US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 16, APRIL 19, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS


ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
1.  US Support of UN Efforts In Bosnia-Herzegovina -- President Clinton
2.  US Assistance for Victims Of Violence in the Former Yugoslavia
3.  Humanitarian Assessment Team Reports on Bosnia-Herzegovin-- 
Department Statement, Executive Summary  
4.  Seventh Report on War Crimes  In the Former Yugoslavia
5.  Extension of Fast-Track Procedures For Uruguay Round Implementing 
Bill
6.  Peace-Keeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa -- Herman J. Cohen
7.  Assassination of South African Leader
8.  Focus on East Asia and the Pacific
9.  Treaty Actions 
 (###)



ARTICLE 1:

US Support of UN Efforts In Bosnia-Herzegovina
President Clinton

Text of letter sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, dated April 13, 1993, and 
released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary on April 14, 
1993.

Dear Mr. Speaker:
(Dear Mr. President:)

As part of my continuing effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I 
am providing this report, consistent with section 4 of the War Powers 
Resolution, to advise you of actions that I have ordered in support of 
the United Nations efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Beginning with U.N. Security Council Resolution 713 of September 25, 
1991 [Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 39, p. 724 or Dispatch Supplement Vol. 3, No. 
7, p. 34], the United Nations has been actively addressing the crisis in 
the former Yugoslavia.  The Security Council acted in Resolution 781 
[Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 42, p. 777] to establish a ban on all unauthorized 
military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina.  There have, however, been 
blatant violations of the ban, and villages in Bosnia have been bombed.

In response to these violations, the Security Council decided, in 
Resolution 816 of March 31, 1993 [Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 14, p. 201], to 
extend the ban to all unauthorized flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
to authorize Member States, acting nationally or through regional 
organizations, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance.  
NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to provide NATO air 
enforcement for the no-fly zone.  The U.N. Secretary General was 
notified of NATO's decision to proceed with Operation DENY FLIGHT, and 
an activation order was delivered to participating allies.

The United States actively supported these decisions.  At my direction, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent an execute order to all U.S. forces 
participating in the NATO force, for the conduct of phased air 
operations to prevent flights not authorized by the United Nations over 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The U.S. forces initially assigned to this 
operation consist of 13 F-15 and 12 F-18A fighter aircraft and 
supporting tanker aircraft.  These aircraft commenced enforcement 
operations at 8:00 a.m. e.d.t. [eastern daylight time] on April 12, 
1993.  The fighter aircraft are equipped for combat to accomplish their 
mission and for self-defense.

NATO has positioned forces and has established combat air patrol (CAP) 
stations within the control of Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft.  
The U.S. CAP aircraft will normally operate from bases in Italy and from 
an aircraft carrier in the Adriatic Sea.  Unauthorized aircraft entering 
or approaching the no-fly zone will be identified, interrogated, 
intercepted, escorted/monitored, and turned away (in that order).  If 
these steps do not result in compliance with the no-fly zone, such 
aircraft may be engaged on the basis of proper authorization by NATO 
military authorities and in accordance with the approved rules of 
engagement, although we do not expect such action will be necessary.  
The Commander of UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force currently 
operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina) was consulted to ensure that his 
concerns for his force were fully considered before the rules of 
engagement were approved.

It is not possible to predict at this time how long such operations will 
be necessary.  I have directed U.S. armed forces to participate in these 
operations pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in 
Chief.  I am grateful for the continuing support that the Congress has 
given to this effort, and I look forward to continued cooperation as we 
move forward toward attainment of our goals in this region.

Sincerely,
William J. Clinton (###)



ARTICLE 2:


US Assistance for Victims of Violence in the Former Yugoslavia
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, April 
13, 1993.

The US Government will provide $6.75 million to assist victims of 
violence, rape, and torture in the former Yugoslavia through programs 
funded by the Bureau for Refugee Programs and the US Agency for 
International Development [USAID].

The war in the former Yugoslavia has witnessed the systematic 
application of violence and abuse on a scale unparalleled in Europe 
since World War II.  Killing, torture, rape, and other forms of extreme 
violence have been widespread.  Special counseling and assistance is 
urgently needed for the victims of rape and other forms of trauma.

An initial contribution of $1.5 million is being made this week by the 
Bureau for Refugee Programs to the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in support of its social welfare 
program for victims of abuse, rape, and torture among the refugees and 
displaced persons in Croatia and Slovenia.  The program will place 
special emphasis on women and children.  IFRC does not have a program in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina at this time but is looking into the possibility of 
setting up a program there.

The US Agency for International Development will provide over $5 million 
to fund other projects to assist victims of atrocities in the former 
Yugoslavia.  The core programs will be located in Croatia, where it is 
possible to help victims beyond their mere survival needs.  At the same 
time, assistance will be provided to victims in Bosnia when and where 
outreach is possible from bases in Croatia.  USAID's assistance will 
fund the following projects:

--  A tracing program to reunify abandoned and displaced children, the 
elderly, and their families;

--  An umbrella grant to a qualified American private voluntary agency 
to assist local organizations, including women's groups, community 
organizations, and other groups which will provide counseling, support, 
and services to the victims of rape and violence;

--  A project to train and upgrade the skills of medical professionals 
and community workers who are treating trauma victims.  This project 
would utilize existing health care professionals in conjunction with 
American experts in this area;

--  Three hospital partnerships centered around the treatment of 
physical and mental trauma.  These partnerships would link American 
hospitals and providers of trauma services with counterpart institutions 
in Croatia and would transfer American technology, help provide care, 
and offer technical assistance in health care management; and

--  $1.5 million in emergency medical supplies targeted toward the 
treatment of physical and mental trauma will be delivered through 
Project Hope in the coming weeks. (###)



ARTICLE 3:

Humanitarian Assessment Team Reports on Bosnia-Herzegovina
Department Statement, Executive Summary

Department Statement
April 15, 1993
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, April 
15, 1993.

Attached is the executive summary of the report of the interagency 
humanitarian assessment team which traveled to Bosnia-Herzegovina last 
month.  The executive summary is a six-page document presenting issues 
which the team identified as key as they prepared their draft 
comprehensive report.  We are following up on all the ideas presented in 
the report.

Many of the humanitarian actions identified by the assessment team, 
including some which fell even below the threshold for mention in the 
overall report, are within the means of appropriate agencies to pursue 
without reference to senior levels of the Administration.  These are 
already in various stages of follow-up or actual implementation.

As noted in the report, some of the recommendations had broader 
implications for policy and, therefore, required a wider and higher 
level review.  That review continues.  We are evaluating them in the 
context of our overall efforts to bring about a settlement as well as 
provide relief.  On February 10, the Secretary promised "quite 
determined" steps to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies.  We 
have flown airdrops now for 44 days and delivered over 1,800 tons of 
food and medical supplies to those in need in eastern Bosnia.  The UN 
has continued its efforts, despite the fighting and the security risks, 
in getting aid convoys into eastern and other parts of Bosnia.

The US will continue to be at the forefront of efforts to stop the 
fighting, to bring Bosnian Serbs to a negotiated solution, and to care 
for the many innocent people who are suffering because of the fighting.


Executive Summary
Report of the Humanitarian Assessment Team on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
February 24-March 10, 1993, released April 15, 1993.

Introduction
International humanitarian relief efforts and an unusually mild Balkan 
winter are the two primary factors which combined to avert the 
predicted, much larger losses of life in war-ravaged Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
As the Bosnian-Herzegovinian economy continued its decline, dependence 
upon international relief for survival is mounting rapidly.  The Bosnian 
Muslims are the overwhelming victims of the current war.

This report concentrates on identifying ways in which the US Government 
can both augment and improve its own relief effort and contribute to 
enhancing the major, ongoing international programs.  However, it also 
reconfirms the limits imposed on humanitarian relief which must be 
conducted in a war environment, especially one focused on civilian 
populations.  In such an environment, there are no magic formulas to 
perfect the international relief effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

NOTE:  Although these recommendations are addressed to US policy- makers 
and agencies, the humanitarian assessment team believes they must, if 
adopted, be carried out in conjunction with the UN, other donor nations, 
and the private relief community.

Findings
1.  Political/military:

a.  The major cause of human suffering and loss of life in Bosnia-
Herzegovina remains the war and attendant issues of:

--  Security for both impacted populations and deliverers of relief when 
civilian populations are the specific targets of the war; and

--  Lack of access to large elements of impacted populations.

b.  Despite Serbian and Bosnian Serb protestations that Bosnian Serb 
military commanders in isolated areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina are acting 
independently when harassing relief workers or constricting the delivery 
of relief supplies, it is apparent that Belgrade and Pale are doing 
little to change the situation on the ground.

c.  The team found evidence that Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) are 
increasing pressure on relief convoys and on Muslim civilians in areas 
under their control and areas designated as Croatian-controlled under 
the Vance-Owen plan (e.g., Jablanica).  HVO is vulnerable to Croatian 
Government pressure and influence.

d.  The deployment of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force for Yugoslavia] 
troops, despite continued attacks, has had a calming, facilitative 
effect on many parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Although UNPROFOR units in 
Bosnia are not configured to aggressively enforce delivery of 
humanitarian aid, they have facilitated passage of convoys through 
checkpoints, established mail transfers, arranged prisoner and body 
exchanges, and assisted hospitals and other inter-communal facilities.  
The absence of either a permanent troop presence in or at least a 
liaison representation immediately adjacent to contested areas may 
constitute a lost opportunity to reduce tensions and assist the relief 
effort.

e.  Acceptance and implementation of the Vance-Owen plan, particularly 
if marked by relative peace and the end of fighting, may lead to 
spontaneous large-scale population transfers, especially by Muslims to 
Muslim-controlled areas, creating major humanitarian assistance issues.

f.  The forced termination of the UNPROFOR presence in Croatia and any 
resumption of Serb-Croat fighting there would have an immediate, major, 
and disruptive impact on relief efforts throughout the region, including 
Serbia, Croatia, and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Refugees and 
displaced persons, as well as other vulnerable groups, in all republics 
would be seriously and adversely affected.

2.  Although they deliver only a portion of needed supplies, both the 
Sarajevo airlift and eastern Bosnia airdrop operations are very 
important--supplementing food and medical deliveries and serving as 
sources of hope to innocent victims of the Bosnian catastrophe.

3.  The town and region around Tuzla in north central Bosnia risks being 
swamped with further major refugee flows if additional besieged enclaves 
of eastern Bosnia fall.  Further, the central role of Tuzla in coal and 
electrical energy production for much of Bosnia-Herzegovina makes it 
strategic in preventing the collapse of what remains of the Bosnian-
Herzegovinian economy and further deterioration of the already 
disastrous electricity and water delivery systems in, for instance, 
Sarajevo.  Marginal to impassable road conditions on the southern route 
from Croatia now through the spring thaw (while good roads exist, they 
are blocked by warring parties), and uncertainties of access over 
northern routes from Serbia lead to pessimistic projections for 
resupplying Tuzla, even at current population levels.  The Tuzla 
airport--in terms of physical condition and cooperative attitude of 
responsible Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities--was studied by a qualified 
specialist seconded to the team and was found to be in condition to be 
made at least minimally operational now.

4.  There are major weaknesses in medical and public health services 
available to the population at present, which vary from region to region 
and are susceptible to varying degrees of correction depending upon the 
issues of security and access noted above.  Key areas of need are 
delivery of acute care, monitoring, and public health interventions, and 
there is the potential for severely worsening conditions.  (The 
physicians from the CDC [US Centers for Disease Control] and other 
agencies who joined this assessment team have prepared a detailed 
description of medical care needs.)

5.  There exist a range of problems in the areas of food and nutrition 
for large parts of the resident and refugee populations in and around 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.

--  With the planting season at hand, there is an urgent need to provide 
a proper mix of seeds to those populations and areas in Bosnia-
Herzegovina which might be in a position to grow some of their own food 
requirements during the 1993 season.  Agriculture in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which satisfied only a fraction of domestic needs prior to the war, has 
ground to a virtual standstill.

--  Close attention is needed to ensure continued support of the food 
pipeline in the immediate and medium-term future, as the number of 
beneficiaries grows in the wake of economic collapse and as currently 
important private contributions decline.

6.  Logistics/relief delivery systems/public affairs and community 
relations:

a.  Although both UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] and UNPROFOR 
staffs are dedicated to fulfilling their shared missions in leading the 
international assistance effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina, short staffing, 
operational pressures, non-collocated headquarters, communications 
difficulties, and formidable logistical obstacles conspire to create 
relief delivery coordination problems in most of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
Coordination with NGOs [non-governmental organizations] is particularly 
difficult.

b.  There is a current dearth of information available to the people of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding their own situation, as well as the 
evolution of international political developments and relief efforts on 
their behalf.  A radio broadcasting facility capable of covering the 
country via short/medium wave and distribution of program materials to 
local stations could have a significant impact.  A similar print media 
capacity could also be of great importance in supporting the morale of 
the population and in fostering positive relations between the people 
and key elements of the relief community.

c.  UNPROFOR perceives significant opportunities for improving community 
relations at the local level, but has extremely limited civil affairs 
expertise available to be drawn upon from current UNPROFOR contributing 
countries.

7.  Economic rehabilitation:  Beyond immediate relief needs, 
rehabilitation of critical economic sectors in Bosnia-Herzegovina--
especially power generation/transmission and agriculture--would greatly 
relieve suffering and improve prospects for moving beyond relief 
dependency in the mid-term.

8.  Reliable data both on precise dimensions of specific needs and on 
the degree to which such needs are being met by existing relief efforts 
remains elusive, although there has been marginal improvement in 
information collection systems over recent months.

Recommendations
1.  Political/military:

a.  While actual recommendations on how to deal with the war itself go 
beyond the mandate of this team, the team notes some elements within the 
range of broader policy options which could have a beneficial impact in 
humanitarian terms:

--  The declaration and enforcement of safe havens for specifically 
identified beneficiary communities or populations;

--  A militarily robust system for delivery of relief supplies to such 
communities and populations, even in the absence of enforced safe 
havens; or

--  Application of robust military and/or renewed diplomatic means to 
silence heavy weapons systems which inflict a major portion of physical 
casualties and psychological trauma on civilian populations.

b.  The US Government should convey to Serb and Bosnian Serb leaders, in 
the strongest possible terms, that the US holds directly responsible for 
deaths and human suffering both the leaderships and those local 
commanders in Bosnia-Herzegovina whose actions block humanitarian aid 
deliveries.  Punitive measures must be developed (e.g., in the context 
of negotiations or confidence-building measures) for obstruction of 
relief efforts.

c.  To counter impact of HVO obstructions to Muslim relief:

--  The US Government should insist that the Government of Croatia 
intervene with the HVO to cease its harassment of Muslim civilians and 
relief operations.

--  The US Government should support the cost of additional employment 
of expatriate drivers and trucking necessary to transport relief 
materials through central Bosnian checkpoints manned by opposing 
factions.

d.  Beneficial effect of UN military presence:

--  The US Government should prompt discussion within the UN of creative 
mechanisms for establishing a small military presence, such as a[n] 
UNPROFOR liaison team, in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina enclave regions 
away from the front lines but in a position to facilitate relief and 
reconciliation initiatives or openings among the factions.

--  UNPROFOR deployment to Banja Luka should be restudied.

2.  Sarajevo airlift and eastern Bosnia airdrop operations:

--  Both operations should be continued at this time;

--  Department of Defense officials should consult with USAID [US Agency 
for International Development], USDA [US Department of Agriculture], and 
CDC experts on evolving composition of deliveries in both operations to 
maximize the benefits for target populations.

3.  Tuzla airport:

--  The US Government should review urgently options for participating 
in and actively supporting UN actions to open Tuzla airport in the very 
near future for delivery of food and critical coal/energy production-
related materials.

--  Short of a reopening,  Tuzla airport should be given active 
consideration as a site for contingency airlift operations or airdrops 
of key commodities.

4.  Medical and public health:

--  The US Government (USAID/Department of Defense) should provide 
personnel and equipment in leading a major upgrading of medical care and 
preventive public health capabilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Short of 
stopping military attacks on civilian populations, these steps will save 
the greatest number of innocent lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  (See Annex 
I [of complete report].)

5.  Food and nutrition:

--  The US Government (USAID/USDA/Department of Defense) should both 
identify the nutritionally appropriate mix of such seed and help cover 
costs of procurement and delivery of an appropriate portion of it, 
including by airdrop, beginning immediately.  In view of the United 
States' comparative disadvantage in providing bulk commodities from the 
United States and    of obstacles to broader-scale agricultural 
activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina at present, the US effort should 
concentrate on relief of the individual through support of a "victory 
gardens" program.

--  Planning for a surge of refugees into Tuzla and other Muslim-
controlled areas, including either pre-positioning of food and medical 
supplies or the capacity to respond to such a surge, is necessary in 
consultation with other donors.  (Finding 2.d.)

6.  Logistics/relief delivery systems/public affairs and community 
relations:

a.  Multiple, linked coordination centers dealing with the UNHCR and NGO 
convoys, escorts, traffic control, etc., should be created.  The US 
Government (Department of Defense/USAID) should offer coordination and 
other support personnel to UNHCR and UNPROFOR, as well as communications 
and related equipment, identified in close consultations with UNHCR and 
UNPROFOR.

b.  The US Government should identify civilian and military media assets 
to be put at the disposal of UNPROFOR, for example, to conduct an 
intensive, ongoing public information program.

--  Alternatively, if a broader information system is created for 
keeping the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina more aware of international 
efforts which affect them, ways should be found to use program content 
in support of UN agencies' roles and activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

c.  The US Government should provide appropriately trained military 
personnel with concomitant resources to augment the fledgling UNPROFOR 
civil affairs effort aimed at improving its relations with the Bosnian-
Herzegovinian populace, which poorly understands its limited, aid-
related mission.   This would not entail a formal US role in UNPROFOR, 
but the provision of a limited number of G-5 specialists to augment and 
train UNPROFOR G-5 staff.  A possible model effort might be with 
UNPROFOR in Sarajevo.

7.  A combined civilian-military task force on power supplies in Bosnia-
Herzegovina should be established to collaborate with Bosnian-
Herzegovinian officials to enhance coal production, undertake power 
plant repairs and other programs possible in the current hostilities.

Funding Implications
There are few unexpended or non-earmarked funds available to the State, 
USAID, and Defense offices which normally bear the cost of humanitarian 
assistance programs.  To the extent that options presented in this 
summary or in the full report require significant additional funding, 
the team will forward recommendations for reprogramming or for 
requesting a supplemental appropriation. (###)



ARTICLE 4:

Seventh Report on War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia
Following is the text of the Supplemental United States Submission of 
Information to The United Nations Security Council in Accordance With 
Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 
(1992), dated April 12, 1993.

Editor's Note:  This report contains graphic descriptions.

This is the seventh submission by the US Government of information 
pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) 
relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia.  As in our previous reports, we have focused on grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with Resolution 
771, have provided information that is "substantiated," that is, which 
rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or that 
includes detail sufficient for corroboration.

 As with previous reports, we have tried to ensure that our collection 
effort has been even-handed and aimed at gathering information on crimes 
committed by all parties to the conflict.  It should be noted, however, 
that access to independent sources within the territory of the Republics 
of Serbia and Montenegro has proved very difficult, due to limitations 
imposed by authorities in those areas.

 We have tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other 
countries and non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit 
reports pursuant to Resolutions 771 and 780.  The United States has 
further information substantiating the incidents included in this 
report, which we will make available on a confidential basis directly to 
the Commission of Experts, established under Security Council Resolution 
780.

In accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution 780, the United States 
intends to continue providing reports as additional relevant information 
comes into our possession.  As in our previous reports, the notations at 
the end of each of the items indicate the source from which the 
information was drawn.

Former Yugoslavia:  Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
Seventh Submission

Willful Killing

Jun-Sep 92:  A 32-year-old Muslim had fled with some other men into the 
woods around his village of Cara-kovo in early May 1992.  On June 22, 
after nearly 2 months of hiding, Serbian soldiers captured him, the 6 
men with whom he had been hiding, and another 22 men from the village.

An estimated 40 Serb soldiers wearing JNA [Yugoslav National Army] 
uniforms marched the men along the road to a spot called Poljski Put 
near the Sidrov Kavana (Anchor Cafe), where they ordered the men to sit 
on the ground.  The Serb soldiers then threw two pictures of Tito onto 
the ground in front of the men and told some of them to tear up the 
pictures and eat them.

After this, the Serbs began to take the men one by one off to the side 
to beat them.  The witness saw them carve orthodox crosses into the 
chests of some of the men.  After each prisoner was beaten, he was taken 
into a nearby shed and shot.  The beatings and killings lasted about 2 
hours, during which time the group's commander was in a nearby yard and 
did nothing to stop the violence.

As the soldiers tried to carve a cross into the 20th man in the group, 
the prisoner struggled free--his head covered with blood and one eyeball 
hanging from its socket.  A soldier then shot the man in the head and 
nearly shot one of his comrades in the process.  At this point, the 
commander ordered the soldiers to stop the killings before they killed 
one of their own.  Thus, nine men, including the witness, survived.

The nine survivors were loaded onto a bus for Keraterm camp.  As the bus 
drove off, the witness saw the shed that held the corpses of the 20 dead 
men engulfed in flames.

This witness was in Room Three at Keraterm on the night of July 24, 
1992, when Serbian guards opened fire on the room with machine guns.  He 
said that 157 men were killed, and 57 wounded.

On September 3, 1992, the witness was transferred with about 1,000 other 
prisoners to Trnopolje camp, where he said security was lax, and 
prisoners were allowed out of the camp to find food.  After 19 days at 
Trnopolje, the witness escaped.  (Department of State)

Summer 92:  According to Muslim witnesses, Muslims conducted revenge 
killings in Gorazde during the summer of 1992, executing innocent Serbs 
summarily and destroying whole districts where Serbs had congregated.  
Gorazde city officials confirmed that there had been no trials.  (The 
New York Times)

Jul 92:  A 57-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the ethnic cleansing of 
Prijedor in late July 1992.

The Serbs in Prijedor killed large numbers of Muslims in the Muslim 
section located in the city center.  The witness saw them massacre 18 
Muslim men at the home of Mustafa Ceric, who was one of the victims.  
JNA soldiers cut off two fingers (the little finger and the ring finger) 
of each man's hand "so they could make the sign of the cross."  They 
then cut off the men's noses and ears, and finally cut their throats.

The bodies of these 18 men were put on a truck together with 40 or 50 
bodies of other men killed in Partizanska Ulica and were buried in the 
old coal mines at Tomasica, south of Prijedor.  (Department of State)

Jul 92:  A 40-year-old Muslim woman witnessed the killing of Foca 
Muslims in early July 1992.

One night at 9 pm, the witness saw Serbs leading a group of seven people 
up to the "Tito" sign on a hill overlooking Foca.  She said [that] the 
group was driven up the hill in a yellow mini-van.  The group included 
Nezir Hatibovic, a dentist, and his wife, Majda.  She saw the Serbs make 
the group strip, take their money and identification cards, and murder 
them with knives.  The bodies were thrown into the Drina River.

During the next 4 to 5 days, the witness saw the same yellow mini-van 
bringing people to the same site where they were slaughtered in the same 
fashion.  She saw some bodies thrown in the Drina, and others thrown 
into trucks that were driven away.

The witness said the van came from the direction of the men's prison at 
the KP Dom and she suspected [that] the victims were prisoners from that 
camp.  She believes there is a mass grave under the "Tito" sign, and two 
or three mass graves near the outdoor stadium in Foca.  (Department of 
State)

3 Jul 92:   A middle-aged Muslim woman described the attack on her 
village of Trosan, near Foca.

Local Serbs had surrounded Trosan from April 8 to July 3, 1992, 
prohibiting Muslims from entering or leaving.  Every night, the 
villagers slept in the woods out of fear of being attacked.  They 
returned by day for food.

On July 3, an 80-member band of local Serbs attacked the sleeping 
villagers in the woods.  The band called themselves White Eagles and had 
White Eagle emblems on the shoulders of their camouflage uniforms.  
Their leader was a man from a neighboring village and known to the 
witness.

The band started the attack by opening fire on the group, immediately 
killing Edhem Barlov, Selman Kobilar, Esad Calovo, Selima Pekaz, and 
Faila Odobasic.  At least four others were wounded and a woman was 
beaten until she fainted.  Everyone was treated roughly.  Eventually 
another local Serb approached the group and told them to leave the 
villagers alone.

The villagers were then separated--men in one group, women in another.  
When the approximately 35 women and children were led away about 20 
meters, the Serbs opened automatic weapons fire on the men.  The women 
and children, who were not allowed to bury the dead or see who was 
killed, were led around Trosan through the woods and observed the 
burning of all 30 homes in the village.  (Department of State)

Jun-Jul 92:  A 55-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Brcko stated that Serbian 
forces "stormed" into the suburb of Novo Brcko.  Chetniks, including 
White Eagle forces, shot rifles into the windows of residences and drove 
people into the street.  All residents were put into six trucks, which 
made about three trips to ferry the people to an area where three 
schools were co-located.

The residents of Novo Brcko were gathered onto the combined athletic 
fields of the schools.  With megaphones, the captors directed Serbs to 
one part of the field, Croats to another, and Muslims to yet another.  
Members of mixed marriages and children were not permitted to remain 
together.  Along with a group of males aged 13 and older, the witness 
was among the first prisoners taken to Luka camp, where he was forced to 
sign documents "selling" his property in Novo Brcko at a low price to a 
Serb whom he identified.

During his first days at the camp, the captors called out names of 
prisoners from electoral rolls.  All those who were members of the SDA 
(a Bosnian, primarily Muslim, political party) or who had held positions 
of leadership in business or industry were killed.  Shootings often 
occurred at 4 am.  The witness estimates that, during his first week at 
Luka, more than 2,000 men were killed and thrown into the Sava River.  
(See section that includes mass graves.)

After 4 days of mass shootings, there was a lull.  From the fifth day, 
prisoners who were ethnic Serbs and were accused of being disloyal to 
the Chetnik cause were taken for interrogation and beatings.

The witness was interrogated on the seventh day of his captivity.  This 
was the stage when detainees with property or money were subjected to 
questioning and torture.  The witness, who was affluent, would not 
describe his own beating.  By this point, all prisoners known to have 
been politically active had already been killed.

Following his second week in the Luka facility, the witness saw guards 
torture or kill Serbs who had hidden or helped Muslims.  The camp 
commander designated a Bosnian Serb who had been a waiter at a Brcko 
hotel to seek out specific ethnic Serb prisoners for interrogation 
because he knew most of the Brcko area residents by name.

After the witness had been interrogated, he was taken with other 
prisoners to Hangar Two of the loading dock, where they were forced to 
look at a pile of more than 200 corpses or torsos.  Most of the body 
parts had been chopped off:  hands, arms, and genitals.  The prisoners 
standing outside Hangar Two were told [that] they would end up like that 
if they told lies while being interrogated.

When the 13-year-old son of Rasko Kartal tried to protect his father 
from the sight, one of the Chetniks hit the boy with the butt of a gun, 
shattering his face.  The guard killed the father with three shots when 
Rasko went after the guard for crushing the boy's face.

Looking out the window during one of his interrogations, the witness saw 
the soldiers gang-rape a woman whom he had known since his school days 
and murder her husband.  A Brcko school teacher among the guards, an 
ethnic Serb, was shot dead for refusing to join in the torture and 
killing of this couple.

The witness identified many of those responsible for the atrocities at 
Luka, including its second camp commander.  This commander, according to 
the witness, showed serious concern over the fact that some guards 
carried out their "duties" with knives.  Most other guards at Luka were 
also visibly afraid of the knife-wielding guards, who were regularly 
seen castrating male prisoners.  (Department of State)

Jun-Jul 92:  A 38-year-old Bosnian Muslim described the beating deaths 
of two men at Omarska camp.

He recalled a Croatian man, under 30 years old, named Petrovic, who had 
come from Ljubija.  The Serbian guards were especially brutal to 
Petrovic and beat him repeatedly in the "White House" over several days.  
After the last such beating, the witness helped take the bloody shirt 
off his back and saw that it was bruised black from waist to neck.  
Petrovic died about 4 am on July 1 or 2.

A man in his twenties, named Avdic, was beaten in the White House 
repeatedly over the same open wounds until the witness could see the 
bone in his upper back where the skin and muscle had been torn away.  
The wounds, oozing blood, had festered so much that other prisoners 
could not bear to sit next to him because of the stench.  About 1 pm on 
August 18 or 19, the Serbian guards took Avdic outside.  The witness 
heard a burst of gun-fire about an hour later.  He never saw Avdic 
again.  (Department of State)

13 Jun 92:  A 22-year-old Bosnian Muslim was part of the June 13, 1992, 
roundup in Mostar of about 200 Bosnian Muslim and Croatian men, women, 
and children by Bosnian Serb forces.  They were taken to Zalik, at the 
northern end of Mostar.

At about 4 pm on that day, the chief of police in Zalik ordered the 
women and children separated from the men, who were marched to the JNA 
Sjevrni Logor military installation located nearby.  After their names 
were registered on a roster, the men were put on three small trucks.  
Between 12 to 15 Serbian irregulars boarded a fourth truck, and the 
four-vehicle convoy departed for Sutine, located several kilometers 
north of Zalik.

Upon their arrival in Sutine, the prisoners were taken to a building 
that belonged to the cemetery and was adjacent to the Sutine landfill.  
The building was being used as an interrogation and processing center 
for Bosnian Muslim and Croatian prisoners.  Two of the rooms in the 
building were used for interrogation and torture of prisoners.

One by one, the prisoners were led to one of the interrogation rooms, 
where they were beaten and tortured by an inspector and two or three 
guards.  After being indiscriminately beaten and tortured, the prisoners 
were taken outside and executed by either the inspector, with a pistol 
shot to the head, or by the guards, with a burst from their automatic 
rifles.

Over a period of 90 minutes, bodies of executed prisoners were dumped 
into the Sutine landfill at a rate of about one body every 5 minutes.  
The witness, who was wounded and assumed dead, escaped from the landfill 
later at night.  (Department of State)

1 Jun 92:   A 62-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the willful killing 
by ethnic Serb paramilitary forces of at least 53 men, women, and 
children in the village of Prhovo, Bosnia.

At about 3 pm on May 30, 1992, a large force of ethnic Serb paramilitary 
soldiers and three armored personnel carriers entered Prhovo, a village 
located about 7 kilometers northeast of Kjuc.  The village, which 
contained 45 houses grouped along a main road and several small streets, 
had more than 150 inhabitants.

The soldiers, who wore stocking masks over their faces, went from house 
to house searching for weapons.  After finding some weapons, the 
soldiers proceeded to ransack the homes, break windows and doors, and 
pull the residents out into the streets.  These men, women, and children 
were ordered to fold their hands behind their heads and were herded 
through the village to a point on the road where they were stopped and 
lined up.

Meanwhile, the soldiers attempted to coax back into the village those 
residents who had run into the woods when the soldiers arrived.  The 
soldiers announced through megaphones that the residents would not be 
harmed if they returned.  When these people returned, the soldiers beat 
them severely; about 10 were beaten into unconsciousness.

The assembled villagers were then told that they were free, that they 
need not worry anymore, and that they must place white flags on their 
homes to indicate the village had surrendered.  During the nights of May 
30-31, some people fled to the woods, while others slept in their 
cellars.

At about 6 pm on June 1, the soldiers returned and again used megaphones 
to call people in from the forest.  They also went from house to house, 
pulling people out into the streets.  The male residents were beaten 
severely.  At about 7 pm, the soldiers began murdering the residents 
with automatic weapons.  They fired single shots, then long bursts of 
automatic gunfire.

After the shooting stopped and the soldiers had departed, the witness, 
who had fled to the woods when the shooting started, returned to the 
village.  The murdered men, women, and children   lay in the streets.  
Houses were burning, and their roofs were collapsing.  Some women and 
children who had hidden in basements began coming into the street crying 
and looking for their loved ones.

The following 53 people were killed in the massacre:

 1.  Ekrem HADZIC,  32
 2.  Izet HADZIC, 30
 3.  Suvad HADZIC, 31
 4.  Zijad HADZIC, 30, husband of No. 5
 5.  Riubija HADZIC, 32, wife of No. 4
 6.  Amel HADZIC, 14, son of Nos. 4 and 5
 7.  Amela HADZIC, 9, daughter of Nos. 4 and 5
 8.  Hajro HADZIC, 55
 9.  Hasim HADZIC, 34, son of No. 8
10.  Senad HADZIC, 17, grandson of No. 8
11.  Ilfad BRKOVIC, 45, husband of No. 12
12.  Rasema BRKOVIC, 45, wife of No. 11
13.  Nisveta BRKOVIC, 10 daughter of Nos. 12 and 13
14.  Camil MEDANOVIC, 40
15.  Enes MEDANOVIC,  21
16.  Sulejman MEDANOVIC, 55
17.  Ahmo MEDANOVIC, 59, brother of No. 16
18.  Vahid MEDANOVIC, 60
19.  Suvad MEDANOVIC,  23,  son of No. 18
20.  Safet MEDANOVIC,  32
21.  Nasiha MEDANOVIC, 30
22.  Enesa MEDANOVIC, 20
23.  Fadila MEDANOVIC, 18
24.  Hadzire MEDANOVIC, 65
25.  Indira MEDANOVIC, 7
26.  Hava MEDANOVIC, 30
27.  Arif MEDANOVIC, 70
28.  Sefik MEDANOVIC, 28
29.  Teufik MEDANOVIC, 30
30.  Fatime MEDANOVIC, 55
31.  Midheta MEDANOVIC, 18
32.  Hasan MEDANOVIC, 45
33.  Halil MEDANOVIC, 22, son of No. 32
34.  Mujo MEDANOVIC, 15, son of No. 32
35.  Hilmo  JUSIC
36.  Nedzad JUSIC
37.  Nermin JUSIC
38.  Enisa JUSIC
39.  Azemine JUSIC
40.  Emira JUSIC
41.  Samira JUSIC
42.  Latif JUSIC
43.  Ramiza JUSIC
44.  Osme JUSIC
45.  Isak MESIC
46.  Ismet MESIC
47.  Gane MESIC
48.  Ismeta MESIC
49.  Kamanfie OSMANOVIC
50.  Tehvid OSMANOVIC
51.  Rufad OSMANOVIC
52.  Mehmed DEDIC
53.  Hamdo ISLAMAGIC

Most of the survivors left Prhovo on June 2 to live with friends and 
relatives in nearby villages.  The witness and a few other Muslim men 
buried the dead on June 9.  (Department of State)

May-Jul 92:  An elderly Muslim woman was living with her family on the 
outskirts of the Muslim-controlled area of Gorazde when, in May 1992, 
Uzicki corps from the Serbian town of Uzicka stationed tanks on the 
mountain of Povrsnica, outside Gorazde.

On May 4, the Serbs announced that a Muslim had killed a Serb and, 
according to the witness, used this as a pretext to begin bombing the 
city.  She saw the Serb bombing of the Hotel Drina, which housed 
numerous Muslim female and child refugees from neighboring areas, and 
the victims' bodies strewn over the pavement.

From May 4, local Serbs, who had roamed around town harassing Muslims, 
removed the stockings they had been wearing over their heads to conceal 
their identities.  Thus, the witness was able to identify many of the 
perpetrators of atrocities in Gorazde.

In mid-June, the witness saw Serbian soldiers massacre Muslims in a 
settlement at the foot of the mountain and throw the bodies into the 
Drina River.  On July 19, a Serb soldier came to her house on the 
Povrsnica mountain and killed her daughter.  Local Serbs had already 
taken away her son-in-law on May 26.  (Department of State)

May-Jun 92:  Two Bosnian Muslims witnessed Serbian actions against a 
series of villages from a hill above Prijedor and identified some of the 
men who helped command the attacks and performed executions.

On May 27, 1992, there was a skirmish when a Serbian patrol stumbled 
upon a Muslim checkpoint on the road from Harambine to Ljubija.  Three 
Serbs were killed.  The Serbs then gave an ultimatum for the village of 
Harambine to surrender.  Soon after this, the Sixth Krajina brigade 
attacked Harambine, using three tanks in the fighting.  From Carakovo, 
the two witnesses could see the village of Harambine in flames.  The 
Serb forces then moved on to Kozarac and Biscani.

On June 23, 3 days after the attack on Biscani, the Serbs moved against 
Carakovo.  Radio Prijedor had announced that Muslims should not be 
afraid, that the soldiers were only looking for extremists.  Both 
witnesses were hiding in the village during the attack.  The attack 
began at 8:15 am.  The Serbs first killed two older men by slitting 
their throats.

The witnesses then heard gunfire and afterward saw a pile of 15-20 
bodies in the street.  Seventeen people were forced into a local mosque.  
The soldiers then burned down the mosque with the people inside.

The two witnesses eventually escaped across the border into Croatia.  
(Department of State)

6 May 92:   A 55-year-old Bosnian Muslim was in Kremalusa on May 5, 
1992, when White Eagles surrounded the village and opened fire with 
machine guns and mortars.

The Serbian irregulars continued firing at the village until the after- 
noon of May 6 when they moved into the village and began to search the 
houses and round up the occupants.  They used the witness as a point man 
and human shield when they entered the houses and as a precaution 
against booby traps.

During the searches, the soldiers were looking primarily for gold, 
Western currency, and weapons.  Some residents who were believed to be 
wealthy or who had a family member working in Western Europe were killed 
for not surrendering the gold or foreign currency that they were 
expected to have; the houses, with the bodies inside, were then set on 
fire.

If the occupants were too old to leave the building without assistance, 
no efforts were made to remove them, and the buildings were simply set 
on fire with the elderly occupants still inside.  The witness identified 
the leader and several members of this search party.

Some of the Kremalusa victims were:  Imam Abid Ukara, 80, who was burned 
alive in his daughter's house; Serif Ukara, 66, who was burned alive in 
his own house; Saban Ukara, 40, who was killed and then burned in his 
house; 75- to 80-year-old Hasan Polovina and his daughter, Sida 
Polovina, 40, both killed and then burned in their home; Tija Bojadzija, 
40, who was killed and then burned when his house was set on fire.  
(Department of State)

26 Apr 92:  A 62-year-old Muslim joined other villagers to visit the JNA 
military installation in Pilipovic, a small village outside Foca, for 
protection from the fighting in the surrounding area.

At 1 pm, 50 White Eagles came to the military installation and searched 
all the Muslims for money.  At one point during this search, the witness 
saw the White Eagles select six people from the group and shoot them in 
a field 50 meters away.  Four were killed:  Meho Dedovic, 80; Sarko 
Sahovic, 57; Vahid Frasto, 37; and Munir Termiz, 29.  (Department of 
State)

Torture of Prisoners

May-Dec 92:  A 38-year-old Bosnian Muslim described his torture and 
imprisonment in the Keraterm, Omarska, and Manjaca camps.

After the wave of Serbian attacks began in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina 
in April 1992, the witness fought for about 1 month with the local 
Kozarac Territorial Defense Force in defense of the town.  Serbian 
forces captured him on May 25, 1992, when his small patrol ran into an 
ambush.

The Serbs tied him to a tree and beat him.  He has a deep scar on his 
left arm and another scar on his right thigh caused when a Serb stuck a 
knife into his leg and twisted it.  They also knocked out some of his 
teeth and tried to cut off part of his left index finger.  A group of 
about 50 other Serb irregulars came by and took him to Prijedor prison 
on the evening of May 25.

On May 29, three Serbs who were not guards in Prijedor prison beat him 
and two other Muslim prisoners for at least half an hour with their 
fists and steel pipes.  The witness was bleeding and half-conscious on 
the floor when he heard one of the Serbs tell another not to bother 
hitting him, that he was already dead.  The witness said he could 
identify the three again.

On May 30, other Serbs took the witness to Prijedor hospital and put him 
in a large ward with other Muslim and Croatian patients.  A Serbian 
nurse put him on intravenous treatment, which he believes saved his 
life.

On the morning of June 6 or 7, a Serbian doctor announced that all 
Muslim and Croatian patients, about 100 people, had to leave Prijedor 
hospital immediately.  The Muslim and Croatian medical staff also had to 
leave.  The witness was moved by truck to Keraterm camp where he spent 
about 20 days before being moved on June 26 to Omarska camp.

While at Omarska camp, the witness was beaten on two occasions in the 
White House.  He and other prisoners were moved in late August to 
Manjaca camp, where he said Serbian guards kicked and hit him, but not 
as badly as those at Omarska.  The witness was very grateful to the ICRC 
[International Committee of the Red Cross] for providing the food that 
kept him from starving until his release on December 14.  (Department of 
State)

Aug-Oct 92:  Three Bosnian Muslim men from Bileca--aged 33, 35, and 39--
witnessed the rounding up of the entire male Muslim population of their 
village, placement of these men in detention centers, and the final 
ethnic cleansing of Bileca by local Serbian authorities.

The 35-year-old witness described how 50 men were singled out for 
physical abuse at the detention center in Bilica.  Each night the police 
would enter the camp and conduct "telephone" torture.  This method 
consisted of delivering 40-volt electrical shocks through a telephone 
wire affixed to their fingers.  Each time the phone was dialed, the 
prisoners received massive electrical shocks.

The same witness said that between 9 and 10 pm on September 5, police 
came to the jail claiming to be White Eagles and threatened to kill all 
the inmates.  In response to this threat, the prisoners boarded up the 
iron door to their cell to prevent the White Eagles from entering.

A Serbian guard helped the prisoners by warning them that the White 
Eagles were returning and not to let them in.  The guard then threw the 
key to their cell in the bushes.  For having helped the Muslims, the 
Serbian guard was beaten and held in an isolation cell with four 
Muslims.

The White Eagles shot at the cell and threw tear gas into the windows.  
During the 3-hour siege, six prisoners were wounded by bullets.  The 
White Eagles left shortly after midnight.

The three witnesses provided names of those responsible for much of the 
torture and ethnic cleansing, but all were afraid to release the names 
of Serbians who had helped the Muslims for fear of retribution against 
these Serbs.  The three witnesses were released on October 5.  
(Department of State)

Jun-Sep 92:  A 37-year-old Bosnian Muslim was one of 183 Muslims being 
held at the central prison in Zvornik on June 29, 1992.  All were from 
the surrounding area.  The prisoners were beaten day and night.  Every 2 
to 3 hours, the guards would enter the cells and take a group of five to 
ten prisoners with them for interrogation, during which time they were 
beaten by four to five guards at a time.

The guards would kick the prisoners with boots and beat them with rifle 
butts and ax or shovel handles.  Some of the prisoners taken for 
interrogation did not come back to their cells and were believed to have 
died from beatings.  Every day new prisoners were brought to the Zvornik 
prison, and an equal number of prisoners were taken to the Batkovic 
camp.

Between July 15 and September 23, the ICRC visited Batkovic camp twice.  
One visit was on or about August 15.  Each time, prior to the arrival of 
Red Cross personnel, the guards would take away the beaten prisoners and 
children under the age of 14 and hide them.  The prisoners were taken to 
the town of Raca, where the rivers Sava and Drina join together.  The 
prisoners were brought back after the departure of the Red Cross 
personnel.

After the first visit to the Manjaca camp by the news media, the Serbs 
transferred 700 prisoners from Manjaca to Batkovic.  Between July 15 and 
September 23, the Serbs made at least four or five such transfers.  In 
addition, two similar prisoner transfers were made from Omarska to 
Batkovic.

A prisoner who was transferred from the Luka camp in Brcko to the 
Batkovic camp in early September 1992 stated that while at the Luka camp 
he was assigned to a working party whose daily mission was to destroy 
corpses.  The working party would collect the corpses from a freezer 
located at a meat processing plant and dump them into a meat processing 
machine.  After the corpses were ground up, the working party would load 
the processed corpses into the trucks and dump them into the Sava River.  
(Department of State)

Apr-Aug 92:  A 59-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Foca was at home on April 
27, 1992, when Serbian special forces entered his home and forced him 
and his son to go outside.  The soldiers wore camouflage uniforms and 
black headbands and were complete strangers to him.  He assumes they 
came from Serbia because they spoke in the Ekovski dialect.

The witness, his son, and 18 other men from the neighborhood were taken 
by buses to the local KP Dom, a criminal rehabilitation center near the 
railway bridge on the Drina River.  According to the witness, 560 Muslim 
men, all from the greater Foca area, were interned at KP Dom.  The Serbs 
running the camp kept written records and biographic files on all those 
interned.  Interrogations focused primarily on uncovering which Muslims 
in town had weapons.

Those running the center instilled fear in the Muslim prisoners by 
selecting certain prisoners for beatings.  From his window in Room 13, 
the witness saw prisoners regularly being taken to a building where 
beatings were conducted.  This building was close enough for him to hear 
the screams of those who were being beaten.

The witness said about four men were beaten almost every night between 
midnight and 1 am.  From his window in Room 13, he saw prisoners, 
covered with blood, leaving the building.  The witness remained at KP 
Dom until his release on August 29, 1992.  (Department of State)

Jun-Jul 92:  A 55-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Brcko was a prisoner at 
Luka camp during which time he observed a Serbian woman in her 20s 
(later in this report described under the name of Monika) beat 
"handsome" male prisoners, aged 20 to 30, on the genitals repeatedly and 
for extended periods of time.

The witness said that on Wednesdays and Saturdays, guards raped teen-
aged girls (described later in this report).  Monika and certain other 
guards routinely lined up handsome young men, Croat against Muslim, in 
rows of three or four.  The male prisoners were forced to perform sodomy 
on one another while being taunted by laughing guards.

According to the witness, the younger handsome males at Luka suffered 
the most horrific abuses by far of any group of prisoners.  (Department 
of State)

18 Apr 92:  A 43-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Foca was in Sokuvac on 
April 18, 1992, when she witnessed Serbs set[ting] fire to all the homes 
500 meters below her mother's home.

The witness was arrested at the same time by these men who shouted at 
her, "Do you know who we are?  We are Chetniks!"  They wore stockings 
over their faces to conceal their identity.

The soldiers brought the witness to KP Dom, a detention facility, to be 
interrogated.  Following the interrogation, she was beaten with a rifle 
butt and bled from her ears and mouth.  She then was thrown into a cell 
where she was the only woman.  A half hour later, a Muslim man, who had 
been wounded by a bullet and beaten on the head, was thrown into the 
same cell.

Two other prisoners came into the cell; one was vomiting blood, the 
other barely recognizable because of his beating.  The witness said that 
guards threatened to cut her up and throw her into the Drina River.  She 
was also forced to hand over her wedding ring when a Serb fighter 
threatened to cut off her finger.  The witness eventually was released 
and put on a convoy out of Bosnia.  (Department of State)

Abuse of Civilians In Detention Centers

Jul-Aug 92:  A 40-year-old Muslim woman was at home on July 14, 1992, in 
Foca when 26 Serbian soldiers--claiming to be Seseljovci from Trebinje--
came to her door.  She said that she did not know most of the soldiers 
because their accents were not local, but that two Foca Serbs had led 
them to the Muslim homes.

The soldiers hit the witness on the head twice with a police truncheon, 
asked for her husband, and ordered her to go outside.  They sliced the 
neck of a 16-year-old boy with a rusty knife while asking for his 
father; the boy was not seriously injured.  Then they ordered the 
Muslims to kiss an Orthodox cross, which they all did.

After separating the men from the women and children, they took the 
latter group to the police station.  As the group was leaving, the 
soldiers burned the Muslim houses.  The women and children were 
separated into four groups at the police station and taken to separate 
houses confiscated from Muslim owners.  The witness was placed with a 
group of 28 women.  One of the soldiers told her that women, children, 
and old people were being taken to these homes because they were "not 
worth a bullet."  They were kept in this house for 27 days.

Day and night, soldiers came to the house taking two to three women at a 
time.  There were four to five guards at all times, all local Foca 
Serbs.  The women knew the rapes would begin when Mars Na Drinu was 
played over the loudspeaker of the main mosque.  (Mars Na Drinu, or 
March on the Drina, is reportedly a former Chetnik fighting song that 
was banned during the Tito years.)

While Mars Na Drinu was playing, the women were ordered to strip and 
soldiers entered the homes, taking away the ones they wanted.  The ages 
of women taken ranged from 12 to 60.  Frequently the soldiers would seek 
out mother and daughter combinations.  Many of the women were severely 
beaten during the rapes.

The witness was selected twice.  The first time, soldiers had entered 
and grabbed an 18-year-old girl, asking her if she were a virgin.  She 
said she was.  Licking his knife, one of the soldiers said that if they 
found she was not, he would butcher her.  The witness pleaded with them 
not [to] take the girl but to take her instead.  "We'll take you too," 
they said.

While the witness was being raped, her rapist told her, "You should have 
already left this town.  We'll make you have Serbian babies who will be 
Christians."  Two soldiers raped her at that time; five soldiers raped 
the 18-year-old girl in full view of the witness.

The next time the witness was raped, her rapists showed her that they 
had had themselves circumcised so as not to "disgust" the women.  She 
said she knew of four local Serbs who had had themselves circumcised for 
the rapes.  She said at least 12 other women could testify to this.

The witness also said she was forced to drink alcohol and eat pork at 
the rape house.  Many women threw up and then were beaten for getting 
sick.  Some women from her house were taken to a hotel near Tjentiste 
and raped there.  The women were permitted to leave on August 18, 1992, 
on a convoy evacuating Muslims from Foca.  (Department of State)

Jul-Aug 92:  A middle-aged Muslim woman described the abuse of women 
following the attack on her village of Trosan, near Foca, on  July 3, 
1992.

An 80-member band of local Serbs had attacked Trosan and taken about 35 
women and children to Buk Bijelo, a construction site  for a dam, where 
they were kept for 3 to 4 hours in a workers' barracks.  All the women's 
gold was confiscated.  The band of Serbs started raping the women in a 
separate room of the barracks.

One woman was raped by 24 different soldiers before she was led away.  
The witness knows of no one who has heard from her since that time.  Two 
16-year-old girls were taken to the other room and could not stand up 
when they were brought back.  The witness identified the men who 
participated in the rapes; another witness identified the chief of 
police, who reportedly had signed a document ordering the rapes.

A 28-year-old woman was taken by Serbian soldiers around midnight on 
August 12 to the outdoor sports stadium in Foca.  There she was raped by 
28 soldiers before losing consciousness.  In addition, the soldiers 
burned her body with cigarettes and cigarette lighters.

The group was then taken to Foca high school where they spent 8 days.  
Every night, three to five women were taken away and often returned 
severely beaten.  They were then taken by truck to the Partizan sport 
center in the middle of downtown Foca for 40 days.  The women and 
children were not allowed to change their clothes and were fed only some 
bread at night.

This group from Trosan was the first group to be interned at Partizan, 
but more came later, eventually totaling 74 detainees.  In addition to 
women and children, there were five elderly men.  During her time at 
Partizan, the witness said that "soldiers" entered day and night to lead 
away young women.  One 24-year-old woman was raped in front of the 
entire group of detainees.  (Department of State)

Jun-Jul 92:  A 55-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Brcko was a prisoner at 
Luka camp during which time he saw teenaged girls being brought, eight 
to ten at a time, into the camp commander's office building on 
Wednesdays and Saturdays, between about 2 and 6 pm.  The teenagers came 
only those 2 days of the week.

Monika, a Serbian woman in her early 20s, would say "We've brought 
them."  The camp commander would take his time selecting a girl, who 
would then be escorted upstairs.  Once the commander had made his 
choice, three or four guards would select another girl, and so on.  Only 
the commander had a girl to himself.

The witness identified Monika as the well-known daughter of Brcko's 
leading prostitute.  She bragged about her job of going around town to 
"buy and prepare" the girls, and she was assisted by three men who 
participated in the "delivery service," as well as serving as "police" 
at Luka prison.  The witness identified all of the aforementioned people 
and provided names of girls known to be dead and presumed to have died 
from being gang-raped at Luka camp.

Monika brought a nurse to Luka to "prepare the girls and make them 
calm."  The girls apparently had no idea what was going to happen to 
them, because they were only slightly frightened.  The witness implied 
that the nurse was coerced into "treating" the girls.  The witness 
observed Monika beating young men on the genitals repeatedly and for 
extended periods of time.

The nurse, also a fellow refugee, said that Monika had stabbed one girl, 
who had resisted being sent to the soldiers, on the breast and in the 
vagina with the broken neck of a glass bottle; the girl bled to death.  
The nurse personally witnessed this incident.  (Department of State)

18 Apr 92:  A 37-year-old Serbian woman described her rape by Croatian 
soldiers following the shelling of her village near Odzak in Bosnia.

The Croats came for me at 12:30 am on June 5.   They broke down the door 
of the house and picked me out, made me walk some 20 meters away and 
said 'Now you're going to tell us where the Chetniks are.'  There were 
15 of them, I knew them all, they were neighbors.  They call themselves 
the Fire Horses Brigade.

The witness was brought to a place in Posavska Mahala where she was 
raped by at least seven men before she passed out.

One man ripped my clothes off and raped me; he didn't spare my mouth or 
my anus.  He put a gun in my mouth and threatened to kill me.  At 5:30 
in the morning, he let me go, kicking me from behind and telling me to 
walk home.  I was naked.  My 9-year-old niece was raped.  They were our 
neighbors, the ones who raped us.

My family is embarrassed to see me on TV, but I have to do it.  
Everything we owned was burned.  We have nothing now.  

(The New York Review of Books)

Impeding Delivery of Food and Medical Supplies to the Civilian 
Population

31 Mar 93:  Bosnian Serbs blocked a UN humanitarian aid convoy at Mali 
Zvornik as it was trying to move food, plastic sheeting, and tents to 
Srebrenica.  The general commanding the Bosnian Serb army told the UN 
that he would allow only empty trucks into Srebrenica, not trucks 
carrying relief supplies.  (Department of State, Paris AFP, The New York 
Times)

27 Mar 93:  Serbian police and Bosnian Serbs blocked a 20-truck 
humanitarian aid convoy with food and medicine from reaching Srebrenica; 
it was forced to return to Belgrade.  (The Washington Post)

24 Mar 93:  Bosnian Serbs assaulted a landing zone for UNPROFOR [UN 
Protection Force for Yugoslavia] helicopters in Srebrenica, killing a 
Muslim child and wounding at least 21 persons, including two Canadian 
peace-keepers who suffered head wounds.  Serb forces had shelled 
Srebrenica's post office, which was serving as a UN peace-keeping base, 
and then hit the landing zone before and after three French helicopters 
had evacuated only 22 of an estimated 300 seriously wounded Muslim 
civilians.  Two British helicopters, sent to evacuate the wounded 
Canadians, also came under fire.

"It is clear that (Bosnian Serb) forces are deliberately impeding the 
medical evacuation from Srebrenica," said an UNPROFOR letter to the 
commander of those forces.

French Maj. Olivier de Bavinchove described the Bosnian Serb mortar 
attack as "wounding again the already wounded."

Bosnian Serbs shelled the airfield used by the helicopters in Tuzla 
after the departure of the helicopters for the Bosnian Serb-mandated 
inspection point in Zvornik.  They later fired seven more shells shortly 
after the arrival of the British helicopters from Srebrenica.

The commander of the UN peace force in Bosnia, French Lt. Gen. Philippe 
Morillon, said Bosnian Serb gunners "deliberately targeted" the Tuzla 
airport and Srebrenica landing zone.

At the request of the UN peace-keeping force in Bosnia, the commander of 
the Bosnian Serb forces arrested Serbian Colonel Ilic for having ordered 
the attack on Srebrenica during the UNPROFOR helicopter evacuation of 
wounded.  Ilic will face a court martial for having broken the cease-
fire agreement.  (Department of State, Reuters, The Washington Post, The 
New York Times, The Washington Times, API, Warsaw Radio Warszawa 
Network, Paris AFP)

19 Mar 93:  Bosnian Serbs blocked a humanitarian aid convoy bound for 
Srebrenica at the border of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from March 11 
to March 19, 1993.

At least 60,000 people trapped in the vicinity of Srebrenica faced the 
threat of an increased death rate by starvation, exposure to the winter 
weather, and lack of medical care.  UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees] staff members in the enclave said [that] the situation   had 
become increasingly desperate with each passing hour, with at least 40 
residents dying each day.  (Department of State, Reuters, The Washington 
Post, API, Time)

19 Mar 93:  An anti-aircraft round passed within 200 meters of a British 
aircraft as it approached the Sarajevo airport.  UNPROFOR subsequently 
closed the airport to humanitarian aid flights.  (Reuters)

9 Mar 93:  Bosnian Serb forces blocked a UN convoy of eight ambulances--
carrying mattresses, blankets, and medical aid--that was sent from 
Belgrade to evacuate 70 to 75 seriously wounded civilians, mostly Muslim 
Slavs, from Konjevic Polje and Srebrenica.  (Los Angeles Times, Paris 
AFP, The Washington Post, API)

5 Mar 93:  A grenade attack injured four drivers in a humanitarian aid 
convoy from Belgrade that was carrying 100 tons of flour from Croatian, 
Serbian, and Muslim non-governmental organizations.  The grenades 
reportedly were fired by Bosnian Government forces.  (Reuters, Paris 
AFP)

4 Mar 93:   A sniper near Sarajevo airport killed Chantal Godinot, a 
Frenchwoman with the Equilibre humanitarian organization, and wounded 
two Polish aid workers.  Snipers ambushed the humanitarian aid convoy as 
it left Sarajevo.  (The Washington Times, API, Reuters, Paris AFP)

Deliberate Attacks On Non-Combatants

26 Mar 93:  The UN charged Serbia with the continued shelling of 
Srebrenica, which had caused two deaths and 41 casualties in the past 
few days.  According to a UN official, "We have the facts that artillery 
shells come from Serbia."  (The Washington Post)

16 Mar 93:  A Serb mortar fell about  10 meters from visiting Dutch 
Defense Minister Relus ter Beek in Sarajevo.  The impact of the shell 
injured an Egyptian UNPROFOR soldier; another shell killed two civilians 
nearby.  (Paris AFP)

13 Mar 93:  Serbian nationalist troops surrounding Sarajevo launched at 
least three mortar bombs at the Sarajevo courthouse in which a Bosnian 
war crimes trial is being conducted.  One mortar struck the building's 
roof.  (The New York Times)

3 Mar 93:   Snipers fired upon Canadian peace-keepers while traveling 
between Visoko and Kiseljac, towns located near Sarajevo.  (Montreal 
Radio Canada International, Paris AFP)

2 Mar 93:   Bosnian Serbs fired a tank shell into Kosevo hospital 
complex at midday, the hospital's busiest time.  The shell landed a few 
feet from the diagnostic building, killing one person--named Munira--and 
injuring eight others.

According to Munira's husband, this was the 177th shell to hit the 
hospital since April 1992.  An emergency room physician said that "It 
happens every day, all the time."

A 60-year-old patient, victim of an earlier volley of shells, said her 
Serbian husband had been killed the previous week by an indiscriminate 
Serbian attack on Sarajevo.  (The Washington Post)

Other, Including Mass Forcible Expulsion, Deportation of Civilians, and 
Mass Graves

6-7 Mar 93:  Two bombs exploded during the weekend in Korcula in 
apparent attacks against Serbian-owned property.  One boutique, whose 
owner was a Serb from Novi Sad, was damaged.  A second bomb exploded in 
the courtyard of a home owned by a Serb.  (Department of State)

2 Mar 93:   Serbian forces, reportedly from the regular Serbian army 
(VJ), overran Cerska and obstructed the medical evacuation of the town's 
Muslim women, children, elderly, and 1,500 wounded.  Muslims fled into 
the woods and in the direction of Konjevice Polje.  (Department of 
State, Paris AFP)

27 Feb 93:  British UNPROFOR units in Bosnia-Herzegovina had to help 
carry to safety some 1,500 Muslims and 15 Croats, mostly women and 
children, expelled by Serbian extremists from the village of Sipov.  
Those expelled had been taken by bus to Turbe near Travnik and then 
forced to walk through snow to the other side of the battlefield.  Serbs 
reportedly fired at the fleeing group as it crossed the no-man's land.  
(Department of State)

Feb 93:  Bosnian Serb authorities  have required Bosnian Muslims to pay 
for their own deportation.  A 30-year-old lawyer described his attempt 
"to secure permission to escape" from Bosnia:

We've been trying to leave since summer, but it is difficult because we 
need money for all of the letters and guarantees.  We want to go. . . 
any- where where our refugees are still accepted.


Bosnian Muslims are sometimes required to mark their homes with white 
flags, to wear white arm-bands for identification, and to obtain 
permission to walk on the streets.  A local assistance worker said:

We have restrictions on our movements.  We cannot go anywhere from Banja 
Luka.  Almost all Muslims in Banja Luka have been fired from their jobs.  
To walk around town, we must carry special papers.

A 40-year-old Muslim woman described drunken vigilantes in Celinac, a 
village near Banja Luka:

"Every night they break into our apartments.  They take away the men and 
demand our money."  (Los    Angeles Times)

May-Sep 92:  A 53-year-old Bosnian Muslim described the ethnic cleansing 
of his village Obrevena.

The witness said the Rudo district (opcina) originally had a 28% Muslim 
population and two mosques.  In April 1991, the Serbian Democratic party 
(SDS) candidate, a Serbian language teacher, was elected president of 
Rudo.  Ethnic relations were fine until the beginning of May 1992, when 
the police chief fired Muslim policemen and the district government 
called up the local reserves, excluding Muslim reservists.

In May 1992, the witness saw Serbian soldier[s] burn the Muslim village 
of Polmilje, and, in July, he witnessed the burning of the Muslim 
village of Bisevic.  Also in July, the police started arresting Muslim 
men and interning them in a military warehouse in Rudo and at the Gojava 
military installation.  Some were transferred to KP Dom, a criminal 
rehabilitation center.

On August 2, 1992, local Serb soldiers came to Obrevena.  The witness 
recognized many of the Serbs who were dressed in camouflage uniforms 
with Serbian flag and SDS insignias, wearing head- bands, and heavily 
armed.  The soldiers collected nine Muslim men from the village and 
marched them 2 kilometers to a field by the Sokol Pasa mosque in 
Sokolovic.  After the men waited there for 2 hours, the soldiers' leader 
told the men,  "If you can run, then run," and released them.

The men fled toward Priboj, the closest town across the Serbian border, 
but were not allowed to cross the bridge over the border.  They then 
forded the river and traveled by foot for 2 months through the woods 
until they arrived in Novi Pazar, the capital of the Muslim-controlled 
Sandzak area of Serbia.  (Department of State)

May-Aug 92:  A 46-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Mioce in the Rudo 
district (opcina) of eastern Bosnia described the ethnic cleansing of 
his home district.  In January 1992, all Muslims had been asked to sign 
a loyalty oath to the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" and to 
give up their arms; all complied.

In May 1992, about 100 Serbian troops, led by a Serb from a neigh-boring 
village, surrounded Mioce and refused to permit Muslims to enter or 
leave the village.  These soldiers wore stockings over their heads and 
dark sunglasses, and stopped people on the streets to extort money from 
them.

The soldiers also began looting homes, setting crops on fire, and 
shooting automatic weapons into the air day and night.  The villagers 
slept in the woods.  The soldiers' leader spent considerable time 
walking the streets of the village threatening Muslims and telling them 
[that] they would die soon.  He frequently said he was carrying out 
"orders from Pale."

At the end of July, the Serbian troops began attacking the witness' 
village in earnest.  They burned Muslim homes, three of them with their 
occupants still inside.  Some Muslims were taken to a camp in Rudo.

On August 1, 1992, a Serbian national assembly member came to Mioce and 
said that there was no longer any "control" over the Rudo district and 
that everyone should evacuate as soon as possible.  At about 5 pm, 50 
Muslim families ran into the woods for Priboj, a Serbian town about 10 
kilometers away.  They later heard from a neighbor that all 60 Muslim 
homes in the village had been looted and burned.

The villagers walked from Priboj to Prijepolje, on the Montenegrin 
border, where they were turned back by Serbian police.  They eventually 
took a regular bus to Novi Pazar, the capital of the Muslim-controlled 
Sandzak region of Serbia.  (Department of State)

Jul 92:  A 27-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the Bosnian Serb 
artillery bombardment of Biscani at about noon on July 20, 1992.  
Biscani was one of many Muslim villages in the Prijedor area and had a 
population of about 1,000 Muslims.  Since May 1992, there had been 
Bosnian Serb soldiers and other officials in the town.

From May to July, their activities had been limited to provoking the 
population by insults, residential searches, and general harassment.  
The primary targets of the provocations appeared to be the wealthier and 
more prominent citizens of the town, including doctors, lawyers, and 
business owners.

Sometime between 2 pm and 3 pm on July 20, the artillery bombardment was 
lifted, and the town was assaulted by a force of Bosnian Serb infantry 
supported  by one tank and one armored personnel carrier.  Members of 
the attacking unit were Bosnian Serbs from the Prijedor area and from 
areas in the vicinity, such as Sanski Most and Banja Luka.  The witness 
recognized several of the attacking soldiers as residents of the 
Prijedor area.  All wore camouflage uniforms, red berets, and had the 
Serbian flag on one sleeve of their uniforms.

Small groups of soldiers quickly occupied virtually every house in the 
village.  After they had secured each house, they shot and killed most 
of the male residents in or immediately outside their homes.  The women 
and children were rounded up and placed in a small number of houses so 
that they would be easier to watch.

The witness observed the shooting through a window from inside one of 
the houses.  He saw two soldiers kill Vehid Duratovic and Sadik Causevic 
as they attempted to run away.  He also saw seven Bosnian Serb soldiers 
assemble five male residents of the village in front of a wall of a 
house across the street where one of the Bosnian Serb soldiers shot and 
killed them.  Four of the five victims were:  Rifet Duratovic, Mirsad 
Kadiric, Ifed Karagic, and Ibrahim Kadiric.

From July 20 to 27, the surviving local residents, mostly women and 
children, buried the victims' bodies in the local cemetery.

On July 27, about 35 women and children and about 15 men were rounded up 
by Bosnian Serb soldiers.  The witness believed that this group 
constituted all the remaining survivors of the village.  This group was 
forced to walk to an unknown location near the entrance to the city of 
Prijedor where Serb soldiers had set up a roadblock.  At about 8 pm, a 
bus arrived and transported the entire group to the Trnopolje detention 
camp.  (Department of State)

Jul 92:  A Bosnian Croat from Prijedor reported the existence of 23 mass 
grave sites in northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina believed to contain the 
remains of over 1,000 Muslim and Croatian victims of Serbian ethnic 
cleansing, especially during the period July 20-25, 1992.

He and other eyewitnesses had seen bodies being dumped in some of the 
locations and scores of unburied corpses lying among the trees in other 
locations.  Nine locations containing the 23 mass graves were plotted on 
a map and described as follows:

--  First location:  23 villagers were killed at Brisevo and buried in 
eight graves.

--  Second location:  19 villagers were killed at Raljas and buried in 
five graves.

--  Third location:  43 people from Stara Rijeka were killed and buried 
in two graves.

--  Fourth location:  200 people were killed and buried in one grave in 
the area known as Redak.

--  Fifth location:  several hundred corpses were buried in the open pit 
iron mine at Ljubija.

--  Sixth location:  21 people were killed and buried in two graves in 
the region called Volaric.

--  Seventh location:  120 people from the villages of Jugovic and 
Biscani were killed and buried in the village of Jubovci.

--  Eighth location:  several tens of people were killed and buried in 
the left bank of the Sana River near the village of Biscani-Sredice.

--  Ninth location:  several hundred bodies reportedly still lie 
unburied in the Kurevo Forest.  There were reportedly 80 bodies at the 
base of Mount Lisina.  (Department of State)

Jun-Jul 92:  A 55-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Brcko, who was a prisoner 
at Luka camp in early June 1992, described the disposal of corpses from 
Luka prison.  (See section on "Willful Killing.")

In the first week of June, the bodies of most of the 2,000 that he 
estimates were killed were thrown down a well and emerged later floating 
down the Sava River, surfacing at Resovo Polje and even as far away as 
Belgrade.  As Luka guards became aware of the surfacing corpses, they 
took to cutting open the bodies and packing them with sand to keep them 
submerged.  This effort did not always succeed.  The third approach was 
to chop up corpses and burn the bodies.

The witness strongly urges the international community to secure access 
to the Luka harbor and send underwater divers down to identify the 
corpses that were dumped there in June and July, and to excavate sites 
where quantities of human bones can be found.  (Department of State)

Mar-Jul 92:  A Muslim woman in her mid-40s described the ethnic 
cleansing of Gacko, a town with a population of 16,000.

The witness said [that] the Serbian army first came through Gacko in 
March 1992, on the way to the front in Mostar.  Serbs--calling 
themselves White Eagles--began destroying Muslim-owned cafes, 
apartments, and shops.  All these Serbs were local, with the exception 
of some who said they were refugees from Mostar.  About May 15, the 
White Eagles began shooting into homes and making arrests.

Around noon on June 1, soldiers arrested Muslim men as they finished 
their shift at the power plant where the witness worked.  The soldiers 
put the Muslims in military transport and took about 100 men to the 
military prison in Avtovac, 5 kilometers from Gacko.  The Serbian 
soldiers then moved from house to house arresting more Muslim men and 
moving them first to Avtovac and then to Hotel Terma, outside the town.

On July 4, shortly after midnight, Serbs began going house to house for 
the remaining Muslims.  A soldier came to the witness's home and said, 
"You have 2 minutes to leave."  She said that about 980 were forced to 
leave at this time.  They were taken by bus and train eventually to the 
Serbian-Macedonian border, where a Muslim relief organization brought 
them to Skopje.  (Department of State)

26 Jun 92:  A 37-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the arrival of local 
Serb paramilitary units reinforced with regular tank and infantry units 
from Serbia in Kozluk, Bosnia, on June 26, 1992.  The units from Serbia 
were from Valjevo, Sabac, Loznica, Novi Sad, and Titovo Uzice.  Prior to 
capturing the town, the Serbs bombarded it with artillery from the 
Gucevo mountains across the border in Serbia.  On June 26, the Serbs 
entered the town and brought with them buses and trucks.  They ordered 
the entire population of Kozluk to assemble in the town center.  About 
1,500 people assembled.

The Serbs then read from a list the names of prominent local people and 
told them to move to one side.  They were ordered into a bus and taken 
away to an unknown location; they were never seen again.  Next, the 
Serbs segregated all the men from the women and children and ordered the 
men to board buses.  Finally, the women and children were ordered to 
board buses.  Before they departed, the town residents were told that, 
for their own safety, they were being taken to a refugee camp in Palic, 
near Subotica.  (Department of State)

18 Jun 92:  A 62-year-old Bosnian Muslim described the ethnic cleansing 
of the cluster of villages known as Fazlagica Kula, in the Gacko area.

On June 18, at about 5 am, Serbian forces from the Serb villages of 
Miholjace, Srdzevici, and Medjulic advanced on the villages.  "They came 
with tanks from every direction," said the witness.  The villagers fled 
to the mountains and watched their villages being bombed the entire day.  
On June 19, Serbian infantry entered the villages and looted homes and 
livestock.

The witness said between 200 and 300 residents of her village managed to 
escape to a nearby mountain, where they stayed for 27 days.  She said 
[that] there were over 1,000 Muslim villagers from the area at various 
points on the mountain.  The Serbs bombed their position every day and 
surveilled their position by helicopter.

On July 25, the Serbs called by megaphone asking the Muslims to give up 
the women and children and promised protection for them.  About 200-300 
women and children, carrying a white flag, descended the mountain.  They 
were brought to Gacko where the police chief put them into four military 
convoys and transported the women and children through Bileca to 
Trebinje.  Rejected at Trebinje, the group was dropped off at Bileca.  
After 15 days in Bileca, the witness fled to Montenegro.  (Department of 
State)

May 92:  A 34-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Sokolovo saw local Serbs 
establish a control point on the bridge over the Sana River at the 
southeast end of Kljuc.  The surrounding villages began to come under 
mortar fire and the Muslims were ordered to turn over all weapons, legal 
and illegal, to the Kljuc district government.

The Muslims were told that if the weapons were not turned over, the 
bombardment would continue.  The bombardment included the following 
villages:  Pudin Han, Velagici, Velecevo, Dubocani, Plamenice, Prhovo, 
Crljeni, Gornji Ramici, Donji Ramici, Krasulje, Balijevici, Hripavci, 
and Kamicak.

The mortar attacks continued through May 29.  Between May 31 and June 1, 
the witness said that Serbian forces had killed 40 persons, and that 
another 22 disappeared from the village of Prhovo.  The murder victims 
lay where they had fallen 9 days before they were buried.  Two 
eyewitnesses to the murders were among those who gathered up the dead 
and buried them under the supervision of paramilitary forces sent by the 
Kljuc district.

Following these attacks, the local Serbs maintained pressure on the 
remaining Muslim inhabitants through a campaign of random killings, 
looting, rapes, and destruction of houses.

In late August, the Kljuc district government took a census of the area 
and announced over the radio that those who wanted to leave the area 
could do so, but only if they agreed to relinquish all claims to their 
property.  The government prepared property abandonment forms for this 
purpose and the Muslims were required to sign them.  Kljuc district 
officials participated as witnesses and signatories to the documents.  
In addition, Muslims were required   to obtain a certificate allowing  
them to leave the area and to pay  50 Deutsch marks each for their 
transportation.

On September 11, the Kljuc district government set up a convoy of about 
eight buses and 12 large trucks in front of the Kljuc school center.  
All the Muslims who had the proper documentation and who had paid 50 
[Deutsch] marks were loaded aboard the vehicles at 10 am, and the convoy 
departed for Vlasic mountain and Travnik, arriving about 5 pm.  
(Department of State)

27 May 92:  A 32-year-old Bosnian Muslim said that, on the morning of 
May 27, 1992, the roads across the Sana River, from his neighborhood to 
the center of Sanski Most, were blocked by local Serbian police and 
soldiers whom he believed were from the JNA.  During the day, he saw the 
police and soldiers bringing mortars and artillery into position on the 
other side of the river.

The shelling began at 9 pm and lasted until 8 [am] the next morning.  
The witness estimates that the Serbs used more than 3,000 shells and 
mortars.  In the morning, the radio announced that all those in the 
neighborhood who wanted to surrender should raise a white flag.  Another 
broadcast said that all weapons should be turned in to a central police 
station.

Later, the radio announced that all "innocent citizens" should report to 
the main soccer field to "settle accounts" for the activities of the 
Green Berets--a Muslim force allegedly fighting the Serbs.  The witness 
said that nearly everyone from the neighborhood--a couple of thousand 
people--went to the sports field.  Only those who had not heard the 
radio broadcast or who were too scared or distrustful of the Serbs to go 
stayed in their homes.

Once they were on the sports field, the Serbs began to "cleanse" the 
neighborhood.  From the field, the witness watched the Serbian police 
and irregulars roam through streets, looting and burning houses.  If 
they found people still in their homes, the Serbs threw a grenade 
through the window to kill the occupants.

Sometime in June, while being transported between detention facilities 
on the road between Kljuc and Sanski Most, the witness saw from the bus 
window a pile of 40 to 50 bodies stacked in a meadow about 5 meters from 
the road.  At the foot of a hill, he saw a bulldozer digging what the 
witness presumed would be a mass grave.  The witness gave a detailed 
description of the location of the site.  (Department of State)

27 May 92:  A 43-year-old Bosnian Muslim was in Velagici, located 
approximately 5 kilometers northwest of Kljuc, when Bosnian Serb forces 
started the systematic destruction of the village.  Velagici had a 
population of about 8,000 people whose ethnic composition was 75% 
Muslim, 24% Serbian, and 1% Croatian.

Velagici was perhaps the wealthiest district of Kljuc because many of 
the men worked in Germany during the summer and earned hard currency.  
Because of this, many men were not in the village when the shelling 
began, leaving thousands of women and children virtually defenseless.

As soon as the shelling began on May 27, 1992, local Serbian radio 
broadcasts demanded that the citizens of Velagici surrender all arms and 
property unconditionally to the Serbian forces.  Most of the women and 
children managed to escape on foot that evening to the nearby village of 
Postajre, where they hid in the homes of local residents.  As a result, 
mass casualties were avoided in Velagici, though a total of 13 men and 
women were killed during this attack.

On May 28 at 6 pm, Serbian soldiers completely surrounded Velagici and 
forced 70 men, a group that included the witness, to turn over all 
weapons and surrender.  All Muslim homes were subsequently robbed and 
burned.  Velagici was renamed Ravna Gora by local Serbian authorities in 
June 1992.  (Department of State)

Apr-May 92:  A middle-aged Muslim couple from the village of Rodic Brdo, 
1 kilometer from Visegrad, witnessed the movement of the Uzicki corps--
troops from Uzice--into the Visegrad vicinity on April 13, 1992.

This corps consisted of JNA soldiers, reservists, Uzice territorial 
defense forces, and White Eagles.  The JNA soldiers wore their regular 
JNA uniforms.  They brought a significant amount of heavy equipment with 
JNA markings (tanks, heavy trucks, and mortars) into town.  Planes and 
helicopters with JNA markings frequently flew overhead.

The White Eagles overtly identified themselves as such and wore outfits 
that combined elements of military and civilian garb, including 
headbands.  Some wore hats with the kokada emblem, a royalist insignia.

The two witnesses noted a significant difference between the way White 
Eagles and the JNA treated Muslim civilians, the latter appearing far 
more attentive to the need not to harm the civilians.  They also 
discerned tensions between the White Eagles and the JNA.

Upon learning that the Uzicki corps was 2 kilometers away, most of the 
town's Muslims fled to the woods.  As they were fleeing, Uzicki corps 
soldiers fired upon them.  The corps broadcast calls over the radio for 
Muslim residents to return to Visegrad, assuring them of a safe return.

The witnesses returned to town on April 20 and found it filled with 
rubble and burned out homes.  By this date, the JNA had blocked all 
roads out of Visegrad (to Uzice, Sarajevo, Foca, and Rudo), White Eagles 
stood behind the JNA troops, and the Uzicki corps had set up roadblocks 
all around the area.

At each roadblock, a soldier carried a list of Muslim names.  Everyone 
was required to show identification; those Muslims whose names appeared 
on the list were taken away and not heard from again.  They included 
factory directors, political and community leaders, and other respected 
citizens.

Between May 18 and 25, the Uzicki corps left Visegrad, taking its heavy 
equipment with it, and pulled back to a location between Visegrad and 
the Serbian border.  The town fell under the control of the White Eagles 
on May 25.  (Department of State)

Oct 91:  A 44-year-old Bosnian Muslim was working in Trebinje when the 
Serbs started the siege of Dubrovnik on October 10, 1991.  The witness 
described how the mayor of Trebinje was very much involved with and in 
favor of the offensive, welcomed the arrival of the JNA troops, and was 
an accomplice to the destruction of Dubrovnik.  The witness said that 
Trebinje was the headquarters for the offensive against Dubrovnik.  
There was a communications center, helicopter pad, hospital, and two or 
three JNA military installations.

From October 1991, Muslims could not leave Trebinje because of the JNA 
presence.  At the end of October, the JNA attacked the Croat enclave of 
Ravno and burned it to the ground.

Following UN protests against the shelling of Dubrovnik, the JNA 
withdrew and the Serbian Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina took over, in 
collusion with the Trebinje mayor's police force.  Soldiers began 
looting Muslim homes, extorting money, and requiring Muslims to give up 
their weapons.  By April, most Muslims had fled.  (Department of State) 
(###)


For the texts of the first six reports, see the following issues of 
Dispatch:

Vol. 3, No. 39, p. 732;
Vol. 3, No. 44, p. 802;
Vol. 3, No. 46, p. 825;
Vol. 3, No. 52, p. 917;
Vol. 4, No. 6, p. 75; and
Vol. 4, No.15, p. 243.

For the text of Resolution 771, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 33, p. 652 or 
Dispatch Supplement Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 44.

For the text of Resolution 780, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769. 
(###)



ARTICLE 5:

Extension of Fast-Track Procedures For Uruguay Round Implementing Bill
Opening statement by White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers at press 
briefing, Washington, DC, April 9, 1993.

The President has asked me to announce today his decision to pursue with 
Congress the approval of legislation renewing fast-track procedures to 
conclude the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] of the multilateral trade negotiations.  Since taking office in 
January, this Administration's highest priority has been to strengthen 
the US economy.  We have put forth an ambitious program designed to 
reduce the budget deficit and increase investments in areas critical to 
our future economic strength.  But while the Administration's economic 
strategy starts with the enactment of the President's economic program, 
global economic growth from expanded world trade is a crucial part of 
our strategy.

The Uruguay Round, involving more than 100 nations, began in 1986.  The 
failure to complete the round has been a source of disappointment and 
frustration to the United States and many of our trading partners.  A 
successful round would lower tariff and non-tariff barriers around the 
world and establish new multilateral rules for world trade.  It would be 
the single most important step we could take to open foreign markets 
around the world to US manufactured goods, agricultural products, and 
services.

President Clinton and [US Trade Representative] Ambassador Kantor have 
spoken with leaders from the EC [and] Japan and other nations and 
emphasized our strong desire to complete an ambitious Uruguay Round this 
year.  They believe that our trading partners share their commitment to 
the overriding importance of completing the round.

Consequently, the President has decided, after consulting with Members 
of Congress, to seek legislation this year needed to complete these 
important negotiations this year.  The draft bill we will send to 
Congress would extend congressional fast-track procedures to a Uruguay 
Round implementing bill provided that he notifies the Congress no later 
than December 15, 1993, of his intent to enter into such agreements 
before April 15, 1994.

Conventional wisdom says [that] it will be difficult to complete this 
round--to expand and liberalize trade--at a time when much of the world 
economy is in the doldrums.  But the President believes that is 
precisely the time we must do it.  We ask other nations to join us in 
taking the sometimes hard steps needed to bring the round to a 
successful conclusion for the benefit of all nations. (###)



ARTICLE 6:

Peace-keeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Washington, DC, March 31, 1993

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:  Once again I have the 
pleasure to testify before you.  I regret that George Moose could not be 
here, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held confirmation 
hearings on his nomination, and I hope that he will be confirmed before 
the end of the week.

We now know that the end of the Cold War has allowed conflicts long 
suppressed by bipolar tension to re-emerge throughout the world.  In 
Africa, where ethnic tensions exist in combination with rapidly growing 
populations, economic problems, and social cleavages, and where 30 years 
of authoritarianism have left a legacy of intolerance, conflict 
resolution is this decade's most urgent challenge.

I am particularly pleased to work with the subcommittee on this issue, 
and it is gratifying to me that you have scheduled a full day of your 
very limited time to hear about this complex and difficult issue from a 
wide variety of viewpoints.

Resolution of Africa's many conflicts is necessary for stability, 
economic reform, democratization, and better governance.  The tragic 
human suffering caused by these conflicts is more than a brake on the 
development Africa so desperately needs; it is an imperative for 
intervention and massive international humanitarian relief which could 
be channeled into more productive help for Africa in the absence of 
conflict.  It is wiser--and less expensive--to pay for conflict 
prevention and resolution than to shoulder the immense burdens of 
refugee assistance, famine relief, emergency intervention, and 
rebuilding destroyed infrastructure.  The need for a timely and 
effective approach to conflict resolution is great, and resources are 
limited.

The Administration is now conducting a full-scale review of conflict 
resolution requirements and resources worldwide.  While the results of 
that study are still some time off, we have devoted a great deal of 
thought to these problems in Africa; and, today, I am pleased to have 
this opportunity to share our thinking with you.

I speak as a practitioner rather than as a theorist. The rules of the 
game in Africa can be very hard on losers.  Confidence-building, common 
goals, and other important conflict resolution techniques can be used 
only after we have convinced all the parties that a negotiated solution 
will not jeopardize them, their families, or their principles.  Mistrust 
is often deep, and patience is required to make good use of our 
resources and our efforts.

We pursue conflict resolution in Africa as a crucial first step toward 
improving those factors which lead to stability, the rule of law, and 
good government.  This approach includes some strongly held American 
values which are worldwide in practice.

We approach conflict resolution and peace-making generally in four ways.

First, through preventive diplomacy.  This is a core part of our policy 
and programs in Africa.  We strive whenever possible to avert the costs 
of human suffering [that] conflict invariably causes.  

Second, through multilateral diplomacy. We work closely with the United 
Nations and African regional institutions, including the Organization of 
African Unity [OAU] and the Economic Community of West African States 
[ECOWAS], which have the credibility to support security and stability 
in Africa.

Third, through participation in a mediation effort, as in Angola, 
Mozambique, and Rwanda.  There are often advantages to working in 
partnership with other countries to broker and/or implement agreements 
to end conflicts.  But our role as the world's remaining superpower 
often makes the US imprimatur an essential contribution to a lasting 
settlement.

Finally, through informal cooperation with such organizations as the 
Global Coalition for Africa, the Africa Leadership Forum, the African-
American Institute, the Carter Center, Africare, and the many other non-
governmental organizations which are striving to develop creative new 
approaches to conflict resolution in Africa at all levels.

Of critical importance is the reinforcement of Africans' own ability to 
resolve their internal and regional conflicts.  Consequently, much of 
our assistance concentrates on building the conflict-resolution capacity 
of existing organizations, such as the OAU and ECOWAS.  The OAU is now 
developing a permanent peace-keeping structure, and the United States 
has already provided technical assistance in sup- port of that effort. 

In many countries--Rwanda, Mozambique, Angola, and Somalia, for example-
-direct assistance, including in some cases our scarce FMF [Foreign 
Military Financing] and ESF [Economic Support Funds]  resources, has 
been appropriate.  Some forms of help critical for peace must come from 
outside Africa, such as demining operations and the removal of other 
ordnance.

With the World Bank and other donors, we are now beginning to assist 
with the reduction of oversized military forces and the redefinition of 
the remaining forces' roles in Uganda.  We are studying creative ways to 
assist demobilization and downsizing of military establishments in other 
parts of the continent--an activity with both economic and political 
payoffs.  The United States already helps with military "nation-
building" projects in several countries, but more resources, including 
provisions for adjustment to civilian life and retraining, are needed to 
make demobilization effective. 

Areas of Extensive US Engagement

Allow me to review briefly the areas where we are or have been 
extensively engaged in peace-making.

Namibia.  The negotiations leading to Namibian independence, which took 
place in 1977-88, were a triumph of US diplomacy.  In the final stages 
of the process (1987-88), the United States was the official mediator, 
with the then-Soviet Union playing a helpful unofficial role due to its 
close relationships to Cuba and the [Angolan President Jose Eduardo] dos 
Santos government.  The New York agreements of December 1988 led to free 
and fair elections in Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
Angola, both under UN supervision.  The revelation on March 24 that 
South Africa possessed nuclear devices adds new luster to our mediation 
role, which may have prevented a nuclear tragedy in Southern Africa.

Angola.  In Angola the United States, the Portuguese, and the former 
Soviet Union worked closely to achieve the 1991 cease-fire which ended 
15 years of civil war and made elections possible.  The September 
elections were supervised by UN and other international monitors, but 
UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] rejected the 
results, and both sides have resumed hostilities.  Our highest priority 
in Angola is an immediate cease-fire and a return to serious, direct 
dialogue between the government and UNITA under UN auspices based on the 
1991 Bicesse accords.

Liberia.  In Liberia, the parties looked to the United States for 
assistance in the early stages of conflict because of our historical 
relationship.  A special committee of the Economic Community of West 
African States took over the mediation effort early in 1990, but lack of 
progress led to the deployment of a six-nation peace-making task force 
called the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990.  That 
operation was successful in saving the city of Monrovia from total 
destruction and preventing widespread fighting until October 1992, but 
has not been able to force Charles Taylor's compliance with the 
Yamoussoukro accords, which were brokered by ECOWAS and signed by 
Taylor.  

The United States has continued to play a facilitative role toward 
promoting  the accords, and for some months in 1990-91 maintained a 
considerable Naval force off  the Liberian coast.  ECOMOG  has received 
the endorsement of the UN Security Council, and UN Special Envoy Gordon-
Somers is formulating recommendations of how the United Nations might 
more directly bolster the peace-keeping effort there.  The United States 
supported ECOWAS by providing nearly $29 million in peace-keeping 
support, in addition to over $203 million in humanitarian assistance, 
which shows the scale of those needs in such a situation.

Ethiopia.  Our involvement in Ethiopia was stimulated in part by the US 
desire to cooperate with then-Soviet President Gorbachev in resolving 
regional conflicts.  The Soviets brought us in--after years of frigid 
relationships with the Mengistu regime--to relieve them of a major 
financial burden.  Former President Carter was originally the mediator 
between the regime and the Eritrean insurgency; the US Government was 
brought in later.  Mediation did not end the war, however.  The 
insurgents defeated the regime in May 1991.  As mediators, we influenced 
the end of the war and assisted in the process of national 
reconciliation, democratization, and Eritrean self-determination after 
the war.

Mozambique.  In Mozambique, US involvement began several years ago with 
an effort to persuade President Chissano to accept that negotiations 
with RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance] were essential.  White 
House involvement--at times, Presidential involvement--proved 
instrumental in bringing the Mozambican Government to the table.  US 
involvement in the formal negotiations has been indirect.  The Italian 
religious order, St. Egidio, has been the mediator, with the assistance 
of the Italian Government and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Beira.  
However, as an official observer, we were able to move the sides along 
when impasses threatened during the months leading up to the May 1992 
accord; and US technical experts in law and military affairs provided 
critical support in devising technical agreements.

Rwanda.  In Rwanda, we have had facilitators in the field throughout the 
last 10 months trying to keep the parties talking.  The United States 
plans to continue its support for the OAU peace-keeping force now 
deployed in northern Rwanda.  We have provided about $1 million to date 
in FMF and ESF to this first important OAU effort to end a tragic civil 
war.  Renewed negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, now give cause for hope.

Somalia.  In Somalia, we are working with the United Nations to rebuild 
a badly fragmented society.  Eleven African countries have contributed 
troops or other assistance to this effort, so far.  As you know, we are 
now in the process of transferring responsibility for this major peace 
enforcement operation to the United Nations.

South Africa.  South Africa presents a unique problem.  The 
Administration believes deeply that achieving  a democratic South Africa 
requires an end to further political and ethnic violence.  Conflict 
resolution in South Africa is a factor critical to the success of a 
transition to a representative and non-racial government and to economic 
development in that country, the region, and the continent.  We are 
committed to assisting that process when and where possible.  As is the 
case elsewhere in Africa, the South African people themselves must 
determine--and live with--the final arrangements;  but where we can help 
with assistance and simple "honest brokering," we intend to do so.  
Although informal and low-key, our inputs over the past 3 years have 
been significant.

We will continue to be engaged in helping Africans resolve these 
conflicts, and there are others which could require assistance in the 
future.  Ethnic violence continues between Tuaregs and the governments 
of most of the Sahelian countries, particularly Niger and Mali; Sudan is 
riven with a north-south conflict;  the Liberian conflict has further 
destabilized neighboring Sierra Leone; the impasse has worsened in Togo; 
Cameroon is torn by ethnic, linguistic, and political strife;  Zaire 
could drift into civil war if Mobutu continues to obstruct democratic 
change.  These contingencies--as well as the ongoing peace-making 
efforts--will need our continual attention and our assistance.

Unavoidably, there have been mistakes and false starts.  Not all parties 
will understand that conflict resolution does not mean allowing people 
with guns to prescribe one-sided "solutions" to long-standing political, 
ethnic, and social problems.  We have, occasionally, underestimated the 
depth of feeling, the distrust, the fear, and, frankly, the hostility 
which opposing sides often bring to the table.  More importantly, some 
of our interlocutors simply acted in bad faith with no interest in a 
negotiated settlement. 

Lessons Learned In Conflict Resolution

We have enough experience in African conflict resolution to have learned 
some important lessons--a number of them the hard way.

--  US involvement in conflict resolution is considered desirable by 
most Africans, and the United States is seen as impartial.  US technical 
assistance is highly prized.  Our involvement reassures the parties, and 
the presence of the only remaining superpower seems to serve as a moral 
guarantee that agreements will be implemented.

--  We have learned that agreements must be simple and workable.  We 
should not applaud solely because the parties have successfully 
negotiated an agreement, however impractical.

--  From our experience in Angola, we have learned that joint 
commissions formed solely by representatives of parties to the conflict 
do not work well; there needs to be a referee.  In Angola, the lack of a 
referee led to paralysis in the implementation phase.  The United 
Nations will play that role in Mozambique.

--  We cannot rush elections.  Security arrangements must be completely 
implemented.  In Angola, the failure to complete demobilization allowed 
UNITA to retain a hidden army.  Furthermore, "winner-take-all" elections  
do not lead to national reconciliation and a government of national 
unity.  We were pleased to hear Nelson Mandela pledge to form a 
government of national unity if the ANC [African National Congress] wins 
the first non-racial election in South Africa.

--  Amnesty and forgiveness must be part of the equation.  When 
opposition movements--or for that matter, aggrieved governments--
announce that there will be a Nuremburg-like trial after the war, there 
will be no agreement.

--  Force must sometimes be part of the equation.  ECOWAS mediation in 
Liberia was ineffective without ECOMOG; US-led international involvement 
in Somalia provided a chance for national reconciliation.  Monitoring 
without the ability to enforce can undermine the credibility of peace-
keepers.

Improving the Conflict Resolution Process

We also have a few ideas to improve the conflict resolution process in 
Africa and make our own role more effective.

--  Although we do not wish to prescribe solutions, continuing US 
involvement is critical to success in many parts of the continent.  We 
need a regular mechanism for US involvement, since the United States is 
generally considered impartial and US technical assistance, especially 
in juridical and military matters, is highly valued, as our experiences 
in Mozambique and Rwanda have demonstrated.

--  Conflicts generate large military establishments.   Former soldiers 
need retraining to readapt them to civilian life.  Advice and assistance 
should be provided to professionalize and integrate downsizing military 
establishments.

--  The use of force to establish peace--"peace enforcement" as opposed 
to "peace-keeping"--is expensive and, occasionally, risky.  Nonetheless, 
the examples of Somalia and Liberia set precedents for the use of force 
to end actual fighting and make conditions more fertile for negotiation.  
Massive unilateral intervention by the United States should rarely be 
necessary.  African solutions, such as that by ECOWAS in Liberia, are 
more effective.  Africans are willing to pay a price for this 
involvement--as Nigeria has in paying the lion's share of ECOMOG 
expenses--but they will look to the international community to help them 
meet part of the massive costs of such peace enforcement.

--  The development of regularized African mechanisms for conflict 
resolution is indispensable for long-term stability.  The OAU has taken 
several early steps away from its traditionally strict doctrine of non-
intervention.  Africa needs a system of mediation and reconciliation 
which governments or other parties can call on when a full-blown 
conflict erupts requiring intervention.  There are models for such 
systems in both Latin America and Southeast Asia.  The United States is 
committed to helping the OAU establish such mechanisms, as we 
demonstrated by providing $1 million toward the OAU's initial conflict 
resolution and peace-keeping effort in Rwanda.

Conclusion

Finally, let me speak about the role of our donor partners in this 
process.  Donor governments, the EC [European Community], international 
financial institutions, and UN agencies are important contributors to 
African development, and we share with them an understanding of and an 
interest in Africa's need for internal stability.  We are coordinating 
closely with interested governments and institutions in every case, and 
several governments and other institutions have contributed financially 
and otherwise to the conflict resolution effort in individual countries.

Conflict resolution in Africa, as elsewhere, is not the labor of a day 
or a week.  Nor is it an issue at which we can simply throw money, 
although the need for resources is great.  As Africa attempts to meet 
the difficult challenge of conflict resolution, the Bureau of African 
Affairs intends to remain involved to help ensure the success of 
practical mechanisms and long-term efforts to build trust, tolerance, 
and accountability. (###)



ARTICLE 7:

Assassination of South African Leader
Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, 
Washington, DC, April 10, 1993.

The assassination of [South African Communist Party Secretary General] 
Chris Hani is a deplorable and troubling event.  This brutal murder will 
sadden all who are working for peace, democracy, and justice in South 
Africa.  It underscores the urgent need to end violence in the country 
and to push ahead with the negotiations which will create a democratic 
South Africa.

Chris Hani actively supported these negotiations and only this week 
called for an end to violence so the negotiations could proceed in a 
climate of peace and stability.

We share the grief of the Hani family and extend our condolences to them 
and to Mr. Hani's close friends. (###)



ARTICLE 8:


Focus on East Asia and the Pacific

A Periodic Update
The East Asia and Pacific region is America's largest trading partner 
and plays an increasingly important role in global affairs.  Focus on 
East Asia and the Pacific provides information about economic and 
political developments and US policy.

Overview

The achievements of the dynamic East Asian and Pacific economies are 
largely the result of market-oriented, outward-looking growth 
strategies.  These free-market policies have fostered the highest growth 
rates in the world.

Japan is the second-largest economy in the world and one of the world's 
leading trading countries.  China is the world's fastest-growing economy 
and has enormous potential, assuming its economic reforms proceed as 
planned.  The four "little tigers"--Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan--are maintaining robust growth with inflation 
under control. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand enjoy spectacular 
growth.  The Philippines is lagging, but reform could put its economy on 
the fast track.  These four countries, along with Singapore and Brunei, 
make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 

Trade and investment reforms, particularly in intellectual property 
rights, banking, and other financial ser-vices, have contributed to 
progress in East Asia.  Further strides are needed before the region 
realizes its potential as a magnet for foreign investment.

East Asia is accumulating an increasing percentage of the world's 
foreign exchange reserves, which could raise its profile in global 
financial markets.  Taiwan's reserves of $83 billion are the world's 
largest.  Reserves in Japan, China, and Singapore are high relative to 
gross domestic product.  This heightened profile makes further financial 
liberalization essential.

America's status as a Pacific power in its own right means that US 
interests are closely connected with the future of the countries in the 
region.

Multilateral Organizations

A number of multilateral organizations foster economic and political 
integration and cooperation in the region.

ASEAN was created in August 1967 with the signing of the Bangkok 
Declaration by the five original members (Brunei Darussalam became the 
sixth member in 1984).  ASEAN's major goals are to strengthen regional 
cohesion and self-reliance, emphasizing economic, social, and cultural 
cooperation.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) seeks to foster trade and 
investment among its 15 members.  Ten working groups are developing 
solutions to problems in energy, telecommunications, human resources, 
conservation, data flow, trade promotion, tourism, transportation, 
investment, technology transfer, and fisheries.  APEC ministers first 
met in Canberra, Australia, in November 1989.  Between annual 
ministerial meetings, a group of senior officials (deputy assistant 
secretary level in the United States) meets to oversee its program. 

APEC  is an important mechanism for sustaining market-oriented economic 
growth, advancing global and regional trade liberalization, and meeting 
the new challenges of interdependence.  Its members include the ASEAN 
countries, plus Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and 
the United States.  China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (known as Chinese 
Taipei in APEC) joined in 1991.

The Asia Development Bank (ADB) supports program loans and key 
infrastructure projects that promote economic development, facilitate 
commercial activity, and expand trade and regional economic integration.  

The Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) was established in 
1980 as an organization involving business, academia, and government in 
promoting economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.  PECC 
includes all members of APEC, plus Chile, Mexico, Peru, Pacific Island 
countries, and Russia.  PECC recently agreed to admit Russia, which 
formally took its seat at the ninth PECC general meeting in San 
Francisco in September 1992.  Members of the PECC Secretariat observe at 
APEC meetings and participate in APEC working groups.

The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) is an association of senior 
business leaders from throughout the Pacific Basin dedicated to the 
expansion of trade and investment in the region.  Today, PBEC includes 
more than 850 firms in Australia, Canada, Chile, Fiji and other Pacific 
Island countries, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, 
Thailand, and the United States.  Its international secretariat is in 
Honolulu.

The Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum (APPF), is a parliamentary 
interface to APEC that involves members of the legislatures of many APEC 
and other economies.

US Role

The United States has strong political, economic, security, and 
diplomatic ties to the East Asia-Pacific region.  It is a key trading 
partner with the region, promotes an open trade and financial system, 
and provides economic assistance to the region's developing countries.  

As East Asia's economic strength has grown, its economies have become 
increasingly intertwined with that of the United States.  The United 
States trades more with the East Asia-Pacific  region than with any 
other region.  US trans-Pacific trade first surpassed trans-Atlantic 
trade in 1980.  In 1992, US trans-Pacific trade rose to $344 billion, 
50% more than trans-Atlantic trade of $228 billion.  US investment in 
the East Asia-Pacific region ($66 billion in 1991) has almost doubled in 
the last 5 years.

The United States is a key participant in the multilateral organizations 
that promote closer economic cooperation with this dynamic region.  At 
the end of the APEC ministers' meeting in Bangkok, Thailand, in 
September 1992, the United States assumed the chairmanship, which will 
entail substantive policy leadership for the region.  The US Government 
is committed to APEC, which it views as the logical focus for economic 
cooperation, given the vast economic flows across the Pacific Basin.  
The United States has made regional trade liberalization the theme of 
its 1-year chairmanship.  

The US-ASEAN Dialogue provides opportunities for government officials 
and private sector representatives to discuss a broad range of economic 
issues.  US-ASEAN Dialogue meetings occur about every 18 months and 
traditionally include participants at the  sub-cabinet-level.  

The United States shares a lead position in ADB with Japan and maintains 
its share of the bank's capital and the Asian Development Fund, which 
the bank administers.

Members of the US House and Senate were represented at the initial 
meetings of the APPF in Singapore and Tokyo this year.(###)


Addresses of key organizations in the East Asia-Pacific region:

Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC)
438 Alexandra Road #19-01/04
Alexandra Point
Singapore  0511

Asian Development Bank
PO Box 789
1099 Manila, Philippines

Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC)
Robert G. Lees
International Director General
1001 Bishop Street
Pauahi Tower, Suite 1150
Honolulu, Hawaii  96813

Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC)
Robert Armstrong
Director of Publications
PECC Secretariat
4 Nassim Road
Singapore  1035 (###)



ARTICLE 9:

TREATY ACTIONS

Multilateral
Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations.  Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963.  
Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the United States Dec. 24, 1969.  
TIAS 6820; 21 UST 77.
Succession deposited:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993.

Copyright
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of 
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris July 24, 1971, and amended on Oct. 2, 
1979.  Entered into force for the United States Mar. 1, 1989.  [Senate] 
Treaty Doc. 99-27.
Accession deposited:  Kenya, Mar. 11, 1993.

Diplomatic Relations
Convention on diplomatic relations.  Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961.  
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the United States Dec. 13, 1972.  
TIAS 7502; 23 UST 3227.
Successions deposited:  Croatia, Oct. 12, 1992; Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 
1993.

Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the Inter-national 
Labor Organization.  Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force 
Apr. 20, 1948; re-entered into force for the United States Feb. 18, 
1980.  TIAS 1868; 62 Stat. 3485.
Acceptances deposited:  Slovakia, Jan. 22, 1993; Czech Republic, Feb. 5, 
1993.

United Nations
Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations.  Done 
at New York Feb. 13, 1946.  Entered into force Sept. 17, 1946; for the 
United States Apr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900; 21 UST 1418.
Succession deposited:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993.

Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women.  Done at New York Dec. 18, 1979.  Entered into force Sept. 3, 
1981.1
Accession deposited:  Suriname, Mar. 1, 1993.  
Succession deposited:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993.
Signature:  South Africa, Jan. 29, 1993.


Bilateral 

Albania
Investment incentive agreement.  Signed at Washington Nov. 19, 1991.  
Entered into force Mar. 18, 1993.

Azerbaijan
Investment incentive agreement.  Signed at Washington Sept. 28, 1992.  
Enters into force on date on which Azerbaijan notifies the United States 
that all necessary legal requirements have been fulfilled.

Canada
Agreement concerning cooperative testing and evaluation of defense 
systems.  Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Feb. 10, 1993.  
Entered into force Feb. 10, 1993.

Ecuador
Agreement for the prevention and control of narcotic-related money 
laundering.  Signed at Quito Aug. 7, 1992.  Entered into force Feb. 4, 
1993.

Estonia
Agreement regarding grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, and the furnishing of defense articles, related training or 
other defense services from the United States to the Republic of 
Estonia.  Effected by exchange of notes at Tallinn Feb. 11 and 12, 1993.  
Entered into force Feb. 12, 1993.

Germany
Supplementary treaty to the treaty concerning extradition of June 20, 
1978 (TIAS 9785).  Signed at Washington Oct. 21, 1986.  [Senate] Treaty 
Doc. 100-6.
Instruments of ratification exchanged:  Mar. 11, 1993.
Entered into force:  Mar. 11, 1993.

Hague Conference on Private International Law
Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex.  Signed at The Hague Jan. 27, 
1993.  Entered into force Jan. 27, 1993.

Honduras
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of 
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government 
and its agencies, with annexes.  Signed at Tegucigalpa Feb. 2, 1993.  
Entered into force Mar. 29, 1993.

Japan
Agreement for the assembly and repair in Japan of the AN/ALQ-131 System 
(Electronic Countermeasures Pod) and related equipment and materials, 
with exchange of letters.  Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Mar. 
12, 1993.  Entered into force Mar. 12, 1993.

Lithuania
Postal money order agreement.  Signed at Vilnius and Washington Jan. 26 
and Feb. 5, 1993.  Enters into force June 1, 1993.

Pakistan
INTELPOST memorandum of understanding, with detailed regulations.  
Signed at Islamabad and Washington Feb. 23 and Mar. 11, 1993.  Entered 
into force Mar. 15, 1993.

Peru
SWAP agreement between the US Treasury and the Government of 
Peru/Central Bank of Peru, with memorandum of understanding.  Signed at 
Washington Mar. 9, 1993.  Entered into force Mar. 9, 1993.

Philippines
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 11, 1991, regarding the 
consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies.  
Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Mar. 4 and 9, 1993.  Entered 
into force Mar. 9, 1993.

Uzbekistan
Investment incentive agreement.  Signed at Tashkent Oct. 28, 1992.  
Entered into force Oct. 28, 1992.

1  Not in force for the US. (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 16

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