US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 17, APRIL 26, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Reaffirming the US Commitment To Protect Global Environment --
President Clinton
2. Assistance to Russia And the Foreign Affairs Budget -- Secretary
Christopher
3. Middle East Peace Talks To Resume -- Secretary Christopher
4. US Must Lead a Strategic AllianceWith Post-Soviet Reform -- Strobe
Talbott
5. Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons: Building Confidence and
Partnership -- James E. Goodby
6. US Aid to Central and Eastern Europe: A Call for Imagination --
Robert L. Hutchings
7. Crisis in Zaire
8. UN Security Council Resolutions On the Former Yugoslavia
9. Status of Negotiations in Haiti -- Secretary Christopher
10. Department's Efforts To Combat International Terrorism -- Laurence
Pope
11. US Delegation Visits Hanoi; POW/MIA Issues Discussed
12. Fact Sheet: The Federal Bulletin Board
13. What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United States,
Geographic Notes
(###)
ARTICLE 1:
Reaffirming the US Commitment To Protect Global Environment
President Clinton
Address at the US Botanical Gardens, Washington, DC, April 21, 1993
(opening remarks deleted)
A little more than 1 week ago, most Americans celebrated holy days of
freedom and renewal. Today, we still nurture the faith that helps us to
understand more clearly that we can do better. This is a time of new
beginnings, a time when there is anguish and anxiety all around us; but
we still must yearn once again to succeed in our common purposes to
reach our deepest goals.
For all of our differences, I think there is an overwhelming
determination to change our course, to offer more opportunity, to assume
more responsibility, to restore the larger American community, and to
achieve things that are larger than ourselves and more lasting than the
present moment. We seek to set our course by the star of age-old
values, not short-term expediencies; to waste less in the present and
provide more for the future; to leave a legacy that keeps faith with
those who left the earth to us.
This is the American spirit. It moves us not only in great gatherings,
but also when we stand silently all alone in the presence only of nature
and our Creator.
If there is one commitment that defines our people, it is our devotion
to the rich and expansive land we have inherited. From the first
Americans to the present day, our people have lived in awe of the power,
the majesty, and the beauty of the forests, the rivers, and the streams
of America. That love of the land, which flows like a mighty current
through this land and through our character, burst into service on the
first Earth Day in 1970.
When I traveled the country last year, I saw and spoke of how much had
been accomplished by the environmental movement since then and how much
still remains to be done. For all that has been done to protect the air
and the water, we haven't halted the destruction of wetlands at home and
the rain forests abroad. For all that has been learned, we still
struggle to comprehend such dangers to our planet's delicate environment
as the shroud of greenhouse gases and the dangerous thinning of the
ozone layer. We haven't done nearly enough to protect our forest
communities from the hazards such as lead poisoning, which is believed
to cause mental retardation, learning disabilities, and impaired growth.
Unless we act, and act now, we face a future where our planet will be
home to 9 billion people within our lifetime, but its capacity to
support and sustain our lives will be very much diminished. Unless we
act, we face the extinction of untold numbers of species that might
support our livelihoods and provide medication to save our very lives.
Unless we act now, we face a future in which the sun may scorch us, not
warm us; where the change of season may take on a dreadful new meaning;
and where our children's children will inherit a planet far less
hospitable than the world in which we came of age. I have a faith that
we will act, not from fear but from hope and through vision.
All across this country, there is a deep understanding rooted in our
religious heritage and renewed in the spirit of this time that the
bounty of nature is not ours to waste. It is a gift from God that we
hold in trust for future generations. Preserving our heritage,
enhancing it, and passing it along is a great purpose worthy of a great
people. If we seize the opportunity and shoulder the responsibility, we
can enrich the future and ennoble our own lives.
Just as we yearn to come together as a people, we yearn to move beyond
the false choices that the last few years have imposed upon us. For too
long, we have been told that we have to choose between the economy and
the environment; between our jobs; between our obligations to our own
people and our responsibilities to the future and to the rest of the
world; between public action and private economy.
I am here today in the hope that we can together take a different course
of action to offer a new set of challenges to our people. Our
environmental program is based on three principles.
First, we think [that] you can't have a healthy economy without a
healthy environment. We need not choose between breathing clean air and
bringing home secure paychecks. The fact is, our environmental problems
result not from robust growth but from reckless growth. The fact is
that only a prosperous society can have the confidence and the means to
protect its environment. And the fact is [that] healthy communities and
environmentally sound products and services do best in today's economic
competition. That's why our policies must protect our environment,
promote economic growth, and provide millions of high-skill, high-wage
jobs.
Second, we want to protect the environment at home and abroad. In an
era of global economics, global epidemics, and global environmental
hazards, a central challenge of our time is to promote our national
interest in the context of its connectedness with the rest of the world.
We share our atmosphere, our planet, [and] our destiny with all the
peoples of this world. The policies I outline today will protect all of
us because that is the only way we can protect any of us.
Third, we must move beyond the antagonisms among business, government,
and individual citizens. The policies I outline today are part of our
effort to reinvent government, to make it your partner and not your
overseer, to lead by example and not by bureaucratic fiat.
In the face of great challenges, we need a government that not only
guards against the worst in us but helps to bring out the best in us. I
know we can do this because our Administration includes the best team of
environmental policy-makers who have ever served the United States: the
Vice President, Interior Secretary Babbitt, EPA Administrator Browner--
and I hope that the EPA will, soon, by the grace of Congress, be a
Cabinet-level department--and Energy Secretary O'Leary, Commerce
Secretary Brown, Transportation Secretary Pena, the Agriculture
Secretary Mike Espy, our Environmental Policy Director Katie McGinty,
and our Science and Technology Adviser Jack Gibbons. All of them share
an unshakable commitment to a healthy environment, a growing economy,
and a responsive government.
Our economic plan will create new job opportunities and new business
opportunities [in] protecting our natural environment. The reductions
in the interest rates which we have seen already will free up tens of
billions of dollars for responsive investments in this year alone.
The jobs package [that] I have asked the Congress to pass contains--this
[has] hardly been noticed, but it actually contains--green jobs from
wastewater treatment to energy efficiency, to the restoration of our
national parks, to investments in new technologies designed to create
the means by which we can solve the problems of the future and create
more jobs for Americans.
Our long-term strategy invests more in pollution prevention, energy
efficiency, and solar energy; in renewable energy and environmental
restoration and water treatment--all of which can be found in the 5-year
budget that we have presented to the Congress.
These investments will create tens of thousands of new jobs, and they
will save tens of thousands more. Because when we save energy and
resources, we will have more to invest in creating new jobs and
providing better living standards. Today, every other advanced nation
is more energy efficient than we are. That is one of the reasons why
over the last couple of years, for example, the average German factory
worker has come to make over 20% more than his American counterpart
[and] that German workers, while having higher wages, also have more
secure and better health care. That's because the economy uses one-half
the energy we do to produce the same amount of goods. We can do better,
and we will.
I believe [that] we can develop the know-how to out-conserve and out-
compete anyone else on earth. All over the world, people are buying
products that help them to protect the environment. There's a $200-
billion market today for environmental technologies. And by the turn of
the decade and the century, it will be $300 billion.
Let me just share one example with you--something we all know and use,
and something some of us are still trying to learn how to replace:
light bulbs. Long-lasting, energy-saving light bulbs didn't even exist
in 1985. Now American companies sell over $500-million worth of these
products, with sales expected to reach $2 billion by 1995 and $10
billion by the year 2000, creating thousands of new jobs. American
scientists have taken the lead in developing these technologies, and
it's time to help our companies take the lead in bringing out products
and services to market.
I've asked the Energy Department, the Commerce Department, and the EPA
to assess current environmental technologies and create a strategic plan
to give our companies the trade development, promotional efforts, and
technical assistance they need to turn these advances into jobs here in
America as well as to help promote a better environment. America can
only maintain its lead in the world economy by taking the lead to
preserve the world environment.
Last year, the nations of the world came together at the earth summit in
Rio to try to find a way to protect the miraculous diversity of plant
and animal life all across the planet. The biodiversity treaty which
resulted had some flaws, and we all knew that. But, instead of fixing
them, the United States walked away from the treaty. That left us out
of a treaty that is critically important not only to our future but to
the future of the world--and not only because of what it will do to
preserve species but because of opportunities it offers for cutting-edge
companies whose research creates new medicines, new products, and new
jobs.
Again, just one recent example makes the point. A tree that was thought
to have no value, the Pacific yew, used to be bulldozed and burned. Now
we know that the tree contains one of our most promising potential cures
for ovarian cancer, breast cancer, and other forms of cancer. We cannot
walk away from challenges like those presented by the biodiversity
treaty. We must step up to them.
Our Administration has worked with business and environmental groups
toward an agreement that protects both American interests and the world
environment. And today, I am proud to announce the United States'
intention to sign the bio-diversity treaty.
This is an example of what you can do by bringing business and
environmentalists together instead of pitting them against each other.
We can move forward to protect critical natural resources and critical
technologies. I'm also directing the State Department to move ahead
with our talks with other countries which have signed the convention so
that the United States can move as quickly as possible toward
ratification.
To learn more about where we stand in protecting all our biological
resources here at home, I'm asking the Interior Department to create a
national biological survey to help us protect endangered species and,
just as importantly, to help the agricultural and biotechnical
industries of our country identify new sources of food, fiber, and
medication.
We also must take the lead in addressing the challenge of global warming
that could make our planet and its climate less hospitable and more
hostile to human life. Today, I reaffirm my personal [commitment] and
announce our nation's commitment to reducing our emissions of greenhouse
gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000.
I am instructing my Administration to produce a cost-effective plan by
August that can continue the trend of reduced emissions. This must be a
clarion call--not for more bureaucracy or regulation or unnecessary
costs but, instead, for American ingenuity and creativity to produce the
best and most energy-efficient technology.
After the Cold War, we face the challenge of helping Russia achieve a
healthy democracy, a healthy economy, and a healthy environment. Our
Russian aid package includes $38 million to clean up pollution and
promote better uses of energy. As with the full range of our
investments in Russia, this is truly an investment not only in promoting
our own values but in protecting our national security. To protect the
environment at home and abroad, I am committed to a government that
leads by example, brings people together, and brings out the best in
everyone. For too long, our government did more to inflame
environmental issues than to solve them. Different agencies pursued
conflicting policies, national leaders polarized people, and problems
wound up in the courts or in the streets instead of being solved.
We seek to bring a new spirit to these difficult issues. Three weeks
ago in Portland, Oregon, we brought together business people, timber
workers, and environmentalists from throughout the Northwest to discuss
how best to preserve jobs and to protect the old-growth forests and the
species which inhabit them. People sat down in a conference room, not a
court room, and, in the words of Archbishop Thomas Murphy of Seattle, we
tried to find common ground for a common good. At the close of that
forest conference, I asked my Cabinet and our entire Administration to
begin work immediately to craft a balanced, comprehensive, long-term
policy that is also comprehensible.
Before I ask our companies and our communities and our families to meet
any challenge, it seems to me [that] we have to set that standard for
the government. The American people are entitled to know where the
United States stands on this issue and many other issues. It is time to
bring an end to the time when issues like this wind up in court and
[when] there are five different positions from the US Government itself.
We can never solve problems in that fashion. We can only undermine the
security and stability of people's lives.
That's one reason I am proud that yesterday the US Army announced its
plan to clean up a large number of sites where we learned, recently,
that chemical weapons materials may be buried in some places from as
long ago as World War I. Working with the EPA, the Army will clean up
this problem safely and in an environmentally sound manner.
This is a legacy of America's efforts to defend our people and the
community of free nations. Now we are taking steps to defend our people
and our environment and the environment of the world. In that same
spirit, I plan to sign an executive order requiring federal facilities
that manufacture, process, or use toxic chemicals to comply with the
federal right-to-know laws and publicly report what they are doing.
I might add that it is time that the US Government begins to live under
the laws it makes for other people. With this executive order, I ask
all federal facilities to set a voluntary goal to reduc[e] their release
of toxic pollutants by 50% by 1999. This will reduce toxic releases,
control costs associated with cleanups, and promote clean technologies.
And it will help make our government what it should be: a positive
example for the rest of the country.
Poor neighborhoods in our cities suffer most often from toxic pollution.
Cleaning up the toxic wastes will create new jobs in these neighborhoods
for those people and make them safer places to live, to work, and to do
business.
Today, I am also signing an executive order that directs federal
agencies to make preliminary changes in their purchasing policies to use
fewer substances harmful to the ozone layer. Here, too, we must put our
actions where our values are. Our government is a leading purchaser of
goods and services, and it's time to stop not only the waste of
taxpayers' money but the waste of our natural resources.
Today, I am signing an executive order which commits the federal
government to buy thousands more American-made vehicles using clean,
domestic fuels such as natural gas, ethanol, methanol, and electric
power. This will reduce our demand for foreign oil, reduce air
pollution, promote promising technologies, promote American companies,
create American jobs, and save American tax dollars. To demonstrate my
commitment to this issue, Energy Secretary O'Leary is creating a task
force led by the Land Commissioner of Texas, Gary Mauro--who is here in
the audience today--who has headed a successful effort in his own state.
I hope we can do as well in America as they have done in Texas.
In that same spirit, I plan to sign an executive order committing every
agency of the national government to do more than ever to buy and use
recycled products. This will provide a market for new technologies,
make better use of recycled materials, and encourage the creation of new
products that can be offered to the government, to private companies,
and to consumers. And again, it will create jobs through the recycling
process.
We must keep finding new ways to be a force for positive change. For
example, the federal government is the largest purchaser of computer
equipment in the world, and computers are the fastest-growing area of
electricity use. That's why I am also signing an executive order today
requiring the federal government to purchase energy-efficient computers.
We're going to expand the market for a technology where America
pioneered and still leads the world, and we'll save energy, saving the
taxpayers $40 mil-lion per year, and set an example for our country and
for the world.
For as long as I live and work in the White House, I want Americans to
see it not only as a symbol of clean government but also [of] a clean
environment. That's why I'm announcing an energy and environmental
audit of the White House. We're going to identify what it takes to make
the White House a model for efficiency and waste reduction. It might
mean fewer memos and less paper. Then we're going to get the job done.
I want to make the White House a model for other federal agencies, for
state and local governments, for business, and for families in their
homes. Before I ask you to do the best you can in your house, I ought
to make sure I'm doing the best I can in my house.
I ask that all of us today reaffirm our willingness to assume
responsibility for our common environment and to do it willingly,
hopefully, and joyously. We are challenged here today not so much to
sacrifice as to celebrate and create. I've challenged Americans who are
young in years or young in spirit to offer their time and their talent
to serve their communities and their country. I've asked them to help
in teaching our children, healing the sick, policing our streets.
But equally important are efforts to protect our environment--from our
largest cities to our smallest towns to our suburbs. Our national
service plan will ask thousands of Americans to do their part, from
leading recycling drives to preventing lead poisoning.
The challenge to shoulder responsibility and seize opportunity extends
to each of us in business, communities, and homes. In our own lives, in
our own ways, each of us has something to offer to the work of cleaning
up America's environment. And each of us surely has something very
personal to gain.
On a colder day in the middle of winter, just 3 months ago, a poet asked
us to celebrate not only the marvelous diversity of our people but the
miraculous bounty of our land. "Here on the pulse of this new day,"
Maya Angelou challenged us to look at "the rock, the river, the tree,
your country." Now, it is a season of new hope and new beginnings. As
we look anew at our neighbors, our children, and our communities as well
as the world around us, we must seize the possibilities inherent in this
exhilarating moment--to face our challenges, to exercise our
responsibilities, and to rejoice in them. (###)
ARTICLE 2:
Assistance to Russia And the Foreign Affairs Budget
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC,
April 20, 1993
It is a pleasure to appear again before you and this committee. Three
months have passed since our first official meeting at my confirmation
hearing. Much has transpired in that time. We have conducted an
activist, internationalist, democracy-oriented foreign policy.
I look forward to exploring the full range of challenges we confront. I
will limit my formal remarks to two key issues.
First, I want to update you on our single-most important foreign policy
priority: the effort to help reform succeed in Russia.
Second, I will review the Administration's foreign affairs budget
requests and management strategy.
Assisting Reform in Russia: From Vancouver to Tokyo
Mr. Chairman, the last few weeks have witnessed important developments
in Russia's relations with the United States and the West. The
Vancouver summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin marked a
milestone. It was the first truly post-Cold War summit, where talk
about economic reform and democracy played as central a role as
negotiations over nuclear weapons did in the past.
At the summit, the presidents agreed on a new package of bilateral
programs designed to address Russia's immediate human needs and
contribute to the building of a market economy. It targets areas of
high priority. This includes a resumption of US food exports; support
for privatization and new businesses; help in dismantling nuclear
weapons; a housing program for demobilized soldiers to speed Russia's
withdrawal from the Baltic countries and parts of the former Soviet
empire; funding for programs to enhance nuclear safety; help in
resurrecting Russia's energy sector; and an increase in people-to-people
exchanges.
These programs are designed to deliver quick, tangible benefits to the
Russian people. They will support Russia's long-term transformation to
the market, and--most importantly-- directly serve US interests by
reducing the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and opening new markets for
our workers, farmers, and businesses.
While America's increased support and leadership will be critical for
promoting reform, we cannot do it alone. Our help must be part of a
much larger partnership between Russia and the international community.
Building that broader cooperative effort was precisely the purpose
behind last week's extraordinary meeting in Tokyo between foreign and
finance ministers of the G-7 [Group of 7 industrialized] countries and
Russia.
At that meeting, Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Fyodorov outlined a bold
new plan to control Russia's money supply, reduce its budget deficits,
and achieve macroeconomic stabilization. In response, we and our G-7
partners--working through the international financial institutions--
announced a major new multilateral initiative to support reform. In
addition to the Paris Club's recent rescheduling of $15 billion of
Russia's foreign debt, the $28-billion Tokyo package will include
helping Russia to stabilize its currency, to finance critical imports,
to restructure key sectors of its economy, and to reduce the threat of
its deadly nuclear legacy.
The vast majority of this new support for Russian reform will come from
the international financial institutions. But it is also going to
require contributions from G-7 members, as well as other countries in
Asia, the Middle East, and Europe that are capable of participating.
Here, America must be willing to pay its fair share.
As President Clinton stated in Vancouver, our strategy to assist Russia
consists of three steps.
-- The first is the $1.6 billion package of bilateral programs
announced at the US-Russian summit. As you know, the monies for this
package have already been appropriated by the Congress.
-- The second step is the new multilateral support program announced in
Tokyo. One of the most important and innovative parts of that program
could be the creation of a G-7 privatization fund. This fund is
designed to help Russia cope with the economic and political
consequences of privatizing the huge--and hugely wasteful--state-owned
enterprises that are bleeding its budget dry and fueling inflation. Our
share of this effort would amount to some $500 million, and would take
the form of a "challenge grant." That is, it would be contingent on
other G-7 members contributing another $1.5 billion. We would then look
to the international financial institutions to commit an additional $2
billion in co-financing, bringing the fund's total resources to $4
billion in grants and loans.
-- The third step in the President's plan to support Russian reform is
to work closely with the Congress to develop further bilateral
assistance efforts. A starting point will be the funding requests in
our fiscal year (FY) 1994 budget to continue current programs to
dismantle nuclear weapons, deliver humanitarian help, and promote
democracy and privatization. In recent talks with the Russians, our G-7
partners, and the Congress, we have reached the conclusion, Mr.
Chairman, that even more must be done. As I announced last week in
Tokyo, the President has decided to seek an expanded package of US
bilateral programs, to build upon the ones announced at Vancouver, and
in addition to the requests contained in our FY 1994 budget.
This package reflects the intensive consultations that we have had. It
focuses on what Russia's reformers say they most need, as well as the
areas where Members of Congress have suggested our efforts should be
aimed. This will build on our assistance efforts in energy,
privatization, and housing for demobilized soldiers and also provide
support for the environment, medicines, trade and investment, and
exchange programs.
This expanded package of bilateral steps, together with our $500 million
contribution to the prospective G-7 privatization fund, would require an
additional appropriation of approximately $1.8 billion. We are now
consulting with this committee and others in Congress to determine how
best to structure such a request. Mr. Chairman, I realize this is a
difficult proposal at a time when so many Americans face hardships here
at home. But President Clinton and I are convinced that this investment
in Russia's democratic future is an essential investment in America's
future. By making this investment, we can help turn our most dangerous
enemy into an enduring partner. That, I believe, is a critical--indeed,
a noble--mission.
The President and I will continue to make the case to the American
people that a focused program to assist Russian democracy is in our
deepest self-interest. We are counting on the members of this committee
to join us in this effort.
International Affairs Budget
Mr. Chairman, let me now turn briefly to a discussion of our FY 1994
international affairs budget. It is a budget that accurately reflects
the times we live in. In its funding requests, it recognizes the tight
fiscal constraints confronting our government today. And in its
priorities and objectives, it marks a first but important step toward
addressing the new challenges of the post-Cold War era.
One of our highest priorities will be promoting democracy and human
rights. I have already described the especially high stake we have in
helping freedom triumph in Russia and the other new states of the former
Soviet Union. But our efforts must be worldwide. The lesson of this
tragic century is clear: The best check against international
aggression is the emergence of governments that encourage tolerance,
pluralism, and respect for the individual.
Our budget also places a new emphasis on promoting multinational peace-
keeping and peace-making. The end of the Cold War has unleashed long-
suppressed conflicts in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and
elsewhere. But it has also opened up new possibilities for
international cooperation. Our task is to harness that cooperation to
contain, and far more importantly, to prevent conflict. The tragedies
of the Balkans and Somalia bear grim witness to the price of
international delay. International peace-keeping--especially by the UN-
-can and must play a critical role. Capabilities must be enhanced to
permit prompt, effective, preventive action.
We in the United States must be ready to do our part. In this
connection, the President and I believe that millions spent now on
preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping can save hundreds of millions in
defense and international relief later.
These priorities, as well as others highlighted in our budget, represent
an important effort to reorient our scarce resources to the realities of
the post-Cold War era. The budget reflects a commitment to using the
taxpayers' dollars wisely and efficiently, in full support of the
President's economic and deficit-reduction programs.
Reforming the Institutions
As important as how much we spend on foreign policy, however, is how we
spend it. I'm convinced that the Department of State cannot hope to
respond effectively to new challenges unless we improve the way we deal
with complex problems that cut across traditional bureaucratic
boundaries. A stifling bureaucracy, an obsolete division of labor, or
cumbersome decision-making are luxuries we cannot afford.
As a first step in remaking the State Department, I announced a broad-
based reorganization plan in February. The plan shifts portfolios and
creates new positions to mirror post-Cold War missions. It will reduce
excessive layering within the Department and streamline the policy
process. Our objective is simple: quicker policy-making, more open
policy-making, and, most importantly, better policy-making.
We also need to refocus our foreign assistance priorities and programs.
Specifically, the US Agency for International Development must be
overhauled. I have asked Deputy Secretary Wharton to examine the
Agency's role in the post-Cold War era and report his recommendations to
me by the end of this month. We look forward to working closely with
this committee and the full Congress in this effort.
Conclusion
Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to depart from my prepared
remarks to say a few words about the worsening tragedy in Bosnia. Upon
taking office, our Administration was faced with a condition of advanced
deterioration. Frankly, it was a situation that would have been better
dealt with by the West more than a year ago. Nonetheless, we now face a
worsening environment in eastern Bosnia that has horrified the world.
In response to the Serbs' relentless aggression, the United States
joined our partners in the Security Council this weekend in passing a
resolution that will dramatically tighten existing economic sanctions.
The steps are, indeed, severe--and entirely fitting. When implemented,
they will significantly increase the pariah status of Belgrade and its
Bosnian allies. We intend to press for total isolation so long as they
continue their aggression.
If Bosnia's Serbs fail to halt their aggression and agree to a peace
plan within 6 days from today, Serbia will confront a series of harsh
new measures, including the following:
-- All ships will be banned from entering Yugoslav territorial waters;
-- No country will be allowed to ship goods by land across Serbia;
-- Every Yugoslav plane, ship, truck, rail car, and cargo container
outside the country will be subject to impoundment;
-- Barges will be prohibited from passing through Serbia along the
Danube River unless they have special permission and submit to UN
monitoring; and
-- All bank accounts and other financial assets held by Yugoslav
institutions abroad will be frozen.
These steps will also apply to Serb-held areas of Bosnia and Croatia.
The President remains deeply concerned [about] the situation. The
Administration is now urgently reviewing a wide range of options
available to the world community to further punish Serbian aggression
and bring an end to the violence. As the President has said, this
includes options that have previously been unacceptable. We will stay
in close touch with members of this committee and the full Congress as
our deliberations proceed. (###)
Materials relating to the Vancouver summit (April 3-4) and Secretary
Christopher's trip to Tokyo (April 12-15) will be printed in Dispatch
Vol. 4, Supplement No. 2. (###)
ARTICLE 3:
Middle East Peace Talks To Resume
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at a news conference, Washington, DC, April 21, 1993
On behalf of President Clinton, I am very pleased to announce that the
Middle East peace talks will resume on April 27, here in Washington, DC.
We were informed of this decision directly by the Arab leaders and by
the Palestinians. This information came through [during] the night, and
it has just been confirmed this morning.
The information to us included a letter this morning from Faisal
Husseini, in his capacity as head of the Palestinian peace team. I've
informed Prime Minister Rabin of this good news and understand that the
Israeli Government will be responding to these developments later today.
We have also been consulting during this period with our Russian co-
sponsors. These decisions, of course, are very welcome and serve the
best interests of the Arab states, the Palestinians, Israel, and the
entire world community.
It has been almost 5 months since the last round of talks. Too much
time has been lost, and now there is an opportunity for the parties to
work together and make tangible progress. If the parties are prepared
to do their part and to narrow the gaps, we will certainly do ours and
play the role of full partner.
From the outset of the Administration, President Clinton has made clear
his commitment to promoting peace in the Middle East. Our extensive
efforts over the past few months [and] the developments announced today
reflect the high priority that President Clinton gives to doing so.
Let me say just a few words about our contacts with the Palestinians.
I've had important and productive discussions with them. They have
spoken eloquently of the human rights problems in the occupied
territories. They have reaffirmed the Palestinian commitment to the
peace process and the importance of making early progress, particularly
to address the conditions that the Palestinians face in the West Bank
and Gaza. They have agreed that it's time to deal with causes, not the
symptoms, of the conflict. We realize that the decision to rejoin the
talks was a difficult one for them to make. I think it was a courageous
one, and I commend them for making it.
For our part, I have reaffirmed the American opposition to deportations,
making it clear that we believe that they contravene the Fourth Geneva
Convention and are not consistent with the pursuit of peace. Israel has
assured us that the deportations in December were unprecedented and were
an exception. I made [it] very clear that violence and deportation are
counter-productive and that we call on all parties to avoid acts that
can undermine the negotiating process and the prospects for peace. We
are deeply dismayed by the killings and suffering in both the occupied
territories and in Israel.
In the course of this process, I also have reaffirmed on behalf of the
United States our continued commitment to the letters of invitation to
the Madrid conference and to the letters of assurance provided to the
Palestinians and to the other parties at that time. Further, I affirmed
our position on a comprehensive, full, and real peace based upon UN
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on the core principles that
underlie that process--land for peace, realizing the legitimate
political rights of the Palestinian people, and security for all
parties.
All the parties--Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon--
need and want real peace and security. Only negotiations can produce a
settlement that embodies these principles. Negotiations can give the
Palestinians the prospect that the very difficult conditions under which
they now live in the territories can be brought to an end. Through
negotiations, they can see occupation give way to self-government and a
resolution of the final status.
Negotiations will put in Palestinian hands the means to build and shape
their institutions, their life, and their fate. Violence will not solve
any problems. It will only make matters worse. Those responsible for
the violence offer a future that only perpetuates occupation. The
answer to the needs of the Palestinian people will be found not in
violence and rejection but in negotiations that produce tangible
results.
In this respect, we very much welcome the decision of the Palestinians
to come to the table and negotiations on April 27. We are prepared to
play the role of full partners with all the parties in this negotiating
process and in helping the negotiators to produce results.
During my trip to the Middle East, every leader with whom I met--
Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian--made clear to me their desire to resume
negotiations and achieve early results. All have recommitted themselves
to the peace process during the recent consultations that led up to
today's decision.
In sum, it is time to end violence and build a new Middle East--a Middle
East of peace, of reconciliation, and of hope. (###)
ARTICLE 4:
US Must Lead a Strategic Alliance With Post-Soviet Reform
Strobe Talbott, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary
for the New Independent States
Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House
Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, April 19, 1993
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the Clinton Administration's policy toward
Russia and the other new independent states of the former Soviet Union.
The task of your subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, is to draft legislation,
just as the task of our Administration is to draft policy. But on the
issue before us in this hearing, what we are really doing--what we are
doing together--is nothing less than helping to shape history.
There have been three great struggles in this century. The first was
World War I, a conflagration that ignited the Russian Revolution of
1917; the second was the World War against fascism and imperialism of
1939-1945; the third was the Cold War against Soviet communism and
expansionism. Now a fourth great struggle is underway in Eurasia. It
pits those who brought down the Soviet communist system against those
who would like to preserve its vestiges if not restore its essence. It
pits those who are determined to build a proud future against those who
are clinging to a cruel and shameful past. In short, it pits reform
against reaction.
We have a stake in the outcome of that struggle. Until now, many
Americans have been led to see our stake primarily in terms of what we
do not want to happen: We do not want economic distress and political
turmoil to trigger a civil war that could rage across 11 time zones; we
do not want a nuclear Yugoslavia in the heart of Eurasia; nor do we want
to see the rise of a new dictatorship that represses its people,
threatens its neighbors, and requires the United States and its allies
to return to a Cold War footing.
Mr. Chairman, while those concerns are entirely valid, I believe we need
to think of our objectives in much more positive terms: An investment
now in the heroic effort of these new democracies to restructure their
economies will pay dividends down the road. A Russia, a Ukraine, a
Kazakhstan fully integrated into the international economy will be a
reliable source for raw materials and manufactured products, a reliable
market for American goods and services, and a reliable partner in
diplomacy and in dealing with global threats to human welfare and the
environment.
In other words, Mr. Chairman, our policy should not be only to prevent
the worst that can happen, but should focus on nurturing the best.
Russia is undergoing a transformation in its very nature as a state.
We, therefore, should undertake a corresponding transformation in the
role we play. Having successfully led an international coalition
against the Soviet Union for nearly half a century, we must now lead a
strategic alliance with post-Soviet reform. A strategic alliance
implies a policy intended to serve us, and our allies, for a long time.
And so ours must.
Yet, while taking the long view, our Administration has also had to act
quickly. The beginning of this Administration has coincided with a
crisis in Russian politics. Exactly 1 month after President Clinton's
inauguration here in Washington, President Yeltsin threw down the
gauntlet in Moscow before a parliament that is dominated by
reactionaries.
Six days from now, on April 25, Mr. Yeltsin faces a referendum in which
the Russian people will express their views on his leadership, on his
economic policies, and on whether there should be new presidential and
parliamentary elections. We all hope that the referendum will
strengthen the reformers' ability to pursue their course. We want the
Russian people to understand that the world stands with them as they
make the transition from communism to democracy and free markets. But
we recognize that April 25 may not be conclusive, either for better or
for worse. And the referendum alone is unlikely to end the struggle
between competing interests and conflicting visions.
Both on April 25 and in the months and years that follow, the showdown
between the reformers and the reactionaries will be waged largely over
the issue of which camp represents the interests of the Russian people.
One of the main reasons that President Yeltsin is embattled today is
that too many Russians identify reform with hardship--with skyrocketing
prices, falling living standards, and deteriorating social order.
Unless the reformist government is able to build a broader and more
active constituency for its policies in the months to come, those
policies--and that government--will be in jeopardy.
Thus, the Administration has had to move boldly, in a way that reflects
our sense of urgency yet demonstrates our commitment to the long haul.
In what we have done already--and in what we are asking you to do now as
you go about drafting foreign aid legislation in the weeks ahead--the
United States must advance two objectives:
First, we must do what we can from the outside to make the benefits of
reform visible and tangible to the people on the inside--that is,
average Russians--and to do so as soon as possible.
Second, we must find targets for support that will last [and] that
represent trends we hope will become irreversible, so that we are
supporting an ongoing process that can survive the buffeting of
political and economic setbacks.
While the first of these objectives is short term and the second is long
term, they are, we believe, entirely compatible. Indeed, they are
mutually reinforcing.
We believe that both objectives are evident in the four steps the
Administration has taken in support of reform: the $1.6-billion
initiative that President Clinton unveiled in Vancouver on April 4; the
$28.4-billion package of multilateral measures to which the G-7 [Group
of 7 industrialized nations], led by the United States, committed itself
last week; the additional $1.3 billion in bilateral programs that the
Administration announced at the same time; and, finally, the $704
million FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies
and Open Markets] Support Act component of the FY 1994 budget. Let me
say a bit about each.
At the conclusion of the Vancouver summit 2 weeks ago yesterday, the
President announced a plan for accelerating, intensifying, and
redirecting existing programs so that their benefits will be apparent to
the Russian people this year. Moreover, the Vancouver package is
intended to meet the key needs that the Russian reformers themselves
have identified: in the areas of energy and environment, housing,
exchanges, private sector development, and trade and investment
activities. The Vancouver package also included $700 million in
concessional loans for foods sales, which permit a resumption of US food
exports to Russia.
It has been President Clinton's determination from the outset to use US-
Russian bilateral cooperation as a catalyst to multilateral support for
Russian reform. In that spirit, 10 days after the Vancouver summit,
Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of the Treasury Bentsen
traveled to Tokyo for a meeting of the Group of 7. The Tokyo meeting
delivered a clear message of support for Yeltsin and the reform
movement. That support took the form of a commitment on behalf of the
G-7 to help Russia restructure key sectors of its economy, divest itself
of inefficient state enterprises, finance critical imports, and
stabilize its currency.
Significantly, the Tokyo meeting was the first joint meeting of finance
and foreign ministers in the history of the G-7. It was intended to
underscore the connection between politics and economics in Russia:
Market reform is likely to succeed only in a pluralistic society
governed by the rule of law; democracy is more likely to thrive in a
vibrant economy.
Tokyo also demonstrated two vital themes in this Administration's
policy:
First, that we, the United States, are in partnership with our fellow
industrial democracies; and
Second, that we, the industrial democracies, are in partnership with the
Russian reformers who are trying to transform their country into an
industrial democracy in its own right.
Just as the contents of the Vancouver package reflected the discussions
between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, so the contents of the Tokyo
package reflected what [Russian] Foreign Minister Kozyrev and [Russian]
Deputy Prime Minister Federov told Secretaries Christopher and Bentsen
and their assembled G-7 colleagues: namely, that Russia needs Western
help to maintain the pace of reform.
Minister Federov and his colleagues were actively involved in the
discussions leading up to Tokyo. They helped shape a number of the
elements of the multilateral package. Their involvement focused the G-7
effort on developing a realistic set of short- and medium-term
objectives for reform. Ministers Federov and Kozyrev participated fully
in the second day of the G-7 meetings. The G-7, in turn, made clear to
the ministers that it is up to the Russians themselves [to] control
inflation before our support can be effectively used.
The Tokyo G-7 package includes approximately $4 billion in fast-
disbursing funds from the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World
Bank. These are targeted at the primary objectives of reigning in the
credit policies of the Russian Central Bank and providing critical
imports to slow the economic contraction. Disbursements could be made
in a matter of weeks. They would allow the Russian Government to
undertake some politically tough measures necessary to stabilize the
economy.
These initial steps would, we hope, yield substantial progress in the
campaign against inflation. The government could then translate success
on that critical front into a more comprehensive economic stabilization
program. The G-7 has agreed to support $10 billion over the coming year
for this endeavor. This includes $4 billion for a new IMF standby
program and a renewed commitment to a $6-billion currency stabilization
program.
Unlike last year's G-7 program to support Russian reform, this year's
program sets what we believe to be realistic standards for Russian
performance. The Russian economy must walk before it can run. Each
incremental step must be matched by prompt, demonstrable benefits to the
Russian economy and to the Russian people.
The third component of multilateral support is directed toward reforms
in specific sectors of the economy. While long-term viability depends
on the success of the stabilization program, efforts in sectors, like
energy and agriculture, can complement and enhance the stabilization
program by increasing foreign exchange earnings and making improvements
in the local market visible to the general population. In Tokyo, the G-
7 leaders committed $14 billion to this effort, most of it in the form
of new export credits.
The US has already made a significant contribution in this area. In
Tokyo we announced with the Russians an agreement on a $2-billion EXIM
[Bank--Export-Import Bank] framework for export credits in the oil and
gas industry. The US equipment and services financed under this
agreement will substantially increase Russian exports and foreign
exchange earnings. At the same time, there will be benefits here at
home. The first tranche of $500 million in guarantees alone will
support thousands of jobs in US companies that were hit hard by the
recent recession.
We also laid the groundwork at Tokyo for a number of what we believe to
be promising additional multilateral measures. We hope to persuade the
G-7 to join us in providing assistance for the safe dismantlement and
destruction of nuclear weapons in keeping with the terms of
international agreements. We were pleased that the Japanese announced
last week that they will contribute $100 million toward this end, but we
think more needs to be done by them and by other G-7 members. We agreed
in Tokyo to establish a working group on how to expand the nuclear-
weapons dismantlement program by the July G-7 summit.
The second new proposal put forward by the United States at Tokyo was
for the creation of a special privatization and restructuring fund.
This fund--which is an American idea strongly endorsed by the Russian
reformers--would help ease the economic and social consequences of
privatizing some of the more than 20,000 medium- and large-scale
enterprises. The fund would help make the newly privatized firms self-
sustaining with loans to modernize plants, retraining for workers, and
technical assistance to managers who are making the adjustment to
operating in a market economy.
The Russian economy and society are cursed by huge--and hugely
inefficient--state-owned enterprises that utterly dominate entire
cities. The special privatization and restructuring fund would be used
to help municipal governments in these one-company towns cope with the
consequences of breaking up and selling off these monoliths. Outlays
from the funds could be used to invest in local infrastructure to
support the smaller, newly privatized companies and the communities of
which they are a part.
To be effective on ground, this program must be carefully targeted,
phased, and monitored. The funds would be directed toward enterprises
and communities that are selected as the most promising and deserving.
The US proposed in Tokyo that the G-7 create a support implementation
office. The office would be headed by a person with strong
administrative and managerial capabilities--as well as experienced in
Russian affairs--and with a small staff of technical experts. This
office would also be responsible for working with the Russian reformers
to remove bureaucratic obstacles to implementation of G-7 programs and
for ensuring that Western funds are spent effectively.
At Tokyo, the US told the G-7 that the Administration would seek from
Congress $500 million for the privatization fund as a "challenge grant,"
to be matched by at least $1.5 billion in contributions from other
countries, as well as up to $2 billion in co-financing by the World Bank
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Here again, Mr. Chairman, please note one of the central elements of our
policy: The US is not only demonstrating its leadership--it is using
that leadership to leverage from the international community
considerably more money than we are putting on the table ourselves. The
G-7 has agreed to establish a working group on the special privatization
fund, with a view toward making a decision by the July summit.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say a bit about the new package of US-
Russian bilateral initiatives that President Clinton announced
simultaneously with the G-7 meeting. You will recall that, at
Vancouver, the President indicated his intention to go beyond the $1.6-
billion program he announced there. He would, he said, seek additional
funds for certain high-priority areas after he had a chance to take into
account what he had heard from President Yeltsin and what he learned
from further consultations with Congress. The congressional
consultations have begun in earnest, and I regard my appearance before
you here today as part of that process.
The Administration is committed to seeking approximately $1.3 billion in
additional bilateral assistance to support reform in Russia and the new
independent states. Those funds would be used to strengthen programs in
the priority areas of energy and environment, housing, the private
sector, exchanges, trade and investment, and humanitarian assistance.
How exactly the $1.3 billion will be apportioned is still a matter we
are discussing. Our discussion will, as I just indicated, depend in
significant measure on our deliberations with you and your colleagues,
both on the details of the package and on the appropriate funding
mechanisms.
While I cannot, therefore, get into a detailed breakdown of the package,
I can say a bit more about the areas on which we intend to concentrate.
In energy and environment, a substantial portion of the funds would be
used to finance improvements in nuclear reactor safety. With nearly two
dozen water-cooled nuclear power plants, there is an urgent need for
additional assistance to upgrade the safety systems and protect against
potentially catastrophic accidents.
We also hope to expand significantly our efforts to improve oil
production and restore oil and gas pipelines that are an environmental
hazard and that waste precious resources. Other industries are also
major polluters and desperately need the benefits of US technology.
In Vancouver, President Yeltsin identified housing for returning and
demobilized officers as a top priority. It is in our interest as well
as his to see the continued withdrawal of the troops of the former
Soviet armed forces from neighboring countries, especially the Baltics.
The success of continued political reform, is, in part, dependent on the
military staying out of politics and allowing the democratic
transformation to continue.
Expanded US support could finance the construction of several thousand
housing units for returning officers. This initiative seeks to include
the US private sector and American private and voluntary organizations
in building houses and developing the local construction capacity.
There is also a need to expand efforts to help Russia's farmers and
institutions create a market-driven food system. If more US
agribusinesses are linked with Russian partners, it will help break
marketing bottlenecks and make delivery systems more efficient.
Expanded programs would respond to the ever-growing demand to help small
businesses and entrepreneurs overcome the enormous obstacles that are
the vestige of a command economy.
Additional funding would also be used to dramatically increase the
number of people-to-people exchanges. There is no substitute for making
training and firsthand experience in America available to people who
lived their entire lives under a system that discouraged creative
initiative and independent thinking. It is our hope that thousands of
students, teachers, and budding entrepreneurs could be given the chance
to study and train in this country. They would take back not just facts
and know-how but a view of a successful democracy and free market based
on a real experience.
To expand bilateral trade and investment, the Administration would also
intend to provide additional credits and guarantees through the Export-
Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC].
Beyond the oil and gas sector already being targeted, the EXIM Bank and
OPIC could use additional funds to support financing in areas like
mineral extraction, telecommunications and air-traffic control, and
defense conversion. With US companies and exports directly supported by
these programs, the mutual benefits are obvious.
Still, there must be a continuing component of humanitarian assistance
as well. Americans have always responded generously to medical
emergencies around the world, and the need in Russia is acute. The
recent congressional delegation, of which several of you were a part,
saw the appalling lack of supplies for hospitals. Some of the funds we
are requesting in the follow-up bilateral package would be used for
supplying vaccines and responding to critical shortages of medicines,
especially those that will help children.
But in this area, too, we are guided by the adage: Give a man a fish,
and you feed him for a day; teach him how to fish, and you feed him for
a lifetime. Our hope is that over time, Russia and the other new
independent states will move away from a reliance on foreign donations.
To that end, we want to provide technical assistance to build up local
capacity for the manufacture of basic pharmaceuticals, particularly in
areas outside of Moscow.
Let me reiterate that I have purposely not attached specific dollar
figures to the programs I have mentioned here, because we hope over the
next few weeks to have continuing consultations with members of this
committee and other Members of Congress before making final decisions on
the components of the additional request. I would welcome your views on
the areas I mentioned as priorities as well as programs you think we
missed.
I should add that Ambassador Thomas Simons will shortly be assuming the
post of coordinator of our assistance programs to the new independent
states. After serving for several years as ambassador to Poland, he has
a great deal of experience in helping former communist countries make
the transition to democracy and market reform. He knows what works and
what doesn't, and he has the proven leadership and management skills to
ensure that the many agencies involved remain focused on key objectives
and are complementary to each other. I expect Ambassador Simons to work
closely with members of this committee and its staff in shaping our
program and carrying out his duties.
Ambassador Simons will coordinate US assistance programs, including
those funded under the FREEDOM Support Act, which was passed last year
and on which we intend to build. As you know, we have requested $704
million in the FY 1994 budget to continue many of the successful
programs under the FREEDOM Support Act into next year. Those funds will
be used in the same key areas I have just outlined.
Before making myself available to your questions, let me make a final
point. Much of what the Administration has done so far--and much of
what I have said here this morning--has been focused on Russia. That is
appropriate, given the sheer size of the country as well as the
magnitude of the problems it poses and of the opportunities it
represents. However, this Administration's efforts will be directed at
reform in all of the new independent states. A significant share of the
grants and credits announced in Vancouver and Tokyo will be directed
toward the other countries. A number of the multilateral programs
announced in Tokyo, like the new IMF facility, will be available to
these countries as they move along the path to reform. Substantial
amounts of our own Nunn- Lugar nuclear-weapons dismantlement funds will
also be used in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. So will funds from
whatever dismantlement program emerges from the G-7. The funds we are
requesting for the FY 1994 FREEDOM Support Act will be weighted toward
states other than Russia in the hopes that many will have followed
Russia's lead in reform.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, my overall point is that as you and your
colleagues examine the specifics of our policy, I think you will see
that they reflect our determination to support reformers wherever they
are to be found--whether in capitals like Moscow or Kiev or Bishkek or
in the farthest reaches of those countries, large or small; whether in
the Kremlin or the parliament or the regional governments or
municipalities, down to the grass roots.
We have also concentrated, to the greatest extent possible, on the non-
governmental sector. Since we are trying to nurture the growth of the
private sectors in the new independent states, it is natural that we
should enlist the American private sector. That is another common
denominator of the initiatives we have put forward.
In general, Mr. Chairman, when we speak about US-Russian economic
"engagement" and "partnership" instead of "assistance" and "aid"--when
we speak about building a "strategic partnership with Russian reform"--
we are not resorting to euphemisms. We are expressing what we believe
to be a fundamental aspect of our policy. All the programs I have
outlined for you today are intended to benefit both Russia's people and
our own. (###)
ARTICLE 5:
Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons: Building Confidence and Partnership
James E. Goodby, US Negotiator on Safe and Secure Dismantlement of
Nuclear Weapons
Address before the Third UN Conference on Disarmament Issues, Kyoto,
Japan, April 13, 1993
I would like to speak to you today about an issue that is as urgent now
as at any time during the last half-century--the control of nuclear
weapons. But in a larger sense, the theme of my remarks is about
reconciliation and the building of confidence, of replacing hostility
with partnerships, of warm friendship where once it seemed there could
be none. For dismantling nuclear weapons and strengthening the ties
among democratic nations go hand in hand; only in this way can it be
said that nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to human life on this
planet are truly under control.
The Changing Problem Of Controlling Nuclear Weapons
Last year, the Soviet Union gave way to 15 sovereign states, and, in the
process, millions of people chose democracy. Yet, as President Clinton
has said:
Their struggle to build free societies is one of the great human dramas
of our day. It presents the greatest security challenge for our
generation and offers one of the greatest economic opportunities of our
lifetime.
But, I would add, we could miss the great promise of the future by
passively "sleepwalking through history" if we choose to be onlookers
rather than actors in this drama.
For the United States, the hour has come to complete the transition from
adversary to partner of states rich in history and culture. This will
permit the United States to restructure its defenses to deal with
threats to international peace and security within the UN framework.
This will increase the prospects for successful democratic and market
reform. And this will offer a vastly enhanced potential for trade and
prosperity.
I have been asked by the Administration of President Clinton to lead the
US delegation on the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in
the former Soviet Union. I feel particularly fortunate to do this
because, in many respects, the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear
weapons is at the very forefront of our effort to remove Cold War
impediments to cooperation and to build up democratic partnerships in
their place. The START I and START II agreements [Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty I and II] and the reciprocal, unilateral US and Soviet
decisions of 1991 and 1992 to destroy large numbers of tactical nuclear
weapons require Russia and the United States to eliminate more than
6,000 nuclear weapons systems. This includes not only destroying
missiles, submarines, and bombers but also downloading about 30,000
nuclear warheads associated with those delivery vehicles. This is an
enormous engineering task, and the costs are substantial.
The task is complicated significantly by the situation in the former
Soviet Union--not only the severe economic difficulties but also the
fact that nuclear warheads are located on the territories of four of the
new independent states. The dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons
agreed to in the past few years can be realized--perhaps even earlier
than anticipated--if the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and
Ukraine can cooperate in programs to assist in the safe and secure
dismantlement of these weapons. The problem of controlling nuclear
weapons is vastly different from that posed in the decades of the 1970s
and 1980s; it requires fresh thinking and very close collaboration at
several levels. There is no longer any reason why states should
continue to aim these thousands of warheads at each other throughout the
entire 7-year elimination period set forth in START I. It is time to
put these relics of the Cold War behind us as quickly and safely as we
can and to get on with building democracy and free market economies.
As demonstrated by the Vancouver Declaration, safe and secure
dismantlement is a key element of US-Russian economic programs aimed at
addressing immediate human needs and contributing to the building of
structures for a successful transition to a market economy. This is
true also for programs that help Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
fulfill their commitments undertaken in the Lisbon Protocol. But the
most important peace dividend is to turn away from weaponry capable of
destroying human civilization on much of the globe. The disaster at
Chernobyl in a terrifying way reminds us how deadly nuclear radiation
can be and why we need to ensure that nuclear weapons are dismantled
safely and securely. Safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons
is an investment in global security and peace that will enable all of us
to reap the benefits of the end of the Cold War.
Origins and Purpose of the Initiative on Safe and Secure Nuclear
Dismantlement
The safe and secure dismantlement effort on the part of the US
Government dates back to the fall of 1991. Events in the Soviet Union
at that time quite naturally raised questions, both there and elsewhere,
about the security and control of nuclear forces, particularly tactical
nuclear weapons--those with ranges up to 500 kilometers. These weapons,
because of their small size and transportability, seemed to pose a real
risk of loss of control or seizure by unauthorized parties.
The United States moved to address these concerns in September 1991,
when then-President Bush ordered a unilateral reduction in the US
nuclear force posture. President Gorbachev, as we had hoped, responded
in October 1991 with a reciprocal series of reductions. As a result of
these actions, the United States and the Soviet Union began an
unprecedented global stand-down of tactical nuclear weapons. Most of
these weapons are now slated for elimination.
At the same time, the US Congress, prompted by the vision of Senators
Nunn and Lugar, was concluding that the United States should put the
Cold War behind it and begin building new relationships with reformers
in the Soviet Union--to seek creative, cooperative solutions to complex
common problems.
It soon became clear that the magnitude of the nuclear dismantlement
effort would require extensive cooperative actions by the two countries.
It was at this point that the United States engaged Moscow in detailed
talks on safe and secure dismantlement at high levels of government and
in discussions of technical experts.
The situation became more complex when Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine emerged as newly independent states with nuclear weapons located
on their territories. In the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty,
signed May 23, 1992, all four countries became successor states to the
Soviet Union in connection with the START Treaty and assumed the
obligations of the former Soviet Union under the treaty. Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also committed themselves to adhere to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear
weapons states "in the shortest possible time." START II, of course,
would provide for dismantling thousands of nuclear weapons systems
beyond the reductions required by START I; its realization has become
dependent upon the fulfillment of START I obligations.
Responding to these unprecedented circumstances, the US Congress, under
the Nunn-Lugar Act, initially authorized the President to spend up to
$400 million in Department of Defense funds to assist the four states in
their dismantlement efforts. Our intention was to work with these
states bilaterally to determine how, based on their own stated
requirements, we could assist them in expediting the safe and secure
dismantlement of strategic offensive arms under the START Treaty. As
amended, the Nunn-Lugar legislation now doubles that amount and makes
available up to $800 million. Another $400 million is being requested
for FY 1994.
The immediate US objective, consistent with long-standing bipartisan
policies in the United States, is to block the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons states. Failure to achieve this would be a
major blow to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, would generate
international tension, and would foster costly new regional arms races.
This would sap vitality from developing free market economies and, in a
climate of heightened uncertainty, jeopardize economic progress. It
would turn back the clock to the days before the remarkable progress of
START I and START II and leave us in a situation bordering on nuclear
anarchy in our relations with the new independent states.
Initial Nunn-Lugar Efforts
It is neither justified nor constructive to proceed as though this
worst-case scenario were inevitable. I believe what we have
accomplished in our efforts so far leads to the reasonable conclusion
that events have been moving in the direction of a safe and sensible
outcome.
First, the Secretary of State has informed the US Congress that Russia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have met the eligibility requirements
for assistance under the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Briefly these
requirements are that each country must be committed to:
-- Making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or
destroying weapons of mass destruction, if it has an obligation under a
treaty or other agreement to destroy any such weapons;
-- Forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate
defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed nuclear
weapons;
-- Forgoing any use in new nuclear weapons of fissile or other
components of destroyed nuclear weapons;
-- Facilitating US verification of any weapons destruction carried out
under this legislation;
-- Complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and
-- Observing internationally recognized human rights, including the
protection of minorities.
Each of these states is important in its own right in terms of what it
can contribute to a program aimed at dismantling the nuclear threat to
human survival. I will discuss the extent of cooperation achieved with
each of them in our efforts to date.
I will begin with Russian-US cooperation. A year ago, at a June 1992
Washington meeting, an "umbrella" agreement was signed by the United
States and Russia that identified the scope of the cooperative program
and established a legal framework for providing the assistance
authorized by the Nunn-Lugar legislation. In addition, prior to March
1993, the United States and Russia signed seven implementing agreements
providing for:
-- Armored blankets to enhance the safety and security of weapons and
fissile material during transport to dismantlement and storage sites;
-- Safety and security enhancements for railcars used in transporting
nuclear weapons and fissile material to dismantlement and storage sites;
-- Emergency response equipment and training to upgrade capabilities to
respond in case of a nuclear accident;
-- Transportation and storage containers for fissile material removed
from dismantled nuclear weapons;
-- Assistance in the design of a storage facility for fissile material;
-- Assistance in chemical weapons destruction; and
-- Establishment of a science center to employ former weapons
scientists.
Together, these seven agreements provided for a total of $150 million in
safe and secure dismantlement projects.
At the Vancouver meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, the two
Presidents agreed on initiatives totaling $1.6 billion to bolster
political and economic reforms in Russia. Recorded in the Vancouver
Declaration are agreements which the United States and Russia completed
in Moscow on March 26. They provide Nunn-Lugar funds for the following:
-- Equipment for dismantling strategic nuclear delivery vehicles;
-- Equipment to support construction and operation of a storage
facility for nuclear materials derived from dismantled warheads; and
-- Assistance in enhancing systems for controlling, accounting, and
physically protecting nuclear materials.
These three new agreements amount to an additional $215 million--aside
from agricultural loan guarantees, the largest single element in the
$1.6-billion package. This sum, combined with the $150 million from the
previous agreements, an additional $5 million in Nunn-Lugar funds for
accident response equipment, and $6 million for a pilot project to
provide housing and job training for Russian military officers, brings
the grand total of US-Russian cooperative programs as of this date in
this field to $376 million.
Taken together, these agreements serve US, Russian, and international
interests by reducing the chances that nuclear material will leak out of
a central control system, by enhancing stability within Russia and
between Russia and its neighbors, and by contributing to a broad pattern
of US-Russian cooperation in seeking a safer, more stable international
environment.
As to cooperation between the United States and Belarus in the specific
area of safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons, the two
governments have signed an "umbrella" agreement as well as implementing
agreements to provide:
-- Emergency response equipment and training for responding to the
consequences of a nuclear accident;
-- A continuous communications link to allow the transmission of data
and notifications under the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] and
START Treaties; and
-- Assistance and training to help establish an effective export
control system.
These agreements total $8.3 million in assistance.
I would like to take this opportunity to underscore that Belarus has
acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons
state, has ratified the START Treaty, and has expressed its desire to
have nuclear weapons removed from its territory as soon as possible.
These actions testify to the fact that Belarus and the United States are
in a position to build an enduring and confident relationship. The
United States has set aside up to $65 million in additional Nunn-Lugar
funds for cooperative programs with Belarus. We look forward to further
cooperation and to building a strong partnership with Belarus.
Kazakhstan has ratified the START I Treaty and is working toward
acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We are engaged in
developing a program of cooperation between our two countries. Early in
March 1993, senior representatives of Kazakhstan visited Washington. As
a result of these discussions, we anticipate concluding an umbrella
agreement and separate implementing agreements on a government-to-
government communications link, emergency response equipment, assistance
in establishing an export control system, and a system for accounting
for and physically protecting civil nuclear material. A very high
priority also is to initial at an early date an implementing agreement
on dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. This would be
implemented upon accession by Kazakhstan to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty as a non- nuclear state.
As to cooperation between the United States and Ukraine, the United
States has agreed to provide at least $175 million in Nunn-Lugar
assistance. The US Congress has already been notified of $27 million in
proposed Nunn-Lugar obligations for Ukraine, and the next step will be
to finalize these agreements. This could be done in the near future.
The scope of US-Ukrainian cooperation would include critical funds for
dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, a government-to-
government communications link, emergency response equipment, assistance
and training in establishing an export control regime, and a system for
accounting and physical protection for civil nuclear material.
Because they are such a high priority, projects on missile and silo
launcher dismantlement are expected to take up the bulk of the $175
million that the United States has already pledged to Ukraine. This
critical area involves the elimination of hundreds of strategic
offensive arms and would be an important element in a broad-based US-
Ukrainian relationship. Nunn-Lugar funds for this purpose will be
released after ratification by Ukraine of START I and its accession to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state.
Ukrainian and US interests point toward a common priority goal:
Ukraine's complete integration into the international community of
democratic nations and free market economies. This is well understood,
I believe, by both governments. I believe another view also is widely
shared: That in the final analysis, it is not nuclear weapons that
guarantee the safety or survival--or the wealth and prestige--of any
state. Evidence for that conclusion abounds in contemporary events.
The Clinton Administration sees the safe and secure dismantlement of
nuclear weapons as integral to its broad policy of cooperation with each
of the new independent states concerned. The US Department of Defense
is playing a key role in this program, along with other US Government
agencies.
We are seeking to improve and streamline the process. We are looking
for flexible, fast, and responsive ways to achieve the policy goals of
the Nunn-Lugar legislation. We also expect to find ways to accelerate
the implementation of the program to match its high priority. To the
maximum extent possible, we will use the flexibility available under
current US laws and regulations. And we will consider using foreign
technology and equipment if we determine that this would significantly
increase the cost-effectiveness and technical success of the program.
The Need For a Multinational Effort
The nuclear dismantlement effort supports vitally important
international treaties--START I and II, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Together, these agreements
furnish most of the legal framework within which the international
community seeks to control the threat to human survival presented by
weapons of mass destruction. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that
the success of the dismantlement effort is essential to the realization
of the goals laid down in each of these agreements. Through this effort
we, the international community, can help prevent the further
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and eliminate, literally,
thousands of nuclear weapons, down to a small fraction of the levels now
deployed in the United States and on the territory of the former Soviet
Union.
Since all nations ultimately benefit from the dismantlement process, the
time has come to consider a new, broader, international agenda for
cooperative dismantling of the nuclear threat. To those nations that
have the economic and technical resources to lend a hand, I would say
[that] there is much more that needs to be done. All of us need to give
urgent and serious thought to expanding and more broadly
internationalizing the effort.
I can illustrate the need for many nations to join in a collaborative
nuclear dismantling program by citing a few projects that the United
States has not yet been able to pursue with the first $800 million in
Nunn-Lugar assistance:
-- Providing Russia additional assistance to facilitate the design,
site selection, and construction of a storage facility for fissile
material from dismantled weapons. This would lend itself especially
well to multinational support;
-- Additional assistance for Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in
dismantling their nuclear delivery vehicles. This could include, for
example, assistance in the environmentally sound elimination of highly
toxic rocket fuels, additional equipment for silo dismantlement, and
research into methods to destroy solid propellant missiles in an
environmentally safe manner;
-- Cleanup of contaminated areas, for example, missile silos and other
nuclear facilities; and
-- Defense conversion assistance for very high priority projects, such
as conversion of the SS-18 plant in Ukraine and providing housing and
retraining of former strategic rocket forces officers in Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.
Assistance thus far has been in the form of equipment and technical
services; future projects may increasingly be in the form of joint
ventures and grant assistance.
Of course, with a broader, international initiative to dismantle
cooperatively the nuclear threat that still imperils us all, there would
be a greater need to establish compatible strategies and to coordinate
our efforts. We would need to ensure that our programs complement one
another, fill in gaps, and benefit from our comparative advantages in
different technologies and funding arrangements.
Conclusion
The Cold War is behind us now. It was with us a long time, and we came
to know it well. It was a dangerous time, but it had familiar contours
and predictable reference points. Now, the topography of the bipolar
confrontation is gone. We face great uncertainty, and, yes, danger is
still our companion. It is close at hand in the deadly relics of the
Cold War--the thousands of nuclear weapons that have been left behind
like mines buried in a battlefield long after the guns have fallen
silent.
Our challenge is to construct a new and safer framework for our mutual
relations beyond the Cold War, based not on suspicion and fear but on
confidence and partnership. In doing so, it would be well to reflect on
the enormous resources that were devoted to building weapons as compared
to the relatively modest resources that will be needed to invest in
peace. From that comparison should emerge a sense of proportion as to
what we are called upon to do.
The man who was President of the United States at the dawn of the
nuclear age once said that "this generation of Americans has a
rendezvous with destiny." I believe this generation all over the globe
has a rendezvous with destiny. We will be judged in the future less by
our success in weathering the Cold War and more by how we meet the great
post-Cold War opportunity to cast out this "destroyer of worlds" and
create democratic and prosperous societies.
We have choices. We can idly sleepwalk through history and, once again,
allow nuclear weapons to generate suspicion, competition, tension, and
arms races reminiscent of the Cold War. If we allow that to happen, we
will have failed in our duty to posterity, and future generations will--
and should--judge us harshly. As the historian Barbara Tuchman might
say, this would truly be the march of folly. But if we seize the moment
to build a solid foundation of confidence and partnership, we will
surely be celebrated for our legacy of wisdom and peace. This is that
moment. Let us now be wise. (###)
ARTICLE 6:
US Aid to Central and Eastern Europe: A Call for Imagination
Robert L. Hutchings, Special Adviser For East European Assistance
Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House
Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, April 19, 1993
I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify, for I believe that the
US assistance program for Central and Eastern Europe is one of the most
important activities [that] our country undertakes. Three and a half
years after the democratic revolutions of 1989, the countries of this
region are in the midst of deep recession, with rising unemployment and
social tensions threatening the political consensus behind these painful
economic and political transitions. Yet there have been spectacular
successes as well: a dynamic new private sector in Poland, now
accounting for more than half of GDP; an upsurge in US and other Western
investment in the Czech Republic; and an impressive expansion of
Hungarian trade with new partners in the West.
In the Balkans, progress has been more halting and uneven, owing partly
to the economic and political spillover of the conflict in [the] former
Yugoslavia. Yet, despite these strains, Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania
have maintained their commitment to free market democracy under very
difficult circumstances. The Baltic states, too, are making steady
progress despite the many problems associated with the withdrawal of
Russian troops and the disruption of traditional trade relations.
The success of these new democracies is of enormous importance to US
interests. As the first to attempt the transition from communism to
democracy, they can be an example to Russia, Ukraine, and others facing
even greater difficulties. Russians need to see that this transition
can be made successfully and peacefully. A democratic and prospering
Eastern Europe, with a combined population of some 135 million, is also
becoming an important market for US goods and services--and a gateway to
the vast potential markets farther east. Finally, successful progress
toward stable democracy in Eastern Europe is key to ending the
continent's postwar division and building a peaceful, democratic order
across Europe that assures security at lower cost to ourselves. The
bleak alternative to this vision is being played out before our eyes in
the former Yugoslavia.
US and other Western assistance obviously cannot assure success nor
guarantee that there will not be "another Yugoslavia." But our help can
make a difference--sometimes a decisive one. As our assistance program
enters its fourth year, we can say with confidence that our help has
already made a difference--in providing capital and other assistance to
Poland's new entrepreneurs, for example, and in helping the Czechs
navigate their ambitious program of mass privatization.
The Administration's request for FY 1994 is $409 million for programs
authorized under the SEED [Support for East European Democracy] Act,
roughly the same as last year's appropriated amount. This will mean a
tight budget, particularly in light of the increased number of recipient
countries and the still-growing needs in the region. However, with the
anticipated completion, or near completion, of the capitalization of the
first two Enterprise Funds for Poland and Hungary during the current
fiscal year, we will then have somewhat greater flexibility to augment
some of our smaller programs elsewhere. Two general areas where we
intend to expand our assistance in the region are public sector reform
and environmental assistance, both of which are areas of high interest
to this committee.
As the committee has pointed out, the early predictions of a 3- to 5-
year "sunset" for this program have proved much too optimistic. We,
nonetheless, continue to see this program as a transitional one, even if
the sunset will take longer to arrive than was anticipated during the
heady days of 1989. Without trying to be too specific or engaging in
false precision, I would forecast roughly steady needs in the more
advanced countries of Central Europe for another 2 to 3 years, followed
by a gradual phasing down. The rest of the region is harder to
forecast, but it is clear that needs will rise before they begin to
taper off, with the net result that it will be some years before the
overall assistance needs in the region diminish substantially. Even
after the "sunset" has finally arrived, we may want to maintain modest
cooperative programs to ensure the survival and sustainability of
certain partnerships and exchanges, but these countries would, at that
point, effectively have "graduated" from SEED assistance.
I would like to depart from the usual practice whereby Administration
officials chronicle only the virtues of their policies or programs. I
would like to focus on our weaknesses, too, in the interest of
strengthening our dialogue. This Administration is committed to that
kind of dialogue, and the introduction to this year's SEED Act
Implementation Report reflects our readiness to admit mistakes, share
with you the dilemmas that we have not yet been able to answer, and
engage in full and open discussion.
Let me begin by identifying what I see as the major strengths of this
program:
First, it is quick, responsive, and flexible. It is willing to take
risks.
Second, it has developed innovative ways of delivering assistance--the
Enterprise Funds, the International Media Fund, the Citizens Democracy
Corps, and others--that have helped cut through bureaucratic delays.
Third, through these and other programs such as the ABA's [American Bar
Association] Central and East European Legal Initiative and the MBA
Enterprise Corps, the US assistance program has built a public-private
partnership that enables us to use scarce public funds to leverage large
private sector assistance.
Fourth, it engages the strengths of multiple agencies, including those
that are charged with advancing US commercial interests.
Fifth and most important, it is based on close cooperation among State,
USAID [US Agency for International Development], Treasury, NSC [National
Security Council], and other key agencies, so that foreign assistance is
an integral part of broader foreign policy interests and linked to
domestic policy as well.
Now the deficiencies--and here I should mention that those which worry
me most are not always those that are called to my attention by the
Congress. I believe it is worth exploring why this is so, also in the
interest of strengthening our dialogue.
-- First, we are still too slow and risk-averse. These countries are
in the midst of profound and revolutionary change. Their needs and
priorities are in constant flux, and we must keep up if we are to be
relevant to their transformations. G.K. Chesterton once said that
anything worth doing is worth doing badly, by which he meant that there
are some things so important, some tasks so urgent, that we should be
prepared to take risks and be prepared to make mistakes. I try to keep
this in mind when an East European minister makes a request that was not
even on his agenda 2 months before. If we allowed ourselves the luxury
of studying a problem until we satisfied every possible concern, the
need will have passed before we decide what to do about it.
-- Another weakness is program proliferation. We are simply trying to
do too much with too little money. We are making some headway in paring
down our programs and focusing them more tightly, but, as we all know,
it is easier to start a program than stop one. I hope that our country
strategy papers--which I will describe in a moment--will help us build
greater discipline into every program [that] we undertake or consider.
-- Coordination remains a weakness. Within our government, we have
developed remarkably good cooperation among the 18 agencies involved,
and coordination between Washington and the field is improving steadily,
but international coordination leaves much to be desired. There is too
much duplication and competition among donors and too little
coordination of activities so that we can make the best and most
effective use of our collective resources. We have no magic formula to
offer and certainly do not want to build yet another international
bureaucracy to try to solve the problem, but we are taking some
practical steps that we hope will improve coordination. We are working
to improve coordination among the major players--the IMF [International
Monetary Fund], World Bank, EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development], EC, the United States, and others--and then to improve
coordination in the region itself on select sectors. We have been
pushing for these steps in various forums and will present further,
specific suggestions at three meetings next month: a G-24 [Group of 24]
senior officials meeting and combined G-24/World Bank meetings on
Bulgaria and Romania. Our feeling is that we may be able to achieve
more by lowering our sights and focusing on limited but sharply defined
areas where coordination is most urgently needed.
-- Of course, there are also specific weaknesses regarding individual
projects and activities. Given the size and complexity of our
assistance program, it could hardly be otherwise. This committee has
expressed particular concern with some aspects of the operations of the
Enterprise Funds. We take these concerns very seriously and want to
work with you to resolve them. At the same time, I hope that these
efforts do not cause us to lose sight of the funds' great success in
helping develop the new private sectors in the region.
Some of the weaknesses I have identified--and this committee may help me
identify others--are products of the experimental nature of an
assistance program that has evolved and is still evolving. Already, we
have passed through three stages. In 1989 and 1990, we sought "targets
of opportunity" and put a premium on getting programs up and running as
quickly as possible. It was politically essential to do so--to show US
engagement and support at that critical moment. In 1990 and 1991, we
put in place the "building blocks" of the program. These included the
four Enterprise Funds, partnership programs in various sectors, and
large institutional contracts that are administered regionally but
deployed according to each country's specific needs.
Beginning last year, we developed more detailed country strategies--
tightly argued, real-world statements of our priority objectives and the
programs we have, or intend, to advance those objectives. These
documents, prepared with the country team and USAID representative in
the lead and in full consultation with host governments, are helping us
achieve a greater degree of rigor in our work, improve transparency and
predictability, enhance host country participation, and develop better
communication among Washington agencies and between Washington and the
field. In short, the process of developing these papers--the ongoing
interaction on the substance and aims of our assistance program--is at
least as important as the products themselves.
Let me elaborate on this dimension of the program's evolution, which I
know is of special interest to this committee. In the early stages of
the program, some of the successes we achieved may have come at the
expense of the full participation of embassies and host governments.
This was at a time when we were rushing to launch programs, many of
which were by nature experimental, and when USAID offices were embryonic
and host governments disorganized. Now, with 3 years' experience, USAID
offices better staffed, and host governments more clear about their own
priorities, the program has evolved. The role of USAID representatives
has been clarified and strengthened, and we are developing a new balance
of responsibilities between Washington agencies, embassies, and host
governments.
Here is how this process is working in practice. Last fall, I led an
interagency delegation from State, USAID, Treasury, and NSC to Poland,
the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary, stopping in Brussels on the
way for consultations with EC officials. These were intensive
discussions, over the course of 3 to 4 days in each country. They
included meetings with the ambassador, the USAID representative, and the
entire country team; large group meetings between the US delegation--
together with the ambassador and USAID representative--and senior
officials from all the key host country ministries; and a series of more
detailed meetings with individual ministries according to schedules
worked out in advance with the governments concerned. We reached
agreement on the strategies and priorities of US assistance, engaged in
a no-holds-barred critique of the assistance program, and agreed on an
action plan for addressing problems that we could not resolve on the
spot. Regular visits like this, along with the more detailed country
strategy papers we are developing, are helping us define the agenda for
an ongoing, substantive dialogue among Washington, our embassies and
USAID representatives, and senior officials of each host government.
The program is evolving organizationally within the Department of State
as well. As Assistant Secretary [of State for European and Canadian
Affairs] Oxman explained during his confirmation hearings, the office I
direct will be under his authority in the Department's overall
reorganization. The Administration, beginning most immediately with Mr.
Oxman and myself, is committed to implementing this move in a way that
preserves the program's effectiveness and interagency character while
also strengthening overall policy integration within the Department.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me return to Central and Eastern
Europe--to matters of substance rather than process. In that thrilling
fall of 1989, when our assistance program began, no one knew what lay
ahead. No one forecast the split of Czechoslovakia; no one knew how
these unprecedented democratic transitions would unfold; no one divined
how quickly communism would unravel in Russia itself. We engaged as
fast as we could and learned as we went. We were willing to take risks
because of the importance and urgency of the task at hand, and we
adapted the program to changing circumstances.
Now, 31/2 years later, we are wiser, perhaps, but no more able to
predict what the next few years will bring. These countries are still
in the midst of profound and essentially unpredictable change; the
economic transitions are in some cases well advanced, but the
revolutionary transformation of these societies is only beginning.
Democracy has scored amazing advances, but nowhere is democracy secure.
Our commitment to this region must remain steady, but our policies and
programs should stay nimble, with strong political leadership exercising
the imagination and flexibility that these turbulent times demand. (###)
ARTICLE 7:
Crisis in Zaire
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC,
April 15, 1993
In response to the deteriorating situation in Shaba, Charge John Yates
has declared that a state of disaster exists in the city of Kolwezi.
Some 40,000 Kasaians have recently fled to Kolwezi as a result of
government-directed ethnic victimization in Shaba province. There are
now over 100,000 displaced persons in the province. These displaced
persons lack adequate sanitation, medical support, food and water;
approximately 60 persons are dying of malnutrition per month. The US
Government will provide immediately an additional $25,000 for assistance
to the displaced persons. The funds will be channeled through Medecins
Sans Frontieres.
We have recently approved grants totaling an additional $1.4 million for
displaced persons in Shaba, where the provincial government has been
carrying out oppression against people of Kasai origin. Since early
last year, we have given more than $3 million in emergency aid for such
persons.
In recent years, we have given only emergency humanitarian aid to Zaire.
The total since September 1991 has been about $5 million in food aid,
medicine, and displaced persons assistance, which has gone solely to
non-governmental organizations, not to the government.
It is apparent that local authorities are still involved in
orchestrating intimidation directed at Kasaians which is intended to
force them out of the province. This tragedy is another symptom of the
crisis in Zaire brought on by President Mobutu's refusal to allow a
democratic transition. We have made clear to President Mobutu and the
responsible authorities in Shaba that they must take action to halt the
persecution and to bring those responsible to justice. (###)
ARTICLE 8:
UN Security Council Resolutions On the Former Yugoslavia
Resolution 819 (April 16, 1993)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all its
subsequent relevant resolutions,
Taking note that the International Court of Justice in its Order of 8
April 1993 in the case concerning application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) unanimously indicated
as a provisional measure that the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should immediately in pursuance of
its undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take all measures within its
power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide,
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Reaffirming its call on the parties and others concerned to observe
immediately the cease-fire throughout the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
Reaffirming its condemnation of all violations of international
humanitarian law, including, in particular, the practice of "ethnic
cleansing",
Concerned by the pattern of hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary
units against towns and villages in eastern Bosnia and in this regard
reaffirming that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat or
use of force, including through the practice of "ethnic cleansing", is
unlawful and unacceptable,
Deeply alarmed at the information provided by the Secretary-General to
the Security Council on 16 April 1993 on the rapid deterioration of the
situation in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas, as a result of the
continued deliberate armed attacks and shelling of the innocent civilian
population by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units,
Strongly condemning the deliberate interdiction by Bosnian Serb
paramilitary units of humanitarian assistance convoys,
Also strongly condemning the actions taken by Bosnian Serb paramilitary
units against UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], in particular, their
refusal to guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of UNPROFOR
personnel,
Aware that a tragic humanitarian emergency has already developed in
Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as a direct consequence of the
brutal actions of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units, forcing the large-
scale displacement of civilians, in particular women, children and the
elderly,
Recalling the provisions of resolution 815 (1993) on the mandate of
UNPROFOR and in that context acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations,
1. Demands that all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and
its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed
attack or any other hostile act;
2. Demands also to that effect the immediate cessation of armed attacks
by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against Srebrenica and their
immediate withdrawal from the areas surrounding Srebrenica;
3. Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and
services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina;
4. Requests the Secretary-General, with a view to monitoring the
humanitarian situation in the safe area, to take immediate steps to
increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and its surroundings;
demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully and
promptly with UNPROFOR towards that end; and requests the Secretary-
General to report urgently thereon to the Security Council;
5. Reaffirms that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat
or use of force, including through the practice of "ethnic cleansing",
is unlawful and unacceptable;
6. Condemns and rejects the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb
party to force the evacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica
and its surrounding areas as well as from other parts of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of its overall abhorrent campaign of
"ethnic cleansing";
7. Reaffirms its condemnation of all violations of international
humanitarian law, in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and
reaffirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts
shall be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;
8. Demands the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all
parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular to the
civilian population of Srebrenica and its surrounding areas and recalls
that such impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance
constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian law;
9. Urges the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees [UNHCR] to use all the resources at their disposal within
the scope of the relevant resolutions of the Council to reinforce the
existing humanitarian operations in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in particular Srebrenica and its surroundings;
10. Further demands that all parties guarantee the safety and full
freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and of all other United Nations
personnel as well as members of humanitarian organizations;
11. Further requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with UNHCR
and UNPROFOR, to arrange for the safe transfer of the wounded and ill
civilians from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas and to urgently
report thereon to the Council;
12. Decides to send, as soon as possible, a mission of members of the
Security Council to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ascertain
the situation and report thereon to the Security Council;
13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider
further steps to achieve a solution in conformity with relevant
resolutions of the Council.
VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).
Resolution 820 (April 17, 1993)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions,
Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the peace
talks held by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (S/25221, S/25248,
S/25403 and S/25479),
Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all
of the Bosnian parties,
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by force or any
practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and totally unacceptable, and
insisting that all displaced persons be enabled to return in peace to
their former homes,
Reaffirming in this regard its resolution 808 (1993) in which it decided
that an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution
of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
since 1991 and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report at the
earliest possible date,
Deeply alarmed and concerned about the magnitude of the plight of
innocent victims of the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
Expressing its condemnation of all the activities carried out in
violation of resolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) between the territory
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Serb-
controlled areas in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina,
Deeply concerned by the position of the Bosnian Serb party as reported
in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the report of the Secretary-General of 26
March 1993 (S/25479),
Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United
Nations,
A
1. Commends the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form
agreed to by two of the Bosnian parties and set out in the report of the
Secretary-General of 26 March 1993 (S/25479), namely the Agreement on
Interim Arrangements (annex I), the nine Constitutional Principles
(annex II), the provisional provincial map (annex III) and the Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (annex IV);
2. Welcomes the fact that this plan has now been accepted in full by
two of the Bosnian parties;
3. Expresses its grave concern at the refusal so far of the Bosnian
Serb party to accept the Agreement on Interim Arrangements and the
provisional provincial map, and calls on that party to accept the peace
plan in full;
4. Demands that all parties and others concerned continue to observe
the cease-fire and refrain from any further hostilities;
5. Demands full respect for the right of the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) and the international humanitarian agencies to free and
unimpeded access to all areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and that all parties, in particular the Bosnian Serb party and others
concerned, cooperate fully with them and take all necessary steps to
ensure the safety of their personnel;
6. Condemns once again all violations of international humanitarian
law, including in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and the
massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women, and
reaffirms that those who commit or have committed or order or have
ordered the commission of such acts will be held individually
responsible in respect of such acts;
7. Reaffirms its endorsement of the principles that all statements or
commitments made under duress, particularly those relating to land and
property, are wholly null and void and that all displaced persons have
the right to return in peace to their former homes and should be
assisted to do so;
8. Declares its readiness to take all the necessary measures to assist
the parties in the effective implementation of the peace plan once it
has been agreed in full by all the parties, and requests the Secretary-
General to submit to the Council at the earliest possible date, and if
possible not later than nine days after the adoption of the present
resolution, a report containing an account of the preparatory work for
the implementation of the proposals referred to in paragraph 28 of the
Secretary-General's report of 26 March 1993 (S/25479) and detailed
proposals for the implementation of the peace plan, including
arrangements for the effective international control of heavy weapons,
based inter alia on consultations with Member States, acting nationally
or through regional organizations or arrangements;
9. Encourages Member States, acting nationally or through regional
organizations or arrangements, to cooperate effectively with the
Secretary-General in his efforts to assist the parties in implementing
the peace plan in accordance with paragraph 8 above;
B
Determined to strengthen the implementation of the measures imposed by
its earlier relevant resolutions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
10. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below
shall, to the extent that they establish obligations beyond those
established by its earlier relevant resolutions, come into force nine
days after the date of the adoption of the present resolution unless the
Secretary-General has reported to the Council that the Bosnian Serb
party has joined the other parties in signing the peace plan and in
implementing it and that the Bosnian Serbs have ceased their military
attacks;
11. Decides further that if, at any time after the submission of the
above-mentioned report of the Secretary- General, the Secretary-General
reports to the Council that the Bosnian Serbs have renewed their
military attacks or failed to comply with the peace plan, the provisions
set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below shall come into force
immediately;
12. Decides that import to, export from and transshipment through the
United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those
areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of
Bosnian Serb forces, with the exception of essential humanitarian
supplies including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by
international humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with proper
authorizations from the Government of the Republic of Croatia or the
Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively;
13. Decides that all States, in implementing the measures imposed by
resolutions 757 (1992), 760 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present
resolution, shall take steps to prevent diversion to the territory of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of
commodities and products said to be destined for other places, in
particular the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia
and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the
control of Bosnian Serb forces;
14. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with
UNPROFOR in the fulfilment of its immigration and customs control
functions deriving from resolution 769 (1992);
15. Decides that transshipments of commodities and products through the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the Danube
shall be permitted only if specifically authorized by the Committee
established by resolution 724 (1991) and that each vessel so authorized
must be subject to effective monitoring while passing along the Danube
between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs;
16. Confirms that no vessels (a) registered in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or (b) in which a majority or
controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or (c)
suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713
(1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution shall be
permitted to pass through installations, including river locks or canals
within the territory of Member States, and calls upon the riparian
States to ensure that adequate monitoring is provided to all cabotage
traffic involving points that are situated between Vidin/Calafat and
Mohacs;
17. Reaffirms the responsibility of riparian States to take necessary
measures to ensure that shipping on the Danube is in accordance with
resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present
resolution, including any measures under the authority of the Security
Council to halt or otherwise control all shipping in order to inspect
and verify their cargoes and destinations, to ensure effective
monitoring and to ensure strict implementation of the relevant
resolutions, and reiterates its request in resolution 787 (1992) to all
States, including non-riparian States, to provide, acting nationally or
through regional organizations or arrangements, such assistance as may
be required by the riparian States, notwithstanding the restrictions on
navigation set out in the international agreements which apply to the
Danube;
18. Requests the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) to make
periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to the
Committee regarding alleged violations of the relevant resolutions,
identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels,
reported to be engaged in such violations;
19. Reminds States of the importance of strict enforcement of measures
imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, and calls upon them to bring
proceedings against persons and entities violating the measures imposed
by resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present
resolution and to impose appropriate penalties;
20. Welcomes the role of the international Sanctions Assistance
Missions in support of the implementation of the measures imposed under
resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present
resolution and the appointment of the Sanctions Coordinator by the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and invites the
Sanctions Coordinator and the Sanctions Assistance Missions to work in
close cooperation with the Committee established by resolution 724
(1991);
21. Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds
derived from property, (a) of the authorities in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or (b) of commercial, industrial or
public utility undertakings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), or (c) controlled directly or indirectly by
such authorities or undertakings or by entities, wherever located or
organized, owned or controlled by such authorities or undertakings,
shall require all persons and entities within their own territories
holding such funds to freeze them to ensure that they are not made
available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the
authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility
undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), and calls on all States to report to the Committee
established by resolution 724 (1991) on actions taken pursuant to this
paragraph;
22. Decides to prohibit the transport of all commodities and products
across the land borders or to or from the ports of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the only exceptions being:
(a) The importation of medical supplies and foodstuffs into the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as provided for in
resolution 757 (1992), in which connection the Committee established by
resolution 724 (1991) will draw up rules for monitoring to ensure full
compliance with this and other relevant resolutions;
(b) The importation of other essential humanitarian supplies into the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) approved on a
case-by-case basis under the no-objection procedure by the Committee
established by resolution 724 (1991);
(c) Strictly limited transshipments through the territory of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), when authorized
on an exceptional basis by the Committee established by resolution 724
(1991), provided that nothing in this paragraph shall affect
transshipment on the Danube in accordance with paragraph 15 above;
23. Decides that each State neighbouring the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall prevent the passage of all
freight vehicles and rolling stock into or out of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except at a strictly limited
number of road and rail border crossing points, the location of which
shall be notified by each neighbouring State to the Committee
established by resolution 724 (1991) and approved by the Committee;
24. Decides that all States shall impound all vessels, freight
vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their territories in which a
majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in
or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) and that these vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and
aircraft may be forfeit to the seizing State upon a determination that
they have been in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787
(1992) or the present resolution;
25. Decides that all States shall detain pending investigation all
vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes found in
their territories and suspected of having violated or being in violation
of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present
resolution and that, upon a determination that they have been in
violation, such vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft
shall be impounded and, where appropriate, they and their cargoes may be
forfeit to the detaining State;
26. Confirms that States may charge the expense of impounding vessels,
freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft to their owners;
27. Decides to prohibit the provision of services, both financial and
non-financial, to any person or body for purposes of any business
carried on in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
the only exceptions being telecommunications, postal services, legal
services consistent with resolution 757 (1992) and, as approved, on a
case-by-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724
(1991), services whose supply may be necessary for humanitarian or other
exceptional purposes;
28. Decides to prohibit all commercial maritime traffic from entering
the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) except when authorized on a case-by-case basis by the
Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) or in case of force
majeure;
29. Reaffirms the authority of States acting under paragraph 12 of
resolution 787 (1992) to use such measures commensurate with the
specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the
Security Council to enforce the present resolution and its other
relevant resolutions, including in the territorial sea of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
30. Confirms that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 29
above, strengthening the implementation of the measures imposed by its
earlier relevant resolutions, do not apply to activities related to
UNPROFOR, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia or the
European Community Monitor Mission;
C
Desirous of achieving the full readmittance of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the international community once
it has fully implemented the relevant resolutions of the Council,
31. Expresses its readiness, after all three Bosnian parties have
accepted the peace plan and on the basis of verified evidence, provided
by the Secretary-General, that the Bosnian Serb party is cooperating in
good faith in effective implementation of the plan, to review all the
measures in the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions
with a view to gradually lifting them;
32. Invites all States to consider what contribution they can make to
the reconstruction of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
33. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
VOTE: 13-0-2 (China, Russia abstaining). (###)
ARTICLE 9:
Status of Negotiations In Haiti
Statement by Secretary Christopher, Washington, DC, April 17, 1993.
I met today with UN/OAS [Organization of American States] Special Envoy
Dante Caputo on the current status of negotiations in Haiti. While there
have been positive signs of willingness to engage in serious
negotiations, Mr. Caputo's talks last week with the Haitian high command
were disappointing. The rejection of the proposal is a matter of
serious concern to the United States.
We had been assured up to this point that the military leadership in
Haiti understood the importance to their institution and to the people
of Haiti of their playing a constructive role in bringing about the
prompt return of constitutional government and President Aristide.
It is time for the military leadership of Haiti to indicate its firm
agreement on the key points of a settlement of the political crisis in
Haiti. I hope that careful reflection over this weekend in Port-au-
Prince will result in sufficient progress to permit these important
negotiations to move forward. (###)
ARTICLE 10:
Department's Efforts To Combat International Terrorism
Laurence Pope, Acting Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism
Statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC, April
21, 1993
Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the Department of State's
views on international terrorism and the outlook for the future. I
welcome this committee's decision to take up this important issue.
As I am sure the committee is aware, I cannot comment on the World Trade
Center bombing. I would note, however, that the State Department has
and will continue to work closely with our colleagues in the law
enforcement community to help ensure that every lead is followed up
until the facts have been established and a court can render its verdict
in that case.
Director for Central Intelligence Woolsey already has provided the
committee a comprehensive review of the current threat. We will shortly
be sending to Congress our annual report, "Patterns of Global
Terrorism." [See Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 19 for excerpts.] As Director
Woolsey makes clear, while there were fewer terrorist incidents in 1992
than several years ago, the threat continues to be significant. We
cannot and will not drop our guard.
Complacency can be costly. As we develop counter-measures, terrorists
will look for ways to evade them. Just as we are facing the
contemporary threat, we must continue to be vigilant to detect and
counter emerging threats before they pose a major risk to US national
interests.
Predictions about international affairs are risky, and this is
particularly true in trying to predict future terrorism. There are too
many variables, groups, and motives. Terrorism is often cyclical in
nature; as old passions and groups fade, new factors, new groups, and
new "causes" turn into deadly terrorist attacks.
The more fluid post-Cold War international environment has allowed long-
suppressed ethnic conflicts to find new violent expression. From the
Balkans to the Middle East, an area of traditional concern, tensions in
many parts of the world have increased. We know from experience that
terrorism is often a by-product of such conflicts.
In the Middle East and North Africa, new and radical groups have emerged
in recent years, invoking Islamic ideology but using terrorist tactics
to advance their extremist agendas. Groups such as Hamas and the
Palestine Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the so-
called Islamic Group in Egypt--with which Omar Abdurrahman is
associated-- have turned to violence and terrorism. In Egypt, the
Islamic Group has attacked foreign tourists in an effort to destabilize
the Mubarak government. Militant elements of Hamas have carried out
acts of terrorism and violence against Israeli officials and civilians.
The misuse of Islamic political rhetoric by these groups should not
cause us to confuse in our own minds terrorism and Islam. Our problem
is not, of course, with Islam; it is with the use of violence and
terrorism by anyone, anywhere.
We were shocked recently by the increasingly callous disregard for
civilian casualties shown by the Provisional Irish Republican Army
bombing of a crowded shopping area in Warrington, England. Two young
children died in the blast, and many other persons were injured.
As President Clinton said in a letter read at the April 7 memorial
service:
The United States condemns in the strongest terms such violence and
those who support and perpetuate it. That the [most] recent outrages
have caused the deaths of young children and injuries to many more, only
emphasizes the callous nature of such violence.
The President also said the American people join the people of Ireland
and the United Kingdom in the belief that "violence from whatever
quarter can never be justified."
Coordination and Policy
Mr. Chairman, in my remarks I will concentrate on our efforts to provide
international leadership in the fight against terrorism and on the
process of inter-agency coordination and cooperation within the
executive branch. I will end with comments from the State Department
perspective on some current legislative proposals.
In dealing with the international terrorism threat, we have learned that
inter-agency coordination and cooperation is absolutely critical. We
cannot allow the tensions which sometimes result from differences in
perspective to become battles over turf. Within the State Department,
my office is the focal point for this inter-agency coordination. We
work extremely closely with colleagues in the Justice Department, the
FBI, and the intelligence community.
We want to ensure that American diplomacy reinforces our law enforcement
efforts on the basis of the best information available. There is no
inherent contradiction between the requirements of law enforcement and
foreign policy. On the contrary, the rule of law is one of the most
effective tools we have in the fight against international terrorism.
In addition to working closely with the Justice Department, the FBI, the
CIA, and the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], we are in daily
contact with the Defense Department, which has developed impressive and
highly specialized capabilities to deal with international terrorism
contingencies. Specialized inter-agency working subgroups also have
been established to coordinate counter-terrorism activities such as
research and development, to apply new technologies against terrorist
threats, and [to administer] the counter-terrorism rewards programs. As
you know, the Department of State is the designated lead agency for US
policy on international terrorism.
State Support
The basis of our policy is the effort to reduce and eventually eliminate
the support which states provide to terrorist groups. As Director
Woolsey made clear, in the final analysis, without the support of
states, terrorists are exposed and vulnerable to effective law
enforcement. Terrorist organizations rely heavily on state support,
such as provision of weapons, training and training sites, intelligence
support, funding, travel documents, and safe havens from prosecution.
Without a sanctuary to operate from, and the facilities that only a
state can provide, terrorists can be dealt with as the criminals that
they are.
An important tool in this effort is the list of state sponsors of
terrorism that developed from the counter-terrorism provisions of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as revised by the Anti-Terrorism and
Arms Export Control Act of 1989.
This year, in our annual review of state sponsorship, we determined that
the six nations previously on the list--Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, and Syria--should continue to be designated state sponsors. We
remain concerned about reports of Pakistani support for militant groups
engaged in terrorism as well as of Sudan's apparently growing support
for terrorist groups. Our dialogue with Pakistan is high level and
continuing. We will be taking a very close look at both countries in
the coming weeks and months to consider whether they have, in the words
of the law, repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism. As Director Woolsey has said, none of the designated
governments has completely abandoned the terrorist option nor severed
ties to terrorist surrogates.
Of the current state sponsors, Iran is the major problem we face.
Iran's support for terrorism includes the threat to murder British
author Salman Rushdie, Tehran's continued campaign assassinations of
Iranian dissidents overseas, and its support for groups which seek to
use violence against the Middle East peace process. We are continuing
to work with our friends and allies within the European Community, the
G-7 [Group of 7 industrialized countries], and with other governments to
ensure that our collective response to the threat Iranian actions
present is as effective as possible. We have made the point repeatedly
that if we act in concert, we can have an impact on Iran's policies. We
will continue to make this case to our friends and allies at every
opportunity.
-- Syria has cooperated with the United States in several important
ways in the past several years, but it retains close ties to groups that
have engaged in international terrorism and allows them to maintain
offices in Damascus and to train in territory it controls.
-- Iraq--despite the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions--
has exercised the terrorism option repeatedly against regime opponents
and against UN officials and Western relief workers in northern Iraq.
-- Libya continues to refuse to comply with all of the requirements of
UN Security Council resolutions, and allows some representatives of
terrorist groups to remain in its territory.
-- Although North Korean and Cuba have been relatively quiescent, they
both continue to serve as a safe haven to radical groups, some with
links to terrorism.
International Cooperation And the Rule of Law
The good news is that, increasingly, governments have been willing to
join in steps against state sponsors and the groups they support. We
saw this clearly during Operation Desert Storm when many countries
joined in expelling or keeping under close scrutiny suspected Iraqi
agents and imposing other security measures to thwart Iraq's terrorist
efforts.
Collective efforts also were essential in the UN Security Council
condemnation of Libya for the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings. The
passage of landmark UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 is a
significant indication of this changed attitude. UNSC Resolution 748
last year imposed sanctions, which include a complete cut-off of air
service to and from Libya; an embargo on the provision of aviation spare
parts; a similar proviso concerning military equipment, spare parts, and
services to Libya; and a requirement that nations reduce the number of
Libyan diplomats serving at overseas missions. These sanctions are
effective in almost all cases, and potential violations are acted upon
quickly by the United States.
Until Libya complies fully with the requirements imposed by the Security
Council, these sanctions will remain in place. The UN Security Council
earlier this month renewed the sanctions. We continue to work closely
with our allies, Britain and France. Ambassador Albright and her
British and French colleagues warned Libya in the Council this month
that new, tougher sanctions may be necessary if it does not comply with
the Council's demands. As Secretary Christopher has said, one of the
new measures under consideration is an oil embargo. Libya would be well
advised not to misjudge our resolve.
I have mentioned the importance of bringing terrorists to justice. We
have had several successes recently which have not received much public
attention. For example, we worked successfully with Greece in the trial
of Muhammed Rashid, who was accused of the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am
aircraft. Ten years after this bombing, Rashid was convicted and
sentenced to a lengthy jail term in Athens.
More recently, Italy extradited Khalid Mohammed El-Jassem, a Palestinian
terrorist, to the United States to stand trial for offenses committed 20
years ago while a member of the notorious Black September Organization.
He was sentenced in New York last week to 30 years on these charges,
which included attempting to kill then-Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir
and plant[ing] an explosive at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport.
These actions serve notice on international criminals that our memories
are long, and so is the reach of US law enforcement.
We also strengthen the rule of law by helping improve the judicial and
law enforcement capabilities of other nations that may be victims of
terrorist acts. Through training provided under the Department of
State's Anti-terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), we have improved the
ability of other governments to preempt, investigate, and prosecute
terrorists. In 1992, more than 1,125 senior officials from 25 countries
received such training, bringing the total number of persons trained in
the program to about 14,000 from 75 nations.
The ATA program also helps develop working relationships between US and
foreign officials and provides a better understanding of each other's
capabilities. We were able recently to dispatch a team on short notice
to a friendly country that is cooperating on a sensitive terrorism
matter and felt it needed to bolster its security. The ATA program is
moving from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security into the new Bureau of
Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Crime. This change will help
ensure a close linkage between our policy initiatives to counter
terrorism, and our operational programs designed to improve the anti-
terrorism capabilities of friendly governments.
Legislation
Mr. Chairman, in your letter of invitation, you mentioned your interest
in the Department's views on possible legislation. There are several
measures for which we seek congressional support.
We expect to submit soon for Senate ratification a new international
convention dealing with detecting and controlling plastic explosives.
After the December 1988 destruction of Pan Am 103 by a plastic explosive
bomb, the United States and key European nations agreed to identify
chemical marking agents which could be incorporated into plastic
explosives during the manufacturing stage in order to make these
explosives detectable. Our aim was to develop an international
agreement which would help prevent bombings using plastic explosives.
The Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection was completed in Montreal in 1991. It has been signed by the
United States and 50 other nations.
The US Army has completed technical testing of the US-selected chemical-
marking agent, much of which was initially financed by the State
Department's Counter-Terrorism Research and Development Fund, to ensure
that the marked US plastic explosives will have no adverse
environmental, occupational health, or national security implications.
Based on these tests, the Army is prepared to begin producing plastic
explosives incorporating the marking chemical by January 1994.
The Department also seeks speedy congressional action this year on
implementing legislation for two important counter-terrorism treaties:
The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Aviation and The Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Attacks Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation.
These treaties extend the "prosecute or extradite" principle, embodied
in previous multilateral anti-terrorism treaties, to attacks on airports
serving civilian aviation and to attacks on civilian shipping and
offshore platforms. These treaties were prompted by the 1985 Rome and
Vienna airport attacks and the hijacking of the the Achille Lauro
passenger liner.
The Senate gave its advice and consent to these international
conventions in 1989, but approval of the implementing legislation was
delayed since it was incorporated into the omnibus crime bill. To
underscore the importance we attach to these and related provisions,
such as making it a federal offense to provide material support for
international terrorist attacks, they are included in the draft State
Department authorization bill.
We appreciate the support you gave these and other counter-terrorism-
related provisions during the past session of Congress. I hope your
committee can help expedite passage this year.
Mr. Chairman, as both the President and Secretary have made clear, the
issue of international terrorism is a high priority for this
Administration. Our response must and will be to maintain our
vigilance, increase and adjust our capabilities, and further develop
cooperation to help ensure the safety of Americans and American
interests throughout the world. It is an effort that requires continued
effort, attention, and persistence. And we appreciate your continued
support. (###)
ARTICLE 11:
US Delegation Visits Hanoi; POW/MIA Issues Discussed
Joint press statement by Gen. John Vessey, the President's Special Envoy
for POW/MIA Affairs, and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam,
Hanoi, Vietnam, April 19, 1993.
As agreed by both governments, Gen. John Vessey, President Clinton's
Special Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA affairs, led a US delegation to
Hanoi [on] April 18-19 for a full range of discussions with officials of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. While in Hanoi, General Vessey paid
a call on President Le Duc Anh [on] the afternoon of April 19. The
Vietnamese side was led by Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam and included
the deputy ministers of defense, interior, and foreign affairs, as well
as officials concerned with the issues of searching for missing persons
in Vietnam. The US side included representatives of the National
Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
and the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting.
The US side reaffirmed President Clinton's objective of achieving the
fullest possible accounting for missing American servicemen from the
Vietnam war. General Vessey stressed that the most immediate issue to
be addressed was the serious concern raised in America by the document
the United States had just received in Russia regarding the number of
POWs held during the war. General Vessey also stressed the importance
of answering the questions raised by the document and his hope that the
two sides would cooperate on the matter.
Concerning the Russian document recently obtained by the American side,
the Vietnamese side rejected the information contained in it as
completely inaccurate and not reflecting the reality which existed
during the war. At the same time, the Vietnamese side expressed its
willingness to assist the United States regarding this matter. To this
end, the Vietnamese side arranged for General Vessey to meet with
retired Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang, whose name appears in the document, as
well as retired Lt. Col. Doan Hanh, a former official of the POW prison
system. The US side expressed its appreciation for the cooperation of
the Vietnamese Government on this matter.
In response to previous American requests, the Vietnamese side provided
important documents from the archives of the General Political
Directorate and other archives listing American POWs held during the war
as well as American servicemen who died in captivity in southern and
central Vietnam. The US side indicated these documents will assist in
its efforts to account for US servicemen. They also appear to shed
light on the Russian document, but further analysis is required.
General Vessey indicated that he would report immediately to President
Clinton upon his return about all of these developments.
The two sides also carried out a full review of all areas of POW/MIA
cooperation. They agreed that substantial progress is being made and
agreed that further action was necessary in order to increase this
progress. Both sides agreed they would join officials of the Government
of Laos for trilateral talks on POW/MIA cooperation to be held May 6-8
in Hanoi. Both sides also agreed to establish a new joint team to
accelerate investigation of the remaining American discrepancy cases.
There also was agreement in principle on the work plan for activities to
investigate cases of missing Americans during the remainder of 1993.
The Vietnamese side provided new information about other unilateral
steps it has taken to assist in POW/MIA accounting. Foreign Minister
Cam provided General Vessey with seven documents obtained from
Vietnamese citizens, including sketches and maps of reported grave sites
of American servicemen. The two sides indicated they would investigate
these reports during their next joint field investigation.
At General Vessey's request, Minister Cam also briefed the US side on
the results of the recently started amnesty program designed to induce
Vietnamese citizens to turn over possible remains of US servicemen which
they are holding. As a result of this effort, on April 7, the US side
repatriated remains associated with multiple individuals from eight
wartime incidents.
The Vietnamese side also provided a review of the humanitarian needs of
Vietnam for consideration by the United States. General Vessey noted
this information and indicated [that] he would convey it to President
Clinton when he meets with him upon his return. General Vessey also
expressed confidence that the US would assist Vietnam in its efforts to
account for its missing men and war dead.
The two sides also discussed the issue of Cambodia. The US side
reiterated the United States' strong condemnation of recent acts of
murder carried out against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. It also
reviewed actions [that] the US is taking in conjunction with other
members of the international community to halt these heinous acts. The
Vietnamese side indicated its appreciation for these steps by the United
States.
General Vessey expressed his appreciation to the Government of Vietnam
for the cooperation and assistance provided to him during this mission.
(###)
ARTICLE 12:
Fact Sheet: The Federal Bulletin Board
In September 1992, the State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs was
one of the first three participants in the new Federal Bulletin Board
Service (BBS) of the US Government Printing Office (GPO). According to
Mr. Wayne Kelley, GPO's Superintendent of Documents, the BBS "is
providing customers with rapid, easy, and inexpensive access to
electronic publications and giving federal agencies a new alternative
for cost-effective information dissemination."
The BBS benefits both the State Department and private users. The user-
friendly service has reduced the time required for the Bureau of Public
Affairs to upload and administer its former electronic dissemination
system. For the public, it allows quick and easy identification,
selection, and transfer of electronic files to personal computers. For
both, the BBS has reduced costs.
Consequently, the Bureau of Public Affairs will be phasing out the
Computerized Information Delivery Service (CIDS). When CIDS was
initiated at the State Department in February 1991, it was the first
time that electronic foreign policy information was provided to the
general public. Effective August 31, 1993, the bureau will no longer
participate in CIDS.
US Government Contributors
Ms. Judy Russell, Director of GPO's Office of Electronic Information
Dissemination Services, is working with other government agencies, like
the State Department, that want to improve public access to their
electronic information. "We now offer more than 2,000 files on the
Federal Bulletin Board," said Ms. Russell, "and are adding new ones
daily." Agencies which now provide electronic information on the BBS
are the Departments of State and Energy, the US Supreme Court, the
Environmental Protection Agency, Food and Drug Administration, Health
Care Financing Administration, and Public Health Service. The
Departments of Justice and Commerce and the General Services
Administration plan to join in the near future.
How the BBS Works
Users can access free services on the bulletin board with a personal
computer, modem (settings: 8 bit, no parity, 1 stop bit, speeds 300-9600
baud), telecommunications software, and telephone line by calling GPO at
202-512-1387. Unlike CIDS, no monthly subscription is required. Users
can search file names, dates, and up to 10 keywords assigned to each
file by the publishing agency or GPO. The BBS is available 22 hours a
day (5:00 am to 3:00 am, eastern time). User assistance is available
from 8:00 am to 4:00 pm, eastern time, Monday-Friday (except federal
holidays) by calling 202-512-1526.
At present, a GPO Deposit Account (with an initial deposit of $50; no
minimum balance thereafter) is required to download files. Prices for
downloading are reasonable: The minimum charge per file is $2 (up to 50
kilobytes); a full megabyte file costs $21. A GPO Deposit Account can
be opened with a major credit card, check, or money order. For more
information on opening an account, call 202-512-0822 (FAX 202-512-1262).
For additional information about the BBS, contact GPO's Office of
Electronic Information Dissemination Services on 202-512-1524.
GPO sells disks and plans to sell hard copies of the electronic
material, which can be ordered from GPO through BBS electronic mail.
For information about on-line material now available through the BBS
from the State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs, you also can
communicate with the bureau through the free E-mail feature or contact
Ms. Anita Stockman on 202-647-6681 (PA/PC, Rm. 6808, US State
Department, Washington, DC 20520).
NTIS Electronic Gateway
The National Technical Information Service (NTIS) of the US Department
of Commerce has established the FedWorld GateWay™ which allows access
to GPO's bulletin board in addition to more than 100 federal computer
bulletin board systems. For further information on FedWorld™,
contact Alan Wenberg, NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA
22161. (###)
Highlights of State Department Material on the BBS
-- US Department of State Dispatch, the Department's weekly foreign
policy magazine, including "Treaty Actions" and special sections such as
the "Focus on the Emerging Democracies" and "Focus on the Environment."
(Library File: DOS_DISP)
Dispatch Supplements, periodic supplements to the foreign policy
magazine on topics such as the UN Conference on Environment and
Development and the economic summits. (Library File: DOS_DISP)
-- Official transcript of the daily State Department press
briefings. (Library File: DOS_DPB)
-- Background Notes on countries and selected international
organizations. (Library File: DOS_BKG)
-- Travel information to US citizens such as travel tips to various
countries/regions and advisories on residing abroad and protecting
business interests. (Library File: DOS_TRA)
-- Special publications, including Defense Trade News and National
Action Plan for Global Climate Change. (Library File: DOS_MISC)
-- Major reports, including the annual "Human Rights Country
Reports" (Library File: DOS_HRCR), and International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (Library File: DOS_INM). (###)
ARTICLE 13:
What's in Print
Foreign Relations Of the United States
The Department of State recently released Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXIII, Part 2, Korea. Part 1, Japan,
was released in 1991.
This volume is the last of the Foreign Relations series for the years
1955-57, completing the Department of State program to document the
triennium of the middle Eisenhower years.
The Korean war ended in 1953 with an armistice devised to last until the
opposing sides could reach a permanent settlement at an international
conference. North and South Korea remained in a state of suspended war
with the armistice supervisory machinery the only mechanism to maintain
the uneasy standstill between them. US military advisers warned
President Eisenhower that US and South Korean forces were at a serious
disadvantage in light of the military power of North Korea and its
allies. This volume focuses on the response of the Eisenhower
Administration to this dangerous situation.
The Administration examined the introduction of modern weapons into the
Republic of Korea (ROK) as a means of reducing the burden of supporting
the massive ROK army. Technically, such modernization violated the
armistice provisions, but US defense officials maintained that North
Korean violations justified the ROK and US upgrade. The Department of
State reluctantly accepted the necessity of large-scale modernization
but hoped it could be accomplished unobtrusively. The US military,
however, wanted to introduce dual-capable (atomic/conventional) weapons
into Korea. As a result, the United States publicly abrogated Article
13(d) of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which had prohibited the
introduction of new armaments into Korea.
President Eisenhower, after much discussion, decided to introduce an
atomic cannon and rockets for the use of US forces, and authorized
upgrading of the ROK Air Force and two ROK divisions. In return, ROK
President Rhee agreed to a reduction of 60,000 soldiers in the ROK army.
Documents in this volume were selected from the central indexed files of
the Department of State; the decentralized lot files of the Department's
Executive Secretariat; bureau, office, and division files; and lot files
retired by the American Embassy in Seoul. Documents also were selected
from Presidential and other papers at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
in Abilene, Kansas. Additional files were consulted and documents
selected from files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Volume XXIII, Part 2 (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02363-6; (ISBN 0-16-038253-
X) may be purchased for $26 from the Superintendent of Documents, New
Orders, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. To FAX your orders,
call (202) 512-2250. For further information, contact Glenn W.
LaFantasie, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202)
663-1133.
Geographic Notes
Geographic Notes is published quarterly by the US Department of State,
Office of the Geographer. It contains official information on changes
in foreign geographic names and international boundary designations. It
also offers analyses, maps, and other graphics that provide a geographic
perspective on such foreign policy-related topics as boundary and
sovereignty disputes, maritime issues, international migration and
refugee flows, transnational environmental problems, and issues
concerning political and economic geography.
The recently released issue for Winter 1992-93 (Vol. 2, No. 4) includes
articles that range from an exploration of Baltic state energy
prospects, to analyses of trade and investment developments in China and
Japan, to a look at employment trends in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. A highlight of this issue is a centerfold
map depicting the administrative divisions of Russia.
Published for the first time is a historical analysis on the UN mission
in the Congo (1960-64). Also printed is the third in a series of four
articles on population and territorial issues along Russia's periphery.
Subscriptions and copies of individual issues are available from the
Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954.
Subscription prices are $8.00 per year (four issues) for domestic orders
and $10.00 per year, foreign. Single-issue prices are $3.25 domestic
and $4.06 foreign. You can FAX your order by using credit card
(MasterCard or VISA) or GPO Deposit Account number to (202) 512-2233.
Information related to publication content should be directed to:
Editor, Geographic Notes, Office of the Geographer, US Department of
State, Washington, DC 20520-6510. (###)
END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 17
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