US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 11, MARCH 15, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Budget Priorities for Shaping A New Foreign Policy -- Secretary 
Christopher 
2.  Resumption of Middle East Peace Negotiations -- Secretary 
Christopher 
3.  Sponsors Issue Invitations to Middle East Peace Talks
4.  US-French Cooperation in the Post-Cold War World -- President 
Clinton, French President Mitterrand 
5.  US Trade Policy and the Post-Cold War World -- Mickey Kantor 
6.  US Policy in the Middle East -- Edward P. Djerejian
7.  Situation in Sudan -- Herman J. Cohen
8.  Fact Sheet:  Open Skies Treaty
9.  Fact Sheet:  Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons
10.  Department Statements
          US To Enforce Moratorium on Driftnet Fishing
          Rwanda 
          Secretary Names Special Adviser for Haiti


ARTICLE 1:

Budget Priorities for Shaping A New Foreign Policy 
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and 
Judiciary of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, March 
10, 1993

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.  I'm pleased to make my first 
official congressional appearance as Secretary of State before this 
subcommittee.  I realize how important you are to the work of the 
committee and to the work of the State Department.  Our joint challenge, 
of course, is to shape a new foreign policy in a world that's 
fundamentally changed.  Today, I want to try to discuss, as you say, an 
overview as to how we can best direct our resources to meet this 
extraordinary challenge.

Mr. Chairman, because it's my first official appearance on Capitol Hill, 
with your permission I'll impose on your time, perhaps more than I would 
under other circumstances, by making a somewhat longer than usual 
statement.  Of course, the members of your committee are uniquely 
qualified to take on the hard work of determining the priorities and 
organizing the resources of the State Department to achieve those 
priorities.  My appearance here begins what I hope will be a 
relationship that's marked by candor and cooperation on all sides.  I 
think that kind of candor and cooperation will be essential if we are to 
meet the challenges that this fundamentally new world presents to us.

We'll work closely with you to try to determine the priorities and to 
articulate the new strategies.  But I think, Mr. Chairman, it's 
important that we work together to explain and justify our foreign 
policy to the American people.  As I said at my confirmation hearing, 
foreign policymakers cannot afford to ignore the public, for there's a 
real danger that then the public will ignore us.  

We must work together to explain the stake that the American people have 
in an activist and an internationalist foreign policy, to explain 
clearly the need for preventive diplomacy, to deal with problems before 
they become crises, [and] to stress the priority that we all feel for 
ensuring open and fair trade and the expansion of new markets; and we 
must underscore the benefits that will flow to our nation from active 
promotion of democracy, including, hopefully, from a reduced [Department 
of] Defense budget, greater economic opportunity, a cleaner environment, 
and a safer world.

Along these lines, Mr. Chairman, I intend to travel around the country 
to explain our foreign policy initiatives and seek the support of the 
American people.  I'm going to Chicago on the 22nd of this month to 
begin that process, and, if it's proper, I might encourage you and the 
members of your committee to do the same in your districts and around 
the country.  I know [that] you do that on a regular basis.

Collectively, I think we have a responsibility to try to define our 
foreign policy to the American people and to define America's role in 
the new world.  We need to think about how to deal with the new threats 
we're facing, how to deal with the difficult challenges as well as the 
breath-taking opportunities that come to us in this new era.  And, very 
relevant to this committee and to the budget, we need to take a look at 
the foreign policy institutions to make sure that they take into account 
the realities of the new age and not be stuck with those of the prior 
era.

I really can't stress this last point too much.  The State Department as 
we know it, the US Agency for International Development [USAID], the US 
Information Agency [USIA],  [and] the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency [ACDA] are all creatures of the Cold War period.  They evolved 
during an era when our nation was facing a single, overwhelming 
challenge--that is, the challenge of containing the communist threat.  
With the demise of communism, that threat is passed.  Containment has 
served its purpose, and it's taken its rightful place in our history.

And yet our foreign policy institutions continue in large measure to 
mirror the Cold War imperatives.  Maps have changed considerably faster 
than mind-sets.  Budgets and bureaucracies still reflect the reality of 
a world that's passed.  For our institutions, including the State 
Department, it may be that it was easier to deal in an earlier time when 
almost any program could be justified in terms of the global struggle 
against communism.  That struggle is passed, and that easy rationale of 
the past is also a thing of the past.

Here, as elsewhere, I think the American people are ahead of us and have 
proven themselves to be wise.  They know our policies must be tested and 
retested against the facts of the new and uncertain world we face.  They 
demand very rightfully that we get money back--value back--for every 
dollar we spend; to make sure that the dollars we spend promote their 
interests and their values.  They understand that foreign policy must 
conform to new functions, not the old world, and they expect action.

It's our determination--President Clinton and the Administration--to 
provide that kind of action.  Although our Administration is only 2 
months old, we've already begun to redirect our American foreign policy, 
to refocus our aid budgets, and to reform our institutions.  I'd like to 
share my thoughts on each of these topics with you today.

A New Foundation For Foreign Policy

American foreign policy in the years ahead will be grounded in what 
President Clinton has called the three "pillars" of our national 
interest:  first, revitalizing our economy; second, updating our 
security forces for a new era; and, third, protecting democracy as the 
best means to protect our own national security while expanding the 
reach of freedom, human rights, prosperity, and peace.

Our watchword always must be action, not reaction; timely prevention, 
rather than costly cure.

Let me speak a paragraph or so on each one of these three pillars, Mr. 
Chairman.  First, we must renew the American economy.  The single most 
important thing that Congress can do to ensure that American foreign 
policy is effective is to enact the President's economic program and to 
do so as soon as possible. We certainly cannot be strong abroad unless 
we're strong at home.

In the post-Cold War global economy, there's no such thing as a purely 
domestic policy.  Over and over again, I heard in my recent 9-day trip 
to the Middle East and Europe that the whole world is watching our 
economic policy and how well we deal with our economic situation.

President Clinton's economic program, which he laid out, of course, in 
his [State of the Union] address to Congress, as well as his recent 
speech at American University [Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 9, p. 113], 
challenges American firms, workers, and farmers to win in world markets, 
to reduce our national reliance on foreign creditors, and to sustain our 
foreign commitments.

We remain the world's most powerful economy with vast manufacturing, 
service, and agriculture sectors.  We're the world's largest exporter, 
and we are the world's largest market.  We must use all the tools at our 
disposal to generate growth here at home and bring down barriers to our 
goods and services worldwide.  And by "all of our barriers," I mean GATT 
[the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], NAFTA [North American Free 
Trade Agreement]--with the parallel agreements--as well as vigorous 
export promotion.

As a second pillar, we must update our security structures to meet the 
realities of the post-Cold War period.  This begins with adapting our 
military forces to meet the new and old threats to national security.  
But we must even go further than that.  In tandem with our partners, we 
must continue to mold our alliances like NATO to meet new missions.  

More robust peace-keeping and even peace-making capabilities are needed, 
given the potential for ethnic conflicts that challenge our conscience 
and threaten international peace.  Strengthened non-proliferation 
regimes are also essential if we are to prevent new and dangerous 
threats from emerging on the international landscape.

Let me emphasize the strong commitment I feel personally to making 
strides on non-proliferation now that we're in this new era.

Third--as the third pillar--we must encourage the democratic revolution 
that has swept so much of the world.  By promoting democracy and free 
markets, we do more to honor the universal values upon which our nation 
is founded.  We must go beyond just the moral aspect of it to ensure our 
own security and prosperity.

Democracies tend not to make war on other democracies.  They are more 
reliable partners in diplomacy, business, trade, arms agreements, and 
global environmental protection.  We should have no illusions.  
Democracy cannot be imposed from above.  By its very nature it must be 
built from underneath, from the bottom up.

We should embrace and promote this process by sustained support for 
democratic institution-building in the former Soviet bloc and elsewhere.  
And we should by collective engagement, working in partnership with 
other great democracies, promote democracy around the globe.

Financial Constraints And Foreign Policy

Successful foreign policy, of course, doesn't just happen.  It's not 
just a statement of policy.  It requires resources--financial resources 
and human resources.  Like all of you committee members, I am acutely 
aware of the budgetary constraints under which we operate.  Our fiscal 
crisis is real, and so is President Clinton's commitment to tackling it.  
Foreign affairs constitutes only a very small part of the overall budget 
[and] State Department operations, even a smaller part.  

But the time has long since passed when we could overlook even the most 
minute line in the federal budget.  The FY 1994 budget, as you 
indicated, Mr. Chairman, is something we'll submit in a few weeks, and 
it will reflect that reality.  It will be a tough budget for tough 
times.  It will be a flexible budget that seeks austerity, not as a 
hardship to be endured but as a challenge to innovate and do our job 
better.  Above all, we hope that this budget will mark a transitional 
step to a truly focused budget that sets priorities and puts resources 
behind them.

As you indicated, Mr. Chairman, I'm not able to discuss our funding 
requests in detail because they have not yet been finalized.  But I will 
say this:  All reflect one or more of the pillars I mentioned--economic 
renewal, new security structures, and promotion of democracy.  But our 
priorities also stress another important theme.  They all reflect and 
represent our investment in the future.

Our budget will stress the importance of US business internationally and 
our support for US business.  State must work closely with our agencies 
like [the] Commerce [Department], the Export-Import [Exim] Bank, and 
USAID to create a comprehensive and coordinated export strategy.  We 
must do even more than that by upgrading the Department's own economic 
and business support capabilities.  We must turn State into what I've 
termed an "American desk"--an American desk for businessmen here and 
abroad, complementing the important work of the foreign commercial 
service.  The dividend from this will be economic growth and job 
creation here at home.

As I indicated, another top priority will be non-proliferation.  If the 
lawlessness of [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein has taught us any single 
lesson, it is that weapons of mass destruction, especially when combined 
with missile technology, can transform a petty tyrant into a threat to 
world peace and stability.  We must assist the new states of the former 
Soviet Union to control and account for nuclear material.  We must help 
them and other countries to establish effective support and control 
systems for the weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, 
and we must strengthen international supplier regimes and support 
existing and new arms control agreements.  All of this must be part of a 
comprehensive strategy to halt and, indeed, reverse proliferation.

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize the importance of 
moving forward to ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction [START] 
Treaties around the world--in the former Soviet Union--and also to move 
forward with the ratification of START II here in the United States.

Another priority is enhanced multinational peace-keeping and peace-
making.  The end of the Cold War has unleashed long-suppressed ethnic 
and religious and sectional conflict in the former Soviet bloc and 
elsewhere.  But it has opened up new possibilities also for 
international cooperation.  Our task is to harness that cooperation to 
contain and to prevent future conflict.

The tragedies in Somalia and the Balkans bear grim witness to the price 
of international delay--a human price paid daily in pain, privation, and 
death.  Here, international peacekeeping--especially by the United 
Nations--can and must play a critical role.  Capabilities must be 
enhanced to permit prompt, effective, preventive action, and the United 
States must be prepared to pay its fair share.  Millions invested in 
peace-keeping now may save hundreds of millions of dollars in relief 
later.

We can never forget either that peace-keeping saves more than dollars.  
Rightly done, it also saves lives.  It may avert greater dangers that 
would require even larger military expenditures down the road.

I know [that] this committee has supported peace-keeping funds in the 
past, and I look forward to working with you--all the members of the 
committee--to meet our responsibilities in the future.

Our budget will also promote democracy, especially in the states of the 
former Soviet Union.  If a democratic government and free enterprise 
prevail in the former Soviet bloc, America will gain not only partners 
in peace but a vast, growing market for American goods and services.  

On the other hand, if this brave experiment in freedom fails, we could 
see an insecure Europe once again, and once again we would see our 
defense budgets rise.  Assisting democracy in the Soviet Union and, 
indeed, around the world is more than a helping hand--it's an investment 
in American security and prosperity.

As the President pointed out in his speech at American University just a 
few days ago:

If we were willing to spend trillions of dollars to ensure communism's 
defeat in the Cold War, surely we should be willing to invest a tiny 
fraction of that to support democracy's success where communism failed.

Our FY 1994 budget will also advance our global agenda.  Population 
control and protection of the environment cannot be second-tier foreign 
policy priorities any longer.  By encouraging responsible population 
programs, we assist poor countries to achieve sustainable growth.  By 
actively moving to combat environmental degradation, we can improve the 
quality of life in poor and rich countries alike and open up new 
possibilities for US business.

By combating international scourges like nepotism, narcotics, and 
terrorism, we make America and the world a safer place.  These are 
investments with real human returns.

These priorities--these investments--will be prominent in our 1994 
fiscal year budget presentations.  Some may require modest increases in 
funding.  Others may not.  But all reflect this new focus.  All will be 
met within overall stringent limitations.

Reorganization of the State Department

Just as important as how much we spend is how we spend it.  The 
challenges of the 1990s have already brought new flexibility and 
discipline to the State Department.  Confronted by the collapse of the 
Soviet empire, we've opened 20 new posts in just 2 years.  Faced with 
budget realities, we're moving in cooperation with Congress to close 
about an equal number of posts, and we're evaluating staffing levels of 
State and other agencies at both new and established missions.  The 
State Department must do more than just accept the hard decisions thrust 
on us.  We must fundamentally reorganize ourselves for the post-Cold War 
era, and I want to speak a bit more about that.

I'm convinced that the Department of State cannot hope to respond to the 
many challenges of this era unless we improve the way we deal with tough 
and complex problems that cut across traditional bureaucratic 
boundaries.  We must find creative ways both to increase the efficiency 
of the policy process and to enhance the administration of the many 
programs we manage.  A stifling bureaucracy, an obsolete division of 
duties, or cumbersome decision-making are luxuries that we just cannot 
afford in this new period.

I'm therefore committed, Mr. Chairman, to a broad-based reform of the 
State Department's organization and operations.

The reorganization plan that I announced last month [Dispatch, Vol. 4, 
No. 6, p. 69] includes the designation of the Deputy Secretary and five 
Under Secretaries as my principal foreign policy advisers.  Portfolios 
have been shifted and modified to mirror the post-Cold War missions.  
More importantly, we intend to create a new Under Secretary for Global 
Affairs responsible for issues as varied--but critical--as human rights, 
democratization, the environment, refugees, narcotics, and terrorism.  
President Clinton's nomination of Senator Tim Wirth--a person who I 
think you all know and whose accomplishments are well known to you--
sends a clear signal on the importance that the Administration attaches 
to these global responsibilities.

Our reorganization will also create new focal points for key foreign 
policy initiatives--notably, an Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser 
for the new independent states of the former Soviet Union.  President 
Clinton has nominated Strobe Talbott--a trusted friend and an eminent 
expert in this area--to manage the full range of our relations with this 
vital and volatile region.  I can say that we're already benefiting from 
Strobe Talbott's advice as the President prepares for the summit with 
[Russian] President Yeltsin on April 4 in Vancouver, British Columbia 
[Canada].

Our reorganization plan not only adds these two new important positions, 
but it also will reduce excessive layering within the Department of 
State and do much to streamline our policy processes.  We've set a 
target of cutting back the number of our Deputy Assistant Secretaries 
and their equivalents by up to 40%, and we're well on the way to doing 
that.  Wherever possible, we intend to force decision-making down.  Our 
objective is a quicker policy-making, more open policy-making, and 
better policy-making.

Mr. Chairman, we also intend to eliminate 11 bureaus or important 
positions, all in the way of trying to be more economical and to 
streamline our processes.  I think we can do the job better with fewer 
resources and [by] cutting out a substantial amount of an intermediate 
layer.

I've implemented some of these initiatives.  Some will require 
congressional action, and we'll seek the counsel of you and your other 
colleagues in    the House and Senate as we move forward with this very 
important institutional reform to which I am strongly committed.

It's so important that I've asked Deputy Secretary Clif Wharton--a man 
of extraordinary ability and very broad experience in business--to 
direct our efforts to create a State Department for the 21st century.  
In addition to implementing the current reorganization plan, I've asked 
Dr. Wharton to oversee and improve the way the executive branch manages 
the international affairs budget.  We simply must do a better job of 
assessing our priorities and allocating our resources.

I've also asked other key members of the State Department's team--
especially Under Secretary-designate [for Management] Brian Atwood--to 
focus efforts on modernizing the Department of State.  We must assure 
clearer financial accountability for our operations.  We must invest in 
better training for our personnel, both Foreign Service and Civil 
Service.  And we must work unceasingly to ensure that the face the 
Department shows to the world is an American face of diversity.  In 
short, we must remake the State Department.

As I've gone around the world, especially on my recent trip, I've been 
struck by the lack of diversity in the representatives of other 
governments.  We can't solve that problem, but we can deal with our own 
problem, and I'm going to make one of our highest priorities to increase 
the diversity within the higher ranks of the State Department.  We're 
doing considerably better at the entry levels, but there's much room for 
improvement here.

I've also asked Dr. Wharton to examine the role of the US Agency for 
International Development and to report to me his recommendations before 
the end of April.  USAID, like the State Department as a whole, must 
plainly change.  And we look forward to working  with Congress to 
restructure our assistance program to reflect our foreign policy 
priorities, such as promoting democracy, enhancing competitiveness, and 
supporting the peace process.  We also need to reorganize--and we need 
your thinking on this--we need to reorganize ACDA, the USIA, and the 
Board for International Broadcasting to take into account the new world 
priorities.

The need for a truly integrated foreign policy certainly demands this 
kind of a reorganization and nothing less.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, as I conclude, let me say [that] I was struck as I 
prepared this testimony by the extent to which the challenges 
confronting the State Department closely parallel those confronting our 
nation as a whole.  President Clinton's call for investment, for 
innovation, for putting people first, resonates as strongly in Foggy 
Bottom as it does on Main Street.  I'm really dedicated to seeing that 
the State Department, along with the other departments of government, 
answers the President's call.

This is a call for a renewal, and it really touches a deeply American 
chord.  It echoes with our history.  In 1862, Abraham Lincoln wrote that 
as our case is new, we must think anew and act anew.  Our case is, 
thankfully, somewhat less grave than that facing Lincoln, but the 
injunction remains as compelling, then, today as it was a hundred years 
ago.  It holds true for American foreign policy, just as it does for 
American domestic policy.

The Cold War has ended and with it the imperatives that define America's 
role in the world.  With it we must have new policies, and we must 
reorganize our foreign policy establishment.  It's time to think anew 
and to act anew.  This will take vision on your part and on our part.  
We'll have to work hard.  It will take courage to shift away from old 
priorities.  It will take a real partnership--between Democrats and 
Republicans, between Congress and the executive branch--and also a 
partnership between government and the American people, to convince the 
American people that we're acting in their interest.

So far as I'm concerned, my partnership with this committee begins 
today, and I look forward to a good relationship.  I know I can count on 
you, and I'll tell you that you can count on me. (###)



ARTICLE 2:

Resumption of Middle East Peace Negotiations
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at news conference, released by the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, March 10, 1993

President Clinton has asked me to make an announcement today on our 
efforts in the Middle East.  Events in the Middle East have historically 
captured the attention of the world.  Unfortunately, too often this has 
been because of war.  This is a region that since 1948 has known five 
Arab-Israeli wars.  And every time there has been a war, the world has 
held its breath because the risk of a superpower confrontation was ever 
present.

That risk is now a thing of the past.  The end of the Cold War has 
created an unusual opportunity for progress toward peace in the region, 
and now all of us must act to seize and enhance that opportunity.

In the Middle East, such opportunities are unlikely to last very long, 
and the cost of lost opportunity would be very high.  It's precisely 
because of the recognition of these costs that every Administration, for 
over the last 4 decades--Democratic and Republican alike--has played an 
active role in the search for peace in the Middle East.

This enduring and bipartisan commitment to promote peace reflects an 
unassailable reality.  The search for peace in the Middle East is in 
America's vital national interest.  It reflects the fact that conflict 
in this region, especially given the abundance of very destructive 
weapons in the region, contains the seeds of dangerous escalation.  It 
reflects the fact that a great majority of the world's oil supplies 
could be put at risk; and it reflects the fact that the United States 
has a special commitment to Israel's security, a country that is a solid 
and trusted ally with whom we share a deep and abiding commitment to 
democratic values.

I believe we now have an opportunity to promote peace that will serve 
the interests of Israel, the Arab states, the Palestinians, and the 
entire world community.  A passive American role is not enough.  What is 
called for is an active, positive effort that will take advantage of 
what many believe to be a historic moment in that region.

We must now seize this opportunity to play the role of full partner, 
just as we did in the achievement of the Israeli-Egyptian peace 14 years 
ago.  We have been repaid in full over the years by strong friendship 
and ties with both Israel and Egypt.  The visits to Washington by 
[Israeli] Prime Minister Rabin this week and by [Egyptian] President 
Mubarak in April are testimony to the enduring nature of the 
relationships that were forged out of this negotiation.

It is time for the people in this region to set aside violence and work 
together for reconciliation and peace.  The important steps taken at the 
Madrid conference have opened up a wide vista of possibilities.  Over 
the years, Arabs and Israelis have sat together--that is, over the 
course of the last year they have sat together--in bilateral 
negotiations, seeking to achieve a comprehensive settlement based upon 
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.  They have also joined in 
multilateral negotiations on such diverse and pressing issues as arms 
control and regional security, economic development, water, refugees, 
and the environment.  They have sought to build a Middle East in which 
neighbors work together to resolve common problems.

President Clinton is committed to helping the parties confront and 
overcome the difficult challenges that lie ahead.  In asking me to take 
my first trip to the Middle East to consult with leaders in that region, 
the President offered our full assistance as an active, full partner in 
the search for peace.  In doing so, he underscored the enduring  reality 
of an American involvement in Middle East peace efforts.  It is good for 
us as Americans, and it is good for our friends and interests in the 
region.

The resumption of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, which we are 
announcing today, is important but not an end in itself.  Our objective 
and the objective of all parties must be to make real, tangible progress 
soon.  Nearly everyone I spoke to on my trip in the Middle East agreed 
that there may be now a one-time opportunity to promote peace.  History 
tells us that such opportunities may be fleeting, especially in the 
Middle East, and we believe it is now time to re-launch the 
negotiations.

Toward this end, the United States and Russia, as co-sponsors of the 
Middle East peace negotiations, are today inviting the parties to resume 
bilateral negotiations here in Washington for the 2-week period 
commencing on Tuesday, April 20 [1993].  We're also announcing the 
reconvening of the multilateral working groups [on] a specified series 
of dates beginning with the water group on April 27 in Geneva [for text 
of joint statement, see p. 142].

To prepare the ground for these important bilateral negotiations and 
multilateral negotiations, we'll also be inviting the parties to send 
representatives to Washington in late March or early April to have 
substantive discussions with our enhanced US team.

And so we must now all roll up our sleeves to make 1993 a year marked by 
real progress toward peace and reconciliation.  The United States is 
prepared to do its part, and now the other parties must be prepared to 
do theirs.  (###)



ARTICLE 3:

Sponsors Issue Invitations To Middle East Peace Talks
US-Russian joint statement, released by the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, March 10, 1993.

The United States and Russia, as co-sponsors of the Middle East peace 
process, have extended invitations to Israel, Jordan, Syria, 
Palestinians, and Lebanon to resume bilateral negotiations in Washington 
on Tuesday, April 20 [1993].  This ninth round of negotiations will 
continue until Thursday, May 6.

In conveying this invitation to the parties, the co-sponsors have re-
emphasized their commitment and determination to achieve substantive 
progress toward the common objective of a comprehensive peace settlement 
based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.  The co-sponsors 
have conveyed to the parties their intention to work with the parties 
actively to promote substantive progress in the negotiations.

The co-sponsors have also notified host countries for the next round of 
multilateral working groups that the working groups have been 
rescheduled.  The co-sponsors have proposed that the Water Working Group 
convene in Geneva, April 27-29; that the Economic Development Working 
Group convene in Rome, May 4-5; that the Refugee Working Group convene 
in Oslo, May 11-13; that the Arms Control and Regional Security Working 
Group convene in Washington, May 17-20; and that the Environment Working 
Group convene in Tokyo, May 24-25.

With the resumption of both bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the 
co-sponsors join the parties in expressing their conviction that 1993 
should be a year of substantive progress toward peace and 
reconciliation.  (###)



ARTICLE 4:

US-French Cooperation in the Post-Cold War World
President Clinton, French President Mitterrand
Opening statements at news conference, released by the White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, March 9, 1993

President Clinton:  It is a great pleasure for me to welcome President 
Mitterrand to the White House at this early date in our Administration.  
Our two nations share a friendship--which dates back to the 
revolutionary birth of both countries--rooted in common values of 
equality, liberty, and democracy.  These bonds of culture, of history, 
and of common purpose have made possible a remarkable amount of 
cooperation in recent days in meeting the challenges in Iraq and Somalia 
and Bosnia.

Today President Mitterrand and I discussed the global partnership that 
we must bring to the post-Cold War world--new uncertainties and new 
opportunities.  Both our nations and both our continents are renewing 
institutions of security and economic growth for this era.

I salute President Mitterrand and the French people for their 
leadership.  Their exemplary contribution to the UN peace-keeping 
operations around the globe is just one of many examples of the 
contributions they have [made] and will continue to make.

This morning, we discussed Russia, Bosnia, and the progress toward 
European union.  Over lunch, we will discuss other issues, including the 
Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] of trade 
talks.  We have differences on some issues.  Clearly, we need French 
leadership to resolve some outstanding differences but also to make 
common cause in the areas in which we agree.

Both our nations are great trading nations and have much to gain by 
resolving the differences between us and moving the world toward a 
growing global economy.  I am very, very hopeful that the United States 
and France can be partners in updating our common interests and in 
leading the G-7 [Group of 7 industrialized nations] toward coordinated 
policies of global economic growth and especially toward action in 
dealing with Russia.

President Mitterrand is going to Russia soon, and he will be there and 
back before I have an opportunity to meet with [Russian] President 
Yeltsin in April in Canada, and I look forward to closely consulting 
with him about that again after his trip to Russia.

We talked a little bit about the  Vance-Owen peace process [on the 
former Yugoslavia] today, and you might want to ask President Mitterrand 
about his views on that.  Let me say that I have been very pleased with 
the comments that he has made today and with the possibilities that we 
might have toward working together to secure a peace in Bosnia.

There are many challenges facing the great democracies of the world 
today.  We have to reaffirm our support for the difficult 
transformations to democracy now taking place in the former Soviet Union 
and in Central and Eastern Europe [and] to reaffirm our interest in 
closely cooperating to advance peace in the Middle East and elsewhere in 
the world and to promote democracy and economic growth throughout the 
world.

We made a very good beginning this morning, and I want to publicly thank 
the President, as I have privately, for the enormously helpful 
conversations we had this morning.  He has been at this work longer than 
I have by several years.  I learned a lot today; I appreciated his 
candor and the insights which he brought to our discussion.  I look 
forward to continuing over lunch and to continuing a long and 
significant relationship between the United States and France.

President Mitterrand:  I think everything that needs to be said has been 
said.  At least everything has been said about what we talked about and 
about what we will be talking about during the time that remains for our 
meeting.  So I haven't really anything to add while waiting for 
questions that you may wish to ask.

On the other hand, I would like to recall--just as President Clinton has 
just done--I'd like to recall that for Frenchmen, it's always a very 
important moment, it's a real event, and it's a very happy moment to be 
coming to Washington in order to meet with the President of the United 
States of America.  And so it is with the same keen interest that, 
today, I'm here in this capital city in order to meet a President whose 
fame has already encompassed the world several times but whom I'd never 
met.

Now we have had useful conversations.  The subjects that we've talked 
about--as mentioned by President Clinton--these subjects have given us 
the opportunity of seeing that our positions were very similar.   It is 
pleasant to note, particularly as the subjects are very difficult 
subjects--Bosnia, former Yugoslavia, the revolution that is taking place 
in Russia and in all the countries of the former Soviet Union--and all 
this is very important.

President Clinton has shown a keen interest in the future of the 
European  unity.  I gave him my feelings and what I was committed to 
myself.  We still have matters to talk about.  There are [opposing 
interests], which is perfectly natural, between our countries.  That's 
in the nature of things.  But there is a real determination to reach 
agreement.  And that is, I think, [what] is the [leitmotif] of all our 
conversations.  (###)



ARTICLE 5:

US Trade Policy and the Post-Cold War World
Mickey Kantor, US Trade Representative
Statement before the Senate Finance Committee, Washington, DC, March 9, 
1993

I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Finance Committee today 
to discuss the approach and direction of the trade policy of the Clinton 
Administration.  This is my first public appearance before a 
congressional committee since I assumed my responsibilities.  I am 
delighted that I can appear first before this committee, which 
recommended me for confirmation to the position of US Trade 
Representative [USTR].

In his February 26 [1993] speech at the American University [Dispatch, 
Vol. 4, No. 9, p. 113], President Clinton set forth his vision of 
America's role in the global economy, confronting the third defining 
moment of the 20th century.  Our role in the world emerges quite clearly 
from that important speech.  As we and other nations struggle to face 
the new realities in the aftermath of the fall of communism, the United 
States will be fully engaged internationally, not turning inward.  We 
see our prosperity bound up with [the] prosperity of our trading 
partners in Canada, Europe, Japan, and Mexico.  We will work with them 
to promote global growth, aid the development of other less prosperous 
nations, address the emerging issues of environmental degradation and 
proliferation, and focus on the central importance of what is at stake 
in Russia.

Where trade policy is concerned, the United States will continue to 
champion open markets and expanded trade, but we will insist that the 
markets of other nations be open to our products and services.  As the 
President said, we will compete, not retreat.

The trade policy of this Administration starts from the same point its 
economic policy does:  Our prosperity and that of our children depends 
on our ability to compete and win in the global markets.

A little more than a generation ago, American industrial and 
technological superiority were unquestioned.  Our workers, consumers, 
and companies lived almost entirely within the American economy and 
prospered there.  But those days, when the world was a far simpler 
place, are long gone.  Today, our exports and imports represent more 
than a quarter of our entire economy.  And in the new global 
marketplace--where capital, management, production, technology, and even 
labor are increasingly mobile--more than 70% of our products face 
competition from products produced in other countries.

Principles of Clinton Administration Trade Policy

Let me start with the principles that will guide Clinton Administration 
trade policy, as articulated in the President's American University 
speech.

1.  In this Administration, trade policy is a part of integrated 
economic policy, and the fundamental goal is economic growth and the 
creation of high-wage jobs for American workers.

The trade deficits which have grown up since 1980 are a fair measure of 
our competitive slippage, but they represent many factors beyond trade 
policy and trade agreements.  If, as a nation, we increase public and 
private investment, if we attack our budget deficits, if we take control 
over our health care system, if we educate our children and train our 
workers, we will have taken enormous steps toward prospering in global 
competition.  If we do not take those actions, trade agreements alone 
will not produce prosperity for our people.

Nothing is more important to our economic prosperity, our competitive 
success, and our trade policy than the adoption of the President's 
economic package.  Bill Clinton was elected to get the economy back on 
track and to fix the track--to ensure that we came out of recession in 
the short term and to lay the groundwork for long-term prosperity.  The 
lack of investment and the deficits have crippled our economic 
performance.  If unaddressed, they could consign this country and its 
children to a diminished economic future.  America and all of us in 
political life will benefit if we can come together to pass the 
President's program.

A real attack on the budget deficits will reduce long-term interest 
rates, leading to increased investment and job growth.  US companies, 
choosing where to invest, will find contributing to our own country's 
growth a more attractive option.  Over the longer term, increased 
investment in the education and training of our workers, our 
transportation and communications infrastructure, and research and 
development generally are vital to our ability to compete globally.  In 
that connection, the Administration's new technology initiative, 
unveiled by the President and Vice President Gore on February 24, is a 
concerted effort to bolster US civilian technology, which has too often 
been slighted because of our traditional focus on defense technologies.

Moreover, the link between the President's program and our ability to 
promote global growth is inescapable.  The economic stagnation of the 
past few years has not been confined to the United States.  Growth will 
resume through concerted action by the leading economic powers:  our 
attack on the budget deficits, Germany's willingness to lower interest 
rates, [and] Japan's readiness to stimulate its domestic economy.  For 
each of us, hard steps with short-term costs are necessary to produce 
growth and prosperity.  President Clinton's call to arms makes it 
possible for him to enlist other nations in joining us in a concerted 
effort to promote global growth.

2.  Past Administrations have often neglected US economic and trading 
interests because of foreign policy and defense concerns.  The days when 
we could afford to do so are long past.  In the post-Cold War world, our 
national security depends on our economic strength.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States led the 
free world in creating a free and open trading system.  The Bretton 
Woods Agreement, the Marshall Plan, the creation of the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and the IMF [International Monetary 
Fund] are all testimony to the vitality of the free world in creating a 
postwar economic framework.

This framework was both geo-political and economic in its origin.  The 
United States recognized the military threat imposed by communism:  that 
our vital interests would almost always be defined in national security 
terms.  At the same time, we realized that the expansion of trade and 
investment was one of the free world's most potent weapons.

This policy was virtually painless for the United States.  Although the 
United States was the world's economic giant, US trade amounted to 
relatively little.  In 1950, for example, US exports and imports each 
amounted to only about 4% of the GNP, or 8% for trade as a whole.  For 
Britain and France, on the other hand, trade was their economic 
lifeline, representing 30-45% of their GNP.

As a result, the United States tolerated "infant industries" policies in 
both Europe and Japan and other forms of protectionist economic policy 
in the postwar environment.  Indeed, the creation and support of these 
economic policies by our allies was seen as an essential element of our 
national security interests.

Our foreign and economic policy in the postwar era deserves credit for 
its historic accomplishments.  We contained communism and rebuilt the 
economic strength of the free world.  In the 4 decades following World 
War II, growth in the non-communist world tripled.  More importantly, 
communism as a political system failed to maintain its toehold in 
Western Europe.

By the early 1970s, however, our trading partners had begun to come of 
age, and external shocks, such as the oil embargo of 1973, jolted our 
economy.  The United States ran its first merchandise deficit of the 
century in 1971 and confronted the first wave of popularity of cars from 
Japan.  Accustomed to steady economic growth and a secure domestic 
market, American business and workers had difficulty adjusting to the 
new dynamics of world trade.  Equally important, government policy did 
not change.  American jobs and economic interests continued to take a 
back seat to foreign policy concerns.

The deep recession of 1981-82 took a devastating toll on US 
manufacturers, but, even when the economy recovered strongly, the 
overvalued dollar saddled US exporters with a serious competitive 
disadvantage.  Confronted with the reality of Japan's trade and 
industrial policies, the Reagan Administration's principal response was 
laissez faire and, after the 1985 Plaza Accord, dollar devaluation.  By 
1987, the US merchandise trade deficit was $150 billion, $57 billion of 
which was with Japan.  The weakness infecting basic industries spread to 
our leading-edge high technology sectors as well.

The truth is [that] there is ample blame for everyone.  The great 
majority of  US companies were very slow to adjust to the blast of 
competition; there was no excuse for their failure to see what was 
happening years ago.  But it is also true that US Government policy 
saddled our companies with every conceivable burden:  higher costs of 
capital; increasingly serious health care costs; and, most relevant to 
us, a trade policy that for many years failed to enforce our laws at 
home or open markets abroad.

The fundamental question that I am asked about trade policy is:  how 
much continuity and how much change?  There will be a great deal of 
continuity, largely because of the 6-year, bipartisan congressional 
effort, in which this committee was instrumental, which culminated in 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.  Thanks to that act, 
the United States has a trade policy with clear objectives that have 
broad support from Congress and the private sector.  Obviously, there 
will be no shortage of difficult decisions to make, but the United 
States Trade Representative is charged with enforcing the laws and 
opening foreign markets and given the tools to do so.

At the negotiating table, I will be representing the interests of 
American workers, farmers, and businessmen and -women, just as my 
counterparts represent theirs.  We will continue to play our part in 
making the international trading system work, but we will insist on our 
trading partners bearing their share of the responsibility as well.

3.  We will compete, and we have proven that we can.

Because of failed government policies and the difficulty of adjusting to 
the new global economy, the United States has had serious 
competitiveness problems in many areas of the economy.  But I have no 
doubt about the ability of our corporations, our farmers, and our 
workers to compete.  In many sectors--computers, aircraft, machinery, 
agriculture, motion pictures, financial services--American companies and 
American workers set the standard of excellence in the world.  Our 
universities and our entrepreneurs are the envy of the world.  We will 
build and maintain a strong manufacturing base, and we will manufacture 
a full range of products from semiconductors to steel.  We welcome the 
products of other nations, but we will not prosper if we are content to 
simply buy, sell, assemble, and distribute high quality and low cost 
goods from abroad.

Export expansion has been the bright spot in an otherwise dismal 
economic picture over the past few years.  From 1985 through 1992, US 
merchandise exports increased from $222 billion to $445 billion in 
current dollars, a virtual doubling.  We regained our position as the 
world's number one exporter.  By 1990, more than one in six US 
manufacturing jobs were related to merchandise exports, and the average 
wages for workers in manufacturing and service exporting sectors, where 
American products are most competitive, substantially exceeded the US 
average.  This dramatic increase in exports has occurred even though 85% 
of US exports come from only 15% of US companies.  The export potential 
of our vibrant small and mid-sized businesses remain to be realized, and 
that is a high priority for this Administration.

4.  We will seek to expand trade by opening foreign markets, and we will 
enforce the laws at home.  One of my principal responsibilities as USTR 
is to open foreign markets and break down barriers to US manufactured 
goods, agricultural products, and services.  This includes pursuing the 
strong protection of US intellectual property so important to our high 
technology industries.  When all is said and done, opening foreign 
markets is our main objective in the Uruguay Round [of the GATT]; it is 
the impetus, from our standpoint, for the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA); it will be a principal focus of our efforts with 
respect to Japan and China, as well as in other nations around the 
world.

We are not a perfectly open market, of course, but, because of history, 
practice, and our concern for maximizing consumer choice, this market 
will always be basically open.  Consequently, we need to use every tool 
at our disposal--multilaterally where possible and bilaterally where 
necessary--to make sure that other markets are comparably open to our 
own.  That includes resort, where legitimate and necessary, to Section 
301, strengthened by Congress in 1988.  Both Super and Special 301, used 
appropriately, have proven to be valuable tools for breaking down 
significant barriers to our products and services, including the failure 
to protect our intellectual property.

It should be understood:  While there are many factors beyond trade 
policy that contribute to trade deficits, trade policy matters.  In 
today's global economy, allowing other nations to promote and protect 
their industries, building profits from secure home markets while 
targeting our open market, is a formula for competitive suicide.  We 
will not stand by and pretend that other nations share our commitment to 
expanded trade and open markets if the real world evidence suggests that 
they do not.

5.  We will ask companies and workers to join in partnership with 
government to build competitive industries.  Nor will we stand by, 
indifferent, when companies, workers, and communities are hard hit by 
foreign competition--fair or unfair.  In appropriate cases, our 
Administration will offer trade relief to industries under pressure, but 
we will expect in return that the affected companies and workers will 
commit to actions that will build the future competitiveness of the 
industry.  This Administration is asking all Americans to join in the 
effort to rebuild our country's economic strength; there will be no free 
rides.  We will not protect industries only to watch them raise salaries 
for their CEOs [chief executive officers] and prices for their 
customers.

Let me address specifically a number of the major issues facing us.

North American Free Trade Agreement

President Clinton has consistently affirmed his support for the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, provided it is accompanied by effective 
US domestic economic policies and supplemented by additional agreements 
and domestic actions to address concerns regarding labor, the 
environment, and safeguards against import surges.  Addressing these 
concerns does not mean reopening the NAFTA text.  Our goal is rather to 
negotiate the necessary supplemental agreements and to work with 
Congress to develop implementing legislation so that the NAFTA and the 
supplemental agreements and domestic measures can by in place by January 
1, 1994.  An enhanced NAFTA package can contribute to the ability of our 
companies and farmers to compete at home and abroad and help improve 
working conditions, living standards, and environmental quality 
throughout North America.

We have already seen the benefits [that] we can gain as Mexico opens its 
markets.  Thanks to the economic liberalization program enacted by 
[Mexican] President Salinas, our merchandise exports already have grown 
from about $12.4 billion in 1987 to $40.6 billion in 1992.  This export 
growth has reversed what was a $6-billion trade deficit in 1987 and 
turned it into a trade surplus of nearly $6 billion last year.  And 
these increased exports have come from every region of the United 
States.  Mexico is one of the top 10 overseas markets for 38 states, and 
20 states each shipped roughly $250 million or more to Mexico in 1991.

Mexico is our fastest-growing major export market, our second-largest 
market for manufactured goods, and our third-largest market for 
agricultural products.  Seventy percent of Mexico's imports come from 
the United States, and Mexicans already consume more US goods per person 
than either the Europeans or the Japanese.  The NAFTA will open still 
greater opportunities for US  exporters by eliminating Mexican tariffs 
(which are more than twice as high as US duties, on average), knocking 
down other forms of Mexican trade restrictions, and eliminating 
discrimination against US providers of goods and services.

On March 17 [1993], we will begin negotiation of the supplemental 
agreements on labor standards and safety, the environment, and import 
surges which the President called for during his campaign.  We will 
pursue these agreements vigorously.  Let me assure you that we will not 
sacrifice substance for speed, nor will we delay our efforts in the name 
of an artificial timetable.  We will not ask you to vote on NAFTA 
implementing legislation until these negotiations result in 
comprehensive, enforceable agreements.

In the supplemental agreements on environment and labor, we are looking 
for concrete improvements.  We want the agreements to have mechanisms 
and provisions to help raise standards where they are deficient; 
strengthen national enforcement of national laws; improve the US-Mexico 
border environment; and ensure, so far as possible, that the NAFTA 
promotes prosperity and improved social conditions in all three 
countries.

I am optimistic that we can achieve these goals.  My Mexican 
counterpart, [Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development] Jaime 
Serra Puche, has told me that he would like to view these talks not as a 
negotiation but a collaboration.  Mexico has excellent labor and 
environmental standards on its books, and President Salinas has 
repeatedly recognized the need for strengthened enforcement.

I see the labor standards and environmental agreements covering three 
basic areas:

--  Improved cooperation on worker and environmental safeguards, 
including technical assistance and data sharing, with a goal of 
attaining the best protections possible;

--  Improving enforcement of standards and national laws, both through 
the administrative and judicial processes of each country and new labor 
and environmental commissions which will provide independent scrutiny of 
measures taken to enforce national laws; and

--  Encouraging a positive impact of the NAFTA on North America's 
working conditions and the environment.

In these negotiations, we will be breaking new ground for the United 
States and for our continent.  We want to promote the strongest possible 
improvements in all areas.  At the same time, we have to bear in mind 
that the agreements will apply to us as well as our neighbors.  This 
could raise tough issues for us, including matters of prosecutorial 
discretion, state/federal relationships, the operations of the courts, 
and Constitutional guarantees of due process.  My staff and I will be 
looking to you and to our experts in the labor and the environmental 
communities to find ways to address these problems as the negotiations 
progress.  At the same time, USTR, along with OMB [Office of Management 
and Budget], [Department of] Treasury, [Department of] Labor, and EPA 
[Environmental Protection Agency], will be studying the various options 
for funding critical environmental cleanup efforts.

In the area of import surges, we are not looking to change the 
mechanisms in NAFTA but, rather, want to ensure that these provisions 
can be effectively and fairly used for all sectors.  I know there are 
concerns in certain industries about whether NAFTA's provisions could 
result in an import surge, and I want to address those concerns.  At the 
same time, we should remember that our exports are a much greater share 
of the Mexican and Canadian domestic markets than are their exports in 
our much larger economy.  So any new measures may be more likely used 
against US exports.  As with labor standards and the environment, I will 
be looking to you and the private sector for guidance on these matters.

The Uruguay Round Of the GATT

President Clinton is committed to the successful completion of the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations which has been ongoing 
since 1986.  When Sir Leon Brittan, the EC [European Community] Trade 
Minister, was here on February 11, I announced the President's decision 
to seek the renewal of fast-track procedures to complete the round.  I 
indicated at that time that timing of the request and the duration of 
the authority we would seek would be determined only after further 
discussions within the Administration and consultation with Congress and 
the private sector.  We are in the midst of that process, and no final 
decision on timing or duration has yet been made.

[Former USTR] Ambassador Hills and the staff at USTR expended enormous 
effort for 4 years to reach a strong Uruguay Round agreement.  Others 
committed to the round, including the Director General of the GATT, 
Arthur Dunkel, have done the same.  Through discussions with the private 
sector and Congress, we are developing a good sense of the 
accomplishments to date and the remaining obstacles to be overcome 
before the round is completed.  I think we can complete the round in a 
way that will benefit the United States and the world economy, but, 
based on our discussions to date, I do not believe that we were as close 
to completion as some have reported in early January.  I told Sir Leon 
that our goal was a good agreement, not just a quick one.

Sir Leon pointed out the danger that whatever consensus that has emerged 
so far behind the draft final act, known as the Dunkel text, could 
dissipate if quick agreement was not reached and the United States and 
other nations tried to reopen the text to address issues where we have 
concerns.  While I recognize this concern, the fact remains that we are 
not going to reach agreement until some of our major problem areas with 
the draft final act are dealt with seriously and effectively.

Moreover, the question of whether we can reach an agreement depends very 
much on the market access commitments for goods and services which are 
still being negotiated.  If we reach ambitious agreements on market 
access--cutting tariffs, breaking down non-tariff barriers--the round 
will hold out potential benefits of the magnitude that will inspire 
enthusiasm in the American business community and their workers that has 
been, to date, muted at best.

We chose to announce the decision to seek fast-track procedures when Sir 
Leon was here, because the round depends, in the first instance, on US 
and EC leadership in setting out the ambitious objectives to be achieved 
in areas such as market access for goods and services.  The 3-year 
deadlock between the rest of the world and the EC over agriculture 
stalemated the round and gave other nations, most notably Japan, the 
ability to avoid contributing meaningfully to the successful completion 
of the talks.  We will not complete the round without some leadership by 
the US and the EC, but we will also not complete it if Japan continues 
to behave as if it has little stake in the outcome.  We also need to see 
meaningful contributions from other trading partners--the newly 
industrializing countries in Asia and Latin America--and the developing 
countries who owe their economic gains to a strong, open multilateral 
system.  It is time to address the free riders in this round.

A successful round would give an immediate boost of confidence to the 
world economy, sorely in need of one.  It would contribute to increased 
economic growth over the next decade by lowering barriers to trade in 
goods; bringing new rules and discipline to services, agriculture, and 
textiles; and creating, for the first time, a set of enforceable rules 
for protecting intellectual property and governing investment.  But the 
round is not a favor that the United States is doing for the world.  If 
it is ambitious enough, US companies and workers stand to gain a great 
deal because of lowered barriers in our existing markets and the 
creation of new markets.

But our criterion should be clear:  Despite the sometimes single-minded 
focus on agriculture and the preoccupation with the so-called new issues 
of intellectual property and services, support for the round in the 
United States will turn on the benefits that result for US exports of 
manufactured goods, agricultural goods, and services produced by workers 
and farmers here in the United States.  However, in pursuit of those 
benefits, we will not weaken the provisions of current law such as those 
that provide remedies for our industries against the unfairly traded 
products of other countries and those that protect health, safety, and 
the environment.

European Community

We have our share of current difficult issues with the European 
Community.   Despite this, our trading relationship with the European 
Community is one of the most important in the world and is critical to 
the integrity and vitality of the multilateral trading system.  We are 
each others' largest trading partners and maintain a diverse and largely 
balanced trade relationship.  Last year, two-way trade amounted to $197 
billion, with the United States running a surplus of nearly $9 billion.

The evolution of the European Single Market (EC 1992), which officially 
came into effect on January 1 of this year, has been a prominent feature 
in our trade relations with the EC in recent years.  We have welcomed 
the European project for its elimination of trade barriers between 12 of 
our most important trading partners, creating a single market comparable 
in size to our own.  But we insist that European integration legislation 
and policies treat US firms fairly.  When European policies create new 
barriers to US exports, we will act firmly to protect our interests.  I 
have already moved to address the barriers to US firms created by the 
newly implemented EC directive on procurement by utilities.  As the EC 
proceeds to form the European Economic Area with other West European 
countries, to deepen its own economic and monetary integration, and to 
add associate members from Eastern Europe, we will continue to make full 
use of the tools in our international agreements and US trade laws to 
keep markets open.

Japan

No aspect of our trade policy has proven more complex or contentious 
than our relationship with Japan.  In the past decade, our trade deficit 
with Japan has totaled nearly $500 billion.  The bilateral deficit 
peaked at $57 billion in 1987 and then came down over the next 4 years 
to $43 billion.  US exports did increase from $28 billion in 1987 to $48 
billion in 1991 but have leveled off since as the Japanese economy has 
stalled.  This year, the bilateral deficit has again increased to $49 
billion.  As always, the disproportionate amount of the deficit is made 
up of autos and auto parts and electronics.

A year ago, in the immediate aftermath of President Bush's trip to 
Japan, there was significant anger on both sides of the Pacific, 
particularly as the recession deepened.  The presidential campaign, 
which had the potential for inflaming the relationship further, did not.  
A great deal of credit goes to President Clinton, who steadfastly 
refrained from criticizing Japan and, instead, ran a campaign focused on 
dealing with our problems at home to strengthen our economy.

Nonetheless, the US-Japan trade relationship needs immediate and serious 
attention.  Clearly, the Japanese market has gradually become more open 
to our products and services and those of other nations over time, but 
the progress has not been rapid enough to produce the level playing 
field that we have sought for years.  Numerous barriers remain in Japan 
which prevent or dramatically reduce the sale of US products and 
services which are highly sought after in other countries around the 
world.

At the same time, Japan feels that it has been bombarded by demands from 
the United States--export less, import more, strengthen the yen, 
negotiate about individual products, negotiate about sectors, talk about 
structural impediments--demands that frequently change but never end.  
After years of a booming economy, Japan faces its own economic 
difficulties, making government and business leaders even more hostile 
to pressure from the United States, even while many in Japan express the 
view that change can occur only as a result of outside pressure.  
Resentments on both sides of the Pacific have built as a result of a 
decade of almost constant acrimony over one trade issue after another, 
but, despite efforts by both sides, we still find ourselves with an 
intolerable trade deficit and still-limited access to this critical 
market.

In the first instance, we must insist that Japan fully implement the 
range of agreements already negotiated and implement them in such a way 
that they provide important and concrete benefits to the United States 
and other non-Japanese suppliers.  Very early on, we have a chance to 
gauge the efficacy of these agreements.  In the coming weeks, we will be 
reviewing the progress on the semiconductor agreement to monitor the 
progress being made toward the expectation of a 20% market share in 
Japan for foreign semiconductors.  We intend to vigorously follow up on 
commitments that were made in January 1992 with respect to the auto 
parts market in Japan.  Recent developments in our supercomputer 
agreement are troubling, and we are evaluating our next steps.  On all 
these issues, we will be consulting closely with this committee and 
other interested Members of Congress.

Above and beyond the series of  individual disputes, we need to find a 
better approach for dealing with Japan trade issues--one that will lead 
steadily in the direction of a more equitable balance of economic 
benefits and responsibilities.  The beginning of a new Administration is 
the natural juncture for a careful review of the overall US-Japan 
relationship, to underscore the importance of the relationship by 
collaborating on problems that we can move on jointly while moving to 
address the very real bilateral problems between us.  President 
Clinton's commitment to dealing with our problems at home, without 
blaming Japan or any of our other trading partners, provides a more 
promising starting point for discussions about hard steps that Japan 
needs to take on its part.

China

With the highest growth rate in the world over the past decade and an 
entrepreneurial boom in the south, China has enormous potential as a 
market for American goods and services.  At the same time, China's human 
rights practices do not conform with international standards; we are 
concerned that its arms sales behavior jeopardizes our global non-
proliferation efforts; significant barriers to our products and services 
continue while China sends an increasing share of its exports to the 
United States.  All these factors raise serious questions about the 
nature of the relationship.

These issues have come together in the annual most-favored-nation [MFN] 
debate in the Congress.  The Bush Administration was adamant in 
rejecting every effort to put conditions on extension of MFN to China.  
The Clinton Administration will address all of these concerns--human 
rights, proliferation, and trade--and we will address them aggressively.  
We are currently reviewing our policy toward China, including MFN, and I 
can tell you that we will consult closely with the Congress.

On trade, an interagency team was in China last week following up on the 
two trade agreements that Ambassador Hills negotiated last year on 
intellectual property rights [IPR] and on market access.  So far, the 
Chinese are abiding by the terms of the IPR agreements.  On market 
access, there are some problems, and I am following up with my Chinese 
counterparts.  We are leading the process to negotiate China's entry 
into the GATT, and we will ensure that significant further changes in 
China's trade regime are made before that happens.  Finally, we are 
looking at other areas, such as services, that were not the subject of 
earlier negotiations yet are very important to our businessmen.  We 
expect an equitable and balanced trading relationship with China, and we 
will settle for no less.

The Administration and Congress also face the issues of renewing the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, which we are reviewing 
carefully as we consider our overall policies of trade and aid with 
developing and East and Central European countries.  As the President 
noted in his speech, the steady expansion of growth in the developing 
world is in our interest and theirs as well.  We need to do our part to 
alleviate the grinding poverty which afflicts much of the world at the 
same time [that] we are building markets for products made by our 
workers here.

Let me close on a personal note, which I mentioned in my confirmation 
hearing.  There is nothing theoretical about the job I have or the work 
that we will do together.  I traveled around the country during the last 
campaign, and I have seen the pain inflicted on people and communities 
from jobs lost as a result of a changing global economy.  I have spoken 
with many of you, and, through you, I have heard the concerns of those 
you represent.  Together, we need to find the mix of policies that 
rebuild the US economy so that our children have the opportunities that 
we were fortunate enough to have. (###)



ARTICLE 6:

US Policy in the Middle East
Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, March 9, 1993

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to meet again with you and the 
distinguished members of the subcommittee.

As you know, Secretary Christopher returned 11 days ago from his first 
journey outside the United States as Secretary of State, a trip that 
took us to Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Cyprus, Lebanon, 
[and] Israel; to Geneva, where he met with Russian Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev; and, finally, to Brussels for meetings with the North Atlantic 
Council.

President Clinton asked Secretary Christopher to travel to the Middle 
East with several important objectives in mind:

First, to demonstrate his belief that the Middle East peace process 
presented an opportunity for real progress in the period ahead and, 
conversely, to signal our awareness that this is a region which, if left 
unattended, can do much harm to vital US interests; [and]

Second, to promote other important objectives of our policy, namely:

--  Concern about human rights and broader political participation in 
the region;

--  Promotion of American business and commercial opportunities abroad 
and the need to end the secondary and tertiary aspects of the Arab 
economic boycott;

--  Reassurance to allies that we would expect Iraq's full compliance 
with all UN Security Council resolutions; [and]

--  Recognition of the importance we attach to Lebanon's continuing to 
make progress toward full independence and economic recovery.

The Secretary returned from the trip satisfied that we made some 
progress on these issues, which enables us to move forward in meeting 
these objectives in the period ahead.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly review for 
the subcommittee the status of our relations and interests in the Middle 
East following the Secretary's trip, after which I will be happy to take 
your questions.  I will endeavor to bring you up to date on the peace 
process, on our bilateral relations with some of the countries in the 
region, on our efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Persian 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, and on broader concerns such as our economic 
and commercial interests and the prospects for democracy and human 
rights.

Peace Process

On the peace process:  Since the eighth round of bilaterals adjourned in 
mid-December [1992], there has been a hiatus in the negotiations.  
President Clinton sent Secretary Christopher to the Middle East last 
month not only to re-energize and reactivate the peace talks but also to 
assess the determination and commitment of the parties to the goal of a 
negotiated peace.

The President and Secretary especially wanted to emphasize the 
commitment of the United States to a full partnership role in this 
complex and difficult process if, and this is important, the parties 
come to the table prepared to engage in serious and meaningful 
negotiations in order to narrow the substantive differences between 
them.

Much work needs to be done.  Not only are the substantive positions 
between the parties still far apart, but the political environment has 
been made more difficult by the resurgence of violence directed against 
Israel by terrorists and by the deportation of Hamas activists.

Deportees

The Secretary recognized and acted on the specific challenge of the 
deportees issue in the earliest days of the new Administration.  He 
engaged in intensive discussions with [Israeli] Prime Minister Rabin to 
move the issue off dead center.

In this regard, the understandings reached with Israel and announced by 
Prime Minister Rabin on February 1 and the Security Council's 
endorsement of the process for carrying out Resolution 799 were positive 
steps forward to resolve this issue.  Further, while the Secretary was 
in Jerusalem, he worked closely with Prime Minister Rabin and the 
Palestinians, represented by Faisal Husseini and his colleagues, to 
determine what more could be done to move the parties to resume 
negotiations at the earliest possible date.  As a result of these close 
consultations and discussions, more progress was achieved which allowed 
the Secretary and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev to announce in Geneva 
the intention of the co-sponsors to extend invitations to the parties 
very soon for a ninth round of negotiations in Washington in April.

Discussions With Arab Leaders

The Secretary's discussions with Arab leaders were positive and 
substantive.  Each of them emphasized privately their commitment to the 
negotiating process and their strong intent to return to the table of 
negotiations as soon as possible.  Equally important, each said the same 
thing publicly and, thus, placed their countries squarely behind an 
early resumption of the bilateral negotiations.

In delivering letters to each of the leaders from President Clinton, the 
Secretary focused on the key elements of the President's policy:

--  The United States remains committed to the process of peace- making 
launched at Madrid, including the terms of reference for the 
negotiations and the letters of assurances provided by the US Government 
to each party.

--  Our policy remains directed at the achievement of a comprehensive 
Arab-Israeli peace settlement, achieved through direct negotiations 
based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

--  The United States is prepared to play an active role to help narrow 
and overcome substantive differences if, as I stated earlier, the 
parties, on their part, are prepared to come to the table and engage in 
meaningful negotiations.  In playing this role, which the Secretary 
characterized as "full partner," he stressed that in no way would we 
substitute ourselves for the parties themselves; but, rather, we would 
assist the parties who are engaged in direct, face-to-face negotiations 
as an active intermediary--an honest broker and facilitator--in helping 
to move the talks forward and to narrow substantive differences.

The parties appreciated the continuity in US policy which this approach 
indicated;  they were buoyed by the willingness of the United States to 
play a more active role;  they indicated their understanding that such a 
role would not substitute for the direct talks between themselves.

Discussions With Israelis And Palestinians

The Secretary's talks in Israel on a range of bilateral, regional, and 
peace process issues benefited from his previous engagement with Prime 
Minister Rabin in arranging the process for dealing with the 
deportations issue.  Through that effort, a positive relationship was 
begun, characterized by mutual trust and personal rapport that, as a 
result of this visit, has intensified and provides an excellent basis 
for Prime Minister Rabin's meeting with President Clinton this month.

The Secretary's discussions with Palestinian leaders were also frank and 
substantive.  The Palestinians expressed their continued concerns about 
the human rights situation in the occupied territories, and there was an 
extensive discussion of issues involving the negotiations on interim 
self-government arrangements and final status talks.

After these detailed exchanges with both Israelis and Palestinians, we 
left the region persuaded that there was broad agreement in principle on 
the steps that were needed to restart the peace negotiations.

In sum, the Secretary's trip allowed us to refocus the parties on 
resuming the negotiations and to sensitize the parties that it is time 
to delve into substance and that the United States will be there to 
assist them to reach agreements.

Bilateral Relations

A primary aim of the Secretary in undertaking his trip was to get to 
know the region's leaders, to listen and to learn of their concerns, and 
to establish good personal relationships that would facilitate the 
conduct of our formal bilateral relations.  In this respect, we were 
very encouraged by the results.

Egypt.  In Cairo, the Secretary renewed the friendship and cooperative 
relationship the United States has enjoyed with Egypt for many years.  
Recognizing the "pivotal role" Egypt plays in the region, the Secretary 
saluted Egypt's invaluable leadership under President Mubarak in the 
search for peace and expressed his appreciation for the "wise counsel" 
proffered by Egypt's leaders on issues of mutual concern.

Jordan.  In Jordan, the Secretary noted substantial progress toward 
democratization and King Hussein's commitment to protection of human 
rights.  Jordan is taking concrete steps toward economic reform and a 
strengthened free market economy.  Of course, Jordan has been a key 
participant in the peace process, and we look forward to its continued 
positive role. King Hussein also assured the Secretary that Jordan would 
continue to adhere to UN sanctions against Iraq.

To support Jordan's positive role in the peace process and its adherence 
to UN sanctions, we will recommend soon to the Secretary that he release 
the remaining $50 million in FY 1992 security assistance funds.  We 
will, of course, discuss our plans with you and other Members of 
Congress before disbursement.

Syria.  In Damascus, the Secretary consulted extensively with President 
Assad on the peace process and a wide range of bilateral issues.  The 
Syrian President assured the Secretary that he remains firmly committed 
to the peace process and to re-engaging as soon as possible in the next 
round of bilateral negotiations.

The Secretary also established with the Syrians the basis for continuing 
our dialogue to address high-priority bilateral concerns, including 
terrorism, narcotics, and human rights, with a view toward obtaining 
positive results.  In this latter respect, the Secretary raised the 
issue of Syrian Jewry, and President Assad reconfirmed his decision to 
allow Syrian Jews full freedom of travel.  Secretary Christopher also 
made clear the importance we continue to attach to the redeployment of 
Syrian forces in Lebanon.

Lebanon.  The Secretary identified as one of his objectives the 
recognition of the progress achieved by the Lebanese Government in 
reconciling and reconstructing that war-torn nation.  His dramatic visit 
to Beirut--the first by an American Secretary of State since 1983--
underscored our continuing support for Lebanon's efforts to restore its 
economy and to regain full control of its territory and its political 
independence and was welcomed by the Lebanese leadership--President 
Hraoui, Prime Minister Hariri, and Foreign Minister Buouez--as a 
powerful symbol of the US commitment to Lebanon.

We continue to support full implementation of both the letter and the 
spirit of the Taif accord and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces 
from Lebanon, and the Secretary made this clear during his trip.

In Lebanon, a key to the extension of government authority throughout 
the country is the maintenance of strong Lebanese armed forces.  The 
Lebanese army has traditionally sought training for many of its soldiers 
in the West, including in the United States.  It remains our hope that 
we can resume accepting a number of Lebanese officers and enlisted 
personnel for training in this country under the IMET [International 
Military Education and Training] program, and we would appreciate 
Congress' support in this endeavor.

Israel.   Upon his arrival in Israel, Secretary Christopher reconfirmed 
the special relationship, based on shared democratic values and common 
interests, that exists between Israel and the United States.  Citing 
President Clinton's determination to make the ties binding our two 
countries "even stronger and more resilient," the Secretary also 
reaffirmed the United States' unalterable commitment to Israel's 
security and its qualitative military edge, a commitment based on our 
recognition of Israel's continuing security challenges.

The Secretary observed that real security for Israel can only be brought 
about by real peace--not just the absence of war but peace reflected in 
lasting treaties, normalized relations, and genuine reconciliation with 
her neighbors and with the Palestinians.  To that end, and recognizing 
that obstacles still existed, he reiterated the US commitment to the 
role of full partner in a reinvigorated peace process.

Gulf Security

Turning now to the Persian Gulf, we continue to work on two fronts to 
assure the security of this economically vital region.  Those two fronts 
are our continuing efforts to encourage and help provide a credible 
defense of our friends and allies on the Arabian Peninsula and the full 
enforcement of UN resolutions on Iraq.

The Arabian Peninsula.  In helping provide for the defense of the Gulf 
states, it must first be noted that the six Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries--allies and important trading partners of the United 
States--remain vulnerable to aggression from an unrepentant Iraq or a 
rearmed and ideologically assertive Iran.

Secretary Christopher reaffirmed the US position on Gulf security when 
he told the Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders that "President Clinton's 
commitment to the security of friends in the Gulf, like that of every 
President since Franklin Roosevelt, is firm and constant."  As you know, 
the US Government has encouraged regional security cooperation and 
collective defense arrangements within the GCC and has been engaged in 
our own bilateral security agreements with the individual Gulf states.  
Further, we have made arms sales to those states to satisfy their 
legitimate defense needs.

Iraq.  The Baghdad Government has lately been trying to convince anyone 
who will listen that it seeks a more amicable relationship with the 
Clinton Administration and that there is no longer any reason for the 
United Nations to retain sanctions against Iraq.  This has been 
characterized as Iraq's "charm offensive."  Let me make clear, as 
President Clinton and Secretary Christopher already have, that we are 
not charmed.  Iraq must comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.

In his semi-annual report to Congress on the Iraq sanctions, released 
just 3 weeks ago [Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 8, p. 97], President Clinton 
reaffirmed the continuity of our policy toward Iraq.  He noted that the 
Iraqi regime's continued refusal to accept the UN resolutions has 
perpetuated the suffering of the Iraqi people.  The President stressed 
that Iraq must fully comply with the UN resolutions, which mandate an 
end to repression of the Iraqi people as well as measures designed to 
achieve the security of Iraq's neighbors, before lifting of economic 
sanctions can be considered.  Recent incidents of Iraqi threats against 
UN helicopters are further examples of Iraq's non-compliance with the 
most basic of its obligations--to permit full and free access to UN 
inspectors seeking to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
programs and to establish long-term monitoring of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction capabilities.

In Riyadh [Saudi Arabia] and Kuwait 2 weeks ago, the Secretary stressed 
yet again the importance the Clinton Administration attaches to the full 
implementation of all UN resolutions on Iraq and of implementing the 
means chosen by the coalition to do so.  He emphasized that "we bear no 
ill will to the suffering people of Iraq. . . .  The pain inflicted on 
the Iraqi people is the responsibility of Saddam Hussein's regime."  In 
fact, we continue to fund relief programs in northern Iraq, to support 
UN efforts to establish relief in central and southern Iraq, and to 
support the recent recommendations of UN Special Representative Max van 
der Stoel that the United Nations should station human rights monitors 
throughout Iraq.

We also support the work of the opposition Iraqi National Congress to 
draw all Iraqis into the creation of a future and, hopefully, democratic 
regime that can allow the Iraqi people to live in peace.  A future Iraqi 
Government which is representative of all the people of Iraq, which is 
committed to the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq, and which does 
not threaten its neighbors or its own people remains a key US foreign 
policy goal.

Mr. Chairman, the message is clear:  No one should doubt the continued 
and undiminished resolve of the US Government under the leadership of 
President Clinton to see that the will of the international community, 
as defined by the UN Security Council, is heeded and fully complied 
with.

Economic and Commercial Interests

The United States has important economic and commercial interests in the 
Middle East, and especially in the Gulf region, which we continue to 
pursue actively.  Throughout his trip, the Secretary raised with several 
of his interlocutors the Administration's support for US companies that 
are bidding on significant local contracts.  Regarding American business 
interests in Saudi Arabia, I am pleased to report that, as Secretary [of 
Defense] Aspin has written to you, we are achieving progress in 
resolving a number of the commercial disputes with that country.

Several have been concluded recently, and Saudi Ambassador Bandar is 
working to conclude agreements with the remaining claimants.  We will 
continue our strong efforts in this regard.

During his visit, the Secretary strongly urged the leaders of Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait to work to eliminate the Arab League boycott of 
Israel.  Since the Gulf war, these countries have quietly reduced 
enforcement of the boycott against American companies.  The Secretary 
emphasized clearly that more needs to be done, however.  We continue to 
press Arab states hard to end these anachronistic measures, and we have 
urged immediate action to eliminate the secondary and tertiary aspects 
of the boycott, especially as they affect American companies.  We are 
also working with our trading partners, and the European Community and 
Japan have both made their own demarches.

Democracy, Human Rights, And Islam

I have previously mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that we have been encouraged 
to see concrete steps being taken toward expanding political 
participation in a number of Arab countries.  During his trip, Secretary 
Christopher applauded [Jordanian] King Hussein's ongoing process of 
democratization and, in Kuwait, the reinstitution of its parliament.  He 
encouraged the Kuwaiti Government's consideration of expanding suffrage 
and specifically raised the right of women to vote in Kuwaiti elections.

We also note that Yemen is scheduled to hold its first-ever 
parliamentary elections in late April, and we are encouraging the 
Yemenis in this effort.  We have encouraged American bipartisan and non-
government[al] organization observers to be present during the polling, 
with the endorsement of the Government of Yemen.

In keeping with Muslim tradition, the other Gulf countries, including 
Saudi Arabia, are in the process of creating or reviving appointed 
consultative councils, which is a step toward broader political 
participation.  As Secretary Christopher stated before his visit, we 
hope the respective governments will move forward on these intentions 
and will use these councils to provide broader and more formal public 
access to and participation in the process of governance.

Several of the region's governments are struggling to cope with 
rhetorical, political, and sometimes violent challenges justified on the 
basis of religious precepts.  While we recognize the seriousness of some 
of these challenges and have stated our position on Islamic and 
extremist groups in the speech I gave at Meridian House last June--and 
which you were kind enough to enter into the Congressional Record--we 
call on all concerned--secular or religious activists and governments 
alike--to practice the respect for human rights, pluralism, and 
tolerance of others inherent in the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian 
traditions.  These are values we Americans cherish and, without 
attempting to impose our own model on other governments, these are 
values we are convinced will well serve the peoples of this turbulent 
region. (###)



ARTICLE 7:

Situation in Sudan
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Washington, DC, March 10, 1993

I want to thank the members of this committee for the opportunity to 
review the situation in Sudan.  I would especially like to congratulate 
Congressman Johnston on assuming the chairmanship of this subcommittee, 
which plays such an important role in developing US policy toward 
Africa.

This may well be my last appearance before Congress, and I wish that the 
subject matter were a more uplifting one.  But I am very grateful for 
the Congress' continuing interest in Sudan, as demonstrated by the 
resolution passed last November, the numerous letters, and the personal 
visit of Congressman Wolf.  We in the Administration value Congress' 
help in drawing attention to the civil war, human rights, and 
humanitarian crises in Sudan and in seeking new ways to bring assistance 
to suffering people there.  Khartoum needs to know that American 
concerns about its behavior extend beyond the State Department, and you 
in Congress have helped to make that clear.

Sudan presents us with a raft of thorny problems which, taken as a 
whole, constitute one of our biggest policy challenges in Africa.  Civil 
war, systematic abuse of human rights, intense humanitarian suffering, 
concerns about terrorism, and regional instability--these are the pieces 
of the Sudan policy puzzle.  I can tell you that putting the puzzle 
together in a way that satisfies America's concerns and interests is a 
top priority for the Administration in its approach to Africa.

I would like to frame my remarks to you today by first discussing the 
humanitarian situation and our response to it, then addressing our other 
policy concerns, and, finally, reviewing some options for a more 
vigorous approach to the Sudanese crisis.

Humanitarian Disaster and US Response

As you've heard from your colleague Congressman Wolf, southern Sudan has 
become one of the world's darkest humanitarian nightmares.  It is a 
chaotic territory where civil war, disease, homelessness, and hunger 
form a tapestry of tragedy for millions of Sudanese.  You will receive a 
detailed report on the situation from Ms. Richards [Acting Assistant 
Administrator for the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, US 
Agency for International Development (USAID)], but it is clear that 
several hundred thousand people face starvation if they do not receive 
assistance in the coming months.  In at least some areas, people are 
already dying in large numbers, at rates comparable to the worst 
situations in Somalia.

Sudan's civil war is at the very heart of this human catastrophe.  
Fighting between government forces and the Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army (SPLA) and between factions of the SPLA has driven people from 
their homes, disrupted agricultural production, and prevented relief 
organizations from reaching the victims of war and drought.

Recent UN initiatives have produced some progress in resolving obstacles 
to delivering relief to southern Sudan, and some relief supplies are now 
beginning to move along the Nile, railroads, and overland routes.  An 
increasing number of NGOs [non-governmental organizations] are willing 
to go back into southern Sudan, and the food pipeline is in good shape.  
But access to affected populations will remain a problem as long as the 
civil war continues.  Government bombing of rebel-held towns in the 
south and rebel looting of relief deliveries are examples of the 
problems facing the relief effort.  With the humanitarian crisis 
reaching new depths, it is critical that all sides in the conflict 
permit access.  If this access is not granted to avoid further 
catastrophe, we will certainly be considering other options to ensure 
the delivery of relief assistance.

Ms. Richards will provide details on what the United States has done and 
is doing to meet the needs of the southern Sudanese.  Let me just pre- 
face those details by saying that our contribution has been substantial, 
with over $53 million in humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people 
provided in FY 1992.  Beyond our contributions in cash and in kind, we 
have pursued active diplomacy with both the Sudanese Government and the 
SPLA to press for increased access for relief operations.  The recent 
marginal improvements in the access situation tell us that our efforts 
have had some success.

As we explore new approaches to the Sudanese crisis--and I'll have more 
on that later--one thing is certain:  The United States will remain 
actively engaged with UN agencies, non-government[al] organizations, and 
other donor countries to help meet the needs of suffering populations in 
southern Sudan.  Our ambassador in Khartoum, Don Petterson, has recently 
traveled to the south, as have a number of relief experts from OFDA 
[USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance].  We will be closely 
examining their recommendations as we seek a more vigorous approach to 
this crisis.

While we will do everything we can to meet the needs of this crisis, it 
is very clear that the only long-term solution to southern Sudan's 
humanitarian nightmare is an end to civil strife.  As long as southern 
populations are regularly dislocated by warfare, the international 
relief community will be playing an endless game of catch-up.  In this 
regard, the recent announcement that talks between the government and 
John Garang's faction of the SPLA will resume in Nigeria is welcome 
news.  We hope that both sides will bring a more serious commitment to 
these talks than has been the case in the past, and we have told all 
sides that we are willing to facilitate the peace process.

Other Bilateral Concerns

Let me turn for a moment from the central issue of the humanitarian 
crisis to touch on some other matters in our relationship with the 
Khartoum Government.  Our bilateral relations with Sudan remain badly 
strained--and for good reason.  Our shock and outrage over the 
government's execution of two of our Sudanese employees in Juba last 
August have in no way diminished with the passage of time.  The 
Government in Khartoum has informed us that an independent commission is 
investigating these killings.  We have yet to receive any results from 
this investigation, and we continue to make clear to the government that 
the lack of a satisfactory response on this issue remains a very serious 
problem in our bilateral relationship.

I'd like to briefly summarize our principal human rights concerns with 
respect to Sudan.  The forced removal of Khartoum's squatter populations 
has been a long-standing concern, as have the forced relocations and 
systematic abuses perpetrated against people in the Nuba Mountains.  
Infringement of the rights of women, arbitrary detention, torture, 
repression of the press, and restrictions on labor unions are routinely 
used by the government to suppress dissent.

We also remain deeply worried about Khartoum's policy of coercive 
Islamization of non-Muslim Sudanese.  As we have consistently stressed 
to the government, the fact that the Sudanese Government has an Islamic 
orientation is not at issue.  Our objection, rather, is to a state-
sponsored effort to impose a specific religion and religious law on 
those whose beliefs lie elsewhere.  The Pope's recent visit to Khartoum 
usefully called attention to the persecution of Christians, and we are 
encouraged by the government's pledges, before and during the Pope's 
visit, to take a more tolerant approach to the Christian community.  Now 
Khartoum's actions must meet its word.

The United States also continues to watch Sudan closely in connection 
with our worldwide efforts to combat terrorism.  Khartoum harbors known 
terrorists and terrorist groups, including Hizballah, Hamas, and the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  It maintains close ties to Libya and Iraq, 
which it tacitly supported during the Gulf war.  Most disturbing, 
however, is the increasing level of Iranian activity in Sudan since 
[Iranian] President Rafsanjani's visit to Khartoum in December 1991.  
Iranian Revolutionary Guards operate in Sudan, and Khartoum has become a 
venue for contact with Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups and North 
African extremists.  We are monitoring the situation closely and have 
made it clear to the Sudanese that, under US law, they are extremely 
close to being designated a state sponsor of terrorism.

Diplomatic Actions

We are working hard, and with some success, to maintain international 
pressure on Khartoum in order to moderate the regime's human rights 
behavior.  A resolution, which we sponsored at the UN General Assembly 
in December, called attention to Sudan's human rights record and its 
unproductive approach to the humanitarian needs of its own population.

Due to consistent US pressure, Sudan figured prominently in the debate 
of the recently concluded UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva.  The 
United States has taken the lead in seeking to have a special rapporteur 
appointed to examine alleged abuses in Sudan.  Aside from these 
successful efforts within the UN system, we have pursued bilateral 
approaches to engage our allies in an attempt to isolate Khartoum.  One 
focus of this effort has been on diplomatic efforts to discourage 
shipments of arms to Sudan.  For our own part, we have formalized a 
policy of disapproving all license applications for military-related 
exports to Sudan and have asked our allies to do the same.  Further, we 
have urged our donor partners to follow our lead in suspending non-
humanitarian development assistance to Sudan.

There is some indication that these measures have helped to shake 
Khartoum's leaders into a realization, however faint, that 
internationally unacceptable behavior has economic and political 
consequences.  While Khartoum continues to respond to our concerns 
mainly with half-measures and promises of positive action, there are 
some signs that elements within the government understand the need to be 
more forthcoming.  The government's marginally more cooperative approach 
to humanitarian relief in recent months is one such indication.  A 
dialogue with the government on human rights and other issues continues, 
and we believe that this dialogue holds the potential for additional 
constructive moves by Khartoum.

Next Steps

Our concerns are, however, far from being satisfied.  Clearly, we need 
to maintain and increase our pressure to produce results on the 
humanitarian and human rights fronts.  The Administration has recently 
embarked on a comprehensive review of US policy toward Sudan, designed 
to cover all of our outstanding concerns--the humanitarian crisis, human 
rights, terrorism, and the civil war.  I want to stress that we are at 
the early stages of this review.  We are developing options, and I 
expect that decisions on these options will be made within the next 
month.  So while I can't be specific about policies that are still under 
review, I would like to discuss some broad options and to hear your 
reactions and your own ideas.

The humanitarian issue is at the top of the agenda as we review our 
policy toward Sudan.  We will continue to explore ways to keep the 
relief lines open through our contacts with both the government and the 
SPLA.  More importantly, we will continue to press for serious peace 
talks between the government and the SPLA.  We have no illusions about 
the difficulty of this process.  Khartoum's lack of enthusiasm for 
negotiations has been amply demonstrated in the past, and internal 
fractures within the SPLA are bound to reduce the chances for serious 
breakthroughs.  An end to this conflict will require greater efforts by 
both sides.

As many of you may be aware, a number of non-government[al] 
organizations are pressing for the establishment of "secure zones" 
within the south, where drought- and war-affected Sudanese could take 
refuge and receive relief.  This idea merits consideration, although 
implementation would be a complex affair.  First, it seems likely that 
any action along these lines would require a UN mandate.  The real 
concern, however, is that identification of secure zones would almost 
certainly become subject to the ambitions and objectives of the parties 
to warfare in the south.   Given the tremendous difficulty in soliciting 
cooperation from the government and SPLA for existing relief efforts, a 
mandate to create these zones in disputed territory could well encounter 
significant resistance which would have to be countered with solid, 
coordinated international pressure.

We are also examining ways to encourage a moderation of Sudan's human 
rights performance through concerted international attention and action.  
We believe that our efforts in the UN General Assembly and at the Human 
Rights Commission in Geneva have helped to reinforce to Khartoum that 
its behavior is unacceptable and that the international community is 
determined to focus a harsh spotlight on the regime's political 
repression and its brutal treatment of significant portions of Sudan's 
population.  

Unfortunately, we are dealing with a government which answers 
international concern with half-measures, if at all.  We will continue 
to explore ways of using our political and economic leverage, in 
coordination with other concerned nations, to bring the maximum pressure 
to bear in support of human rights in Sudan.

Again, as we continue to focus on the situation in Sudan, Congress can 
play a critical role.  The congressional resolution passed last November 
sent a strong message to Khartoum.  Congressman Wolf's visit and his 
activist approach on Sudan since his return have been extremely 
constructive.  By publicly demonstrating interest and concern, the 
Congress can continue to play an important role.  The Administration 
looks forward to continued close contact with this committee as our 
Sudan policy evolves.  (###)



ARTICLE 8:

Fact Sheet:  Open Skies Treaty

The following fact sheet was released by the Office of Public Affairs, 
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, March 4, 1993.

Introduction

The Treaty on Open Skies establishes a regime of unarmed aerial 
observation flights over the entire territory of its participants.  The 
treaty is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by 
giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering 
information about military forces and activities of concern to them.  
Open Skies is the most wide-ranging international effort to date to 
promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities.

Current Status

The Treaty on Open Skies was signed in Helsinki, Finland, on March 24, 
1992.  It was negotiated between the members of NATO and members of the 
Warsaw Pact; the latter dissolved during the course of the talks.  The 
following states have signed the Open Skies Treaty:  Belarus, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.  

The other independent states on the territory of the former Soviet Union 
are eligible to sign the treaty.  Other members of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe may apply for participation in the 
Open Skies regime as soon as the treaty enters into force.  Six months 
after entry into force, the Treaty on Open Skies will be open to 
application for participation by any interested state.  Applications for 
participation after entry into force are subject to consensus agreement 
by the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC), a forum of all states 
parties charged with facilitating the implementation of the treaty.

Provisional application of portions of the Open Skies Treaty began on 
March 24, 1992, and can be extended beyond the initial 1-year term.  The 
treaty will enter into force 60 days after the deposit of 20 instruments 
of ratification, including those of the two depositaries, Canada and 
Hungary, and states parties with a passive quota of eight or more (which 
include Belarus, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States).  The Open Skies Treaty was 
submitted to the US Senate for its advice and consent on August 12, 
1992.

Basic Elements of the Treaty

Territory.  The treaty specifies that all territory of the participating 
states is open to observation.  Observed countries may not restrict 
observation flights for national security reasons, only for legitimate 
reasons of flight safety.

Aircraft.  Observation aircraft may be provided by either the observing 
party or by the observed party, at the latter's option.  All Open Skies 
aircraft and sensors must pass specific certification and pre-flight 
inspection procedures to ensure that they meet treaty standards and that 
only treaty-permitted sensors are installed.  The US Open Skies aircraft 
will be a modified WC-135B aircraft (a military version of the Boeing 
707).

Sensors.  Open Skies aircraft may have video, optical panoramic, and 
framing cameras for daylight photography, infrared line scanners for a 
day/night capability, and synthetic aperture radar for a day/night all-
weather capability.  Photographic image quality will permit recognition 
of major military equipment--the ability to distinguish a tank from a 
truck--thus allowing significant transparency of military forces and 
activities.  Sensor categories may be added and capabilities improved by 
agreement among states parties.  All equipment used in Open Skies must 
be commercially available to all participants.  

Quotas.  Each participant has agreed to an annual quota of observation 
flights it is willing to receive--its passive quota of observation 
flights.  Each participant may conduct as many observation flights--its 
active quota--as its passive quota.  The full passive quota for the US 
and the Russia/Belarus group of states parties is 42 flights each.  
During the first 3 years after entry into force, countries will have to 
accept only 75% of their passive quotas.  The initial US and 
Russia/Belarus passive quota is 31 flights each.  For the first year of 
the treaty's operation, only 4 of the 31 potential flights over the 
United States were requested, all by Russia/Belarus.  The United States 
is entitled to 8 of the 31 flights available over Russia/Belarus.  
Additionally, the United States is entitled to one flight over Ukraine, 
to be shared with Canada.

Data Availability.  The treaty provides that the observing state will 
provide a copy of the data that it collects during an overflight to the 
observed state.  In addition, all participating states have the right to 
purchase the data collected by any state.  As a result, the data 
available to each Open Skies participating state is much greater than 
that which it can collect itself under the treaty quota system.(###)



ARTICLE 9:

Fact Sheet:  Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons
The following fact sheet was released by the Office of Public Affairs, 
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, March 5, 1993.

From February 8-12, 1993, the Preparatory Commission of all signatories 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) met in The Hague, the 
Netherlands, to set up the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) and to further elaborate detailed CWC implementing 
procedures.  The purpose of the OPCW will be to ensure implementation of 
the CWC, signed in Paris on January 13 [1993] by 130 nations.  The CWC 
bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, 
transfer, and use of chemical weapons.

Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons.  All countries 
ratifying the convention will become states parties to the CWC and will 
make up the membership of the OPCW.  The OPCW, with headquarters in The 
Hague, will consist of the Conference of the States Parties and its 
Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. 

Conference of the States Parties.  The first meeting of the Conference 
of the States Parties will be convened not later than 30 days after the 
entry into force of the CWC.  (The CWC will enter into force 180 days 
after the 65th ratification but not earlier than 2 years after January 
13, 1993.)  The first meeting is expected to occur in the spring of 
1995.  

As the principal organ of the OPCW, the conference will oversee the 
implementation of the CWC and act in order to promote its object and 
purpose, including reviewing compliance with the CWC.  The conference 
also will oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the 
Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines in accordance with the 
CWC to either of them for the exercise of their functions.  

Not later than 1 year after the expiration of the fifth and tenth year 
after entry into force of the CWC, and at such other times as may be 
decided upon within that time period, the conference shall convene in 
special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of the CWC.  Such 
reviews will take into account any relevant scientific and technological 
developments.  At intervals of 5 years thereafter, unless otherwise 
decided upon, further sessions of the conference will be convened with 
the same objective.

Executive Council.  The Executive Council will consist of 41 members, 
with each state party having the right, in accordance with the principle 
of rotation, to serve on the council.  The members of the council will 
be elected by the conference for a  2-year term.  (For the first 
election of the Executive Council, 20 members shall be elected for a 1-
year term.)  In order to ensure the effective functioning of the CWC, 
the composition of the council will be made up in a way that gives due 
regard to equitable geographical distribution, to the importance of 
chemical industry, and to political and security interests. 

The council will be the executive organ of the OPCW and shall be 
responsible to the Conference of the States Parties for its actions.  In 
this capacity, the council will carry out the powers and functions 
entrusted to it under the CWC, as well as those functions delegated to 
it by the conference.  In so doing, it will act in conformity with the 
recommendations, decisions, and guidelines of the conference and assure 
their proper and continuous implementation.  In addition to promoting 
the effective implementation of and compliance with the CWC, the council 
will supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat, cooperate 
with the national authority of each state party, and facilitate 
consultations and cooperation among states parties at their request. 

The council has the right and duty to consider any issue or matter 
within its competence affecting the CWC and its implementation, 
including concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance, 
and, as appropriate, inform states parties and bring the issue or matter 
to the attention of the conference. 

In cases of particular gravity and urgency, the council will bring the 
matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the 
attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.  At 
the same time, the council will inform all states parties of its action.  

Technical Secretariat.  The Technical Secretariat will be comprised of a 
director general, who will be its head and chief administrative officer; 
inspectors; and such scientific, technical, and other personnel as may 
be required.  The conference will appoint the director general upon the 
recommendation of the Executive Council, and he [or she] will be 
responsible to them for the appointment of the staff and the 
organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat.  

The secretariat will assist the conference and the council in the 
performance of their functions as well as carry out the verification 
measures provided for in the CWC.   The secretariat also will carry out 
the other functions entrusted to it under the CWC and those functions 
delegated to it by the conference and the council. 

A major responsibility of the secretariat is to inform the council of 
any problem that arises with regard to the discharge of its functions, 
including doubts, ambiguities, or uncertainties about compliance with 
the CWC that have come to its notice in the performance of its 
verification activities and that it has been unable to resolve or 
clarify through its consultations with the state party concerned. 

It is the responsibility of each state party to respect the exclusively 
international character of the responsibilities of the director general, 
the inspectors, and other members of the staff and not seek to influence 
them in the discharge of their duties. (###)



ARTICLE 10:

Department Statements

US To Enforce Moratorium on Driftnet Fishing
Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, 
Washington, DC, March 8, 1993.

The United States announced plans today to enforce a moratorium on 
large-scale driftnet fishing on the high seas.  The moratorium was 
agreed to at the UN General Assembly in 1991.  Under UN Resolution 
46/215, which was adopted by consensus, a global moratorium on all 
large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing operations on the high seas took 
effect on January 1, 1993.  All members of the international community 
agreed to take measures individually and collectively to  implement the 
resolution.

The United States plans to take the following steps in the event US 
enforcement authorities have reasonable grounds to believe that any 
foreign flag vessel encountered on the high seas is conducting or has 
conducted large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing operations in violation 
of the UN resolution:

1.  US authorities will contact the authorities of the territory whose 
flag the vessel is flying to seek confirmation that the vessel is in 
fact registered by those authorities.  If the vessel is not flying a 
flag, US authorities will contact the authorities of the territory in 
which the vessel claims to be registered to seek confirmation of the 
same information.  The US Government will expect a prompt response to 
such a request to facilitate enforcement operations.

2.  If the contacted authorities verify that the vessel in question is 
registered in their territory, US authorities will take appropriate 
action in accordance with agreements in force between the United States 
and those authorities or any other bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements that may be made to prevent large-scale pelagic driftnet 
fishing operations on the high seas [which are] inconsistent with the UN 
resolution.  If there are no pre-existing arrangements, the United 
States will seek a special arrangement to take law enforcement or other 
appropriate action on behalf of the authorities in whose territory the 
vessel is registered.

3.  If the contacted authorities deny that the vessel in question is 
registered in their territory, or if the vessel refuses to reveal or 
claim a territory of registry, US authorities will, consistent with 
Article 92 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, treat the 
vessel as stateless.  It is noted that, under customary international 
and US law, a stateless vessel conducting large-scale pelagic driftnet 
fishing operations on the high seas would be subject to penalty in the 
United   States.


Rwanda
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, March 
9, 1993.

The Government of the United States welcomes the communique signed by 
the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front in Dar es 
Salaam [Tanzania on] March 7 calling for renewed negotiations in Arusha 
[Tanzania] and consolidation of the Nsele cease-fire agreement.  We 
commend the two parties for their recognition of the need for 
reconciliation and a negotiated settlement to the conflict that has 
devastated Rwanda since 1990 and displaced up to a million people.  We 
call on both parties to abide by the commitments and timetable they have 
agreed to and facilitate the return of the displaced to their homes, as 
announced in the communique.

The government also wishes to commend the facilitator, the Government of 
Tanzania, and representatives of the Organization of African Unity for 
their work in helping the two parties reach agreement.

We have been participating as observers in the Arusha negotiations since 
July 1992.  A State Department political-military specialist is 
currently in the region to meet with both sides and attend the Arusha 
talks.

In recognition of Rwanda's recent progress toward democratization and 
economic reform, we are providing approximately $20 million in bilateral 
assistance programs in FY 1993.  Continued assistance depends upon 
further progress on democratization, good governance, and a renewed 
commitment to human rights and the rule of law.  Continued violence 
could jeopardize our bilateral assistance programs.

Last year, we provided almost $3 million in humanitarian assistance to 
the 350,000 persons displaced by previous fighting.  The US Agency for 
International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has 
already committed an additional $1 mil-lion to assist the newly 
displaced, food airlifts have begun, and a US planeload of blankets and 
other relief items arrived [on] March 4.


Secretary Names Special Adviser for Haiti
Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, 
Washington, DC, March 11, 1993.

The Secretary is today announcing the appointment of Ambassador Lawrence 
Pezzullo, a distinguished retired Foreign Service officer, as his 
special adviser for Haiti.

Haiti is a full-time concern of this Administration, and the Secretary 
wanted to have a high-level official devoting full time to Haiti.  
Ambassador Pezzullo will fill that role.

With the UN/OAS [Organization of American States] mission in place and 
with UN/OAS Special Envoy Dante Caputo undertaking renewed efforts to 
promote a negotiated solution in Haiti, the Secretary anticipates the 
need in coming months for the United States and other parties to engage 
intensively to support diplomatic efforts.  As we move forward, 
Ambassador Pezzullo will advise the Secretary on Haitian matters, and he 
will support in particular Mr. Caputo's efforts to promote negotiations.

The President and the Secretary place a very high priority on resolving 
Haiti's crisis.  This Administration wants to see democracy restored, 
[Haitian] President Aristide returned to office, and a resumed 
international effort to promote Haiti's economic and democratic 
development.

Ambassador Pezzullo will begin work at the Department tomorrow.  He has 
been Executive Director of Catholic Relief Services since 1983.  He 
entered the Foreign Service in 1957 and served as ambassador to Uruguay 
(1977-79) and Nicaragua (1979-81).  (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 11

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