US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 14, APRIL 5, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1.  A Strategic Alliance With Russian Reform--President Clinton 
2.  Status Report on Iraq's Non-Compliance With UN Resolutions--
President Clinton, Fact Sheets
3.  Bosnia-Herzegovina--Secretary Christopher, Department Statement, UN 
Security Council Resolution, Ambassador Walker
4.  US-German Relations--President Clinton, German Chancellor Kohl 
5.  US Support for Nuclear Suppliers Group--Secretary Christopher, Press 
Statement
6.  Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Session 
7.  Current Status of US Policy on Bosnia, Somalia, and UN Reform--
Madeleine K. Albright
8.  Statements at Confirmation Hearings
     Timothy E. Wirth
     Thomas E. Donilon
     George E. Moose
     Winston Lord
9.  Treaty Actions


ARTICLE 1.  

A Strategic Alliance With Russian Reform
President Clinton
Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Annapolis, 
Maryland, April 1, 1993

I want to talk to you about the events in Russia, about our policies 
toward the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and 
about my meetings with [Russian] President Boris Yeltsin this weekend.  
But first, I wish to speak about America's purposes in the world.  That 
is not something we often examine, for it is human nature to focus on 
daily affairs most of the time.  In our own lives, we do our jobs, we 
raise our children, we nurture our relationships, [and] we struggle with 
the dilemmas of the moment one day at a time.  Yet we are each guided by 
some sense of purpose, drawn from our families and our faith, which 
shapes the millions of small events of our life into a larger work that 
bears the imprint of our character.

Defining America's Broader Purposes Anew
So it is in the life of a nation.  Decisions command attention.  Crises 
drive action.  But it is only with an overriding sense of purpose, drawn 
from their history and their cultures, that great nations can rise above 
the daily tyranny of the urgent to construct their security, to build 
their prosperity, to advance their interests, and to reaffirm their 
values.  A clear sense of purpose is most essential, yet most elusive, 
at times of profound global change.  A half-century ago, our nation 
emerged victorious from the Second World War to discover itself in 
wholly unfamiliar terrain.  The old empires of Europe and Asia were 
gone.  A new communist empire loomed.  Ours was the only economy in the 
world still strong and dominant.

[A] former secretary of state, the late Dean Acheson, later described it 
as a time of "great obscurity."  Yet in that dim obscurity, he and 
George Marshall and President Harry Truman and other leaders in both 
political parties saw the stakes clearly enough.  They acted decisively.  
They accepted the mantle of leadership.  Their sense of purpose helped 
to rescue Europe, to rebuild Japan, to contain aggression, and to foster 
two generations of unprecedented prosperity and peace.

And now--thanks in large measure to their vision, carried forward 
through succeeding generations, and thanks, too, to the enormous courage 
of the people of Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet 
Union and the people of Eastern Europe--freedom has once again won a 
very great victory.  Over the past 4 years, the Berlin Wall crumbled.  
The Cold War ended.  The Soviet Union gave way to 15 sovereign states.  
Millions threw off the constricting yoke of communism so they could 
assume instead the ennobling burdens of democracy.

Yet these victories also confront us with a moment of profound change, a 
challenge.  The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the international 
order forever.  The emerging economic powerhouses of the Pacific are 
changing the financial order forever.  The proliferation of demonic 
weapons of mass destruction threaten to change the distribution of 
military power forever.  Resurgent ethnic conflict is challenging the 
very meaning of the nation state.  The rise of a global economy has 
changed the linkages between our domestic and our foreign policies and, 
I would argue to you, has made them indivisible.  In a time of dramatic 
global change, we must define America's broader purposes anew.  And part 
of that purpose clearly consists of reviving economic opportunity and 
growth here at home, for the opportunity to do well here at home is the 
ultimate basis of our influence abroad.

US Domestic and Foreign Policy--No Clear Dividing Line
Congress is acting this week to break the gridlock, to build our 
prosperity.  Just today, the Congress passed the heart of my economic 
program--a long-term plan to drastically reduce the deficit and increase 
investment in our nation's economic future.  After years of policies 
that have diminished our future, Washington has finally realized that 
the best social program is a good job and [that] the best route to 
deficit reduction is a growing economy founded on a bold plan of change 
that will both cut spending and increase investment to empower the 
working people of this country.  Our program invests in people by 
changing the tax code to reward work and investment--by working to 
ensure that anybody who works 40 hours a week and has children in the 
home won't have to live in poverty anymore, by providing our children 
with education and nutrition and immunizations they need to start life 
successfully, by reinventing the way we educate and train our workers to 
make it properly adequate for the new global economy, and by creating 
jobs now through investments in infrastructure and safe streets and 
community development in communities large and small all across this 
land.

The American people had the courage to call for change last November and 
gave me the awesome opportunity and responsibility to try to implement 
that change.  I am hopeful that Congress will now have the courage to 
vote for all those changes this week.  As I said, today they voted for a 
plan that both reduces the long-term deficit and increases our 
investment in the things that will grow this economy--in new jobs and 
new technologies and new education strategies.  I hope now they will 
adopt the short-term jobs program that will add a half-million new jobs 
to this country over the next 2 years.  Let me say parenthetically that 
one of the great challenges of every wealthy country in the world today 
is not only to promote growth but to create jobs.  There are many, many 
examples in the 1980s, when in Europe and elsewhere countries had great 
growth but produced no new jobs.  That is what has happened here in the 
last year or so.  And we must prove that we can do better.

As I have said so often over the last year and a half, in the global 
village--with this kind of global economy-- there is simply no clear 
dividing line between domestic and foreign policy.  We can't be strong 
abroad unless we're strong at home.  And we cannot be strong at home 
unless we are actively engaged in the world which is shaping events for 
every American.  There is a sense in which every one of the young people 
in this country today will live a life which is shaped by events beyond 
our borders as well as events within our borders.

US Investment and Engagement In the Post-Cold War World
So, today, I say again we must have a clear sense of our purposes around 
the world.  Everyone knows the world remains a dangerous place.  And our 
preeminent imperative is to ensure our own security.  That is why we're 
working to ensure that our military is not only the finest in the world 
but also specifically tailored for the challenges of this new era--for 
the central fronts of our fight for a safe world have moved from the 
plains of northern Europe to our efforts to stem weapons of mass 
destruction, to relieve ethnic turmoil, to promote democracy, to expand 
markets, and to protect the global environment.

During the Cold War, our foreign policies largely focused on relations 
among nations.  Our strategies sought a balance of power to keep the 
peace.  Today, our policies must also focus on relations within nations, 
on a nation's form of governance, on its economic structure, [and] on 
its ethnic tolerance.  These are of concern to us, for they shape how 
these nations treat their neighbors as well as their own people and 
whether they are reliable when they give their word.

In particular, democracies are far less likely to wage war on other 
nations than dictatorships are.  Emphatically, the international 
community cannot seek to heal every domestic dispute or to resolve every 
ethnic conflict.  Some are simply beyond our reach.  But within 
practical bounds and with a sense of clear strategic priorities, we must 
do what we can to promote the democratic spirit and the economic reforms 
that can tip the balance for progress well into the next century.

From the first hours of my Administration, several critical situations 
have demanded our attention--in Iraq, in Somalia, in Haiti, in the 
Middle East, in the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere.  We have sought to 
develop strategies to address these and other immediate challenges.  And 
I'm encouraged by the progress which has been made in most of the areas 
of challenge.  Yet all of us must also focus on the larger questions 
that this new era presents.  For, if we act out of a larger sense of 
purpose and strategy, our work on the crises of the late 20th century 
can lay the basis for a more peaceful and democratic world at the start 
of the 21st century.

The end of the long, twilight struggle does not ensure the start of a 
long peace.  Like a wise homeowner who recognizes that you cannot stop 
investing in your house once you buy it, we cannot stop investing in the 
peace now that we have obtained it.  That recognition was the triumph of 
President Truman's era.  But, unlike then, we lack the specter of a 
menacing adversary to spur our efforts to engage other nations.  Now, 
not fear but vision must drive our investment and our engagement in this 
new world.

US Engagement in Russia and The Former Soviet Union
Nowhere is that engagement more important than in our policies toward 
Russia and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.  
Their struggle to build free societies is one of the great human dramas 
of our day.  It presents the greatest security challenge for our 
generation and offers one of the greatest economic opportunities of our 
lifetime.  That's why my first trip out of the country will be to 
Vancouver [Canada], to meet with President Yeltsin.

Over the past month, we have seen incredibly tumultuous events in 
Russia.  They've filled our headlines and probably confused our heads.  
President Yeltsin has been at loggerheads with the People's Congress of 
Deputies.  Heated political standoffs have obstructed economic change.  
Meanwhile, neighboring states, such as Ukraine and the Baltic nations, 
have watched Russia anxiously while they grapple with their own reforms 
and while they deal with economic problems equally severe.

For most Americans, these events, while dramatic, are still very remote 
from their immediate concerns.  After all, in every community we have 
our own problems.  We've got our own needs.  We face a stagnant economy 
and dislocations brought about by the end of the Cold War and the down-
sizing of the military budget.  We've got all these big companies 
restructuring themselves.  And for the last 2 years, small business has 
not created enough new jobs to offset that.  It's projected that two-
thirds of the growth of our income in the next 5 years--two-thirds--will 
[be] absorbed by health care cost increases.  And 100% of the wage 
increases for the next 5 years will be absorbed by health care costs 
increases unless we act.

We're worried about our cities, like Los Angeles, coming up on the 
anniversary of the disturbances there a year ago.  And many people say, 
in the face of all this and with a huge budget deficit:  Why in the 
world should we help a distant people when times are so tough here at 
home?

Well, I know that we cannot guarantee the future of reform in Russia or 
any of the other newly independent states.  I know and you know that, 
ultimately, the history of Russia will be written by Russians and the 
future of Russia must be charted by Russians.  But I would argue that we 
must--that we must--do what we can and we must not act now--we must act 
now.  Not out of charity but because it is a wise investment--a wise 
investment building on what has already been done and looking to our own 
future.  While our efforts will entail new costs, we can reap even 
larger dividends for our safety and our prosperity if we act now.

To understand why, I think we must grasp the scope of the transformation 
now occurring in Russia and the other states.  From Vilnius on the 
Baltic to Vladivostok on the Pacific, we have witnessed a political 
miracle--genuinely historic and heroic deeds--without precedent in all 
of human history.  The other two world-changing events of this century, 
World Wars I and II, exacted a price of over 60 million lives.  By 
contrast, look at this world-changing event.  It has been remarkably 
bloodless, and we pray it remains so.

Now free markets and free politics are replacing repression.  Central 
Europe is in command of its own fate.  Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 
are again independent.  Ukraine, Armenia, and other proud nations are 
free to pursue their own destinies.  At the heart of it all is Russia.  
Its rebirth has begun.  A great nation, rich in natural and human 
resources and unbelievable history, has once again moved to rejoin the 
political and  economic cultures of the West.  President Yeltsin and his 
fellow reformers throughout Russia are courageously leading three modern 
Russian revolutions at once:  to transform their country from a 
totalitarian state into a democracy, from a command economy into a 
market, [and] from an empire into a modern nation-state that freely let 
go of countries once under its control and now freely respects their 
integrity.

Russia's rebirth is not only material and political; it is genuinely 
spiritual.  As the Librarian of Congress, James Billington, said:
Evil has been transcended by repentance without revenge; innocent 
suffering in past gulags has been given redemptive value; and the 
amazingly nonviolent breakthrough of August 1991, which occurred on the 
Feast of the Transfiguration, was indeed a "miracle" through which 
ordinary people rediscovered a moral dimension to their own lives.  
Across what was the Soviet Union, the freedom to pray has been met by a 
resurgence of worship.

Nothing could contribute more to global freedom, to security, [and] to 
prosperity than the peaceful progression of this rebirth of Russia.  It 
could mean a modern state at peace not only with itself but with the 
world.  It could mean one productively and prosperously integrated into 
a global economy, a source of raw materials and manufactured products 
and a vast market for American goods and services.  It could mean a 
populous democracy contributing to the stability of both Europe and 
Asia.

Russian Renewal--Opportunities For the United States
The success of Russia's renewal must be a first-order concern to our 
country because it confronts us with four distinct opportunities.

First, it offers us a historic opportunity to improve our own security.  
The danger is clear if Russia's reforms turn sour--if it reverts to 
authoritarianism or disintegrates into chaos.  The world cannot afford 
the strife of the former Yugoslavia replicated in a nation as big as 
Russia, spanning 11 time zones, [and] with an armed arsenal of nuclear 
weapons that is still very vast.

But there is great opportunity here.  Across most of our history, our 
security was challenged by European nations set on domination of their 
continent and the high seas that lie between us.  The tragic violence in 
Bosnia reminds us again that Europe has not seen the end of conflict 
within its own borders.  Now, we could at last face a Europe in which no 
great power, not one, harbors continental designs.  Think of it--land 
wars in Europe cost hundreds of thousands of American lives in the 20th 
century.  The rise of a democratic Russia, satisfied within its own 
boundaries, bordered by other peaceful democracies, could ensure that 
our nation never needs to pay that kind of price again.

We also face the opportunity to increase our own security by reducing 
the chances of nuclear war.  Russia still holds over 20,000 strategic 
and tactical nuclear warheads.  Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have 
nuclear weapons on their soil as well.  We are implementing historic 
arms control agreements that for the first time will radically reduce 
the number of strategic nuclear weapons.  Now, by sup- porting Russia's 
reforms, we can help to turn the promise of those agreements into a 
reality for ourselves and for our children, and for Russians and their 
children, too.

Second, Russia's reforms offer us the opportunity to complete the 
movement from having an adversary in foreign policy to having a partner 
in global problem solving.  Think back to the Cold War.  Recall the 
arenas in which we played out its conflicts:  Berlin, Korea, the Congo, 
Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan.  We competed everywhere.  
We battled the Soviets at the United Nations.  We tracked each other's 
movements around the globe.  We lost tens of thousands of our finest 
young people to hold freedom's line.  Those efforts were worthy.  But 
their worth was measured in prevention more than in creation, in the 
containment of terror and oppression rather than the advancement of 
human happiness and opportunity.

Now reflect on what has happened just since Russia joined us in a search 
for peaceful solutions.  We cooperated in the United Nations to defeat 
Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.  We cosponsored promising peace talks on the 
Mideast.  We worked together to foster reconciliation in Cambodia and El 
Salvador.  We joined forces to protect the global environment.  Progress 
of this kind strengthens our security and that of other nations.  If we 
can help Russia to remain increasingly democratic, we can leave an era 
of standoff behind us and explore expanding horizons of progress and 
peace.

Third, Russia's reforms are important to us because they hold one of the 
keys to investing more in our own future.  America's taxpayers have 
literally spent trillions of dollars to prosecute the Cold War.  Now we 
can reduce that pace of spending--and, indeed, we have been able to 
reduce that pace of spending--not only because the arms of the former 
Soviet Union pose a diminishing threat to us and our allies.  If Russia 
were to revert to imperialism or were to plunge into chaos, we would 
need to reassess our plans for defense savings.  We would have to 
restructure our defenses to meet a whole different set of threats than 
those we now think will occur.  That means billions of dollars less for 
other uses.  Less for creating new businesses and new jobs.  Less for 
preparing our children for the future.  Less for the new technologies of 
the 21st century which our competitors in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere 
are pouring money into right now hoping they can capture the high-wage 
jobs of the future.  Therefore, our ability to put people first at home 
requires that we put Russia and its neighbors first on our agenda 
abroad.

Fourth, Russia's reforms offer us a historic opportunity.  Russia, after 
all, is in a profound economic crisis today.  But it is still an 
inherently rich nation.  It has a wealth of oil and gas and coal and 
gold and diamonds and timbers for its own people to develop.  The 
Russian people are among the most well educated and highly skilled in 
the world.  They are good people sitting on a rich land.  They have been 
victimized by a system which has failed them.  We must look beyond the 
Russia of today and see its potential for prosperity.  Think of it--a 
nation of 150 million people able to trade with us in a way that helps 
both our peoples.  Russia's economic recovery may be slow, but it is in 
the interest of all who seek more robust global growth to ensure that, 
aided by American business and trade, Russia rises to its great economic 
potential.

The burning question today is whether Russia's economic progress, 
whether Russia's democratic progress, will continue or be thwarted.  I 
believe that freedom, like anything sweet, is hard to take from people 
once they have had a taste of it.  The human spirit is hard to bottle up 
again, and it will be hard to bottle up again in Russia.  Yet if we 
cannot be certain of how Russia's affairs will proceed, we are 
nonetheless certain of our own interests.  The interests of all 
Americans lie with efforts that enhance our security and our prosperity.  
That's why our interests lie with Russian reform and with Russian 
reformers led by Boris Yeltsin.

Principles of US Investment In Russian Reform
America's position is unequivocal.  We support democracy.  We support 
free markets.  We support freedom of speech, conscience, and religion.  
We support respect for ethnic minorities in Russia and for Russian and 
other minorities throughout the region.  I believe it is essential that 
we act prudently but urgently to do all that we can to strike a 
strategic alliance with Russian reform.  My goal in Vancouver will be 
that.  And that will be my message to the man who stands as the leader 
of reform, Russia's democratically elected President Boris Yeltsin.  I 
won't describe today all the specific ideas that I plan to discuss with 
him.  And, of course, I don't know all those that he will discuss with 
me.  But I want to tell you the principles on which our efforts to 
assist reform will rest.

First, our investments in Russian reform must be tangible to the Russian 
people.  Support for reform must come from the ground up.  And that will 
only occur if our efforts are broadly dispersed and not focused just on 
Moscow.  I plan to talk with President Yeltsin about measures intended 
to help promote the broad development of small businesses, to accelerate 
the privatization of state enterprises, to assist local food processing 
and distribution efforts, and to ease the transition to private markets.  
Our goal must be to ensure that the Russian people soon come to feel 
that they are the beneficiaries of reform and not its victims.  We must 
help them to recognize that their sufferings today are not the birth 
pangs of democracy and capitalism but the death throes of dictatorship 
and communism.

Second, our investments in Russian reform must be designed to have 
lasting impact.  Russia's economic vessel is too large and leaky for us 
to bail it out.  That's not what's at issue here.  Our challenge is to 
provide some tools to help the Russians do things that work for 
themselves.  A good example is Russia's energy sector.  Russia is one of 
the world's largest oil producers; yet millions of barrels of the oil 
Russia pumps each month seep out of the system before ever reaching the 
market.  Just the leakage from Russia's natural gas pipelines could 
supply the entire State of Connecticut.

The Russians must make many reforms to attract energy investments.  And 
by helping to introduce modern drilling practices and to repair Russia's 
energy infrastructure, we can help Russia regain a large and lasting 
source of hard currency.  Over the long run, that effort can help to 
protect the environment as well and to moderate world energy prices.  We 
have a direct interest in doing that.

Third, our people must do what we can to have people-to-people 
initiatives, not just government-to-government ones.  We have entered a 
new era in which the best way to achieve many of our goals abroad is not 
through diplomats or dollars but through private citizens who can impart 
the skills and habits that are the lifeblood of democracy and free 
markets.  We intend to expand efforts for retired American business 
executives to work with Russian entrepreneurs to start new businesses.  
We intend to work so that our farmers can teach modern farming 
practices; so that our labor leaders can share the basics of trade 
unionism; so that Americans experienced in grass-roots activities can 
impart the techniques that ensure responsive government; so that our 
armed forces can engage in more exchanges with the Russian military; and 
so that thousands and thousands of young Russians--who are reform's 
primary beneficiaries and reform's primary constituency--so that they 
can come to our country and study our government, our economy, and our 
society not because it's perfect but because it's a great example of a 
democracy at work.

Fourth, our investments in reform must be part of a partnership among 
all the newly independent states and the international community.  They 
must be extended in concert with measures from our allies, many of whom 
have at least as much stake in the survival of Russian democracy as we 
do.  Working through the international financial institutions, we can do 
great things together that none of us can do by ourselves.

This principle is especially important as we help Russia to stabilize 
its currency and its markets.  Russia's central bank prints too many 
rubles and extends too many credits.  The result is inflation that has 
been nearly 1% a day.  Inflation at such levels gravely imperils 
Russia's emerging markets.  In Vancouver, I plan to discuss the progress 
we are making among the major industrialized nations to help Russia make 
the leap to a stable currency and a market economy.  While we cannot 
support this effort alone in the United States and while we must insist 
on reciprocal commensurate Russian reforms, American leadership to curb 
inflation and stabilize the currency is essential.

Fifth, we must emphasize investments in Russia that enhance our own 
security.  I want to talk with President Yeltsin about steps we can take 
together to ensure that denuclearization continues in Russia and its 
neighboring states.  We will explore new initiatives to reassure Ukraine 
so that it embraces the START Treaty [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] 
and to move toward the goal of the Lisbon Protocol agenda, which was 
intended to ensure that Russia is the only nuclear armed successor state 
to the Soviet Union.

Ukraine will play a special role in the realization of these objectives, 
and we recognize our interest in the success of reform in Ukraine and 
the other new states.  I'll talk with President Yeltsin about new 
efforts to realize the two-third reduction in United States and Soviet 
strategic nuclear arsenals envisioned under START.  And I'll suggest 
steps both of us can take to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction--something that will be a major, major cause of concern for 
years to come.

Sixth, we must recognize that our policy toward Russia and the other 
states comprises a long-term strategy.  It may take years to work 
completely.  That was the key to our success in the Cold War.  We were 
in it for the long run--not to win every day, not to know what every 
development in every country would be.  We had clear principles, clear 
interests, clear values, [and] a clear strategy, and we were in it for 
the long run.

As the Soviets veered from the terror of Stalin, to the thaw of 
Khrushchev, to the gray days of Brezhnev, to the perestroika of 
Gorbachev, our purpose always remained constant:  containment, 
deterrence, [and] human freedom.  Our goals must remain equally fixed 
today--above all, our security and that of our allies but also 
democracy, market economies, human rights, and respect for international 
law.  In this regard, I welcome President Yeltsin's assurance that civil 
liberties will be respected and continuity in Russia's foreign policy 
maintained as Russia strives to determine its own future.

The path that Russia and the other states take toward reform will have 
rough stretches.  Their politics may seem especially tumultuous today, 
in part because it's so much more public than in decades past--thanks to 
the television and the other mass media. Then, the ruler of the Kremlin 
had only subjects; now, the ruler of the Kremlin has constituents--just 
like me--and it's a lot more complicated.  We must be concerned over 
every retreat from democracy but not every growing pain within 
democracy.

Let me remind you of our own early history.  It was marked by revision 
of our governing charter and fistfights in Congress.  [Czech President] 
Vaclav Havel has noted that democracy is not a destination, but it's a 
horizon toward which we make continual progress. Just remember how long 
it was from the signing of the Declaration of Independence, to forging a 
real, new Constitution, to the election of the first President, and then 
you can't be so impatient about what's happened in the short stretch of 
time from Gorbachev to Yeltsin to the present crisis.  As long as there 
are reformers in the Russian Federation and the other states leading the 
journey toward democracy's horizon, our strategy must be to support 
them.  And our place must be at their side.

Moreover, we and the Russian people must not give up on reform simply 
because of the slow pace of economic renewal.  Recall for a moment how 
many of the world's economic success stories were written off too soon.  
Western visitors to Japan in 1915 dismissed its economic prospects as 
dismal.  [South] Korea's economy was described as a "hopeless case" by 
American experts in 1958, and look at them now.  Many Germans after 
World War II anticipated decades of national poverty.  A German minister 
of economic affairs noted after the war [that] few realized that if 
people were allowed once more to become aware of the value and worth of 
freedom, dynamic forces would be released.  The miracle of prosperity 
that Japan, Korea, and Germany have discovered awaits those who are 
willing to sustain democratic and economic reforms in Russia and in her 
neighboring states.  I believe that, and I hope you do, too.  Despite 
today's troubles, I have great faith that Russian reform will continue 
and eventually succeed.

Answering the Courageous Call of Russian Reform
Let me here address directly the Russian people who will read or hear my 
words.  You are a people who understand patriotic struggle.  You have 
persevered through an unforgiving climate.  Your whole history has been 
punctuated with suffering on a scale unknown to the American people.  
You heroically withstood murderous invasions by Napoleon and Hitler.  
Your great literature and your music, which has so enriched our own 
culture, were composed with the pen of longing and the ink of sorrow.  
Your accomplishments of education and science speak to your faith in 
progress.  And now, as you seek to build a great tomorrow for Russia 
upon a foundation of democracy and commerce, I speak for Americans 
everywhere when I say:  We are with you.  For we share this bond--the 
key to each of our futures is not in clinging to the past but in having 
the courage to change.

As we look upon Russia's challenges, we should remember, all of us, that 
the American and Russian people have in common so much.  We are both 
rooted deeply in our land.  We are both built of diverse heritage.  We 
are both forever struggling with the responsibilities that come with 
vast territory and power.  We both have had to deal with the dilemmas of 
human nature on an immense scale.  That may be why there has been so 
little real hatred between our people, even across the decades when we 
pointed weapons of nightmarish destruction at each other's lands.

Now, as in the past, America's future is tied in important ways to 
Russia's.  During the Cold War, it was tied in negative ways.  We saw in 
each other only danger.  Now that the walls have come down, we can see 
hope and opportunity.  In the end, our hope for the future of Russian 
reform is rooted simply in our faith in the institutions that have 
secured our own freedom and prosperity.  But it is also rooted in the 
Russian people.  The diversity of their past accomplishments gives us 
hope that there are diverse possibilities for the future.  The vitality 
of Russian journalism and public debate today gives us hope that the 
great truth-seeking traditions of Russian culture will endure and that 
Russia's anti-democratic demagogues will not-- indeed, must not--in the 
long run prevail.  And the discipline of Russia's military, which has 
proved itself anew in August 1991 and since--that discipline gives us 
hope that Russia's transition can continue to be peaceful. Fifty years 
ago, in a different period of historic challenge for Russia, the great 
Russian poet, Anna Akhmatova, wrote, "We know what lies in the balance 
at this moment and what is happening right now.  The hour for courage 
strikes upon our clocks and the courage will not desert us."

The opportunity that lies before our nation today is to answer the 
courageous call of Russian reform--as an expression of our own values, 
as an investment in our own security and prosperity, [and] as a 
demonstration of our purpose in a new world. (###)


ARTICLE 2.  


Status Report on Iraq's Non-Compliance With UN Resolutions

President Clinton, Fact Sheets, Letter to Congress
Text of a letter from the President to  the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Washington, 
DC,  March 22, 1993.

Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President):

Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq 
Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and in an effort to keep the Congress 
fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's 
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council.

Under my Administration, the United States will continue to lead 
international efforts aimed at ensuring that the Iraqi regime does not 
threaten international peace and security and at ending the Iraqi 
Government's brutal repression of its people.  To that end, we will 
maintain our insistence on full Iraqi compliance with UN Security 
Council resolutions.  We will work with the international community to 
ensure the integrity of the UN sanctions regime, which is the best means 
to promote Iraqi compliance.

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 687, the UN Special 
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) have continued to investigate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) programs and to verify the destruction of relevant facilities, 
equipment, and weapons.  Destruction of chemical munitions at  Al 
Muthanna has continued.

UNSCOM #48, a missile team, and UNSCOM #49/IAEA #17, a nuclear team, 
arrived in Iraq just a week after the cruise missile attack on the Al 
Zaafaraniyah nuclear-related facility.  The nuclear team inspected the 
Al Zaafaraniyah site, confirmed that only buildings with technical 
functions had been hit, and verified the destruction of many highly 
sensitive machine tools.  After initial resistance, Iraqi officials have 
permitted baseline inventories of the Ibn Al Haytham Research Center; 
this is an important but limited step in enabling UNSCOM to move toward 
comprehensive evaluation and long-term monitoring of Iraqi WMD 
capabilities.  The inspections were successful in eliciting new details 
of Iraqi WMD programs and an admission from Iraqi officials that they 
attempted to deceive a previous UNSCOM team.

A missile team designated as UNSCOM #50 discovered a small discrepancy 
in the inventory of missile propellant at one site.  During this 
inspection, the Iraqi side argued that UNSCOM should not be permitted to 
use Global Positioning System equipment to identify the precise 
locations of sites visited.  Iraq alleges inaccurately that such 
readings were used by the US military to target the Al Zaafara-niyah 
site.  UNSCOM rejected this argument.  On February 22, the team was 
redesignated as UNSCOM #51 and searched for possible SCUD sites west of 
Baghdad.

Iraqi harassment of inspectors and interference with UNSCOM and IAEA 
activities have resumed, after a lull immediately following the attack 
on   Al Zaafaraniyah.  Iraqi authorities also threatened to shoot down a 
helicopter performing support for a ground inspection that UNSCOM #51 
was carrying out.  In early February, an Iraqi, possibly an official 
"minder" for the inspectors, threw a rock through the window of an 
UNSCOM vehicle.

Iraq continues to refuse to provide the United Nations and IAEA with a 
comprehensive list of the suppliers for its WMD programs.  Moreover, it 
refuses to accept UN Security Council Resolution 715, which mandates the 
creation of a long-term monitoring regime for Iraq's WMD infrastructure.  
The international community must insist on such long-term monitoring.

The United Nations has continued its work to settle the Iraq-Kuwait 
border.  The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission continues its 
work, without Iraqi participation.  At its December meeting, the 
Commission agreed to begin to demarcate the offshore section of the 
boundary "with the principal purpose . . . being navigational access for 
both parties."

In response to continued Iraqi violations of the border and the 
demilitarized zone (DMZ), the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 806 
on February 5.  The Resolution clarified that the United Nations Iraq-
Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) can take any necessary actions to 
prevent such violations and authorized a potential increase in UNIKOM 
forces from 250 to 3,600 troops.  The United Nations is seeking to 
identify countries willing to contribute an armed battalion for this 
purpose.

Evidence continues to mount concerning the massive extent of the Iraqi 
Government's human rights violations, both before and after the Persian 
Gulf War.  Max van der Stoel, Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights 
Commission, has produced compelling evidence of Iraqi atrocities against 
the civilian population in southern Iraq.  We support the Rapporteur's 
proposal to place human rights monitors throughout Iraq.

Iraq's campaigns of repression against its own people underline the 
importance of international actions to protect Iraq's civilian 
populations.  Acts of violence and terrorism continue at the behest of 
the Government of Iraq in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 
687 and 688.  The "no-fly zones" over northern and southern Iraq seek to 
monitor Iraq's compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 688.  
Since the no-fly zone was instituted in southern Iraq last year, Iraq's 
use of aircraft in aggression against its population in the region has 
stopped.  The no-fly zone in the north has also prevented use of fixed 
or rotary wing aircraft against the local population there.  Other acts 
of repression continue, however, underscoring the need for UN monitors.

The international community has continued its efforts, consistent with 
Security Council resolutions, to alleviate suffering in Iraq.  The 
United States is working closely with the United Nations and other 
organizations to provide humanitarian relief to the people of northern 
Iraq, in the face of Iraqi Government efforts to disrupt this 
assistance.  We support new UN efforts to mount a relief program for 
persons in Baghdad and the south, but the United Nations must be able to 
prevent the Iraqi Government from diverting supplies.

The UN sanctions regime exempts medicine and requires only that the UN 
Sanctions Committee be notified of food shipments.  In accordance with 
paragraph 20 of Resolution 687, the Committee received notices of 17 
million tons of foodstuffs to be shipped to Iraq through January 1993.  
The Sanctions Committee also continues to consider and, when 
appropriate, approve requests to send to Iraq materials and supplies for 
essential civilian needs.

The Iraqi Government, in contrast, has for months maintained a full 
embargo against its northern provinces, in violation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 688, and has acted to distribute humanitarian 
supplies only to its supporters and to the military.  It has also 
refused to utilize the opportunity under Resolutions 706 and 712 to sell 
up to $1.6 billion in oil, proceeds from which could be used by Iraq to 
purchase foodstuffs, medicines, materials, and supplies for essential 
civilian needs of its population; the distribution of these supplies 
would be monitored by the United Nations.  (These proceeds could also be 
used to finance essential UN activities concerning Iraq.)  The Iraqi 
authorities bear full responsibility for any suffering in Iraq that 
results from their refusal to implement Resolutions 706 and 712.

The United States has recently transmitted to the United Nations a 
report on Iraqi violations of international humanitarian law committed 
during the Gulf War.  This report provides the international community 
with a documented record of Iraqi crimes.  We encourage others to 
transmit whatever information they have on Iraqi violations of 
international humanitarian law to the United Nations in accordance with 
UN Security Council Resolution 674.

Since January 19, the UN Compensation Commission has continued to 
prepare for the processing of claims from individuals, corporations, 
other entities, governments, and international organizations that 
suffered direct loss or damage as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait.  The Commission has received about 400,000 
claims to date.  The next session of the Governing Council of the 
Commission is scheduled to be held in Geneva March 29 to April 2, 1993, 
with another meeting in July 1993.

Iraq has not met its obligations concerning Kuwaitis and third-country 
nationals it detained during the war.  The Government of Kuwait has 
compiled over 600 files on missing individuals.  Although Iraq has 
received this information through the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), it has taken no substantive steps to comply with Security 
Council Resolution 687, which requires that Iraq cooperate fully with 
the ICRC.  Regional organizations have also been engaged--thus far to no 
avail--in trying to obtain Iraqi compliance on the issue of detainees.  
We continue to work for Iraqi compliance and the release of all those 
detained in Iraq.

The United States and our allies continue to press the Government of 
Iraq to return all property and equipment removed from Kuwait by Iraq.  
Iraq continues to withhold necessary cooperation on these issues and to 
resist unqualified ICRC access to detention facilities in Iraq.

We will continue to seek to maintain Iraq's territorial integrity.  A 
future government that represents all the people of Iraq and that is 
commit-ted to the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq would be a 
stabilizing force in the Gulf region.  In this regard, we are encouraged 
by recent efforts of the Iraq National Congress (INC) to develop broad-
based indigenous opposition to the Baghdad regime.  A democratic and 
pluralistic government would be the best guarantor of the future of the 
Iraqi people.

My Administration does not seek to use force, but we will not shrink 
from using force in self-defense or as authorized by UN Security Council 
resolutions to compel Iraq's compliance with their terms.  I am grateful 
for the support of the Congress for these efforts.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton


FACT SHEETS

Iraq's Continuing Repression of its Civilian Population and Violation Of 
UNSCR 688

Iraq continues its repression of the civilian population and to deny 
humanitarian organizations' access to all those in need of assistance in 
violation of   UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 688.

What is Resolution 688?
UNSCR 688 demanded that Iraq end the repression of its citizens, and 
insisted that Iraq allow humanitarian organizations access to all those 
in need of assistance and make all necessary facilities available for 
this purpose.

Repression
In southern Iraq, government forces are still conducting military 
operations against the Shi'a Muslim population and dissidents who have 
taken refuge in the marshes surrounding the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.  
The regime has a massive project underway to drain portions of the 
marshes, both to facilitate military operations and to drive the 
inhabitants from the area.

The Baghdad regime continues its repression of civilians throughout 
Iraq.  The Government of Iraq has maintained an internal embargo on the 
northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and As Sulaymaniyah.  Baghdad has 
cut off virtually all shipments of food and fuel for the north.  Bombing 
attacks against UN convoys carrying relief supplies from Turkey have 
slowed relief efforts.  Baghdad's internal embargo of the north is 
largely responsible for the continuing need for an international relief 
program in northern Iraq.

The UN continues to record politically motivated arrests, torture, and 
executions of Iraqis throughout the country.  All communities in Iraq 
are victims of repression, including Arab Sunnis, Shi'a, Kurds, 
Turkomen, and Assyrians.

Access for Humanitarian Agencies
Iraq has consistently interfered with humanitarian agencies' efforts to 
gain access to all Iraqi citizens in need, particularly in the south.  
The countrywide presence of non-governmental organizations and UN relief 
personnel in 1991 has shriveled under Iraq's bureaucratic and physical 
harassment to the point where most relief organizations are confined to 
the north.  Iraq recently refused to issue visas and travel permits to 
donor nation experts to participate in a UN needs assessment mission 
gathering information for relief plans.  The United States believes 
[that] Iraq is the sponsor of regular terrorist bombings of relief 
convoys.  Iraq has refused to accept the stationing of human rights 
monitors in Iraq as proposed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights, Max van der Stoel.  With proper monitoring, the UN would be able 
to ensure that the population, especially in the south, receives the 
humanitarian and medical aid it needs.

Missing Kuwaiti Detainees And Compensation

Kuwaiti Detainees
During the 1990-91 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, thousands of Kuwaiti 
citizens and other residents of Kuwait were taken to Iraq as prisoners.  
UNSCR 687 requires that they all be returned to Kuwait or accounted for.  
Many were returned in the weeks following the cease-fire, but hundreds 
remain missing and unaccounted for by the Government of Iraq.  The 
Government of Kuwait has passed to the International Committee of the 
Red Cross for the Iraqi Government files on over 615 Kuwaitis and other 
residents of Kuwait who remain missing in Iraq.  Up to 100 other cases 
require further investigation.

The Iraqi Government's response to efforts to find and repatriate the 
missing is grossly inadequate.  It claims all detainees have been 
released but has refused ICRC access to detention centers to confirm 
this claim.  Iraq has taken no substantive steps to act on the 
information in the ICRC case files.

Return of Property
Iraq is obliged under UNSCR 687 to return property stolen from Kuwait 
during the occupation.  While some property was returned in usable 
condition in the months immediately after the war, more recently 
returned property has been deliberately vandalized and rendered unusable 
prior to being handed over.  For example, aircraft fuselages were sawed 
in half and radar systems stripped of their electronic gear.  Some items 
have not been returned, including I-Hawk air defense systems and 
priceless cultural artifacts and antiques stolen from the Kuwait 
National Museum and private collections.

These actions constitute not only gross violations of UNSCR requirements 
but reflect continuing Iraqi non-compliance with UNSCR 687.

Compensation
Under UNSCR 687, Iraq is liable for any direct loss, damage, or injury 
to foreign governments, nationals, and corporations as a result of the 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait.  Claims are to be paid out of a fund 
to be administered by the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) which would 
be financed by 30% of the revenues generated by the sale of Iraqi oil.  
Thus, the availability of funds to pay claims (over 400,000 already 
filed and perhaps 2 million expected) depends upon Iraq's resumption of 
oil sales under conditions acceptable to the UNSC.  Iraq's failure to 
comply with the relevant aspects of UNSC resolutions and UNSCR 687 has 
precluded the lifting of sanctions on the sale of Iraqi oil.  Resolution 
778 established a mechanism for countries to loan frozen Iraqi assets to 
the UN-managed escrow account, with 30% going to the Compensation Fund.

The Need for Long-Term Monitoring in Iraq
The United States strongly supports continued unrestricted inspections 
and monitoring in Iraq, envisioned under UN Security Council Resolutions 
687, 707, and 715.

More than a year has passed since the UN Security Council approved UNSCR 
715, which adopted the plans for long-term monitoring of Iraq's weapons 
industry to ensure it did not reactivate its weapons of mass destruction 
and ballistic missile programs.  These Iraqi weapons programs were 
prohibited by UNSCR 687 following the Gulf war cease-fire.

Iraq's Record
UNSCR 687 requires Iraq to disclose fully its weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missile programs to the UN Special Commission 
and the IAEA, to allow these programs to be eliminated under UN 
supervision, and to establish a monitoring regime to ensure that Iraq 
does not reacquire banned weapons.  While Iraq has publicly accepted 
UNSCR 687 and maintains it is in full compliance, Iraqi actions tell 
another story.  From the very beginning of UN weapons inspections in 
Iraq in 1991, the Iraqis have tried to hide major portions of their 
programs, refused to give the UN complete information about their 
programs and their foreign suppliers, and have actively tried to foil 
the attempts of UN inspectors to uncover these programs.  From time to 
time, as in the standoff outside the Agricultural Ministry in August 
1992, Iraq's defiance has been blatant and has resulted in further UNSC 
resolutions reminding Iraq of the need to comply.

Need for Long-Term Monitoring
This intransigence--plus Iraq's continued unwillingness to formally 
acknowledge its obligations under UNSCR 715's monitoring regime and to 
provide information on their foreign suppliers--makes UNSCOM's and 
IAEA's efforts at implementing their long-term monitoring programs 
critical.  Moreover, Iraq still has the human and technological 
resources to renew its nuclear, chemical, [and] biological weapons and 
ballistic missile programs for weapons of mass destruction, if 
inspections were to stop.

In the nuclear area, Iraq almost certainly retains key nonfissible 
materials, equipment, and trained personnel that could be used to 
rejuvenate nuclear weapons design and development and fissile material 
production programs.

The United States believes Iraqi authorities remain committed to 
achieving a nuclear weapon capability--and, if sanctions and inspections 
were to cease, would attempt to reconstitute Iraq's nuclear weapon 
program using existing resources as well as possible assistance from 
abroad.

Harassment of UNSCOM Inspectors
Iraqi harassment of UN inspectors, a constant backdrop to the inspection 
process, is part of Iraq's refusal to comply with UNSCOM's objectives as 
outlined in UN Security Council resolutions.  UNSCR 707 requires Iraq to 
ensure the complete safety and freedom of movement of UN inspectors, 
which it clearly has not done.  Incidents of harassment tapered off in 
late January but have picked up momentum since then.

Harassment
Harassment of UN Special Commission staff and inspectors has taken many 
forms on countless occasions.  Inspectors routinely receive harassing 
telephone calls very late at night.  The callers make obscene, 
intimidating, and threatening remarks, which include death, bomb, and 
fire bomb threats.

Another form of harassment involves wrongful entry and searches of 
inspectors' hotel rooms.  The contents of drawers have sometimes been 
emptied onto the floor; and, at other times, items such as cameras and 
money have been stolen.

UNSCOM staff members have been jostled in public, threatened with 
physical abuse, refused service at restaurants, and have had meals and 
drinks intentionally overturned on them while in restaurants.

Physical Attacks
UNSCOM property has been subject to repeated damage.  Cars have been 
sprayed with paint; antennas broken; tires stolen, deflated, or slashed; 
and lights, windows, and windshields broken.  In February, a rock 
shattered the rear window of an UNSCOM official's car in Baghdad.

Inspectors have had a variety of items thrown at them:  fruit, 
vegetables, eggs, rocks, bottles, rubbish, ink, paint, and diesel fuel.  
Light bulbs have been dropped from the top of multi-story buildings at 
them.  On one occasion, an UNSCOM inspector narrowly escaped a 
potentially life-threatening injury when an Iraqi lunged at him with a 
knife.

While some of these incidents may be spontaneous, the bulk of them 
appear to be the result of a coordinated government campaign to 
intimidate and humiliate the UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors.

Iraq's Support for Terrorism
UNSC Resolution 687 requires Iraq to cease support for acts of 
international terrorism.  The Baghdad regime has conducted terrorist 
attacks against a variety of targets.  In 1992, Iraqi-sponsored 
terrorism focused on Kurdish targets and on UN and Western relief 
organization employees working in northern Iraq.  Thirty-nine attacks 
were carried out last year.

Iraqi intelligence has also resumed sending agents abroad to track 
opponents of the regime.  The most recent case of an assassination was 
committed by two Iraqi men who killed an Iraqi nuclear scientist in 
Amman, Jordan, as he was preparing to defect.  Jordanian authorities 
arrested the two Iraqis, who admitted they were working for Iraqi 
intelligence.

There have been many casualties in the dozens of attacks in recent 
months aimed at driving UN and international relief workers out of 
northern Iraq.  In November, magnetic time bombs placed under UN convoy 
trucks exploded in Irbil; all evidence points to Iraqi Government 
responsibility for the attacks.  In December, Iraqi authorities placed 
eight time bombs under UN relief convoy trucks.  The bombs were set to 
explode in Irbil but were discovered and defused.  One week later, 
explosions destroyed or damaged 14 relief trucks that had just passed an 
Iraqi checkpoint.  In January 1993, an expatriate employee of CARE was 
killed and two people were wounded in an attack in northern Iraq.  In 
March 1993, a Belgian relief worker was assassinated while traveling 
from As Sulaymaniyah to Erbil.  The houses, offices, and vehicles of UN 
and relief workers have been repeatedly attacked by bombs, grenades, 
guns, and fires.

UN Security Council Resolution 687 also requires that Iraq not allow any 
terrorist organization to operate within its territory.  Nevertheless, 
Baghdad continues to maintain contacts and in some cases provide 
sanctuary to several groups and individuals that have practiced 
terrorism.


--  Iraq hosts and supports the main Iranian opposition group, the 
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which carried out several violent attacks in 
Iran in 1992.

--  Iraq also supports extremist Palestinian groups including the Abu 
Nidal Organization (ANO); the Arab Liberation Front; Abu Abbas's 
Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF); and Abu Ibrahim, leader and master 
bomb-maker of the now-defunct May 15 Organization.

--  Baghdad is reportedly providing safe haven and support to the 
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).

How Iraq Could Feed Its People
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 6, 1990, created a difficult problem 
for the international community:  how to compel the Baghdad regime to 
comply with its demands while, at the same time, preventing undue 
hardship from being inflicted upon Iraqi civilians.

The UN Security Council has made every effort to resolve this dilemma.  
Unfortunately, the Iraqi Government has rejected each proposal and, 
instead, cynically diverts humanitarian imports to regime supporters and 
uses the suffering of civilians as a means of evading compliance with 
Security Council resolutions.

Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688
Security Council Resolutions 687 (which established the cease-fire) and 
688 were both passed in April 1991 and dealt with humanitarian issues.  
The former extended sanctions until Iraq complied fully with the terms 
of the cease-fire.  The latter demanded that Iraq cooperate fully with 
UN efforts to coordinate relief programs throughout Iraq and give relief 
workers access to those in need.  The sanctions regime always exempted 
medicine.  By April 1991, it was liberalized so that food shipments need 
only be notified to the UN Sanctions Committee, which also approves by 
consensus shipments of other humanitarian supplies.

To date, Iraq has refused to comply fully with both resolutions.  It has 
severely restricted the ability of UN relief agencies to operate, 
especially in southern Iraq.  It maintains an embargo against its 
northern governorates.  Nonetheless, donors have contributed $610 
million since April 1991 to support UN humanitarian work in Iraq.

Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712
In August and September 1991, the Security Council created an exemption 
to the sanctions which would allow Iraq to fund the purchase of food and 
medicine through the export of petroleum.  Resolutions 706 and 712 
created a UN-managed escrow account for the deposit of oil-export 
revenues and established a structure through which UN monitors could 
track the equitable distribution of the humanitarian supplies purchased 
with those revenues.  The resolution approved total oil sales of $1.6 
billion, of which  $933 million would be used for humanitarian needs.  
One and a half years later, the Government of Iraq still refuses to 
implement these resolutions.

Security Council Resolution 778
In October 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 778.  Its main 
purpose was to establish a means by which countries could loan frozen 
Iraqi assets to the escrow account established in Resolution 706 and 
hence make them available for humanitarian use.  Iraq has worked to 
prevent the release of its assets to this humanitarian mechanism, but 
the United States has drawn on Iraqi assets to match $50 million in 
voluntary contributions by Arab Gulf states.  

List of Incidents of Iraqi Non-compliance and  Non-cooperation with UN  
Security Council Resolutions

Iraq has broadened its resistance to complying with the UN Security 
Council Resolutions 687, 688, and subsequent, related resolutions.  Iraq 
has outrightly refused to accept many of the terms imposed by the 
Security Council, especially those of UNSCR 687 and later resolutions 
that follow up Resolution 687.  A special area of concern lies in Iraqi 
Government-sponsored harassment and intimidation of UN personnel.  These 
efforts are in addition to more general Iraqi refusal to cooperate with 
UN and other international organizations as required by UNSCR 688.

The list below stands as evidence  of Iraq's non-compliance and non-
cooperation with UN Security Council resolutions.

Iraq-Kuwait Border
December 14, 1992:  Iraq declines to take part in the eighth session of 
the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission.

January 2, 1993:  A group of approximately 250 Iraqis, half in military 
uniforms, enter the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ and begin unauthorized 
property retrievals in the area between the old and newly demarcated 
boundary lines.

January 3, 1993:  Unauthorized property retrieval continues.  Iraqi 
personnel number approximately 500.  Operations include demolition  and 
dismantling of buildings and structures.  Operations continue through 
January 13.

January 10, 1993:  200 Iraqis break into and loot the contents of six 
ordnance bunkers on the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ.  Iraqis challenge 
UNIKOM efforts to stop them by ramming UNIKOM vehicles and brandishing 
weapons.  Iraqi officer in charge advises UNIKOM that Iraq intended to 
demolish UNIKOM's northern sector headquarters the following day and 
that they would bring the building down on UNIKOM personnel if the 
building were not vacated.

January 13, 1993:  A group of 21 Iraqis, using five vehicles and a 
crane, enter Kuwaiti territory and remove three transformers and a 
length of pipe from the Ritqa oil field.

January 17, 1993:  Three armed Iraqis enter the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ 
and fire upon Kuwaiti policemen.

March 4, 1993:  Iraqi authorities seize two Pakistani officers employed 
in ordnance-clearing operations who had strayed into the Iraqi side of 
the DMZ [demilitarized zone].  The Iraqis respond to UNIKOM personnel's 
request to go to UNIKOM headquarters by brandishing weapons at the 
Pakistani officers and taking them further into Iraq.

March 15, 1993:  Iraq declines to take part in the ninth session of the 
Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission.

UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)

(Including violations of UNSCR's 687, 707, and 715 and the UN-Iraq 
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities.)

December 2, 1992:  Iraqis refuse portion of an UNSCOM helicopter flight, 
claiming [that] the flight would be in the "city limits" of Baghdad.

December 10, 1992:  Iraqis refuse to permit UNSCOM #47/CBW [chemical and 
biological weapons] #3 team unconditional and unrestricted access to all 
records sought for inspection at PC-3.

January 5, 1993:  Iraq stipulates that all UN flights into and out of 
Iraq must stay west of the Euphrates River, both when northbound and 
southbound.

January 7, 1993:  Government of Iraq notifies UNSCOM that UN aircraft 
are no longer allowed to use Habanniyah airport.

January 15, 1993:  Iraq refuses to take responsibility for the safety of 
flights into Baghdad carrying UN inspection teams.  Iraqi Permanent 
Representative [to the United Nations] Hamdoon sends letter to UNSCOM 
saying U-2 flights should be suspended.

January 25, 1993:  Iraqis say they have released 90% of information on 
nuclear program--but continue to refuse to provide supplier data.

January 28, 1993:  Iraqis admit to UNSCOM #48/MT #1 team that they made 
a deliberate and false statement to UNSCOM #3 concerning missile 
launchers.

February 1, 1993:  Rock shatters rear window of UNSCOM doctor's car in 
Baghdad--possibly thrown by an Iraqi escort.

February 4, 1993:  Iraqi official Hossan Amin tells UNSCOM #48 
inspectors [that] they cannot conduct a baseline survey of the Ibn Al 
Haytham Missile R&D Center.  He alleges that an inventory is a UNSCR 715 
activity that falls outside the agreed modalities for the inspection 
team.

February 22, 1993:  Iraq tells UNSCOM #51 missile team [that] it cannot 
fly to an inspection site; UN helicopter is tracked by anti-aircraft 
artillery.  UNSCOM #50 team members continue to receive harassment calls 
in the middle of the night.

December 9, 1992:  General Amir threatens to "break the backs" of any 
Iraqis who provide UN inspectors [with] technical information and says 
UNSCOM helicopters will not be allowed to fly "one meter" within 
Baghdad.

Return of Property
March 8, 1993:  Iraqi Permanent Representative [to the UN] informs UN 
Secretary General that all Kuwaiti Air Force equipment except one C-130 
aircraft has been returned.  Iraqi information memo promises return of 
tanks and other heavy equipment.  No reference is made to I-Hawk 
missiles or the severely damaged condition of numerous items returned.

Repatriation of Detainees
March 2, 1993:  Kuwait informs the Security Council that Iraq has 
provided no response to over 600 files, presented to the Iraqi 
Government through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
on prisoners, detainees, and missing persons.

Compensation Commission
February 12, 1993:  Iraq's Foreign Minister, in a letter to the UN 
Security Council, challenges a decision of the Compensation Fund's 
Governing Council which imposed interest on claims related to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait.

UNSCR 688
(Including violations of the UN-Iraq Memorandum of Understanding on 
Humanitarian Assistance.)

December 17, 1992:  Iraqi forces fired on "food trucks" near Bardarsh.

December 22, 1992:  A truck belonging to a local relief organization is 
destroyed by an explosion.

December 22, 1992:  A 10-ton truck belonging to the CARITAS relief 
organization is destroyed by a car bomb.  The truck was parked in a 
residential area and had been used earlier to transport building 
material.

December 23, 1992:  An anti-tank mine is discovered in the driveway to a 
MEDAIR camp.

December 28, 1992:  A bomb placed under the rear axle destroys 1 of 10 
UN convoy trucks in NGO custody.

December 30, 1992:  An electric transformer located 200 meters from the 
UN Guard headquarters in Dahuk in destroyed by a bomb.

December 31, 1992:  An explosion shatters windows and destroys a garden 
wall at the offices of the relief agency Shelter Now.

January 5, 1993:  Five shots are fired through the window of a room 
occupied by a UNICEF engineer.  No injuries were reported.

January 9, 1993:  A Save the Children relief worker is threatened near 
the Qandil bridge by armed men.  Peshmerga guards capture the men and 
hand them over to local authorities.

January 12, 1993:  A bomb explodes 100 meters from the UN Guard office 
in Dahuk, shattering windows and destroying a nearby electric 
transformer.

January 14, 1993:  An unidentified man smashes the window of UN relief 
coordinator Foran's car, while a UN guard sits in the back seat.  
Earlier in the week, the tires of Foran's car were slashed outside a 
Baghdad hotel.

January 23, 1993:  An Iraqi hurls a grenade into a passing relief convoy 
in As Sulaymaniyah.  Under questioning, he admits [that] he was sent by 
Baghdad to attack the relief effort.

January 29, 1993:  Local authorities arrest a man carrying a magnetic 
bomb into Kurdish-controlled territory.  He claims [that] Baghdad 
offered him 200,000 Iraqi dinars to place the bomb on a UN vehicle.

January 30, 1993:  A magnetic time bomb explodes on an empty UN relief 
kerosene tanker at the Turkish customs area at Habur bridge.

January 1993:  The house of a non-governmental organization (NGO) worker 
is bombed; his family managed to escape injury.

February 2, 1993:  Unidentified men throw stones through the windshields 
of UN convoy trucks in two separate incidents.  One incident occurs 
inside Baghdad-controlled territory.

February 13, 1993:  Several time bombs explode inside a Red Crescent [an 
Islamic humanitarian organization similar to the Red Cross] warehouse, 
killing one and injuring five others.  Another [bomb] was discovered at 
the scene.

February 15, 1993:  A pressure-activated explosive device detonates 
under the wheel of a Turkish fuel tanker consigned to carry fuel into 
Dahuk.  A similar device was recovered from another truck.

February 24, 1993:  An unidentified man placed a bomb on an empty UN 
tanker truck returning to Kurdish-controlled territory from Baghdad-
controlled territory.  The man escaped in a taxi waiting in a Government 
of Iraq-controlled parking lot.  Iraqi officials confiscated the bomb 
after it was defused.

March 1993:  Iraq refuses to issue visas to non-UN experts on UN 
humanitarian assessment teams planning to visit southern and northern 
Iraq.

March 16, 1993:  A bomb, placed on the main chassis frame, explodes on a 
UN-leased truck parked on the Iraqi side of the Habur bridge.  The truck 
was waiting to clear customs for re-entry into Turkey.

March 20, 1993:  Two bombs explode in the UN Guard car park in Irbil.  
The first exploded under a UN Guard vehicle and caused extensive damage.

UNSCRs 706 and 712
Iraq has taken no steps in recent months to avail itself of authorized 
oil sales for the purchase of food, medicine, and other humanitarian 
goods.

UNSCR 773
January 1993:  Iraqi border incursions and violations of the Iraq-Kuwait 
demilitarized zone flout Resolution 773 on boundary demarcation.  (###)


ARTICLE 3.  

Bosnia-Herzegovina
Secretary Christopher, Department Statement, UN Security Council 
Resolution, Ambassador Walker

Signing of Bosnian Peace Plan

Statement by Secretary Christopher, released by the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, March 25, 1993.

The signature today by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
Bosnian Croatian delegation of the principal documents of the Bosnian 
peace plan, developed in the process of negotiations conducted by co-
chairmen Vance and Owen, marks a vital step toward a settlement of the 
conflict in Bosnia. 

The US Government welcomes the difficult and courageous decision made by 
the Bosnian Government.  President Izetbegovic has shown commendable 
statesmanship.  We also commend the efforts made by the Bosnian Croatian 
delegation in reaching this conclusion.

We now have an agreement signed by two of the three parties.  It is 
imperative that the Bosnian Serbs reach agreement immediately so that a 
final settlement of this tragic conflict can be achieved.  We call upon 
the Bosnian Serbs to immediately cease their attacks, to lift the siege 
and bombardment of Sarajevo and other cities, and to end their campaign 
of ethnic cleansing.  We believe the entire world community must do its 
utmost to impress upon the Bosnian Serbs and their supporters in 
Belgrade that they must abandon their present policies.

As I stated on February 10 [see Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 10, p. 81], if 
there is a viable agreement entered into in good faith by the parties, 
the United States is prepared to do its share to help implement and 
enforce such an agreement, working with NATO and under the United 
Nations.  We believe it is of critical importance that this conflict be 
settled on terms which will preserve the independence and territorial 
integrity of Bosnia.  Such a solution would be in keeping with our 
values as a nation and the goal of preventing a wider Balkan war.

Looking to the day when a settlement of this terrible conflict has been 
reached, the entire international community should do its utmost to 
provide economic aid and reconstruction assistance to the Bosnian state.


Admission to the US Of Bosnian Refugees
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, March 
26, 1993.

The United States is expanding its admissions program for Bosnian 
refugees to include additional groups of special humanitarian concern to 
the United States.

While the initial program was limited to former detainees and their 
immediate family members, we will now accept refugee applications from 
other groups such as:

--  Women victims of violence, victims of torture, and other individuals 
referred by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as being in 
need of resettlement;

--  Bosnian Muslim relatives of US citizens, lawful permanent residents, 
refugees, and asylees; and 

--  Parents and siblings of minor US-citizen children who have been 
displaced as a result of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This expansion will also allow for the resettlement of up to 3,000 
Bosnian refugees.

The main focus of our efforts to help the over 3 million refugees and 
displaced from the former Yugoslavia remains humanitarian assistance in 
place.  To date, the United States has contributed over $200 million, in 
cash and in kind, and will continue to give generously until this 
humanitarian tragedy has ended.

It is anticipated that most refugee processing for this program will 
take place in Zagreb, Croatia, and should begin the week of March 29, 
1993.  In addition, persons falling within the categories of interview 
eligibility may apply at other refugee processing posts.  In Europe, 
these posts are Belgrade, Rome, Vienna, Frankfurt, Madrid, Athens, and 
Istanbul.

For additional information about this program, please contact:

--  Eligible Bosnians in the immediate region of the former Yugoslavia 
should contact the US Refugee Resettlement Office (USRRO), Iblerov TRG 
#9, 2nd floor, Zagreb, Croatia;  telephone no. (38) (41) 419-696.

--  Relatives in the United States and potential sponsors should contact 
the local voluntary agency in their area which resettles refugees.  For 
a listing of such agencies, call InterAction at (202) 667-8227.

--  Persons seeking general information about the program should contact 
the US headquarters of the Zagreb Refugee Resettlement Office (the 
International Rescue Committee in New York) at (212) 679-0010 or the 
Bureau for Refugee Programs at the Department of State at (202) 663-1077 
or (202) 663-1048.


Resolution 816 (March 31, 1993)  

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992 and 786 (1992) of 
10 November 1992,

Recalling paragraph 6 of resolution 781 (1992) and paragraph 6 of 
resolution 786 (1992) in which the Council undertook to consider 
urgently, in the case of violations of the ban on military flights in 
the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the further 
measures necessary to enforce the ban,

Deploring the failure of some parties concerned to cooperate fully with 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) airfield monitors in the 
implementation of resolutions 781 (1992) and 786 (1992),

Deeply concerned by the various reports of the Secretary-General 
concerning violations of the ban on military flights in the airspace of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/24783, S/24810, S/24840, 
S/24870, S/24900 and Add.1 to 31),

Deeply concerned in particular by the Secretary-General's letters to the 
President of the Security Council of 12 and 16 March 1993 (S/25443 and 
S/25444) concerning new blatant violations of the ban on military 
flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
recalling in this regard the statement by the President of the Security 
Council of 17 March 1993 (S/25426), and in particular the reference to 
the bombing of villages in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United 
Nations,

Determining that the grave situation in the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina continues to be a threat to international peace and 
security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.  Decides to extend the ban established by Resolution 781 (1992) to 
cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this ban not to apply to 
flights authorized by UNPROFOR in accordance with paragraph 2 below:

2.  Requests UNPROFOR to modify the mechanism referred to in paragraph 3 
of resolution 781 (1992) so as to provide for the authorization, in the 
airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of humanitarian 
flights and other flights consistent with relevant resolutions of the 
Council;

3.  Requests UNPROFOR to continue to monitor compliance with the ban on 
flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
calls on all parties urgently to cooperate with UNPROFOR in making 
practical arrangements for the close monitoring of authorized flights 
and improving the notification procedures;

4.  Authorizes Member States, seven days after the adoption of this 
resolution, acting nationally or through regional organizations of 
arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and 
subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, 
all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in the event of further violations, to ensure compliance 
with the ban on flights referred to in paragraph 1 above, and 
proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of the 
flights;

5.  Requests the Member States concerned, the Secretary-General and 
UNPROFOR to coordinate closely on the measures they are taking to 
implement paragraph 4 above, including the rules of engagement, and on 
the starting date of its implementation, which should be no later than 
seven days from the date when the authority conferred by paragraph 4 
above takes effect, and to report the starting date to the Council 
through the Secretary-General;

6.  Decides that, in the event of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering 
Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
notifying the Council that all the Bosnian parties have accepted their 
proposals on a settlement before the starting date referred to in 
paragraph 5 above, the measures set forth in the present resolution will 
be subsumed into the measures for implementing that settlement;

7.  Also requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-
General immediately of any actions they take in exercise of the 
authority conferred by paragraph 4 above;

8.  Requests further the Secretary-General to report regularly to the 
Council on the matter and to inform it immediately of any action taken 
by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by 
paragraph 4 above;

9.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
VOTE:  14-0-1 (China)


US Explanation of Vote On Resolution 816
Statement by US Deputy Permanent Representative Edward Walker, New York 
City, March 31, 1993.  

The United States strongly supported, and, indeed, co-sponsored, the 
resolution which the Security Council has just adopted.  As members of 
this Council are already aware, the United States has long been in favor 
of such a resolution and has worked vigorously in recent days for a 
resolution that would unequivocally demonstrate the international 
community's will to enforce resolutions of this council and agreements 
signed by the Bosnian parties.

As members of this Council remember, all of the Bosnian parties agreed 
to a ban on military flights over Bosnia at the August 1992 conference 
that was chaired by Lord Carrington.  The ink was hardly dry on that 
agreement before violations--the overwhelming majority of which have 
been carried out by the Bosnian Serbs--began to occur.  The aerial 
bombing of Bosnian government targets by Bosnian Serb forces on March 11 
of this year, which the Council eloquently and aptly condemned in its 
statement of March 17, is but the latest flagrant violation of the 
London Conference Agreement and the subsequent Security Council 
resolution on the no-fly zone.

These bombing attacks follow more than 400 other apparent violations, 
mainly by the Bosnian Serbs, since the Council adopted Resolution 781 in 
October 1992.  Confronted with these violations and the Bosnian Serbs' 
determination to flout the will of this Council with impunity, we had no 
choice but to act now.

The Bosnian Serbs must understand that this resolution is evidence of 
the international community's growing concern and intolerance of their 
acts of aggression.  The credibility of the United Nations and its 
entire approach to resolving this conflict rests on its willingness to 
act strongly and effectively, as we are doing through this resolution.  
We repeat that the United States deplores Serbian aggression against a 
member state of this organization.  We will not recognize Serbian 
attempts to change international borders by force. We will do all in our 
power to ensure that those who commit unspeakable violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law against innocent civilians are 
brought to justice. This resolution should send a message that if the 
Bosnian Serbs want to rejoin the family of nations, their behavior must 
conform to international norms.  We will accept nothing less.

While the international community has a duty to encourage the parties to 
reach such a settlement, we must also demonstrate that signing pieces of 
paper without an intent to implement them is not enough.  By showing our 
will to enforce agreements, this council has today demonstrated our 
commitment to peace and our resolve to end the conflict.  (###)


ARTICLE 4.  

US-German Relations
President Clinton, German Chancellor Kohl

Excerpts from opening statements at a news conference, released by the 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, March 26, 
1993

President Clinton:  Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  Before we 
begin the press conference, I have a sad announcement to make.  I have 
just been informed that five US servicemen on a routine training flight 
with the USS Theodore Roosevelt have crashed at sea within a mile of the 
carrier.  I want to express my deep concern over the accident.  Just 2 
weeks ago, I visited the USS Theodore Roosevelt and met the fine sailors 
and marines [serving] their nation at sea there.  I was profoundly 
impressed by their commitment, their dedication, and their 
professionalism.  They made America proud.  And I want to say that my 
thoughts and prayers are with the relatives and shipmates of those five 
servicemen who are missing at sea.

I want to begin by extending a warm welcome to Chancellor Kohl.  We have 
had a wonderful visit.  The personal chemistry between us, I think, was 
quite good.  Helmut Kohl, over more than a decade of service in his 
present position, has proved himself time and again to be a true friend 
and staunch ally of the United States.

Our peoples are closely linked with long-standing ties and common 
values.  Our common bonds ensure that our two federal systems can learn 
from each other.  And, indeed, I told the Chancellor that, 
notwithstanding the persistent problems of cost in the German health 
care system, my wife [First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton] had found a lot 
to learn from Germany.

We are working, our two countries, on the establishment of a project 
conceived by Chancellor Kohl and very close to his heart, the German 
American Academic Council, which will promote exchanges of people in the 
areas of science and technology and about which he might want to speak 
more in a moment.

During the Cold War, our two nations stood shoulder to shoulder in the 
common effort to contain communism in Europe.  Today we must be leaders 
in the great crusade of the post-Cold War era to foster liberty, 
democracy, human rights, and free market economics throughout the world.

If the world is to progress and prosper, the United States and Germany 
must work closely together.  Our bilateral relationship is invaluable.  
Our relations are, at the same time, important in the context of the 
North Atlantic alliance, the European Community, and the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe.  In these three institutions, 
Germany serves as both an anchor of stability and a source of fresh 
initiatives to meet the challenges of our changing world.

A paramount challenge for the West in our generation is helping to 
ensure the survival of democracy and economic reform in Russia and the 
other republics of the former Soviet Union.  Germany, as the largest 
single donor of assistance to Russia, has demonstrated its firm 
commitment to this historic cause.  The United States and Germany must 
now strengthen our partnership on this effort and work both bilaterally 
and multilaterally to support Russian reform.  The Chancellor and I 
discussed this issue at great length today.

I discussed with him the approach that I plan to take in the meeting 
with President Yeltsin at Vancouver.  And I believe we are in agreement 
on the general approach.  I know that we are committed to doing 
everything we possibly can to keep alive democracy and reform in Russia, 
and we believe it is in the immediate interests and the long-term 
interest of all of our people.

We also believe that the rest of the G-7 countries [Group of 7 
industrialized countries] must cooperate with us and with each other to 
vigorously produce a program of support for Russia.  We discussed in 
depth the troubling situations in Bosnia and elsewhere, and we conferred 
on trade and economics.  We agreed that we must work hard to conclude 
the Uruguay GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] round this 
year, and we committed to work closely together in this endeavor.

As two of the world's leading exporting nations, the United States and 
Germany have a powerful interest in expanding global trade.  I assured 
the Chancellor that the United States intends to remain politically and 
strategically engaged in Europe and to maintain a significant military 
presence on the continent.  The budget that I am fighting for in the 
Congress now would permit us to maintain a troop contingent on the order 
of 100,000 troops in Europe.

We believe that American and European securities remain indivisible and 
that the common threads of the post-Cold War era require common action.  
At the same time, we also recognize that each of us are reducing our 
defense budgets and must be increasingly responsible for our own defense 
needs.

Thirty years ago during his famous trip to Germany, President Kennedy 
toasted another great leader of the Christian Democratic Union and the 
German people, Konrad Adenauer, saying these are critical days.  The 
President's pronouncement reflected his concern then for the survival of 
freedom and even humankind at the height of the Cold War.

Today, thankfully, the nuclear shadow is receding from both our lands.  
And the wall that divided the German people is gone.  But I would say 
again, these are critical days, for the actions we take together now 
will help to determine the fate of democracy, the prosperity of our 
people, and the peace of the world.  In that work, I could not ask for a 
better partner than Chancellor Kohl or the German people.  And I want to 
say to him, I am delighted with this first visit, and I look forward to 
working with you in the days ahead.

Chancellor Kohl:  Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen.  First, Mr. 
President, allow me to express my heartfelt sympathy on the loss and the 
fear, because we don't have any detailed information about the loss of 
life of five American officers.

I hope very much that these soldiers may be able to return to their 
families safe and sound, because they serve the freedom and the security 
of their country, the United States of America.  And without that 
service, there would be no freedom and peace and no reunification for 
Germany.  This is why I am very sad about the things that you have just 
had to present to us.   I should like to ask you to convey to the 
families of the people concerned my feelings of sympathy.

Ladies and gentlemen, today I had my first meeting with the President of 
the United States of America.  It was a friendly exchange of views.  It 
is something that can be easily said in English--the chemistry is right. 
You said so, and I am pleased to take it up; indeed, the chemistry is 
right.  We touched upon many issues, many of which are very close to our 
hearts, at an important point in time of international politics, of 
European politics.  And I was also able to present many things that are 
important to German politics.

American-German relations, to put it in a nutshell, are for us--Germans 
and for me personally--today equally important if not more important 
than 30 years ago.  More than 30 years ago, when I was for the first 
time elected to the German Parliament, the alliance between the 
Americans and Germans, the European-American alliance, was much more 
matter of fact, because we lived under the threat and in the fear of the 
war.  Remember the Berlin blockade--the Berlin Wall--many challenges 
that we had to master together--down to the things that happened under 
John F. Kennedy in Cuba.

Today, many of these people have been released--they're free again. But 
in Europe and in Germany, too, there are quite a few who believe that 
there were no dangers existent anymore now that the times are changed.  
For these reasons, American-German relations have become ever more 
important.  The psychological environment has changed.

I said to you, Mr. President, and I should like to repeat this here and 
now, in this house of Europe that we are in the process of building 
right now--and I should like to go into greater detail on that later on-
-it is of existential importance for me, a German, that the Americans 
have a flat in this house; that the American soldiers and troops-- the 
presence in Europe and in Germany--documents that they're not there for 
decorative purposes but to defend freedom and security of people.

The fact that we can further develop the relations in the economic 
field--and that includes that despite the problems that we have, we 
bring about a speedy and successful conclusion of the GATT round.  This 
is something that we touched upon, too. We agreed that we want to work 
on this.

You were so kind, Mr. President, to mention that in the cultural and 
scientific field, we have the intention to intensify relations between 
both our countries.  You mentioned the German American Academic Council, 
which is to be founded this year.  I am very happy that you have agreed 
that once the necessary decisions have been taken in the next few weeks, 
we will found this economic council.  This is important for the public 
in both our countries.  It is for me very important that young 
Americans, that young Germans, visit the other country--vice versa--that 
they get to know the people and their culture.  To put it differently, 
Mr. President, we [will] plant many young trees so that we have a forest 
later on of things that we share, that we have in common.

I should also like to add for those who might have heard different 
reports on this here in the United States, there is no alternative for 
the Germans to a policy that makes progress with European unification--
and we are the engine of this development--and at the same time, places 
great care and value on American-German relations. 

And I should like to say this: Because we are now confronted with a 
common challenge and a major task--that is, we have to see to it that 
the spirit of reform--the willingness to establish democratic structures 
and a pluralist society, market economic structures in Russia and the 
CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]--is continuing.

I'm very grateful to you personally, Mr. President, for the 
determination and the courage that you have documented in the last few 
weeks in standing by Boris Yeltsin.  Both of us--and I underline and 
subscribe to every single word that you said on this--one, that reforms 
are successful in Russia.  And both of us are aware of the fact that any 
type of setback will in the end turn out to be much more expensive than 
any type of assistance we have the intention of granting right now.

We have discussed many issues and items on our plate.  The members of 
our staff will continue prior to the meeting with President Yeltsin and 
the American President to continue to discuss these matters.  Then we 
have the G-7 finance and foreign minister's meeting in Tokyo [on] the 
14th and 15th of April. We want to send a message to the people of 
Russia that the West under the leadership of the Americans and the 
American President will do everything in its power to see to it that 
Russia and other successor states to the Soviet Union stand a chance to 
walk on their own path toward freedom.

We the Germans--and I outlined this earlier on to you, Mr. President--as 
far as this question is concerned, are very committed, not only because 
we are neighbors of the former Soviet Union and the threat, if there was 
a relapse to form a dictator structures, would affect us first and 
foremost, but we do so because we have made our own experiences.

We were standing in the Oval Office looking at the sculpture of Harry S 
Truman, and I was reminded of the importance that the activities of 
George Marshall and Harry S Truman had for Germany when the zero hour-- 
when we were outlawed in the world.  These two stood up--stood by us and 
assisted us.  These were the fathers of the Marshall Plan, of a moral 
gesture of coexistence and cooperation.  And this, to my mind, is fair 
to say, a flourishing industry and country has developed--the former 
Federal Republic of Germany.

And if the Americans at that point in time had stood back and said:  
Well, what do we care?  The Germans shall see what will become of it.  
And if something good comes out of it, we'll be proud to say we 
assisted; and if not, we will say, we've always told you so didn't we, 
and therefore we stood back.  This kind of policy, a policy pursued by 
Harry S Truman and George Marshall, [proved] a successful recipe for the 
whole of Europe--West Europe.  And this is why I should like to tell my 
American listeners here that you can learn lessons from history.

And with a view to what is happening right now in Moscow, I think the 
message is what counts.  The message indicating in what way the big 
countries of the Western democracies and market economic systems feel 
committed to assist.

Allow me also to say that we discussed, Mr. President, the developments 
in the former Yugoslavia. The Bosnian President happened to be here this 
morning, and we met briefly in the White House.  We would wish to see 
that use is being made of all opportunities to see to it that a cease-
fire occurs, that then peace can be reached.

What is happening to the people there--day in, day out--belongs in 
numbers amongst the most terrible experience of this very century.  And 
here again, I'm happy and grateful, Mr. President, that you and your 
Administration have taken a clear position on this.

Once again, thank you very much for this friendly reception, for the 
friendly and open talks that we had.

May I perhaps just briefly announce, Mr. President, that I repeat my 
invitation to you and to your wife to come and to visit in Germany; and 
that you were so kind, Mr. President, to follow that invitation.  (###)


ARTICLE 5.  

Secretary Christopher
April 1, 1993
Message from the Secretary to the  meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in Lucerne, Switzerland, released by the Office of the Press 
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC.

The United States welcomes the renewed vigor of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG), which reflects the international community's increased 
emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation.  Over the last 2 years, much has 
been accomplished in two important plenary meetings and in several 
working groups.  Progress over this period has reinforced the role of 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a fundamental component of the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

I believe that the plenary in Lucerne will continue the outstanding 
spirit of cooperation among suppliers demonstrated by recent activities 
of the group.  I also want to express the deep appreciation of the US 
Government to the Government of Switzerland for hosting this meeting.

The United States has been a strong proponent of requiring full-scope 
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards as a condition for 
significant new nuclear supply commitments.  This policy was adopted at 
last year's plenary, and I urge the group now to amend its guidelines to 
incorporate this important provision.  No non-proliferation principle is 
more appropriate for the first change to the Nuclear Suppliers 
Guidelines since they were first published in 1978.

Last year, the NSG also created an important new arrangement to 
harmonize export controls on nuclear-related dual-use commodities.  We 
are honored to chair the dual-use arrangement for the next year.  We are 
also pleased with the progress of the working groups on institutional 
and technical matters and expect their work to strengthen the non-
proliferation efforts of the Group.

The statement issued by last year's plenary appealed to all nuclear 
exporting countries to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines.  I am 
pleased that Argentina has adhered to the guidelines and will attend 
this year's meeting.  Other countries have also shown interest in 
adhering to the guidelines.  We hope that all countries will come to 
share our common non-proliferation objectives.  We are committed to 
working with you in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and elsewhere to achieve 
a world free of the threat of nuclear proliferation.


Press Statement
April 1, 1993
Released at the meeting and made available by the Office of the Press 
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC.

The 1993 Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)1 took place in 
Lucerne (Switzerland) from 30 March to 1 April 1993 under the 
chairmanship of Professor Alec Baer, Switzerland.  A fundamental 
objective of the group is to ensure that cooperation in peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy does not contribute directly or indirectly to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The group reviewed current supplier arrangements and reaffirmed the 
importance of the NSG Guidelines on trade in nuclear-related goods and 
technology to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  The group invited 
all nuclear supplier countries to adhere to the guidelines.

Members endorsed a proposal for an amendment to the NSG Guidelines that 
requires IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards on all 
current and future nuclear activities2 as a condition for any 
significant, new supply commitments to non-nuclear weapon states.  The 
group again called on nuclear supplier countries which have not yet 
adopted such a policy to do so as soon as possible, and will try to 
ensure that indirect supply through third countries does not undermine 
this policy.

The members noted that the comprehensive arrangement to control the 
export of nuclear-related dual-use goods and technology adopted at last 
year's Warsaw meeting became effective on 1 January 1993.  They pledged 
their full cooperation to ensure its successful implementation.

The group adopted new procedural arrangements to formalize its 
membership and to improve the effectiveness of its operations.

The group welcomed Argentina's presence as observer at the meeting.  It 
recognized the important steps taken by Argentina in the field of non-
proliferation, including its adherence to the guidelines.

The group renewed its special appeal to the new states which have 
emerged from the former Soviet Union, who have not yet done so, to 
accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon 
states, to adopt IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to implement effective 
nuclear export controls.

It also emphasized the importance of the NPT to the nuclear non-
proliferation regime.  In this regard, it expressed great concern over 
the announcement by North Korea that it intends to withdraw from the NPT 
and urged that country to reconsider its position and to comply fully 
with its commitments under the treaty.

As part of the continuing NSG activities, members agreed on the need to 
hold further consultations on a range of issues, including conditions of 
supply and information exchange.

The next plenary meetings of the NSG will be held in Madrid in April 
1994 and in Helsinki in 1995.  

1Members of the group are:  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.  Argentina and the 
Commission of the European Communities attended as observers.

2Known as full-scope safeguards.(###)


ARTICLE 6.  

Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Session
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, March 
25, 1993.

The missile technology control regime (MTCR), the multilateral group for 
control of trade in missile-related items, recently held a plenary 
session in Canberra, Australia.  At the close of the session, the MTCR 
issued the following statement:

A Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was 
held in Canberra from 8-11 March [1993].  It was chaired by Australia.

Partners welcomed Iceland as the newest member of the Regime, attending 
the Plenary for the first time.  This multilateral non-proliferation 
regime thus comprises the following 23 countries:  Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

Partners agreed that the MTCR Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-relevant 
Transfers of 16 April 1987, and extended at the Oslo Plenary of July 
1992, remain an essential mechanism for the prevention of proliferation 
of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.  Partners 
further noted, with satisfaction, that the decision at Oslo to extend 
the coverage of the Regime's guidelines was fully implemented as agreed 
by all partners by 7 January 1993 [Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 41].

Partners agreed to give further detailed consideration to future 
directions for the Regime.  Such consideration would be aimed at 
ensuring that the Regime can curb, even more effectively, missile 
proliferation taking into account their concern about continuing exports 
of missiles and technology by non-member suppliers.

Partners were pleased to note once more that a number of countries 
outside the Regime have declared their intention to continue to observe 
the MTCR Guidelines, and they jointly appeal to all states to do 
likewise.

Partners particularly welcomed applications from Argentina and Hungary 
to participate in the MTCR and agreed to invite Argentina and Hungary to 
become Partners, to be effective in accordance with arrangements agreed 
by the Partners.

The next Plenary will be held in Switzerland towards the end of 1993.  
(###)


ARTICLE 7.  

Current Status of US Policy on Bosnia, Somalia, and UN Reform
Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative  to the United 
Nations

Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, 
Washington, DC, March 12, 1993

This is my first appearance before the House of Representatives as your 
ambassador to the United Nations.  I look forward to appearing before 
you and consulting frequently.  I also hope that you will come up to the 
United Nations individually or as a group.  You are pivotal for the US 
commitment to the United Nations.

Never before in the history of the United Nations have so many nations 
and peoples expected so much from the UN system, particularly its peace-
keeping operations and those agencies that rely upon the voluntary 
contributions of the member states.  The world's most intractable 
problems are being thrust at the United Nations:  ethnic conflicts, 
aggression, genocide and ethnic cleansing, famine, refugees, population 
growth, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global 
warming, grinding poverty, and the survival of democracy in the face of 
tyranny.  This is the inescapable agenda of the United Nations today.  
Whether we like it or not, the United States cannot walk away from these 
problems either.  We, however, do not and cannot shoulder these burdens 
alone.  The United Nations needs us, and we need it to reach and then 
implement a multilateral strategy.  There simply is no other way.

Within the short time that I have represented the United States at the 
United Nations, I have realized first-hand what I used to lecture my 
students at Georgetown University:  The leadership of the United States 
in these turbulent years after the end of the Cold War is sought by 
other governments and has assumed even greater importance within the UN 
system.  Not a day passes without the United States being called upon to 
take the lead at the United Nations, whether it be to preserve or 
restore the peace, uphold the rule of law, save the environment, or 
rescue failing societies.  If the previous era was one of containment, 
the new era is one of engagement in a global agenda of immeasurable 
complexity and diversity.

Quite frankly, as a former professor of international relations, I 
talked about all the issues with which I am now dealing.  So, for me, 
this really is like being in a candy store.  During the last month, I 
have worked in the Security Council on Somalia, the Western Sahara, 
UNIKOM [UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission], and other measures to ensure 
Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions, Cambodia, former 
Yugoslavia, a war crimes tribunal, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, and the 
deportees in south Lebanon.  The [US] mission also has been deeply 
involved in focusing on UN reform, reviewing the work of ECOSOC [the 
Economic and Social Council of the UN], and following up on the Rio 
summit [on the environment], including preparation for the work of the 
new Commission on Sustainable Development.

I want to report that I have found unbelievable congeniality among my 
colleagues on the Security Council.  They are energized by the 
realization that we are all making history.  There is very little 
animosity.  While there are clearly different opinions on various 
issues, there is a remarkably unified outlook about our responsibilities 
on the council.  I think you will appreciate that the Security Council 
and General Assembly are parliamentary bodies.  Many of the tactics and 
practices employed in the United Nations are quite similar to those 
found in the US Congress.  I wager you would feel quite comfortable in 
the corridors and assembly halls of Turtle Bay as priorities are weighed 
against each other and each country's domestic and foreign policies come 
into contact.

I am well aware of our own society's tremendous needs.  President 
Clinton and you have spoken about these frequently and eloquently.  I 
understand the challenge of dealing with our economic stimulus and 
deficit reduction program.  However, I am not appearing before you today 
as a representative of OMB [the Office of Management and Budget] but as 
your ambassador to the United Nations.  I am here to tell you that what 
you are doing to affect our economy will also have profound impact on 
the UN system.  Much of the UN's work is heavily influenced by the 
health of the world economy, which is driven, to a large extent, by the 
health of our own economy.  A strengthened American economy ultimately 
will enhance the work of the United Nations.

It is tempting at this time of domestic need to cut back on payments to 
the United Nations.  It would be dangerous, however, to think that at a 
time when we are thrusting more burdens on the United Nations, we can 
withhold the relatively limited funds it needs on the premise that the 
American economy must first be rescued.  The international problems that 
consequently might be abandoned would surely cost us far more to resolve 
in the years ahead.  For example, unattended ethnic conflicts create 
problems--which may require security forces or massive infusions of 
humanitarian aid from contributors such as the United States, either in 
the near or long term.  The unrestrained emission of carbon dioxide on a 
global scale could cause environmental changes with enormous economic, 
geopolitical, and social costs.  The continued withholding of vital 
funds from the UN Population Fund can lead to population growth of such 
profound magnitude in the coming decades that all other efforts--at home 
and abroad--to achieve economic prosperity would be utterly futile.

I fully recognize the tough decisions you must make in appropriating 
funds for foreign operations and in taking the necessary steps to revive 
the American economy.  The Clinton Administration will not shy away from 
those tough decisions, but we will also work closely with you to 
confront the international challenges at the United Nations that cannot 
be ignored.

I understand that there are three policy areas you would like to review 
today--Bosnia, Somalia, and the UN agencies and operations that fall 
within your subcommittee's jurisdiction.  That is a tall order, but I 
will do my best to address each one in turn briefly.

Bosnia
Since arriving at the US Mission to the United Nations in early 
February, I have spent more time working on the conflict in Bosnia and 
other parts of the former Yugoslavia than on any other matter.  By the 
admission of those who were in charge of it before, the Clinton 
Administration inherited a very bad situation.  But we have traveled far 
in the short time since President Clinton assumed office, and we fully 
recognize that Bosnia will require our involvement for a long time to 
come.

--  On February 10, Secretary Christopher announced the President's six-
step approach to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.  Those steps 
include:

1.  Direct and active US participation in the Vance-Owen negotiations, 
including the appointment of Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew as the 
President's envoy to those talks.

2.  Pressure on the Serbs, Bosnians, and Croatians to engage in the 
negotiations and craft a workable solution, because an imposed 
settlement would be far more difficult to sustain than a settlement that 
the parties have voluntarily embraced.

3.  Tightening the enforcement of economic sanctions, increasing 
political pressure on Serbia, and deterring Serbia from widening the 
war.  We remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the event of 
conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action.

4.  Enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia under a new UN resolution and 
further actions to promote greater delivery of aid.

5.  The United States is prepared to do its share to help implement and 
enforce an agreement that is acceptable to all parties.  As the 
Secretary said on February 10 [Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 7, p. 82]:  If there 
is a viable agreement containing enforcement provisions, the United 
States would be prepared to join with the United Nations, NATO, and 
others in implementing and enforcing it, including possible US military 
participation. This is a shared problem, and must be a shared burden.

6.  The United States will consult widely with friends and allies on 
these actions, and that has been taking place on a daily basis.

--  Immediately upon announcement of the President's six-step approach, 
Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew traveled to Moscow to consult with the 
Russian Government, a key participant in any multilateral approach to 
the conflict.  Moscow's cooperation since then has been very 
constructive.  In recent weeks, Ambassador Bartholomew has worked 
tirelessly with the parties to the Vance-Owen talks and, in my opinion, 
has been instrumental in keeping those talks alive and moving toward 
closure.

--  On February 22, following the lead of the United States and France, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 808, pursuant to which the 
Security Council has decided to establish a tribunal to sit in judgment 
of those who have committed war crimes and other violations of 
international humanitarian law during the Yugoslav conflict.  We should 
not underestimate the importance of this historic step.

--  On February 26, the President announced the commencement of a US-led 
airdrop of humanitarian supplies to civilians in eastern Bosnia.  Since 
then, about 315 tons of food and medical supplies have been dropped--
with increasing accuracy, I might add--on villages in eastern Bosnia.  
We expect the Russians to join us soon in the airlift operation. When 
Mrs. Ogata [the UN High Commissioner for Refugees] met with Secretary 
Christopher and me on Tuesday, she made clear that the airdrops were 
hitting their targets.  Witnesses had seen ready-to-eat meals and empty 
cartons.  People knew they had not been forgotten.

--  In mid-February, the United States joined France in pushing for an 
extension of the mandate for UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] until the 
end of March.  We sought and obtained authority for UNPROFOR to use 
force if necessary to carry out its mandate during this period.  We are 
now actively engaged in determining UNPROFOR's longer term mandate, 
which may include authority to use force to carry out its mission in 
case of interference by the parties.

--  The United States has taken the lead within NATO to plan for the 
possibility of a NATO role in implementing an agreement in Bosnia.

--  On March 5, the President reaffirmed our efforts to tighten the UN 
sanctions regime against Serbia and Montenegro.  We are working hard at 
strengthening enforcement actions on the Danube.  Further steps will be 
announced shortly.

--  We are continuing to seek a new resolution at the Security Council 
to authorize enforcement of Resolution 781 of October 9, 1992, which 
prohibits all military flights over Bosnia by the parties to the 
conflict.

In the coming days, three objectives loom large for the United Nations 
and this Administration:  to deliver humanitarian aid to the civilian 
population of Bosnia through US airdrops, our continuing airlift to 
Sarajevo, and UN-organized land convoys; to further tighten the 
sanctions regime against Serbia and Montenegro; and to achieve a cease-
fire and political settlement among the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian 
Serbs, and the Government of Bosnia.  The United States will spare no 
effort to push on each of these fronts.  Nor should anyone underestimate 
our determination to join in the enforcement of a just and workable 
agreement among the parties.  But we will not act unilaterally when a 
multilateral presence is clearly needed and available.  The multilateral 
force brought together to enforce an agreement must be strong enough to 
succeed in its mission.

There has been some unfortunate confusion in recent days about the 
nature of any future US military involvement in Bosnia.  Let me clarify 
the record.  As Secretary Christopher stated on February 10, the United 
States is prepared to participate in implementing and enforcing a peace 
plan agreed to by all parties to the conflict.  That plan is the object 
of the peace talks in New York.  We have not yet decided what the US 
participation would be.

Last Sunday, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali spoke of a 
future contingency, namely, what would happen if, following conclusion 
and adoption of the peace plan by all three parties, Bosnian Serb 
fighters failed to withdraw from territory they are required to 
surrender under the peace plan that their authorities had already agreed 
to.  If and when a settlement is reached, and in case one of the parties 
did not comply with its terms, the UN-deployed or authorized force would 
have the mandate to enforce it.  With respect to the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, Secretary Christopher testified on Wednesday that "We 
do not envision, at this point, the use of American ground forces in 
order to get relief supplies into Bosnia."

If an agreement is not reached by the three parties, the Security 
Council will retain all of its considerable authority and power to 
enforce its resolutions and international law against the violating 
parties--be they individuals, de facto regimes, or governments.

The task of building coalitions among nations can be maddeningly 
frustrating and even stymie missions that, if left to unilateral means, 
might quickly achieve a worthy humanitarian objective but jeopardize a 
long-term resolution of the conflict.  We will neither walk away from 
this conflict nor rush in blindly or unilaterally to stop the aggression 
and atrocities.  Our policy is multilateral in character and execution, 
unrelenting, and morally sound.  It is unquestionably in our long-term 
interests to have the United Nations and our European allies fully 
engaged in any military endeavor within the former Yugoslavia.

Secretary Christopher pointed to other interests on February 10.  He 
said that the United States cannot ignore the human toll and that we 
have strategic interests as well, including the prospect that this 
conflict threatens to spill over into Kosovo and Macedonia and become a 
greater Balkan war engaging Greece, Albania, and Bulgaria at a minimum.  
The refugee exodus could reach into the hundreds of thousands.  This is 
a crucial test for how we address the concerns of ethnic and religious 
minorities and promote the spread of freedom.

Somalia
Americans should take great pride in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.  
It is historic in purpose, [in] size, and in its results.  I sense that 
humanitarian-military missions are here to stay because of this 
precedent.

Following adoption of Security Council Resolution 794 early in December, 
the United States deployed the largest humanitarian-military relief 
force in UN history to create a secure environment for the delivery of 
food and medicine to the people of Somalia.  Between December 9, 1992, 
when our troops first landed on the shores of Mogadishu, and February 
19, [1993], 70,000 tons of food and medical supplies had been delivered, 
and most of that has been successfully transported from the warehouses 
to those in need.  Operation Restore Hope has enabled the UN and non-
governmental humanitarian relief organizations to undertake their 
extensive operations.  Regrettably, seven US servicemen have died in 
Somalia, and three humanitarian relief workers have died since early 
December.  Their deaths were not in vain.  Despite occasional acts of 
violence, the secure environment for humanitarian relief called for in 
Resolution 794 has been established in key parts of Somalia where food 
must be delivered.

Approximately 14,000 US troops remain stationed in Somalia today, down 
from the peak of 24,000 in late January.  About 15,000 troops from more 
than a dozen other countries are also currently participating in the 
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) led by the United States under Resolution 
794.

With those numbers in mind, let me begin with the Secretary General's 
report on Somalia released on March 3.  This report was required by 
Resolution 794 in order to brief the Security Council on the Secretary 
General's plan for the transition from UNITAF to the second phase of UN 
operations, or UNOSOM II.  While we are still reviewing the Secretary 
General's report, its basic thrust is consistent with what we have been 
planning and with the regular discussions we have had with the Secretary 
General and other high UN officials since Operation Restore Hope was 
launched last December.  We might quibble with some of the Secretary 
General's characterizations about the situation in Somalia, but, in 
general, they reflect well the enormous tasks that still lie ahead for 
the world community in that country.

The report recommends a number of steps:

--  A large UNOSOM II force of 20,000 troops and 8,000 logistical 
support personnel should be under the command of the UNOSOM II Force 
Commander.  The United States plans to participate in UNOSOM II with 
between 3,000 and 5,000 logistical support personnel but will withdraw 
its other UNITAF troops in a continuing process that has been underway 
for some time.  We also plan to maintain offshore of Somalia a rapid 
deployment force under US command that, while not a formal part of 
UNOSOM II, will be available to intervene should circumstances warrant.  
The Secretary General intends to draw as many UNOSOM II troops and 
logistical support personnel as possible from the existing multilateral 
UNITAF forces already in Somalia.  We are very pleased that the UNOSOM 
II Force Commander will be Turkish Gen. Cevik Bir and that his deputy 
commander will be US Gen. Thomas Montgomery.

--  The new enlarged UNOSOM force will have Chapter VII [of the UN 
Charter] mandate with much the same responsibility and authority as the 
UNITAF forces have had.  The rules of engagement for UNOSOM II troops, 
thus, will be much more robust than conventional peace-keeping rules of 
engagement.  The Secretary General describes UNOSOM II's projected 
mandate, which will encompass all regions of Somali territory, as 
including a wide range of responsibilities that will almost certainly 
involve assertive use of military force.  They include responsibilities 
to prevent any resumption of violence or violations of the cessation of 
hostilities; to control heavy weapons of all factions; to seize small 
arms; to secure or maintain security at ports, airports, and lines of 
communication required for delivery of humanitarian assistance; to 
protect and defend humanitarian aid personnel, installations, and 
equipment; to de-mine in various areas; and to aid in the return and 
resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.

--  There should be a phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.  As I 
said earlier, some of our troops in Somalia have already started 
rotating home.  Additional US forces will be removed in a planned, 
phased transition to UNOSOM II.  As sectors of Somalia are made secure 
by UNITAF, responsibility for their security will be transferred to 
UNOSOM II.  We expect UNITAF and UNOSOM II commanders to work out 
appropriate mechanisms for the transfer of responsibility, and the 
Secretary General has recommended, for budgetary and administrative 
purposes, May 1 as the formal date of transfer of command from UNITAF to 
UNOSOM II.

Operation Restore Hope, or UNITAF, has been a voluntary undertaking, 
both operationally and financially.  The Secretary General has 
recommended that UNOSOM II be an assessed operation with the costs borne 
by member states on the basis of the UN special peace-keeping scale of 
assessments, meaning that the United States will be assessed 30.4% of 
its operating expenses.

I want to discuss the purpose of the Trust Fund for Somalia--Unified 
Command which was established under Resolution 794 (1992).  It is a 
voluntary fund that currently stands at $115 million of donated monies, 
mostly from Japan.  The purpose of the Somalia fund is not and has never 
been, as some seem to believe, to reimburse the United States for the 
costs of Operation Restore Hope.  Rather, about 10,000 troops 
participating in UNITAF have come from developing countries unable to 
finance their own operations.  The Somalia fund was established to cover 
the expenses associated with their transport and in-country operations 
[of] these forces.  The United States is providing most of the transport 
and other support for these troops, and the fund will reimburse us for 
these costs but not for the support of our own troops.  More than $115 
million may well be needed to cover these expenses, so we are 
coordinating with the United Nations and the Japanese to solicit more 
contributions for the Somalia fund.  It is an important exercise, 
because we have sought the widest possible participation in UNITAF.

One of the unknown variables of the UNOSOM II operation, stressed by the 
Secretary General in his report, will be the disarming of all factions 
in Somalia pursuant to the Addis Ababa agreements of early January.  The 
plan calls for establishment of cantonments for the collection of heavy 
weapons and the operation of transition sites for the temporary 
accommodation of factional forces so that they can turn in their small 
arms and be re-integrated into civilian life.  We believe that this 
exercise is critical to the long-term restoration of a functioning 
government and society in Somalia.

The key to the future of Somalia will be the establishment of a viable 
and representative national government and economy and resolution of the 
future of Somaliland, or northwest Somalia, where certain groups seek 
recognition as an independent nation.  The United Nations will be deeply 
engaged in this institution-building exercise, and the United States 
should play a constructive role.

Voluntary Contributions To the UN System

I want to emphasize that the UN agencies and programs funded through 
voluntary contributions are critically important to the challenges 
confronting the new world.  The President is committed to American 
leadership in the fields that have for so many years been funded 
voluntarily through these long-standing UN organs to which you have 
devoted so much of your energy.

For example, this Administration is committed to the non-proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction as a pillar of its foreign policy.  So we 
will be looking to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in an 
effort to strengthen the inspection and verification of suspect sites 
anywhere in the world.  The current stand-off between North Korea and 
the IAEA over the UN agency's authority to inspect certain sites in 
North Korea is an important test case of the IAEA's authority.  The 
IAEA's work in Iraq since the end of the Gulf war has been exemplary and 
shown that some of the most important responsibilities of collective 
security are what the United Nations does after the hostilities are 
ended.

We want to ensure that the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the UN 
Environment Program work compatibly, efficiently, and consistently with 
the new Commission on Sustainable Development, which the Clinton 
Administration is going to support and help to lead in the years ahead.  
We are determined that an American succeed William Draper at the UNDP 
this year.  The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) will have an even greater 
role in coming years to address the priorities about children that are 
such an important part of our own domestic agenda.  I no more want to 
suggest slashing funding for children's programs abroad than I do here 
at home.

The World Food Program remains an indispensable channel through which 
the United States and other major powers can contribute food assistance 
to famine and disaster victims in the far corners of Asia and Africa.  
And the UN Development Fund for Women is a means we intend to explore 
further to enhance the status of women in societies around the world.

I am not going to comment on all of the UN agencies and programs within 
your purview, Mr. Chairman, but I want to stress how important the 
Administration considers them.  Perhaps it is ironic that many of the UN 
agencies that struggled so hard during the Cold War are now at the 
cutting edge of the UN's growing agenda of "new world" priorities.  We 
are not going to shy away from that challenge.

UN Reform
Having argued for support for these voluntary programs, this testimony 
would not be complete if I did not address a familiar but fundamental 
issue facing us at the United Nations:  reform of the institution.  I am 
very pleased to confirm, today, the Secretary General's decision to 
appoint Ambassador Melissa Wells to succeed Richard Thornburgh as Under-
Secretary General of Administration and Management at the United 
Nations.  Ambassador Wells will be leaving her post in Zaire soon to 
assume her duties in New York.  I have the greatest confidence in her, 
and I know that the Secretary General is looking forward to working 
closely with her on management reform.

We have begun to assess a wide range of analyses, reports, and proposals 
on reforming the management, administration, and financing of the UN 
system.  Within the past year, a number of highly professional studies 
have been completed that include many constructive analyses and ideas 
for UN reform.  For example, the Independent Advisory Group on UN 
Financing, co-chaired by Paul Volcker and Shijuro Ogata, just released a 
report on financial reform that merits our attention.  Richard 
Thornburgh's report to the Secretary General on March 1 points to 
significant inefficiencies within the UN system that I am deeply 
concerned about.  I must say that I find little in his report that I 
would describe as alarmist.  Mr. Thorn-burgh's report as a whole is a 
very constructive assessment of the United Nations that includes 
recommendations meriting serious examination.

UN reform has bedeviled every US ambassador to the United Nations.  I 
can assure you from my own discussions with the Secretary General that 
he is committed to significant reform in the system.  I am determined to 
work closely with him and Ambassador Wells to ensure that substantial 
reform takes place.  But first, I think we need to be clear about our 
priorities for reform and how we want to achieve them.  One priority 
Secretary Christopher and I have previously testified in favor of is the 
establishment of an Office of Inspector General at the United Nations.  
I think Secretary Christopher put it well on Wednesday when he cautioned 
that, while the United Nations is an organization that leaves a lot of 
room for administrative improvement, we need to be careful "not to come 
down so hard on that side that we don't recognize the importance of the 
UN and seek to reform it, rather than to disregard it."  As he said, we 
need to remember that the United Nations does many things well and there 
really is no substitute for it.

The opportunities and challenges confronting the United States at the 
United Nations are daunting.  But we must face them squarely and boldly.  
I ask every Member of Congress, and particularly this subcommittee, to 
work with me in the coming years so that the United Nations can fulfill 
its mandate, which Americans played such a key role in drafting and 
upholding during the last 5 decades.   (###)


ARTICLE 8.  

Statements at Confirmation Hearings

Timothy  E. Wirth 
Designate for Counselor  Of the Department
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
March 25, 1993.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a great honor to appear 
before you today and a real pleasure to be back in familiar surroundings 
with so many respected former colleagues.

I rejoin your company as President Clinton's nominee to be Counselor of 
the Department of State.  We meet at a time when the Department, your 
committee, and our country face a range of unfamiliar challenges in a 
world itself so unfamiliar as to be nearly unrecognizable.  I hope to 
contribute to the work of mastering those challenges and to have your 
support for my efforts.

Today, moreover, I seek your advice--as I hope to do often in the years 
ahead--on how to address these novel concerns in the uncertain setting 
of inescapable, disorienting, fast-forward global change.

I have some personal understanding of some of that change.  In August 
1961, as the Berlin Wall rose, I was an Army private, the Cold War was 
an all-consuming reality, and we thought we were about to be shipped off 
to war in Europe.

Thirty years later, my children and some 750,000 other young people from 
all over Europe sat on the remnants of the Berlin Wall to hear a Pink 
Floyd concert.  The Cold War, in the vernacular of their generation, was 
toast.

Just as irrelevant today are the assumptions about the permanence and 
the mortal danger of East-West conflict that shaped the foreign policy 
of America and, to a degree, the personal outlook of Americans for more 
than 4 decades.  The changes and the choices we now confront are every 
bit as demanding as those we have known since World War II, but their 
nature and their diversity and the speed with which they proliferate are 
remaking your job and the one I hope, with your help, to perform.

The Clinton Administration embraces the challenge of change.  Its broad 
commitment is propelling a fresh approach at the Department of State to 
many issues that, in the context of the Cold War, gained limited notice 
but now require sustained, profound, and imaginative attention.  The 
President, Vice President Gore, and Secretary Christopher have asked me 
to oversee part of that effort, and I will try to justify their 
confidence.

In shorthand terms, the specific issues involved are international 
crime, narcotics trafficking and terrorism, population growth, refugee 
and migration flows, environmental and scientific affairs, and the 
promotion [of] democracy, including human and worker rights.

That sounds like a very mixed bag.  A friend familiar with the 
traditional pecking order in the State Department has called me the 
designated "supervisor in chief for none of the above."  Indeed, in the 
Cold War world, these subjects were either peripheral or awkward topics 
for diplomacy.

They are not yet at the top of our national security agenda.  They are 
rarely the lead stories on the evening news.  But they already represent 
pressing international realities that, unattended, can force a nightmare 
future on our children and our nation.  As a country and a leader of 
other countries, we must begin and indefinitely sustain ambitious, 
patient, innovative, multifaceted endeavors to address both new threats 
to our safety and new opportunities for peaceful growth.

Let me give some specific examples of the ways in which these global 
issues can and do affect our security.

--  The international drug trade ruins the lives of young people the 
world over.  Its masters threaten civil societies both in our great 
cities and in the villages of South Asia and Latin America.

--  Terrorism that can strike as easily in New York as in Bombay 
endangers not just human lives and livelihood but the rule of law as 
well.

--  The HIV virus, the source of AIDS, respects no borders.  Unknown a 
decade ago, it holds the seeds of a public health disaster as 
devastating as the plagues of the Middle Ages.

--  Ocean-dumping, ozone depletion, and global warming are just some of 
the phenomena that have made the planetary environment everybody's 
urgent business.

--  Growth that is all-too capable of doubling--even tripling--today's 
global population in the next century is already a force contributing to 
violent disorder and mass dislocations in resource-poor societies.  Some 
of the resulting refugees are our near neighbors.  Others--refugees-in-
waiting-- press hungrily against the fabric of social and political 
stability around 
the world.

At the same time, however, the democratic ideals America embodies and 
the democratic practices we have spent 2 centuries embedding in our 
culture are, to revise Lincoln's immortal words, producing a new birth 
of freedom in many lands, a new hope "that government of the people, by 
the people, for the people" could take hold all over the earth.

For American foreign policy, this intricate maze of hope and danger 
around the world presents challenges that are hard--indeed, I would 
argue impossible--to handle in the traditional confines of bilateral 
relations.  They call for new alliances, novel approaches, [and] fresh 
definitions of national and international security.  The persistent and 
perplexing nature of cross-cutting global issues demonstrates that 
safety no longer lies in wealth or power alone.  Long-term cooperation 
among all nations is an imperative.

While America, as President Clinton has frequently said, cannot solve 
all the world's problems, only American leadership--the strength of the 
sole remaining superpower--can help tip the balance toward progress and 
durable peace.

In order to exert that leadership, we must first organize ourselves 
around this set of challenges.  We must establish the institutional and 
operational capability to confront global issues.  The new 
Administration has initiated those changes through Secretary Christopher 
and Deputy Secretary Wharton's reorganization of the State Department 
and corresponding reconfigurations at the National Security Council and 
[the] Department of Defense.

At the State Department, the old position of Counselor to the 
Department, a Level III appointment, will be the point of coordination 
for four bureaus. . . . This is part of the effort to streamline the 
Department, eliminate overlapping jurisdictions and unnecessary levels 
of middle management, and to emphasize these new cross-cutting 
priorities.  Working with the Congress, the Administration will soon 
propose legislation to implement this broad reorganization plan.  Under 
it, the Counselor's functions and level of authority will be the same 
only with a new name:  Under Secretary for Global Affairs.  The position 
of the Counselor will be retained at the IV level.

Building on the important and successful human rights initiatives of the 
last 15 years, the new Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor will 
serve also as the home for initiatives to promote and nurture the rapid 
spread of democracy around the globe, incorporating as well the 
important tools and resources of the trade union movement.  A second 
bureau will combine the existing international narcotics and counter-
terrorism programs with a new initiative to combat international crime.  
To consolidate existing Departmental responsibilities for refugee 
matters and address emerging global demographic trends, a new Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration will be organized.  This portfolio 
is to be rounded out by the existing and top priority Bureau for Oceans 
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, which was 
established under Chairman Pell's leadership following the 1972 
Stockholm Conference.

This ambitious reorganization and the elevation of responsibilities for 
global issues within the Department will enable us to better advocate 
these concerns in the implementation of our foreign policy.  What is 
intended for the environment, international crime and narcotics, 
population and refugees is analogous to the successful efforts to 
integrate human rights concerns into our foreign policy.  That model--
created, at Congress' initiative over the past 15 years--demonstrates 
how a cross-cutting functional issue can be incorporated into the day-
to-day bilateral relations that have traditionally dominated foreign 
policymaking.  Successfully done, the elevation of these other concerns 
can also serve to build into the career Foreign Service a system of 
rewards for successful tours in cross-cutting functional bureaus.

Beyond reorganization, the Department must develop a conceptual 
framework enabling America to exert an extra measure of leadership in a 
rapidly changing world order.  Our proud history has taught us that the 
United States and all nations can best address any challenge by 
maintaining a commitment to democratic institutions and the democratic 
process.  Encouraging democracy--and thereby conferring new power on 
citizens, governments, and institutions--is our most basic tool for 
promoting free markets and addressing global issues.  Respect for 
liberty under law is the common thread woven through the seemingly 
disparate set of responsibilities for which I have been nominated.  To 
put this another way, my mission is one of exporting the best of 
America:

--  Our commitment to and legacy of human rights and the rule of law;
--  Our sense of stewardship of the land, sea, and natural resources;
--  Our unflagging belief in the role of education and opportunity for 
all;
--  Our steadfast commitment to free and open markets; and
--  Our tolerance of each other, whatever our religious, racial, or 
ethnic background.

These are the cornerstones of our society.  It and they are the envy of 
the world.  Our unalterable belief in the power and promise of democracy 
underlies our economic, political, and social strength and progress.  
That secular faith has allowed us to develop remarkable technological, 
scientific, and intellectual capabilities.  Where we have successfully 
harnessed those capacities, we have been able to tackle difficult 
environmental, criminal, and economic problems.  Now, our challenge is 
to help build similar capacities in societies throughout the world.  The 
return on these initiatives will be a more peaceful, a cleaner, [and] a 
more just and predictable world order.

In today's seamless international economy, exporting America's democracy 
can and must include exporting American  products.  On our own at home 
and in concert with other nations, we have to set the example for others 
to follow and commit resources that will pay us double dividends through 
sustainable development:  progress toward global security and profits 
from selling the goods and services on which such progress depends.

I believe that this new set of long-term global challenges offers 
America a worthy mission and a noble challenge.  And I believe we are 
ready for both.  Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.  I would be happy to 
answer any questions you may have.


Thomas E. Donilon
Assistant Secretary-designate For Public Affairs
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
March 26, 1993.

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before this committee today.  I 
am honored to have been nominated by President Clinton and Secretary 
Christopher to help them in their dialogue with the American people on 
US foreign policy.  I hope that my appearance here today will be only 
the first of many discussions with members of this committee about a 
task that we both face every day.

I am also pleased to have the opportunity, if confirmed, to work with 
Secretary of State Christopher.  He and I have had a long acquaintance.  
He is a man of uncommon intelligence, integrity, and decency.  The 
nation is fortunate to have him as Secretary of State, and I am 
fortunate and privileged to have the opportunity to work with him.

The role of the Bureau of Public Affairs is to communicate clearly and 
effectively the foreign policies of  the United States.  As Secretary 
Christopher told this committee at his confirmation hearings in January 
[Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 45], he places a high priority on speaking 
directly and often to the American people about what our interests are 
in the world and how we can best pursue them.  Diplomats sometimes spend 
so much time explaining foreign policy to other diplomats that they can 
take for granted the one audience that really counts--the American 
people.

American foreign policy must be firmly grounded in the support of the 
American people.  At a time when the nation is rightly focused on 
domestic renewal and [when] the days when any policy or program could be 
defended in terms of the global containment of communism are over, our 
foreign policy must be justified anew to the American people.  They will 
demand that the time, attention, and money spent on foreign affairs 
promote their interests and values.  This will, in my view, require an 
ongoing dialogue and conversation with the American people.

Secretary Christopher began this process with his speech on Monday 
[March 22] in Chicago [Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 13, p. 173].  The 
Secretary's speech addressed the questions we believe Americans are 
asking:

--  Why, with the Soviet threat gone, do we need to be active on the 
international scene?

--  Why must America still carry the burdens of leadership?

--  Why, when we urgently need renewal at home, should we continue to 
dedicate resources abroad?

The Chicago speech responded by setting forth the central tenets of the 
Clinton Administration's new American foreign policy, stressing the 
undeniable link and interaction between domestic and foreign policy.  
The Secretary also outlined directly the stakes that the American people 
have in a successful transition to a market economy and democracy in 
Russia.

I can tell you that this is only the first of many trips Secretary 
Christopher plans to make to cities and towns across the country.  
Although we do not want to be held to a strict ratio, it is our intent 
to try and take one domestic trip for each foreign trip we make.

Mr. Chairman, we very much need to work together in this effort to 
engage the American people in our foreign policy.  I know you and others 
on this committee have been doing this for some time, and I welcome the 
advice borne of your experience and foreign policy expertise.  As you 
know, I am always available to be of any assistance I can to you and the 
committee, and I look forward to continuing to work together. 


George E. Moose
Assistant Secretary-designate For African Affairs
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
March 29, 1993.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:  I 
am deeply honored to appear before you today as President Clinton's 
nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs.  I would like to take this opportunity to extend to the 
President and to Secretary Christopher my gratitude for the confidence 
they have placed in me.  I am pleased to be so honored, but I am also 
deeply mindful of the heavy responsibilities that are associated with 
the task.

If I am confirmed for this position, it will in many ways stand as the 
fulfillment of both a lifelong dream and a long-held career ambition.  
My psychic awareness of the African continent goes back to my childhood, 
imbibed through family members and others who corresponded with friends 
and relatives in Sierra Leone and Liberia.  My first physical contact 
with Africa goes back some 28 years, to 1965.  As a student at Grinnell 
College, I was afforded an opportunity to travel to Tanzania, along with 
80 other students from the United States, Canada, and the Caribbean.  
One-third of our number spent that summer in the provincial town of 
Morogoro, about 100 miles inland from the capital of Dar es Salaam, 
lending our labor to the construction of a three-room schoolhouse that 
was to be run by the local Anglican Church as part of Tanzania's 
national education program.

For a group of college juniors and seniors impressed with our presumed 
sophistication and knowledge of the world, it was a humbling experience.  
We quickly discovered that our book learning had prepared us not at all 
for the seemingly modest task of erecting four perpendicular walls and 
raising atop them a simple tin roof.  Without the skill and patient 
tutoring of our Tanzanian mason, the project would never have been 
completed.  And while we accepted his kind words of praise, we knew well 
that the real achievement was his and not ours.

But it was also an exhilarating experience, one that opened new doors 
and new vistas for all of us and left me with an immense appreciation of 
the richness of Africa's history and culture and the tremendous 
potential of its human and natural resources.  In my case, it led 
ultimately to my search for a career in foreign affairs.  The following 
summer I interned at the State Department, where, by a miraculous 
coincidence, I was assigned to the Office of East and Southern African 
Affairs.  Following a second internship in Mexico City, I entered the 
Foreign Service in October 1967.

Over the past 26 years, I have had assignments in Asia, the Caribbean, 
and Africa.  During most of that period, I dealt with African issues, 
initially from the perspective of Washington and New York and later in 
assignments on the continent itself.  As an analyst in the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research from 1974 to 1976, I tracked the closing 
phases of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola.  As the desk 
officer for what was then Southern Rhodesia, I was a reporting officer 
during the first Rhodesian all-parties conference in Geneva in the fall 
of 1976.  During 1977 and 1978, I was privileged and fortunate to serve 
two of the Foreign Service's finest officers--Phil Habib and David 
Newsom--as a special assistant for African and UN affairs.  My 
association with African issues continued during my 3 years in New York 
at our mission to the United Nations, where efforts were underway to 
bring about independence for Namibia.  My most recent African experience 
has been in West Africa, as ambassador to Benin, from 1983 to 1986, and 
to Senegal, from 1988 to 1991.  In effect, the Africa bureau has been my 
professional home for most of the past 26 years.

Much has happened in and to Africa in the 28 years since I first set 
foot on the continent.  It must be said that the period has not been an 
illustrious one for the continent.  Much of the promise that accompanied 
modern Africa's first revolution--the revolution for independence that 
occurred during the 1950s and 1960s--has not been realized.  But I am 
firmly of the view that this recent history, despite its 
disappointments, holds the seeds of great hope and promise for the 
future.  The problems of the continent are real, but they are not beyond 
the mastery of human will and intelligence.

During the presidential campaign, then-Governor Clinton made reference 
to what I like to think of as modern Africa's second revolution.  He 
said:  A revolution is underway in Africa.  From South Africa to 
Ethiopia--from Kenya to Zaire--Africans are struggling to achieve 
political and economic freedoms that we Americans often take for 
granted.  We have a strong interest in helping them to translate those 
freedoms into a better life for themselves and their children.

America's interest in Africa is directly linked to the three pillars of 
American foreign policy that Secretary of State Christopher outlined in 
his March 22 address in Chicago [Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 13, p. 173].  One 
of those key pillars is the promotion of democracy.  In Africa, it is 
clear to me that our top priority must be to encourage and consolidate 
the spread of democracy.  The impetus for this movement comes from 
Africans themselves, who are vigorously pursuing the same rights, the 
same blessings of liberty, which people everywhere are fervently 
seeking.  It is imperative that we use our influence and our material 
support to encourage in Africa governments that recognize and ensure the 
basic human rights which are the necessary foundation of democracy.  We 
need unerringly to sustain the movement toward the establishment of 
democratically elected governments that are representative of their 
people, [are] able to speak confidently and legitimately on their 
behalf, and are thus capable of implementing sound and responsible 
policies--domestically and internationally. 

Mr. Chairman, if I am confirmed, I would actively seek the views and 
participation of the Congress, as well as others throughout the 
government and experts outside government, as we develop and execute 
strategies to nurture democracy in Africa.  Whenever possible, our 
policies will be designed to coordinate and reinforce the efforts of 
other nations and international organizations.  When making decisions 
about how to spend our own resources, we will endeavor at all times to 
take into account the efforts made by African governments themselves to 
strengthen democratic institutions.  That also means that we will not 
allow our assistance to be used for the support of dictators and that we 
will use the full weight of our influence to end dictatorial practices.

For a number of African countries, the movement toward democracy is 
being frustrated by civil conflict, in some cases by wars that have 
dragged on for years.  In those countries--countries such as Liberia and 
Angola--the initial focus of our policy must be to help bring about 
peace.  It clearly is in our interest to use creative diplomatic means, 
working with Africa's leaders and Africa's friends, to prevent conflicts 
before they are inflamed or to resolve conflicts once they have broken 
out.  Our approach to conflict resolution should also seek to strengthen 
the capacity of regional organizations and institutions, like the 
Organization of African Unity, to play a larger role in conflict 
resolution and peace-keeping.  If we have learned anything from our 
recent experience in Somalia, it is that we must find ways to address 
civil conflicts before they become major human tragedies which require 
massive intervention and great human and material expense.

It is obviously not in the US interest to have areas of anarchy 
anywhere, including Africa.  As Secretary Christopher noted in Chicago, 
our own prosperity is linked to that of the world.  An Africa made up of 
stable democratic governments is important to American prosperity 
because of the potential markets it represents for increased American 
exports, which in turn means additional American jobs.  For our own 
economic future, we need to be sure that we have access to those 
markets.  In addition, we also need to be certain of access to Africa's 
immense natural resources.  The continent holds 78% of the world's 
chromium reserves, 89% of platinum reserves, and 59% of the cobalt 
reserves.  With these concerns in mind, our embassies need to seek 
opportunities for American business aggressively and purposefully.  
Moreover, I firmly believe that private sector investments and 
partnerships also serve African interests.  They are the key to the 
prosperity of African nations and our own.

For all these reasons, it is important that we continue to work with 
African governments that are sincerely trying to reform their economies 
and are replacing statist policies with free market systems.  We need 
also to examine with Africa's leaders and Africa's friends what can be 
done to create a more favorable economic environment for Africa's 
development, one which will enable African governments to sustain their 
efforts toward political and economic liberalization.  In the GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations, our efforts in 
the context of the Uruguay Round to develop free and fair trading 
relationships have potentially powerful benefits not only for US 
producers but also for Africa.  In future rounds of trade negotiations, 
I hope that we can make these issues a more conscious part of the 
agenda.

As Secretary Christopher stated in Chicago, America cannot thrive in a 
world of economic recession, violent conflicts, and dictatorships.  We 
need to be concerned about Africa because what happens in Africa affects 
us.  But it is not within our means, our power, or even our desires to 
assume direct responsibility for the continent.  We need governments 
which can represent and speak on behalf of their people, which can make 
commitments and fulfill them, [and which can] elaborate strategies and 
implement them.  We are looking, ultimately, for partners in Africa 
fully able to assume their role and responsibilities in the 
international community.  I remain convinced that the way to secure such 
partners is to support and sustain Africa's movement toward democracy--
directly through our action and engagement and indirectly through the 
creation of a more favorable and supportive economic environment.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I would warmly welcome the opportunity to 
work with you and the other members of this committee to elaborate an 
active American agenda for Africa in pursuit of these goals.


Winston Lord
Assistant Secretary-designate For East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
March 31, 1993.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:  President Clinton has honored 
me with his nomination as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and 
the Pacific.  I am grateful for the trust that he and Secretary 
Christopher have invested in me to help shape America's policy for this 
critical region.

If I am confirmed, our exchange today will be the first step in a 
journey charted by thorough consultation and cooperation.  This I pledge 
in the national interest and my own self-interest.  There is much to be 
learned from your perspectives and those of the American people.  There 
is much to be gained when policies are jointly crafted.  Thus, in 
addition to ad hoc exchanges on breaking issues, I will maintain a 
process of regular meetings, on the Hill and in the Department, with key 
members of Congress and their staffs.  I also intend, as both 
opportunity and responsibility, to traverse this nation to listen to 
Americans and clarify our Asian-Pacific policies.

I come to this assignment with a global perspective based on 3 decades 
of international experience in the government and non-profit sector.  I 
am foremost a generalist--as a Foreign Service officer with varied 
assignments, a member of the Defense Department's Policy Planning Staff, 
special assistant to the President's National Security Adviser, and 
director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.  Outside 
government, I have served as president of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy, vice 
chairman of the International Rescue Committee, and chairman of the 
Carnegie National Commission on America and the New World.  Throughout, 
I have dealt extensively with Asian issues, including as ambassador to 
China and as director and member of many organizations with emphasis on 
that region.

Above all, I come in the spirit of bipartisanship, with a record of 
service under all but one Administration since [President] Kennedy.  I 
am gratified to have been selected by both Presidents Reagan and Clinton 
for positions requiring Senate confirmation.  Seasoning has sharpened, 
not mellowed, my conviction that the greater our unity at home, the 
greater our success abroad.  America has permanent interests.  They do 
not change every 4 years.

A New Pacific Community
Today, no region in the world is more important for the United States 
than Asia and the Pacific.  Tomorrow, in the 21st century, no region 
will be as important.  In that vast area, most of the world's people 
live.  Many of the richest cultures flourish.  The most dynamic 
economies beckon.  The major powers intersect.

America has fought in three wars in Asia during the past half-century.  
We have abiding security interests there.  Forty percent of our trade is 
with the region, its share swelling more rapidly than that of any other 
and half again as large as with Western Europe.  More and more eager, 
talented Asian immigrants enrich America's cultural and economic mosaic.  
Our nation's population and production shift steadily toward our Pacific 
Coast.  In sum, the firmest guarantees of America's staying power in 
Asia--more credible than rhetoric from the rostrum or writs on paper--
are our overriding national interests.

Ever since the Vietnam War, we have enjoyed broad bipartisan consensus 
on the most salient policies in the Asia-Pacific region; this has 
contributed mightily to our successes.  But in recent years, preoccupied 
by crises in Europe and the Middle East, we have paid insufficient 
attention to major transformations underway across the Pacific.  Our 
Asian partners have noticed.  Some are apprehensive.  Asia has been 
moving from an arena of confrontations to the premier growth area of the 
world.  Economic, political, and cultural exchanges within this region 
have mushroomed.  Familiar landmarks are shifting.  New patterns are 
taking shape.  New generations are taking charge.  We risk squandering 
assets and lagging behind trends.

We have enormous stakes in the Pacific.  We need to integrate our 
economic, political, and security policies.  We need fresh approaches 
and structures of cooperation.  It is time to build--with others--a new 
Pacific community.  A survey of the regional landscape yields both hopes 
and hazards:

--  It includes the world's fastest-growing economies and most lucrative 
terrain for American exports and jobs.  But we risk losing markets to 
aggressive competitors, and we are running unacceptable deficits with 
some of them.

--  The end of the Cold War eased relations among regional powers and 
deflated regional conflicts.  But some of our bilateral ties are frayed 
or fragile and new security challenges cloud the horizon.

--  Global revolutions in technology, transportation, and communications 
lift the hopes and prospects for countless Asians.  But global risks 
resonate ominously in the area--the proliferation of dangerous weapons, 
the burgeoning of populations, the spectre of AIDS, the degradation of 
the environment, the spawning of refugees, [and] the traffic in drugs.

--  The universal tides of democracy, fanned by information and free 
markets, flow in the region.  But four of the world's last five 
communist regimes, together with other repressive governments, remain 
caught in a time warp in Asia.

How, then, do we remove the peril and realize the promise?  Foreign 
policy for the region--as for the world at large--begins at home.  
President Clinton has wisely declared the renewal of America as his 
supreme goal.  This is not only essential for the American people.  It 
is essential for American interests and values abroad.  As the Carnegie 
Commission--which I recently chaired--stated, first, our foreign policy 
must be founded on a renewal of our domestic strength; rebuilding our 
economic base is now our highest priority.  

Equally compelling is the need to perfect the American experiment in 
democracy.  We must practice at home what we preach overseas.  We can 
project to troubled countries a multi-ethnic society that reconciles the 
need for national purpose with the right of groups to be distinctive.  
As President Eisenhower once said, "Whatever America hopes to bring to 
pass in the world must first come to pass in the heart of America."  
There can be no greater contribution to our Asian policy than fostering 
domestic economic vigor and social cohesion in America.  Our Asian 
friends recognize this.  Progress at home will burnish our leadership 
credentials.  It will make us competitive in the marketplace of goods 
and credible in the marketplace of values.  It will help secure the 
resources needed for international action.  And it will steady popular 
support without which our foreign policy founders.

Looking forward, we can see 10 major goals for American policy in Asia 
and the Pacific.  They are not listed in any order but, rather, as 
parameters of progress:

--  Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more 
mature balance of responsibilities;

--  Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation 
on the Korean Peninsula;

--  Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China where 
political openness catches up with economic reform;

--  Deepening our ties with ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations] as it broadens its membership and scope;

--  Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing in action 
as we normalize our relations with Vietnam;

--  Securing a peaceful, independent, and democratic Cambodia;

--  Strengthening APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] as the 
cornerstone of Asian-Pacific economic cooperation;

--  Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while 
maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances;

--  Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the 
environment, refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation, and arms 
sales; [and]

--  Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to 
flower.  

Let me briefly elaborate on each one.

Japan
Our fortunes in Asia--indeed, the world--will hinge on developing a 
comprehensive, durable partnership with Japan.  This will be my highest 
priority. Together, Japan and America comprise 40% of the world's GNP.  
Our alliance reassures friends, promotes stability, and deters arms 
races.  We are--or must become--partners on issues ranging from Korea to 
Somalia, Cambodia to Russia, technology to foreign aid, [and] the 
environment to democracy.

We offer our Japanese friends both reassurance about our intentions and 
a sense of urgency about festering frictions.  We will maintain a 
substantial military presence in Asia.  We will strive energetically to 
open markets.  Japan will have our strong support for a permanent seat 
in the UN Security Council; while complex negotiations are underway, we 
will consult Tokyo systematically on all major issues before the world 
organization.

In return, equity and reality require more vigorous Japanese performance 
on economic issues and international responsibilities.  An open global 
economic system is crucial to that country's future.  Its current 
account surplus of $125 billion strains that system; its $49 billion-
surplus with us creates severe tension.  During the past decade, our 
deficits with Japan have totaled almost $500 billion.  We are addressing 
this imbalance on several fronts:  making the American economy more 
competitive, urging Japanese macroeconomic measures to stimulate demand 
and imports, implementing agreements already negotiated, and achieving 
concrete export and investment results in selected areas.

Globally, Japan has already taken some promising initiatives ranging 
from peace-keeping to foreign assistance.  But Japan's aspirations for a 
central seat at world councils should be bolstered by contributions 
worthy of a major political and economic power.  It is time to shape a 
global partnership with Japan.  Together we should thicken webs of 
consultations and cooperation on three levels.  On the global plane, we 
should collaborate on the Uruguay Round of [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] negotiations; the G-7 [Group of 7 industrialized nations] 
process;  UN peace-keeping missions; and international challenges such 
as non-proliferation, the environment, refugees, health, human rights, 
and democracy.  On the regional plane, we should together nourish 
economic institutions like APEC and security consultations on a range of 
issues.  On the bilateral plane, we should pursue a structure of 
economic consultations and deepen our dialogue on our respective 
policies toward major nations like Korea, Russia, and China.

In this way, we can forge a more equitable, positive partnership.  
America will listen more, lecture less.  In turn, Japan should step 
forward not in response to American entreaties or pressure but in a 
spirit of enlightened self-interest and mutual benefit.

Korea
The Korean Peninsula reflects at once remarkable progress, tenuous 
openings, and lurking dangers.  The Republic of Korea represents one of 
Asia's greatest success stories.  Its economic growth has been little 
short of astonishing.  Its diplomacy has scored a series of 
breakthroughs.  It is steadily shouldering more of its self-defense.  
Its continued movement toward democracy--crowned by the recent 
inauguration of a President who had spent 3 decades in opposition--
heartens those living under authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the 
region.  We applaud these advances even as we work toward greater 
economic cooperation and reforms on intellectual property rights, 
financial liberalization, the investment climate, and market access.

But the threat from the North remains the most perilous legacy of the 
Cold War.  Prodded by a disastrous economy and estrangement from its 
major patrons, Pyongyang [North Korea] has toyed with opening toward the 
outside world.  After some promising moves in the past 2 years, North 
Korea currently seems to be retreating toward paranoia.  In recent 
weeks, it has fueled anxieties in the region by first reneging on 
commitments to inspection of its nuclear facilities and then declaring 
its intention to withdraw from the [nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
Looming ahead are the profound uncertainties of its political 
succession.

The policy lines of the United States are clear and consistent.  We will 
maintain significant military forces in South Korea as long as Americans 
and Koreans believe they are needed for deterrence and regional 
stability.  We will continue to support fully the IAEA [International 
Atomic Energy Agency] and other international bodies to eliminate the 
North Korean nuclear threat.  North Korea's nuclear challenge is to the 
world community, not just to the United States, as Pyongyang seeks to 
portray it.  This problem is critical to the worldwide campaign to stem 
proliferation.  The future of the peninsula must be resolved essentially 
through direct South-North negotiations; we remain prepared to enhance 
this process through close consultation with our South Korean ally and 
multilateral diplomacy.  We also stand ready to improve our relations 
with North Korea if it cooperates on fundamental issues.

China
Ever since participating in the opening to China more than 2 decades 
ago, I have worked hard to build Sino-American relations.  I will 
continue to do so, conscious of both American interests and values.  
China is an influential member of the international order.  More than 
one of every five humans live there.  It possesses nuclear weapons and 
exports nuclear technology.  It launches satellites and sells missiles.  
It represents a huge market and one of the world's richest 
civilizations.  It holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  
It is central to key regional issues like Indochina, Korea, and disputed 
islands.  It abuts the unsettled Central Asia region.  It is salient in 
new challenges that require global action.

In recent years, China has opened up to the world, moved toward a market 
economy, and enjoyed the fastest growth rate in the world.  Together 
with the greater Chinese communities of Taiwan and Hong Kong, it has 
become one of the most promising areas for investment and trade.  At the 
same time, its leaders cling to an outdated authoritarian system.  
Serious abuses persist.  While Beijing releases some prominent activists 
toward the end of their jail sentences, it arrests others for the 
peaceful expression of political views.  The Chinese leaders are 
gambling that open economics and closed politics will preserve their 
system of control.  It is a gamble that, sooner or later, will be lost.  
Economic reform produces--and requires--political reform.  In today's 
world, nations cannot prosper for long without opening up their 
societies.  Technology and information, the forces of modernization, and 
global democratic trends have been eroding communism and totalitarianism 
across the globe.

All of the Asian models of economic success toward which China looks--
many of them Chinese societies--have shown that political relaxation, 
tolerance of opposition, a freer press, the rule of law, and other 
democratic elements are inescapably linked with economic development.  
Our policy challenge, therefore, is to reconcile our need to deal with 
this important nation with our imperative to promote international 
values.  We will seek cooperation with China on a range of issues.  But 
Americans cannot forget Tiananmen Square.

The United States, therefore, should conduct a nuanced policy toward 
Beijing until a more humane system emerges.  Shunning China is not an 
alternative.  We need both to condemn repression and preserve links with 
progressive forces which are the foundations for our longer term ties.  
We will continue to be guided by the three Sino-American joint 
communiques that have provided a flexible framework for our relations.  
It is up to China and Taiwan to work out their future relationship; we 
insist only that the process be peaceful.  Consistent with our 
undertakings not to challenge the principle of "one China," we will 
continue to build upon our unofficial relations with Taiwan based on the 
Taiwan Relations Act.  In our diplomacy and through the 1992 US-Hong 
Kong Policy Act, we should make clear our large humanitarian and 
commercial stakes in the future of Hong Kong.

Against this backdrop we face a host of serious issues with China:  

--  Widespread human rights violations, including in Tibet;
--  Chinese exports of dangerous weapons and technology to volatile 
areas;
--  Our fastest-growing trade deficit, which is now more than $18 
billion, second only to Japan;
--  Collaboration at the United Nations and on regional conflicts; [and]
--  Emerging challenges like the environment and drugs.  We should work 
together where our interests converge and bargain hard over differences.

We will press forward with this agenda in a sober, constructive fashion.  
Our approach will reflect that China is a great nation.  In response to 
positive movement by the Chinese, we are prepared to address their 
concerns and strengthen our ties.  The Chinese people hold the same 
aspirations as others around the globe.  We will support those 
aspirations--without arrogance--recognizing that the Chinese people will 
determine their own destiny but confident that we are aligning ourselves 
with the future.

ASEAN
The ASEAN nations, with 330 million people, boast some of the fastest-
growing economies and became, last year, our fourth-largest overseas 
market.  We welcome ASEAN's establishment this January of the world's 
newest free trade grouping.  By the year 2000, ASEAN could become a 
trillion-dollar economic area encompassing 11 countries.  We will, 
therefore, intensify our efforts to promote US exports and the jobs they 
create.  Last year, a successful American tour by our ambassadors to 
ASEAN raised awareness of this dynamic region.  We will continue such 
efforts to attract more American firms to this competitive market.

This institution, 25 years young, serves regional stability as well as 
prosperity.  The future admission of the Indochina countries would 
encourage them in constructive directions.  The ASEAN Post-Ministerial 
Conference, which brings together the ministers of ASEAN and seven other 
nations, is evolving into an increasingly important forum for regional 
security consultations.  Imaginative diplomacy by Indonesia and others 
has been crucial in moving the Cambodian peace process forward and 
exploring peaceful ways to resolve competing claims in the South China 
Sea.

With the closing of our military facilities in the Philippines, we are 
gradually developing a diversified pattern of security ties in Southeast 
Asia.  All the ASEAN countries view a continuing US military presence as 
a stabilizing element during an uncertain period; each in its own way is 
helping to make it possible.  Our commitments to Thailand and the 
Philippines--both exemplars of democratic advance--remain firm.  We 
welcome more cordial relations with Malaysia.  We will strengthen those 
with Singapore and Brunei.  The United States will accord ASEAN and its 
individual countries the growing attention they merit--for American 
trade and investment, for regional security, [and] for the extension of 
freedom.

Vietnam
We are taking an especially close look at our policy toward Vietnam.  
Let me emphasize that obtaining the fullest possible accounting for 
Americans missing from the Vietnam War, including those lost in Laos and 
Cambodia, will remain a central objective.  I have reviewed the findings 
of the Senate's Select Committee on POW/MIA [prisoners-of-war/missing in 
action], before which I was honored to testify.  The Senate's exhaustive 
examination of this highly charged issue was a major achievement.  I 
congratulate the committee, whose findings have served to narrow 
uncertainties and ease some of the families' pain.  Most of the 20-year 
record of Hanoi on this issue has been one of callousness and deceit, 
but we can be encouraged that the Senate Select Committee has confirmed 
that Vietnamese cooperation with our investigations has substantially 
improved.  While we may never find all the answers, this Administration 
will make every effort to accelerate the process.  We must secure 
whatever comfort we can for the families of the missing.  I assure you 
as well that we will vigorously pursue POW/MIA issues with Pyongyang, 
Moscow, and Beijing.

Looking to the future, Vietnam--a rapidly growing country of 70 million, 
the fourth-largest in East Asia--can play an important political and 
economic role.  If the necessary ground-work is laid, we can strengthen 
regional stability.  A key factor will be the political settlement in 
Cambodia.  Vietnam has taken a positive role to date in the UN peace 
process; we expect its full support for the elections in May and the 
establishment of a new, independent Cambodian Government.  On the 
economic side, Vietnam has undertaken market reforms, opening up 
promising vistas for trade and investment.  The American business 
community is eager to take advantage of these opportunities and compete 
effectively with others.

At the same time, Vietnam continues under a repressive communist 
political system.  There are scant traces of freedom.  As we seek to 
normalize relations, the intensity and warmth of our ties will depend on 
progress in this area.  The graduated, reciprocal policy of recent years 
has successfully induced the Vietnamese to be more cooperative on the 
POW/MIA and Cambodian issues.  South Vietnamese personnel have been 
released from re-education camps.  Now we need to consider how further 
steps toward normalization can serve our multiple objectives.  With 
Vietnam's cooperation we are prepared to heal the wounds of history.

Cambodia
Cambodia continues to be a land of tragedy, torn by 2 decades of war and 
ravaged by the brutal policies of the Khmer Rouge.  After arduous 
diplomacy involving many nations, the fragile outlines of a settlement 
finally emerged--cease-fire, demobilization, a large UN presence, and 
free elections leading to an independent Cambodian Government.  Even 
more is at stake here than the fate of that country and regional 
security.  The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia--UNTAC--is the 
largest peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations.  
Thus, we face a crucial test of multilateral peace-keeping by the 
international community.

The situation is precarious.  The headlines are grim.  Yet UNTAC has 
recorded some impressive achievements.  The 20,000 peace-keepers have 
managed a cease-fire for over 1 year.  UNTAC has registered over 95% of 
the eligible voters for the elections slated for May.  Almost all of the 
360,000 Cambodian refugees have been repatriated; the demining and 
repairing of the country's infrastructure goes forward.  Formidable 
obstacles remain.  The Khmer Rouge refuse to participate in the 
elections; they seek to disrupt them; they are apparently hunkering down 
for a long-term struggle to take over the nation.  The Cambodian 
Government, installed by Hanoi in 1979, fears repudiation at the polls; 
it is using violence to intimidate potential voters; it threatens to 
discredit the election results.

There will be no easy path through this thicket.  Working with others, 
the United States must support the process of free and fair elections 
and assist the government that emerges.  The immediate task for UNTAC is 
to convince the Cambodian people that their votes will be secret and 
that their votes will count.  The looming policy choices before the 
world community include the ongoing role of the United Nations, the 
means to strengthen the future government, and the ways to contain the 
genocidal Khmer Rouge and others who seek to undermine the settlement.  
One of the most complex and central tasks for our Asian policy will be 
to help provide the Cambodians with a brighter future.  No other people 
deserve peace more.

Economics
In the aftermath of the Cold War, economics is increasingly supplanting 
military considerations on our foreign policy agenda.  More than ever, 
our national security depends on our economic strength.  With domestic 
renewal now America's highest priority, trade and investment are 
critical.  And no region is more central for American economic interests 
than the world's most dynamic one--Asia.

When I served as ambassador to China, I devoted more time to promoting 
American business and economic interests than any other task.  I will do 
so as well in my forthcoming role.  I will consult closely with the 
American business community on their problems and their goals.  I will 
urge our overseas posts to do the same.  For the private sector in Asia, 
as elsewhere around the world, is an increasingly important actor.  
Helping American businesses to penetrate overseas markets will be key to 
America's prosperity.  The Asia-Pacific region is the world's largest 
consumer market and our biggest export market.  Last year, our exports 
were worth more than $120 billion and 2.3 million American jobs.

We need to confront our Asian economic challenges and opportunities on 
several levels.  Foreign policy begins at home--strengthening our 
competitiveness is a sine qua non for an effective policy.  The 
successful completion of the Uruguay Round is the most urgent 
multilateral task--this would dramatically increase trade and investment 
in Asia as in the world, and it would help preserve an open global 
system against the dangers of protectionism and regional blocs.  We 
welcome the positive role played by Australia and New Zealand as active 
Cairns Group members.  Here, as on other issues, we will consult closely 
with Canada.  Bilaterally, we must continue to pry open Asian markets, 
particularly in those nations running large surpluses with us.  We will 
champion expanding trade, but we will insist that others open up to our 
products and services.  As the President has said, we will compete, not 
retreat.

In addition to these domestic, global, and bilateral policies, greater 
regional cooperation is required.  The most promising vehicle is APEC, 
established in 1989 through the efforts of Australia and others.  Today, 
this trans-Pacific grouping brings together 15 Pacific economies 
representing almost half of the world's GNP.  It underscores the new 
imperatives of interdependence.  It can dampen the appeal of 
exclusionary regional blocs.  It can advance regional trade 
liberalization and integration.  It can anchor America in the world's 
most dynamic region.  As the host for this year's annual ministerial 
conference in November, the United States has the opportunity to 
strengthen this organization.  This will be at the top of our agenda 
this year.  Working with others, we can create a true Asian-Pacific 
economic community.

Security
By virtue of history and geography, the United States is the one major 
power in Asia not viewed as a threat.  Virtually every country wants us 
to maintain our security presence.  While balance-of-power 
considerations have declined in the wake of the Cold War, they remain 
relevant as Asian-Pacific nations contemplate their fates.  Each one 
harbors apprehensions about one or more of its neighbors.  A precipitous 
American military withdrawal would magnify these concerns.  Add the 
increasing resources available for weapons purchases in the rapidly 
growing Asian nations, and there is a recipe for escalating arms races 
and future confrontations that could threaten US interests.

American security policy for Asia begins with a reaffirmation of our 
treaty alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines; our military arrangements under the Compact of Free 
Association; and the maintenance of a substantial military presence.  To 
be sure, given the end of the Cold War, stronger friends, and budget 
considerations, there could be prudent modifications after close 
consultation with our allies.  And they can and must assume a growing 
share of the security burden.

Unlike other regions, crises in Asia do not dominate the headlines, but 
serious security problems persist.  Those left over from the Cold War--
such as the Cambodian conflict and tensions on the Korean Peninsula--are 
being addressed by the appropriate groupings of nations.  The dispute 
between Japan--whom we support--and Russia over the Northern Territories 
belongs to bilateral negotiations.  Clearly, however, we must develop 
new mechanisms to manage or prevent other emerging concerns.  We welcome 
increased security consultations in the framework of the ASEAN Post-
Ministerial Conference.  This process can usefully encourage nations to 
share information, convey intentions, ease tensions, resolve disputes, 
and foster confidence.  The United States will fully participate.

For the first time in this century, there are no adversarial fault lines 
among the great powers in Northeast Asia:  the United States, Japan, 
Russia and China.  The post-Cold War period invites dialogue to prevent 
arms races, the forging of competing alignments, and efforts by one 
power or group of powers to dominate this strategic region.  Our voice 
will be crucial.  In close concert with our Pacific allies, we could 
engage Russia, China, and others inside and outside Northeast Asia.

Asia is not Europe.  We do not envisage a formal CSCE [Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe]-type structure.  But it is time to 
step up regional discussions on future security issues.  We are open-
minded on the arenas.  We will heed the ideas of others, like Japan, 
Australia, and ASEAN, which have been particularly fertile in this 
domain.  Together we can explore new Asian-Pacific paths toward 
security.

Global Issues
President Clinton and his Cabinet officers have already moved to 
restructure the executive branch to meet the new global challenges in 
our foreign policy.  These issues loom large in Asia and the Pacific.  
They will assume increasing prominence on our regional agenda as we 
approach the 21st century.  A brief checklist illustrates some of these 
problems:

--  With the end of global superpower rivalry, the proliferation of 
dangerous weapons now poses the greatest threat to our security.  In 
Asia, North Korean programs currently dramatize this challenge.

--  It took until 1830 for the world's population to reach 1 billion 
people.  Now it increases by that number every decade, with 90% of the 
growth in developing countries.  Asia, East and South, is home to half 
the world's people.  Twenty years from now, 1 billion more people will 
live there.

--  Many measures of human impact--from water use to the emissions of 
trace gases--show greater change since 1950 than in the previous 10,000 
years.  The Asian region, with its massive increase in energy 
consumption, faces severe environmental problems.  They range from the 
plundering of Southeast Asian forests to China's burning of coal to the 
threat of global warming for some Pacific Island states.

--  There are almost 20 million refugees in the world today.  Even more 
people are uprooted within their own lands.  While some recent 
developments in Asia are promising, poverty, repression, and uncertain 
political succession could unleash major migrations in the future.

--  The traffic in drugs remains a scourge on American society.  
Although the battle must be won at home by eliminating demand, the 
supply of narcotics from Burma and neighboring countries exacerbates our 
calamity.

Surely this is a daunting array of issues.  But problems common to all 
nations can stimulate communities.  They can be positive additions to 
our bilateral and regional dialogues.  And if they are not addressed 
effectively in Asia, they can hardly be addressed by the world.  
Increasingly, we will inject these global subjects into our relations.  
We will also encourage new institutions, like APEC, to enhance regional 
consultations and cooperation.

Democracy and Human Rights
History is on the side of freedom.  In recent years, hundreds of 
millions of people have won more open political systems.  For the first 
time ever, a majority of the world's nations are governed by some form 
of democracy.  This spread of liberty not only affirms American values 
but also serves our interests.  Open societies do not attack one 
another.  They make better trading partners.  They press for 
environmental reform.  They do not practice terrorism.  They do not 
produce refugees.

Thus, as President Clinton has emphasized, promoting democracy must be 
one of the central pillars of our foreign policy.  Moreover, the end of 
our global rivalry with the Soviet Union reduces the pressure to muffle 
concerns about unsavory governments for the sake of security.  
Naturally, this pursuit cannot be our only foreign goal; we must weigh 
geopolitical, economic, and other factors.  Nor do we seek to impose an 
American model; each nation must find its own way in its own cultural 
and historical contexts.  But universal principles of freedom and human 
rights belong to all, the peoples of Asia no less than others.

Mongolia was the first Asian country to throw off the communist yoke.  
From Korea to Taiwan to Thailand and the Philippines, we have witnessed 
encouraging strides toward more democratic and humane societies.  This 
phenomenon is not a product of "Westernization;" rather, it is an 
imperative of "modernization."  How can countries attract investment 
without the rule of law?  How can they combat corruption without a free 
press?  How can they shape wise development policies without the 
unfettered exchange of ideas?  In an age of technology and information, 
it is impossible for nations to develop without pluralism and openness.  
And sooner or later--accelerated by exposure to television and tourists, 
fax machines and cellular telephones, cassettes and computers--economic 
advance produces political yearnings.

To be sure, areas of Asia lag behind the march of history.  First-
generation communist leaders still hold together repressive regimes in 
several countries.  Grave human rights violations continue from Tibet to 
Rangoon [Burma] to East Timor.  But it is only a matter of time before 
the impact of economic reforms, the transmission of international 
values, and the thrust of human aspirations lead to sunnier climes.  The 
remainder of this century will be marked by a series of portentous 
successions in Asia.

Thus, even as we deal pragmatically with authoritarian governments we 
should press universal principles.  Whenever possible, we should work 
with others to expand the frontiers of freedom.  There are many 
instruments at our disposal:  consistent public positions that eschew 
double standards; quiet diplomacy; multilateral organizations; selective 
conditioning of foreign aid; and the efforts of private organizations 
like the National Endowment for Democracy and the Asia Foundation.  The 
establishment of a Radio Free Asia will be a vital supplement to the 
Voice of America and will signal our commitment to liberty.

Conclusion
Today a Pacific community is a vision. Tomorrow it can become a reality.  
The initial contours, eased by the end of the Cold War and strengthened 
by the dynamism of the region, are already emerging:  the rapid growth 
of trade and investment within the area; the increasing integration of 
economies, technologies, and ecologies; the deepening of ASEAN and its 
expanding dialogue; the promising evolution of APEC; the beginnings of 
regional security consultations; [and] the spread of freedom.

These are promising trends.  They reflect the foresight of the region's 
leaders and the energies of its peoples.  They also reflect the 
achievements of a bipartisan American foreign policy that has supported 
for half a century a huge investment of our national treasure.  It would 
be a tragic error for America to rest on its oars.  That would tempt the 
forces of adversity, sowing conflict rather than cooperation.  This 
generation of Americans owes it to the labors of those who came before 
us, and the hopes of our successors, to help build a new Pacific 
community.  (###)


ARTICLE 9.  

TREATY ACTIONS

Multilateral
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Done at New York 
Oct. 26, 1956.  Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873;  8 UST 
1093. 
Acceptance deposited:  Croatia, Feb. 12, 1993. 

Automotive Traffic
Convention on road traffic, with annexes and protocol.  Done at Geneva 
Sept. 19, 1949.  Entered into force Mar. 26, 1952.  TIAS 2487; 3 UST 
3008. 
Succession deposited:  Slovakia, Feb. 1, 1993.

Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation.  Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 
1944.  Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947.  TIAS 1591; 61 Stat. 1180. 
Adherences deposited:  Armenia, July 18, 1992; Azerbaijan, Oct. 9, 1992; 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan. 13, 1993; Croatia, Apr. 9, 1992; Estonia, Jan. 
24, 1992; Kazakhstan, Aug. 21, 1992; Kyrgyzstan, Feb. 25, 1993; Latvia, 
July 13, 1992; Lithuania, Jan. 8, 1992; Moldova, July 1, 1992; Slovenia, 
May 13, 1992; Ukraine, Aug. 10, 1992; Uzbekistan, Oct. 13, 1992.

Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations.  Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963.  
Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the US Dec. 24, 1969.  TIAS 6820; 
21 UST 77. 
Accession deposited:  Moldova, Jan. 26, 1993.

Cultural Relations
Protocol to the agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, 
and cultural materials of Nov. 22, 1950.  Done at Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976.  
Entered into force Jan. 2, 1982; for the US Nov. 15, 1989.  [Senate] 
Treaty Doc. 97-2.  
Signature:  Austria, Feb. 4, 1993.
 
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.  Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 
1961.  Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the US Dec. 13, 1972.  TIAS 
7502; 23 UST 3227. 
Accession deposited:  Moldova, Jan. 26, 1993. 

Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.  
Done at Paris Dec. 9, 1948.  Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the 
US Feb. 23, 1989. 
Accession deposited:  Moldova, Jan. 26, 1993.

Health 
Constitution of the World Health Organization.  Done at New York July 
22, 1946.  Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the US June 21, 1948.  
TIAS 1808; 62 Stat. 2679.
Amendment of Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization.  Done at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 
1975.  TIAS 8086; 26 UST 990.
Amendments to Articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization.   Done at Geneva May 22, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 3, 
1977.  TIAS 8534; 28 UST 2088.
Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization.  Done at Geneva May 17, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 20, 
1984.  TIAS 10930. 
Acceptances deposited:  Czech Republic, Jan. 22, 1993; Slovakia, Feb. 4, 
1993. 

Human Rights 
International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights.  Done 
at New York Dec. 16, 1966.  Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.1 
Accession deposited:  Moldova, Jan. 26, 1993. 

International covenant on civil and political rights.  Done at New York 
Dec. 16, 1966.  Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for the US Sept. 8, 
1992. 
Accession deposited:  Latvia, Apr. 14, 1992.

Intellectual Property
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.  
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.  Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for 
the US Aug. 25, 1970.  TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749. 
Accession deposited:  Armenia, Jan. 22, 1993. 

Judicial Procedure 
Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction.  Done 
at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980.  Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the US 
July 1, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-11. 
Signature:  Czech Republic, Jan. 1, 1993.

Marriage
Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and 
registration of marriage.  Done at New York Dec. 10, 1962.  Entered into 
force Dec. 9, 1964.1  
Ratification deposited:  Romania, Jan. 21, 1993.  

Narcotic Drugs 
Convention on psychotropic substances.  Done at Vienna 
Feb. 21, 1971.  Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the US July 15, 
1980.  TIAS 9725; 32 UST 543. 
Accession deposited:  Romania, Jan. 21, 1993.

UN convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988.  
Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4.  
Accession deposited:  Romania, Jan. 21, 1993. 

Prisoner Transfer
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons.  Done at Strasbourg 
Mar. 21, 1983.  Entered into force July 21, 1985. TIAS 10824.
Successions deposited:  Czech Republic, Jan. 1, 1993; Slovakia, Jan. 1, 
1993. 

Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination.  Done at New York Dec. 21, 1965.  Entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969.1 
Accession deposited:  Moldova, Jan. 26, 1993. 

Red Cross 
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of 
the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field.  Done at Geneva Aug. 
12, 1949.  Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the US Feb. 2, 1956.  
TIAS 3363; 6 UST 3114.
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, 
sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea.  Done at Geneva 
Aug. 12, 1949.  Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the US Feb. 2, 
1956.  TIAS 3362; 6 UST 3217.
Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.  Done 
at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949.  Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the US 
Feb. 2, 1956.  TIAS 3364; 6 UST 3316.
Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time 
of war.  Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; 
for the US Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3365; 6 UST 3516. 
Succession deposited:  Kazakhstan, May 5, 1992 (effective Dec. 21, 
1991); Kyrgyzstan, Sept. 18, 1992 (effective Dec. 21, 1991); 
Turkmenistan, Apr. 10, 1992 (effective Dec. 26, 1991). 
Accession deposited:  Myanmar, Aug. 25, 1992.  

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 
3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), relating to the protection of victims of 
international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes.  Done at 
Geneva June 8, 1977.  Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.1
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 
3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of 
non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II).  Done at Geneva June 8, 
1977.  Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.1 
Successions deposited:  Kazakhstan, May 5, 1992 (effective Dec. 21, 
1991); Kyrgyzstan, Sept. 18, 1992 (effective Dec. 21, 1991); 
Turkmenistan, Apr. 10, 1992 (effective Dec. 26, 1992). 

Torture  
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  Done at New York Dec. 10, 1984.  Entered into 
force June 26, 1987.1  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20. 
Accession deposited:  Cambodia, Oct. 15, 1992.  

UNIDO 
Constitution of the UN Industrial Development Organization.  Done at 
Vienna Apr. 8,1979.  Entered into force June 21, 1985.  TIAS 1985. 
Accessions deposited:  Czech Republic, Jan. 22, 1993; Slovakia, Jan. 20, 
1993. 
Denunciation deposited:  Canada, Dec. 3, 1992; (effective Dec. 31, 
1993).

Women 
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women.  Done at New York Dec. 18, 1979.  Entered into force Sept. 3, 
1981.1 
Accessions deposited:  Cambodia, Oct. 15, 1992; Samoa, Sept. 25, 1992. 
Succession deposited:  Croatia, Sept. 9, 1992 (effective Oct. 8, 1991). 

World Meteorological Organization
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.  Done at Washington 
Oct. 11, 1947.  Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052; 1 UST 281. 
Accessions deposited:  Czech Republic, Jan. 25, 1993; Slovak Republic, 
Feb. 11, 1993.


Bilateral

Argentina 
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with attachments.  
Signed at Buenos Aires Dec. 4, 1990.  Entered into force Feb. 9, 1993.  
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-18. 

China 
Agreement amending and extending the protocol of Oct. 17, 1981 (TIAS 
10287), as amended and extended, on cooperation in nuclear safety 
matters.  Signed at Shanghai Jan. 11, 1993.  Entered into force Jan. 11, 
1993.

Croatia  
Investment incentive agreement.  Signed at Washington Jan. 15, 1993.  
Entered into force Jan. 15, 1993. 

France 
Agreement concerning cooperation on the application of non-proliferation 
assurances to material, nuclear material, equipment, and facilities 
transferred from France to Taiwan for use in Taiwan's nuclear research 
and light water nuclear power reactor programs, with annex and related 
exchange on notes.  Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Jan. 19, 
1993.  Entered into force Jan. 19, 1993. 

Greece 
Agreement concerning the transfer of US Government-origin defense 
articles or related training or other defense services to the Government 
of the Hellenic Republic.  Effected by exchange of notes at Athens Jan. 
22 and 27, 1993.  Entered into force Jan. 27, 1993.

Honduras 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of 
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government 
and its agencies, with annexes.  Signed at Tegucigalpa  Feb. 2, 1993.  
Enters into force upon receipt  by Honduras of written notice from the 
United States that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been 
fulfilled.

Israel 
Second protocol amending the convention with respect to taxes on income 
of Nov. 20, 1975, as amended, with exchange of notes.  Signed at 
Jerusalem Jan. 26, 1993.  Enters into force 30 days after the date of 
exchange of instruments of ratification. 

Jamaica 
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign 
assistance owed to the US Government and its agencies, with appendices.  
Signed at Washington and Kingston Jan. 13 and 15, 1993.  Enters into 
force upon receipt by Jamaica of written notice from the United States 
that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled. 

Korea 
Agreement concerning wartime host nation support, with annexes and 
agreed minute.  Signed at Seoul Nov. 21, 1991.  Entered into force Dec. 
23, 1992. 

Kyrgyzstan 
Treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of 
investment, with annex.  Signed at Washington Jan. 19, 1993.  Enters 
into force 30 days after exchange of instruments of ratification.

Moldova 
Agreement concerning the program of the Peace Corps of the United States 
in the Republic of Moldova.  Signed at Chisinau Feb. 2, 1993.  Entered 
into force Feb. 2, 1993.

Netherlands 
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of 
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.  Signed at Washington 
Dec. 18, 1992.  Enters into force on the 30th day after the later of the 
dates on which the governments have notified each other in writing that 
the formalities constitutionally required in their respective states 
have been complied with. 

Norway 
Agreement amending the basic military logistical support agreement of 
Jan. 29 and Aug. 20, 1982 (TIAS 10449).  Signed at Oslo and Stuttgart-
Vaihingen Nov. 14, 1992 and Jan. 15, 1993.  Entered into force Jan. 15, 
1993. 

Poland 
Agreement between the United States and the Government of 
Poland/Narodowy Bank Polski concerning the Polish Bank Privatization 
Fund Account, with memorandum of understanding.  Signed at Washington 
Dec. 28, 1992.  Entered into force Dec. 28, 1992.

Russia 
Agreement concerning the disposition of highly enriched uranium 
extracted from nuclear weapons.  Signed at Washington Feb. 18, 1993.  
Entered into force Feb. 18, 1993.

Spain 
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs services.  Signed 
at Madrid July 3, 1990.  Entered into force Feb. 28, 1993. 

Turkmenistan 
Investment incentive agreement.  Signed at Ashgabat June 26, 1992.  
Entered into force June 26, 1992. 

United Nations 
Agreement concerning reimbursement procedures for humanitarian relief 
operations in Somalia.  Signed at New York Jan. 29, 1993.  Entered into 
force Jan. 29, 1993.


1Not in force in the US.  (###) 

END OF DISPATCH VOL. 4, NO. 14

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