US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 15, APRIL 12, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
1.  New Democratic Partnership Between The United States and Russia--
President Clinton, Russian President Yeltsin 
2.  US-Egyptian Search for Peace andStability in the Middle East--
President Clinton, Egyptian President Mubarak
3.  Offensive in Azerbaijan's Kelbajar District
4.  Statement at Confirmation Hearing Of US Ambassador to the United 
Nations--Madeleine K. Albright 
5.  US Assistance to Nicaragua 
6.  View From the UN:  The US Reviews Events Around the World--Richard 
Schifter
7.  Summary of April 1993 International Narcotics Control Report 
8.  UN Security Council Resolutions On Somalia, UNPROFOR
9.  Sixth Report on War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia 
10.  Deputy Secretary Meets With Nigerian Head of Government


ARTICLE 1.  

New Democratic Partnership Between The United States and Russia 
President Clinton, Russian President Yeltsin Opening remarks at a news 
conference following the US-Russian summit in Vancouver, released by the 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Vancouver, Canada, April 4, 
1993

President Clinton:  Good afternoon.  I have just completed 2 days of 
intensely productive discussions with President Boris Yeltsin.  I want 
to join him in thanking Prime Minister Mulroney and the people of Canada 
for their hospitality.  The beauty of Vancouver has inspired our work 
here, and this weekend I believe we have laid the foundation for a new 
democratic partnership between the United States and Russia.

The heroic deeds of Boris Yeltsin and the Russian people launched their 
reforms toward democracy and market economies and defended them 
valiantly during the dark days of August 1991.  Now it is in the self-
interest and the high duty of all the world's democracies to stand by 
Russia's democratic reforms in its new hour of challenge.  The contrast 
between our promising new partnership and our confrontational past 
underscores the opportunities that hang in the balance today.  For 45 
years we pursued a deadly competition in nuclear arms.  Now we can 
pursue a safe and steady cooperation to reduce the arsenals that have 
haunted mankind.  For 45 years our nation invested trillions of dollars 
to contain and deter Soviet communism.  Now the emergence of a peaceful 
and democratic Russia can enable us to devote more to our own domestic 
needs.

The emergence of a newly productive and prosperous Russia could add 
untold billions in new growth to the global economy.  That would mean 
new jobs and new investment opportunities for Americans and our allies 
around the world.  We are investing today not only in the future of 
Russia but in the future of America as well.

Mr. President, our nation will not stand on the sidelines when it comes 
to democracy in Russia.  We know where we stand. We are with Russian 
democracy.  We are with Russian reforms.  We are with Russian markets.  
We support freedom of conscience and speech and religion.  We support 
respect for ethnic minorities. We actively support reform and reformers 
and you in Russia.

The ultimate responsibility for the success of Russia's new course, of 
course, rests with the people of Russia.  It is they who must support 
economic reforms and make them work.  But Americans know that our nation 
has a part to play, too, and we will do so.

In our discussions, President Yeltsin and I reached several important 
agreements on the ways in which the United States and the other major 
industrialized democracies can best support Russian reforms.   

First are programs that can begin immediately.  I discussed with 
President Yeltsin the initiatives totaling $1.6 billion intended to 
bolster political and economic reforms in Russia.  These programs 
already are funded.  They can provide immediate and tangible results for 
the Russian people.

We will invest in the growth of Russia's private sector through two 
funds to accelerate privatization and to lend to new small private 
businesses.  We will resume grain sales to Russia and extend $700 
million in loans for Russia to purchase American grain.  We will launch 
a pilot project to help provide housing and retraining for the Russian 
military officers as they move into jobs in the civilian economy.

Because the momentum for reform must come upward from the Russian 
people, not down from their government, we will expand exchanges between 
American farmers, business people, students, and others with expertise 
working directly with the Russian people.  And we agreed to make a 
special effort to promote American investment, particularly in Russia's 
oil and gas sectors.  To give impetus to this effort, we will ask Vice 
President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to chair a new 
commission on energy and space.

Second, beyond these immediate programs, the President and I agreed that 
our partnership requires broader perspectives and broader cooperative 
initiatives, which I will discuss with  the Congress when I return home.  
We expect to do more than we are announcing today in housing and 
technical assistance, in nuclear safety and cooperation on the 
environment, and in important exchanges.

Third, this challenge we face today is clearly not one for the United 
States and Russia alone.  I have asked our allies in the G-7 [Group of 7 
industrialized nations] to come forward with their own individual 
bilateral initiatives.  Canada and Britain have already done so, and I 
expect others to follow.  President Yeltsin and I also discussed plans 
for the G-7 nations to act together in support of Russia's reforms.  The 
foreign and finance ministers of the G-7 are meeting in Tokyo on April 
14-15.  Coordinated efforts are required to help Russia stabilize its 
economy and its currency.

The President and I agreed that Russia and the G-7 nations must  take 
mutually reinforcing steps to strengthen reform in Russia.  And those 
will be announced on April 14-15.

Beyond these economic initiatives, the President and I discussed a broad 
agenda of cooperation in foreign affairs.  We reaffirmed our commitment 
to safe dismantlement and disposal of nuclear weapons.  We discussed the 
need to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to assure that 
Ukraine, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, ratify the START Treaty 
[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] and accede to the NPT as non-nuclear 
weapons states.  I stress that we want to expand our relationships with 
all the new independent states.

We also agreed to work in concert to help resolve regional crises, to 
stem weapons of proliferation, to protect the global environment, and to 
address common challenges to international peace, such as the tragic 
violence in Bosnia, advancing the promising peace talks we have co-
sponsored in the Mideast, and continuing our cooperation to end the 
regional conflicts of the Cold War era.

Many of the dreams Americans and Russians hold for their children and 
for generations to come rest on the success of Russia's reforms and, 
thus, on the long-term partnerships between our two nations.  Our new 
democratic partnership can make a historic contribution for all humanity 
well into the next century.  Both of us know that it requires effort and 
vigilance to make progress along the path toward democracy's ideal.  And 
I believe we both see those ideas as rooted deeply in the human spirit.

I think of the words of one of the great poets of democracy within our 
own country, Walt Whitman.  In a poem about crossing the East River in 
New York where the Brooklyn Bridge now stands, he commands:  Flow on, 
river; flow on.  Of course, the river hardly required his permission.  
It  has flowed on for centuries, and will continue to, whether old Walt 
Whitman decree[s] it or not.  Yet, he bellowed  his enthusiastic support 
for the river's timeless journey.

Russia's struggle for democracy and America's support are much the same.  
We know that the attraction to freedom that animates democracy flows 
powerfully through the human spirit like a river.  Our words do not 
cause that river to flow, and history has now proven that in the long 
run no tyrant can cause the river to stop.  Yet, we bellow our support 
because it is right and because democracy's river can carry both our 
nations toward a better future.

As we have looked out across the Pacific to the shores of Russia and its 
far east, over the last few days we have committed ourselves anew to 
that journey.  I now return to the United States with a reaffirmed 
commitment to that course and a determination to engage Members of 
Congress in both parties and the American people in a rededication to 
the prospect that a successful and strong and democratic Russia is very 
much in the best interest of America and the world.

President Yeltsin:  First of all, I should like to thank you, Mr. 
President, for your kind words addressed to Russia.  I should like to 
thank Canada's Prime Minister, Mr. Mulroney, for the excellent way in 
which this summit of two Presidents of two great powers was organized.  
I'd like to thank the people of Vancouver for being so hospitable, for 
having so warmly welcomed our delegations and us personally, the 
Presidents.  I should like to thank the journalists, who, it seems to 
me, kept a round-the-clock watch at their posts.

I am fully satisfied by the results and by the spirit and atmosphere of 
my encounter with President Bill Clinton.  It was, in all senses, out of 
the ordinary.  But it was made extraordinary by processes transpiring in 
the United States and Russia, conditioned by [the] very special 
relationships developing between ourselves and Mr. Bill Clinton.  We met 
for the first time yesterday, but became partners back at that meeting 
in Washington.

When Bill Clinton became President, we rapidly established good working 
contacts over the telephone.  We candidly discussed the most intricate 
issues and stated at the outset that there would be [no] pauses in our 
dialogue and that we would rapidly manage to find time to meet and 
establish that right at the beginning, as I say, several months ago.

We had no right to further postpone an encounter in the face of this 
world emerging from a wounded past, its thoughts preoccupied by what has 
occurred in two great countries, the United States and Russia.  We 
immediately found common language in Vancouver, probably because we're 
both businesslike people and, at the same time, to some extent, 
idealists both.

We also believe that freedom, democracy, and freedom of choice for 
people are not mere words and are prepared to struggle for our beliefs.  
We understand that everything that happens in the world is interlinked; 
that cooperation is not concession-making, but a vital necessity, a 
contribution to our future.  At previous meetings, the nation's leaders 
discussed primarily the disassembly of confrontational structures; but 
here in Vancouver, we talked about building the new, laying the 
foundations of a future economy.  This was the first economically 
oriented meeting of the two great powers.  We adopted some signal 
decisions in the interests of the people of the Russian Federation, in 
the interests of the people of the United States of America, in the 
interests of the world's people.

We decided to eliminate discriminatory limitations on trade with Russia.  
We, in fact, said that we were simply hurt. Russia had embarked upon the 
path of democracy, whereas America was still treating us as though we 
were a communist country.  In fact, we're struggling against communism.  
I stated that quite clearly, and Bill Clinton agreed.  We are prepared 
to compete, but compete honestly.  We decided to alter our approach to 
trade in Russian uranium, space technology, [and] access to Russian 
military technology.  We decided to do away with the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment and to resolve other legislative issues.

There is considerably greater interest on the part of American investors 
in the fuel sector in Russian space technology.  We decided to cooperate 
in this area and decided to join forces, the US and Russian 
Administrations. . . .  Bill Clinton's economic package is predicated on 
the fact [that] America wishes to see Russia prosper with a blooming 
economy.  America intends to support Russian entrepreneurs, particularly 
small and medium farmers, Russia's youth.  It's going to cooperate in 
housing construction for the military and in other areas.  All of this 
is in support of Russian reforms, a part of the strategic form of 
cooperation between us, stressed Bill Clinton.

The figure that reflects that cooperation is $1.6 billion.  We're 
looking forward to other steps to be undertaken by the United States of 
America and other major industrial countries to support real reform in 
Russia.

 The linkage between that set of measures and other political measures 
was avoided.  Of course, military and political problems could not [be] 
skirted.  We discussed what might be done to see to it that all 
participants in the Bosnian conflict support the UN position.  Here, our 
positions match as to the main points.  

We devoted quite a lot of attention to problems of non-proliferation.  
We decided to extend our agreements  on the avoidance of accidents, such  
as the near accident involving submarines very recently.  We decided to 
strengthen cooperation between various areas of the military.  All of  
this is reflected in the Vancouver Declaration [and] some of the 
principal elements of that declaration.

Members of our delegation felt that the US side did not appreciate that 
support for Russia had to be timely.  Our partners make it their goal to 
support Russia's reforms, which are not yet yielding major results as 
far [as] ordinary Russians are concerned.

The meeting in Vancouver signals  a shift from general assurances of 
support to Russia to pragmatic, specific, nitty-gritty projects.  What  
we see dominating here are economic and not military strategic issues. . 
. .

Another very important result is that we, with President Bill Clinton, 
did establish some pretty close personal contacts.  Bill Clinton is a 
serious partner.  He is prepared to tackle the major problems 
confronting our two countries in the interest of our two countries, in 
the interest of all free people throughout the world.  I have invited 
Bill Clinton to visit Moscow, to render us an official visit at a time 
convenient to him. (###)


ARTICLE 2.  

US-Egyptian Search for Peace and Stability in the Middle East
President Clinton, Egyptian President Mubarak
Opening remarks at a news conference, released by the White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, April 6, 1993 

President Clinton:  Good morning.  Today, I have the great pleasure of 
welcoming President Mubarak to Washington and to the White House.  We 
have had an excellent meeting, and I look forward to more in the coming 
years as well as to a successful conclusion of our first meeting here at 
lunch after this press conference.

For nearly 2 decades, Egypt and the United States have worked together 
in a special relationship to bring peace and stability to the Middle 
East.  American and Egyptian soldiers have served side by side in 
defeating aggression in the Gulf and in bringing humanitarian relief in 
Somalia.  American and Egyptian diplomats have worked side by side to 
pioneer peace with Israel and, lately, to bring others to the 
negotiating table.

After our discussions today, I am convinced that we share a common 
vision of a more peaceful Middle East, and we are determined to see that 
vision realized.

Egypt has long experience in  peace-making and knows that only 
negotiations can resolve long-standing grievances.  The Egyptian-Israeli 
treaty stands as a cornerstone of our common efforts to attain a just 
and lasting and comprehensive settlement based upon UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.  Our challenge is now to broaden the circle of 
peace, recognizing the principles that underlie the peace process:  
territory for peace, realization of the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people, security for all parties, and full and real peace.

As I have made clear, the United States is prepared to assume the role 
of full partner when the parties themselves return to the negotiating 
table for serious discussions.  We both feel deeply that there is a 
historic opportunity to achieve real progress in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process in 1993.  This opportunity must not be missed.  And all parties 
must live up to their responsibilities for making peace.

We discussed the need to ensure stability in the Gulf.  We're determined 
that the hard-won achievements of [Operation] Desert Storm will be 
protected and that Iraq will comply fully with all relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions.  We're also determined to counter Iran's 
involvement in terrorism and its active opposition to the Middle East 
peace process.

Both our nations have suffered from the tragic consequences of 
terrorism.  Both are absolutely determined to oppose the cowardly 
cruelty of terrorists wherever we can.  We reviewed the common danger 
presented by religious extremism which promotes an intolerant agenda 
through violent means.  We discussed ways of strengthening our 
cooperation in countering this and other forms of terrorism.  We know 
that all Americans, including Americans of all races and all faiths, 
join us in strongly condemning such terrorism.

Mr. President, I know that you have undertaken the difficult task of 
reforming and restructuring your nation's economy to provide for the 
needs of tomorrow.  We have a similar challenge here in the United 
States.  We appreciate the gains that have been made in Egypt as well as 
the bridges that remain to be crossed.  We are impressed by your courage 
and your efforts.

We will continue to work together to stimulate trade, investment, and 
cooperation.  Our economic assistance will continue to support Egypt's 
economic reform program, including privatization, and Egypt's 
cooperation with international financial institutions.

We are fast approaching a new century.  This is perhaps less of a 
milestone for Egypt--which has, after all, 7,000 years of recorded 
history--than it is for our relatively young country.  I told the 
President on the way up that every President of the United States since 
1800 had lived in the White House, and he looked at me as if it were a 
drop in the bucket of time.

But even taking the longest view, this is a critical period for the 
Middle East--the crucible of much of our common spiritual heritage.  For 
the Middle East, the year 1993 can determine whether the new century is 
consumed by old enmities or used to unlock the human and material 
potential of the people.  Our historic mission is to make this a year of 
peace, and  I am delighted to have President Mubarak as a partner in 
pursuing this mission.

President Mubarak:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I was very pleased to 
meet with President Clinton today.  Our meeting was very positive and 
productive.  In a spirit of friendship and mutual confidence, we 
explored the problems and opportunities [that] our two nations are 
facing.  I emphasized  to [the] President that it is of utmost 
importance to our region to reach a just and comprehensive settlement 
between Israel and all her Arab neighbors, including the Palestinian 
people.

Such a settlement should be raised on Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338 and the principle of land for peace and realizing the national 
rights of the Palestinians.  We believe that Egypt and the United States 
have a crucial role to play in order to allow the peace negotiations to 
reach a successful conclusion.  Together, we can make the ends meet and 
bridge the existing gaps.

Equally important is the task of removing the remaining obstacles, 
especially that of the deportees.  I was pleased to hear from President 
Clinton that significant progress has been [made] on this issue and that 
he recognizes the importance of the Middle East peace talks.  He is 
committed to the influence of the United States to achieve meaningful 
progress in these talks when they are resumed on April 20.  We are 
confident that the negotiations will proceed smoothly and successfully.

Beyond the peace process, we discussed a wide range of regional issues 
of common concern to our two countries.  We stressed our concern  for 
the stability of the Gulf region and the need for full compliance with 
the relevant Security Council resolutions.  No country of that region 
should doubt our firm commitment to help preserve the security, 
stability, and territorial integrity of all friendly states.  Similarly, 
we are doing all that we can to stop the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction in the Middle East.  As you are certainly aware, Egypt has 
submitted a plan for making the area free of all weapons of mass 
destruction.  We shall pursue this goal with vigor and determination.

On the global front, I offered to work closely with the President for  
the purpose of making the world more human and equitable; a world where 
opportunity and hope exists for all and where people learn to accept 
divergences and employ diversity for the benefit of mankind.

I am making this appeal because  I am alarmed by the refusal of some 
elements in the different societies to accept the diversity and the 
coexistence.  This has resulted in unprecedented atrocities and 
suffering in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The world cannot tolerate the 
savage practices which are committed under the ugly slogan of ethnic 
cleansing and purification.  It is against all human values to see such 
claims emerge at the threshold of the 21st century.

Unfortunately, violence is increasingly being used by certain misguided 
elements in many parts of the world, including the Middle East.  Acute 
social and economic problems are being exploited in order to breed 
violence and anarchy.  At the same time, foreign countries are 
interfering in the domestic affairs of other nations under false 
pretext.  All civilized nations are called upon to fight the spirit of 
violence and terrorism everywhere, for this is a threat to the existence 
and future of humanity.  No country is immune or distant from that 
danger.

In Egypt, we are coping with the phenomena through a comprehensive 
program which deals with the roots and the causes of the problem.  We 
have embarked on an ambitious economic reform program.  Parallel with 
this, we are enforcing our democratic system, solidifying the protection 
of the human rights.  Our goal is to improve the quality of life for 
every Egyptian with equal determination.  We are confronting foreign 
plots and attempted intervention.

Having said this, I would like to assure you all that Egypt is not in 
danger.  The image which has been projected by the media lately is 
rather exaggerated.  As well as [we] all know, violence makes instant 
news, but the real story is our confidence, our unity, and our growing 
success in facing this problem.  The Egyptian people will not accept any 
challenge to their tradition of friendship with other nations and 
hospitality to our visitors.  We will remain true to our culture of 
resolving problems peacefully and defeating the forces of violence and 
aggression.  Let the whole world know that Egypt is as strong as ever 
and that its leadership is firm and confident.

Mr. President, as I told you, Egypt is a country which values its 
excellent relations with the United States.  Let me take this 
opportunity to express our deep appreciation for the support and 
assistance we are receiving from the United States.  This aid is crucial 
to the success of our reform program.

We would like to assure a friendly welcome to all Americans who visit 
us.  We encourage the American business community to invest in our 
economy.  The climate for investment has become very favorable following 
the steps [that] we took in the past few years on the road to economic 
reform.

Our budget deficit has been reduced from 18% of the GDP in 1990 to 3.5% 
this year.  The foreign exchange market has been deregulated, and our 
foreign currency reserves have reached record levels.  Trade is being 
liberalized, and the balance in payment is showing steady improvement.  
After registering a deficit of $2.6 billion in 1990, it now shows a 
surplus of about  $3 billion.

President Clinton, our discussion today affirmed a broad identity of 
interest over a wide range of issues.  We have developed a full agenda 
of cooperation for the future.  I want to thank you for your 
understanding and your enthusiastic response.  I fully appreciate your 
warm welcome and extend to the American people my best wishes for 
success and fulfillment.  I look forward to working closely with you 
during the months ahead for our common goals.  And I extend to you an 
invitation to visit Egypt at your earliest convenience.   (###)


ARTICLE 3.  

Offensive in Azerbaijan's Kelbajar District Statement by Secretary 
Christopher, released by the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, April 6, 1993.

Last week's offensive by ethnic Armenian forces in the Kelbajar district 
of Azerbaijan has threatened efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict peacefully and has created additional suffering for the 
innocent civilian population of the region.  The US Government condemns 
this offensive and has expressed its deep concern about the offensive to 
the highest level of the Government of Armenia and to representatives of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.  We have called for the prompt and 
complete withdrawal of all ethnic Armenian forces from the Kelbajar 
district.

The US Government remains convinced that the CSCE [Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe]-sponsored Minsk Group negotiations 
remain the best hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  We call 
upon all parties to the conflict to refrain from seeking a military 
solution and to return in good faith to the negotiating table.  (###)


ARTICLE 4.  

Statement at Confirmation Hearing of US Ambassador to the United Nations
Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative-designate to the 
United Nations
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
January 21, 1993 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms, and distinguished members of the committee, 
I am most honored to appear before you today as President Clinton's 
nominee to be the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations.  At 
this time of turmoil and hope, this assignment is a major challenge.

When the President announced my appointment last month, he said that, in 
his Administration, the post of ambassador to the United Nations will be  
one of the most critical foreign policy positions.  He said that never 
before  in its history has the United Nations faced greater challenges 
or opportunities.  With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations is 
poised to play a central and positive role for peace.  He also said that 
his representative at the United Nations must understand how to seize 
these challenges and how to direct America's leadership to promote and 
advance our goals.  The position  of the American representative at the 
United Nations is strengthened greatly when the President indicates his 
full support so clearly.

The role of the US Permanent Representative at the United Nations is 
also strengthened when it has the support of Congress.  Many of you know 
that I spent a number of years  up here working for a great chairman, 
Senator Muskie.  I also spent 3 years  on the National Security Council 
staff, coordinating legislation and working with many of you and your 
staffs.

I respect the role of Congress in the foreign policymaking process.  
And, in fact, many of my friends say that I have a Hill perspective.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher spoke with you last week about the three pillars of the 
Clinton Administration foreign policy:  economic security, military 
strength, and promoting democracy and free markets abroad.  These are 
the themes that then-candidate Clinton enunciated so frequently during 
the campaign and, again, at Georgetown University on Monday [see 
Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 57].

It will be the duty of those of us involved in the conduct of the 
Administration's foreign policy to make sure that the President's goals 
are carried out.  I believe that each of them can and will be pursued at 
the United Nations.  In fact, they are compatible with the changing 
priorities of that institution in the fields of collective security, 
humanitarian relief, sustainable development, and the promotion  of 
democracy.

History will record that the end  of the Cold War has marked a new 
beginning for the United Nations.  Every day we witness the United 
Nations taking on the most intractable problems of the new era.  We 
should take great pride in the accomplishments of Ambassadors Pickering 
and Perkins during the last 4 years and  the positive contributions of 
the Bush Administration.

The United Nations is on the verge of becoming the institution that its 
founders foresaw in 1945.  With essential American support, the United 
Nations is useful, it is at the center of debate, and it is working to 
build peace and security in a fractured world.

The growing scope of the United Nations' efforts is truly remarkable.  
Today, more than 50,000 peace-keepers participate in 13 peace-keeping 
and observer missions ranging from Somalia and Cambodia to the former 
Yugoslavia.  Eight of these 13 missions have been launched since 1989.

The United Nations is also helping to promote democracy and defend human 
rights in Central America, Africa, and Asia.  The new UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development will oversee an ambitious global environmental 
agenda.

One dramatic way to measure increased UN activity is to note that last 
year, the Security Council met more than twice as often as the previous 
year and adopted 74 resolutions, 32 more than in 1991.  And may I say 
that none of those resolutions were frivolous.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am firmly convinced that, 
today, we are witnessing the best chance for fulfilling the United 
Nations' original mission.  Written in 1945, the Charter calls upon us 
to join with the peoples of the United Nations, 

. . . to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, to establish conditions 
under which justice and respect for international law can be maintained, 
and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom.

Those who wrote the Charter were ahead of their time.  We not only need 
to fulfill their dreams but also to make this international organization 
face the challenges of the next century.  And if we do not do it today, 
we may not have another opportunity.

As I appear here today before you for my confirmation hearing, it is not 
good enough for me to show only how important the United Nations is to 
us;  it is also important for you to know that I see the imperfections 
and the many problems of the institution.  The United Nations remains 
bogged down by an unwieldy and inefficiently administered staff, 
overlapping responsibilities, and a financial crisis.

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, a tireless diplomat for peace, sees the 
problems.  If more and more nations are inclined to say, let the United 
Nations do it, and, at the same time, do not push for comprehensive 
reform and build a sound financial base, then the United Nations stands 
in peril of collapsing under the weight of the new burdens placed upon 
it.

The United States must be fully engaged in bringing the United Nations 
into the 21st century.  Many of you have led the fight for reform, and I 
intend to continue working with you very hard to achieve the efficiency 
you have called for in the organization's work.

I must say, however, that there is a fine line between the leverage 
gained by withholding funds in anticipation of reform and losing 
credibility because you owe so much money.  The time has arrived to pay 
our outstanding obligations to the United Nations and enable it to bear 
the burdens of the multilateral era.

As a professor of international relations and president of the Center 
for National Policy, I have spent a great deal of time describing and 
analyzing the past.  Our 45-year struggle with communism is over.  
Ironically, there was much more certainty in that period than there is 
about the current one.  There is even less certainty about the future.  
Perhaps this is why we are having such a hard time naming the new period 
and keep referring to it as the post-Cold War era.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is time to think of this period more in terms 
of where we are going than where we have been.  We should feel ourselves 
privileged to be among those who will be defining the role of the United 
States in a historical period, comparable to the other great watershed 
times when new international systems were created, such as in 1815, 
1918, and 1945.

As we look  at what must be done in 1993, we face two dynamic and 
seemingly contradictory forces.  On the one hand, there are powerful 
forces of integration.  However, arrayed against these forces of 
integration are the forces of fragmentation and division.  The dual 
challenge of this new era is how to harness the emerging realization 
that nations must cooperate to solve common problems and use that 
cooperative spirit to curb the excesses of long-suppressed nationalism.

While we Americans are, in many respects, guardians of the principle of 
self-determination, we also bear special responsibility for 
international peace and security.  It will be at the United Nations that 
we either fuse these two challenges into a more peaceful world or lose 
the struggle and set ourselves adrift in a chaotic one.

The other challenge we face is  to make sure that the work of the United 
Nations is not isolated from  our domestic agenda, for it impinges  so 
directly on Americans' daily lives.  So I join with Secretary 
Christopher in assuring you that we will work to explain the stakes of 
our foreign policy to the American people in an effort to make foreign 
policy less foreign.

While the United Nations is a very important part of all our lives, for 
me, the United Nations has an even more personal connection.  As I said 
in Little Rock--and again, today--a few weeks ago, my family would not 
have been in the United States had it not been for the United Nations.

My father, a Czechoslovak diplomat, was a member of the first UN 
Commission for India and Pakistan.  Shortly after he was chosen for that 
post in February 1948, there was a communist coup in Czechoslovakia.   
My mother, sister, and brother, who are also here with me today, and I 
came to the United States.  And while our father traveled in India and 
Pakistan and Kashmir, we came to the United States.  He completed his 
work, and then he joined us.  Shortly thereafter, he asked for political 
asylum.  Thanks to the generosity of the American people, we had an 
opportunity to grow up as free Americans.

The fact remains that I am literally a child of the Cold War.  Born in 
Czechoslovakia, I came to this country because my parents realized that 
life under communism was intolerable.  I, therefore, as much as anyone, 
celebrated the fall of the Berlin Wall and, most especially, the Velvet 
Revolution of Vaclav Havel.  But ever since 1989, I have spoken often 
about the danger of sitting on our laurels.

The end of the Cold War has resulted in historic arms control agreements 
and, most especially, START II [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty].  The 
people of the United States feel much safer.  But the prob- lem is that 
for many of those living  in other countries, the world is a more 
dangerous place.  I believe that this generation has an inescapable 
responsibility to build a peaceful world and to put an end to the 
abominable injustices and conditions that still plague civilization at 
the advent of the 21st century:  aggression against nations, genocide, 
famine, ethnic cleansing, mass torture and rape, vast upheavals of 
people, environmental degradation, pervasive discrimination against and 
oppression of women and children, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and the denial of real freedom to so many.

And while President Clinton has reminded us that America cannot and 
should not bear the world's burdens alone, he also believes that the 
Gulf conflict and the humanitarian relief operation in Somalia 
demonstrate the best of what the United Nations' founders had in mind 48 
years ago:  With our international partners, we have confronted 
aggression by outlaw governments and restored hope to those in need.

Members of the committee, there is another kind of partnership I want to 
touch on today.  As I visited with many of you, a process which I have 
enjoyed thoroughly, I was reassured by your comments and your agreement 
that this is a crucial period for the United Nations and, thus, for all 
of us.

If confirmed, I intend to strengthen the ties between the United Nations 
and Congress by opening my offices in New York and Washington to you, 
[and] by inviting as many of you as possible to New York, perhaps as 
delegates or to observe the work that is going on there.  I plan to 
build cooperative relations between our staffs.  I will consider getting 
your advice and criticism to be an integral part of my job.

As a member of President Clinton's Cabinet, I will weigh in with my own 
view during White House deliberation, but knowing your views will be an 
essential factor in my own decision-making process and in the advice 
that  I give [to] the President.

At the time of the founding of the United Nations, our foreign policy 
was characterized by bipartisanship.  And as I listened to your opening 
statements and questions during Secretary Christopher's hearing, I was 
struck by the historic significance of that session.  Although it was 
possible to note some disagreement, there was remarkable agreement on 
the major issues of the day.  We have an exceptional opportunity to 
forge a strong and much-needed bipartisan policy for the years ahead.

I hope and expect to appear before you frequently.  I am sure that you 
will continue to ask me how our money is spent, and I will continue to 
ask you to pay our bills.  I can assure you that I will not only get 
whatever information you want, but I will also push for the necessary 
reforms.  But, most of all, be assured that as I vote in the Security 
Council, converse with other delegates, and travel the country to 
explain the policies of the United Nations to the American people, I 
will always be the US ambassador to the United Nations and not the UN 
ambassador to the United States.  In other words, I will not succumb to 
that disease known as clientitis.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in my years out of 
government, I have theorized about the role that the United States can 
and should play during this crucial period.  The power that we have had 
as a nation comes from our ability to look into the future and to be on 
the side of change.  We need to harness this power today for our work at 
the United Nations.  I am very aware of the enormous challenges that lie 
ahead.

President Clinton has called for a new covenant with the American 
people.  I believe that we should work to extend his vision and call for 
a new covenant among nations, one that recognizes and respects the 
diversity  of the world in which we live as well as our common needs and 
aspirations.  With your help, we can succeed in building that new 
covenant.  Thank you very much.  (###)


ARTICLE 5.  

US Assistance to Nicaragua
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, April 
2, 1993.

This morning in Paris at the meeting  of the Consultative Group of 
International Aid Donors for Nicaragua, the US delegation announced the 
release of  $50 million in previously appropriated  FY 1992 assistance.  
Before taking  the decision to release this money,  we conducted 
extensive and useful consultations with the US Congress.

The Government of President Violeta Chamorro is taking a number of 
steps, at the urging of the United States, to address issues that are 
vital to the consolidation of democracy and to Nicaragua's ability to 
attract aid and private investment.  Nicaragua also is making important 
strides in cutting the size of its army and in reforming the Nicaraguan 
economy, particularly in bringing hyperinflation down to single-digit 
levels and in opening up the foreign trade sector.

Nicaragua needs our assistance to continue on its path of economic 
reform and reconstruction of the country.  At the same time, it is clear 
to us that more progress needs to be made in these and other areas for 
Nicaragua to win the support of the Administration and Congress for 
continued economic assistance.

Some of the significant steps which have led to this decision are:

--  Extending the mandate of the Tripartite Commission (OAS 
[Organization of American States]/government/church) to investigate 
violations of human rights and recommend corrective measures;

--  Suspending police officers and others named by the Tripartite 
Commission for violating human rights;

--  Requesting a 2-year extension of the OAS civilian mission (CIAV 
[Central American Verification Commission]) with a broadened mandate to 
monitor human rights throughout Nicaragua;

--  Establishing adequate procedures for resolving property claims of US 
citizens and others--this includes an arbitration system which meets 
international standards and a new compensation mechanism funded by some 
of the proceeds of the privatization program; and

--  Calling for a dialogue with political parties to address 
polarization and the issue of civilian control of the police and 
military.  (###)


ARTICLE 6.  

View From the UN:  The US Reviews Events Around the World
Richard Schifter, Head of the US Delegation to the UN Human Rights 
Commission
Statement before the 49th session of the UN Human Rights Commission, 
Geneva, Switzerland, March 3, 1993 

Mr. Chairman, the very first rights spelled out in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are the rights to life, liberty, and 
security of person.  As we look at the human rights developments of the 
past year, we must recognize the sad fact that intergroup conflicts, 
based on ethnic, religious, or even clan differences have, in many parts 
of the world, deprived millions of people of these fundamental rights.

We have, rightfully, spent a great deal of time discussing the 
atrocities which have been recently committed in the former Yugoslavia.  
But, as is often the case, we tend to follow the media.  They cover 
Yugoslavia.  It took some time before they covered Somalia.  They seem 
to have forgotten Afghanistan, and they have yet to discover Rwanda.

The danger of a nuclear holocaust [and] the risk of the destruction of 
the human race, which some members sought to debate in this commission 
some years ago, has fortunately been significantly reduced.  But, in 
place of the political struggle which once consumed our attention, we 
face now, in many parts of the world, the death, victimization, and 
destruction brought about by intergroup hatred.

As we examine the manner in which governments respond to this 
phenomenon, we can note that there are those which take measures against 
it and thus respond effectively.  Then there are those [governments] 
which simply do not know how to handle the problem which besets them.  
And there are governments which exacerbate the problem by inciting the 
dominant ethnic group against persons of other ethnicity who live in the 
same country.  The latter, I submit, are invariably governments which 
repress all of their own people.  History has demonstrated that 
governments which mistreat their own people are likely to deal even more 
harshly with those whom they deem to be strangers, whether they live in 
their midst or are their neighbors.

The United States has a new, young, and energetic President, who 
strongly believes that words must be followed by action.  He has, in 
recent days, come before the country to tell the American people that we 
have serious problems and that their solution requires hard work and 
sacrifice.

During the course of the political campaign, our President also made 
clear his commitment to the cause of democracy, human rights, and to 
multilateralism.  The new Administration deeply believes in the ideals 
set forth in the UN Charter and looks for their realization.

But in the UN system and, more particularly, in the UN Human Rights 
Commission, too, institutional reform is desperately needed.  There is 
no doubt that, over the years, we have registered accomplishments.  But 
are there not problems in the vast area of human rights which have 
remained unaffected by our activities?  Should it not be a challenge to 
us to identify those worldwide human rights problems which we have 
ignored but which we could help solve if we were able to begin to deal 
with them?

There are those who say that different cultures view human rights 
differently and that the Universal Declaration represents the views of 
only one culture.  Persons from different cultures undoubtedly see some 
human rights issues differently.  Yet, are there not a great many 
experiences in life which are common to all humankind?  Does the mother 
in Sarajevo whose son has been killed in intergroup violence grieve any 
more than the mother in Kigali [Rwanda]?  Can  a native of Baghdad 
accept torture more readily than a native of, say, Copenhagen?  Is a 
native of Havana culturally better endowed to accept police spying than 
a native of Madrid?  Is a native of Beijing more willing to accept 
imprisonment for the mere expression of his views than a native  of 
London?

In years past, the question on which I have just touched, namely, that 
of different views of human rights, was debated in this commission along 
the East-West divide.  After that divide had disappeared, I had occasion 
to meet one of the persons with whom I had once engaged in verbal jousts 
in this commission.  His first statement to me was:  "You knew all along 
that I did not believe a word I was saying--didn't you?"

So, let us put aside the artificial arguments which have been advanced 
in this post-Cold War period about North versus South, about Christian 
culture against non-Christian cultures, and let us agree on the simple 
fact that we are all members of the human race, that there are goals in 
the field of human rights that we all wish to attain, and that we should 
unite in our efforts to reach those goals.

To those who contend that the principles of the Universal Declaration 
have relevance only to Europe and North America, let me offer a historic 
reminder.  About 700 years ago, many of the basic principles which we 
now treat as human rights were recognized by the citizens of three 
communities not far from here:  Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden--the 
nucleus of the country which is now known as Switzerland.  It is 
conceivable that members of the court of the Holy Roman Emperor said at 
that time that, if the rights claimed by these people of courage have 
any validity at all, they are appropriate only to the Swiss mountains 
and have no relevance to life elsewhere, most surely not to the rest of 
Europe.  And what may have been said about the relevance of democratic 
thought and human rights principles to England under Henry VIII, to 
France under Louis XIV, or to the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin?

Concern has also been expressed about the inter-relationship between 
political and economic development.  It is the view of a good many, 
including the United States, that the two forms of development go hand 
in hand.  But there are also those who contend that economic development 
must precede political development.

The evidence is to the contrary.  If there ever was a test tube 
experiment in this field, it was that offered by West and East Germany.  
A politically free West Germany produced one of the world's strongest 
economies, and a politically unfree East Germany lagged far behind.

In East Asia, we can find in North Korea the world's most oppressive 
dictatorship, a society reminiscent of the nightmare vision of George 
Orwell in his novel 1984.  Today, North Korea is an economic basket 
case.  The Republic of Korea, by contrast, has evolved both politically 
and economically.  It is now a full-fledged democracy which also enjoys 
an increasingly higher standard of living.

Throughout the world, we can note that governments which are not 
controlled by the people and are not called to account by a free press 
have put into place counterproductive economic policies, or have 
expended foreign assistance funds improvidently, or have lined the 
pockets of their leaders with the money which belongs to the people or 
wasted it on unnecessary military expenditures.

The conclusion we can draw from the foregoing is that economic 
assistance may, indeed, be needed in many places to spur economic 
development.  But one way of assuring that the assistance will be well 
used is to improve governance.  There are a few countries that may have 
been able to develop economically under the guidance of a benevolent 
autocrat.    But most autocrats tend to be erratic and greedy, retarding 
development.  Accountability of a leadership produces the best assurance 
of economic evolution.

Earlier in this intervention, I made the point that human rights 
problems exist almost everywhere and that some governments are 
succeeding in resolving them, some governments want to resolve them but 
have been unable  to do so, and some governments are, indeed, an 
integral part of the problem.

It is to the second category, Mr. Chairman, that this commission and  
the UN system should devote more attention.  These governments should 
not be castigated.  They need to be helped.  The UN system, which 
expends substantial funds on programs and projects of questionable 
value, should reset its priorities and should focus attention on what it 
can do to assist countries which seek such assistance, in efforts to 
ameliorate human rights problems.

That human rights problems can be resolved through political will and 
the application of resources has been demonstrated time and again.  In 
my own country, the practice of pressing confessions out of persons 
under arrest was, by and large, brought to an end when our courts simply 
refused to accept such confessions.  In Mexico, President Salinas has, 
in recent years, demonstrated the political will  to change practices in 
police stations throughout his country.  The Mexican Human Rights 
Commission, under the outstanding and courageous leadership of Judge 
Jorge Carpizo, who has recently moved on to the position of Attorney 
General, has made enormous strides in carrying out the President's 
mandate.  Experiences of this kind can and should be shared with 
countries whose governments do not wish to see torture practiced but 
find it difficult to prevent it.  We need to explore the role which the 
Human Rights Center could play, under an appropriate mandate from the 
commission, to enable countries to share their experiences in the 
resolution of human rights problems.  As we look to the future, this 
can, indeed, be one of the most important program goals for this 
commission.

We also need to recognize that international controversies have now been 
replaced in large part by intra-national disputes.  Just as the United 
Nations has applied itself to international controversies, it can and 
should apply itself to what is now the most common cause of human rights 
deprivations:  intergroup controversies which result in acts of 
violence.  There are many situations in which outsiders, particularly 
outsiders coming under the UN flag, might be better able to act as 
mediators than do persons who come from the country beset with 
intergroup rivalry.  Furthermore, there are educational programs which 
governments could be encouraged to institute in the schools to overcome 
hatred and antagonisms based on intergroup differences in race, 
ethnicity, or religion.  Here, too, the Human Rights Center, acting 
under the commission's leadership, could play a highly significant role.

But, as I noted earlier, the fact that many governments which practice 
repression as official policy have been replaced does not mean that that 
phenomenon has vanished from the earth.  It is, therefore, necessary for 
this commission to send a message to these governments that the 
international community remains deeply concerned about these practices, 
as well as a message of hope to the citizens of those countries who now 
are  the victims of repression.

The reports laid before us by the rapporteurs on Burma, Cuba, Iran, and 
Iraq describe systems which differ from each other in detail but which 
have a common result:  that of creating an all-pervasive climate of fear 
in those countries.  No citizen, be he ever so humble and politically 
disinterested, can escape it.  Big Brother is always watching, and even 
minor deviations from prescribed standards of behavior can be severely 
punished.  Intimidation, denial of economic and educational 
opportunities, torture, long-term imprisonment, and even summary and 
arbitrary execution, or execution or imprisonment on trumped-up charges 
are among the measures these countries resort to to keep their people in 
check.  We must once again draw attention to this state of affairs and 
urge once again that these forms of repression be brought to an end.

In Burma, the 1991 Nobel Peace [Prize] winner, Aung San Suu Kyi, remains 
under house arrest.  One thousand, two hundred political prisoners were 
arrested in 1992.  An estimated 1,000 political prisoners remain in 
prison in early 1993.

In addition to opposition political leaders, ethnic minorities--
especially in border regions--have been persecuted by the Burmese 
military.  Over 270,000 Muslim refugees from Burma's Arakan State have 
fled to Bangladesh, charging persecution, forced labor, and rape by the 
Burmese military.  About 70,000 Karen and other refugees fled  to the 
Thai border in 1992.  Over 1,000 Nagas have sought refuge in India.

As the special rapporteur's report on Cuba documents, the price for 
advocating political change in that country is imprisonment.  Yndamiro 
Restano, chairman of the Harmony Movement, was sentenced last year  to 
10 years of confinement.  Marco Antonio Abad, Jorge Crespo Diaz, and 
Maria Elena Cruz Varela are paying the price for free artistic 
expression with years in jail; they have seen their works labeled "enemy 
propaganda"  and their freedom taken away by the Cuban state.  The price 
for forming  a human rights group in Cuba is a government-organized mob 
surrounding your home, breaking down your door, and beating you 
senseless.  Gustavo Arcos, Aida Valdez, Elizardo Sanchez, and other 
respected human rights advocates experienced this first-hand only a few 
months ago on UN Human Rights Day.  The special rapporteur's report 
identifies dozens  of other Cubans in prison for purely political 
crimes, and more that have been threatened, harassed, or fired from 
their jobs because of their beliefs.  The existence of Cuba's 
omnipresent security apparatus underlines the fear the Cuban Government 
has of permitting free and fair elections, the right of assembly, or 
even the visit of the UN envoy.

In Iran, the government continues to execute political opponents and to 
carry out assassinations of its opponents residing abroad, most 
recently, for example, the killings in September 1992, of four Iranian 
Kurdish dissidents in Berlin.  A prominent adherent of the Baha'i 
religion, Bahman Samandari, was summarily executed in March 1992.

Detainees are routinely tortured, and arbitrary brutalization of 
prisoners is common, including by suspension for long periods in 
contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, and severe and repeated 
beating with cables or other instruments on the back and on the soles of 
the feet.  Baha'is continue to face arbitrary arrest, detention, and 
other forms of persecution.

In Iraq, the regime's abysmal record on human rights continues to 
affront civilized people.  It has imposed a full embargo, including food 
and medicine, against its three northern provinces.  Particularly 
flagrant abuses include military operations against noncombatant Shi'a 
civilians in southern Iraq, in which hundreds and probably thousands of 
innocents, including children, were killed last year.  Many others were 
arrested, removed from the area, and killed.  Helicopter gunships 
participated in attacks against civilians until stopped by the 
imposition of the no-fly zone under UN Security Council Resolution 688.  
Hundreds of political prisoners have been killed at the Al-Radwaniya 
Prison near Baghdad last spring, and many others have been tortured in 
Iraq's prison system.  Young women are sometimes raped in order to 
blackmail them into becoming informants or as a form of degradation.

We also need to call attention to the situation in Sudan.  In Sudan, 
summary executions, arbitrary detentions, and torture continue, much of 
it carried out in incommunicado detention houses.  In Juba last July, 
government troops reportedly killed several hundred unarmed civilians 
and arrested hundreds more following a rebel attack  on the city.  More 
than 100 of those arrested still remain unaccounted for.  In Nuba 
Province, tens of thousands of civilians were forcibly relocated from 
their homes in 1992 to desolate areas in northern Kordofan; many died or 
disappeared during the move.  Hundred of thousands more were forcibly 
removed from Khartoum to inadequate camps outside the city.  Reports 
indicate that massive relocations are continuing in 1993, as is 
indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations.  International relief 
organizations continue to be denied access to much  of the population in 
desperate need  of assistance.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, while we welcome the recent announcement of early 
release from prison of several well-known political dissidents, hundred 
of others--if not more--continue to languish in Chinese jails.  We note 
that, contrary to China's recent public assertions, not all the student 
leaders involved in the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations have been 
released.  Student leader Liu Gang, for instance, remains in a prison 
labor camp in the northeast of China.  According to one report, during a 
hunger strike in 1992 to protest prison conditions, his arm was broken 
by prison officials trying to force feed him.

Today in China, political and religious dissidents continue to be 
arrested, tried, and sent to prison.  Conditions in Chinese penal 
institutions are harsh and frequently degrading.  There are numerous 
reports of prisoners being denied adequate medical care despite serious 
health problems.  Basic human rights standards thus continue to be 
ignored.

 Mr. Chairman, it is a particular honor for me to be sitting next to 
Sergei Kovalev, a true hero of the Soviet Union.  Ten years ago, I 
recited his name in this hall as we called for the release of Soviet 
prisoners of conscience.  None of us would have dreamed that the day was 
not distant when Sergei Kovalev would be with us as a colleague, as 
leader of the delegation of the Russian Federation.  His presence among 
us today is vivid proof of the value of our work.

Mr. Chairman, by sending our message to these oppressive governments, we 
are also sending a message to the oppressed people of these countries.  
Our message tells them  of our concern.  It should also be a message of 
hope along the lines of a song from the Nazi concentration camps for 
political prisoners of 60 years ago.  The last lines from that song, the 
song of the peatbog soldiers, go like this:  "But for us there's no 
complaining, winter will in time be past.  One day we shall cry, 
rejoicing:  'Homeland, you are mine at last.' "  (###)


ARTICLE 7.  

Summary of April 1993 International Narcotics Control Report

Following is the text of the executive summary of the International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, dated April 1993.  The full report 
was released by the Department of State's Bureau of International 
Narcotics Matters (INM) and is available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, US Government Printing Office (stock no. 044-000-02370-9).  
It also is available electronically through GPO's Federal Bulletin Board 
(see inside back cover for more details).

In 1992, despite some setbacks, the international anti-drug effort 
gained further strength, forcing a highly adaptable international drug 
trade to shift tactics and operations.  Under the leadership of the 
United States, more countries have joined the battle against the drug 
trade in earnest.  Closer coordination between governments--particularly 
in training and police enforcement activities; increasingly effective 
multilateral action against money-laundering and essential and precursor 
chemicals; as well as continuing reforms of national legal regimes to 
meet the requirements of the 1988 UN Convention [Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances] have kept the major drug-
trafficking organizations on the defensive.

There has also been some inevitable bad news.  Despite stepped-up 
programs, hundreds of tons of cocaine and heroin continue to flow to the 
United States and to Europe, while consumption rises in Latin America.  
The Western Hemisphere's most notorious cocaine trafficker, Pablo 
Escobar, still on the loose after his July 1992 escape from a Medellin 
[Colombia] prison, has launched a campaign of terror and violence.  
While Peru's coca cultivation has remained stable over the past  2 years 
in areas where the government has control, growers have begun planting 
coca in isolated areas less accessible to the authorities.  As a result, 
the crop may be expanding.  In Europe and Central Asia, the breakup of 
the old Soviet empire has opened new frontiers for venturesome drug-
traffickers, as the free market economy offers the potential of new drug 
markets in the former Soviet states.  There are reports that ethnically 
based smuggling rings from the Baltics to Kazakhstan are gearing up to 
cash in on the heroin flowing abundantly from Southeast and Southwest 
Asia.

If there appears to be a loss for every gain in the drug war, it is 
largely because an annual review looks at progress in a relatively 
narrow slice of time and tends to obscure long-term progress.  Long-term 
gains such as stronger anti-drug cooperation between governments, 
reduction of drug crops, tightening of money-laundering restrictions, 
and curbing chemical shipments do not always make exciting reading.  Yet 
the drug trade knows that without a steady source of drugs, money, and 
chemicals, it cannot long survive.  More than anything, trafficking 
organizations fear concerted action across borders by governments 
committed to attack the grower-to-user chain at every link.  It is in 
these areas that there has been progress in the international anti-drug 
effort; it is also in these areas where greater efforts need to be made.  

Close cooperation at the highest levels between the United States and 
the governments of the major drug-producing and transit countries in the 
Western Hemisphere has intensified pressure on the cartels.  The 
February 1992 San Antonio [Texas] drug summit broadened the multilateral 
cooperation initiated at the earlier Cartagena [Colombia] summits by 
linking the Andean nations, Mexico, and the United States against the 
trafficking organizations.  There is now an acknowledged community of 
interest at the highest level of the key drug-affected governments.  
Multilateral air control operations between the US Government and Andean 
governments, as well as bilateral counter-narcotics assistance programs 
with all the front-line drug countries, are forcing traffickers to delay 
shipments and switch transportation methods and routes more frequently 
to stay in business.  Fewer seizures in 1992 of multi-ton air shipments 
of cocaine suggest that trafficking organizations may now be relying 
more heavily on sea and land transport to move cocaine to the United 
States.

Unlike other illicit drugs which grow in almost all regions of the 
globe, significant coca cultivation is confined to Peru (61%), Bolivia 
(21%), and Colombia (18%).  In 1992, for the third successive year, 
overall coca cultivation has been kept from expanding.  One should bear 
in mind that until 1989,  the Andean coca crop had been increasing 
annually at a rate of 10% to 20%, despite active crop suppression 
programs.  Without these, coca cultivation probably would have doubled.  
At the end of 1992, an estimated 211,700 ha [hectares] of coca were 
under cultivation, the same amount estimated to be growing in 1990.  
While this number is 3% higher than last year's estimate of 206,000 ha, 
it falls within the statistical margin of error of the estimating 
process.  

This leveling off is particularly important in light of Peru's  
unwillingness to attack coca fields in the insurgent-infested Upper 
Huallaga Valley, Bolivia's inability to meet its coca eradication quota, 
and Colombia's decision to divert suppression resources in part from 
coca to its rapidly expanding opium poppy fields.  Even with such 
impediments, the major coca-producing countries have managed to hold 
down the spread of coca.  This indicates growing political commitment on 
the part of the governments of those countries.

Chemical Controls
An important area in which the international community is making 
progress is the control of the chemicals necessary for drug refining.  
Without adequate supplies of chemicals such as ether and acetic 
anhydride, coca leaf and opium gum cannot be transformed into cocaine or 
heroin.  For this reason, regulation of legitimate commerce to deny 
traffickers the chemicals they need is one of the most valuable tools in 
the battle against drug criminals.

The US Government has been a pioneer in organizing an international 
effort to keep such chemicals from the drug trade.  The US-chaired 
Chemical Action Task Force (CATF) has developed and gained widespread 
international acceptance of a set of measures to be incorporated into 
national chemical regulatory regimes to bring countries into compliance 
with the chemical control provision of the UN convention.  Encouraging 
progress was made in 1992 in the adoption of regulatory regimes 
incorporating these measures.  The European Community amended its 
chemical regulation to make such measures binding on community members 
on January 1, 1993.  Japan, in mid-1992, adopted a chemical regulatory 
regime based on the CATF measures.  The Andean cocaine-producing 
countries and many other Latin American countries have chemical 
regulatory regimes based on the CATF measures and the more comprehensive 
Organization of American States (OAS) Model Chemical Regulations.  In 
1992, an international working group, led by the UN International 
Narcotics Control Board, prepared a set of practical guidelines based on 
the CATF measures for governments to follow in drafting and implementing 
chemical regulatory regimes.  The CATF has established a policy 
framework to identify changes that may be required in chemical 
regulatory regimes to attack new methods of using chemicals and new 
diversion techniques and to bring under control chemicals being used as 
substitutes for regulated chemicals.	Success will, of course, 
depend on effective implementation of these chemical controls, but these 
steps are encouraging.

Persistence and Success
In spite of the ground gained over the past few years in all these 
areas, the illegal drug-trafficking industry continues to be strong, 
rich, and able to adapt to changing circumstances.  We are dealing with 
some of the best-financed, best-armed, and most ruthless organizations 
in the world.  These groups have the wherewithal, the experience, and 
the determination to exploit the weaknesses of governments beset by 
economic crises, political instability, and social unrest.  While there 
is no question that the trafficking organizations have suffered from 
concerted government action, they have also shown that they can absorb 
heavy losses and still thrive.  Success depends on an integrated attack 
sustained over time on every stage of the drug-producing, marketing, and 
distribution process.

Corruption and Political Will
The international anti-drug effort is, in many ways, a collective 
assault on drug-generated corruption, which, left unchecked, could 
destroy democratic governments already sapped by internal economic and 
social crises.  Since the only defense against such corruption is a 
strong sense of national political will and purpose, a main objective of 
US Government anti-drug policy is to help strengthen political will in 
the most vulnerable frontline drug countries.

Although any lucrative criminal enterprise can threaten order in a 
country with underpaid law enforcement or military officials, the drug 
trade, because of its enormous wealth, poses a threat of a much greater 
magnitude:  Drug profits can carry corruption to the highest levels of 
government.  Cocaine and heroin are currently the most abundant, 
lucrative commodities in the world.  Cultivation is cheap, processing 
relatively simple, and profit margins enormous.  At average street 
prices of $100 a gram, a metric ton [mt] of cocaine is worth  $100 
million once in the United States.  By this measure, the estimated  150-
175 mt of cocaine alone which the US market consumes annually would put 
as much as $15-$17.5 billion into criminal hands.  The cartels, 
therefore, have access to sums of money available to few governments, 
and, unlike governments, they are not accountable to any authority 
except themselves for the way in which they spend their funds.

It is clear that those countries most affected by the drug trade are 
engaged in a defense of national sovereignty against very powerful 
enemies.  With billions of dollars available to them, traffickers, often 
allied with insurgent groups, are theoretically in a position to buy 
themselves a controlling interest in governments which they cannot 
overthrow by force.  A major goal of US anti-drug policy is to ensure 
that this does not happen.  By supporting those democratic governments 
which show the necessary political resolve to take on the drug cartels, 
the United States is investing in the future democratic stability of the 
hemisphere.

Such an investment, however, can only pay dividends when it supplements 
another government's determination to carry out its own anti-drug 
campaign.  The US Government can only help another government fight the 
international drug trade; it cannot do the job for it.  Frontline 
governments must attack drug corruption  out of genuine national self-
interest.  Where governments have realized this, there is progress 
against the drug trade;  where they have not, the traffickers prosper.

Demand Reduction
At one time, many important drug source countries took comfort in a 
sense that drug addiction was a rich country's disease.  There was a 
belief that poor countries were immune to the type of drug epidemic 
which fueled international demand for cocaine and heroin.  Experience, 
however, has taught otherwise.  All of the major drug-producing and 
transit countries now have significant--often expanding--addict 
populations, which not only sap the political, social, and economic 
stability of a nation but offer new markets to the drug trade.  The US 
Government has been working with many of these countries to reduce 
demand and prevent drug abuse. 

In 1992, the US Government addressed the question of international 
demand reduction through continuing bilateral and multilateral efforts.  
Bilaterally, INM funded programs on training, public awareness, and 
education in Latin America [and] Southeast and Southwest Asia.  INM 
conducted bilateral programs in 1992 with The Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Panama, Thailand, and Venezuela.  Multilaterally, the US Government 
worked closely with the European Community, the UNDCP [UN International 
Drug Control Program], OAS-CICAD [Inter-American Drug Control 
Commission], the Colombo Plan, and ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations] on such projects as setting up regional demand reduction 
training centers in Argentina and Thailand and drug prevention services 
for "street children" in Brazil and Peru.

The United Nations
The US Government has long had a close working relationship with the 
United Nations International Drug Control Program (and its predecessor 
UNFDAC) as part of the US Government strategy to promote active anti-
drug cooperation on a global scale.  Most recently, the US Government 
has intensified its efforts to engage the entire UN system, particularly 
the specialized agencies, in drug control issues.  The US Government has 
been working to further the aims of the UN System-Wide Action Plan on 
Drug Abuse Control (SWAP), adopted by  the Economic and Social Council 
in 1990.  The goal of the SWAP has been to make drug control an integral 
part  of UN programs, especially those of  the UN specialized agencies 
involved  in development, health, labor and  children.

1988 UN Convention
Seventy-two states have now ratified or acceded to the 1988 UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, an increase from the 58 states reported in the 1992 INCSR 
[International Narcotics Control Strategy Report].  As of January 21, 
1993, states parties to the convention include:  Afghanistan, Australia, 
The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Costa 
Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, 
France, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, 
Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, 
Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar [Burma], Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovenia, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela, and 
Yugoslavia.  The European Community confirmed Article 12.

Cocaine  
Cocaine, particularly in its most addictive form--crack--still poses the 
most immediate threat to the United States.  While there has been 
encouraging data that cocaine use by certain sectors of American youth 
has dropped, hundreds of tons of cocaine continue to flow to the United 
States.  As the nerve center of the cocaine industry, Colombia continued 
to play a pivotal role against the drug trade in 1992.  The Gaviria 
Government's decision in July to challenge the corruption which allowed 
drug lord Pablo Escobar to  run his Medellin cartel out of a luxury 
prison was a sign of government determination to challenge a potential 
threat to its sovereignty.  The Medellin cartel's violent response 
appears to have strengthened the government's resolve to put an end to 
the cartel's operations.

Throughout 1992, the Colombian Government maintained an active 
enforcement and crop suppression program.  Because the government had to 
shift limited resources from coca and cocaine control operations to 
destruction of the country's rapidly expanding opium poppy crop, year-
end data for coca suppression and cocaine seizures were lower than 
projected.  Nonetheless, they show progress.  Areas under coca 
cultivation dropped to 37,100 ha, a slight decline from 1991's estimate 
of 37,500 ha.  Cocaine HCl [hydrochloride] seizures fell to 
approximately 32 mt from approximately 77 mt last year.   To a large 
extent, the seizure rate was a casualty of shifting enforcement 
resources, including aircraft, to the anti-poppy campaign. 

Although the Government of Bolivia only eradicated three-quarters of its 
7,000-hectare target for 1992, the country's coca cultivation showed a  
net decline and is now at its lowest in  5 years.  At the end of 1992, 
there were an estimated 45,500 ha under cultivation, a 14% drop from 
1989's high of an estimated 52,900 ha.  This steady reduction 
underscores the importance of the combination of political determination 
and a regular crop control program in turning back the spread of an 
illegal drug crop.  Even a modest display of political will can produce 
important results.

In counter-narcotics operations, Bolivian enforcement actions led to 
record seizures of coca leaf, paste, base, and precursor chemicals.  An 
important accomplishment was the seizure of approximately 50 mt of "agua 
rica" paste and base.  Agua rica, a weakly acidic suspension of cocaine 
which can apparently last indefinitely without spoiling, is a relatively 
new product.  Since it can readily be converted into finished cocaine 
HCl, seizures of this magnitude have an important impact on drug flows.

Peru continues to be the country where counter-narcotics progress faces 
its greatest challenges.  Since Peru is also the source of the bulk of 
the drug trade's coca leaf, it is the key country in the anti-cocaine 
effort.  Although more than 60% of the world's coca is cultivated in 
Peru, the Fujimori Government has not taken effective anti-drug action 
in the face of continuing insurgent violence, economic chaos, and 
political uncertainty.  Last year, Peru's coca cultivation rose by 7% 
from an estimated 120,800 ha in 1991 to an estimated 129,100 ha in 1992.  
Most of the expansion was in insurgent areas.  Unless the Government of 
Peru takes more aggressive action, further expansion of the Peruvian 
coca crop will offset hard-won gains in Bolivia and Colombia.

Enforcement authorities in Ecuador scored a major success in June 1992 
by dismantling the Jorge Reyes Torres narcotics organization, one of the 
continent's important trafficking organizations.  Thanks to an operation 
along  the Colombian border in February, Ecuadorian police seized nearly  
4 mt of cocaine, over three times the quantity captured in any of the 
previous years.  

In Mexico, the Salinas Government continued to pursue a vigorous anti-
drug policy.  Mexican authorities seized 38.8 mt of cocaine during 1992, 
as well as large amounts of marijuana and heroin.  The Northern Border 
Response Force (NBRF), working closely with US Government agencies, was 
responsible for a record 28.7 mt of cocaine, nearly 70% of the total 
seizures.  Mexico also continued to make important reductions in its 
opium poppy crops.

Law enforcement authorities in most of the Central American countries 
have been carrying out active anti-drug efforts.  Though the volume of 
drugs seized has been relatively small, in Honduras cocaine seizures 
tripled from 0.5 mt in 1991 to nearly 1.5 mt in 1992.  In Panama, in 
July 1992, government authorities seized 5.3 tons of cocaine in the 
Colon Free Zone, the largest single cocaine seizure to date in Central 
America and the Caribbean.  Over  10 mt were seized in Panama in 1992.  
In Guatemala, anti-drug operations were responsible for the seizure of  
9.5 mt in the country.

In the Caribbean, anti-drug actions continued to show results. In 
Jamaica, cocaine seizures rose from 60 kg [kilograms] in 1991 to nearly 
0.5 mt in 1992.  Although cocaine seizures dropped slightly in The 
Bahamas to 4.8 mt from 5.3 mt in 1991, they remain higher than in 1990.  
Since the government has maintained a high level of effort, the lower 
seizure rate may reflect a shift in modes or routes by the drug trade.

Opium
Amid signs that the US cocaine market may be leveling off, Latin 
American trafficking organizations appear to be looking to heroin as the 
drug of the 1990s.  In contrast to stimulants such as cocaine, which 
burn out their users in anywhere from a few months to a few years, a 
depressant such as heroin can be used over decades or longer periods.  
Heroin is also considerably more lucrative to the drug wholesaler than 
cocaine.  Where a kilo[gram] of cocaine might fetch between $15,000 and 
$30,000 wholesale, an equal amount of heroin could sell for between 
$180,000 and $200,000.  New forms  of heroin are also showing up on the 
market.  Although most heroin used in the United States is injected, the 
fear of AIDS and the convenience of eliminating hypodermic needles may 
enhance the appeal of the smokable variety, heroin no. 3.

Traditionally, most of the heroin consumed in the United States has come 
from Southeast and Southwest Asia (refined white heroin) or Mexico 
(brown tar).  In the past few years, however, Colombian cocaine cartels 
apparently have been experimenting with diversification by cultivating 
opium poppies in the Andes.  They have been expanding their operations 
rapidly.  The estimated 2,300 ha discovered in Colombia in 1991 exploded 
to an estimated 32,000 ha in 1992.  Thanks to an active and costly poppy 
spraying program, the Colombian Government has destroyed an estimated 
12,700 ha of the crop.  While the remaining 20,000 ha theoretically 
could produce as much as 20 mt of heroin, it seems that the 
inefficiencies of the "learning curve" are keeping production low.  
Since some fields have also been found in Ecuador and there are reports 
of incipient cultivation in Peru, the US Government is working closely 
with the concerned governments to ensure that the opium industry does 
not gain a firm foothold in South America.

Such action is especially important because most of the world's opium 
grows in Burma, Afghanistan, and Laos, countries in which the US 
Government and other Western governments have limited influence.  If all 
its potential poppy cultivation were processed into heroin, Burma alone 
could satisfy the world's known demand for the drug.  Since the break-up 
of the Soviet empire, there are indications that some of the Central 
Asian countries could also become illicit opium producers.  Economic 
difficulties and the presence of well-organized smuggling groups raise 
the specter of new heroin-trafficking networks to Europe and perhaps the 
United States.

Another disturbing development is the emergence of Nigerian drug-
trafficking organizations which seek to control heroin distribution in 
the way that the Colombian cartels dominate the cocaine trade.  There 
are reports of Nigerian drug couriers turning up in capitals from Tokyo 
to Addis Ababa, not to mention the growing numbers arrested annually by 
US Customs.  The US Government is working with the Nigerian Government 
to curb the growth of an international "Nigerian connection" and focus 
enforcement efforts on Nigerian drug barons rather than on low-level 
couriers.

The good news in opium and heroin control is that in those areas where 
governments have been willing to destroy crops systematically, 
cultivation has declined markedly.  Mexico's sustained crop control 
program over the past 3 years has reduced poppy cultivation to its 
lowest level in nearly a decade.  As all significant reduction has taken 
place under the Salinas Administration, there is a clear correlation 
between the exercise of political will and accomplishment.  In 
Guatemala, there were also dramatic results from an aggressive crop 
control program.  In 1992, with US Government assistance, Guatemalan 
authorities virtually eliminated a crop which a year earlier potentially 
could have yielded nearly 12 mt of opium.

In Southwest Asia, there was limited progress in controlling opium 
production.  Although Pakistan--which produces about one-fifth of the 
heroin coming to the United States--reduced opium poppy cultivation 
slightly, the government lost momentum in attacking traffickers.  In 
1992, there were only two prosecutions of major traffickers, while less-
stringent banking regulations made it easier for trafficking 
organizations to launder their profits.  In Afghanistan, the second-
largest opium producer after Burma, poppy cultivation increased in 1992 
by 12%.  The US Government is working with local Afghan leaders and 
other donor nations to help Afghanistan reduce its opium poppy 
cultivation.

In the Golden Triangle area of Burma, Laos, and Thailand--where three-
quarters of the world's opium originates--total cultivation was down by 
approximately 6%, primarily as a result of weather.  Burma, which 
continues to account for about 60% of potential worldwide opium and 
heroin production, took few effective measures to curb either poppy 
cultivation or heroin-trafficking.  Opium poppy cultivation expanded in 
some insurgent-controlled areas where previously Burmese Government crop 
suppression campaigns had made important inroads.  These are areas where 
the Burmese Government reached a political accommodation with certain 
ethnic groups to permit poppy cultivation and drug-trafficking.  Burmese 
authorities have made only half-hearted attempts to curb the drug trade.  
Seizures remain insignificant, while major traffickers in some cases 
openly associate with senior military officials.  The current Burmese 
Government seems more interested in maintaining a truce with former 
insurgent groups linked to the drug trade than in curtailing heroin 
production.  The US Government continues to urge the Government of Burma 
to move against the trafficking organizations.

Laos, the world's third-largest opium producing country, is the only one 
of the top three to reduce its potential opium production in each of the 
past 3 years.  Thanks to US Government and UNDCP assistance, better 
enforcement, and an active public information program, estimated opium 
production declined 13% in 1992 from 1991, bringing the total crop 
reduction since the initiation of US Government and UNDCP-funded rural 
development/opium replacement programs in 1989 to 39%.  

Once a source country for opiates, Thailand has sustained an active 
opium poppy crop control program, with total cultivation declining by 
50% since 1989.  Opium poppy hectarage in 1992 was  at its lowest in 
more than 12 years.  Thailand, however, remains the primary conduit for 
heroin from the Golden Triangle sold in the United States.

Next Steps
Under US Government leadership, the international anti-drug effort must 
continue to focus on the drug trade at its four most vulnerable points:  
at the source, in processing, in the distribution system, and in the 
financial area.  Except for crop destruction at the source, the drug 
trade is most vulnerable in its finances, since not only are financial 
flows potentially subject to the greatest degree of intergovernmental 
control, but they lie at the heart of the enterprise.  The drug cartels 
are part of a large money-generating machine which itself is fueled by 
money.  Without fuel, the machine can neither function nor produce more 
money.  If through joint action concerned governments can cut the flow 
of illicit drug money for long enough, they can deal a strong blow to 
the drug trade.

More effective action and cooperation with other countries in the 
Chemical Action Task Force is also important in order to deprive the 
drug processors of the chemicals they need to transform raw materials 
into finished drugs.  The US Government will continue to support OAS 
efforts to foster adoption and effective implementation of the OAS model 
regulations on precursor chemicals controls and on money-laundering and 
asset forfeiture.  The US Government will also work with the UNDCP and 
OAS-CICAD in strengthening the judicial systems of Latin American and 
Caribbean states.  

Reducing the demand for drugs overseas will continue to be an important 
focus of US Government anti-drug policy, helping developing countries 
reduce or prevent the growth of addict populations.  While the US 
Government will strengthen its bilateral demand reduction programs, it 
will also promote a strong United Nations effort, working with the major 
industrialized countries to implement the UN System-Wide Action Plan.  
We will give special attention to working with the UN specialized 
agencies such as UNICEF [UN Children's Fund] to promote effective drug 
abuse prevention programs in those countries of Latin America where 
large numbers of young people, especially "street children," are at 
risk.

While promoting short- to medium-term success requires assistance from 
the United States, Europe, and other donors, long-term progress in 
suppressing the drug trade depends on the commitment of the frontline 
drug countries themselves.  The drug trade has prospered because for 
many years the major drug-producing and transit countries felt neither 
responsible for nor threatened by the drug problem.  In less than a 
decade, attitudes have altered dramatically.  The frontline drug 
countries recognize the threat which the drug trade poses to their 
national sovereignty.  Only a few, however, have the economic resources 
and political determination to crack down on the drug trade on their 
own.

We must work to change this situation.  Although the US Government will 
provide the leadership as well as many of the resources in attacking the 
international drug trade, we cannot be the sole driving force.  The 
frontline drug-producing and transit countries themselves must take the 
initiative to protect their national sovereignty by attacking drug-
related corruption before it undermines the core of democratic 
government.  They must strengthen judicial and legislative institutions 
partially tainted by drug money as well as reform financial institutions 
to prevent money-laundering.  They must also focus on the damage which 
drug consumption is doing among their own youth and create effective 
demand reduction and treatment programs to protect a generation which 
otherwise could be lost to addiction.

In summary, success depends on joint action driven by individual 
national commitment.  If we can build on our achievements in denying the 
drug trade the necessary raw materials, in restricting its area of 
operations, and, more importantly, in eliminating any useful market for 
its products, in a few years we may be able to downgrade illicit drugs 
from serious threat to manageable nuisance.  (###)


ARTICLE 8.  

UN Security Council Resolutions  On Somalia, UNPROFOR
Resolution 814 on Somalia (March 26, 1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 
17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 
775 (1992) of 28 August 1992 and 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 
794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
operations in Somalia,

Acknowledging the need for a prompt, smooth and phased transition from 
the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the expanded United Nations Operation 
in Somalia (UNOSOM II),

Regretting the continuing incidents of violence in Somalia and the 
threat they pose to the reconciliation process,

Deploring the acts of violence against persons engaging in humanitarian 
efforts on behalf of the United Nations, States, and non-governmental 
organizations,

Noting with deep regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread 
violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of 
the rule of law in Somalia,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility 
for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and 
effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements 
and factions,

Noting the need for continued humanitarian relief assistance and for the 
rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Concerned that the crippling famine and drought in Somalia, compounded 
by the civil strife, have caused massive destruction to the means of 
production and the natural and human resources of that country,

Expressing its appreciation to the Organization of African Unity, the 
League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and 
the Non-Aligned Movement for their cooperation with, and support of, the 
efforts of the United Nations in Somalia,

Further expressing its appreciation to all Member States which have made 
contributions to the fund established pursuant to paragraph 11 of 
resolution 794 (1992) and to all those who have provided humanitarian 
assistance to Somalia,

Commending the efforts, in difficult circumstances, of the initial 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) established pursuant to 
resolution 751 (1992),

Expressing its appreciation for the invaluable assistance the 
neighbouring countries have been providing to the international 
community in its efforts to restore peace and security in Somalia and to 
host large numbers of refugees displaced by the conflict and taking note 
of the difficulties caused to them due to the presence of refugees in 
their territories,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would 
contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and 
political settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's 
political institutions and economy,

Convinced also of the need for broad-based consultations and 
deliberations to achieve reconciliation, agreement on the setting up of 
transitional government institutions and consensus on basic principles 
and steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic 
institutions,

Recognizing that the re-establishment of local and regional 
administrative institutions is essential to the restoration of domestic 
tranquillity,

Encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to 
continue and intensify their work at the national, regional and local 
levels, including and encouraging broad participation by all sectors of 
Somali society, to promote the process of political settlement and 
national reconciliation and to assist the people of Somalia in 
rehabilitating their political institutions and economy,

Expressing its readiness to assist the people of Somalia, as 
appropriate, on a local, regional or national level, to participate in 
free and fair elections, with a view towards achieving and implementing 
a political settlement,

Welcoming the progress made at the United Nations-sponsored Informal 
Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa 
from 4 to 15 January 1993, in particular the conclusion at that meeting 
of three agreements by the Somali parties, including movements and 
factions, and welcoming also any progress made at the Conference on 
National Reconciliation which began in Addis Ababa on  15 March 1993,

Emphasizing the need for the Somali people, including movements and 
factions, to show the political will to achieve security, reconciliation 
and peace,

Noting the reports of States concerned of 17 December 1992  (S/24976) 
and 19 January 1993  (S/25126) and of the Secretary-General of 19 
December 1992 (S/24992) and  26 January 1993 (S/25168) on the 
implementation of resolution 794 (1992),

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993  
(S/25354 and Add.1 and 2),

Welcoming the intention of the Secretary-General to seek maximum economy 
and efficiency and to keep the size of the United Nations presence, both 
military and civilian, to the minimum necessary to fulfil its  mandate,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace 
and security in the region,

A
1.  Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993;

2.  Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for convening 
the Conference on National Reconciliation for Somalia in accordance with 
the agreements reached during the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali 
Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and for the 
progress achieved towards political reconciliation in Somalia, and also 
for his efforts to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somalis, including 
movements, factions, community leaders, women, professionals, 
intellectuals, elders and other representative groups are suitably 
represented at such  conferences;

3.  Welcomes the convening of the Third United Nations Coordination 
Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 11 
to 13 March 1993 and the willingness expressed by Governments through 
this process to contribute to relief and rehabilitation efforts in 
Somalia, where and when possible;

4.  Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, 
and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations 
entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and 
other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their 
political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement 
and national reconciliation, in accordance with the recommendations 
contained in his report of 3 March 1993, including in particular:

(a)  To assist in the provision of relief and in the economic 
rehabilitation of Somalia, based on an assessment of clear, prioritized 
needs, and taking into account, as appropriate, the 1993 Relief and 
Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia prepared by the United Nations 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs;

(b)  To assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons 
within Somalia;

(c)  To assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political 
reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali 
society, and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions 
and civil administration in the entire country;

(d)  To assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate 
at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration 
and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the 
investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of 
international humanitarian law;

(e)  To assist the people of Somalia in the development of a coherent 
and integrated programme for the removal of mines throughout Somalia;

(f)  To develop appropriate public information activities in support of 
the United Nations activities in Somalia;

(g)  To create conditions under which Somali civil society may have a 
role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation and in 
the formulation and realization of rehabilitation and reconstruction 
programmes;

B
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

5.  Decides to expand the size of the UNOSOM force and its mandate in 
accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 56-88 of the 
report of the Secretary-General of  3 March 1993, and the provisions of 
this resolution;

6.  Authorizes the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) for an 
initial period through 31 October 1993, unless previously renewed by the 
Security Council;

7.  Emphasizes the crucial importance of disarmament and the urgent need 
to build on the efforts of UNITAF in accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of 
the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993;

8.  Demands that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, 
comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements 
they concluded at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political 
Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement on 
Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (S/25168, 
annex III);

9.  Further demands that all Somali parties, including movements and 
factions, take all measures to ensure the safety of the personnel of the 
United Nations and its agencies as well as the staff of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), intergovernmental 
organizations and non-governmental organizations engaged in providing 
humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in 
rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting 
political settlement and national reconciliation;

10.  Requests the Secretary-General to support from within Somalia the 
implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992), 
utilizing as available and appropriate the UNOSOM II forces authorized 
by this resolution, and to report on this subject, with any 
recommendations regarding more effective measures if necessary, to the 
Security Council;

11.  Calls upon all States, in particular neighbouring States, to 
cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established by 
resolution 733 (1992);

12.  Requests the Secretary-General to provide security, as appropriate, 
to assist in the repatriation of refugees and the assisted resettlement 
of displaced persons, utilizing UNOSOM II forces, paying particular 
attention to those areas where major instability continues to threaten 
peace and security in the region;

13.  Reiterates its demand that all Somali parties, including movements 
and factions, immediately cease and desist from all breaches of 
international humanitarian law and reaffirms that those responsible for 
such acts be held individually accountable;

14.  Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, 
to direct the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for 
the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment 
throughout Somalia, taking account of the particular circumstances in 
each locality, on an expedited basis in accordance with the 
recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, and in this 
regard to organize a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to 
UNOSOM II;

C
15.  Requests the Secretary-General  to maintain the fund established 
pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) for the additional purpose of 
receiving contributions for maintenance of UNOSOM II forces following 
the departure of UNITAF forces and for the establishment of Somali 
police, and calls on Member States to make contributions to this fund, 
in addition to their assessed contributions;

16.  Expresses appreciation to the United Nations agencies, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and the ICRC for 
their contributions and assistance and requests the Secretary-General to 
ask them to continue to extend financial, material and technical support 
to the Somali people in all regions of the country;

17.  Requests the Secretary-General to seek, as appropriate, pledges and 
contributions from States and others to assist in financing the 
rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia;

18.  Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully 
informed on action taken to implement the present resolution, in 
particular to submit as soon as possible a report to the Council 
containing recommendations for establishment of Somali police forces and 
thereafter to report no later than every ninety days on the progress 
achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in the present 
resolution;

19.  Decides to conduct a formal review of the progress towards 
accomplishing the purposes of the present resolution no later than  31 
October 1993;

20.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0).  


Resolution 815 on UNPROFOR (March 30, 1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) and all subsequent resolutions 
relating to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),

Reaffirming in particular its commitment to ensure respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia and of the other 
Republics where UNPROFOR is deployed,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 25 March 
1993 (S/25470 and Add. 1),

Deeply concerned by the continuing violations by the parties and others 
concerned of their cease-fire obligations,

Determining that the situation thus created continues to constitute a 
threat to peace and security in the region,

Determined to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of 
movement for all its missions, and to these ends acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.  Approves the report of the Secretary-General, in particular its 
paragraph 5;

2.  Reaffirms all the provisions of its resolutions 802 (1993) and 807 
(1993);

3.  Decides to reconsider one month after the date of this resolution, 
or at any time at the request of the Secretary-General, UNPROFOR's 
mandate in light of developments of the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia and the situation on the ground;

4.  Decides, in this context, further to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for 
an additional interim period terminating on 30 June 1993;

5.  Supports the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in their efforts to 
help to define the future status of those territories comprising the 
United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), which are integral parts of the 
territory of the Republic of Croatia, and demands full respect for 
international humanitarian law, and in particular the Geneva 
Conventions, in these Areas;

6.  Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on 
how the United Nations Peace Plan for Croatia can be effectively 
implemented;

7.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.  

VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0).  (###)


ARTICLE 9.  

Sixth Report on War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia Following is the 
text of the Supple- mental United States Submission of Information to 
the United Nations Security Council in Accordance With Paragraph 5 of 
Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992), dated 
March 1, 1993.

Editor's Note:  The report contains graphic descriptions.

For the texts of the first five reports, see the following issues of 
Dispatch:
Vol. 3, No. 39, p. 732;
Vol. 3, No. 44, p. 802;
Vol. 3, No. 46, p. 825;
Vol. 3, No. 52, p. 917; and
Vol. 4, No. 6, p. 75.

For the text of Resolution 771, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 33, p. 652 or 
Dispatch Supplement Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 44.
For the text of Resolution 780, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769.

This is the sixth submission by the US Government of information 
pursuant  to paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) 
relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia.  As in our previous reports, we have focused on grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with Resolution 
771, have provided information that is "substantiated," that is, which 
rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or that 
includes detail sufficient for corroboration.

We have tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other 
countries and non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit 
reports pursuant to Resolutions 771 and 780.  The United States has 
further information substantiating the incidents included in this 
report, which we will make available on a confidential basis directly to 
the commission of experts established under Security Council Resolution 
780.

In accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution 780, the United States 
intends to continue providing reports as additional relevant information 
comes into our possession.  As in our previous reports, the notations at 
the end of each of the items indicate the source from which the 
information was drawn.

Former Yugoslavia:  Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
Sixth Submission

Willful Killing
Jul.-Aug 92:  A 20-year-old Bosnian Muslim from the village of 
Harambine, near Prijedor, described his capture by Serbian forces in 
July and the events leading to the murder of his father and five other 
men.  He was held in Omarska camp for 3 weeks, from July 20 until August 
6.  During his time there, he witnessed the deaths of about 20 men.  He 
was then transferred to Manjaca camp, from which he was released to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] on December 18, 1992.

The witness fled his home on May 23, 1992, when Serbian soldiers 
attacked.  He said his village was the first in the region attacked by 
the Serbs because they claimed Muslim soldiers from Harambine had killed 
Serbian soldiers.  He fled with his family to the settlement of Ravne, 
in the nearby village of Biscani, to live with his uncle.  On July 20, 
however, Serbs came to arrest all men over the age of 15 from Biscani.  
Judging by their accents and the style of caps which they wore, the 
witness believes that his captors were Montenegrins.

One hundred meters from the house, on the road leading to the center of 
Biscani, the soldiers stopped the group and searched them for valuables.  
Another 200 meters down the road, the  group stopped again.  This time 
the soldiers ordered the eight men, who had lined up in pairs, to begin 
beating the man next to them in line.  The witness was on the end of the 
line and standing next to his father, so he was being ordered to begin 
beating his father.  Each of the pairs in the group were similar, with 
father pitted against son, or brother versus brother.

After a short while, the man in the pair next to the witness refused the 
soldiers' exhortations to beat his son more fiercely.  One of the 
soldiers then marched the man off the road and into the ditch where he 
shot him.

By the end of the ordeal, six of the men either refused or were unable 
to continue beating their kin and were executed.  The witness and the 
youngest in the group managed to persuade the soldiers to spare them by 
lying and pleading that they were only 18 years old.  The soldiers, 
however, did beat the two boys badly, and the witness lost a tooth.

The two prisoners continued down the road with the soldiers, leaving 
their relatives' bodies in the ditch.  After 500 meters, they joined a 
group of over 100 men, all of whom were ordered to lie on the ground 
with their hands on their heads.  They were then beaten for 30 minutes 
before two buses arrived to take the men to the detention camp.  Many of 
the men never made it onto the buses.  The witness described how an 
elderly cousin of his was asked his age.  The man replied, "70," and was 
told to go home, but  50 meters before the old man reached his house, 
another soldier shot him in the back.

After 4 hours, the buses arrived at Omarska camp, a distance of about 20 
kilometers from Biscani.  All of the men, about 100 in all, were sent to 
the "white house."  The witness was held in the white house for 2 weeks, 
during which time he was only interrogated and beaten once.  But many 
mornings, on the way to the toilets, he saw bodies awaiting transport or 
burial.

After 2 weeks, the witness was transferred to a large hangar, where the 
majority of the prisoners were held.  He saw no beatings here, but 
guards came to the hall sometimes, calling out a list of names of men 
who would then be taken away.  The witness saw some of them die after 
returning from their beatings.

On four or five occasions, the men would be lined up for a roll call in 
the central yard after lunch.  As they stood there, someone would begin 
shooting at the group from a distance.  They could hear the bullets 
whistling through the air.  He saw a man killed in this manner, and 
another who was hit in the ear by a bullet.  On August 6, the witness 
was transferred to Manjaca camp where he said beatings occurred but 
where conditions were much better than they had been in Omarska.  
(Department of State) 

Jul-Aug 92:  A 40-year-old Muslim male from Matrici witnessed tortures 
and murders in the Keraterm and Trnopolje camps.

On July 9, 1992, local Serbs and others from outside the area collected 
all Muslim males from Matrici in groups and marched them to Trnopolje.  
The witness, one of those rounded up, believes the Serb captors belonged 
to the White Eagle paramilitary organization and to "Arkan's men."  He 
identified two of the men, both from Gornji Orlovci.  The Serbs randomly 
beat and killed some of the prisoners along the way.  The witness saw 
approximately  25 bodies along the roads and in nearby fields, 
apparently victims from earlier groups.

Upon arrival at Trnopolje, the men of Matrici were bused to Omarska, 
then to the Keraterm facility at Prijedor.  The men were then confined 
to rooms so tightly packed that they could sit but not lie down.  For 
the first several days they received no food or water.  Following that 
period, water and an inadequate amount of food was provided.

The witness estimates that due to beatings, torture, or executions by 
guards as well as other Serbs who were not members of the regular camp 
complement, about 400-500 prisoners at Keraterm died from early July 
until August 5, 1992, when about 1,500 inmates were transferred to 
Trnopolje due to an impending visit to Keraterm by the Red Cross.   
(Department of State) 

Apr-Aug 92:  A 22-year-old male from Teslic, about 60 kilometers 
southeast of Banja Luka, said that in late April and early May 1992, 
Serbian infantry forces attacked Mostar, forcing the populace to flee 
into the hills surrounding the city.

Those taken captive were later organized into truck convoys, one of 
which arrived on June 1 in Gacko.  The 15 prisoners in this truck were 
unloaded in front of the city's hotel, where they were beaten by local 
Serbs before being put into the hotel's basement.  Already incarcerated 
in the basement were about  100 prominent Muslims of Gacko, including 
its wealthier businessmen, civic leaders, and teachers, as well as one 
Croat.  Every night, eight or nine prisoners were taken upstairs and 
interrogated for military information and beaten for 2 or 3 hours.  
About 15 never returned.  Through messages passed by secret means, the 
prisoners learned those who disappeared were buried in a mass grave in 
Gacko's World War II Partisan Cemetery.

One local Serb guard from Gacko, on the night of June 28, began firing 
into the basement--killing one Muslim, Osman, and wounding another.

On July 1, the prisoners were called from the basement in groups of 10, 
made to pass through a gauntlet of Serb guards who beat them, and then 
boarded into a large truck.  Semad Memic, the 25-year-old leader of the 
local chapter of the Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnian) organization, the youth 
wing of the Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA), was ordered from 
the truck and shot and killed when he tried to escape.  The guards also 
killed two other Muslim prisoners.

Instead of being exchanged for Serbian prisoners as they had been told, 
the roughly 100 Muslims were taken to a former Yugoslav Army Reserve 
Officer training academy in Bileca that was commanded by a Serb from the 
Sarajevo area.  There the prisoners experienced random beating and were 
forced to eat from the same cans in which they relieved themselves.  Two 
prisoners subsequently died from injuries received during beatings.  
(Department of State) 

Apr-Aug 92:  A 34-year-old Croatian from Sanski Most said that the 
Serbian repression of the Muslim and Croatian inhabitants of his town, 
which had begun in April with the dismissal of non-Serbian police 
officers, reached a climax on May 23 when a Serbian artillery element of 
the Sixth Krajiska Brigade began advancing on Muslim areas from the 
surrounding hills.

The following morning, three- and four-man groups of armed Serbs began 
arresting male members of Muslim and Croat families.  The men were taken 
to the basement of the police headquarters where they were beaten for 
days.  Some of the men were later released, but of 33 non-Serbian 
policemen from Sanski Most, 17 were killed there during interrogations.  
Eight were sent to Manjaca.  (Department of State) 

20-30 Jul 92:  A Bosnian Muslim refugee described the rounding up at 
gunpoint on July 20 of the inhabitants of the village of Rizvahovici, 
near Prijedor, by 100-150 Serbian soldiers.  About three-quarters of 
this force consisted of Serb "Chetniks" and members of the White Eagle 
paramilitary group, while the remainder were local Serbs, most of whom 
were well-known to the Muslim villagers.  Two Serbs relayed all orders.

The witness, along with other men aged 60 or older, was made to wait in 
a house while the younger villagers and others from the surrounding area 
were loaded into four buses.  During this process, the witness watched 
through a window of the house as 29 villagers were randomly separated 
from the younger group and killed by the Chetniks and White Eagles.

Nine days later the witness was brought to a Serbian-run detention 
center in Trnopolje, commanded by a professor from a technical training 
school in Prijedor.  A local Serbian coal worker was second in charge.  
During the day and night the witness spent in the camp, he saw four Serb 
soldiers grab a 17-year-old girl and drag her into the bushes.  Those 
inmates within sight of this were forced into the school where they 
could not see outside.  He also observed inhabitants taken out of the 
camp that night and then heard gunshots.  He never saw these individuals 
return to the camp.  (Department of State) 

Jun-Jul 92:  A 58-year-old Bosnian Muslim said that a Serbian unit 
identified as the Sixth Brigade from Sanski Most occupied the village of 
Sanica Gorija on June 1, 1992, and began rounding up all Muslims between 
the ages of 18 and 60 for transport to the Manjaca camp.  During the 
witness's time at Manjaca, the camp received hundreds of inmates from 
various areas of Bosnia including a group of 1,200 Muslims from the 
Omarska area on the evening of July 19.

The next morning, as the captives were unloaded for processing, Serbian 
guards attacked and killed 24 of the Muslims with knives.  One of those 
attacked was a prominent 60-year-old businessman from Prijedor.  On July 
29, a high-ranking member of the Bosnian Muslim party was also beaten to 
death by guards.  (Department of State) 

May-Aug 92:   A 32-year-old male Bosnian Muslim from the village of 
Kozarusa, near Trnopolje, gave a report on his incarceration at the 
Keraterm and Omarska facilities.

Following a 2-day Serbian shelling of his village commencing May 20, he 
and the other 200 male inhabitants were rounded up by Serbs, packed into 
buses, and taken to detention camps including Keraterm, Omarska, and 
Trnopolje.  Women and children were bused to Trnopolje, Zenica, and 
finally Croatia.

The witness said that those taken to Keraterm were packed so tightly 
into a building they could not lie down.  During their 2-day stay, they 
received neither food nor water.  On or about May 23, the Serbs emptied 
Keraterm and bused about 300 captives to Omarska.

At Omarska, a Bosnian Serbian army officer on several occasions 
conducted interrogation of prisoners accompanied by beatings.  The 
witness identified a taxi driver from Prijedor as the most vicious 
guard.  During the initial period two old men died after being beaten.  
Other prisoners were taken out nightly and shot by executioners who wore 
stocking caps to avoid recognition.  Many prisoners also starved to 
death at Omarska.

The witness said that on June 25 about 100 inmates were transferred to 
Trnopolje.  Other beatings and killings continued at Trnopolje.  The 
witness estimated that 50 to 60 prisoners died at this facility every 
day.  (Department of State) 

May-Aug 92:  A 44-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor, Bosnia, gave 
the following report based on his personal experience as an inmate at 
the Keraterm prisoner camp, from May to August 1992.

Keraterm camp was commanded by a 32-year-old Serbian male from Prijedor 
who had previously been employed at the Celuloz Paper Mill.  The guard 
who first checked arriving prisoners at the camp was almost always a 
brutal 22-year-old man known only as "the cook" because of his previous 
occupation at a restaurant in the Sarajevo Agricultural Bank building in 
Prijedor.  He routinely stripped incoming prisoners of their jewelry and 
money before beating them with metal pipes or thick wooden sticks, often 
breaking bones.  He also personally participated in the mass execution 
of nearly 400 men in the prisoner's courtyard in the early morning hours 
of July 19, 1992.

Also notorious for his brutality in the greater Prijedor area and the 
most-feared man at Keraterm was a taxi cab driver who drove a beige-
colored Polish PZ125 taxi with Prijedor registration.  Though not 
assigned to Keraterm prison, he freely participated in beatings, 
shootings, and the fatal torture of prisoners from the day Keraterm 
opened until its closure.  (Department of State) 

28 May-26 Jul 92:  A 60-year-old Muslim farmer from Modrica, in northern 
Bosnia, described the looting and burning of all non-Serbian properties 
in the village.  The Catholic church was demolished by tanks and the 
over-500-year-old mosque was dynamited.

There were also three mass killings perpetrated by Bosnian Serbs, the 
first of which occurred about 100-200 meters from the power/transformer 
station.  The victims were buried at the site by a bulldozer.  The 
second mass killing took place near a second power line and transformer 
station, where the victims also were buried at the site.  The third mass 
killing was performed behind the "Sutjesk" Junior High School on the 
Serbian side of Modrica.  Again, the victims were buried at the site.  
(Department of State) 

22 Jul 92:  A 31-year-old Bosnian Croatian from Teslic, Slatina, 
witnessed drunken Bosnian Serb militiamen beat to death about 50 Muslim 
and Croatian prisoners in a local stadium on or about July 22, 1992.

Four or five soldiers, wearing red berets and green uniforms and from 
the so-called Crveni Barek militia groups picked up the witness and his 
friend, Anto Bavic, on July 12 in Teslic.  Both he and his friend, whose 
names were on the soldiers' list, were taken to a large, local 
government house called Stara Opstina, where all the rooms and the 
cellar were packed with Croatian and Muslim prisoners.

The witness described several beatings he received at this site, as well 
as forced labor.  On July 14, he and his fellow prisoners were 
transferred to a local stadium.

On the morning of July 22, a group of about 25 drunken Serb soldiers 
arrived at the stadium.  The Muslim and Croatian prisoners were lined up 
as usual.  At about 6 am, the soldiers began calling names from a list.  
One by one, the respondents went forward, and were beaten and stabbed to 
death by as many as 10 Serbs at a time.

About 50 prisoners were killed by soldiers who over a period of 2 to 3 
hours took turns drinking and murdering.  Many of the victims, including 
16-year-old Grgic Slavko, were mutilated with spikes, but the killers 
used anything they could lay their hands on.

The witness's friend, Anto Bavic, was machine-gunned to death when he 
refused to step forward and be butchered.  Mrgan Grfic, aged 37, was 
beaten to death with a baseball bat, and 27-year-old Jozo Gabic's right 
eye was removed with a knife before his throat was cut.

The witness was able to escape in August, though not without being shot 
in the leg by guards trying to stop him.  (Department of State) 

Jul 92:  A 48-year-old Muslim from Sanica Donja, near Kljuc, witnessed 
the occupation and shelling of that town and the decapitation of about 
100 prisoners in Tomina.

Following a siege of about 1 month and an initial occupation of Sanica 
Donja, regular Yugoslav National Army [JNA] troops again re-entered the 
village on about July 3, 1992.  Starting at one end of the village and 
going from house to house, they took all the men hostage and used them 
as a human screen as they went through the village.

The witness believes these JNA forces were from the Sixth Krajina 
Brigade headquartered at Palanka.  They were local Bosnian Serbs and 
their regular JNA uniforms bore a Yugoslav flag on shoulder and hat.  A 
red ribbon was displayed on the pocket.

The roughly 32 men who were taken prisoner, including the witness, were 
marched to the nearby village of Jerzerce, where they were loaded into a 
canvas-covered truck and transported to Sanski Most.  At around noon the 
truck stopped at the Ojedinostvo school in Tomina; the rear canvas was 
lifted and the prisoners could see the square in front of the school.

Two livestock transport trucks were parked on the square.  Male 
prisoners were brought out of the school three at a time by soldiers and 
were walked over to three other soldiers near the trucks.  These 
soldiers laid the prisoners down and cut off their heads with a curved 
knife about 30 centimeters long.  Four men in civilian clothes, 
apparently prisoners, then loaded the heads onto one truck and the 
decapitated corpses into the other.  During the hour the prisoners' 
truck was parked in the square, about 100 prisoners were brought out of 
the school and decapitated.

From Tomina the prisoners were driven to the municipal gymnasium at 
Sanski Most, where they remained 11 days without food.  During this time 
two prisoners were taken each night to the police station for individual 
interrogation.  During the witness' interrogation, two policemen 
alternately asked questions and beat him with shovel handles, hit him in 
the stomach, and kicked him when he fell.

On about July 14, four large livestock transport trucks with trailers 
moved all the prisoners from Sanski Most to Manjaca.  Because of 
malnutrition and dehydration, combined with the extreme heat in the 
trucks, about 18 people died before reaching Manjaca.

Upon arrival at Manjaca the group of prisoners were addressed by the 
camp commandant, a lieutenant colonel in the regular JNA, with a husky 
build and white hair; from his dialect he appeared to the witness to be 
a Macedonian.  He wore no insignia indicating branch of service.  
Apparently as an example to the prisoners, four soldiers brought two men 
to the front and beat them with ax handles.

Each morning at about 6 am guards came through the stables where the 
prisoners were housed, randomly beating them.  Every night two to five 
prisoners were taken by the guards for interrogation.  Those called were 
mostly wealthy people and intellectuals; at least two of them died as a 
result of their beatings.  One pharmacist returned with broken ribs.  
(Department of State) 

22 Jun 92:  A 24-year-old Muslim housewife from Agici said that on June 
22, 1992, at approximately 7 pm, a group of about 50 Serbians from the 
village, which is some 4 kilometers from the Japra River, forced their 
Muslim neighbors out of their homes.

The Muslims were marched to a graveyard about 1 kilometer from the 
village in the direction of the Japra valley where the men were 
separated from the women and children.  There, the Serbs began beating 
and taunting some of the Muslims; they shot and killed one Muslim 28-
year-old man, Fadic Ekic.

Around midnight, two farm tractors with trailers were brought to the 
graveyard and transported the women and children to Urije Street in 
Bosanski Novi.  There they were taken out of the trailers and ordered to 
turn over their valuables on threat of death.  After the vehicles left, 
the group appealed to residents for housing and were taken in.  They 
stayed in Bosanski Novi for 1 month before departing for Karlovac and 
eventual safety in another country.

The 25 men who remained at the graveyard and two Muslim men who had been 
made to drive the tractors transporting the women and children to 
Bosanski Novi were never seen again.  A Serbian backhoe operator later 
told the women that he had been sent to the graveyard to bury the bodies 
of the men, who had been killed after first being forced to dig their 
own graves with their bare hands.  (Department of State) 

28 Apr-15 May 92:  A 58-year-old Muslim male from Blagaj Japra made the 
following report:

On April 28, 1992, Bosnian Serb forces took about 12,000 Bosnian Muslim 
men, women, and children from the surrounding area to Blagaj Japra near 
Bosanski Novi.  Two hundred Muslim men, whose names appeared on a list 
of those whose sons and brothers had joined the fighting against Bosnian 
Serbian forces, were taken to an open field next to the Alici school 
building, where they were lined up and executed by fire from automatic 
weapons.

The order for the executions was given