US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 3, JANUARY 18, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. US Signs Chemical Weapons Convention -- President Bush
2. Chemical Weapons Convention Signing Ceremony -- Secretary
Eagleburger
3. Chemical Weapons Convention -- ACDA Statement, ACDA Chronology, UN
General Assembly Resolution, ACDA Occasional Paper
4. Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait -- UN Security Council President
Hatano, White House Statements
5. US Recognizes Czech and Slovak Republics
6. Fact Sheet: US Policy for a New Era In Sub-Saharan Africa
7. UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on the Former Yugoslavia
8. Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines Revised -- Department
Statement, Text of Revisions
9. Department Statements
Haiti: Legislative Elections
US To Assist With Senegal's Withdrawal From Liberia
US-Pacific Island Nation Joint Commercial Commission
ARTICLE 1:
US Signs Chemical Weapons Convention
President Bush
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Washington, DC, January 13, 1993
For more than 20 years, the United States and many other countries have
labored to achieve a ban on chemical weapons. The long-awaited Chemical
Weapons Convention is now completed and open for signature.
I have had a deep and abiding personal interest in the success of the
effort to ban these terrible weapons. As Vice President, I had the
honor on two occasions to address the Conference on Disarmament and to
present US proposals to give impetus to the negotiations. As President,
I directed the United States to take new initiatives to advance and
conclude the negotiations. The United States is profoundly gratified
that these talks have now been successfully concluded.
The countries that participated in the negotiations at the Conference on
Disarmament deserve special congratulations. The Chemical Weapons
Convention is uniquely important in the field of arms control
agreements. It will improve the security of all nations by eliminating
a class of weapons of mass destruction that exists in all quarters of
the world and that has been used in recent conflicts. It is a truly
stabilizing and non-discriminatory agreement.
The United States strongly supports the Chemical Weapons Convention and
is proud to be an original signatory. We are encouraged that so many
other states have also decided to take this step. This clearly
demonstrates global--international--endorsement of the convention and
the new norm of international conduct that it establishes. However, we
must not cease our efforts until the norm becomes truly universal, with
all countries becoming not only signatories but also parties to the
convention.
Much work remains to make the convention fully effective. The United
States will cooperate closely with other countries to bring the
convention into force as soon as possible and to ensure that it is
faithfully implemented. Only then will we be able to say that the risk
of chemical warfare is no longer a threat to people anywhere in the
world. (###)
ARTICLE 2:
Chemical Weapons Convention Signing Ceremony
Secretary Eagleburger
Remarks upon signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, Paris, France,
January 13, 1993
It is fitting that we meet to sign this historic Chemical Weapons
Convention in a city where, 4 years ago, the international community
appealed for the strengthening of norms against chemical warfare. I am
pleased to be in Paris, and I am especially pleased to represent my
President, George Bush, a man who, over the course of the past decade,
launched some of the key initiatives which helped to make this agreement
possible. He and all those responsible can take pride in an achievement
whose revolutionary scope and impact we can recognize today without
having to await the verdict of history.
But such has been the amazing record of the past few years. We have
seen the international community liberate itself from half a century of
gridlock and paralysis and move beyond the rhetoric of democracy to
achieve real democracy; move beyond the rhetoric of detente to achieve
real peace; and move beyond the rhetoric of disarmament to achieve real
reductions in weapons of mass destruction.
The Chemical Weapons Convention we sign today does more than simply
reduce a class of arms or mitigate against their proliferation. This
convention mandates a worldwide non-discriminatory ban on an entire
class of weapons of mass destruction--the only class of such weapons
that has been widely used in combat. By the radical terms of this
agreement, all signatory states forswear the possession, production,
stockpiling, transfer, and, indeed, the use of chemical weapons; and all
signatories must destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons
production facilities in their possession. Moreover, the convention's
strict verification regime, which accommodates legitimate commercial and
sovereign interests, sets an innovative standard for future multilateral
agreements.
The international community is virtually united in support of the
objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, there must be
truly global adherence if the convention is to achieve its purpose and
if doubts are to be eliminated over the commitment and intentions of
those who fail to sign, ratify, and fully comply with its terms.
Nowhere is this more important today than in the Middle East, a region
which over the past 30 years has been home to more active chemical
weapons programs--and which has seen more chemical weapons use--than any
other part of the world. It is, therefore, particularly disappointing
that so many Middle Eastern states are absent from this ceremony today.
The fact of the matter is that linking this convention to other issues
cannot affect the fate of those issues, but it will surely undermine the
effect of this treaty in the one region most exposed to the danger of
chemical weapons--namely, the Middle East. The point, I believe, is to
tackle the challenge of weapons of mass destruction wherever we can,
whenever we can. I would, therefore, urge the members of the Arab
League to seize this opportunity and sign the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Doing so would be a step toward, and not away from, making
the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, as
called for by President Mubarak of Egypt.
Today's ceremony is only the beginning of the work which lies ahead.
Next month, the Preparatory Commission will meet in The Hague [the
Netherlands] to work out the important and detailed provisions for
implementing the convention. The United States is fully committed to
the success of those efforts, which will require the same broad support
and participation which produced the successful convention itself.
As I indicated at the beginning, the past few years have been a
remarkably creative period of international achievement. Perhaps not
coincidentally, I believe that President Bush's passage across the
international scene has equally been one of tangible achievement,
particularly in terms of the issue most important to the fate and future
of the planet--the issue of weapons of mass destruction. George Bush's
legacy will include landmark treaties--START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty] I, START II, and CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]--as
well as diplomatic efforts which paid non-proliferation dividends in
Africa, South America, the Middle East, and here in Paris today. But he
knows, as all of us must know, that what we have accomplished to date
will matter little unless we are prepared to confront the even greater
proliferation dangers we most certainly will face in the years to
come.(###)
ARTICLE 3:
Chemical Weapons Convention
ACDA Statement, ACDA Chronology, UN General Assembly Resolution, ACDA
Occasional Paper
France Hosts Signing Ceremony
Based on statement released by the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA), Washington, DC, January 5, 1993.
On January 13, the Government of France will host a ceremony in Paris
for the signing of a multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Representatives from more than 130 countries are expected to be present
to sign the convention.
The multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, concluded on September 3,
1992, by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and endorsed by the
United Nations on November 30, 1992, is historic in the scope of its
provisions and in the number of countries involved in its development.
It offers an opportunity to build confidence regionally and globally and
to enable signatories to play a more responsible role in the
international community.
The convention prohibits:
-- The development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention,
and transfer of chemical weapons;
-- The use of chemical weapons against any other state--regardless of
whether the country is a signatory to the convention;
-- Engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and
-- Assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in activities
prohibited to convention signatories.
In addition, the convention requires that:
-- Signatories declare all chemical weapons and chemical weapons
production facilities;
-- The declarations be checked;
-- Storage, production, and destruction facilities be monitored
through on-site inspection; and
-- All chemical weapons be eliminated completely within 10 years.
To further enhance security and to deter clandestine chemical weapons
production, storage, and use, the convention also provides routine
monitoring and verification of relevant chemical weapons industry
facilities. Additionally, the convention provides for a challenge
inspection regime which allows any convention signatory to initiate an
inspection of any facility or location in any other signatory state to
clarify and resolve questions of possible non-compliance.
After signature of the CWC, a preparatory commission of all signatory
states will begin work in early February to further elaborate detailed
implementation procedures and establish the CWC international
organization. These meetings will take place in The Hague, which will
also be the seat of the organization.
The US welcomes the action of the Government of France to host the
signing ceremony.
Chronology of Events Leading to the Signing
Released by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA),
Washington, DC, January 5, 1993.
Listed below are some of the key events in the chemical weapons [CW]
negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors, the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [CCD] and the Committee on
Disarmament, which led to the completion of a draft Chemical Weapons
Convention [CWC], its approval by the United Nations, and its opening
for signature in Paris.
March 15, 1962: The United States and the Soviet Union submit plans for
general and complete disarmament to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee which include provisions for eliminating chemical and
biological weapons.
August 15, 1968: Chemical weapons are placed on the agenda of the CCD
in Geneva.
June 27-July 3, 1974: At the Moscow summit, the United States and the
Soviet Union agree to hold bilateral talks in an effort to develop a
joint proposal to be submitted to the CCD on the prohibition of chemical
weapons.
March 17, 1980: The ad hoc working group on chemical weapons is
established in the Committee on Disarmament (CD), the successor to the
CCD.
February 4, 1983: At the CD, Vice President Bush announces US
requirements for a verifiable prohibition on the production,
stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons:
-- Declaration and systematic international on-site inspection of
chemical weapons stocks and production facilities and declaration of
plans for destruction of stocks;
-- Systematic international on-site inspection of the destruction of
both chemical weapons stocks and production facilities;
-- Declaration and on-site inspection of the operation of other
facilities for legal production of chemicals that pose a specific risk
of being diverted to chemical weapons production; and
-- A multilateral mechanism for dealing with compliance issues.
June 1983: The United States presents a paper at the CD showing how
stockpile destruction can be verified. The US approach combines
extensive use of on-site instruments with continuous monitoring by
international inspectors.
August 23, 1983: The United States invites CD member and observer
delegations to participate in a workshop at the US chemical weapons
destruction test bed facility at Tooele, Utah. The Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact (except Romania) decline the invitation.
November 14-16, 1983: Fifty diplomats from 30 CD nations attend the
Chemical Weapons Verification Workshop at Tooele, Utah.
April 18, 1984: At the Conference on Disarmament, the new title for the
Committee on Disarmament, Vice President Bush presents a US draft treaty
that provides for a worldwide ban on the development, acquisition,
production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The
plan calls for systematic on-site inspection of chemical weapon
facilities to ensure compliance.
The Soviet Union dismisses the US draft treaty immediately. However, it
is essentially the 1984 draft which becomes the basis of discussion for
the ad hoc working group of the CD. The document, reflecting agreed
changes as a result of the CD negotiations, is informally referred to as
the "rolling text."
July 10, 1986: The United States provides information to the Conference
on Disarmament about its chemical weapons stockpiles and storage site
locations--the first CD member to do so.
August 6, 1987: Soviet Foreign Minister [Shevardnadze] addresses the
CD, accepting the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without
the right of refusal. He invites the CD delegations to the Shikany
military facility and extends a future invitation to the CW destruction
facility under construction near Chapayevsk. On October 3-4, 1987, a
multilateral delegation from the CD visits the Soviet CW installation at
Shikany to view munitions and a mobile destruction site.
July 28, 1988: In a speech to the CD, US Ambassador [to the Conference
on Disarmament] Max Friedersdorf declares the location of all US CW
production facilities and out-lines plans for their elimination under a
CW ban. The US calls on the Soviet Union and other states to do the
same.
February 21-23, 1989: The United States conducts a trial inspection of
a private American chemical production plant. This is part of an
experiment to develop procedures for a routine inspection regime which
would satisfy confidence and security requirements without significantly
disrupting the civilian chemical industry.
The Soviet Union and other members of the CD subsequently conduct
similar trial inspections of their own chemical industries.
February 7-9, 1990: Secretary of State Baker and [Soviet] Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze agree on a framework for action to expedite the
negotiation at the CD for a Chemical Weapons Convention.
June 1, 1990: At the Washington summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev
sign the US-Soviet Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of
Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). Key provisions of this important accord are:
-- Cessation of chemical weapons production to begin upon entry into
force and destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks to start by
the end of 1992--down to 5,000 tons of CW agents [weight exclusive of
casings] by 2002;
-- On-site inspections during and after the destruction process to
confirm destruction; and
-- Development and use of safe and environmentally sound methods of
destruction.
May 13, 1991: President Bush announces a new series of steps to
strengthen the prospects of an early, successful conclusion of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. To this end, the President declared that
the United States would take the following actions:
-- Formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason--
including retaliation--against any state, effective when the convention
enters into force and propose that all states follow suit--providing the
USSR is also a party to the treaty;
-- Unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all US stocks of
chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force and propose that
all other states do likewise;
-- Offer technical assistance to others so that they can destroy their
chemical weapons stocks efficiently and safely;
-- Call for setting a target date to conclude the convention and
recommend that the conference stay in continuous session [as] necessary
to meet the target;
-- Propose new and effective verification measures for inspecting sites
suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons;
-- Propose that the convention require parties to refuse to trade in
chemical weapons-related materials with states that do not join in the
convention in order to provide tangible benefits for those states that
join the convention and significant penalties for those that fail to
support it; and
-- Reaffirm that the United States will impose all appropriate
sanctions in response to violations of the convention, especially the
use of chemical weapons.
July 15, 1991: The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
Japan jointly table a draft challenge inspection proposal at the CD,
followed by a US proposal on handling inspection of declared facilities.
March 19, 1992: Australian Foreign Minister Evans presents a draft
treaty offering compromise solutions to outstanding issues as a basis
for early completion of the CD negotiations. The United States applauds
the Australian effort and supports the process it represents. The
Australian text differs from US positions on a number of important
issues. The United States, however, expresses hope that it will aid
resolution of remaining issues and permit completion of the CWC in 1992,
as President Bush has repeatedly urged.
June 22, 1992: The chairman of the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons
at the CD, Adolph Ritter von Wagner of Germany, in an effort to speed
the process, released a draft "final text" for consideration. This
draft is a complete text and embodies consensus compromises as well as
the chairman's own proposed compromise language on unresolved major
issues.
June 26, 1992: The second CD session concluded with meetings during the
last few days devoted to the chairman's explanations of the new text.
July 20, 1992: The CD resumes.
July 23, 1992: The United States accepts the chairman's draft Chemical
Weapons Convention.
August 7, 1992: Chairman von Wagner puts forth a package of changes to
the draft convention in an effort to satisfy the concerns of some
members of the CD.
August 13, 1992: President Bush announces strong US support for the
draft Chemical Weapons Convention completed at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva. The President states that the United States is
committed to be an original party to the treaty once it is open for
signing and calls on all other nations to support the treaty and to
pledge adherence to it.
August 26, 1992: The CD resumes.September 3, 1992: The CD concludes
the draft Chemical Weapons Convention.
September 7, 1992: The CD forwards the draft Chemical Weapons
Convention to the United Nations for endorsement.
November 12, 1992: The UN First Committee approves the draft convention
and submits it for endorsement by the entire UN membership.
November 30, 1992: The UN endorses by consensus, with 145 co-sponsors,
the draft of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
January 13, 1993: In a ceremony in Paris, the Chemical Weapons
Convention will be opened for signature.
February 8, 1993: The Preparatory Commission of all states parties to
the convention is scheduled to meet in The Hague [the Netherlands] to
set up the Chemical Weapons Convention international organization.
UN General Assembly Resolution
Text of Resolution A/C.1/47/L.1/Rev. 2, "Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction," approved by consensus by the UN General
Assembly, New York City, November 30, 1992.
The General Assembly,
Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community
to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production,
stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, as well
as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,1 as expressed by consensus in many
previous resolutions,
Recalling in particular its resolution 46/35 C of 6 December 1991, in
which the Assembly strongly urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a
matter of the highest priority, to resolve outstanding issues so as to
achieve a final agreement on a convention on the prohibition of the
development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on
their destruction during its 1992 session,
Bearing in mind the Final Declaration2 of the Conference of States
Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in
Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, in which participating States stressed
their determination to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by
completely eliminating them,
Determined to make progress towards general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control, including the
prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,
Convinced, therefore, of the urgent necessity of a total ban on chemical
weapons, so as to abolish an entire category of weapons of mass
destruction, and thus eliminate the risk to mankind of renewed use of
these inhumane weapons,
Welcoming the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction,3 adopted by the Conference on Disarmament and contained in
its report dated 3 September 1992, the result of many years of intensive
negotiations, which constitutes a historic achievement in the field of
arms control and disarmament,
Convinced that the Convention, particularly as adherence to it
approaches universality, will contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and improve the security of all States, and that it
therefore merits the strong support of the entire international
community,
Convinced further that the implementation of the Convention should
promote expanded international trade, technological development and
economic cooperation in the chemical sector, in order to enhance the
economic and technological development of all States parties,
Determined to ensure the efficient and cost-effective implementation of
the Convention,
Recalling the support for the prohibition of chemical weapons expressed
in the declaration by representatives of the world's chemical industry
at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, held at
Canberra from 18 to 22 September 1989,4
Bearing in mind the relevant reference to the Convention in the Final
Documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of
Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992,
Welcoming the invitation of the President of the French Republic to
participate in a ceremony to sign the Convention in Paris on 13 January
1993,
1. Commends the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, as contained in the report of the Conference on Disarmament
dated 3 September 1992;
2. Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to
open it for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993;
3. Calls upon all States to sign and, thereafter, according to their
respective constitutional processes, to become parties to the Convention
at the earliest possible date, thus contributing to its rapid entry into
force and to the early achievement of universal adherence;
4. Further calls upon all States to ensure the effective implementation
of this unprecedented, global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral
disarmament agreement, thereby enhancing cooperative multilateralism as
a basis for international peace and security;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide such services as may be
requested by the signatory States to initiate the work of the
Preparatory Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons;
6. Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to
report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on the status
of signatures and ratifications of the Convention.
1 League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.
2 A/44/88, annex.
3 Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session,
Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix I.
4 See A/C.1/44/4.
ACDA Occasional Paper
The following text is taken from "Chemical Weapons Convention: A
Balance Between Obligations and the Needs of States Parties," dated
January 5, 1993.
The multilateral negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
concluded in Geneva on September 3, 1992, with the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) forwarding the draft text to the United Nations for
endorsement on September 7. On November 30, the UN General Assembly
endorsed the CWC by consensus, with 145 countries cosponsoring the
supporting resolution. The CWC will be opened for signature in Paris on
January 13, 1993. The CWC is historic in the scope of its provisions
and in the number of countries involved in its development.
Additionally, the conference of states parties established by the
convention will provide members an opportunity for building regional and
global stability and for playing a more responsible role in the
international community.
The majority of the provisions of the CWC represent the long-agreed upon
consensus of the 39 members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) who
drafted the convention. In a few sections, where prior consensus had
not been attained, compromises were reached which struck an equitable
balance among varying positions.
Overview
This paper describes some of the CWC's key provisions, which were
designed to balance the need for effective convention provisions with
the national security and economic requirements of states parties in
implementing such provisions.
The Destruction of CW and CW Production Facilities
Throughout the CWC negotiations, CD participants sought ways to remove
the possibility of use or threat of use of chemical weapons (CW) through
measures which would provide confidence among states parties adhering to
the convention that their security will be enhanced. To this end, the
negotiators desired to ensure the complete elimination of CW and their
production facilities within a specific period of time; assign
responsibility for destruction of CW stocks abandoned on a state party's
territory; prohibit any right of CW retaliation; prohibit the use of
herbicides and riot control agents (RCAs) as a method of warfare; and,
in the event of CW use or threat of use, provide for protection and
assistance to the victimized party.
At the same time, negotiators had to take into account such factors as
the technical difficulties associated with destruction of CW, the
possible need for commercial use of former CW production facilities, and
the non-warfare uses of herbicides and RCAs, (e.g., crop control, law
enforcement). This required negotiators to develop provisions which
balance a state party's obligations under the convention for
declarations, destruction timeframes, international monitoring, etc.,
with the needs and requirements of states parties in implementing these
obligations.
Thus, the CWC contains provisions which prohibit: the development,
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and direct or indirect
transfer to anyone of CW; the use of CW against anyone; engaging in any
military preparations to use CW; and assisting, encouraging, or inducing
anyone to engage in activities prohibited to states parties.
The convention requires all CW to be declared, declarations to be
checked, and all CW to be completely eliminated within 10 years, with
storage and destruction monitored through on-site inspection. An
extension of a state party's destruction program for up to 5 years is
possible but not automatic. It must be approved by the conference of
states parties which will set conditions under which the extension may
be granted, including specific verification measures and actions to
mitigate the delay. The CWC requires a state party to destroy and bear
the costs of destruction of CW it abandoned on another state party's
territory; otherwise, the territorial state party may request assistance
from the CWC organization.
The CWC further requires all CW production to cease, CW production
facilities to be declared, the declarations to be checked, and the
facilities destroyed, with cessation of production and destruction
monitored through on-site inspection. In exceptional cases of
compelling need, the conference of states parties may approve conversion
of former CW production facilities for prescribed non-CW uses, subject
to appropriate international monitoring.
Finally, the convention contains provisions which prohibit the use of
RCAs as a method of warfare, reaffirms the prohibition on use of
herbicides as a method of warfare, and provides for protection and
assistance in the event of use or threat of use of CW against a state
party.
Most importantly, the inspected party has final say in determining the
extent and nature of access within the challenged site. The party will
negotiate with the inspection team the following: the extent of access
to any particular place or places within the inspection site; the
particular inspection activities, including sampling; the performance of
particular activities by the inspection team; and the provision of
particular information by the inspected party.
Monitoring the Chemical Industry
In the convention, chemicals of concern have been divided into three
schedules according to the risk that they pose to the objectives of the
CWC. Facilities producing, processing, and consuming these chemicals are
subject to initial and annual declaration and international monitoring,
including on-site inspection. In addition to these facilities, other
facilities capable of producing the scheduled chemicals but not doing so
are also subject to declaration and a monitoring regime.
At the same time, the provisions for monitoring chemical industries take
into account countries' concerns about the difficulties of national
implementation of the CWC such as negative impact of the provisions on
economic and technological development, the possible loss of
confidential business information, and the difficulty of monitoring
small chemical industry facilities in developing countries. Measures
are included which provide inspection procedures and methods for
handling information which protect sensitive, non-CW-related
information; require that the convention be implemented in a manner
which avoids hampering economic or technological development; and
require states parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of
chemicals, equipment, and scientific and technical information for
permitted purposes.
The convention also contains provisions to allay the fears of some
developing countries about the difficulty of identifying and opening to
monitoring chemical industries capable of producing scheduled chemicals
but not doing so. In particular, there is a provision for assistance in
compiling lists of such facilities and means to address any problems of
completeness of such lists. Thresholds for declarations and inspection
have been set high enough to preclude capturing small, irrelevant
chemical industries. Finally, the inspection regime for this sector of
the chemical industry will not start until the fourth year after entry
into force of the CWC. Moreover, the implementation of this category of
inspections will be subject to further discussion and decision making by
the conference of states parties and will take into account the accrued
experience of other industry inspections.
Verification
The CWC contains two verification regimes to enhance the security of
states parties to the convention and to preclude the possibility of
clandestine CW production, storage, and use. The first regime provides
a routine monitoring regime involving declarations, initial visits, and
systematic inspections of CW storage, production, and destruction
facilities and relevant chemical industry. The second regime, challenge
inspection, allows a state party to request and have conducted an
international inspection of any facility or location in another state
party in order to clarify and resolve questions of possible
noncompliance.
The challenge inspection procedures were the most sensitive and
difficult to develop, given the need to balance provision for an
adequate degree of intrusiveness to address compliance concerns with the
need to protect sensitive, non-CW-related facilities and information of
national security concern. The CWC obligates the state party to be
inspected to accept a challenge inspection and to make every reasonable
effort to satisfy the compliance concern. At the same time, the CWC
provides for a system of managing access to a challenged site which
allows for protection of the inspected party's national security
concerns. It does so in two ways: first, through procedures to deter
the challenging party from abusing the process and, second, through
procedures which allow the inspected party to protect sensitive, non-CW
facilities and locations.
Deterrence of Abuse
To deter abuse, the convention contains provisions for both the
requesting and the inspected parties to have their concerns about
compliance and possible abuse of the system addressed by the Executive
Council at both the beginning and the conclusion of the inspection. A
state party must submit a request for challenge inspection to the
Executive Council as well as to the Director General of the technical
secretariat of the CWC organization. If the Executive Council considers
an inspection request to be frivolous, abusive, or clearly beyond the
scope of the convention, it may, within 12 hours after having received
the request decide (by a three-quarter majority of all its members)
against carrying out the challenge inspection.
After a challenge inspection, the Executive Council will review the
final report of the inspection team. In addition to addressing concerns
about whether any noncompliance occurred, the council will also address
concerns as to whether the request had been within the scope of the
convention as well as whether the right to request a challenge
inspection had been abused. If the Executive Council concludes there was
abuse, it may recommend to the conference of states parties measures to
take against the requesting party and examine whether that party should
bear any of the costs of the inspection.
In addition to specific provisions to address abuse, there is a general
provision giving state parties the right at any time to request the
Executive Council to consider concerns about abuse of the rights
provided for under the convention.
Protection Through Inspection Procedures
The convention also contains inspection procedures which provide the
inspected party with the means to protect sensitive sites. Such means
include the timeframes specified to provide access, limitations on
observers, and the process of managed access at the site.
With respect to timeframes for inspection, after receiving notification
of the site to be inspected, the inspected party has the ability to take
up to 5 days to provide access to the site. This time period allows
inspected parties adequate time to prepare a site for inspection. Once
at the site, the period of inspection itself is limited to 84 hours,
extendable only by agreement with the inspected party.
Concerning limitations on observers, while the requesting party can ask
to have an observer accompany the inspection team, the inspected party
has the right to disapprove the participation of such an observer. If
the inspected party allows the participation of an observer, it can
limit the access and activities of the observer at the site.
Finally, and most importantly, the inspected party has final say in
determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged site.
The party will negotiate with the inspection team the following: the
extent of access to any particular place or places within the inspection
site; the particular inspection activities, including sampling, to be
conducted by the inspection team; the performance of particular
activities by the inspection team; and the provision of particular
information by the inspected party. For example, the party may give
only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection
site; it may shroud sensitive pieces of equipment such as computer
electronic systems; and it may restrict sampling and sampling analysis.
In the event the inspected party provides less than full access to
places, activities, or information, it is under the obligation to make
every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to clarify the
possible noncompliance concern that generated the challenge inspection.
Organization and Costs
Two other issues of importance and concern which arose during
negotiations of the CWC were the allocation of costs for implementing
the convention and equitable participation in its organizational bodies-
-in particular, the Executive Council, since it will play a large role
in CWC implementation. Provisions of the convention address these
concerns by allocating costs on an adjusted UN scale to lessen the
burden on small and developing countries, with the most expensive costs-
-verification of destruction--to be borne almost entirely by the
countries possessing CW. Another provision establishes the principle of
rotational seats on the Executive Council and seat allocation on a
regional basis, leaving it up to each region to designate members and
taking into account not only a state's industrial significance but also
other regional factors. Yet another provision provides for staffing the
technical secretariat, drawing from states parties in a manner which
gives due regard to recruiting on as wide a geographical basis as
possible.
Provisions for Improving The Convention
Finally, the negotiators recognized the need for making the convention a
living document which will allow for the possibility of improvement
based on inspection experience and advances in verification technology.
Therefore, the CWC contains provisions to allow for technical changes
and annual and special conferences to discuss implementation and address
any particular problems.
Preparing for Implementation Of the Convention
After the convention is signed, a preparatory commission of all
signatory states will begin work in early February 1993 to further
elaborate detailed procedures and to set up the CWC international
organization. Commission meetings will take place in The Hague, the
Netherlands, which will be the seat of the organization. (###)
ARTICLE 4:
Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait
UN Security Council President Hatano, White House Statements
President Hatano
January 8, 1993
Statement by UN Security Council President Hatano, New York City,
January 8, 1993.
Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have
been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the
Council.
"1. The Security Council is deeply disturbed by the Government of
Iraq's recent Notes to the Office of the Special Commission [UNSCOM] in
Baghdad and to the Headquarters of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait
Observation Mission (UNIKOM) that it will not allow the United Nations
to transport its personnel into Iraqi territory using its own aircraft.
"2. The Security Council refers to resolution 687 (1991) [for text, see
Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 14, p. 236] requiring Iraq to permit the Special
Commission and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to
undertake immediate on-site inspection of any locations designated by
the Commission. The agreement on facilities, privileges and immunities
between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations, and resolutions
707 (1991) and 715 (1991) [for texts, see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 34, p.
644 and No. 42, p. 790, respectively] elaborated on Iraq's obligations
by demanding, inter alia, that the Special Commission and the IAEA be
allowed, as they determined necessary, to use their own aircraft
throughout Iraq and any airfield in Iraq without interference or
hindrance of any kind. Concerning UNIKOM, Iraq is obligated by
resolution 687 (1991) and committed by an exchange of letters dated 15
April 1992 and 21 June 1992 respectively to the unrestricted freedom of
entry and exit without delay or hindrance of its personnel, property,
supplies, equipment, spare parts and means of transport.
"3. The implementation of the measures set out in the recent
communications of the Iraqi Government would seriously impede the
activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and UNIKOM. Such
restrictions constitute an unacceptable and material breach of the
relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991), which established the
cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of
peace and security in the region, as well as other relevant resolutions
and agreements.
"4. The Council demands that the Government of Iraq abide by its
obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions and
cooperate fully with the activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA
and UNIKOM. In particular, it demands that the Government of Iraq not
interfere with the currently envisaged United Nations flights. The
Security Council warns the Government of Iraq, as it has done in this
connection in the past, of the serious consequences which would ensue
from failure to comply with its obligations."
The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its
consideration of the item on the agenda.
The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.
White House Statement
January 9, 1993
Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington,
DC, January 9, 1993.
All available evidence indicates that Iraq is acceding to the
requirements of the coalition's January 6, 1993, demarche [see summary
in January 13 White House Statement, p. 34]. No Iraqi aircraft have
entered the no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel, and the Iraqi
surface-to-air missiles have been dispersed and are no longer
threatening coalition flight operations.
Once again, [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein has backed down in the face
of coalition solidarity. Iraq remains isolated and a pariah among
nations due to its flagrant attempts to violate the cease-fire regime.
The coalition's January 6 demarche remains in effect. We will continue
to scrutinize Iraqi activity. No further warning will be issued if Iraq
violates the requirements of the January 6 demarche.
This episode should make clear to Iraq that interference with UN and
coalition operations--including humanitarian relief operations,
Operation Provide Comfort, UN Special Commission and International
Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction,
and the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission force on the Iraq-Kuwait border-
-will not be tolerated. In this regard, we fully support the UN
Security Council presidential statement of January 8 that demanded that
Iraq comply with its obligations. We underscore the Security Council's
warning of serious consequences if Iraq fails to do so.
President Hatano
January 11, 1993
Statement by UN Security Council President Hatano, New York City,
January 11, 1993.
Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have
been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the
Council:
"The Security Council notes that there have been a number of recent
actions by Iraq as part of its pattern of flouting relevant Security
Council resolutions. One was the series of border incidents involving
the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM); another was
the incident concerning the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
and UNIKOM flights.
"The Security Council is deeply concerned at the incidents reported in
the Secretary-General's special report of 10 January 1993 on UNIKOM
(S/25085). The Security Council recalls the provisions of resolution
687 (1991) that established the demilitarized zone between Iraq and
Kuwait and demanded that both countries respect the inviolability of the
international boundary between them. It reaffirms that the boundary was
at the very core of the conflict and that, in resolutions 687 (1991) and
773 (1992) [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 39, p. 731] it guaranteed
the inviolability of the boundary and undertook to take as appropriate
all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.
"The Council condemns the action taken by Iraq on 10 January 1993 to
remove equipment by force from the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized
zone without prior consultation with UNIKOM, and through UNIKOM with the
Kuwaiti authorities, as set out in the letter of 8 January 1993 from the
President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General. In
particular, the Council draws attention to the removal by Iraq of four
HY-2G anti-ship missiles and other military equipment from the six
bunkers in the former Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr on Kuwaiti territory,
in spite of the objections of UNIKOM and their efforts to prevent this.
This action is a direct challenge to the authority of UNIKOM and amounts
to clear-cut defiance by Iraq of the Council, which stipulated in the
letter of 3 November 1992 from the President of the Council to the
Secretary-General that the military equipment in the six bunkers should
be destroyed by or under the supervision of UNIKOM. The Council demands
that the anti-ship missiles and other military equipment removed by
force from the six bunkers at Umm Qasr in Kuwaiti territory be returned
immediately to the custody of UNIKOM for destruction, as previously
decided.
"The Council also condemns further Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti
side of the demilitarized zone on 11 January 1993. It demands that any
future retrieval mission be in accordance with the terms set out in the
letter of 8 January 1993 from the President of the Council to the
Secretary-General. On the UNIKOM facilities at Camp Khor, the Council
stresses that the land and premises occupied by UNIKOM shall be
inviolate and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the
United Nations.
"The Council invites the Secretary-General, as a first step, to explore
on an urgent basis the possibilities for restoring UNIKOM to its full
strength and to consider in an emergency such as this the need for rapid
reinforcement as set out in paragraph 18 of his report of 12 June 1991
(S/22692), as well as any other suggestions that he might have to
enhance the effectiveness of UNIKOM, and to report back to the Council.
"The Council is also alarmed by Iraq's refusal to allow the United
Nations to transport its Special Commission and UNIKOM personnel into
Iraqi territory using its own aircraft. In this connection the Council
reiterates the demand in its statement of 8 January 1993 that Iraq
permit UNSCOM and UNIKOM to use their own aircraft to transport their
personnel into Iraq. It rejects the arguments contained in the letter
of 9 January 1993 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the
President of the Security Council (S/25086).
"These latest developments concerning the activities of UNIKOM and
UNSCOM constitute further material breaches of resolution 687 (1991),
which established the cease-fire and provided the conditions essential
for the restoration of peace and security in the region, as well as
other relevant resolutions and agreements. The Council demands that
Iraq cooperate fully with UNIKOM, UNSCOM and other United Nations
agencies in carrying out their mandates, and again warns Iraq of the
serious consequences that will flow from such continued defiance. The
Council will remain actively seized of the matter."
The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its
consideration of the item on its agenda.
The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.
White House Statement
January 13, 1993
Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington,
DC, January 13, 1993.
The United States and its coalition partners today took forceful actions
against Iraq.
Coalition aircraft today attacked surface-to-air missiles and associated
infrastructure in southern Iraq. Preliminary information indicates that
the coalition aircraft accomplished their mission.
This action was taken pursuant to the coalition demarche of January 6,
1993. This communication demanded that Iraq take steps within 48 hours
to ensure that its aircraft and surface-to-air missiles did not pose a
threat to coalition aircraft operating south of the 32nd parallel to
monitor Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council Resolution [687].
After initially responding to the terms of the January 6 demarche, Iraq
violated its requirements, and the coalition is acting to restore an
environment that poses no threat to coalition aircraft.
All requirements of the January 6 demarche regarding potential threats
to coalition air operations south of 32 degrees remain in effect. We
will continue to scrutinize Iraqi activity. No further warning will be
issued if Iraq again violates the requirements of the January 6
demarche.
Similarly, the Government of Iraq should understand that continued
defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and related coalition
demarches will not be tolerated. The US Government fully associates
itself with the January 8 and January 11 statements by the President of
the UN Security Council that declared Iraq in material breach of UN
Security Council Resolution 687 and the cease-fire regime and warned of
the serious consequences of its actions. We stand ready to take
additional, forceful actions with our coalition partners if Iraq
continues to flout the will of the international community and disregard
its international obligations. Consistent with the above, the [US]
President has directed the deployment of a battalion task force to
Kuwait to underline our continuing commitment to Kuwait's security and
independence.(###)
ARTICLE 5:
US Recognizes Czech and Slovak Republics
Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington,
DC, January 1, 1993.
The President today recognized the new Czech and Slovak Republics and
offered to establish full diplomatic relations. In an exchange of
letters, Czech Prime Minister Klaus and Slovak Prime Minister Meciar
welcomed US recognition and accepted our offer of full diplomatic
relations.
Both leaders provided assurances that the new states will fulfill the
obligations and commitments of the former Czechoslovakia and will abide
by the principles and provisions of the UN Charter, the Charter of
Paris, the Helsinki Final Act, and subsequent CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe] documents. They also pledged to
prevent the proliferation of destabilizing military technology, to
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, to uphold international
standards concerning national minorities, and to move rapidly to create
free market economies.
The United States looks forward to full and mutually productive
relations with the new Czech and Slovak states. We commend both
republics for the peaceful means by which their separation was carried
out. In the interest of ensuring stability and prosperity in the region
and speeding full integration into the international community, the
United States urges continued close regional cooperation among the
states of Central Europe.
Our ambassador to Czechoslovakia will remain in Prague as the US
ambassador to the Czech Republic. We look forward to appointing an
ambassador to the Slovak Republic as soon as possible. (###)
ARTICLE 6:
Fact Sheet: US Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa
In a new, post-Cold War environment, Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing
unprecedented political and economic change. These dramatic shifts and
the end of superpower strategic competition in the region have resulted
in a thorough re-examination and reorientation of US policy. The US
Government intends to maintain its engagement in Africa despite resource
constraints. Progress and stability will require long-term support by
the international community and the efforts of Africans themselves.
Adequate diplomatic and financial resources will be needed to promote
peaceful change, conflict resolution, stable democracy, and sustainable
development.
Just as striking as the changes outside Africa are the shifts in the
attitudes and aspirations of Africans themselves. No longer content
with the victories of the post-independence period, Africans are
demanding their just rights along with popular participation and
accountability in government. Even more insistently, they are seeking a
decent standard of living, basic public services, and economic progress
free from war and repression.
With a population of 795 million, 20% of the world's land area, and a
wealth of natural resources and biological diversity, Sub-Saharan Africa
cannot and should not be ignored or neglected. Because of conflicts and
crushing poverty worsened by deadly threats from famine and the acquired
immuno-deficiency syndrome (AIDS), there is a long-term humanitarian
imperative to help alleviate acute suffering as much as possible. On
the other hand, there also is an enormous human and natural resource
potential in Africa which Africans can use for their own betterment.
The world community also has an important stake in the realization of
this potential. Finally, as the United States is a society with a large
minority of African origin, American policy naturally reflects US
domestic cultural and political ties to the region.
US Policy Goals in Sub-Saharan Africa
Conflict resolution and peaceful change in Africa are primary US goals
since the degree of success in achieving them is the basis for progress
in all other areas. The United States actively supports the nascent
efforts of Africans to take the lead in resolving conflicts and peace-
keeping efforts in the region. However, it also is willing to play the
role of catalyst, technical adviser, and honest broker to resolve
conflicts.
Democratic systems that respect human rights and seek equitable economic
growth are the best guarantees of peaceful change and stability. They
provide the peaceful, stable environment essential to sustained
development. The United States seeks greater respect for human rights,
the rule of law, accountable and honest government, and democratic
political pluralism. It neither wishes to impose a particular system
nor to enforce any legal code. Rather, it supports what Africans
themselves increasingly demand: an effective voice in their own affairs
and an end to corruption and abuse of power.
The United States will work for sustained equitable development through
market-based reforms that rely more on the private sector and promise to
reduce dependence on external aid. Ensuring access to markets,
investment opportunities, and resources in Africa is the most effective
way to sustain growth and US involvement. US assistance programs should
support reform; aid criteria should include good governance and
structural reform goals along with respect for political and human
rights.
Africa is beset by a variety of transnational problems which the United
States can address. With both bilateral programs and support for
international efforts, the United States can work to ameliorate the
devastation caused by AIDS and environmental degradation in Africa.
Necessary efforts to curb population growth and refugee flows also will
involve improving the status of women. The United States and the world
community have a strong interest in preventing the spread of terrorism
and narcotics trafficking to Africa. Subversion by radical regimes on
the periphery of the region also must be countered.
US policy cannot afford to disregard the important, and often
disproportionate, role of African military and security forces in public
life. The United States will support efforts to create smaller, more
professional forces clearly subordinate to civilian control and
respectful of human rights. As some US military resources are
redirected to peace-keeping and humanitarian relief, Africans and their
regional organizations will be encouraged to take the lead in these
efforts.
Programs for US Engagement in Africa
A collective response to conflict resolution. As newly empowered
democratic forces struggle for control with established governments and
elites, the potential for regional conflict could increase. Economic
desperation will cause severe pressures within many societies. In
addition, the very existence of some African states could be threatened
by divisive and violent ethnic conflicts. Political and economic
reforms are subject to reversal and repression, and in many states
military establishments may continue to intervene in factional or ethnic
disputes. Such conflict and resulting humanitarian disasters are costly
in human and financial terms and, at times, offer compelling cause for
outside intervention.
The United States strives to deal with such conflicts through a well-
informed diplomacy coupled increasingly with support for multilateral
efforts to preempt and mediate strife. Collective action with US allies
and other partners can effectively support African efforts to make and
keep the peace. Although the United States will become militarily
involved in such conflicts only under rare and compelling circumstances,
a strong US diplomatic presence is required. US involvement in
resolving conflicts in Namibia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique has
earned it respect and influence internationally and in Africa and will
help guide its future efforts.
To prevent conflict from reaching the point of demanding outside
intervention, the United States supports African efforts in mediating
and averting conflict both internally and between states. Strengthening
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and expanding its mandate into
regular peace-keeping operations and conflict- mediation services will
be a key to this effort. Supporting similar intervention by sub-
regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), now carrying out an unprecedented peace-keeping
operation in Liberia, also encourages further African efforts in
collective security. Finally, active American support for efforts to
reduce armaments and military spending in the region is an integral part
of keeping the peace and resolving conflict.
Preventing further bloodshed and conflict in South Africa is another
policy priority, both because of that country's economic importance in
Africa and the world's focus on the drama of its transition to majority
rule. US public concern about apartheid and the creation of a new South
African society offers another compelling reason for current US
involvement and later assistance to South Africa under a truly
representative, non-racial government.
Helping democracy take root. The United States is committed to help
promote and sustain political reforms now being demanded by Africans.
The United States focuses on supporting broadly democratic processes and
institutions, not personalities or specific political outcomes.
Programs to support these reforms increasingly are integrated into
efforts to achieve other objectives in Africa. Stable democracy with
respect for basic rights is essential to peaceful change, and
responsible and responsive government is the basis of sustainable
economic growth. This policy responds to the near-universal recognition
in Africa that the post-colonial, authoritarian model has brought
political failure and economic ruin.
An agenda of active support for human rights and democratization also
commits the United States to help build civil societies and the
institutions which sustain reform. As repressive and often corrupt
institutions are swept away by the tide of reform, the United States has
a historic opportunity to work with Africans to achieve stability and
development through responsible, democratic government.
Strong US programs to encourage democratic values and practices are
essential. Projects advancing human and civil rights, the rule of law,
freedom and diversity in the press, effective government, the status of
women, and other pillars of a democratic society should reinforce direct
assistance for holding elections. Support for democracy and good
government must be firmly integrated into all dealings with Africans,
especially those in the military and security forces who may pose the
greatest threat to reform. Efforts to reduce the size of bloated
security forces both through positive incentives and negative
conditionality will be key to these efforts.
A strong information program which shares and promotes democratic values
is integral to US efforts to encourage lasting reform. American public
diplomacy should take advantage of the information and communications
revolutions in Africa. In many African states, fragile institutions of
civil society are emerging: independent newspapers, labor unions, human
rights groups, and political parties. Imperfect but reasonably
representative elections are installing governments with genuine popular
mandates. By identifying publicly with these developments and offering
flexible support, the United States, in concert with other democracies,
can solidify these gains and help make democratic experiments permanent.
Success in this endeavor serves American political, economic, and
humanitarian interests in Africa.
Fostering economic growth and trade. The central concern of most
Africans remains how to ensure a decent standard of living and lay the
groundwork for a modern economy. Sustainable economic growth driven by
the private sector is as essential to the achievement of all other US
policy goals in Africa as it is domestically. Development assistance
and economic support programs must focus on countries committed to free
market policies which ensure equitable, long-term growth.
Popular support for government and the democratic process is essential
for tough economic reform measures to endure. The United States seeks
to broaden the role of the private sector in political and economic
reform while helping to meet basic human needs through its aid.
Economic performance and need as well as progress toward democracy and
responsible government will be the primary considerations in allocating
US development assistance. The United States also seeks to include such
criteria in the decisions of international financial institutions. To
maximize assistance, coordination with other donors will be more
important than ever.
Africans must dedicate themselves to the basic economic reforms which
will lead to a decent minimum standard of living and the continent's
full participation in the world economy. US programs support these
tough decisions by African leaders and their people, for they will
ultimately lead to economic growth, a reduction in conflict, reduced
dependence on aid, and expanded markets for US goods and services.
The United States continues to respond quickly and substantially to
suffering caused by natural or man-made disasters. Drought, famine, and
population pressures will continue to afflict Africa. Wars and civil
strife will continue to generate refugees, suffering, death, and
economic destruction. The United States will seek equitable
burdensharing among all international donors to meet these crises.
The United States aims to expand its private sector commercial
relationships and presence in Africa. Improving the investment climate,
promoting non-discriminatory treatment for American business, and
enhancing private sector support and followup services needed to carry
on trade are priorities in this area. The US Government aggressively
seeks out trade and investment opportunities for American firms and
equal market access. US assistance programs promote American exports
and trade.
Free trade and an open economic system are particularly important for
creating the wealth needed to spur economic growth for all sectors of
society in South Africa. Many Africans look to a democratic South
Africa as a potential economic engine for the whole region. Economic
success or failure there will have serious implications for South
Africa's neighbors as well as its own people.
The United States encourages African nations to support the application
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including the
introduction of modern intellectual property rights protections, non-
discriminatory investment policies, and support for the other provisions
of the Uruguay Round. Freer trade, especially for agricultural products
and textiles, also will be vital to Africa's economic progress. Growth
through trade can reduce Africans' dependence on aid.
Africans also face the burden of military expenditures on their
economies and societies. With renewed effort to prevent conflict, there
will be even more emphasis on reintegrating former soldiers into often
devastated economies. US economic assistance and military programs in
the region encourage appropriate reductions in military spending and
help Africans redirect these financial and human resources into
productive nation building.
Debt is a crushing economic reality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Along with
other donors, the United States continues to explore possible solutions
to the burdens of debt servicing for struggling African economies. Debt
relief should be targeted on those countries undertaking effective
reforms.
Addressing regional concerns and problems. The United States supports
an expanded role for international collective action to address problems
which affect the well-being of the world community. It also actively
encourages regional solutions and organizations such as the OAU and
ECOWAS as they take on new missions ranging from peace-keeping and
conflict mediation to election and human rights monitoring. These
fledgling efforts deserve US political and financial support as well as
technical assistance and training. Stronger regional organizations will
bring African solutions to African problems, necessary for the
continent's long-term stability and development.
Other critical issues with an impact in and beyond the region include:
-- Women--The vital role played by women in the management of natural
resources only recently has been appreciated. Women's generally low
status in Africa is an important factor in economic, social, and health
problems. US assistance and information programs should focus on women
as key actors in sustainable development and building a healthy society.
Programs for educating and training women are vital to this process.
-- Environment--In coordination with international programs for the
environment, the United States works to preserve and restore Africa's
often ravaged ecosystems. Again, the emphasis should be on helping
Africans build their own capacity and institutions to promote better
environmental practices and the protection of the continent's unique
biological diversity. The environmental problems of cities and new
industries also require attention.
-- AIDS--The AIDS pandemic has had a particularly devastating effect on
Africa, where more than one-half of the world's HIV [human immuno-
deficiency virus]-infected persons live. The OAU Action Plan on AIDS is
a positive first step toward a comprehensive prevention program in all
African medical systems and societies. US technical assistance to
research and to combat the spread of AIDS is joined to active efforts to
mitigate the suffering and economic costs of the epidemic. Prevention
and control of AIDS must involve every sector of development assistance,
from population control to agriculture and industry. The entire world
has a stake in stopping the pernicious spread of this disease and
helping Africans devise cost-effective care for the infected.
-- Population control--Economic progress in Africa is contingent upon
slowing population growth. Gains in living standards and reduced
dependence on outside assistance will be impossible without vigorous
programs to support family health care and family planning. US support
for such programs is essential to its policy goals.
-- Refugees--Africa's conflicts and internal turmoil will continue to
generate large numbers of refugees in dire need. Resources devoted to
pre-venting and mitigating such conflict will more than pay for
themselves in reduced costs for humanitarian relief and mass
repatriations. To encourage voluntary repatriation as conflicts recede,
US assistance should focus on reintegrating refugees into their own
societies.
-- Terrorism and narcotics--While Africa thus far has been spared the
worst ravages of these global problems, desperate poverty and a
breakdown in civil order has encouraged terrorism and drug use and
trafficking. Terrorists and their state sponsors need to be countered
by strong measures and both bilateral and regional cooperation. The
United States can improve coordination of drug law enforcement and
increase education to reduce domestic demand. When African countries
become transit centers for illegal drugs, US technical assistance and
training also is appropriate.
Conclusion
The United States is following this ambitious policy agenda in Africa
while working to meet urgent needs in America and the requirement to
reduce the size of budget deficits. Active diplomacy and a firm
commitment to the objectives described above, however, will require
little more than the resources currently available, especially with more
effective collaboration by donor countries. Vigorous promotion of
stable democracy, peaceful change, and economic reform will, in fact,
reduce the potential costs faced by the United States by reducing both
the intensity and frequency of conflict and humanitarian crises. Along
with strong programs to support development which meets the basic needs
of impoverished populations, the United States will be able to ensure
that Africa can realize its enormous potential in peace and prosperity
as a friend and full partner of the United States. (###)
ARTICLE 7:
UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on the Former Yugoslavia
Text of Resolution 1992/S-2/1, "The Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia," adopted by the Commission on Human
Rights of the UN Economic and Social Council, Geneva, Switzerland,
December 1, 1992.
The Commission on Human Rights,
Meeting in special session,
Guided by the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants
on Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and
international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 for the protection of war victims and the Additional
Protocols thereto of 1977,
Aware of its responsibility to promote and encourage respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all and to prevent violations of
such rights,
Deeply concerned at the human tragedy in the former Yugoslavia and at
the continuing grave, massive and systematic violations of human rights
occurring there, particularly in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina
under Serbian control,
Recalling its resolution 1992/S-1/1 [for text, see Dispatch Supplement
Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 46],
Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Special Rapporteur appointed
pursuant to resolution 1992/S-1/1, as well as those of the Chairman of
the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur
on the question of torture and the Representative of the Secretary-
General on internally displaced persons, who accompanied the Special
Rapporteur on one or both of his missions,
Noting with alarm the three reports of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia (A/47/666 - S/24809,
E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9 and E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10),
Gravely concerned in particular at the continuing, odious practice of
ethnic cleansing, which is the direct cause of the vast majority of
human rights violations and whose principal victims are the Muslim
population virtually threatened with extermination, which the Special
Rapporteur reports has continued, and in some regions intensified, in an
effort to create a fait accompli in disregard of international
commitments, in particular the statement of principles and the programme
of action of the London Conference, entered into by those who carry out
such ethnic cleansing, and recalling, as stated in its resolution
1992/S-1/1, that ethnic cleansing is aimed at the dislocation or
destruction of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups,
Alarmed that although the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a
religious conflict, it has been characterized by the systematic
destruction and profanation of mosques, Catholic churches and other
places of worship, as well as other sites of cultural heritage, in
particular in areas currently or previously under Serbian control,
Deeply concerned that the human rights situation in the former
Yugoslavia has resulted in more than two and a half million refugees and
displaced persons and at the catastrophic humanitarian situation now
prevailing,
Recalling with appreciation the continuing efforts of the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Co-Chairmen of its Steering
Committee, including their proposals for the constitution for the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina designed to protect human rights on
the basis of fundamental international human rights instruments,
1. Commends the Special Rapporteur for his activities to date, and in
particular his two missions and his reports;
2. Condemns in the strongest terms all violations of human rights in
the former Yugoslavia, including killings, torture, beatings, rape,
disappearances, destruction of houses and other acts or threats of
violence aimed at forcing individuals to leave their homes, as
identified by the Special Rapporteur;
3. Categorically condemns the ethnic cleansing being carried out, in
particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognizing that the Serbian
leadership in territories under their control in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Yugoslav Army and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia
bear primary responsibility for this reprehensible practice;
4. Demands an immediate end to the practice of ethnic cleansing, and in
particular demands that the Republic of Serbia use its influence with
the self-proclaimed Serbian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Croatia to bring the practice of ethnic cleansing to an immediate end
and to reverse the effects of that practice, re-emphasizing the rights
of refugees, displaced persons and other victims of ethnic cleansing to
return to their homes and the invalidity of acts made under duress;
5. Affirms that States are to be held accountable for violations of
human rights which their agents commit upon the territory of another
State;
6. Condemns in particular the violations of human rights and
humanitarian law in connection with detention, including killings,
torture and the systematic practice of rape, and calls upon all parties
in the former Yugoslavia to close immediately all detention centres not
authorized by and in compliance with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and to release immediately in conditions of safety all persons
arbitrarily or illegally detained;
7. Condemns also the indiscriminate shelling of cities and civilian
areas, the systematic terrorization and murder of non-combatants, the
destruction of vital services, the besieging of cities, and the use of
military force against civilian populations and relief operations by all
sides, recognizing that the main responsibility lies with Serbian
forces;
8. Calls upon parties in the former Yugoslavia, and especially those
most responsible, to cease violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law immediately and to take appropriate steps to apprehend
and punish those guilty of perpetrating or authorizing them;
9. Expresses deep concern at the number of disappearances and missing
persons in the former Yugoslavia and calls on all parties to make all
possible efforts to account for those missing;
10. Welcomes the establishment, pursuant to Security Council resolution
780 (1992) of 6 October 1992 [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 41, p.
769], of a Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information
relating to violations of international humanitarian law and encourages
the closest possible cooperation between the Special Rapporteur and the
Commission of Experts, recommends that this Commission be granted the
staff and resources necessary to enable it to act effectively, and
requests the Commission of Experts to provide its conclusions to the
Secretary-General in order to allow the Security Council to consider
further appropriate steps towards bringing those accused to justice;
11. Reaffirms that all persons who perpetrate or authorize crimes
against humanity or other grave breaches of international humanitarian
law are individually responsible for these breaches and that the
international community will exert every effort to bring them to
justice, and calls on all parties to provide all pertinent information
to the Commission of Experts in accordance with Security Council
resolution 780 (1992);
12. Calls upon all States to consider the extent to which the acts
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia constitute genocide,
in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide;
13. Urges the Commission of Experts, with the assistance of the Centre
for Human Rights, to arrange for an immediate and urgent investigation
by qualified experts of a mass grave near Vukovar and other mass grave
sites and places where mass killings are reported to have taken place,
and requests the General Assembly to provide the resources necessary for
this undertaking;
14. Expresses its grave concern at the information contained in the
third report of the Special Rapporteur (A/47/666-S/24809) on the
dangerous situation in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, and urges all
parties in those areas to engage in a meaningful dialogue under the
auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to
act with utmost restraint and to settle disputes in full observance of
human rights and freedoms, and calls on the Serbian authorities to
refrain from the use of force and immediately to stop the practice of
ethnic cleansing, and to respect fully the rights of persons belonging
to ethnic communities or minorities in order to prevent the extension of
the conflict to other parts of the former Yugoslavia;
15. Welcomes the call of the Special Rapporteur for the opening of
humanitarian relief corridors to prevent the imminent death of tens of
thousands of persons in besieged cities;
16. Welcomes Security Council resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992
[for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 47, p. 843] in which it invites the
Secretary-General in consultation with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant agencies, to study the
possibility and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for
humanitarian purposes and the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur
for the creation of such security zones for the protection of displaced
persons, while keeping in mind that the international community must not
acquiesce in demographic changes caused by ethnic cleansing;
17. Affirms that all the parties in the former Yugoslavia share the
responsibility for finding peaceful solutions through negotiations under
the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,
and welcomes the acceptance by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
of the constitutional proposals of the Co-Chairmen as a basis for
negotiations;
18. Requests the Special Rapporteur to continue his efforts, especially
by carrying out such further missions to the former Yugoslavia as he
deems necessary, to call on other existing mechanisms of the Commission
on Human Rights to assist him and to report his findings and
recommendations at its forty-ninth session, and requests the Secretary-
General to continue to make the reports of the Special Rapporteur
available to the Security Council;
19. Urges the Secretary-General to take steps to ensure the full and
effective cooperation of all United Nations bodies to implement the
present resolution and calls upon those bodies entrusted with human
rights monitoring in the former Yugoslavia to cooperate closely with the
Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts;
20. Requests the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, within the
overall budgetary framework of the United Nations, to make all necessary
resources available for the Special Rapporteur to carry out his mandate
and to comply with the request of the Special Rapporteur for staff based
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia to enhance effective
continuous monitoring of the human rights situation there;
21. Decides to examine the situation of human rights in the former
Yugoslavia at its forty-ninth session under agenda item 12.
VOTE: 45-1-1 (Yugoslavia opposed, Cuba abstaining).(###)
ARTICLE 8:
Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines Revised
Department Statement, Text of Revisions
Department Statement
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC,
January 7, 1993.
The Government of the United States, together with its partners in the
missile technology control regime [MTCR], has strengthened its efforts
to combat the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
The United States and all the partners in the missile technology control
regime have adopted revised guidelines to extend the scope of the regime
to missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons as
well as nuclear weapons.
The adoption of these guidelines and their implementation confirms and
tightens existing policy. These measures will further strengthen the
MTCR and will be important factors in countering the proliferation of
missile systems.
The Government of the United States and its MTCR partners welcome the
growing number of countries which have publicly committed themselves to
respect the MTCR guidelines, and we call on all states to show a similar
spirit of responsibility in the interest of international peace and
security.
A similar statement is being made simultaneously in the capitals of the
22 partners of the MTCR. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Text of Revisions
Issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington,
DC, January 7, 1993.
Missile Technology Control Regime
The United States Government has, after careful consideration and
subject to its international treaty obligations, decided that, when
considering the transfer of equipment and technology related to
missiles, it will act in accordance with the attached Guidelines
beginning on January 7, 1993. These Guidelines replace those adopted on
April 16, 1987.
Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers
1. The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a
contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such
weapons. The Guidelines are not designed to impede national space
programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such
programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction. These Guidelines, including the attached Annex, form the
basis for controlling transfers to any destination beyond the
Government's jurisdiction or control of all delivery systems (other than
manned aircraft) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and
of equipment and technology relevant to missiles whose performance in
terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters. Restraint will be
exercised in the consideration of all transfers of items contained
within the Annex and all such transfers will be considered on a case-by-
case basis. The Government will implement the Guidelines in accordance
with national legislation.
2. The Annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes
equipment and technology. Category I items, all of which are in Annex
Items 1 and 2, are those items of greatest sensitivity. If a Category I
item is included in a system, that system will also be considered as
Category I, except when the incorporated item cannot be separated,
removed or duplicated. Particular restraint will be exercised in the
consideration of Category I transfers regardless of their purpose, and
there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Particular
restraint will also be exercised in the consideration of transfers of
any items in the Annex, or of any missiles (whether or not in the
Annex), if the Government judges, on the basis of all available,
persuasive information, evaluated according to factors including those
in paragraph 3, that they are intended to be used for the delivery of
weapons of mass destruction, and there will be a strong presumption to
deny such transfers. Until further notice, the transfer of Category I
production facilities will not be authorized. The transfer of other
Category I items will be authorized only on rare occasions and where the
Government (A) obtains binding government-to-government undertakings
embodying the assurances from the recipient government called for in
paragraph 5 of these Guidelines and (B) assumes responsibility for
taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its
stated end-use. It is understood that the decision to transfer remains
the sole and sovereign judgment of the United States Government.
3. In the evaluation of transfer applications for Annex items, the
following factors will be taken into account:
A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of
the recipient state;
C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential
development of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons
of mass destruction;
D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the
relevant assurances of the recipient states referred to in sub-
paragraphs 5.A and 5.B below;
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.
4. The transfer of design and production technology directly associated
with any items in the Annex will be subject to as great a degree of
scrutiny and control as will the equipment itself, to the extent
permitted by national legislation.
5. Where the transfer could contribute to a delivery system for weapons
of mass destruction, the Government will authorize transfers of items in
the Annex only on receipt of appropriate assurances from the government
of the recipient state that:
A. The items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use
will not be modified nor the items modified or replicated without the
prior consent of the United States Government;
B. Neither the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will be
retransferred without the consent of the United States Government.
6. In furtherance of the effective operation of the Guidelines, the
United States Government will, as necessary and appropriate, exchange
relevant information with other governments applying the same
Guidelines.
7. The adherence of all States to these Guidelines in the interest of
international peace and security would be welcome. (###)
ARTICLE 9:
Department Statements
Haiti: Legislative Elections
Statement released by the Office of the Acting Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, January 12, 1993.
The de facto government of Haiti has announced its intention to hold
elections for several Senate seats and other offices on January 18 and
25.
The US Government believes that free and fair elections can only be held
under a legally constituted government in an atmosphere of respect for
free expression, freedom of assembly, and open political dialogue.
These conditions do not exist in Haiti today. Consequently, we do not
regard the planned elections as legitimate.
In the same context, we remain firmly committed to restoration of
democratic, constitutional government in Haiti. We continue to
recognize Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the legitimately elected president
of that country. We urge all Haitian parties to dedicate themselves to
serious negotiations that will end the current crisis and restore
democracy to Haiti.
US To Assist With Senegal's Withdrawal From Liberia
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Joseph C. Snyder, Washington,
DC, January 12, 1993.
The United States wishes to commend the Senegalese military personnel in
Liberia for the important role they have played in pursuing regional
stability in West Africa. Their mission successfully completed, the
Senegalese troops in Liberia will begin returning to Dakar [Senegal]
tomorrow. The United States, which at the request of the Government of
Senegal and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
assisted in the deployment of the Senegalese troops in late 1991, will
help with their redeployment to Dakar. The operation, using military
air transport and a commercial ship, will be financed from US funds
allocated when the approximately 1,400 Senegalese troops arrived in
Liberia in 1991.
The Senegalese were in Liberia as part of the West African peacekeeping
force (ECOMOG) maintained by ECOWAS. ECOMOG has significantly
reinforced its presence in Liberia since the October 15, 1992, attack on
Monrovia [Liberia] by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL). The peace-keeping force repelled the NPFL attack and
has now secured virtually all territory seized by the NPFL at that time.
ECOMOG will remain capable of protecting the Liberian people from attack
after the departure of the Senegalese contingent.
We expect ECOWAS to continue pursuing implementation of the Yamoussoukro
[Cote d'Ivoire] peace agreement in accordance with the mandate contained
in UN Security Council Resolution 788 of November 19, 1992 [for text,
see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 48, p. 861]. The United States continues to
support ECOWAS fully in its effort to bring peace to Liberia, disarm and
demobilize the warring factions, and create conditions in which free and
fair elections can be held. However, Charles Taylor has rejected the
ECOWAS call for a cease-fire and asserted that his irregular army will
not disarm under ECOMOG supervision. We call upon all Liberian
combatants to cease aggressive actions and cooperate with the UN-
endorsed ECOWAS plan.
US-Pacific Island Nation Joint Commercial Commission
Statement released by the Office of the Acting Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, January 12, 1993.
Leaders from 13 Pacific island countries met with US officials on
January 12 in Honolulu, Hawaii, to sign a memorandum of understanding
establishing the US-Pacific Island Nations Joint Commercial Commission
(JCC). This initiative, first proposed by President Bush at his October
27, 1990, Honolulu summit meeting with island heads of government, will
function as a consultative mechanism to enhance commercial and trade
links among member nations. As such, it will complement the economic
policies of the South Pacific island governments, which stress the
importance of the private sector in their respective national
development programs.
The United States currently has JCC agreements with Poland, China, South
Korea, and Thailand. The Honolulu agreement marks the first time the
United States has participated in a JCC comprised of so many nations in
a single region. The successful conclusion of this undertaking
underscores our continuing commitment to playing a constructive role in
the South Pacific.
Pacific island members of the JCC are the Cook Islands, the Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue,
Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and
Western Samoa. (###)
END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 3
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