US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 21, MAY 24, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  The United States and Africa:  A New Relationship -- Secretary 
Christopher
2.  Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the Conflict in Bosnia 
-- Secretary Christopher, Joint Action Program
3.  Security Council Condemns Bosnian Croat Paramilitary Offensive -- 
UNSC President Vorontsov
4.  FY 1994 Assistance Requests for Europe -- Stephen A. Oxman
5.  Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan -- George E. Moose
6.  U.S. Recognition of Angolan Government
7.  Arab-Israeli Peace Process:  Defining Issues and Producing Common 
Ground -- Edward P. Djerejian
8.  North African Countries: U.S. Relations and Assistance -- Edward P. 
Djerejian 
9.  East Asia and the Pacific:  U.S. Policy and Assistance -- Winston 
Lord
10.  UN Security Council Resolution 825 on the North Korean Nuclear 
Issue
11.  Statement at Confirmation Hearing -- Alexander F. Watson
12.  Review of U.S. Efforts To Combat the International Narcotics Trade 
-- Melvyn Levitsky
13.  Department Statements
     Terrorists Attack TV Station in Suriname
     U.S. Assistance to UNTAC 


ARTICLE 1:  


The United States and Africa:  A New Relationship
Secretary Christopher
Address before the 23rd African-American Institute Conference, Reston, 
Virginia, May 21, 1993

Good morning, Maurice Tempelsman, Vivian Derryck, friends:  I welcome 
this opportunity to speak to you today about the Clinton 
Administration's approach to Africa.  I am especially pleased to be the 
first Secretary of State ever to address the African-American Institute.

Our Administration is well aware of  what you have accomplished, through 
40 years of dedicated work, in building better ties between America and 
Africa, and in helping the people of Africa build better lives for 
themselves.

Next week, the second Africa/African-American Summit convenes in 
Libreville, Gabon.  Conceived by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, this Summit 
brings together Africans and African-Americans to form bonds of 
friendship, share ideas, and do business together.  I am pleased that 
our new Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, George Moose, will be 
leading the U.S. Government delegation.  Congressman John Conyers is 
leading the Congressional delegation to this important conference.

America and Africa are linked in so many different ways.

As the world's oldest democracy, we have an enduring interest in the 
success of the new democracies of Africa.  As a multi-racial society, 
the U.S. is especially encouraged by the approaching transition to 
democracy in South Africa.

And there are links of conscience--and links of cooperation.

When a child dies of hunger in Africa, that tragedy touches us here in 
America.  When American scientists seek a cure for AIDS, they carry the 
prayers and hopes of both Africans and Americans.  

When our Agency for International Development makes a substantial 
investment in child survival programs, that makes a difference in 
helping Africa to reduce infant mortality rates. And when the American 
company Merck provides a drug that frees millions of Africans from the 
devastating effects of river blindness, that action not only extends the 
frontiers of pharmacology, but it lessens the distance from America to 
Africa.

That distance is also lessened by the end of the Cold War.  During the 
long Cold War period, policies toward Africa were often determined not 
by how they affected Africa, but by whether they brought advantage or 
disadvantage to Washington or Moscow.  Thankfully, we have moved beyond 
the point of adopting policies based on how they might affect the 
shipping lanes next to Africa rather than the people in Africa.  And 
that's an improvement.

In today's changed world, we can and will move to a productive new 
relationship with Africa.  The President and I are committed to building 
that new relationship based upon our common interests and our shared 
values.  The Clinton Administration will make Africa a high priority and 
give it the attention it deserves.

The Clinton Administration will provide strong and visible support for 
the movement to freedom in Africa--the movement toward democracies and 
toward free markets.  We will work with the nations of Africa to address 
the health, environmental and population issues that threaten lives and 
imperil sustainable development.  And we will help Africa build its 
capacity for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution so that the 
people of that continent can live free of the terror of war.

Promoting Democracy And Human Rights
At the heart of our new relationship will be an enduring commitment to 
democracy and human rights--and that includes women's rights.  President 
Clinton has made it clear that promoting democracy and human rights is a 
pillar of American foreign policy.   And that pillar stands just as tall 
in Africa as it does in every part of the world.

It is democracies--not dictatorships --that offer the best means to 
defend human rights, to put African nations on the path toward progress 
and to address the vital social and economic concerns that cut across 
national borders.

The United States will work through our AID program and with the 
multilateral assistance and lending institutions to help Africa build 
its economic capacity.  Under the Clinton Administration, these global 
concerns will not be relegated to the footnotes of our foreign policy 
agenda.   Instead, they will be given top tier attention--the attention 
they deserve.

Today Africa has gained our attention and respect through the courageous 
efforts to build democracy and opportunity on that continent.  While the 
drive for democracy and free markets has attracted more recent attention 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America, the people of Africa are demanding 
their freedom as well.

Listen to the words of President Chiluba of Zambia:

     We know what is right.  Democracy is right.  The greatest lesson we 
can learn from the past 27 years is that freedom is at the core of every 
successful nation in the world and in Africa today.

The people of Africa know where their future lies:  not with corrupt 
dictators like Mobutu, but with courageous democrats in every part of 
the continent.  From Senegal to Benin, from Madagascar to Mali, African 
nations are building strong democratic institutions.  They recognize 
that democracy offers the only framework for tolerance and harmony 
because it safeguards individual rights and provides essential 
protection for minorities.

AAI has played an extraordinarily useful role in promoting democracy.  
You have monitored elections, trained officials, and provided civic 
education.  You understand that democracy must work not only on election 
day--but every day--through a vibrant civic culture and a commitment to 
free and open debate and the rule of law.

Democracy worked on election day last September in Angola.  But since 
then, the people of Angola have been denied the benefits of their 
participation in that election process.  President Clinton acknowledged 
the importance of that free and fair election when he announced this 
week that the United States now recognizes the Government of Angola.

We intend to remain actively engaged in promoting a negotiated 
settlement between the Angolan government and UNITA--a settlement that 
will enable all the people of Angola to enjoy the benefits of democracy.  
U.S. recognition is designed to help achieve that goal and to encourage 
UNITA to join the process of peace and reconciliation.  As President 
Clinton said, we hope UNITA will be a part of the government we 
recognize.  We continue to believe that there can be no military victory 
in Angola.  And I want to emphasize that the United States will not 
support those who pursue a military solution.

Now South Africa stands on the verge of its own transition to non-racial 
democracy.  The United States supports that peaceful transition.  We 
oppose those who seek to derail the negotiations and we reject those who 
resort to violence.

We hope that within a short time, a date will be set for a truly 
democratic election in South Africa.  That election will echo around the 
African continent and across the world as a roaring triumph of human 
rights.

The credit for that monumental achievement will belong most of all to 
those in South Africa who dedicated their lives--and in some instances, 
gave their lives--so that a new day of freedom would dawn.  Credit will 
belong to Nelson Mandela, who walked out of prison after 27 years--
unconquered, unbowed, standing tall in his belief that the people of 
South Africa could still build a future based upon the inherent worth 
and dignity of every human being.  

Credit will also belong to F.W. De Klerk, whose vital contribution can 
be measured by how far his views have evolved, and by how far a majority 
of white South Africans have come with him.  

The transition to non-racial democracy in South Africa is also the 
product of principled opposition to apartheid in the international 
community.  In the finest American political tradition, a coalition of 
conscience in this country has carried out a long and uplifting campaign 
against the apartheid system half a world away.  Our own sanctions have 
played an important role in the progress made to date.

The installation of a non-racial government in South Africa will 
resonate with every American, but especially with those in cities and 
towns across the nation who joined the effort to bring an end to 
apartheid.

In sharing the spirit and lessons of our own civil rights movement, we 
are certainly not saying that America has found every answer or that we 
have yet formed a perfect union here in the United States.  But we are 
committed to the basic principle that human rights are universal--that 
every citizen in every country ought to be judged as an individual, 
irrespective of race or economic condition.

South Africa's successful transition is important for Africa, the United 
States and the world.  The United States will help--and we expect the 
other industrial democracies to help as well.  Once a Transitional 
Executive Council has been put in place--and once a date for elections 
has been set--we will work with our G-7 partners to help South Africa 
re-enter the global economy.  We have urged the World Bank and the 
parties in South Africa to begin planning now the projects that will 
translate into economic growth.  Similarly, the American business 
community should be a part of the effort to help the people of South 
Africa build a strong and vibrant economy once the progress toward 
democracy is irreversible.

Unfortunately, South Africa has had no monopoly on the violation of 
human rights on the continent.  American policy must reflect that 
painful fact.  We cannot hold Africa to a lesser standard for human 
rights than we apply to other parts of the world.  I want to make clear 
that the United States will take human rights into account as we 
determine how to allocate our scarce resources for foreign assistance.  

The promotion of democracy is central to the goals of the Clinton 
Administration.  That is why President Clinton chose to invite the first 
President of a democratic Namibia, Sam Nujoma, as the first African head 
of state to be received at his White House.

Sustaining Africa's Capacity for Development
It is the democratic nations of Africa, reflecting the will of their 
people, that are best positioned to make the kind of economic changes 
that improve the lives of their citizens.  The development challenge 
facing most African nations remains imposing, but it is within the 
capacities of free market democracies to overcome.

Economic crises still afflict many of the continent's nations.  For many 
countries, per capita incomes have been stagnating or even falling; 
trade and investment flows have remained weak; debt burdens stunt the 
prospects for new growth.  Drought, famine and civil war have turned 
crises into calamities; no region of the continent has been spared the 
ravages of man or nature.

This is why the trend toward democracy in Africa must be reinforced by 
sustainable economic development.  The peace and stability that 
democracy brings can also lead to desperately needed private investment-
-and with it, development capital, technology transfer and technical 
expertise.  The trend toward disinvestment in Africa will only be 
reversed when Africa makes itself a more attractive place for new 
capital.  Applying the rule of law, reducing corruption, assuring the 
remittance of profits, and building more skilled workforces--all of 
these will help give Africa a far greater role in the global economy.

The first responsibility for building that capacity, of course, rests 
with African countries themselves.  But the developed nations of the 
world--including the United States--share a responsibility to help.  For 
the coming fiscal year, we are requesting bilateral development funding 
for Africa of $800 million.  In addition, we will continue to provide 
over half a billion dollars in humanitarian and other assistance to 
Africa.

The United States and the international community will be more willing 
to support the economies of African nations that have embarked on 
serious reform.  We are working with other creditor nations to provide 
additional debt reduction for countries cooperating with IMF adjustment 
programs.  The Administration is requesting congressional support to 
enable the U.S. to participate in a multilateral debt relief effort.  
This new initiative would reward those poor countries implementing 
difficult reforms.

New trade policies will also help African nations to compete in global 
markets.  Protectionist barriers still impede Africa's competitiveness 
and prospects for growth.  Africa has much to gain from a successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations that the U.S. is pushing 
with all its might to complete by the end of this year.

Africa's economic future is inseparable from its environmental future.  
An Africa that is yielding to the desert sands and to the scrub, and an 
Africa whose soil is eroding, is an Africa diminishing its capacity to 
feed itself.  An Africa that is losing its forests and renewable water 
supplies is an Africa that is compromising its ability to meet its basic 
needs for the future.

One African leader has said that the problem of soil erosion has become 
so serious that his country, when viewed from space, appears to be 
bleeding into the ocean.  We must help to heal these environmental 
wounds.  To that end, AID will spend at least $70 million on 
environmental and natural resource projects in Africa this year.

One environmental challenge in which the U.S. was particularly helpful 
was the devastating drought in southern Africa.  Working with interested 
nations and with the donor community, the U.S. provided close to $1 
billion to respond to this catastrophe.  Today, the threat of famine is 
gone and the countries of the region are harvesting a good crop. 

Sustainable development cannot be accomplished without a renewed sense 
of urgency about population growth rates that will double the size of 
many African nations in 15-20 years.  Rapid population growth imperils 
efforts to combat poverty and to protect the environment.  No longer 
will the United States pretend--as we have done in recent years--that 
this problem does not exist.

Instead, we will work in partnership with nations in Africa and 
elsewhere to provide a full range of family planning and reproductive 
health services, and we will work to improve the status of women in 
Africa and worldwide.

Resolving Conflicts in Africa
Let me be clear:  The Clinton Administration's new relationship toward 
Africa will differ in important respects from the approach of the past 
12 years.  At the same time, I salute former President Bush for 
launching Operation Restore Hope--a military mobilization for a mission 
of mercy in Somalia.  What a proud moment it was to see American 
soldiers help to feed starving children in a place far from our shores 
but clearly close to our hearts.

Certainly America was not alone in that effort.  Other nations--
including many in Africa--were instrumental in providing relief.  While 
serious problems persist in Somalia, the efforts of the international 
community have alleviated the worst suffering and provided the 
opportunity to rebuild that nation.  Somalia's experience reminds us 
that the international community can respond compassionately and 
effectively.  But it also reminds us that we must not wait until 
thousands upon thousands of people have succumbed to starvation.

Now we need to apply these lessons in Sudan.  The civil war in Sudan has 
resulted in terrible suffering and appalling violations of human rights.  
The U.S. is working with governments in the region, the UN and others to 
bring the fighting to an end.  We must do whatever we can to ensure the 
delivery of adequate relief supplies to stem this tragedy, especially as 
the rainy season begins.  

In Liberia, where brutal conflict has raged, we support the efforts of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to restore peace.  
We seek a negotiated settlement leading to full disarmament of all 
warring factions; free and fair, internationally-monitored elections; 
and the establishment of a democratic government.

But Liberia's future will be determined in Monrovia, not in Washington.  
Only Liberians can create a real and lasting peace.  Only Liberians can 
heal the deep scars in Liberian society.  And only they can determine 
who will lead them in the future.

Liberia's suffering must be brought to a swift and peaceful end.  That 
country deserves a better fate, like the future now dawning to the east 
across the continent in Eritrea.  The intertwined tragedies of Eritrea 
and Ethiopia are now happily receding into history, we hope, never again 
to be repeated.  After thirty years of civil war, an independent Eritrea 
has emerged, aided in part by peace talks sponsored by the Carter Center 
in Atlanta.

Just last month, Eritreans voted overwhelmingly for independence from 
Ethiopia in a UN-monitored referendum.  On April 27, Eritrea declared 
its independence--and the United States recognized it that same day.  
Alongside a newly democratic Ethiopia, this new nation of Eritrea can 
take its rightful place as a beacon of hope astride the Horn of Africa.

I have spoken of American efforts to end some of the military conflicts 
in Africa, but our most enduring contribution may be assisting Africa to 
build its own capacity for conflict resolution and peacekeeping.  The 
United States is working closely with the Organization of African Unity, 
providing support for peacekeeping in Rwanda and training for election 
monitors elsewhere.  As the OAU prepares to observe its thirtieth 
anniversary, it is important not only to recognize what that 
organization has done, but to focus on how it can play a greater role in 
preventing and stopping wars on the continent. 

I also want to acknowledge the often-overlooked involvement of Africans 
as peacekeepers abroad.  Nigeria and Kenya have been active in the 
former Yugoslavia--Cameroon in Cambodia--Ghana and Sierra Leone in 
Lebanon:  These and other African nations are making the world safer 
through their peacekeeping efforts.

The OAU and other African organizations need to step up mediation and 
preventive diplomacy to give people in Africa the chance to live free of 
war.  In the exercise of creative, often life-saving diplomacy, Africa's 
destiny will be shaped by Africans.

A New Relationship
Today I have outlined the basis for a substantially new American 
relationship with Africa.  It will be a new relationship in which 
Americans can assist Africans in building democratic institutions and 
laying the foundation for economic growth, but in which our role is to 
enhance--not to erase--African solutions.

It will be a new relationship grounded in our firm belief that while 
dictators in Africa are not yet extinct, the future lies in free 
elections and free institutions.

It will be a new relationship reinforced once a new South Africa has 
moved from repression to democracy.

The people and governments of Africa are moving toward democracy and 
free markets with a growing conviction that they are on the path to 
progress.  They are embarked on a uniquely African journey, as awe-
inspiring as anything on this continent of such breathtaking beauty.

It is a journey worthy of America's respect and support--and that 
respect and support is what I pledge today.  Thank you.(###)



ARTICLE 2:


Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the Conflict in Bosnia
Secretary Christopher, Joint Action Program

Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at joint news conference with French Foreign Minister 
Juppe, UK Foreign Secretary Hurd, Spanish Foreign Minister Solana, and 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Washington, DC, May 22, 1993.

Good morning.  I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues, Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Hurd of the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev of Russia, Foreign Minister Javier Solana of Spain, and Foreign 
Minister Alain Juppe of France.  I have been asked by my colleagues to 
make a short summary statement with respect to our deliberations.

We are determined that the international community will act together--
based upon shared responsibilities and common purpose--to bring 
increased pressure to bear on those engaged in the conflict in Bosnia.  
Each of us--along with our colleagues in other capitals and at the 
United Nations--has worked hard to find a common approach that will work 
to stop the killing in Bosnia, to prevent the conflict from spreading, 
and to bring concerted pressure on the parties to reach a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict.  This international pressure will be brought 
especially to bear on the Bosnian Serbs, who stand solely isolated from 
the community of civilized nations.

During the last 3 days, we have agreed on a Joint Action Program of 
further steps which we are announcing today.  This Joint Action Program 
describes the steps we'll be pursuing to extinguish this terrible war 
and achieve a lasting and equitable settlement.  We understand, 
collectively, that there is an urgent need for action.  Taken together, 
the course of action we outline today is designed to directly affect the 
environment in Bosnia and escalate the pressure on those still fighting 
so that a political settlement to this crisis--which must be achieved--
will be more likely.

Let me now, on behalf of my colleagues, summarize the specific, concrete 
steps that we have agreed to take and which are presented in the joint 
document which you have received.

--  We will continue our program of humanitarian assistance to the 
people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to save lives, and we will insist that all 
parties allow this aid to pass without hindrance.

--  We will rigorously enforce the tight and tough regime of sanctions 
that isolate and pressure Serbia and Montenegro.  This pressure will be 
unrelenting until the necessary conditions of the relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions are met, including the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb 
troops from territories occupied by force.

--  Each of us will contribute in our own way--for instance, through 
monitors, technical assistance, or surveillance--to a joint effort that 
will ensure that Belgrade's promise to close its border with Bosnia is 
not a shallow one.

--  We will work in the United Nations for early adoption of measures 
that will implement certain "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Each of 
our nations will make appropriate contributions to securing these "safe 
areas."  In this context, the United States is prepared to meet its 
commitment to help protect United Nations forces in the event they are 
attacked and request such action by the United States.

--  We will continue to enforce vigorously the no-fly zone established 
over Bosnia.

--  We support the rapid establishment of a war crimes tribunal so that 
those guilty of atrocities may be brought to justice.

--  We will remain intensively involved in efforts to achieve a durable, 
negotiated settlement to this crisis.  To the extent that the parties 
decide to implement mutually agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen 
agreement, that is something we would encourage.

--  We are putting Croatia on notice that assistance to the Bosnian 
Croatian forces engaged in fighting and in "ethnic cleansing" could 
result in international sanctions against Croatia.

--  Grave consequences would arise from violence spreading elsewhere in 
the Balkans.  Accordingly, we support an increased international 
presence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which we will do 
in consultation with the authorities in Skopje, and we support an 
increased presence of international monitoring in Kosovo.

--  In addition, we will keep other options open for new and tougher 
measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration.

Each of us will work--individually and collectively--to define 
operational plans to carry out these measures promptly.

It is a testimony to the strength of our alliance and our new 
partnership with the Russian Federation that we have arrived at this 
mutual course of action that I am announcing on behalf of my colleagues 
and myself today.  The actions we announce today will save lives, keep 
the conflict from spreading, and increase pressure for a negotiated 
settlement.

As our statement says, we are firmly united and committed to prosecuting 
and pursuing this course of action.


Joint Action Program
Text of Joint Action Program released by the Office of the Spokesman, 
Washington, DC, May 22, 1993.

France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America are profoundly concerned that the conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is continuing despite the strenuous efforts of the 
international community and the Co-Chairmen of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which they strongly support, to 
bring an end to it.

We shall continue to work urgently to help extinguish this terrible war 
and to achieve a lasting and equitable settlement.

We also have common views on the most productive immediate steps to 
take.  These should lead to implementation of relevant Security Council 
resolutions as well as the elaboration of further steps.

1.  Humanitarian Assistance.  We will continue providing humanitarian 
assistance for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and will insist that 
all parties allow humanitarian aid to pass without hindrance.

2.  Sanctions.  The economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations 
Security Council against Serbia and Montenegro must be rigorously 
enforced by all members of the UN until the necessary conditions set out 
in Security Council Resolution 820, including the withdrawal of Bosnian 
Serb troops from territories occupied by force, are met for lifting the 
sanctions.

3.  Sealing Borders.  We note the pledge of the Belgrade authorities to 
close the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to put pressure on 
the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan.  We are watching to see if 
the border closure is effective.  Although the primary responsibility 
for enforcing this step belongs to Belgrade, we can assist, for instance 
by placing monitors on the borders or providing technical expertise or 
conducting aerial surveillance.  We also note the willingness expressed 
by the Zagreb authorities for monitoring to take place along the border 
between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4.  "Safe Areas."  The concept of "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as 
France and others have proposed, could make a valuable contribution.  We 
will work to secure early adoption of the new UN Security Council 
resolution now under discussion.  The United Kingdom and France along 
with other nations already have forces serving with UNPROFOR in "safe 
areas."  Troops from other countries, including Spain and Canada, are 
playing an important role on the ground.  The Russian Federation is 
considering making forces available in Bosnia in addition to its forces 
presently in Croatia.  The United States is prepared to meet its 
commitment to help protect UNPROFOR forces in the event they are 
attacked and request such action.  Further contributions from other 
countries would be most welcome

5.  No-Fly Zone.  The No-Fly Zone should continue to be enforced in 
Bosnia.

6.  War Crimes Tribunal.  We support the rapid establishment of the War 
Crimes Tribunal, so that those guilty of atrocities may be brought to 
justice.

7.  Durable Peace.  Negotiated settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
building on the Vance-Owen process and intensified international 
cooperation and effort, is the way a durable peace can be established.  
France, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States will 
assist and actively participate in a continued political process to this 
end.  To the extent that the parties decide to implement promptly 
mutually-agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan, this is to be 
encouraged.

8.  Central Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We are deeply concerned about the 
fighting between Bosnian Croatian and Bosnian Government forces and the 
related "ethnic cleansing," and we agree that Croatia should be put on 
notice that assistance to Bosnian Croatian forces engaged in these 
activities could result in the international community imposing 
sanctions on Croatia.

9.  Containment.  We will cooperate closely to enhance efforts to 
contain the conflict and prevent the possibility that it will spill over 
into neighboring countries.  We would regard such a development with the 
utmost seriousness.

10.  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  It is essential that 
everyone in the region understands that aggression against the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would have grave consequences.  We will 
support an increase in the international presence there in consultation 
with the authorities in Skopje.  The United States is considering a 
contribution to this effort.

11.  Kosovo.  We favor an increase in the international monitoring 
presence in Kosovo.  International standards of human rights should be 
strictly respected in the formerly-autonomous region of Kosovo, although 
we do not support declarations of independence there.

12.  Croatia.  The same considerations apply to the Serb-populated areas 
of Croatia.  We will work for the renewal and strengthening of 
UNPROFOR's mandate.  The Croatian Government and the local Serb 
authorities should maintain the cease-fire and constructively pursue 
their dialogue leading to settling practical, economic, and, eventually, 
political problems between them.

13.  Further Measures.  We will keep open options for new and tougher 
measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration.

We five members of the United Nations Security Council are firmly united 
and firmly committed to taking these immediate steps.  We will work 
closely with the United Nations and the involved regional organizations 
as we carry out these efforts.(###)



ARTICLE 3:


Security Council Condemns Bosnian Croat Paramilitary Offensive
UN Security Council President Vorontsov
Text of note released by the UN Security Council, New York City, May 10, 
1993

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the 
President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the 
Council, at its 3210th meeting, on 10 May 1993, in connection with the 
Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina":

"The Security Council, recalling its statement of 21 April 1993 
(S/25646) concerning the atrocities and killings in areas north and west 
of Sarajevo, expresses its grave concern at the major new military 
offensive launched by Bosnian Croat paramilitary units in the areas of 
Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica.

"The Security Council strongly condemns this major military offensive 
launched by Bosnian Croat paramilitary units which is totally 
inconsistent with the signature of the Peace Plan for the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Bosnian Croat party.  The Council demands 
that the attacks against the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica 
cease forthwith; that Bosnian Croat paramilitary units withdraw 
immediately from the area and that all the parties strictly comply with 
their previous commitments as well as the cease-fire agreed to today 
between the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Bosnian Croat party.

"The Security Council also expresses its deep concern that the UNPROFOR 
battalion in the area has been forced under fire to redeploy as a result 
of this latest offensive and condemns the refusal of Bosnian Croat 
paramilitary units to allow the presence of United Nations military 
observers, in particular in the city of Mostar.

"The Security Council once again reiterates its demand that UNPROFOR 
personnel be allowed unimpeded access throughout the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and, in this particular case, demands that the Bosnian 
Croat paramilitary units ensure the safety and security of UNPROFOR as 
well as all United Nations personnel in the areas of Mostar, Jablanica 
and Dreznica.  In this connection, the Council expresses its deep 
concern at the increasing[ly] hostile attitude of Bosnian Croat 
paramilitary units towards UNPROFOR personnel.

"The Security Council calls upon the Republic of Croatia, in accordance 
with the commitments under the Zagreb agreement of 25 April 1993 
(S/25659), to exert all its influence on the Bosnian Croat leadership 
and paramilitary units with a view to ceasing immediately their attacks 
particularly in the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica.  It further 
calls on the Republic of Croatia to adhere strictly to its obligations 
under Security Council resolution 752, including putting an end to all 
forms of interference and respecting the territorial integrity of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"The Security Council once again reaffirms the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the inacceptability of the acquisition of territory by force and the 
practice of 'ethnic cleansing'.

"The Security Council remains seized of the matter and is ready to 
consider further measures to ensure that all parties and others 
concerned abide by their commitments and fully respect relevant Council 
decisions."(###)



ARTICLE 4:


FY 1994 Assistance Requests for Europe
Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, May 11, 1993

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to meet today with you and your committee 
to discuss the Administration's FY 1994 request for assistance to 
countries in Europe.  I recognize the great interest in and attention to 
our aid programs that you and this committee have shown, and I will 
value your comments and guidance.  

In this statement, I would like to give an overview of our aid programs 
and the policies they support.  One of our largest funding requests is 
for the Support for East European Democracies Act (SEED).  While we are 
requesting SEED funding at approximately current levels and while we 
expect the program to retain approximately the same emphasis and 
structure that it now has, I do want to note for you some of the 
directions we expect the program to take in the future.  We are also 
requesting funding for the International Fund for Ireland and security 
assistance for a number of countries.

Support for East European Democracies
I know that this committee shares the Administration's commitment to our 
continued support of the democratic revolution in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  Democratic states and free markets in this region advance the 
security, political, and economic interests of the United States and our 
allies in several ways.

First, nothing will serve the cause of peace and stability in this 
region so much as a meaningful transformation to thriving democracies.  
History teaches us that prosperous and truly free peoples generally do 
not start wars.

Second, an Eastern Europe at peace with itself and with its neighbors is 
key to ending the post-war division of Europe.  Sound and stable 
societies will form strong economic and political ties to the countries 
of the West.  These strengthened relationships will ease the legitimate 
security concerns of Eastern and Western Europeans.

Third, the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe will serve as a model 
for reform efforts in Russia and the rest of the NIS.  Success in 
establishing democratic, market economy societies in Central and Eastern 
Europe will help mute criticism by opponents of reform in the former 
Soviet Union, and will give credibility to the efforts of reformers.

Finally, creation of market-oriented economies in a region of some 135 
million people offers significant commercial opportunities for American 
business both in Central and Eastern Europe itself and as a gateway to 
the vast potential markets further east.  This, of course, is the 
reasoning behind the SEED Act, originally passed in 1989.

Through the SEED program, we have provided to date over $1 billion of 
financial and technical assistance to the transition to democracy and 
free markets.  Helped by the aid we have provided under this program, 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe--with the bleak exception of 
parts of former Yugoslavia--have made great strides.  Democratic 
institutions, although still fragile, are largely functioning.  In every 
country in the region, there has been at least one constitutional 
transfer of power.  Generally accepted human rights are usually 
respected.  Independent mass media have appeared throughout the region.

In the economic sphere, the private sector accounts for an increasing 
share of output and employment.  Significant progress has been made with 
currency stabilization, with freeing prices, and with liberalizing trade 
regimes.  Governments are beginning to erect the necessary legal and 
regulatory framework for a market-oriented economy.

However, the development of democratic and free market institutions 
remains incomplete.  Banking and financial sectors remain generally 
inadequate; we have committed $200 million to an international effort to 
restructure and privatize banks in Poland.  Privatization of state 
enterprises has generally proceeded slowly in most countries.  The size 
of fiscal deficits remains worrisome, and private foreign investment has 
been disappointing in many countries of the region.

The transition has also been uneven in the countries of the region.  The 
countries of the northern tier--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic-
-are the most advanced, with somewhat less progress in Slovakia and 
Bulgaria.  Albania has been making a valiant effort considering its past 
isolation and relative poverty.  But in the rest of the Balkans, 
progress has been halting, in part due to the turmoil in the former 
Yugoslavia and in part due to the greater underlying economic 
difficulties these countries face.  The Baltic states are also moving in 
the right direction, despite problems arising from the disruption of 
their former economic relationships with Russia.

Finally, the transition to market economies has been very painful to 
many East Europeans.  Replacing a command economy with one based on 
market forces, closing inefficient enterprises, and tightening fiscal 
and monetary policies have led to sharp contractions in output (as much 
as 50% in Albania), increased unemployment, and a decline in living 
standards. Popular discontent with the burdens of reform is widespread.

It is thus essential that we continue to provide assistance to the 
countries of this region as we have done.  Thanks in large part to the 
leadership of the Congress, our SEED program has proven a highly 
effective means of supporting Eastern Europe's transition.  The program 
has three major objectives:

--  Strengthening democratic institutions; 
--  Developing a market economy and private sector; and 
--  Improving the basic quality of life.

Through the SEED program, we have provided assistance to the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe in a wide variety of areas.  

I would like to give you just a few examples of the type of projects 
that SEED has supported.

--  The Frost Committee of this House has provided computer equipment 
and training to parliaments in several countries. 

--  The enterprise funds are providing urgently needed capital to 
developing private sectors in five countries. 

--  We are providing technical assistance to privatization in countries 
throughout the region. 

--  Our energy efficiency program has established projects in several 
countries demonstrating how to reduce energy consumption and monitor 
energy use. 

--  We are providing technical assistance for significant air and water 
quality projects in the "black triangle" of Upper Silesia.

The SEED program is highly regarded by the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe.  It delivers assistance faster and cheaper than aid 
programs elsewhere in the world and faster and cheaper than programs 
conducted by other donors.  And the assistance program has been 
particularly well-targeted and effective because of the way it has been 
administered.

Our Washington-based organization allowed us to get started quickly and 
to respond nimbly to rapidly changing conditions in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  The time between conception and contract in SEED-funded aid is 
some 8 to 9 months, as opposed to 20 months in other aid programs.  
Costs have also been held down significantly:  Administrative costs are 
far lower for a program based in Washington than for one with a 
predominantly overseas staff.

The regional nature of the program also enables us to deliver assistance 
where it is really needed, without the long lead time associated with 
separate programs in each country.  At the same time, we are making 
adaptations to seek to ensure that each country's program is tailored to 
its particular needs.

Finally, the SEED program relies heavily upon non-governmental 
intermediaries to deliver aid.  We make use of private organizations 
such as the Citizens Democracy Corps, the International Media Fund, the 
International Executive Service Corps, and the MBA Enterprise Corps to 
provide know-how directly to those who need it.  And the Enterprise 
Funds are a unique government-private enterprise partnership providing 
capital directly to the private sector.  Today, with 3 years' 
experience, we recognize that some changes can be made in the way we 
have administered the SEED program.  With better organized host 
governments and more fully staffed USAID offices, we are developing a 
new balance between Washington and the field.  This will allow us to 
retain the necessary flexibility while strengthening coordination with 
host governments.

We have also facilitated coordination of the SEED program with our 
overall policy toward Central and Eastern Europe by placing 
responsibility for the program in the Bureau for European and Canadian 
Affairs.  This structure does not reflect any change in the importance 
attached to this program but is intended to improve it.  The change is 
also consistent with Secretary Christopher's policy of decentralization 
within the State Department and with the organization of our assistance 
and policy offices for the NIS.

What does the future hold for the SEED program?  When the program began 
in 1989, there were predictions that it would last only 3-5 years.  
These predictions have proved overly optimistic.  I expect that in the 
northern tier, we can begin phasing down in 2 or 3 more years.  The rest 
of the region, however, will require increased levels of assistance for 
several more years.  In particular, the situation in the Balkans has 
been aggravated by the economic consequences of the war in the former 
Yugoslavia and the enforcement of sanctions against Serbia.  It will, 
therefore, be some years before overall assistance needs diminish 
substantially.  

For FY 1994, we are requesting SEED funding of $408,951,000, essentially 
the same as the current year.  Although the number of countries eligible 
for assistance under SEED has doubled since 1989, funding has not kept 
pace.  We could easily spend several times this figure and will have to 
continue to make difficult decisions among competing priorities.  This 
does, however, provide discipline and force us to concentrate on those 
key sectors where U.S. assistance can be most helpful.

In particular, as the economies of the northern tier countries advance 
toward free markets, and as democratic institutions take firm root 
there, they will have a relatively lesser need for the transitional SEED 
programs.  We, therefore, expect to devote an increasing share of 
assistance to the southern tier countries and the Baltics as they 
continue to implement additional reform measures.

I would like to close my discussion of the SEED program with a final 
plea.  It is essential that our program of emergency assistance to 
Russia not come at the expense of Central and Eastern Europe.  Both 
regions have pressing needs which must be met.  Moreover, as I mentioned 
above, the success or failure of the revolution in Central and Eastern 
Europe will have a great influence on the success or failure of the 
similar revolution in Russia and the other states of the NIS.  We 
cannot, therefore, allow our need to meet the historic opportunities in 
Russia to detract from our need to meet the equally historic opportunity 
in Central and Eastern Europe.

The nations of Central and Eastern Europe have come a long way since 
1989.  This progress has been brought about principally by the 
aspirations, courage, and hope of these people.  We can take pride in 
our support of their efforts.  We should continue that support, because 
their success is in our interest and because it is right to do so.

Ireland
Let me now turn to our request for Ireland.  The Administration is 
proposing a $20 million contribution to the International Fund for 
Ireland for FY 1994.  U.S. support for the fund is a tangible expression 
of our policy of favoring peace and reconciliation through economic 
progress in Northern Ireland and along the border in the Irish Republic.

The fund is a joint project of the Governments of Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, which supports projects in Northern Ireland and the six border 
counties of the republic, particularly in disadvantaged areas such as 
west Belfast and remote border towns.  It concentrates on community 
regeneration projects such as the rehabilitation of derelict facilities, 
on employment creation and training, and on the encouragement of 
community-based private enterprise.

The fund is highly regarded by both the Catholic and Protestant 
communities in Ireland and Northern Ireland.  U.S. representatives on 
the ground and the U.S. observer to the fund's board of directors report 
that our contribution is being used according to the intent of Congress.

Security Assistance
We have requested security assistance for 18 European countries. This 
assistance is designed to enhance regional security and defense 
cooperation.  It comes in three forms.

--  Economic Support Funds (ESF) provide budgetary support to recipient 
countries.  We are requesting $143 million in ESF for Turkey and $15 
million for Cyprus.

--  Foreign Military Funding (FMF) provides loans or grants for the 
purchase of military equipment.  We are requesting $315 million in FMF 
for Greece, $450 million for Turkey, and $90 million for Portugal.

--  International Military Education and Training (IMET) promotes 
democracy and human rights by emphasizing principles of civilian control 
of the military in a democratic society.  We have requested $15,000 each 
for Austria and Finland; $65,000 for Malta; $100,000 for Romania; 
$150,000 each for Albania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; $200,000 each 
for Greece and Spain; $300,000 for Bulgaria; $350,000 for Slovakia; 
$500,000 for the Czech Republic; $700,000 each for Poland and Hungary; 
$1 million for Portugal; and $2.8 million for Turkey.  I would like to 
comment briefly on some of these aid requests.

Turkey
Turkey's importance for America's strategic interests in southwestern 
Asia and southeastern Europe has increased in the post-Cold War era.  A 
look at the map shows how important Turkey is to our regional interests, 
bordering as it does the Balkans, the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq, and the 
Middle East.  

Turkey has continued to be a reliable ally--providing, for example, 
critical support during and since the Gulf war--but is among the poorest 
of the countries that support our strategic goals.  In the 1990s, Turkey 
is continuing the policy it began a decade ago of liberalizing its 
economy by implementing free-market, export-oriented policies that have 
sustained the highest growth rate of all the countries of the OECD.  

However, inflation and the enlarged public sector remain serious 
problems, and were aggravated by Turkey's resolve in supporting the 
coalition during the Gulf war.  Turkey continues to enforce the 
sanctions against Iraq, at great economic cost.  The shut-down of a 
pipeline from Iraq and the loss of Iraq as one of its principal trade 
partners have sharply reduced Turkey's foreign revenues.

We recognize the importance of an improvement in Turkey's human rights 
record.  The Turkish Government has publicly committed itself to 
strengthening parliamentary democracy and improving human rights 
protections.  We are working with the government to develop specific 
targets and programs for meeting these commitments, and will continue to 
press them vigorously and ensure that they remain aware of the high 
priority we attach to improvement in the area of human rights.

The partnership through which the United States gives material and 
political assistance to Turkey, and Turkey's role as a democratic 
partner in regional affairs, strengthens the prospects for peace, 
stability, and prosperity in an area threatened with political and 
economic turmoil.  Our aid request for Turkey will provide needed budget 
support and will provide security assistance to help Turkey meet its 
commitments to the NATO alliance.

Greece
With the end of the Cold War and the reduction of forces in Central 
Europe, our security assistance programs for Greece help the United 
States and NATO respond to threats to security in the more volatile 
areas of southeastern Europe and the Middle East.  Since taking office 
in April 1990, the government of Prime Minister Mitsotakis has improved 
Greek military cooperation with NATO and concluded a new Mutual Defense 
Cooperation Agreement.  Prime Minister Mitsotakis has also taken steps 
to reduce tensions between Greece and Turkey.

Greece is one of the poorer members of the European Community, but its 
defense expenditures are relatively high because of its strategic 
importance.  The United States has thus committed itself to assisting 
Greece with its defense modernization program.  This program will 
enhance Greece's ability to operate with the other forces of the NATO 
alliance.

Portugal
Portugal values its ties with the United States and has given strong 
public support to our foreign policy initiatives. Portuguese willingness 
and ability to pursue close military cooperation with us makes an 
important contribution to our global strategic mobility.  We are 
proposing continuation of our FMF program, as pledged in 1989, to enable 
Portugal to purchase 20 F-16 aircraft.

Cyprus
The United States supports the UN Secretary General's efforts to 
facilitate a settlement of the dispute, and actively encourages all 
parties involved to do the same.  Our assistance to Cyprus is designed 
to assist the parties in reaching a settlement that will be acceptable 
to both Cypriot communities by promoting cooperation between the two 
communities and providing opportunities for Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
to develop mutual confidence through joint economic planning and 
development activities.  To this end, we have tried to have our ESF 
funds expended for bicommunal activities to the greatest extent 
practicable.  In the past, we have not been wholly successful.  The 
representatives of the two communities who determine which projects will 
be funded have frequently chosen to interpret "bicommunal" as "aid to 
both communities," and too often have approved projects that do little 
or nothing to bring the communities together.  The President's Special 
Cyprus Coordinator and embassy officials in Nicosia are working with 
representatives of the two communities to increase to the maximum extent 
practicable the amount of ESF being used for truly bicommunal projects.

Conclusion
I appreciate the opportunity to explain to you the thinking behind our 
aid requests for FY 1994.  I would be happy to answer your questions and 
would welcome any comments or suggestions that you have.(###)



ARTICLE 5:


Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan
George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, May 4, 1993

Iwant to thank the members of this committee for the opportunity to 
review the situation in Sudan.  I am particularly grateful for the 
interest members of this committee have shown in a very tragic and 
difficult situation, as demonstrated by the resolution submitted by you, 
Mr. Chairman, and Senators Kassebaum, Jeffords, and Feingold.

We, in the Administration, value your help in drawing attention to the 
humanitarian crisis in Sudan and in seeking new ways to bring assistance 
to people who are in desperate need of it.  The Government of Sudan and 
the rebel factions need to know that American concerns about their 
behavior extend beyond the executive branch, and you have helped to make 
that clear.

Sudan is a top foreign policy challenge for the Administration, because 
America's values do not permit us to sit idly by while civil war rages, 
human rights are systematically abused, humanitarian suffering 
intensifies, and serious concerns about terrorism and regional 
instability deepen.

I would like to frame my remarks to you today by first discussing the 
peace negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria, and how they impact on the 
humanitarian situation and our ability to respond to it, then addressing 
our other policy concerns, and, finally, reviewing some options for 
dealing with the Sudanese crisis.

Abuja II:  Continuing Peace Negotiations
We have been following the Nigerian-sponsored peace negotiations 
closely, as peace is the only long-term solution to the humanitarian 
tragedy  in southern Sudan.  The second round of peace negotiations 
between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army 
(SPLA) resumed in Abuja, Nigeria, April 26.

We have repeatedly told all sides that they must bring a more serious 
commitment to these talks than has been the case in the past.  In recent 
meetings in Nairobi, I emphasized this in the strongest terms to Dr. 
Garang and to leaders of other SPLA factions.  We have made clear to all 
of the parties that we are willing to facilitate the peace process in 
any way we can.

Humanitarian Disaster:  The U.S. Response
As you've heard in recent press reports, southern Sudan has become one 
of the world's worst humanitarian nightmares.  The rainy season is 
beginning in some parts of southern Sudan, further complicating relief 
operations.  You will receive a detailed report on the situation, and on 
the assistance the United States is providing, from Mr. Kunder, who has 
just returned from a visit to southern Sudan.  But it is clear that 
several hundred thousand people face death from starvation and disease 
if they do not receive assistance in the coming months.  In at least 
some areas, people are already dying in large numbers.

War is at the very heart of this human catastrophe.  Despite the various 
cease-fire declarations, intra-SPLA fighting has flared up anew, once 
again shutting down relief operations in a number of critical areas.  
These actions demonstrate that the leaders of the rebel factions have 
little regard for the welfare of their own people.  Because of the 
uncertain security situation, some non-governmental organizations have 
been reluctant to go back into the country, and others are just resuming 
fragile operations.  The food pipeline for U.S. Government programs is 
in good shape, but access to affected populations will remain a problem 
as long as the fighting continues.

We appeal to all factions responsible for the most recent upsurge in the 
fighting to end the suffering of the people caught in its midst.  With 
the humanitarian crisis reaching new depths, I cannot emphasize too 
strongly that relief organizations must be granted access not only to 
southern Sudan, but to the area known as the transition zone--south 
Kurdufan, including the Nuba Mountains, and Bahr al Ghazal--as well, 
where people are also in urgent need.  We are prepared to examine any 
proposal that might ensure the delivery of relief assistance to Sudan.  
Our ambassador to Khartoum, Don Petterson, recently traveled to the 
south, along with Mr. Kunder, and reiterated my message to Dr. Garang 
and representatives of other SPLA factions, that it is imperative that 
all fighting end in the south so that urgently needed relief assistance 
can be delivered.

Other Bilateral Concerns
Let me turn for a moment from the central issue of the humanitarian 
crisis to touch on several other issues in our relationship with the 
Khartoum government.

I'd like to briefly summarize our principal human rights concerns with 
respect to Sudan.  The forced removal of Khartoum's displaced 
populations has been a long-standing concern, as have the forced 
relocations and systematic abuses perpetrated against people in the Nuba 
Mountains.  Since November 1992, thousands of these people have fled a 
brutal government crackdown in the area.  We have recently received 
credible reports that human rights abuses are taking place throughout 
the transition zone, including massacres, kidnaping and forced labor, 
conscription of children, and forced displacement and arabization.  Some 
of the abuses may be carried out by poorly controlled militias without 
the approval of the government; other abuses, however, are occurring 
with a frequency and on a scale that make it difficult to believe that 
they are happening without the knowledge and tacit complicity of the 
government.  Arbitrary detention, torture, repression of the press, and 
restrictions on labor unions are routinely used by the government to 
suppress dissent.

As we have consistently stressed to the government, its Islamic 
orientation is not at issue.  Our objection, rather, is to a state-
sponsored effort to impose a specific religion and religious law, and to 
use religious criteria as a standard for higher education and government 
positions.  These policies result in the violation of basic human 
rights.  There are reports that Christian charities, even indigenous 
ones, are denied access to some areas of the country, while Islamic 
charities operate freely.  We are especially disturbed about reports of 
pressures for conversion exerted in camps of the displaced in return for 
food, clothing, and education for destitute children.

As we have reported to you before, we continue to watch Sudan closely in 
connection with our worldwide efforts to combat terrorism.  Khartoum 
harbors known terrorists and terrorist groups, including Hizballah, 
Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  It maintains close ties to 
Libya and Iraq, which it tacitly supported during the Gulf war, and 
especially to Iran.  We are now reviewing the situation closely and will 
make the determination soon on whether to designate Sudan a state 
sponsor of terrorism based on the facts and the law.

Diplomatic Actions
We are also working hard, and with some success, to maintain 
international pressure on Khartoum in order to moderate the regime's 
human rights behavior.  A resolution, which we sponsored at the UN 
General Assembly in December, called attention to Sudan's human rights 
record and its unproductive approach to the humanitarian needs of its 
own population.  The United States has successfully prompted a UN Human 
Rights Commission resolution appointing a special rapporteur to examine 
alleged abuses in Sudan.

Aside from these successful efforts within the UN system, we have 
pursued bilateral approaches to engage our allies in focusing 
international concern on the situation in Sudan.  One focus of this 
effort has been on diplomatic efforts to discourage shipments of arms to 
Sudan.  For our own part, we have formalized a policy of disapproving 
all license applications for military-related exports to Sudan and have 
asked our allies to do the same.  Further, we have urged our donor 
partners to follow our lead in suspending non-humanitarian development 
assistance to Sudan.

There is some indication that these measures have begun to bring home to 
the government of Khartoum that internationally unacceptable behavior 
has economic and political consequences.  A dialogue with the government 
on human rights and other issues continues, and we hope that this 
dialogue will encourage additional constructive moves by Khartoum.  We 
have heard that the Government of Sudan has approved the resumption of 
International Committee of the Red Cross activities in the country.  
This is welcome news.  At the same time, I am increasingly concerned 
that intra-SPLA fighting is becoming as much an obstacle to peace as the 
standoff between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA.

Next Steps
In order to address the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, I am convinced we 
must, in concert with the world community, find ways to pressure all 
involved to negotiate seriously.  When I was in Europe late last month, 
I consulted with our allies on what we can do in Sudan.  There was 
general agreement that increased UN involvement in the peace process, 
and in humanitarian efforts, is necessary.  Our ambassador to the United 
Nations, Madeleine Albright, took the initiative in New York by going to 
the PERM-5 to push for a higher profile role for the United Nations and 
to galvanize coordinated international action.

Again, as we continue to focus on the situation in Sudan, you can play a 
critical role.  Your resolution of April 3 sends a strong message to 
Khartoum.  By publicly demonstrating interest and concern, the Congress 
can continue to play an important role.

The Administration looks forward to continued close contact with this 
committee as our Sudan policy evolves.(###)



ARTICLE 6:


U.S. Recognition of Angolan Government
Statement by President Clinton, Washington, DC, May 19, 1993.

Today I am pleased to announce the United States' recognition of the 
Government of Angola.  This decision reflects the high priority that our 
Administration places on democracy.

In 1992, after years of bitter civil war, the people of Angola held a 
multi-party election that the United States, the United Nations, and 
others monitored and considered free and fair.  Since taking office on 
January 20, I have tried to use the possibility of U.S. recognition as a 
leverage toward promoting an end to the civil war and hostilities and, 
hopefully, the participation of all relevant political groups in the 
Government of Angola.

Sadly, the party that lost the election, UNITA, resumed the fighting 
before the electoral process could even be completed.  And UNITA has now 
refused to sign the peace agreement currently on the table.  The Angolan 
Government, by contrast, has agreed to sign that peace agreement, has 
sworn in a democratically elected national assembly, and has offered 
participation by UNITA at all levels of government.

Today we recognize those achievements by recognizing the Government of 
the Republic of Angola.  It is my hope that UNITA will accept a 
negotiated settlement and that it will be part of this government.  I 
intend to continue working closely with the Government of Angola and 
with UNITA to achieve a lasting peace settlement and a vibrant democracy 
there.  I hope the efforts of the United States have been helpful.  I am 
confident that the Government of Angola has more than earned the 
recognition that the United States extends today.(###)



ARTICLE 7:

Arab-Israeli Peace Process:  Defining Issues and Producing Common Ground
Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs
Opening remarks at press briefing, Washington, DC, May 13, 1993

Over the last 3 weeks, all the negotiating tracks have demonstrated a 
deeper discussion of substance and intense engagement.  Consistent with 
these efforts by the parties, the United States has stepped up its full-
partner role and has worked actively and productively with the parties 
to define issues and help produce common ground.

In the Israeli-Palestinian track, important developments occurred.

(1)  The two sides formed working groups on land and water, on the 
concept of interim arrangements, and a working group on human rights.

(2)  The two sides exchanged substantive drafts of a declaration of 
principles.  These drafts were extensive in scope and addressed issues 
such as elections, interim self-government arrangements, and security.  
This work provides an important basis, in our view, for future progress.

(3)  The two sides subsequently agreed to engage seriously on a United 
States draft for a joint statement incorporating substantive elements of 
both other drafts.

Both parties went beyond simply articulating principles.  We saw the 
evolution of positions and the beginning of the emergence of common 
elements and their stands on key issues.

Although the Palestinians were dissatisfied with the lack of 
improvements on the ground and the West Bank and Gaza and reduced the 
size of their delegation and opted not to attend the working groups for 
the last few days, they did and have remained engaged.

In this regard, playing the role of full partner as described by 
President Clinton and Secretary Christopher, the United States called a 
trilateral United States-Israeli-Palestinian meeting yesterday evening 
in order to help the parties with their efforts.

Although the Palestinians did not come to this meeting, the United 
States shared with Israel and with the Palestinians a paper reflecting 
elements drawn from the Israeli and Palestinian papers which could, in 
our view, make up a joint statement.

We discussed the U.S. paper in detail yesterday and today with both 
Israel and the Palestinians and will continue to do so.  Our tabling of 
this paper was designed to capture the substantive progress that the 
sides had made during the last 3 weeks and help guide them toward areas 
that need to be discussed further.

In the Syrian-Israeli track, the parties continued to address the core 
issues of withdrawal, peace, and security.  They reviewed texts, engaged 
in detailed discussion of their positions, and addressed important 
concepts such as simultaneity.  I would add that the United States has 
also been deeply involved with Syria and Israel in an effort to help 
them move forward on the core issues.

In the Jordanian-Israeli track, the parties established working groups 
to discuss the key issues of importance to both sides.  The working 
groups have addressed substantive issues such as water, the environment 
and energy, economics and tourism, and refugees and displaced persons.

In the Lebanon-Israeli track, for the first time we have substantive 
written proposals submitted by both sides now which address key issues 
in the negotiations.  The delegations have begun the serious work of 
explaining and exchanging assessments on their respective documents.

The parties will be adjourning their discussions today, and we are 
discussing reconvening in June after the Jewish and Muslim holidays.  We 
will be continuing to work with the parties during the intervening 
period.  We have continued to work closely and cooperatively with our 
fellow co-sponsor, Russia, in our common efforts to move the negotiating 
process forward.

As I have said, the negotiations on all the tracks have taken on a 
significantly different and more intense character, and the United 
States intends to work with the parties as a full partner as they engage 
more deeply on the tough issues.  Secretary Christopher, as you know, 
met with all the delegation heads at the beginning of this session and 
was actively involved throughout the talks with some of the parties and 
in instructing the U.S. peace team.

We will continue to play our role as full partners as effectively as we 
can, but the parties must also do their part.  We will be there to help 
them in the important task of making peace, but we cannot do it for 
them.  It is up to the parties to show the necessary flexibility, 
creativity, and commitment to success required to achieve progress.(###)



ARTICLE 8:


North African Countries:  U.S. Relations and Assistance
Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Washington, DC, May 12, 1993

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee.  
I am pleased to have the opportunity to be with you today to discuss 
U.S. relations with the countries of North Africa and our foreign 
assistance programs in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.

Like so much of the developing world these days, the Maghreb is a region 
being buffeted by the winds of change.  There is a growing popular 
demand for greater political participation, for economic opportunity, 
and for social justice.  The countries of the Maghreb are responding in 
different ways to these trends, which in some cases involve political, 
economic, social, and even violent challenges to the governments 
involved.

Secretary Christopher has made clear that the promotion of democracy and 
respect for human rights form one of the major pillars of the Clinton 
Administration's foreign policy.  Our policy toward the countries of the 
Maghreb strongly reflects that reality.

It also, Mr. Chairman, reflects the reality that the Maghreb is today on 
the cutting edge of a phenomenon affecting much of the Middle East--a 
phenomenon known as political Islam.  I would like to start my 
presentation with a few words on that important subject.

Political Islam
Experience suggests that political Islamic movements are, to an 
important degree, rooted in worsening socioeconomic conditions in 
individual countries.  While political Islam takes many forms and varies 
considerably in its goals from one country to another, our approach to 
the phenomenon can be outlined in a few basic points reiterated by 
Secretary Christopher last month.

First, Islam, one of the world's great religions, is not our enemy.

Second, what we do oppose is extremism and fanaticism, whether of a 
religious or secular nature.  We part company with those who preach 
intolerance, abuse human rights, or resort to violence in pursuit of 
their political goals.

And, third, while we cannot impose our own form of government on others, 
we strongly support those who share and seek to encourage democratic 
values in their own countries.

As the Secretary said, Mr. Chairman, "the United States stands ready to 
work with our friends in the region toward the important goals of peace, 
stability, and social justice."  In the Maghreb, our efforts can make a 
difference.  From the perspective of our worldwide policy goals of 
encouraging democracy, fostering respect for human rights, and 
facilitating free market reforms, the picture in North Africa is a mixed 
one.  There have been both notable successes and serious 
disappointments. 

Algeria
Not long ago, many pointed to Algeria as a potential model of 
democratization and economic reform in the Arab world.  Unfortunately, 
Algeria's move toward a more open political system and market economy 
was suspended in January 1992, and efforts to get back on track have 
been eclipsed by internal divisions--largely between the regime and the 
Islamic Salvation Front-- violence, and economic stagnation.

Although some outside forces may seek to exploit Algeria's instability, 
we are convinced that the current situation in Algeria has its roots in 
the frustration of a populace whose basic aspirations remain unmet.  We 
continue to believe that structural political and economic reforms are 
necessary to satisfy the pressing needs of the Algerian people.  All 
Algerians, and particularly the many young unemployed and underemployed, 
need to be given a chance for a better future.  Disaffected elements of 
the populace need to be incorporated in a political dialogue as part of 
a process to chart a new course for Algeria.

Since the suspension of parliamentary elections, little progress has 
been made in restoring the democratic process and correcting the 
disturbing deterioration in the human rights situation.  The current 
Algerian Government has affirmed repeatedly its intention to have 
meaningful political dialogue and institute needed economic reforms.  It 
has had intermittent dialogue with some political parties and social and 
professional groups.  It has also stated that resumption of the 
electoral process is an important goal for the future.  In a recent 
speech, Algerian President Ali Kafi reaffirmed his government's 
determination to hold a nationwide referendum by the end of the year on 
yet-to-be-defined constitutional changes.  Frankly, so far we have seen 
little in the way of action or specificity as to how the government 
plans to implement real political and economic reform.

Let me be clear:  The United States Government in no way condones 
violence or political extremism from any quarter or under any guise, be 
it religious or secular.  We deplore the continuing assassinations of 
Algerian Government officials and members of the security forces by 
those in opposition to the government.  We also deplore attempts to 
justify such violence.  At the same time, we do not believe that 
Algeria's problems can be resolved mainly through resort to security 
methods, while political, economic, and social questions are not 
addressed.  In our contacts with the Algerian Government, we urge a 
measured approach to security, one which focuses on those guilty of 
violence but avoids wide-scale repression or renewed incommunicado 
detention.

The Government of Algeria has stated that it is committed to 
democratization, privatization of the economy,  and human rights.  We 
are prepared to do what we can to assist Algerian leaders to realize 
this commitment.  But we cannot help but recognize gaps between official 
goals and practice.  Privatization should be pursued seriously and with 
governmental support.

The U.S. strongly supports freedom of the press and is thus concerned 
about the restrictions placed on the press and the pressure which has 
been brought to bear against individual journalists.  Such actions 
undermine the democratic process in Algeria and inhibit political 
dialogue.  We also are disturbed by reports from independent human 
rights organizations alleging the widespread use of torture, and we urge 
the Algerian Government to allow a full-scale investigation into these 
allegations.

We have no bilateral aid program with Algeria.  We have a very small--
$150,000 per year--International Military Education and Training 
Program.  This program is administered under the terms of "expanded 
IMET," which is primarily designed to enhance democratization and 
respect for human rights in both the civilian and military sectors.  We 
believe that this program has been and can continue to be an effective, 
if small, tool for influencing the outlook of Algeria's current and 
future military leadership and thus the policies of Algeria's government 
as a whole. 

Tunisia
Tunisia provides a case study of the positive results of free market 
economic reforms.  Tunisia's forward-looking, market-oriented economic 
reforms have earned praise from the international financial community.  
They have paid off in a remarkable 8.6% growth rate in 1992.   We 
encourage Tunisia to continue to pursue its economic liberalization 
because we believe that the only way to build long-lasting, meaningful 
development--and to preempt those with an extremist agenda--is on the 
solid foundation of a strong market-based economy.

Our modest foreign assistance program in Tunisia has been designed to 
complement Tunisia's market-oriented reforms.  USAID projects are 
targeted at private sector revitalization and addressing housing and 
urban development problems.  Our military assistance and training 
programs have allowed Tunisia to maintain U.S.-origin equipment, support 
joint military exercises, and deter aggression in a hostile 
neighborhood.  Our assistance programs can sometimes show immediate, 
tangible benefits.  Recently, U.S. military training and equipment laid 
the basis for Tunisia's decision to send troops to join UNITAF forces in 
Somalia.  In fact, the U.S. airlift of Tunisian forces to Somalia was 
planned by Tunisian officers trained in the U.S.

For many years, Tunisia has been a regional leader in its progressive 
approach toward women.  The high literacy rate of Tunisian women and a 
correspondingly low birth rate have helped save Tunisia from the severe 
overpopulation and unemployment problems which today confront many 
developing countries.

As elections in Tunisia approach in 1994, we hope that gains comparable 
to Tunisia's impressive economic progress can be made in broadening the 
scope of participation in the political scene, which currently is 
monopolized by the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally Party.  The 
government's efforts to foster a healthy opposition are encouraging.  
Ultimately, a free and open political system needs to find a way to 
answer the aspirations and represent the views of the diverse segments 
of the population.

While we acknowledge Tunisia's concerns about violence, we are seriously 
concerned that, in the name of internal security, Tunisia has dealt too 
harshly with some of its political opponents.  Tunisia's human rights 
record has been marred by credible claims of torture and incommunicado 
detention which surfaced during last year's trials of hundreds of 
Islamists.  Tunisia has taken the first step by acknowledging that 
abuses have occurred.  We urge the government to prosecute those 
responsible and put an end to such abuse once and for all.

We support the government's efforts to improve the training of security 
personnel and to heighten awareness of the rights of individuals.  We 
hope these efforts will continue and be supplemented by a greater 
willingness on the part of the government to tolerate public debate and 
differences of opinion. 

Morocco
I would now like to turn to Morocco, a country that we have long relied 
on as a constructive, moderate force in the region.  Our relationship 
with Morocco is close and multifaceted.  Since it is a current member of 
the UN Security Council, Morocco's cooperation has been important 
recently on the many crucial matters before the Council, from Bosnia to 
the status of Palestinian deportees.

Under the leadership of King Hassan II, Morocco has embarked on a 
program of economic and political reform.  In the economic realm, the 
Moroccan Government is moving to expand the private sector and encourage 
foreign investment and market forces.  We endorse this effort, and much 
of our economic assistance program is designed to encourage further 
structural economic reform, privatization, and improvements in the 
quality of life for the Moroccan people.  I might also add that Morocco 
is the only other Arab country besides Egypt which is working with 
Israel in a regional cooperation program.  

Concerning human rights, the Moroccan Government has made some progress.  
But we see a number of areas where further progress is needed.  For 
example, credible reports of torture, restrictions on freedoms of speech 
and press, corruption, and the lack of access to fair trial in some 
cases remain matters of serious concern.  We believe that Moroccan 
military forces in Equatorial Guinea--which are propping up an 
extraordinarily abusive regime--should be withdrawn, and we have been 
given assurances that this will occur.  In the area of democratization, 
King Hassan has firmly stated a commitment to political reform.  The 
fairness of Moroccan parliamentary elections scheduled for June 25 will 
be an important indicator of the seriousness of that commitment, and we 
welcome the Moroccan Government's invitation to have American non-
governmental organizations observe those elections.

The U.S. and Morocco have had a long history of close and productive 
cooperation on key regional issues, such as the Arab-Israeli peace 
process, and in international security.  The bulk of our military 
assistance now does not go for the acquisition of new weapons but for 
the maintenance of existing U.S.-origin equipment and weaponry in the 
Moroccan inventory.  Our International Military Education and Training 
program provides valuable training to the Moroccan military, serving to 
enhance its professionalism and technical expertise.  Moroccan 
eligibility for excess U.S. defense equipment under the Southern Region 
Amendment is also important for Morocco's long-term force modernization.  
Military cooperation with Morocco is not a one-way street.  The U.S. 
benefits from having a stable friend at the strategic western end of the 
Mediterranean.  The Moroccans have shown a willingness to commit forces 
on behalf of shared interests; during Operation Desert Storm, for 
example, they deployed troops to assist in Saudi Arabia's defense.  
Morocco also was the first Arab country to offer to contribute forces to 
the UN operation in Somalia.  U.S. forces enjoy access to Moroccan 
facilities under a 1982 transit and access agreement and also benefit 
from regular joint training exercises.

Western Sahara
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to bring you up to 
date on the situation in the Western Sahara.  As you and your colleagues 
are aware, the United States has, since 1989, supported efforts by the 
UN Secretary General to organize a referendum on the status of that 
territory as the best hope for ending the long conflict over its 
sovereignty.

On March 2 of this year, the U.S. joined other members of the Security 
Council in passing UN Security Council Resolution 809, which has given 
new impetus to this effort.  The resolution instructed the Secretary 
General to intensify his work to overcome differences between Morocco 
and the POLISARIO on the modalities of a referendum, the most important 
of which have to do with criteria for eligibility of participants.  The 
resolution specified that the Secretary General should proceed with a 
view to holding the referendum by the end of this year but did not set a 
date for a referendum.  The resolution requested that the Secretary 
General make an interim report to the council this month.

The United States considers Resolution 809 an important step toward 
resolution of the Western Sahara conflict and has been actively engaged 
since its passage in supporting the efforts of the Secretary General.  
We have stressed to each of the parties involved--Morocco, the 
POLISARIO, and Algeria--the importance of seizing the opportunity 
provided by the resolution.  To each, we have made clear our view that a 
better opportunity for a fair, viable, and lasting settlement is not 
likely to arise if the current UN effort fails.  And we have pointed out 
the growing impatience of some Security Council members, who already 
advocate abandonment of the UN effort, including withdrawal of UN 
personnel from the Western Sahara should it prove impossible to organize 
an early referendum.

In short, we believe this is a time for the parties to make hard 
decisions on the Western Sahara.  We do not believe refusal to engage 
seriously with the Secretary General should be rewarded.  It is our hope 
that the parties will show the political intent, flexibility, and 
creativity necessary to enable the Secretary General to organize and 
carry out a referendum this year which will allow the people of the 
Western Sahara freely and fairly to express their will.  We will do 
everything we can to contribute to his success and to have this issue 
resolved equitably and peacefully.

Libya 
I would like to close my presentation, Mr. Chairman, with a discussion 
of what remains for us one of the most troubling concerns in North 
Africa.  For more than a year, Libya has flagrantly defied the 
international community by refusing to comply with United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748.  In those resolutions, the 
Security Council took a historic decision to signal the world that it 
would no longer tolerate state sponsorship of terrorism.  U.S. policy 
remains clear:  There can be no resolution of this issue until Libya 
fully complies with the demands of the international community.

It is in this context, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to mention a 
curious and disturbing phenomenon.  In recent months, we have been 
deluged by intermediaries urged by Libya to seek to negotiate a 
resolution of Libya's problems short of compliance with the United 
Nations mandate.  Our response in each case has been clear:  The U.S. 
Government does not work through intermediaries on this matter.  If 
Libya is truly serious about resolving its problems with the 
international community, it needs to comply with the United Nations 
Security Council--and to do so quickly before it becomes necessary to 
seek and impose tougher sanctions.

That concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.  I will now be 
pleased to answer your questions.(###)



ARTICLE 9:


East Asia and the Pacific:  U.S. Policy and Assistance
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, May 6, 1993

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Leach, members of the subcommittee:  I welcome this 
opportunity to appear before this committee and share with you my ideas 
concerning the direction of United States policy toward East Asia and 
the Pacific and how our modest economic and security assistance programs 
contribute to achieving our goals.  During my confirmation process, I 
made a personal pledge to maintain regular consultations with this 
committee, its members, and your staffs.  I respect the integral role 
that you must play in our foreign policy toward the region.  These 
hearings reflect the first of many steps in our common journey.  As this 
is my first appearance before this committee as assistant secretary, I 
would like to outline some of the broader context for the issues we are 
discussing here today.  

First, the importance of the region:  As I noted in my March 31 
confirmation hearing statement, there is no region in the world today 
that is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific.  
Looking ahead to the 21st century, no region will be as important.  The 
region contains the world's fastest-growing and most dynamic economies.  
It is the world's largest consumer market and our biggest export market.  
Last year, our exports were worth more than $120 billion and accounted 
for 2.3 million American jobs.  Forty percent of U.S. trade is with the 
region, more than half again as large as with Western Europe.  The 
economic vigor of the United States increasingly is dependent on global 
economic health and development.  President Clinton has declared our 
domestic economic renewal as his highest priority.  And no region of the 
world is more crucial in this regard than Asia and the Pacific.

We continue to have abiding security interests in Asia.  In this post-
Cold War period, with the closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines, we 
have detected some concern in the region that the United States may be 
losing interest in Asia.  It is important for our national interests to 
demonstrate--not only by reassuring words but by concrete actions--that 
the U.S. intends to remain firmly engaged in Asia and the Pacific 
economically, politically, and in a positive security role.  We will 
maintain the foundations of our five mutual security agreements--with 
Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand--and a 
substantial military presence.  We are prepared with others to explore 
through dialogue and consultations new Asia-Pacific paths toward 
security.  

Goals for American Policy in Asia
In my confirmation hearing, I outlined 10 major goals for American 
policy in Asia and the Pacific.  Permit me to reiterate them briefly:

--  Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more 
mature balance of responsibilities;
--  Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation 
on the Korean Peninsula;
--  Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China where 
political openness catches up with economic reform;
--  Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and 
scope;
--  Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing-in-action 
as we normalize our relations with Vietnam;
--  Securing a peaceful, independent, and democratic Cambodia;
--  Strengthening APEC as the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific economic 
cooperation;
--  Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while 
maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances;
--  Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the 
environment, refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation, and arms 
sales;
--  Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to 
flower.

Achieving these objectives will be a challenge but one which, with your 
support, we relish.  We will use a variety of means to pursue them, 
tailored to the individual situation.  One important foreign policy 
instrument for achieving these goals remains our modest economic and 
security assistance programs in Asia and the Pacific.

U.S. Assistance to Asia and the Pacific
In a very real sense, Mr. Chairman, the Asia-Pacific region has been a 
major success story for the U.S. foreign aid program.  Many of the 
countries of the region which once received substantial U.S. assistance 
have long since graduated from the ranks of aid recipients.  Some, such 
as Japan and Korea, are today major contributors themselves of 
international economic and humanitarian assistance.  

The economic success of many of the countries of Asia is attributable in 
part to carefully targeted U.S. economic assistance, buttressed in some 
instances by specific security assistance.  The U.S. forward-deployed 
military presence contributed significantly to the Asian economic boom 
by providing the stability essential for economic development.  The 
success of our Asian assistance program is perhaps best demonstrated by 
the fact that our overall assistance to the region has been reduced 
significantly and [that] some former aid recipients now challenge us 
vigorously in the global marketplace.  

As a result of such progress and mindful of the need to set rigorous 
budget priorities, over the past 5 years, U.S. assistance to East Asia 
and the Pacific has been reduced from approximately $680 million in FY 
1988 to approximately $268 million in FY 1993.  These figures include 
ESF, FMF, IMET, and development assistance.  During this period, the 
region's share of the security assistance budget fell by half, from 
approximately 3.7% of the global program to approximately 1.7%.  Its 
portion of the development assistance budget was also halved, from 
approximately 15% to 7% of the global total.

But even given these reductions, if the region has been so successful 
economically, how can we justify continuing to provide any economic and 
security assistance to countries in Asia and the Pacific, at a time when 
some American taxpayers are hard-pressed to meet their own families' 
needs, budgets are tight, and President Clinton has declared the 
economic renewal of the United States as his highest priority?  Why does 
this area of economic dynamism continue to need our assistance?  

The answer, Mr. Chairman, is that while the outline I sketched of Asia's 
remarkable economic dynamism is accurate, that dynamism is not uniform 
throughout the region.  There remain some countries which, while making 
progress, continue to need carefully targeted assistance to enhance 
their own  efforts.  Our modest program of development assistance and, 
in some instances, of economic support funds, is directed to those 
particular situations.  

In addition, our small IMET program (slightly more than $5 million in FY 
1993) enhances our interaction with armed forces in the region and 
serves not only our long-term security interests but, by increasing 
exposure of foreign armed forces personnel to U.S. concepts concerning 
civilian control of the military and humane behavior, supports our goal 
of furthering democratization and increasing respect for human rights.

Overall, while recognizing the need for austerity at a time of severe 
budget pressures, the Administration believes that the modest programs 
we have for selected countries and purposes in Asia and the Pacific are 
a sound investment for the United States.

Assistance Programs
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues from the Agency for International 
Development and the Department of Defense have detailed presentations 
concerning the specifics of our assistance programs.  I will highlight 
briefly just a few of our ongoing assistance efforts for you.  

Cambodia.  One of the most complex and central tasks for our Asian 
policy is to help provide the long-suffering Cambodian people with a 
brighter future.  Our long-term goals in Cambodia are to help the 
Cambodians attain peace, democracy, and development after more than two 
decades of war and suffering caused by the genocidal regime of the Khmer 
Rouge and the Vietnamese occupation.  The United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia--UNTAC--has been laboring for more than a year to 
implement the Paris accords on Cambodia aimed at achieving those goals.  
We have provided approximately $200 million in assistance since 1986 to 
meet pressing humanitarian needs throughout Cambodia and to promote the 
growth of democratic and free market institutions.  We are now also 
providing development assistance to help Cambodians rebuild their 
country.  In addition, our assessed contribution to the UN peace-keeping 
mission in Cambodia will total more than $500 million.

Despite the non-cooperation and, at times, the violence of the Khmer 
Rouge faction, UNTAC has recorded some impressive achievements.  Some 
360,000 Cambodian refugees have been repatriated.  Over 500 kilometers 
of roads were de-mined and repaired last year alone.  Over 95% of the 
eligible voters have been registered for the elections scheduled to be 
held from May 23-28.  Twenty political parties have registered to 
participate in the elections.  We expect to see the newly elected 
assembly draft a new Cambodian constitution and form a new government no 
later than 3 months after the elections, at which point the mandate of 
UNTAC will end. 

Our commitment to Cambodia, however, will not end at that time.  The 
future, elected Cambodian government will be hard-pressed to deal with 
Cambodia's enormous economic and social problems and, most probably, 
Khmer Rouge intransigence.  In Tokyo in June 1992, the international 
community, including the United States, pledged it will provide urgently 
needed assistance to the fledgling government to help it 
institutionalize the democracy which the UN-assisted elections are 
intended to implant in Cambodia's troubled soil.  

We are concerned by recent acts of disruption and violence, primarily by 
the Khmer Rouge, which threaten to harm the election process.  Working 
with others, we are trying to check this violence and help ensure a free 
and credible election.   Even more is at stake in Cambodia than the fate 
of that country and regional security.  Given the UNTAC deployment--the 
largest peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations--we 
face a crucial test of multilateral peace-keeping by the international 
community.  We must not fail.

The Philippines.  When the United States had military bases in the 
Philippines, that country was among the top recipients of U.S. 
assistance worldwide.  With the closure of the bases, the end of the 
Cold War, and additional U.S. budget constraints, assistance to the 
Philippines was reduced greatly.  

But the Philippines remains a treaty ally struggling to fulfill 
democratic aspirations and develop economically in the face of daunting 
challenges, including continued insurgencies, both communist and Muslim 
separatist, and frequent major natural disasters.  Our traditional ties 
with the Philippines remain strong.  The democratically elected 
Philippine President is continuing to implement needed economic reforms.  
Continued U.S. assistance--developmental as well as security-related, 
including an IMET program--is essential.  We must help the Philippines 
successfully consolidate its fragile democratic institutions and 
continue to execute the economic reform program directed at putting the 
Philippines' economy on a sustainable growth path.

An important engine of Philippine economic and social development has 
been the Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI).  Initiated in 1989 
with strong backing--indeed, inspiration--from the United States 
Congress, the MAI has been the rallying point for developed nation 
support of the Philippines.  In 1989, the United States pledged best 
efforts to contribute $1 billion to the MAI over 5 years.  Our bilateral 
contributions total $438.5 million through FY 1993.  I urge the Congress 
to continue to support U.S. contributions to the MAI.   

Mongolia.  United States assistance to Mongolia reflects U.S. support 
for emerging democratic and market-oriented nations around the world.  
In 1990, Mongolia broke from the Soviet orbit and threw off communism.  
Since then, Mongolia's Government and its people have proven their 
commitment to democracy and a market economy.  Despite the difficult 
transition, the government continues along the path of reform.

Mongolia is sandwiched between Russia and China--two giants engaged in 
their own processes of reform.  A prosperous, market-oriented, 
democratic Mongolia will have a positive effect across its borders.  A 
successful transition to democracy and a market economy in Mongolia will 
provide a positive example for other countries struggling to overcome 
decades of political subjugation and economic mismanagement.  Continued 
U.S. support--humanitarian, technical, and a modest IMET program--
provides tangible proof that the U.S. matches its pro-reform words with 
concrete deeds for countries which accept the democratic challenge.

The South Pacific.  Far to the south of Mongolia, the island countries 
of the South Pacific are pursuing market-oriented policies as they 
attempt to develop their promising resources and improve the well-being 
of their peoples.  USAID's regional development office in Fiji and a 
branch office in Papua New Guinea are working with 10 of the Pacific 
Island countries in a variety of programs to help meet these challenges, 
the details of which my USAID colleague has provided in his statement.  
I would note, however, that the Commerce and State Departments are 
working to establish the U.S.-Pacific Island Joint Commercial 
Commission, which will help facilitate the region's development.

In addition, USAID administers project support under the South Pacific 
Fisheries Treaty, which was concluded between the U.S. and Pacific 
Island countries in 1987.  This treaty guarantees continued access by 
the U.S. fishing fleet to large portions of the South Pacific, which 
harbors two-thirds of the world's tuna resources.  The economic 
assistance provided under the treaty helps to strengthen the region's 
self-sufficiency and provides a sound basis for further democratization.  
The treaty has been highly successful and encourages cooperation among 
member countries and better coordination of marine resources and other 
policies.

IMET Programs.  I would like to underscore the important role that our 
modest IMET program--slightly more than $5 million in FY 1993--plays in 
the region.  

This Administration is strongly committed to democratic development and 
increased respect for human rights.  While East Asia and the Pacific now 
contain some of the world's fastest-growing economies, the region also 
has a number of developing democracies, some with historical legacies of 
extensive military involvement in the political process.  IMET programs 
are designed specifically to bring foreign military and civilian 
government leaders to the United States for military training, during 
which they experience the American way of life.  Over the last 5 years 
alone, we have brought over 4,800 military and civilian government 
officials to the U.S. from East Asian and Pacific countries under the 
IMET program.  

In the U.S., IMET students are exposed to U.S. democratic values, 
respect for human rights, belief in the rule of law, and the way in 
which the U.S. military functions under civilian control.  IMET students 
develop mutually beneficial professional relationships with American 
military personnel.  In a period when we are seeking to broaden our 
relations with the armed forces in the region, to increase joint 
exercises, and to enhance our access to service facilities for our 
forward-deployed forces, IMET is a valuable resource.  In the case of 
the Philippines, the closing of U.S. bases makes IMET almost the sole 
means of building relationships with the younger generation of 
Philippine military leaders.  In the more affluent countries of Asia and 
the Pacific--Singapore and Korea, for example--IMET is the only U.S. 
assistance program we have.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think all of us can take satisfaction in 
the returns which our small foreign assistance investment in East Asia 
and the Pacific is providing to the U.S. economy, to our commitment to 
democratic values and human rights, and to support for the continued 
U.S. military presence in East Asia.  In addition, individual 
development assistance programs in Asia also address some of the 
critical global issues, such as environmental degradation, the AIDS 
scourge, population pressures, and narcotics.

In my confirmation statement, I stated that:

     Today a Pacific community is a vision.  Tomorrow it can become a 
reality. . . .  This generation of Americans owes it to the labors of 
those who came before us, and the hopes of our successors, to help build 
a new Pacific community.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the resources that this committee 
authorizes are important both for the successes which I have outlined 
above and for our hopes for a more democratic, peaceful, and prosperous 
Pacific community.  I pledge to you my personal commitment and energy to 
help move toward that goal.(###)



ARTICLE 10:


UN Security Council Resolution 825 On the North Korean Nuclear Issue

Resolution 825
(May 11, 1993)

The Security Council,

Having considered with concern the letter from the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) dated 12 
March 1993 addressed to the President of the Council (S/25405) 
concerning the intention of the Government of the DPRK to withdraw from 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty) and 
the report of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) (S/25556),

Recalling the Security Council presidential statement of 8 April 1993 
(S/25562) in which the members of the Council welcome all efforts aimed 
at resolving this situation and, in particular, encourage the IAEA to 
continue its consultations with the DPRK for proper settlement of the 
nuclear verification issue in the DPRK,

Noting in that context the critical importance of the Treaty, and 
emphasizing the integral role of IAEA safeguards in the implementation 
of the Treaty and in ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and 
reaffirming the crucial contribution which progress in non-proliferation 
can make to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling the Joint Declaration by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which includes 
establishment of a credible and effective bilateral inspection regime 
and a pledge not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment 
facilities,

Noting that the DPRK is party to the Treaty and has concluded a full-
scope safeguards agreement as required by that Treaty,

Having also considered with regret the IAEA Board of Governors' findings 
contained in its resolution of 1 April 1993 that the DPRK is in non-
compliance with its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement 
(INFCIRC/403), and that the IAEA is not able to verify that there has 
been no diversion of nuclear materials required to be safeguarded under 
the terms of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement to nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices,

Noting the 1 April 1993 statement by the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, depositories of the Treaty (S/25515), 
which questions whether the DPRK's stated reasons for withdrawing from 
the Treaty constitute extraordinary events relating to the subject-
matter of the Treaty,

Noting the letter of reply by the DPRK to the Director-General of the 
IAEA dated 22 April 1993 which, inter alia, encourages and urges the 
Director-General to hold consultations with the DPRK on the 
implementation of the safeguards agreement, noting also that the DPRK 
has expressed its willingness to seek a negotiated solution to this 
issue,

Welcoming recent signs of improved cooperation between the DPRK and the 
IAEA and the prospect of contacts between the DPRK and other Member 
States,

1.  Calls upon the DPRK to reconsider the announcement contained in the 
letter of 12 March 1993 and thus to reaffirm its commitment to the 
Treaty;

2.  Further calls upon the DPRK to honour its non-proliferation 
obligations under the Treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 
25 February 1993;

3.  Requests the Director-General of the IAEA to continue to consult 
with the DPRK with a view to resolving the issues which are the subject 
of the Board of Governors' findings and to report to the Security 
Council on his efforts in due time;

4.  Urges all Member States to encourage the DPRK to respond positively 
to this resolution, and encourages them to facilitate a solution;

5.  Decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further 
Security Council action if necessary.

VOTE:  13-0-2 (China, Pakistan abstaining).(###)



ARTICLE 11:


Statement at Confirmation Hearing
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary-designate for Inter-American 
Affairs
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
May 5, 1993

I am honored to be nominated by President Clinton to serve as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.  I appreciate this 
opportunity to discuss Latin American and Caribbean affairs with members 
of the committee and to respond to your questions.

I am particularly fortunate to be nominated for this post at this 
historical juncture when, as Secretary Christopher has said, there is an 
unprecedented "convergence of goals and values among all the people of 
the Americas."  We have today an opportunity to work together with our 
neighbors in this hemisphere, inspired by common values, to strengthen 
relations and achieve a wide range of benefits for all our peoples.

Fortunately, representative democracy is now the norm in this region.  
But elections alone do not guarantee that all citizens are fully 
enfranchised, have recourse to fair and effective systems of justice, or 
have a government capable of meeting needs and guaranteeing basic 
rights.

By the same token, the countries of the region are recognizing the 
enormous potential of liberal, market economics to generate economic 
growth, investment, and employment.  But sound macroeconomic policies 
alone do not guarantee that a society will work effectively to lift 
people out of poverty, or to create equal opportunity for all citizens.  
I believe the United States should cooperate in efforts to extend the 
benefits of democracy and sustainable economic growth as broadly and as 
deeply as possible in this hemisphere, as President Clinton intends to 
do at home.

President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have made a clear decision 
to engage actively on the full range of issues confronting the Americas.

I would like to discuss these issues briefly, making reference to the 
three pillars of President Clinton's foreign policy:  building American 
prosperity, promoting democracy, and defending American security.

Building American Prosperity
First, economics.  This is the area where a strong relationship with 
Latin America and the Caribbean offers the clearest, most tangible 
mutual benefits.

Latin and Caribbean reformers are adopting market-oriented economic 
policies, and their economies are growing as a result.  In 1991 and 
1992, for the first time in a decade, the region's economic growth 
outpaced population growth.

These governments' unilateral moves to drop trade barriers and cut 
tariffs have led to a boom in regional trade.  This hemisphere has 
become our fastest-growing export market.  Last year, our exports grew 
19%, from $63 billion to $76 billion, creating an estimated 240,000 new 
jobs in this country.  As our neighbors' incomes continue to grow, so 
will their demand for our exports.

Our challenge is to build upon this shared prosperity so that economies 
of the hemisphere will enjoy strong economic growth which is 
environmentally sound and treats labor fairly.  As you know, President 
Clinton is working aggressively to open markets to our goods worldwide.  
He is committed to working with the Congress to achieve approval of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, and to seeing it enter into force 
on January 1, 1994.  If confirmed, I would look forward to contributing 
to this accomplishment.

The President has also made special mention of this hemisphere as a 
region where we will work, after the North American Free Trade Agreement 
is completed, to reach further agreements with democratic countries 
which are succeeding at economic reform.

The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, launched in 1990 with 
bipartisan support, provides a solid policy foundation to expand trade 
and investment, and to alleviate debt burdens in the hemisphere.  This 
initiative was very well received in the region.  Its essential elements 
are continuing in this Administration, and if confirmed, I would work to 
build on them.

Promoting Democracy
President Clinton's second foreign policy pillar--strengthening 
democracy--is of vital importance in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
which has made dramatic progress is this regard.

Citizens and political leaders throughout the region have understood 
that only open and democratic societies have the resiliency and capacity 
to draw on the talents and energies of their people to confront the 
challenges of this age.  For them as for us, democracy and human rights 
are more than moral imperatives which fulfill our vision of a free and 
just society--they are practical necessities.

Strengthening democracy means first and foremost bolstering the public 
and private institutions which defend human rights, engage citizens in 
the political process, and promote justice and social equity.  If 
confirmed, I would use our foreign assistance, working with public and 
private organizations throughout this hemisphere, to strengthen these 
vital institutions.

I know first-hand from my experience in the Andean region that one of 
the most dangerous threats to democracy and free societies is narcotics 
trafficking.  I have seen the courage and the sacrifice with which many 
of our neighbors are confronting this threat, despite resources that are 
even scarcer than ours.  Their losses have been great.  Their victories 
have benefited us as well as themselves.  I look forward to examining 
with our partners in the hemisphere the ways we can cooperate which will 
most likely lead to further success in this terrible struggle.

I would also work with our neighbors to promote good governance.  For 
democracy to work well, governments must be able to respond to citizens' 
needs effectively, regularly, and fairly.  Misapplication of funds or 
simple corruption is corrosive to public trust, undermines democratic 
institutions, subverts governments' efforts to serve their citizens, and 
is a cruel tax paid most often by society's weakest members.  Good 
governance is an important challenge, a permanent challenge for all 
democracies, even our own.

Central America remains an important focus of U.S. foreign policy.  The 
people of El Salvador and Nicaragua have ended their civil wars and are 
making extraordinary efforts to heal their societies, rebuild their 
economies, and strengthen their democratic systems.  In Guatemala, good 
progress is being made in negotiations to end the last military conflict 
in Central America.  I believe we have a strong interest in exercising 
leadership and providing assistance to help Central Americans 
consolidate a democratic peace and pursue a brighter future.

Defending American Security
Modernizing our armed forces and enhancing American security is a third 
pillar of President Clinton's foreign policy.  In this hemisphere, with 
the Cold War ended, with the spread of democracy and the waning of 
guerrilla movements once sponsored by Cuba, the issue of regional 
security has been transformed.  Still, we cannot neglect security 
concerns in our own region.  I believe we must take advantage of this 
period of peace to search for opportunities to enhance security and 
prevent future crises.

One of the most hopeful developments of recent years has been the action 
taken by Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to control the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction.  If confirmed, I would set as a key goal of our 
diplomacy the search for a regional consensus to continue progress in 
this critical area.

I would also search for opportunities to contribute to the solution of 
lingering border disputes, and to foster understandings to restrain the 
buildup of conventional weapons.  Success in such efforts would build 
confidence among neighbors and permit them to devote more resources to 
urgent social needs.

I am confident that my personal experience in the Foreign Service 
affords me a good opportunity to be successful as Assistant Secretary 
for Inter-American Affairs.  In my 31 years in the Foreign Service, I 
have served 16 years in Latin America and 5 more working on Latin 
American affairs in the State Department.

Yet I have also had opportunities to step back from Latin America and 
the Caribbean--in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, at our 
mission to the United Nations--where I could view inter-American affairs 
in a broader policy perspective.

I value my economic experience, given the high priority of economic 
issues in the affairs of this region.  If confirmed, I would make 
economic and business affairs a key priority of our personnel in 
Washington and in the field.  I want the American business community to 
see the State Department and each of our embassies as working partners 
in the search for new export opportunities.

In my service as the United States Deputy Representative to the United 
Nations the last 3 years, I gained an appreciation of the opportunities 
offered by strong multilateral organizations.  In our hemisphere, the 
Organization of American States is today working constructively in a 
wide range of areas beneficial to our interests.  I would welcome the 
chance to work closely with Ambassador Babbitt to strengthen the OAS for 
the benefit of all its members.

I would also place a high priority on consulting frequently with the 
Congress and on achieving the highest possible degree of bipartisan 
support for our policies.  When our foreign policy is built on a solid 
domestic consensus, it sends the clearest possible signal that our 
policy is sustainable and that we are serious in our purpose.  To a 
diplomat, that is an invaluable asset.

Finally, I would work to maintain a tone of partnership and mutual 
respect in our relations with the nations of the Americas.  I believe 
President Clinton has set forth a policy for this hemisphere which is 
worthy of American values and will serve our economic and security 
interests.  If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and with 
the nations of this region to make that vision a reality.(###)



ARTICLE 12:


Review of U.S. Efforts To Combat the International Narcotics Trade
Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters
Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, 
International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, May 11, 1993

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate this opportunity 
to discuss the status of our efforts to combat the international 
narcotics trade and the threat that it poses to the national security of 
our friends and allies.  I am providing this testimony as part of the 
annual process in which the State Department submits its International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) to Congress.  This report 
forms the basis for the President's decision on whether to certify 27 
major drug-producing or transit countries as having fully cooperated 
with the United States--or taken adequate steps on their own--to achieve 
full compliance with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances.

Denial of certification means that most forms of U.S. assistance to the 
country concerned may not be provided and that U.S. representatives are 
required to vote against that country's loan applications in 
multilateral development banks.  The President denied certification to 
three countries: Burma, Iran, and Syria.  The President did not certify 
but granted national interest waivers to two countries: Afghanistan and 
Lebanon.  The President certified 22 [others]:  The Bahamas, Belize, 
Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, 
Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela.

I come before you at a moment when our international narcotics control 
effort is under review.  The Administration is looking at the range and 
mix of counter-narcotics options, as part of its comprehensive, 
government-wide assessment of anti-drug programs and policies.  We are 
taking a hard look at ourselves and our programs, at what has worked and 
what has not worked--all with an eye toward achieving the best possible 
use of our resources and return on our investment in what will likely 
continue to be tough budget times.  

This review is taking place within the context of the U.S. effort to 
promote two broad goals.  Our first goal is to support the domestic 
objective of reducing drug abuse and drug-related crime in the U.S. by 
promoting and assisting efforts by other countries and multilateral 
institutions to stem drug production, trafficking, and abuse worldwide.  
The second goal is to support our important foreign policy priorities in 
promoting democracy, respect for human rights, sustainable economic 
growth, and environmental protection.  This goal recognizes that drug 
production and trafficking weaken democratic systems and free market 
economies, because traffickers attempt to corrupt and threaten 
institutions such as the courts, the police, legislatures, and financial 
systems, and because slash-and-burn drug cultivation and the 
indiscriminate use of chemicals bring about environmental degradation.

Let me cite two important recent statements which provide a policy 
framework for the current review of international counter-narcotics 
strategy.  In announcing the nomination of Lee Brown as Director of the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, President Clinton said:

We will continue to work with other nations who have shown the political 
will to fight illegal drugs.  They will continue to get our full support 
and cooperation.

In remarks to the Council of the Americas on May 3, Deputy Secretary 
Wharton, speaking on behalf of Secretary Christopher, stated:

     We want to work with governments to strengthen key public 
institutions and the administration of justice.  We want to share our 
experience to help democratic governments to fight corruption and other 
abuses of power.  Corruption is a cancer that will destroy democracy--
and investment opportunities--if it is not eradicated.

We will work in partnership with the governments of this region to fight 
narco-traffickers, whose corruption and violence threaten the survival 
of democratic institutions.  We will work with the OAS to create a 
common legal framework for action.  Let no one doubt our resolve to 
reduce drug consumption, to enforce our laws, and to help our democratic 
neighbors defeat the drug traffickers.

With this background in mind, let me briefly review developments over 
the past year in the international counter-narcotics field.  For a more 
complete review, I refer you to the Executive Summary of the INCSR.  As 
usual, the balance sheet contains good and bad news.  On the positive 
side of the ledger, I would note the following.

--  With U.S. Government assistance, the overall Andean coca crop has 
been contained at about 210,000 hectares for the past 3 years.  
Previously, it had been growing at approximately 10%-20% per year.

--  The international community is making important progress in the 
control of the chemicals needed for drug refining.  Recommendations by 
the 27-member Chemical Action Task Force are beginning to be 
implemented.

--  Over the last 3 years, [eliminating] narcotics money-laundering has 
evolved into an important foreign policy and financial management 
priority in both small and large financial center countries.  The 
Financial Action Task Force established by the G-7 summit in 1989 has 
been influential and valuable in this regard.

--  As for demand reduction, in 1992, the U.S. Government funded more 
programs on training, public awareness, epidemiology, and education in 
Latin America and Southeast and Southwest Asia.  INM programs trained 
3,000 demand-reduction experts worldwide.

--  Many countries now openly admit the dangers posed by narcotics-
trafficking and domestic consumption and are actively combatting the 
problem as a matter of their own national interests.

--  The U.S. Government intensified its efforts to engage the entire UN 
system, particularly the specialized agencies in drug-control issues.

--  Seventy-two states have now ratified or acceded to the 1988 UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances.

--  Colombia continued to play a pivotal role against the drug trade 
throughout 1992, maintaining an active enforcement and crop-control 
program, including the eradication of more than one-third of the opium 
poppy crop, more hectares (12,000) in the last year than any other 
government, ever. 

--  The Government of Bolivia's coca cultivation showed a net decline in 
1992 and is now at its lowest in 5 years.

--  Ecuador scored a major success in June 1992 by dismantling the Jorge 
Reyes Torres narcotics organization.

--  Precedent-setting regional cooperation in cross-border operations 
among the Andean countries was witnessed in 1992.

--  Mexico seized 38.8 metric tons of cocaine during 1992 and 15 metric 
tons so far this year, including two multi-ton (5 and 7.2) seizures in 
April.  Mexico has also reduced domestic production of opium poppy and 
marijuana to the lowest levels in a decade, and has seized large amounts 
of marijuana and heroin.  Mexico dramatically increased its own counter-
narcotics burden by assuming full financial responsibility for 
previously U.S.-funded programs.

--  Guatemala, with U.S. Government assistance, virtually eliminated a 
poppy crop in 1992 which a year earlier potentially could have yielded 
nearly 12 metric tons of opium/1 metric ton of heroin.

--  With U.S. Government assistance, the Government of Panama, in early 
1993 (April 2-3), conducted the first ever aerial eradication of a coca 
crop in Central America, sending a strong message to other potential 
coca leaf farmers in the region.

--  In three different cases during December and January, Turkish police 
interdicted over eight metric tons of morphine base and heroin from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the largest amounts ever seized in the 
Mediterranean and on the Turkish/Georgian border.  They did so with the 
assistance of technical equipment supplied by the INM Bureau.

--  Laos has reduced its potential opium production in each of the past 
3 years, for a total reduction of 39%.  This is a direct result of U.S. 
and UN programs.  Laos has formed a new, dedicated police counter-
narcotics unit which we are preparing to help equip and train. We plan 
to staff a Narcotics Assistant Section in our embassy in Vientiane in 
the fall of this year.

--  Thailand has sustained an active opium poppy crop control program, 
with total cultivation declining by 50% since 1989, to a level 
insufficient for Thailand's own domestic consumption.  Thailand passed 
new conspiracy and asset forfeiture statutes and has taken its first 
steps to investigate and prosecute drug traffickers under these new 
laws.

Now, for the bad news.

--  Despite stepped-up programs, hundreds of tons of cocaine and heroin 
continued to flow to the United States and to Europe, while consumption 
has risen in Latin America.

--  In Europe and Central Asia, the break-up of the old Soviet empire 
opened new frontiers for entrepreneurial drug traffickers.  Well-
established as well as new criminal organizations from the Baltics to 
Tajikistan are cashing in on the heroin flowing abundantly from 
Southeast and Southwest Asia.

--  The illegal drug-trafficking industry continues to be strong, 
ruthless, rich, and adaptable.

--  Major traffickers continue to exploit the weaknesses of governments 
beset by economic-political instability and social unrest.

--  Drug-financed corruption continues to be one of the greatest 
impediments to effective counter-narcotics efforts in many parts of the 
world.

As the bad news items indicate, the international drug industry remains 
a formidable and dangerous challenge. The traffickers continue to probe 
for weaknesses, seek out new markets, and grab for increased political 
and economic influence through corruption and intimidation.  We should 
not expect them to simply surrender to our pressure; they will have to 
be defeated. 

The achievements, however, show that the prospects for our success are 
improving.  The trend is toward more sophisticated and effective 
international counter-narcotics actions.  As is now occurring in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, more countries are signaling their commitment 
by requesting basic training in the areas of drug enforcement and 
prevention.  Others are moving to disrupt the trade and cause financial 
and other hardships to the traffickers with more intensified operations 
to seize drugs, confiscate vehicles, and destroy labs.  And as drug laws 
and counter-narcotics institutions grow stronger, an expanding number of 
countries are focusing their efforts increasingly on dismantling the 
managerial and financial networks that run the trade and pose the most 
serious drug-related threats to their political, economic, and social 
interests.

This balance sheet shows that the task continues to be monumental. 
Progress has been made, but much more needs to be done.  Success in our 
international efforts will depend on strengthening international resolve 
and cooperation.  It is clear that our primary job is here at home in 
working to reduce drug abuse and its widespread ill effects on our 
society.  Our international counter-narcotics efforts have the goal of 
making that job easier, as well as trying to ensure that other societies 
are not plagued by the same effects.

However we choose to structure our efforts, I am convinced that a strong 
international component is key to success.  While the work will continue 
to be difficult, it will also continue to be necessary.(###)



ARTICLE 13:


Department Statements

Terrorists Attack TV Station in Suriname 
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, May 
11, 1993.

The United States condemns in the strongest terms last night's terrorist 
attack on the government-owned television station that had broadcast 
President Ronald Venetiaan's May 10 report to Suriname's National 
Assembly on his efforts to consolidate democracy and the rule of law, 
and, particularly, to establish civilian control over the military.  The 
United States has given, and will continue to give, its fullest support 
to the Government of Suriname in these efforts.

Those responsible were associated with those who oppose the full 
establishment of democracy in Suriname.  They injured several people and 
burned part of the facilities.  They should be brought to justice as 
soon as possible.

The United States is deeply concerned over deterioration of the security 
situation in Suriname.  The struggle for democracy in Suriname is on the 
agenda of the entire inter-American community.  The Organization of 
American States (OAS) has been involved in Suriname for over 2 years.  
We are consulting with OAS members and other governments who share our 
concerns; we expect the OAS will continue to monitor the situation in 
Suriname closely.


U.S. Assistance to UNTAC
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, May 
12, 1993.

In response to the UN's request for immediate assistance to enhance 
security conditions for the upcoming Cambodian elections, the U.S. 
agreed to provide and transport urgently needed equipment and materiel 
to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).  The first 
delivery arrived in Cambodia on Wednesday, May 12 (Cambodia time).  The 
materiel included 6,000 body armor jackets, 19,000 helmets, 15,000 
medical dressings, and 5,400 assorted flares.

The U.S. is also prepared to airlift six Australian Blackhawk 
helicopters into Cambodia to improve UNTAC's security and enable greater 
use of mobile polling facilities.  We expect these deliveries to begin 
shortly.  This equipment will enhance security conditions and increase 
the confidence of the Cambodian people that they can vote freely and 
safely in the elections.

The rapid response by the U.S. and other countries to UNTAC's request 
demonstrates clearly and concretely the determination of the 
international community to support in every way possible UNTAC's efforts 
to proceed with democratic elections in Cambodia on May 23-28, as 
provided for in the Paris accords.  More than 95% of eligible Cambodians 
and 20 political parties have registered to participate in the UN-
supervised election, despite the refusal of the Khmer Rouge to 
participate.  We believe the Cambodian people must be given an 
opportunity to determine their own political future.  Our actions 
reflect our firm commitment to this democratic process.(###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL. 4, NO. 21

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