On Crisis in Haiti

Resolution 841
(June 16, 1993)

The Security Council,

Having received a letter from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to 
the President of the Council dated 7 June 1993 (S/25958) requesting that 
the Council make universal and mandatory the trade embargo on Haiti 
recommended by the Organization of American States,

Having also heard a report of the Secretary-General on 10 June 1993 
regarding the crisis in Haiti,

Noting resolutions MRE/RES.1/91, MRE/RES.2/91, MRE/RES.3/92 and 
MRE/RES.4/92, adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of 
American States, and resolution CP/RES.594 (923/92) and declarations 
CP/Dec.8 (927/93), CP/Dec.9 (931/93) and CP/Dec.10 (934/93) adopted by 
the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,

Noting in particular resolution MRE/RES.5/93 adopted by the Foreign 
Ministers of the Organization of American States in Managua, Nicaragua, 
on 6 June 1993,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 46/7 of 11 October 1991, 46/138 
of 17 December 1991, 47/20 A of 24 November 1992, 47/143 of 18 December 
1992 and 47/20 B of 23 April 1993,

Strongly supportive of the continuing leadership by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the 
Organization of American States and of the efforts of the international 
community to reach a political solution to the crisis in Haiti,

Commending the efforts undertaken by the Special Envoy for Haiti of the 
United Nations and Organization of American States Secretaries-General, 
Mr. Dante Caputo, to establish a political dialogue with the Haitian 
parties with a view to resolving the crisis in Haiti,

Recognizing the urgent need for an early, comprehensive and peaceful 
settlement of the crisis in Haiti in accordance with the provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations and international law,

Also recalling the statement of 26 February 1993 (S/25344), in which the 
Council noted with concern the incidence of humanitarian crises, 
including mass displacements of population, becoming or aggravating 
threats to international peace and security,

Deploring the fact that, despite the efforts of the international 
community, the legitimate Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
has not been reinstated,

Concerned that the persistence of this situation contributes to a 
climate of fear of persecution and economic dislocation which could 
increase the number of Haitians seeking refuge in neighbouring Member 
States and convinced that a reversal of this situation is needed to 
prevent its negative repercussions on the region,

Recalling, in this respect, the provisions of Chapter VIII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, and stressing the need for effective 
cooperation between regional organizations and the United Nations,

Considering that the above-mentioned request of the Permanent 
Representative of Haiti, made within the context of the related actions 
previously taken by the Organization of American States and by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, defines a unique and exceptional 
situation warranting extraordinary measures by the Security Council in 
support of the efforts undertaken within the framework of the 
Organization of American States, and,

Determining that, in these unique and exceptional circumstances, the 
continuation of this situation threatens international peace and 
security in the region,

Acting, therefore, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations,

1.  Affirms that the solution of the crisis in Haiti should take into 
account the above-mentioned resolutions of the Organization of American 
States and of the General Assembly of the United Nations;

2.  Welcomes the request of the General Assembly that the Secretary-
General take the necessary measures in order to assist, in cooperation 
with the Organization of American States, in the solution of the crisis 
in Haiti;

3.  Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 5 to 14 below,  
which are consistent with the trade embargo recommended by the 
Organization of American States, shall come into force at 00.01 EST on 
23 June 1993 unless the Secretary-General, having regard to the views of 
the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, has 
reported to the Council that, in light of the results of the 
negotiations conducted by the Special Envoy for Haiti of the United 
Nations and Organization of American States Secretaries-General, the 
imposition of such measures is not warranted at that time;

4.  Decides that if, at any time after the submission of the above-
mentioned report of the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General, having 
regard to the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of 
American States, reports to the Council that the de facto authorities in 
Haiti have failed to comply in good faith with their undertakings in the 
above-mentioned negotiations, the provisions set forth in paragraphs 5 
to 14 below shall come into force immediately;

5.  Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their 
nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or 
aircraft, of petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related 
materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military 
vehicles and equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the 
aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories, to any 
person or body in Haiti or to any person or body for the purpose of any 
business carried on in or operated from Haiti, and any activities by 
their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated 
to promote such sale or supply;

6.  Decides to prohibit any and all traffic from entering the territory 
or territorial sea of Haiti carrying petroleum or petroleum products, or 
arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and 
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, police equipment and spare 
parts for the aforementioned, in violation of paragraph 5 above; 

7.  Decides that the Committee established by paragraph 10 below may 
authorize on an exceptional case-by-case basis under a no-objection 
procedure the importation, in non-commercial quantities and only in 
barrels or bottles, of petroleum or petroleum products, including 
propane gas for cooking, for verified essential humanitarian needs, 
subject to acceptable arrangements for effective monitoring of delivery 
and use;

8.  Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds 
derived from property, (a) of the Government of Haiti or of the de facto 
authorities in Haiti, or (b) controlled directly or indirectly by such 
Government or authorities or by entities, wherever located or organized, 
owned or controlled by such Government or authorities, shall require all 
persons and entities within their own territories holding such funds to 
freeze them to ensure that they are not made available directly or 
indirectly to or for the benefit of the de facto authorities in Haiti;

9.  Calls upon all States, and all international organizations, to act 
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, 
notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or 
imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or 
any licence or permit granted prior to 23 June 1993;

10. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional 
rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of 
all the members of the Council to undertake the following tasks and to 
report on its work to the Council with its observations and 
recommendations:

(a)  To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 below;

(b)  To seek from all States further information regarding the motion 
taken by them concerning the effective implementation of this 
resolution;

(c)  To consider any information brought to its attention by States 
concerning violations of the measures imposed by this resolution and to 
recommend appropriate measures in response thereto;

(d)  To consider and decide expeditiously requests for the approval of 
imports of petroleum and petroleum products for essential humanitarian 
needs in accordance with paragraph 7 above;

(e)  To make periodic reports to the Security Council on information 
submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the present resolution, 
identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, 
reported to be engaged in such violations;

(f)  To promulgate guidelines to facilitate implementation of this 
resolution;

11. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee 
established by paragraph 10 in the fulfilment of its tasks, including 
supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in 
pursuance of the present resolution;

12.  Calls upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities 
violating the measures imposed by this resolution and to impose 
appropriate penalties;

13.  Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 16 July 
1993 on the measures they have initiated for meeting the obligations set 
out in paragraphs 5 to 9 above;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance 
to the Committee established by paragraph 10 and to make the necessary 
arrangements with the Secretariat for this purpose;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council, 
not later than 15 July 1993, and earlier if he considers it appropriate, 
on progress achieved in the efforts jointly undertaken by him and the 
Secretary-General of the Organization of American States with a view to 
reaching a political solution to the crisis in Haiti;

16. Expresses its readiness to review all the measures in the present 
resolution with a view to lifting them, if, after the provisions set 
forth in paragraphs 5 to 14 have come into force, the Secretary-General, 
having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization 
of American States, reports to the Council that the de facto authorities 
in Haiti have signed and have begun implementing in good faith an 
agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide;

17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

VOTE:  15-0.  (###)


ARTICLE 9:


Fact Sheet:  Diplomatic Immunity

Background
Diplomatic immunity is a principle of international law by which certain 
foreign government officials are not subject to the jurisdiction of 
local courts and other authorities.  The concept of immunity began with 
ancient tribes.  In order to exchange information, messengers were 
allowed to travel from tribe to tribe without fear of harm.  They were 
protected even when they brought bad news.  Today, immunity protects the 
channels of diplomatic communication by exempting diplomats from local 
jurisdiction so that they can perform their duties with freedom, 
independence, and security.  Diplomatic immunity is not meant to benefit 
individuals personally; it is meant to ensure that foreign officials can 
do their jobs.  Under the concept of reciprocity, diplomats assigned to 
any country in the world benefit equally from diplomatic immunity.  

Legal Framework
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 codified most modern diplomatic 
and consular practices, including diplomatic immunity.  More than 160 
nations, including the United States, are parties to these treaties.  
The conventions provide immunity to persons according to their rank in a 
diplomatic mission or consular post and according to the need for 
immunity in performing their duties.  For example, diplomatic agents and 
members of their immediate families are immune from all criminal 
prosecution and most civil law suits.  Administrative and technical 
staff members of embassies have a lower level of immunity.  Consular 
officers serving in consulates throughout the country have an even lower 
level of immunity.  Members of an embassy's service staff and consular 
employees are immune only for acts performed as part of their official 
duties.  

The United States considers the Vienna conventions particularly 
important because of the large number of American diplomatic and 
consular personnel stationed in countries where judicial systems are 
very different and less protective of individual rights than our own or 
where unfriendly governments might use their police authorities to 
harass American diplomats and their families.  Failure by U.S. 
authorities to uphold the Vienna conventions would complicate U.S. 
diplomatic relations and could lead to harsher treatment in foreign 
courts of U.S. personnel abroad. 

Abuses of Diplomatic Immunity
Under the Vienna conventions, all persons entitled to immunity have the 
obligation and duty to respect the laws and regulations of the host 
country.  Immunity is not a license to commit a crime, and violations of 
the law are not condoned.  In the United States, any time a person with 
immunity is alleged to have committed a crime, the Department of State 
advises his or her government of the incident and, where prosecution 
would be the normal procedure, requests a waiver of the alleged 
offender's immunity so that the case may be heard in the appropriate 
U.S. court.  If immunity is not waived, the Department of State may, in 
serious cases, order the withdrawal of the offender from the United 
States.  In the case of an offense committed by a member of a diplomat's 
family, the diplomat and his or her entire family may be expelled.  
Diplomatic visas of serious offenders are canceled, and their names are 
entered into a worldwide lookout system to keep them from returning to 
the United States.

The Department of State's Office of Protocol works with the injured 
parties and the foreign government to secure restitution in those cases 
where criminal incidents have resulted in injuries to individuals.  The 
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 and related regulations require that 
before a person with immunity can obtain license plates for a vehicle, 
he or she must have liability insurance.  Anyone injured in an 
automobile accident by a person with immunity may bring direct action 
against the vehicle's insurer in U.S. District Court.  In addition, 
diplomats do not have a right to endanger public safety by driving a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or by disregarding the 
rules of the road.  Police stop them and, if they are intoxicated, 
prevent them from driving.  Police issue citations for driving offenses 
and the Department of State revokes drivers' permits for any persons 
found to be unsafe drivers or who continually abuse driving regulations.  
Furthermore, some countries follow the practice of investigating, and, 
if appropriate, taking legal action against their own diplomats who are 
accused of breaking a host country's laws.

In those cases where immunity prevents civil suits, the Department of 
State works to settle the matter and mediates disputes in an effort to 
find a mutually satisfactory solution.

The vast majority of persons entitled to some form of diplomatic 
immunity are law-abiding people.  Only a few ever run afoul of the law.  
Unfortunately, those few who do exhibit egregious behavior draw the 
attention of the public and the media and damage the reputation of the 
entire group. (###)


ARTICLE 10:

Department Statements

Uzbekistan:  U.S. Foreign Service National Beaten and Detained
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, June 
18, 1993.

The Department of State is deeply concerned about recent actions by the 
Government of Uzbekistan which threaten prospects for improvement in our 
bilateral relations.  On May 25, officers of the National Security 
Service (NSS), the local successor to the KGB, beat and detained a U.S. 
embassy Foreign Service national employee at Tashkent International 
Airport while performing her official duties.  On that same day, our 
embassy in Tashkent sent the Government of Uzbekistan a diplomatic note 
protesting the incident, which occurred in the presence of a U.S. 
Government official.

We expected the Uzbekistan Government to honor its commitments to human 
rights and to normal diplomatic practice and to respond to our note in a 
forthcoming and confidential manner.  Instead, the Uzbekistan Government 
chose to respond on June 15 by publishing an article on the incident in 
all the major daily newspapers in Uzbekistan.  The article openly 
alleges that the U.S. embassy misrepresented the facts of the beating 
and detention, and even jokes about the injuries suffered by our 
employee.  The article was signed by the head of the Uzbek Foreign 
Ministry's press office, and, thus, we view it as official government 
policy.

Our embassy in Tashkent continues to raise both the May 25 incident and 
its subsequent handling with the Government of Uzbekistan in the 
strongest possible terms.  In response to this situation, the U.S. 
Government has determined that as long as U.S. employees are being 
harassed and beaten by the Uzbek authorities, it would be entirely 
inappropriate to engage in activities from which Uzbek officials would 
benefit.  Therefore, the U.S. has terminated a visit of Uzbek 
parliamentarians currently in progress.  We are also reviewing our other 
bilateral activities with Uzbekistan to determine their appropriateness 
in light of current circumstances.  In our conversations with the Uzbeks 
on this matter, we continue to insist that there be a full and fair 
inquiry and that justice be served so that we can put this issue behind 
us and put our relationship on a more normal, positive path.



Malawi's Referendum
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, June 
18, 1993.

The United States Government has followed closely the progress toward a 
democratic system that Malawians have made in recent months.  In that 
regard, we are particularly impressed by the exemplary conduct of all 
sectors of Malawian society during Monday's national referendum on the 
country's political future.  By a nearly two-to-one margin, Malawians 
voted to replace one-party rule with a multi-party political system.  We 
believe this result represents a significant victory for democratization 
and for the future of Malawi.

The United States Government welcomes President Banda's acceptance of 
the result and his decision to implement it promptly.  We urge the 
government and opposition to continue their constructive dialogue in 
planning the next steps to multi-partyism and subsequent national 
elections.

With Monday's vote, the people of Malawi made their country the latest 
example of the democratization process that is reshaping Africa.  The 
United States looks forward to working with the government and the 
opposition as they implement the decision of the electorate.



Nigeria:  Presidential Election
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, June 
23, 1993.

The United States deplores the outrageous decision of Nigeria's military 
regime to annul the results of the June 12 presidential election and 
cancel the transition to elected civilian rule.  According to 
independent Nigerian monitoring groups and outside observers, the 
election was orderly, fair, and free from any serious irregularities.  
The Nigerian press, public, and leading civilian politicians view the 
election as the most successful in Nigeria's history and have called 
upon the military to release and respect the results.  We remain 
concerned about the continuing repression of the press and democratic 
forces.

The United States Government has strongly and consistently supported the 
restoration of civilian rule in Nigeria and calls upon the military 
regime to hand over power to the duly elected civilian leadership on 
August 27, 1993, in keeping with its previously announced transition 
plan.  The failure on the part of the military regime to respect the 
will of the Nigerian people and transition to democracy will have 
serious implications for U.S.-Nigerian relations.

We are in the process of reassessing our relations with Nigeria.  There 
are various options available for responding.  We are closely examining 
each  one to see whether employing it might help the Nigerian people 
successfully express their political will.  All aspects of our bilateral 
relations, including our $22.8 million in bilateral assistance, are 
currently under review. (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 26

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