1.  US Signs Chemical Weapons Convention  -- President Bush  
2.  Chemical Weapons Convention Signing Ceremony -- Secretary 
3.  Chemical Weapons Convention -- ACDA Statement, ACDA Chronology, UN 
General Assembly Resolution, ACDA Occasional Paper 
4.  Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait -- UN Security Council President 
Hatano, White House Statements 
5.  US Recognizes Czech and Slovak Republics
6.  Fact Sheet:  US Policy for a New Era  In Sub-Saharan Africa 
7.  UN Human Rights Commission  Resolution on the Former Yugoslavia 
8.  Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines Revised -- Department 
Statement, Text of Revisions 
9.  Department Statements
           Haiti:  Legislative Elections   
           US To Assist With Senegal's Withdrawal From Liberia 
           US-Pacific Island Nation Joint Commercial Commission


US Signs Chemical Weapons Convention
President Bush
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Washington, DC, January 13, 1993

For more than 20 years, the United States and many other countries have 
labored to achieve a ban on chemical weapons.  The long-awaited Chemical 
Weapons Convention is now completed and open for signature.

I have had a deep and abiding personal interest in the success of the 
effort to ban these terrible weapons.  As Vice President, I had the 
honor on two occasions to address the Conference on Disarmament and to 
present US proposals to give impetus to the negotiations.  As President, 
I directed the United States to take new initiatives to advance and 
conclude the negotiations.  The United States is profoundly gratified 
that these talks have now been successfully concluded.

The countries that participated in the negotiations at the Conference on 
Disarmament deserve special congratulations.  The Chemical Weapons 
Convention is uniquely important in the field of arms control 
agreements.  It will improve the security of all nations by eliminating 
a class of weapons of mass destruction that exists in all quarters of 
the world and that has been used in recent conflicts.  It is a truly 
stabilizing and non-discriminatory agreement.

The United States strongly supports the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
is proud to be an original signatory.  We are encouraged that so many 
other states have also decided to take this step.  This clearly 
demonstrates global--international--endorsement of the convention and 
the new norm of international conduct that it establishes.  However, we 
must not cease our efforts until the norm becomes truly universal, with 
all countries becoming not only signatories but also parties to the 

Much work remains to make the convention fully effective.  The United 
States will cooperate closely with other countries to bring the 
convention into force as soon as possible and to ensure that it is 
faithfully implemented.  Only then will we be able to say that the risk 
of chemical warfare is no longer a threat to people anywhere in the 
world. (###)


Chemical Weapons Convention Signing Ceremony
Secretary Eagleburger
Remarks upon signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, Paris, France, 
January 13, 1993

It is fitting that we meet to sign this historic Chemical Weapons 
Convention in a city where, 4 years ago, the international community 
appealed for the strengthening of norms against chemical warfare.  I am 
pleased to be in Paris, and I am especially pleased to represent my 
President, George Bush, a man who, over the course of the past decade, 
launched some of the key initiatives which helped to make this agreement 
possible.  He and all those responsible can take pride in an achievement 
whose revolutionary scope and impact we can recognize today without 
having to await the verdict of history.

But such has been the amazing record of the past few years.  We have 
seen the international community liberate itself from half a century of 
gridlock and paralysis and move beyond the rhetoric of democracy to 
achieve real democracy; move beyond the rhetoric of detente to achieve 
real peace; and move beyond the rhetoric of disarmament to achieve real 
reductions in weapons of mass destruction.

The Chemical Weapons Convention we sign today does more than simply 
reduce a class of arms or mitigate against their proliferation.  This 
convention mandates a worldwide non-discriminatory ban on an entire 
class of weapons of mass destruction--the only class of such weapons 
that has been widely used in combat.  By the radical terms of this 
agreement, all signatory states forswear the possession, production, 
stockpiling, transfer, and, indeed, the use of chemical weapons; and all 
signatories must destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons 
production facilities in their possession.  Moreover, the convention's 
strict verification regime, which accommodates legitimate commercial and 
sovereign interests, sets an innovative standard for future multilateral 

The international community is virtually united in support of the 
objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  However, there must be 
truly global adherence if the convention is to achieve its purpose and 
if doubts are to be eliminated over the commitment and intentions of 
those who fail to sign, ratify, and fully comply with its terms.

Nowhere is this more important today than in the Middle East, a region 
which over the past 30 years has been home to more active chemical 
weapons programs--and which has seen more chemical weapons use--than any 
other part of the world.  It is, therefore, particularly disappointing 
that so many Middle Eastern states are absent from this ceremony today.

The fact of the matter is that linking this convention to other issues 
cannot affect the fate of those issues, but it will surely undermine the 
effect of this treaty in the one region most exposed to the danger of 
chemical weapons--namely, the Middle East. The point, I believe, is to 
tackle the challenge of weapons of mass destruction wherever we can, 
whenever we can.  I would, therefore, urge the members of the Arab 
League to seize this opportunity and sign the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.  Doing so would be a step toward, and not away from, making 
the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, as 
called for by President Mubarak of Egypt.

Today's ceremony is only the beginning of the work which lies ahead.  
Next month, the Preparatory Commission will meet in The Hague [the 
Netherlands] to work out the important and detailed provisions for 
implementing the convention.  The United States is fully committed to 
the success of those efforts, which will require the same broad support 
and participation which produced the successful convention itself.

As I indicated at the beginning, the past few years have been a 
remarkably creative period of international achievement.  Perhaps not 
coincidentally, I believe that President Bush's passage across the 
international scene has equally been one of tangible achievement, 
particularly in terms of the issue most important to the fate and future 
of the planet--the issue of weapons of mass destruction.  George Bush's 
legacy will include landmark treaties--START [Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty] I, START II, and CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]--as 
well as diplomatic efforts which paid non-proliferation dividends in 
Africa, South America, the Middle East, and here in Paris today.  But he 
knows, as all of us must know, that what we have accomplished to date 
will matter little unless we are prepared to confront the even greater 
proliferation dangers we most certainly will face in the years to 


Chemical Weapons Convention
ACDA Statement, ACDA Chronology, UN General Assembly Resolution, ACDA 
Occasional Paper

France Hosts Signing Ceremony

Based on statement released by the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA), Washington, DC, January 5, 1993.

On January 13, the Government of France will host a ceremony in Paris 
for the signing of a multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  
Representatives from more than 130 countries are expected to be present 
to sign the convention.

The multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, concluded on September 3, 
1992, by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and endorsed by the 
United Nations on November 30, 1992, is historic in the scope of its 
provisions and in the number of countries involved in its development.  
It offers an opportunity to build confidence regionally and globally and 
to enable signatories to play a more responsible role in the 
international community.

The convention prohibits:
--  The development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, 
and transfer of chemical weapons;
--  The use of chemical weapons against any other state--regardless of 
whether the country is a signatory to the convention;
--  Engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and 
--  Assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in activities 
prohibited to convention signatories.

In addition, the convention requires that:
--  Signatories declare all chemical weapons and chemical weapons 
production facilities;
--  The declarations be checked;
--   Storage, production, and destruction facilities be monitored 
through on-site inspection; and
--  All chemical weapons be eliminated completely within 10 years.

To further enhance security and to deter clandestine chemical weapons 
production, storage, and use, the convention also provides routine 
monitoring and verification of relevant chemical weapons industry 
facilities.  Additionally, the convention provides for a challenge 
inspection regime which allows any convention signatory to initiate an 
inspection of any facility or location in any other signatory state to 
clarify and resolve questions of possible non-compliance.

After signature of the CWC, a preparatory commission of all signatory 
states will begin work in early February to further elaborate detailed 
implementation procedures and establish the CWC international 
organization.  These meetings will take place in The Hague, which will 
also be the seat of the organization.

The US welcomes the action of the Government of France to host the 
signing ceremony.  

Chronology of Events Leading to the Signing
Released by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 
Washington, DC, January 5, 1993.

Listed below are some of the key events in the chemical weapons [CW] 
negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors, the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [CCD] and the Committee on 
Disarmament, which led to the completion of a draft Chemical Weapons 
Convention [CWC], its approval by the United Nations, and its opening 
for signature in Paris.

March 15, 1962:  The United States and the Soviet Union submit plans for 
general and complete disarmament to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament 
Committee which include provisions for eliminating chemical and 
biological weapons.

August 15, 1968:  Chemical weapons are placed on the agenda of the CCD 
in Geneva.

June 27-July 3, 1974:  At the Moscow summit, the United States and the 
Soviet Union agree to hold bilateral talks in an effort to develop a 
joint proposal to be submitted to the CCD on the prohibition of chemical 

March 17, 1980:  The ad hoc working group on chemical weapons is 
established in the Committee on Disarmament (CD), the successor to the 

February 4, 1983:  At the CD, Vice President Bush announces US 
requirements for a verifiable prohibition on the production, 
stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons:

--  Declaration and systematic international on-site inspection of 
chemical weapons stocks and production facilities and declaration of 
plans for destruction of stocks;

--  Systematic international on-site inspection of the destruction of 
both chemical weapons stocks and production facilities;

--  Declaration and on-site inspection of the operation of other 
facilities for legal production of chemicals that pose a specific risk 
of being diverted to chemical weapons production; and

--  A multilateral mechanism for dealing with compliance issues.

June 1983:  The United States presents a paper at the CD showing how 
stockpile destruction can be verified.  The US approach combines 
extensive use of on-site instruments with continuous monitoring by 
international inspectors.

August 23, 1983:  The United States invites CD member and observer 
delegations to participate in a workshop at the US chemical weapons 
destruction test bed facility at Tooele, Utah.  The Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact (except Romania) decline the invitation.

November 14-16, 1983:  Fifty diplomats from 30 CD nations attend the 
Chemical Weapons Verification Workshop at Tooele, Utah.

April 18, 1984:  At the Conference on Disarmament, the new title for the 
Committee on Disarmament, Vice President Bush presents a US draft treaty 
that provides for a worldwide ban on the development, acquisition, 
production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.  The 
plan calls for systematic on-site inspection of chemical weapon 
facilities to ensure compliance.

The Soviet Union dismisses the US draft treaty immediately.  However, it 
is essentially the 1984 draft which becomes the basis of discussion for 
the ad hoc working group of the CD.  The document, reflecting agreed 
changes as a result of the CD negotiations, is informally referred to as 
the "rolling text."

July 10, 1986:  The United States provides information to the Conference 
on Disarmament about its chemical weapons stockpiles and storage site 
locations--the first CD member to do so.

August 6, 1987:  Soviet Foreign Minister [Shevardnadze] addresses the 
CD, accepting the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without 
the right of refusal.  He invites the CD delegations to the Shikany 
military facility and extends a future invitation to the CW destruction 
facility under construction near Chapayevsk.  On October 3-4, 1987, a 
multilateral delegation from the CD visits the Soviet CW installation at 
Shikany to view munitions and a mobile destruction site.

July 28, 1988:  In a speech to the CD, US Ambassador [to the Conference 
on Disarmament] Max Friedersdorf declares the location of all US CW 
production facilities and out-lines plans for their elimination under a 
CW ban.  The US calls on the Soviet Union and other states to do the 

February 21-23, 1989:  The United States conducts a trial inspection of 
a private American chemical production plant.  This is part of an 
experiment to develop procedures for a routine inspection regime which 
would satisfy confidence and security requirements without significantly 
disrupting the civilian chemical industry.

The Soviet Union and other members of the CD subsequently conduct 
similar trial inspections of their own chemical industries.

February 7-9, 1990:  Secretary of State Baker and [Soviet] Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze agree on a framework for action to expedite the 
negotiation at the CD for a Chemical Weapons Convention.

June 1, 1990:  At the Washington summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev 
sign the US-Soviet Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of 
Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC).  Key provisions of this important accord are:

--  Cessation of chemical weapons production to begin upon entry into 
force and destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks to start by 
the end of 1992--down to 5,000 tons of CW agents [weight exclusive of 
casings] by 2002;

--  On-site inspections during and after the destruction process to 
confirm destruction; and

--  Development and use of safe and environmentally sound methods of 

May 13, 1991:  President Bush announces a new series of steps to 
strengthen the prospects of an early, successful conclusion of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.  To this end, the President declared that 
the United States would take the following actions:

--  Formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason--
including retaliation--against any state, effective when the convention 
enters into force and propose that all states follow suit--providing the 
USSR is also a party to the treaty;

--  Unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all US stocks of 
chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force and propose that 
all other states do likewise;

--  Offer technical assistance to others so that they can destroy their 
chemical weapons stocks efficiently and safely;

--  Call for setting a target date to conclude the convention and 
recommend that the conference stay in continuous session [as] necessary 
to meet the target;

--  Propose new and effective verification measures for inspecting sites 
suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons;

--  Propose that the convention require parties to refuse to trade in 
chemical weapons-related materials with states that do not join in the 
convention in order to provide tangible benefits for those states that 
join the convention and significant penalties for those that fail to 
support it; and

--  Reaffirm that the United States will impose all appropriate 
sanctions in response to violations of the convention, especially the 
use of chemical weapons.

July 15, 1991:  The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
Japan jointly table a draft challenge inspection proposal at the CD, 
followed by a US proposal on handling inspection of declared facilities.

March 19, 1992:  Australian Foreign Minister Evans presents a draft 
treaty offering compromise solutions to outstanding issues as a basis 
for early completion of the CD negotiations.  The United States applauds 
the Australian effort and supports the process it represents.  The 
Australian text differs from US positions on a number of important 
issues.  The United States, however, expresses hope that it will aid 
resolution of remaining issues and permit completion of the CWC in 1992, 
as President Bush has repeatedly urged.

June 22, 1992:  The chairman of the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons 
at the CD, Adolph Ritter von Wagner of Germany, in an effort to speed 
the process, released a draft "final text" for consideration.  This 
draft is a complete text and embodies consensus compromises as well as 
the chairman's own proposed compromise language on unresolved major 

June 26, 1992:  The second CD session concluded with meetings during the 
last few days devoted to the chairman's explanations of the new text.

July 20, 1992:  The CD resumes.

July 23, 1992:  The United States accepts the chairman's draft Chemical 
Weapons Convention.

August 7, 1992:  Chairman von Wagner puts forth a package of changes to 
the draft convention in an effort to satisfy the concerns of some 
members of the CD.

August 13, 1992:  President Bush announces strong US support for the 
draft Chemical Weapons Convention completed at the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva.  The President states that the United States is 
committed to be an original party to the treaty once it is open for 
signing and calls on all other nations to support the treaty and to 
pledge adherence to it.

August 26, 1992:  The CD resumes.September 3, 1992:  The CD concludes 
the draft Chemical Weapons Convention.

September 7, 1992:  The CD forwards the draft Chemical Weapons 
Convention to the United Nations for endorsement.

November 12, 1992:  The UN First Committee approves the draft convention 
and submits it for endorsement by the entire UN membership.

November 30, 1992:  The UN endorses by consensus, with 145 co-sponsors, 
the draft of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

January 13, 1993:  In a ceremony in Paris, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention will be opened for signature. 

February 8, 1993:  The Preparatory Commission of all states parties to 
the convention is scheduled to meet in The Hague [the Netherlands] to 
set up the Chemical Weapons Convention international organization.

UN General Assembly Resolution
Text of Resolution A/C.1/47/L.1/Rev. 2, "Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on Their Destruction," approved by consensus by the UN General 
Assembly, New York City, November 30, 1992.

The General Assembly,

Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community 
to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, 
stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, as well 
as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 
signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,1 as expressed by consensus in many 
previous resolutions,

Recalling in particular its resolution 46/35 C of 6 December 1991, in 
which the Assembly strongly urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a 
matter of the highest priority, to resolve outstanding issues so as to 
achieve a final agreement on a convention on the prohibition of the 
development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on 
their destruction during its 1992 session,

Bearing in mind the Final Declaration2 of the Conference of States 
Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in 
Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, in which participating States stressed 
their determination to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by 
completely eliminating them,

Determined to make progress towards general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control, including the 
prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,

Convinced, therefore, of the urgent necessity of a total ban on chemical 
weapons, so as to abolish an entire category of weapons of mass 
destruction, and thus eliminate the risk to mankind of renewed use of 
these inhumane weapons,

Welcoming the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction,3 adopted by the Conference on Disarmament and contained in 
its report dated 3 September 1992, the result of many years of intensive 
negotiations, which constitutes a historic achievement in the field of 
arms control and disarmament,

Convinced that the Convention, particularly as adherence to it 
approaches universality, will contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and improve the security of all States, and that it 
therefore merits the strong support of the entire international 

Convinced further that the implementation of the Convention should 
promote expanded international trade, technological development and 
economic cooperation in the chemical sector, in order to enhance the 
economic and technological development of all States parties,

Determined to ensure the efficient and cost-effective implementation of 
the Convention,

Recalling the support for the prohibition of chemical weapons expressed 
in the declaration by representatives of the world's chemical industry 
at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, held at 
Canberra from 18 to 22 September 1989,4

Bearing in mind the relevant reference to the Convention in the Final 
Documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of 
Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992,

Welcoming the invitation of the President of the French Republic to 
participate in a ceremony to sign the Convention in Paris on 13 January 

1.  Commends the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, as contained in the report of the Conference on Disarmament 
dated 3 September 1992;

2.  Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to 
open it for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993;

3.  Calls upon all States to sign and, thereafter, according to their 
respective constitutional processes, to become parties to the Convention 
at the earliest possible date, thus contributing to its rapid entry into 
force and to the early achievement of universal adherence;

4.  Further calls upon all States to ensure the effective implementation 
of this unprecedented, global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral 
disarmament agreement, thereby enhancing cooperative multilateralism as 
a basis for international peace and security;

5.  Requests the Secretary-General to provide such services as may be 
requested by the signatory States to initiate the work of the 
Preparatory Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons;

6.  Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to 
report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on the status 
of signatures and ratifications of the Convention.

1  League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

2  A/44/88, annex.

3  Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, 
Supplement No. 27   (A/47/27), appendix I.

4  See A/C.1/44/4.

ACDA Occasional Paper
The following text is taken from "Chemical Weapons Convention:  A 
Balance Between Obligations and the Needs of States Parties," dated 
January 5, 1993.

The multilateral negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
concluded in Geneva on September 3, 1992, with the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) forwarding the draft text to the United Nations for 
endorsement on September 7.  On November 30, the UN General Assembly 
endorsed the CWC by consensus, with 145 countries cosponsoring the 
supporting resolution.  The CWC will be opened for signature in Paris on 
January 13, 1993.  The CWC is historic in the scope of its provisions 
and in the number of countries involved in its development.  
Additionally, the conference of states parties established by the 
convention will provide members an opportunity for building regional and 
global stability and for playing a more responsible role in the 
international community.

The majority of the provisions of the CWC represent the long-agreed upon 
consensus of the 39 members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) who 
drafted the convention.  In a few sections, where prior consensus had 
not been attained, compromises were reached which struck an equitable 
balance among varying positions.

This paper describes some of the CWC's key provisions, which were 
designed to balance the need for effective convention provisions with 
the national security and economic requirements of states parties in 
implementing such provisions.

The Destruction of CW and CW Production Facilities
Throughout the CWC negotiations, CD participants sought ways to remove 
the possibility of use or threat of use of chemical weapons (CW) through 
measures which would provide confidence among states parties adhering to 
the convention that their security will be enhanced.  To this end, the 
negotiators desired to ensure the complete elimination of CW and their 
production facilities within a specific period of time; assign 
responsibility for destruction of CW stocks abandoned on a state party's 
territory; prohibit any right of CW retaliation; prohibit the use of 
herbicides and riot control agents (RCAs) as a method of warfare; and, 
in the event of CW use or threat of use, provide for protection and 
assistance to the victimized party.

At the same time, negotiators had to take into account such factors as 
the technical difficulties associated with destruction of CW, the 
possible need for commercial use of former CW production facilities, and 
the non-warfare uses of herbicides and RCAs, (e.g., crop control, law 
enforcement). This required negotiators to develop provisions which 
balance a state party's obligations under the convention for 
declarations, destruction timeframes, international monitoring, etc., 
with the needs and requirements of states parties in implementing these 

Thus, the CWC contains provisions which prohibit:  the development, 
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and direct or indirect 
transfer to anyone of CW; the use of CW against anyone; engaging in any 
military preparations to use CW; and assisting, encouraging, or inducing 
anyone to engage in activities prohibited to states parties.

The convention requires all CW to be declared, declarations to be 
checked, and all CW to be completely eliminated within 10 years, with 
storage and destruction monitored through on-site inspection.  An 
extension of a state party's destruction program for up to 5 years is 
possible but not automatic.  It must be approved by the conference of 
states parties which will set conditions under which the extension may 
be granted, including specific verification measures and actions to 
mitigate the delay.  The CWC requires a state party to destroy and bear 
the costs of destruction of CW it abandoned on another state party's 
territory; otherwise, the territorial state party may request assistance 
from the CWC organization.

The CWC further requires all CW production to cease, CW production 
facilities to be declared, the declarations to be checked, and the 
facilities destroyed, with cessation of production and destruction 
monitored through on-site inspection.  In exceptional cases of 
compelling need, the conference of states parties may approve conversion 
of former CW production facilities for prescribed non-CW uses, subject 
to appropriate international monitoring.

Finally, the convention contains provisions which prohibit the use of 
RCAs as a method of warfare, reaffirms the prohibition on use of 
herbicides as a method of warfare, and provides for protection and 
assistance in the event of use or threat of use of CW against a state 

Most importantly, the inspected party has final say in determining the 
extent and nature of access within the challenged site.  The party will 
negotiate with the inspection team the following:  the extent of access 
to any particular place or places within the inspection site; the 
particular inspection activities, including sampling; the performance of 
particular activities by the inspection team; and the provision of 
particular information by the inspected party.

Monitoring the Chemical Industry
In the convention, chemicals of concern have been divided into three 
schedules according to the risk that they pose to the objectives of the 
CWC. Facilities producing, processing, and consuming these chemicals are 
subject to initial and annual declaration and international monitoring, 
including on-site inspection.  In addition to these facilities, other 
facilities capable of producing the scheduled chemicals but not doing so 
are also subject to declaration and a monitoring regime.

At the same time, the provisions for monitoring chemical industries take 
into account countries' concerns about the difficulties of national 
implementation of the CWC such as negative impact of the provisions on 
economic and technological development, the possible loss of 
confidential business information, and the difficulty of monitoring 
small chemical industry facilities in developing countries.  Measures 
are included which provide inspection procedures and methods for 
handling information which protect sensitive, non-CW-related 
information; require that the convention be implemented in a manner 
which avoids hampering economic or technological development; and 
require states parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of 
chemicals, equipment, and scientific and technical information for 
permitted purposes.

The convention also contains provisions to allay the fears of some 
developing countries about the difficulty of identifying and opening to 
monitoring chemical industries capable of producing scheduled chemicals 
but not doing so.  In particular, there is a provision for assistance in 
compiling lists of such facilities and means to address any problems of 
completeness of such lists.  Thresholds for declarations and inspection 
have been set high enough to preclude capturing small, irrelevant 
chemical industries.  Finally, the inspection regime for this sector of 
the chemical industry will not start until the fourth year after entry 
into force of the CWC.  Moreover, the implementation of this category of 
inspections will be subject to further discussion and decision making by 
the conference of states parties and will take into account the accrued 
experience of other industry inspections.

The CWC contains two verification regimes to enhance the security of 
states parties to the convention and to preclude the possibility of 
clandestine CW production, storage, and use.  The first regime provides 
a routine monitoring regime involving declarations, initial visits, and 
systematic inspections of CW storage, production, and destruction 
facilities and relevant chemical industry.  The second regime, challenge 
inspection, allows a state party to request and have conducted an 
international inspection of any facility or location in another state 
party in order to clarify and resolve questions of possible 

The challenge inspection procedures were the most sensitive and 
difficult to develop, given the need to balance provision for an 
adequate degree of intrusiveness to address compliance concerns with the 
need to protect sensitive, non-CW-related facilities and information of 
national security concern.  The CWC obligates the state party to be 
inspected to accept a challenge inspection and to make every reasonable 
effort to satisfy the compliance concern.  At the same time, the CWC 
provides for a system of managing access to a challenged site which 
allows for protection of the inspected party's national security 
concerns.  It does so in two ways:  first, through procedures to deter 
the challenging party from abusing the process and, second, through 
procedures which allow the inspected party to protect sensitive, non-CW 
facilities and locations.

Deterrence of Abuse
To deter abuse, the convention contains provisions for both the 
requesting and the inspected parties to have their concerns about 
compliance and possible abuse of the system addressed by the Executive 
Council at both the beginning and the conclusion of the inspection.  A 
state party must submit a request for challenge inspection to the 
Executive Council as well as to the Director General of the technical 
secretariat of the CWC organization.  If the Executive Council considers 
an inspection request to be frivolous, abusive, or clearly beyond the 
scope of the convention, it may, within 12 hours after having received 
the request decide (by a three-quarter majority of all its members) 
against carrying out the challenge inspection.

After a challenge inspection, the Executive Council will review the 
final report of the inspection team.  In addition to addressing concerns 
about whether any noncompliance occurred, the council will also address 
concerns as to whether the request had been within the scope of the 
convention as well as whether the right to request a challenge 
inspection had been abused. If the Executive Council concludes there was 
abuse, it may recommend to the conference of states parties measures to 
take against the requesting party and examine whether that party should 
bear any of the costs of the inspection.

In addition to specific provisions to address abuse, there is a general 
provision giving state parties the right at any time to request the 
Executive Council to consider concerns about abuse of the rights 
provided for under the convention.

Protection Through Inspection Procedures
The convention also contains inspection procedures which provide the 
inspected party with the means to protect sensitive sites.  Such means 
include the timeframes specified to provide access, limitations on 
observers, and the process of managed access at the site.

With respect to timeframes for inspection, after receiving notification 
of the site to be inspected, the inspected party has the ability to take 
up to 5 days to provide access to the site. This time period allows 
inspected parties adequate time to prepare a site for inspection.  Once 
at the site, the period of inspection itself is limited to 84 hours, 
extendable only by agreement with the inspected party.

Concerning limitations on observers, while the requesting party can ask 
to have an observer accompany the inspection team, the inspected party 
has the right to disapprove the participation of such an observer.  If 
the inspected party allows the participation of an observer, it can 
limit the access and activities of the observer at the site.

Finally, and most importantly, the inspected party has final say in 
determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged site.  
The party will negotiate with the inspection team the following:  the 
extent of access to any particular place or places within the inspection 
site; the particular inspection activities, including sampling, to be 
conducted by the inspection team; the performance of particular 
activities by the inspection team; and the provision of particular 
information by the inspected party.  For example, the party may give 
only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection 
site; it may shroud sensitive pieces of equipment such as computer 
electronic systems; and it may restrict sampling and sampling analysis.  
In the event the inspected party provides less than full access to 
places, activities, or information, it is under the obligation to make 
every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to clarify the 
possible noncompliance concern that generated the challenge inspection.

Organization and Costs
Two other issues of importance and concern which arose during 
negotiations of the CWC were the allocation of costs for implementing 
the convention and equitable participation in its organizational bodies-
-in particular, the Executive Council, since it will play a large role 
in CWC implementation. Provisions of the convention address these 
concerns by allocating costs on an adjusted UN scale to lessen the 
burden on small and developing countries, with the most expensive costs-
-verification of destruction--to be borne almost entirely by the 
countries possessing CW.  Another provision establishes the principle of 
rotational seats on the Executive Council and seat allocation on a 
regional basis, leaving it up to each region to designate members and 
taking into account not only a state's industrial significance but also 
other regional factors.  Yet another provision provides for staffing the 
technical secretariat, drawing from states parties in a manner which 
gives due regard to recruiting on as wide a geographical basis as 

Provisions for Improving The Convention
Finally, the negotiators recognized the need for making the convention a 
living document which will allow for the possibility of improvement 
based on inspection experience and advances in verification technology.  
Therefore, the CWC contains provisions to allow for technical changes 
and annual and special conferences to discuss implementation and address 
any particular problems.

Preparing for Implementation Of the Convention
After the convention is signed, a preparatory commission of all 
signatory states will begin work in early February 1993 to further 
elaborate detailed procedures and to set up the CWC international 
organization. Commission meetings will take place in The Hague, the 
Netherlands, which will be the seat of the organization. (###)


Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait
UN Security Council President Hatano, White House Statements

President Hatano 
January 8, 1993
Statement by UN Security Council President Hatano, New York City, 
January 8, 1993.

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have 
been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the 

"1.  The Security Council is deeply disturbed by the Government of 
Iraq's recent Notes to the Office of the Special Commission [UNSCOM] in 
Baghdad and to the Headquarters of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation Mission (UNIKOM) that it will not allow the United Nations 
to transport its personnel into Iraqi territory using its own aircraft.

"2.  The Security Council refers to resolution 687 (1991) [for text, see 
Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 14, p. 236] requiring Iraq to permit the Special 
Commission and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to 
undertake immediate on-site inspection of any locations designated by 
the Commission.  The agreement on facilities, privileges and immunities 
between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations, and resolutions 
707 (1991) and 715 (1991) [for texts, see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 34, p. 
644 and No. 42, p. 790, respectively] elaborated on Iraq's obligations 
by demanding, inter alia, that the Special Commission and the IAEA be 
allowed, as they determined necessary, to use their own aircraft 
throughout Iraq and any airfield in Iraq without interference or 
hindrance of any kind.  Concerning UNIKOM, Iraq is obligated by 
resolution 687 (1991) and committed by an exchange of letters dated 15 
April 1992 and 21 June 1992 respectively to the unrestricted freedom of 
entry and exit without delay or hindrance of its personnel, property, 
supplies, equipment, spare parts and means of transport.

"3.  The implementation of the measures set out in the recent 
communications of the Iraqi Government would seriously impede the 
activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and UNIKOM.  Such 
restrictions constitute an unacceptable and material breach of the 
relevant provisions of resolution  687 (1991), which established the 
cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of 
peace and security in the region, as well as other relevant resolutions 
and agreements.

"4.  The Council demands that the Government of Iraq abide by its 
obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions and 
cooperate fully with the activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA 
and UNIKOM.  In particular, it demands that the Government of Iraq not 
interfere with the currently envisaged United Nations flights.  The 
Security Council warns the Government of Iraq, as it has done in this 
connection in the past, of the serious consequences which would ensue 
from failure to comply with its obligations."

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its 
consideration of the item on the agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

White House Statement
January 9, 1993
Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington, 
DC, January 9, 1993.

All available evidence indicates that Iraq is acceding to the 
requirements of the coalition's January 6, 1993, demarche [see summary 
in January 13 White House Statement, p. 34].  No Iraqi aircraft have 
entered the no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel, and the Iraqi 
surface-to-air missiles have been dispersed and are no longer 
threatening coalition flight operations.

Once again, [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein has backed down in the face 
of coalition solidarity.  Iraq remains isolated and a pariah among 
nations due to its flagrant attempts to violate the cease-fire regime.

The coalition's January 6 demarche remains in effect.  We will continue 
to scrutinize Iraqi activity.  No further warning will be issued if Iraq 
violates the requirements of the January 6 demarche.

This episode should make clear to Iraq that interference with UN and 
coalition operations--including humanitarian relief operations, 
Operation Provide Comfort, UN Special Commission and International 
Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, 
and the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission force on the Iraq-Kuwait border-
-will not be tolerated.  In this regard, we fully support the UN 
Security Council presidential statement of January 8 that demanded that 
Iraq comply with its obligations.  We underscore the Security Council's 
warning of serious consequences if Iraq fails to do so.

President Hatano
January 11, 1993
Statement by UN Security Council President Hatano, New York City, 
January 11, 1993.

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have 
been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the 

"The Security Council notes that there have been a number of recent 
actions by Iraq as part of its pattern of flouting relevant Security 
Council resolutions.  One was the series of border incidents involving 
the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM); another was 
the incident concerning the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) 
and UNIKOM  flights.

"The Security Council is deeply concerned at the incidents reported in 
the Secretary-General's special report of 10 January 1993 on UNIKOM 
(S/25085).  The Security Council recalls the provisions of resolution 
687 (1991) that established the demilitarized zone between Iraq and 
Kuwait and demanded that both countries respect the inviolability of the 
international boundary between them.  It reaffirms that the boundary was 
at the very core of the conflict and that, in resolutions 687 (1991) and 
773 (1992) [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 39, p. 731] it guaranteed 
the inviolability of the boundary and undertook to take as appropriate 
all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.

"The Council condemns the action taken by Iraq on 10 January 1993 to 
remove equipment by force from the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized 
zone without prior consultation with UNIKOM, and through UNIKOM with the 
Kuwaiti authorities, as set out in the letter of 8 January 1993 from the 
President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General.  In 
particular, the Council draws attention to the removal by Iraq of four 
HY-2G anti-ship missiles and other military equipment from the six 
bunkers in the former Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr on Kuwaiti territory, 
in spite of the objections of UNIKOM and their efforts to prevent this.  
This action is a direct challenge to the authority of UNIKOM and amounts 
to clear-cut defiance by Iraq of the Council, which stipulated in the 
letter of 3 November 1992 from the President of the Council to the 
Secretary-General that the military equipment in the six bunkers should 
be destroyed by or under the supervision of UNIKOM.  The Council demands 
that the anti-ship missiles and other military equipment removed by 
force from the six bunkers at Umm Qasr in Kuwaiti territory be returned 
immediately to the custody of UNIKOM for destruction, as previously 

"The Council also condemns further Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti 
side of the demilitarized zone on 11 January 1993.  It demands that any 
future retrieval mission be in accordance with the terms set out in the 
letter of 8 January 1993 from the President of the Council to the 
Secretary-General.  On the UNIKOM facilities at Camp Khor, the Council 
stresses that the land and premises occupied by UNIKOM shall be 
inviolate and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the 
United Nations.

"The Council invites the Secretary-General, as a first step, to explore 
on an urgent basis the possibilities for restoring UNIKOM to its full 
strength and to consider in an emergency such as this the need for rapid 
reinforcement as set out in paragraph 18 of his report of 12 June 1991 
(S/22692), as well as any other suggestions that he might have to 
enhance the effectiveness of UNIKOM, and to report back to the Council.

"The Council is also alarmed by Iraq's refusal to allow the United 
Nations to transport its Special Commission and UNIKOM personnel into 
Iraqi territory using its own aircraft.  In this connection the Council 
reiterates the demand in its statement of 8 January 1993 that Iraq 
permit UNSCOM and UNIKOM to use their own aircraft to transport their 
personnel into Iraq.  It rejects the arguments contained in the letter 
of 9 January 1993 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the 
President of the Security Council (S/25086).

"These latest developments concerning the activities of UNIKOM and 
UNSCOM constitute further material breaches of resolution 687 (1991), 
which established the cease-fire and provided the conditions essential 
for the restoration of peace and security in the region, as well as 
other relevant resolutions and agreements.  The Council demands that 
Iraq cooperate fully with UNIKOM, UNSCOM and other United Nations 
agencies in carrying out their mandates, and again warns Iraq of the 
serious consequences that will flow from such continued defiance.  The 
Council will remain actively seized of the matter." 

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its 
consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

White House Statement
January 13, 1993
Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington, 
DC, January 13, 1993.

The United States and its coalition partners today took forceful actions 
against Iraq.

Coalition aircraft today attacked surface-to-air missiles and associated 
infrastructure in southern Iraq.  Preliminary information indicates that 
the coalition aircraft accomplished their mission.

This action was taken pursuant to the coalition demarche of January 6, 
1993.  This communication demanded that Iraq take steps within 48 hours 
to ensure that its aircraft and surface-to-air missiles did not pose a 
threat to coalition aircraft operating south of the 32nd parallel to 
monitor Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council Resolution [687].  
After initially responding to the terms of the January 6 demarche, Iraq 
violated its requirements, and the coalition is acting to restore an 
environment that poses no threat to coalition aircraft.

All requirements of the January 6 demarche regarding potential threats 
to coalition air operations south of 32 degrees remain in effect.  We 
will continue to scrutinize Iraqi activity.  No further warning will be 
issued if Iraq again violates the requirements of the January 6 

Similarly, the Government of Iraq should understand that continued 
defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and related coalition 
demarches will not be tolerated.  The US Government fully associates 
itself with the January 8 and January 11 statements by the President of 
the UN Security Council that declared Iraq in material breach of UN 
Security Council Resolution 687 and the cease-fire regime and warned of 
the serious consequences of its actions.  We stand ready to take 
additional, forceful actions with our coalition partners if Iraq 
continues to flout the will of the international community and disregard 
its international obligations.  Consistent with the above, the [US] 
President has directed the deployment of a battalion task force to 
Kuwait to underline our continuing commitment to Kuwait's security and 


US Recognizes Czech and Slovak Republics
Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington, 
DC, January 1, 1993.

The President today recognized the new Czech and Slovak Republics and 
offered to establish full diplomatic relations.  In an exchange of 
letters, Czech Prime Minister Klaus and Slovak Prime Minister Meciar 
welcomed US recognition and accepted our offer of full diplomatic 

Both leaders provided assurances that the new states will fulfill the 
obligations and commitments of the former Czechoslovakia and will abide 
by the principles and provisions of the UN Charter, the Charter of 
Paris, the Helsinki Final Act, and subsequent CSCE [Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe] documents.  They also pledged to 
prevent the proliferation of destabilizing military technology, to 
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, to uphold international 
standards concerning national minorities, and to move rapidly to create 
free market economies.

The United States looks forward to full and mutually productive 
relations with the new Czech and Slovak states.  We commend both 
republics for the peaceful means by which their separation was carried 
out.  In the interest of ensuring stability and prosperity in the region 
and speeding full integration into the international community, the 
United States urges continued close regional cooperation among the 
states of Central Europe.

Our ambassador to Czechoslovakia will remain in Prague as the US 
ambassador to the Czech Republic.  We look forward to appointing an 
ambassador to the Slovak Republic as soon as possible.  (###)


Fact Sheet:  US Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa

In a new, post-Cold War environment, Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing 
unprecedented political and economic change.  These dramatic shifts and 
the end of superpower strategic competition in the region have resulted 
in a thorough re-examination and reorientation of US policy.  The US 
Government intends to maintain its engagement in Africa despite resource 
constraints.  Progress and stability will require long-term support by 
the international community and the efforts of Africans themselves.  
Adequate diplomatic and financial resources will be needed to promote 
peaceful change, conflict resolution, stable democracy, and sustainable 

Just as striking as the changes outside Africa are the shifts in the 
attitudes and aspirations of Africans themselves.  No longer content 
with the victories of the post-independence period, Africans are 
demanding their just rights along with popular participation and 
accountability in government.  Even more insistently, they are seeking a 
decent standard of living, basic public services, and economic progress 
free from war and repression.

With a population of 795 million, 20% of the world's land area, and a 
wealth of natural resources and biological diversity, Sub-Saharan Africa 
cannot and should not be ignored or neglected.  Because of conflicts and 
crushing poverty worsened by deadly threats from famine and the acquired 
immuno-deficiency syndrome (AIDS), there is a long-term humanitarian 
imperative to help alleviate acute suffering as much as possible.  On 
the other hand, there also is an enormous human and natural resource 
potential in Africa which Africans can use for their own betterment.  
The world community also has an important stake in the realization of 
this potential.  Finally, as the United States is a society with a large 
minority of African origin, American policy naturally reflects US 
domestic cultural and political ties to the region.

US Policy Goals in Sub-Saharan Africa
Conflict resolution and peaceful change in Africa are primary US goals 
since the degree of success in achieving them is the basis for progress 
in all other areas.  The United States actively supports the nascent 
efforts of Africans to take the lead in resolving conflicts and peace-
keeping efforts in the region.  However, it also is willing to play the 
role of catalyst, technical adviser, and honest broker to resolve 

Democratic systems that respect human rights and seek equitable economic 
growth are the best guarantees of peaceful change and stability.  They 
provide the peaceful, stable environment essential to sustained 
development.  The United States seeks greater respect for human rights, 
the rule of law, accountable and honest government, and democratic 
political pluralism.  It neither wishes to impose a particular system 
nor to enforce any legal code.  Rather, it supports what Africans 
themselves increasingly demand:  an effective voice in their own affairs 
and an end to corruption and abuse of power.

The United States will work for sustained equitable development through 
market-based reforms that rely more on the private sector and promise to 
reduce dependence on external aid.  Ensuring access to markets, 
investment opportunities, and resources in Africa is the most effective 
way to sustain growth and US involvement.  US assistance programs should 
support reform; aid criteria should include good governance and 
structural reform goals along with respect for political and human 

Africa is beset by a variety of transnational problems which the United 
States can address.  With both bilateral programs and support for 
international efforts, the United States can work to ameliorate the 
devastation caused by AIDS and environmental degradation in Africa.  
Necessary efforts to curb population growth and refugee flows also will 
involve improving the status of women.  The United States and the world 
community have a strong interest in preventing the spread of terrorism 
and narcotics trafficking to Africa.  Subversion by radical regimes on 
the periphery of the region also must be countered.

US policy cannot afford to disregard the important, and often 
disproportionate, role of African military and security forces in public 
life.  The United States will support efforts to create smaller, more 
professional forces clearly subordinate to civilian control and 
respectful of human rights.  As some US military resources are 
redirected to peace-keeping and humanitarian relief, Africans and their 
regional organizations will be encouraged to take the lead in these 

Programs for US Engagement in Africa
A collective response to conflict resolution.  As newly empowered 
democratic forces struggle for control with established governments and 
elites, the potential for regional conflict could increase.  Economic 
desperation will cause severe pressures within many societies.  In 
addition, the very existence of some African states could be threatened 
by divisive and violent ethnic conflicts.  Political and economic 
reforms are subject to reversal and repression, and in many states 
military establishments may continue to intervene in factional or ethnic 
disputes.  Such conflict and resulting humanitarian disasters are costly 
in human and financial terms and, at times, offer compelling cause for 
outside intervention.

The United States strives to deal with such conflicts through a well-
informed diplomacy coupled increasingly with support for multilateral 
efforts to preempt and mediate strife.  Collective action with US allies 
and other partners can effectively support African efforts to make and 
keep the peace.  Although the United States will become militarily 
involved in such conflicts only under rare and compelling circumstances, 
a strong US diplomatic presence is required.  US involvement in 
resolving conflicts in Namibia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique has 
earned it respect and influence internationally and in Africa and will 
help guide its future efforts.

To prevent conflict from reaching the point of demanding outside 
intervention, the United States supports African efforts in mediating 
and averting conflict both internally and between states.  Strengthening 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and expanding its mandate into 
regular peace-keeping operations and conflict- mediation services will 
be a key to this effort.  Supporting similar intervention by sub-
regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), now carrying out an unprecedented peace-keeping 
operation in Liberia, also encourages further African efforts in 
collective security.  Finally, active American support for efforts to 
reduce armaments and military spending in the region is an integral part 
of keeping the peace and resolving conflict.

Preventing further bloodshed and conflict in South Africa is another 
policy priority, both because of that country's economic importance in 
Africa and the world's focus on the drama of its transition to majority 
rule. US public concern about apartheid and the creation of a new South 
African society offers another compelling reason for current US 
involvement and later assistance to South Africa under a truly 
representative, non-racial government.

Helping democracy take root.  The United States is committed to help 
promote and sustain political reforms now being demanded by Africans.  
The United States focuses on supporting broadly democratic processes and 
institutions, not personalities or specific political outcomes.

Programs to support these reforms increasingly are integrated into 
efforts to achieve other objectives in Africa.  Stable democracy with 
respect for basic rights is essential to peaceful change, and 
responsible and responsive government is the basis of sustainable 
economic growth.  This policy responds to the near-universal recognition 
in Africa that the post-colonial, authoritarian model has brought 
political failure and economic ruin.

An agenda of active support for human rights and democratization also 
commits the United States to help build civil societies and the 
institutions which sustain reform.  As repressive and often corrupt 
institutions are swept away by the tide of reform, the United States has 
a historic opportunity to work with Africans to achieve stability and 
development through responsible, democratic government.

Strong US programs to encourage democratic values and practices are 
essential.  Projects advancing human and civil rights, the rule of law, 
freedom and diversity in the press, effective government, the status of 
women, and other pillars of a democratic society should reinforce direct 
assistance for holding elections.  Support for democracy and good 
government must be firmly integrated into all dealings with Africans, 
especially those in the military and security forces who may pose the 
greatest threat to reform.  Efforts to reduce the size of bloated 
security forces both through positive incentives and negative 
conditionality will be key to these efforts.

A strong information program which shares and promotes democratic values 
is integral to US efforts to encourage lasting reform.  American public 
diplomacy should take advantage of the information and communications 
revolutions in Africa.  In many African states, fragile institutions of 
civil society are emerging:  independent newspapers, labor unions, human 
rights groups, and political parties.  Imperfect but reasonably 
representative elections are installing governments with genuine popular 
mandates.  By identifying publicly with these developments and offering 
flexible support, the United States, in concert with other democracies, 
can solidify these gains and help make democratic experiments permanent.  
Success in this endeavor serves American political, economic, and 
humanitarian interests in Africa.

Fostering economic growth and trade.  The central concern of most 
Africans remains how to ensure a decent standard of living and lay the 
groundwork for a modern economy.  Sustainable economic growth driven by 
the private sector is as essential to the achievement of all other US 
policy goals in Africa as it is domestically.  Development assistance 
and economic support programs must focus on countries committed to free 
market policies which ensure equitable, long-term growth.

Popular support for government and the democratic process is essential 
for tough economic reform measures to endure.  The United States seeks 
to broaden the role of the private sector in political and economic 
reform while helping to meet basic human needs through its aid.  
Economic performance and need as well as progress toward democracy and 
responsible government will be the primary considerations in allocating 
US development assistance.  The United States also seeks to include such 
criteria in the decisions of international financial institutions.  To 
maximize assistance, coordination with other donors will be more 
important than ever.

Africans must dedicate themselves to the basic economic reforms which 
will lead to a decent minimum standard of living and the continent's 
full participation in the world economy.  US programs support these 
tough decisions by African leaders and their people, for they will 
ultimately lead to economic growth, a reduction in conflict, reduced 
dependence on aid, and expanded markets for US goods and services.

The United States continues to respond quickly and substantially to 
suffering caused by natural or man-made disasters.  Drought, famine, and 
population pressures will continue to afflict Africa.  Wars and civil 
strife will continue to generate refugees, suffering, death, and 
economic destruction.  The United States will seek equitable 
burdensharing among all international donors to meet these crises.

The United States aims to expand its private sector commercial 
relationships and presence in Africa.  Improving the investment climate, 
promoting non-discriminatory treatment for American business, and 
enhancing private sector support and followup services needed to carry 
on trade are priorities in this area.  The US Government aggressively 
seeks out trade and investment opportunities for American firms and 
equal market access.  US assistance programs promote American exports 
and trade.  

Free trade and an open economic system are particularly important for 
creating the wealth needed to spur economic growth for all sectors of 
society in South Africa.  Many Africans look to a democratic South 
Africa as a potential economic engine for the whole region.  Economic 
success or failure there will have serious implications for South 
Africa's neighbors as well as its own people.

The United States encourages African nations to support the application 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including the 
introduction of modern intellectual property rights protections, non-
discriminatory investment policies, and support for the other provisions 
of the Uruguay Round.  Freer trade, especially for agricultural products 
and textiles, also will be vital to Africa's economic progress.  Growth 
through trade can reduce Africans' dependence on aid.

Africans also face the burden of military expenditures on their 
economies and societies.  With renewed effort to prevent conflict, there 
will be even more emphasis on reintegrating former soldiers into often 
devastated economies.  US economic assistance and military programs in 
the region encourage appropriate reductions in military spending and 
help Africans redirect these financial and human resources into 
productive nation building.

Debt is a crushing economic reality in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Along with 
other donors, the United States continues to explore possible solutions 
to the burdens of debt servicing for struggling African economies.  Debt 
relief should be targeted on those countries undertaking effective 

Addressing regional concerns and problems.  The United States supports 
an expanded role for international collective action to address problems 
which affect the well-being of the world community.  It also actively 
encourages regional solutions and organizations such as the OAU and 
ECOWAS as they take on new missions ranging from peace-keeping and 
conflict mediation to election and human rights monitoring.  These 
fledgling efforts deserve US political and financial support as well as 
technical assistance and training.  Stronger regional organizations will 
bring African solutions to African problems, necessary for the 
continent's long-term stability and development.

Other critical issues with an impact in and beyond the region include:

--  Women--The vital role played by women in the management of natural 
resources only recently has been appreciated.  Women's generally low 
status in Africa is an important factor in economic, social, and health 
problems.  US assistance and information programs should focus on women 
as key actors in sustainable development and building a healthy society.  
Programs for educating and training women are vital to this process.

--  Environment--In coordination with international programs for the 
environment, the United States works to preserve and restore Africa's 
often ravaged ecosystems.  Again, the emphasis should be on helping 
Africans build their own capacity and institutions to promote better 
environmental practices and the protection of the continent's unique 
biological diversity.  The environmental problems of cities and new 
industries also require attention.

--  AIDS--The AIDS pandemic has had a particularly devastating effect on 
Africa, where more than one-half of the world's HIV [human immuno-
deficiency virus]-infected persons live. The OAU Action Plan on AIDS is 
a positive first step toward a comprehensive prevention program in all 
African medical systems and societies.  US technical assistance to 
research and to combat the spread of AIDS is joined to active efforts to 
mitigate the suffering and economic costs of the epidemic. Prevention 
and control of AIDS must involve every sector of development assistance, 
from population control to agriculture and industry.  The entire world 
has a stake in stopping the pernicious spread of this disease and 
helping Africans devise cost-effective care for the infected.

--  Population control--Economic progress in Africa is contingent upon 
slowing population growth.  Gains in living standards and reduced 
dependence on outside assistance will be impossible without vigorous 
programs to support family health care and family planning.  US support 
for such programs is essential to its policy goals.

--  Refugees--Africa's conflicts and internal turmoil will continue to 
generate large numbers of refugees in dire need.  Resources devoted to 
pre-venting and mitigating such conflict will more than pay for 
themselves in reduced costs for humanitarian relief and mass 
repatriations.  To encourage voluntary repatriation as conflicts recede, 
US assistance should focus on reintegrating refugees into their own 

--  Terrorism and narcotics--While Africa thus far has been spared the 
worst ravages of these global problems, desperate poverty and a 
breakdown in civil order has encouraged terrorism and drug use and 
trafficking.  Terrorists and their state sponsors need to be countered 
by strong measures and both bilateral and regional cooperation. The 
United States can improve coordination of drug law enforcement and 
increase education to reduce domestic demand.  When African countries 
become transit centers for illegal drugs, US technical assistance and 
training also is appropriate.

The United States is following this ambitious policy agenda in Africa 
while working to meet urgent needs in America and the requirement to 
reduce the size of budget deficits.  Active diplomacy and a firm 
commitment to the objectives described above, however, will require 
little more than the resources currently available, especially with more 
effective collaboration by donor countries.  Vigorous promotion of 
stable democracy, peaceful change, and economic reform will, in fact, 
reduce the potential costs faced by the United States by reducing both 
the intensity and frequency of conflict and humanitarian crises.  Along 
with strong programs to support development which meets the basic needs 
of impoverished populations, the United States will be able to ensure 
that Africa can realize its enormous potential in peace and prosperity 
as a friend and full partner of the United States. (###)


UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on the Former Yugoslavia
Text of Resolution 1992/S-2/1, "The Situation of Human Rights in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia," adopted by the Commission on Human 
Rights of the UN Economic and Social Council, Geneva, Switzerland, 
December 1, 1992.

The Commission on Human Rights,

Meeting in special session,

Guided by the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants 
on Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and 
international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 for the protection of war victims and the Additional 
Protocols thereto of 1977,

Aware of its responsibility to promote and encourage respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all and to prevent violations of 
such rights,

Deeply concerned at the human tragedy in the former Yugoslavia and at 
the continuing grave, massive and systematic violations of human rights 
occurring there, particularly in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
under Serbian control,

Recalling its resolution 1992/S-1/1 [for text, see Dispatch Supplement 
Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 46],

Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Special Rapporteur appointed 
pursuant to resolution 1992/S-1/1, as well as those of the Chairman of 
the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur 
on the question of torture and the Representative of the Secretary-
General on internally displaced persons, who accompanied the Special 
Rapporteur on one or both of his missions,

Noting with alarm the three reports of the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia (A/47/666 - S/24809, 
E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9 and E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10),

Gravely concerned in particular at the continuing, odious practice of 
ethnic cleansing, which is the direct cause of the vast majority of 
human rights violations and whose principal victims are the Muslim 
population virtually threatened with extermination, which the Special 
Rapporteur reports has continued, and in some regions intensified, in an 
effort to create a fait accompli in disregard of international 
commitments, in particular the statement of principles and the programme 
of action of the London Conference, entered into by those who carry out 
such ethnic cleansing, and recalling, as stated in its resolution 
1992/S-1/1, that ethnic cleansing is aimed at the dislocation or 
destruction of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups,

Alarmed that although the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a 
religious conflict, it has been characterized by the systematic 
destruction and profanation of mosques, Catholic churches and other 
places of worship, as well as other sites of cultural heritage, in 
particular in areas currently or previously under Serbian control,

Deeply concerned that the human rights situation in the former 
Yugoslavia has resulted in more than two and a half million refugees and 
displaced persons and at the catastrophic humanitarian situation now 

Recalling with appreciation the continuing efforts of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Co-Chairmen of its Steering 
Committee, including their proposals for the constitution for the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina designed to protect human rights on 
the basis of fundamental international human rights instruments,

1.  Commends the Special Rapporteur for his activities to date, and in 
particular his two missions and his reports;

2.  Condemns in the strongest terms all violations of human rights in 
the former Yugoslavia, including killings, torture, beatings, rape, 
disappearances, destruction of houses and other acts or threats of 
violence aimed at forcing individuals to leave their homes, as 
identified by the Special Rapporteur;

3.  Categorically condemns the ethnic cleansing being carried out, in 
particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognizing that the Serbian 
leadership in territories under their control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the Yugoslav Army and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia 
bear primary responsibility for this reprehensible practice;

4.  Demands an immediate end to the practice of ethnic cleansing, and in 
particular demands that the Republic of Serbia use its influence with 
the self-proclaimed Serbian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia to bring the practice of ethnic cleansing to an immediate end 
and to reverse the effects of that practice, re-emphasizing the rights 
of refugees, displaced persons and other victims of ethnic cleansing to 
return to their homes and the invalidity of acts made under duress;

5.  Affirms that States are to be held accountable for violations of 
human rights which their agents commit upon the territory of another 

6.  Condemns in particular the violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law in connection with detention, including killings, 
torture and the systematic practice of rape, and calls upon all parties 
in the former Yugoslavia to close immediately all detention centres not 
authorized by and in compliance with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and to release immediately in conditions of safety all persons 
arbitrarily or illegally detained;

7.  Condemns also the indiscriminate shelling of cities and civilian 
areas, the systematic terrorization and murder of non-combatants, the 
destruction of vital services, the besieging of cities, and the use of 
military force against civilian populations and relief operations by all 
sides, recognizing that the main responsibility lies with Serbian 

8.  Calls upon parties in the former Yugoslavia, and especially those 
most responsible, to cease violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law immediately and to take appropriate steps to apprehend 
and punish those guilty of perpetrating or authorizing them;

9.  Expresses deep concern at the number of disappearances and missing 
persons in the former Yugoslavia and calls on all parties to make all 
possible efforts to account for those missing;

10.  Welcomes the establishment, pursuant to Security Council resolution 
780 (1992) of 6 October 1992 [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 
769], of a Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information 
relating to violations of international humanitarian law and encourages 
the closest possible cooperation between the Special Rapporteur and the 
Commission of Experts, recommends that this Commission be granted the 
staff and resources necessary to enable it to act effectively, and 
requests the Commission of Experts to provide its conclusions to the 
Secretary-General in order to allow the Security Council to consider 
further appropriate steps towards bringing those accused to justice;

11.  Reaffirms that all persons who perpetrate or authorize crimes 
against humanity or other grave breaches of international humanitarian 
law are individually responsible for these breaches and that the 
international community will exert every effort to bring them to 
justice, and calls on all parties to provide all pertinent information 
to the Commission of Experts in accordance with Security Council 
resolution 780 (1992);

12.  Calls upon all States to consider the extent to which the acts 
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia constitute genocide, 
in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide;

13.  Urges the Commission of Experts, with the assistance of the Centre 
for Human Rights, to arrange for an immediate and urgent investigation 
by qualified experts of a mass grave near Vukovar and other mass grave 
sites and places where mass killings are reported to have taken place, 
and requests the General Assembly to provide the resources necessary for 
this undertaking;

14.  Expresses its grave concern at the information contained in the 
third report of the Special Rapporteur (A/47/666-S/24809) on the 
dangerous situation in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, and urges all 
parties in those areas to engage in a meaningful dialogue under the 
auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to 
act with utmost restraint and to settle disputes in full observance of 
human rights and freedoms, and calls on the Serbian authorities to 
refrain from the use of force and immediately to stop the practice of 
ethnic cleansing, and to respect fully the rights of persons belonging 
to ethnic communities or minorities in order to prevent the extension of 
the conflict to other parts of the former Yugoslavia;

15.  Welcomes the call of the Special Rapporteur for the opening of 
humanitarian relief corridors to prevent the imminent death of tens of 
thousands of persons in besieged cities;

16.  Welcomes Security Council resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 
[for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 47, p. 843] in which it invites the 
Secretary-General in consultation with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant agencies, to study the 
possibility and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for 
humanitarian purposes and the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur 
for the creation of such security zones for the protection of displaced 
persons, while keeping in mind that the international community must not 
acquiesce in demographic changes caused by ethnic cleansing;

17.  Affirms that all the parties in the former Yugoslavia share the 
responsibility for finding peaceful solutions through negotiations under 
the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 
and welcomes the acceptance by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
of the constitutional proposals of the Co-Chairmen as a basis for 

18.  Requests the Special Rapporteur to continue his efforts, especially 
by carrying out such further missions to the former Yugoslavia as he 
deems necessary, to call on other existing mechanisms of the Commission 
on Human Rights to assist him and to report his findings and 
recommendations at its forty-ninth session, and requests the Secretary-
General to continue to make the reports of the Special Rapporteur 
available to the Security Council;

19.  Urges the Secretary-General to take steps to ensure the full and 
effective cooperation of all United Nations bodies to implement the 
present resolution and calls upon those bodies entrusted with human 
rights monitoring in the former Yugoslavia to cooperate closely with the 
Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts;

20.  Requests the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, within the 
overall budgetary framework of the United Nations, to make all necessary 
resources available for the Special Rapporteur to carry out his mandate 
and to comply with the request of the Special Rapporteur for staff based 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia to enhance effective 
continuous monitoring of the human rights situation there;

21.  Decides to examine the situation of human rights in the former 
Yugoslavia at its forty-ninth session under agenda item 12.

VOTE:  45-1-1 (Yugoslavia opposed, Cuba abstaining).(###)


Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines Revised
Department Statement, Text of Revisions
Department Statement

Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, 
January 7, 1993.

The Government of the United States, together with its partners in the 
missile technology control regime [MTCR], has strengthened its efforts 
to combat the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

The United States and all the partners in the missile technology control 
regime have adopted revised guidelines to extend the scope of the regime 
to missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons as 
well as nuclear weapons.

The adoption of these guidelines and their implementation confirms and 
tightens existing policy.  These measures will further strengthen the 
MTCR and will be important factors in countering the proliferation of 
missile systems.

The Government of the United States and its MTCR partners welcome the 
growing number of countries which have publicly committed themselves to 
respect the MTCR guidelines, and we call on all states to show a similar 
spirit of responsibility in the interest of international peace and 

A similar statement is being made simultaneously in the capitals of the 
22 partners of the MTCR.  They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Text of Revisions
Issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, 
DC, January 7, 1993.

Missile Technology Control Regime
The United States Government has, after careful consideration and 
subject to its international treaty obligations, decided that, when 
considering the transfer of equipment and technology related to 
missiles, it will act in accordance with the attached Guidelines 
beginning on January 7, 1993.  These Guidelines replace those adopted on 
April 16, 1987.

Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers
1.  The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a 
contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such 
weapons.  The Guidelines are not designed to impede national space 
programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such 
programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction.  These Guidelines, including the attached Annex, form the 
basis for controlling transfers to any destination beyond the 
Government's jurisdiction or control of all delivery systems (other than 
manned aircraft) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and 
of equipment and technology relevant to missiles whose performance in 
terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters.  Restraint will be 
exercised in the consideration of all transfers of items contained 
within the Annex and all such transfers will be considered on a case-by-
case basis.  The Government will implement the Guidelines in accordance 
with national legislation.

2.  The Annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes 
equipment and technology.  Category I items, all of which are in Annex 
Items 1 and 2, are those items of greatest sensitivity.  If a Category I 
item is included in a system, that system will also be considered as 
Category I, except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, 
removed or duplicated.  Particular restraint will be exercised in the 
consideration of Category I transfers regardless of their purpose, and 
there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Particular 
restraint will also be exercised in the consideration of transfers of 
any items in the Annex, or of any missiles (whether or not in the 
Annex), if the Government judges, on the basis of all available, 
persuasive information, evaluated according to factors including those 
in paragraph 3, that they are intended to be used for the delivery of 
weapons of mass destruction, and there will be a strong presumption to 
deny such transfers.  Until further notice, the transfer of Category I 
production facilities will not be authorized.  The transfer of other 
Category I items will be authorized only on rare occasions and where the 
Government (A) obtains binding government-to-government undertakings 
embodying the assurances from the recipient government called for in 
paragraph 5 of these Guidelines and (B) assumes responsibility for 
taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its 
stated end-use.  It is understood that the decision to transfer remains 
the sole and sovereign judgment of the United States Government.

3.  In the evaluation of transfer applications for Annex items, the 
following factors will be taken into account:

A.  Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

B.  The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of 
the recipient state;

C.  The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential 
development of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons 
of mass destruction;

D.  The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the 
relevant assurances of the recipient states referred to in sub-
paragraphs 5.A and 5.B below;

E.  The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.

4.  The transfer of design and production technology directly associated 
with any items in the Annex will be subject to as great a degree of 
scrutiny and control as will the equipment itself, to the extent 
permitted by national legislation.

5.  Where the transfer could contribute to a delivery system for weapons 
of mass destruction, the Government will authorize transfers of items in 
the Annex only on receipt of appropriate assurances from the government 
of the recipient state that:

A.  The items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use 
will not be modified nor the items modified or replicated without the 
prior consent of the United States Government;

B.  Neither the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will be 
retransferred without the consent of the United States Government.

6.  In furtherance of the effective operation of the Guidelines, the 
United States Government will, as necessary and appropriate, exchange 
relevant information with other governments applying the same 

7.  The adherence of all States to these Guidelines in the interest of 
international peace and security would be welcome. (###)


Department Statements

Haiti:  Legislative Elections
Statement released by the Office of the Acting Assistant 
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, January 12, 1993.

The de facto government of Haiti has announced its intention to hold 
elections for several Senate seats and other offices on January 18 and 

The US Government believes that free and fair elections can only be held 
under a legally constituted government in an atmosphere of respect for 
free expression, freedom of assembly, and open political dialogue.  
These conditions do not exist in Haiti today.  Consequently, we do not 
regard the planned elections as legitimate.

In the same context, we remain firmly committed to restoration of 
democratic, constitutional government in Haiti.  We continue to 
recognize Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the legitimately elected president 
of that country.  We urge all Haitian parties to dedicate themselves to 
serious negotiations that will end the current crisis and restore 
democracy to Haiti.

US To Assist With Senegal's Withdrawal From Liberia
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Joseph C. Snyder, Washington, 
DC, January 12, 1993.

The United States wishes to commend the Senegalese military personnel in 
Liberia for the important role they have played in pursuing regional 
stability in West Africa.  Their mission successfully completed, the 
Senegalese troops in Liberia will begin returning to Dakar [Senegal] 
tomorrow.  The United States, which at the request of the Government of 
Senegal and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
assisted in the deployment of the Senegalese troops in late 1991, will 
help with their redeployment to Dakar.  The operation, using military 
air transport and a commercial ship, will be financed from US funds 
allocated when the approximately 1,400 Senegalese troops arrived in 
Liberia in 1991.

The Senegalese were in Liberia as part of the West African peacekeeping 
force (ECOMOG) maintained by ECOWAS.  ECOMOG has significantly 
reinforced its presence in Liberia since the October 15, 1992, attack on 
Monrovia [Liberia] by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL).  The peace-keeping force repelled the NPFL attack and 
has now secured virtually all territory seized by the NPFL at that time.  
ECOMOG will remain capable of protecting the Liberian people from attack 
after the departure of the Senegalese contingent.

We expect ECOWAS to continue pursuing implementation of the Yamoussoukro 
[Cote d'Ivoire] peace agreement in accordance with the mandate contained 
in UN Security Council Resolution 788 of November 19, 1992 [for text, 
see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 48, p. 861].  The United States  continues to 
support ECOWAS fully in its effort to bring peace to Liberia, disarm and 
demobilize the warring factions, and create conditions in which free and 
fair elections can be held.  However, Charles Taylor has rejected the 
ECOWAS call for a cease-fire and asserted that his irregular army will 
not disarm under ECOMOG supervision.  We call upon all Liberian 
combatants to cease aggressive actions and cooperate with the UN-
endorsed ECOWAS plan.

US-Pacific Island Nation Joint Commercial Commission
Statement released by the Office of the Acting Assistant 
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, January 12, 1993.

Leaders from 13 Pacific island countries met with US officials on 
January 12 in Honolulu, Hawaii, to sign a memorandum of understanding 
establishing the US-Pacific Island Nations Joint Commercial Commission 
(JCC).  This initiative, first proposed by President Bush at his October 
27, 1990, Honolulu summit meeting with island heads of government, will 
function as a consultative mechanism to enhance commercial and trade 
links among member nations.  As such, it will complement the economic 
policies of the South Pacific island governments, which stress the 
importance of the private sector in their respective national 
development programs.

The United States currently has JCC agreements with Poland, China, South 
Korea, and Thailand.  The Honolulu agreement marks the first time the 
United States has participated in a JCC comprised of so many nations in 
a single region.  The successful conclusion of this undertaking 
underscores our continuing commitment to playing a constructive role in 
the South Pacific.

Pacific island members of the JCC are the Cook Islands, the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, 
Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and 
Western Samoa. (###)


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