US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 17, APRIL 26, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS


ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Reaffirming the US Commitment To Protect Global Environment -- 
President Clinton
2.  Assistance to Russia And the Foreign Affairs Budget -- Secretary 
Christopher
3.  Middle East Peace Talks To Resume -- Secretary Christopher
4.  US Must Lead a Strategic AllianceWith Post-Soviet Reform -- Strobe 
Talbott
5.  Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons:  Building Confidence and 
Partnership -- James E. Goodby
6.  US Aid to Central and Eastern Europe:  A Call for Imagination --  
Robert L. Hutchings
7.  Crisis in Zaire
8.  UN Security Council Resolutions On the Former Yugoslavia
9.  Status of Negotiations in Haiti -- Secretary Christopher
10.  Department's Efforts To Combat International Terrorism -- Laurence 
Pope
11.  US Delegation Visits Hanoi; POW/MIA Issues Discussed
12.  Fact Sheet:  The Federal Bulletin Board 
13.  What's in Print: Foreign Relations of  the United States, 
Geographic Notes
(###)



ARTICLE 1:

Reaffirming the US Commitment To Protect Global Environment
President Clinton
Address at the US Botanical Gardens, Washington, DC, April 21, 1993 
(opening remarks deleted)

A little more than 1 week ago, most Americans celebrated holy days of 
freedom and renewal.  Today, we still nurture the faith that helps us to 
understand more clearly that we can do better.  This is a time of new 
beginnings, a time when there is anguish and anxiety all around us; but 
we still must yearn once again to succeed in our common purposes to 
reach our deepest goals.

For all of our differences, I think there is an overwhelming 
determination to change our course, to offer more opportunity, to assume 
more responsibility, to restore the larger American community, and to 
achieve things that are larger than ourselves and more lasting than the 
present moment.  We seek to set our course by the star of age-old 
values, not short-term expediencies; to waste less in the present and 
provide more for the future; to leave a legacy that keeps faith with 
those who left the earth to us.

This is the American spirit.  It moves us not only in great gatherings, 
but also when we stand silently all alone in the presence only of nature 
and our Creator.

If there is one commitment that defines our people, it is our devotion 
to the rich and expansive land we have inherited.  From the first 
Americans to the present day, our people have lived in awe of the power, 
the majesty, and the beauty of the forests, the rivers, and the streams 
of America.  That love of the land, which flows like a mighty current 
through this land and through our character, burst into service on the 
first Earth Day in 1970.

When I traveled the country last year, I saw and spoke of how much had 
been accomplished by the environmental movement since then and how much 
still remains to be done.  For all that has been done to protect the air 
and the water, we haven't halted the destruction of wetlands at home and 
the rain forests abroad.  For all that has been learned, we still 
struggle to comprehend such dangers to our planet's delicate environment 
as the shroud of greenhouse gases and the dangerous thinning of the 
ozone layer.  We haven't done nearly enough to protect our forest 
communities from the hazards such as lead poisoning, which is believed 
to cause mental retardation, learning disabilities, and impaired growth.

Unless we act, and act now, we face a future where our planet will be 
home to 9 billion people within our lifetime, but its capacity to 
support and sustain our lives will be very much diminished.  Unless we 
act, we face the extinction of untold numbers of species that might 
support our livelihoods and provide medication to save our very lives.  
Unless we act now, we face a future in which the sun may scorch us, not 
warm us; where the change of season may take on a dreadful new meaning; 
and where our children's children will inherit a planet far less 
hospitable than the world in which we came of age.  I have a faith that 
we will act, not from fear but from hope and through vision.

All across this country, there is a deep understanding rooted in our 
religious heritage and renewed in the spirit of this time that the 
bounty of nature is not ours to waste.  It is a gift from God that we 
hold in trust for future generations.  Preserving our heritage, 
enhancing it, and passing it along is a great purpose worthy of a great 
people.  If we seize the opportunity and shoulder the responsibility, we 
can enrich the future and ennoble our own lives.

Just as we yearn to come together as a people, we yearn to move beyond 
the false choices that the last few years have imposed upon us.  For too 
long, we have been told that we have to choose between the economy and 
the environment; between our jobs; between our obligations to our own 
people and our responsibilities to the future and to the rest of the 
world; between public action and private economy.

I am here today in the hope that we can together take a different course 
of action to offer a new set of challenges to our people.  Our 
environmental program is based on three principles.

First, we think [that] you can't have a healthy economy without a 
healthy environment.  We need not choose between breathing clean air and 
bringing home secure paychecks.  The fact is, our environmental problems 
result not from robust growth but from reckless growth.  The fact is 
that only a prosperous society can have the confidence and the means to 
protect its environment.  And the fact is [that] healthy communities and 
environmentally sound products and services do best in today's economic 
competition.  That's why our policies must protect our environment, 
promote economic growth, and provide millions of high-skill, high-wage 
jobs.

Second, we want to protect the environment at home and abroad.  In an 
era of global economics, global epidemics, and global environmental 
hazards, a central challenge of our time is to promote our national 
interest in the context of its connectedness with the rest of the world.  
We share our atmosphere, our planet, [and] our destiny with all the 
peoples of this world.  The policies I outline today will protect all of 
us because that is the only way we can protect any of us.

Third, we must move beyond the antagonisms among business, government, 
and individual citizens.  The policies I outline today are part of our 
effort to reinvent government, to make it your partner and not your 
overseer, to lead by example and not by bureaucratic fiat.

In the face of great challenges, we need a government that not only 
guards against the worst in us but helps to bring out the best in us.  I 
know we can do this because our Administration includes the best team of 
environmental policy-makers who have ever served the United States:  the 
Vice President, Interior Secretary Babbitt, EPA Administrator Browner--
and I hope that the EPA will, soon, by the grace of Congress, be a 
Cabinet-level department--and Energy Secretary O'Leary, Commerce 
Secretary Brown, Transportation Secretary Pena, the Agriculture 
Secretary Mike Espy, our Environmental Policy Director Katie McGinty, 
and our Science and Technology Adviser Jack Gibbons.  All of them share 
an unshakable commitment to a healthy environment, a growing economy, 
and a responsive government.

Our economic plan will create new job opportunities and new business 
opportunities [in] protecting our natural environment.  The reductions 
in the interest rates which we have seen already will free up tens of 
billions of dollars for responsive investments in this year alone.

The jobs package [that] I have asked the Congress to pass contains--this 
[has] hardly been noticed, but it actually contains--green jobs from 
wastewater treatment to energy efficiency, to the restoration of our 
national parks, to investments in new technologies designed to create 
the means by which we can solve the problems of the future and create 
more jobs for Americans.

Our long-term strategy invests more in pollution prevention, energy 
efficiency, and solar energy; in renewable energy and environmental 
restoration and water treatment--all of which can be found in the 5-year 
budget that we have presented to the Congress.

These investments will create tens of thousands of new jobs, and they 
will save tens of thousands more.  Because when we save energy and 
resources, we will have more to invest in creating new jobs and 
providing better living standards.  Today, every other advanced nation 
is more energy efficient than we are.  That is one of the reasons why 
over the last couple of years, for example, the average German factory 
worker has come to make over 20% more than his American counterpart 
[and] that German workers, while having higher wages, also have more 
secure and better health care.  That's because the economy uses one-half 
the energy we do to produce the same amount of goods.  We can do better, 
and we will.

I believe [that] we can develop the know-how to out-conserve and out-
compete anyone else on earth.  All over the world, people are buying 
products that help them to protect the environment.  There's a $200-
billion market today for environmental technologies.  And by the turn of 
the decade and the century, it will be $300 billion.

Let me just share one example with you--something we all know and use, 
and something some of us are still trying to learn how to replace:  
light bulbs.  Long-lasting, energy-saving light bulbs didn't even exist 
in 1985.  Now American companies sell over $500-million worth of these 
products, with sales expected to reach $2 billion by 1995 and $10 
billion by the year 2000, creating thousands of new jobs.  American 
scientists have taken the lead in developing these technologies, and 
it's time to help our companies take the lead in bringing out products 
and services to market.

I've asked the Energy Department, the Commerce Department, and the EPA 
to assess current environmental technologies and create a strategic plan 
to give our companies the trade development, promotional efforts, and 
technical assistance they need to turn these advances into jobs here in 
America as well as to help promote a better environment.  America can 
only maintain its lead in the world economy by taking the lead to 
preserve the world environment.

Last year, the nations of the world came together at the earth summit in 
Rio to try to find a way to protect the miraculous diversity of plant 
and animal life all across the planet.  The biodiversity treaty which 
resulted had some flaws, and we all knew that.  But, instead of fixing 
them, the United States walked away from the treaty.  That left us out 
of a treaty that is critically important not only to our future but to 
the future of the world--and not only because of what it will do to 
preserve species but because of opportunities it offers for cutting-edge 
companies whose research creates new medicines, new products, and new 
jobs.

Again, just one recent example makes the point.  A tree that was thought 
to have no value, the Pacific yew, used to be bulldozed and burned.  Now 
we know that the tree contains one of our most promising potential cures 
for ovarian cancer, breast cancer, and other forms of cancer.  We cannot 
walk away from challenges like those presented by the biodiversity 
treaty.  We must step up to them.

Our Administration has worked with business and environmental groups 
toward an agreement that protects both American interests and the world 
environment.  And today, I am proud to announce the United States' 
intention to sign the bio-diversity treaty.

This is an example of what you can do by bringing business and 
environmentalists together instead of pitting them against each other.  
We can move forward to protect critical natural resources and critical 
technologies.  I'm also directing the State Department to move ahead 
with our talks with other countries which have signed the convention so 
that the United States can move as quickly as possible toward 
ratification.

To learn more about where we stand in protecting all our biological 
resources here at home, I'm asking the Interior Department to create a 
national biological survey to help us protect endangered species and,  
just as importantly, to help the agricultural and biotechnical 
industries of our country identify new sources of food, fiber, and 
medication.

We also must take the lead in addressing the challenge of global warming 
that could make our planet and its climate less hospitable and more 
hostile to human life.  Today, I reaffirm my personal [commitment] and 
announce our nation's commitment to reducing our emissions of greenhouse 
gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000.

I am instructing my Administration to produce a cost-effective plan by 
August that can continue the trend of reduced emissions.  This must be a 
clarion call--not for more bureaucracy or regulation or unnecessary 
costs but, instead, for American ingenuity and creativity to produce the 
best and most energy-efficient technology.

After the Cold War, we face the challenge of helping Russia achieve a 
healthy democracy, a healthy economy, and a healthy environment.  Our 
Russian aid package includes $38 million to clean up pollution and 
promote better uses of energy.  As with the full range of our 
investments in Russia, this is truly an investment not only in promoting 
our own values but in protecting our national security.  To protect the 
environment at home and abroad, I am committed to a government that 
leads by example, brings people together, and brings out the best in 
everyone.  For too long, our government did more to inflame 
environmental issues than to solve them.  Different agencies pursued 
conflicting policies, national leaders polarized people, and problems 
wound up in the courts or in the streets instead of being solved.

We seek to bring a new spirit to these difficult issues.  Three weeks 
ago in Portland, Oregon, we brought together business people, timber 
workers, and environmentalists from throughout the Northwest to discuss 
how best to preserve jobs and to protect the old-growth forests and the 
species which inhabit them.  People sat down in a conference room, not a 
court room, and, in the words of Archbishop Thomas Murphy of Seattle, we 
tried to find common ground for a common good.  At the close of that 
forest conference, I asked my Cabinet and our entire Administration to 
begin work immediately to craft a balanced, comprehensive, long-term 
policy that is also comprehensible.

Before I ask our companies and our communities and our families to meet 
any challenge, it seems to me [that] we have to set that standard for 
the government.  The American people are entitled to know where the 
United States stands on this issue and many other issues.  It is time to 
bring an end to the time when issues like this wind up in court and 
[when] there are five different positions from the US Government itself.  
We can never solve problems in that fashion.  We can only undermine the 
security and stability of people's lives.

That's one reason I am proud that yesterday the US Army announced its 
plan to clean up a large number of sites where we learned, recently, 
that chemical weapons materials may be buried in some places from as 
long ago as World War I.  Working with the EPA, the Army will clean up 
this problem safely and in an environmentally sound manner.

This is a legacy of America's efforts to defend our people and the 
community of free nations.  Now we are taking steps to defend our people 
and our environment and the environment of the world.  In that same 
spirit, I plan to sign an executive order requiring federal facilities 
that manufacture, process, or use toxic chemicals to comply with the 
federal right-to-know laws and publicly report what they are doing.

I might add that it is time that the US Government begins to live under 
the laws it makes for other people.  With this executive order, I ask 
all federal facilities to set a voluntary goal to reduc[e] their release 
of toxic pollutants by 50% by 1999.  This will reduce toxic releases, 
control costs associated with cleanups, and promote clean technologies.  
And it will help make our government what it should be:  a positive 
example for the rest of the country.

Poor neighborhoods in our cities suffer most often from toxic pollution.  
Cleaning up the toxic wastes will create new jobs in these neighborhoods 
for those people and make them safer places to live, to work, and to do 
business.

Today, I am also signing an executive order that directs federal 
agencies to make preliminary changes in their purchasing policies to use 
fewer substances harmful to the ozone layer.  Here, too, we must put our 
actions where our values are.  Our government is a leading purchaser of 
goods and services, and it's time to stop not only the waste of 
taxpayers' money but the waste of our natural resources.

Today, I am signing an executive order which commits the federal 
government to buy thousands more American-made vehicles using clean, 
domestic fuels such as natural gas, ethanol, methanol, and electric 
power.  This will reduce our demand for foreign oil, reduce air 
pollution, promote promising technologies, promote American companies, 
create American jobs, and save American tax dollars.  To demonstrate my 
commitment to this issue, Energy Secretary O'Leary is creating a task 
force led by the Land Commissioner of Texas, Gary Mauro--who is here in 
the audience today--who has headed a successful effort in his own state.  
I hope we can do as well in America as they have done in Texas.

In that same spirit, I plan to sign an executive order committing every 
agency of the national government to do more than ever to buy and use 
recycled products.  This will provide a market for new technologies, 
make better use of recycled materials, and encourage the creation of new 
products that can be offered to the government, to private companies, 
and to consumers.  And again, it will create jobs through the recycling 
process.

We must keep finding new ways to be a force for positive change.  For 
example, the federal government is the largest purchaser of computer 
equipment in the world, and computers are the fastest-growing area of 
electricity use.  That's why I am also signing an executive order today 
requiring the federal government to purchase energy-efficient computers.  
We're going to expand the market for a technology where America 
pioneered and still leads the world, and we'll save energy, saving the 
taxpayers $40 mil-lion per year, and set an example for our country and 
for the world.

For as long as I live and work in the White House, I want Americans to 
see it not only as a symbol of clean government but also [of] a clean 
environment.  That's why I'm announcing an energy and environmental 
audit of the White House.  We're going to identify what it takes to make 
the White House a model for efficiency and waste reduction.  It might 
mean fewer memos and less paper.  Then we're going to get the job done.  
I want to make the White House a model for other federal agencies, for 
state and local governments, for business, and for families in their 
homes.  Before I ask you to do the best you can in your house, I ought 
to make sure I'm doing the best I can in my house.

I ask that all of us today reaffirm our willingness to assume 
responsibility for our common environment and to do it willingly, 
hopefully, and joyously.  We are challenged here today not so much to 
sacrifice as to celebrate and create.  I've challenged Americans who are 
young in years or young in spirit to offer their time and their talent 
to serve their communities and their country.  I've asked them to help 
in teaching our children, healing the sick, policing our streets.

But equally important are efforts to protect our environment--from our 
largest cities to our smallest towns to our suburbs.  Our national 
service plan will ask thousands of Americans to do their part, from 
leading recycling drives to preventing lead poisoning.

The challenge to shoulder responsibility and seize opportunity extends 
to each of us in business, communities, and homes.  In our own lives, in 
our own ways, each of us has something to offer to the work of cleaning 
up America's environment.  And each of us surely has something very 
personal to gain.

On a colder day in the middle of winter, just 3 months ago, a poet asked 
us to celebrate not only the marvelous diversity of our people but the 
miraculous bounty of our land.  "Here on the pulse of this new day," 
Maya Angelou challenged us to look at "the rock, the river, the tree, 
your country."  Now, it is a season of new hope and new beginnings.  As 
we look anew at our neighbors, our children, and our communities as well 
as the world around us, we must seize the possibilities inherent in this 
exhilarating moment--to face our challenges, to exercise our 
responsibilities, and to rejoice in them.  (###)



ARTICLE 2:


Assistance to Russia And the Foreign Affairs Budget
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
April 20, 1993

It is a pleasure to appear again before you and this committee. Three 
months have passed since our first official meeting at my confirmation 
hearing.  Much has transpired in that time.  We have conducted an 
activist, internationalist, democracy-oriented foreign policy.

I look forward to exploring the full range of challenges we confront.  I 
will limit my formal remarks to two key issues.

First, I want to update you on our single-most important foreign policy 
priority:  the effort to help reform succeed in Russia.

Second, I will review the Administration's foreign affairs budget 
requests and management strategy.

Assisting Reform in Russia:  From Vancouver to Tokyo
Mr. Chairman, the last few weeks have witnessed important developments 
in Russia's relations with the United States and the West.  The 
Vancouver summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin marked a 
milestone.  It was the first truly post-Cold War summit, where talk 
about economic reform and democracy played as central a role as 
negotiations over nuclear weapons did in the past.

At the summit, the presidents agreed on a new package of bilateral 
programs designed to address Russia's immediate human needs and 
contribute to the building of a market economy.  It targets areas of 
high priority.  This includes a resumption of US food exports; support 
for privatization and new businesses; help in dismantling nuclear 
weapons; a housing program for demobilized soldiers to speed Russia's 
withdrawal from the Baltic countries and parts of the former Soviet 
empire; funding for programs to enhance nuclear safety; help in 
resurrecting Russia's energy sector; and an increase in people-to-people 
exchanges.

These programs are designed to deliver quick, tangible benefits to the 
Russian people.  They will support Russia's long-term transformation to 
the market, and--most importantly-- directly serve US interests by 
reducing the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and opening new markets for 
our workers, farmers, and businesses.

While America's increased support and leadership will be critical for 
promoting reform, we cannot do it alone.  Our help must be part of a 
much larger partnership between Russia and the international community.  
Building that broader cooperative effort was precisely the purpose 
behind last week's extraordinary meeting in Tokyo between foreign and 
finance ministers of the G-7 [Group of 7 industrialized] countries and 
Russia.

At that meeting, Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Fyodorov outlined a bold 
new plan to control Russia's money supply, reduce its budget deficits, 
and achieve macroeconomic stabilization.  In response, we and our G-7 
partners--working through the international financial institutions--
announced a major new multilateral initiative to support reform.  In 
addition to the Paris Club's recent rescheduling of $15 billion of 
Russia's foreign debt, the $28-billion Tokyo package will include 
helping Russia to stabilize its currency, to finance critical imports, 
to restructure key sectors of its economy, and to reduce the threat of 
its deadly nuclear legacy.

The vast majority of this new support for Russian reform will come from 
the international financial institutions.  But it is also going to 
require contributions from G-7 members, as well as other countries in 
Asia, the Middle East, and Europe that are capable of participating.  
Here, America must be willing to pay its fair share.

As President Clinton stated in Vancouver, our strategy to assist Russia 
consists of three steps.

--  The first is the $1.6 billion package of bilateral programs 
announced at the US-Russian summit.  As you know, the monies for this 
package have already been appropriated by the Congress.  

--  The second step is the new multilateral support program announced in 
Tokyo.  One of the most important and innovative parts of that program 
could be the creation of a G-7 privatization fund.  This fund is 
designed to help Russia cope with the economic and political 
consequences of privatizing the huge--and hugely wasteful--state-owned 
enterprises that are bleeding its budget dry and fueling inflation.  Our 
share of this effort would amount to some $500 million, and would take 
the form of a "challenge grant."  That is, it would be contingent on 
other G-7 members contributing another $1.5 billion.  We would then look 
to the international financial institutions to commit an additional $2 
billion in co-financing, bringing the fund's total resources to $4 
billion in grants and loans.

--  The third step in the President's plan to support Russian reform is 
to work closely with the Congress to develop further bilateral 
assistance efforts.  A starting point will be the funding requests in 
our fiscal year (FY) 1994 budget to continue current programs to 
dismantle nuclear weapons, deliver humanitarian help, and promote 
democracy and privatization.  In recent talks with the Russians, our G-7 
partners, and the Congress, we have reached the conclusion, Mr. 
Chairman, that even more must be done.  As I announced last week in 
Tokyo, the President has decided to seek an expanded package of US 
bilateral programs, to build upon the ones announced at Vancouver, and 
in addition to the requests contained in our FY 1994 budget.

This package reflects the intensive consultations that we have had.  It 
focuses on what Russia's reformers say they most need, as well as the 
areas where Members of Congress have suggested our efforts should be 
aimed.  This will build on our assistance efforts in energy, 
privatization, and housing for demobilized soldiers and also provide 
support for the environment, medicines, trade and investment, and 
exchange programs.

This expanded package of bilateral steps, together with our $500 million 
contribution to the prospective G-7 privatization fund, would require an 
additional appropriation of approximately $1.8 billion.  We are now 
consulting with this committee and others in Congress to determine how 
best to structure such a request.  Mr. Chairman, I realize this is a 
difficult proposal at a time when so many Americans face hardships here 
at home.  But President Clinton and I are convinced that this investment 
in Russia's democratic future is an essential investment in America's 
future.  By making this investment, we can help turn our most dangerous 
enemy into an enduring partner.  That, I believe, is a critical--indeed, 
a noble--mission.

The President and I will continue to make the case to the American 
people that a focused program to assist Russian democracy is in our 
deepest self-interest.  We are counting on the members of this committee 
to join us in this effort.

International Affairs Budget
Mr. Chairman, let me now turn briefly to a discussion of our FY 1994 
international affairs budget.  It is a budget that accurately reflects 
the times we live in.  In its funding requests, it recognizes the tight 
fiscal constraints confronting our government today.  And in its 
priorities and objectives,  it marks a first but important step toward 
addressing the new challenges of the post-Cold War era.

One of our highest priorities will be promoting democracy and human 
rights.  I have already described the especially high stake we have in 
helping freedom triumph in Russia and the other new states of the former 
Soviet Union.  But our efforts must be worldwide.  The lesson of this 
tragic century is clear:  The best check against international 
aggression is the emergence of governments that encourage tolerance, 
pluralism, and respect for the individual.

Our budget also places a new emphasis on promoting multinational peace-
keeping and peace-making.  The end of the Cold War has unleashed long-
suppressed conflicts in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and 
elsewhere.  But it has also opened up new possibilities for 
international cooperation.  Our task is to harness that cooperation to 
contain, and far more importantly, to prevent conflict.  The tragedies 
of the Balkans and Somalia bear grim witness to the price of 
international delay.  International peace-keeping--especially by the UN-
-can and must play a critical role. Capabilities must be enhanced to 
permit prompt, effective, preventive action.

We in the United States must be ready to do our part.  In this 
connection, the President and I believe that millions spent now on 
preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping can save hundreds of millions in 
defense and international relief later.

These priorities, as well as others highlighted in our budget, represent 
an important effort to reorient our scarce resources to the realities of 
the post-Cold War era.  The budget reflects a commitment to using the 
taxpayers' dollars wisely and efficiently, in full support of the 
President's economic and deficit-reduction programs.

Reforming the Institutions
As important as how much we spend on foreign policy, however, is how we 
spend it.  I'm convinced that the Department of State cannot hope to 
respond effectively to new challenges unless we improve the way we deal 
with complex problems that cut across traditional bureaucratic 
boundaries.  A stifling bureaucracy, an obsolete division of labor, or 
cumbersome decision-making are luxuries we cannot afford.

As a first step in remaking the State Department, I announced a broad-
based reorganization plan in February.  The plan shifts portfolios and 
creates new positions to mirror post-Cold War missions.  It will reduce 
excessive layering within the Department and streamline the policy 
process.  Our objective is simple:  quicker policy-making, more open 
policy-making, and, most importantly, better policy-making.

We also need to refocus our foreign assistance priorities and programs.  
Specifically, the US Agency for International Development must be 
overhauled.  I have asked Deputy Secretary Wharton to examine the 
Agency's role in the post-Cold War era and report his recommendations to 
me by the end of this month.  We look forward to working closely with 
this committee and the full Congress in this effort.

Conclusion
Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to depart from my prepared 
remarks to say a few words about the worsening tragedy in Bosnia.  Upon 
taking office, our Administration was faced with a condition of advanced 
deterioration.  Frankly, it was a situation that would have been better 
dealt with by the West more than a year ago.  Nonetheless, we now face a 
worsening environment in eastern Bosnia that has horrified the world.

In response to the Serbs' relentless aggression, the United States 
joined our partners in the Security Council this weekend in passing a 
resolution that will dramatically tighten existing economic sanctions.   
The steps are, indeed, severe--and entirely fitting.  When implemented, 
they will significantly increase the pariah status of Belgrade and its 
Bosnian allies. We intend to press for total isolation so long as they 
continue their aggression.

If Bosnia's Serbs fail to halt their aggression and agree to a peace 
plan within 6 days from today, Serbia will confront a series of harsh 
new measures, including the following:

--  All ships will be banned from entering Yugoslav territorial waters;

--  No country will be allowed to ship goods by land across Serbia;

--  Every Yugoslav plane, ship, truck, rail car, and cargo container 
outside the country will be subject to impoundment;

--  Barges will be prohibited from passing through Serbia along the 
Danube River unless they have special permission and submit to UN 
monitoring; and

--  All bank accounts and other financial assets held by Yugoslav 
institutions abroad will be frozen.

These steps will also apply to Serb-held areas of Bosnia and Croatia.

The President remains deeply concerned [about] the situation.  The 
Administration is now urgently reviewing a wide range of options 
available to the world community to further punish Serbian aggression 
and bring an end to the violence.  As the President has said, this 
includes options that have previously been unacceptable.  We will stay 
in close touch with members of this committee and the full Congress as 
our deliberations proceed.  (###)

Materials relating to the Vancouver  summit (April 3-4) and Secretary 
Christopher's trip to Tokyo (April 12-15) will be printed in Dispatch 
Vol. 4, Supplement No. 2.  (###)




ARTICLE 3:


Middle East Peace Talks To Resume 
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at a news conference, Washington, DC, April 21, 1993

On behalf of President Clinton, I am very pleased to announce that the 
Middle East peace talks will resume on April 27, here in Washington, DC.  
We were informed of this decision directly by the Arab leaders and by 
the Palestinians.  This information came through [during] the night, and 
it has just been confirmed this morning.

The information to us included a letter this morning from Faisal 
Husseini, in his capacity as head of the Palestinian peace team.  I've 
informed Prime Minister Rabin of this good news and understand that the 
Israeli Government will be responding to these developments later today.

We have also been consulting during this period with our Russian co-
sponsors.  These decisions, of course, are very welcome and serve the 
best interests of the Arab states, the Palestinians, Israel, and the 
entire world community.

It has been almost 5 months since the last round of talks.  Too much 
time has been lost, and now there is an opportunity for the parties to 
work together and make tangible progress.  If the parties are prepared 
to do their part and to narrow the gaps, we will certainly do ours and 
play the role of full partner.

From the outset of the Administration, President Clinton has made clear 
his commitment to promoting peace in the Middle East.  Our extensive 
efforts over the past few months [and] the developments announced today 
reflect the high priority that President Clinton gives to doing so.

Let me say just a few words about our contacts with the Palestinians.  
I've had important and productive discussions with them.  They have 
spoken eloquently of the human rights problems in the occupied 
territories.  They have reaffirmed the Palestinian commitment to the 
peace process and the importance of making early progress, particularly 
to address the conditions that the Palestinians face in the West Bank 
and Gaza.  They have agreed that it's time to deal with causes, not the 
symptoms, of the conflict.  We realize that the decision to rejoin the 
talks was a difficult one for them to make.  I think it was a courageous 
one, and I commend them for making it.

For our part, I have reaffirmed the American opposition to deportations, 
making it clear that we believe that they contravene the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and are not consistent with the pursuit of peace.  Israel has 
assured us that the deportations in December were unprecedented and were 
an exception.  I made [it] very clear that violence and deportation are 
counter-productive and that we call on all parties to avoid acts that 
can undermine the negotiating process and the prospects for peace.  We 
are deeply dismayed by the killings and suffering in both the occupied 
territories and in Israel.

In the course of this process, I also have reaffirmed on behalf of the 
United States our continued commitment to the letters of invitation to 
the Madrid conference and to the letters of assurance provided to the 
Palestinians and to the other parties at that time.  Further, I affirmed 
our position on a comprehensive, full, and real peace based upon UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on the core principles that 
underlie that process--land for peace, realizing the legitimate 
political rights of the Palestinian people, and security for all 
parties.

All the parties--Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon--
need and want real peace and security.  Only negotiations can produce a 
settlement that embodies these principles.  Negotiations can give the 
Palestinians the prospect that the very difficult conditions under which 
they now live in the territories can be brought to an end.  Through 
negotiations, they can see occupation give way to self-government and a 
resolution of the final status.

Negotiations will put in Palestinian hands the means to build and shape 
their institutions, their life, and their fate.  Violence will not solve 
any problems.  It will only make matters worse.  Those responsible for 
the violence offer a future that only perpetuates occupation.  The 
answer to the needs of the Palestinian people will be found not in 
violence and rejection but in negotiations that produce tangible 
results.

In this respect, we very much welcome the decision of the Palestinians 
to come to the table and negotiations on April 27.  We are prepared to 
play the role of full partners with all the parties in this negotiating 
process and in helping the negotiators to produce results.

During my trip to the Middle East, every leader with whom I met--
Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian--made clear to me their desire to resume 
negotiations and achieve early results.  All have recommitted themselves 
to the peace process during the recent consultations that led up to 
today's decision.

In sum, it is time to end violence and build a new Middle East--a Middle 
East of peace, of reconciliation, and of hope.  (###)



ARTICLE 4:


US Must Lead a Strategic Alliance With Post-Soviet Reform
Strobe Talbott, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary 
for the New Independent States
Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House 
Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, April 19, 1993

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for 
the opportunity to discuss the Clinton Administration's policy toward 
Russia and the other new independent states of the former Soviet Union.

The task of your subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, is to draft legislation, 
just as the task of our Administration is to draft policy.  But on the 
issue before us in this hearing, what we are really doing--what we are 
doing together--is nothing less than helping to shape history.

There have been three great struggles in this century.  The first was 
World War I, a conflagration that ignited the Russian Revolution of 
1917; the second was the World War against fascism and imperialism of 
1939-1945; the third was the Cold War against Soviet communism and 
expansionism.  Now a fourth great struggle is underway in Eurasia.  It 
pits those who brought down the Soviet communist system against those 
who would like to preserve its vestiges if not restore its essence.  It 
pits those who are determined to build a proud future against those who 
are clinging to a cruel and shameful past.  In short, it pits reform 
against reaction.

We have a stake in the outcome of that struggle.  Until now, many 
Americans have been led to see our stake primarily in terms of what we 
do not want to happen:  We do not want economic distress and political 
turmoil to trigger a civil war that could rage across 11 time zones; we 
do not want a nuclear Yugoslavia in the heart of Eurasia; nor do we want 
to see the rise of a new dictatorship that represses its people, 
threatens its neighbors, and requires the United States and its allies 
to return to a Cold War footing.

Mr. Chairman, while those concerns are entirely valid, I believe we need 
to think of our objectives in much more positive terms:  An investment 
now in the heroic effort of these new democracies to restructure their 
economies will pay dividends down the road.  A Russia, a Ukraine, a 
Kazakhstan fully integrated into the international economy will be a 
reliable source for raw materials and manufactured products, a reliable 
market for American goods and services, and a reliable partner in 
diplomacy and in dealing with global threats to human welfare and the 
environment.

In other words, Mr. Chairman, our policy should not be only to prevent 
the worst that can happen, but should focus on nurturing the best.  
Russia is undergoing a transformation in its very nature as a state.  
We, therefore, should undertake a corresponding transformation in the 
role we play.  Having successfully led an international coalition 
against the Soviet Union for nearly half a century, we must now lead a 
strategic alliance with post-Soviet reform.  A strategic alliance 
implies a policy intended to serve us, and our allies, for a long time.  
And so ours must.

Yet, while taking the long view, our Administration has also had to act 
quickly.  The beginning of this Administration has coincided with a 
crisis in Russian politics.  Exactly 1 month after President Clinton's 
inauguration here in Washington, President Yeltsin threw down the 
gauntlet in Moscow before a parliament that is dominated by 
reactionaries.

Six days from now, on April 25, Mr. Yeltsin faces a referendum in which 
the Russian people will express their views on his leadership, on his 
economic policies, and on whether there should be new presidential and 
parliamentary elections.  We all hope that the referendum will 
strengthen the reformers' ability to pursue their course.  We want the 
Russian people to understand that the world stands with them as they 
make the transition from communism to democracy and free markets.  But 
we recognize that April 25 may not be conclusive, either for better or 
for worse.  And the referendum alone is unlikely to end the struggle 
between competing interests and conflicting visions.

Both on April 25 and in the months and years that follow, the showdown 
between the reformers and the reactionaries will be waged largely over 
the issue of which camp represents the interests of the Russian people.  
One of the main reasons that President Yeltsin is embattled today is 
that too many Russians identify reform with hardship--with skyrocketing 
prices, falling living standards, and deteriorating social order.  
Unless the reformist government is able to build a broader and more 
active constituency for its policies in the months to come, those 
policies--and that government--will be in jeopardy.

Thus, the Administration has had to move boldly, in a way that reflects 
our sense of urgency yet demonstrates our commitment to the long haul.  
In what we have done already--and in what we are asking you to do now as 
you go about drafting foreign aid legislation in the weeks ahead--the 
United States must advance two objectives:

First, we must do what we can from the outside to make the benefits of 
reform visible and tangible to the people on the inside--that is, 
average Russians--and to do so as soon as possible.

Second, we must find targets for support that will last [and] that 
represent trends we hope will become irreversible, so that we are 
supporting an ongoing process that can survive the buffeting of 
political and economic setbacks.

While the first of these objectives is short term and the second is long 
term, they are, we believe, entirely compatible.  Indeed, they are 
mutually reinforcing.

We believe that both objectives are evident in the four steps the 
Administration has taken in support of reform:  the $1.6-billion 
initiative that President Clinton unveiled in Vancouver on April 4; the 
$28.4-billion package of multilateral measures to which the G-7 [Group 
of 7 industrialized nations], led by the United States, committed itself 
last week; the additional $1.3 billion in bilateral programs that the 
Administration announced at the same time; and, finally, the $704 
million FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies 
and Open Markets] Support Act component of the FY 1994 budget.  Let me 
say a bit about each.

At the conclusion of the Vancouver summit 2 weeks ago yesterday, the 
President announced a plan for accelerating, intensifying, and 
redirecting existing programs so that their benefits will be apparent to 
the Russian people this year.  Moreover, the Vancouver package is 
intended to meet the key needs that the Russian reformers themselves 
have identified:  in the areas of energy and environment, housing, 
exchanges, private sector development, and trade and investment 
activities.  The Vancouver package also included $700 million in 
concessional loans for foods sales, which permit a resumption of US food 
exports to Russia.

It has been President Clinton's determination from the outset to use US-
Russian bilateral cooperation as a catalyst to multilateral support for 
Russian reform.  In that spirit, 10 days after the Vancouver summit, 
Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of the Treasury Bentsen 
traveled to Tokyo for a meeting of the Group of 7. The Tokyo meeting 
delivered a clear message of support for Yeltsin and the reform 
movement.  That support took the form of a commitment on behalf of the 
G-7 to help Russia restructure key sectors of its economy, divest itself 
of inefficient state enterprises, finance critical imports, and 
stabilize its currency.

Significantly, the Tokyo meeting was the first joint meeting of finance 
and foreign ministers in the history of the G-7.  It was intended to 
underscore the connection between politics and economics in Russia:  
Market reform is likely to succeed only in a pluralistic society 
governed by the rule of law; democracy is more likely to thrive in a 
vibrant economy.

Tokyo also demonstrated two vital themes in this Administration's 
policy:

First, that we, the United States, are in partnership with our fellow 
industrial democracies; and

Second, that we, the industrial democracies, are in partnership with the 
Russian reformers who are trying to transform their country into an 
industrial democracy in its own right.

Just as the contents of the Vancouver package reflected the discussions 
between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, so the contents of the Tokyo 
package reflected what [Russian] Foreign Minister Kozyrev and [Russian] 
Deputy Prime Minister Federov told Secretaries Christopher and Bentsen 
and their assembled G-7 colleagues:  namely, that Russia needs Western 
help to maintain the pace of reform.

Minister Federov and his colleagues were actively involved in the 
discussions leading up to Tokyo.  They helped shape a number of the 
elements of the multilateral package.  Their involvement focused the G-7 
effort on developing a realistic set of short- and medium-term 
objectives for reform.  Ministers Federov and Kozyrev participated fully 
in the second day of the G-7 meetings.  The G-7, in turn, made clear to 
the ministers that it is up to the Russians themselves [to] control 
inflation before our support can be effectively used.

The Tokyo G-7 package includes approximately $4 billion in fast-
disbursing funds from the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World 
Bank.  These are targeted at the primary objectives of reigning in the 
credit policies of the Russian Central Bank and providing critical 
imports to slow the economic contraction.  Disbursements could be made 
in a matter of weeks.  They would allow the Russian Government to 
undertake some politically tough measures necessary to stabilize the 
economy.

These initial steps would, we hope, yield substantial progress in the 
campaign against inflation.  The government could then translate success 
on that critical front into a more comprehensive economic stabilization 
program.  The G-7 has agreed to support $10 billion over the coming year 
for this endeavor.  This includes $4 billion for a new IMF standby 
program and a renewed commitment to a $6-billion currency stabilization 
program.

Unlike last year's G-7 program to support Russian reform, this year's 
program sets what we believe to be realistic standards for Russian 
performance.  The Russian economy must walk before it can run.  Each 
incremental step must be matched by prompt, demonstrable benefits to the 
Russian economy and to the Russian people.

The third component of multilateral support is directed toward reforms 
in specific sectors of the economy.  While long-term viability depends 
on the success of the stabilization program, efforts in sectors, like 
energy and agriculture, can complement and enhance the stabilization 
program by increasing foreign exchange earnings and making improvements 
in the local market visible to the general population.  In Tokyo, the G-
7 leaders committed $14 billion to this effort, most of it in the form 
of new export credits.

The US has already made a significant contribution in this area.  In 
Tokyo we announced with the Russians an agreement on a $2-billion EXIM 
[Bank--Export-Import Bank] framework for export credits in the oil and 
gas industry.  The US equipment and services financed under this 
agreement will substantially increase Russian exports and foreign 
exchange earnings.  At the same time, there will be benefits here at 
home.  The first tranche of $500 million in guarantees alone will 
support thousands of jobs in US companies that were hit hard by the 
recent recession.

We also laid the groundwork at Tokyo for a number of what we believe to 
be promising additional multilateral measures.  We hope to persuade the 
G-7 to join us in providing assistance for the safe dismantlement and 
destruction of nuclear weapons in keeping with the terms of 
international agreements.  We were pleased that the Japanese announced 
last week that they will contribute $100 million toward this end, but we 
think more needs to be done by them and by other G-7 members.  We agreed 
in Tokyo to establish a working group on how to expand the nuclear-
weapons dismantlement program by the July G-7 summit.

The second new proposal put forward by the United States at Tokyo was 
for the creation of a special privatization and restructuring fund.  
This fund--which is an American idea strongly endorsed by the Russian 
reformers--would help ease the economic and social consequences of 
privatizing some of the more than 20,000 medium- and large-scale 
enterprises.  The fund would help make the newly privatized firms self-
sustaining with loans to modernize plants, retraining for workers, and 
technical assistance to managers who are making the adjustment to 
operating in a market economy.

The Russian economy and society are cursed by huge--and hugely 
inefficient--state-owned enterprises that utterly dominate entire 
cities.  The special privatization and restructuring fund would be used 
to help municipal governments in these one-company towns cope with the 
consequences of breaking up and selling off these monoliths.  Outlays 
from the funds could be used to invest in local infrastructure to 
support the smaller, newly privatized companies and the communities of 
which they are a part.

To be effective on ground, this program must be carefully targeted, 
phased, and monitored.  The funds would be directed toward enterprises 
and communities that are selected as the most promising and deserving.

The US proposed in Tokyo that the G-7 create a support implementation 
office.  The office would be headed by a person with strong 
administrative and managerial capabilities--as well as experienced in 
Russian affairs--and with a small staff of technical experts.  This 
office would also be responsible for working with the Russian reformers 
to remove bureaucratic obstacles to implementation of G-7 programs and 
for ensuring that Western funds are spent effectively.

At Tokyo, the US told the G-7 that the Administration would seek from 
Congress $500 million for the privatization fund as a "challenge grant," 
to be matched by at least $1.5 billion in contributions from other 
countries, as well as up to $2 billion in co-financing by the World Bank 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Here again, Mr. Chairman, please note one of the central elements of our 
policy:  The US is not only demonstrating its leadership--it is using 
that leadership to leverage from the international community 
considerably more money than we are putting on the table ourselves.  The 
G-7 has agreed to establish a working group on the special privatization 
fund, with a view toward making a decision by the July summit.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say a bit about the  new package of US-
Russian bilateral initiatives that President Clinton announced 
simultaneously with the G-7 meeting.  You will recall that, at 
Vancouver, the President indicated his intention to go beyond the $1.6-
billion program he announced there.  He would, he said, seek additional 
funds for certain high-priority areas after he had a chance to take into 
account what he had heard from President Yeltsin and what he learned 
from further consultations with Congress.  The congressional 
consultations have begun in earnest, and I regard my appearance before 
you here today as part of that process.

The Administration is committed to seeking approximately $1.3 billion in 
additional bilateral assistance to support reform in Russia and the new 
independent states.  Those funds would be used to strengthen programs in 
the priority areas of energy and environment, housing, the private 
sector, exchanges, trade and investment, and humanitarian assistance.  
How exactly the $1.3 billion will be apportioned is still a matter we 
are discussing.  Our discussion will, as I just indicated, depend in 
significant measure on our deliberations with you and your colleagues, 
both on the details of the package and on the appropriate funding 
mechanisms.

While I cannot, therefore, get into a detailed breakdown of the package, 
I can say a bit more about the areas on which we intend to concentrate.

In energy and environment, a substantial portion of the funds would be 
used to finance improvements in nuclear reactor safety.  With nearly two 
dozen water-cooled nuclear power plants, there is an urgent need for 
additional assistance to upgrade the safety systems and protect against 
potentially catastrophic accidents.

We also hope to expand significantly our efforts to improve oil 
production and restore oil and gas pipelines that are an environmental 
hazard and that waste precious resources.  Other industries are also 
major polluters and desperately need the benefits of US technology.

In Vancouver, President Yeltsin identified housing for returning and 
demobilized officers as a top priority.  It is in our interest as well 
as his to see the continued withdrawal of the troops of the former 
Soviet armed forces from neighboring countries, especially the Baltics.  
The success of continued political reform, is, in part, dependent on the 
military staying out of politics and allowing the democratic 
transformation to continue.

Expanded US support could finance the construction of several thousand 
housing units for returning officers.  This initiative seeks to include 
the US private sector and American private and voluntary organizations 
in building houses and developing the local construction capacity.

There is also a need to expand efforts to help Russia's farmers and 
institutions create a market-driven food system.  If more US 
agribusinesses are linked with Russian partners, it will help break 
marketing bottlenecks and make delivery systems more efficient.  
Expanded programs would respond to the ever-growing demand to help small 
businesses and entrepreneurs overcome the enormous obstacles that are 
the vestige of a command economy.

Additional funding would also be used to dramatically increase the 
number of people-to-people exchanges.  There is no substitute for making 
training and firsthand experience in America available to people who 
lived their entire lives under a system that discouraged creative 
initiative and independent thinking.  It is our hope that thousands of 
students, teachers, and budding entrepreneurs could be given the chance 
to study and train in this country.  They would take back not just facts 
and know-how but a view of a successful democracy and free market based 
on a real experience.

To expand bilateral trade and investment, the Administration would also 
intend to provide additional credits and guarantees through the Export-
Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC].  
Beyond the oil and gas sector already being targeted, the EXIM Bank and 
OPIC could use additional funds to support financing in areas like 
mineral extraction, telecommunications and air-traffic control, and 
defense conversion.  With US companies and exports directly supported by 
these programs, the mutual benefits are obvious.

Still, there must be a continuing component of humanitarian assistance 
as well.  Americans have always responded generously to medical 
emergencies around the world, and the need in Russia is acute.  The 
recent congressional delegation, of which several of you were a part, 
saw the appalling lack of supplies for hospitals.  Some of the funds we 
are requesting in the follow-up bilateral package would be used for 
supplying vaccines and responding to critical shortages of medicines, 
especially those that will help children.

But in this area, too, we are guided by the adage:  Give a man a fish, 
and you feed him for a day; teach him how to fish, and you feed him for 
a lifetime.  Our hope is that over time, Russia and the other new 
independent states will move away from a reliance on foreign donations.  
To that end, we want to provide technical assistance to build up local 
capacity for the manufacture of basic pharmaceuticals, particularly in 
areas outside of Moscow.

Let me reiterate that I have purposely not attached specific dollar 
figures to the programs I have mentioned here, because we hope over the 
next few weeks to have continuing consultations with members of this 
committee and other Members of Congress before making final decisions on 
the components of the additional request.  I would welcome your views on 
the areas I mentioned as priorities as well as programs you think we 
missed.

I should add that Ambassador Thomas Simons will shortly be assuming the 
post of coordinator of our assistance programs to the new independent 
states.  After serving for several years as ambassador to Poland, he has 
a great deal of experience in helping former communist countries make 
the transition to democracy and market reform.  He knows what works and 
what doesn't, and he has the proven leadership and management skills to 
ensure that the many agencies involved remain focused on key objectives 
and are complementary to each other.  I expect Ambassador Simons to work 
closely with members of this committee and its staff in shaping our 
program and carrying out his duties.

Ambassador Simons will coordinate US assistance programs, including 
those funded under the FREEDOM Support Act, which was passed last year 
and on which we intend to build.  As you know, we have requested $704 
million in the FY 1994 budget to continue many of the successful 
programs under the FREEDOM Support Act into next year.  Those funds will 
be used in the same key areas I have just outlined.

Before making myself available to your questions, let me make a final 
point.  Much of what the Administration has done so far--and much of 
what I have said here this morning--has been focused on Russia.  That is 
appropriate, given the sheer size of the country as well as the 
magnitude of the problems it poses and of the opportunities it 
represents.  However, this Administration's efforts will be directed at 
reform in all of the new independent states.  A significant share of the 
grants and credits announced in Vancouver and Tokyo will  be directed 
toward the other countries.  A number of the multilateral programs 
announced in Tokyo, like the new IMF facility, will be available to 
these countries as they move along the path to reform.  Substantial 
amounts of our own Nunn- Lugar nuclear-weapons dismantlement funds will 
also be used in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.  So will funds from 
whatever dismantlement program emerges from the G-7.  The funds we are 
requesting for the FY 1994 FREEDOM Support Act will be weighted toward 
states other than Russia in the hopes that many will have followed 
Russia's lead in reform.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, my overall point is that as you and your 
colleagues examine the specifics of our policy, I think you will see 
that they reflect our determination to support reformers wherever they 
are to be found--whether in capitals like Moscow or Kiev or Bishkek or 
in the farthest reaches of those countries, large or small; whether in 
the Kremlin or the parliament or the regional governments or 
municipalities, down to the grass roots.

We have also concentrated, to the greatest extent possible, on the non-
governmental sector.  Since we are trying to nurture the growth of the 
private sectors in the new independent states, it is natural that we 
should enlist the American private sector.  That is another common 
denominator of the initiatives we have put forward.

In general, Mr. Chairman, when we speak about US-Russian economic 
"engagement" and "partnership" instead of "assistance" and "aid"--when 
we speak about building a "strategic partnership with Russian reform"--
we are not resorting to euphemisms.  We are expressing what we believe 
to be a fundamental aspect of our policy.  All the programs I have 
outlined for you today are intended to benefit both Russia's people and 
our own. (###)



ARTICLE 5:


Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons:  Building Confidence and Partnership
James E. Goodby, US Negotiator on Safe and Secure Dismantlement of 
Nuclear Weapons
Address before the Third UN Conference on Disarmament Issues, Kyoto, 
Japan, April 13, 1993

I would like to speak to you today about an issue that is as urgent now 
as at any time during the last half-century--the control of nuclear 
weapons.  But in a larger sense, the theme of my remarks is about 
reconciliation and the building of confidence, of replacing hostility 
with partnerships, of warm friendship where once it seemed there could 
be none.  For dismantling nuclear weapons and strengthening the ties 
among democratic nations go hand in hand; only in this way can it be 
said that nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to human life on this 
planet are truly under control.

The Changing Problem Of Controlling Nuclear Weapons
Last year, the Soviet Union gave way to 15 sovereign states, and, in the 
process, millions of people chose democracy.  Yet, as President Clinton 
has said:

Their struggle to build free societies is one of the great human dramas 
of our day.  It presents the greatest security challenge for our 
generation and offers one of the greatest economic opportunities of our 
lifetime.

But, I would add, we could miss the great promise of the future by 
passively "sleepwalking through history" if we choose to be onlookers 
rather than actors in this drama.

For the United States, the hour has come to complete the transition from 
adversary to partner of states rich in history and culture.  This will 
permit the United States to restructure its defenses to deal with 
threats to international peace and security within the UN framework.  
This will increase the prospects for successful democratic and market 
reform.  And this will offer a vastly enhanced potential for trade and 
prosperity.

I have been asked by the Administration of President Clinton to lead the 
US delegation on the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in 
the former Soviet Union.  I feel particularly fortunate to do this 
because, in many respects, the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear 
weapons is at the very forefront of our effort to remove Cold War 
impediments to cooperation and to build up democratic partnerships in 
their place.  The START I and START II agreements [Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty I and II] and the reciprocal, unilateral US and Soviet 
decisions of 1991 and 1992 to destroy large numbers of tactical nuclear 
weapons require Russia and the United States to eliminate more than 
6,000 nuclear weapons systems.  This includes not only destroying 
missiles, submarines, and bombers but also downloading about 30,000 
nuclear warheads associated with those delivery vehicles.  This is an 
enormous engineering task, and the costs are substantial.

The task is complicated significantly by the situation in the former 
Soviet Union--not only the severe economic difficulties but also the 
fact that nuclear warheads are located on the territories of four of the 
new independent states.  The dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons 
agreed to in the past few years can be realized--perhaps even earlier 
than anticipated--if the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and 
Ukraine can cooperate in programs to assist in the safe and secure 
dismantlement of these weapons.  The problem of controlling nuclear 
weapons is vastly different from that posed in the decades of the 1970s 
and 1980s; it requires fresh thinking and very close collaboration at 
several levels.  There is no longer any reason why states should 
continue to aim these thousands of warheads at each other throughout the 
entire 7-year elimination period set forth in START I.  It is time to 
put these relics of the Cold War behind us as quickly and safely as we 
can and to get on with building democracy and free market economies.

As demonstrated by the Vancouver Declaration, safe and secure 
dismantlement is a key element of US-Russian economic programs aimed at 
addressing immediate human needs and contributing to the building of 
structures for a successful transition to a market economy.  This is 
true also for programs that help Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine 
fulfill their commitments undertaken in the Lisbon Protocol.  But the 
most important peace dividend is to turn away from weaponry capable of 
destroying human civilization on much of the globe.  The disaster at 
Chernobyl in a terrifying way reminds us how deadly nuclear radiation 
can be and why we need to ensure that nuclear weapons are dismantled 
safely and securely.  Safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons 
is an investment in global security and peace that will enable all of us 
to reap the benefits of the end of the Cold War.

Origins and Purpose of the Initiative on Safe and Secure Nuclear 
Dismantlement

The safe and secure dismantlement effort on the part of the US 
Government dates back to the fall of 1991.  Events in the Soviet Union 
at that time quite naturally raised questions, both there and elsewhere, 
about the security and control of nuclear forces, particularly tactical 
nuclear weapons--those with ranges up to 500 kilometers.  These weapons, 
because of their small size and transportability, seemed to pose a real 
risk of loss of control or seizure by unauthorized parties.

The United States moved to address these concerns in September 1991, 
when then-President Bush ordered a unilateral reduction in the US 
nuclear force posture.  President Gorbachev, as we had hoped, responded 
in October 1991 with a reciprocal series of reductions.  As a result of 
these actions, the United States and the Soviet Union began an 
unprecedented global stand-down of tactical nuclear weapons.  Most of 
these weapons are now slated for elimination.

At the same time, the US Congress, prompted by the vision of Senators 
Nunn and Lugar, was concluding that the United States should put the 
Cold War behind it and begin building new relationships with reformers 
in the Soviet Union--to seek creative, cooperative solutions to complex 
common problems.

It soon became clear that the magnitude of the nuclear dismantlement 
effort would require extensive cooperative actions by the two countries.  
It was at this point that the United States engaged Moscow in detailed 
talks on safe and secure dismantlement at high levels of government and 
in discussions of technical experts.

The situation became more complex when Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine emerged as newly independent states with nuclear weapons located 
on their territories.  In the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, 
signed May 23, 1992, all four countries became successor states to the 
Soviet Union in connection with the START Treaty and assumed the 
obligations of the former Soviet Union under the treaty.  Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also committed themselves to adhere to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear 
weapons states "in the shortest possible time."  START II, of course, 
would provide for dismantling thousands of nuclear weapons systems 
beyond the reductions required by START I; its realization has become 
dependent upon the fulfillment of START I obligations.

Responding to these unprecedented circumstances, the US Congress, under 
the Nunn-Lugar Act, initially authorized the President to spend up to 
$400 million in Department of Defense funds to assist the four states in 
their dismantlement efforts.  Our intention was to work with these 
states bilaterally to determine how, based on their own stated 
requirements, we could assist them in expediting the safe and secure 
dismantlement of strategic offensive arms under the START Treaty.  As 
amended, the Nunn-Lugar legislation now doubles that amount and makes 
available up to $800 million.  Another $400 million is being requested 
for FY 1994.

The immediate US objective, consistent with long-standing bipartisan 
policies in the United States, is to block the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear weapons states.  Failure to achieve this would be a 
major blow to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, would generate 
international tension, and would foster costly new regional arms races.  
This would sap vitality from developing free market economies and, in a 
climate of heightened uncertainty, jeopardize economic progress.  It 
would turn back the clock to the days before the remarkable progress of 
START I and START II and leave us in a situation bordering on nuclear 
anarchy in our relations with the new independent states.

Initial Nunn-Lugar Efforts
It is neither justified nor constructive to proceed as though this 
worst-case scenario were inevitable.  I believe what we have 
accomplished in our efforts so far leads to the reasonable conclusion 
that events have been moving in the direction of a safe and sensible 
outcome.

First, the Secretary of State has informed the US Congress that Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have met the eligibility requirements 
for assistance under the Nunn-Lugar legislation.  Briefly these 
requirements are that each country must be committed to:

--  Making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or 
destroying weapons of mass destruction, if it has an obligation under a 
treaty or other agreement to destroy any such weapons;

--  Forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate 
defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed nuclear 
weapons;

--  Forgoing any use in new nuclear weapons of fissile or other 
components of destroyed nuclear weapons;

--  Facilitating US verification of any weapons destruction carried out 
under this legislation;

--  Complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and

--  Observing internationally recognized human rights, including the 
protection of minorities.

Each of these states is important in its own right in terms of what it 
can contribute to a program aimed at dismantling the nuclear threat to 
human survival.  I will discuss the extent of cooperation achieved with 
each of them in our efforts to date.

I will begin with Russian-US cooperation.  A year ago, at a June 1992 
Washington meeting, an "umbrella" agreement was signed by the United 
States and Russia that identified the scope of the cooperative program 
and established a legal framework for providing the assistance 
authorized by the Nunn-Lugar legislation.  In addition, prior to March 
1993, the United States and Russia signed seven implementing agreements 
providing for:

--  Armored blankets to enhance the safety and security of weapons and 
fissile material during transport to dismantlement and storage sites;

--  Safety and security enhancements for railcars used in transporting 
nuclear weapons and fissile material to dismantlement and storage sites;

--  Emergency response equipment and training to upgrade capabilities to 
respond in case of a nuclear accident;

--  Transportation and storage containers for fissile material removed 
from dismantled nuclear weapons;

--  Assistance in the design of a storage facility for fissile material;

--  Assistance in chemical weapons destruction; and

--  Establishment of a science center to employ former weapons 
scientists.

Together, these seven agreements provided for a total of $150 million in 
safe and secure dismantlement projects.

At the Vancouver meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, the two 
Presidents agreed on initiatives totaling $1.6 billion to bolster 
political and economic reforms in Russia.  Recorded in the Vancouver 
Declaration are agreements which the United States and Russia completed 
in Moscow on March 26.  They provide Nunn-Lugar funds for the following:

--  Equipment for dismantling strategic nuclear delivery vehicles;

--  Equipment to support construction and operation of a storage 
facility for nuclear materials derived from dismantled warheads; and

--  Assistance in enhancing systems for controlling, accounting, and 
physically protecting nuclear materials.

These three new agreements amount to an additional $215 million--aside 
from agricultural loan guarantees, the largest single element in the 
$1.6-billion package.  This sum, combined with the $150 million from the 
previous agreements, an additional $5 million in Nunn-Lugar funds for 
accident response equipment, and $6 million for a pilot project to 
provide housing and job training for Russian military officers, brings 
the grand total of US-Russian cooperative programs as of this date in 
this field to $376 million.

Taken together, these agreements serve US, Russian, and international 
interests by reducing the chances that nuclear material will leak out of 
a central control system, by enhancing stability within Russia and 
between Russia and its neighbors, and by contributing to a broad pattern 
of US-Russian cooperation in seeking a safer, more stable international 
environment.

As to cooperation between the United States and Belarus in the specific 
area of safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons, the two 
governments have signed an "umbrella" agreement as well as implementing 
agreements to provide:

--  Emergency response equipment and training for responding to the 
consequences of a nuclear accident;

--  A continuous communications link to allow the transmission of data 
and notifications under the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] and 
START Treaties; and

--  Assistance and training to help establish an effective export 
control system. 

These agreements total $8.3 million in assistance.

I would like to take this opportunity to underscore that Belarus has 
acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons 
state, has ratified the START Treaty, and has expressed its desire to 
have nuclear weapons removed from its territory as soon as possible.  
These actions testify to the fact that Belarus and the United States are 
in a position to build an enduring and confident relationship.  The 
United States has set aside up to $65 million in additional Nunn-Lugar 
funds for cooperative programs with Belarus.  We look forward to further 
cooperation and to building a strong partnership with Belarus.

Kazakhstan has ratified the START I Treaty and is working toward 
acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  We are engaged in 
developing a program of cooperation between our two countries.  Early in 
March 1993, senior representatives of Kazakhstan visited Washington.  As 
a result of these discussions, we anticipate concluding an umbrella 
agreement and separate implementing agreements on a government-to-
government communications link, emergency response equipment, assistance 
in establishing an export control system, and a system for accounting 
for and physically protecting civil nuclear material.  A very high 
priority also is to initial at an early date an implementing agreement 
on dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.  This would be 
implemented upon accession by Kazakhstan to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty as a non- nuclear state.

As to cooperation between the United States and Ukraine, the United 
States has agreed to provide at least $175 million in Nunn-Lugar 
assistance.  The US Congress has already been notified of $27 million in 
proposed Nunn-Lugar obligations for Ukraine, and the next step will be 
to finalize these agreements.  This could be done in the near future.  
The scope of US-Ukrainian cooperation would include critical funds for 
dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, a government-to-
government communications link, emergency response equipment, assistance 
and training in establishing an export control regime, and a system for 
accounting and physical protection for civil nuclear material.

Because they are such a high priority, projects on missile and silo 
launcher dismantlement are expected to take up the bulk of the $175 
million that the United States has already pledged to Ukraine.  This 
critical area involves the elimination of hundreds of strategic 
offensive arms and would be an important element in a broad-based US-
Ukrainian relationship.  Nunn-Lugar funds for this purpose will be 
released after ratification by Ukraine of START I and its accession to 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state.

Ukrainian and US interests point toward a common priority goal:  
Ukraine's complete integration into the international community of 
democratic nations and free market economies.  This is well understood, 
I believe, by both governments.  I believe another view also is widely 
shared:  That in the final analysis, it is not nuclear weapons that 
guarantee the safety or survival--or the wealth and prestige--of any 
state.  Evidence for that conclusion abounds in contemporary events.

The Clinton Administration sees the safe and secure dismantlement of 
nuclear weapons as integral to its broad policy of cooperation with each 
of the new independent states concerned.  The US Department of Defense 
is playing a key role in this program, along with other US Government 
agencies.

We are seeking to improve and streamline the process.  We are looking 
for flexible, fast, and responsive ways to achieve the policy goals of 
the Nunn-Lugar legislation.  We also expect to find ways to accelerate 
the implementation of the program to match its high priority.  To the 
maximum extent possible, we will use the flexibility available under 
current US laws and regulations.  And we will consider using foreign 
technology and equipment if we determine that this would significantly 
increase the cost-effectiveness and technical success of the program. 

The Need For a Multinational Effort
The nuclear dismantlement effort supports vitally important 
international treaties--START I and II, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.  Together, these agreements 
furnish most of the legal framework within which the international 
community seeks to control the threat to human survival presented by 
weapons of mass destruction.  It is hardly an exaggeration to say that 
the success of the dismantlement effort is essential to the realization 
of the goals laid down in each of these agreements.  Through this effort 
we, the international community, can help prevent the further 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and eliminate, literally, 
thousands of nuclear weapons, down to a small fraction of the levels now 
deployed in the United States and on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union.

Since all nations ultimately benefit from the dismantlement process, the 
time has come to consider a new, broader, international agenda for 
cooperative dismantling of the nuclear threat.  To those nations that 
have the economic and technical resources to lend a hand, I would say 
[that] there is much more that needs to be done.  All of us need to give 
urgent and serious thought to expanding and more broadly 
internationalizing the effort.

I can illustrate the need for many nations to join in a collaborative 
nuclear dismantling program by citing a few projects that the United 
States has not yet been able to pursue with the first $800 million in 
Nunn-Lugar assistance:

--  Providing Russia additional assistance to facilitate the design, 
site selection, and construction of a storage facility for fissile 
material from dismantled weapons.  This would lend itself especially 
well to multinational support;

--  Additional assistance for Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in 
dismantling their nuclear delivery vehicles.  This could include, for 
example, assistance in the environmentally sound elimination of highly 
toxic rocket fuels, additional equipment for silo dismantlement, and 
research into methods to destroy solid propellant missiles in an 
environmentally safe manner;

--  Cleanup of contaminated areas, for example, missile silos and other 
nuclear facilities; and

--  Defense conversion assistance for very high priority projects, such 
as conversion of the SS-18 plant in Ukraine and providing housing and 
retraining of former strategic rocket forces officers in Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.

Assistance thus far has been in the form of equipment and technical 
services; future projects may increasingly be in the form of joint 
ventures and grant assistance.

Of course, with a broader, international initiative to dismantle 
cooperatively the nuclear threat that still imperils us all, there would 
be a greater need to establish compatible strategies and to coordinate 
our efforts.  We would need to ensure that our programs complement one 
another, fill in gaps, and benefit from our comparative advantages in 
different technologies and funding arrangements.

Conclusion
The Cold War is behind us now.  It was with us a long time, and we came 
to know it well.  It was a dangerous time, but it had familiar contours 
and predictable reference points.  Now, the topography of the bipolar 
confrontation is gone.  We face great uncertainty, and, yes, danger is 
still our companion.  It is close at hand in the deadly relics of the 
Cold War--the thousands of nuclear weapons that have been left behind 
like mines buried in a battlefield long after the guns have fallen 
silent.

Our challenge is to construct a new and safer framework for our mutual 
relations beyond the Cold War, based not on suspicion and fear but on 
confidence and partnership.  In doing so, it would be well to reflect on 
the enormous resources that were devoted to building weapons as compared 
to the relatively modest resources that will be needed to invest in 
peace.  From that comparison should emerge a sense of proportion as to 
what we are called upon to do.

The man who was President of the United States at the dawn of the 
nuclear age once said that "this generation of Americans has a 
rendezvous with destiny."  I believe this generation all over the globe 
has a rendezvous with destiny.  We will be judged in the future less by 
our success in weathering the Cold War and more by how we meet the great 
post-Cold War opportunity to cast out this "destroyer of worlds" and 
create democratic and prosperous societies.

We have choices.  We can idly sleepwalk through history and, once again, 
allow nuclear weapons to generate suspicion, competition, tension, and 
arms races reminiscent of the Cold War.  If we allow that to happen, we 
will have failed in our duty to posterity, and future generations will--
and should--judge us harshly.  As the historian Barbara Tuchman might 
say, this would truly be the march of folly.  But if we seize the moment 
to build a solid foundation of confidence and partnership, we will 
surely be celebrated for our legacy of wisdom and peace.  This is that 
moment.  Let us now be wise.  (###)



ARTICLE 6:


US Aid to Central and Eastern Europe:  A Call for Imagination
Robert L. Hutchings, Special Adviser For East European Assistance
Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House 
Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, April 19, 1993

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify, for I believe that the 
US assistance program for Central and Eastern Europe is one of the most 
important activities [that] our country undertakes.  Three and a half 
years after the democratic revolutions of 1989, the countries of this 
region are in the midst of deep recession, with rising unemployment and 
social tensions threatening the political consensus behind these painful 
economic and political transitions.  Yet there have been spectacular 
successes as well:  a dynamic new private sector in Poland, now 
accounting for more than half of GDP; an upsurge in US and other Western 
investment in the Czech Republic; and an impressive expansion of 
Hungarian trade with new partners in the West.

In the Balkans, progress has been more halting and uneven, owing partly 
to the economic and political spillover of the conflict in [the] former 
Yugoslavia.  Yet, despite these strains, Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania 
have maintained their commitment to free market democracy under very 
difficult circumstances.  The Baltic states, too, are making steady 
progress despite the many problems associated with the withdrawal of 
Russian troops and the disruption of traditional trade relations.

The success of these new democracies is of enormous importance to US 
interests.  As the first to attempt the transition from communism to 
democracy, they can be an example to Russia, Ukraine, and others facing 
even greater difficulties.  Russians need to see that this transition 
can be made successfully and peacefully.  A democratic and prospering 
Eastern Europe, with a combined population of some  135 million, is also 
becoming an important market for US goods and services--and a gateway to 
the vast potential markets farther east.  Finally, successful progress 
toward stable democracy in Eastern Europe is key to ending the 
continent's postwar division and building a peaceful, democratic order 
across Europe that assures security at lower cost to ourselves.  The 
bleak alternative to this vision is being played out before our eyes in 
the former Yugoslavia.

US and other Western assistance obviously cannot assure success nor 
guarantee that there will not be "another Yugoslavia."  But our help can 
make a difference--sometimes a decisive one.  As our assistance program 
enters its fourth year, we can say with confidence that our help has 
already made a difference--in providing capital and other assistance to 
Poland's new entrepreneurs, for example, and in helping the Czechs 
navigate their ambitious program of mass privatization.

The Administration's request for FY 1994 is $409 million for programs 
authorized under the SEED [Support for East European Democracy] Act, 
roughly the same as last year's appropriated amount.  This will mean a 
tight budget, particularly in light of the increased number of recipient 
countries and the still-growing needs in the region.  However, with the 
anticipated completion, or near completion, of the capitalization of the 
first two Enterprise Funds for Poland and Hungary during the current 
fiscal year, we will then have somewhat greater flexibility to augment 
some of our smaller programs elsewhere.  Two general areas where we 
intend to expand our assistance in the region are public sector reform 
and environmental assistance, both of which are areas of high interest 
to this committee.

As the committee has pointed out, the early predictions of a 3- to 5-
year "sunset" for this program have proved much too optimistic.  We, 
nonetheless, continue to see this program as a transitional one, even if 
the sunset will take longer to arrive than was anticipated during the 
heady days of 1989.  Without trying to be too specific or engaging in 
false precision, I would forecast roughly steady needs in the more 
advanced countries of Central Europe for another 2 to 3 years, followed 
by a gradual phasing down.  The rest of the region is harder to 
forecast, but it is clear that needs will rise before they begin to 
taper off, with the net result that it will be some years before the 
overall assistance needs in the region diminish substantially.  Even 
after the "sunset" has finally arrived, we may want to maintain modest 
cooperative programs to ensure the survival and sustainability of 
certain partnerships and exchanges, but these countries would, at that 
point, effectively have "graduated" from SEED assistance.

I would like to depart from the usual practice whereby Administration 
officials chronicle only the virtues of their policies or programs.  I 
would like to focus on our weaknesses, too, in the interest of 
strengthening our dialogue.  This Administration is committed to that 
kind of dialogue, and the introduction to this year's SEED Act 
Implementation Report reflects our readiness to admit mistakes, share 
with you the dilemmas that we have not yet been able to answer, and 
engage in full and open discussion.

Let me begin by identifying what I see as the major strengths of this 
program:

First, it is quick, responsive, and flexible.  It is willing to take 
risks.

Second, it has developed innovative ways of delivering assistance--the 
Enterprise Funds, the International Media Fund, the Citizens Democracy 
Corps, and others--that have helped cut through bureaucratic delays.

Third, through these and other programs such as the ABA's [American Bar 
Association] Central and East European Legal Initiative and the MBA 
Enterprise Corps, the US assistance program has built a public-private 
partnership that enables us to use scarce public funds to leverage large 
private sector assistance.

Fourth, it engages the strengths of multiple agencies, including those 
that are charged with advancing US commercial interests.

Fifth and most important, it is based on close cooperation among State, 
USAID [US Agency for International Development], Treasury, NSC [National 
Security Council], and other key agencies, so that foreign assistance is 
an integral part of broader foreign policy interests and linked to 
domestic policy as well.

Now the deficiencies--and here I should mention that those which worry 
me most are not always those that are called to my attention by the 
Congress.  I believe it is worth exploring why this is so, also in the 
interest of strengthening our dialogue.

--  First, we are still too slow and risk-averse.  These countries are 
in the midst of profound and revolutionary change.  Their needs and 
priorities are in constant flux, and we must keep up if we are to be 
relevant to their transformations.  G.K. Chesterton once said that 
anything worth doing is worth doing badly, by which he meant that there 
are some things so important, some tasks so urgent, that we should be 
prepared to take risks and be prepared to make mistakes.  I try to keep 
this in mind when an East European minister makes a request that was not 
even on his agenda 2 months before.  If we allowed ourselves the luxury 
of studying a problem until we satisfied every possible concern, the 
need will have passed before we decide what to do about it.

--  Another weakness is program proliferation.  We are simply trying to 
do too much with too little money.  We are making some headway in paring 
down our programs and focusing them more tightly, but, as we all know, 
it is easier to start a program than stop one.  I hope that our country 
strategy papers--which I will describe in a moment--will help us build 
greater discipline into every program [that] we undertake or consider.

--  Coordination remains a weakness.  Within our government, we have 
developed remarkably good cooperation among the 18 agencies involved, 
and coordination between Washington and the field is improving steadily, 
but international coordination leaves much to be desired.  There is too 
much duplication and competition among donors and too little 
coordination of activities so that we can make the best and most 
effective use of our collective resources.  We have no magic formula to 
offer and certainly do not want to build yet another international 
bureaucracy to try to solve the problem, but we are taking some 
practical steps that we hope will improve coordination.  We are working 
to improve coordination among the major players--the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund], World Bank, EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development], EC, the United States, and others--and then to improve 
coordination in the region itself on select sectors.  We have been 
pushing for these steps in various forums and will present further, 
specific suggestions at three meetings next month:  a G-24 [Group of 24] 
senior officials meeting and combined G-24/World Bank meetings on 
Bulgaria and Romania.  Our feeling is that we may be able to achieve 
more by lowering our sights and focusing on limited but sharply defined 
areas where coordination is most urgently needed.

--  Of course, there are also specific weaknesses regarding individual 
projects and activities.  Given the size and complexity of our 
assistance program, it could hardly be otherwise.  This committee has 
expressed particular concern with some aspects of the operations of the 
Enterprise Funds.  We take these concerns very seriously and want to 
work with you to resolve them.  At the same time, I hope that these 
efforts do not cause us to lose sight of the funds' great success in 
helping develop the new private sectors in the region.

Some of the weaknesses I have identified--and this committee may help me 
identify others--are products of the experimental nature of an 
assistance program that has evolved and is still evolving.  Already, we 
have passed through three stages.  In 1989 and 1990, we sought "targets 
of opportunity" and put a premium on getting programs up and running as 
quickly as possible.  It was politically essential to do so--to show US 
engagement and support at that critical moment.  In 1990 and 1991, we 
put in place the "building blocks" of the program.  These included the 
four Enterprise Funds, partnership programs in various sectors, and 
large institutional contracts that are administered regionally but 
deployed according to each country's specific needs.

Beginning last year, we developed more detailed country strategies--
tightly argued, real-world statements of our priority objectives and the 
programs we have, or intend, to advance those objectives.  These 
documents, prepared with the country team and USAID representative in 
the lead and in full consultation with host governments, are helping us 
achieve a greater degree of rigor in our work, improve transparency and 
predictability, enhance host country participation, and develop better 
communication among Washington agencies and between Washington and the 
field.  In short, the process of developing these papers--the ongoing 
interaction on the substance and aims of our assistance program--is at 
least as important as the products themselves.

Let me elaborate on this dimension of the program's evolution, which I 
know is of special interest to this committee.  In the early stages of 
the program, some of the successes we achieved may have come at the 
expense of the full participation of embassies and host governments.  
This was at a time when we were rushing to launch programs, many of 
which were by nature experimental, and when USAID offices were embryonic 
and host governments disorganized.  Now, with 3 years' experience, USAID 
offices better staffed, and host governments more clear about their own 
priorities, the program has evolved.  The role of USAID representatives 
has been clarified and strengthened, and we are developing a new balance 
of responsibilities between Washington agencies, embassies, and host 
governments.

Here is how this process is working in practice.  Last fall, I led an 
interagency delegation from State, USAID, Treasury, and NSC to Poland, 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary, stopping in Brussels on the 
way for consultations with EC officials.  These were intensive 
discussions, over the course of 3 to 4 days in each country.  They 
included meetings with the ambassador, the USAID representative, and the 
entire country team; large group meetings between the US delegation--
together with the ambassador and USAID representative--and senior 
officials from all the key host country ministries; and a series of more 
detailed meetings with individual ministries according to schedules 
worked out in advance with the governments concerned.  We reached 
agreement on the strategies and priorities of US assistance, engaged in 
a no-holds-barred critique of the assistance program, and agreed on an 
action plan for addressing problems that we could not resolve on the 
spot.  Regular visits like this, along with the more detailed country 
strategy papers we are developing, are helping us define the agenda for 
an ongoing, substantive dialogue among Washington, our embassies and 
USAID representatives, and senior officials of each host government.

The program is evolving organizationally within the Department of State 
as well.  As Assistant Secretary [of State for European and Canadian 
Affairs] Oxman explained during his confirmation hearings, the office I 
direct will be under his authority in the Department's overall 
reorganization.  The Administration, beginning most immediately with Mr. 
Oxman and myself, is committed to implementing this move in a way that 
preserves the program's effectiveness and interagency character while 
also strengthening overall policy integration within the Department.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me return to Central and Eastern 
Europe--to matters of substance rather than process.  In that thrilling 
fall of 1989, when our assistance program began, no one knew what lay 
ahead.  No one forecast the split of Czechoslovakia; no one knew how 
these unprecedented democratic transitions would unfold; no one divined 
how quickly communism would unravel in Russia itself.  We engaged as 
fast as we could and learned as we went.  We were willing to take risks 
because of the importance and urgency of the task at hand, and we 
adapted the program to changing circumstances.

Now, 31/2 years later, we are wiser, perhaps, but no more able to 
predict what the next few years will bring.  These countries are still 
in the midst of profound and essentially unpredictable change; the 
economic transitions are in some cases well advanced, but the 
revolutionary transformation of these societies is only beginning.  
Democracy has scored amazing advances, but nowhere is democracy secure.  
Our commitment to this region must remain steady, but our policies and 
programs should stay nimble, with strong political leadership exercising 
the imagination and flexibility that these turbulent times demand. (###)



ARTICLE 7:


Crisis in Zaire
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, 
April 15, 1993

In response to the deteriorating situation in Shaba, Charge John Yates 
has declared that a state of disaster exists in the city of Kolwezi.  
Some 40,000 Kasaians have recently fled to Kolwezi as a result of 
government-directed ethnic victimization in Shaba province.  There are 
now over 100,000 displaced persons in the province. These displaced 
persons lack adequate sanitation, medical support, food and water; 
approximately 60 persons are dying of malnutrition per month. The US 
Government will provide immediately an additional $25,000 for assistance 
to the displaced persons.  The funds will be channeled through Medecins 
Sans Frontieres.

We have recently approved grants totaling an additional $1.4 million for 
displaced persons in Shaba, where the provincial government has been 
carrying out oppression against people of Kasai origin.  Since early 
last year, we have given more than $3 million in emergency aid for such 
persons.

In recent years, we have given only emergency humanitarian aid to Zaire. 
The total since September 1991 has been about $5 million in food aid, 
medicine, and displaced persons assistance, which has gone solely to 
non-governmental organizations, not to the government.

It is apparent that local authorities are still involved in 
orchestrating intimidation directed at Kasaians which is intended to 
force them out of the province.  This tragedy is another symptom of the 
crisis in Zaire brought on by President Mobutu's refusal to allow a 
democratic transition.  We have made clear to President Mobutu and the 
responsible authorities in Shaba that they must take action to halt the 
persecution and to bring those responsible to justice. (###)



ARTICLE 8:


UN Security Council Resolutions On the Former Yugoslavia

Resolution 819 (April 16, 1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all its 
subsequent relevant resolutions,

Taking note that the International Court of Justice in its Order of 8 
April 1993 in the case concerning application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) unanimously indicated 
as a provisional measure that the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should immediately in pursuance of 
its undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take all measures within its 
power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming its call on the parties and others concerned to observe 
immediately the cease-fire throughout the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,

Reaffirming its condemnation of all violations of international 
humanitarian law, including, in particular, the practice of "ethnic 
cleansing", 

Concerned by the pattern of hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary 
units against towns and villages in eastern Bosnia and in this regard 
reaffirming that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat or 
use of force, including through the practice of "ethnic cleansing", is 
unlawful and unacceptable,

Deeply alarmed at the information provided by the Secretary-General to 
the Security Council on 16 April 1993 on the rapid deterioration of the 
situation in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas, as a result of the 
continued deliberate armed attacks and shelling of the innocent civilian 
population by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units,

Strongly condemning the deliberate interdiction by Bosnian Serb 
paramilitary units of humanitarian assistance convoys,

Also strongly condemning the actions taken by Bosnian Serb paramilitary 
units against UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], in particular, their 
refusal to guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of UNPROFOR 
personnel,

Aware that a tragic humanitarian emergency has already developed in 
Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as a direct consequence of the 
brutal actions of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units, forcing the large-
scale displacement of civilians, in particular women, children and the 
elderly,

Recalling the provisions of resolution 815 (1993) on the mandate of 
UNPROFOR and in that context acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations,

1.  Demands that all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and 
its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed 
attack or any other hostile act;

2.  Demands also to that effect the immediate cessation of armed attacks 
by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against Srebrenica and their 
immediate withdrawal from the areas surrounding Srebrenica;

3.  Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and 
services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina;

4.  Requests the Secretary-General, with a view to monitoring the 
humanitarian situation in the safe area, to take immediate steps to 
increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and its surroundings; 
demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully and 
promptly with UNPROFOR towards that end; and requests the Secretary-
General to report urgently thereon to the Security Council;

5.  Reaffirms that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat 
or use of force, including through the practice of "ethnic cleansing", 
is unlawful and unacceptable;

6.  Condemns and rejects the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb 
party to force the evacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica 
and its surrounding areas as well as from other parts of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of its overall abhorrent campaign of 
"ethnic cleansing";

7.  Reaffirms its condemnation of all violations of international 
humanitarian law, in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and 
reaffirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts 
shall be held individually responsible  in respect of such acts;

8.  Demands the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all 
parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular to the 
civilian population of Srebrenica and its surrounding areas and recalls 
that such impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian law;

9.  Urges the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees [UNHCR] to use all the resources at their disposal within 
the scope of the relevant resolutions of the Council to reinforce the 
existing humanitarian operations in the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in particular Srebrenica and its surroundings;

10.  Further demands that all parties guarantee the safety and full 
freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and of all other United Nations 
personnel as well as members of humanitarian organizations;

11.  Further requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with UNHCR 
and UNPROFOR, to arrange for the safe transfer of the wounded and ill 
civilians from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas and to urgently 
report thereon to the Council;

12.  Decides to send, as soon as possible, a mission of members of the 
Security Council to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ascertain 
the situation and report thereon to the Security Council;

13.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider 
further steps to achieve a solution in conformity with relevant 
resolutions of the Council.

VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0).


Resolution 820 (April 17, 1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the peace 
talks held by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (S/25221, S/25248, 
S/25403 and S/25479),

Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all 
of the Bosnian parties,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by force or any 
practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and totally unacceptable, and 
insisting that all displaced persons be enabled to return in peace to 
their former homes,

Reaffirming in this regard its resolution 808 (1993) in which it decided 
that an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution 
of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 
since 1991 and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report at the 
earliest possible date,

Deeply alarmed and concerned about the magnitude of the plight of 
innocent victims of the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 

Expressing its condemnation of all the activities carried out in 
violation of resolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) between the territory 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Serb-
controlled areas in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,

Deeply concerned by the position of the Bosnian Serb party as reported 
in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the report of the Secretary-General of 26 
March 1993 (S/25479),

Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United 
Nations,

A

1.  Commends the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form 
agreed to by two of the Bosnian parties and set out in the report of the 
Secretary-General of 26 March 1993 (S/25479), namely the Agreement on 
Interim Arrangements (annex I), the nine Constitutional Principles 
(annex II), the provisional provincial map (annex III) and the Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (annex IV);

2.  Welcomes the fact that this plan has now been accepted in full by 
two of the Bosnian parties;

3.  Expresses its grave concern at the refusal so far of the Bosnian 
Serb party to accept the Agreement on Interim Arrangements and the 
provisional provincial map, and calls on that party to accept the peace 
plan in full;

4.  Demands that all parties and others concerned continue to observe 
the cease-fire and refrain from any further hostilities;

5.  Demands full respect for the right of the United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR) and the international humanitarian agencies to free and 
unimpeded access to all areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and that all parties, in particular the Bosnian Serb party and others 
concerned, cooperate fully with them and take all necessary steps to 
ensure the safety of their personnel;

6.  Condemns once again all violations of international humanitarian 
law, including in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and the 
massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women, and 
reaffirms that those who commit or have committed or order or have 
ordered the commission of such acts will be held individually 
responsible in respect of such acts;

7.  Reaffirms its endorsement of the principles that all statements or 
commitments made under duress, particularly those relating to land and 
property, are wholly null and void and that all displaced persons have 
the right to return in peace to their former homes and should be 
assisted to do so;

8.  Declares its readiness to take all the necessary measures to assist 
the parties in the effective implementation of the peace plan once it 
has been agreed in full by all the parties, and requests the Secretary-
General to submit to the Council at the earliest possible date, and if 
possible not later than nine days after the adoption of the present 
resolution, a report containing an account of the preparatory work for 
the implementation of the proposals referred to in paragraph 28 of the 
Secretary-General's report of 26 March 1993 (S/25479) and detailed 
proposals for the implementation of the peace plan, including 
arrangements for the effective international control of heavy weapons, 
based inter alia on consultations with Member States, acting nationally 
or through regional organizations or arrangements;

9.  Encourages Member States, acting nationally or through regional 
organizations or arrangements, to cooperate effectively with the 
Secretary-General in his efforts to assist the parties in implementing 
the peace plan in accordance with paragraph 8 above;

B

Determined to strengthen the implementation of the measures imposed by 
its earlier relevant resolutions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

10.  Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below 
shall, to the extent that they establish obligations beyond those 
established by its earlier relevant resolutions, come into force nine 
days after the date of the adoption of the present resolution unless the 
Secretary-General has reported to the Council that the Bosnian Serb 
party has joined the other parties in signing the peace plan and in 
implementing it and that the Bosnian Serbs have ceased their military 
attacks;

11.  Decides further that if, at any time after the submission of the 
above-mentioned report of the Secretary- General, the Secretary-General 
reports to the Council that the Bosnian Serbs have renewed their 
military attacks or failed to comply with the peace plan, the provisions 
set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below shall come into force 
immediately;

12.  Decides that import to, export from and transshipment through the 
United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those 
areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of 
Bosnian Serb forces, with the exception of essential humanitarian 
supplies including  medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by 
international humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with proper 
authorizations from the Government of the Republic of Croatia or the 
Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively;

13.  Decides that all States, in implementing the measures imposed by 
resolutions 757 (1992), 760 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present 
resolution, shall take steps to prevent diversion to the territory of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of 
commodities and products said to be destined for other places, in 
particular the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia 
and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the 
control of Bosnian Serb forces;

14.  Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with 
UNPROFOR in the fulfilment of its immigration and customs control 
functions deriving from resolution 769 (1992);

15.  Decides that transshipments of commodities and products through the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the Danube 
shall be permitted only if specifically authorized by the Committee 
established by resolution 724 (1991) and that each vessel so authorized 
must be subject to effective monitoring while passing along the Danube 
between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs;

16.  Confirms that no vessels (a) registered in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or (b) in which a majority or 
controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating 
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or (c) 
suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 
(1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution shall be 
permitted to pass through installations, including river locks or canals 
within the territory of Member States, and calls upon the riparian 
States to ensure that adequate monitoring is provided to all cabotage 
traffic involving points that are situated between Vidin/Calafat and 
Mohacs;

17.  Reaffirms the responsibility of riparian States to take necessary 
measures to ensure that shipping on the Danube is in accordance with 
resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present 
resolution, including any measures under the authority of the Security 
Council to halt or otherwise control all shipping in order to inspect 
and verify their cargoes and destinations, to ensure effective 
monitoring and to ensure strict implementation of the relevant 
resolutions, and reiterates its request in resolution 787 (1992) to all 
States, including non-riparian States, to provide, acting nationally or 
through regional organizations or arrangements, such assistance as may 
be required by the riparian States, notwithstanding the restrictions on 
navigation set out in the international agreements which apply to the 
Danube;

18.  Requests the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) to make 
periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to the 
Committee regarding alleged violations of the relevant resolutions, 
identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, 
reported to be engaged in such violations;

19.  Reminds States of the importance of strict enforcement of measures 
imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, and calls upon them to bring 
proceedings against persons and entities violating the measures imposed 
by resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present 
resolution and to impose appropriate penalties;

20.  Welcomes the role of the international Sanctions Assistance 
Missions in support of the implementation of the measures imposed under 
resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present 
resolution and the appointment of the Sanctions Coordinator by the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and invites the 
Sanctions Coordinator and the Sanctions Assistance Missions to work in 
close cooperation with the Committee established by resolution 724 
(1991);

21.  Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds 
derived from property, (a) of the authorities in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or (b) of commercial, industrial or 
public utility undertakings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro), or (c) controlled directly or indirectly by 
such authorities or undertakings or by entities, wherever located or 
organized, owned or controlled by such authorities or undertakings, 
shall require all persons and entities within their own territories 
holding such funds to freeze them to ensure that they are not made 
available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the 
authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility 
undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro), and calls on all States to report to the Committee 
established by resolution 724 (1991) on actions taken pursuant to this 
paragraph;

22.  Decides to prohibit the transport of all commodities and products 
across the land borders or to or from the ports of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the only exceptions being:

(a)  The importation of medical supplies and foodstuffs into the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as provided for in 
resolution 757 (1992), in which connection the Committee established by 
resolution 724 (1991) will draw up rules for monitoring to ensure full 
compliance with this and other relevant resolutions;

(b)  The importation of other essential humanitarian supplies into the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) approved on a 
case-by-case basis under the no-objection procedure by the Committee 
established by resolution 724 (1991);

(c)  Strictly limited transshipments through the territory of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), when authorized 
on an exceptional basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 
(1991), provided that nothing in this paragraph shall affect 
transshipment on the Danube in accordance with paragraph 15 above;

23.  Decides that each State neighbouring the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall prevent the passage of all 
freight vehicles and rolling stock into or out of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except at a strictly limited 
number of road and rail border crossing points, the location of which 
shall be notified by each neighbouring State to the Committee 
established by resolution 724 (1991) and approved by the Committee;

24.  Decides that all States shall impound all vessels, freight 
vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their territories in which a 
majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in 
or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) and that these vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and 
aircraft may be forfeit to the seizing State upon a determination that 
they have been in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 
(1992) or the present resolution;

25.  Decides that all States shall detain pending investigation all 
vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes found in 
their territories and suspected of having violated or being in violation 
of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present 
resolution and that, upon a determination that they have been in 
violation, such vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft 
shall be impounded and, where appropriate, they and their cargoes may be 
forfeit to the detaining State;

26.  Confirms that States may charge the expense of impounding vessels, 
freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft to their owners;

27.  Decides to prohibit the provision of services, both financial and 
non-financial, to any person or body for purposes of any business 
carried on in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
the only exceptions being telecommunications, postal services, legal 
services consistent with resolution 757 (1992) and, as approved, on a 
case-by-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 
(1991), services whose supply may be necessary for humanitarian or other 
exceptional purposes;

28.  Decides to prohibit all commercial maritime traffic from entering 
the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) except when authorized on a case-by-case basis by the 
Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) or in case of force 
majeure;

29.  Reaffirms the authority of States acting under paragraph 12 of 
resolution 787 (1992) to use such measures commensurate with the 
specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the 
Security Council to enforce the present resolution and its other 
relevant resolutions, including in the territorial sea of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

30.  Confirms that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 29 
above, strengthening the implementation of the measures imposed by its 
earlier relevant resolutions, do not apply to activities related to 
UNPROFOR, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia or the 
European Community Monitor Mission;

C

Desirous of achieving the full readmittance of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the international community once 
it has fully implemented the relevant resolutions of the Council,

31.  Expresses its readiness, after all three Bosnian parties have 
accepted the peace plan and on the basis of verified evidence, provided 
by the Secretary-General, that the Bosnian Serb party is cooperating in 
good faith in effective implementation of the plan, to review all the 
measures in the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions 
with a view to gradually lifting them;

32.  Invites all States to consider what contribution they can make to 
the reconstruction of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

33.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

VOTE:  13-0-2 (China, Russia abstaining).  (###)



ARTICLE 9:


Status of Negotiations In Haiti
Statement by Secretary Christopher, Washington, DC, April 17, 1993.

I met today with UN/OAS [Organization of American States] Special Envoy 
Dante Caputo on the current status of negotiations in Haiti. While there 
have been positive signs of willingness to engage in serious 
negotiations, Mr. Caputo's talks last week with the Haitian high command 
were disappointing.  The rejection of the proposal is a matter of 
serious concern to the United States.

We had been assured up to this point that the military leadership in 
Haiti understood the importance to their institution and to the people 
of Haiti of their playing a constructive role in bringing about the 
prompt return of constitutional government and President Aristide.

It is time for the military leadership of Haiti to indicate its firm 
agreement on the key points of a settlement of the political crisis in 
Haiti.  I hope that careful reflection over this weekend in Port-au-
Prince will result in sufficient progress to permit these important 
negotiations to move forward. (###)



ARTICLE 10:


Department's Efforts To Combat International Terrorism
Laurence Pope, Acting Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism
Statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC, April 
21, 1993

Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the Department of State's 
views on international terrorism and the outlook for the future.  I 
welcome this committee's decision to take up this important issue.

As I am sure the committee is aware, I cannot comment on the World Trade 
Center bombing.  I would note, however, that the State Department has 
and will continue to work closely with our colleagues in the law 
enforcement community to help ensure that every lead is followed up 
until the facts have been established and a court can render its verdict 
in that case.

Director for Central Intelligence Woolsey already has provided the 
committee a comprehensive review of the current threat.  We will shortly 
be sending to Congress our annual report, "Patterns of Global 
Terrorism."  [See Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 19 for excerpts.]  As Director 
Woolsey makes clear, while there were fewer terrorist incidents in 1992 
than several years ago, the threat continues to be significant.  We 
cannot and will not drop our guard.

Complacency can be costly.  As we develop counter-measures, terrorists 
will look for ways to evade them.  Just as we are facing the 
contemporary threat, we must continue to be vigilant to detect and 
counter emerging threats before they pose a major risk to US national 
interests.

Predictions about international affairs are risky, and this is 
particularly true in trying to predict future terrorism.  There are too 
many variables, groups, and motives.  Terrorism is often cyclical in 
nature; as old passions and groups fade, new factors, new groups, and 
new "causes" turn into deadly terrorist attacks.

The more fluid post-Cold War international environment has allowed long-
suppressed ethnic conflicts to find new violent expression.  From the 
Balkans to the Middle East, an area of traditional concern, tensions in 
many parts of the world have increased.  We know from experience that 
terrorism is often a by-product of such conflicts.

In the Middle East and North Africa, new and radical groups have emerged 
in recent years, invoking Islamic ideology but using terrorist tactics 
to advance their extremist agendas.  Groups such as Hamas and the 
Palestine Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the so-
called Islamic Group in Egypt--with which Omar Abdurrahman is 
associated-- have turned to violence and terrorism.  In Egypt, the 
Islamic Group has attacked foreign tourists in an effort to destabilize 
the Mubarak government.  Militant elements of Hamas have carried out 
acts of terrorism and violence against Israeli officials and civilians.

The misuse of Islamic political rhetoric by these groups should not 
cause us to confuse in our own minds terrorism and Islam.  Our problem 
is not, of course, with Islam; it is with the use of violence and 
terrorism by anyone, anywhere.

We were shocked recently by the increasingly callous disregard for 
civilian casualties shown by the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
bombing of a crowded shopping area in Warrington, England.  Two young 
children died in the blast, and many other persons were injured.

As President Clinton said in a letter read at the April 7 memorial 
service:

The United States condemns in the strongest terms such violence and 
those who support and perpetuate it.  That the [most] recent outrages 
have caused the deaths of young children and injuries to many more, only 
emphasizes the callous nature of such violence.

The President also said the American people join the people of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom in the belief that "violence from whatever 
quarter can never be justified."

Coordination and Policy
Mr. Chairman, in my remarks I will concentrate on our efforts to provide 
international leadership in the fight against terrorism and on the 
process of inter-agency coordination and cooperation within the 
executive branch.  I will end with comments from the State Department 
perspective on some current legislative proposals.

In dealing with the international terrorism threat, we have learned that 
inter-agency coordination and cooperation is absolutely critical.  We 
cannot allow the tensions which sometimes result from differences in 
perspective to become battles over turf.  Within the State Department, 
my office is the focal point for this inter-agency coordination.  We 
work extremely closely with colleagues in the Justice Department, the 
FBI, and the intelligence community.

We want to ensure that American diplomacy reinforces our law enforcement 
efforts on the basis of the best information available.  There is no 
inherent contradiction between the requirements of law enforcement and 
foreign policy.  On the contrary, the rule of law is one of the most 
effective tools we have in the fight against international terrorism.

In addition to working closely with the Justice Department, the FBI, the 
CIA, and the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], we are in daily 
contact with the Defense Department, which has developed impressive and 
highly specialized capabilities to deal with international terrorism 
contingencies.  Specialized inter-agency working subgroups also have 
been established to coordinate counter-terrorism activities such as 
research and development, to apply new technologies against terrorist 
threats, and [to administer] the counter-terrorism rewards programs.  As 
you know, the Department of State is the designated lead agency for US 
policy on international terrorism.

State Support
The basis of our policy is the effort to reduce and eventually eliminate 
the support which states provide to terrorist groups.  As Director 
Woolsey made clear, in the final analysis, without the support of 
states, terrorists are exposed and vulnerable to effective law 
enforcement.  Terrorist organizations rely heavily on state support, 
such as provision of weapons, training and training sites, intelligence 
support, funding, travel documents, and safe havens from prosecution.  
Without a sanctuary to operate from, and the facilities that only a 
state can provide, terrorists can be dealt with as the criminals that 
they are.

An important tool in this effort is the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism that developed from the counter-terrorism provisions of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979, as revised by the Anti-Terrorism and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1989.

This year, in our annual review of state sponsorship, we determined that 
the six nations previously on the list--Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, and Syria--should continue to be designated state sponsors.  We 
remain concerned about reports of Pakistani support for militant groups 
engaged in terrorism as well as of Sudan's apparently growing support 
for terrorist groups.  Our dialogue with Pakistan is high level and 
continuing.  We will be taking a very close look at both countries in 
the coming weeks and months to consider whether they have, in the words 
of the law, repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism.  As Director Woolsey has said, none of the designated 
governments has completely abandoned the terrorist option nor severed 
ties to terrorist surrogates.

Of the current state sponsors, Iran is the major problem we face.  
Iran's support for terrorism includes the threat to murder British 
author Salman Rushdie, Tehran's continued campaign assassinations of 
Iranian dissidents overseas, and its support for groups which seek to 
use violence against the Middle East peace process.  We are continuing 
to work with our friends and allies within the European Community,  the 
G-7 [Group of 7 industrialized countries], and with other governments to 
ensure that our collective response to the threat Iranian actions 
present is as effective as possible.  We have made the point repeatedly 
that if we act in concert, we can have an impact on Iran's policies.  We 
will continue to make this case to our friends and allies at every 
opportunity.

--  Syria has cooperated with the United States in several important  
ways in the past several years, but it retains close ties to groups that 
have engaged in international terrorism and allows them to maintain 
offices in Damascus and to train in territory it controls.

--  Iraq--despite the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions--
has exercised the terrorism option repeatedly against regime opponents 
and against UN officials and Western relief workers in northern Iraq.

--  Libya continues to refuse to comply with all of the requirements of 
UN Security Council resolutions, and allows some representatives of 
terrorist groups to remain in its territory.

--  Although North Korean and Cuba have been relatively quiescent, they 
both continue to serve as a safe haven to radical groups, some with 
links to terrorism.

International Cooperation And the Rule of Law
The good news is that, increasingly, governments have been willing to 
join in steps against state sponsors and the groups they support.  We 
saw this clearly during Operation Desert Storm when many countries 
joined in expelling or keeping under close scrutiny suspected Iraqi 
agents and imposing other security measures to thwart Iraq's terrorist 
efforts.

Collective efforts also were essential in the UN Security Council 
condemnation of Libya for the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings.  The 
passage of landmark UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 is a 
significant indication of this changed attitude.  UNSC Resolution 748 
last year imposed sanctions, which include a complete cut-off of air 
service to and from Libya; an embargo on the provision of aviation spare 
parts; a similar proviso concerning military equipment, spare parts, and 
services to Libya; and a requirement that nations reduce the number of 
Libyan diplomats serving at overseas missions.  These sanctions are 
effective in almost all cases, and potential violations are acted upon 
quickly by the United States.

Until Libya complies fully with the requirements imposed by the Security 
Council, these sanctions will remain in place.  The UN Security Council 
earlier this month renewed the sanctions.  We continue to work closely 
with our allies, Britain and France.  Ambassador Albright and her 
British and French colleagues warned Libya in the Council this month 
that new, tougher sanctions may be necessary if it does not comply with 
the Council's demands.  As Secretary Christopher has said, one of the 
new measures under consideration is an oil embargo.  Libya would be well 
advised not to misjudge our resolve.

I have mentioned the importance of bringing terrorists to justice.  We 
have had several successes recently which have not received much public 
attention.  For example, we worked successfully with Greece in the trial 
of Muhammed Rashid, who was accused of the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am 
aircraft.  Ten years after this bombing, Rashid was convicted and 
sentenced to a lengthy jail term in Athens.

More recently, Italy extradited Khalid Mohammed El-Jassem, a Palestinian 
terrorist, to the United States to stand trial for offenses committed 20 
years ago while a member of the notorious Black September Organization.  
He was sentenced in New York last week to 30 years on these charges, 
which included attempting to kill then-Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir 
and plant[ing] an explosive at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport.  
These actions serve notice on international criminals that our memories 
are long, and so is the reach of US law enforcement.

We also strengthen the rule of law by helping improve the judicial and 
law enforcement capabilities of other nations that may be victims of 
terrorist acts.  Through training provided under the Department of 
State's Anti-terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), we have improved the 
ability of other governments to preempt, investigate, and prosecute 
terrorists.  In 1992, more than 1,125 senior officials from 25 countries 
received such training, bringing the total number of persons trained in 
the program to about 14,000 from 75 nations.

The ATA program also helps develop working relationships between US and 
foreign officials and provides a better understanding of each other's 
capabilities.  We were able recently to dispatch a team on short notice 
to a friendly country that is cooperating on a sensitive terrorism 
matter and felt it needed to bolster its security.  The ATA program is 
moving from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security into the new Bureau of 
Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Crime.  This change will help 
ensure a close linkage between our policy initiatives to counter 
terrorism, and our operational programs designed to improve the anti-
terrorism capabilities of friendly governments. 

Legislation
Mr. Chairman, in your letter of invitation, you mentioned your interest 
in the Department's views on possible legislation.  There are several 
measures for which we seek congressional support.

We expect to submit soon for Senate ratification a new international 
convention dealing with detecting and controlling plastic explosives.  
After the December 1988 destruction of Pan Am 103 by a plastic explosive 
bomb, the United States and key European nations agreed to identify 
chemical marking agents which could be incorporated into plastic 
explosives during the manufacturing stage in order to make these 
explosives detectable.  Our aim was to develop an international 
agreement which would help prevent bombings using plastic explosives.  
The Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection was completed in Montreal in 1991.  It has been signed by the 
United States and 50 other nations.

The US Army has completed technical testing of the US-selected chemical-
marking agent, much of which was initially financed by the State 
Department's Counter-Terrorism Research and Development Fund, to ensure 
that the marked US plastic explosives will have no adverse 
environmental, occupational health, or national security implications.  
Based on these tests, the Army is prepared to begin producing plastic 
explosives incorporating the marking chemical by January 1994.

The Department also seeks speedy congressional action this year on 
implementing legislation for two important counter-terrorism treaties: 
The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at 
Airports Serving International Aviation and The Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Attacks Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation.

These treaties extend the "prosecute or extradite" principle, embodied 
in previous multilateral anti-terrorism treaties, to attacks on airports 
serving civilian aviation and to attacks on civilian shipping and 
offshore platforms.  These treaties were prompted by the 1985 Rome and 
Vienna airport attacks and the hijacking of the the Achille Lauro 
passenger liner.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to these international 
conventions in 1989, but approval of the implementing legislation was 
delayed since it was incorporated into the omnibus crime bill.  To 
underscore the importance we attach to these and related provisions, 
such as making it a federal offense to provide material support for 
international terrorist attacks, they are included in the draft State 
Department authorization bill.

We appreciate the support you gave these and other counter-terrorism-
related provisions during the past session of Congress.  I hope your 
committee can help expedite passage this year.

Mr. Chairman, as both the President and Secretary have made clear, the 
issue of international terrorism is a high priority for this 
Administration.  Our response must and will be to maintain our 
vigilance, increase and adjust our capabilities, and further develop 
cooperation to help ensure the safety of Americans and American 
interests throughout the world.  It is an effort that requires continued 
effort, attention, and persistence.  And we appreciate your continued 
support. (###)



ARTICLE 11:


US Delegation Visits Hanoi; POW/MIA Issues Discussed
Joint press statement by Gen. John Vessey, the President's Special Envoy 
for POW/MIA Affairs, and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam, 
Hanoi, Vietnam, April 19, 1993.

As agreed by both governments, Gen. John Vessey, President Clinton's 
Special Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA affairs, led a US delegation to 
Hanoi [on] April 18-19 for a full range of discussions with officials of 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.  While in Hanoi, General Vessey paid 
a call on President Le Duc Anh [on] the afternoon of April 19.  The 
Vietnamese side was led by Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam and included 
the deputy ministers of defense, interior, and foreign affairs, as well 
as officials concerned with the issues of searching for missing persons 
in Vietnam.  The US side included representatives of the National 
Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, 
and the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting.

The US side reaffirmed President Clinton's objective of achieving the 
fullest possible accounting for missing American servicemen from the 
Vietnam war.  General Vessey stressed that the most immediate issue to 
be addressed was the serious concern raised in America by the document 
the United States had just received in Russia regarding the number of 
POWs held during the war.  General Vessey also stressed the importance 
of answering the questions raised by the document and his hope that the 
two sides would cooperate on the matter.

Concerning the Russian document recently obtained by the American side, 
the Vietnamese side rejected the information contained in it as 
completely inaccurate and not reflecting the reality which existed 
during the war.  At the same time, the Vietnamese side expressed its 
willingness to assist the United States regarding this matter.  To this 
end, the Vietnamese side arranged for General Vessey to meet with 
retired Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang, whose name appears in the document, as 
well as retired Lt. Col. Doan Hanh, a former official of the POW prison 
system.  The US side expressed its appreciation for the cooperation of 
the Vietnamese Government on this matter.

In response to previous American requests, the Vietnamese side provided 
important documents from the archives of the General Political 
Directorate and other archives listing American POWs held during the war 
as well as American servicemen who died in captivity in southern and 
central Vietnam.  The US side indicated these documents will assist in 
its efforts to account for US servicemen.  They also appear to shed 
light on the Russian document, but further analysis is required.  
General Vessey indicated that he would report immediately to President 
Clinton upon his return about all of these developments.

The two sides also carried out a full review of all areas of POW/MIA 
cooperation.  They agreed that substantial progress is being made and 
agreed that further action was necessary in order to increase this 
progress.  Both sides agreed they would join officials of the Government 
of Laos for trilateral talks on POW/MIA cooperation to be held May 6-8 
in Hanoi.  Both sides also agreed to establish a new joint team to 
accelerate investigation of the remaining American discrepancy cases.  
There also was agreement in principle on the work plan for activities to 
investigate cases of missing Americans during the remainder of 1993.

The Vietnamese side provided new information about other unilateral 
steps it has taken to assist in POW/MIA accounting.  Foreign Minister 
Cam provided General Vessey with seven documents obtained from 
Vietnamese citizens, including sketches and maps of reported grave sites 
of American servicemen.  The two sides indicated they would investigate 
these reports during their next joint field investigation.

At General Vessey's request, Minister Cam also briefed the US side on 
the results of the recently started amnesty program designed to induce 
Vietnamese citizens to turn over possible remains of US servicemen which 
they are holding.  As a result of this effort, on April 7, the US side 
repatriated remains associated with multiple individuals from eight 
wartime incidents.

The Vietnamese side also provided a review of the humanitarian needs of 
Vietnam for consideration by the United States.  General Vessey noted 
this information and indicated [that] he would convey it to President 
Clinton when he meets with him upon his return.  General Vessey also 
expressed confidence that the US would assist Vietnam in its efforts to 
account for its missing men and war dead.

The two sides also discussed the issue of Cambodia.  The US side 
reiterated the United States' strong condemnation of recent acts of 
murder carried out against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia.  It also 
reviewed actions [that] the US is taking in conjunction with other 
members of the international community to halt these heinous acts.  The 
Vietnamese side indicated its appreciation for these steps by the United 
States.

General Vessey expressed his appreciation to the Government of Vietnam 
for the cooperation and assistance provided to him during this mission. 
(###)



ARTICLE 12:


Fact Sheet:  The Federal Bulletin Board

In September 1992, the State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs was 
one of the first three participants in the new Federal Bulletin Board 
Service (BBS) of the US Government Printing Office (GPO).  According to 
Mr. Wayne Kelley, GPO's Superintendent of Documents, the BBS "is 
providing customers with rapid, easy, and inexpensive access to 
electronic publications and giving federal agencies a new alternative 
for cost-effective information dissemination."  

The BBS benefits both the State Department and private users.  The user-
friendly service has reduced the time required for the Bureau of Public 
Affairs to upload and administer its former electronic dissemination 
system.  For the public, it allows quick and easy identification, 
selection, and transfer of electronic files to personal computers.  For 
both, the BBS has reduced costs.

Consequently, the Bureau of Public Affairs will be phasing out the 
Computerized Information Delivery Service (CIDS).  When CIDS was 
initiated at the State Department in February 1991, it was the first 
time that electronic foreign policy information was provided to the 
general public.  Effective August 31, 1993, the bureau will no longer 
participate in CIDS.

US Government Contributors
Ms. Judy Russell, Director of GPO's Office of Electronic Information 
Dissemination Services, is working with other government agencies, like 
the State Department, that want to improve public access to their 
electronic information.  "We now offer more than 2,000 files on the 
Federal Bulletin Board," said Ms. Russell, "and are adding new ones 
daily."  Agencies which now provide electronic information on the BBS 
are the Departments of State and Energy, the US Supreme Court, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, Food and Drug Administration, Health 
Care Financing Administration, and Public Health Service.  The 
Departments of Justice and Commerce and the General Services 
Administration plan to join in the near future. 

How the BBS Works
Users can access free services on the bulletin board with a personal 
computer, modem (settings: 8 bit, no parity, 1 stop bit, speeds 300-9600 
baud), telecommunications software, and telephone line by calling GPO at 
202-512-1387.  Unlike CIDS, no monthly subscription is required.  Users 
can search file names, dates, and up to 10 keywords assigned to each 
file by the publishing agency or GPO.  The BBS is available 22 hours a 
day (5:00 am to 3:00 am, eastern time).  User assistance is available 
from 8:00 am to 4:00 pm, eastern time, Monday-Friday (except federal 
holidays) by calling 202-512-1526.

At present, a GPO Deposit Account (with an initial deposit of $50; no 
minimum balance thereafter) is required to download files.  Prices for 
downloading are reasonable:  The minimum charge per file is $2 (up to 50 
kilobytes); a full megabyte file costs $21.  A GPO Deposit Account can 
be opened with a major credit card, check, or money order.  For more 
information on opening an account, call 202-512-0822 (FAX 202-512-1262).  
For additional information about the BBS, contact GPO's Office of 
Electronic Information Dissemination Services on 202-512-1524.

GPO sells disks and plans to sell hard copies of the electronic 
material, which can be ordered from GPO through BBS electronic mail.  
For information about on-line material now available through the BBS 
from the State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs, you also can 
communicate with the bureau through the free E-mail feature or contact 
Ms. Anita Stockman on 202-647-6681 (PA/PC, Rm. 6808, US State 
Department, Washington, DC 20520).

NTIS Electronic Gateway
The National Technical Information Service (NTIS) of the US Department 
of Commerce has established the FedWorld GateWay™ which allows access 
to GPO's bulletin board in addition to more than 100 federal computer 
bulletin board systems.  For further information on  FedWorld™,  
contact Alan Wenberg, NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA  
22161. (###)

Highlights of State Department Material on the BBS 
    --  US Department of State Dispatch, the Department's weekly foreign 
policy magazine, including "Treaty Actions" and special sections such as 
the "Focus on the Emerging Democracies" and "Focus on the Environment."  
(Library File:  DOS_DISP)
    Dispatch Supplements, periodic supplements to the foreign policy 
magazine on topics such as the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development and the economic summits.  (Library File:  DOS_DISP)
    --  Official transcript of the daily State Department press 
briefings.  (Library File:  DOS_DPB)
    --  Background Notes on countries and selected international 
organizations.  (Library File:  DOS_BKG)
    --  Travel information to US citizens such as travel tips to various 
countries/regions and advisories on residing abroad and protecting 
business interests.  (Library File:  DOS_TRA)
    --  Special publications, including Defense Trade News and National 
Action Plan for Global Climate Change.  (Library File:  DOS_MISC)
    --  Major reports, including the annual "Human Rights Country 
Reports" (Library File:  DOS_HRCR), and International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report  (Library File:  DOS_INM). (###)



ARTICLE 13:

What's in Print

Foreign Relations Of the United States
The Department of State recently released Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXIII, Part 2, Korea.  Part 1, Japan, 
was released in 1991.

This volume is the last of the Foreign Relations series for the years 
1955-57, completing the Department of State program to document the 
triennium of the middle Eisenhower years.

The Korean war ended in 1953 with an armistice devised to last until the 
opposing sides could reach a permanent settlement at an international 
conference.  North and South Korea remained in a state of suspended war 
with the armistice supervisory machinery the only mechanism to maintain 
the uneasy standstill between them.  US military advisers warned 
President Eisenhower that US and South Korean forces were at a serious 
disadvantage in light of the military power of North Korea and its 
allies.  This volume focuses on the response of the Eisenhower 
Administration to this dangerous situation.

The Administration examined the introduction of modern weapons into the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) as a means of reducing the burden of supporting 
the massive ROK army.  Technically, such modernization violated the 
armistice provisions, but US defense officials maintained that North 
Korean violations justified the ROK and US upgrade.  The Department of 
State reluctantly accepted the necessity of large-scale modernization 
but hoped it could be accomplished unobtrusively.  The US military, 
however, wanted to introduce dual-capable (atomic/conventional) weapons 
into Korea.  As a result, the United States publicly abrogated Article 
13(d) of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which had prohibited the 
introduction of new armaments into Korea.

President Eisenhower, after much discussion, decided to introduce an 
atomic cannon and rockets for the use of US forces, and authorized 
upgrading of the ROK Air Force and two ROK divisions.  In return, ROK 
President Rhee agreed to a reduction of 60,000 soldiers in the ROK army.

Documents in this volume were selected from the central indexed files of 
the Department of State; the decentralized lot files of the Department's 
Executive Secretariat; bureau, office, and division files; and lot files 
retired by the American Embassy in Seoul.  Documents also were selected 
from Presidential and other papers at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library 
in Abilene, Kansas.  Additional files were consulted and documents 
selected from files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.

Volume XXIII, Part 2 (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02363-6; (ISBN 0-16-038253-
X) may be purchased for $26 from the Superintendent of Documents, New 
Orders, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954.  To FAX your orders, 
call (202) 512-2250.  For further information, contact Glenn W. 
LaFantasie, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 
663-1133. 


Geographic Notes

Geographic Notes is published quarterly by the US Department of State, 
Office of the Geographer.  It contains official information on changes 
in foreign geographic names and international boundary designations.  It 
also offers analyses, maps, and other graphics that provide a geographic 
perspective on such foreign policy-related topics as boundary and 
sovereignty disputes, maritime issues, international migration and 
refugee flows, transnational environmental problems, and issues 
concerning political and economic geography.

The recently released issue for Winter 1992-93 (Vol. 2, No. 4) includes 
articles that range from an exploration of Baltic state energy 
prospects, to analyses of trade and investment developments in China and 
Japan, to a look at employment trends in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.  A highlight of this issue is a centerfold 
map depicting the administrative divisions of Russia.

Published for the first time is a historical analysis on the UN mission 
in the Congo (1960-64).  Also printed is the third in a series of four 
articles on population and territorial issues along Russia's periphery.

Subscriptions and copies of individual issues are available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954.  
Subscription prices are $8.00 per year (four issues) for domestic orders 
and $10.00 per year, foreign.  Single-issue prices are $3.25 domestic 
and $4.06 foreign.  You can FAX your order by using credit card 
(MasterCard or VISA) or GPO Deposit Account number to (202) 512-2233.

Information related to publication content should be directed to:  
Editor, Geographic Notes, Office of the Geographer, US Department of 
State, Washington, DC 20520-6510.   (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 17

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