US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 13, MARCH 29, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Securing US Interests While Supporting Russian Reform -- Secretary 
Christopher  
2.  US Support for Russian Democracy -- President Clinton 
3.  Preparations for US-Russia Summit -- Secretary Christopher  
4.  US Support for Reform and Free Markets in Russia  
5.  Focus on the Emerging Democracies
6.  US Committed to Israel's Security And a Real Peace -- Secretary 
Christopher 
7.  Secretary Christopher Meets With Palestinians -- Secretary 
Christopher, Palestinian leader Husseini 
8.  Open Skies Treaty Will Enhance  International Security -- John H. 
Hawes 
9.  Panel To Examine Truth Commission Report on El Salvador


ARTICLE 1:

Securing US Interests While Supporting Russian Reform
Secretary Christopher
Address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the Executives' 
Club of Chicago, and the Mid-America Committee, Chicago, Illinois, March 
22, 1993

It is a pleasure for me to be here today.  This might surprise you, but 
I am happy to be here on a white and snowy morning.  It reminds me of 
growing up in North Dakota--walking home from school and having my 
mother greet me with a cup of hot chocolate.  You can see I have happy 
memories of the Midwest, so I'm especially happy to be here.  

I'm particularly pleased to be speaking to this very audience.  
Secretaries of State spend probably too much of their time explaining 
American foreign policy to foreign diplomats, and they might tend to 
take for granted audiences such as this, the audiences that really 
count:  the American people.

I want to say a special welcome today to the students that are here from 
the congressional districts of Congressmen Reynolds and Rush.  You 
students have a tremendous stake in our foreign policy.  After all, you 
are the ones that will have to live with the consequences of all that we 
do.  So it's critical that your voice be heard, and I am particularly 
glad that you're here today.

My trip today is only the first of many that I hope to be making to the 
cities and towns of the United States.  My mission is quite a simple 
one:  to begin an ongoing conversation with the people here in America 
about the world we live in and our country's proper role in it.

It is fitting that I launch this process, I think, here in Chicago.  
Your city is a city that symbolizes America in so many ways--by its 
location here in the country's heartland, by its fighting spirit, by its 
broad shoulders, and most of all by its good common sense.  Yet 
at the same time, Chicago is very much at the center of the world--with 
its mighty industries exporting goods around the globe, with its 
commodity markets linking international investors near and far.

Chicagoans and all Americans have a right to a foreign policy that 
serves their interests in very concrete ways.  They want a foreign 
policy that will build a safer world, a more prosperous world, and a 
world where their values can be secure.  That is exactly the kind of 
foreign policy that Governor--that President Clinton--I still call him 
Governor Clinton sometimes--has charged me to carry out.  

At the State Department, we have a desk responsible for every foreign 
country, or virtually every foreign country--the China desk, an 
Argentine desk, a Russia desk.  As Secretary of State, I am determined 
that the State Department will also have an "American desk"--and I want 
to be sitting behind that desk.  My foremost mission is to advance the 
vital interests of the citizens of the United States.  Today, and over 
the coming weeks and months, I want to outline how the Clinton 
Administration plans to pursue that objective--pursue the objective of 
furthering the interests of the American people.

America in a New World

As you all know, our world has changed fundamentally in recent years.  
Walls have come down.  Empires have collapsed.  Most important, the Cold 
War is over, and the Soviet Union is no more.  Soviet communism is dead.  
But with it so is the reference point that guided our policies for over 
40 years.  It was easy when we could simply point to the Soviet Union 
and say that what we had to do was to contain Soviet expansion.  That 
reference point explained why our international leadership was so 
necessary, why our defense burden was so heavy, and why assistance to 
other countries was so critical.

Today, we face a vastly more complicated world.  It is a world of 
breathtaking opportunities to expand democracy and free markets.  But it 
is also a world of grave new perils.  Long-simmering ethnic conflicts 
have flared up anew in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere.  Weapons of 
mass destruction are falling into the hands of very dangerous dictators.  
And new global challenges cry out for attention around our entire world-
-challenges like the environment, overpopulation, drug- trafficking, and 
AIDS.

Like the last generation's great leaders who met the challenges of the 
Cold War, we need a new strategy for protecting and promoting American 
interests in this new era.  We need a strategy that will face the 
questions that Americans are asking, and most understandably asking:  
Why, they say, with the threat of Soviet expansionism gone, do we need 
to be active on the international front?  Why must America continue to 
carry the heavy burdens of leadership?  Why, when we so urgently need 
renewal here at home, should we continue to dedicate large resources 
abroad?

The Three Pillars:  Renewing America's Foreign Policy

President Clinton has responded to these challenges by laying out an 
American foreign policy based upon three pillars:  

     First, building American prosperity;  
     Second, modernizing America's armed services; and 
     Third, promoting democracy and human rights abroad.  

This policy's fundamental premise is that in today's world foreign and 
domestic policy are inseparable.  If we fail to maintain our strength at 
home, we will be, certainly, unable to lead abroad.  If we retreat into 
isolationism, it will be impossible to revitalize our domestic strength.  
America cannot thrive in a world of economic recession or violent 
conflicts or a world which is riven with dictatorships.

It is no accident that President Clinton has identified promotion of 
America's economic security as the first pillar of our foreign policy.  
We've entered an era where economic competitiveness is vital to our 
ability to succeed abroad.  As an essential first step, as you know, the 
President has put forward a bold, new program to get America's own 
economic house in order.  It's a comprehensive strategy that will invest 
in the needs of our people, reduce our deficits, and lay the foundation 
for long-term economic growth.   

The single most important step that we can take to strengthen our 
foreign policy, to strengthen our position in the world, is to enact the 
President's economic program--and to do so just as soon as possible.   

But steps at home cannot ensure America's prosperity.  Today, we are 
irreversibly linked to the global economy.  Our lives are constantly 
touched by huge flows of trade and finance that cross many borders.  To 
take another example, over 7 million Americans are now employed in 
export-related jobs--many of them here, of course, right in the Chicago 
area.

Our ability to prosper in this global economy depends upon our ability 
to compete.  That means harnessing our diplomacy to serve our economic 
goals.  We must ensure that foreign markets are open to US goods and US 
investments.  We must fight unfair competition against US business and 
labor.  And we must press the world's other financial powers to enact 
responsible policies that foster growth.

The second pillar of our foreign policy will be to modernize our armed 
forces to meet new needs around the world and to meet continuing 
threats.  The collapse of the Soviet Union enables us to significantly 
scale back our military establishment.  But, nevertheless, our power 
must always be sufficient to counter any threat to our vital interests.  
We must be able to deter and, when necessary, to defeat any potential 
foe.  That's why we are taking steps to make our military more agile, 
mobile, flexible, and smart.  Let me emphasize that President Clinton is 
determined to have the best-equipped and best fighting force in America 
to defend America.

As we talk about our armed forces, I think it's important for me to say 
that America cannot be the world's policeman.  We cannot be responsible 
for settling every dispute or answering every alarm.  We are 
indispensable, but we certainly must not be indiscriminate.  America's 
leadership will require that we wisely marshal the West's collective 
strength.  

Ethnic conflicts--and the humanitarian disasters they generate--deeply  
offend our conscience.  In many cases, they also pose a serious risk to 
international peace.  And they produce thou- sands of refugees, so 
often, that strain the political and economic stability of an entire 
region.  Our imperative is to develop international means to contain 
and, more important, to prevent these conflicts before they erupt.  
Here, it is critical that we use the United Nations in the manner its 
founders intended, and there is high, new hope that this may take place.  
UN peace-keeping capabilities must be strengthened so as to allow 
prompt, preventive action.   Our other instruments of collective 
security, such as our NATO alliance, must be adapted in this new era to 
support the UN efforts.

One of the most promising areas for preventive diplomacy is in the 
Middle East.  Here, fortunately, the end of the Cold War has not 
unleashed conflict; but, rather, it has created new opportunities, new 
chances for ending conflict.  I recently returned from a 7-day trip to 
the region, where I held extensive talks with all the top leaders of the 
Arab and Israeli Governments.  I came back absolutely convinced that 
there is a historic opportunity to take new strides toward peace in this 
troubled region.  

Now it's imperative that all sides to this long-simmering conflict seize 
this opportunity to return to the negotiating table in Washington on 
April 20, as we have invited them to do.  If they return and enter 
negotiations, the United States is ready to act as a full partner in 
their efforts.  If they do not, however--if they allow this unique 
chance to slip away--another generation in the Middle East could be lost 
to an endless cycle of confrontation and, eventually, to renewed 
conflict.

Let me now turn to the third pillar of this Administration's foreign 
policy:  encouraging the global revolution for democracy and human 
rights that is transforming the world.  By helping promote democracy, we 
do more than honor our deepest values.  We are also making a strategic 
investment in our nation's security.  History has shown that a world of 
more democracies is a safer world.  It is a world that will devote more 
to human development and less to human destruction.  And it is a world 
that will promote what all people have in common rather than what tears 
them apart.

The Challenge of Our Time:  Helping Russian Democracy

These three pillars of American foreign policy--building American's 
prosperity, modernizing America's armed forces, and promoting democratic 
values--form the core of the Clinton Administration's new diplomacy.  
Now I would like to tell you how these three pillars converge and form 
the basis for one of our highest foreign policy priorities--and that is 
helping the Russian people to build a free society and a market economy.  
This, in my judgment, is the greatest strategic challenge of our time.  
Bringing Russia--one of history's most powerful nations--into the family 
of peaceful nations will serve our highest security, economic, and moral 
interests.

For America and the world, the stakes are just monumental.  If we 
succeed, we will have established the foundation for our lasting 
security into the next century.  But if Russia falls into anarchy or 
lurches back to despotism, the price that we pay could be frightening.  
Nothing less is involved than the possibility of renewed nuclear threat, 
higher defense budgets, spreading instability, the loss of new markets, 
and a devastating setback for the worldwide democratic movement.  This 
circumstance deserves the attention of each and every American.

Over the days and weeks ahead, the Clinton Administration will set forth 
a comprehensive strategy to support Russia's democracy and its efforts 
to build a market economy.  My intention today is not to announce a 
detailed program of new initiatives; rather, what I would like to do is 
to try to provide a strategic context for the approach that we will 
follow.  I want to explain the tremendous interest we have in doing 
everything we can to help Russia's democracy succeed.

Let me stress here today that by focusing on Russia, I do not mean to 
neglect the other new independent states.  The well-being of Ukraine, of 
Kazakhstan, of Belarus, of Armenia, and, indeed, of each of the former 
republics, is a matter of utmost importance to America.  We are 
committed to developing strong bilateral relations with each of these 
countries.  We will support their independence and do everything we can 
to assist in their integration into the world community.  Indeed, it is 
partly out of concern for their welfare that I want to concentrate on 
Russia today.  For the fact is that the future security of each of these 
neighbors of Russia depends so heavily on Russia's own democratic 
revolution.

Let me step back for just a moment and analyze with you the breathtaking 
benefits that the end of the Cold War has brought to the United States 
and the world.  To mention just a few of the results:

     --  Historic agreements have been reached to slash the nuclear 
arsenals that threatened our country with annihilation.
     --  The nations of the former Warsaw Pact are now free of Soviet 
domination and of the burden of communism.
     --  The possibility of a superpower conflict on the European 
continent has now all but vanished, allowing us to bring home thousands 
of troops and to reduce our defense budgets.
     --  Around the globe, totalitarian regimes that looked to the 
Soviet Union for help and support are now isolated and on the defensive.
     --  And from Vilnius on the Baltic to Vladivostok on the Pacific, 
vast new markets are opening--opening slowly but nonetheless opening--to 
Western business.

With a reforming Russia, all of these historic achievements were 
possible.  But without it, many will not be sustainable.

So we stand again at a historic crossroads.  It is very reminiscent of 
the crossroads that we faced in 1918 and 1945.  Then, we were summoned 
after conflicts to lead the world by building a new peace.  After World 
War I, we chose to retreat, and the consequences were disastrous.  
However, after World War II, our leaders had the wisdom to answer the 
call.  We fostered institutions that rebuilt the free world's 
prosperity.  And we helped to lead a democratic alliance that contained 
and, ultimately, drained Soviet communism.

Today, for the third time this century, we have a historic opportunity 
to build a more secure world.  We must redouble our efforts to help the 
Russian people as they struggle in an effort that has no historical 
precedent.  With great courage, they are attempting to carry out three 
simultaneous revolutions:  first, transforming a totalitarian system 
into a democracy;  second, transforming a command economy into one based 
upon free markets; and third, transforming an aggressive, expansionist 
empire into a peaceful, modern nation-state.  If they succeed in this 
tremendous experiment, we all will succeed.

Now it appears that another turning point has been reached in Russia's 
transition.  For months, a constitutional crisis between President 
Yeltsin and the parliament has paralyzed Russian politics.  That crisis 
came--as you all know--came to a head over the weekend.  President 
Yeltsin has called for a national plebiscite to resolve the 
constitutional impasse.  In doing so, he has again demonstrated his 
faith that the only force that can guarantee reform is the people--the 
Russian people.

We welcome President Yeltsin's assurance that civil liberties, including 
freedom of speech and of the press, will be respected at this difficult 
moment.  We also welcome his firm rejection of imperial and Cold War 
policies.  The most important point is that Russia must remain a 
democracy during this period, moving toward a market economy.  This is 
the basis, the only basis, for the US-Russian partnership.

The United States has strongly supported Russia's efforts to build a 
democracy.  Under President Yeltsin's leadership, historic progress has 
been made toward a free society.  We urge that this progress continue 
and that the Russian people be allowed to determine their future through 
peaceful means and with full respect for civil liberties.  On that 
basis, Russia can be assured of our full support in the days ahead.

Now, today's crisis in Russia results from one indisputable fact:  The 
pain of building a new system virtually from scratch is exacting a 
tremendous toll.  The patience of the Russian people is wearing thin, a 
fact that is reflected in Russia's current political 
stalemate.Nevertheless, we should notice that over the last year, 
President Yeltsin and Russia's other democrats have demonstrated their 
commitment to reform in many ways.  Civil liberties have been 
dramatically expanded.  The military budget has been significantly cut.  
Prices have been freed in most sectors, and the result has been [that] 
the once-long lines that formed outside Russia's stores have come to an 
end.  Tens of thousands of shops, restaurants, and other firms have been 
put into private hands, and a real start has been made on the most 
difficult process of even privatizing the large enterprises.  As a 
result of these steps, the share of the work force engaged in private 
commerce has more than doubled over the last 2 years.

I'm glad to say that over the weekend, President Yeltsin recommitted his 
government to economic reform.  He laid out in clear and strong language 
the key elements of such a program:  continued privatization of firms, 
selling land to farmers, stopping inflation, and stabilizing the ruble.  
If this program is implemented, our capacity to help will be greatly 
enhanced.

Russia's reformers are now looking to the West for support at this 
moment of extreme difficulty.  The United States has a deep self-
interest in responding to this historic challenge.  We should extend to 
the Russian people not a hand of pity but a hand of partnership.  We 
must lead a long-term Western strategy of engagement for democracy.

Here in America, it is very important that we not create a false choice 
between what is required to renew our economy at home and what is 
necessary to protect our interests abroad.  We can and must do both.  
During the long struggle of the Cold War, we kept the American dream 
alive for all people here at home.  At the same time, we made great 
sacrifices to protect our national security, and today we can and must 
meet the same challenge.  To succeed, we must first change our mindsets.  
We must understand that helping consolidate democracy in Russia is not a 
matter of charity but a security concern of the highest order. It is no 
less important to our well-being than the need to contain a hostile 
Soviet Union was at an earlier day.

Tomorrow and the next day, in Washington, [DC] President Clinton and I 
will meet with the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev.  We will 
communicate to him our support for Russia's continued democratic 
development.  And we will reiterate that the current situation in Moscow 
must be resolved peacefully and in a way consistent with civil 
liberties.  At his meeting with President Yeltsin next month in 
Vancouver [Canada], President Clinton intends to spell out the tangible 
steps we will take to assist Russian reform.  The President is still 
considering the specific measures he will announce.  But our bottom line 
is that we will be increasing and accelerating our support for Russia's 
democracy.  We cannot do it alone, but we must be prepared to do our 
part and to do it fully.  The United States favors a meeting later in 
April where the foreign and finance ministers of the leading industrial 
democracies will coordinate their joint efforts to assist in Russia's 
historic transformation.

As I said earlier in my remarks, my task today is not to spell out 
specific initiatives.  Nevertheless, I would like to offer just a few 
thoughts on the central issue of Western aid to Russia in general terms.  
Clearly, our assistance must be better targeted and better coordinated 
than it's been in the past.  It must focus on areas and constituencies 
in Russia that have the greatest impact on their long-term reform.  It 
must not and cannot be limited solely to public funds.  Rather, it must 
catalyze our private sectors to take a leading role in Russia's 
transformation through trade, investment, and training.  And our aid 
must be felt at the grassroots, to ease the pain of the Russian 
children, workers, and senior citizens who are suffering through this 
transformation.

Despite all of its current economic difficulties, it is worth 
remembering that Russia is inherently a rich country.  Its people are 
well-educated.  Its natural resource base exceeds that of any other 
country in the world.  For example, Russia's oil reserves are huge and, 
if properly exploited, could probably finance much of Russia's economic 
reform.  But today, thousands of aging oil wells and pipelines in Russia 
stand idle, decaying and desperately in need of critical spare parts.  
If Russia could find the means to repair them, perhaps with our help, 
the oil sold would be a lucrative source of foreign exchange that could 
do a great deal to stabilize their economy.  

One area of possible assistance where America's vital interests are 
directly engaged is our effort to dismantle the nuclear weapons of the 
former Soviet Union.  The $800-million program established through the 
leadership of Senators Nunn and Lugar to destroy these weapons is a 
direct investment in our own security.  Unfortunately, some bottlenecks, 
both here and in Russia, have allowed only a small fraction of the $800 
million to be spent up to this point.  Part of it has been caused by 
bureaucratic delays in Washington, and we are fully determined to remove 
these obstacles.  We want to see these weapons dismantled in the very 
shortest possible time.

Another important goal we should have is strengthening the groups in 
Russia that will form the bulwark of a thriving democracy.  There are 
public opinion polls in Russia, too, as you know, and time after time 
they show one thing:  By large margins, it's the younger generation that 
expresses the greatest sympathy for democracy.  The younger people are 
the ones who are pushing for more economic freedom and closer contacts 
with the West.  Ultimately, whatever the result of today's political 
turmoil, this is the group that will carry the day for Russia's 
successful transition to democracy.

Through exchange programs, many young Russians can be brought to the 
West and exposed to the workings of democracy and our free market.  
Russian students, public officials, scientists, and businessmen are 
hungry for such experiences.  Upon their return home, they can adapt 
their knowledge to best suit Russia's conditions.  And, perhaps most 
important of all, we can win long-term friends and partners for freedom.

The existence, to take another example, of a strong, independent media 
is also essential for a democratic society.  While Russia's free press 
has experienced tremendous growth in recent years, there is still a real 
need for professional training of reporters, editors, and news managers.  
Here, technical assistance can make a real difference.

Another area that deserves strong support is Russia's privatization 
effort, which, as I said, has made some progress.  This process has 
continued across many of Russia's regions despite the political problems 
in Moscow.  Putting private property into the hands of the Russian 
people is a critical step in building a free market economy.  It will 
create millions of property owners and private entrepreneurs--a genuine 
middle class with a powerful stake in continued reform.

Of course, at the end of the day, Russia's progress toward the market 
and democracy cannot occur without an overhaul of the general ground 
rules of the Russian economy.  It will be vital to reduce their budget 
deficit, control the money supply, stabilize the ruble, and close down 
inefficient factories.  Unfortunately, these are also steps that will 
cause the greatest pain and political risk.  Here again, Russia needs 
our help.  The West must find a way to respond, and the response can't 
be limited to big promises and little delivery.  We are now engaged in 
intensive consultations with our partners from the leading industrial 
democracies to develop a program of joint assistance to Russia in these 
areas.

Helping Russia's Democracy:  A Long-Term Commitment

Let me close by making two points.  First, we must have no illusions 
about the situation in Russia.  Even with our help, the road ahead is 
rocky.  Setbacks will be inevitable.  Russia's transformation will take 
a great deal of hard work--probably a generation to complete.  As we 
meet, a great struggle is underway, as you know, to determine the kind 
of nation that Russia will be.  However, as we focus on today's drama, 
it's important that we maintain a long-term perspective.  Just as our 
vigilance in the Cold War took more than 4 decades to pay off, our 
commitment to Russia's democracy must be for the duration.  Our 
engagement with the reformers must be for the long haul--whether they're 
"out" as well as when they're "in," whether they're "down" as well as 
when they're "up."  However difficult things may be in the short run, we 
should have faith that the strategic course we have set--supporting 
democracy's triumph--is the correct one.

Second, we should know that any realistic program to assist Russia won't 
be cheap.  But there's no question that our nation can afford its fair 
share of the international effort.  We can't afford, indeed, to do 
otherwise.  Together with President Clinton, I am determined to work 
with the Congress to find the funding.  I am confident that the 
necessary resources can be found as we restructure our defense budget.  
But it will require bipartisanship, leadership, and vision, and, 
vitally, it will take a Russian partner committed to democratic values 
and market reform.

At a time of great domestic challenge, some would say that we should 
delay bold action in the foreign realm.  But history will not wait.  As 
Abraham Lincoln advised his countrymen, "We cannot escape history.  We . 
. . will be remembered in spite of ourselves."  Today, history is 
calling again for our nation to decide whether we will lead or defer, 
whether we will shape this new era or be shaped by it.  How will history 
remember us?  I, for one, am confident that we will make the right 
choice --that we will be bold and brave in revitalizing our nation here 
at home, while continuing to promote our interests and ideals abroad.  
(###)



ARTICLE 2:

US Support for Russian Democracy 
President Clinton
Excerpts from a news conference, released by the White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, March 23, 1993

. . . I want to reiterate that the United States supports the historic 
movement toward democratic political reform in Russia.  President 
Yeltsin is the leader of that process.  He is a democratically elected 
national leader; indeed, the first democratically elected president in 
1,000 years of Russian history.  He has US support, as do his reformed 
government and all reformers throughout Russia.

At this moment, Russia is in a constitutional and political crisis. 
President Yeltsin proposes to break the logjam by letting the people of 
Russia decide on April 25.  That is an appropriate step in a democracy. 
Our interest is to see that this process unfolds peacefully.

We're encouraged that President Yeltsin is committed to defend civil 
liberties, to continue economic reform, to continue foreign policy 
cooperation toward a peaceful world. Russia is--and must remain--a 
democracy. Democratic reform in Russia is the basis for a better future 
for the Russian people, for continued US-Russian partnership, and for 
the hopes of all humanity for a more peaceful and secure world.

The United States has great responsibilities abroad and at home.  To 
meet these responsibilities, we must not only continue to support reform 
and change abroad but also the revitalization of our economy here at 
home. We need to fundamentally change as our times require it. . . .


Q.  Mr. President, I wonder what your view of the American possibilities 
are. How do you see the US role?  Can the United States play a decisive 
role, or are we really just ultimately bystanders?

A.  I think somewhere in between.  I think in the end the Russian people 
will have to resolve this for themselves, and I hope they'll be given 
the opportunity to do that in some appropriate fashion. . . .  I have 
only the same access, in a way, that you do in terms of all the possible 
developments that are in the air.  I do not believe that we can be 
decisive in the sense that we can determine the course of events in 
Russia or, frankly, in the other republics of the former Soviet Union, 
[in] which we also have a deep interest.  But I do believe that we are 
not bystanders. . . .

The United States has three interests in our cooperation with Russia.  
One is to make the world a safer place, to continue to reduce the threat 
of nuclear war, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Two is to 
support the development of democracy and freedom for the people of 
Russia; it is a vast and great country and, indeed, for all of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.  And three is to support the 
development of a market economy.  At every step along the way, with or 
without President Yeltsin in authority, from now--I suppose until the 
end of time or at least for the foreseeable future--the United States 
will have those interests, and we will be guided by those interests. . . 
.  (###)



ARTICLE 3:

Preparations for US-Russia Summit 
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement from a news conference following a meeting with 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev,Washington, DC, March 24, 1993

Foreign Minister Kozyrev and I have just completed our pre-summit 
meetings here today.  Foreign Minister Kozyrev had a very good meeting 
with President Clinton, and, as you know, he met with a number of other 
officials, both on Capitol Hill as well as in other government 
departments.  I think our meetings established a very good, productive 
framework for the summit meeting that, of course, will take place on the 
3rd and 4th of April in Vancouver between President Clinton and 
President Yeltsin.

Summit preparations were the principal reason for our getting together, 
and I think we achieved the result we wanted to on that subject. During 
the course of our conversations, we reviewed the current political 
situation in Russia.  The Foreign Minister stressed President Yeltsin's 
determination to break the political impasse there by enabling the 
people to express their will.  The Foreign Minister has given me 
President Yeltsin's assurance that he would do all he could to protect 
basic freedoms and civil liberties as Russia proceeds in this very 
historic transformation.

President Clinton and I assured the Minister of our strong support for 
the economic and political reforms that have been set forth in this 
process by President Yeltsin.  The success of this most historic effort 
in Russia is of great importance to the United States and is a 
reflection of the partnership between the United States and Russia.

In laying the groundwork for the summit and in our discussions over the 
last 36 hours, we discussed ways to broaden and deepen the US-Russian 
partnership.  And we discussed, of course, a number of problems around 
the world:  in the Middle East, where we are cosponsors, and in the 
former Yugoslavia, where there are some grave problems.  It was very 
reassuring to be able to engage with the Foreign Minister on such grave 
problems in the spirit of mutual and common interests. We believe this 
kind of partnership will serve the interests of our two countries as 
well as the world as a whole.

I agree with the Minister that this partnership has unlimited potential 
and [is] one that we are determined to build upon.  I've enjoyed my 
opportunity to deepen my relationship and friendship with the Minister 
and look forward to seeing him in Vancouver.  (###)



ARTICLE 4:

US Support for Reform And Free Markets In Russia 
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Washington, DC, March 20, 1993.

The United States supports the historic movement toward democracy and 
free markets in Russia.  Russian President Boris Yeltsin is the leader 
of that process.  As Russia's only democratically elected national 
leader, he has our support, as does his reform government and all 
reformers throughout the Russian Federation.

President Yeltsin proposes to break the political impasse in Russia by 
letting the Russian people decide their future.  We were encouraged to 
hear him say [in his March 20 speech] that civil liberties will be 
respected.

We also welcome President Yeltsin's assurance of continuity in Russia's 
foreign policy.  We will work to maintain the close relations between 
our two countries.  The President looks forward to his summit meeting 
with President Yeltsin in Vancouver [Canada] on April 3-4.  And we will 
continue to work in concert with our allies to support those in Russia 
who wish to further reform.

What matters most is that Russia is and must remain a democratic country 
moving toward a market economy.  That is the basis for a continued US-
Russian partnership and for a better and more prosperous future for the 
Russian people.  (###)



ARTICLE 5:

Focus on the Emerging Democracies
A Periodic Update
Overview

US assistance efforts to Russia originated at the International 
Coordinating Conference in Washington, DC, in January 1992.  At that 
time, the US announced a program to deliver emergency humanitarian 
assistance and that it would participate in several working groups in an 
international assistance effort to combine humanitarian aid with 
technical assistance.

Since then, the assistance effort to Russia has been composed of three 
general categories (humanitarian assistance, technical assistance, and 
credit guarantees and economic agreements), each with different types of 
programs, and often with interrelationships that link humanitarian 
assistance to technical assistance.  This interrelationship is 
exemplified in the health sector, where providing equipment and supplies 
is considered to be humanitarian assistance and building reliable health 
sector practices is technical assistance.  Agriculture and food system 
efforts have  similar aspects:  provision of commodities and 
transportation are considered humanitarian assistance; assistance to 
support private farming and other elements of a free market agricultural 
system is technical assistance.

This summary explains both types of assistance as well as government 
credits and other financial guarantees.

Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian assistance supports Russia's "social safety net" by 
providing basic, emergency commodities or support to stave off sickness, 
hunger, and threats to human life.

Government Assistance.  Much of the US Government's humanitarian 
assistance effort has been under Operation Provide Hope, which was 
officially launched in January 1992.  Provide Hope was divided into 
three phases involving the delivery of Department of Defense (DOD) 
excess food, medicines, and medical supplies to Russia and other 
destinations using DOD transportation assets (including contracts with 
private shipping entities).  Under the three phases of Operation Provide 
Hope, the US has delivered an estimated $48.8 million worth of food and 
$32.9 million worth of medicines and medical supplies to Russia.  

The Emergency Medicines Initiative of the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) draws upon a $10 million appropriation to purchase 
emergency medicines for the new independent states.  For Russia, this 
fund has been used to purchase $15,000 worth of pharmaceuticals, 
primarily leukemia drugs, that were delivered to Khabarovsk in November 
1992.

Public Health Surveillance--The Atlanta-based Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) has been working with the Russian Ministry of Health 
departments and other organizations since October 1992 to study the 
availability of health care resources and to identify early warning 
indicators of disease.  CDC helped assess the reported diphtheria 
outbreak in certain places in Russia during the 1992-93 winter and 
sponsored a trip to Atlanta by Russian health officials in February 1993 
to learn the principles of publications dealing with epidemiology. 

Food Assistance--Separate from the food deliveries made under Operation 
Provide Hope, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has three supply 
initiatives (see Commodity Credit Corporation credit program on page 
181) to provide food assistance to Russia.  USDA has allocated $165 mil-
lion of a $250 million grant food commitment to Russia.  Commodities now 
available under this initiative include:  rice ($24 million), corn ($20 
million), baby food ($16 million), wheat and wheat products ($78 
million), whole dry milk ($8 million), and peanuts and peanut products 
($4 million).  A total of $15 million is reserved for transportation.  
These commodities are made available through Food for Progress or 
surplus donation programs. 

Under a special Food for Progress program, USDA has purchased 300,000 
metric tons of corn ($28.5 million) in fiscal year (FY) 1993.  Food for 
Progress purchases in FY 1992 totaled $52.5 million for 63,500 metric 
tons of agricultural commodities.  Section 416(b) availability in FY 
1992 was 39,400 metric tons of food worth about $75 million.

Under Section 416(b) (surplus donation) of the Agriculture Act of 1949 
as amended, USDA has made available 125,000 metric tons of feed wheat 
worth $18.1 million in FY 1993.

In both the Food for Progress and Section 416(b) programs, the dollar 
amounts also include cost of transportation of all commodities.

Special Commodities--Under separate programs, the US Government 
purchased $13 million worth of dry whole milk and non-fat dry milk 
distributed by CARE USA in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Perm, and 
Yekaterinburg.  A second program, authorized by an earmark in the 
Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies (FREEDOM) Support 
Act, allows the US to allocate about $10 million of the $30 million 
earmark to the Russian Far East for the purchase of nutritionally 
enriched food products for women and children.  Deliveries should begin 
in the spring of 1993.

Private Sector Assistance.  A second component of the US humanitarian 
assistance effort has been donations by the private sector.  Under the 
Medical Assistance Initiative (MAI)--originally called the Presidential 
Medical Initiative--the non-profit organization Project HOPE was 
authorized to solicit, collect, and distribute medicines and medical 
supplies within the new independent states.  Since the announcement of 
this initiative in February 1991, Project Hope has shipped $50 million 
worth of medical items to 29 locations in Russia.

Working through non-profit contractors (Volunteers in Technical 
Assistance and the Fund for Democracy and Development), private 
voluntary organizations throughout the US are able to have their donated 
humanitarian assistance items transported by DOD.  In 1992, about 8,700 
tons of food, medicines and medical supplies, and clothing were 
delivered to more than 48 locations in Russia.  In January 1993, two 
airlifts to St. Peters-burg of 113,000 pounds of medicines and medical 
supplies were valued at $6 million.

Private sector assistance includes individual packs of medical supplies, 
personal hygiene products, and toys collected by the Girl Scouts of 
America and shipped to children in hospitals and long-term care 
institutions in St. Petersburg in January 1993.

Technical Assistance

Technical assistance helps recipients understand and develop the 
capability to build a free market economy and a functioning democratic 
system.  Technical assistance may consist of advisers and consultants; 
learning materials, seminars, workshops; equipment and supplies 
necessary to begin operations; information resource centers and 
libraries; exchanges of professional groups; technology transfer; and 
the publication or broadcast of mass media to educate the population in 
general.

One of the largest areas of technical assistance has been agriculture 
and related agribusiness projects.  USDA supports a demonstration farm 
outside St. Petersburg with two volunteer American farm couples working 
alongside farmers and ex-military personnel.  Russia will receive 50 
grain storage facilities, each consisting of four grain storage bins and 
grain moving equipment.  About 800 US volunteers in the Farmer to Farmer 
Program are being placed in Russia from 1992 to 1994.  (To date, 61 
volunteers have completed their service.)  A USDA policy adviser is 
working with the Russian Ministry of Agriculture and, under the Loaned 
Executive Program, two American agribusiness executives will be working 
with newly privatized food industries.  Study programs of agricultural 
marketing under the USDA Cochran Fellowship Program have included 19 
Russians; 11 are in the US study program now, and more than 20 will be 
trained.  A $66-million Food Systems Restructuring project funded by 
USAID is expected to have a significant Russian focus.

Under a $645,000 grant, the University of Idaho is training Russian and 
Ukrainian farmers to harvest, store, process, and market perishable 
foods.  The US Government also has supported two private agribusiness 
centers (managed by the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development) 
in Russia and Ukraine and provided assistance in transporting seed, 
inoculant, special planting equipment, and harvesting and storage 
equipment.

Another major area of emphasis is the health sector.  The US Government 
has helped establish five hospital partnerships (between US consortia 
and specific institutions) in Moscow, Dubna, and Murmansk, with new 
partnerships approved for Vladivostok and Stavropol.  Under a $300,000 
grant, the Children's Health System and Children's Hospital of the 
King's Daughters of Norfolk, the state of Virginia is setting up a 
mother and child health program for the Rostropovich Foundation in 
Moscow.  A similar program is being established in St. Petersburg.

The Trade and Development Agency has approved five feasibility studies 
for investment in the health sector, with emphasis on the need for 
modernizing pharmaceutical distribution.  The Commerce Department sent a 
health care mission to Russia in October 1992 and has conducted US-based 
seminars for private industry.  The Commerce Department also conducted 
two major conferences for American health industry firms in 1993, and 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation has approved two health 
sector pre-investment studies.

In addition, three agreements have been signed to aid pharmaceutical 
production and to restore the Russian childhood vaccine industry.  The 
Food and Drug Administration dispatched a team to plan training 
activities at the Tarasavich Institute in January 1993.  The US 
Government will provide equipment and training to three Russian vaccine 
producers.  Merck and Lederle (two major US pharmaceutical firms) are 
working on this project as well as seeking joint venture partners.

Privatization.  The US Government has funded three programs through the 
International Finance Corporation of the World Bank:  an auction of the 
trucking sector in Nizhny Novgorod in October 1992; auctions to sell 
retail enterprises in Volgograd oblast and Tomsk; and printing and 
distribution of "how to" manuals for small privatization auctions.  The 
US Government also provides funding to the Russian State Committee on 
the Management of State Property (GKI) for the implementation of mass 
privatization and voucher programs.  In addition, the US Government has 
funded the purchase and installation of computers for the GKI.

Defense Conversion.  Through grants to the International Executive 
Service Corps, the US Government has sent defense conversion advisers to 
Nizhny Novgorod and Yekaterinburg and plans to send advisers to Tomsk.  
Short-term projects have been completed in Saratov and St. Petersburg, 
and the latter city may receive a long-term adviser.  A recently 
announced Enterprise Fund for Russia will encourage equity or other 
financial participation in defense conversion: for example, the fund may 
provide loans for new small businesses or equity investments for spin-
off projects at existing defense conversion facilities.  A US-Russia 
defense conversion subcommittee, under the auspices of the Department of 
Commerce, was established in June 1992.

Energy.  US energy technical assistance programs aim to increase safety 
of nuclear reactors and energy efficiency, to reduce wasteful 
consumption of energy resources, and to develop more efficient energy 
reserves.  Under the nuclear reactor safety program, the Department of 
Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are setting up a training 
center to improve operational safety.  An energy efficiency team (sent 
to Kostroma and Yekaterinburg) and coal mine safety teams (Kuzbas and 
Vorkuta regions) have been sent to various locations to provide advice 
and install energy-saving equipment.  A program is underway to 
strengthen the ability of the Moscow commodity market to trade petroleum 
products.  A number of seminars on oil and gas operations and electric 
power have been held under US Government auspices in Russia and in the 
US.  A Center for Energy Efficiency has been established in Moscow.

Democratic Institution-Building.  These programs provide knowledge on 
the principles of government in a democratic society.  The main areas 
for this aspect of technical assistance are programs in rule of law, 
public administration, strengthening political parties and elections, 
and encouraging independent media.

Under US rule of law programs, eight Russian parliamentarians visited 
the US in 1992 under the US Information Agency's (USIA) Parliamentary 
Exchange Program.  A leadership delegation of Russian Supreme Soviet 
Deputies spent 1 week in Washington in early 1993 under the "Lawmaking 
for Democracy" project organized under a USIA grant by the Lawyers 
Alliance for World Security.  An American Bar Association (ABA) legal 
adviser is in Moscow to coordinate ABA activities in constitution and 
legislative drafting, judicial restructuring, and criminal law reform.  
The ABA held several workshops in Washington, DC, on constitutional 
reform and the draft Russian constitution in January 1993.  Among other 
programs, a judicial education program is underway at the Legal Academy 
of the Russian Ministry of Justice.

Under the public administration programs, USIA sponsors training 
programs for senior local and municipal officials from Russia and has 
provided a grant to Sister Cities International to establish municipal 
training programs among partner cities.  USIA is also publishing 
materials on public policy and administration.  The mayor of Nizhny 
Novgorod attended a 3-week study program in the US on city management, 
business involvement in city government, federalism, and US economics.  
An adviser from the National Forum Foundation worked with the St. 
Petersburg City Council on zoning laws and regulations.  Two US experts 
on local government have conducted regional training programs in 
Novosibirsk and are developing programs for Nizhny Novgorod, 
Yekaterinburg, and Saratov.    

Under programs to strengthen political parties and elections, the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican 
Institute (IRI) have opened offices in Moscow to conduct political 
training and civic education activities.  NDI brought 15 Russian 
political party organizers to the US to observe the US electoral 
process.  The International Foundation for Electoral Systems is working 
with three Russian oblasts (provinces) to study the upcoming referendum 
and prepare programs of assistance for subsequent elections.

Under programs to build independent media, a variety of activities and 
organizations are involved.  Internews, an American non-profit 
organization,  conducts journalism training and helps recommend ways to 
establish an independent TV news distribution system.  USIA and the 
Soros Foundation sponsored a 2-week seminar organized by Internews in 
December 1992 in the US on American television operations, especially 
independent stations in major American markets.  Internews organized the 
first video teleconference for an audience of about 100 million people 
to view discussions by the parliaments of Russia and the Ukraine.

Business Principles and Small Business Training.  A variety of programs 
are underway to provide advice on business principles.  The Peace Corps 
has sent more than 90 volunteers to teach the principles of small 
business in Vladivostok and the Volga River region.

The Commerce Department is setting up an American Business Center to 
disseminate business training information, and 110 Russians have been 
selected to participate in Commerce's Special American Business 
Internship Training (SABIT).  Commerce has formed a US-Russia Business 
Development Committee.

USIA is establishing an America House in Vladivostok as a central 
information resource on various aspects of free market business 
principles.

USIA has a wide variety of publications in translation and distribution 
to provide examples of free market economics.  USIA also is providing 
several television programs and broadcast productions that show aspects 
of a free market economy.

Credit Guarantees And Economic Agreements

In September 1992, USDA announced $900 million in new Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) loan guarantees for Russia.  Once averages are 
corrected, Russia can draw on an additional $275 million during the 
first quarter of 1993.  A prior CCC Credit Guarantee of $600 million was 
announced in April 1992, and before that, the US provided nearly $4 
billion in credits to the former Soviet Union since 1991, the bulk of 
which went to Russia.

--   The Export-Import Bank has approved $125.7 million in loan 
guarantees and insurance for six transactions in Russia.
--  Under an agreement ratified in June 1992, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation can provide insurance and other guarantee 
programs for American businesses in Russia.
--  In June 1992, a bilateral trade agreement granting most-favored- 
nation status was ratified.  Bilateral investment and tax treaties were 
signed and are awaiting ratification.
--  The Trade and Development Agency has funded feasibility studies and 
other related programs for 17 commercial projects, totaling more than $6 
million.

Other Programs

Other programs also are underway.

--   The US Government has agreed to help fund an International Science 
and Technology Center in Russia.
--   USIA is publishing a pamphlet in Russian on "Civilian Control of 
the Military," and the Atlantic Council of the US is working with the 
Russian Government to develop civilian oversight procedures for military 
and national security affairs.
--   Resident housing advisers are stationed in Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
Novosibirsk, and Yekaterinburg to work on legal reform in the housing 
sector, develop a housing privatization law, and advise on municipal 
management.  The University of Maryland has been sponsored to set up an 
exchange program for housing development managers.  USIA funded an 
advanced housing seminar on the US housing sector in February 1993.
--   Under the FREEDOM Support Act, secondary school students from 
Russia have begun exchange programs in US high schools.  The Soros 
Foundation announced its intention to provide $10 million to higher 
education reform in Russia, to include the "Transformation of the 
Humanities and Social Sciences" project.
--   The Treasury Department is sending three resident advisers to the 
Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank.  Four short-term tax policy 
missions have been sent to Russia since May 1992.  KPMG Peat Marwick, a 
US accounting firm, has received funds to expand its East Europen 
training program to Russia.   
--   Citizen's Democracy Corps, a non-profit organization, has opened an 
office in Moscow and is focusing on business development, information 
exchange between the Russian public and private sector, and advising the 
Moscow Human Rights Center.
--   A World Bank team, with USAID and Environmental Protection Agency 
members, is preparing an agreement on a $3-4 million environment and 
energy loan package to establish a mechanism to attract more assistance.
--   Five private voluntary organizations in the US have received grants 
to upgrade the capabilities of indigenous non-governmental organizations 
and foster volunteerism.  Total funding of the Russian program is $2.1 
million.  (###)



ARTICLE 6:

US Committed to Israel's Security and a Real Peace
Secretary Christopher
Address before the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 
conference, Washington, DC, March 23, 1993

It's a great pleasure for me to be here today with so many friends and 
to have this opportunity to address this policy conference.  I 
understand that there are at this conference--and I've seen a number of 
them in the room as I came in--over 1,200 college students from more 
than 200 colleges.

I know well that this group has added tremendous energy to an already 
very energetic organization.  As [AIPAC President] Steve [Grossman] has 
said, I've been in meetings this morning with [Russian] Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev and will continue this afternoon, but I wanted to break away for 
a brief time to keep my commitment to say a few words to this 
organization.  And next time I come, I hope I'll be able to stay longer 
than I can today.

You all know that President Clinton sent me, as my first trip outside 
the United States, to the Middle East to reinvigorate the peace process.  
In doing so, the President demonstrated that pursuing peace in the 
region is a top priority and will continue to be for his presidency.

During the trip, I spent 3 nights and 2 days in Israel--the longest I 
spent in any place in the Middle East--and while I was there, I did as 
much as I could to absorb some of the history and culture of that great 
country.  This included time at the Yad Vashem [Holocaust memorial], 
which was certainly one of the most moving experiences that I've ever 
had.  The press reported that when I came out I was choked up and 
solemn, and I guess I have to plead guilty.  It was quite an experience; 
I'm sure that most in the room have had it.  As with all of us, I think 
it was the children who got to me the most.

My travels in Israel also gave me a new appreciation of Israel's 
security situation.  Indeed, my entire experience there dramatically 
underscored the need to make the strongest effort that we can to achieve 
peace and security for Israel.

Although I had met him before, during this trip I had my first real 
opportunity to get to know [Israeli] Prime Minister Rabin well and to 
have extensive personal discussions with him--three separate sessions.  
From my perspective--and I hope from his, too--we established a good, 
personal, working relationship.  I'm absolutely resolved to do my part 
to establish with him a relationship of trust and confidence and, 
through that, to establish a relationship with Israel of trust and 
confidence, for I believe it will be essential and valuable in promoting 
the cause of peace.

I know how deeply the people in this room care about the state of Israel 
and the future of US-Israeli relationships.  I'd like to talk to you for 
just a few minutes today about the nature of that relationship.

Israel--I don't have to tell you--is a very special place, and the 
unique relationship between our two countries has proven strong and 
durable over the years.  President Clinton has committed himself to 
making this partnership even more strong and even deeper.  Given the 
challenges we face in the years ahead, particularly as we search for 
peace in the region, this close partnership will be absolutely 
essential.

Three particular themes come to mind in relationship to this 
relationship between Israel and the United States:

--  First, our shared ideals and values;
--  Second, America's commitment to Israel's security; and
--  Third, the mutual commitment that we have to the Arab-Israeli peace 
process.

I want to talk today a little bit about each of these three and then 
conclude with some brief comments on the peace negotiations.

Shared Ideals and Values
With respect to shared values, of course, many factors account for the 
depth of the relationship between the United States and Israel.  They 
include Israel's role as a strategic ally, the US commitment to the idea 
of Jewish statehood in the wake of the Nazi genocide, and the importance 
of Israel to the American Jewish community.

Beyond these principal factors are fundamental values that we share, and 
they are exceedingly important.

--  Israel is a vibrant democracy with a dynamic political life, not 
unlike ours;
--  Israel is a pluralistic society, much like our own, with remarkable 
diversity even for a small country; and
--  Israel is a society based upon religious, ethical, and moral values.

These shared values have provided an absolutely essential solid 
sustenance for the relationship between the United States and Israel.  
Shared values are exceedingly important.  Certainly shared interests 
are, but shared values give our relationship a special character that 
has linked us over the years, that bring our societies and peoples close 
together.

Commitment to Israel's Security

With respect to our commitment to Israel's security, no one who has ever 
visited Israel can fail to appreciate how much the need for security 
shapes Israel's view of the world.  No one can begin to appreciate the 
concerns of Israel without studying the shadow that history has cast 
over it.  My visit impressed upon me anew the narrow margin on which 
security in Israel rests.

Since independence, the state of Israel has been confronted with 
terrorism; [with] the Scud missiles; with war; and, now, with an even 
deadlier threat of mass destruction and weapons of mass destruction.  No 
one in the area should have to live this way in the future.  It is 
precisely for these reasons that the United States is unshakeably 
committed to Israel's security.

The discussions last week between President Clinton and Prime Minister 
Rabin accentuated our revitalized strategic partnership.  Indeed, we 
agreed on a number of tangible ways of demonstrating and accelerating 
that partnership.

--  We renewed our umbrella agreement on strategic cooperation under 
which our officials meet frequently to coordinate our policies.
--  We agreed to preserve in meaningful ways Israel's qualitative edge--
and as the weapons of destruction grow more technical and more high-
tech, indeed I think we have a new challenge to preserve the qualitative 
edge that we're committed to.
--  We also established a US-Israel science and technology commission to 
be headed by Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown on our side, a development 
that was warmly received by Prime Minister Rabin.

Commitment to Peace Process

And now a few words with respect to the peace process.  It is clear that 
real security will ultimately depend upon real peace between Israel and 
its Arab neighbors and the Palestinians.  Direct negotiations between 
Israel and its neighbors are the only pathway to real peace.  The 
process launched at Madrid--based upon UN Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338 and the search for a comprehensive peace--offers a real 
opportunity for the parties to negotiate a meaningful peace.  It is a 
rare opportunity that must not be wasted.

President Clinton sent me to the region last month to focus the parties-
-indeed, I think I should say "to refocus" them--on the substance of the 
negotiation.  My trip had three other purposes that are closely related:

First, to encourage the Lebanese Government to continue the path toward 
political and economic reform, and I was delighted to be able to go into 
Beirut to symbolize the fact that progress has been made on that front;

Second, to make clear to friend and foe alike that the United States 
expects Iraq to fully comply with every single relevant UN Security 
Council resolution; and

Third, to explain our commitment to human rights and economic freedom, 
including ending the Arab boycott of Israel and including ending the 
discrimination against American companies.

On the peace process, I made clear to everyone that President Clinton 
and I are not interested in negotiations that are simply a ritual 
without a purpose.  Enough time and effort has gone into the modalities 
of the peace process. Now it is time to turn to serious negotiations and 
to agreements leading up to real peace.

While all parties are aware of the challenge ahead, I found everywhere--
in Israel, in the key Arab states, and among the Palestinians--a real 
desire to see the process succeed.  I must tell you that every Arab 
leader I met with made it very clear that they're serious about pursuing 
peace.  What I heard in all the capitals convinced me that this is a 
truly historic opportunity to achieve peace--perhaps a one-time 
opportunity.

As a result of my trip out there, I decided and met with the Russians, 
and together we decided that we should invite all parties to return for 
negotiations starting here in Washington on April 20 [1993].

As you know, this past week President Clinton and I had long 
conversations with Prime Minister Rabin about the negotiations and about 
ways to make them succeed.  There is no doubt in my mind at all that 
Prime Minister Rabin is serious about peace, that he wants to move ahead 
as quickly as possible, and that he is prepared to make the hard choices 
that are needed to see this process through.

We'll be consulting very closely with him--and, indeed, we'll be 
consulting closely with all the parties--about how to make the next 
round of negotiations truly meaningful, truly productive.

I'm firmly persuaded that progress is within the grasp of the parties.  
The road ahead certainly won't be an easy one.  All the parties will 
face difficult choices and risks.  I want you to know that the United 
States is committed as a full partner to help these negotiations 
succeed.  This does not mean that the United States plans to negotiate 
for the parties or to try to interpose itself between them.  Clearly, 
direct negotiations, particularly on the issues that involve physical 
survival and political survival, remain the responsibility of the 
parties.  The President and I have made it very clear, however, that we 
will do our part--as an intermediary, as an honest broker--provided that 
the other parties do theirs.

When the Arabs, the Israelis, and the Palestinians put forward their 
views--seriously and realistically--we will be there to probe positions, 
to clarify responses, to help define common ground, [and] to offer what 
may be bridging ideas.  This is the meaning of "full partnership," and 
it reflects our determination to work with all the parties to facilitate 
negotiations that will take into account the needs and concerns of 
Israel, of the Arabs, and of the Palestinians.  Only in this way can we 
have a meaningful peace.

If the political will and the commitment are there--and I believe they 
are--I think we can play a facilitating role in helping to secure that 
peace, a peace that will be good for Israel, good for the Arabs, good 
for the Palestinians, and good for all of mankind.  I know that I can 
count on the support of this organization, as American leaders always 
have, in working toward this necessary and important goal.

Conclusion

As I conclude today, let me say that I very much hope that the next time 
I come back I can spend longer with you and respond to the questions 
that I know you have from the floor.  But this is the size of the window 
that I could open today, and I wanted to come, at least, and make my 
presence known and to tell you that I value this organization.  You and 
other leaders will have access to me, as much as I can possibly give, 
through[out] my tenure as Secretary of State, and thank you again. (###)



ARTICLE 7:

Secretary Christopher Meets With Palestinians
Opening statements by Secretary Christopher and Palestinian leader 
Faisal Husseini before their meeting, Washington, DC, March 26, 1993.

Secretary Christopher:  Good afternoon.  I'm very pleased to welcome to 
the State Department this afternoon Mr. Faisal Husseini, who is the 
leader of the Palestinian group that I met with twice when I was in 
Jerusalem [in February].  I'm very pleased to have him here in 
Washington.  We are going to be discussing progress on the [Middle East] 
peace process.

I feel that 1993 can be a real year of progress here, a year of 
breakthroughs, [and] a year in which we can see the results of 
negotiations.  Only through negotiations between all the parties will we 
be able to achieve a true peace based upon [UN Security Council] 
Resolutions 242 and 338.  Only through negotiations will we be able to 
restore the political rights of the Palestinians.  Only through 
negotiations will we be able to achieve a degree of tranquility in the 
territories there that have been so troubled by violence recently.  Only 
through negotiations can we make real progress in 1993.

So, I look forward to discussions with Mr. Husseini, whom I met in 
Jerusalem and formed a very high regard for.  I welcome him here to 
Washington.  Welcome--a little handshake for all of you.  Thank you.


Mr. Husseini:  Thank you very much.  We are happy and we are optimistic 
about this meeting.  We really would like to reach that point [where] we 
can remove all these obstacles which are the cause for the stop[ping] of 
the peace talks.  We hope by this meeting [that] we can solve all these 
problems and we can go ahead.  As the Secretary of State said, only by 
negotiations can we solve all these problems.  (###)



ARTICLE 8:

Open Skies Treaty Will Enhance International Security
John H. Hawes, US Representative To the Open Skies Conference
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
March 11, 1993

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to testify before this committee in support 
of the Open Skies Treaty.  As Secretary Christopher indicated in his 
letter of March 4 [to Chairman Pell], the treaty

. . . will contribute to mutual understanding and confidence-building by 
giving all States Parties, regardless of size, a direct role in 
gathering information about military forces and activities of interest 
to them.

This treaty has been made possible by the dramatic political changes of 
the last several years.  When former President Eisenhower first proposed 
cooperative aerial observation in 1955, the idea was summarily rejected 
by the Soviet Union.  Indeed, it was only after the abortive coup in 
Moscow in August 1991 that an agreement could be negotiated embodying 
the values of openness and cooperative international observation.

In my remarks I will briefly describe the content and operation of the 
treaty.  Before doing so, let me put that in context by noting the four 
essential ways in which the Treaty on Open Skies will contribute to 
international security in the post-Cold War world.

First, the treaty empowers all signatory states--regardless of size, 
wealth, or level of technology--to acquire meaningful security 
information on neighboring countries.  This will enhance the confidence 
of all participants and enable them to play more responsible roles in 
maintaining regional and international security.  In this regard, 
moreover, by generating information which can be easily shared and 
discussed among participants, the Open Skies Treaty will avoid the 
difficulties often encountered in working with restricted information.

Second, the treaty nails down the key principle of full territorial 
openness.  All the territory of all the participants will be open to 
observation, including specifically all the territory of states which 
formerly restricted large portions of their territory on grounds of 
national security.  The United States insisted on full openness during 
the negotiations as a sine qua non for an effective confidence-building 
regime.  The United States determined at the outset, moreover, that such 
an unprecedented degree of openness would not pose an unmanageable 
security risk within the United States itself.

Third, the treaty dramatically advances the tools available for 
confidence building.  Over the past 2 decades, the array of confidence-
building measures has expanded steadily.  Now the Open Skies Treaty adds 
to this tool kit detailed procedures for aerial observation, with agreed 
sensors, predetermined quotas, and no right of refusal.  It also 
establishes a new framework for contacts, cooperation, and consultation 
among participating states.

Fourth, the treaty establishes a major precedent--which may prove 
particularly useful in other parts of the world beyond the original 
signatories--in reducing tensions, contributing to greater mutual 
understanding, and reinforcing regional peace and security.  Other 
nations outside the Euro-Atlantic area, where the treaty was negotiated, 
have already expressed interest in the treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to describe the principal provisions of the 
Open Skies Treaty relating to participation, coverage, sensors, quotas, 
aircraft, data, and costs.

Participation
The Open Skies Treaty was negotiated between the members of NATO and 
members of the former Warsaw Pact.  The latter organization dissolved 
during the course of the talks.  Original signatories include all 16 
NATO states, the East European members of the former Warsaw Pact, and 5 
of the successor states of the former Soviet Union:  Belarus, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine.  Since signature of the treaty on March 
24, 1992, the former Czech and Slovak Republic has divided into two 
separate states; both are in the process of reaffirming their 
participation in the treaty.

The treaty is now open to signature by all seven other successor states 
of the former Soviet Union.  Following entry into force, the treaty will 
be open to requests for accession by all states participating in the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.  The treaty and the 
Open Skies concept are not, however, confined to Europe.  Beginning 6 
months after entry into force, any state, without regard to geographic 
limitations, can accede to the Open Skies Treaty provided that it will 
contribute to the objectives of the treaty and has the consensus 
approval of the Open Skies Consultative Commission.

Coverage
The Open Skies Treaty provides that all of the territory of 
participating states must be open to observation.  No exceptions are 
permitted for "national security" purposes.  Observation flights will 
follow routes set by the observing party; only modifications for 
legitimate reasons of flight safety may be proposed.

The question of full territorial access was debated within the US 
Government when the initial Open Skies proposal was developed.  At that 
time, a decision was made that full access was essential to the 
political and confidence-building objectives of the proposal and that 
such access could be provided in the United States consistent with 
national security.  Given the previous restrictions in force in the 
former Soviet Union, this requirement for full territorial access was 
perhaps the subject most intensely debated in  the negotiation.  
Agreement was only reached in the fall of 1991, following the abortive 
Moscow coup of August 1991.

The treaty text not only affirms the principle of full territorial 
access but also spells out how this is to be implemented effectively in 
actual aerial operations.  The treaty does this with detailed provisions 
on the formulation of the flight plan to ensure that the observation 
objectives of the observing party will be achieved.

Sensors
Once the question of access was determined, the second factor shaping 
the quality and quantity of information which the participants could 
gather in Open Skies was the package of sensors to be employed.

For the United States, the sensors which have been agreed [to] for use 
in Open Skies will not provide a significant new source of information.  
For most other participants, however, the ability to utilize the Open 
Skies sensor suite to observe the full territory of the other 
participating countries will  represent a new and very significant 
enhancement in their ability to gather security-related information.  
The United States will, however, be a major, indirect beneficiary of 
this increase in knowledge, confidence, and security of the other 
participants.  This, in fact, was one of the primary considerations 
behind the US initiative in presenting the Open Skies idea and bringing 
the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

All parties in Open Skies will have access to sensors of equal 
capabilities.  In the spring of 1990, the East European states obtained 
agreement from the United States and its NATO allies that all 
participants would have access to sensor capabilities equal to those 
employed by any other participant.  The East European governments no 
longer could, or wished to, depend on the Soviet Union for sensor 
support.  At the same time, they recognized that most Western sensors 
were still subject to technology transfer controls.  This right of equal 
access is specified in the treaty and was one of the first points of 
agreement in the negotiations.  One result of this agreement was that 
the United States and its NATO allies had to ensure that any sensor 
capability which we wished to use in Open Skies could be made available 
to all other participants.  In practice, that imposed a ceiling on the 
sensors, which we and our NATO allies were prepared to employ under the 
treaty.

In the spring of 1991, the United States and its NATO allies proposed 
that Open Skies sensors include optical and electro-optical cameras, 
synthetic aperture radar [SAR], infrared line scanning systems, air 
sampling systems, and multispectral systems-- although NATO agreed that 
the last two systems would have a lower priority.  Agreement was reached 
in the treaty on the inclusion of panoramic and framing optical cameras, 
video cameras, synthetic aperture radar, and infrared line scanning 
systems.  Air sampling systems and multispectral systems were not 
accepted.  Additional sensor systems can be agreed [on] by consensus of 
the Open Skies Consultative Commission.

In determining sensor specifications, the United States and its allies 
worked from the postulate that Open Skies optical imagery should permit 
analysts to recognize armored vehicles--i.e., to distinguish a tank from 
a truck--an objective which was eventually accepted by all participants.  
This recognition could be achieved with a ground resolution of 30 
centimeters [the ability to distinguish between two bars--of a 
standardized array and size--which are 30 cm apart; also known in US 
usage as] 60-cm Ground Resolved Distance.  This standard would enable 
Open Skies to contribute meaningfully to confidence building as well as 
supplement arms control verification regimes.  Many of the European 
states, for example, believed that the ability to observe armored 
vehicles would be a useful supplement to the verification provisions of 
the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, inter alia, 
because Open Skies flights could reach the former Soviet Union east of 
the Urals, outside the CFE zone of application.

At the same time, this imagery standard would not permit the collection 
of technical intelligence--e.g., on models of tanks and their equipment-
-and thus would not trigger security concerns in participating 
countries.  This limitation was important to the military 
representatives of the former Soviet Union.  This may have reflected not 
only tactical military concerns but also essentially political concerns 
about the implications of greater openness. The tank-recognition 
standard also served to minimize certain counter-intelligence and anti-
terrorist concerns in the West.

The standard for video cameras is the same as that for optical cameras--
i.e., 30 centimeters ground resolution. In practice, it is believed that 
the most potential value will come from optical imagery and that the 
altitude from which the optical cameras will operate may preclude the 
collection of quality imagery by video cameras most of the time.

The standard for synthetic aperture radar was set at 3 meters ground 
resolution, which allows recognition of the presence of very large 
equipment or buildings but is not sufficient for recognition of 
individual pieces of equipment.  This level was primarily determined by 
US concerns that systems with a better resolution would pose 
unacceptable technology transfer problems.  The Soviet Union had 
initially not wanted any synthetic aperture radar.  In April 1990, it 
moved to accept SAR in principle but at a ground resolution capacity of 
10 meters.  In the fall of 1991, it accepted inclusion of SAR at 3 
meters ground resolution.

The standard for infrared line scanning devices was set at 50 
centimeters ground resolution.  The United States and its NATO allies 
would have preferred to use the same standard for infrared as for 
optical imagery.  The Soviet Union resisted this, arguing that infrared 
imagery of that quality would provide an observer with tactical 
information which could be useful in attack planning, thereby going 
beyond the confidence-building purposes of the regime.  For this reason, 
the Soviet Union had initially objected to the inclusion of any infrared 
systems.  Even when it ultimately agreed to the inclusion of an infrared 
system with a 50-centimeter ground resolution, it insisted that it only 
be used after the initial 3 years of implementation of the treaty.

Quotas
Observation under Open Skies will not be subject to refusal.  All 
parties to the treaty are assigned "passive quotas," specifying the 
number of flights they must accept from other participants in a year.  
Further, parties are assigned "active quotas," specifying how many 
observation flights they may undertake and which countries they may 
observe.  The determination of the passive and active quotas of the 
participants was a sensitive subject in the negotiations.

Under the Open Skies Treaty, the United States will have a passive quota 
of 42 flights annually--i.e., it will be obligated to accept up to 42 
flights from other participating states if requested.  The United States 
originally said it could accept 52 flights annually, or one flight per 
week.  That number was lowered in the course of the negotiations so that 
the US number would not exceed the number for Belarus-Russia, also 42.

For the first 3 years after entry into force, countries will only have 
to accept up to 75% of their passive quotas, meaning that the initial US 
passive obligation is 31.  For the first year of the treaty's operation, 
only 4 of these 31 potential flights over the United States were 
requested, all by Belarus-Russia, which are operating as a "group of 
states parties" under the provisions of the treaty.  As a group, 
Belarus-Russia will have a joint quota and will conduct observation 
flights jointly and receive flights jointly, which may go to any portion 
of their combined territory.  No other participating state expressed 
interest in observing the United States.

The treaty provides that a country's active quota--i.e., the number of 
observation flights it may conduct--may equal but not exceed its passive 
quota.  Thus, the ceiling for the US active quota in the initial period 
would be 31.  The initial negotiated distribution of the active quota of 
the United States provides for 9 flights:  8 flights over the Belarus-
Russia group of parties and one flight over Ukraine, the latter to be 
shared with Canada.  The United States would have preferred to utilize 
more of its potential allocation of active quotas, particularly in 
Eastern Europe and the nations of the former Soviet Union.  But the 
passive quotas of Russia and all the countries in the former Warsaw Pact 
were oversubscribed.

Belarus-Russia provides a good example.  The passive quota for Belarus-
Russia--as a group--is 42, equal to that of the United States.  For the 
initial 3 years, this works out to a passive quota of 31, or 75% of the 
full quota.  This passive quota of 31 for Belarus-Russia is fully 
subscribed.  In addition to the 8 flights allocated to the United 
States, the Belarus-Russia quota was exhausted as follows:  Germany--3, 
France--3, the United Kingdom--3, Canada--2, Italy--2, Norway--2, 
Turkey--2, the three Benelux states acting as a combined party--1, 
Denmark--1, and Poland--1.  In addition, although Finland and Sweden are 
not initial signatories to the treaty, one quota over Belarus-Russia was 
set aside for Finland and two for Sweden in anticipation of their early 
accession to the treaty and in recognition of their direct security 
concerns and the contribution they made to the success of negotiations.

All 31 of the available passive quotas over the Belarus-Russia group of 
parties are allocated, while only 4 passive quotas are allocated over 
the United States.  As a result, Belarus-Russia will be subjected to 
significantly more observation than the United States, even though the 
nominal passive quotas are identical.  Further, because of the treaty's 
data sharing provisions, the United States or any other participating 
state will be able to obtain the data from observation flights there.

The United States and Belarus-Russia have by far the largest passive 
quotas in Open Skies.  Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, 
and the United Kingdom each have quotas of 12.  Portugal has the lowest-
- two.

The distribution of active quotas--i.e., the rights to conduct 
observation flights over individual participating countries or groups of 
countries--will be subject to annual redistribution in the Open Skies 
Consultative Commission on the basis of consensus.  Absent consensus for 
change, the previous year's distribution will continue in effect.

Aircraft  
The Open Skies Treaty provides that any party may designate one or more 
aircraft for use in Open Skies.  It provides, further, that either 
aircraft of the observing party or the observed party may be used on 
observation flights.  The United States, and most of the other 
participants in the talks, would have preferred that only aircraft of 
the observing party be used.  The former Soviet Union, however, insisted 
on the right to provide the aircraft for observation of its own 
territory.

Because the treaty contains options for aircraft provided by either the 
observing or observed party, the treaty also contains extensive measures 
to ensure that the capabilities of the aircraft utilized and the sensor 
equipment mounted on them meet specified treaty standards.  These 
measures include procedures for initial certification of aircraft and 
sensors, provisions for inspection of aircraft and sensors prior to 
observation flights, provisions for demonstration flights over test 
targets, provisions for the presence and rights of  personnel of both 
the observing and observed parties on board the aircraft during an 
observation flight, and provisions for the sharing of the raw data 
gathered on an observation flight between the observing and observed 
parties.

Data Sharing
The NATO "Basic Elements" paper of December 1989 stated that "members of 
the same alliance will determine among themselves how information 
acquired through Open Skies is to be shared."  This provision was based 
on US concerns that data collected by the United States or its allies 
under Open Skies should not be shared with the Warsaw Pact countries, 
since it might enable them to better assess their vulnerability to 
observation and thereby to improve their cover, concealment, and 
deception techniques.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact left the countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe without a formal security structure within which data 
might be shared and, at the same time, radically reoriented their 
security concerns.  As a result, they then argued strongly for broader 
sharing of Open Skies raw data.  In addition, the decision that the 
categories and specifications of the Open Skies sensors would be 
precisely defined in the treaty made it possible for countries to 
calculate their vulnerability to observation, regardless of data 
sharing.  This reinforced further the argument for the widest possible 
sharing of raw data.

As a result, under the Open Skies Treaty, all participant states can 
purchase the raw overflight data produced by any participating state's 
flight over any other.  This wide access to raw data will greatly 
multiply the value of the regime to individual participating countries, 
enabling them to compile data well beyond that which they could acquire 
with their own observation flights.

Operational Costs
Basic agreement on the allocation of costs was reached in the first 
session of the Open Skies Consultative Commission in the spring of 1992.  
This agreement was formally adopted, however, in the second session of 
the Open Skies Consultative Commission in the fall of 1992, when 
agreement was also reached on the waiver of fees for navigation aids and 
air traffic control services.

The cost allocation agreements clarify the responsibilities of the 
observing and observed parties in various scenarios, thereby minimizing 
the potential for future disagreement or unexpected financial burdens.  
These agreements deal with payment for goods and services related to the 
observation aircraft and specify that the prices for the above items 
shall be set at the lowest commercially available rate at the airport in 
Cologne, Germany.  The cost agreement also deals with the costs of 
recording media and processing that media, as well as a number of other 
detailed subjects such as the allocation of costs for the certification 
of aircraft, demonstration flights, and deviations or curtailments of 
flights.

Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the Open Skies Treaty will provide an important tool for 
enhancing international security in the new circumstances of the post-
Cold War world.  It will increase the ability of all participating 
states, regardless of size and wealth, to seek and exchange meaningful 
security information through a regime of unarmed observation flights 
according to internationally agreed [to] and legally binding procedures.  
It establishes a regime of unprecedented transparency and openness which 
will contribute to mutual understanding of military forces and 
activities.  In addition to reducing tensions, Open Skies will enhance 
the ability of many of the participating states to monitor arms control 
agreements.  Overall, the treaty will promote the US interest in greater 
international security and in the ability of many more states to assume 
active and responsible roles in maintaining that security.  For these 
reasons, I urge the Senate to give the Open Skies Treaty early and 
favorable consideration.  (###)



ARTICLE 9:

Panel To Examine Truth Commission Report On El Salvador
Statement by Secretary Christopher released by the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, March 24, 1993.

Today, I have appointed a panel to examine the implications of the UN-
sponsored El Salvador Truth Commission report for the conduct of US 
foreign policy and the operations of the Department of State.  The panel 
will be co-chaired by retired career Ambassadors George Vest and Richard 
Murphy.

Acting as academic advisers to the committee will be Professor I.M. 
Destler of the University of Maryland and Professor Carol Lancaster of 
Georgetown University.  Professor Destler has authored several books and 
articles on the foreign policy process, including a seminal work on the 
subject titled Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy, Princeton 
University Press, 1972 and 1974.  Professor Lancaster is a noted scholar 
and has authored numerous articles on development and Third World 
issues.

The atrocities committed during the long civil war in El Salvador are 
well documented in the Truth Commission Report.  Although the report 
contains no explicit criticism of the US Government or its 
representatives, its publication does have implications for the conduct 
of US foreign policy and the Department of State's operations.  Respect 
for human rights is a cornerstone of US foreign policy, and when 
questions arise that challenge our commitments, we have an obligation to 
seek answers.

Accordingly, I have asked this panel to review the Truth Commission's 
Report and examine the activities and conduct of the Department during 
this period.  The panel's review will include responsiveness to 
congressional and public inquiries, human rights reporting, and the 
degree to which we encouraged State Department officers to conduct a 
full and independent inquiry of abuses by both sides in the civil 
conflict.  The panel is to report its findings to me and make 
recommendations on steps the Department can take to ensure that the 
Department functions in a manner consistent with the highest 
professional and ethical standards and our nation's values. (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 13

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