US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 4, JANUARY 25, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Excerpts From President's Inaugural Address -- President Clinton
2.  Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing -- Secretary-Designate 
         Christopher
3.  Deputy Secretary-Designate's Confirmation Hearing -- Deputy 
Secretary-
         Designate Wharton  
4.  START II Treaty Transmittal Letter -- President Bush 
5.  New Hope for Haiti -- Luigi R. Einaudi
6.  Haiti:  Diplomatic Initiative
7.  Zaire:  Need for Economic Reform


ARTICLE 1:

Excerpts From President's Inaugural Address
President Clinton

Washington, DC, January 20, 1993
. . . To renew America, we must meet challenges abroad as well as at 
home.  There is no longer a clear division between what is foreign and 
what is domestic.  The world economy, the world environment, the world 
AIDS [acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome] crisis, the world arms race--
they affect us all.  Today, as an old order passes, the new world is 
more free but less stable.  Communism's collapse has called forth old 
animosities and new dangers.  Clearly, America must continue to lead the 
world we did so much to make.

While America rebuilds at home, we will not shrink from the challenges 
nor fail to seize the opportunities of this new world.  Together with 
our friends and allies, we will work to shape change lest it engulf us.  
When our vital interests are challenged or the will and conscience of 
the international community is defied, we will act--with peaceful 
diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary.

The brave Americans serving our nation today in the Persian Gulf, in 
Somalia, and wherever else they stand are testament to our resolve.  But 
our greatest strength is the power of our ideas, which are still new in 
many lands.  Across the world, we see them embraced, and we rejoice.  
Our hopes, our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who 
are building democracy and freedom.  Their cause is America's cause. . . 
. (###)



ARTICLE 2:


Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing
Secretary-Designate Christopher
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
January 13, 1993

Mr. Chairman:  It is a great honor to appear before you as President-
elect Clinton's nominee for Secretary of State.  This hearing room is a 
long way from Scranton, North Dakota, population 300, where I was born 
and raised, and I am deeply moved by being here in these circumstances.

You and the members of this committee have contributed much leadership 
and wisdom to our nation's foreign policy over the past decade.  Let me 
say at the outset that I look forward to a close and cooperative 
relationship with you.  I also look forward to your questions and will 
try to answer them with the ruthless candor for which diplomats are 
famous.

In the 3 weeks since President-elect Clinton asked me to serve as his 
Secretary of State, I have received about as much commiseration as 
congratulation.  Friends point to this new world's raw conflicts and 
stress our own limited resources.  They tell me I have drawn an 
important but unpleasant assignment.

I appreciate their concern.  But I dispute their assessment.  I believe 
we have arrived at a uniquely promising moment.  The signature of this 
era is change, and I believe many of the changes work in our favor.  The 
Cold War is over.  Forty years of sustained effort on behalf of 
collective security and human dignity have been rewarded.  Millions who 
lived under the stultifying yoke of communism are free.  The tide of 
democratic aspirations is rising from Tibet to Central America.  Freer 
markets are expanding the reach of prosperity.  The nuclear nightmare is 
receding, and I want to congratulate President Bush and [Russian] 
President Yeltsin on their successful negotiation of the START II Treaty 
[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty].  We now have the opportunity to 
create a new strategy that directs America's resources at something 
other than superpower confrontation.

Perils of the New Era
Neither President-elect Clinton nor I have any illusions about the 
perils that lurk in many of this era's changes.  The end of the Cold War 
has lifted the lid on many cauldrons of long-simmering conflict.  The 
bloody results are evident in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere.  Nor 
will this era lack for ruthless and expansionist despots; [Iraqi 
President] Saddam Hussein confirmed that fact.  Yet it is also true that 
we are now relatively more powerful and physically more secure.  So 
while we are alert to this era's dangers, we nonetheless approach it 
with an underlying sense of optimism.

Not since the late 1940s has our nation faced the challenge of shaping 
an entirely new foreign policy for a world that has fundamentally 
changed.  Like our counterparts then, we need to design a new strategy 
for protecting American interests by laying the foundations for a more 
just and stable world.  That strategy must reflect the fundamental 
changes that characterize this era:

--  The surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and sectional 
conflicts, especially in the former Soviet bloc;
--  The globalization of commerce and capital;
--  A worldwide democratic revolution, fueled by new information 
technologies that amplify the power of ideas;
--  New and old human rights challenges, including protecting ethnic 
minorities as well as political dissidents;
--  The rise of new security threats, especially terrorism and the 
spread of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction; and 
--  Global challenges including overpopulation, famine, drought, 
refugees, AIDS [acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome], drug-trafficking, 
and threats to the earth's environment.

To adapt our foreign policy goals and institutions to these changes, 
President-elect Clinton has stressed that our effort must rest on three 
pillars:

First, we must elevate America's economic security as a primary goal of 
our foreign policy.

Second, we must preserve our military strength as we adapt our forces to 
new security challenges.  

Third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of promoting 
the spread of democracy and markets abroad.

As we adapt to new conditions, it is worth underscoring the essential 
continuity in American foreign policy.  Despite a change in 
administrations, our policy in many specific instances will remain 
constant and will seek to build upon the accomplishments of our 
predecessors.  Examples include the Middle East peace process, firm 
enforcement of the UN sanctions against Iraq, ratification and 
implementation of the START II Treaty, and the continuing need for US 
power to play a role in promoting stability in Europe and the Pacific.

Nevertheless, our Administration inherits the task of defining a 
strategy for US leadership after the Cold War.  We cannot afford to 
careen from crisis to crisis.  We must have a new diplomacy that seeks 
to anticipate and prevent crises, like those in Iraq, Bosnia, and 
Somalia, rather than simply to manage them.  Our support for democratic 
institutions and human rights can help defuse political conflicts.  And 
our support for sustainable development and global environmental 
protection can help prevent human suffering on a scale that demands our 
intervention.  We cannot foresee every crisis.  But preventive diplomacy 
can free us to devote more time and effort to problems facing us at 
home.

It is not enough to articulate a new strategy; we must also justify it 
to the American people.  Today, foreign policy makers cannot afford to 
ignore the public, for there is a real danger that the public will 
ignore foreign policy.  The unitary goal of containing Soviet power will 
have to be replaced by more complex justifications to fit the new era.  
We need to show that, in this era, foreign policy is no longer foreign.

Practitioners of statecraft sometimes forget [that] their ultimate 
purpose is to improve the daily lives of the American people.  They 
assume foreign policy is too complex for the public to be involved in 
its formation.  That is a costly conceit.  From Vietnam to Iran-contra, 
we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign policies 
hatched by the experts without proper candor or consultation with the 
public and their representatives in Congress.

More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to have 
"clientitis," a malady characterized by undue deference to the potential 
reactions of other countries.  I have long thought the State Department 
needs an "America Desk."  This Administration will have one--and I'll be 
sitting behind it.

Guiding Principles For Foreign Policy
I will not attempt today to fit the foreign policy of the next 4 years 
into the straightjacket of some neatly tailored doctrine.  Yet, 
America's actions in the world must be guided by consistent principles.  
As I have noted, I believe there are three that should guide foreign 
policy in this new era.

First, we must advance America's economic security with the same energy 
and resourcefulness we devoted to waging the Cold War.  The new 
Administration will shortly propose an economic program to empower 
American firms and workers to win in world markets, reduce our reliance 
on foreign borrowing, and increase our ability to sustain foreign 
commitments.  Despite our economic woes, we remain the world's greatest 
trading nation, its largest market, and its leading exporter.  That is 
why we must utilize all the tools at our disposal, including a new GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] agreement and a North American 
Free Trade Agreement that serves the interests of American firms, 
workers, and communities.

In an era in which economic competition is eclipsing ideological 
rivalry, it is time for diplomacy that seeks to assure access for US 
businesses to expanding global markets.  This does not mean that our 
commercial goals will trump other important concerns, such as non-
proliferation, human rights, and sustainable development in the Third 
World.  But for too long, we have made economics the poor cousin of our 
foreign policy.  For example, in nearly all the countries of the former 
Eastern bloc--nations whose economies and markets are on the threshold 
of growth--we have for years assigned only one Foreign Service officer 
to assist US companies.  In the case of Russia, that means one 
commercial officer for a nation of 150 million people.  Other economic 
powers, such as Germany and Japan, devote far more personnel to 
promoting their firms, industries, and economic concerns.

The Clinton Administration intends to harness our diplomacy to the needs 
and opportunities of American industries and workers.  We will not be 
bashful about linking our high diplomacy with our economic goals.  We 
will ask our foreign missions to do more to gather crucial information 
about market opportunities and barriers and actively assist American 
companies seeking to do business abroad.

Second, we must maintain a strong defense as we adapt our forces to new 
and enduring security challenges.  As a result of efforts begun in the 
late 1970s by President Carter and continued under Presidents Reagan and 
Bush, our Administration inherits the best fighting force in the world.  
But the world has changed.

We face a paradox.  The collapse of the Soviet Union enables us to 
reduce our Cold War military forces.  But it also leaves American power 
as the main ballast for an unstable world.  Our ability to manage the 
transition to a more stable system of international relations will 
depend on tenacious diplomacy backed by credible strength.  The 
President-elect and Secretary [of Defense]-designate Aspin have 
described how we must adapt our armed forces to new missions. And I 
agree with President-elect Clinton's statement that we will resolve 
constantly to deter, sometimes to fight, and always to win.

I have spent a good portion of my life practicing various forms of 
diplomacy, negotiation, and problem solving--from the effort to secure 
the release of the American hostages in Iran, to responses to urban 
unrest and police brutality, to the practice of law over 4 decades.  I 
have argued and still believe that diplomacy is a neglected imperative.  
I believe we must apply new dispute resolution techniques and forms of 
international arbitration to the conflicts that plague the world.

I also know from experience that nations do not negotiate on the basis 
of goodwill alone; they negotiate on the basis of interests and, 
therefore, on calculations of power.  As I reflect on our experience in 
the Cold War, it is clear that our success flowed from our ability to 
harness diplomacy and power together--both the modernization of our 
forces and negotiations for arms control; both advocacy for human rights 
and covert and overt opposition to Soviet expansionism.

In the years to come, Americans will be confronted with vexing questions 
about the use of force--decisions about whether to intervene in border 
disputes, civil wars, outright invasions, and in cases of possible 
genocide; about whether to intervene for purposes that are quite 
different from the traditional missions of our armed forces--purposes 
such as peace-keeping, peace-making, humanitarian assistance, evacuation 
of Americans abroad, and efforts to combat drug smuggling and terrorism. 
While there is no magic formula to guide such decisions, I do believe 
that the discreet and careful use of force in certain circumstances--and 
its credible threat in general--will be essential to the success of our 
diplomacy and foreign policy.  Although there will always be differences 
at the margin, I believe we can--and must--craft a bipartisan consensus 
in which these questions concerning the use of force will no longer 
divide our nation as they once did.

However, we cannot respond to every alarm.  I want to assure the 
American people that we will not turn their blood and treasure into an 
open account for use by the rest of the world.  We cannot let every 
crisis become a choice between inaction or American intervention.  It 
will be this Administration's policy to encourage other nations and the 
institutions of collective security, especially the United Nations, to 
do more of the world's work to deter aggression, relieve suffering, and 
keep the peace.  In that regard, we will work with [UN] Secretary 
General Boutros-Ghali and the members of the Security Council to ensure 
[that] the United Nations has the means to carry out such tasks.

The United Nations has recently shown great promise in mediating 
disputes and fulfilling its promise of collective security--in Namibia, 
Cambodia, El Salvador, and elsewhere.  But the United Nations cannot be 
an effective instrument for sharing our global burdens unless we share 
the burden of supporting it.  I will work to ensure that we pay our 
outstanding obligations.

Ultimately, when our vital interests are at stake, we will always 
reserve our option to act alone.  As the President-elect has said, our 
motto in this era should be:  Together where we can; on our own where we 
must.

One of the main security problems of this era will be the proliferation 
of very deadly weapons--nuclear, chemical, biological, and enhanced 
conventional weapons--as well as their delivery systems.  The [Persian] 
Gulf war highlighted the problem of a fanatical aggressor developing or 
using weapons of mass destruction.  We must work assiduously with other 
nations to discourage proliferation through improved intelligence, 
export controls, incentives, sanctions, and even force when necessary.  
Overall, this Administration will give high priority to the prevention 
of proliferation as we enter a new and exceedingly dangerous period.

Third, our new diplomacy will encourage the global revolution for 
democracy that is transforming our world.  Promoting democracy does not 
imply a crusade to remake the world in our image.  Rather, support for 
democracy and human rights abroad can and should be a central strategic 
tenet in improving our own security.  Democratic movements and 
governments are not only more likely to protect human and minority 
rights, they are also more likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and 
territorial disputes in a peaceful manner and to be reliable partners in 
diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and global environmental protection.

A strategic approach to promoting democracy requires that we coordinate 
all of our leverage, including trade, economic and security assistance, 
and debt relief.  By enlisting international and regional institutions 
in the work of promoting democracy, the United States can leverage our 
own limited resources and avoid the appearance of trying to dominate 
others.  In the information age, public diplomacy takes on special 
importance--and that is why we will support the creation of a Radio Free 
Asia to ensure that the people of all Asian nations have access to 
uncensored information about their societies and about the world.

Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down but must be built from the 
bottom up.  Our policy should encourage patient, sustained efforts to 
help others build the institutions that make democracy possible:  
political parties, free media, laws that protect property and individual 
rights, an impartial judiciary, labor unions, and voluntary associations 
that stand between the individual and the state.  American private and 
civic groups are particularly well suited to help.  In this regard, we 
will move swiftly to establish the Democracy Corps, to put experienced 
Americans in contact with foreign grassroots democratic leaders, and to 
strengthen the bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy.

We must also improve our institutional capacity to provide timely and 
effective aid to people struggling to establish democracy and free 
markets.  To that end, we need to overhaul the US Agency for 
International Development [USAID].  The agency needs to take on fewer 
missions, narrow the scope of its operations, and make itself less 
bureaucratic.  As a matter of enlightened self-interest as well as 
compassion, we need to extract lessons from USAID's past successes and 
failures to make its future efforts stronger.

In all this work, we must ensure that the people who carry out our 
nation's foreign policy have the resources they need to do the job.  I 
want to work with you to ensure they have adequate facilities, training, 
information systems, and security.  We also need to take a new look at 
the way our State Department is organized and our policy is formulated.  
In the coming weeks, I intend to streamline the Department of State to 
enhance our capabilities to deal with issues that transcend national 
boundaries and to improve the international competitiveness of American 
business.

The Clinton Administration will put America back in the forefront of 
global efforts to achieve sustainable development and, in the process, 
leave our children a better world.  We believe that sound environmental 
policies are a precondition of economic growth, not a brake on it.

These three pillars for our foreign policy--economic growth, military 
strength, and support for democracy--are mutually re-enforcing.  A 
vibrant economy will strengthen America's hand abroad, while permitting 
us to maintain a strong military without sacrificing domestic needs.  
And by helping others to forge democracy out of the ruins of 
dictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new ones, and create 
new markets for US trade and investment.

Principal Challenges To US Security
Let me take a few moments to consider how this strategic approach 
applies to the principal security challenges that America faces in the 
1990s.  None is more important than helping Russia demilitarize, 
privatize, invigorate its economy, and develop representative political 
institutions.  President Yeltsin's courageous economic and political 
reforms stand as our best hope for reducing the still-formidable arsenal 
of nuclear and conventional arms in Russia and other states of the 
former Soviet Union, and this, in turn, permits reductions in our own 
defense spending.  A collapse of the Russian economy, which contracted 
by 20% last year, could fatally discredit democracy, not only in the 
eyes of the Russians but in the eyes of their neighbors as well.  Our 
Administration will join with our  G-7 [Group of Seven leading 
industrialized nations] partners to increase support for Russia's 
economic reforms.  That aid must be conditioned on the willingness of 
Russia to continue the difficult but essential steps necessary to move 
from a command economy to a more market-oriented one.

We shall also place high priority on direct and technical assistance for 
Russia's efforts to dismantle its weapons and properly dispose of its 
nuclear materials, to provide civilian employment for defense 
technicians, and to house its demobilized forces.  We must say to the 
democratic reformers in Russia that the democratic nations stand with 
them and that the world's experience in coping with similar problems is 
available to them.  We should also orchestrate similar international 
action to help Ukraine, the other Commonwealth [of Independent] States, 
the Baltics, and the nations of Eastern and Central Europe.

In Europe, we remain committed to NATO, history's most successful 
military and political alliance, even as we support the evolution of new 
security arrangements that incorporate the emerging democracies to the 
east.  Our Administration will support efforts by the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe to promote human rights, democracy, 
free elections, and the historic re-integration of the nations of 
Eastern and Western Europe.  I can also assure you that this 
Administration will vigorously pursue concerted action with our European 
allies and international bodies to end the slaughter in Bosnia--a 
slaughter that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and that threatens 
to spread throughout the Balkans.  Europe and the world community in 
general must bring real pressures, economic and military, to bear on the 
Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of ethnic cleansing.

In Asia, we confront many challenges and opportunities.  In particular, 
as President-elect Clinton stressed during the campaign, a complex blend 
of new and old forces requires us to rethink our policy toward China.  
On the one hand, there is a booming economy based increasingly on free 
market principles, which is giving hundreds of millions of Chinese 
citizens an unprecedented degree of prosperity and a thirst for economic 
as well as political reform.  On the other hand, we cannot ignore 
continuing reports of Chinese exports of sensitive military technology 
to troubled areas, widespread violations of human rights, or abusive 
practices that have contributed to a $17-billion trade imbalance between 
our two nations.  Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful 
evolution of China from communism to democracy by encouraging the forces 
of economic and political liberalization in that great country.

Elsewhere in Asia, the countries of the Pacific Rim are becoming a 
global center of economic dynamism.  In 1991, our trans-Pacific trade 
exceeded     $316 billion, dwarfing our $221-billion trade with Western 
Europe.  We must devote particular attention to Japan.  Japan has 
recently taken important steps to meet more of its international 
security responsibilities, such as assisting in peace-keeping efforts 
from Cambodia to Somalia.  Now it must do more to meet its economic 
responsibilities as well--to lower trade barriers more quickly and to 
open its economy to competition.  Together, Japan and the United States 
account for a third or more of the global economy.  That obligates us 
both to steer clear of the reefs of recrimination and the rise of 
regional trading blocs that could sink prospects for global growth.  But 
we also have an obligation to America's firms and workers to ensure 
[that] they are able to benefit from the growth of Japan's economy,  
just as the strength and openness of the US economy has helped fuel 
Japan's prosperity over many decades.

In South Korea, we will continue to maintain our military presence as 
long as North Korea poses a threat to that nation.  And on Asia's 
subcontinent, our interests include combating nuclear proliferation; 
restoring peace to Afghanistan; seeing an end to communal strife that 
threatens India's democracy; and promoting human rights and free 
elections in Burma, Pakistan, and elsewhere.

In the Middle East, we must maintain the momentum behind the current 
negotiations over peace and regional issues.  President Bush and 
[former] Secretary of State Baker deserve great credit for bringing 
Arabs and Israelis to the bargaining table, and the Clinton 
Administration is committed to building on that historic breakthrough.  
Our democracy-centered policy underscores our special relationship with 
Israel, the region's only democracy, with whom we are committed to 
maintaining a strong and vibrant strategic relationship.  We also 
believe that America's unswerving commitment to Israel's right to exist 
behind secure borders is essential to a just and lasting peace.  We will 
continue our efforts with both Israel and our Arab friends to address 
the full range of that region's challenges.

Throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, we will work toward new 
arms control agreements, particularly concerning weapons of mass 
destruction.  We will assume a vigilant stance toward both Iraq and 
Iran, which seem determined to sow violence and disorder throughout the 
region and even beyond.  In this region, as well, we will champion 
economic reform, more accountable governance, and increased respect for 
human rights.  And following a decade during which over 1,000 Americans 
were killed, injured, or kidnaped by perpetrators of international 
terrorism, we will give no quarter to terrorists or the states that 
sponsor their crimes against humanity.

Nowhere has the march against dictators and toward democracy been more 
dramatic than in our own hemisphere.  It is in our self-interest to help 
Latin America consolidate a decade of hard-won progress.  In the past 
several years, as democracy has spread in the region and market 
economies have been liberalized, our exports to Latin America have 
doubled.  In close partnership with our hemispheric partners, Canada and 
Mexico, we should explore ways to extend free trade agreements to Latin 
American nations that are opening their economies and political systems.  
At the same time, we expect to complete understandings regarding the 
North American Free Trade Agreement as outlined by President-elect 
Clinton.  We also need to make the Organization of American States [OAS] 
a more effective forum for addressing our region's problems.  In Haiti, 
we strongly support the international effort by the UN and the OAS to 
restore democracy.  In Cuba, we will maintain the embargo to keep 
pressure on the Castro regime.  We will strongly support national 
reconciliation and the full implementation of peace accords in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua.  And in the Andean countries, the power of the 
drug lords must be broken to free their people and ours from the 
corrupting influence of the narcotics trade.

In Africa, as well, a new generation is demanding the opportunities that 
flow from multi-party democracy and open economies.  They deserve our 
understanding and support.  We need to assist their efforts to build 
institutions that can empower Africa's people to husband and benefit 
from the continent's vast resources; deal with its economic, social, and 
environmental problems; and address its underlying causes of political 
instability.  We will be equally committed to working with Congress to 
redirect our foreign assistance programs to promote sustainable 
development and private enterprise in Africa.  In South Africa, we shall 
work actively to support those, black and white, who are striving to 
dismantle the hateful machinery of apartheid and working with 
determination to build a multi-racial democracy.

The Triumph of Freedom
As I said on the day President-elect Clinton nominated me to be 
Secretary of State, back when I was in law school, two of my heroes were 
[former Secretaries of State] Gen. George Marshall and Dean Acheson.  
And I am enormously honored by the opportunity to occupy the post held 
by them and by many of the most revered names in our nation's history.  
Marshall and Acheson were visionaries who recognized at the dawn of the 
Cold War that America could not remain safe by standing aloof from the 
world.  And the triumph of freedom in that great struggle is the legacy 
of the activist foreign policy they shaped to project our values and 
protect our interests.

Now, as in their day, we face a new era and the challenge of developing 
a new foreign policy.  Its activism must be grounded in America's 
enduring interests.  It must be informed by a realistic estimate of the 
dangers we face.  It must be shaped by the democratic convictions we 
share.  And, to command respect abroad, it must rest on a sturdy, 
bipartisan consensus here at home.

The ultimate test of the security strategy I have outlined today will be 
in the benefits it delivers to the American people.  Its worth will be 
measured not by its theoretical elegance but by its results.  If it 
makes our people more prosperous and increases their safety abroad; if 
it helps expand the stabilizing and ennobling reach of democratic 
institutions and freer markets; if it helps protect the global 
environment for our children--if it achieves these kinds of benefits, 
then we will have discharged our responsibilities to our generation as 
Marshall, Acheson, and the other architects of the post-war world 
discharged theirs.

They have given us a high standard to emulate as we define anew the 
requirements of US global leadership.  I look forward to working with 
both parties in Congress to construct a new framework for that 
leadership, a frame-work within which healthy debate will occur but 
within which we can also build a strong consensus that will help us 
cooperatively pursue the national interest at home and abroad.  (###)



ARTICLE 3:

Deputy Secretary-Designate's Confirmation Hearing
Deputy Secretary-Designate Wharton
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
January 22, 1993

When President Clinton asked me to join his new Administration, I 
accepted with a sense of honor, of excitement, and a sense of great 
personal fulfillment.

For more than 2 decades, I have been an executive in higher education 
and finance--president of a university; chancellor of a multi-campus 
university system; and head of a very large insurance company and 
pension fund for employees of colleges and universities, research 
institutes, private secondary schools, and foundations.

Some might ask how, with that background, I came to be considered for 
this post.  While I am not privy to the thoughts of President Clinton or 
Secretary of State Christopher on my selection, I should point out that 
my career did not suddenly begin when I was elected president of 
Michigan State University in 1970.

The fact is that for some 22 years previously, my full-time career 
involved technical assistance and foreign economic development.  Mr. 
Chairman, if I may be permitted to forego my usual diffidence, an 
anecdote may help to clarify the dilemma I face when trying to rebut 
those who say I have no foreign policy experience.  At a recent college 
commencement where I was privileged to receive an honorary degree, I was 
waiting in the procession line when I was approached by a faculty 
member.  His first comment after congratulating me on the honorary 
degree was the inevitable question: "How's my retirement money?"  His 
second comment was to say, "I am very happy to meet you because I use 
your father's book on economic development in my course."  When I 
pointed out to him that my ambassador father never wrote a book on 
economic development but that he was referring to my book, my faculty 
friend expressed amazement to learn that I was the same person.

Background
So how did all this begin?  In his presentation several days ago, Warren 
Christopher recalled the great influence on the post-1945 world of our 
nation's Marshall Plan--surely one of the few shining episodes in the 
history of relations between nations formerly at war.  Perhaps the event 
that most shaped my own career was my presence in the graduating class 
at Harvard University on June 5, 1947.  As someone who has given more 
than a few of them, I can tell you that commencement speeches are 
usually listened to by the boisterous seniors with half an ear, if that.  
But for my class, the speaker was Secretary of State George C. Marshall 
himself.  The address he gave that day--the address in which he set 
forth the elements of the Marshall Plan--stands as one of the great 
turning points in enlightened diplomacy.

Even now I remember key thoughts from his speech:

Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against 
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the 
revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence 
of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.

General Marshall knew full well [that] he was laying the groundwork for 
a great campaign to rebuild war-torn Europe-- physically, economically, 
and politically as well.  He may have been less aware of the effect his 
words had on one idealistic youngster who resolved, on the spot, to 
dedicate himself to the inspired and inspiring principles General 
Marshall had just put before the graduating class. Nonetheless, his 
words guided my educational and career choices from that moment onward.  
At Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, I took my 
masters in international affairs with an emphasis on Latin America-- a 
specialization that eventually led to 5 years of work on assistance 
programs in Venezuela, Brazil, and Costa Rica in association with Nelson 
Rockefeller.  Later, when I was studying for my doctorate in economics 
at the University of Chicago, my mentor was the great Nobel laureate in 
economics, Theodore W. Shultz, who was then evaluating US technical 
assistance throughout Latin America.  My dissertation was on the impact 
of technical assistance on agricultural development in Brazil.

When I completed my doctorate, I faced the usual choice [of] what in the 
world to do with it.  My father, a career diplomat who would eventually 
become our country's first black career ambassador, made no secret of 
his eagerness to have me follow his footsteps into the Foreign Service.  
And that was by no means an unappealing possibility.  

Yet, 10 years after I heard George Marshall speak at Harvard, his 
message still filled me with excitement.  In Japan and Europe it was now 
possible to see, in the most vivid and concrete ways, what international 
assistance and trade could accomplish.   And in President Truman's 
subsequent "Point Four" program, the United States had already embarked 
on an extension of the original Marshall Plan concept to what were then 
called the "underdeveloped" nations of the Third World.

To be sure, the Point Four program was undertaken in large part, if not 
entirely, to contain the expanding communist sphere of influence.  Yet 
Point Four struck me as potentially much more than just a Cold War 
gambit.  Ultimately, I thought it might be, at least, as constructive an 
element of US foreign policy as traditional diplomacy.  And, on that 
basis, I made my choice.

Between 1957 and 1970, I worked for the private, non-profit Agricultural 
Development Council headed by John D. Rockefeller III.  For 6 of those 
years, my family and I lived in Malaysia, while my teaching, research, 
and grant-making and development activities also took me regularly to 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.  It was a part of the world where 
the majority of people were struggling to move from bare subsistence to 
a higher standard of living.  They were seeking better nutrition, 
housing, education, and health care--all the things we mean when we talk 
about the "quality of life" and "economic development."  Our efforts to 
help them we labeled "technical assistance."  Back in the United States, 
our commitments got thrown together with a lot of other things under the 
catch-all heading of "foreign aid."  Then, as now, not understanding 
"foreign aid" didn't necessarily prevent people from attacking it.

In 1970, I became president of Michigan State University--a huge 
"megaversity" in the then-popular term and one with a large and highly 
respected international studies program.  These were important programs, 
including scores of projects based in developing nations around the 
world, many funded by the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID).

In 1978, I became chancellor of the State University of New York (SUNY) 
system, the nation's largest public university.  With 64 campuses, 
47,000 employees, and more than 380,000 students, SUNY also maintained 
major international program commitments, and I made enhancing them one 
of my key initiatives during the 9 years I worked there.

In 1987, I became chairman and chief executive officer of the Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund 
[TIAA-CREF].  With assets of $112 billion, TIAA-CREF is the largest 
private pension fund in the world and the third-largest insurance 
company in the United States.

Without belaboring the point much further, I want to stress that my 
involvement in international relations did not end after my overseas 
development days were over.  My first foreign policy foray came in 1966 
as a member of the State Department's Advisory Committee on East Asia 
and the Pacific.  In the intervening years, I was chairman of the Food 
Advisory Plan of Congress' Office of Technology Assistance; a member of 
President Carter's Commission on World Hunger; co-chairman of Secretary 
of State Shultz's Commission on Security and Economic Assistance; and 
the first chairman of USAID's Board for International Food and 
Agricultural Development.  I have been a long-standing member of the 
Overseas Development Council and trustee of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, where I had the privilege of serving with Secretary 
Christopher.  Most recently, I have briefly served on the Advisory 
Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I hope you will forgive me 
for the brief, though probably not brief enough, recitation of what 
could be called my foreign policy portfolio.  I wanted to give you some 
assurance that, in this extremely demanding assignment as Deputy 
Secretary of State, I will not be starting from square one.  Moreover, 
since Secretary Christopher provided you with his perspectives on the 
many challenges that our country faces around the world, particularly in 
Russia, the Middle East, and Somalia, it seemed only fair to offer you 
some sense of the background and values I bring to these and other 
challenges that lie ahead.

Immediate Priorities
What, in fact, are some of the challenges that are uppermost in my mind?  
The Deputy Secretary of State is, in one sense, the Secretary's alter 
ego and, in another, the State Department's chief operating officer.  As 
such, I propose to concentrate, at least initially, on at least four 
issues. 

First, I have been asked by Secretary Christopher to take an active role 
in putting together both the State Department budget for FY 1994 and the 
Function 150 International Affairs Budget.  In that process, we will be 
seeking to balance two imperatives. 

--  The first is to support the Administration's key foreign policy 
objectives in national security, economic competitiveness and the 
promotion of democracy and free markets abroad. 

--  The second is to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent 
with the Administration's domestic agenda. Given the obvious fiscal 
constraints, we will need to take much greater care in assuring that the 
resources we dedicate to advance our important interests abroad are 
expended in a coordinated and effective way.

Second, I will search for ways to adapt our foreign affairs machinery to 
the new realities of the post-Cold War era.  As Secretary Christopher 
stated in his appearance before this committee, recent changes on the 
global scene make it both timely and necessary to re-examine the way our 
State Department is organized and how our policy is formulated.  Also, 
we need to streamline the Department and the policy- making process as 
we enhance our ability to deal with issues that transcend national 
boundaries.

Third, I intend to pay special attention to the restructuring of our aid 
programs and institutions.  It is clear from the many recent studies 
that we need to redefine USAID and revamp its organization accordingly.  
In particular, we must ensure that our aid activities directly support 
democracy, free markets, and sustainable development.  This will receive 
my highest priority.  We intend to name an Administrator of USAID and to 
move quickly to develop proposals which can serve as the basis for 
consultation with the Congress.

Finally, I will look for ways to strengthen and support the people who 
are responsible for the day-to-day management and execution of our 
foreign policy, for they constitute our most important resource.  We 
must be sure that they have the training and direction they need to 
advance our key policy objectives, and we must see to it that they have 
the facilities, information systems, and security needed to accomplish 
their critically important missions.

In each of these important areas, I hope that my managerial experience 
in business and academia, as well as my earlier experience in economic 
development, will serve me well.  But I want to emphasize that as we 
consider ways to improve the Department, I will work closely with the 
Congress and especially with the members of this committee.  Your wisdom 
and insights will be invaluable.

More broadly, as Secretary Christopher's alter ego, I expect to be fully 
engaged in policy issues.  As we shift from a bipolar to a multipolar 
world, the United States is, by force of destiny, a nation which must 
act in global terms.  But we need not think about the fate of other 
nations for purely altruistic reasons.  The fact is, as President 
Clinton has said on numerous occasions, our national interest is 
inextricably linked with the rest of the world's.

Our economy now stretches to every corner of the world through 
international trade and resource specialization.  Oil tremors anywhere 
in the world are quickly felt at the gas pumps in our towns and 
villages. American exports are the source of millions of jobs in this 
country.  Our balance-of-trade problems and deficits are symptomatic of 
the global linkages.  Our ecology is the world's ecology. Whether it is 
global warming or desertification, national boundaries mean nothing to 
the forces of nature. The volcanic dust from Krakatoa didn't know the 
difference between the United States, Canada, or Europe.

Our base of human knowledge is globally linked.  It is no accident that 
today American universities have the largest numbers of foreign graduate 
students ever.  These students will take back to their countries part of 
the American culture, which will further extend American influence.  The 
explosion in new technologies and the speed with which they travel 
around the world accelerates almost daily. Many of these new 
technologies are invented here in the United States but are often more 
skillfully commercialized by other nations.  We must take dramatic steps 
to reverse this trend, but we cannot hope to reverse it if we turn our 
backs on the world.

Finally, we have to recognize the extent to which the world's peoples 
are linked.  The United States, with its kaleidoscope of race, religion, 
creed, ethnic and national origin, is one of the most diverse nations in 
the world.  The influx of immigrants throughout our nation's history has 
strengthened us in many ways.  But it also has cemented our ties to 
foreign lands, allies, and trading partners.

I belabor these points because if our foreign policy is to be a viable 
one, it must reflect the fundamental reality of our global nature.  Our 
domestic strength is linked to our international strength and vice 
versa.  Isolationism is not a viable option.

To pursue peace not just through preparedness but also by eliminating 
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos; to champion democracy not by 
imposing it but by fostering the economic, political, and social 
conditions for the development of free institutions--this is the vision 
that inspired me as a young college graduate.  It is a vision fed by the 
best and purest springs of the American character.  And it is a vision 
that will serve us as well in foreign policy as it will for the Clinton 
Administration's agenda for domestic economic growth and social progress 
in the years ahead.

Conclusion
In nominating Warren Christopher to be the architect of our nation's 
foreign policy, President Clinton has chosen superbly well.  Secretary 
Christopher is an exemplary public servant and diplomat--a man of both 
vision and experience, absolute integrity, and heartfelt love of 
country.  I look forward to serving with him, and I will consider it a 
great honor if he considers his formidable skills in any way 
complemented by my own.

With your permission, I would like to conclude on a very personal note.  
I spoke before of my father, a 40-year veteran of the US Foreign 
Service--in fact, the first black career officer to be appointed a US 
ambassador.  I can't say that these things are in the genes, of course.  
I can't even say my father was always in full agreement with my need to 
find my own way in life or the paths I took to do so.  But my father did 
instill in me both a thirst for knowledge about the world and a sense of 
diplomacy's high calling for resolving the conflicts that inevitably 
arise between nations.  My one regret is that he couldn't be in the 
audience today as you consider his son's nomination as second-in-command 
of the Department he was so proud to serve.  If he had been here, he'd 
probably be nodding and saying, "Well, son, you certainly took the long 
way around.  Now it's about time you took my advice." (###)



ARTICLE 4:

START II Treaty Transmittal Letter 
President Bush
Text of a letter to the US Senate, January 15, 1993.

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993 
[see Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 20].  The Treaty includes the following 
documents, which are integral parts thereof:

--  the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs 
[intercontinental ballistic missiles] and on Procedures Governing 
Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the 
Elimination and Conversion Protocol); 

--  the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers 
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation on Strategic 
Offensive Arms (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and

--  the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy 
Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on Attribution).

In addition, I transmit herewith,  for the information of the Senate, 
the report of the Department of State and letters exchanged by 
representatives of the Parties.  The letters are associated with, but 
not integral parts of, the START II Treaty.  Although not submitted for 
the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, these letters are 
provided because they are relevant to the consideration of the Treaty by 
the Senate.

The START II Treaty is a milestone in the continuing effort by the 
United States and the Russian Federation to address the threat posed by 
strategic offensive nuclear weapons, especially multiple-warhead ICBMs.  
It builds upon and relies on the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) signed at 
Moscow on July 31, 1991.  At the same time, the START II Treaty goes 
even further than the START Treaty.

The START Treaty was the first treaty actually to reduce strategic 
offensive arms of both countries, with overall reductions of 30-40 
percent and reductions of up to 50 percent in the most threatening 
systems.  It enhances stability in times of crisis.  It not only limits 
strategic arms but also reduces them significantly below current levels.   
In addition, the START Treaty allows equality of forces and is 
effectively verifiable.  Finally, commitments associated with the START 
Treaty will result in the elimination of nuclear weapons and deployed 
strategic offensive arms from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine within 7 years after entry into force, and accession of 
these three states to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties.  As a result, after 
7 years, only Russia and the United States will retain any deployed 
strategic offensive arms under the START Treaty.

The START II Treaty builds upon and surpasses the accomplishments of the 
START Treaty by further reducing strategic offensive arms in such a way 
that further increases the stability of the strategic nuclear balance.  
It bans deployment of the most destabilizing type of nuclear weapons 
system--land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple 
independently targetable nuclear warheads.  At the same time, the START 
II Treaty permits the United States to maintain a stabilizing sea-based 
force.

The central limits of the START II Treaty require reductions by January 
1, 2003, to 3000-3500 warheads.  Within this, there are sublimits of 
between 1700-1750 warheads on deployed SLBMs [submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles] for each Party, or such lower number as each Party 
shall decide for itself; zero for warheads on deployed multiple-warhead 
ICBMs; and zero for warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs.   Thus, the Treaty 
reduces the current overall deployments of strategic nuclear weapons on 
each side by more than two-thirds from current levels.   These limits 
will be reached by the end of the year 2000 if both Parties reach 
agreement on a program of assistance to the Russian Federation with 
regard to dismantling strategic offensive arms within a year after entry 
into force of the Treaty.  Acceptance of these reductions serves as a 
clear indication of the ending of the Cold War.

In a major accomplishment, START II will result in the complete 
elimination of heavy ICBMs (the SS-18s) and the elimination or 
conversion of their launchers.  All heavy ICBMs and launch canisters 
will be destroyed.  All but 90 heavy ICBM silos will likewise be 
destroyed and these 90 silos will be modified to be incapable of 
launching SS-18s.  To address the Russians' stated concern over the cost 
of implementing the transition to a single-warhead ICBM force, the START 
II Treaty provides for the conversion of up to 90 of the 154 Russian SS-
18 heavy ICBM silos that will remain after the START Treaty reductions.  
The Russians have unilaterally undertaken to use the converted silos 
only for the smaller, SS-25 type single-warhead ICBMs.  When 
implemented, the Treaty's conversion provisions, which include extensive 
on-site inspection rights, will preclude the use of these silos to 
launch heavy ICBMs.  Together with the elimination of SS-18 missiles, 
these provisions are intended to ensure that the strategic capability of 
the 
SS-18 system is eliminated.

START II allows some reductions to be taken by downloading, i.e., 
reducing the number of warheads attributed to existing missiles.  This 
will allow the United States to achieve the reductions required by the 
Treaty in a cost-effective way by downloading some or all of our sea-
based Trident SLBMs and land-based Minuteman III ICBMs.  The Treaty also 
allows downloading, in Russia, of 105 of the 170 SS-19 multiple-warhead 
missiles in existing silos to a single-warhead missile.  All other 
Russian launchers of multiple-warhead ICBMs--including the remaining 65 
SS-19s--must be converted for single-warhead ICBMs or eliminated in 
accordance with START procedures.   START II can be implemented in a 
fashion that is fully consistent with US national security.   To ensure 
that we have the ability to respond to worldwide conventional 
contingencies, it allows for the reorientation, without any conversion 
procedures, of 100 START-accountable heavy bombers to a conventional 
role. These heavy bombers will not count against START II warhead 
limits.

The START Treaty and the START II Treaty remain in force concurrently 
and have the same duration.  Except as explicitly modified by the START 
II Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty will be used to implement 
START II.

The START II Treaty provides for inspections in addition to those of the 
START Treaty.  These additional inspections will be carried out 
according to the provisions of the START Treaty unless otherwise 
specified in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or in the 
Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol.  As I was convinced that the START 
Treaty is effectively verifiable, I am equally confident that the START 
II Treaty is effectively verifiable.

The START Treaty was an historic achievement in our long-term effort to 
enhance the stability of the strategic balance through arms control.  
The START II Treaty represents the capstone of that effort.  Elimination 
of heavy ICBMs and the effective elimination of all other multiple-
warhead ICBMs will put an end to the most dangerous weapons of the Cold 
War.

In sum, the START II Treaty is clearly in the interest of the United 
States and represents a watershed in our efforts to stabilize the 
nuclear balance and further reduce strategic offensive arms.  I 
therefore urge the Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to 
the Treaty, including its Protocols and Memorandum on Attribution, and 
to give its advice and consent to ratification.

George Bush (###)



ARTICLE 5:

New Hope for Haiti
Luigi R. Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to the Organization of 
American States (OAS)
Address before the OAS Permanent Council, Washington, DC, January 13, 
1993

Mr. Chairman:  I thank the [OAS] Secretary General for his report, which 
gives some of the reasons why we believe there is new hope for progress 
in Haiti.  

Indeed, I wish to convey explicitly from the outset my government's 
appreciation for Secretary General Baena Soares' continuing efforts to 
carry out the mandates created by the OAS Foreign Ministers during their 
ad hoc meeting last December 13, as well as those that have been in 
place since October of 1991.

Our Secretary General has, in our view, borne daunting responsibilities 
with grace and energy in an environment characterized by rapid change 
and complexity, one presenting major obstacles as well as opportunities.  
His performance--both individually and in coordination with the Foreign 
Minister of Bolivia--reaffirms the unique role of regional solidarity 
organized in support of Haitian democracy through the OAS. 

Now, a renewed effort to resolve Haiti's crisis has been taking shape 
for some time.  In its current form, however, the new initiative now 
developing is built on three pillars that have emerged clearly only over 
the past month.  They are: 

--  Internationally, a new pattern of coordination between the OAS and 
the United Nations in which are combined the special strengths of 
regional sensitivity and global power; 
--  In Haiti, a desire among the most varied of sectors to put an end to 
this tragic crisis; and, finally,
--  In the United States, close cooperation in the national interest 
between incoming and outgoing administrations of different political 
parties. 

The prelude took place in September [1992], when Secretary General Baena 
Soares hosted a week of negotiations between personal representatives of 
[Haitian] President Aristide and of Haiti's de facto government.  Those 
private talks led to a breakthrough agreement to station an 18-member 
civilian presence in Haiti.  Now headed by the gifted diplomat from 
Trinidad and Tobago, Colin Granderson, that mission has faced both 
logistical and political difficulties--yet it has become the inspiration 
for a process to reassure all parties in Haiti that a peaceful solution 
is possible and that their intrinsic human rights can be respected.  

In October [1992], President Aristide reminded world leaders of the 
continuing urgency of the crisis and called upon the UN to join the OAS 
in enforcing measures designed to restore democracy there.  His letter 
stimulated November resolutions in both the OAS and the UN calling for 
implementation of economic measures and--I quote the OAS--". . . with 
special emphasis on the suspension of oil, arms and munitions supplies 
and on the freezing of assets of the Haitian state."

At the same time, at the request of our Secretary General Baena Soares, 
Jamaica's former Prime Minister Michael Manley carried out quiet shuttle 
diplomacy with a view to assessing opportunities for an early solution 
of the crisis.  In early December, Manley met in Atlanta with UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and former President Carter.

On December 11, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali nominated former 
Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo as his Special Representative on 
Haiti.  We in the United States have a high regard for Dante Caputo, and 
we are impressed that our [OAS] Secretary General has ensured greater 
cooperation with the United Nations and a single voice by naming Mr. 
Caputo his representative.  On December 13, the hemisphere's foreign 
ministers met in Washington in a reconvened OAS ministerial on Haiti.  
After a 31/2-hour, closed-door debate, during which Jamaica's current 
Foreign Minister David Coore made a moving statement of the need for 
both stronger measures and greater humanitarian assistance, the 
ministers took several decisions.  Of particular significance for future 
events, they authorized new efforts focused on a "substantial increase 
in the OAS civilian  presence" and on increasing cooperation with the 
United Nations, possibly even the Security Council.  

On December 19, special envoy Caputo traveled to Port au Prince and met 
with all interested sectors.  That week, our Secretary General met with 
the Secretary General of the United Nations in New York.

On January 6 [1993], Secretary of State Eagleburger and Secretary-
designate Warren Christopher discussed the situation in Haiti [see box].  
On an exceptional basis, the Department of State issued a formal 
statement that it had been coordinating closely with senior members of 
the Clinton transition team in a joint effort with UN and OAS 
representatives to support the initiative being developed by Mr. Caputo.

Mr. Chairman, let me quote directly from this exceptional official US 
statement:

The incoming Administration and this Administration [that is, the Bush 
Administration and the Clinton Administration-to-be] share the goal of 
restoring democracy to Haiti--safeguarding the human rights of all 
Haitians on the island and helping the parties find a lasting solution 
that will end Haiti's suffering and attain new support for Haiti's 
economy and people.  We urge all sides to be flexible in their positions 
and to be responsive to the entreaties of the United Nations and OAS. 

The next day, Secretary General Baena added to the new momentum by 
calling publicly again for an immediate enhancement of the OAS civilian 
presence in Haiti.  The United States agrees, believing that the early 
augmentation of the international civilian presence on the ground in 
Haiti can help create a climate of confidence for negotiations to end 
Haiti's political and economic crisis and can, by its very presence, 
have an immediate, positive impact in reducing human rights violations 
from whatever source. 

We agree entirely with Secretary General Baena Soares that the OAS 
civilian presence should not be seen as a substitute for the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.  We regret that the de facto 
government in Port au Prince declined a request from the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights to visit Haiti to observe the human rights 
situation.

I might also add that we, too, are concerned by the announcement by the 
de facto government that it intends to hold elections for several Senate 
seats and other offices on January 18 and 25.  The United States 
believes that free and fair elections can only be held under a legally 
constituted government in an atmosphere of respect for free expression, 
freedom of assembly, and open political dialogue.  These conditions do 
not exist in Haiti today; for that reason the State Department yesterday 
publicly indicated that we do not regard the planned elections as 
legitimate [see Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 42].  My delegation would 
support a similar statement by the president of this permanent council 
to that effect today.

The fact is that the United States is firmly committed to restoration of 
democratic, constitutional government in Haiti.  We continue to 
recognize Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the legitimately elected president 
of that country.  And we urge all parties to dedicate themselves to 
serious negotiations to end the current crisis by restoring democracy to 
Haiti.

Haiti needs a democratic solution to end its suffering--to attain new 
support for its economy and people.  One component of this lasting 
solution is economic.  The US is providing food for some 400,000-500,000 
Haitians every day and emergency medical care for up to 2 million 
Haitian men, women, and children.  Our purpose in joining the embargo is 
to help induce negotiations and restore democracy.  

Our purpose is not to deny food to the poor or to deprive the Haitian 
people generally of basic needs.  In fact, today the United States is 
publishing in the Federal Register regulations decided upon some time 
ago that will allow the export to Haiti of school books, medicine, 
generators, and generator spare parts for humanitarian purposes such as 
hospitals.  Our purpose is to maintain pressure for a negotiated 
political solution, not to punish the Haitian people.  To that end, we 
continue to ban most trade.  To that end, we oppose access by the de 
facto regime to international financial institutions or to arms.  To 
that end, we maintain frozen the assets of the Haitian Government in the 
United States. 

We are not and have not been shy about this policy.  Maj. Gen. John 
Sheehan, USMC, is in charge of US Security Assistance Programs in the 
Caribbean.  He regularly consults with the military liaison officers in 
our embassies there.  Last week, we took advantage of his visit to Haiti 
to reinforce our basic message:  that there must be a peaceful solution 
to Haiti's crisis that recognizes the legitimate authority of President 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Finally, let me say that any lasting solution must address the tragic 
conditions of the Haitian "boat people."  We are very concerned that 
migration by boat from Haiti is an extremely dangerous undertaking which 
has led to many deaths.  As we have said many times, we believe that 
migration is a regional problem to which the only lasting solution is 
the restoration of democracy in Haiti itself.  We urge all Haitians 
wishing to seek refugee status to operate through normal legal 
procedures that are already in place and accessible to them.  

Let me conclude by repeating that we believe this is a moment of unusual 
opportunity to make progress on a terrible problem.  The opportunity has 
been created by an unprecedented conjunction of forces and events inside 
Haiti and out.  

We now have the United Nations undertaking a complementary and 
reinforcing role in addition to that of the OAS, which has been involved 
since the beginning of this crisis.  It is crucial that the Haitian 
people take advantage of this opportunity before new pressures arise and 
before additional hardships affect them.  It is crucial that they seek a 
fair and lasting democratic solution that bolsters democratic 
institutions, safeguards the rights of all citizens, and allows economic 
reconstruction.

We urge all sides to be flexible in their positions and to be responsive 
to the UN and OAS as this new initiative develops.  And we urge all 
countries--not only those who have already been generous in their 
support but all countries--to provide the long-term financial and human 
support needed to ensure that this new initiative prospers and that the 
plan set forth so well by our Secretary General today can be put into 
practice.   (###)



ARTICLE 6:

Haiti:  Diplomatic Initiative
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, 
January 6, 1993.

In their initial meeting this morning, Secretary Eagleburger and 
Secretary-designate Christopher discussed the new diplomatic initiative 
being under-taken by the United Nations and the Organization of American 
States (OAS) to find a solution to the Haiti crisis.  The State 
Department and the Clinton transition team have been coordinating 
closely in a joint effort to support this initiative.  UN and OAS 
representatives have been in close touch with the Department and senior 
members of the Clinton transition team in recent days.

The incoming Administration and this Administration share the goal of 
restoring democracy to Haiti--safeguarding the human rights of all 
Haitians on the island and helping the parties find a lasting solution 
that will end Haiti's suffering and attain new support for Haiti's 
economy and people.  We urge all sides to be flexible in their positions 
and to be responsive to the entreaties of the United Nations and OAS. 
(###)



ARTICLE 7:

Zaire:  Need for Economic Reform
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Joseph Snyder, Washington, DC, 
January 14, 1993.

In Zaire today, the ambassadors of the United States, Belgium, and 
France delivered a joint demarche personally to the President, the Prime 
Minister, and the Chairman of the High Council urging them to adopt a 
short-term stabilization plan and other reforms in cooperation with the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  The ambassadors made 
clear that such economic reforms are an essential precondition for 
increased bilateral and multilateral aid.

The demarche stressed that the transition government of Prime Minister 
Tshisekedi must have full authority to pursue the twin objectives of 
peaceful transition to democracy and economic stabilization without 
interference from the presidency.

The demarche also stated that the government budget, including limited 
and controlled appropriations for the presidency, should be formulated 
in a fully transparent way and strictly observed.  The demarche noted 
the absolute importance of appointing a qualified managerial team 
responsible to the prime minister, according to procedures approved by 
the national conference, including the governor of the central bank.

The ambassadors emphasized that when Zaire has taken these initial 
steps, the United States, Belgium, and France will be prepared to help 
assist Zaire's economic recovery, according to their individual 
procedures.  Initially, such assistance would include increased 
humanitarian aid; private voluntary organization and government programs 
to help establish a social safety net; and technical support, including 
advice on the implementation of necessary economic reforms. (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 4