US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 8, FEBRUARY 22, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Report on Iraqi Developments -- President Clinton 
2.  Update on Progress in Somalia -- Robert Houdek  
3.  Department Statements
     Cuban Crackdown on Labor Union Leaders
     Support for Colombian Democracy 
4.  Fact Sheet:  Cuba 
5.  Country Profile:  Cuba 
6.  Fact Sheet:  Council of Europe
7.  Fact Sheet:  Who Belongs To What 
8.  New Ambassadors



ARTICLE 1:

Report on Iraqi Developments
President Clinton
Text of a letter to Congress, February 16, 1993.

To the Congress of the United States:

I hereby report to the Congress on the developments since the last 
report of August 3, 1992, concerning the national emergency with respect 
to Iraq that was declared in Executive Order No. 12722 of August 2, 
1990.  This report is submitted pursuant to sections 401(c) of the 
National Emergencies Act ("NEA"), 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 204(c) 
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. 
1703(c).

Executive Order No. 12722 ordered the immediate blocking of all property 
and interests in property of the Government of Iraq (including the 
Central Bank of Iraq) then or thereafter located in the United States or 
within the possession or control of a U.S. person.  That order also 
prohibited the importation into the United States of goods and services 
of Iraqi origin, as well as the exportation of goods, services, and 
technology from the United States to Iraq.  The order prohibited travel-
related transactions to or from Iraq and the performance of any contract 
in support of any industrial, commercial, or governmental project in 
Iraq.  U.S. persons were also prohibited from granting or extending 
credit or loans to the Government of Iraq.

The foregoing prohibitions (as well as the blocking of Government of 
Iraq property) were continued and augmented on August 9, 1990, by 
Executive Order No. 12724, which was issued in order to align the 
sanctions imposed by the United States with United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990.

This report discusses only matters concerning the national emergency 
with respect to Iraq that was declared in Executive Order No. 12722 and 
matters relating to Executive Orders Nos. 12724 and 12817 (the 
"Executive Orders").  The report covers events from August 2, 1992, 
through February 1, 1993.

1.  On October 21, 1992, President Bush issued Executive Order No. 
12817, implementing in the United States measures adopted in United 
Nations Security Council Resolution ("UNSCR") No. 778 of October 2, 
1992.  UNSCR No. 778 requires U.N. member states temporarily to transfer 
to a U.N. escrow account up to $200 million apiece in Iraqi oil proceeds 
paid by the purchaser after the imposition of U.N. sanctions on Iraq.  
These funds finance Iraq's obligations for U.N. activities with respect 
to Iraq, including expenses to verify Iraqi weapons destruction and to 
provide humanitarian assistance in Iraq on a nonpartisan basis.  A 
portion of the escrowed funds will also fund the activities of the U.N. 
Compensation Commission in Geneva, which will handle claims from victims 
of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  The funds placed in the escrow account 
are to be returned, with interest, to the member states that transferred 
them to the U.N., as funds are received from future sales of Iraqi oil 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council.  No member state is 
required to fund more than half of the total contributions to the escrow 
account.

Executive Order No. 12817 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury (the 
"Secretary") to identify the proceeds of the sale of Iraqi petroleum or 
petroleum products paid for by or on behalf of the purchaser on or after 
August 6, 1990, and directed United States financial institutions 
holding such funds to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York ("FRBNY") in the manner required by the Secretary.  Executive Order 
No. 12817 further directs the FRBNY to receive, hold, and transfer funds 
in which the Government of Iraq has an interest at the direction of the 
Secretary to fulfill U.S. rights and obligations pursuant to UNSCR No. 
778.

2.  The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq by the Executive Orders are 
administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control ("FAC") pursuant to the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 
575 ("ISR").  The ISR were amended on September 1, 1992, to revoke 
section 575.603, which had required U.S. financial institutions to file 
monthly reports regarding certain bank accounts in which the Government 
of Iraq has an interest.  While this information was needed during the 
early implementation of the regulations and for a period thereafter, it 
is no longer required on a monthly basis and can be obtained by FAC on a 
case-by-case basis as required.  The amendment is in harmony with 
President Bush's Regulatory Initiative.

3.  Investigations of possible violations of the Iraqi sanctions 
continue to be pursued and appropriate enforcement actions taken.  These 
are intended to deter future activities in violation of the sanctions.  
Additional civil penalty notices were prepared during the reporting 
period for violations of the IEEPA and ISR with respect to transactions 
involving Iraq.  Penalties were collected, principally from financial 
institutions which engaged in unauthorized, albeit apparently 
inadvertent, transactions with respect to Iraq.

4.  Investigation also continues into the roles played by various 
individuals and firms outside Iraq in [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein's 
procurement network.  These investigations may lead to additions to the 
FAC listing of individuals and organizations determined to be Specially 
Designated Nationals ("SDNs") of the Government of Iraq.

5.  Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12817 implementing UNSCR No. 778, on 
October 26, 1992, FAC directed the FRBNY to establish a blocked account 
for receipt of certain post-August 6, 1990, Iraqi oil sales proceeds, 
and to hold, invest, and transfer these funds as required by the order.  
On the same date, FAC directed the eight United States financial 
institutions holding the affected oil proceeds, on an allocated, pro 
rata basis, to transfer a total of $200 million of these blocked Iraqi 
assets to the FRBNY account.  On December 15, 1992, following the 
payment of $20 million by the Government of Kuwait and $30 million by 
the Government of Saudi Arabia to a special United Nations-controlled 
account, entitled UNSCR No. 778 Escrow Account, the FRBNY was directed 
to transfer a corresponding amount of $50 million from the blocked 
account it holds to the United Nations-controlled account.  Future 
transfers from the blocked FRBNY account will be made on a matching 
basis up to the $200 million for which the United States is potentially 
obligated pursuant to UNSCR No. 778.

6.  Since the last report, one case filed against the Government of Iraq 
has gone to judgment.  Consarc Corporation v. Iraqi Ministry of Industry 
and Minerals et al., No. 90-2269 (D.D.C., filed December 29, 1992), 
arose out of a contract for the sale of furnaces by plaintiff to the 
Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals ("MIM"), an Iraqi governmental 
entity.  In connection with the contract, the Iraqi defendants opened an 
irrevocable letter of credit with an Iraqi bank in favor of Consarc, 
which was advised by Pittsburgh National Bank ("PNB"), with the Bank of 
New York ("BoNY") entering into a confirmed reimbursement agreement with 
the advising bank.  Funds were set aside at BoNY, in an account of the 
Iraqi bank, for reimbursement of BoNY if PNB made a payment to Consarc 
on the letter of credit and sought reimbursement from BoNY.  Consarc 
received a down payment from the Iraqi MIM and manufactured the 
furnaces.  No goods were shipped prior to imposition of sanctions on 
August 2, 1990, and the United States claimed that the funds on deposit 
in the Iraqi bank account at BoNY were blocked, as well as the furnaces 
manufactured for the Iraqi Government or the proceeds of the sale of the 
furnaces to third parties.  The district court ruled that the furnaces 
or their sales proceeds were properly blocked pursuant to the 
declaration of the national emergency and blocking of Iraqi Government 
property interests, but that, due to fraud on MIM's part in concluding 
the sales contract, the funds on deposit in an Iraqi bank account at 
BoNY were not the property of the Government of Iraq, and ordered FAC to 
unblock these funds.  FAC has noted its appeal of this ruling.

7.  FAC has issued a total of 337 specific licenses regarding 
transactions pertaining to Iraq or Iraqi assets since August 1990.  
Since the last report, 49 specific licenses have been issued.  Licenses 
were issued for transactions such as the filing of legal actions 
involving Iraqi interests, for legal representation of Iraq, and the 
exportation to Iraq of donated medicine, medical supplies, and food 
intended for humanitarian relief purposes.

To ensure compliance with the terms of the licenses which have been 
issued, stringent reporting requirements have been imposed that are 
closely monitored.  Licensed accounts are regularly audited by FAC 
compliance personnel and deputized auditors from other regulatory 
agencies.  FAC compliance personnel continue to work closely with both 
State and Federal bank regulatory and law enforcement agencies in 
conducting special audits of Iraqi accounts subject to the ISR.

8.  The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the 6-month 
period from August 2, 1992, through February 1, 1993, that are directly 
attributable to the exercise of powers and authorities conferred by the 
declaration of a national emergency with respect to Iraq are estimated 
at about $2 million, most of which represents wage and salary costs for 
Federal personnel.  Personnel costs were largely centered in the 
Department of the Treasury (particularly in FAC, the U.S. Customs 
Service, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, and the 
Office of the General Counsel), the Department of State (particularly of 
the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, the Bureau[s] of Near East 
[Affairs] and South Asian Affairs, the Bureau of International 
Organization [Affairs], and the Office of the Legal Adviser), the 
Department of Transportation (particularly the U.S. Coast Guard), and 
the Department of Commerce (particularly in the Bureau of Export 
Administration and the Office of the General Counsel).

9.  The United States imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in response to 
Iraq's invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait, a clear act of brutal 
aggression.  The United States, together with the international 
community, is maintaining economic sanctions against Iraq because the 
Iraqi regime has failed to comply fully with United Nations Security 
Council resolutions, including those calling for the elimination of 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the inviolability of the Iraq-Kuwait 
boundary, the release of Kuwaiti and other third country nationals, 
compensation for victims of Iraqi aggression, long-term monitoring of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, and the return of 
Kuwaiti assets stolen during its illegal occupation of Kuwait.  The U.N. 
sanctions remain in place; the United States will continue to enforce 
those sanctions.

The Saddam Hussein regime continued to violate basic human rights by 
repressing the Iraqi civilian population and depriving it of 
humanitarian assistance.  The United Nations Security Council passed 
resolutions that permit Iraq to sell $1.6 billion of oil under U.N. 
auspices to fund the provision of food, medicine, and other humanitarian 
supplies to the people of Iraq.  Under the U.N. resolutions, the 
equitable distribution within Iraq of this assistance would be 
supervised and monitored by the United Nations.  The Iraqi regime 
continued to refuse to accept these resolutions and has thereby chosen 
to perpetuate the suffering of its civilian population.

The regime of Saddam Hussein continues to pose an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the 
United States, as well as to regional peace and security.  Because of 
Iraq's failure to comply fully with United Nations Security Council 
resolutions, the United States will therefore continue to apply economic 
sanctions to deter Iraq from threatening peace and stability in the 
region, and I will continue to report periodically to the Congress on 
significant developments, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1703(c).

William J. Clinton  (###)



ARTICLE 2:

Update on Progress in Somalia
Robert Houdek, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Washington, DC, February 17, 1993

Thank you, Mr. Chairman [Harry Johnstone, D., Fla.] for this opportunity 
to testify before your subcommittee on the progress we are making in 
Somalia.  But first, let me offer congratulations as you take up your 
duties as chairman.  Your committee historically has played a vital and 
constructive role in US-African relations.  This is a period of dramatic 
change in Africa offering both new opportunities and some daunting 
challenges.  We look forward to working closely with you, the members, 
and your staffs.

Mr. Chairman, exactly 2 months ago, Assistant Secretary [for African 
Affairs Herman J.] Cohen came before this committee and discussed the 
horrific humanitarian crisis in Somalia.  At that time, Ambassador Cohen 
explained that the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) under UN auspices 
had a clearly defined and do-able mission:  establishing a secure 
environment for the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid in 
Somalia.  Once sufficient order was established, the mission would be 
handed over to an expanded UN peace-keeping operation.

UNITAF has made remarkable progress toward achieving that goal.  The 
32,000 UNITAF troops presently in Somalia, of which approximately 18,000 
are American, have performed with great professionalism and devotion.  
Their discipline has minimized casualties on both sides and won the 
admiration and support of the vast majority of Somalis.

Security Assessment
I want to share with you our assessment of the current security and 
political environment.

UNITAF forces have secured nine key areas in southern Somalia, including 
airports and the ports of Mogadishu and Kismaayo.  Daily surface convoys 
deliver supplies to relief organizations around these key points.  
Relief corridors are open, and regular convoys are sent to Baidoa, which 
is being used as a staging site for humanitarian distribution into the 
Somali interior.

Death rates are falling dramatically.  In Baidoa, one relief agency 
estimates that death rates for children under 5 [years] have dropped 
from 50 to 15 per 10,000 per day (mostly from disease rather than 
starvation).  More needs to be done, but we are seeing a dramatic 
impact.

Circumstances have dictated that UNITAF forces be increasingly active in 
disarming armed Somalis to help ensure the sustainability of a secure 
environment and to protect the lives of UNITAF forces.  In Mogadishu, 
Kismaayo, Baidoa, and Bardera, technicals [vehicles used by warring 
factions] and heavy weapons have been moved to cantonment areas under 
UNITAF supervision.  The so-called green line in Mogadishu dividing 
previously warring factions is no more.   The agreement of factional 
leaders Ali Mahdi and Aideed to get their technicals and heavy weapons 
out of Mogadishu and dismantle the "green line" was a major achievement.

Further, in Addis Ababa [Ethiopia] last month, leaders of 15 Somali 
factions agreed to a cease-fire and to turn over all heavy weaponry to 
UNITAF and UN troops.  The accords also called for creation of a 
committee of representatives of Somali factions to work with the United 
Nations and UNITAF.  Somali factional leaders have been asked to 
inventory their weapons and have been invited by UN Special 
Representative Ismat Kittani to discuss [the] next steps in disarmament 
and monitoring the cease-fire.

We view this as a promising initiative which should further bolster the 
security environment.  But it would be misleading to leave the 
impression that southern Somalia is now a safe place.  Many former 
militiamen and gang members, denied the opportunity to extort from 
relief agencies or steal relief shipments, have turned to preying on 
less lucrative, unprotected targets.

To counter the upsurge in common crime and banditry and to relieve 
UNITAF troops from routine security duties, priority is being given to 
the establishment of Somali police forces.  The United Nations will help 
fund auxiliary, interim police forces in Mogadishu and other population 
centers.  These units, which UNITAF helped to establish, will report to 
local combined committees of elders [and] community and religious 
leaders.  Local police began operating in Mogadishu on February 6.  

We expect that interim police forces will be followed by establishment 
of trained, professional, [and] neutral regional or national police.  
International police experts are now in Somalia developing 
recommendations for the United Nations as to how this can be best 
accomplished.  This is a difficult but central task.

Political Appraisal
The vast majority of the Somali people have welcomed UNITAF forces not 
only because UNITAF brought an end to anarchy and starvation but also 
because UNITAF made it clear [that] it came in peace to help, not to 
impose a settlement.

We have supported the UN's previously articulated strategy of building 
political reconciliation from the grassroots up.  We have seen broad, if 
somewhat uneven, progress in the Somali political situation.  The 
improved security climate and reduced threats by warlords have 
encouraged establishment of representative local committees of Somalis 
to discuss security and relief issues among themselves and with UNITAF 
and UN leaders, US liaison officers, and USAID/OFDA representatives.  
While the process of rebuilding community organizations is in its early 
stages, the re-emergence of the influence of elders, religious leaders, 
intellectuals, and women's groups in local affairs is encouraging. 

Last month's UN-sponsored Addis Ababa conference of factional leaders 
was a significant first step in the dialogue of old-time enemies.  A 
successful followup on implementing the cease-fire and disarmament 
accords will be crucial.

Progress on the security and political fronts are closely interrelated.  
UNITAF and UNOSOM [UN Operation in Somalia] are working together to 
maintain the momentum in implementing the Addis [Ababa] cease-fire and 
disarmament accords.  We are continuing to give full backing to the UN's 
political reconciliation efforts.  But we should not expect quick 
results.  Lasting reconciliation will require further control of arms 
and broad participation of the Somali people--local and regional 
involvement--not just a deal at the top at the national level.  This 
political process will take time.

Transition From UNITAF To UNOSOM
We anticipate a smooth, phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II; in 
fact, parts of the transition have already occurred.  Some US forces 
have returned home, replaced by non-American UNITAF troops, some of whom 
will become part of UNOSOM II.

US military planners are working with their UN counterparts on the 
transition.  Secretary of State Christopher has assured UN Secretary 
General Boutros-Ghali that the United States is prepared to aid UNOSOM 
II with logistics and other support, as well as with a quick reaction 
force, if necessary.  The United States will also provide an officer to 
be the deputy commander of UNOSOM II.

Neither the exact number of American personnel nor the total number of 
UNOSOM forces has been decided at this point.  Those decisions must 
await issuance of the Secretary General's report, the subsequent 
Security Council resolution authorizing formation of UNOSOM II, and 
final discussions among UNOSOM II participants, the United Nations and 
contributing countries' military experts.  However, I can assure you 
that the vast majority of UNOSOM II forces will not be American.

The UN Secretary General is expected to present his latest report on 
Somalia to the UN Security Council this week, opening the way for prompt 
Security Council debate on a new resolution.  We anticipate that the 
report will reflect the close consultations in New York and Somalia 
between the United Nations, the United States, and the UNITAF coalition.  
From our consultations, we believe that the Secretary General's report 
will coincide with much that is in our own general approach:  most 
importantly that the new UNOSOM should have sufficient size, 
capabilities, and rules of engagement to enable it to enforce the peace 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter throughout all of Somalia.

We share the view that without improved security the political process 
cannot prosper.  We also agree that the new mandate must include 
prevention of the resumption of violence; control of heavy weapons; 
maintenance of the cease-fire; and the building of a new professional 
police force to ensure that the UN's efforts to promote political 
reconciliation and rehabilitation can progress. 

While the elements of UNOSOM's new mandate are important, equally 
important is international support for UNOSOM.  The earlier UN Operation 
in Somalia has been criticized; but, in a real sense, the success of 
UNOSOM's future operations depends on widespread international support.  

We have assured the Secretary General of our military backing for 
UNOSOM's peace enforcement operations.  We are heartened by the offers 
of many UNITAF troop contingents to remain in Somalia under UNOSOM, as 
well as the offers of other countries to send troops to be part of 
UNOSOM.  We are confident that the United Nations will field a force 
that will accomplish its mission.  Additionally, we have told the United 
Nations [that] we are willing to assist on the civilian side, with some 
staff if needed, to contribute to progress on the rehabilitation and 
reconciliation fronts.  We also are urging our friends to help. 

This is not a time for self-congratulation; the starving and the 
suffering continue in areas of Somalia.  But I would be remiss if I did 
not highlight the superb cooperative work of [Head of US Command in 
Somalia Lieutenant] General Johnston and [US Special envoy] Ambassador 
Oakley.  They, and the men and women who work with them, have made an 
incredibly difficult job look deceptively easy.  Here I would like to 
emphasize the essential contributions of our coalition partners.  
International cooperation has worked under harsh conditions and in an 
unprecedented state of anarchy.

We are moving to a new phase of our efforts in Somalia--from UNITAF to 
UNOSOM; from the job of re-establishing a secure environment to get 
relief to the most needy to the challenge of consolidating security 
gains and promoting political reconciliation and rehabilitation.

While progress has been swift under UNITAF, patience and endurance will 
now be needed, because there are no shortcuts to restoring trust and 
rebuilding a civil society. 

Television images of starving Somalis, which moved the American 
conscience last fall, are now replaced by those of suffering peoples 
elsewhere.  The Somalis are a resilient people.  They are returning to 
their villages and are planting crops.  Markets are coming alive; 
children are leaving feeding kitchens, some to return to school.

But this picture of normalcy is deceptive.  A tremendous amount needs to 
be done before Somalia is a normal society.  The essential work of 
UNOSOM may well take place without great public pressure for 
international involvement.  But if we are to avoid the risk of 
forfeiting the gains of Operation Restore Hope, continued American and 
allied assistance will be essential.  This Administration is committed 
to such a course and looks forward to Congress' continued cooperation 
and support.

In this spirit, we welcome congressional support--as expressed in S. J. 
[Senate Joint] Resolution 45, for the efforts we have been making in 
creating a secure environment for provision of humanitarian relief 
alleviating the massive suffering of the Somali people.  The dual 
catastrophes of famine and merciless civil strife have been devastating 
to Somalia.  Although the Administration does not believe specific 
statutory authorization for the deployment of US forces to Somalia is 
necessary, we are immensely gratified that the Hill and the 
Administration have cooperated so well in delivering an appropriate and 
urgent response.  (###)



ARTICLE 3:

Department Statements

Cuban Crackdown on Labor Union Leaders
Statement released by the Office of  the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, 
Washington, DC, February 16, 1993.

The United States is concerned about the Cuban Government's treatment of 
Cuba's nascent free trade unions.  Free trade union leaders Juan 
Guarino, Javier Troncoso, Jorge Bonet, Eduardo Rois, Roberto Trobajo, 
Leonardo Varo, Omar Fernandez, and Lazaro Corp were detained by police 
on February 5 while they met to discuss details of the merger of the 
unions they represent.  Police reportedly threatened them if they 
continued their free union activities.  All were issued a written 
warning and released at 3 am the following day.

On February 6, Rafael Gutierrez Santos, head of the Labor Union of Cuban 
Workers, was arrested by plainclothes security agents.  He is being held 
incommunicado, in violation of Cuban law, at state security 
headquarters.

Cuba has ignored International Labor Organization (ILO) criticisms of 
its abuse of worker rights.  The ILO reminded Cuba in 1992 that 
arresting trade unionists without a warrant or when no grounds for 
conviction exist is a violation of trade union rights; concluded that 
Cuba violates ILO norms on freedom of association and the right to 
organize; and found that Cuban Government restrictions on the freedom to 
choose or change employment are incompatible with ILO conventions 
prohibiting forced labor.

We call on the Cuban Government to release Mr. Gutierrez without delay, 
to comply with the conclusions of the ILO, and to permit free trade 
unions to register legally and operate freely and independently for the 
benefit of Cuban workers.


Support for Colombian Democracy
Statement by State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, February 17, 
1993, Washington, DC.

Colombian democracy, one of the oldest and most stable in our 
hemisphere, is under attack from a vicious combination of narcotics 
traffickers and guerrillas.  We condemn the recent series of bombings 
against innocent civilians as well as civil and police officials who are 
the true heroes of Colombia's struggle to preserve its democratic 
institutions.  We extend our sympathy to the families of these people.

We admire the Colombian Government and people who continue to defend and 
develop Colombia's democratic institutions and its economy despite the 
terrible violence.  We support the Colombian Government's condemnation 
of all terrorist acts.  We strongly support Colombia's efforts, under 
the leadership of President Gaviria, to improve law enforcement measures 
against major drug traffickers, to bring about significant judicial 
reform, and to achieve greater economic prosperity.  (###)



ARTICLE 4:

Fact Sheet:  Cuba

PEOPLE
Cuba is a multi-racial society with a population of mainly Spanish and 
African origins.  The largest organized religion is the Roman Catholic 
Church.  Officially, Cuba has been an atheist state for most of the 
Castro era.  How-ever, a constitutional amendment adopted on July 12, 
1992, changed the nature of the Cuban state from atheist to secular, 
enabling religious believers to belong to the Cuban Communist Party 
(PCC).

HISTORY
Before the arrival of Columbus in 1492, Cuba was inhabited by three 
groups--Siboneys, Guanahabibes, and Tainos--the last of which introduced 
agriculture, including maize and tobacco, to the island.  As Spain 
developed its colonial empire in the Western Hemisphere, Havana became 
an important commercial port.  Settlers eventually moved inland, 
devoting themselves mainly to sugar cane and tobacco.  As the native 
Indian population died out, African slaves were imported to work the 
plantations.  A 1774 census in Cuba recorded 96,000 whites, 31,000 free 
blacks, and 44,000 slaves.  Slavery was abolished in 1886.

Cuba was the last major Spanish colony to gain independence in a 
movement which began in 1850, when Cuban planters financed and led 
several expeditions against Spanish garrisons.  In 1868, the Ten Years' 
War for independence began under the leadership of Carlos Manuel de 
Cespedes, whom the Cubans consider to be the father of their country.  
Jose Marti, Cuba's greatest national hero, initiated plans for a general 
uprising 24 years later.   In 1895, Marti announced the Grito de Baire, 
heralding the beginning of Cuba's final struggle for independence.  
Shortly after, he died in battle.

The United States entered the conflict on the side of the 
revolutionaries when the USS Maine, anchored in Havana Harbor to protect 
US citizens, was sunk by an explosion of unknown origin on February 15, 
1898.  On December 10, 1898, Spain signed the Treaty of Paris, ending 
the Spanish-American War and relinquishing control of Cuba to the United 
States.  The United States administered the island for 3 years.  
Independence was proclaimed May 20, 1902, although the United States 
retained the right to intervene to preserve Cuban independence and 
stability under the Platt Amendment, which established conditions 
mandated by Congress for the withdrawal of US troops from Cuba.

In 1934, the amendment was repealed in keeping with the Roosevelt 
Administration's "Good Neighbor" policy.  Later the same year, the 
United States and Cuba reaffirmed by treaty the 1903 agreement which 
leased the Guantanamo Bay naval base to the United States.  This 
agreement remains in force today and can only be terminated by mutual 
agreement or abandonment by the United States.

Cubans elected General Gerardo Machado as president in 1924, but he 
forcibly extended his rule until a popular uprising deposed him in 1933. 
Army Sergeant Fulgencio Batista led the revolt and established himself 
as Cuba's dominant leader for more than 25 years.  He ruled through a 
series of presidents and was himself elected in 1940 for 4 years.  In 
March 1952, shortly before regularly scheduled elections, Batista seized 
the presidency in a bloodless coup.

On July 26, 1953, an armed opposition group led by Fidel Castro attacked 
the Moncada army barracks at Santiago de Cuba.  The attack was 
unsuccessful, and many, including Castro, were captured and imprisoned.  
Castro, released by Batista under a May 1955 amnesty, went into exile in 
Mexico, where he formed a revolutionary group, the  "26th of July 
Movement."

On December 2, 1956, Castro and  81 of his followers landed  in eastern 
Cuba aboard the yacht Granma.  All but 12 were soon captured, killed, or 
dispersed.  From this nucleus, Castro's forces eventually grew to 
several thousand.  While other groups also actively opposed Batista, 
Castro's "26th of July" forces became predominant when Batista fled on 
January 1, 1959.  Castro's assumption of power was acclaimed in Cuba and 
abroad because he seemed to embody the hopes of most Cubans for a return 
to democratic government and an end to graft and corruption.

Within months, Castro moved to consolidate his power and to set up an 
authoritarian government.  Many leaders of the opposition to Batista 
were executed or sentenced to lengthy prison terms for opposing Castro's 
policies.  Moderates were forced out of the government, and hundreds of 
thousands of Cubans fled the island.  

During an April 1959 visit to Washington, Castro addressed concerns 
about a reported leftist tilt to his regime by saying, "We are against 
all kinds of dictators, whether of a man, or a country, or a class, or 
an oligarchy, or by the military.  That is why we are against 
communism." 

On December 2, 1961, Castro publicly declared himself a Marxist- 
Leninist.  Representative democracy was abolished, effective freedom of 
expression ended, and all opposition political activity was soon 
terminated.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected 
as a result of economic hardship and the end of the East-West conflict.  

Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment, and 
to drum up opposition to US policy toward Cuba, especially the trade 
embargo and the Cuban Democracy Act.  Support for revolutionary 
movements, once an article of faith for the regime, is largely a thing 
of the past.  Cuba has relations with nearly 140 countries and has 
civilian assistance workers--principally medical--in more than 20 
nations.

When it first came to power, the Castro Government supported the spread 
of revolution by aiming to reproduce throughout Latin America its rural-
based guerrilla warfare experience.  In 1959, Cuba aided armed 
expeditions against Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.  During 
the 1960s, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia all faced 
serious Cuban-backed attempts to develop guerrilla insurgencies.  These 
movements failed to attract popular support.  The most conspicuous 
failure occurred in 1967.  Castro had sent Che Guevara--a charismatic 
revolutionary hero from Argentina and symbol of Cuban efforts to spread 
the revolution throughout Latin America--to lead an insurgency in 
Bolivia.  Guevara's efforts were opposed by both the peasantry and the 
Bolivian Communist Party.  Guevara was killed, and the insurgency 
collapsed.

Cuba's support for Latin revolutionaries, along with the openly Marxist-
Leninist character of its government and its alignment with the USSR, 
contributed to its isolation in the hemisphere.  In January 1962, the 
Organization of American States (OAS) excluded Cuba from active 
participation.  Two years later, OAS foreign ministers resolved that 
member nations should have no diplomatic and consular relations with 
Cuba and should suspend all trade and sea transportation.

In the late 1960s, Cuba de-emphasized its policy of supporting 
revolutions abroad and began to pursue normal government-to-government 
relations with other Latin American nations.  By the mid-1970s, Cuba had 
reestablished diplomatic relations with a number of countries in the 
region.  In 1975, the OAS lifted comprehensive sanctions and deferred to 
individual member states the option of diplomatic and trade relations 
with Cuba.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence 
abroad--deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 
1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere.  In Angola, Cuban 
troops, supported logistically by the USSR, backed the Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), one of the movements competing for 
power after Portugal granted Angola its independence.

Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war in the Ogaden region 
against Somalia, 1977-78, and remained there in substantial numbers as a 
garrison force for a decade.  Cubans served in a non-combat advisory 
role in Mozambique and the Congo.  Cuba also used the Congo as a 
logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission.

In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily.  Cuba 
unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia; Cuba met the timetable of 
the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its 
forces from Angola before July 1991; and Cuba ended military assistance 
to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.  In 
January 1992, following the peace agreement in El Salvador, Castro 
stated that Cuban support for insurgents was a thing of the past. 

Cuban-Soviet Relations
Ties between Cuba and the Soviet Union were close from 1960 until 
perestroika and the subsequent demise of the USSR.  Cuba received 
critical economic and military assistance, which kept its economy afloat 
and enabled it to maintain a disproportionately large military 
establishment.  However, as the former USSR's economy experienced 
growing problems, its reliability as a trade and aid partner for Cuba 
declined.  Russia has drastically reduced economic and military aid to 
Cuba.  In November 1992, Cuba and Russia signed a number of economic and 
commercial agreements.  Russian officials have stated that all trade 
will be at world prices. 

Cuban-Soviet ties led to a direct confrontation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union in 1962 over the installation of nuclear-
equipped missiles in Cuba, resolved only when Moscow agreed to the 
withdrawal of the missiles and other offensive weapons.  In late 1970, 
the possibility that the Soviet Union would establish submarine bases in 
Cuba became an issue.  However, they were never established.  In 1971, 
President Nixon affirmed the existence of an understanding between the 
United States and the USSR that the Soviet Union would not install any 
offensive weapons systems in Cuba nor operate such systems from there, 
including sea-based systems. 

Cuba's special relationship with the Soviet Union began to disintegrate 
during perestroika, due to growing economic difficulties and ideological 
differences.  During a visit in April 1989, President Gorbachev spoke 
out against the "export of revolution."  Following Gorbachev's trip, 
Castro and the Cuban press began to harshly criticize reforms in the 
Soviet Union.

With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union undertook a worldwide 
reduction of its military forces.  Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 
numbering around 15,000 in 1990, today total under 4,000 Russian troops.  
In September 1991, then-President Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of 
the 2,800-man Soviet combat brigade.  An estimated 1,600 soldiers still 
in Cuba are to be withdrawn by June 1993.  Russia maintains a signal 
intelligence-gathering facility, the largest of the former USSR, at 
Lourdes.  It is staffed by 2,100 technicians and monitors US civilian 
and military communications.

US-Cuban Relations
After Castro came to power, bilateral relations deteriorated sharply, 
primarily because of its imposition of a repressive dictatorship, its 
uncompensated nationalization of American property valued at about $1.8 
billion in 1962, and its support for violent subversive groups.  The 
United States broke diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961, after the 
Cuban Government demanded that the US embassy in Havana be reduced to a 
skeleton staff.  In 1962, the United States imposed a comprehensive 
economic embargo against Cuba.  Tensions between the two governments 
peaked during the abortive "Bay of Pigs" invasion by anti-Castro Cubans 
supported by the United States in April 1961 and the October 1962 
missile crisis.

Following Cuba's de-emphasis of the export of revolution in the 1970s, 
the United States did not oppose the OAS decision to make discretionary 
the application of sanctions against Cuba and began to discuss 
normalization of relations with Cuba.  Talks began but were halted when 
Cuba launched a large-scale intervention in Angola.  Subsequent efforts 
undertaken to improve relations led to the establishment of interests 
sections in the two capitals on September 1, 1977.  Currently, the US 
interests section in Havana and the Cuban interests section in 
Washington, DC, are under the protection of the Swiss embassy.

New differences in the late 1970s--Cuba's failure to withdraw troops 
from Angola, intervention in Ethiopia, increasing subversion in the 
Caribbean Basin and Central America, the delivery of sophisticated 
Soviet weaponry, and the Cuban Government's deliberate efforts to 
violate US sovereignty and immigration laws through the 1980 Mariel 
exodus--eroded the possibility of improvement in bilateral relations.

Quiet efforts to explore the prospects for improving relations were 
initiated by the United States in 1981-82; however, the Cuban Government 
refused to alter its conduct with regard to US concerns about Cuba's 
support for violent political change and its close political and 
military cooperation with the Soviet Union.  The liberation of Grenada 
by the United States and regional allies in 1983 and the expulsion of 
Cuban forces based there was a setback for Cuba's plans to expand its 
regional sphere of influence.

One year later, the United States and Cuba negotiated an agreement to 
normalize immigration and return to Cuba the "excludables" (criminals or 
insane persons who, under US law, are not allowed to reside in the 
United States) who had arrived during the 1980 Mariel boatlift.  Cuba 
suspended this agreement in May 1985 following the US initiation of the 
Radio Marti by the Voice of America (VOA), which broadcasts news to 
Cuba.  The Mariel agreement, reinstated in November 1987, allowed normal 
migration to occur between the two countries.  In March 1990, VOA began 
transmitting TV Marti to Cuba.  Since its inception, Cuba has jammed TV 
Marti and blocked Radio Marti on the AM band.  Radio Marti on short wave 
has a large audience. 

With the peace settlement in El Salvador and establishment of democracy 
in Nicaragua, US concerns focused on Cuban resistance to democratic 
reforms and its denial of human rights--two major obstacles to improved 
bilateral relations.  In May 1991, President Bush said that if Cuba 
holds free and fair elections under international supervision, respects 
human rights, and stops subverting its neighbors, US-Cuban relations 
could improve significantly.  In October 1992, President Bush signed 
into law the Cuban Democracy Act.  This bipartisan legislation was 
intended as a statement of US policy toward a free and democratic Cuba.  
Its principal provisions ban most US subsidiary trade with Cuba and 
exclude any vessel which stops in Cuba from entering US ports for 180 
days .  It also provides for humanitarian donations to non-govern- 
mental organizations in Cuba and improved telecommunications.  Despite 
existing tensions, the United States continues to discuss areas of 
mutual concern, such as immigration, with the Government of Cuba. 

Interests Sections
Havana:  US Interests Section, Calzada between L and M, Vedado.  Tel.  
33-3551 through 33-3559.

Principal Officer--Alan Flanigan
Deputy Principal Officer--Vincent Mayer
Consul--William H. Griffith 
Public Affairs Adviser--Gene Bigler


Washington, DC:  Cuban Interests Section, 2630 16th Street, NW, 
Washington, DC  20009. Tel.  202-797-8518. 

Principal Officer--Alfonso Fraga Perez 
Deputy Principal Officer--Miguel Nunez

GOVERNMENT
Cuba is a totalitarian state dominated by Fidel Castro, who is President 
of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, First Secretary of 
the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.  Castro 
exercises control over nearly all aspects of Cuban life through a 
network of directorates ultimately responsible to him through the Cuban 
Communist Party.  

From January 1959 until December 1976, Castro ruled by decree.  The 1976 
constitution, extensively revised in July 1992, provides for a system of 
government in which the PCC is "the highest leading force of the society 
and state."  The center of party power is the Politburo, which has 24 
members, in addition to Fidel Castro and his brother, Raul Castro.  
There are 205 members in the Central Committee.  

Executive and administrative power is vested in the Council of 
Ministers; its president since 1959, Fidel Castro, is head of 
government.  There are 10 other vice presidents on the Council of 
Ministers.  Legislative authority rests with the National Assembly of 
People's Government, which meets for about 5 days per year. When the 
assembly is not in session, it is represented by the Council of State, 
of which Fidel Castro is the president and Raul Castro is first vice 
president.  

The PCC is Cuba's only legal political party.  It monopolizes all 
government positions, including judicial offices.  All pre-1959 
political parties and political organizations have been abolished.  
Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto 
prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional 
advancement in most areas, although non-party members have been elected 
to the National Assembly.  Cuba's trade unions, women's federation, and 
youth and other mass organizations are controlled by the government and 
party.  These organizations attempt to extend Cuban Government and PCC 
control over each citizen's daily activities at home, work, and school.

The Cuban Communist Party is composed of the pre-revolution communist 
party which, along with two other political groups supporting the 
revolution, was absorbed into a new political entity formed by Castro in 
July 1961.  Further refinements resulted in the emergence in late 1965 
of the PCC.  The party's Politburo and Central Committee together 
include most of the country's military and civilian leaders.  

In July 1992, the National Assembly convened for 3 days to amend the 
1976 constitution.  Changes included abolishing references to the former 
Soviet bloc; outlawing discrimination for religious beliefs; permitting 
foreign investment; giving Fidel Castro new emergency powers; and 
allowing direct elections to the National Assembly, although candidates 
will still be approved by quasi-governmental bodies, and campaigns will 
not be allowed.

Cubans do not possess equal protection under the law, the right to 
choose freely government representatives, freedom of expression, freedom 
of peaceful assembly and association, or freedom to travel to and from 
Cuba without restriction.  The government and party control all 
electronic and print media.

Cuba has no independent judiciary.  Although the constitution specifies 
that the courts shall be "a system of state organs independent of all 
others," it explicitly subordinates the judiciary to the National 
Assembly and, thus, to the Council of State.  The People's Supreme Court 
is the highest judicial body.  Due process safeguards can be 
circumvented constitutionally, and defense attorneys face severe 
disadvantages under the Cuban judicial system.  The Ministry of Interior 
ensures political and social conformity as well as internal security:  
It operates border and police forces, orchestrates public 
demonstrations, investigates evidence of non-conformity, regulates 
migration, and maintains pervasive vigilance through a network of 
informers and 80,000 block committees (Committees for the Defense of the 
Revolution--CDR).

In practice, the top leadership determines the degree to which civil 
liberties are exercised.  In February 1992, member states of the UN 
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) voted 23-8 (with 21 abstentions) to 
approve a resolution expressing "alarm at continuing reports of human 
rights abuses" and profound concern at "numerous uncontradicted reports 
of continued violations . . . of human rights."  Cuba refused to 
cooperate with 1991 and 1992 UNHRC resolutions creating special envoys 
to investigate Cuba's human rights situation.  Human rights activists 
continue to be the subject of arbitrary arrest, court procedures that 
violate even Cuban constitutional guarantees, and lengthy prison 
sentences based on the flimsiest of evidence.

Principal Government Officials
President, Council of State and Council of Ministers; First Secretary of 
the Communist Party; and Commander in Chief--Fidel Castro

First Vice President, Council of State and Council of Ministers; Second 
Secretary of the Communist Party; General of the Army and Minister of 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)--Raul Castro

Minister of Foreign Relations--Ricardo Alarcon 

Ambassador to the United Nations--Alcibiades Hidalgo

ECONOMY
Since the late 18th century, the Cuban economy has been dominated by 
sugar production and has prospered or suffered due to fluctuations in 
sugar prices.  The Castro regime has been unable to break that pattern, 
and sugar accounts for about three-quarters of export earnings.  Cuba's 
famous tobacco provides a second source of export earnings, but it is 
also subject to market forces.  Cuba has never diversified from its 
basic monocultural economy despite some development of natural resources 
such as nickel, iron ore, copper and timber and a well-educated work 
force.

For more than 30 years, the defects in Cuba's economy and the effects of 
the economic embargo imposed by the United States in 1962 were at least 
partially offset by heavy subsidies from the former Soviet Union and 
favorable trade relationships with the countries of the former Soviet 
bloc.  But those supports ended abruptly with the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc in the late 1980s and with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Cuba's break with its former patron and its failure to undertake needed 
reforms combined to produce an unprecedented economic crisis.  Its 
economy is estimated to have declined by 40% from 1989 through 1992.

The economic prospects are not good, largely because of the Castro 
regime's decision to maintain the state's highly centralized control 
over economic decision-making, the lack of inputs for industry, and the 
"Special Period in Peacetime," which relies upon strict rationing of 
food, fuel, and electricity.  The "Special Period" gives priority to 
domestic food production, development of tourism, and biotechnology 
production.

Responsibility for running the economy and for economic policy rests 
with the Council of State.  Basic public services are provided by the 
state, either free of charge or for minimal fees.  Access to education 
generally is adequate, but urban housing and medical care have 
deteriorated, as have communications and transportation.  The Central 
Planning Board, working closely with the Banco Nacional de Cuba, directs 
nearly all economic activity and sets prices and targets for production, 
imports, and exports.  Five-year plans have fallen into disuse with the 
advent of the "Special Period" and the disintegration of the trading 
relationship with the former Soviet bloc.  The last 5-year plan was for 
1986-1990.

The state owns and operates most of Cuba's farms and all industrial 
enterprises.  State farms occupy about 70% of farmland, while peasant 
cooperatives account for about 20%.  Private farms account for about 10% 
of Cuba's agriculture.  Cuba's manufacturing sector emphasizes import 
substitution and provision of basic industrial materials.  In recent 
years, many Cuban firms have closed or reduced production because of 
shortages of foreign exchange and limited access to spare parts and 
imported components.

Castro's efforts to diversify the economy and reduce Cuba's dependence 
on sugar exports in the country's international trade have been 
unsuccessful.  Sugar continues to account for about 75% of export 
earnings, although sugar production and exports have declined over the 
past 5 years.  Cuba specializes in the production of sugar byproducts 
and, to a lesser extent, light industry, electronics, pharmaceuticals, 
and biotechnology.  Tobacco and tobacco products traditionally have been 
Cuba's second-largest agricultural export.  Other important crops 
include coffee and citrus.

Cuba's light industrial sector, which grew in the 1970s and 1980s, has 
declined because of a lack of spare parts and components.  Hard hit are 
the electrical power, food processing, cigar, chemical, petroleum, 
textile, and metallurgy industries.

Cuba has three large oil refineries--two expropriated from US firms--and 
a recently completed refinery at Cienfuegos, built with Soviet 
technology and capital.  The two older refineries are operating well 
below capacity, while the one at Cienfuegos has never opened.  
Traditionally, Cuba's mining sector has accounted for a significant part 
of export earnings.  The country's nickel reserves are the fourth 
largest in the world.  The ore is processed on the island in two 
formerly US-owned plants at Nicaro and Moa Bay.  Plants are also located 
at Punta Gorda and Las Camariocas.  

Much of Cuba's transportation network was developed in pre-revolutionary 
Cuba to serve the sugar industry.  The road network exceeds 30,000 
kilometers (19,000 mi.), of which about half is paved.  The island has a 
14,640 kilometer (5,600 mi.) railway system.  Buses are found throughout 
urban areas but are notoriously crowded and in disrepair.  Public 
transport has been crippled by the lack of fuel.  A significant portion 
of rural public transport is provided by horse and buggy, while in urban 
areas bicycles largely have replaced private vehicles.  Havana is the 
most important of the country's 11 major ports.  The national airline, 
Cubana de Aviacion, serves major cities in Cuba and a shrinking number 
of foreign cities in Europe and Latin America.  Aero-Caribbean, a 
charter company formed in 1982, provides unscheduled passenger and cargo 
service to the Caribbean Basin and Western Europe.

During the 1980s, more than 80% of Cuba's external trade was with the 
former Soviet bloc, of which the Soviet share normally was more than 
70%.  The Soviet Union alone imported 80% of all Cuban sugar and 40% of 
all Cuban citrus.  Cuba's trade with the Soviet bloc involved use of 
non-convertible currencies.  Annual trade protocols set the volume of 
goods to be exchanged between Cuba and these countries.  This system was 
abandoned as the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
introduced market-oriented economic policies that affected trade with 
Cuba.  

Currently, Cuban trade with Russia is only a fraction of its trade with 
the former Soviet Union, which had subsidized Cuban oil imports.  Cuban 
oil imports from the former Soviet Union of an estimated 13 million tons 
in 1989 have fallen to about 5 million tons in 1992 from all sources.  
An oil-for-sugar barter agreement with Russia was completed in June 
1992.  Russia has announced the end of all trade subsidies to Cuba.

In November 1992, Cuba and Russia announced that agreements for trade, 
scientific, and maritime relations had been signed.  Among the 
cooperative programs discussed was how to continue financing and 
construction of the Juragua, Cuba, nuclear power plant, begun in 1983 
with the former Soviet Union.  Completion of the power plant is a Cuban 
priority, but construction lagged during the 1980s and fell further 
behind schedule due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  In 1992, 
Cuba suspended work because it could not afford the cost of Russian 
technical assistance.  However, the November 1992 agreement between the 
two states would result in completion of the plant if a financier can be 
found for the nuclear safety and control equipment.

Although Cuba is not a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a Latin American regional non-
proliferation regime, it is subject to International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards normally applied to non-NPT parties.  Cuba has 
entered into an agreement with the IAEA to apply safeguards to 
individual facilities including the Juragua power plant.  The reactors 
that would be installed are of the VVER-400 type, an advanced model of 
the Soviet pressurized water reactor.  They are not the same as those 
installed at Chernobyl.  In addition, the Cuban reactors are housed in a 
reinforced concrete containment dome.

The United States has imposed a comprehensive trade embargo on Cuba.  
Legislation signed into law in October 1992 revoked Treasury authority 
to issue licenses for most US subsidiary trade with Cuba and bans for 
180 days vessels which have entered a Cuban port from loading or 
unloading in US ports.  The legislation provides support for the Cuban 
people by permitting licensing for "efficient and adequate" 
telecommunications and for humanitarian donations to non-governmental 
organizations in Cuba. 

With the loss of trade and aid from the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, Cuba has attempted to attract foreign investment and Western 
buyers for its sugar and nickel, as well as for its biotech products.  
Except in tourism, Cuba has had limited success in attracting investors 
because of the deterioration of the economy, its unpaid debt to Western 
countries, and the lack of clear titles to expropriated property.  In 
1990, tourism generated $325 million; most of the visitors came from 
Western Europe and Canada.  Since July 1986, Cuba has not serviced its 
roughly $7-billion debt owed to Western, mainly governmental, creditors.  
Consequently, Cuba has not received rescheduling either from the Paris 
Club (an association of international governmental lenders) or from 
private institutions.  Cuba is not servicing its debts to Russia--
perhaps as high as $20 billion--or to Eastern Europe.


"Rectification" Policy
In April 1986, Castro called for "rectification of errors and negative 
tendencies" and mandated the observance of strict Marxist orthodoxy in 
running the economy.  The policy, which continues today, is the 
antithesis of the Soviet perestroika (restructuring) concept.  
"Rectification" emphasizes centralized direction over market forces and 
moral and ideological, as opposed to material, incentives to spur 
productivity.  It calls upon Cubans to make greater sacrifices to 
further the collective good.

In 1986, as a part of the "rectification" effort, the government closed 
farmers' markets through which some people had been able to sell produce 
grown on their own garden plots at uncontrolled prices since 1980.  It 
also sought to eliminate many bonuses and overtime pay for workers.  The 
Castro Government encourages voluntary labor, in the form of "micro-
brigades" and "contingents," especially in the construction sector, and 
has tried to reduce corruption and black marketeering.

"Special Period"
In October 1990, Castro announced that Cuba had entered a "special 
period in time of peace" and that the economy would function as if in 
time of war until the crisis had passed.  Cubans are feeling the effects 
of the end of Havana's special relationship with Moscow.  Most goods are 
now rationed, and many previously imported from the Soviet Union simply 
have disappeared.  Total Cuban imports in 1992 are expected to be less 
than 60% of the 1989 total.  Economic production may have decreased by 
more than 40% from 1989 to 1992.

Underemployment, a chronic problem, has worsened with the idling of 
thousands of industrial workers whose jobs depended on inputs from 
abroad.  Labor has been shifted to agriculture to compensate for fuel 
and machinery shortages affecting food and production. Education and 
medical care generally are accessible, although both have been affected 
by nationwide austerity.  Many pharmaceutical products are in short 
supply or unavailable.  Urban housing, as well as transportation and 
communications services, remain seriously inadequate.  Havana's bus 
system, for example, has reduced service by more than 40% in the last 2 
years. 

DEFENSE
Under Castro, Cuba has become one of the most highly militarized 
societies in the world.  In Latin America, only   Brazil, with a 
population more than 12 times that of Cuba, has a larger military.  In 
1958, in the middle of an insurrection, Cuba's armed forces numbered 
46,000.  Today, the Revolutionary Armed Forces contain about 270,000 
active duty and ready reserves--235,000 army, 17,000 air force/air 
defense, and 13,500 navy, plus some military units under the Ministry of 
Interior.  More than 1 million Cubans belong to the country's two 
paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth 
Labor Army.

Cuba's military establishment is considered to be one of the most modern 
in the region.  From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military 
assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project 
power abroad.  The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba 
throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the 
military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.  In 1990, Cuba's air 
force, with about 150 Soviet-supplied fighters, including advanced MiG-
23 Floggers and MiG-29 Fulcrums, was probably the best equipped in Latin 
America.  The Cuban army has more than 1,000 Soviet-supplied T-62 and T-
54/55 main battle tanks.

Cuban military power has been drastically reduced by the loss of the 
special relationship between the former Soviet Union and Cuba.  Lack of 
fuel has resulted in reduced training and military exercises.  Lack of 
spare parts and new materiel has resulted in the moth-balling of planes, 
tanks, and other military equipment.  Due to the end of the Cold War, 
Cuban forces are no longer used as a surrogate for Soviet geopolitical 
objectives. (###)



ARTICLE 5:

Country Profile:  Cuba
Official Name:  Republic of Cuba

People
Nationality:  Noun--Cuban(s); adjective--Cuban.  Population: 10.8 
million; 70% urban, 30% rural.  Avg. annual growth rate:  1%.  Density:  
97/sq. km. (244/sq. mi.).  Ethnic groups:  Spanish-African mixture.  
Language:  Spanish.  Education:  Compulsory--6 years.  Attendance:  92% 
(ages 6-16).  Literacy:  99%.  Health:  Infant mortality rate--12/1,000. 
Life expectancy--77 years for women, 74 years for men.  Work force:  3.6 
million; 30% government and services, 22% industry, 20% agriculture, 11% 
commerce, 10% construction, 7% transportation and communications (June 
1990).

Geography
Area:  110,860 sq. km. (44,200 sq. mi.); about the size of Pennsylvania.  
Capital:  Havana (pop. 2 million).  Other cities:  Santiago de Cuba, 
Camaguey, Santa Clara, Holguin, Guantanamo, Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Pinar 
del Rio.  Terrain:  Flat or gently rolling plains, hills, mountains up 
to 2,000 meters  (6,000 ft.) in the southeast.  Climate:  Tropical, 
moderated by trade winds; dry season (November-April); rainy season 
(May-October).

Government 
Type:  Communist state; current government assumed power January 1, 
1959.  Independence:  May 20, 1902.  Constitution:  February 24, 1976.  
Branches:  Executive--President, Council of Ministers. Legislative-- 
National Assembly of People's Government.  Judicial--People's Supreme 
Court.  Political party:  Cuban Communist Party (PCC).  Suffrage:  All 
citizens age 16 and older, except those who have applied for permanent 
emigration.  Indirect National Assembly elections were held in 1986. 

Administrative subdivisions:  14 provinces including the city of Havana, 
and one special municipality (Isle of Youth). 

Flag:  White star centered on red triangle at staff side, three blue and 
two white horizontal bands.


Economy 
Gross social product (This economic measure is not convertible to 
GNP/GDP) (1991 est.):  $21 billion.  Real annual growth rate:  -20% 
(1991).  Per capita income:  $1,500.

Natural resources:  Nickel, cobalt, iron ore, copper, manganese, salt, 
timber. 

Agriculture:  Products--sugar, citrus and tropical fruits, tobacco, 
coffee, rice, beans, meat, and vegetables.

Industry:  Types--sugar, food processing, oil refining, cement, electric 
power, light consumer and industrial products. 

Trade:  Exports--$3.6 billion (f.o.b. 1991):  Sugar and its by-products, 
petroleum, nickel, seafood, citrus, tobacco products, rum.  Major 
markets in 1991:  former USSR 63%; OECD 17%; China 6%.  Imports--$3.7 
billion (c.i.f. 1991):  Capital goods, industrial raw materials, food, 
petroleum, consumer goods.  Major suppliers in 1991: former USSR 47%; 
OECD 24%; China 6%.  

Official exchange rate: 1 Cuban peso=US $1 for trade.  1 Cuban peso=US 
$1.33 for tourists and diplomats. (###)




ARTICLE 6:

Fact Sheet:  Council of Europe

Background
The Council of Europe is the oldest European post-World War II 
organization.  It was founded in 1949 to encourage greater European 
unity and cooperation, pluralistic democracy, and human rights.  The 
location of its headquarters on the French-German border in Strasbourg, 
France, symbolized post-war reconciliation.  The Council includes the 12 
members of the European Community (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and 
United Kingdom), as well as Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Hungary, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Poland, San Marino, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Turkey.  Israel is an observer.

The Council is perhaps best known for its work in developing a 
multilateral system of human rights safeguards and for its contributions 
in harmonizing European laws and policies with more than 140 
intergovernmental conventions.  The Council's most important 
responsibility is the enforcement of the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights, which all member states must ratify.  The Council also 
gives priority to other areas, such as promoting pluralist democracy, 
enhancing Europe's cultural identity, harmonizing legal practices, and 
protecting the environment and social welfare. 

As Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) develop democratic institutions, a primary focus of the Council 
over the next several years will be on aiding that transition and 
expanding its membership as newly democratized states meet the Council's 
requirements.

Hungary became a full member on November 6, 1990, the first formerly 
communist state to meet the Council of Europe's admission criteria of 
pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law.  
Poland and the former Czechoslovakia became full members in 1991, 
followed by Bulgaria in 1992.  With the January 1, 1993, dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia, the successor states of the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic now have "special guest" status and await full 
membership.

Structure
The Council includes the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary 
Assembly, the European Commission of Human Rights, and the European 
Court of Human Rights--all supported by a 900-member secretariat.  Each 
of the Council's 26 member countries is represented on the Committee of 
Ministers by a permanent representative with the rank of ambassador.    
The committee, the main decision-making body, meets for 1 week each 
month and at least twice a year at the foreign minister level to discuss 
matters of common concern to Europe.  Many committees of experts work to 
harmonize European laws and regulations and to formulate European and 
international conventions.

The Parliamentary Assembly, composed of 202 national representatives 
selected by member-state legislatures, holds four plenary sessions each 
year.  The assembly has no major decision-making power but is a 
significant voice within Europe on regional and international issues.  
The Commission on Human Rights and the Court of Human Rights serve as a 
multilateral system to safeguard European civil and political rights.

Relations With the European Community
The growing authority during the 1980s of the European Community (EC) 
over a wide range of economic, technical, and political matters sparked 
concern about the possible division of Europe into community and non-
community states.  In response, the Colombo Commission, created in 1985, 
urged closer cooperation between the EC and the Council, reinforced 
Council activities among its members, and expanded contacts between the 
Council and Eastern Europe and between the Council and the United 
States.  In 1989, the EC and the Council began to hold regular 
"quadripartite" meetings including the Council's Secretary General, its 
chair of the Committee of Ministers, and the presidents of the Council 
of Europe and the EC Commission.  Working-level contacts between the EC 
and the Council of Europe also have increased.

A joint statement issued at the October 1990 quadripartite meeting in 
Venice gave the Council the leading role in welcoming Central and East 
European states back into the European family.  Leaders of the two 
organizations also pledged to explore ways to bring Council members who 
are not in the EC closer to European political cooperation.

The Council expanded its own activities on subjects such as terrorism, 
narcotics, and the environment.  In 1989, it opened for signature a 
convention on cross-border broadcasting and, in 1990, conventions on 
international bankruptcy and on the seizure of the proceeds of crime.  
The Council continues to be a principal European forum for social, 
legal, health, and environmental affairs.

Relations With Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS
In a policy declaration issued on its 40th anniversary, May 5, 1989, the 
Council underlined its role as a bridge between Eastern and Western 
Europe as well as between EC members and non-members.  Then Soviet 
President Gorbachev addressed the Council's Parliamentary Assembly in 
July 1989.  By January 1993, Albania, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine had been granted "special guest" status 
in the Parliamentary Assembly and were being initiated step-by-step into 
selected intergovernmental activities.  Most of these countries 
expressed interest in full membership.  (The former Yugoslavia's special 
guest status was suspended in 1992.) 

By policy and statute, Council membership requires governments to 
practice pluralistic democracy and to respect human rights and the rule 
of law.  The Council established a program, Project Demosthenes, for 
preparing new democracies to meet its standards.  

Activities Beyond Europe
The Council's Parliamentary Assembly takes an active role in fostering 
the worldwide development of democracy.  Together with the European 
Parliament, the assembly sponsors major international conferences on 
parliamentary democracy in Strasbourg, with the next scheduled for 1995, 
and annual regional conferences such as the one held in Guatemala in 
1992.  The United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are 
active partners in organizing this endeavor, which created the 
Strasbourg-based International Institute for Democracy in 1989.  As an 
offshoot of its North-South campaign, the Council established in 1990 a 
Lisbon-based center to promote awareness of global interdependence.

The Council has worked to strengthen its relations in the West as well 
as the East and is open to closer cooperation with the United States and 
Canada.  On several occasions during 1990, it offered its resources and 
expertise to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
process, particularly for activities related to the human dimension.  In 
this regard, the Council has proposed that its Parliamentary Assembly 
form the basis for a CSCE parliamentary body.

The United States recently gained observer status in the Council's 
European Commission for Democracy Through Law and has participated in 
meetings on human rights, migration, minorities, data protection, and 
narcotics.  It is a signatory to the Council's convention on 
repatriation of prisoners and has participated in the development of 
others on use of drugs in sports and seizure of the proceeds from crime.

Council Secretary General Catherine Lalumiere met with President Bush in 
1992, and a delegation from the assembly's Political Affairs Committee 
visited Washington, DC,  in March 1990.  The Council assembly invites US 
Members of Congress to attend at least one plenary session each year.  
It seeks closer relations with the United States and the other 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. (###)



ARTICLE 7:

Fact Sheet:  Who Belongs To What
Membership by country in selected international organizations.

APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) participating economies

15 members:  Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, 
Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Thailand, United States


Arab League

20 members:  Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen


Arab Maghreb Union

5 members:  Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania


ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)

6 members:  Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand


Cairns Group (Named after a town in Australia where the group first met 
in August 1986.)

13 members: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, 
Uruguay 


CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)

11 members:  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan


COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls)

17 members:  Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States


Common Market--See European Community


Council of Baltic Sea States

10 members, plus EC Commission: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden


Council of Europe

26 members, plus EC Commission:  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom


CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe)

53 members, plus EC Commission:  Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia (participation suspended)


EC (European Community)

12 members:  Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom


EFTA (European Free Trade Association)

7 members:  Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland


GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)

6 members:  Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates


Group of 5

5 members:  France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States


Group of 7

7 members, plus EC Commission:  Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
United Kingdom, United States


Group of 24--Same members as OECD


NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

16 members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States


NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council)

38 members: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan


Nordic Council

5 members:  Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden


OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries)

11 members:  Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates


OAS (Organization of American States)

35 members:  Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba 
(participation suspended), Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United 
States, Uruguay, Venezuela


OAU (Organization of African Unity)

51 members:  Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
Cote d'lvoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe


OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)

24 members:  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States


OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)

48 members:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijian, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros,  
Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgystan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen 


OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)

12 members:  Algeria, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela


WEU (Western European Union)

10 members:  Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom  (###)



ARTICLE 8:

New Ambassadors

October-December 1992
Benin--Ruth A. Davis, October 8, 1992
Cape Verde--Joseph Monroe Segars, December 4, 1992
Central African Republic--Robert E. Gribbin III, November 25, 1992
Oman--David J. Dunford, October 23, 1992
United Arab Emirates--William Arthur Rugh, October 16, 1992 (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 

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