US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 21, MAY 24, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. The United States and Africa: A New Relationship -- Secretary
Christopher
2. Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the Conflict in Bosnia
-- Secretary Christopher, Joint Action Program
3. Security Council Condemns Bosnian Croat Paramilitary Offensive --
UNSC President Vorontsov
4. FY 1994 Assistance Requests for Europe -- Stephen A. Oxman
5. Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan -- George E. Moose
6. U.S. Recognition of Angolan Government
7. Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Defining Issues and Producing Common
Ground -- Edward P. Djerejian
8. North African Countries: U.S. Relations and Assistance -- Edward P.
Djerejian
9. East Asia and the Pacific: U.S. Policy and Assistance -- Winston
Lord
10. UN Security Council Resolution 825 on the North Korean Nuclear
Issue
11. Statement at Confirmation Hearing -- Alexander F. Watson
12. Review of U.S. Efforts To Combat the International Narcotics Trade
-- Melvyn Levitsky
13. Department Statements
Terrorists Attack TV Station in Suriname
U.S. Assistance to UNTAC
ARTICLE 1:
The United States and Africa: A New Relationship
Secretary Christopher
Address before the 23rd African-American Institute Conference, Reston,
Virginia, May 21, 1993
Good morning, Maurice Tempelsman, Vivian Derryck, friends: I welcome
this opportunity to speak to you today about the Clinton
Administration's approach to Africa. I am especially pleased to be the
first Secretary of State ever to address the African-American Institute.
Our Administration is well aware of what you have accomplished, through
40 years of dedicated work, in building better ties between America and
Africa, and in helping the people of Africa build better lives for
themselves.
Next week, the second Africa/African-American Summit convenes in
Libreville, Gabon. Conceived by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, this Summit
brings together Africans and African-Americans to form bonds of
friendship, share ideas, and do business together. I am pleased that
our new Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, George Moose, will be
leading the U.S. Government delegation. Congressman John Conyers is
leading the Congressional delegation to this important conference.
America and Africa are linked in so many different ways.
As the world's oldest democracy, we have an enduring interest in the
success of the new democracies of Africa. As a multi-racial society,
the U.S. is especially encouraged by the approaching transition to
democracy in South Africa.
And there are links of conscience--and links of cooperation.
When a child dies of hunger in Africa, that tragedy touches us here in
America. When American scientists seek a cure for AIDS, they carry the
prayers and hopes of both Africans and Americans.
When our Agency for International Development makes a substantial
investment in child survival programs, that makes a difference in
helping Africa to reduce infant mortality rates. And when the American
company Merck provides a drug that frees millions of Africans from the
devastating effects of river blindness, that action not only extends the
frontiers of pharmacology, but it lessens the distance from America to
Africa.
That distance is also lessened by the end of the Cold War. During the
long Cold War period, policies toward Africa were often determined not
by how they affected Africa, but by whether they brought advantage or
disadvantage to Washington or Moscow. Thankfully, we have moved beyond
the point of adopting policies based on how they might affect the
shipping lanes next to Africa rather than the people in Africa. And
that's an improvement.
In today's changed world, we can and will move to a productive new
relationship with Africa. The President and I are committed to building
that new relationship based upon our common interests and our shared
values. The Clinton Administration will make Africa a high priority and
give it the attention it deserves.
The Clinton Administration will provide strong and visible support for
the movement to freedom in Africa--the movement toward democracies and
toward free markets. We will work with the nations of Africa to address
the health, environmental and population issues that threaten lives and
imperil sustainable development. And we will help Africa build its
capacity for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution so that the
people of that continent can live free of the terror of war.
Promoting Democracy And Human Rights
At the heart of our new relationship will be an enduring commitment to
democracy and human rights--and that includes women's rights. President
Clinton has made it clear that promoting democracy and human rights is a
pillar of American foreign policy. And that pillar stands just as tall
in Africa as it does in every part of the world.
It is democracies--not dictatorships --that offer the best means to
defend human rights, to put African nations on the path toward progress
and to address the vital social and economic concerns that cut across
national borders.
The United States will work through our AID program and with the
multilateral assistance and lending institutions to help Africa build
its economic capacity. Under the Clinton Administration, these global
concerns will not be relegated to the footnotes of our foreign policy
agenda. Instead, they will be given top tier attention--the attention
they deserve.
Today Africa has gained our attention and respect through the courageous
efforts to build democracy and opportunity on that continent. While the
drive for democracy and free markets has attracted more recent attention
in Eastern Europe and Latin America, the people of Africa are demanding
their freedom as well.
Listen to the words of President Chiluba of Zambia:
We know what is right. Democracy is right. The greatest lesson we
can learn from the past 27 years is that freedom is at the core of every
successful nation in the world and in Africa today.
The people of Africa know where their future lies: not with corrupt
dictators like Mobutu, but with courageous democrats in every part of
the continent. From Senegal to Benin, from Madagascar to Mali, African
nations are building strong democratic institutions. They recognize
that democracy offers the only framework for tolerance and harmony
because it safeguards individual rights and provides essential
protection for minorities.
AAI has played an extraordinarily useful role in promoting democracy.
You have monitored elections, trained officials, and provided civic
education. You understand that democracy must work not only on election
day--but every day--through a vibrant civic culture and a commitment to
free and open debate and the rule of law.
Democracy worked on election day last September in Angola. But since
then, the people of Angola have been denied the benefits of their
participation in that election process. President Clinton acknowledged
the importance of that free and fair election when he announced this
week that the United States now recognizes the Government of Angola.
We intend to remain actively engaged in promoting a negotiated
settlement between the Angolan government and UNITA--a settlement that
will enable all the people of Angola to enjoy the benefits of democracy.
U.S. recognition is designed to help achieve that goal and to encourage
UNITA to join the process of peace and reconciliation. As President
Clinton said, we hope UNITA will be a part of the government we
recognize. We continue to believe that there can be no military victory
in Angola. And I want to emphasize that the United States will not
support those who pursue a military solution.
Now South Africa stands on the verge of its own transition to non-racial
democracy. The United States supports that peaceful transition. We
oppose those who seek to derail the negotiations and we reject those who
resort to violence.
We hope that within a short time, a date will be set for a truly
democratic election in South Africa. That election will echo around the
African continent and across the world as a roaring triumph of human
rights.
The credit for that monumental achievement will belong most of all to
those in South Africa who dedicated their lives--and in some instances,
gave their lives--so that a new day of freedom would dawn. Credit will
belong to Nelson Mandela, who walked out of prison after 27 years--
unconquered, unbowed, standing tall in his belief that the people of
South Africa could still build a future based upon the inherent worth
and dignity of every human being.
Credit will also belong to F.W. De Klerk, whose vital contribution can
be measured by how far his views have evolved, and by how far a majority
of white South Africans have come with him.
The transition to non-racial democracy in South Africa is also the
product of principled opposition to apartheid in the international
community. In the finest American political tradition, a coalition of
conscience in this country has carried out a long and uplifting campaign
against the apartheid system half a world away. Our own sanctions have
played an important role in the progress made to date.
The installation of a non-racial government in South Africa will
resonate with every American, but especially with those in cities and
towns across the nation who joined the effort to bring an end to
apartheid.
In sharing the spirit and lessons of our own civil rights movement, we
are certainly not saying that America has found every answer or that we
have yet formed a perfect union here in the United States. But we are
committed to the basic principle that human rights are universal--that
every citizen in every country ought to be judged as an individual,
irrespective of race or economic condition.
South Africa's successful transition is important for Africa, the United
States and the world. The United States will help--and we expect the
other industrial democracies to help as well. Once a Transitional
Executive Council has been put in place--and once a date for elections
has been set--we will work with our G-7 partners to help South Africa
re-enter the global economy. We have urged the World Bank and the
parties in South Africa to begin planning now the projects that will
translate into economic growth. Similarly, the American business
community should be a part of the effort to help the people of South
Africa build a strong and vibrant economy once the progress toward
democracy is irreversible.
Unfortunately, South Africa has had no monopoly on the violation of
human rights on the continent. American policy must reflect that
painful fact. We cannot hold Africa to a lesser standard for human
rights than we apply to other parts of the world. I want to make clear
that the United States will take human rights into account as we
determine how to allocate our scarce resources for foreign assistance.
The promotion of democracy is central to the goals of the Clinton
Administration. That is why President Clinton chose to invite the first
President of a democratic Namibia, Sam Nujoma, as the first African head
of state to be received at his White House.
Sustaining Africa's Capacity for Development
It is the democratic nations of Africa, reflecting the will of their
people, that are best positioned to make the kind of economic changes
that improve the lives of their citizens. The development challenge
facing most African nations remains imposing, but it is within the
capacities of free market democracies to overcome.
Economic crises still afflict many of the continent's nations. For many
countries, per capita incomes have been stagnating or even falling;
trade and investment flows have remained weak; debt burdens stunt the
prospects for new growth. Drought, famine and civil war have turned
crises into calamities; no region of the continent has been spared the
ravages of man or nature.
This is why the trend toward democracy in Africa must be reinforced by
sustainable economic development. The peace and stability that
democracy brings can also lead to desperately needed private investment-
-and with it, development capital, technology transfer and technical
expertise. The trend toward disinvestment in Africa will only be
reversed when Africa makes itself a more attractive place for new
capital. Applying the rule of law, reducing corruption, assuring the
remittance of profits, and building more skilled workforces--all of
these will help give Africa a far greater role in the global economy.
The first responsibility for building that capacity, of course, rests
with African countries themselves. But the developed nations of the
world--including the United States--share a responsibility to help. For
the coming fiscal year, we are requesting bilateral development funding
for Africa of $800 million. In addition, we will continue to provide
over half a billion dollars in humanitarian and other assistance to
Africa.
The United States and the international community will be more willing
to support the economies of African nations that have embarked on
serious reform. We are working with other creditor nations to provide
additional debt reduction for countries cooperating with IMF adjustment
programs. The Administration is requesting congressional support to
enable the U.S. to participate in a multilateral debt relief effort.
This new initiative would reward those poor countries implementing
difficult reforms.
New trade policies will also help African nations to compete in global
markets. Protectionist barriers still impede Africa's competitiveness
and prospects for growth. Africa has much to gain from a successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations that the U.S. is pushing
with all its might to complete by the end of this year.
Africa's economic future is inseparable from its environmental future.
An Africa that is yielding to the desert sands and to the scrub, and an
Africa whose soil is eroding, is an Africa diminishing its capacity to
feed itself. An Africa that is losing its forests and renewable water
supplies is an Africa that is compromising its ability to meet its basic
needs for the future.
One African leader has said that the problem of soil erosion has become
so serious that his country, when viewed from space, appears to be
bleeding into the ocean. We must help to heal these environmental
wounds. To that end, AID will spend at least $70 million on
environmental and natural resource projects in Africa this year.
One environmental challenge in which the U.S. was particularly helpful
was the devastating drought in southern Africa. Working with interested
nations and with the donor community, the U.S. provided close to $1
billion to respond to this catastrophe. Today, the threat of famine is
gone and the countries of the region are harvesting a good crop.
Sustainable development cannot be accomplished without a renewed sense
of urgency about population growth rates that will double the size of
many African nations in 15-20 years. Rapid population growth imperils
efforts to combat poverty and to protect the environment. No longer
will the United States pretend--as we have done in recent years--that
this problem does not exist.
Instead, we will work in partnership with nations in Africa and
elsewhere to provide a full range of family planning and reproductive
health services, and we will work to improve the status of women in
Africa and worldwide.
Resolving Conflicts in Africa
Let me be clear: The Clinton Administration's new relationship toward
Africa will differ in important respects from the approach of the past
12 years. At the same time, I salute former President Bush for
launching Operation Restore Hope--a military mobilization for a mission
of mercy in Somalia. What a proud moment it was to see American
soldiers help to feed starving children in a place far from our shores
but clearly close to our hearts.
Certainly America was not alone in that effort. Other nations--
including many in Africa--were instrumental in providing relief. While
serious problems persist in Somalia, the efforts of the international
community have alleviated the worst suffering and provided the
opportunity to rebuild that nation. Somalia's experience reminds us
that the international community can respond compassionately and
effectively. But it also reminds us that we must not wait until
thousands upon thousands of people have succumbed to starvation.
Now we need to apply these lessons in Sudan. The civil war in Sudan has
resulted in terrible suffering and appalling violations of human rights.
The U.S. is working with governments in the region, the UN and others to
bring the fighting to an end. We must do whatever we can to ensure the
delivery of adequate relief supplies to stem this tragedy, especially as
the rainy season begins.
In Liberia, where brutal conflict has raged, we support the efforts of
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to restore peace.
We seek a negotiated settlement leading to full disarmament of all
warring factions; free and fair, internationally-monitored elections;
and the establishment of a democratic government.
But Liberia's future will be determined in Monrovia, not in Washington.
Only Liberians can create a real and lasting peace. Only Liberians can
heal the deep scars in Liberian society. And only they can determine
who will lead them in the future.
Liberia's suffering must be brought to a swift and peaceful end. That
country deserves a better fate, like the future now dawning to the east
across the continent in Eritrea. The intertwined tragedies of Eritrea
and Ethiopia are now happily receding into history, we hope, never again
to be repeated. After thirty years of civil war, an independent Eritrea
has emerged, aided in part by peace talks sponsored by the Carter Center
in Atlanta.
Just last month, Eritreans voted overwhelmingly for independence from
Ethiopia in a UN-monitored referendum. On April 27, Eritrea declared
its independence--and the United States recognized it that same day.
Alongside a newly democratic Ethiopia, this new nation of Eritrea can
take its rightful place as a beacon of hope astride the Horn of Africa.
I have spoken of American efforts to end some of the military conflicts
in Africa, but our most enduring contribution may be assisting Africa to
build its own capacity for conflict resolution and peacekeeping. The
United States is working closely with the Organization of African Unity,
providing support for peacekeeping in Rwanda and training for election
monitors elsewhere. As the OAU prepares to observe its thirtieth
anniversary, it is important not only to recognize what that
organization has done, but to focus on how it can play a greater role in
preventing and stopping wars on the continent.
I also want to acknowledge the often-overlooked involvement of Africans
as peacekeepers abroad. Nigeria and Kenya have been active in the
former Yugoslavia--Cameroon in Cambodia--Ghana and Sierra Leone in
Lebanon: These and other African nations are making the world safer
through their peacekeeping efforts.
The OAU and other African organizations need to step up mediation and
preventive diplomacy to give people in Africa the chance to live free of
war. In the exercise of creative, often life-saving diplomacy, Africa's
destiny will be shaped by Africans.
A New Relationship
Today I have outlined the basis for a substantially new American
relationship with Africa. It will be a new relationship in which
Americans can assist Africans in building democratic institutions and
laying the foundation for economic growth, but in which our role is to
enhance--not to erase--African solutions.
It will be a new relationship grounded in our firm belief that while
dictators in Africa are not yet extinct, the future lies in free
elections and free institutions.
It will be a new relationship reinforced once a new South Africa has
moved from repression to democracy.
The people and governments of Africa are moving toward democracy and
free markets with a growing conviction that they are on the path to
progress. They are embarked on a uniquely African journey, as awe-
inspiring as anything on this continent of such breathtaking beauty.
It is a journey worthy of America's respect and support--and that
respect and support is what I pledge today. Thank you.(###)
ARTICLE 2:
Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the Conflict in Bosnia
Secretary Christopher, Joint Action Program
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at joint news conference with French Foreign Minister
Juppe, UK Foreign Secretary Hurd, Spanish Foreign Minister Solana, and
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Washington, DC, May 22, 1993.
Good morning. I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues, Foreign
Secretary Douglas Hurd of the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Andrei
Kozyrev of Russia, Foreign Minister Javier Solana of Spain, and Foreign
Minister Alain Juppe of France. I have been asked by my colleagues to
make a short summary statement with respect to our deliberations.
We are determined that the international community will act together--
based upon shared responsibilities and common purpose--to bring
increased pressure to bear on those engaged in the conflict in Bosnia.
Each of us--along with our colleagues in other capitals and at the
United Nations--has worked hard to find a common approach that will work
to stop the killing in Bosnia, to prevent the conflict from spreading,
and to bring concerted pressure on the parties to reach a peaceful
settlement of the conflict. This international pressure will be brought
especially to bear on the Bosnian Serbs, who stand solely isolated from
the community of civilized nations.
During the last 3 days, we have agreed on a Joint Action Program of
further steps which we are announcing today. This Joint Action Program
describes the steps we'll be pursuing to extinguish this terrible war
and achieve a lasting and equitable settlement. We understand,
collectively, that there is an urgent need for action. Taken together,
the course of action we outline today is designed to directly affect the
environment in Bosnia and escalate the pressure on those still fighting
so that a political settlement to this crisis--which must be achieved--
will be more likely.
Let me now, on behalf of my colleagues, summarize the specific, concrete
steps that we have agreed to take and which are presented in the joint
document which you have received.
-- We will continue our program of humanitarian assistance to the
people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to save lives, and we will insist that all
parties allow this aid to pass without hindrance.
-- We will rigorously enforce the tight and tough regime of sanctions
that isolate and pressure Serbia and Montenegro. This pressure will be
unrelenting until the necessary conditions of the relevant UN Security
Council resolutions are met, including the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb
troops from territories occupied by force.
-- Each of us will contribute in our own way--for instance, through
monitors, technical assistance, or surveillance--to a joint effort that
will ensure that Belgrade's promise to close its border with Bosnia is
not a shallow one.
-- We will work in the United Nations for early adoption of measures
that will implement certain "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each of
our nations will make appropriate contributions to securing these "safe
areas." In this context, the United States is prepared to meet its
commitment to help protect United Nations forces in the event they are
attacked and request such action by the United States.
-- We will continue to enforce vigorously the no-fly zone established
over Bosnia.
-- We support the rapid establishment of a war crimes tribunal so that
those guilty of atrocities may be brought to justice.
-- We will remain intensively involved in efforts to achieve a durable,
negotiated settlement to this crisis. To the extent that the parties
decide to implement mutually agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen
agreement, that is something we would encourage.
-- We are putting Croatia on notice that assistance to the Bosnian
Croatian forces engaged in fighting and in "ethnic cleansing" could
result in international sanctions against Croatia.
-- Grave consequences would arise from violence spreading elsewhere in
the Balkans. Accordingly, we support an increased international
presence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which we will do
in consultation with the authorities in Skopje, and we support an
increased presence of international monitoring in Kosovo.
-- In addition, we will keep other options open for new and tougher
measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration.
Each of us will work--individually and collectively--to define
operational plans to carry out these measures promptly.
It is a testimony to the strength of our alliance and our new
partnership with the Russian Federation that we have arrived at this
mutual course of action that I am announcing on behalf of my colleagues
and myself today. The actions we announce today will save lives, keep
the conflict from spreading, and increase pressure for a negotiated
settlement.
As our statement says, we are firmly united and committed to prosecuting
and pursuing this course of action.
Joint Action Program
Text of Joint Action Program released by the Office of the Spokesman,
Washington, DC, May 22, 1993.
France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the
United States of America are profoundly concerned that the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina is continuing despite the strenuous efforts of the
international community and the Co-Chairmen of the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which they strongly support, to
bring an end to it.
We shall continue to work urgently to help extinguish this terrible war
and to achieve a lasting and equitable settlement.
We also have common views on the most productive immediate steps to
take. These should lead to implementation of relevant Security Council
resolutions as well as the elaboration of further steps.
1. Humanitarian Assistance. We will continue providing humanitarian
assistance for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and will insist that
all parties allow humanitarian aid to pass without hindrance.
2. Sanctions. The economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations
Security Council against Serbia and Montenegro must be rigorously
enforced by all members of the UN until the necessary conditions set out
in Security Council Resolution 820, including the withdrawal of Bosnian
Serb troops from territories occupied by force, are met for lifting the
sanctions.
3. Sealing Borders. We note the pledge of the Belgrade authorities to
close the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to put pressure on
the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan. We are watching to see if
the border closure is effective. Although the primary responsibility
for enforcing this step belongs to Belgrade, we can assist, for instance
by placing monitors on the borders or providing technical expertise or
conducting aerial surveillance. We also note the willingness expressed
by the Zagreb authorities for monitoring to take place along the border
between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4. "Safe Areas." The concept of "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as
France and others have proposed, could make a valuable contribution. We
will work to secure early adoption of the new UN Security Council
resolution now under discussion. The United Kingdom and France along
with other nations already have forces serving with UNPROFOR in "safe
areas." Troops from other countries, including Spain and Canada, are
playing an important role on the ground. The Russian Federation is
considering making forces available in Bosnia in addition to its forces
presently in Croatia. The United States is prepared to meet its
commitment to help protect UNPROFOR forces in the event they are
attacked and request such action. Further contributions from other
countries would be most welcome
5. No-Fly Zone. The No-Fly Zone should continue to be enforced in
Bosnia.
6. War Crimes Tribunal. We support the rapid establishment of the War
Crimes Tribunal, so that those guilty of atrocities may be brought to
justice.
7. Durable Peace. Negotiated settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
building on the Vance-Owen process and intensified international
cooperation and effort, is the way a durable peace can be established.
France, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States will
assist and actively participate in a continued political process to this
end. To the extent that the parties decide to implement promptly
mutually-agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan, this is to be
encouraged.
8. Central Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are deeply concerned about the
fighting between Bosnian Croatian and Bosnian Government forces and the
related "ethnic cleansing," and we agree that Croatia should be put on
notice that assistance to Bosnian Croatian forces engaged in these
activities could result in the international community imposing
sanctions on Croatia.
9. Containment. We will cooperate closely to enhance efforts to
contain the conflict and prevent the possibility that it will spill over
into neighboring countries. We would regard such a development with the
utmost seriousness.
10. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is essential that
everyone in the region understands that aggression against the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would have grave consequences. We will
support an increase in the international presence there in consultation
with the authorities in Skopje. The United States is considering a
contribution to this effort.
11. Kosovo. We favor an increase in the international monitoring
presence in Kosovo. International standards of human rights should be
strictly respected in the formerly-autonomous region of Kosovo, although
we do not support declarations of independence there.
12. Croatia. The same considerations apply to the Serb-populated areas
of Croatia. We will work for the renewal and strengthening of
UNPROFOR's mandate. The Croatian Government and the local Serb
authorities should maintain the cease-fire and constructively pursue
their dialogue leading to settling practical, economic, and, eventually,
political problems between them.
13. Further Measures. We will keep open options for new and tougher
measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration.
We five members of the United Nations Security Council are firmly united
and firmly committed to taking these immediate steps. We will work
closely with the United Nations and the involved regional organizations
as we carry out these efforts.(###)
ARTICLE 3:
Security Council Condemns Bosnian Croat Paramilitary Offensive
UN Security Council President Vorontsov
Text of note released by the UN Security Council, New York City, May 10,
1993
Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the
President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the
Council, at its 3210th meeting, on 10 May 1993, in connection with the
Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina":
"The Security Council, recalling its statement of 21 April 1993
(S/25646) concerning the atrocities and killings in areas north and west
of Sarajevo, expresses its grave concern at the major new military
offensive launched by Bosnian Croat paramilitary units in the areas of
Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica.
"The Security Council strongly condemns this major military offensive
launched by Bosnian Croat paramilitary units which is totally
inconsistent with the signature of the Peace Plan for the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Bosnian Croat party. The Council demands
that the attacks against the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica
cease forthwith; that Bosnian Croat paramilitary units withdraw
immediately from the area and that all the parties strictly comply with
their previous commitments as well as the cease-fire agreed to today
between the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Bosnian Croat party.
"The Security Council also expresses its deep concern that the UNPROFOR
battalion in the area has been forced under fire to redeploy as a result
of this latest offensive and condemns the refusal of Bosnian Croat
paramilitary units to allow the presence of United Nations military
observers, in particular in the city of Mostar.
"The Security Council once again reiterates its demand that UNPROFOR
personnel be allowed unimpeded access throughout the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and, in this particular case, demands that the Bosnian
Croat paramilitary units ensure the safety and security of UNPROFOR as
well as all United Nations personnel in the areas of Mostar, Jablanica
and Dreznica. In this connection, the Council expresses its deep
concern at the increasing[ly] hostile attitude of Bosnian Croat
paramilitary units towards UNPROFOR personnel.
"The Security Council calls upon the Republic of Croatia, in accordance
with the commitments under the Zagreb agreement of 25 April 1993
(S/25659), to exert all its influence on the Bosnian Croat leadership
and paramilitary units with a view to ceasing immediately their attacks
particularly in the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica. It further
calls on the Republic of Croatia to adhere strictly to its obligations
under Security Council resolution 752, including putting an end to all
forms of interference and respecting the territorial integrity of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
"The Security Council once again reaffirms the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the inacceptability of the acquisition of territory by force and the
practice of 'ethnic cleansing'.
"The Security Council remains seized of the matter and is ready to
consider further measures to ensure that all parties and others
concerned abide by their commitments and fully respect relevant Council
decisions."(###)
ARTICLE 4:
FY 1994 Assistance Requests for Europe
Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, May 11, 1993
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to meet today with you and your committee
to discuss the Administration's FY 1994 request for assistance to
countries in Europe. I recognize the great interest in and attention to
our aid programs that you and this committee have shown, and I will
value your comments and guidance.
In this statement, I would like to give an overview of our aid programs
and the policies they support. One of our largest funding requests is
for the Support for East European Democracies Act (SEED). While we are
requesting SEED funding at approximately current levels and while we
expect the program to retain approximately the same emphasis and
structure that it now has, I do want to note for you some of the
directions we expect the program to take in the future. We are also
requesting funding for the International Fund for Ireland and security
assistance for a number of countries.
Support for East European Democracies
I know that this committee shares the Administration's commitment to our
continued support of the democratic revolution in Central and Eastern
Europe. Democratic states and free markets in this region advance the
security, political, and economic interests of the United States and our
allies in several ways.
First, nothing will serve the cause of peace and stability in this
region so much as a meaningful transformation to thriving democracies.
History teaches us that prosperous and truly free peoples generally do
not start wars.
Second, an Eastern Europe at peace with itself and with its neighbors is
key to ending the post-war division of Europe. Sound and stable
societies will form strong economic and political ties to the countries
of the West. These strengthened relationships will ease the legitimate
security concerns of Eastern and Western Europeans.
Third, the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe will serve as a model
for reform efforts in Russia and the rest of the NIS. Success in
establishing democratic, market economy societies in Central and Eastern
Europe will help mute criticism by opponents of reform in the former
Soviet Union, and will give credibility to the efforts of reformers.
Finally, creation of market-oriented economies in a region of some 135
million people offers significant commercial opportunities for American
business both in Central and Eastern Europe itself and as a gateway to
the vast potential markets further east. This, of course, is the
reasoning behind the SEED Act, originally passed in 1989.
Through the SEED program, we have provided to date over $1 billion of
financial and technical assistance to the transition to democracy and
free markets. Helped by the aid we have provided under this program,
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe--with the bleak exception of
parts of former Yugoslavia--have made great strides. Democratic
institutions, although still fragile, are largely functioning. In every
country in the region, there has been at least one constitutional
transfer of power. Generally accepted human rights are usually
respected. Independent mass media have appeared throughout the region.
In the economic sphere, the private sector accounts for an increasing
share of output and employment. Significant progress has been made with
currency stabilization, with freeing prices, and with liberalizing trade
regimes. Governments are beginning to erect the necessary legal and
regulatory framework for a market-oriented economy.
However, the development of democratic and free market institutions
remains incomplete. Banking and financial sectors remain generally
inadequate; we have committed $200 million to an international effort to
restructure and privatize banks in Poland. Privatization of state
enterprises has generally proceeded slowly in most countries. The size
of fiscal deficits remains worrisome, and private foreign investment has
been disappointing in many countries of the region.
The transition has also been uneven in the countries of the region. The
countries of the northern tier--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic-
-are the most advanced, with somewhat less progress in Slovakia and
Bulgaria. Albania has been making a valiant effort considering its past
isolation and relative poverty. But in the rest of the Balkans,
progress has been halting, in part due to the turmoil in the former
Yugoslavia and in part due to the greater underlying economic
difficulties these countries face. The Baltic states are also moving in
the right direction, despite problems arising from the disruption of
their former economic relationships with Russia.
Finally, the transition to market economies has been very painful to
many East Europeans. Replacing a command economy with one based on
market forces, closing inefficient enterprises, and tightening fiscal
and monetary policies have led to sharp contractions in output (as much
as 50% in Albania), increased unemployment, and a decline in living
standards. Popular discontent with the burdens of reform is widespread.
It is thus essential that we continue to provide assistance to the
countries of this region as we have done. Thanks in large part to the
leadership of the Congress, our SEED program has proven a highly
effective means of supporting Eastern Europe's transition. The program
has three major objectives:
-- Strengthening democratic institutions;
-- Developing a market economy and private sector; and
-- Improving the basic quality of life.
Through the SEED program, we have provided assistance to the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe in a wide variety of areas.
I would like to give you just a few examples of the type of projects
that SEED has supported.
-- The Frost Committee of this House has provided computer equipment
and training to parliaments in several countries.
-- The enterprise funds are providing urgently needed capital to
developing private sectors in five countries.
-- We are providing technical assistance to privatization in countries
throughout the region.
-- Our energy efficiency program has established projects in several
countries demonstrating how to reduce energy consumption and monitor
energy use.
-- We are providing technical assistance for significant air and water
quality projects in the "black triangle" of Upper Silesia.
The SEED program is highly regarded by the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. It delivers assistance faster and cheaper than aid
programs elsewhere in the world and faster and cheaper than programs
conducted by other donors. And the assistance program has been
particularly well-targeted and effective because of the way it has been
administered.
Our Washington-based organization allowed us to get started quickly and
to respond nimbly to rapidly changing conditions in Central and Eastern
Europe. The time between conception and contract in SEED-funded aid is
some 8 to 9 months, as opposed to 20 months in other aid programs.
Costs have also been held down significantly: Administrative costs are
far lower for a program based in Washington than for one with a
predominantly overseas staff.
The regional nature of the program also enables us to deliver assistance
where it is really needed, without the long lead time associated with
separate programs in each country. At the same time, we are making
adaptations to seek to ensure that each country's program is tailored to
its particular needs.
Finally, the SEED program relies heavily upon non-governmental
intermediaries to deliver aid. We make use of private organizations
such as the Citizens Democracy Corps, the International Media Fund, the
International Executive Service Corps, and the MBA Enterprise Corps to
provide know-how directly to those who need it. And the Enterprise
Funds are a unique government-private enterprise partnership providing
capital directly to the private sector. Today, with 3 years'
experience, we recognize that some changes can be made in the way we
have administered the SEED program. With better organized host
governments and more fully staffed USAID offices, we are developing a
new balance between Washington and the field. This will allow us to
retain the necessary flexibility while strengthening coordination with
host governments.
We have also facilitated coordination of the SEED program with our
overall policy toward Central and Eastern Europe by placing
responsibility for the program in the Bureau for European and Canadian
Affairs. This structure does not reflect any change in the importance
attached to this program but is intended to improve it. The change is
also consistent with Secretary Christopher's policy of decentralization
within the State Department and with the organization of our assistance
and policy offices for the NIS.
What does the future hold for the SEED program? When the program began
in 1989, there were predictions that it would last only 3-5 years.
These predictions have proved overly optimistic. I expect that in the
northern tier, we can begin phasing down in 2 or 3 more years. The rest
of the region, however, will require increased levels of assistance for
several more years. In particular, the situation in the Balkans has
been aggravated by the economic consequences of the war in the former
Yugoslavia and the enforcement of sanctions against Serbia. It will,
therefore, be some years before overall assistance needs diminish
substantially.
For FY 1994, we are requesting SEED funding of $408,951,000, essentially
the same as the current year. Although the number of countries eligible
for assistance under SEED has doubled since 1989, funding has not kept
pace. We could easily spend several times this figure and will have to
continue to make difficult decisions among competing priorities. This
does, however, provide discipline and force us to concentrate on those
key sectors where U.S. assistance can be most helpful.
In particular, as the economies of the northern tier countries advance
toward free markets, and as democratic institutions take firm root
there, they will have a relatively lesser need for the transitional SEED
programs. We, therefore, expect to devote an increasing share of
assistance to the southern tier countries and the Baltics as they
continue to implement additional reform measures.
I would like to close my discussion of the SEED program with a final
plea. It is essential that our program of emergency assistance to
Russia not come at the expense of Central and Eastern Europe. Both
regions have pressing needs which must be met. Moreover, as I mentioned
above, the success or failure of the revolution in Central and Eastern
Europe will have a great influence on the success or failure of the
similar revolution in Russia and the other states of the NIS. We
cannot, therefore, allow our need to meet the historic opportunities in
Russia to detract from our need to meet the equally historic opportunity
in Central and Eastern Europe.
The nations of Central and Eastern Europe have come a long way since
1989. This progress has been brought about principally by the
aspirations, courage, and hope of these people. We can take pride in
our support of their efforts. We should continue that support, because
their success is in our interest and because it is right to do so.
Ireland
Let me now turn to our request for Ireland. The Administration is
proposing a $20 million contribution to the International Fund for
Ireland for FY 1994. U.S. support for the fund is a tangible expression
of our policy of favoring peace and reconciliation through economic
progress in Northern Ireland and along the border in the Irish Republic.
The fund is a joint project of the Governments of Ireland and the United
Kingdom, which supports projects in Northern Ireland and the six border
counties of the republic, particularly in disadvantaged areas such as
west Belfast and remote border towns. It concentrates on community
regeneration projects such as the rehabilitation of derelict facilities,
on employment creation and training, and on the encouragement of
community-based private enterprise.
The fund is highly regarded by both the Catholic and Protestant
communities in Ireland and Northern Ireland. U.S. representatives on
the ground and the U.S. observer to the fund's board of directors report
that our contribution is being used according to the intent of Congress.
Security Assistance
We have requested security assistance for 18 European countries. This
assistance is designed to enhance regional security and defense
cooperation. It comes in three forms.
-- Economic Support Funds (ESF) provide budgetary support to recipient
countries. We are requesting $143 million in ESF for Turkey and $15
million for Cyprus.
-- Foreign Military Funding (FMF) provides loans or grants for the
purchase of military equipment. We are requesting $315 million in FMF
for Greece, $450 million for Turkey, and $90 million for Portugal.
-- International Military Education and Training (IMET) promotes
democracy and human rights by emphasizing principles of civilian control
of the military in a democratic society. We have requested $15,000 each
for Austria and Finland; $65,000 for Malta; $100,000 for Romania;
$150,000 each for Albania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; $200,000 each
for Greece and Spain; $300,000 for Bulgaria; $350,000 for Slovakia;
$500,000 for the Czech Republic; $700,000 each for Poland and Hungary;
$1 million for Portugal; and $2.8 million for Turkey. I would like to
comment briefly on some of these aid requests.
Turkey
Turkey's importance for America's strategic interests in southwestern
Asia and southeastern Europe has increased in the post-Cold War era. A
look at the map shows how important Turkey is to our regional interests,
bordering as it does the Balkans, the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq, and the
Middle East.
Turkey has continued to be a reliable ally--providing, for example,
critical support during and since the Gulf war--but is among the poorest
of the countries that support our strategic goals. In the 1990s, Turkey
is continuing the policy it began a decade ago of liberalizing its
economy by implementing free-market, export-oriented policies that have
sustained the highest growth rate of all the countries of the OECD.
However, inflation and the enlarged public sector remain serious
problems, and were aggravated by Turkey's resolve in supporting the
coalition during the Gulf war. Turkey continues to enforce the
sanctions against Iraq, at great economic cost. The shut-down of a
pipeline from Iraq and the loss of Iraq as one of its principal trade
partners have sharply reduced Turkey's foreign revenues.
We recognize the importance of an improvement in Turkey's human rights
record. The Turkish Government has publicly committed itself to
strengthening parliamentary democracy and improving human rights
protections. We are working with the government to develop specific
targets and programs for meeting these commitments, and will continue to
press them vigorously and ensure that they remain aware of the high
priority we attach to improvement in the area of human rights.
The partnership through which the United States gives material and
political assistance to Turkey, and Turkey's role as a democratic
partner in regional affairs, strengthens the prospects for peace,
stability, and prosperity in an area threatened with political and
economic turmoil. Our aid request for Turkey will provide needed budget
support and will provide security assistance to help Turkey meet its
commitments to the NATO alliance.
Greece
With the end of the Cold War and the reduction of forces in Central
Europe, our security assistance programs for Greece help the United
States and NATO respond to threats to security in the more volatile
areas of southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Since taking office
in April 1990, the government of Prime Minister Mitsotakis has improved
Greek military cooperation with NATO and concluded a new Mutual Defense
Cooperation Agreement. Prime Minister Mitsotakis has also taken steps
to reduce tensions between Greece and Turkey.
Greece is one of the poorer members of the European Community, but its
defense expenditures are relatively high because of its strategic
importance. The United States has thus committed itself to assisting
Greece with its defense modernization program. This program will
enhance Greece's ability to operate with the other forces of the NATO
alliance.
Portugal
Portugal values its ties with the United States and has given strong
public support to our foreign policy initiatives. Portuguese willingness
and ability to pursue close military cooperation with us makes an
important contribution to our global strategic mobility. We are
proposing continuation of our FMF program, as pledged in 1989, to enable
Portugal to purchase 20 F-16 aircraft.
Cyprus
The United States supports the UN Secretary General's efforts to
facilitate a settlement of the dispute, and actively encourages all
parties involved to do the same. Our assistance to Cyprus is designed
to assist the parties in reaching a settlement that will be acceptable
to both Cypriot communities by promoting cooperation between the two
communities and providing opportunities for Greek and Turkish Cypriots
to develop mutual confidence through joint economic planning and
development activities. To this end, we have tried to have our ESF
funds expended for bicommunal activities to the greatest extent
practicable. In the past, we have not been wholly successful. The
representatives of the two communities who determine which projects will
be funded have frequently chosen to interpret "bicommunal" as "aid to
both communities," and too often have approved projects that do little
or nothing to bring the communities together. The President's Special
Cyprus Coordinator and embassy officials in Nicosia are working with
representatives of the two communities to increase to the maximum extent
practicable the amount of ESF being used for truly bicommunal projects.
Conclusion
I appreciate the opportunity to explain to you the thinking behind our
aid requests for FY 1994. I would be happy to answer your questions and
would welcome any comments or suggestions that you have.(###)
ARTICLE 5:
Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan
George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, May 4, 1993
Iwant to thank the members of this committee for the opportunity to
review the situation in Sudan. I am particularly grateful for the
interest members of this committee have shown in a very tragic and
difficult situation, as demonstrated by the resolution submitted by you,
Mr. Chairman, and Senators Kassebaum, Jeffords, and Feingold.
We, in the Administration, value your help in drawing attention to the
humanitarian crisis in Sudan and in seeking new ways to bring assistance
to people who are in desperate need of it. The Government of Sudan and
the rebel factions need to know that American concerns about their
behavior extend beyond the executive branch, and you have helped to make
that clear.
Sudan is a top foreign policy challenge for the Administration, because
America's values do not permit us to sit idly by while civil war rages,
human rights are systematically abused, humanitarian suffering
intensifies, and serious concerns about terrorism and regional
instability deepen.
I would like to frame my remarks to you today by first discussing the
peace negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria, and how they impact on the
humanitarian situation and our ability to respond to it, then addressing
our other policy concerns, and, finally, reviewing some options for
dealing with the Sudanese crisis.
Abuja II: Continuing Peace Negotiations
We have been following the Nigerian-sponsored peace negotiations
closely, as peace is the only long-term solution to the humanitarian
tragedy in southern Sudan. The second round of peace negotiations
between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army
(SPLA) resumed in Abuja, Nigeria, April 26.
We have repeatedly told all sides that they must bring a more serious
commitment to these talks than has been the case in the past. In recent
meetings in Nairobi, I emphasized this in the strongest terms to Dr.
Garang and to leaders of other SPLA factions. We have made clear to all
of the parties that we are willing to facilitate the peace process in
any way we can.
Humanitarian Disaster: The U.S. Response
As you've heard in recent press reports, southern Sudan has become one
of the world's worst humanitarian nightmares. The rainy season is
beginning in some parts of southern Sudan, further complicating relief
operations. You will receive a detailed report on the situation, and on
the assistance the United States is providing, from Mr. Kunder, who has
just returned from a visit to southern Sudan. But it is clear that
several hundred thousand people face death from starvation and disease
if they do not receive assistance in the coming months. In at least
some areas, people are already dying in large numbers.
War is at the very heart of this human catastrophe. Despite the various
cease-fire declarations, intra-SPLA fighting has flared up anew, once
again shutting down relief operations in a number of critical areas.
These actions demonstrate that the leaders of the rebel factions have
little regard for the welfare of their own people. Because of the
uncertain security situation, some non-governmental organizations have
been reluctant to go back into the country, and others are just resuming
fragile operations. The food pipeline for U.S. Government programs is
in good shape, but access to affected populations will remain a problem
as long as the fighting continues.
We appeal to all factions responsible for the most recent upsurge in the
fighting to end the suffering of the people caught in its midst. With
the humanitarian crisis reaching new depths, I cannot emphasize too
strongly that relief organizations must be granted access not only to
southern Sudan, but to the area known as the transition zone--south
Kurdufan, including the Nuba Mountains, and Bahr al Ghazal--as well,
where people are also in urgent need. We are prepared to examine any
proposal that might ensure the delivery of relief assistance to Sudan.
Our ambassador to Khartoum, Don Petterson, recently traveled to the
south, along with Mr. Kunder, and reiterated my message to Dr. Garang
and representatives of other SPLA factions, that it is imperative that
all fighting end in the south so that urgently needed relief assistance
can be delivered.
Other Bilateral Concerns
Let me turn for a moment from the central issue of the humanitarian
crisis to touch on several other issues in our relationship with the
Khartoum government.
I'd like to briefly summarize our principal human rights concerns with
respect to Sudan. The forced removal of Khartoum's displaced
populations has been a long-standing concern, as have the forced
relocations and systematic abuses perpetrated against people in the Nuba
Mountains. Since November 1992, thousands of these people have fled a
brutal government crackdown in the area. We have recently received
credible reports that human rights abuses are taking place throughout
the transition zone, including massacres, kidnaping and forced labor,
conscription of children, and forced displacement and arabization. Some
of the abuses may be carried out by poorly controlled militias without
the approval of the government; other abuses, however, are occurring
with a frequency and on a scale that make it difficult to believe that
they are happening without the knowledge and tacit complicity of the
government. Arbitrary detention, torture, repression of the press, and
restrictions on labor unions are routinely used by the government to
suppress dissent.
As we have consistently stressed to the government, its Islamic
orientation is not at issue. Our objection, rather, is to a state-
sponsored effort to impose a specific religion and religious law, and to
use religious criteria as a standard for higher education and government
positions. These policies result in the violation of basic human
rights. There are reports that Christian charities, even indigenous
ones, are denied access to some areas of the country, while Islamic
charities operate freely. We are especially disturbed about reports of
pressures for conversion exerted in camps of the displaced in return for
food, clothing, and education for destitute children.
As we have reported to you before, we continue to watch Sudan closely in
connection with our worldwide efforts to combat terrorism. Khartoum
harbors known terrorists and terrorist groups, including Hizballah,
Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It maintains close ties to
Libya and Iraq, which it tacitly supported during the Gulf war, and
especially to Iran. We are now reviewing the situation closely and will
make the determination soon on whether to designate Sudan a state
sponsor of terrorism based on the facts and the law.
Diplomatic Actions
We are also working hard, and with some success, to maintain
international pressure on Khartoum in order to moderate the regime's
human rights behavior. A resolution, which we sponsored at the UN
General Assembly in December, called attention to Sudan's human rights
record and its unproductive approach to the humanitarian needs of its
own population. The United States has successfully prompted a UN Human
Rights Commission resolution appointing a special rapporteur to examine
alleged abuses in Sudan.
Aside from these successful efforts within the UN system, we have
pursued bilateral approaches to engage our allies in focusing
international concern on the situation in Sudan. One focus of this
effort has been on diplomatic efforts to discourage shipments of arms to
Sudan. For our own part, we have formalized a policy of disapproving
all license applications for military-related exports to Sudan and have
asked our allies to do the same. Further, we have urged our donor
partners to follow our lead in suspending non-humanitarian development
assistance to Sudan.
There is some indication that these measures have begun to bring home to
the government of Khartoum that internationally unacceptable behavior
has economic and political consequences. A dialogue with the government
on human rights and other issues continues, and we hope that this
dialogue will encourage additional constructive moves by Khartoum. We
have heard that the Government of Sudan has approved the resumption of
International Committee of the Red Cross activities in the country.
This is welcome news. At the same time, I am increasingly concerned
that intra-SPLA fighting is becoming as much an obstacle to peace as the
standoff between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA.
Next Steps
In order to address the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, I am convinced we
must, in concert with the world community, find ways to pressure all
involved to negotiate seriously. When I was in Europe late last month,
I consulted with our allies on what we can do in Sudan. There was
general agreement that increased UN involvement in the peace process,
and in humanitarian efforts, is necessary. Our ambassador to the United
Nations, Madeleine Albright, took the initiative in New York by going to
the PERM-5 to push for a higher profile role for the United Nations and
to galvanize coordinated international action.
Again, as we continue to focus on the situation in Sudan, you can play a
critical role. Your resolution of April 3 sends a strong message to
Khartoum. By publicly demonstrating interest and concern, the Congress
can continue to play an important role.
The Administration looks forward to continued close contact with this
committee as our Sudan policy evolves.(###)
ARTICLE 6:
U.S. Recognition of Angolan Government
Statement by President Clinton, Washington, DC, May 19, 1993.
Today I am pleased to announce the United States' recognition of the
Government of Angola. This decision reflects the high priority that our
Administration places on democracy.
In 1992, after years of bitter civil war, the people of Angola held a
multi-party election that the United States, the United Nations, and
others monitored and considered free and fair. Since taking office on
January 20, I have tried to use the possibility of U.S. recognition as a
leverage toward promoting an end to the civil war and hostilities and,
hopefully, the participation of all relevant political groups in the
Government of Angola.
Sadly, the party that lost the election, UNITA, resumed the fighting
before the electoral process could even be completed. And UNITA has now
refused to sign the peace agreement currently on the table. The Angolan
Government, by contrast, has agreed to sign that peace agreement, has
sworn in a democratically elected national assembly, and has offered
participation by UNITA at all levels of government.
Today we recognize those achievements by recognizing the Government of
the Republic of Angola. It is my hope that UNITA will accept a
negotiated settlement and that it will be part of this government. I
intend to continue working closely with the Government of Angola and
with UNITA to achieve a lasting peace settlement and a vibrant democracy
there. I hope the efforts of the United States have been helpful. I am
confident that the Government of Angola has more than earned the
recognition that the United States extends today.(###)
ARTICLE 7:
Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Defining Issues and Producing Common Ground
Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs
Opening remarks at press briefing, Washington, DC, May 13, 1993
Over the last 3 weeks, all the negotiating tracks have demonstrated a
deeper discussion of substance and intense engagement. Consistent with
these efforts by the parties, the United States has stepped up its full-
partner role and has worked actively and productively with the parties
to define issues and help produce common ground.
In the Israeli-Palestinian track, important developments occurred.
(1) The two sides formed working groups on land and water, on the
concept of interim arrangements, and a working group on human rights.
(2) The two sides exchanged substantive drafts of a declaration of
principles. These drafts were extensive in scope and addressed issues
such as elections, interim self-government arrangements, and security.
This work provides an important basis, in our view, for future progress.
(3) The two sides subsequently agreed to engage seriously on a United
States draft for a joint statement incorporating substantive elements of
both other drafts.
Both parties went beyond simply articulating principles. We saw the
evolution of positions and the beginning of the emergence of common
elements and their stands on key issues.
Although the Palestinians were dissatisfied with the lack of
improvements on the ground and the West Bank and Gaza and reduced the
size of their delegation and opted not to attend the working groups for
the last few days, they did and have remained engaged.
In this regard, playing the role of full partner as described by
President Clinton and Secretary Christopher, the United States called a
trilateral United States-Israeli-Palestinian meeting yesterday evening
in order to help the parties with their efforts.
Although the Palestinians did not come to this meeting, the United
States shared with Israel and with the Palestinians a paper reflecting
elements drawn from the Israeli and Palestinian papers which could, in
our view, make up a joint statement.
We discussed the U.S. paper in detail yesterday and today with both
Israel and the Palestinians and will continue to do so. Our tabling of
this paper was designed to capture the substantive progress that the
sides had made during the last 3 weeks and help guide them toward areas
that need to be discussed further.
In the Syrian-Israeli track, the parties continued to address the core
issues of withdrawal, peace, and security. They reviewed texts, engaged
in detailed discussion of their positions, and addressed important
concepts such as simultaneity. I would add that the United States has
also been deeply involved with Syria and Israel in an effort to help
them move forward on the core issues.
In the Jordanian-Israeli track, the parties established working groups
to discuss the key issues of importance to both sides. The working
groups have addressed substantive issues such as water, the environment
and energy, economics and tourism, and refugees and displaced persons.
In the Lebanon-Israeli track, for the first time we have substantive
written proposals submitted by both sides now which address key issues
in the negotiations. The delegations have begun the serious work of
explaining and exchanging assessments on their respective documents.
The parties will be adjourning their discussions today, and we are
discussing reconvening in June after the Jewish and Muslim holidays. We
will be continuing to work with the parties during the intervening
period. We have continued to work closely and cooperatively with our
fellow co-sponsor, Russia, in our common efforts to move the negotiating
process forward.
As I have said, the negotiations on all the tracks have taken on a
significantly different and more intense character, and the United
States intends to work with the parties as a full partner as they engage
more deeply on the tough issues. Secretary Christopher, as you know,
met with all the delegation heads at the beginning of this session and
was actively involved throughout the talks with some of the parties and
in instructing the U.S. peace team.
We will continue to play our role as full partners as effectively as we
can, but the parties must also do their part. We will be there to help
them in the important task of making peace, but we cannot do it for
them. It is up to the parties to show the necessary flexibility,
creativity, and commitment to success required to achieve progress.(###)
ARTICLE 8:
North African Countries: U.S. Relations and Assistance
Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Washington, DC, May 12, 1993
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to be with you today to discuss
U.S. relations with the countries of North Africa and our foreign
assistance programs in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.
Like so much of the developing world these days, the Maghreb is a region
being buffeted by the winds of change. There is a growing popular
demand for greater political participation, for economic opportunity,
and for social justice. The countries of the Maghreb are responding in
different ways to these trends, which in some cases involve political,
economic, social, and even violent challenges to the governments
involved.
Secretary Christopher has made clear that the promotion of democracy and
respect for human rights form one of the major pillars of the Clinton
Administration's foreign policy. Our policy toward the countries of the
Maghreb strongly reflects that reality.
It also, Mr. Chairman, reflects the reality that the Maghreb is today on
the cutting edge of a phenomenon affecting much of the Middle East--a
phenomenon known as political Islam. I would like to start my
presentation with a few words on that important subject.
Political Islam
Experience suggests that political Islamic movements are, to an
important degree, rooted in worsening socioeconomic conditions in
individual countries. While political Islam takes many forms and varies
considerably in its goals from one country to another, our approach to
the phenomenon can be outlined in a few basic points reiterated by
Secretary Christopher last month.
First, Islam, one of the world's great religions, is not our enemy.
Second, what we do oppose is extremism and fanaticism, whether of a
religious or secular nature. We part company with those who preach
intolerance, abuse human rights, or resort to violence in pursuit of
their political goals.
And, third, while we cannot impose our own form of government on others,
we strongly support those who share and seek to encourage democratic
values in their own countries.
As the Secretary said, Mr. Chairman, "the United States stands ready to
work with our friends in the region toward the important goals of peace,
stability, and social justice." In the Maghreb, our efforts can make a
difference. From the perspective of our worldwide policy goals of
encouraging democracy, fostering respect for human rights, and
facilitating free market reforms, the picture in North Africa is a mixed
one. There have been both notable successes and serious
disappointments.
Algeria
Not long ago, many pointed to Algeria as a potential model of
democratization and economic reform in the Arab world. Unfortunately,
Algeria's move toward a more open political system and market economy
was suspended in January 1992, and efforts to get back on track have
been eclipsed by internal divisions--largely between the regime and the
Islamic Salvation Front-- violence, and economic stagnation.
Although some outside forces may seek to exploit Algeria's instability,
we are convinced that the current situation in Algeria has its roots in
the frustration of a populace whose basic aspirations remain unmet. We
continue to believe that structural political and economic reforms are
necessary to satisfy the pressing needs of the Algerian people. All
Algerians, and particularly the many young unemployed and underemployed,
need to be given a chance for a better future. Disaffected elements of
the populace need to be incorporated in a political dialogue as part of
a process to chart a new course for Algeria.
Since the suspension of parliamentary elections, little progress has
been made in restoring the democratic process and correcting the
disturbing deterioration in the human rights situation. The current
Algerian Government has affirmed repeatedly its intention to have
meaningful political dialogue and institute needed economic reforms. It
has had intermittent dialogue with some political parties and social and
professional groups. It has also stated that resumption of the
electoral process is an important goal for the future. In a recent
speech, Algerian President Ali Kafi reaffirmed his government's
determination to hold a nationwide referendum by the end of the year on
yet-to-be-defined constitutional changes. Frankly, so far we have seen
little in the way of action or specificity as to how the government
plans to implement real political and economic reform.
Let me be clear: The United States Government in no way condones
violence or political extremism from any quarter or under any guise, be
it religious or secular. We deplore the continuing assassinations of
Algerian Government officials and members of the security forces by
those in opposition to the government. We also deplore attempts to
justify such violence. At the same time, we do not believe that
Algeria's problems can be resolved mainly through resort to security
methods, while political, economic, and social questions are not
addressed. In our contacts with the Algerian Government, we urge a
measured approach to security, one which focuses on those guilty of
violence but avoids wide-scale repression or renewed incommunicado
detention.
The Government of Algeria has stated that it is committed to
democratization, privatization of the economy, and human rights. We
are prepared to do what we can to assist Algerian leaders to realize
this commitment. But we cannot help but recognize gaps between official
goals and practice. Privatization should be pursued seriously and with
governmental support.
The U.S. strongly supports freedom of the press and is thus concerned
about the restrictions placed on the press and the pressure which has
been brought to bear against individual journalists. Such actions
undermine the democratic process in Algeria and inhibit political
dialogue. We also are disturbed by reports from independent human
rights organizations alleging the widespread use of torture, and we urge
the Algerian Government to allow a full-scale investigation into these
allegations.
We have no bilateral aid program with Algeria. We have a very small--
$150,000 per year--International Military Education and Training
Program. This program is administered under the terms of "expanded
IMET," which is primarily designed to enhance democratization and
respect for human rights in both the civilian and military sectors. We
believe that this program has been and can continue to be an effective,
if small, tool for influencing the outlook of Algeria's current and
future military leadership and thus the policies of Algeria's government
as a whole.
Tunisia
Tunisia provides a case study of the positive results of free market
economic reforms. Tunisia's forward-looking, market-oriented economic
reforms have earned praise from the international financial community.
They have paid off in a remarkable 8.6% growth rate in 1992. We
encourage Tunisia to continue to pursue its economic liberalization
because we believe that the only way to build long-lasting, meaningful
development--and to preempt those with an extremist agenda--is on the
solid foundation of a strong market-based economy.
Our modest foreign assistance program in Tunisia has been designed to
complement Tunisia's market-oriented reforms. USAID projects are
targeted at private sector revitalization and addressing housing and
urban development problems. Our military assistance and training
programs have allowed Tunisia to maintain U.S.-origin equipment, support
joint military exercises, and deter aggression in a hostile
neighborhood. Our assistance programs can sometimes show immediate,
tangible benefits. Recently, U.S. military training and equipment laid
the basis for Tunisia's decision to send troops to join UNITAF forces in
Somalia. In fact, the U.S. airlift of Tunisian forces to Somalia was
planned by Tunisian officers trained in the U.S.
For many years, Tunisia has been a regional leader in its progressive
approach toward women. The high literacy rate of Tunisian women and a
correspondingly low birth rate have helped save Tunisia from the severe
overpopulation and unemployment problems which today confront many
developing countries.
As elections in Tunisia approach in 1994, we hope that gains comparable
to Tunisia's impressive economic progress can be made in broadening the
scope of participation in the political scene, which currently is
monopolized by the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally Party. The
government's efforts to foster a healthy opposition are encouraging.
Ultimately, a free and open political system needs to find a way to
answer the aspirations and represent the views of the diverse segments
of the population.
While we acknowledge Tunisia's concerns about violence, we are seriously
concerned that, in the name of internal security, Tunisia has dealt too
harshly with some of its political opponents. Tunisia's human rights
record has been marred by credible claims of torture and incommunicado
detention which surfaced during last year's trials of hundreds of
Islamists. Tunisia has taken the first step by acknowledging that
abuses have occurred. We urge the government to prosecute those
responsible and put an end to such abuse once and for all.
We support the government's efforts to improve the training of security
personnel and to heighten awareness of the rights of individuals. We
hope these efforts will continue and be supplemented by a greater
willingness on the part of the government to tolerate public debate and
differences of opinion.
Morocco
I would now like to turn to Morocco, a country that we have long relied
on as a constructive, moderate force in the region. Our relationship
with Morocco is close and multifaceted. Since it is a current member of
the UN Security Council, Morocco's cooperation has been important
recently on the many crucial matters before the Council, from Bosnia to
the status of Palestinian deportees.
Under the leadership of King Hassan II, Morocco has embarked on a
program of economic and political reform. In the economic realm, the
Moroccan Government is moving to expand the private sector and encourage
foreign investment and market forces. We endorse this effort, and much
of our economic assistance program is designed to encourage further
structural economic reform, privatization, and improvements in the
quality of life for the Moroccan people. I might also add that Morocco
is the only other Arab country besides Egypt which is working with
Israel in a regional cooperation program.
Concerning human rights, the Moroccan Government has made some progress.
But we see a number of areas where further progress is needed. For
example, credible reports of torture, restrictions on freedoms of speech
and press, corruption, and the lack of access to fair trial in some
cases remain matters of serious concern. We believe that Moroccan
military forces in Equatorial Guinea--which are propping up an
extraordinarily abusive regime--should be withdrawn, and we have been
given assurances that this will occur. In the area of democratization,
King Hassan has firmly stated a commitment to political reform. The
fairness of Moroccan parliamentary elections scheduled for June 25 will
be an important indicator of the seriousness of that commitment, and we
welcome the Moroccan Government's invitation to have American non-
governmental organizations observe those elections.
The U.S. and Morocco have had a long history of close and productive
cooperation on key regional issues, such as the Arab-Israeli peace
process, and in international security. The bulk of our military
assistance now does not go for the acquisition of new weapons but for
the maintenance of existing U.S.-origin equipment and weaponry in the
Moroccan inventory. Our International Military Education and Training
program provides valuable training to the Moroccan military, serving to
enhance its professionalism and technical expertise. Moroccan
eligibility for excess U.S. defense equipment under the Southern Region
Amendment is also important for Morocco's long-term force modernization.
Military cooperation with Morocco is not a one-way street. The U.S.
benefits from having a stable friend at the strategic western end of the
Mediterranean. The Moroccans have shown a willingness to commit forces
on behalf of shared interests; during Operation Desert Storm, for
example, they deployed troops to assist in Saudi Arabia's defense.
Morocco also was the first Arab country to offer to contribute forces to
the UN operation in Somalia. U.S. forces enjoy access to Moroccan
facilities under a 1982 transit and access agreement and also benefit
from regular joint training exercises.
Western Sahara
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to bring you up to
date on the situation in the Western Sahara. As you and your colleagues
are aware, the United States has, since 1989, supported efforts by the
UN Secretary General to organize a referendum on the status of that
territory as the best hope for ending the long conflict over its
sovereignty.
On March 2 of this year, the U.S. joined other members of the Security
Council in passing UN Security Council Resolution 809, which has given
new impetus to this effort. The resolution instructed the Secretary
General to intensify his work to overcome differences between Morocco
and the POLISARIO on the modalities of a referendum, the most important
of which have to do with criteria for eligibility of participants. The
resolution specified that the Secretary General should proceed with a
view to holding the referendum by the end of this year but did not set a
date for a referendum. The resolution requested that the Secretary
General make an interim report to the council this month.
The United States considers Resolution 809 an important step toward
resolution of the Western Sahara conflict and has been actively engaged
since its passage in supporting the efforts of the Secretary General.
We have stressed to each of the parties involved--Morocco, the
POLISARIO, and Algeria--the importance of seizing the opportunity
provided by the resolution. To each, we have made clear our view that a
better opportunity for a fair, viable, and lasting settlement is not
likely to arise if the current UN effort fails. And we have pointed out
the growing impatience of some Security Council members, who already
advocate abandonment of the UN effort, including withdrawal of UN
personnel from the Western Sahara should it prove impossible to organize
an early referendum.
In short, we believe this is a time for the parties to make hard
decisions on the Western Sahara. We do not believe refusal to engage
seriously with the Secretary General should be rewarded. It is our hope
that the parties will show the political intent, flexibility, and
creativity necessary to enable the Secretary General to organize and
carry out a referendum this year which will allow the people of the
Western Sahara freely and fairly to express their will. We will do
everything we can to contribute to his success and to have this issue
resolved equitably and peacefully.
Libya
I would like to close my presentation, Mr. Chairman, with a discussion
of what remains for us one of the most troubling concerns in North
Africa. For more than a year, Libya has flagrantly defied the
international community by refusing to comply with United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748. In those resolutions, the
Security Council took a historic decision to signal the world that it
would no longer tolerate state sponsorship of terrorism. U.S. policy
remains clear: There can be no resolution of this issue until Libya
fully complies with the demands of the international community.
It is in this context, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to mention a
curious and disturbing phenomenon. In recent months, we have been
deluged by intermediaries urged by Libya to seek to negotiate a
resolution of Libya's problems short of compliance with the United
Nations mandate. Our response in each case has been clear: The U.S.
Government does not work through intermediaries on this matter. If
Libya is truly serious about resolving its problems with the
international community, it needs to comply with the United Nations
Security Council--and to do so quickly before it becomes necessary to
seek and impose tougher sanctions.
That concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I will now be
pleased to answer your questions.(###)
ARTICLE 9:
East Asia and the Pacific: U.S. Policy and Assistance
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, May 6, 1993
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Leach, members of the subcommittee: I welcome this
opportunity to appear before this committee and share with you my ideas
concerning the direction of United States policy toward East Asia and
the Pacific and how our modest economic and security assistance programs
contribute to achieving our goals. During my confirmation process, I
made a personal pledge to maintain regular consultations with this
committee, its members, and your staffs. I respect the integral role
that you must play in our foreign policy toward the region. These
hearings reflect the first of many steps in our common journey. As this
is my first appearance before this committee as assistant secretary, I
would like to outline some of the broader context for the issues we are
discussing here today.
First, the importance of the region: As I noted in my March 31
confirmation hearing statement, there is no region in the world today
that is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific.
Looking ahead to the 21st century, no region will be as important. The
region contains the world's fastest-growing and most dynamic economies.
It is the world's largest consumer market and our biggest export market.
Last year, our exports were worth more than $120 billion and accounted
for 2.3 million American jobs. Forty percent of U.S. trade is with the
region, more than half again as large as with Western Europe. The
economic vigor of the United States increasingly is dependent on global
economic health and development. President Clinton has declared our
domestic economic renewal as his highest priority. And no region of the
world is more crucial in this regard than Asia and the Pacific.
We continue to have abiding security interests in Asia. In this post-
Cold War period, with the closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines, we
have detected some concern in the region that the United States may be
losing interest in Asia. It is important for our national interests to
demonstrate--not only by reassuring words but by concrete actions--that
the U.S. intends to remain firmly engaged in Asia and the Pacific
economically, politically, and in a positive security role. We will
maintain the foundations of our five mutual security agreements--with
Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand--and a
substantial military presence. We are prepared with others to explore
through dialogue and consultations new Asia-Pacific paths toward
security.
Goals for American Policy in Asia
In my confirmation hearing, I outlined 10 major goals for American
policy in Asia and the Pacific. Permit me to reiterate them briefly:
-- Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more
mature balance of responsibilities;
-- Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation
on the Korean Peninsula;
-- Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China where
political openness catches up with economic reform;
-- Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and
scope;
-- Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing-in-action
as we normalize our relations with Vietnam;
-- Securing a peaceful, independent, and democratic Cambodia;
-- Strengthening APEC as the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific economic
cooperation;
-- Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while
maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances;
-- Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the
environment, refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation, and arms
sales;
-- Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to
flower.
Achieving these objectives will be a challenge but one which, with your
support, we relish. We will use a variety of means to pursue them,
tailored to the individual situation. One important foreign policy
instrument for achieving these goals remains our modest economic and
security assistance programs in Asia and the Pacific.
U.S. Assistance to Asia and the Pacific
In a very real sense, Mr. Chairman, the Asia-Pacific region has been a
major success story for the U.S. foreign aid program. Many of the
countries of the region which once received substantial U.S. assistance
have long since graduated from the ranks of aid recipients. Some, such
as Japan and Korea, are today major contributors themselves of
international economic and humanitarian assistance.
The economic success of many of the countries of Asia is attributable in
part to carefully targeted U.S. economic assistance, buttressed in some
instances by specific security assistance. The U.S. forward-deployed
military presence contributed significantly to the Asian economic boom
by providing the stability essential for economic development. The
success of our Asian assistance program is perhaps best demonstrated by
the fact that our overall assistance to the region has been reduced
significantly and [that] some former aid recipients now challenge us
vigorously in the global marketplace.
As a result of such progress and mindful of the need to set rigorous
budget priorities, over the past 5 years, U.S. assistance to East Asia
and the Pacific has been reduced from approximately $680 million in FY
1988 to approximately $268 million in FY 1993. These figures include
ESF, FMF, IMET, and development assistance. During this period, the
region's share of the security assistance budget fell by half, from
approximately 3.7% of the global program to approximately 1.7%. Its
portion of the development assistance budget was also halved, from
approximately 15% to 7% of the global total.
But even given these reductions, if the region has been so successful
economically, how can we justify continuing to provide any economic and
security assistance to countries in Asia and the Pacific, at a time when
some American taxpayers are hard-pressed to meet their own families'
needs, budgets are tight, and President Clinton has declared the
economic renewal of the United States as his highest priority? Why does
this area of economic dynamism continue to need our assistance?
The answer, Mr. Chairman, is that while the outline I sketched of Asia's
remarkable economic dynamism is accurate, that dynamism is not uniform
throughout the region. There remain some countries which, while making
progress, continue to need carefully targeted assistance to enhance
their own efforts. Our modest program of development assistance and,
in some instances, of economic support funds, is directed to those
particular situations.
In addition, our small IMET program (slightly more than $5 million in FY
1993) enhances our interaction with armed forces in the region and
serves not only our long-term security interests but, by increasing
exposure of foreign armed forces personnel to U.S. concepts concerning
civilian control of the military and humane behavior, supports our goal
of furthering democratization and increasing respect for human rights.
Overall, while recognizing the need for austerity at a time of severe
budget pressures, the Administration believes that the modest programs
we have for selected countries and purposes in Asia and the Pacific are
a sound investment for the United States.
Assistance Programs
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues from the Agency for International
Development and the Department of Defense have detailed presentations
concerning the specifics of our assistance programs. I will highlight
briefly just a few of our ongoing assistance efforts for you.
Cambodia. One of the most complex and central tasks for our Asian
policy is to help provide the long-suffering Cambodian people with a
brighter future. Our long-term goals in Cambodia are to help the
Cambodians attain peace, democracy, and development after more than two
decades of war and suffering caused by the genocidal regime of the Khmer
Rouge and the Vietnamese occupation. The United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia--UNTAC--has been laboring for more than a year to
implement the Paris accords on Cambodia aimed at achieving those goals.
We have provided approximately $200 million in assistance since 1986 to
meet pressing humanitarian needs throughout Cambodia and to promote the
growth of democratic and free market institutions. We are now also
providing development assistance to help Cambodians rebuild their
country. In addition, our assessed contribution to the UN peace-keeping
mission in Cambodia will total more than $500 million.
Despite the non-cooperation and, at times, the violence of the Khmer
Rouge faction, UNTAC has recorded some impressive achievements. Some
360,000 Cambodian refugees have been repatriated. Over 500 kilometers
of roads were de-mined and repaired last year alone. Over 95% of the
eligible voters have been registered for the elections scheduled to be
held from May 23-28. Twenty political parties have registered to
participate in the elections. We expect to see the newly elected
assembly draft a new Cambodian constitution and form a new government no
later than 3 months after the elections, at which point the mandate of
UNTAC will end.
Our commitment to Cambodia, however, will not end at that time. The
future, elected Cambodian government will be hard-pressed to deal with
Cambodia's enormous economic and social problems and, most probably,
Khmer Rouge intransigence. In Tokyo in June 1992, the international
community, including the United States, pledged it will provide urgently
needed assistance to the fledgling government to help it
institutionalize the democracy which the UN-assisted elections are
intended to implant in Cambodia's troubled soil.
We are concerned by recent acts of disruption and violence, primarily by
the Khmer Rouge, which threaten to harm the election process. Working
with others, we are trying to check this violence and help ensure a free
and credible election. Even more is at stake in Cambodia than the fate
of that country and regional security. Given the UNTAC deployment--the
largest peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations--we
face a crucial test of multilateral peace-keeping by the international
community. We must not fail.
The Philippines. When the United States had military bases in the
Philippines, that country was among the top recipients of U.S.
assistance worldwide. With the closure of the bases, the end of the
Cold War, and additional U.S. budget constraints, assistance to the
Philippines was reduced greatly.
But the Philippines remains a treaty ally struggling to fulfill
democratic aspirations and develop economically in the face of daunting
challenges, including continued insurgencies, both communist and Muslim
separatist, and frequent major natural disasters. Our traditional ties
with the Philippines remain strong. The democratically elected
Philippine President is continuing to implement needed economic reforms.
Continued U.S. assistance--developmental as well as security-related,
including an IMET program--is essential. We must help the Philippines
successfully consolidate its fragile democratic institutions and
continue to execute the economic reform program directed at putting the
Philippines' economy on a sustainable growth path.
An important engine of Philippine economic and social development has
been the Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI). Initiated in 1989
with strong backing--indeed, inspiration--from the United States
Congress, the MAI has been the rallying point for developed nation
support of the Philippines. In 1989, the United States pledged best
efforts to contribute $1 billion to the MAI over 5 years. Our bilateral
contributions total $438.5 million through FY 1993. I urge the Congress
to continue to support U.S. contributions to the MAI.
Mongolia. United States assistance to Mongolia reflects U.S. support
for emerging democratic and market-oriented nations around the world.
In 1990, Mongolia broke from the Soviet orbit and threw off communism.
Since then, Mongolia's Government and its people have proven their
commitment to democracy and a market economy. Despite the difficult
transition, the government continues along the path of reform.
Mongolia is sandwiched between Russia and China--two giants engaged in
their own processes of reform. A prosperous, market-oriented,
democratic Mongolia will have a positive effect across its borders. A
successful transition to democracy and a market economy in Mongolia will
provide a positive example for other countries struggling to overcome
decades of political subjugation and economic mismanagement. Continued
U.S. support--humanitarian, technical, and a modest IMET program--
provides tangible proof that the U.S. matches its pro-reform words with
concrete deeds for countries which accept the democratic challenge.
The South Pacific. Far to the south of Mongolia, the island countries
of the South Pacific are pursuing market-oriented policies as they
attempt to develop their promising resources and improve the well-being
of their peoples. USAID's regional development office in Fiji and a
branch office in Papua New Guinea are working with 10 of the Pacific
Island countries in a variety of programs to help meet these challenges,
the details of which my USAID colleague has provided in his statement.
I would note, however, that the Commerce and State Departments are
working to establish the U.S.-Pacific Island Joint Commercial
Commission, which will help facilitate the region's development.
In addition, USAID administers project support under the South Pacific
Fisheries Treaty, which was concluded between the U.S. and Pacific
Island countries in 1987. This treaty guarantees continued access by
the U.S. fishing fleet to large portions of the South Pacific, which
harbors two-thirds of the world's tuna resources. The economic
assistance provided under the treaty helps to strengthen the region's
self-sufficiency and provides a sound basis for further democratization.
The treaty has been highly successful and encourages cooperation among
member countries and better coordination of marine resources and other
policies.
IMET Programs. I would like to underscore the important role that our
modest IMET program--slightly more than $5 million in FY 1993--plays in
the region.
This Administration is strongly committed to democratic development and
increased respect for human rights. While East Asia and the Pacific now
contain some of the world's fastest-growing economies, the region also
has a number of developing democracies, some with historical legacies of
extensive military involvement in the political process. IMET programs
are designed specifically to bring foreign military and civilian
government leaders to the United States for military training, during
which they experience the American way of life. Over the last 5 years
alone, we have brought over 4,800 military and civilian government
officials to the U.S. from East Asian and Pacific countries under the
IMET program.
In the U.S., IMET students are exposed to U.S. democratic values,
respect for human rights, belief in the rule of law, and the way in
which the U.S. military functions under civilian control. IMET students
develop mutually beneficial professional relationships with American
military personnel. In a period when we are seeking to broaden our
relations with the armed forces in the region, to increase joint
exercises, and to enhance our access to service facilities for our
forward-deployed forces, IMET is a valuable resource. In the case of
the Philippines, the closing of U.S. bases makes IMET almost the sole
means of building relationships with the younger generation of
Philippine military leaders. In the more affluent countries of Asia and
the Pacific--Singapore and Korea, for example--IMET is the only U.S.
assistance program we have.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think all of us can take satisfaction in
the returns which our small foreign assistance investment in East Asia
and the Pacific is providing to the U.S. economy, to our commitment to
democratic values and human rights, and to support for the continued
U.S. military presence in East Asia. In addition, individual
development assistance programs in Asia also address some of the
critical global issues, such as environmental degradation, the AIDS
scourge, population pressures, and narcotics.
In my confirmation statement, I stated that:
Today a Pacific community is a vision. Tomorrow it can become a
reality. . . . This generation of Americans owes it to the labors of
those who came before us, and the hopes of our successors, to help build
a new Pacific community.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the resources that this committee
authorizes are important both for the successes which I have outlined
above and for our hopes for a more democratic, peaceful, and prosperous
Pacific community. I pledge to you my personal commitment and energy to
help move toward that goal.(###)
ARTICLE 10:
UN Security Council Resolution 825 On the North Korean Nuclear Issue
Resolution 825
(May 11, 1993)
The Security Council,
Having considered with concern the letter from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) dated 12
March 1993 addressed to the President of the Council (S/25405)
concerning the intention of the Government of the DPRK to withdraw from
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty) and
the report of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) (S/25556),
Recalling the Security Council presidential statement of 8 April 1993
(S/25562) in which the members of the Council welcome all efforts aimed
at resolving this situation and, in particular, encourage the IAEA to
continue its consultations with the DPRK for proper settlement of the
nuclear verification issue in the DPRK,
Noting in that context the critical importance of the Treaty, and
emphasizing the integral role of IAEA safeguards in the implementation
of the Treaty and in ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and
reaffirming the crucial contribution which progress in non-proliferation
can make to the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling the Joint Declaration by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea
(ROK) on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which includes
establishment of a credible and effective bilateral inspection regime
and a pledge not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment
facilities,
Noting that the DPRK is party to the Treaty and has concluded a full-
scope safeguards agreement as required by that Treaty,
Having also considered with regret the IAEA Board of Governors' findings
contained in its resolution of 1 April 1993 that the DPRK is in non-
compliance with its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement
(INFCIRC/403), and that the IAEA is not able to verify that there has
been no diversion of nuclear materials required to be safeguarded under
the terms of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices,
Noting the 1 April 1993 statement by the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States, depositories of the Treaty (S/25515),
which questions whether the DPRK's stated reasons for withdrawing from
the Treaty constitute extraordinary events relating to the subject-
matter of the Treaty,
Noting the letter of reply by the DPRK to the Director-General of the
IAEA dated 22 April 1993 which, inter alia, encourages and urges the
Director-General to hold consultations with the DPRK on the
implementation of the safeguards agreement, noting also that the DPRK
has expressed its willingness to seek a negotiated solution to this
issue,
Welcoming recent signs of improved cooperation between the DPRK and the
IAEA and the prospect of contacts between the DPRK and other Member
States,
1. Calls upon the DPRK to reconsider the announcement contained in the
letter of 12 March 1993 and thus to reaffirm its commitment to the
Treaty;
2. Further calls upon the DPRK to honour its non-proliferation
obligations under the Treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement
with the IAEA as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of
25 February 1993;
3. Requests the Director-General of the IAEA to continue to consult
with the DPRK with a view to resolving the issues which are the subject
of the Board of Governors' findings and to report to the Security
Council on his efforts in due time;
4. Urges all Member States to encourage the DPRK to respond positively
to this resolution, and encourages them to facilitate a solution;
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further
Security Council action if necessary.
VOTE: 13-0-2 (China, Pakistan abstaining).(###)
ARTICLE 11:
Statement at Confirmation Hearing
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary-designate for Inter-American
Affairs
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC,
May 5, 1993
I am honored to be nominated by President Clinton to serve as Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. I appreciate this
opportunity to discuss Latin American and Caribbean affairs with members
of the committee and to respond to your questions.
I am particularly fortunate to be nominated for this post at this
historical juncture when, as Secretary Christopher has said, there is an
unprecedented "convergence of goals and values among all the people of
the Americas." We have today an opportunity to work together with our
neighbors in this hemisphere, inspired by common values, to strengthen
relations and achieve a wide range of benefits for all our peoples.
Fortunately, representative democracy is now the norm in this region.
But elections alone do not guarantee that all citizens are fully
enfranchised, have recourse to fair and effective systems of justice, or
have a government capable of meeting needs and guaranteeing basic
rights.
By the same token, the countries of the region are recognizing the
enormous potential of liberal, market economics to generate economic
growth, investment, and employment. But sound macroeconomic policies
alone do not guarantee that a society will work effectively to lift
people out of poverty, or to create equal opportunity for all citizens.
I believe the United States should cooperate in efforts to extend the
benefits of democracy and sustainable economic growth as broadly and as
deeply as possible in this hemisphere, as President Clinton intends to
do at home.
President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have made a clear decision
to engage actively on the full range of issues confronting the Americas.
I would like to discuss these issues briefly, making reference to the
three pillars of President Clinton's foreign policy: building American
prosperity, promoting democracy, and defending American security.
Building American Prosperity
First, economics. This is the area where a strong relationship with
Latin America and the Caribbean offers the clearest, most tangible
mutual benefits.
Latin and Caribbean reformers are adopting market-oriented economic
policies, and their economies are growing as a result. In 1991 and
1992, for the first time in a decade, the region's economic growth
outpaced population growth.
These governments' unilateral moves to drop trade barriers and cut
tariffs have led to a boom in regional trade. This hemisphere has
become our fastest-growing export market. Last year, our exports grew
19%, from $63 billion to $76 billion, creating an estimated 240,000 new
jobs in this country. As our neighbors' incomes continue to grow, so
will their demand for our exports.
Our challenge is to build upon this shared prosperity so that economies
of the hemisphere will enjoy strong economic growth which is
environmentally sound and treats labor fairly. As you know, President
Clinton is working aggressively to open markets to our goods worldwide.
He is committed to working with the Congress to achieve approval of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, and to seeing it enter into force
on January 1, 1994. If confirmed, I would look forward to contributing
to this accomplishment.
The President has also made special mention of this hemisphere as a
region where we will work, after the North American Free Trade Agreement
is completed, to reach further agreements with democratic countries
which are succeeding at economic reform.
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, launched in 1990 with
bipartisan support, provides a solid policy foundation to expand trade
and investment, and to alleviate debt burdens in the hemisphere. This
initiative was very well received in the region. Its essential elements
are continuing in this Administration, and if confirmed, I would work to
build on them.
Promoting Democracy
President Clinton's second foreign policy pillar--strengthening
democracy--is of vital importance in Latin America and the Caribbean,
which has made dramatic progress is this regard.
Citizens and political leaders throughout the region have understood
that only open and democratic societies have the resiliency and capacity
to draw on the talents and energies of their people to confront the
challenges of this age. For them as for us, democracy and human rights
are more than moral imperatives which fulfill our vision of a free and
just society--they are practical necessities.
Strengthening democracy means first and foremost bolstering the public
and private institutions which defend human rights, engage citizens in
the political process, and promote justice and social equity. If
confirmed, I would use our foreign assistance, working with public and
private organizations throughout this hemisphere, to strengthen these
vital institutions.
I know first-hand from my experience in the Andean region that one of
the most dangerous threats to democracy and free societies is narcotics
trafficking. I have seen the courage and the sacrifice with which many
of our neighbors are confronting this threat, despite resources that are
even scarcer than ours. Their losses have been great. Their victories
have benefited us as well as themselves. I look forward to examining
with our partners in the hemisphere the ways we can cooperate which will
most likely lead to further success in this terrible struggle.
I would also work with our neighbors to promote good governance. For
democracy to work well, governments must be able to respond to citizens'
needs effectively, regularly, and fairly. Misapplication of funds or
simple corruption is corrosive to public trust, undermines democratic
institutions, subverts governments' efforts to serve their citizens, and
is a cruel tax paid most often by society's weakest members. Good
governance is an important challenge, a permanent challenge for all
democracies, even our own.
Central America remains an important focus of U.S. foreign policy. The
people of El Salvador and Nicaragua have ended their civil wars and are
making extraordinary efforts to heal their societies, rebuild their
economies, and strengthen their democratic systems. In Guatemala, good
progress is being made in negotiations to end the last military conflict
in Central America. I believe we have a strong interest in exercising
leadership and providing assistance to help Central Americans
consolidate a democratic peace and pursue a brighter future.
Defending American Security
Modernizing our armed forces and enhancing American security is a third
pillar of President Clinton's foreign policy. In this hemisphere, with
the Cold War ended, with the spread of democracy and the waning of
guerrilla movements once sponsored by Cuba, the issue of regional
security has been transformed. Still, we cannot neglect security
concerns in our own region. I believe we must take advantage of this
period of peace to search for opportunities to enhance security and
prevent future crises.
One of the most hopeful developments of recent years has been the action
taken by Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to control the spread of weapons
of mass destruction. If confirmed, I would set as a key goal of our
diplomacy the search for a regional consensus to continue progress in
this critical area.
I would also search for opportunities to contribute to the solution of
lingering border disputes, and to foster understandings to restrain the
buildup of conventional weapons. Success in such efforts would build
confidence among neighbors and permit them to devote more resources to
urgent social needs.
I am confident that my personal experience in the Foreign Service
affords me a good opportunity to be successful as Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs. In my 31 years in the Foreign Service, I
have served 16 years in Latin America and 5 more working on Latin
American affairs in the State Department.
Yet I have also had opportunities to step back from Latin America and
the Caribbean--in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, at our
mission to the United Nations--where I could view inter-American affairs
in a broader policy perspective.
I value my economic experience, given the high priority of economic
issues in the affairs of this region. If confirmed, I would make
economic and business affairs a key priority of our personnel in
Washington and in the field. I want the American business community to
see the State Department and each of our embassies as working partners
in the search for new export opportunities.
In my service as the United States Deputy Representative to the United
Nations the last 3 years, I gained an appreciation of the opportunities
offered by strong multilateral organizations. In our hemisphere, the
Organization of American States is today working constructively in a
wide range of areas beneficial to our interests. I would welcome the
chance to work closely with Ambassador Babbitt to strengthen the OAS for
the benefit of all its members.
I would also place a high priority on consulting frequently with the
Congress and on achieving the highest possible degree of bipartisan
support for our policies. When our foreign policy is built on a solid
domestic consensus, it sends the clearest possible signal that our
policy is sustainable and that we are serious in our purpose. To a
diplomat, that is an invaluable asset.
Finally, I would work to maintain a tone of partnership and mutual
respect in our relations with the nations of the Americas. I believe
President Clinton has set forth a policy for this hemisphere which is
worthy of American values and will serve our economic and security
interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and with
the nations of this region to make that vision a reality.(###)
ARTICLE 12:
Review of U.S. Efforts To Combat the International Narcotics Trade
Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters
Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security,
International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, May 11, 1993
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate this opportunity
to discuss the status of our efforts to combat the international
narcotics trade and the threat that it poses to the national security of
our friends and allies. I am providing this testimony as part of the
annual process in which the State Department submits its International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) to Congress. This report
forms the basis for the President's decision on whether to certify 27
major drug-producing or transit countries as having fully cooperated
with the United States--or taken adequate steps on their own--to achieve
full compliance with the goals and objectives established by the 1988
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances.
Denial of certification means that most forms of U.S. assistance to the
country concerned may not be provided and that U.S. representatives are
required to vote against that country's loan applications in
multilateral development banks. The President denied certification to
three countries: Burma, Iran, and Syria. The President did not certify
but granted national interest waivers to two countries: Afghanistan and
Lebanon. The President certified 22 [others]: The Bahamas, Belize,
Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India,
Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela.
I come before you at a moment when our international narcotics control
effort is under review. The Administration is looking at the range and
mix of counter-narcotics options, as part of its comprehensive,
government-wide assessment of anti-drug programs and policies. We are
taking a hard look at ourselves and our programs, at what has worked and
what has not worked--all with an eye toward achieving the best possible
use of our resources and return on our investment in what will likely
continue to be tough budget times.
This review is taking place within the context of the U.S. effort to
promote two broad goals. Our first goal is to support the domestic
objective of reducing drug abuse and drug-related crime in the U.S. by
promoting and assisting efforts by other countries and multilateral
institutions to stem drug production, trafficking, and abuse worldwide.
The second goal is to support our important foreign policy priorities in
promoting democracy, respect for human rights, sustainable economic
growth, and environmental protection. This goal recognizes that drug
production and trafficking weaken democratic systems and free market
economies, because traffickers attempt to corrupt and threaten
institutions such as the courts, the police, legislatures, and financial
systems, and because slash-and-burn drug cultivation and the
indiscriminate use of chemicals bring about environmental degradation.
Let me cite two important recent statements which provide a policy
framework for the current review of international counter-narcotics
strategy. In announcing the nomination of Lee Brown as Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, President Clinton said:
We will continue to work with other nations who have shown the political
will to fight illegal drugs. They will continue to get our full support
and cooperation.
In remarks to the Council of the Americas on May 3, Deputy Secretary
Wharton, speaking on behalf of Secretary Christopher, stated:
We want to work with governments to strengthen key public
institutions and the administration of justice. We want to share our
experience to help democratic governments to fight corruption and other
abuses of power. Corruption is a cancer that will destroy democracy--
and investment opportunities--if it is not eradicated.
We will work in partnership with the governments of this region to fight
narco-traffickers, whose corruption and violence threaten the survival
of democratic institutions. We will work with the OAS to create a
common legal framework for action. Let no one doubt our resolve to
reduce drug consumption, to enforce our laws, and to help our democratic
neighbors defeat the drug traffickers.
With this background in mind, let me briefly review developments over
the past year in the international counter-narcotics field. For a more
complete review, I refer you to the Executive Summary of the INCSR. As
usual, the balance sheet contains good and bad news. On the positive
side of the ledger, I would note the following.
-- With U.S. Government assistance, the overall Andean coca crop has
been contained at about 210,000 hectares for the past 3 years.
Previously, it had been growing at approximately 10%-20% per year.
-- The international community is making important progress in the
control of the chemicals needed for drug refining. Recommendations by
the 27-member Chemical Action Task Force are beginning to be
implemented.
-- Over the last 3 years, [eliminating] narcotics money-laundering has
evolved into an important foreign policy and financial management
priority in both small and large financial center countries. The
Financial Action Task Force established by the G-7 summit in 1989 has
been influential and valuable in this regard.
-- As for demand reduction, in 1992, the U.S. Government funded more
programs on training, public awareness, epidemiology, and education in
Latin America and Southeast and Southwest Asia. INM programs trained
3,000 demand-reduction experts worldwide.
-- Many countries now openly admit the dangers posed by narcotics-
trafficking and domestic consumption and are actively combatting the
problem as a matter of their own national interests.
-- The U.S. Government intensified its efforts to engage the entire UN
system, particularly the specialized agencies in drug-control issues.
-- Seventy-two states have now ratified or acceded to the 1988 UN
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances.
-- Colombia continued to play a pivotal role against the drug trade
throughout 1992, maintaining an active enforcement and crop-control
program, including the eradication of more than one-third of the opium
poppy crop, more hectares (12,000) in the last year than any other
government, ever.
-- The Government of Bolivia's coca cultivation showed a net decline in
1992 and is now at its lowest in 5 years.
-- Ecuador scored a major success in June 1992 by dismantling the Jorge
Reyes Torres narcotics organization.
-- Precedent-setting regional cooperation in cross-border operations
among the Andean countries was witnessed in 1992.
-- Mexico seized 38.8 metric tons of cocaine during 1992 and 15 metric
tons so far this year, including two multi-ton (5 and 7.2) seizures in
April. Mexico has also reduced domestic production of opium poppy and
marijuana to the lowest levels in a decade, and has seized large amounts
of marijuana and heroin. Mexico dramatically increased its own counter-
narcotics burden by assuming full financial responsibility for
previously U.S.-funded programs.
-- Guatemala, with U.S. Government assistance, virtually eliminated a
poppy crop in 1992 which a year earlier potentially could have yielded
nearly 12 metric tons of opium/1 metric ton of heroin.
-- With U.S. Government assistance, the Government of Panama, in early
1993 (April 2-3), conducted the first ever aerial eradication of a coca
crop in Central America, sending a strong message to other potential
coca leaf farmers in the region.
-- In three different cases during December and January, Turkish police
interdicted over eight metric tons of morphine base and heroin from
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the largest amounts ever seized in the
Mediterranean and on the Turkish/Georgian border. They did so with the
assistance of technical equipment supplied by the INM Bureau.
-- Laos has reduced its potential opium production in each of the past
3 years, for a total reduction of 39%. This is a direct result of U.S.
and UN programs. Laos has formed a new, dedicated police counter-
narcotics unit which we are preparing to help equip and train. We plan
to staff a Narcotics Assistant Section in our embassy in Vientiane in
the fall of this year.
-- Thailand has sustained an active opium poppy crop control program,
with total cultivation declining by 50% since 1989, to a level
insufficient for Thailand's own domestic consumption. Thailand passed
new conspiracy and asset forfeiture statutes and has taken its first
steps to investigate and prosecute drug traffickers under these new
laws.
Now, for the bad news.
-- Despite stepped-up programs, hundreds of tons of cocaine and heroin
continued to flow to the United States and to Europe, while consumption
has risen in Latin America.
-- In Europe and Central Asia, the break-up of the old Soviet empire
opened new frontiers for entrepreneurial drug traffickers. Well-
established as well as new criminal organizations from the Baltics to
Tajikistan are cashing in on the heroin flowing abundantly from
Southeast and Southwest Asia.
-- The illegal drug-trafficking industry continues to be strong,
ruthless, rich, and adaptable.
-- Major traffickers continue to exploit the weaknesses of governments
beset by economic-political instability and social unrest.
-- Drug-financed corruption continues to be one of the greatest
impediments to effective counter-narcotics efforts in many parts of the
world.
As the bad news items indicate, the international drug industry remains
a formidable and dangerous challenge. The traffickers continue to probe
for weaknesses, seek out new markets, and grab for increased political
and economic influence through corruption and intimidation. We should
not expect them to simply surrender to our pressure; they will have to
be defeated.
The achievements, however, show that the prospects for our success are
improving. The trend is toward more sophisticated and effective
international counter-narcotics actions. As is now occurring in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, more countries are signaling their commitment
by requesting basic training in the areas of drug enforcement and
prevention. Others are moving to disrupt the trade and cause financial
and other hardships to the traffickers with more intensified operations
to seize drugs, confiscate vehicles, and destroy labs. And as drug laws
and counter-narcotics institutions grow stronger, an expanding number of
countries are focusing their efforts increasingly on dismantling the
managerial and financial networks that run the trade and pose the most
serious drug-related threats to their po