US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 14, APRIL 5, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. A Strategic Alliance With Russian Reform--President Clinton
2. Status Report on Iraq's Non-Compliance With UN Resolutions--
President Clinton, Fact Sheets
3. Bosnia-Herzegovina--Secretary Christopher, Department Statement, UN
Security Council Resolution, Ambassador Walker
4. US-German Relations--President Clinton, German Chancellor Kohl
5. US Support for Nuclear Suppliers Group--Secretary Christopher, Press
Statement
6. Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Session
7. Current Status of US Policy on Bosnia, Somalia, and UN Reform--
Madeleine K. Albright
8. Statements at Confirmation Hearings
Timothy E. Wirth
Thomas E. Donilon
George E. Moose
Winston Lord
9. Treaty Actions
ARTICLE 1.
A Strategic Alliance With Russian Reform
President Clinton
Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Annapolis,
Maryland, April 1, 1993
I want to talk to you about the events in Russia, about our policies
toward the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and
about my meetings with [Russian] President Boris Yeltsin this weekend.
But first, I wish to speak about America's purposes in the world. That
is not something we often examine, for it is human nature to focus on
daily affairs most of the time. In our own lives, we do our jobs, we
raise our children, we nurture our relationships, [and] we struggle with
the dilemmas of the moment one day at a time. Yet we are each guided by
some sense of purpose, drawn from our families and our faith, which
shapes the millions of small events of our life into a larger work that
bears the imprint of our character.
Defining America's Broader Purposes Anew
So it is in the life of a nation. Decisions command attention. Crises
drive action. But it is only with an overriding sense of purpose, drawn
from their history and their cultures, that great nations can rise above
the daily tyranny of the urgent to construct their security, to build
their prosperity, to advance their interests, and to reaffirm their
values. A clear sense of purpose is most essential, yet most elusive,
at times of profound global change. A half-century ago, our nation
emerged victorious from the Second World War to discover itself in
wholly unfamiliar terrain. The old empires of Europe and Asia were
gone. A new communist empire loomed. Ours was the only economy in the
world still strong and dominant.
[A] former secretary of state, the late Dean Acheson, later described it
as a time of "great obscurity." Yet in that dim obscurity, he and
George Marshall and President Harry Truman and other leaders in both
political parties saw the stakes clearly enough. They acted decisively.
They accepted the mantle of leadership. Their sense of purpose helped
to rescue Europe, to rebuild Japan, to contain aggression, and to foster
two generations of unprecedented prosperity and peace.
And now--thanks in large measure to their vision, carried forward
through succeeding generations, and thanks, too, to the enormous courage
of the people of Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet
Union and the people of Eastern Europe--freedom has once again won a
very great victory. Over the past 4 years, the Berlin Wall crumbled.
The Cold War ended. The Soviet Union gave way to 15 sovereign states.
Millions threw off the constricting yoke of communism so they could
assume instead the ennobling burdens of democracy.
Yet these victories also confront us with a moment of profound change, a
challenge. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the international
order forever. The emerging economic powerhouses of the Pacific are
changing the financial order forever. The proliferation of demonic
weapons of mass destruction threaten to change the distribution of
military power forever. Resurgent ethnic conflict is challenging the
very meaning of the nation state. The rise of a global economy has
changed the linkages between our domestic and our foreign policies and,
I would argue to you, has made them indivisible. In a time of dramatic
global change, we must define America's broader purposes anew. And part
of that purpose clearly consists of reviving economic opportunity and
growth here at home, for the opportunity to do well here at home is the
ultimate basis of our influence abroad.
US Domestic and Foreign Policy--No Clear Dividing Line
Congress is acting this week to break the gridlock, to build our
prosperity. Just today, the Congress passed the heart of my economic
program--a long-term plan to drastically reduce the deficit and increase
investment in our nation's economic future. After years of policies
that have diminished our future, Washington has finally realized that
the best social program is a good job and [that] the best route to
deficit reduction is a growing economy founded on a bold plan of change
that will both cut spending and increase investment to empower the
working people of this country. Our program invests in people by
changing the tax code to reward work and investment--by working to
ensure that anybody who works 40 hours a week and has children in the
home won't have to live in poverty anymore, by providing our children
with education and nutrition and immunizations they need to start life
successfully, by reinventing the way we educate and train our workers to
make it properly adequate for the new global economy, and by creating
jobs now through investments in infrastructure and safe streets and
community development in communities large and small all across this
land.
The American people had the courage to call for change last November and
gave me the awesome opportunity and responsibility to try to implement
that change. I am hopeful that Congress will now have the courage to
vote for all those changes this week. As I said, today they voted for a
plan that both reduces the long-term deficit and increases our
investment in the things that will grow this economy--in new jobs and
new technologies and new education strategies. I hope now they will
adopt the short-term jobs program that will add a half-million new jobs
to this country over the next 2 years. Let me say parenthetically that
one of the great challenges of every wealthy country in the world today
is not only to promote growth but to create jobs. There are many, many
examples in the 1980s, when in Europe and elsewhere countries had great
growth but produced no new jobs. That is what has happened here in the
last year or so. And we must prove that we can do better.
As I have said so often over the last year and a half, in the global
village--with this kind of global economy-- there is simply no clear
dividing line between domestic and foreign policy. We can't be strong
abroad unless we're strong at home. And we cannot be strong at home
unless we are actively engaged in the world which is shaping events for
every American. There is a sense in which every one of the young people
in this country today will live a life which is shaped by events beyond
our borders as well as events within our borders.
US Investment and Engagement In the Post-Cold War World
So, today, I say again we must have a clear sense of our purposes around
the world. Everyone knows the world remains a dangerous place. And our
preeminent imperative is to ensure our own security. That is why we're
working to ensure that our military is not only the finest in the world
but also specifically tailored for the challenges of this new era--for
the central fronts of our fight for a safe world have moved from the
plains of northern Europe to our efforts to stem weapons of mass
destruction, to relieve ethnic turmoil, to promote democracy, to expand
markets, and to protect the global environment.
During the Cold War, our foreign policies largely focused on relations
among nations. Our strategies sought a balance of power to keep the
peace. Today, our policies must also focus on relations within nations,
on a nation's form of governance, on its economic structure, [and] on
its ethnic tolerance. These are of concern to us, for they shape how
these nations treat their neighbors as well as their own people and
whether they are reliable when they give their word.
In particular, democracies are far less likely to wage war on other
nations than dictatorships are. Emphatically, the international
community cannot seek to heal every domestic dispute or to resolve every
ethnic conflict. Some are simply beyond our reach. But within
practical bounds and with a sense of clear strategic priorities, we must
do what we can to promote the democratic spirit and the economic reforms
that can tip the balance for progress well into the next century.
From the first hours of my Administration, several critical situations
have demanded our attention--in Iraq, in Somalia, in Haiti, in the
Middle East, in the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. We have sought to
develop strategies to address these and other immediate challenges. And
I'm encouraged by the progress which has been made in most of the areas
of challenge. Yet all of us must also focus on the larger questions
that this new era presents. For, if we act out of a larger sense of
purpose and strategy, our work on the crises of the late 20th century
can lay the basis for a more peaceful and democratic world at the start
of the 21st century.
The end of the long, twilight struggle does not ensure the start of a
long peace. Like a wise homeowner who recognizes that you cannot stop
investing in your house once you buy it, we cannot stop investing in the
peace now that we have obtained it. That recognition was the triumph of
President Truman's era. But, unlike then, we lack the specter of a
menacing adversary to spur our efforts to engage other nations. Now,
not fear but vision must drive our investment and our engagement in this
new world.
US Engagement in Russia and The Former Soviet Union
Nowhere is that engagement more important than in our policies toward
Russia and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.
Their struggle to build free societies is one of the great human dramas
of our day. It presents the greatest security challenge for our
generation and offers one of the greatest economic opportunities of our
lifetime. That's why my first trip out of the country will be to
Vancouver [Canada], to meet with President Yeltsin.
Over the past month, we have seen incredibly tumultuous events in
Russia. They've filled our headlines and probably confused our heads.
President Yeltsin has been at loggerheads with the People's Congress of
Deputies. Heated political standoffs have obstructed economic change.
Meanwhile, neighboring states, such as Ukraine and the Baltic nations,
have watched Russia anxiously while they grapple with their own reforms
and while they deal with economic problems equally severe.
For most Americans, these events, while dramatic, are still very remote
from their immediate concerns. After all, in every community we have
our own problems. We've got our own needs. We face a stagnant economy
and dislocations brought about by the end of the Cold War and the down-
sizing of the military budget. We've got all these big companies
restructuring themselves. And for the last 2 years, small business has
not created enough new jobs to offset that. It's projected that two-
thirds of the growth of our income in the next 5 years--two-thirds--will
[be] absorbed by health care cost increases. And 100% of the wage
increases for the next 5 years will be absorbed by health care costs
increases unless we act.
We're worried about our cities, like Los Angeles, coming up on the
anniversary of the disturbances there a year ago. And many people say,
in the face of all this and with a huge budget deficit: Why in the
world should we help a distant people when times are so tough here at
home?
Well, I know that we cannot guarantee the future of reform in Russia or
any of the other newly independent states. I know and you know that,
ultimately, the history of Russia will be written by Russians and the
future of Russia must be charted by Russians. But I would argue that we
must--that we must--do what we can and we must not act now--we must act
now. Not out of charity but because it is a wise investment--a wise
investment building on what has already been done and looking to our own
future. While our efforts will entail new costs, we can reap even
larger dividends for our safety and our prosperity if we act now.
To understand why, I think we must grasp the scope of the transformation
now occurring in Russia and the other states. From Vilnius on the
Baltic to Vladivostok on the Pacific, we have witnessed a political
miracle--genuinely historic and heroic deeds--without precedent in all
of human history. The other two world-changing events of this century,
World Wars I and II, exacted a price of over 60 million lives. By
contrast, look at this world-changing event. It has been remarkably
bloodless, and we pray it remains so.
Now free markets and free politics are replacing repression. Central
Europe is in command of its own fate. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia
are again independent. Ukraine, Armenia, and other proud nations are
free to pursue their own destinies. At the heart of it all is Russia.
Its rebirth has begun. A great nation, rich in natural and human
resources and unbelievable history, has once again moved to rejoin the
political and economic cultures of the West. President Yeltsin and his
fellow reformers throughout Russia are courageously leading three modern
Russian revolutions at once: to transform their country from a
totalitarian state into a democracy, from a command economy into a
market, [and] from an empire into a modern nation-state that freely let
go of countries once under its control and now freely respects their
integrity.
Russia's rebirth is not only material and political; it is genuinely
spiritual. As the Librarian of Congress, James Billington, said:
Evil has been transcended by repentance without revenge; innocent
suffering in past gulags has been given redemptive value; and the
amazingly nonviolent breakthrough of August 1991, which occurred on the
Feast of the Transfiguration, was indeed a "miracle" through which
ordinary people rediscovered a moral dimension to their own lives.
Across what was the Soviet Union, the freedom to pray has been met by a
resurgence of worship.
Nothing could contribute more to global freedom, to security, [and] to
prosperity than the peaceful progression of this rebirth of Russia. It
could mean a modern state at peace not only with itself but with the
world. It could mean one productively and prosperously integrated into
a global economy, a source of raw materials and manufactured products
and a vast market for American goods and services. It could mean a
populous democracy contributing to the stability of both Europe and
Asia.
Russian Renewal--Opportunities For the United States
The success of Russia's renewal must be a first-order concern to our
country because it confronts us with four distinct opportunities.
First, it offers us a historic opportunity to improve our own security.
The danger is clear if Russia's reforms turn sour--if it reverts to
authoritarianism or disintegrates into chaos. The world cannot afford
the strife of the former Yugoslavia replicated in a nation as big as
Russia, spanning 11 time zones, [and] with an armed arsenal of nuclear
weapons that is still very vast.
But there is great opportunity here. Across most of our history, our
security was challenged by European nations set on domination of their
continent and the high seas that lie between us. The tragic violence in
Bosnia reminds us again that Europe has not seen the end of conflict
within its own borders. Now, we could at last face a Europe in which no
great power, not one, harbors continental designs. Think of it--land
wars in Europe cost hundreds of thousands of American lives in the 20th
century. The rise of a democratic Russia, satisfied within its own
boundaries, bordered by other peaceful democracies, could ensure that
our nation never needs to pay that kind of price again.
We also face the opportunity to increase our own security by reducing
the chances of nuclear war. Russia still holds over 20,000 strategic
and tactical nuclear warheads. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have
nuclear weapons on their soil as well. We are implementing historic
arms control agreements that for the first time will radically reduce
the number of strategic nuclear weapons. Now, by sup- porting Russia's
reforms, we can help to turn the promise of those agreements into a
reality for ourselves and for our children, and for Russians and their
children, too.
Second, Russia's reforms offer us the opportunity to complete the
movement from having an adversary in foreign policy to having a partner
in global problem solving. Think back to the Cold War. Recall the
arenas in which we played out its conflicts: Berlin, Korea, the Congo,
Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan. We competed everywhere.
We battled the Soviets at the United Nations. We tracked each other's
movements around the globe. We lost tens of thousands of our finest
young people to hold freedom's line. Those efforts were worthy. But
their worth was measured in prevention more than in creation, in the
containment of terror and oppression rather than the advancement of
human happiness and opportunity.
Now reflect on what has happened just since Russia joined us in a search
for peaceful solutions. We cooperated in the United Nations to defeat
Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. We cosponsored promising peace talks on the
Mideast. We worked together to foster reconciliation in Cambodia and El
Salvador. We joined forces to protect the global environment. Progress
of this kind strengthens our security and that of other nations. If we
can help Russia to remain increasingly democratic, we can leave an era
of standoff behind us and explore expanding horizons of progress and
peace.
Third, Russia's reforms are important to us because they hold one of the
keys to investing more in our own future. America's taxpayers have
literally spent trillions of dollars to prosecute the Cold War. Now we
can reduce that pace of spending--and, indeed, we have been able to
reduce that pace of spending--not only because the arms of the former
Soviet Union pose a diminishing threat to us and our allies. If Russia
were to revert to imperialism or were to plunge into chaos, we would
need to reassess our plans for defense savings. We would have to
restructure our defenses to meet a whole different set of threats than
those we now think will occur. That means billions of dollars less for
other uses. Less for creating new businesses and new jobs. Less for
preparing our children for the future. Less for the new technologies of
the 21st century which our competitors in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere
are pouring money into right now hoping they can capture the high-wage
jobs of the future. Therefore, our ability to put people first at home
requires that we put Russia and its neighbors first on our agenda
abroad.
Fourth, Russia's reforms offer us a historic opportunity. Russia, after
all, is in a profound economic crisis today. But it is still an
inherently rich nation. It has a wealth of oil and gas and coal and
gold and diamonds and timbers for its own people to develop. The
Russian people are among the most well educated and highly skilled in
the world. They are good people sitting on a rich land. They have been
victimized by a system which has failed them. We must look beyond the
Russia of today and see its potential for prosperity. Think of it--a
nation of 150 million people able to trade with us in a way that helps
both our peoples. Russia's economic recovery may be slow, but it is in
the interest of all who seek more robust global growth to ensure that,
aided by American business and trade, Russia rises to its great economic
potential.
The burning question today is whether Russia's economic progress,
whether Russia's democratic progress, will continue or be thwarted. I
believe that freedom, like anything sweet, is hard to take from people
once they have had a taste of it. The human spirit is hard to bottle up
again, and it will be hard to bottle up again in Russia. Yet if we
cannot be certain of how Russia's affairs will proceed, we are
nonetheless certain of our own interests. The interests of all
Americans lie with efforts that enhance our security and our prosperity.
That's why our interests lie with Russian reform and with Russian
reformers led by Boris Yeltsin.
Principles of US Investment In Russian Reform
America's position is unequivocal. We support democracy. We support
free markets. We support freedom of speech, conscience, and religion.
We support respect for ethnic minorities in Russia and for Russian and
other minorities throughout the region. I believe it is essential that
we act prudently but urgently to do all that we can to strike a
strategic alliance with Russian reform. My goal in Vancouver will be
that. And that will be my message to the man who stands as the leader
of reform, Russia's democratically elected President Boris Yeltsin. I
won't describe today all the specific ideas that I plan to discuss with
him. And, of course, I don't know all those that he will discuss with
me. But I want to tell you the principles on which our efforts to
assist reform will rest.
First, our investments in Russian reform must be tangible to the Russian
people. Support for reform must come from the ground up. And that will
only occur if our efforts are broadly dispersed and not focused just on
Moscow. I plan to talk with President Yeltsin about measures intended
to help promote the broad development of small businesses, to accelerate
the privatization of state enterprises, to assist local food processing
and distribution efforts, and to ease the transition to private markets.
Our goal must be to ensure that the Russian people soon come to feel
that they are the beneficiaries of reform and not its victims. We must
help them to recognize that their sufferings today are not the birth
pangs of democracy and capitalism but the death throes of dictatorship
and communism.
Second, our investments in Russian reform must be designed to have
lasting impact. Russia's economic vessel is too large and leaky for us
to bail it out. That's not what's at issue here. Our challenge is to
provide some tools to help the Russians do things that work for
themselves. A good example is Russia's energy sector. Russia is one of
the world's largest oil producers; yet millions of barrels of the oil
Russia pumps each month seep out of the system before ever reaching the
market. Just the leakage from Russia's natural gas pipelines could
supply the entire State of Connecticut.
The Russians must make many reforms to attract energy investments. And
by helping to introduce modern drilling practices and to repair Russia's
energy infrastructure, we can help Russia regain a large and lasting
source of hard currency. Over the long run, that effort can help to
protect the environment as well and to moderate world energy prices. We
have a direct interest in doing that.
Third, our people must do what we can to have people-to-people
initiatives, not just government-to-government ones. We have entered a
new era in which the best way to achieve many of our goals abroad is not
through diplomats or dollars but through private citizens who can impart
the skills and habits that are the lifeblood of democracy and free
markets. We intend to expand efforts for retired American business
executives to work with Russian entrepreneurs to start new businesses.
We intend to work so that our farmers can teach modern farming
practices; so that our labor leaders can share the basics of trade
unionism; so that Americans experienced in grass-roots activities can
impart the techniques that ensure responsive government; so that our
armed forces can engage in more exchanges with the Russian military; and
so that thousands and thousands of young Russians--who are reform's
primary beneficiaries and reform's primary constituency--so that they
can come to our country and study our government, our economy, and our
society not because it's perfect but because it's a great example of a
democracy at work.
Fourth, our investments in reform must be part of a partnership among
all the newly independent states and the international community. They
must be extended in concert with measures from our allies, many of whom
have at least as much stake in the survival of Russian democracy as we
do. Working through the international financial institutions, we can do
great things together that none of us can do by ourselves.
This principle is especially important as we help Russia to stabilize
its currency and its markets. Russia's central bank prints too many
rubles and extends too many credits. The result is inflation that has
been nearly 1% a day. Inflation at such levels gravely imperils
Russia's emerging markets. In Vancouver, I plan to discuss the progress
we are making among the major industrialized nations to help Russia make
the leap to a stable currency and a market economy. While we cannot
support this effort alone in the United States and while we must insist
on reciprocal commensurate Russian reforms, American leadership to curb
inflation and stabilize the currency is essential.
Fifth, we must emphasize investments in Russia that enhance our own
security. I want to talk with President Yeltsin about steps we can take
together to ensure that denuclearization continues in Russia and its
neighboring states. We will explore new initiatives to reassure Ukraine
so that it embraces the START Treaty [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]
and to move toward the goal of the Lisbon Protocol agenda, which was
intended to ensure that Russia is the only nuclear armed successor state
to the Soviet Union.
Ukraine will play a special role in the realization of these objectives,
and we recognize our interest in the success of reform in Ukraine and
the other new states. I'll talk with President Yeltsin about new
efforts to realize the two-third reduction in United States and Soviet
strategic nuclear arsenals envisioned under START. And I'll suggest
steps both of us can take to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction--something that will be a major, major cause of concern for
years to come.
Sixth, we must recognize that our policy toward Russia and the other
states comprises a long-term strategy. It may take years to work
completely. That was the key to our success in the Cold War. We were
in it for the long run--not to win every day, not to know what every
development in every country would be. We had clear principles, clear
interests, clear values, [and] a clear strategy, and we were in it for
the long run.
As the Soviets veered from the terror of Stalin, to the thaw of
Khrushchev, to the gray days of Brezhnev, to the perestroika of
Gorbachev, our purpose always remained constant: containment,
deterrence, [and] human freedom. Our goals must remain equally fixed
today--above all, our security and that of our allies but also
democracy, market economies, human rights, and respect for international
law. In this regard, I welcome President Yeltsin's assurance that civil
liberties will be respected and continuity in Russia's foreign policy
maintained as Russia strives to determine its own future.
The path that Russia and the other states take toward reform will have
rough stretches. Their politics may seem especially tumultuous today,
in part because it's so much more public than in decades past--thanks to
the television and the other mass media. Then, the ruler of the Kremlin
had only subjects; now, the ruler of the Kremlin has constituents--just
like me--and it's a lot more complicated. We must be concerned over
every retreat from democracy but not every growing pain within
democracy.
Let me remind you of our own early history. It was marked by revision
of our governing charter and fistfights in Congress. [Czech President]
Vaclav Havel has noted that democracy is not a destination, but it's a
horizon toward which we make continual progress. Just remember how long
it was from the signing of the Declaration of Independence, to forging a
real, new Constitution, to the election of the first President, and then
you can't be so impatient about what's happened in the short stretch of
time from Gorbachev to Yeltsin to the present crisis. As long as there
are reformers in the Russian Federation and the other states leading the
journey toward democracy's horizon, our strategy must be to support
them. And our place must be at their side.
Moreover, we and the Russian people must not give up on reform simply
because of the slow pace of economic renewal. Recall for a moment how
many of the world's economic success stories were written off too soon.
Western visitors to Japan in 1915 dismissed its economic prospects as
dismal. [South] Korea's economy was described as a "hopeless case" by
American experts in 1958, and look at them now. Many Germans after
World War II anticipated decades of national poverty. A German minister
of economic affairs noted after the war [that] few realized that if
people were allowed once more to become aware of the value and worth of
freedom, dynamic forces would be released. The miracle of prosperity
that Japan, Korea, and Germany have discovered awaits those who are
willing to sustain democratic and economic reforms in Russia and in her
neighboring states. I believe that, and I hope you do, too. Despite
today's troubles, I have great faith that Russian reform will continue
and eventually succeed.
Answering the Courageous Call of Russian Reform
Let me here address directly the Russian people who will read or hear my
words. You are a people who understand patriotic struggle. You have
persevered through an unforgiving climate. Your whole history has been
punctuated with suffering on a scale unknown to the American people.
You heroically withstood murderous invasions by Napoleon and Hitler.
Your great literature and your music, which has so enriched our own
culture, were composed with the pen of longing and the ink of sorrow.
Your accomplishments of education and science speak to your faith in
progress. And now, as you seek to build a great tomorrow for Russia
upon a foundation of democracy and commerce, I speak for Americans
everywhere when I say: We are with you. For we share this bond--the
key to each of our futures is not in clinging to the past but in having
the courage to change.
As we look upon Russia's challenges, we should remember, all of us, that
the American and Russian people have in common so much. We are both
rooted deeply in our land. We are both built of diverse heritage. We
are both forever struggling with the responsibilities that come with
vast territory and power. We both have had to deal with the dilemmas of
human nature on an immense scale. That may be why there has been so
little real hatred between our people, even across the decades when we
pointed weapons of nightmarish destruction at each other's lands.
Now, as in the past, America's future is tied in important ways to
Russia's. During the Cold War, it was tied in negative ways. We saw in
each other only danger. Now that the walls have come down, we can see
hope and opportunity. In the end, our hope for the future of Russian
reform is rooted simply in our faith in the institutions that have
secured our own freedom and prosperity. But it is also rooted in the
Russian people. The diversity of their past accomplishments gives us
hope that there are diverse possibilities for the future. The vitality
of Russian journalism and public debate today gives us hope that the
great truth-seeking traditions of Russian culture will endure and that
Russia's anti-democratic demagogues will not-- indeed, must not--in the
long run prevail. And the discipline of Russia's military, which has
proved itself anew in August 1991 and since--that discipline gives us
hope that Russia's transition can continue to be peaceful. Fifty years
ago, in a different period of historic challenge for Russia, the great
Russian poet, Anna Akhmatova, wrote, "We know what lies in the balance
at this moment and what is happening right now. The hour for courage
strikes upon our clocks and the courage will not desert us."
The opportunity that lies before our nation today is to answer the
courageous call of Russian reform--as an expression of our own values,
as an investment in our own security and prosperity, [and] as a
demonstration of our purpose in a new world. (###)
ARTICLE 2.
Status Report on Iraq's Non-Compliance With UN Resolutions
President Clinton, Fact Sheets, Letter to Congress
Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Washington,
DC, March 22, 1993.
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President):
Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and in an effort to keep the Congress
fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council.
Under my Administration, the United States will continue to lead
international efforts aimed at ensuring that the Iraqi regime does not
threaten international peace and security and at ending the Iraqi
Government's brutal repression of its people. To that end, we will
maintain our insistence on full Iraqi compliance with UN Security
Council resolutions. We will work with the international community to
ensure the integrity of the UN sanctions regime, which is the best means
to promote Iraqi compliance.
In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 687, the UN Special
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) have continued to investigate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs and to verify the destruction of relevant facilities,
equipment, and weapons. Destruction of chemical munitions at Al
Muthanna has continued.
UNSCOM #48, a missile team, and UNSCOM #49/IAEA #17, a nuclear team,
arrived in Iraq just a week after the cruise missile attack on the Al
Zaafaraniyah nuclear-related facility. The nuclear team inspected the
Al Zaafaraniyah site, confirmed that only buildings with technical
functions had been hit, and verified the destruction of many highly
sensitive machine tools. After initial resistance, Iraqi officials have
permitted baseline inventories of the Ibn Al Haytham Research Center;
this is an important but limited step in enabling UNSCOM to move toward
comprehensive evaluation and long-term monitoring of Iraqi WMD
capabilities. The inspections were successful in eliciting new details
of Iraqi WMD programs and an admission from Iraqi officials that they
attempted to deceive a previous UNSCOM team.
A missile team designated as UNSCOM #50 discovered a small discrepancy
in the inventory of missile propellant at one site. During this
inspection, the Iraqi side argued that UNSCOM should not be permitted to
use Global Positioning System equipment to identify the precise
locations of sites visited. Iraq alleges inaccurately that such
readings were used by the US military to target the Al Zaafara-niyah
site. UNSCOM rejected this argument. On February 22, the team was
redesignated as UNSCOM #51 and searched for possible SCUD sites west of
Baghdad.
Iraqi harassment of inspectors and interference with UNSCOM and IAEA
activities have resumed, after a lull immediately following the attack
on Al Zaafaraniyah. Iraqi authorities also threatened to shoot down a
helicopter performing support for a ground inspection that UNSCOM #51
was carrying out. In early February, an Iraqi, possibly an official
"minder" for the inspectors, threw a rock through the window of an
UNSCOM vehicle.
Iraq continues to refuse to provide the United Nations and IAEA with a
comprehensive list of the suppliers for its WMD programs. Moreover, it
refuses to accept UN Security Council Resolution 715, which mandates the
creation of a long-term monitoring regime for Iraq's WMD infrastructure.
The international community must insist on such long-term monitoring.
The United Nations has continued its work to settle the Iraq-Kuwait
border. The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission continues its
work, without Iraqi participation. At its December meeting, the
Commission agreed to begin to demarcate the offshore section of the
boundary "with the principal purpose . . . being navigational access for
both parties."
In response to continued Iraqi violations of the border and the
demilitarized zone (DMZ), the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 806
on February 5. The Resolution clarified that the United Nations Iraq-
Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) can take any necessary actions to
prevent such violations and authorized a potential increase in UNIKOM
forces from 250 to 3,600 troops. The United Nations is seeking to
identify countries willing to contribute an armed battalion for this
purpose.
Evidence continues to mount concerning the massive extent of the Iraqi
Government's human rights violations, both before and after the Persian
Gulf War. Max van der Stoel, Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights
Commission, has produced compelling evidence of Iraqi atrocities against
the civilian population in southern Iraq. We support the Rapporteur's
proposal to place human rights monitors throughout Iraq.
Iraq's campaigns of repression against its own people underline the
importance of international actions to protect Iraq's civilian
populations. Acts of violence and terrorism continue at the behest of
the Government of Iraq in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions
687 and 688. The "no-fly zones" over northern and southern Iraq seek to
monitor Iraq's compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 688.
Since the no-fly zone was instituted in southern Iraq last year, Iraq's
use of aircraft in aggression against its population in the region has
stopped. The no-fly zone in the north has also prevented use of fixed
or rotary wing aircraft against the local population there. Other acts
of repression continue, however, underscoring the need for UN monitors.
The international community has continued its efforts, consistent with
Security Council resolutions, to alleviate suffering in Iraq. The
United States is working closely with the United Nations and other
organizations to provide humanitarian relief to the people of northern
Iraq, in the face of Iraqi Government efforts to disrupt this
assistance. We support new UN efforts to mount a relief program for
persons in Baghdad and the south, but the United Nations must be able to
prevent the Iraqi Government from diverting supplies.
The UN sanctions regime exempts medicine and requires only that the UN
Sanctions Committee be notified of food shipments. In accordance with
paragraph 20 of Resolution 687, the Committee received notices of 17
million tons of foodstuffs to be shipped to Iraq through January 1993.
The Sanctions Committee also continues to consider and, when
appropriate, approve requests to send to Iraq materials and supplies for
essential civilian needs.
The Iraqi Government, in contrast, has for months maintained a full
embargo against its northern provinces, in violation of UN Security
Council Resolution 688, and has acted to distribute humanitarian
supplies only to its supporters and to the military. It has also
refused to utilize the opportunity under Resolutions 706 and 712 to sell
up to $1.6 billion in oil, proceeds from which could be used by Iraq to
purchase foodstuffs, medicines, materials, and supplies for essential
civilian needs of its population; the distribution of these supplies
would be monitored by the United Nations. (These proceeds could also be
used to finance essential UN activities concerning Iraq.) The Iraqi
authorities bear full responsibility for any suffering in Iraq that
results from their refusal to implement Resolutions 706 and 712.
The United States has recently transmitted to the United Nations a
report on Iraqi violations of international humanitarian law committed
during the Gulf War. This report provides the international community
with a documented record of Iraqi crimes. We encourage others to
transmit whatever information they have on Iraqi violations of
international humanitarian law to the United Nations in accordance with
UN Security Council Resolution 674.
Since January 19, the UN Compensation Commission has continued to
prepare for the processing of claims from individuals, corporations,
other entities, governments, and international organizations that
suffered direct loss or damage as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait. The Commission has received about 400,000
claims to date. The next session of the Governing Council of the
Commission is scheduled to be held in Geneva March 29 to April 2, 1993,
with another meeting in July 1993.
Iraq has not met its obligations concerning Kuwaitis and third-country
nationals it detained during the war. The Government of Kuwait has
compiled over 600 files on missing individuals. Although Iraq has
received this information through the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), it has taken no substantive steps to comply with Security
Council Resolution 687, which requires that Iraq cooperate fully with
the ICRC. Regional organizations have also been engaged--thus far to no
avail--in trying to obtain Iraqi compliance on the issue of detainees.
We continue to work for Iraqi compliance and the release of all those
detained in Iraq.
The United States and our allies continue to press the Government of
Iraq to return all property and equipment removed from Kuwait by Iraq.
Iraq continues to withhold necessary cooperation on these issues and to
resist unqualified ICRC access to detention facilities in Iraq.
We will continue to seek to maintain Iraq's territorial integrity. A
future government that represents all the people of Iraq and that is
commit-ted to the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq would be a
stabilizing force in the Gulf region. In this regard, we are encouraged
by recent efforts of the Iraq National Congress (INC) to develop broad-
based indigenous opposition to the Baghdad regime. A democratic and
pluralistic government would be the best guarantor of the future of the
Iraqi people.
My Administration does not seek to use force, but we will not shrink
from using force in self-defense or as authorized by UN Security Council
resolutions to compel Iraq's compliance with their terms. I am grateful
for the support of the Congress for these efforts.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
FACT SHEETS
Iraq's Continuing Repression of its Civilian Population and Violation Of
UNSCR 688
Iraq continues its repression of the civilian population and to deny
humanitarian organizations' access to all those in need of assistance in
violation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 688.
What is Resolution 688?
UNSCR 688 demanded that Iraq end the repression of its citizens, and
insisted that Iraq allow humanitarian organizations access to all those
in need of assistance and make all necessary facilities available for
this purpose.
Repression
In southern Iraq, government forces are still conducting military
operations against the Shi'a Muslim population and dissidents who have
taken refuge in the marshes surrounding the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.
The regime has a massive project underway to drain portions of the
marshes, both to facilitate military operations and to drive the
inhabitants from the area.
The Baghdad regime continues its repression of civilians throughout
Iraq. The Government of Iraq has maintained an internal embargo on the
northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and As Sulaymaniyah. Baghdad has
cut off virtually all shipments of food and fuel for the north. Bombing
attacks against UN convoys carrying relief supplies from Turkey have
slowed relief efforts. Baghdad's internal embargo of the north is
largely responsible for the continuing need for an international relief
program in northern Iraq.
The UN continues to record politically motivated arrests, torture, and
executions of Iraqis throughout the country. All communities in Iraq
are victims of repression, including Arab Sunnis, Shi'a, Kurds,
Turkomen, and Assyrians.
Access for Humanitarian Agencies
Iraq has consistently interfered with humanitarian agencies' efforts to
gain access to all Iraqi citizens in need, particularly in the south.
The countrywide presence of non-governmental organizations and UN relief
personnel in 1991 has shriveled under Iraq's bureaucratic and physical
harassment to the point where most relief organizations are confined to
the north. Iraq recently refused to issue visas and travel permits to
donor nation experts to participate in a UN needs assessment mission
gathering information for relief plans. The United States believes
[that] Iraq is the sponsor of regular terrorist bombings of relief
convoys. Iraq has refused to accept the stationing of human rights
monitors in Iraq as proposed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights, Max van der Stoel. With proper monitoring, the UN would be able
to ensure that the population, especially in the south, receives the
humanitarian and medical aid it needs.
Missing Kuwaiti Detainees And Compensation
Kuwaiti Detainees
During the 1990-91 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, thousands of Kuwaiti
citizens and other residents of Kuwait were taken to Iraq as prisoners.
UNSCR 687 requires that they all be returned to Kuwait or accounted for.
Many were returned in the weeks following the cease-fire, but hundreds
remain missing and unaccounted for by the Government of Iraq. The
Government of Kuwait has passed to the International Committee of the
Red Cross for the Iraqi Government files on over 615 Kuwaitis and other
residents of Kuwait who remain missing in Iraq. Up to 100 other cases
require further investigation.
The Iraqi Government's response to efforts to find and repatriate the
missing is grossly inadequate. It claims all detainees have been
released but has refused ICRC access to detention centers to confirm
this claim. Iraq has taken no substantive steps to act on the
information in the ICRC case files.
Return of Property
Iraq is obliged under UNSCR 687 to return property stolen from Kuwait
during the occupation. While some property was returned in usable
condition in the months immediately after the war, more recently
returned property has been deliberately vandalized and rendered unusable
prior to being handed over. For example, aircraft fuselages were sawed
in half and radar systems stripped of their electronic gear. Some items
have not been returned, including I-Hawk air defense systems and
priceless cultural artifacts and antiques stolen from the Kuwait
National Museum and private collections.
These actions constitute not only gross violations of UNSCR requirements
but reflect continuing Iraqi non-compliance with UNSCR 687.
Compensation
Under UNSCR 687, Iraq is liable for any direct loss, damage, or injury
to foreign governments, nationals, and corporations as a result of the
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Claims are to be paid out of a fund
to be administered by the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) which would
be financed by 30% of the revenues generated by the sale of Iraqi oil.
Thus, the availability of funds to pay claims (over 400,000 already
filed and perhaps 2 million expected) depends upon Iraq's resumption of
oil sales under conditions acceptable to the UNSC. Iraq's failure to
comply with the relevant aspects of UNSC resolutions and UNSCR 687 has
precluded the lifting of sanctions on the sale of Iraqi oil. Resolution
778 established a mechanism for countries to loan frozen Iraqi assets to
the UN-managed escrow account, with 30% going to the Compensation Fund.
The Need for Long-Term Monitoring in Iraq
The United States strongly supports continued unrestricted inspections
and monitoring in Iraq, envisioned under UN Security Council Resolutions
687, 707, and 715.
More than a year has passed since the UN Security Council approved UNSCR
715, which adopted the plans for long-term monitoring of Iraq's weapons
industry to ensure it did not reactivate its weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile programs. These Iraqi weapons programs were
prohibited by UNSCR 687 following the Gulf war cease-fire.
Iraq's Record
UNSCR 687 requires Iraq to disclose fully its weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile programs to the UN Special Commission
and the IAEA, to allow these programs to be eliminated under UN
supervision, and to establish a monitoring regime to ensure that Iraq
does not reacquire banned weapons. While Iraq has publicly accepted
UNSCR 687 and maintains it is in full compliance, Iraqi actions tell
another story. From the very beginning of UN weapons inspections in
Iraq in 1991, the Iraqis have tried to hide major portions of their
programs, refused to give the UN complete information about their
programs and their foreign suppliers, and have actively tried to foil
the attempts of UN inspectors to uncover these programs. From time to
time, as in the standoff outside the Agricultural Ministry in August
1992, Iraq's defiance has been blatant and has resulted in further UNSC
resolutions reminding Iraq of the need to comply.
Need for Long-Term Monitoring
This intransigence--plus Iraq's continued unwillingness to formally
acknowledge its obligations under UNSCR 715's monitoring regime and to
provide information on their foreign suppliers--makes UNSCOM's and
IAEA's efforts at implementing their long-term monitoring programs
critical. Moreover, Iraq still has the human and technological
resources to renew its nuclear, chemical, [and] biological weapons and
ballistic missile programs for weapons of mass destruction, if
inspections were to stop.
In the nuclear area, Iraq almost certainly retains key nonfissible
materials, equipment, and trained personnel that could be used to
rejuvenate nuclear weapons design and development and fissile material
production programs.
The United States believes Iraqi authorities remain committed to
achieving a nuclear weapon capability--and, if sanctions and inspections
were to cease, would attempt to reconstitute Iraq's nuclear weapon
program using existing resources as well as possible assistance from
abroad.
Harassment of UNSCOM Inspectors
Iraqi harassment of UN inspectors, a constant backdrop to the inspection
process, is part of Iraq's refusal to comply with UNSCOM's objectives as
outlined in UN Security Council resolutions. UNSCR 707 requires Iraq to
ensure the complete safety and freedom of movement of UN inspectors,
which it clearly has not done. Incidents of harassment tapered off in
late January but have picked up momentum since then.
Harassment
Harassment of UN Special Commission staff and inspectors has taken many
forms on countless occasions. Inspectors routinely receive harassing
telephone calls very late at night. The callers make obscene,
intimidating, and threatening remarks, which include death, bomb, and
fire bomb threats.
Another form of harassment involves wrongful entry and searches of
inspectors' hotel rooms. The contents of drawers have sometimes been
emptied onto the floor; and, at other times, items such as cameras and
money have been stolen.
UNSCOM staff members have been jostled in public, threatened with
physical abuse, refused service at restaurants, and have had meals and
drinks intentionally overturned on them while in restaurants.
Physical Attacks
UNSCOM property has been subject to repeated damage. Cars have been
sprayed with paint; antennas broken; tires stolen, deflated, or slashed;
and lights, windows, and windshields broken. In February, a rock
shattered the rear window of an UNSCOM official's car in Baghdad.
Inspectors have had a variety of items thrown at them: fruit,
vegetables, eggs, rocks, bottles, rubbish, ink, paint, and diesel fuel.
Light bulbs have been dropped from the top of multi-story buildings at
them. On one occasion, an UNSCOM inspector narrowly escaped a
potentially life-threatening injury when an Iraqi lunged at him with a
knife.
While some of these incidents may be spontaneous, the bulk of them
appear to be the result of a coordinated government campaign to
intimidate and humiliate the UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors.
Iraq's Support for Terrorism
UNSC Resolution 687 requires Iraq to cease support for acts of
international terrorism. The Baghdad regime has conducted terrorist
attacks against a variety of targets. In 1992, Iraqi-sponsored
terrorism focused on Kurdish targets and on UN and Western relief
organization employees working in northern Iraq. Thirty-nine attacks
were carried out last year.
Iraqi intelligence has also resumed sending agents abroad to track
opponents of the regime. The most recent case of an assassination was
committed by two Iraqi men who killed an Iraqi nuclear scientist in
Amman, Jordan, as he was preparing to defect. Jordanian authorities
arrested the two Iraqis, who admitted they were working for Iraqi
intelligence.
There have been many casualties in the dozens of attacks in recent
months aimed at driving UN and international relief workers out of
northern Iraq. In November, magnetic time bombs placed under UN convoy
trucks exploded in Irbil; all evidence points to Iraqi Government
responsibility for the attacks. In December, Iraqi authorities placed
eight time bombs under UN relief convoy trucks. The bombs were set to
explode in Irbil but were discovered and defused. One week later,
explosions destroyed or damaged 14 relief trucks that had just passed an
Iraqi checkpoint. In January 1993, an expatriate employee of CARE was
killed and two people were wounded in an attack in northern Iraq. In
March 1993, a Belgian relief worker was assassinated while traveling
from As Sulaymaniyah to Erbil. The houses, offices, and vehicles of UN
and relief workers have been repeatedly attacked by bombs, grenades,
guns, and fires.
UN Security Council Resolution 687 also requires that Iraq not allow any
terrorist organization to operate within its territory. Nevertheless,
Baghdad continues to maintain contacts and in some cases provide
sanctuary to several groups and individuals that have practiced
terrorism.
-- Iraq hosts and supports the main Iranian opposition group, the
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which carried out several violent attacks in
Iran in 1992.
-- Iraq also supports extremist Palestinian groups including the Abu
Nidal Organization (ANO); the Arab Liberation Front; Abu Abbas's
Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF); and Abu Ibrahim, leader and master
bomb-maker of the now-defunct May 15 Organization.
-- Baghdad is reportedly providing safe haven and support to the
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).
How Iraq Could Feed Its People
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 6, 1990, created a difficult problem
for the international community: how to compel the Baghdad regime to
comply with its demands while, at the same time, preventing undue
hardship from being inflicted upon Iraqi civilians.
The UN Security Council has made every effort to resolve this dilemma.
Unfortunately, the Iraqi Government has rejected each proposal and,
instead, cynically diverts humanitarian imports to regime supporters and
uses the suffering of civilians as a means of evading compliance with
Security Council resolutions.
Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688
Security Council Resolutions 687 (which established the cease-fire) and
688 were both passed in April 1991 and dealt with humanitarian issues.
The former extended sanctions until Iraq complied fully with the terms
of the cease-fire. The latter demanded that Iraq cooperate fully with
UN efforts to coordinate relief programs throughout Iraq and give relief
workers access to those in need. The sanctions regime always exempted
medicine. By April 1991, it was liberalized so that food shipments need
only be notified to the UN Sanctions Committee, which also approves by
consensus shipments of other humanitarian supplies.
To date, Iraq has refused to comply fully with both resolutions. It has
severely restricted the ability of UN relief agencies to operate,
especially in southern Iraq. It maintains an embargo against its
northern governorates. Nonetheless, donors have contributed $610
million since April 1991 to support UN humanitarian work in Iraq.
Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712
In August and September 1991, the Security Council created an exemption
to the sanctions which would allow Iraq to fund the purchase of food and
medicine through the export of petroleum. Resolutions 706 and 712
created a UN-managed escrow account for the deposit of oil-export
revenues and established a structure through which UN monitors could
track the equitable distribution of the humanitarian supplies purchased
with those revenues. The resolution approved total oil sales of $1.6
billion, of which $933 million would be used for humanitarian needs.
One and a half years later, the Government of Iraq still refuses to
implement these resolutions.
Security Council Resolution 778
In October 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 778. Its main
purpose was to establish a means by which countries could loan frozen
Iraqi assets to the escrow account established in Resolution 706 and
hence make them available for humanitarian use. Iraq has worked to
prevent the release of its assets to this humanitarian mechanism, but
the United States has drawn on Iraqi assets to match $50 million in
voluntary contributions by Arab Gulf states.
List of Incidents of Iraqi Non-compliance and Non-cooperation with UN
Security Council Resolutions
Iraq has broadened its resistance to complying with the UN Security
Council Resolutions 687, 688, and subsequent, related resolutions. Iraq
has outrightly refused to accept many of the terms imposed by the
Security Council, especially those of UNSCR 687 and later resolutions
that follow up Resolution 687. A special area of concern lies in Iraqi
Government-sponsored harassment and intimidation of UN personnel. These
efforts are in addition to more general Iraqi refusal to cooperate with
UN and other international organizations as required by UNSCR 688.
The list below stands as evidence of Iraq's non-compliance and non-
cooperation with UN Security Council resolutions.
Iraq-Kuwait Border
December 14, 1992: Iraq declines to take part in the eighth session of
the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission.
January 2, 1993: A group of approximately 250 Iraqis, half in military
uniforms, enter the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ and begin unauthorized
property retrievals in the area between the old and newly demarcated
boundary lines.
January 3, 1993: Unauthorized property retrieval continues. Iraqi
personnel number approximately 500. Operations include demolition and
dismantling of buildings and structures. Operations continue through
January 13.
January 10, 1993: 200 Iraqis break into and loot the contents of six
ordnance bunkers on the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ. Iraqis challenge
UNIKOM efforts to stop them by ramming UNIKOM vehicles and brandishing
weapons. Iraqi officer in charge advises UNIKOM that Iraq intended to
demolish UNIKOM's northern sector headquarters the following day and
that they would bring the building down on UNIKOM personnel if the
building were not vacated.
January 13, 1993: A group of 21 Iraqis, using five vehicles and a
crane, enter Kuwaiti territory and remove three transformers and a
length of pipe from the Ritqa oil field.
January 17, 1993: Three armed Iraqis enter the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ
and fire upon Kuwaiti policemen.
March 4, 1993: Iraqi authorities seize two Pakistani officers employed
in ordnance-clearing operations who had strayed into the Iraqi side of
the DMZ [demilitarized zone]. The Iraqis respond to UNIKOM personnel's
request to go to UNIKOM headquarters by brandishing weapons at the
Pakistani officers and taking them further into Iraq.
March 15, 1993: Iraq declines to take part in the ninth session of the
Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission.
UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)
(Including violations of UNSCR's 687, 707, and 715 and the UN-Iraq
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities.)
December 2, 1992: Iraqis refuse portion of an UNSCOM helicopter flight,
claiming [that] the flight would be in the "city limits" of Baghdad.
December 10, 1992: Iraqis refuse to permit UNSCOM #47/CBW [chemical and
biological weapons] #3 team unconditional and unrestricted access to all
records sought for inspection at PC-3.
January 5, 1993: Iraq stipulates that all UN flights into and out of
Iraq must stay west of the Euphrates River, both when northbound and
southbound.
January 7, 1993: Government of Iraq notifies UNSCOM that UN aircraft
are no longer allowed to use Habanniyah airport.
January 15, 1993: Iraq refuses to take responsibility for the safety of
flights into Baghdad carrying UN inspection teams. Iraqi Permanent
Representative [to the United Nations] Hamdoon sends letter to UNSCOM
saying U-2 flights should be suspended.
January 25, 1993: Iraqis say they have released 90% of information on
nuclear program--but continue to refuse to provide supplier data.
January 28, 1993: Iraqis admit to UNSCOM #48/MT #1 team that they made
a deliberate and false statement to UNSCOM #3 concerning missile
launchers.
February 1, 1993: Rock shatters rear window of UNSCOM doctor's car in
Baghdad--possibly thrown by an Iraqi escort.
February 4, 1993: Iraqi official Hossan Amin tells UNSCOM #48
inspectors [that] they cannot conduct a baseline survey of the Ibn Al
Haytham Missile R&D Center. He alleges that an inventory is a UNSCR 715
activity that falls outside the agreed modalities for the inspection
team.
February 22, 1993: Iraq tells UNSCOM #51 missile team [that] it cannot
fly to an inspection site; UN helicopter is tracked by anti-aircraft
artillery. UNSCOM #50 team members continue to receive harassment calls
in the middle of the night.
December 9, 1992: General Amir threatens to "break the backs" of any
Iraqis who provide UN inspectors [with] technical information and says
UNSCOM helicopters will not be allowed to fly "one meter" within
Baghdad.
Return of Property
March 8, 1993: Iraqi Permanent Representative [to the UN] informs UN
Secretary General that all Kuwaiti Air Force equipment except one C-130
aircraft has been returned. Iraqi information memo promises return of
tanks and other heavy equipment. No reference is made to I-Hawk
missiles or the severely damaged condition of numerous items returned.
Repatriation of Detainees
March 2, 1993: Kuwait informs the Security Council that Iraq has
provided no response to over 600 files, presented to the Iraqi
Government through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
on prisoners, detainees, and missing persons.
Compensation Commission
February 12, 1993: Iraq's Foreign Minister, in a letter to the UN
Security Council, challenges a decision of the Compensation Fund's
Governing Council which imposed interest on claims related to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait.
UNSCR 688
(Including violations of the UN-Iraq Memorandum of Understanding on
Humanitarian Assistance.)
December 17, 1992: Iraqi forces fired on "food trucks" near Bardarsh.
December 22, 1992: A truck belonging to a local relief organization is
destroyed by an explosion.
December 22, 1992: A 10-ton truck belonging to the CARITAS relief
organization is destroyed by a car bomb. The truck was parked in a
residential area and had been used earlier to transport building
material.
December 23, 1992: An anti-tank mine is discovered in the driveway to a
MEDAIR camp.
December 28, 1992: A bomb placed under the rear axle destroys 1 of 10
UN convoy trucks in NGO custody.
December 30, 1992: An electric transformer located 200 meters from the
UN Guard headquarters in Dahuk in destroyed by a bomb.
December 31, 1992: An explosion shatters windows and destroys a garden
wall at the offices of the relief agency Shelter Now.
January 5, 1993: Five shots are fired through the window of a room
occupied by a UNICEF engineer. No injuries were reported.
January 9, 1993: A Save the Children relief worker is threatened near
the Qandil bridge by armed men. Peshmerga guards capture the men and
hand them over to local authorities.
January 12, 1993: A bomb explodes 100 meters from the UN Guard office
in Dahuk, shattering windows and destroying a nearby electric
transformer.
January 14, 1993: An unidentified man smashes the window of UN relief
coordinator Foran's car, while a UN guard sits in the back seat.
Earlier in the week, the tires of Foran's car were slashed outside a
Baghdad hotel.
January 23, 1993: An Iraqi hurls a grenade into a passing relief convoy
in As Sulaymaniyah. Under questioning, he admits [that] he was sent by
Baghdad to attack the relief effort.
January 29, 1993: Local authorities arrest a man carrying a magnetic
bomb into Kurdish-controlled territory. He claims [that] Baghdad
offered him 200,000 Iraqi dinars to place the bomb on a UN vehicle.
January 30, 1993: A magnetic time bomb explodes on an empty UN relief
kerosene tanker at the Turkish customs area at Habur bridge.
January 1993: The house of a non-governmental organization (NGO) worker
is bombed; his family managed to escape injury.
February 2, 1993: Unidentified men throw stones through the windshields
of UN convoy trucks in two separate incidents. One incident occurs
inside Baghdad-controlled territory.
February 13, 1993: Several time bombs explode inside a Red Crescent [an
Islamic humanitarian organization similar to the Red Cross] warehouse,
killing one and injuring five others. Another [bomb] was discovered at
the scene.
February 15, 1993: A pressure-activated explosive device detonates
under the wheel of a Turkish fuel tanker consigned to carry fuel into
Dahuk. A similar device was recovered from another truck.
February 24, 1993: An unidentified man placed a bomb on an empty UN
tanker truck returning to Kurdish-controlled territory from Baghdad-
controlled territory. The man escaped in a taxi waiting in a Government
of Iraq-controlled parking lot. Iraqi officials confiscated the bomb
after it was defused.
March 1993: Iraq refuses to issue visas to non-UN experts on UN
humanitarian assessment teams planning to visit southern and northern
Iraq.
March 16, 1993: A bomb, placed on the main chassis frame, explodes on a
UN-leased truck parked on the Iraqi side of the Habur bridge. The truck
was waiting to clear customs for re-entry into Turkey.
March 20, 1993: Two bombs explode in the UN Guard car park in Irbil.
The first exploded under a UN Guard vehicle and caused extensive damage.
UNSCRs 706 and 712
Iraq has taken no steps in recent months to avail itself of authorized
oil sales for the purchase of food, medicine, and other humanitarian
goods.
UNSCR 773
January 1993: Iraqi border incursions and violations of the Iraq-Kuwait
demilitarized zone flout Resolution 773 on boundary demarcation. (###)
ARTICLE 3.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Secretary Christopher, Department Statement, UN Security Council
Resolution, Ambassador Walker
Signing of Bosnian Peace Plan
Statement by Secretary Christopher, released by the Office of the
Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, March 25, 1993.
The signature today by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
Bosnian Croatian delegation of the principal documents of the Bosnian
peace plan, developed in the process of negotiations conducted by co-
chairmen Vance and Owen, marks a vital step toward a settlement of the
conflict in Bosnia.
The US Government welcomes the difficult and courageous decision made by
the Bosnian Government. President Izetbegovic has shown commendable
statesmanship. We also commend the efforts made by the Bosnian Croatian
delegation in reaching this conclusion.
We now have an agreement signed by two of the three parties. It is
imperative that the Bosnian Serbs reach agreement immediately so that a
final settlement of this tragic conflict can be achieved. We call upon
the Bosnian Serbs to immediately cease their attacks, to lift the siege
and bombardment of Sarajevo and other cities, and to end their campaign
of ethnic cleansing. We believe the entire world community must do its
utmost to impress upon the Bosnian Serbs and their supporters in
Belgrade that they must abandon their present policies.
As I stated on February 10 [see Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 10, p. 81], if
there is a viable agreement entered into in good faith by the parties,
the United States is prepared to do its share to help implement and
enforce such an agreement, working with NATO and under the United
Nations. We believe it is of critical importance that this conflict be
settled on terms which will preserve the independence and territorial
integrity of Bosnia. Such a solution would be in keeping with our
values as a nation and the goal of preventing a wider Balkan war.
Looking to the day when a settlement of this terrible conflict has been
reached, the entire international community should do its utmost to
provide economic aid and reconstruction assistance to the Bosnian state.
Admission to the US Of Bosnian Refugees
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, March
26, 1993.
The United States is expanding its admissions program for Bosnian
refugees to include additional groups of special humanitarian concern to
the United States.
While the initial program was limited to former detainees and their
immediate family members, we will now accept refugee applications from
other groups such as:
-- Women victims of violence, victims of torture, and other individuals
referred by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as being in
need of resettlement;
-- Bosnian Muslim relatives of US citizens, lawful permanent residents,
refugees, and asylees; and
-- Parents and siblings of minor US-citizen children who have been
displaced as a result of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
This expansion will also allow for the resettlement of up to 3,000
Bosnian refugees.
The main focus of our efforts to help the over 3 million refugees and
displaced from the former Yugoslavia remains humanitarian assistance in
place. To date, the United States has contributed over $200 million, in
cash and in kind, and will continue to give generously until this
humanitarian tragedy has ended.
It is anticipated that most refugee processing for this program will
take place in Zagreb, Croatia, and should begin the week of March 29,
1993. In addition, persons falling within the categories of interview
eligibility may apply at other refugee processing posts. In Europe,
these posts are Belgrade, Rome, Vienna, Frankfurt, Madrid, Athens, and
Istanbul.
For additional information about this program, please contact:
-- Eligible Bosnians in the immediate region of the former Yugoslavia
should contact the US Refugee Resettlement Office (USRRO), Iblerov TRG
#9, 2nd floor, Zagreb, Croatia; telephone no. (38) (41) 419-696.
-- Relatives in the United States and potential sponsors should contact
the local voluntary agency in their area which resettles refugees. For
a listing of such agencies, call InterAction at (202) 667-8227.
-- Persons seeking general information about the program should contact
the US headquarters of the Zagreb Refugee Resettlement Office (the
International Rescue Committee in New York) at (212) 679-0010 or the
Bureau for Refugee Programs at the Department of State at (202) 663-1077
or (202) 663-1048.
Resolution 816 (March 31, 1993)
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992 and 786 (1992) of
10 November 1992,
Recalling paragraph 6 of resolution 781 (1992) and paragraph 6 of
resolution 786 (1992) in which the Council undertook to consider
urgently, in the case of violations of the ban on military flights in
the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the further
measures necessary to enforce the ban,
Deploring the failure of some parties concerned to cooperate fully with
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) airfield monitors in the
implementation of resolutions 781 (1992) and 786 (1992),
Deeply concerned by the various reports of the Secretary-General
concerning violations of the ban on military flights in the airspace of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/24783, S/24810, S/24840,
S/24870, S/24900 and Add.1 to 31),
Deeply concerned in particular by the Secretary-General's letters to the
President of the Security Council of 12 and 16 March 1993 (S/25443 and
S/25444) concerning new blatant violations of the ban on military
flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
recalling in this regard the statement by the President of the Security
Council of 17 March 1993 (S/25426), and in particular the reference to
the bombing of villages in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Determining that the grave situation in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina continues to be a threat to international peace and
security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides to extend the ban established by Resolution 781 (1992) to
cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this ban not to apply to
flights authorized by UNPROFOR in accordance with paragraph 2 below:
2. Requests UNPROFOR to modify the mechanism referred to in paragraph 3
of resolution 781 (1992) so as to provide for the authorization, in the
airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of humanitarian
flights and other flights consistent with relevant resolutions of the
Council;
3. Requests UNPROFOR to continue to monitor compliance with the ban on
flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
calls on all parties urgently to cooperate with UNPROFOR in making
practical arrangements for the close monitoring of authorized flights
and improving the notification procedures;
4. Authorizes Member States, seven days after the adoption of this
resolution, acting nationally or through regional organizations of
arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and
subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR,
all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in the event of further violations, to ensure compliance
with the ban on flights referred to in paragraph 1 above, and
proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of the
flights;
5. Requests the Member States concerned, the Secretary-General and
UNPROFOR to coordinate closely on the measures they are taking to
implement paragraph 4 above, including the rules of engagement, and on
the starting date of its implementation, which should be no later than
seven days from the date when the authority conferred by paragraph 4
above takes effect, and to report the starting date to the Council
through the Secretary-General;
6. Decides that, in the event of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering
Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
notifying the Council that all the Bosnian parties have accepted their
proposals on a settlement before the starting date referred to in
paragraph 5 above, the measures set forth in the present resolution will
be subsumed into the measures for implementing that settlement;
7. Also requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-
General immediately of any actions they take in exercise of the
authority conferred by paragraph 4 above;
8. Requests further the Secretary-General to report regularly to the
Council on the matter and to inform it immediately of any action taken
by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by
paragraph 4 above;
9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
VOTE: 14-0-1 (China)
US Explanation of Vote On Resolution 816
Statement by US Deputy Permanent Representative Edward Walker, New York
City, March 31, 1993.
The United States strongly supported, and, indeed, co-sponsored, the
resolution which the Security Council has just adopted. As members of
this Council are already aware, the United States has long been in favor
of such a resolution and has worked vigorously in recent days for a
resolution that would unequivocally demonstrate the international
community's will to enforce resolutions of this council and agreements
signed by the Bosnian parties.
As members of this Council remember, all of the Bosnian parties agreed
to a ban on military flights over Bosnia at the August 1992 conference
that was chaired by Lord Carrington. The ink was hardly dry on that
agreement before violations--the overwhelming majority of which have
been carried out by the Bosnian Serbs--began to occur. The aerial
bombing of Bosnian government targets by Bosnian Serb forces on March 11
of this year, which the Council eloquently and aptly condemned in its
statement of March 17, is but the latest flagrant violation of the
London Conference Agreement and the subsequent Security Council
resolution on the no-fly zone.
These bombing attacks follow more than 400 other apparent violations,
mainly by the Bosnian Serbs, since the Council adopted Resolution 781 in
October 1992. Confronted with these violations and the Bosnian Serbs'
determination to flout the will of this Council with impunity, we had no
choice but to act now.
The Bosnian Serbs must understand that this resolution is evidence of
the international community's growing concern and intolerance of their
acts of aggression. The credibility of the United Nations and its
entire approach to resolving this conflict rests on its willingness to
act strongly and effectively, as we are doing through this resolution.
We repeat that the United States deplores Serbian aggression against a
member state of this organization. We will not recognize Serbian
attempts to change international borders by force. We will do all in our
power to ensure that those who commit unspeakable violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law against innocent civilians are
brought to justice. This resolution should send a message that if the
Bosnian Serbs want to rejoin the family of nations, their behavior must
conform to international norms. We will accept nothing less.
While the international community has a duty to encourage the parties to
reach such a settlement, we must also demonstrate that signing pieces of
paper without an intent to implement them is not enough. By showing our
will to enforce agreements, this council has today demonstrated our
commitment to peace and our resolve to end the conflict. (###)
ARTICLE 4.
US-German Relations
President Clinton, German Chancellor Kohl
Excerpts from opening statements at a news conference, released by the
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, March 26,
1993
President Clinton: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Before we
begin the press conference, I have a sad announcement to make. I have
just been informed that five US servicemen on a routine training flight
with the USS Theodore Roosevelt have crashed at sea within a mile of the
carrier. I want to express my deep concern over the accident. Just 2
weeks ago, I visited the USS Theodore Roosevelt and met the fine sailors
and marines [serving] their nation at sea there. I was profoundly
impressed by their commitment, their dedication, and their
professionalism. They made America proud. And I want to say that my
thoughts and prayers are with the relatives and shipmates of those five
servicemen who are missing at sea.
I want to begin by extending a warm welcome to Chancellor Kohl. We have
had a wonderful visit. The personal chemistry between us, I think, was
quite good. Helmut Kohl, over more than a decade of service in his
present position, has proved himself time and again to be a true friend
and staunch ally of the United States.
Our peoples are closely linked with long-standing ties and common
values. Our common bonds ensure that our two federal systems can learn
from each other. And, indeed, I told the Chancellor that,
notwithstanding the persistent problems of cost in the German health
care system, my wife [First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton] had found a lot
to learn from Germany.
We are working, our two countries, on the establishment of a project
conceived by Chancellor Kohl and very close to his heart, the German
American Academic Council, which will promote exchanges of people in the
areas of science and technology and about which he might want to speak
more in a moment.
During the Cold War, our two nations stood shoulder to shoulder in the
common effort to contain communism in Europe. Today we must be leaders
in the great crusade of the post-Cold War era to foster liberty,
democracy, human rights, and free market economics throughout the world.
If the world is to progress and prosper, the United States and Germany
must work closely together. Our bilateral relationship is invaluable.
Our relations are, at the same time, important in the context of the
North Atlantic alliance, the European Community, and the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. In these three institutions,
Germany serves as both an anchor of stability and a source of fresh
initiatives to meet the challenges of our changing world.
A paramount challenge for the West in our generation is helping to
ensure the survival of democracy and economic reform in Russia and the
other republics of the former Soviet Union. Germany, as the largest
single donor of assistance to Russia, has demonstrated its firm
commitment to this historic cause. The United States and Germany must
now strengthen our partnership on this effort and work both bilaterally
and multilaterally to support Russian reform. The Chancellor and I
discussed this issue at great length today.
I discussed with him the approach that I plan to take in the meeting
with President Yeltsin at Vancouver. And I believe we are in agreement
on the general approach. I know that we are committed to doing
everything we possibly can to keep alive democracy and reform in Russia,
and we believe it is in the immediate interests and the long-term
interest of all of our people.
We also believe that the rest of the G-7 countries [Group of 7
industrialized countries] must cooperate with us and with each other to
vigorously produce a program of support for Russia. We discussed in
depth the troubling situations in Bosnia and elsewhere, and we conferred
on trade and economics. We agreed that we must work hard to conclude
the Uruguay GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] round this
year, and we committed to work closely together in this endeavor.
As two of the world's leading exporting nations, the United States and
Germany have a powerful interest in expanding global trade. I assured
the Chancellor that the United States intends to remain politically and
strategically engaged in Europe and to maintain a significant military
presence on the continent. The budget that I am fighting for in the
Congress now would permit us to maintain a troop contingent on the order
of 100,000 troops in Europe.
We believe that American and European securities remain indivisible and
that the common threads of the post-Cold War era require common action.
At the same time, we also recognize that each of us are reducing our
defense budgets and must be increasingly responsible for our own defense
needs.
Thirty years ago during his famous trip to Germany, President Kennedy
toasted another great leader of the Christian Democratic Union and the
German people, Konrad Adenauer, saying these are critical days. The
President's pronouncement reflected his concern then for the survival of
freedom and even humankind at the height of the Cold War.
Today, thankfully, the nuclear shadow is receding from both our lands.
And the wall that divided the German people is gone. But I would say
again, these are critical days, for the actions we take together now
will help to determine the fate of democracy, the prosperity of our
people, and the peace of the world. In that work, I could not ask for a
better partner than Chancellor Kohl or the German people. And I want to
say to him, I am delighted with this first visit, and I look forward to
working with you in the days ahead.
Chancellor Kohl: Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. First, Mr.
President, allow me to express my heartfelt sympathy on the loss and the
fear, because we don't have any detailed information about the loss of
life of five American officers.
I hope very much that these soldiers may be able to return to their
families safe and sound, because they serve the freedom and the security
of their country, the United States of America. And without that
service, there would be no freedom and peace and no reunification for
Germany. This is why I am very sad about the things that you have just
had to present to us. I should like to ask you to convey to the
families of the people concerned my feelings of sympathy.
Ladies and gentlemen, today I had my first meeting with the President of
the United States of America. It was a friendly exchange of views. It
is something that can be easily said in English--the chemistry is right.
You said so, and I am pleased to take it up; indeed, the chemistry is
right. We touched upon many issues, many of which are very close to our
hearts, at an important point in time of international politics, of
European politics. And I was also able to present many things that are
important to German politics.
American-German relations, to put it in a nutshell, are for us--Germans
and for me personally--today equally important if not more important
than 30 years ago. More than 30 years ago, when I was for the first
time elected to the German Parliament, the alliance between the
Americans and Germans, the European-American alliance, was much more
matter of fact, because we lived under the threat and in the fear of the
war. Remember the Berlin blockade--the Berlin Wall--many challenges
that we had to master together--down to the things that happened under
John F. Kennedy in Cuba.
Today, many of these people have been released--they're free again. But
in Europe and in Germany, too, there are quite a few who believe that
there were no dangers existent anymore now that the times are changed.
For these reasons, American-German relations have become ever more
important. The psychological environment has changed.
I said to you, Mr. President, and I should like to repeat this here and
now, in this house of Europe that we are in the process of building
right now--and I should like to go into greater detail on that later on-
-it is of existential importance for me, a German, that the Americans
have a flat in this house; that the American soldiers and troops-- the
presence in Europe and in Germany--documents that they're not there for
decorative purposes but to defend freedom and security of people.
The fact that we can further develop the relations in the economic
field--and that includes that despite the problems that we have, we
bring about a speedy and successful conclusion of the GATT round. This
is something that we touched upon, too. We agreed that we want to work
on this.
You were so kind, Mr. President, to mention that in the cultural and
scientific field, we have the intention to intensify relations between
both our countries. You mentioned the German American Academic Council,
which is to be founded this year. I am very happy that you have agreed
that once the necessary decisions have been taken in the next few weeks,
we will found this economic council. This is important for the public
in both our countries. It is for me very important that young
Americans, that young Germans, visit the other country--vice versa--that
they get to know the people and their culture. To put it differently,
Mr. President, we [will] plant many young trees so that we have a forest
later on of things that we share, that we have in common.
I should also like to add for those who might have heard different
reports on this here in the United States, there is no alternative for
the Germans to a policy that makes progress with European unification--
and we are the engine of this development--and at the same time, places
great care and value on American-German relations.
And I should like to say this: Because we are now confronted with a
common challenge and a major task--that is, we have to see to it that
the spirit of reform--the willingness to establish democratic structures
and a pluralist society, market economic structures in Russia and the
CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]--is continuing.
I'm very grateful to you personally, Mr. President, for the
determination and the courage that you have documented in the last few
weeks in standing by Boris Yeltsin. Both of us--and I underline and
subscribe to every single word that you said on this--one, that reforms
are successful in Russia. And both of us are aware of the fact that any
type of setback will in the end turn out to be much more expensive than
any type of assistance we have the intention of granting right now.
We have discussed many issues and items on our plate. The members of
our staff will continue prior to the meeting with President Yeltsin and
the American President to continue to discuss these matters. Then we
have the G-7 finance and foreign minister's meeting in Tokyo [on] the
14th and 15th of April. We want to send a message to the people of
Russia that the West under the leadership of the Americans and the
American President will do everything in its power to see to it that
Russia and other successor states to the Soviet Union stand a chance to
walk on their own path toward freedom.
We the Germans--and I outlined this earlier on to you, Mr. President--as
far as this question is concerned, are very committed, not only because
we are neighbors of the former Soviet Union and the threat, if there was
a relapse to form a dictator structures, would affect us first and
foremost, but we do so because we have made our own experiences.
We were standing in the Oval Office looking at the sculpture of Harry S
Truman, and I was reminded of the importance that the activities of
George Marshall and Harry S Truman had for Germany when the zero hour--
when we were outlawed in the world. These two stood up--stood by us and
assisted us. These were the fathers of the Marshall Plan, of a moral
gesture of coexistence and cooperation. And this, to my mind, is fair
to say, a flourishing industry and country has developed--the former
Federal Republic of Germany.
And if the Americans at that point in time had stood back and said:
Well, what do we care? The Germans shall see what will become of it.
And if something good comes out of it, we'll be proud to say we
assisted; and if not, we will say, we've always told you so didn't we,
and therefore we stood back. This kind of policy, a policy pursued by
Harry S Truman and George Marshall, [proved] a successful recipe for the
whole of Europe--West Europe. And this is why I should like to tell my
American listeners here that you can learn lessons from history.
And with a view to what is happening right now in Moscow, I think the
message is what counts. The message indicating in what way the big
countries of the Western democracies and market economic systems feel
committed to assist.
Allow me also to say that we discussed, Mr. President, the developments
in the former Yugoslavia. The Bosnian President happened to be here this
morning, and we met briefly in the White House. We would wish to see
that use is being made of all opportunities to see to it that a cease-
fire occurs, that then peace can be reached.
What is happening to the people there--day in, day out--belongs in
numbers amongst the most terrible experience of this very century. And
here again, I'm happy and grateful, Mr. President, that you and your
Administration have taken a clear position on this.
Once again, thank you very much for this friendly reception, for the
friendly and open talks that we had.
May I perhaps just briefly announce, Mr. President, that I repeat my
invitation to you and to your wife to come and to visit in Germany; and
that you were so kind, Mr. President, to follow that invitation. (###)
ARTICLE 5.
Secretary Christopher
April 1, 1993
Message from the Secretary to the meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group in Lucerne, Switzerland, released by the Office of the Press
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC.
The United States welcomes the renewed vigor of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), which reflects the international community's increased
emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation. Over the last 2 years, much has
been accomplished in two important plenary meetings and in several
working groups. Progress over this period has reinforced the role of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a fundamental component of the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
I believe that the plenary in Lucerne will continue the outstanding
spirit of cooperation among suppliers demonstrated by recent activities
of the group. I also want to express the deep appreciation of the US
Government to the Government of Switzerland for hosting this meeting.
The United States has been a strong proponent of requiring full-scope
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards as a condition for
significant new nuclear supply commitments. This policy was adopted at
last year's plenary, and I urge the group now to amend its guidelines to
incorporate this important provision. No non-proliferation principle is
more appropriate for the first change to the Nuclear Suppliers
Guidelines since they were first published in 1978.
Last year, the NSG also created an important new arrangement to
harmonize export controls on nuclear-related dual-use commodities. We
are honored to chair the dual-use arrangement for the next year. We are
also pleased with the progress of the working groups on institutional
and technical matters and expect their work to strengthen the non-
proliferation efforts of the Group.
The statement issued by last year's plenary appealed to all nuclear
exporting countries to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines. I am
pleased that Argentina has adhered to the guidelines and will attend
this year's meeting. Other countries have also shown interest in
adhering to the guidelines. We hope that all countries will come to
share our common non-proliferation objectives. We are committed to
working with you in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and elsewhere to achieve
a world free of the threat of nuclear proliferation.
Press Statement
April 1, 1993
Released at the meeting and made available by the Office of the Press
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC.
The 1993 Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)1 took place in
Lucerne (Switzerland) from 30 March to 1 April 1993 under the
chairmanship of Professor Alec Baer, Switzerland. A fundamental
objective of the group is to ensure that cooperation in peaceful uses of
nuclear energy does not contribute directly or indirectly to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The group reviewed current supplier arrangements and reaffirmed the
importance of the NSG Guidelines on trade in nuclear-related goods and
technology to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The group invited
all nuclear supplier countries to adhere to the guidelines.
Members endorsed a proposal for an amendment to the NSG Guidelines that
requires IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards on all
current and future nuclear activities2 as a condition for any
significant, new supply commitments to non-nuclear weapon states. The
group again called on nuclear supplier countries which have not yet
adopted such a policy to do so as soon as possible, and will try to
ensure that indirect supply through third countries does not undermine
this policy.
The members noted that the comprehensive arrangement to control the
export of nuclear-related dual-use goods and technology adopted at last
year's Warsaw meeting became effective on 1 January 1993. They pledged
their full cooperation to ensure its successful implementation.
The group adopted new procedural arrangements to formalize its
membership and to improve the effectiveness of its operations.
The group welcomed Argentina's presence as observer at the meeting. It
recognized the important steps taken by Argentina in the field of non-
proliferation, including its adherence to the guidelines.
The group renewed its special appeal to the new states which have
emerged from the former Soviet Union, who have not yet done so, to
accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon
states, to adopt IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to implement effective
nuclear export controls.
It also emphasized the importance of the NPT to the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. In this regard, it expressed great concern over
the announcement by North Korea that it intends to withdraw from the NPT
and urged that country to reconsider its position and to comply fully
with its commitments under the treaty.
As part of the continuing NSG activities, members agreed on the need to
hold further consultations on a range of issues, including conditions of
supply and information exchange.
The next plenary meetings of the NSG will be held in Madrid in April
1994 and in Helsinki in 1995.
1Members of the group are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Argentina and the
Commission of the European Communities attended as observers.
2Known as full-scope safeguards.(###)
ARTICLE 6.
Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Session
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, March
25, 1993.
The missile technology control regime (MTCR), the multilateral group for
control of trade in missile-related items, recently held a plenary
session in Canberra, Australia. At the close of the session, the MTCR
issued the following statement:
A Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was
held in Canberra from 8-11 March [1993]. It was chaired by Australia.
Partners welcomed Iceland as the newest member of the Regime, attending
the Plenary for the first time. This multilateral non-proliferation
regime thus comprises the following 23 countries: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
Partners agreed that the MTCR Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-relevant
Transfers of 16 April 1987, and extended at the Oslo Plenary of July
1992, remain an essential mechanism for the prevention of proliferation
of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Partners
further noted, with satisfaction, that the decision at Oslo to extend
the coverage of the Regime's guidelines was fully implemented as agreed
by all partners by 7 January 1993 [Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 41].
Partners agreed to give further detailed consideration to future
directions for the Regime. Such consideration would be aimed at
ensuring that the Regime can curb, even more effectively, missile
proliferation taking into account their concern about continuing exports
of missiles and technology by non-member suppliers.
Partners were pleased to note once more that a number of countries
outside the Regime have declared their intention to continue to observe
the MTCR Guidelines, and they jointly appeal to all states to do
likewise.
Partners particularly welcomed applications from Argentina and Hungary
to participate in the MTCR and agreed to invite Argentina and Hungary to
become Partners, to be effective in accordance with arrangements agreed
by the Partners.
The next Plenary will be held in Switzerland towards the end of 1993.
(###)
ARTICLE 7.
Current Status of US Policy on Bosnia, Somalia, and UN Reform
Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United
Nations
Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee,
Washington, DC, March 12, 1993
This is my first appearance before the House of Representatives as your
ambassador to the United Nations. I look forward to appearing before
you and consulting frequently. I also hope that you will come up to the
United Nations individually or as a group. You are pivotal for the US
commitment to the United Nations.
Never before in the history of the United Nations have so many nations
and peoples expected so much from the UN system, particularly its peace-
keeping operations and those agencies that rely upon the voluntary
contributions of the member states. The world's most intractable
problems are being thrust at the United Nations: ethnic conflicts,
aggression, genocide and ethnic cleansing, famine, refugees, population
growth, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global
warming, grinding poverty, and the survival of democracy in the face of
tyranny. This is the inescapable agenda of the United Nations today.
Whether we like it or not, the United States cannot walk away from these
problems either. We, however, do not and cannot shoulder these burdens
alone. The United Nations needs us, and we need it to reach and then
implement a multilateral strategy. There simply is no other way.
Within the short time that I have represented the United States at the
United Nations, I have realized first-hand what I used to lecture my
students at Georgetown University: The leadership of the United States
in these turbulent years after the end of the Cold War is sought by
other governments and has assumed even greater importance within the UN
system. Not a day passes without the United States being called upon to
take the lead at the United Nations, whether it be to preserve or
restore the peace, uphold the rule of law, save the environment, or
rescue failing societies. If the previous era was one of containment,
the new era is one of engagement in a global agenda of immeasurable
complexity and diversity.
Quite frankly, as a former professor of international relations, I
talked about all the issues with which I am now dealing. So, for me,
this really is like being in a candy store. During the last month, I
have worked in the Security Council on Somalia, the Western Sahara,
UNIKOM [UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission], and other measures to ensure
Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions, Cambodia, former
Yugoslavia, a war crimes tribunal, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, and the
deportees in south Lebanon. The [US] mission also has been deeply
involved in focusing on UN reform, reviewing the work of ECOSOC [the
Economic and Social Council of the UN], and following up on the Rio
summit [on the environment], including preparation for the work of the
new Commission on Sustainable Development.
I want to report that I have found unbelievable congeniality among my
colleagues on the Security Council. They are energized by the
realization that we are all making history. There is very little
animosity. While there are clearly different opinions on various
issues, there is a remarkably unified outlook about our responsibilities
on the council. I think you will appreciate that the Security Council
and General Assembly are parliamentary bodies. Many of the tactics and
practices employed in the United Nations are quite similar to those
found in the US Congress. I wager you would feel quite comfortable in
the corridors and assembly halls of Turtle Bay as priorities are weighed
against each other and each country's domestic and foreign policies come
into contact.
I am well aware of our own society's tremendous needs. President
Clinton and you have spoken about these frequently and eloquently. I
understand the challenge of dealing with our economic stimulus and
deficit reduction program. However, I am not appearing before you today
as a representative of OMB [the Office of Management and Budget] but as
your ambassador to the United Nations. I am here to tell you that what
you are doing to affect our economy will also have profound impact on
the UN system. Much of the UN's work is heavily influenced by the
health of the world economy, which is driven, to a large extent, by the
health of our own economy. A strengthened American economy ultimately
will enhance the work of the United Nations.
It is tempting at this time of domestic need to cut back on payments to
the United Nations. It would be dangerous, however, to think that at a
time when we are thrusting more burdens on the United Nations, we can
withhold the relatively limited funds it needs on the premise that the
American economy must first be rescued. The international problems that
consequently might be abandoned would surely cost us far more to resolve
in the years ahead. For example, unattended ethnic conflicts create
problems--which may require security forces or massive infusions of
humanitarian aid from contributors such as the United States, either in
the near or long term. The unrestrained emission of carbon dioxide on a
global scale could cause environmental changes with enormous economic,
geopolitical, and social costs. The continued withholding of vital
funds from the UN Population Fund can lead to population growth of such
profound magnitude in the coming decades that all other efforts--at home
and abroad--to achieve economic prosperity would be utterly futile.
I fully recognize the tough decisions you must make in appropriating
funds for foreign operations and in taking the necessary steps to revive
the American economy. The Clinton Administration will not shy away from
those tough decisions, but we will also work closely with you to
confront the international challenges at the United Nations that cannot
be ignored.
I understand that there are three policy areas you would like to review
today--Bosnia, Somalia, and the UN agencies and operations that fall
within your subcommittee's jurisdiction. That is a tall order, but I
will do my best to address each one in turn briefly.
Bosnia
Since arriving at the US Mission to the United Nations in early
February, I have spent more time working on the conflict in Bosnia and
other parts of the former Yugoslavia than on any other matter. By the
admission of those who were in charge of it before, the Clinton
Administration inherited a very bad situation. But we have traveled far
in the short time since President Clinton assumed office, and we fully
recognize that Bosnia will require our involvement for a long time to
come.
-- On February 10, Secretary Christopher announced the President's six-
step approach to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Those steps
include:
1. Direct and active US participation in the Vance-Owen negotiations,
including the appointment of Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew as the
President's envoy to those talks.
2. Pressure on the Serbs, Bosnians, and Croatians to engage in the
negotiations and craft a workable solution, because an imposed
settlement would be far more difficult to sustain than a settlement that
the parties have voluntarily embraced.
3. Tightening the enforcement of economic sanctions, increasing
political pressure on Serbia, and deterring Serbia from widening the
war. We remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the event of
conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action.
4. Enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia under a new UN resolution and
further actions to promote greater delivery of aid.
5. The United States is prepared to do its share to help implement and
enforce an agreement that is acceptable to all parties. As the
Secretary said on February 10 [Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 7, p. 82]: If there
is a viable agreement containing enforcement provisions, the United
States would be prepared to join with the United Nations, NATO, and
others in implementing and enforcing it, including possible US military
participation. This is a shared problem, and must be a shared burden.
6. The United States will consult widely with friends and allies on
these actions, and that has been taking place on a daily basis.
-- Immediately upon announcement of the President's six-step approach,
Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew traveled to Moscow to consult with the
Russian Government, a key participant in any multilateral approach to
the conflict. Moscow's cooperation since then has been very
constructive. In recent weeks, Ambassador Bartholomew has worked
tirelessly with the parties to the Vance-Owen talks and, in my opinion,
has been instrumental in keeping those talks alive and moving toward
closure.
-- On February 22, following the lead of the United States and France,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 808, pursuant to which the
Security Council has decided to establish a tribunal to sit in judgment
of those who have committed war crimes and other violations of
international humanitarian law during the Yugoslav conflict. We should
not underestimate the importance of this historic step.
-- On February 26, the President announced the commencement of a US-led
airdrop of humanitarian supplies to civilians in eastern Bosnia. Since
then, about 315 tons of food and medical supplies have been dropped--
with increasing accuracy, I might add--on villages in eastern Bosnia.
We expect the Russians to join us soon in the airlift operation. When
Mrs. Ogata [the UN High Commissioner for Refugees] met with Secretary
Christopher and me on Tuesday, she made clear that the airdrops were
hitting their targets. Witnesses had seen ready-to-eat meals and empty
cartons. People knew they had not been forgotten.
-- In mid-February, the United States joined France in pushing for an
extension of the mandate for UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] until the
end of March. We sought and obtained authority for UNPROFOR to use
force if necessary to carry out its mandate during this period. We are
now actively engaged in determining UNPROFOR's longer term mandate,
which may include authority to use force to carry out its mission in
case of interference by the parties.
-- The United States has taken the lead within NATO to plan for the
possibility of a NATO role in implementing an agreement in Bosnia.
-- On March 5, the President reaffirmed our efforts to tighten the UN
sanctions regime against Serbia and Montenegro. We are working hard at
strengthening enforcement actions on the Danube. Further steps will be
announced shortly.
-- We are continuing to seek a new resolution at the Security Council
to authorize enforcement of Resolution 781 of October 9, 1992, which
prohibits all military flights over Bosnia by the parties to the
conflict.
In the coming days, three objectives loom large for the United Nations
and this Administration: to deliver humanitarian aid to the civilian
population of Bosnia through US airdrops, our continuing airlift to
Sarajevo, and UN-organized land convoys; to further tighten the
sanctions regime against Serbia and Montenegro; and to achieve a cease-
fire and political settlement among the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian
Serbs, and the Government of Bosnia. The United States will spare no
effort to push on each of these fronts. Nor should anyone underestimate
our determination to join in the enforcement of a just and workable
agreement among the parties. But we will not act unilaterally when a
multilateral presence is clearly needed and available. The multilateral
force brought together to enforce an agreement must be strong enough to
succeed in its mission.
There has been some unfortunate confusion in recent days about the
nature of any future US military involvement in Bosnia. Let me clarify
the record. As Secretary Christopher stated on February 10, the United
States is prepared to participate in implementing and enforcing a peace
plan agreed to by all parties to the conflict. That plan is the object
of the peace talks in New York. We have not yet decided what the US
participation would be.
Last Sunday, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali spoke of a
future contingency, namely, what would happen if, following conclusion
and adoption of the peace plan by all three parties, Bosnian Serb
fighters failed to withdraw from territory they are required to
surrender under the peace plan that their authorities had already agreed
to. If and when a settlement is reached, and in case one of the parties
did not comply with its terms, the UN-deployed or authorized force would
have the mandate to enforce it. With respect to the delivery of
humanitarian aid, Secretary Christopher testified on Wednesday that "We
do not envision, at this point, the use of American ground forces in
order to get relief supplies into Bosnia."
If an agreement is not reached by the three parties, the Security
Council will retain all of its considerable authority and power to
enforce its resolutions and international law against the violating
parties--be they individuals, de facto regimes, or governments.
The task of building coalitions among nations can be maddeningly
frustrating and even stymie missions that, if left to unilateral means,
might quickly achieve a worthy humanitarian objective but jeopardize a
long-term resolution of the conflict. We will neither walk away from
this conflict nor rush in blindly or unilaterally to stop the aggression
and atrocities. Our policy is multilateral in character and execution,
unrelenting, and morally sound. It is unquestionably in our long-term
interests to have the United Nations and our European allies fully
engaged in any military endeavor within the former Yugoslavia.
Secretary Christopher pointed to other interests on February 10. He
said that the United States cannot ignore the human toll and that we
have strategic interests as well, including the prospect that this
conflict threatens to spill over into Kosovo and Macedonia and become a
greater Balkan war engaging Greece, Albania, and Bulgaria at a minimum.
The refugee exodus could reach into the hundreds of thousands. This is
a crucial test for how we address the concerns of ethnic and religious
minorities and promote the spread of freedom.
Somalia
Americans should take great pride in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.
It is historic in purpose, [in] size, and in its results. I sense that
humanitarian-military missions are here to stay because of this
precedent.
Following adoption of Security Council Resolution 794 early in December,
the United States deployed the largest humanitarian-military relief
force in UN history to create a secure environment for the delivery of
food and medicine to the people of Somalia. Between December 9, 1992,
when our troops first landed on the shores of Mogadishu, and February
19, [1993], 70,000 tons of food and medical supplies had been delivered,
and most of that has been successfully transported from the warehouses
to those in need. Operation Restore Hope has enabled the UN and non-
governmental humanitarian relief organizations to undertake their
extensive operations. Regrettably, seven US servicemen have died in
Somalia, and three humanitarian relief workers have died since early
December. Their deaths were not in vain. Despite occasional acts of
violence, the secure environment for humanitarian relief called for in
Resolution 794 has been established in key parts of Somalia where food
must be delivered.
Approximately 14,000 US troops remain stationed in Somalia today, down
from the peak of 24,000 in late January. About 15,000 troops from more
than a dozen other countries are also currently participating in the
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) led by the United States under Resolution
794.
With those numbers in mind, let me begin with the Secretary General's
report on Somalia released on March 3. This report was required by
Resolution 794 in order to brief the Security Council on the Secretary
General's plan for the transition from UNITAF to the second phase of UN
operations, or UNOSOM II. While we are still reviewing the Secretary
General's report, its basic thrust is consistent with what we have been
planning and with the regular discussions we have had with the Secretary
General and other high UN officials since Operation Restore Hope was
launched last December. We might quibble with some of the Secretary
General's characterizations about the situation in Somalia, but, in
general, they reflect well the enormous tasks that still lie ahead for
the world community in that country.
The report recommends a number of steps:
-- A large UNOSOM II force of 20,000 troops and 8,000 logistical
support personnel should be under the command of the UNOSOM II Force
Commander. The United States plans to participate in UNOSOM II with
between 3,000 and 5,000 logistical support personnel but will withdraw
its other UNITAF troops in a continuing process that has been underway
for some time. We also plan to maintain offshore of Somalia a rapid
deployment force under US command that, while not a formal part of
UNOSOM II, will be available to intervene should circumstances warrant.
The Secretary General intends to draw as many UNOSOM II troops and
logistical support personnel as possible from the existing multilateral
UNITAF forces already in Somalia. We are very pleased that the UNOSOM
II Force Commander will be Turkish Gen. Cevik Bir and that his deputy
commander will be US Gen. Thomas Montgomery.
-- The new enlarged UNOSOM force will have Chapter VII [of the UN
Charter] mandate with much the same responsibility and authority as the
UNITAF forces have had. The rules of engagement for UNOSOM II troops,
thus, will be much more robust than conventional peace-keeping rules of
engagement. The Secretary General describes UNOSOM II's projected
mandate, which will encompass all regions of Somali territory, as
including a wide range of responsibilities that will almost certainly
involve assertive use of military force. They include responsibilities
to prevent any resumption of violence or violations of the cessation of
hostilities; to control heavy weapons of all factions; to seize small
arms; to secure or maintain security at ports, airports, and lines of
communication required for delivery of humanitarian assistance; to
protect and defend humanitarian aid personnel, installations, and
equipment; to de-mine in various areas; and to aid in the return and
resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.
-- There should be a phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. As I
said earlier, some of our troops in Somalia have already started
rotating home. Additional US forces will be removed in a planned,
phased transition to UNOSOM II. As sectors of Somalia are made secure
by UNITAF, responsibility for their security will be transferred to
UNOSOM II. We expect UNITAF and UNOSOM II commanders to work out
appropriate mechanisms for the transfer of responsibility, and the
Secretary General has recommended, for budgetary and administrative
purposes, May 1 as the formal date of transfer of command from UNITAF to
UNOSOM II.
Operation Restore Hope, or UNITAF, has been a voluntary undertaking,
both operationally and financially. The Secretary General has
recommended that UNOSOM II be an assessed operation with the costs borne
by member states on the basis of the UN special peace-keeping scale of
assessments, meaning that the United States will be assessed 30.4% of
its operating expenses.
I want to discuss the purpose of the Trust Fund for Somalia--Unified
Command which was established under Resolution 794 (1992). It is a
voluntary fund that currently stands at $115 million of donated monies,
mostly from Japan. The purpose of the Somalia fund is not and has never
been, as some seem to believe, to reimburse the United States for the
costs of Operation Restore Hope. Rather, about 10,000 troops
participating in UNITAF have come from developing countries unable to
finance their own operations. The Somalia fund was established to cover
the expenses associated with their transport and in-country operations
[of] these forces. The United States is providing most of the transport
and other support for these troops, and the fund will reimburse us for
these costs but not for the support of our own troops. More than $115
million may well be needed to cover these expenses, so we are
coordinating with the United Nations and the Japanese to solicit more
contributions for the Somalia fund. It is an important exercise,
because we have sought the widest possible participation in UNITAF.
One of the unknown variables of the UNOSOM II operation, stressed by the
Secretary General in his report, will be the disarming of all factions
in Somalia pursuant to the Addis Ababa agreements of early January. The
plan calls for establishment of cantonments for the collection of heavy
weapons and the operation of transition sites for the temporary
accommodation of factional forces so that they can turn in their small
arms and be re-integrated into civilian life. We believe that this
exercise is critical to the long-term restoration of a functioning
government and society in Somalia.
The key to the future of Somalia will be the establishment of a viable
and representative national government and economy and resolution of the
future of Somaliland, or northwest Somalia, where certain groups seek
recognition as an independent nation. The United Nations will be deeply
engaged in this institution-building exercise, and the United States
should play a constructive role.
Voluntary Contributions To the UN System
I want to emphasize that the UN agencies and programs funded through
voluntary contributions are critically important to the challenges
confronting the new world. The President is committed to American
leadership in the fields that have for so many years been funded
voluntarily through these long-standing UN organs to which you have
devoted so much of your energy.
For example, this Administration is committed to the non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction as a pillar of its foreign policy. So we
will be looking to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in an
effort to strengthen the inspection and verification of suspect sites
anywhere in the world. The current stand-off between North Korea and
the IAEA over the UN agency's authority to inspect certain sites in
North Korea is an important test case of the IAEA's authority. The
IAEA's work in Iraq since the end of the Gulf war has been exemplary and
shown that some of the most important responsibilities of collective
security are what the United Nations does after the hostilities are
ended.
We want to ensure that the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the UN
Environment Program work compatibly, efficiently, and consistently with
the new Commission on Sustainable Development, which the Clinton
Administration is going to support and help to lead in the years ahead.
We are determined that an American succeed William Draper at the UNDP
this year. The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) will have an even greater
role in coming years to address the priorities about children that are
such an important part of our own domestic agenda. I no more want to
suggest slashing funding for children's programs abroad than I do here
at home.
The World Food Program remains an indispensable channel through which
the United States and other major powers can contribute food assistance
to famine and disaster victims in the far corners of Asia and Africa.
And the UN Development Fund for Women is a means we intend to explore
further to enhance the status of women in societies around the world.
I am not going to comment on all of the UN agencies and programs within
your purview, Mr. Chairman, but I want to stress how important the
Administration considers them. Perhaps it is ironic that many of the UN
agencies that struggled so hard during the Cold War are now at the
cutting edge of the UN's growing agenda of "new world" priorities. We
are not going to shy away from that challenge.
UN Reform
Having argued for support for these voluntary programs, this testimony
would not be complete if I did not address a familiar but fundamental
issue facing us at the United Nations: reform of the institution. I am
very pleased to confirm, today, the Secretary General's decision to
appoint Ambassador Melissa Wells to succeed Richard Thornburgh as Under-
Secretary General of Administration and Management at the United
Nations. Ambassador Wells will be leaving her post in Zaire soon to
assume her duties in New York. I have the greatest confidence in her,
and I know that the Secretary General is looking forward to working
closely with her on management reform.
We have begun to assess a wide range of analyses, reports, and proposals
on reforming the management, administration, and financing of the UN
system. Within the past year, a number of highly professional studies
have been completed that include many constructive analyses and ideas
for UN reform. For example, the Independent Advisory Group on UN
Financing, co-chaired by Paul Volcker and Shijuro Ogata, just released a
report on financial reform that merits our attention. Richard
Thornburgh's report to the Secretary General on March 1 points to
significant inefficiencies within the UN system that I am deeply
concerned about. I must say that I find little in his report that I
would describe as alarmist. Mr. Thorn-burgh's report as a whole is a
very constructive assessment of the United Nations that includes
recommendations meriting serious examination.
UN reform has bedeviled every US ambassador to the United Nations. I
can assure you from my own discussions with the Secretary General that
he is committed to significant reform in the system. I am determined to
work closely with him and Ambassador Wells to ensure that substantial
reform takes place. But first, I think we need to be clear about our
priorities for reform and how we want to achieve them. One priority
Secretary Christopher and I have previously testified in favor of is the
establishment of an Office of Inspector General at the United Nations.
I think Secretary Christopher put it well on Wednesday when he cautioned
that, while the United Nations is an organization that leaves a lot of
room for administrative improvement, we need to be c