1.  America's Role in the World -- President Bush 
2.  Charting the Course:  US Foreign Policy in a Time of Transition -- 
Secretary Eagleburger 
3.  US and Russia Sign START II Treaty -- President Bush, Russian 
President Yeltsin 
4.  Situation in Sierra Leone


America's Role in the World
President Bush
Address at the West Point Military Academy, West Point, New York, 
January 5, 1993 (opening and closing remarks deleted)

I want to share with you at this institution of leadership some of my 
thinking, both about the world you will soon be called upon to enter and 
the life that you have chosen.  Any President has several functions.  He 
speaks for and to the nation.  He must faithfully execute the law.  And 
he must lead.

But no function, none of the President's hats, in my view, is more 
important than his role as Commander in Chief.  For it is as Commander 
in Chief that the President confronts and makes decisions that [in] one 
way or another affect the lives of everyone in this country as well as 
many others around the world.

I have had many occasions to don this most important of hats.  Over the 
past 4 years, the men and women who proudly and bravely wear the 
uniforms of the US armed services have been called upon to go in harm's 
way and have discharged their duty with honor and professionalism.

I wish I could say that such demands were a thing of the past, that with 
the end of the Cold War the calls upon the United States would diminish.  
I cannot.  Yes, the end of the Cold War, we would all concede, is a 
blessing.  It is a time of great promise.  Democratic governments have 
never been so numerous.  What happened 2 or 3 days  ago in Moscow would 
not have been possible in the Cold War days.  Thanks to historic 
treaties, such as that START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] II pact 
just reached with Russia [signed on January 3; see p. 20], the 
likelihood of nuclear holocaust is vastly diminished.

But this does not mean that there is no specter of war, no threats to be 
reckoned with.  And already, we see disturbing signs of what this new 
world could become if we are passive and aloof.  We would risk the 
emergence of a world characterized by violence--characterized by chaos--
one in which dictators and tyrants threaten their neighbors; build 
arsenals brimming with weapons of mass destruction; and ignore the 
welfare of their own men, women, and children.  And we could see a 
horrible increase in international terrorism, with American citizens 
more at risk than ever before.

We cannot and we need not allow this to happen.  Our objective must be 
to exploit the unparalleled opportunity presented by the Cold War's end-
-to work toward transforming this new world into a new world order, one 
of governments that are democratic, tolerant, and economically free at 
home and committed abroad to settling inevitable differences peacefully, 
without the threat or use of force.

Unfortunately, not every one sub-scribes to these principles.  We 
continue to see leaders bent on denying fundamental human rights and 
seizing territory regardless of the human cost.  No, an international 
society--one more attuned to the enduring principles that have made this 
country a beacon of hope for so many for so long--will not just emerge 
on its own.  It's got to be built.

Two hundred years ago, another departing President warned of the dangers 
of what he described as "entangling alliances."  His was the right 
course for a new nation at that point in history.  But what was 
"entangling" in Washington's day is now essential.  This is why, at 
Texas A&M a few weeks ago [see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 51, p. 893], I 
spoke of the folly of isolationism, and of the importance--morally, 
economically, and strategically--of the United States remaining involved 
in world affairs.  We must engage ourselves if a new world order, one 
more compatible with our values and congenial to our interest, is to 
emerge.  But even more, we must lead.

Leadership takes many forms; it can be political or diplomatic; it can 
be economic or military; it can be moral or spiritual.  Leadership can 
take any one of these forms or it can be a combination of them.

Leadership should not be confused with either unilateralism or 
universalism.  We need not respond by ourselves to each and every 
outrage of violence.  The fact that America can act does not mean that 
it must.  A nation's sense of idealism need not be at odds with its 
interests.  Nor does principle displace prudence.

No, the United States should not seek to be the world's policeman.  
There is no support abroad or at home for us to play this role.  Nor 
should there be.  We would exhaust ourselves, in the process wasting 
precious resources needed to address those problems at home and abroad 
that we cannot afford to ignore.

But in the wake of the Cold War, in a world where we are the only 
remaining superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its 
moral and material resources to promote a democratic peace.  It is our 
responsibility--it is our opportunity--to lead.  There is no one else.

Leadership cannot be simply asserted or demanded; it must be 
demonstrated.  Leadership requires formulating worthy goals, persuading 
others of their virtue, and contributing one's share of the common 
effort and then some.  Leadership takes time; it takes patience; it 
takes work.

Some of this work must take place here at home.  Congress does have a 
constitutional role to play.  Leadership, therefore, also involves 
working with the Congress and the American people to provide the 
essential domestic underpinning if US military commitments are to be 

This is what our Administration has tried to do.  When [Iraqi President] 
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, it was the United States that galvanized 
the UN Security Council to act and then mobilized the successful 
coalition on the battlefield.  The pattern [was] not exactly the same 
but [was] similar in Somalia:  first, the United States underscored the 
importance of alleviating the growing tragedy, and then we organized 
humanitarian efforts designed to bring hope, food, and peace.

At times, real leadership requires a willingness to use military force.  
And force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it, or-
-if need be--a temporary alternative.

As Commander in Chief, I have made the difficult choice to use military 
force.  I determined we could not allow Saddam's forces to ravage Kuwait 
and hold this critical region at gunpoint.  I thought then, and I think 
now, that using military force to implement the resolutions of the UN 
Security Council was in the interest of the United States and the world 
community.  The need to use force arose as well in the wake of the Gulf 
war, when we came to the aid of the peoples of both northern and 
southern Iraq.  More recently, as I'm sure you know, I determined that 
only the use of force could stem this human tragedy of Somalia.

The United States should not stand by with so many lives at stake and 
when a limited deployment of US forces, buttressed by the forces of 
other countries and acting under the full authority of the United 
Nations, could make an immediate and dramatic difference and do so 
without excessive levels of risk and cost.  Operations Provide Comfort 
and Southern Watch in Iraq and then Operation Restore Hope in Somalia 
all bear witness to the wisdom of selected use of force for selective 

Sometimes the decision not to use force--to stay our hand--I can tell 
you, it's just as difficult as the decision to send our soldiers into 
battle.  The former Yugoslavia--well, it's been such a situation.  There 
are, we all know, important humanitarian and strategic interests at 
stake there.  But up to now, it's not been clear that the application of 
limited amounts of force by the United States and its traditional 
friends and allies would have had the desired effect given the nature 
and complexity of that situation.

Our assessment of the situation in the former Yugoslavia could well 
change if and as the situation changes.  The stakes could grow; the 
conflict could threaten to spread.  Indeed, we are constantly 
reassessing our options and are actively consulting with others about 
steps that might be taken to contain the fighting, protect the 
humanitarian effort, and deny Serbia the fruits of aggression.

Military force is never a tool to be used lightly or universally; in 
some circumstances, it may be essential--in others, counterproductive.  
I know that many people would like to find some easy formula to apply, 
to tell us with precision when and where to intervene with force.  
Anyone looking for scientific certitude is in for a disappointment.  In 
the complex new world we are entering, there can be no single or simple 
set of fixed rules for using force. Inevitably, the question of military 
intervention requires judgment; each and every case is unique.  To adopt 
rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and 
American lives.  And it would give would-be troublemakers a blueprint 
for determining their own actions; it could signal US friends and allies 
that our support was not to be counted on.

And, similarly, we cannot always decide in advance which interests will 
require our using military force to protect them.  The relative 
importance of an interest is not a guide:  Military force may not be the 
best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the 
best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less 
than vital.

But to warn against a futile quest for a set of hard and fast rules to 
govern the use of military force is not to say there cannot be some 
principles to form our decisions.  Such guidelines can prove useful in 
sizing and, indeed, shaping our forces and in helping us to think our 
way through this key question.

Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, 
where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are 
likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope 
and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs 
and sacrifice.

Once we are satisfied that force makes sense, we must act with the 
maximum possible support.  The United States can and should lead, but we 
will want to act in concert, where possible, involving the United 
Nations or other multinational grouping.  The United States can and 
should contribute to the common undertaking in a manner commensurate 
with our wealth, with our strength.  But others should also contribute 
militarily, be it by providing combat or support forces, access to 
facilities or bases, or overflight rights.  And similarly, others should 
contribute economically; it is unreasonable to expect the United States 
to bear the full financial burden of intervention when other nations 
have a stake in the outcome.

A desire for international support must not become a prerequisite for 
acting, though.  Sometimes, a great power has to act alone.  I made a 
tough decision--I might say on advice of our outstanding military 
leaders who are so well known to everybody here--to use military force 
in Panama, when American lives and the security of the canal appeared to 
be threatened by outlaws who stole power in the face of free elections.  
And similarly, we moved swiftly to safeguard democracy in the 

But in every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to 
have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing 
the mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing US forces 
once the mission is complete.  Only if we keep these principles in mind 
will the potential sacrifice be one that can be explained and justified.  
We must never forget that using force is not some political abstraction 
but a real commitment of our fathers and mothers and sons and daughters, 
brothers and sisters, friends and neighbors.  You've got to look at it 
in human terms.

In order even to have the choice, we must have available adequate 
military forces tailored for a wide range of contingencies, including 
peace-keeping. Indeed, leading the effort toward a new world order will 
require a modern, capable military, in some areas necessitating more 
rather than less defense spending.  As President, I have said that my 
ability to deploy force on behalf of US interests abroad was made 
possible because past Presidents--and I would single out in particular, 
my predecessor, Ronald Reagan--and past secretaries of defense sustained 
a strong military.  Consistent with this sacred trust, I am proud to 
pass on to my successor, President-elect Clinton, a military second to 
none.  We have the very best.

And, yet, it is essential to recognize that as important as such factors 
are, any military is more than simply the sum of its weapons or the 
state of its technology.  What makes any armed force truly effective is 
the quality of its leadership, the quality of its training, the quality 
of its people.

We have succeeded abroad in no small part because of our people in 
uniform.  The men and women in our armed forces have demonstrated their 
ability to master the challenges of modern warfare.  At the same time, 
and whether on the battlefield of Iraq or in some tiny little village in 
Somalia, America's soldiers have always brought a quality of caring and 
kindness to their mission.  Who will ever forget--I know I won't--those 
terrified Iraqi soldiers surrendering to American troops?  And who will 
forget the way the American soldier held out his arms and said, "It's 
OK--you're all right now"?  Or in Somalia, the young marine, eyes filled 
with tears, holding the fragile arm of an emaciated child?  There can be 
no doubt about it.  The all-volunteer force is one of the true success 
stories of modern-day America.

It is instructive to look at just why this is so.  At its heart, a 
voluntary military is based upon choice--you all know that--the decision 
freely taken by young men and women to join, the decision by more mature 
men and women to remain.  And the institution of the armed forces has 
thrived on its commitment to developing and promoting excellence.  It is 
meritocracy in action.  Race, religion, wealth, background count not.  
Indeed, the military offers many examples for the rest of society, 
showing what can be done to eradicate the scourge of drugs, to break 
down the barriers of racial discrimination, to offer equal opportunity 
to women.

This is not just a result of self-selection.  It also reflects the 
military's commitment to education and training.  You know, people speak 
of defense con-version, the process by which defense firms retool for 
civilian tasks.  Well, defense conversion within the military has been 
going on for years.  It is the constant process of training and 
retraining--which the military does so well--that allows individuals to 
keep up with the latest technology, take on more challenging 
assignments, and prepare for life on the outside.

Out of this culture of merit and competition have emerged hundreds of 
thousands of highly skilled men and women brimming with real self-
confidence.  What they possess is a special mix of discipline, a 
willingness to accept direction, and the willingness to accept 
responsibility.  Together, discipline and confidence provide the basis 
for winning, for getting the job done.

There is no higher calling, no more honorable choice, than the one that 
you here today have made.  To join the armed forces is to be prepared to 
make the ultimate sacrifice for your country and for your fellow man.

What you have done--what you are doing--sends an important message, one 
that I fear sometimes gets lost amid today's often materialist, self-
interested culture.  It is important to remember, it is important to 
demonstrate, that there is a higher purpose to life beyond one's self.  
Now, I speak of family, of community, of ideals.  I speak of duty, 
honor, country.

There are many forms of contributing to this country, of public service.  
Yes, there is government.  There is volunteerism.  I love to talk about 
the thousand points of light:  one American helping another.  The daily 
tasks that require doing--in our classrooms, in our hospitals, our 
cities, our farms--all can and do represent a form of service.  In 
whatever form, service benefits our society, and it ennobles the giver.  
It is a cherished American concept, one we should continue to practice 
and pass on to our children.

This was what I wanted to share on this occasion.  You are beginning 
your service to country, and I am nearing the end of mine.  Exactly half 
a century ago, in June of 1942, we were at war and I was graduating from 
school.  The speaker that day at Andover was then-Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson.  And his message was one of public service but with a twist--on 
the importance of finishing one's schooling before going off to fight 
for one's country.

I listened closely to what he had to say, but I didn't take his advice.  
That day was my 18th birthday.  When the commencement ceremony ended, I 
went on into Boston and enlisted in the Navy as a seaman 2nd class.  I 
never regretted it.

You, too, have signed up.  You, too, will never regret it.  And I salute 
you for it.

Fortunately, because of the sacrifices made in years before and still 
being made, you should be able to complete this phase of your education.  
A half century has passed since I left school to go into the service; a 
half century has passed since that day when Stimson spoke of the 
challenge of creating a new world.

You will also be entering a new world, one far better than the one I 
came to know--a world with the potential to be far better yet.  This is 
the challenge; this is the opportunity of your lifetimes.  I envy you 
for it, and I wish you Godspeed. (###)


Charting the Course:  US Foreign   Policy in a Time of Transition
Secretary Eagleburger
Address before the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, January 
7, 1993

Back in September of 1989, I gave a speech in which I discussed the 
unique and difficult challenges the United States was inevitably going 
to face in foreign policy as we moved from a bipolar to a multipolar 
world.  My good friend Peter Tarnoff was quick to take me to task in The 
New York Times for having demonstrated nostalgia for the Cold War.  I 
disputed that characterization at the time, but today, Peter, I have a 
confession to make:  I am now truly nostalgic for the Cold War--and I 
suspect you may soon embrace this feeling yourself.

The fact is that I had no way of foreseeing then just how tumultuous the 
new era was going to be.  But today, it is abundantly clear that we are 
in the middle of a global revolution--a period of change and instability 
equaled in modern times only by the aftermath of the French and Russian 
revolutions.  The status quo everywhere is under siege.  For one thing, 
the end of the Cold War's rigid division of the world into two 
superpower-led blocs has resulted in a more wide-open international 
system, with [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait being 
but the most egregious example of the much greater potential for global 
anarchy which now exists.

And for another, the post-World War II and post-colonial state system 
itself is breaking down as many nations are increasingly unable to 
perform basic governmental functions, to control their internal affairs, 
or to resist particularist and separatist tendencies within their 
borders.  Here, Somalia and Yugoslavia are the most egregious--but by no 
means the only--examples of this tendency toward fragmentation.

These changes, together with the fulfillment of America's Cold War 
mission, now confront the United States with the existential need to 
redefine its place and purpose in the world.  Some view the recent 
global ascendance of democracy as the defining feature of this new era 
and argue that the end of the Cold War has made it both safe and 
necessary for the United States to pursue a Wilsonian foreign policy on 
behalf of the democratic cause.  Others see a world full of unique 
danger and disorder and argue that a United States no longer able to 
dominate politically and economically as before must continue to pursue 
national security and international stability as its highest foreign 
policy objectives.

I am not going to settle the debate between the partisans of idealism 
and realpolitik here tonight.  But what I would like to do is to examine 
how the Bush Administration has handled some of the challenges it has 
faced over the past 4 years.  I do this not only to demonstrate--to my 
satisfaction if not to yours--where we succeeded in laying a foundation 
for US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era but also so that I can 
describe what I believe to be some of the lessons that should be drawn 
from our experience.

Many have argued that we did not succeed in laying any new foundation at 
all--that our foreign policy has been essentially reactive, unduly 
wedded to the status quo, and lacking in strategic rationale or 
democratic vision.  I do not, as you would expect, agree.  I believe 
this Administration has successfully confronted three unique challenges:

--  To end the Cold War peacefully;

--  To deal with the instabilities generated by the Cold War's demise; 

--  To begin the construction of a new architecture for the new world 

We may be faulted, perhaps, with having chosen to articulate our vision 
more in deeds than in words.  But I sincerely believe that the record of 
what we have done--and how we have done it--is one that our successors 
can usefully build upon as they, too, confront a world which will 
continue to be unstable and unpredictable for a good many years to come.

Let me turn now to that record--the record of how we met the three 
challenges noted above.

The First Challenge:  Ending the Cold War

Today we take for granted something which experts and historians would 
have found incredible to imagine only a decade ago--namely, that the 
disengagement of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe and the 
dissolution of the USSR itself could be achieved so quickly, so 
thoroughly, and, above all, so peacefully.  History holds few, if any, 
examples of an empire collapsing without an angry spasm of violence, and 
no one expected the Communist Party to relinquish its monopoly of power 
at home and imperial domination abroad without a fight.  It was entirely 
conceivable that the Soviet Union's demise would be accompanied by civil 
strife, war in Europe, and perhaps even the risk of a global nuclear 

That it was not, I think, is due in part to George Bush's skillful, 
though sometimes misunderstood, diplomacy.  Even today, his critics 
argue that the President was constantly behind the curve in his dealings 
with the former Soviet Union--late and lukewarm in his embrace of 
[Soviet President] Gorbachev; late and low-key in his reaction to the 
collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe; and late to disengage from 
Gorbachev and to embrace the cause of democratic reform in Russia and 
independence in the republics.  At each point, the President was taxed 
for undue attachment to the status quo and insufficient devotion to 
American ideals.

But what was the President trying to achieve?  His early approach was to 
challenge Mr. Gorbachev to inform Soviet new thinking with a practical 
content on matters ranging from regional disputes to arms control.  
Then, as revolution began to engulf Eastern Europe, he worked quietly to 
persuade Gorbachev and his generals that the West would not seek to 
exploit their troubles and that the Soviet Union could enjoy a new kind 
of security in a democratic Europe if peaceful norms were accepted.  
Later, he urged caution and negotiation upon both the central government 
and the independence movements, earning criticism at home but thereby 
denying the Soviet right wing any pretext to co-opt Gorbachev in their 
efforts to destroy the process of reform.

Successful diplomacy is a matter of timing as well as substance.  In the 
end, history will judge George Bush by the results of his efforts--by 
his mastery of timing and substance--particularly against the many 
alternative scenarios that might have come to pass.  History will note 
that on his watch occurred:

--  The peaceful democratic revolution in Eastern Europe;
--  The reunification of Germany and the inclusion of a united Germany 
in NATO;
--  The end to regional conflicts, including, most importantly, in 
Central America;
--  The halting and, later, reversal of the nuclear arms race; and
--  Finally, the peaceful collapse of a regime which commanded both the 
most formidable totalitarian apparatus in history and the fate of the 
world at its nuclear fingertips.

This is a legacy which by itself would qualify President Bush as one of 
our nation's great diplomatists.

The Second Challenge:  A Fragmenting World

But history also called upon this President to confront the multifaceted 
challenges of a disintegrating world order, first in the Persian Gulf 
and, later, in Africa and the Balkans.

Again, according to some, this has been a challenge largely unmet.  
Indeed, it is said in some quarters that the Administration bears some 
responsibility for the invasion of Kuwait by having "coddled" the Iraqi 
dictator and for the tragic civil war in the former Yugoslavia by having 
failed to support the various republics in their bid for independence.  
As in the case of our approach to Gorbachev, however, I believe the 
President's diplomacy has been misunderstood and, in some cases, 
deliberately distorted.  

For example, our efforts to influence Saddam Hussein by diplomatic means 
were demonstrably unsuccessful, but those efforts, I believe, were the 
necessary predicate to our ultimate success.  The fact is that there was 
simply no consensus for multilateral economic sanctions against Iraq 
prior to the August 2 [1990] invasion, nor was there a consensus to 
counter Iraq militarily.  It was Saddam Hussein himself who created such 
a consensus by invading Kuwait.  Until that moment, our Arab friends 
considered deterrent action both unwarranted and provocative and would 
have rallied to Saddam had we sought to isolate or punish him.  Thus, it 
was thanks to the very diplomacy for which the President is now 
criticized--and which was the source of his credibility in the Arab 
world--that we were able to enlist the support without which we could 
not have liberated Kuwait.

I also believe it is important to correct the impression that we could 
have deterred Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait just prior to August 
2.  The problem was that Saddam believed that we had yet to liberate 
ourselves from the shame and the shadow of Vietnam.  He made this very 
clear to our ambassador, telling her he did not think we had the guts to 
face him on the field of battle.  What was she supposed to tell him--
that we would send half a million troops halfway around the globe and 
that the Congress, by the slimmest of margins, would, in the end, 
approve the President's plan to send those troops into battle?

I am not trying to score cheap points here but instead to make an 
important matter clear.  We certainly made mistakes and failed--along 
with everyone else--to anticipate the Iraqi invasion.  But what we did 
not know, and what it took Saddam Hussein to demonstrate, was that the 
passing of the Cold War had changed the international rules of the game 
and that regional powers could now contemplate aggression on the 
assumption that the superpowers could no longer circumscribe their 
freedom of maneuver.  And what Saddam Hussein did not know, and what it 
took George Bush to demonstrate, was that the American people, if not 
the entire political class, were no longer in the thrall of the Vietnam 

Ultimately, it was the President's dual achievement to prevent Saddam 
from establishing the law of the jungle as the norm for international 
behavior in the post-Cold War era and to establish a model for 
collective responses to international acts of aggression.  In so doing, 
he demonstrated how absolutely critical American diplomacy and American 
willingness to use force are to the prospects for stability in the 
otherwise chaotic aftermath of the Cold War.

The President has also been faulted for his decision to end the fighting 
when he did.  But George Bush understood another reality of the post-
Cold War era--namely, that, having personally and necessarily assembled 
an international coalition of forces, he had an obligation to consider 
the views of our contributing allies and, above all, an obligation to 
remain within the scope of the UN resolutions.  Furthermore--and perhaps 
most important of all--he understood that, having given precise 
definition to the purpose of our mission, he had an obligation--to the 
American people and to the future--to withdraw US forces once the 
mission was completed.

A second manifestation of the global disorder inherent today is the 
eruption into conflict of ancient tribal, ethnic, and religious 
rivalries.  We see this most obviously in the former Yugoslavia.  But we 
need to understand that Yugoslavia is but the most obvious manifestation 
of what is going on today in many places and what will likely 
characterize the international landscape for perhaps decades to come.

For many, Yugoslavia is another example of Administration policy behind 
the curve and out of touch with American ideals.  I personally do not 
believe that violence could have been avoided under any circumstances.  
But I do remain convinced that the republics' unilateral and 
uncoordinated declarations of independence, which we unsuccessfully 
opposed, led inexorably to civil war.  Then, as now, the only 
alternative to perpetual bloodshed was for the parties to negotiate 
their separation from each other and, meanwhile, to guarantee respect 
for pluralism and the rights of minorities within their borders.  And 
the only responsible policy for the United States was the one we 
followed--namely, to discourage unilateral acts intended to avoid such 
negotiations and such guarantees.  As the President rightly said in his 
maligned and misunderstood speech in Kiev [Ukraine on August 1, 1991; 
see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 32, p. 596], it was our policy not to support 
"those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred."

Of course, all of this begs the question of what we should do when the 
irrational forces of history and hatred prevail over our appeals to 
reason, as they are doing today in Yugoslavia, in some parts of the 
former Soviet Union, [in] Somalia, and elsewhere.

There are no simple answers.  As the President stated this week at 
West Point [on January 5; see p. 13], there will be times when our vital 
interests are at stake and we must intervene--as we did in the Gulf.  
There will be times when a human tragedy compels us to intervene, 
providing we can justify the cost to the American people--as we have in 
Somalia and on behalf of the Kurds of northern Iraq.  And there will be 
times when neither the force of American ideas nor the force of American 
arms can make a difference to peoples who are truly unwilling to coexist 
peacefully with each other.

The Third Challenge:  Building a New World Order

Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the Bush Administration's 
foreign policy is that it was too reactive to changing events, with 
little attention to the longer-term requirements of the new era.  
However, I  believe that we can, in fact, take credit for having begun 
what will be--and should be--the long work of constructing an 
institutional framework necessary to the establishment of a new world 
order.  Our successors will have to build in places we overlooked or 
neglected.  But I believe they will find a solid foundation in many 
important areas.

Among those areas of institutional creativity, I would identify the 

(1)  Europe, where we have sought to extend the community of democracies 
by helping transform the former communist nations into secure and stable 
free market societies.  Here, we have created two innovative 
institutional structures--the G-24 [Group of 24] process, by which we 
have coordinated economic assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, and 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, through which we have aimed to 
enhance, over time, the political and security relationship between both 
halves of Europe.  I would urge the new Administration to build upon 
this still embryonic structure.

(2)  North America, where we have sought to consolidate our nation's 
continental base through the creation of a single market linking the 
United States, Mexico, and Canada--the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  Our success in this endeavor will pay dividends in political 
and security terms as well as benefit the economies of all three 

(3)  Latin America, where this Administration leaves our overall 
hemispheric ties in perhaps the best shape of anytime in this century.  
President Bush's landmark Enterprise for the Americas Initiative has 
been greeted throughout the hemisphere as a historic turning point and 
an opportunity to consolidate democracy and the free market system 
throughout North and South America.

(4)  Asia, where we helped to create APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation] to enhance our engagement of the most dynamic economic 
region of the world and where we have begun to develop a global 
partnership with Japan.

(5)  The Middle East, where we built upon our Gulf war coalition victory 
to launch the first direct negotiations between Israel and her Arab 

(6)  And finally, across the broad spectrum of transnational issues, 
where we have tried to advance a post-Cold War agenda of global free 
trade through the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] 
negotiations and through negotiations to control the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.

The Bush Legacy

I know I am by no means a neutral observer, but I believe the record I 
have just described is one of substantial accomplishment in the face of 
great dangers and challenges.  I also believe that the Bush foreign 
policy was greater than the sum of its parts and that, indeed, there was 
a strategy behind the President's conduct of foreign policy which we 
need to understand because it is so uniquely suited to the vastly 
changed international situation we now confront.  I would summarize this 
legacy as follows:

First, the Bush foreign policy was characterized by pragmatism and 
flexibility.  I think in this respect we must plead guilty to the charge 
that our approach was often ad hoc.  A certain degree of "ad hocery" is 
a virtue, not a vice, when you are dealing with a world in crisis and in 
chaos--one in which it is impossible to be certain of anything 6 months 
ahead.  The fact of the matter is that, for a long time to come, we will 
be in a post-revolutionary transitional period which will require of us 
an ability to react quickly to events.  In these circumstances, good 
instincts are as invaluable as a good plan.

Second, the President has been deeply committed to the principle and the 
practice of diplomacy.  He, more than his critics, has understood that 
the end of the Cold War has meant the United States can no longer 
dominate either adversaries or allies as we did in a bipolar framework.  
If we want to get our way--and to get others to share our burden, as the 
American people surely desire--we will increasingly have to take the 
views and interests of others into account.  And we will sometimes have 
to build ad hoc alliances of like-minded nations as each new and often 
unique circumstance may demand.  In other words, we will have to 
practice the art of compromise and, thus, of diplomacy.  

This is an art which does not necessarily come easily to us.  Our 
national virtue is that we are comfortable only with a foreign policy 
rooted in the values of our political tradition; our national vice is a 
tendency toward moralism in foreign policy and a kind of moral hubris 
which views the actions of others only through the prism of our own 
standards of conduct.  President Bush resisted this latter tendency 
throughout his presidency, often at great political cost.  But because 
of his commitment to working with and maintaining leverage over 
governments whom his critics deemed worthy of punishment and isolation--
I am thinking principally of the People's Republic of China, but there 
were other examples--he was able consistently to forge international 
coalitions under UN auspices to address critical challenges to world 
peace and stability, including the successful prosecution of the war 
against Saddam Hussein.

Third, the Administration's foreign policy was marked by a commitment to 
harnessing US power--both diplomatic and military--to realize the 
President's long-term vision of a new world order.  The record of the 
past 4 years demonstrates that the new world order is something we are 
not even close to achieving--not with the forces of fragmentation 
currently on the loose.  But the extent to which we have been able to 
keep those forces at bay has been largely a result of American 
willingness to act, to forge ad hoc coalitions, and to begin to build 
the institutions of a better and safer world.

Looking Ahead

I will conclude, for what it is worth, with a few personal observations 
about the road ahead and what I think ought to be our priorities and 

I consider our principal foreign policy challenge to be the maintenance 
and strengthening of the core of democracies which won the Cold War.  As 
I indicated in my [September 13] 1989 speech at Georgetown [University], 
it is going to be harder to keep this core together when the inherent 
centrifugal forces of multipolarity will conspire to drive us apart.  
If, however, we want to avoid a return to the dangerous balance of power 
politics which characterized the world prior to the Cold War, we will 
have to strengthen the economic, political, and military ties which link 
the Western democracies, as well as the multilateral institutions we 
have established over the past half century.  If we do not succeed in 
strengthening those collective links and institutions, we will never be 
able to confront the instabilities now arising beyond the Western fold.

In this regard, there are several incomplete tasks we leave to the next 
Administration:  to build more comprehensive and durable political ties 
with Japan; to ensure that the European Community does not build unity 
at the expense of relations with the United States; and to preserve the 
open world trading system through successful conclusion of the GATT 
negotiations and early ratification of the North America Free Trade 

The second challenge we face is to extend the core of democracies to 
include the former communist world, as well as other nations which have 
embraced our political and economic values.  Here, there is an absolute 
convergence between our interests and our ideals.  Our security is 
especially linked to the fate of reform across the Eurasian landmass, 
which is the most heavily armed region of the world and [has been] the 
source of global conflict twice in this century.  It is thus heartening 
that the incoming President has identified support for democracy in 
Russia and throughout Central and Eastern Europe as one of his highest 

Finally, we must deal with the manifold ills afflicting what was known 
as the Third World--the problems of poverty, debt, underdevelopment, and 
overpopulation--which threaten to bring global chaos in their wake and 
thus threaten our own security and prosperity.  Among the tasks facing 
the next Administration will be the development of both global non-
proliferation regimes and enhanced UN peacekeeping and peace-making 

I began these remarks by referring to the debate underway in this 
country over the purpose of American foreign policy.  It seems to me 
that we have arrived at an important turning point in our history.  We 
have never had a normal attitude toward foreign policy, at least in the 
sense understood in other countries.  For most of our national 
existence, we turned our backs on the world beyond our shores.  And 
then, when we became a global power, we joined the world in the name of 
a mission which we have now substantially completed.  Thus we find 
ourselves today confronting an increasingly uncertain international 
environment--increasingly aware that our role and purpose must change to 
meet that new environment but unclear as to what those changes ought to 

What we may not sufficiently realize, however, is that this uncertainty 
is both normal and healthy.  We are--and will be for some time to come--
in the process of discovering our purpose as we go about the everyday 
business of foreign policy.  It goes without saying that we bring our 
ideals to the table and that our thinking is infused with a desire to 
see those ideals advanced.  But a growing awareness of our limited 
resources and power is forcing us to decide what is important to us in 
foreign policy and thus to develop a sense of hierarchy among a 
multitude of interests and priorities.

All this is very much to the good.  I see much evidence that the 
American people have accepted the lessons of the 20th century and 
understand that our period of virtual supremacy is over and that our 
fate is now and forever linked to what happens beyond our borders.  What 
remains to be seen is not so much whether we have what it takes to 
continue to shoulder the burdens of global leadership which are 
necessarily ours.  Rather, the question is whether we will, in the 
coming decade, deal with the new challenges of the post-Cold War era 
with the wisdom and strength of character that, on the whole, marked our 
international passage over the course of the past half century.  I, for 
one, am proud of the part George Bush played in charting a new course 
for America.  And I am proud to have been a part of that adventure. 


US and Russia Sign START II Treaty
President Bush, Russian President Yeltsin
Opening remarks at news conference on the signing of the START II 
Treaty, Moscow, Russia, January 3, 1993

President Yeltsin:  President George Bush, Mrs. Bush, members of the 
delegations, representatives of mass media, ladies and gentlemen:  It is 
not every century that history gives us an opportunity to witness and 
participate in the event that is so significant in scale and 

Today, the Presidents of the two great powers, the United States and 
Russia, have signed the treaty on further radical cuts in strategic 
offensive arms of Russia and the United States--START II [the Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; see fact 
sheet in Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 1 on p. 5].  In its scale and importance, 
the treaty goes further than all other treaties ever signed in the field 
of disarmament.  This treaty is the triumph for politicians and 
diplomats of Russia and the United States.  It is also an achievement 
for all mankind and benefits all peoples of the earth.  The START II 
Treaty becomes the core of the system of global security guarantees.

The scale of this treaty is determined by a number of factors.  Its 
historical factor is that in the course of all its previous history, 
mankind was arming itself and just dreamed of beating the swords into 
plowshares.  The treaty signed today represents a major step toward 
fulfilling mankind's centuries-old dream of disarmament.  Its political 
factor is that the treaty we have signed today belongs to a new epoch.  
This treaty was concluded by two friendly states, by partners who not 
only trust each other but also assist each other.  It testifies to our 
joint and determined movement toward a new world order.

From the very outset, the new democratic Russian state has been pursuing 
a policy of building equal partnership with the United States.  Today, 
we have every right to say that relations between the two major powers 
have undergone a genuine revolution.  Its political factor lies also in 
the fact that during the last decade of the 20th century and at the turn 
of the 21st century, the START II Treaty will affect policies not only 
of the United States and Russia but of other countries of the world as 
well.  The START II Treaty established parameters of possible political 
agreements in other spheres of interaction among states.

Thus, the military factor is determined by the scale of mutual 
reductions in nuclear arms.  By comparison with the START I Treaty [the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed on July 31, 1991], every state 
will have to reduce and destroy the number of strategic offensive 
warheads by approximately a threefold magnitude.  The deepest cuts will 
affect those categories of arms which are of greatest concern to the 
parties and the world.  For the United States, these are submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers;  for Russia, land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles--ICBMs.  This reduces drastically 
the level of danger, military mistrust, and suspicion.  We opened up 
real prospects for cooperation based on trust between people in military 
uniform--between people with military discipline and military thinking.  
Thus, the START II Treaty will change and gradually replace the very 
psychology of confrontation.

At the same time, as President and Supreme Commander in Chief, I can say 
with absolute certainty [that] the signed treaty strengthens the 
security of Russia rather than weakens it.  I think that President Bush 
can make a similar statement concerning the security of the United 

The implementation of the new treaty will not be economically 
destructive for Russia.  We have made our calculations, and they show 
that the proposed reductions would cost us much less than the mere 
maintenance of nuclear weapons systems in a safe condition.

We save seriously on verification and inspections, two of the most 
expensive, to put it mildly, items of expenditures.  The new character 
of Russian-US relations makes it possible for us to substantially 
simplify verification procedures while ensuring their reliability.  We 
expect to cut considerably the cost of the physical destruction of 
armaments.  We have agreed with the United States to cooperate in 
developing and applying appropriate technologies.  Thus, the 
expenditures under this, then, will, in fact, be shared equally.

This will enable us to eliminate our nuclear weapons not with a delay of 
several years but in parallel with the United States in accordance with 
the schedule provided for in the treaty.  In the context of the present 
economic crisis, it would be difficult for us to keep the pace without 
outside assistance.

The US Congress has made a decision to support Russia in the destruction 
of these nuclear warheads. Its moral factor will manifest itself in the 
fact that the treaty gives all mankind the hope for a nuclear weapons-
free world.

The high moral value of the treaty is that we will be able to hand over 
to our children--the children of the 21st century--a more secure world.  
I would call this treaty a treaty of hope.  As to the purely diplomatic 
aspect of this START II Treaty that has just been signed, it will 
undoubtedly go down into the history of diplomacy as an example of using 
the potential of the partners who are waiting to overcome the heritage 
of animosity and confrontation.

As you may recall, it took 15 years to prepare the first START Treaty. 
The elaboration of  START II, which is of considerably great[er] 
magnitude, took several months.  But there was absolutely no rush in the 
process.  Naturally, this reflects, above all, the high level of 
confidence and mutual understanding achieved between the United States 
and Russia--between the Presidents of the two countries.  It gives great 
impetus to world diplomacy as well.

Today, I would like to express the hope that the diplomatic services of 
the United States and Russia [and] diplomats of European countries will 
double or even triple their efforts in order to settle conflicts that 
are of concern to the world.

I would like to focus on another important aspect, the personal stand of 
President George Bush, who is our guest on a working visit with us.  I 
would like to pay tribute to my colleague and friend, George.  His 
remarkable personal and political qualities and competence have 
contributed to a successful transition from the Cold War to a new world 
order.  I am grateful to him for all he has done to establish new 
relations between Russia and the United States, for his solidarity and 
support during the push for the FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging 
Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act, [and] for the START 
II Treaty.  Thank you, George. 

I consider it [of] fundamental importance that the future President of 
the United States, Mr. Clinton, fully supported the conclusion of the 
START II Treaty.  We can, without delay, proceed to the direct 
implementation of this instrument and consider further steps to 
strengthen global stability, the system of global protection, and 
international security.

President Bush and I have maintained regular contacts with President-
elect Clinton.  Today's signing ceremony would not have taken place had 
there been the slightest reason to doubt his solidarity with our 
endeavors.  I would like to personally thank the most active 
participants in this process and, above all, the President of the United 
States, who personally took part in the elaboration and polishing of the 
text of the treaty.  And I would say we spoke often.  It was a rare week 
that we did not speak on the phone in the last few weeks.  I am also 
grateful, personally, to [national security adviser General] Scowcroft, 
who took an active participation in the consideration of this subject, 
and to [former Secretary of State] Baker, of course, who treated 
globally the entire subject of the treaty and was mainly responsible for 
this breakthrough.  Finally, I am grateful to [Secretary of State] Mr. 
Eagleburger who, on the finishing line, darted with boldness and 
practically initialed the draft treaty there.  

I'm thankful also to the experts--to analysts and consultants and also 
to the leaders of our delegation--[Foreign Minister] Mr. Kozyrev and 
[Defense Minister] Mr. Grachev and the other 48 experts who worked very 
hard for us to come today to the signing of this treaty, the SALT  
[START] II Treaty.  I'm also grateful to all the journalists--press 
people--who kept their hand constantly on the pulse of this subject and 
who did not criticize the treaty before it was signed.

I do believe that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of 
friendly partnership between Russia and the United States.  Strategic 
partnership relations serve the fundamental national interests of the 
two countries and of the international community as a whole.  I am 
deeply confident that the signing of the START II Treaty opens new, 
promising prospects for the peoples of our countries.  I'm certain that 
this day will be a milestone in this process.

President Bush:  Mr. President and Mr. Vice President, Mr. Prime 
Minister, Minister of Justice, Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, representatives of the Russian and American delegations, and 
distinguished guests:  We meet at the beginning of a new year, at a 
moment that is also a new era for our two nations and for the world.  
For half of this century, the Soviet Union and the United States stood 
locked in a nuclear standoff.  For our two nations and for the world, 
cold war, hot words, and the constant threat of war seemed imminent--
indeed, at times inevitable.

The time that we might meet as friends and the time that we might meet 
in freedom seemed distant--indeed, a dream.  Today, the Cold War is 
over, and, for the first time in history, an American president has set 
foot in a democratic Russia.  And together we're now embarked on what 
must be the noblest mission of all:  to turn an adversarial relationship 
into one of friendship and partnership.

We stand together today in this great city at the threshold of a new 
world of hope, a widening circle of freedom for us and for our children. 
This historic opportunity would simply not have been possible without 
our combined common effort.

Mr. President, I salute you for your unwavering commitment to democratic 
reform and for the history you've written since the heroic day in August 
1991 when you climbed atop that tank to defend Russia's democratic 
destiny.  I also want to salute the heroism of the Russian people 
themselves, for it is they who will determine that Russia's democratic 
course is irreversible.

Today, as we meet on Russian soil--home to 1,000 years of heritage and 
history, to a people rich in scientific and creative talent--I want to 
assure the Russian people on behalf of all Americans [that] we 
understand that Russia faces a difficult passage.  We are with you in 
your struggle to strengthen and secure democratic rights, to reform your 
economy, to bring to every Russian city and village a new sense of hope 
and the prospect of a future forever free.  Let me say clearly--we seek 
no special advantages from Russia's transformation.  Yes, deep arms 
reductions, broader and deeper economic ties, expanded trade with Russia 
all are in the interest of my country.  But they're equally in the 
interest of the Russian people.  Our future is one of mutual advantage.

We seek a new relationship of trust between our military forces.  They 
once confronted each other across Europe's great divide; let them now 
come together in the cause of peace.  We seek full cooperation to employ 
our collective capabilities to help resolve crises around the world.  We 
seek a new cooperation between the United States and Russia and among 
all states to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction.  The world looks to us to consign the Cold War to 
history, to ratify our new relationship by reducing the weapons that 
concentrate the most destructive power known to man.

The treaty we signed today builds on the strong beginning we made with 
START I.  Together, these treaties will reduce by more than two-thirds 
the strategic arsenals in place today.  And, just as important, START II 
will bring much better stability to remaining forces.

This agreement represents a common effort to overcome the contentious 
differences and complexities that surround nuclear weapons.  In the face 
of many who doubted Russia and America's intentions and our energy, it 
vindicates our insistence that arms control must do more than simply 
freeze the arms race in place.

The START Treaty--START I-- reduced a quarter century of growth in our 
nuclear arsenals and reversed the course that caused many to fear that 
nuclear conflagration was inevitable. The treaty that we signed today 
goes much further in a way that few believed possible just 1 year ago.

And may I congratulate Messrs. Kozyrev and Grachev and Eagleburger for 
their outstanding work to bring this treaty to fruition.  I also want to 
congratulate former Secretary of State Jim Baker for his important work 
on the treaty during the spring and summer.

In closing, let me tell you what this treaty means--not for presidents 
or premiers, not for historians or heads of state but for parents and 
for their children:  It means a future far more free from fear.

As we sign today this treaty, let us pledge also to move forward 
together throughout this decade and into the next century toward common 
aims:  for Russia, a democratic peace; for our two nations, a strong 
partnership between our people and the lasting friendship that springs 
from a common love of freedom.

Mr. President, may I wish you and the Russian people, at this critical 
moment in history, a new year rich with hope and peace.  (###)


Situation in Sierra Leone
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Joe Snyder, Washington, DC, 
January 4, 1993.

Valentine Strasser, Chairman of Sierra Leone's National Provisional 
Ruling Council, announced on December 29 [1992] that a coup attempt had 
been crushed.  Freetown['s] radio [station] reported on December 31 that 
a special tribunal had sentenced 12 coup plotters to death and that 
another 17 persons found guilty of treason earlier were to be executed 
immediately.  We understand these sentences have already been carried 
out.  The broadcast indicated that additional suspects are being sought.

The United States is gravely concerned over the reported executions and 
calls on the Sierra Leonean authorities to respect fully human rights, 
due process, and the rule of law.  The United States recognizes that 
Sierra Leone is currently encountering numerous problems, including the 
presence of rebel forces.  However, we urge that such problems be 
resolved through peaceful negotiation, so that the process of economic 
and social development and an early return to democratic, civilian rule 
can be facilitated.

In view of the unsettled circumstances in Sierra Leone, the US embassy 
in Freetown has advised resident American citizens to exercise the 
utmost caution in their movements. (###) 


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