US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992

Title:

CSCE: A New Role for a New Era

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Intervention before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Council of Ministers, Stockholm, Sweden Date: Dec, 14 199212/14/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: USSR (former), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro Subject: CSCE, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Madame Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, we meet today in Stockholm already well across the threshold of a new, historical era. As yet, this new era goes unnamed. We describe it, for the time being, as merely the negation of what went before--the post-Cold War era. Ironically, we who cannot know the name which history will give this era are the ones whose actions will most determine what it shall be called. Indeed, we have it within our power to decide whether historians will call this an age of democracy or an age of disorder. With the demise of communism, it is clear, at least, where mankind's aspirations lie. They lie universally with freedom and, thus, with democracy. But it is equally clear that the collapse of the static, Cold War international system has unleashed a dynamic of change worldwide which, unchecked, could overwhelm those aspirations and threaten instability for a long time to come. The Iraqi conquest of Kuwait, starvation in Somalia, and "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans are all emblematic of the fact that we are in a period of transition between an old order which is dead or dying and a new [one] still struggling to be born. Fortunately, the international community has demonstrated the resolve to act on behalf of a more civilized world order when confronted, at least, with the Kuwaiti and Somali emergencies. But the more important and, indeed, more difficult challenge we have yet to face is the need to develop new international structures to manage global change in this new era. This, in short, is a time for institution-building, one not dissimilar to the period immediately following World War II. However, whereas post-war institutions were developed over years-- indeed, decades--the ongoing carnage in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates that we do not have the luxury of time and that we may, in fact, be losing the race against time with the forces of hatred and disintegration which threaten the new, democratic order in Europe. Yugoslavia is a shocking reminder that barbarity exists within our midst and that we cannot call the new Europe either civilized or secure until we have developed stronger mechanisms for dealing with this and similar crises. If we are honest, however, we will go deeper and recognize the former Yugoslavia as a mirror of our darker selves--a mirror of what we, too, could become if we were to succumb to the ethnic hatred and intolerance for diversity which we have also seen this year in Western Europe and North America alike. Yugoslavia should make us realize that our hopes for living in a more peaceful and civilized world are inextricably linked to the way we each conduct ourselves at home. It is precisely for this reason, in fact, that the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] is of such vital importance today. CSCE reflects our faith that a truly democratic Europe will be a peaceful Europe-- that a Europe which overcomes its history of ethnic hatreds need not repeat its endless history of internecine strife. CSCE embodies the revolutionary concept that security in the future will be derived more from respect for human rights and democratic principles than from the balance-of-power mechanisms of the past. However, CSCE must be more than simply the conscience of Europe if it is to fulfill its ambitious purpose. Along with other pillars of Europe's political and security architecture, CSCE must become more operationally effective and solution oriented in the face of mounting instabilities. In fact, our Helsinki meeting confirmed CSCE in this role and conferred upon it a variety of tools to manage the kinds of destabilizing change with which we are confronted. Unfortunately, as the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia demonstrates, these tools were not fully developed, nor have we used them as well or as promptly as we might have done. Our goal today, therefore, must be to focus CSCE on the root causes of instability in Europe and to encourage the organization to adopt a more proactive approach to problem solving. To be sure, there are also questions of structural reforms and of resources which we must also address. But what will be required, above all, is the political will and leadership on the part of all member states to utilize CSCE mechanisms to their fullest potential. Accordingly, I would submit the following as priority items for this meeting's agenda. First, we should build upon the Helsinki decisions and develop a CSCE strategy which is proactive, not reactive--one which will detect early warnings of instability and undertake preventive diplomacy. We must seek early enough to prevent the outbreak of conflict or else find ourselves, as in Yugoslavia, constantly reacting to new horrors. The CSCE has learned that lesson and has deployed several monitoring missions in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, including to Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak, Macedonia, and Georgia. We applaud the work of each of these missions. However, we will ultimately be judged by results, and I believe we have not fully tapped CSCE's potential for preventive diplomacy in the crises at hand. Especially in the Balkans, we must endorse stronger measures to start to reverse an intolerable situation. -- We must identify the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in ex- Yugoslavia by name and ensure that they will be brought to justice in person--exactly as were Hitler's associates at Nuremberg. -- We must expand CSCE missions to assist with the enforcement of UN sanctions and, thereby, increase the pressure on those who continue to prosecute the war. -- We must redouble our efforts to prevent the war from spilling over into neighboring regions and countries--in particular, by committing, here and now, to increase substantially the size of the mission in Kosovo. Let me say, in this regard, that the United States, for its part, will contribute on an urgent basis to this expanded mission. -- Finally, in stating our support for safe areas in Bosnia for the hundreds of thousands of victims of "ethnic cleansing," we must ensure that this humanitarian effort not be misused to confirm the results of that odious policy. CSCE must also play a more effective role in addressing the actual and potential ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union by monitoring respect for human rights and minority rights throughout the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states and by accelerating conflict prevention missions in such places as Georgia and Moldova. Full support of the Minsk Group [11 nations plus Azerbaijan and Armenia working under CSCE auspices to solve the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh] by all CSCE states is imperative to securing peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. Of course, the international community will have to adapt its strategies for preventing, containing, and resolving such conflicts to the specific conditions in each region. But all efforts should occur within the framework of CSCE principles and CSCE political engagement. Thus, we should be prepared to support responsible peace- keeping efforts by Russia and other CIS states within this CSCE umbrella. Second, we need to adjust CSCE organizationally to ensure an effective response to the challenges of conflict prevention and crisis management. As currently constituted, CSCE is barely able administratively to cope with present challenges, let alone those which are looming. Needed are a chief administrative officer for the diverse CSCE institutions, an intersessional body to manage day-to-day operations between senior officials' meetings, and greater administrative coherence and capabilities. I am certain that these objectives can be reached without injury to CSCE's strengths-- creativity, flexibility, and political accountability. We must ensure that the organization continues to remain free of the ills of bureaucracy. Finally, we must be clear that neither the enhanced CSCE role nor the institutional reforms I have outlined will make a difference unless the members demonstrate a commitment backed with resources. The conflict prevention missions and the more active kinds of political engagement I have discussed will require more from all of us in terms of finance, equipment, and personnel. Some--and I do not hesitate to include the United States--have made a major commitment of resources thus far, but all of us can do more. If CSCE is to fulfill its mission, our consensus of rights must be supported by a consensus of responsibilities. Let me conclude by reiterating my view that, as important as our efforts to bolster this organization may be, it is ultimately up to the member states themselves to do the hard work of defending the peace of our democratic order. It is up to us individually to uphold the CSCE's standards of political conduct within our own borders. And it is up to us collectively to support the CSCE mechanisms for conflict prevention and crisis management which I have discussed here today. We cannot expect a deus ex machina to solve our problems. Neither the United States nor the CSCE itself can fulfill that role--although I can guarantee that the United States will work with its European partners to make CSCE succeed. But what is required, most of all, is that we sustain the vision, courage, and solidarity with which both the democratic nations of the West and the peoples who aspired to freedom in the East overcame the formidable dangers and challenges of the Cold War. If we have learned anything in this century, it is that neither peace nor freedom can be preserved without sacrifice. Only by summoning the will to defend, both separately and collectively, our new Europe whole and free can we ensure that democracy will prevail over disorder as the defining feature of the post-Cold War era. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

CSCE: A New Role for a New Era

Boucher Source: Released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman Description: Text of a joint statement by the United States and the Russian Federation at the CSCE Council of Ministers meeting, Stockholm, Sweden Date: Dec, 14 199212/14/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America, E/C Europe Country: Russia, United States, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: CSCE, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Russia and the United States share a long friendship with Serbia, and both countries deeply regret that the policies of the current government of Serbia have resulted in the estrangement of Serbia from Russia and the United States, as well as from the rest of the world. In this connection, Russia and the United States are awaiting with great interest the outcome of the Serbian elections of December 20, 1992. Both countries hope that the people of Serbia will be given a free and fair opportunity that day to embark upon a new course which can open the way to the restoration of the close relations they previously enjoyed with that country. Russia and the United States hope that the people of Serbia will weigh the alternatives carefully. The choice is of returning to the community of nations or remaining in a pariah status, politically isolated and economically devastated because of the policies of the present regime. If the correct choice is made, Russia and the United States pledge to work with the Government of Serbia to restore its position in the world. If such a choice is followed by the fundamental change of policies for which Russia and the United States devoutly hope, the eventual relaxation and removal of the sanctions would be possible. Then Serbia, together with Montenegro, would be welcomed as a member of the UN [United Nations], CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], and other institutions. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Euripe (CSCE)

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia, North America, E/C Europe, Europe Subject: CSCE, Security Assistance and Sales, History [TEXT] From Vancouver to Vladivostok, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) offers a new kind of diplomacy, based on respect for human rights, among 51 Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries (Yugoslavia has been suspended). CSCE furthers European security through a wide variety of policies, commitments, and, more recently, operational tools. It adopts a broad concept of security, ranging from human rights through economic cooperation to arms control and commits to the inviolability of frontiers. The CSCE also fosters cooperation through programs centered on economics, conflict prevention, military security, culture, and the media. It is committed to developing democratic institutions at the grassroots level, through local officials and activities, and through non-governmental organizations.
Evolution of the CSCE
The CSCE began during the Cold War as a way to promote dialogue and decrease tensions between East and West. In August 1975, 35 nations signed the Helsinki Final Act, a politically binding declaratory understanding of the democratic principles governing relations among nations. The act contained a provision to continue regular discussions on a broad range of concerns--from migrations and military security to the environment and media relations--in what became known as the "Helsinki Process." During the 1980s, follow-on meetings in Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna reviewed implementation of CSCE agreements and continued the opportunity for discussion. Although the CSCE had no permanent headquarters and no enforcement capability, important commitments were made to defend human rights and to increase confidence through the advance notification of military activities and the exchange of military information. As it evolved, the CSCE began to explore ways to act on its rigorous principles and to ensure that they were upheld. To do this, the CSCE established a secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, in 1990. During 1992, the decision to move from principle to action was most marked in the Helsinki decisions which established a number of practical tools that help the CSCE work together with NATO, the European Community (EC), and other international bodies to defend human rights and manage the unprecedented changes now taking place in Europe. In particular, it sets out an ambitious role for the CSCE in crisis management and "preventive diplomacy." The CSCE has brokered significant arms control agreements. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in November 1990, limits non- nuclear ground and air forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. A separate political agreement, concluded in July 1992, covers personnel in the same region. Through continued negotiations, confidence-building measures have been extended, and higher expectations for treaty compliance and verification have been set. A new security negotiation, the Forum for Security Cooperation, opened in Vienna on September 22, 1992.
CSCE and European Conflicts
The civil war in the former Yugoslavia has been an early test of the CSCE's ability to take an active part in conflict prevention. On August 6, 1992, President Bush called on the CSCE to help monitor the human rights situation in the Balkans. He also asked that the CSCE work to inhibit the spread of the conflict. It quickly sent fact-finding and rapporteur missions to the region and supported the sanctions and humanitarian measures taken by the United Nations and the EC. The CSCE then established new "missions of long duration" to provide an early warning system for any spillover of the hostilities into the neighboring regions of Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak, and Macedonia, and they also sent a signal that the international community will not allow borders to be violated. These missions aim to dispel mistrust between parties by promoting dialogue and providing information to promote transparency between the conflicting parties. In August 1992, the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia asked the CSCE to assist in monitoring sanctions fulfillment. There are now missions in Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania, and future operations are planned in Croatia and Albania. CSCE is in the forefront of conflict resolution in other parts of the region as well. -- Under CSCE auspices, the Minsk Group--11 nations plus Azerbaijan and Armenia--is the focus of international efforts to solve the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh. -- CSCE representatives currently are assessing the situation in the Ossetia region of Georgia. -- Rapporteur missions have been sent to the new Central Asian republics to assess the governmental and human rights situations. -- CSCE representatives will soon be sent to Estonia and Moldova to look into ethnic conflicts in these states. As an original participant in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United States has been central in the promotion of uncompromising humanitarian standards and their practical implementation. From the beginning, CSCE has embodied America's hopes for a unified, democratic, and prosperous Europe. Americans continually have worked to ensure that the CSCE process remains flexible, innovative, and unbureaucratic. The United States established the first permanent delegation to the CSCE in Vienna in August 1992, charting a course for other nations to follow.
CSCE and Participating States
Albania Armenia Austria Azerbaijan Belgium Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulgaria Belarus Canada Croatia Cyprus Czechoslovakia Denmark Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece The Holy See Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Moldova Monaco Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia San Marino Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uzbekistan Yugoslavia* *Suspended (###)
Scheduled CSCE Meetings 1992-93
1992 Nov. 16-20: Seminar on Tolerance (Warsaw) Nov. 19: CPC Consultative Committee (Vienna) Nov. 23-25: Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) Working Group in preparation for Stockholm Conference (Prague) Dec. 11-13: Committee of Senior Officials (Stockholm) Dec. 14-15: Council of Ministers (Stockholm) 1993 March 16-18: Economic Forum (Prague) March 29-April 2: Migration Seminar (Warsaw) April or May (3 days to be determined): CSBM [Confidence and Security Building Measures] Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting [AIAM] (Vienna) May 17-21: Mediterranean Seminar (Valletta) May (1 week): Seminar on Resolved Problems of National Minorities (Warsaw or Croatia) Sept. 28-Oct. 1: Seminar on Sustainable Development of Boreal and Temperate Forests, followed by 1 week of fieldwork (Montreal) Sept.-Oct. (3 weeks): Human Dimension Implementation Review Meeting (Warsaw) Fall (to be determined): Seminar on the Free Media (Warsaw) Late 1993 (to be determined): Council of Ministers (Rome) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Fourth Report on War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Description: Text of the Supplemental United States Submission of Information to the UN Security Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992) Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92 Category: Reports Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues, United Nations [TEXT] [Following is the text of the Supplemental United States Submission of Information to the UN Security Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992), released on December 7, 1992. For the text of the first three reports, see Dispatch Vol. 3 No. 39, p. 732, Vol. 3, No. 44, p. 802, and Vol. 3, No. 46, p. 825. For the text of Resolution 771, see Dispatch Supplement, Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 44. For text of Resolution 780, see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769. Editor's Note: The following contains graphic descriptions.] This is the fourth submission by the United States Government of information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. As in our three previous reports, we have focused on grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with Resolution 771, have provided information that is "substantiated," that is, which rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or that includes detail sufficient for corroboration. For the moment, we have also tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other countries and non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit reports pursuant to Resolutions 771 and 780. The information provided is intended to be useful to the commission of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780. The United States has further substantiating information concerning the incidents included in this report, which we will make available directly to the commission of experts on a confidential basis. In accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 780, the United States intends to continue providing reports as additional relevant information comes into our possession. The United States is pleased that the commission of experts established pursuant to resolution 780 has begun its work. We particularly welcome its steps with regard to investigations of sites in the former Yugoslavia that may contain important information about violations of humanitarian law. We stand ready to assist the commission in its important work of investigating war crimes allegations with the aim of preparing cases suitable for prosecution and, by doing so, of establishing the record of humanitarian offenses in the former Yugoslavia. As in our previous reports, the notations at the end of each of the items indicate the source from which the information was drawn. Unless otherwise indicated, the reports refer to incidents occurring in 1992.
Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Fourth Submission
Willful Killing
25 Sept: A 48-year-old Bosnian Muslim was picked up from the street in his home town of Bjelina on September 25 or 26 and brought to a detention camp at Klis, near Batkovic. The facility at Klis, formerly used for storing agricultural produce, was guarded by men in solid green uniforms. The witness described how three "rich men" were singled out for special abuse; they were beaten with fists, rifle butts, and kicking: a neighbor who traded in gold and jewelry; a coffee trader; and another with whom the witness was not acquainted. During the witness's second night in the camp, he saw the coffee trader and several others taken at different times from their building to an adjacent facility. There was lots of screaming during their absences. The others returned eventually but the coffee trader never did. The witness learned later that the coffee trader's corpse had been turned over to his family sometime after that. The gold trader suffered a similar fate on the witness's fifth night at the Klis facility; he died from his wounds. The other "wealthy" man who was beaten frequently along with first two victims never returned after being summoned to a nearby building one evening. The witness said an old cleaning man had told him that the third man also died from the beatings. (Department of State) 25 Jul: A 14-year-old boy from the village of Zecovi, near Prijedor, witnessed the murder of 33 people on July 25. The boy said that on July 19 or 20 a number of Serbs in uniform, none of whom he recognized, came to a small enclave of Muslim households near the outskirts of Zecovi. At gunpoint, the Serbs forced people out of their homes and incarcerated them in the cellar of one of the houses. After being held for more than 2 days, those detained were released without explanation and allowed to go back to their homes. A few days later, on July 25, another group of Serbs appeared, also uniformed. They ordered people out of their homes, but in the confusion, the boy was able to hide behind a board leaning against the house and his absence was not noticed. The boy witnessed these men line up 33 people and shoot them summarily with semiautomatic rifles; they then used pistols to finish off anyone who was still moving. (Department of State) Asked if he had recognized any of this group, the witness said "they were our neighbors" from the village. He was able to identify 29 victims by name as well as five of those who took active part in the shooting. 21 Jul-4 Aug: A 36-year-old Bosnian Muslim was in his village of Ribvanovici, near Prijedor, when the Serbian army surrounded all the villages in the area on July 21, and took all of the adult males prisoner--an incident reported in an earlier submission. The Serbian soldiers beat the prisoners with their rifles. One man began to cry, so the soldiers shot him. Half the men, including this witness, were bussed to Keraterm camp in Prijedor, then to Omarska, and finally Trnopolje. The witness does not know what happened to those left behind. After a day at Trnopolje, the witness was taken back to Omarska camp and put into the "white house," where he was kept [for] about 15 days. He was locked in a room with dozens of men, many of whom he recognized from his village. He said that every day prisoners were taken into one of five interrogation rooms and beaten with iron bars and wooden sticks. His sister's husband was beaten to death in this manner. He had been beaten so badly one night that part of his forehead was missing, apparently taken off by an iron bar. He died soon thereafter. The witness once watched through the window as guards took prisoners out of the "white house," told them to run, and then shot them in the back as they fled. He heard what he believed were many other executions, but said they were done behind the building where they could not be seen, or in a red building nearby. Each night, guards would choose two prisoners to bury the dead. This witness was forced to help one night and saw 11 corpses. He said the guards had them stack the bodies crosswise in a pit. Sometime around August 4, he was transferred from Omarska. (Department of State) 20 Jul: A 52-year-old man was bussed to the Keraterm camp on July 20 with hundreds of others from Hambarine, near Prijedor. He was crammed along with several hundred other men into the third of four halls that formed a row on the former factory premises. From the start of his internment, he saw Muslim men regularly beaten with iron bars and rifle butts. Every night until he was released on August 5, men were taken outside hall number three and shot. A friend, Mustafa Ramolic, was hauled outside a few days after the witness's arrival and beaten by Serb guards. His friend collapsed, coughing blood until he died later that evening. The witness observed a mass execution on July 24. It had been an extremely hot day. The doors and windows were closed and the men were screaming for water. What they finally received was contaminated so badly that it caused about 20 men to collapse or faint. The witness and other detainees were convinced that the water had been poisoned. Perhaps in response to the tumult, about 15 Serb guards came in about 10 pm and began beating the prisoners with their rifle butts until they fell. As the situation deteriorated, the guards occasionally fired their rifles into the crowd of prisoners who gradually pulled back toward the large garage door at one end of the hall. When they reached the door, the guards began shooting their rifles and machine guns into the crowd of inmates. The witness positioned himself behind the door and feigned death. The entire incident, from the opening of the doors until the shooting stopped, took about one half hour. At dawn the following day, "volunteers" were chosen to load 130 bodies on trucks; his brother was among the dead. The witness saw approximately 40 wounded, who had waited for what they were told would be another truck to take them to a hospital, eventually loaded with the corpses and taken away. A second massacre took place at about 6 am on July 26. Six soldiers entered the hall and ordered about 50 prisoners outside. As the last of the prisoners stepped outside, the six Serbian guards began firing their automatic weapons. When all 50 had fallen, the guards went around shooting those who were still groaning. The witness recognized those who took part in this second mass execution. Following this second massacre, 10 "volunteers" were again selected to load the corpses. They had to ride in the same truck that took the bodies away. The 10 "volunteers" never came back. That same day, inmates were evacuated from all the halls. About one dozen from each were tasked with cleaning and hosing down the halls. The rumor was that the camp had received a new commander, and that some international commission was expected to inspect the facilities. The "commission" came on August 5, when busses took the witness and other inmates to Trnopolje. (Department of State) 9 Jul: A 35-year-old Muslim woman from Trnopolje described her husband's murder. On July 9, her husband was taken to a detention camp at the nearby school, but was quickly released because the Serbs running the camp recognized him as a famous "Yugoslav" athlete who had won the 1981 European body-building championship in London. Soon after his return, upon hearing of Serbian evictions of Muslim residents of the area, the family left their home. When the witness ran back to get something she had forgotten, four soldiers standing at the nearby corner stopped her husband and ordered his two children to keep going. The children were further down the street when their mother--the witness-- caught up with her husband and the four soldiers. One of them, once considered to be a friend of her husband, spoke to them briefly. The soldiers then ordered her to move on, saying her husband had to stay there. She tried to give him the key to their home, but he, too, told her to move on and catch up with the children. She did so, and was about 20 meters away when shots rang out behind her. The children were about to turn a corner at the end of the street when the shots were fired. All of them, crying, tried to go back, but were blocked by other soldiers. Two days later when the witness was allowed to return to her home for food, she saw her husband's corpse, which apparently had not been moved from the spot where he had been summarily executed 2 days earlier. (Department of State) 11 June-10 Oct: A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Kotor Varos was arrested as a civilian and interned in several locations in Kotor Varos from June 11 until October 10. He described how he had been viciously and sadistically beaten several times, had witnessed forced sex acts among male prisoners, and had been forced at gunpoint to participate in the gang rape/killing of a Muslim woman. On one day, the witness and 11 other prisoners were forced to participate in the rape of a Muslim policeman's wife. He exclaimed "They did everything. You can't imagine or believe what they did. They are animals!" He said that the woman died from her injuries 1 week later. During the first 8 days of his internment, a Serbian TV news crew from Banja Luka arrived and accused him of beating women and killing fetuses during his tenure as a soldier for the Croatian forces. He was required to read such a statement admitting to these acts because a Serbian army captain threatened to kill his parents and family members if he did not. The witness was later transferred to a room in the back of the Osnovni Sud or town courthouse, where he said that three men died in his arms from the beatings and injuries they endured: Enver Beharic, Mato Vatelj, and Smajo Celinac. He named these men, and claimed that their bodies were mutilated after their deaths. All three men were killed between August 13 and 15. The witness stated further that the number of people killed in Kotor Varos was almost unimaginable. On June 11 alone, 300-400 corpses lay in the street. He and several other prisoners had to put the corpses into black nylon body bags. The bags were then carried by a bulldozer to a nearby mass grave, and he described the location in detail. He said that he personally put over 70 bodies into bags that day and estimated that a minimum of 1,000 people were buried in this grave. (Department of State) June-Jul: A 21-year-old Serbian fighter described his own shooting of 10 members of a Muslim family in late June in Ahatovici: It was taken for granted among us that they should be killed. So when somebody said 'Shoot,' I swung around and pulled the trigger, three times, on automatic fire. I remember the little girl with the red dress hiding behind her granny. The Serbian fighter recounted another incident in which he used a 6-inch hunting knife to cut the throats of three captured Muslims. He claimed to have made visits every 3 or 4 days to a motel and restaurant complex outside Vogosca--located 7 miles north of Sarajevo--known as the Sonja Cafe, which had been converted into a prison for Muslim women. He identified the "prison commander," who he said had established a "system" for the Serbian fighters to rape and kill the women interned there. He and his companions were encouraged to go to the Sonja Cafe by military commanders because raping Muslim women was "good for raising the fighters' morale." They were further told by the prison commander: You can do with the women what you like. You can take them away from here--we don't have enough food for them anyway--and don't bring them back. This fighter claimed to have raped and murdered eight women from the motel prison complex. He also said he had seen 30 men from Donja Bioca being shot and loaded-- some alive--into a furnace at a steel plant at Ilijas, a town north of Vogosca in July. (The New York Times) Late June: A 27-year-old Bosnian Muslim watched Serbian Chetniks conduct mass executions on a bridge at Brod, 4 kilometers south of Foca, on three consecutive evenings toward the end of June. He witnessed the executions from a hiding place in the attic of a Serbian friend's home. At about 6 pm of the first day, this witness saw Serb soldiers march small groups of Muslim men onto the bridge in Brod. In the middle of the bridge, which was about 100 meters long, the Chetniks interrogated the Muslims for about 2 hours. Among the 20 to 30 Muslim men, the witness could recognize from his hiding place four friends: Ramo Kadric, Saban Kurtovic, Nusret Cengic, and Ibro Colakovic. Just as it was getting dark, the haranguing stopped and the shooting started. About eight of the 30 to 40 soldiers fired their automatic weapons at their tied-up Muslim captives. The witness was able to identify the man in charge of the Serbs on the bridge. When there were no signs of life among the Muslims, the Serbs dumped their bodies over the meter-high wall of the bridge into the Drina River, about 20 meters below. The following evening, the Chetnik band led another column of Muslim prisoners to the bridge from the other direction. This group was from the witness's hamlet of Trnovac, and involved 50 to 60 captives. They were killed in the same fashion. Among the victims he recognized were: Esad Beckovic, Esad Dzin, Nedzao Dzin, Dzevad Beckovic, Zvijerac Beckovic, Hamdija Beckovic, and Serif Beckovic. The next massacre on the bridge occurred close to midnight of the third evening. The victims were brought to the bridge by bus and truck from the town of Miljevina, about 8 kilometers northwest of Brod, also on the opposite side of the river. The entire operation was carried out more quickly; this time there were about 50 men murdered. The wives and children of the victims were kept for several days in an area school, during which time they had to sign over the ownership papers to their homes. (Department of State) 31 May-Jul: A 43-year-old Muslim from Hambarine was picked up on May 31 in Prijedor by Serb militiamen and herded along with other Muslims into one of the buses and trucks waiting to take them to Keraterm. He claims the more educated Muslims were taken to Omarska. The witness saw four of the Muslim captives randomly shot to death as the loading process took place. He knew two of the victims, brothers Suelgo and Ismo Dzafic. The Keraterm facility was divided into four subdivisions or halls. The witness was in hall number one. On July 22 or 24, a hall at the opposite end of the facility was packed with prisoners from an area where heavy fighting had taken place, and where the Serbs reportedly had sustained heavy casualties. The Serbs machine-gunned to death about 200 of the newly arrived prisoners in that hall. The witness said many of the inmates could see the massacre in the adjacent hall number three, so word of what was taking place spread almost instantly. He and all the occupants could hear the firing and screaming, which lasted for about 15 to 20 minutes. The following morning he also observed trucks loaded with corpses driving from hall number four past the window of hall number one where he was detained. About five men were taken from his hall to help load the corpses. Another man with a badly infected arm was put on a truck full of corpses along with about 20 other injured men. The witness never saw this man again and believes he was killed. (Department of State) 25 May: A 30-year-old Muslim was in Kozarac when the Serbs began a massive artillery bombardment in the mid-afternoon of May 25. As he and a crowd that he estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 headed for the shelter of the nearby forest, the Serbs directed their fire at fleeing civilians. Five or six women running near the witness were killed by a shell just before they reached the tree line. (Department of State) 18 May: A 33-year-old Muslim from Grbavci--2 kilometers from Zvornik-- described a mass killing on the morning of May 18. As Serb militiamen surrounded the village and started shooting, he and several family members fled. Residents of nearby houses were doing the same. Inside the village, the Serb militia occupiers, using megaphones, ordered residents to go back to their homes and put white sheets in their windows. Many of the neighbors obeyed, but this witness and his family decided to wait in their hiding place inside the tree line to assess the situation further. As his neighbors returned to the housing area, hands over their heads, the Serb militiamen separated men from women and children. The witness watched from about 200 meters as the men were lined up. Shortly after noon, one of the Serbs shouted an order to "kill the Ustasha." On this command, about 10 of the militiamen began emptying their automatic weapons into the line of Muslim men and continued shooting until they were all dead. When the shooting stopped, the executioners and other Serb militia, many of whom had been standing around watching, started plundering houses in the village and stealing livestock. The witness, his family, and other neighbors returned from their hiding place 3 days later. He participated along with other neighbors in the burial of 56 victims. They were buried about 20 meters from the edge of the existing cemetery, between two rows of houses, near the spot where they were shot. (Department of State) 9 May: A 41-year-old Bosnian Muslim woman witnessed the execution of a Serbian civilian by Serbian soldiers in Sarajevo. At about 7 am on May 9 or 10, military units wearing the insignias of Serbian Chetniks and the Yugoslav army entered the area (near Sarajevo airport) and ordered all its residents out of the cellars in which they had taken refuge. Once outside, Serbs were told to stand in one place and Muslims in another. One Serb, a 50-year-old man known as "Ljubo," refused to be separated from his Muslim neighbors, with whom he apparently had lived peacefully for many years. His refusal to be separated from his neighbors enraged the Serbian soldiers. They dragged him to the ground, and five or six of them beat him until he was dead. The witness and a group of about 40 other Muslims from the area were then used as human shields and marched through a heavily contested combat zone to waiting Serb vehicles some 300 meters away. From there, they were driven to Trapare, a camp or assembly area some 3 kilometers away. After their arrival at Trapare, a young girl--about 12 years old--was taken from her father. About six men took the girl behind a nearby bunker. The witness said she then could hear the most terrible screaming and crying she had ever heard. After the father collapsed, he was dragged at knife point to the bunker and forced to watch as the soldiers repeatedly raped his daughter, an ordeal which lasted about an hour. Neither the father nor his daughter was returned to the others afterward. The witness believes both were killed. (Department of State) 5 May: In an October letter to President Bush, a Muslim refugee from Brcko described in detail his internment in Brcko camp in northern Bosnia. Below is an informal translation of segments of the letter pertaining to Brcko: On May 5 a representative of the Yugo army in a radio broadcast instructed the citizens in my part of the town to go to the army barracks, from where the Yugo army would organize an evacuation to a safer place. Upon our arrival at the barracks, we realized we were all in a trap because there, together with the regular army, were Chetniks and other Serbian refuse. They offered to give us rifles if we would fight against our own people for the Serbian cause. The Muslims and Croats silently refused. Our wives and children were put on a bus and were taken to an unknown destination. At gunpoint, we were also put on a bus. We were taken to one of Brcko's places of execution, a physical education hall in the center of the town. We noticed, from the puddles of blood on the floor, that the executions had already begun. For the couple hundred of us who were locked up, the long hours of torture began. . . . they took four of us out for execution. They put one of us against the wall and. . . shot him in the back with a machine gun. Looking at the holes in his back. . . I lost consciousness, and my body crumbled onto pieces of glass. My fainting awakened a bit of humanity in the Serbs' leader. He ordered them to bring me back to the hall, where I could rest a little. One of the Serbs took satisfaction in removing my glasses and breaking them. The other three men were killed in the most cruel manner. First they were beaten in another room and left to recover a little. They were taken to a courtyard where we heard the worst sounds that a human throat can produce. We heard the dull slashes of knives cutting into human flesh. The three men were held by their legs and beaten while against the wall of the building where we were imprisoned. With about 20 more shots, the Serbs assured the three men's death. All that I have written here can be confirmed by three other witnesses who also managed to escape from that hell. I think we were lucky that we went through all this in the first days of the Serbian occupation, while the Serbian killing machinery was not so well developed yet. (Department of State)
Torture of Prisoners
Aug-Sep: A US surgeon from California spent 2 weeks in Bosnia- Herzegovina (including time at Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo) in late August and early September performing remedial urological surgery. The doctor reportedly found that Muslim and Mujahedin irregular troops-- some from Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia--had routinely performed crude, disfiguring, non-medical circumcisions on Bosnian Serb soldiers, and he treated one 18-year-old Bosnian Serb soldier who was so brutally circumcised that eventually the entire organ required amputation. (Department of State/news service) Jul-Aug: A Croatian woman, married to a Serb, was interned for 40 days at the Bosnian Government-run detention center at the former Yugoslav National army (JNA) Viktor Bubanj Barracks in Sarajevo. During her confinement, guards--whom she identified as Muslims--routinely beat the more than 300 prisoners, including 30 women. She saw one woman covered with bruises from head to toe after being so abused. She herself was beaten several times. Another woman cut by glass during a mortar attack was left overnight to bleed, as the guards taunted her that "It is your people who are killing you, not us." This witness was released in late August. (Department of State) 11 Jun-10 Oct: A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim agricultural technician from Kotor Varos was arrested as a civilian and interned in several locations in Kotor Varos. Twelve Serbian soldiers, wearing uniforms bearing white eagles, on June 11 arrested the witness in his house and beat him in his yard before escorting him to the Koza Proletaria Fur Factory, were he was interrogated and beaten further. At the fur factory, a guard put a rifle in the witness' mouth and lifted him off the floor. Another guard pulled out two of his upper teeth with pliers. He said he and 100 other men were beaten for eight days and forced to perform sexual acts on each other. He was later transferred to a room in the back of the Osnovni Sud, or town courthouse, where he was held for 31/2 months. He said that 170 men were held there under extremely oppressive conditions. His room measured only about 2.5 by 3.5 meters, yet sometimes as many as 70 men were crammed into it. Serbian guards played loud music as they beat prisoners in the adjoining rooms and in the yard. The room was filthy. They ate spoiled, moldy food and had no access to toilet facilities. Ten to 15 men had diarrhea at any one time. The prisoners' skin turned yellow from jaundice. He spent over 3 months in such conditions without ever taking a bath or washing his clothes. On October 10, the witness and two other Muslims were exchanged for one Serb. Three Serbian guards, whom he recognized, brought him to the courthouse yard where they beat him viciously, then tied his arms and legs together like a sheep and forced him to "baah." Later they tied him to a land rover Jeep and drove to the hospital, with the witness running behind the car. Upon arrival, they forced him to crawl, baah, and eat grass, and then they told him to throw up the grass because it was Serbian grass. One guard brought some very acidic gun-cleaning oil and made the witness drink half a liter of it. He began to have stomach convulsions immediately. A second pulled up his sleeve and extinguished eight cigarettes on his arm. Soon afterward he was released to Muslim forces in the village of Vecici. (Department of State) May-Nov: A woman from Zrenjanin, a town in southern Vojvodina, reported that her husband, a Muslim, was detained by police on May 10 and remains to this day with about 200 other Muslims, most from Bosanski Samac or its immediate environs, in two large warehouses adjacent to the central police station in Bosanski Samac, a town on the Croatian/Bosnian border in Bosnia. On several occasions when this woman was able to visit the detention facility, she talked with her husband and helped treat prisoners who had been beaten brutally. The prisoners she treated had been beaten on the head, arms, and torso. Many had had their arms broken. Her husband said that he had been beaten severely during the first several days of his incarceration, and that he had never been told why he was being held. Other members of her husband's family--including his mother, his sister, and his sister's children--were also detainees in Bosanski Samac. Her husband claimed that the conditions were very bad in the facility and that the prisoners were given only one meal a day, which often consisted of only bread. (Department of State)
Deliberate Attacks on Non-Combatants
18 Nov: Bosnian Serbs on November 18 shelled the main north-south highway near the city of Mostar, which forced a UN food convoy and its escort of Spanish UN peace-keeping troops to abandon an attempt to bring food and housing materials to Sarajevo. (The Washington Post) 6 Nov: Serbian artillery stationed in northeastern Bosnia fired 100 shells into Croatia at Zupanja and surrounding villages, causing the death of two persons, including a 2-year- old child, and injuring another child. Heavy damage to houses was also reported. (Department of State) 7-8 Nov: Bosnian Serbs on November 8 halted relief convoys along the Mostar road. An UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] (UK)-escorted convoy was stopped by Croatian Defense Council (HVO) forces 10 kilometers north of Mostar. (Department of State) Bosnian Serbs on November 7 fired up to 200 rounds of machine gun, mortar, and automatic rifle fire at a British convoy that was trying to find routes for United Nations aid convoys near Tuzla, hitting a British Land Rover. "This is the first time we have come under direct fire, and the first time we have returned fire," according to a UK Ministry of Defense spokesman. (London Press Association)
Wanton Devastation and Destruction of Property
25 May: A 43-year-old Muslim from Hambarine watched from a nearby hill as Serbian artillery demolished the neighboring village of Kozarac on May 25. The artillery unit was part of the so-called Serbian "White Eagles" militia organization, whose commander and tank unit leader he identified. (Department of State) 17 May: Kozarac, in Bosnian Krajina, was flattened in May by Serbian forces. (New York Newsday) Apr-Oct: From the beginning of the war in April, Serbian Democratic party (SDS) paramilitaries in the hills around Sarajevo have bombarded the city, which has little in it that could be called a military target. The assault on the city has damaged or destroyed hospitals, schools, residential buildings, mosques, churches, and all kinds of other civilian facilities. (Department of State) Fall 1991: Serbian forces in the fall of 1991 left Vukovar and several surrounding towns, in the Sector East United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) of Croatia, looking like Berlin--circa 1945. Nearly every residential, commercial, cultural, and religious structure was gutted or damaged severely. Grain elevators, cranes in the port along the river, factories, and high-rise apartment buildings were rendered virtually useless and uninhabitable. (Department of State)
Other, Including Mass Forcible Expulsion and Deportation of Civilians
Nov: Serb military authorities began in early November 1992 forcibly to mobilize ethnic Croats and Muslims in the Banja Luka area and have taken 50 to 200 such conscripts from the suburbs of Gornji Seher and Debeljaci because, according to a Serb official, "There are too many Muslims here." (Department of State) 26 May: A 35-year-old Muslim woman, a resident of Trnopolje long before it gained notoriety as the site of a brutal internment camp, was present on May 26 when trucks and tractors hauled in thousands of children and elderly Muslims from the nearby town of Kozarac, fol-lowing its destruction by Serbian artillery. The newly arrived refugees were settled on the grounds of the local elementary school. The Muslim woman and other town residents were permitted to pass food to them through fences that were being erected around the facility. During the first 5 days, it was the only food the new arrivals received. Additionally, all the homes in the area were forced to take in large number of Kozarac residents. Her family took in 38 of those refugees. Many of the refugees, including those in her home, were eventually transported in railroad freight cars--about a hundred to a car--to facilities further away. On July 8, soldiers came to the house and said the entire village was being "ethnically cleansed." She and her family were forced from her home. Three days later, she and her children were herded with others into a railroad car and forced out near Muslim-controlled territory, whence they made their way to refuge abroad. (Department of State) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

The Need To Respond to War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Statement at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Geneva, Switzerland Date: Dec, 16 199212/16/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] Just under 4 months ago, an important milestone was reached with the convening of the London International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. Commitments were made both by the parties to the Yugoslav conflict and by the international community itself--commitments to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid; to lift the barbaric siege of cities; to halt all military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina; to group all heavy weapons under UN monitoring; to open up and shut down all detention camps; to tighten sanctions against the aggressor; and to prevent the conflict's spread to neighboring regions and countries. Some of those commitments have been kept, particularly in the area of sanctions monitoring, and in efforts to prevent a further widening of the war. Most importantly, London established a negotiating mechanism centered here in Geneva, which has brought the international community and the various ex-Yugoslav parties together on an ongoing basis, and which, thanks to the efforts of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, remains a viable forum for an eventual settlement of the war. But let us be clear: We find ourselves today in Geneva because most of the commitments made in London have not been kept, and because the situation inside the former Yugoslavia has become increasingly desperate. Thus, we meet to discuss how the international community will respond in order to force compliance with the London agreements, and thereby accelerate an end to the war. It is clear in reviewing the record since London that the promises broken have been largely Serbian promises broken. It is the Serbs who continue to besiege the cities of Bosnia; Serb heavy weapons which continue to pound the civilian populations in those cities; the Bosnian Serb air forces which continue to fly in defiance of the London agreements; and Serbs who impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance and continue the odious practice of "ethnic cleansing." It is now clear, in short, that Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic have systematically flouted agreements to which they had solemnly, and yet cynically, given their assent. Today we must, at a minimum, commit ourselves anew to the London agreements by: -- Redoubling our assistance efforts and continuing to press for the opening of routes for aid convoys, so that wide- spread starvation can be avoided this winter; -- Strengthening our efforts to prevent the war's spillover, particularly in the Kosovo, which we will not tolerate; and -- Tightening and better enforcing sanctions, the surest means of forcing an early end to the war. But we must also do more. It is clear that the international community must begin now to think about moving beyond the London agreements and contemplate more aggressive measures. That, for example, is why my government is now recommending that the UN Security Council authorize enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia, and why we are also willing to have the Council re-examine the arms embargo as it applies to the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, my government also believes it is time for the international community to begin identifying individuals who may have to answer for having committed crimes against humanity. We have, on the one hand, a moral and historical obligation not to stand back a second time in this century while a people faces obliteration. But we have also, I believe, a political obligation to the people of Serbia to signal clearly the risk they currently run of sharing the inevitable fate of those who practice ethnic cleansing in their name. The fact of the matter is that we know that crimes against humanity have occurred, and we know when and where they occurred. We know, moreover, which forces committed those crimes, and under whose command they operated. And we know, finally, who the political leaders are to whom those military commanders were--and still are--responsible. Let me begin with the crimes themselves, the facts of which are indisputable: -- The siege of Sarajevo, ongoing since April, with scores of innocent civilians killed nearly every day by artillery shelling; -- The continuing blockade of humanitarian assistance, which is producing thousands upon thousands of unseen innocent victims; -- The destruction of Vukovar in the fall of 1991, and the forced expulsion of the majority of its population; -- The terrorizing of Banja Luka's 30,000 Muslims, which has included bombings, beatings, and killings; -- The forcible imprisonment, inhumane mistreatment, and willful killing of civilians at detention camps, including Banja Luka/Manjaca, Brcko/Luka, Krajina/Prnjavor, Omarska, Prijedor/Keraterm, and Trnopolje/Kozarac; -- The August 21 massacre of more than 200 Muslim men and boys by Bosnian Serb police in the Vlasica Mountains near Varjanta; -- The May-June murders of between 2,000 and 3,000 Muslim men, women, and children by Serb irregular forces at a brick factory and a pig farm near Brcko; -- The June mass execution of about 100 Muslim men at Brod; and -- The May 18 mass killing of at least 56 Muslim family members by Serb militiamen in Grbavci, near Zvornik. We know that Bosnian Serbs have not alone been responsible for the massacres and crimes against humanity which have taken place. For example, in late October Croatian fighters killed or wounded up to 300 Muslims in Prozor, and between September 24-26, Muslims from Kamenica killed more than 60 Serb civilians and soldiers. We can do more than enumerate crimes; we can also identify individuals who committed them. For example: -- Borislay Herak is a Bosnian Serb who has confessed to killing over 230 civilians; and -- "Adil and Arif" are two members of a Croatian paramilitary force which in August attacked a convoy of buses carrying more than 100 Serbian women and children, killing over half of them. We also know the names of leaders who directly supervised persons accused of war crimes, and who may have ordered those crimes. These include: -- Zeljko Raznjatovic, whose para-military forces, the "tigers," have been linked to brutal ethnic cleansing in Zvornik, Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Grobnica; and who were also linked to the mass murders of up to 3,000 civilians near Brcko; -- Vollslay Seselj, whose "White Eagles" force has been linked to atrocities in a number of Bosnian cities, including the infamous incident at Brcko; -- Drago Prcac, commander of the Omarska Detention Camp, where mass murder and torture occurred; and -- Adem Delic, the camp commander at Celebici where at least 15 Serbs were beaten to death in August. I want to make it clear that, in naming names, I am presenting the views of my government alone. The information I have cited has been provided to the UN War Crimes Commission, whose decision it will be to prosecute or not. Second, I am not prejudging any trial proceedings that may occur; they must be impartial and conducted in accordance with due process. Third, the above listing of names is tentative and will be expanded as we compile further information. Finally, there is another category of fact which is beyond dispute--namely, the fact of political and command responsibility for the crimes against humanity which I have described. Leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, Radovan Karadzic, the self-declared President of the Serbian Bosnian Republic, and General Ratho Mladic, commander of Bosnian Serb military forces, must eventually explain whether and how they sought to ensure, as they must under international law, that their forces complied with international law. They ought, if charged, to have the opportunity of defending themselves by demonstrating whether and how they took responsible action to prevent and punish the atrocities I have described which were undertaken by their subordinates. I have taken the step today of identifying individuals suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity for the same reason that my government has decided to seek UN authorization for enforcing the no-fly zone in Bosnia and why we are now willing to examine the question of lifting the arms embargo as it applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is because we have concluded that the deliberate flaunting of Security Council resolutions and the London agreements by Serb authorities is not only producing an intolerable and deteriorating situation inside the former Yugoslavia, it is also beginning to threaten the framework of stability in the new Europe. It is clear that the reckless leaders of Serbia, and of the Serbs inside Bosnia, have somehow convinced themselves that the international community will not stand up to them now, and will be forced eventually to recognize the fruits of their aggression and the results of ethnic cleansing. Tragically, it also appears that they have convinced the people of Serbia to follow them to the front lines of what they proclaim to be an historic struggle against Islam on behalf of the Christian West. It is time to disabuse them of these most dangerous illusions. The solidarity of the civilized and democratic nations of the West lies with the innocent and brutalized Muslim people of Bosnia. Thus, we must make it unmistakably clear that we will settle for nothing less than the restoration of the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with its territory undivided and intact, the return of all refugees to their homes and villages, and, indeed, a day of reckoning for those found guilty of crimes against humanity. It will undoubtedly take some time before all these goals are realized, but then there is time, too, though not much, for the people of Serbia to step back from the edge of the abyss. There is time, still, to release all prisoners; to lift the siege of cities; to permit humanitarian aid to reach the needy; and to negotiate for peace and for a settlement guaranteeing the rights of all minorities in the independent states of the former Yugoslavia. But in waiting for the people of Serbia, if not their leaders, to come to their senses, we must make them understand that their country will remain alone, friendless, and condemned to economic ruin and exclusion from the family of civilized nations for as long as they pursue the suicidal dream of a Greater Serbia. They need, especially, to understand that a second Nuremberg awaits the practitioners of ethnic cleansing, and that the judgment, and opprobrium, of history awaits the people in whose name their crimes were committed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Identifying Yugoslav War Criminals

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Opening statement from a news conference, Geneva, en route Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] I think I mentioned to you when we were coming here that I had this talk with Elie Wiesel in Washington, [DC]. He really impressed me on the question of how much longer we go on without focusing on the fact that what's going on there is, on top of everything else, a humanitarian tragedy. As I listened to him--and he's a very eloquent fellow--I decided it was time we started. The earlier argument had been, with some merit, that if you name names . . . if you move toward peace, it makes it harder for them to back off where they've been because they're afraid they're going to get accused of some crime. We listened to that argument for awhile--a long time--but the fact of the matter is it hasn't gotten any better. The fact of the matter is that things are going on there that are absolutely outrageous of which ethnic cleansing is sort of the catch-all phrase for this but, prison camps, torture, and all of those things. So, I just decided, after listening to Elie Wiesel, that he was probably right. We needed to take this to a different level. I don't know that it's going to solve anything or change anything, but I think it's time, when we have the facts--and we do in some of those cases fairly clearly--that we begin to name names; let them understand that, over the long run, they may be able to run but they can't hide; that we're going to pursue them and raise some questions amongst the more senior people about the degree of their responsibility for what these others do. And, hopefully, at the same time--and I only hope--convince some of those who may try to pull the same outrages that they ought to be careful and not do it, because they will be in the same boat as those who have done these things. So, anyway, after talking with Elie Wiesel and thinking about it a bit, I decided it was time we started naming names. Now, the names we put in that statement today are just some of the highlights of all of these documents we've turned over to the United Nations. It was an attempt to try to force the international community to pay more attention to this issue and to send a message to Yugoslavia--what was Yugoslavia. I'm going to make as sure as I can that we get what I said on Voice of America to Serbia so they can hear some of that. And, for whatever period of time is left to us, that is until the 20th of January, this is going to be a theme. And, I hope the next administration will pick it up. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

NATO Support for the "No-Fly" Zone In the Former Yugoslavia

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Excerpts from remarks at a press conference, Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: NATO [TEXT] First of all, I do think we made a real advance on the general question of the relationship between NATO and peace-keeping, and fundamentally the alliance has said that we're prepared to provide assets to help in peace- keeping. Now then, when you get to the specifics about Yugoslavia, which is where I spent a lot of my time focused on that issue today, I think there are some things that are important here. Let me say first of all--because I watched the previous press conference-- to those of you who wonder whether this alliance did or did not support a no-fly zone and, if not, why not, let me put it to you this way: The issue, as such, never even really came up, and I suppose if I had wanted to push it, I could. But I think if you take a look at the language specifically relating to the no-fly zone, what you see is [that] they say, if the United Nations passes a no-fly zone resolution, we're prepared to provide assets--that is, the alliance, and that includes the United States--to enforce that no-fly zone resolution. Frankly, it never occurred to me in the way you've asked the question, because it seems to me that if we say if a no-fly zone resolution is passed, we'll support it with assets--the question that was fundamental here. I'll also say to you [that] I didn't hear any discussion today--in the various meetings--in which anybody really raised the question of a no-fly zone and the wisdom of it. There was discussion--and there has been all week everywhere I've been--over the impact of enforcing a no-fly zone resolution on how well we are able to continue humanitarian assistance. While I do not think that question should stand in the way of enforcement, there is no question about it, that's a perfectly legitimate question to ask. In other words, if we're going to enforce no-fly, how do we deal with the questions of whether we will be able to continue humanitarian assistance during that process. The Yugoslav resolution also makes it clear that impeding relief shipments is a crime, and that those who have committed those crimes will be held responsible. The subject of criminal behavior by too many people in what was Yugoslavia is a subject I've been talking about all week. I was glad to see that we were able to get agreement on that. It indicates that if the United Nations requests it, the alliance will respond, if UNPROFOR [UN Protective Force] or other UN personnel are threatened or harmed. Again, that obviously means we would have to use NATO assets to do that. I would also say to you, although you may want to ask me more specifically, that--to some degree, at least-- must be an answer to Mr. Karadzic's rather unwise threats of yesterday. This is another step forward, I think. The Yugoslav section clearly demonstrated concern over Kosovo, supported the dispatch of UN forces to prevent violence there, and did say that if there is an explosion in Kosovo, it would be a serious threat to international peace and security. And we would be prepared to take appropriate measures should that happen. Again, you can ask me what "appropriate" means. I'll give you the same answer the Secretary General did. That will be decided at the time, but it seems to me it is a step forward from anything this alliance has said before with regard to Kosovo. Now, I want to go back to the fundamental communique for just a minute, because there's a point I want to make here. In that communique, it stressed the need to secure early ratification of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] agreement and the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. I just want to make it clear that the United States is not particularly happy with the delays that are taking place with regard to the ratification of those two treaties by Ukraine. I saw the Ukrainian Foreign Minister some time earlier this week. I don't remember where it was. It was in Stockholm, as a matter of fact, and was told then that the parliament--the Ukraine Parliament could not deal with those treaties this month. Well, we've got to live with their parliamentary procedures, but I made it clear to him, and I don't mind making it clear publicly, that we have been discussing the issue of ratification of those two treaties with Ukrainian leaders for some months. We expect them to be ratified and without reservations. And, as I indicated to the Foreign Minister when I saw him, if they are not ratified or if the delay goes on much longer, it inevitably will have an impact on the bilateral relationship between the United States and Ukraine. So in a way, ladies and gentlemen, I'm taking advantage of you to send a message publicly. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

North Atlantic Council Ministerial (NAC) Communique

NATO Source: NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium Description: Communique Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, USSR (former) Subject: NATO, CSCE, Arms Control, United Nations [TEXT] 1. We have met today at a time of serious challenges to European security arising from regional conflicts. We have consulted on this grave situation and on the contributions that the Atlantic Alliance can make to meeting these challenges. As the Harmel Report emphasized 25 years ago, the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This remains our goal. In our new Strategic Concept, we have recognised the changing security environment. To meet the new risks and challenges, we will use Alliance resources and expertise in a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions, while continuing to ensure an effective collective defence.
Transatlantic Link
2. The transatlantic partnership, which is embodied in our Alliance, remains vital for European security and stability. The Alliance not only guarantees its members' security, but also remains one of the indispensable instruments for promoting stability and shaping change throughout Europe. An effective Atlantic Alliance and a continuing active, broad cooperation between Europe and North America are essential for a durable order of peace and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area. The substantial presence of US armed forces in Europe and the continuing political and military commitment and active engagement in European security of both the United States and Canada will remain essential. The tasks we face in supporting the process of democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union underscore the importance of maintaining a strong transatlantic partnership based on a community of values and purpose.
NATO's Role in Peacekeeping
3. Following the decision which we took in Oslo, we have reviewed the progress made concerning Alliance support for CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] peacekeeping, and have instructed the Council in Permanent Session to complete its work on this issue. We will further strengthen Alliance coordination in peacekeeping, and develop practical measures to enhance the Alliance's contribution in this area. The Military Committee has already advised the Council in Permanent Session of the resources available and the modalities for possible Alliance support for peacekeeping. We are ready to share experiences in peacekeeping with our Cooperation Partners and other CSCE participating states, and to join them as required in supporting CSCE peacekeeping operations. 4. We confirm today the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case- by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security. We are ready to respond positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary-General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. We have asked NATO's Secretary General to maintain in this respect, under the guidance of the Council in Permanent Session, the necessary contacts with the Secretary-General of the UN regarding the assistance that the Alliance could provide. 5. In this spirit, we are contributing individually and as an Alliance to the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions relating to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. For the first time in its history, the Alliance is taking part in UN peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement operations. The Alliance, together with the WEU, is supporting with its ships in the Adriatic the enforcement of the UN economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and of the arms embargo against all republics of former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] is using elements from the Alliance's NORTHAG [Northern Army Group, Central Europe] command for its operational headquarters. NATO airborne early-warning aircraft-- AWACS--are monitoring daily the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia- Hercegovina.
Relations with Cooperation Partners and NACC
6. The Alliance is helping to promote stability throughout the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia and is supporting their reform processes. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC], created a year ago, has developed into a valuable forum for consultations on security and conflict prevention. We have built up a broad and diverse programme of practical cooperation in areas where our Alliance has competence and expertise. We intend to develop further this dynamic cooperative process step by step, giving it a more practical focus. We have prepared, together with our cooperation partners, a new and expanded Work Plan for 1993. The commitment of all partners to full respect for human rights and democratic principles, as set out in the CSCE documents and in accordance with their international legal obligations, will continue to be the basis of our cooperation. We welcome all positive steps taken in this regard by our North Atlantic Cooperation Council partners, and urge continued efforts.
Strengthening the CSCE Structures
7. The CSCE has an essential role to play in developing a cooperative approach to security and in conflict prevention and crisis management. We support the further strengthening of CSCE structures and the extension of the CSCE's authority and operational involvement in the prevention of conflict. We welcome in this respect the strategy of active diplomacy agreed at the CSCE Ministerial Council in Stockholm. We welcome, in particular, the strengthening of the CSCE's operational capabilities through structural reforms and the appointment of a Secretary General; the appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities; and the establishment of additional mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. As required, we will support the work of the CSCE with whatever experience and expertise we can usefully contribute. 8. We attach great importance to the Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna, established by the CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting as a framework for shaping a new relationship of cooperative security among all CSCE participating states. We have put forward, in association with other participating states, a number of proposals for the Programme for Immediate Action agreed in Helsinki dealing with the harmonisation of existing arms control obligations, with defence planning and with the non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms transfers. We will continue to develop further proposals. We urge all states of the CSCE to participate in the Vienna Forum as well as in all the other CSCE fora.
Practical Relationship between NATO and WEU
9. We reaffirm our support for the development of a common European foreign and security policy and defence identity as reflected in the Declaration of Peace and Cooperation adopted by the Alliance in Rome on 8 November 1991 and in the Treaty and Declarations adopted by the European Community and the Western European Union [WEU] in Maastricht on 9 and 10 December 1991. We believe that the Alliance's interests are best served by a more united Europe and that the maintenance of a strong Atlantic Alliance will be a fundamental element in any emerging European defence policy. 10. We welcome the results of the WEU Ministerial Council meeting in Rome on 20 November, which confirmed the participation of all European Allies in the activities of the WEU as full members, associate members or observers, thereby reinforcing the European pillar of the Alliance. We also welcome the progress made by the WEU in further developing its operational role and structures. These developments will facilitate close working relations and interaction between NATO and the WEU. Our cooperation in the Adriatic is a case in point. We reaffirm the importance of maintaining Allies' existing obligations and commitments of forces to NATO and we emphasise in this regard that the primary responsibility of forces answerable to the WEU will remain NATO's collective defence under the Washington Treaty. 11. We have endorsed an Alliance document proposing guidelines for the practical working relations between the two organisations. These arrangements will help to ensure that all the Allies are properly involved in decisions that may affect their security. We look forward to the transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat to Brussels early in 1993, which will allow close practical cooperation between the two Councils and Secretariats. We welcomed the presence of the Secretary General of the WEU, Mr. Willem van Eekelen, who participated in our meeting for the first time. We are committed to ensuring that the two organisations continue to work on the basis of transparency and complementarity, recognising that it is for each of them to take its own decisions. We reiterate our appreciation of the fact that in stating their aim of introducing joint positions into the process of consultation in the Alliance, the WEU member states have affirmed that the Alliance will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty; and also of WEU's stated intention to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of the WEU member states in the Alliance and to act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Alliance. 12. We express our satisfaction at the initiative taken by the French and German governments in submitting to the Council their joint proposal on the relationship between the European Corps they have created and the Alliance. This major unit, which we note is open to the other WEU partners, is a step forward in strengthening both the European security and defence identity and the European pillar of the Alliance. We welcome the agreement between the French and German Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe on the conditions under which the Corps is to be used within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. This agreement will be considered by the Military Committee and submitted expeditiously to the Council in Permanent Session for approval.
Regional Issues
13. The use of force in contravention of international law for whatever goal is intolerable. Regional conflicts cannot be settled through violence, but only through negotiations and full respect for human and democratic rights, including those of persons belonging to national minorities, the territorial integrity of all states and the inviolability of all frontiers in accordance with CSCE principles and other relevant international commitments and norms. We remain profoundly concerned by the continuing violence in the former Yugoslavia, including the abhorrent practice referred to as "ethnic cleansing," and have issued today a separate statement on this conflict. 14. We deeply regret the ongoing hostilities in and around Nagorno- Karabakh. We urge the parties involved to establish an effective ceasefire. We strongly support UN and CSCE principles as well as all steps and decisions taken by the CSCE in relation to the present conflict. We continue to believe the proposed CSCE Conference in Minsk offers an immediate opportunity to achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict, and we support efforts to convene the conference on the basis of the continuation of the work begun in the framework of the Rome meeting. 15. Completion of the expeditious withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states under appropriate withdrawal agreements is important in view of the overriding principle that military forces should be stationed on the territory of a foreign state only with the consent of that state. The continuation of the withdrawal process will be a major contribution to stability in the Baltic region. We recognise that practical difficulties have to be overcome, but temporary problems should not be allowed to delay the overall process. This withdrawal should not be linked to other issues. We invite all parties to exercise flexibility and moderation in negotiations to resolve remaining problems, including those of a social and material nature.
Arms Control
16. We welcome the definitive entry into force on 9 November of the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, which, together with the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strengths of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1-A), we consider one of the foundations of European security. We stress, following the end of the CFE baseline validation period, the importance of all parties adhering to the schedule for the reduction of Treaty-limited equipment as well as to the information exchange, verification and other provisions of the Treaty. 17. We look forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty on Open Skies and to adherence to it by interested states participating in the CSCE which were not original signatories to the Treaty as provided for by Article XVII of the Treaty and called for in the CSCE Open Skies Declaration of 24 March 1992. 18. We welcome the consolidation by CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states of former Soviet tactical weapons in Russia, the adherence to the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and the commitments by those three states to eliminate all nuclear weapons on their territories. We urge the earliest possible ratification of the START Treaty in conformity with the Lisbon Protocol by those State Parties having not yet done so. We reiterate our expectation that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine will take rapid steps to fulfil their repeated commitments to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. Failure to do so would be a cause of serious concern. We also renew our call upon them to expedite the elimination from their territories of nuclear weapons as agreed. We welcome all agreements concluded by Allies with Russia to facilitate the rapid, safe and secure elimination of former Soviet nuclear weapons. Allies underline their continuing readiness to support this process of elimination and to consult on the matter in the Alliance. 19. We welcome the agreement last June between the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear forces substantially below START levels, and in particular the decision to eliminate all multiple-warhead land-based strategic missiles. 20. We welcome the successful achievement of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention. We look forward to becoming original signatories of the Convention, and commit ourselves to its early ratification. We call on all other states to do likewise. 21. We remain fully committed to ongoing efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, as well as illegal arms transfers. We urge all countries that have not yet done so, particularly those located in regions where the risks of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as the acquisition of relevant technology have increased alarmingly in recent years, to become parties to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention, and to commit themselves to signing and ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention as soon as possible. Strict compliance with these accords is essential. We reaffirm our support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and for its indefinite extension in 1995. We urge transparency and restraint in the field of conventional arms transfers. We support the newly established UN Register of Conventional Arms and urge all UN member states to provide by next April all required data in order to enable this Register to be fully operational and effective. 22. We were honoured by the presence of Minister Pierre Harmel at our meeting. Despite all that has been accomplished in recent years, we have not yet achieved the just and lasting peaceful order in Europe which the Harmel Report laid down as the goal of our Alliance. We had hoped that conflict and cruelty might be banished from the continent. In the face of the new challenges, that hope remains, and we will strive to our utmost to realise it. The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to make an essential contribution to securing peace and stability. 23. We have asked the Secretary General, Mr. Manfred Worner, to remain in office until 30th June 1996, and noted with pleasure his acceptance. 24. The Spring 1993 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session will be held in Athens in June.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

NATO Statement on the Former Yugoslavia

NATO Source: NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium Description: Released by the North Atlantic Council's Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, USSR (former) Subject: NATO, CSCE, Arms Control [TEXT] 1. We are profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace, security, and stability. Recent meetings in Edinburgh, Stockholm and Geneva have made clear the international community's impatience with the situation, its determination that the carnage and lawlessness in former Yugoslavia be brought to a halt, and its commitment to a negotiated, peaceful and lasting settlement. We are contributing individually and as an Alliance to the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, and we are prepared to respond to further requests for such contributions. 2. Primary responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies with the present leadership of Serbia and of the Bosnian Serbs. They have sought territorial gains by force and engaged in systematic gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including the barbarous practice of "ethnic cleansing." There is the systematic detention and rape of Muslim women and girls. Relief convoys are being harassed and delayed. All such acts must cease. Those individuals responsible for atrocities, whatever party they belong to, are accountable for their actions and liable to be judged accordingly. To this end, we welcome consideration of the creation of an ad hoc tribunal. 3. We reject any unilateral changes in borders, territory, or populations. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina must be restored. We call upon all parties in Bosnia- Herzegovina to accept the Geneva Conference draft outline constitution as a basis for negotiations. We strongly support the continuing efforts of the UN and EC Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). 4. We are deeply concerned about possible spillover of the conflict, and about the situation in Kosovo. We call urgently on all parties to act with restraint and moderation. Serious negotiations on the restoration of autonomy to Kosovo within Serbia and the guarantee of full human rights should begin immediately under the ICFY. We are in favour of a UN preventive presence in Kosovo. An explosion of violence in Kosovo could, by spreading the conflict, constitute a serious threat to international peace and security and would require an appropriate response by the international community . 5. We support CSCE efforts and a substantial increase in international conflict prevention measures, such as monitoring missions, and expect cooperation from all parties. We urge further speedy preventive steps by the UN or the CSCE to help defuse existing tensions. In that context, we welcome the decision of the United Nations Security Council to place peacekeeping forces on the borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with Albania and Serbia and Montenegro. 6. Strict enforcement of UN embargoes is essential. We urge nations to continue efforts to tighten their enforcement. 7. The Alliance has contributed personnel and equipment to the UNPROFOR II Headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is helping to enforce UN embargoes in the Adriatic, and is providing to the UN data obtained from NATO Airborne Early-Warning (AWACS) aircraft to help monitor the Bosnia-Herzegovina no- fly zone. Members of the Alliance are prepared to take further steps to assist the UN in implementing its decisions to maintain international peace and security. 8. The Security Council will shortly consider adopting a resolution on enforcement of the No-Fly Zone, bearing in mind the need to continue the current humanitarian effort in Bosnia. Should such a resolution be adopted, and should violations continue thereafter, we would be prepared to support the UN in enforcing that resolution. 9. In view of the continuing attacks on Sarajevo, we urge the Security Council to consider further measures as soon as possible, as set out in the 9th December Statement of the UN Security Council President. 10. All parties, but in particular the Serbian authorities, in and outside Bosnia-Herzegovina must cooperate fully with UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] and UNPROFOR. We recall that UNSCR 770 authorizes all measures necessary to ensure relief deliveries to Bosnia, and that interference in relief activities is an international crime. All must refrain from any action which might jeopardize the safety of UNPROFOR and other UN personnel. If requested by the UN, the Alliance would be prepared to take appropriate measures if any of these personnel are threatened or harmed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe Subject: NATO, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control [TEXT]
NATO Today
NATO continues to provide Western governments the optimal instrument to coordinate their efforts at defense and arms control and to build a durable European order of peace. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the progress of European integration have not ended the need for NATO's essential commitment to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with UN principles. The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued after the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council in July 1990, signaled the vitality of the alliance in adapting to security needs in a post-Cold War world. At that meeting, NATO allies announced a fundamental review of strategy and invited the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to establish regular diplomatic liaison and to develop a new partnership. The November 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation further underlined NATO's intention to redefine its objectives in light of changed circumstances. The declaration took into account the broader challenges to alliance security interests, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, and terrorism. It outlined its future tasks in the context of a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community, and the Council of Europe, working together to build a new European security system. It created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to develop an institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries. This initiative culminated in the participation of Foreign Ministers and representatives from the 16 NATO countries, 6 Central and East European countries, and the 3 new independent Baltic states at the inaugural meeting of the NACC in December 1991. At a second meeting of the NACC in March 1992, the new independent states of the former Soviet Union became members, except Georgia, which was admitted the following month. Albania joined the NACC in June 1992. The "New Strategic Concept" announced at the Rome meeting stresses the alliance's mission in crisis management and mandates a more flexible force structure and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In June 1992, NATO Foreign Ministers expressed concern over continuing violence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and affirmed their readiness to support peace-keeping activities under the auspices of the CSCE on a case-by-case basis. On July 10, 1992, the North Atlantic Council agreed on a NATO maritime operation in the Adriatic, in coordination with the WEU, to monitor compliance with the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. On September 2, 1992, the Council approved UN humanitarian relief efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On November 18, 1992, NATO allies agreed to enforce a naval blockade against Serbia and Montenegro, again in coordination with the WEU, following a UN Security Council resolution to tighten economic sanctions. On December 17, 1992, the Council agreed to support the United Nations in enforcing its October 9, 1992, resolution declaring a ban on military flights over Bosnia- Herzegovina. NATO's role as a forum for political consultation and an association of nations committed to collective defense remains unchanged, even as its new responsibilities in the areas of peace-keeping and crisis management continue to evolve.
US-NATO Relations: "The Trans-Atlantic Partnership"
The decision of the United States after World War II to participate in a regional peace-time, defensive alliance represented a fundamental change in American foreign policy. The United States recognized that its interests no longer could be confined to the limits of the Western hemisphere: US security was linked inextricably to the future of the West European democracies. Concepts of individual liberty and the rule of law, coupled with those of a common heritage and shared values, provided the foundation for the NATO alliance. These ideals, as well as the ongoing goal of each member country to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, continue to link the fate of America to that of its NATO allies. The history of US engagement in NATO has been one of commitment by America and its allies to reduce tensions in Europe and to improve East- West relations. They have pursued a series of initiatives designed to lower levels of personnel and equipment and increase mutual confidence, while adhering to a policy of political cohesion and military strength. Arms control measures aimed at enhancing stability have included the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990. The CFE Treaty between the allies and the nations and successor states of the former Warsaw Pact provides for an unprecedented level of transparency in the security field through an information exchange and obligatory inspections. Most importantly, it mandates a sharp reduction in conventional weapons throughout Europe. The NATO allies coordinate closely to meet their own obligations under the treaty and to ensure Eastern compliance in its information, verification, and reduction provisions. NATO has played a leading role in developing far-reaching proposals for CSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Alliance proposals on force planning, non-proliferation, and harmonization of existing arms control commitments already are being developed. The United States supports the development of a greater European security identity and defense role as a means of strengthening the integrity and effectiveness of NATO. At the NATO summit in Rome, the alliance welcomed the prospect of a European political union with a greater security and defense dimension but underlined that this would not diminish the need for NATO. The alliance's "New Strategic Concept" also reaffirmed the essential nature of the trans-Atlantic partnership, recognizing as a basic principle the indivisibility of security of all its members. The North Atlantic alliance and the American presence in Europe have helped keep peace for more than 40 years. Having helped to forge successful policies toward the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact since the foundation of NATO, the United States with its European allies must play a central role in building the framework of the new Euro-Atlantic architecture.
NATO Strategy
NATO collective security strategy was based on the principle of deterrence. Defense capabilities were created to deter military aggression or other forms of pressure. Parties to the treaty agreed to consult whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any party was threatened. They further pledged to maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and, should such deterrence fail, to defend the territory of the alliance. As a purely defensive alliance, NATO would maintain only a level of military strength sufficient to be credible. Given the marked inferiority of allied conventional strength in Europe, the NATO guarantee would rest primarily on the nuclear superiority of the United States. At the conclusion of a 1967 comprehensive review of NATO strategy, the alliance adopted a revised approach to the common defense, based on a balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. This reassessment of the nature of the potential threat to member countries prompted the realization that the alliance must increasingly look to the dangers of more limited forms of aggression beyond the possibility of a massive Soviet attack. The basis of the new concept of "flexible response" was the belief that NATO should be able to deter and counter military force with a range of responses designed to defend directly against attack at an appropriate level, or, if necessary, to escalate the attack to the level necessary to persuade an aggressor to desist. At the same time, the alliance accepted the recommendations of the Harmel report, titled "Future Tasks of the Alliance," which outlined the need to work toward the achievement of disarmament and balanced force reductions. The maintenance of adequate military forces would be coupled with efforts at improving East-West relations. Soviet deployment of new mobile theater nuclear missiles (SS-20s) called into question the accepted NATO strategy of deterrence based on the concepts of forward defense and flexible response and lead to a decision in 1979 to modernize its defensive capability. The resulting "dual-track" decision by the alliance combined pursuing arms control negotiations with responding appropriately to the increased imbalance created by the new Soviet systems. Alliance governments agreed to deploy US ground- launched cruise missiles in Western Europe. The successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, while eliminating all Soviet and US land-based, intermediate-range missiles, required a new appraisal of NATO policy. In response, the alliance developed its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament," which provided a framework for alliance policy in nuclear, conventional, and chemical fields of arms control, and tied defense policies to progress in arms control. The "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," issued by the North Atlantic Council in July 1990, inaugurated a major transformation to adapt to the new realities in Europe. The ministers pledged to intensify political and military contacts with Moscow and with Central and East European capitals and to work not only for the common defense but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. They underlined the need to undertake broader arms control and confidence- building agreements to limit conventional armed forces in Europe. In recognition of the radical political changes in Europe and the improved security environment, the ministers mandated a fundamental review of the alliance's political and military strategy. The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in November 1991. The threat of a massive full-scale Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's strategy during the Cold War, had disappeared after the end of the political division of Europe. The alliance acknowledged that the risks to its security, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism and sabotage, were now less predictable and beyond the focus of traditional concerns. The new strategy adopts a broader approach to security, centered more on crisis management and conflict prevention. It assumes completion of the planned withdrawal of military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full implementation of arms control agreements limiting conventional forces in Europe. In the context of changed circumstances, the alliance will maintain a mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe, although at a significantly lower level. To ensure effectiveness, alliance forces will be increasingly mobile to respond to a range of contingencies. Forces will be organized for flexible buildup to react to regional instability and crises. Collective defense arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in allied strategy but will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve stability. The new strategy reaffirms the principle of common commitment and mutual cooperation in support of the indivisibility of security for all alliance members and underscores the essential political and military link between European and North American members provided by the presence of nuclear forces in Europe.
NATO Background
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed against the backdrop of emerging post-war tensions engendered by the threat of Soviet expansionism and concern over political and economic instability in Western Europe. On April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the political framework for an international alliance designed to prevent aggression, or, if necessary, to resist attack against any alliance member. In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and by Spain in 1982. This alliance of sovereign states pledges, through a combination of political solidarity and military force, to preserve its mutual security. Reaffirming faith in the principles of individual and collective self-defense embodied in the UN Charter, the parties to the treaty pledge to defend the common heritage and civilization of their peoples and to promote stability and well- being in the North Atlantic area. While recognizing the need to maintain adequate military strength to safeguard the security of its members, the alliance also resolves to work toward the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.
NATO Structure
North Atlantic Council
The Council provides the forum for consultation and cooperation between governments on all issues affecting security. Its decisions are based on consensus, with each member having an equal right to express its views. Each government is represented on the NATO Council by a permanent representative with ambassadorial rank. The Council meets on a weekly basis, with meetings at the ministerial level twice a year. The NATO Secretary General is chairman.
Defense Planning Committee (DPC)
Composed of representatives of all countries except France; deals with overall issues of defense. Like the Council, it meets regularly at ambassadorial level and twice yearly, when member countries are represented by their defense ministers.
Nuclear Planning Group
Has authority for nuclear matters. All countries except France participate. Iceland participates as an observer.
Military Committee
The highest military authority in the alliance; is composed of the chiefs of staff of each country except France, which is represented by a military mission. Iceland, which has no military forces, is represented by a civilian member. The Military Committee advises the Council and the DPC on military measures necessary for the common defense and provides guidance to the NATO commanders.
Regional Commands
The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic treaty is divided into three regional commands: Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic, and Allied Command Channel, with a regional planning group for North America. With the exception of France and Iceland, all countries assign forces to the integrated military command structure. The NATO Defense area covers the territories of member nations in North America, in the Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, and in Europe, including Turkey. However, events occurring outside the area which affect the preservation of peace and security in the treaty area also may be considered by the Council.
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
Designed as a forum for consultation and cooperation on security and related issues, the Council institutionalizes the relationship between NATO countries and the governments of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. Finland has attended as an observer. Defense planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, and defense conversion are discussed at regular meetings of cooperation partners. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

NATO Source: North Atlantic Cooperation Council Description: Text of a communique released at the meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec, 18 199212/18/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tajikistan Subject: NATO, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control, CSCE [TEXT] 1. We, the Foreign Ministers and Representatives of the member countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council have today continued our consultations to contribute to enhanced security and cooperation in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 2. Our area faces new and difficult challenges which give rise to serious concern. Its stability and security will depend on how we are able to respond to these challenges and thereby to manage the process of change. 3. During the first year of its existence, our Council has proved its usefulness for dialogue and cooperation and for strengthening security. Its potential will be further developed and applied. To that end, we have adopted today a substantial Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation for the year 1993. It builds on the positive, mutually beneficial results of our initial Work Plan for 1992 in the political, military, economic, scientific, environmental and information fields, including defence conversion and civil/-military coordination of air traffic management. We agreed to strengthen and broaden further our partnership as a dynamic process and to give it a more practical focus. This would support the continued progress in democratic and market-oriented reforms which is essential for the success of our cooperation. Our cooperation could also take the form of activities agreed by all the partners but carried out by some of them in open-ended groups which reflect specific shared interests, for example, the pilot projects on defence conversion and on defence- related environmental issues. Active cooperation on defence matters and military contacts under our Work Plan are an important contribution to better mutual understanding among armed forces and fostering responsible and cooperative behaviour in the military field, which are essential to our efforts to help safeguard peace. We intend thus to contribute to achieving a pattern of democratically controlled and smaller military forces which are structured with defensive intent, at minimum levels consistent with legitimate security requirements. These objectives should be reflected in military doctrines. We welcome progress already made in these areas. Cooperation will be significantly increased in the science and environmental fields on priority issues. 4. The further development of our cooperation is linked to respect by all our countries for international commitments undertaken inter alia within the framework of the CSCE. We are determined to implement these commitments fully and thereby to enhance the security and stability in our area. 5. Regional tensions, conflicts and ethnic violence are threatening stability and security in our area and hampering the achievement of our goal of enhancing peaceful cooperation. We cannot allow the current process of transition in Europe to be undermined in this manner. 6. We welcome the decisions taken by the CSCE Council in Stockholm to enhance the CSCE's operational and institutional capacity to prevent conflicts, manage crises and settle disputes peacefully. We are determined to contribute to achieving these goals. 7. Our countries are ready to support and contribute on a case by case basis to peacekeeping operations under UN authority or CSCE responsibility, which ensure international legitimacy for such operations. Taking into account the decision of the 1992 CSCE Summit Meeting in Helsinki, we will exchange experience and expertise on peacekeeping and related matters; we will continue our consultations leading to cooperation on this subject in conformity with the Work Plan we have adopted. 8. Our Council is continuing to contribute to the building of a new security architecture based on cooperative relations among states and a network of mutually reinforcing institutions. 9. We condemn the use of force not sanctioned by international law as a means to pursue political goals. Permanent solutions to regional conflicts can only be reached through negotiations as well as equal and full respect for human rights, including those of persons belonging to national minorities, the territorial integrity of all states and the inviolability of their borders in accordance with CSCE principles and other relevant international commitments and norms. We pledge to use our dialogue and cooperation within the NACC to help prevent conflicts. 10. We are profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace, security, and stability. We fully support the efforts of the UN, the CSCE and the UN and EC Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on former Yugoslavia to find a negotiated and just settlement to the tragic conflict in the former Yugoslavia and call on all parties, especially the leadership of Serbia and Montenegro and of the Bosnian Serbs to cooperate with these efforts, in particular to implement strictly the decisions of the London Conference and the mandatory resolutions of the UN Security Council. Any taking of territory by force or any practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and unacceptable and must not be permitted to affect the outcome of the negotiations on constitutional arrangements for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All displaced persons must be enabled to return in peace to their former homes. We support all humanitarian efforts aimed at alleviating the plight of the population and at preventing further dislocation, e.g. through the development of safe areas for the protection of the civilian population and a provision of refuge for particularly vulnerable categories of refugees. We are gravely concerned about the risk of conflict spilling over into other areas. This would have serious implications for the region. In this connection, we are disturbed by the dangerous situation in Kosovo, developments in the Sandjak and Vojvodina and some recent events in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We stress the necessity of urgent preventive measures and support the steps that have already been taken by the United Nations and the CSCE. We welcome the UN Security Council decision to place preventive peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We believe that a UN presence in Kosovo would be a positive step. We urge all parties concerned to strive in the framework of an overall settlement of the crisis for a significant reduction in the level of armaments in the region, in particular through a comprehensive regional harmonization of arms control obligations. We deeply regret the ongoing hostilities in the conflict being dealt with by the CSCE Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh. We urge the parties involved to take immediate steps in order to establish an effective ceasefire. We strongly support UN and CSCE principles as well as all steps and decisions taken by the CSCE in relation to the present conflict. We continue to believe the proposed CSCE Conference in Minsk offers an immediate opportunity to achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict and we support efforts to convene the conference on the basis of the continuation of the work begun in the framework of the Rome meeting. We welcome the continuation of the democratization process in Georgia. We are pleased that the ceasefire agreement between Georgians and Ossetians in the area of conflict has held so far. We welcome the dispatch of the CSCE mission to the area. We hope that it will play a constructive role in promoting a political settlement. We hope that the Georgian-Russian- Ossetian Peacekeeping Force will develop a relationship of cooperation, consultation and trust with the mission. We remain deeply concerned about the conflict in Abkhazia. We call on the parties involved to establish an effective ceasefire and to work together with the CSCE and the UN Secretary-General's representatives for a lasting peaceful solution. We are pleased that the ceasefire in the Republic of Moldova is holding. We urge further efforts towards an expeditious permanent solution to the problem of the Left Bank Dniester Areas without further violence and towards agreement on the status and the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the Republic of Moldova. We support CSCE efforts to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the current situation. We urgently call for a halt to the civil strife in Tajikistan. We welcome the election of a new chairman of the national assembly and head of state of Tajikistan. We hope that this transition will help end the fighting. The restoration of peace will allow Tajikistan to focus on the challenges of democratic development in the interest of its people. 11. Completion of the expeditious withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic States under appropriate withdrawal agreements is important in view of the overriding principle that military forces may be stationed on the territory of a foreign state only with the consent of that state. The continuation of the withdrawal process will be a major contribution to stability in the Baltic region. We recognize that practical difficulties have to be overcome but they should not be allowed to unduly delay the overall process. We hope that international cooperation will help overcome those difficulties. This withdrawal should not be--and is not--linked to other issues. All parties must exercise flexibility and moderation in negotiations to resolve remaining problems, including those of social and material nature. 12. We have already achieved historic advances in arms control, disarmament and confidence building. Full implementation of existing agreements, further dialogue, transparency and confidence and security building measures, as well as the enhancement of consultation and cooperation are fundamental to increased security, taking into account new political and military realities. To this end, -- We welcome entry into force and successful completion of the baseline validation period of the CFE Treaty, which has always received the support of our Council. The High Level Working Group which our Council established on 20 December 1991 has significantly contributed to this success. We are committed to full implementation of all provisions of this vital Treaty, including those on reductions, information exchange and verification. -- We will work with all CSCE countries to make the Forum for Security Cooperation a success, particularly in the areas of harmonization of existing arms control commitments, transparency in defence planning, and non-proliferation. We urge all CSCE participating states to take part in this important forum. -- We support development and definition of the concept of a code of conduct in the security field and we welcome pioneering work undertaken in this respect within the framework of the CSCE. -- We urge those states concerned which have not yet ratified the START Treaty, including the Lisbon Protocol, to do so speedily in order to permit its prompt entry into force. -- We are committed to preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We reiterate our support for the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and for its indefinite extension in 1995. We urge all countries that have not yet done so to become parties to the NPT as non- nuclear weapons states. -- We welcome the successful achievement of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention. We pledge to become original signatories and commit ourselves to its early ratification. We urge other countries to do likewise. -- We call on all countries, particularly those located in regions where the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increased alarmingly, to take all appropriate steps to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. -- We are equally committed to responsibility and restraint with respect to transfers of conventional weapons. We call on all countries to submit full relevant data to the UN Register of Conventional Arms by April 1993. -- Those of us who are signatories of the Treaty on Open Skies are committed to early ratification and entry into force. Those of us who have not yet signed the Treaty will consider the question of accession as soon as possible. We look forward to wider adherence to the Treaty by interested states which are participating in the CSCE but are not original signatories to the Treaty as provided for by Article XVII of the Treaty and called for in the CSCE Open Skies Declaration of 24 March 1992. 13. While we recognize the resource constraints faced by many of our members, we nonetheless encourage the widest possible participation in activities within the framework of our Council. 14. Having taken due notice of the statement by the Representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, we state our readiness to welcome the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as of 1 January 1993. 15. Finland attended the meeting as an observer. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe Subject: History, NATO, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control, CSCE [TEXT]
NACC Today
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) joins the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the newly free and independent states of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union in a program of political-security dialogue, partnership, and cooperation. Subjects discussed in regular meetings between allies and partner states include defense planning and budgeting, democratic concepts of civil- military relations, defense conversion, and scientific and environmental topics. Members also discuss current political issues of common concern. In this way, the NACC complements the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), NATO, the European Community, and the Council of Europe in building a Euro-Atlantic community of stable, democratic, and market-oriented societies from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
NACC's Origins
As the advent of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union and the crumbling of communist control in Eastern Europe changed the nature of the European security challenge, NATO turned from a posture of confrontation with the East to one of dialogue and cooperation. The June 1990 Turnberry North Atlantic Council ministerial and July 1990 London NATO summit extended the hand of friendship to NATO's former adversaries and called for the alliance to institute a liaison program with the Warsaw Pact states. The June 1991 Copenhagen North Atlantic Council ministerial developed this theme in its statement on "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe." In their October 3, 1991, joint statement, Secretary of State Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed the institutionalization of the NATO liaison program in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The following month, the Rome NATO summit formally established the NACC as a forum in which allies could offer their experience and expertise to partner countries on security and related issues.
A Successful First Year
In its first year of existence, NACC developed a solid basis of cooperation and dialogue. The first NACC ministerial, held on December 20, 1991, in Brussels, brought together representatives of the 16 NATO allies, the Baltic states, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Participants pledged to uphold CSCE principles, support arms control efforts, and work together in building a Europe whole and free. The second NACC ministerial, held on March 10, 1992, in Brussels, admitted all the states of the former Soviet Union except Georgia (which joined the following month). Ministers adopted the first NACC work plan, which spelled out a program of intensified consultations and cooperative activities focused on security and related issues, including political, military, economic, scientific, and environmental subjects. Specific topics for cooperation included defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air-traffic management, defense conversion, and enhanced participation in NATO's "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental programs. Ministers also pledged to cooperate in disseminating information about NATO in the partner countries and gave their support to the NACC's ad hoc High Level Group charged with facilitating CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) entry-into-force. The third NACC ministerial was held on June 5, 1992, in Oslo. Albania was admitted to membership, bringing the total membership to 37. Finland attended as an observer. Ministers reviewed progress in implementing the work plan, reaffirmed their commitment to CSCE principles, and pledged their support for arms control and non-proliferation initiatives. They also discussed regional crises and problems in the former Yugoslavia, Nagorno- Karabakh, and the Baltics.
Looking Ahead
On December 18, 1992, at the fourth NACC ministerial in Brussels, ministers adopted a new work plan focusing on practical projects and including a provision for joint planning and training for peace-keeping. They expressed strong approval of CSCE efforts to resolve peacefully hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Moldova. The Council also discussed ways to increase participation by the former Soviet states of Central Asia and the Caucasus and welcomed the future membership of separate Czech and Slovak states in the NACC as of January 1, 1993. As it begins its second year, NACC already has established itself as an important element in post-Cold War Europe's security architecture. It will continue to develop as a complement to other European and trans-Atlantic organizations forging the links of a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Euro-Atlantic community of nations. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

US-UK Policy on the Former Yugoslavia

Bush Major Source: President Bush, Prime Minister Major Description: Text of a joint statement issued by the United States and the United Kingdom and released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Camp David, Maryland. Prime Minister Major visited the United States on December 18-20, 1992. Date: Dec, 20 199212/20/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: USSR (former), United Kingdom, United States, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights [TEXT] The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom have agreed as follows. The objectives of our policy are: a) to work for a peaceful and just settlement in the former Yugoslavia; b) to prevent the spread of fighting in particular to Kosovo and Macedonia; c) to maintain the humanitarian aid effort which includes over 2,000 British troops and without which many more lives will be lost this winter. The President and Prime Minister paid tribute to the work of the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia and to the courage and dedication of the troops who are ensuring that convoys get through. They welcomed the success of the UN and its agencies, despite all the odds, in delivering large quantities of aid to those in need. They agreed on the importance of enabling that effort to go ahead. The United States and the United Kingdom have agreed to cooperate on a Resolution in the United Nations to enforce compliance with the 'no-fly' zone for Bosnia should violation of the existing ban continue. The aim of the resolution would be to prevent flights taking place other than those specifically authorized by the United Nations. The President and the Prime Minister: a) agreed that steps need to be taken to prevent the spread of fighting into Kosovo and Macedonia; b) welcomed the decision to deploy UN troops in Macedonia and hoped that this UN presence would be stepped up over the coming weeks; c) agreed also to press for the very early increase in the numbers of observers in Kosovo; d) agreed that our attitude to sanctions would depend on a rapid and radical change of policy by Serbia; e) confirmed that they would be ready, depending on Serbia's response, to impose new sanctions. They could initially include cutting postal and telecommunication links and could lead to closing the borders and complete diplomatic isolation for years to come. The President and the Prime Minister paid tribute to the work of Cy Vance and David Owen in trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement in the former Yugoslavia. Both Governments will continue to give the negotiators their full support. (###)

Dispatch, Volume 4: 1993

US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993

Title:

Signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address at signing ceremony of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, DC Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: Canada, Mexico, United States Subject: North America Free Trade [TEXT] (introductory and closing remarks deleted) Throughout history, the destiny of nations has often been shaped by change and by chance. When I say chance, I'm talking about things that happen to them. Then there are those unique nations which shape their destinies by choice, by the things that they make happen. Three such nations come together today: Mexico, Canada, and the United States. By signing the North American Free Trade Agreement, we've committed ourselves to a better future for our children and for generations yet unborn. This agreement will remove barriers to trade and investment across the two largest undefended borders of the globe and link the United States in a permanent partnership of growth with our first and third largest trading partners. The peace and friendship that we've long enjoyed as neighbors will now be strengthened by the explosion of growth and trade let loose by the combined energies of our 360 million citizens trading freely across our borders. I want to pay a personal tribute to my partners in this endeavor; two rare and gifted leaders, two special and valued friends without whose courage and leadership and vision this day could not possibly have come about. When the history of our era is written, it will be said that the citizens of all the Americas were truly fortunate that Mexico and Canada--two great nations, two proud people--were led by President Carlos Salinas and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. For Mexico, particularly, the NAFTA is a bold undertaking, made possible by President Salinas' brave reforms to reinvigorate the Mexican economy. It's especially fitting [that] an American president sign this agreement in this great Hall of the Americas, the home of the Organization of American States. NAFTA represents the first giant step toward fulfillment of a dream that has long inspired us all--the dream of a hemisphere united by economic cooperation and free competition. Because of what we have begun here today, I believe the time will soon come when trade is free from Alaska to Argentina; when every citizen of the Americas has the opportunity to share in new growth and expanding prosperity. I hope and trust that the North American free trade area can be extended to Chile, other worthy partners in South America, and Central America and the Caribbean. Free trade throughout the Americas is an idea whose time has come. A new generation of democratic leaders has staked its future on that promise, and under their leadership, a tide of economic reform and trade liberalization is transforming the hemisphere. Today, as a result, the hemisphere is growing again. For the first time in years, more capital is flowing into the Americas for new investment than is flowing out. Every major debtor nation, from Mexico to Argentina, has negotiated a successful agreement to reduce and restructure its commercial bank debt under the Brady Plan. Let me just offer a brief aside about the Brady Plan, if I might. I remember telling my good friend, Nick Brady, our Secretary of the Treasury: Okay, we'll call it the Brady Plan; but if it's successful, we're going to call it the Bush Plan. [Laughter.] And he reluctantly accepted that guidance. I think history will show that the leadership of our distinguished Secretary of the Treasury did pay off and [that] the plan has been highly successful. By the way, the name will always be, appropriately, the Brady Plan. That's the way it's going to stay. Now, under the Enterprise for the Americas [Initiative (EAI)], many nations- -Jamaica, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay--have reduced, or shortly will reduce, their official debt with the United States. EAI is working. The initiative allows interest payments on official debt to be channeled into trust funds that protect the environment and support programs for child survival. To those in other regions struggling to reform statist economies, Latin America shines as a solid example of hope that hyperinflation can be tamed. Growth can be revitalized, and new investment and trade can accelerate if developing nations stay the course through the difficult challenge of economic restructuring. These profound economic changes are a tribute to a courageous group of democratic leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean. Their revolutionary vision has altered forever the face of the Americas. Their friendship and counsel have been enormously gratifying to me as President. But these profound changes, along with the NAFTA itself, reflect a broader and, I believe, more fundamental change in relations between the United States and the nations of this hemisphere. For many decades, we've proclaimed ambitious goals for ourselves of a good neighbor policy, of an alliance for progress, of a partnership built on mutual respect and shared responsibility. And those goals now are rapidly becoming a reality. My talks with the hemisphere's leaders, in recent weeks, show a strong consensus that relations between the United States and its neighbors have never in our history been better and that this development is working to benefit all of our peoples. I take great pride in the fact that, working with those leaders, we've been a part of all of that. I believe that, in the future, America's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean will grow even stronger. I was pleased to hear President-elect Bill Clinton affirm that same goal in his remarks recently, both to the Rio Group and to the Caribbean/Latin American Action conference. This century's epic struggle between totalitarianism and democracy is over. It's dead. Democracy has prevailed. And today, we see unfolding around the world a revolution of hope and courage, propelled by the aspiration of ordinary people for freedom and a better life. The world will long remember the images of that struggle: a citizen of Berlin, sitting atop the Wall, chipping away with his hammer and chisel; Boris Yeltsin and his followers waving the flag of free Russia and defying the tanks and coup plotters. And here in this hall, it is worth remembering that those images were preceded by a democratic revolution in Latin America. No people struggled for freedom against oppression more bravely than the people of this hemisphere. And, here, too, in the Americas, we are constructing a hopeful model of the new post-Cold War world of which we dream. This is the first hemisphere, and the OAS is the first regional organization in the world to take on, through the Santiago Declaration, the formal collective responsibility to defend democracy. In this hemisphere, the weapons of mass destruction--strategic missiles as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--have been rejected voluntarily. In this hemisphere, we've created new models of multilateral cooperation and success in resolving the conflicts that have tormented Central America. As recent proof of the progress we've made, just 2 days ago we celebrated- -and I'm sure everyone did--the end of the war in El Salvador [see p. 8]. In this hemisphere, we have forged a new partnership to defeat the global menace of narco-trafficking, and we must succeed in that effort. Still, we're not satisfied. The birth of democracy has raised expectations throughout the Americas, and now democracy must deliver. The communications revolution has opened the eyes of this hemisphere's citizens to the wider world. We're no longer blind to limits on legitimate political participation, to official corruption, or to economic favoritism. If democracy is to be consolidated, the gulfs that separate the few who are very rich from the many who are very poor, that divide civilian from military institutions, that split citizens of European heritage from indigenous peoples--these gulfs must be bridged, and economic reform must ensure upward mobility and new opportunities for a better life for all citizens of the Americas. To fulfill its promise, democratic government must guarantee not only the right to regular elections but human rights and property rights, swift and impartial justice, and the rule of law. Democratic governments must deliver basic services. Their institutions must be strengthened and must be modernized. To defend democracy successfully, the OAS must strengthen the tools at its disposal. I commend the new steps that you took this week to suspend non-democratic regimes. Together, we must also create new means to end historic border disputes and to control the competition in conventional weaponry. In all of this, I believe my country, the United States of America, bears a special responsibility. We face a moment of maximum opportunity, but also, let's face it, continued risk. And we must remain engaged, for more than ever before our future is bound up with the future of the Americas. This is the fastest growing region in the world for US products. In the struggle to defend democracy, our most cherished values are at stake. Travel to Miami or El Paso, Los Angeles or Chicago or New York, and listen to the language of our neighborhoods. We are tied to the Americas--not just by geography, not just by history, but by who we are as a people. No one knows that more profoundly than this proud grandfather. This year marks the 500th anniversary of a voyage of discovery to the New World. Let this also be a time of rediscovery for my country, the United States, of the importance of our own hemisphere. If we are equal to the challenges before us, we can build in the Americas the world's first completely democratic hemisphere. Just think about that: think of the importance; think of the significance; think of the example for the rest of the world. This hemisphere can be as well a zone of peace, where trade flows freely, prosperity is shared, the rule of law is respected, and the gift of human knowledge is harnessed for all. More than 150 years ago, Simon Bolivar, the liberator whose statue stands outside this hall, spoke about an America united in heart, subject to one law and guided by the torch of liberty. My friends, here in this hemisphere we are on the way to realizing Simon Bolivar's dream. And, today, with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, we take another giant step toward making the dream a reality.
Copies of NAFTA Treaty:
Copies of the official text may be obtained from the Government Printing Office for $41 each. The US Canadian, and Mexican tariff schedules also are available for purchase (prices vary). To place an order, call (202) 783- 3238.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Country Profile: Canada

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jan, 4 19931/4/93 Category: Country Data Region: North America Country: Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics, Cultural Exchange, Democratization [TEXT]
Official Name: Canada
Geography
Area: 10 million sq. km. (3.8 million sq. mi.); second-largest country in the world. Cities: Capital--Ottawa (pop. 833,000). Other major cities--Toronto (4 million), Montreal (3 million), Vancouver (1 million). Terrain: Varied. Climate: Temperate to arctic.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Canadian(s). Population (1991 est.): 27 million. Annual growth rate (1991): 1%. Ethnic groups: British 25%, French 24%, other European 16%, indigenous Indian and Eskimo 1.5%, mixed background 28%. Religions: Roman Catholic 47%, United Church 16%, Anglican 10%. Languages: English, French. Literacy: 98% of population aged 15 and over have at least a ninth grade education. Health: Infant mortality rate--7/1,000. Life expectancy--73 yrs. male, 80 yrs. female. Work force (13.8 million, 1991): Community/business/personal service--4 million. Manufacturing--2 million. Public administration--800,000. Agriculture--400,000.
Government
Type: Confederation with parliamentary democracy. Independence: July 1, 1867. Constitution: The amended British North America Act of 1867 as "repatriated" in 1982, charter of rights, and unwritten custom. Branches: Executive--Queen Elizabeth II (head of state, represented by a governor general), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. Legislative--bicameral parliament (104-member Senate, 295-member House of Commons). Judicial--Supreme Court. Political parties: Progressive Conservative (ruling party), Liberal, New Democratic, Reform, Bloc Quebecois. Subdivisions: 10 provinces, 2 territories. Suffrage: Universal over 18. Flag: A red maple leaf on a white background flanked by vertical red bands.
Economy
GDP (1991): $580 billion. GDP growth rate (1991): -1.7%. Per capita GDP (1991): $21,500. Avg. inflation rate (1991): 5.6%. Natural resources: Petroleum and natural gas, hydroelectric power, metals and minerals, fish, forests, wildlife. Agriculture: Products--wheat, livestock and meat, feed-grains, oilseeds, dairy products, tobacco, fruits, vegetables. Industry: Types--motor vehicles and parts, fish and forest products, processed and unprocessed minerals. Trade (1991): Exports--$127 billion: motor vehicles and parts, lumber, wood-pulp and newsprint, crude and fabricated metals, natural gas, crude petroleum, wheat. Partners--US 75%, EC 8%, Japan 5%. Imports--$122 billion: motor vehicles and parts, industrial machinery, crude petroleum, chemicals, agricultural machinery. Partners--US 61%, EC 10%, Japan 7%.
Principal Government Officials
Prime Minister--Brian Mulroney Secretary of State--Barbara McDougall Ambassador to the US--Derek Burney Ambassador to the UN--Louise Frechette (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Country Profile: Mexico

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jan, 4 19931/4/93 Category: Country Data Region: North America Country: Mexico Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics, Cultural Exchange, Democratization [TEXT]
Official Name: United Mexican States
Geography
Area: 2 million sq. km. (764,000 sq. mi.); about three times the size of Texas. Cities: Capital--Mexico City (est. 20 million). Other major cities-- Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla de Zaragoza, Leon. Terrain: Coastal lowlands, central high plateaus, and mountains up to 18,000 ft. Climate: Tropical to desert.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Mexican(s). Population (1991): 89 million. Annual growth rate: 2%. Ethnic groups: Indian-Spanish (Mestizo) 60%, American Indian 30%, Caucasian 9%, other 1%. Religions: Roman Catholic 90%, Protestant 5%, other 5%. Language: Spanish. Education: Years compulsory--8. Literacy--90%. Health: Infant mortality rate--30/1,000. Life expectancy--68 yrs. male, 76 yrs. female. Work force (30 million): Services--30%. Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing--24%. Manufacturing--19%. Commerce--13%. Construction--7%. Transportation and communication--4%. Mining and quarrying--0.4%.
Government
Type: Federal republic. Independence: First proclaimed Sept. 16, 1810; republic established 1822. Constitution: Feb. 5, 1917. Branches: Executive--president (chief of state and head of government). Legislative--bicameral. Judicial--Supreme Court, local and federal systems. Political parties: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN), Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), Popular Socialist Party (PPS), Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), Party of the Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction (PFCRN). Suffrage: Universal at 18. Administrative subdivisions: 31 states and a federal district. Flag: Green, white, and red vertical bands. Centered is an eagle holding a snake in its beak and perching on a cactus.
Economy
GDP (1991): $282 billion. Per capita GDP: $3,200. Annual real GDP growth: 3.6%. Avg. inflation rate: 19%. Natural resources: Petroleum, silver, copper, gold, zinc, lead, natural gas, timber. Agriculture: Products--corn, beans, oilseeds, feedgrains, fruit, cotton, coffee, sugarcane, winter vegetables. Industry: Types--manufacturing, services, commerce, transportation and communications, petroleum and mining. Trade (1991): Exports--$27 billion: manufacturing 59%, petroleum and derivatives 30%, agriculture 9%. Imports--$38 billion: intermediate goods 63%, capital goods 22%, consumer goods 15%. Major trading partners--US, EC, Japan. US imports--$30 billion.
Principal Government Officials
President--Carlos Salinas de Gortari Foreign Minister--Fernando Solana Morales Ambassador-designate to the United States--Jorge Montano Martinez Ambassador-designate to the United Nations--Manuel Tello Macias Ambassador to the OAS--Alejandro Carrillo Castro (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

President's Remarks on START II and Somalia Trip

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Description: Opening remarks before the press at the White House, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 30 199212/30/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa Country: Russia, Somalia Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] I have just spoken this morning by telephone with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and I am very pleased to announce that we have completed agreement on the START II Treaty [the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms]. US and Russian expert teams are remaining in Geneva now to complete the formal work on the treaty text. This historic treaty will reduce by two- thirds current nuclear arsenals and will dramatically lower the numbers of strategic nuclear arms permitted by START I [the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed on July 31, 1991]. In my view, this treaty is good for all mankind. President Yeltsin and I have agreed to meet in Sochi, Russia, on January 2 and 3 [1993], where we will sign the treaty.1 I want to take this opportunity to congratulate the team standing here with me today-- [Secretary of State] Larry Eagleburger, Secretary [of Defense] Cheney, Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Powell, and others who have done a superb job on this treaty. We're going to use the occasion of the meeting in Sochi to consider a number of bilateral and regional issues and then to discuss ways to fulfill the promise and the potential of US-Russian relations. Let me just say a word about our trip to Somalia. The trip, I hope, will show the concern that all Americans feel for the people of Somalia and for their condition. These are humanitarian concerns. In my view, it is proper that the President show this concern to the people over there. I also want to make very clear how strongly we support our troops that are over there. They're doing a first-class job. I've had a good briefing from General Powell and Secretary Cheney. I just can't tell you how proud I am of the young men and women that are serving halfway around the world in this great humanitarian cause. We've tried to keep Governor [President-elect] Clinton closely advised-- informed--on the Somalia trip and, obviously, on the arms control agreement. So I think these are both important events--the trip to Sochi and the trip to Somalia. 1 Editor's note: Location subsequently was changed to Moscow, Russia. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

START II Treaty To Be Signed

Fitzwater Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 1 19931/1/93 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia Country: Russia, United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] On January 3, 1993, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin will sign the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The treaty, often called START [Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty] II, codifies the Joint Understanding signed by both Presidents at the Washington summit on June 17, 1992. It will eliminate the most destabilizing strategic weapons--heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVed) ICBMs. It also will reduce by two-thirds below current levels the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both countries. The treaty includes a Protocol on Elimination or Conversion concerning heavy ICBMs and heavy ICBM silos, a Protocol on Exhibition and Inspection concerning heavy bombers, and a Memorandum of Attribution.
Relationship to the START Treaty
START II builds upon the START Treaty signed on July 31, 1991, between the United States and the Soviet Union but calls for far greater reductions in strategic nuclear forces. All START provisions will pertain, except as explicitly modified in the new treaty. Because of the close relationship between the two treaties, START II cannot enter into force before the START Treaty [see Background on START, p. 7]. It also will remain in force throughout the duration of START.
Central Limits
The treaty sets equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed by either side. Ceilings are set for two phases: Phase One to be completed 7 years after entry-into-force of the START Treaty [START I] and Phase Two to be completed by the year 2003. Phase Two may be completed by the end of the year 2000 if the United States can help finance the elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia. The treaty sets ranges for some of the central limits. Phase One. By the end of this phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250. These include the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as well as the number of warheads for which heavy bombers with nuclear missions are equipped. Of the total 3,800-4,250 warheads, no more than 1,200 may be on deployed MIRVed ICBMs, no more than 2,160 on deployed SLBMs, and no more than 650 on deployed heavy ICBMs. Phase Two. By the end of the second phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500. Of those, none may be on MIRVed ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs. Thus, all MIRVed ICBMs must be eliminated from each side's deployed forces; only ICBMs carrying a single warhead will be allowed. No more than 1,700-1,750 deployed warheads may be on SLBMs. There will be no prohibition on MIRVed SLBMs.
Downloading
The treaty allows for a reduction in the number of warheads on certain ballistic missiles. Such "downloading" is permitted in a carefully structured fashion, modifying the rules agreed in START. -- Each side is able to download two existing types of ballistic missiles by up to four warheads each, in addition to the US Minuteman III and the Russian SS-N-18. There are no aggregate limits on the number of warheads that can be downloaded. -- A limit of 105 ICBMs of one of those types may be downloaded by up to five warheads each. Such an ICBM may only be deployed in silos in which it was deployed at the time of START signature. Thus, the three-warhead US Minuteman III ICBM, the four-warhead Russian SS-17 ICBM, and 105 of the six-warhead Russian SS-19 ICBMs are able to be downloaded to a single warhead, to comply with the requirement to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs. The US Peacekeeper ICBM and the Russian SS- 18 heavy ICBM and SS-24 ICBM, each of which carry 10 warheads, and the remaining SS-19 ICBMs must all be eliminated, in accordance with START procedures.
Missile System Elimination
In START, deployed SLBMs and most deployed ICBMs may be removed from accountability either by destroying their launchers (silos for fixed ICBMs, mobile launchers for mobile ICBMs, and launcher sections of submarines for SLBMs), or by converting those launchers so that they can carry only another type of permitted missile. The one exception is the SS-18. Under START, the requirement to eliminate 154 deployed SS-18s must be met through silo destruction, not conversion. In the START II Treaty, those rules generally continue to apply. The major exception is the SS-18. Ninety SS-18 silos may be converted to carry a single-warhead missile, which Russia has said will be an SS-25 type. The treaty lays out specific procedures, including on-site inspections, to ensure that those converted silos will never again be able to launch a heavy ICBM. The remaining 64 SS-18 silos subject to this treaty will have to be destroyed. In exchange for the right to retain up to 90 converted SS-18 silos, the treaty requires that all SS-18 missiles and canisters, both deployed and non-deployed, be eliminated no later than January 1, 2003. This is a major change from the START Treaty. Generally, START did not seek destruction of missiles. In START II, the Russians have agreed to eliminate all SS-18 missiles, both deployed and non-deployed. This fully achieves a long- standing US goal to eliminate completely heavy ICBMs.
Heavy Bombers
In START, nuclear heavy bombers are subject to more flexible counting rules than are ballistic missiles. Each heavy bomber equipped to carry only short- range missiles or gravity bombs counts as one warhead. US heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) each count as 10 warheads, and Soviet heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs each count as 8 warheads. In START II, heavy bombers will be counted using the number of nuclear weapons--whether long-range nuclear ALCMs, short-range missiles, or gravity bombs--for which they are actually equipped. This number is specified in the treaty's Memorandum on Attribution and will be confirmed by a one-time exhibition and by routine START on-site inspections. Another new feature of this treaty is the provision that a maximum of 100 heavy bombers that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as long-range-nuclear-ALCM heavy bombers may be reoriented to a conventional role. Such bombers will not count against the treaty warhead limits. They will be based separately from heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons, will be used only for non-nuclear missions, and will have observable differences from other heavy bombers of the same type that are not reoriented to a conventional role. Such heavy bombers may be returned to a nuclear role after 3 months' notification, but then may not be reoriented again to a conventional role.
Verification
The comprehensive START verification regime continues to apply to the new treaty. In addition, START II includes some new verification measures, such as observation of SS-18 silo conversion and missile elimination procedures, exhibitions, and inspections of all heavy bombers to confirm weapon loads, and exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role to confirm their observable differences.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Background on START

Fitzwater Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 1 19931/1/93 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia Country: Russia, United States, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, USSR (former) Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] On July 31, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded almost a decade of arduous and complex negotiations by signing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The treaty was the first to call for significant reductions in the deployed strategic nuclear forces of the two countries. The START Treaty includes a number of Agreed Statements; Protocols; the Definitions Annex; a Memorandum of Understanding on data; and related agreements, letters, and supporting documents. Together, they cover not only weapons limits but also counting rules; conversion or elimination of weapons; verification and inspections; cooperative measures; the creation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission; and procedures for the treaty's entry-into-force, amendment, duration, and withdrawal. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and the Commonwealth of Independent States was established. Four independent states with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory also came into existence--Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Following extensive high-level negotiations, these four newly independent states and the United States reached agreement on May 23, 1992, in Lisbon, Portugal, on how they would all adhere to the START Treaty. The agreement was codified in a new Protocol to START that makes all five states parties to the treaty. Under the terms of the Protocol, the four new independent states will make the necessary implementing arrangements among themselves to carry out their responsibilities under START. In addition, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus committed to join the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states in the shortest possible time. Russia remains a nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. In legally binding letters to President Bush, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus also committed to eliminate all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive arms from their territories within the 7-year START reduction period. The US Congress and the parliaments of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan have since consented to START ratification. We look to early similar action by the parliaments of Ukraine and Belarus, and to the rapid adherence by Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
Comparison of Central Limits Set by START Treaties I and II
START START II START II Phase One Phase Two Total strategic warheads 6,000 3,800-4,250 3,000-3,500 accountable actual actual Ballistic missile warhead 4,900 No specific No specific sublimit sublimit MIRVed ICBM warheads N/A 1,200 0 SLBM warheads N/A 2,160 1,700-1,750 Heavy ICBM warheads 1,540 650 0 Mobile ICBM warheads 1,100 START applies START applies Total Strategic Nuclear 1,600 START applies START applies Delivery Vehicles (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Implementation of Peace Accords In El Salvador

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Address at the ceremony concluding implementation of the peace accords, San Salvador, El Salvador Date: Dec, 15 199212/15/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: El Salvador Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights [TEXT] This is a great moment in the history of this nation and Central America. And it is a great moment for the people of El Salvador. I am enormously proud to be here with you and to bring you greetings from President Bush and the American people. At a time of year when the words "peace on earth" carry such special meaning, we meet to celebrate a new commitment to peace in a land that has seen too much sadness, too much suffering, and too much loss. Men and women who once met on the field of battle now stand together as one in their devotion to the democratic process. We share your joy and your fresh hopes for the future on this day of national reconciliation. National reconciliation in El Salvador embodies the hopes of all peoples. With the end of superpower confrontation, and the active involvement of the United Nations in the cause of peace, we hope to see a further decline in the use of force to solve international problems. This is the promise of the new world order. My country's 16th President, Abraham Lincoln, once said that the ballot is stronger than the bullet. History proves the wisdom of those words. Democratic principles are the key to protecting individual rights; advancing economic prosperity; and preserving the precious gift of peace. Many observers said this day would never come. Some said that peace and justice could only come from the barrel of a gun; others said peace could only be attained by trampling on human rights and liberties. Both were wrong. The guns are stilled today because democracy and human rights have triumphed. There are many here who deserve our gratitude for this achievement. First, we must thank the negotiators on both sides who stepped forward in good faith and carried out their duty with great skill. And we must pay a special tribute to one man who is known around the world as the person who brought peace to El Salvador, President Alfredo Cristiani. Mr. President, you will be honored in the pages of history for all you have done to bring peace to your people. We thank the United Nations, and Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, for patience and determination in this process. We also salute the Organization of American States, and the Four Friends: Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Spain--whose leaders and governments played such a crucial role in the success of the peace process. Finally, we thank the courageous people of El Salvador, who have long prayed that this day would come. Through all your struggles, you were sustained by an unyielding determination to be free--and by your deep faith in the Almighty. Today, your hopes for the triumph of democracy have been realized. Today, your prayers for peace have been answered. The American people are proud to extend the hand of friendship to all of you, regardless of which side you took in the past conflict. We will continue to support your efforts to rebuild this nation and fulfill both the letter and the spirit of the peace accords. As a measure of our commitment, today I am pleased to sign with your President an agreement that forgives 75% of El Salvador's official debt to the United States. A very dark era ends today, and a bright new one begins. You are building a new country founded in peace and national reconciliation--and a new, more hopeful future in which all your citizens can share. As you take these first steps together, let me again share with you the words of our President Lincoln, uttered near the end of America's civil war: With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds . . . to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations. Editor's note: See Joint US-Russia Statement on El Salvador. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Murder of Israeli Policeman

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Stockholm, Sweden Date: Dec, 15 199212/15/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Terrorism [TEXT] We are very troubled and saddened by the violence in the territories, the casualties among both Palestinians and Israelis, and now the kidnaping and murder of an Israeli border policeman. Some extremist groups like Hamas want to destroy any possibility of peace. They offer no hope for the future except more violence and tragedy. We should not give in to the extremists. The pathway to a different, more hopeful future for Israelis and Palestinians lies in working out understandings and agreements in their negotiations. The current violence should give everyone a new sense of urgency in making progress.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Cuba: Continuing Crackdown On Human Rights Activists

Boucher Description: Statement, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 16 199212/16/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Cuba Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] The US Government strongly condemns the Cuban regime's continuing crackdown against those who have advocated respect for human rights and peaceful democratic change. This campaign of repression began on December 10, UN International Human Rights Day, after activists' attempts to call for legalization of human rights groups and a democratic opening. The regime's violent reaction to their desire for free speech and the right to organize shows absolute intolerance for peaceful dissent and a determination to maintain total control. We call on the Cuban Government to release human rights activists Elizardo Sanchez and Rodolfo Gonzalez and to stop its harassment and abuse of Cubans who advocate peaceful change. The latest inhumane outrage in this campaign is the "cordoning off" of human rights leaders' homes. Cuban authorities allow no one to enter or leave; those inside suffer de facto house arrest. This has happened at the homes of Elizardo Sanchez, Gustavo Arcos, and Vladimir Gonzalez. In addition to this, water, gas, and electricity were cut off at the homes of Vladimiro Roca and Alvaro Prendes. Cuban police are stationed in front of the homes of Francisco Chaviano, Oswaldo Paya, and Aida Valdez. As we noted on December 11, Cuban police severely beat and arrested Elizardo Sanchez, President of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, December 10. Although he reportedly suffers from cracked ribs and a broken jaw, he has been moved from a hospital to a facility for common criminals. Sanchez is still in police custody. Also last Thursday, plainclothes police directed a mob that severely beat Cuban Committee for Human Rights (CCPDH) activist Jesus Yanes Pelletier outside Gustavo Arcos' home. Rodolfo Gonzalez, and executive member of the CCPDH, was also arrested and charged with disseminating enemy propaganda and possession of foreign currency.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Secretary Eagleburger Meets With Kosovo Leader

Eagleburger Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Albania, Serbia-Montenegro Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization [TEXT] Secretary of State Eagleburger met on December 17, 1992, in Brussels (following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council) with Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Albanian community of Kosovo. Secretary Eagleburger assured Dr. Rugova of the deep friendship and respect of the American people for the people of Kosovo. He emphasized the understanding of the American people and government for the difficult circumstances of the Albanian people of Kosovo as a consequence of the repressive policies followed by the Government of Serbia. The Secretary emphasized US support for peace and stability in Kosovo. He called to Dr. Rugova's attention the strong statement issued earlier that day by the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Council. Secretary Eagleburger said this statement demonstrated the growing interest of the world community in the situation in Kosovo. He also reaffirmed the US intention to provide $5 million in humanitarian assistance to the people of Kosovo. Dr. Rugova described for Secretary Eagleburger recent developments in Kosovo. He assured the Secretary of State that the people of Kosovo would continue to use only peaceful means to gain the restoration of their political and economic rights. Secretary Eagleburger praised Dr. Rugova's responsible and moderate leadership under difficult conditions.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Israeli Deportations

Boucher Description: Released by the Office of the Acting Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 18 199212/18/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Lebanon Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] We understand that the Israeli Supreme Court decided that the government could proceed with the order to deport over 400 Palestinians to Lebanon and that the government has now done so. The United States understands the difficult security problems Israel faces with terrorist attacks and that the Government of Israel has a right and a duty to protect its citizens. We are deeply troubled by the recent increase in violence in the territories and by the Palestinian and Israeli casualties, including the murder of the Israeli policeman by Hamas, and we strongly condemn it. We have called on Arabs and Israelis to join us in condemning all forms of violence. At the same time, we believe every government throughout the world has an obligation to the fundamental principles of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic practices. We have, therefore, repeatedly urged the Government of Israel immediately and permanently to cease deportations and to comply fully with the Fourth Geneva Convention as it pertains to the treatment of inhabitants of the occupied territories. The United States believes that charges of wrongdoing should be brought against specific individuals in a court of law based on evidence to be argued in a fair trial which would afford full judicial process. We, therefore, strongly condemn the action of deportation.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Presidential Decision on Military Sales to China

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 22 199212/22/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] The President has decided it is in our national interest to close out four cases of suspended Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The President's decision means that, in the coming weeks, we will return Chinese equipment sent to the United States under the FMS programs, reimburse unused funds in China's FMS account, and make available for shipment to China releasable equipment already purchased by the Chinese in connection with these cases. The President's decision closes out this arms sales agreement between the United States and China. We have no plans for new arms sales to China. Consistent with Public Law 101-246, which enacted into law certain of the sanctions imposed by the President against China in June 1989, the President has notified Congress of his decision. These four FMS programs were suspended to demonstrate our deep concern about the tragic events in China. We have made our point. We now believe that continuing to hold aging items after a 31/2-year suspension hinders rather than helps US efforts to promote cooperative PRC behavior in a range of areas. The four suspended programs covered by this decision involve an avionics upgrade for the Chinese F-8 aircraft, equipment for a munitions production line, four anti-submarine torpedoes, and two artillery-locating radars. The equipment will be delivered as is, with no follow-on support, repairs, maintenance, or training by the United States. More specific information about the four programs is available from the Department of Defense.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Equatorial Guinea

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 24 199212/24/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Equatorial Guinea Subject: Human Rights, Democratization [TEXT] The United States is deeply concerned by the continuing repression of political opposition in Equatorial Guinea. Over the last week, scores of students, teachers, priests, and opposition activists have been rounded up on the pretext that they were involved in a minor student disturbance at the Malabo market. Many of the detainees have been badly beaten, often in the presence of high-ranking officials of the Obiang regime. The regime refused permission for the medical evacuation of some of the more badly injured detainees. The Government of Equatorial Guinea has repeatedly pledged itself to a process of democratization; it has just as frequently violated those pledges. The arrest and torture of innocent members of a non-violent opposition once again demonstrates the government's lack of good faith. The US ambassador has attempted to protest these latest acts of political repression to the Government of Equatorial Guinea, but government officials have refused to receive him in the absence of President Obiang from the country. We call upon the Government of Equatorial Guinea to release immediately all political prisoners, to cease the torture in the prisons, to punish those responsible for these abuses, and to compensate those persons unjustly detained. Further, the United States calls for the Government of Equatorial Guinea to cease its thinly disguised threats of violence against US citizens, including our ambassador. The United States reminds the Government of Equatorial Guinea that we hold it directly responsible for the safety of all resident US citizens, including missionaries, businessmen, technicians, and Peace Corps volunteers, as well as diplomats.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Burmese Rohingya Refugees In Bangladesh

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 24 199212/24/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Burma, Bangladesh Subject: Refugees, United Nations [TEXT] The US Government has received credible reports indicating that Bangladesh is coercing Rohingya refugees to return to Burma and that the Government of Bangladesh is denying UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] staff free access to the Rohingya refugee camps, thereby preventing the UNHCR from fulfilling its international mandate to protect refugees. Over the past several months, we and UNHCR have repeatedly raised this problem with the Government of Bangladesh. The US Government deplores the use of coercion by the Government of Bangladesh. The United States also deeply regrets that the Bangladesh Government and the UNHCR have not agreed on an effective role for the UNHCR to protect the Rohingyas both in the refugee camps in Bangladesh and during the repatriation process to Burma. The US Government calls upon the Government of Bangladesh to refrain from coerced repatriation and to negotiate with the UNHCR as soon as possible an effective protection role for [the] UNHCR.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Joint US-Russia Statement On El Salvador

Boucher Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: El Salvador, Russia, United States Subject: Democratization [TEXT] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the United States Department of State have agreed to release the following joint statement: The Russian Federation and the United States, whose constructive interaction on Central American issues the last several years has helped defuse tensions in this area, note with great satisfaction that the peace process in El Salvador started at Esquipulas and pursued further within the framework of the Chapultepec accords has entered a promising new phase. Russia and the United States applaud the political resolve displayed by the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] leadership, which overcame mutual distrust to implement the main provisions of the Chapultepec accords. Russia and the United States are grateful for the role played by the United Nations, above all its Secretary General, and for the support given the peace process by Mexico, Spain, Colombia, and Venezuela. The high level of representation at the reconciliation ceremony December 15 bears testimony to the intention of the international community to continue its support of the peace process. As El Salvador moves forward to fully implement the peace accords and to realize the full potential of progress to date, Russia and the United States express confidence that the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN will continue their dialogue and cooperation with the UN, show restraint, and demonstrate renewed determination to achieve their country's socioeconomic reconstruction. They reiterate their readiness to continue to assist in this effort and express hope that other interested states and international and regional organizations will offer their support.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Elections in Serbia And Montenegro

Snyder Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joseph Snyder Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 29 199212/29/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro Subject: Democratization, Human Rights [TEXT] Officials in Serbia and Montenegro have issued the final results of the December 20 elections. After examining the pre-election period and the conduct of the elections themselves, American and other Western election monitors have concluded that the elections in Serbia and Montenegro failed to meet international standards for a free and fair democratic process as outlined in CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] documents. We agree with their conclusions.
Serbia
In Serbia, the CSCE found the pre-election period was highly unfair. The ruling party of Slobodan Milosevic abused its position to its own advantage and to the disadvantage of the opposition parties. -- The Serbian-run electronic media did not grant equal access to the opposition. It refused to air some of the opposition's advertisements, and it used news and information programs to campaign for the ruling party and attack the opposition. This pattern led the representative of the CSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to conclude that the government-run media in Serbia had been an instrument of "shameless propaganda" during the pre-election period. -- Serbian officials used bureaucratic obstacles to hinder the opposition's ability to campaign. On election day, American and other Western observers found major irregularities. -- Voter lists were manipulated so that many eligible voters were excluded from voting. -- In some places, members of opposition parties were not allowed to participate on electoral commissions that processed the votes. -- Provisions for voter privacy were inadequate. -- Ballot boxes were not handled properly. -- Voters were reportedly intimidated by the presence of police.
Montenegro
Electoral conditions in Montenegro, while not free of problems, were better. The pre-election period in Montenegro included instances of intimidation of the opposition and consistently favorable media access and coverage for the ruling party.
Conclusion
We applaud the courage and determination of the democratic opposition parties, which conducted vigorous campaigns under very adverse circumstances. We call on the appropriate judicial authorities to review the complaints made by opposition parties and take the steps necessary to ensure that Serbia and Montenegro meet their international obligations for the conduct of free and fair elections. We have a long history of friendship with the peoples of Serbia and Montenegro. We are prepared to respond favorably to positive changes in Serbian policies. As long as Serbia continues to pursue its present policies, however, it will remain outside the community of nations and face increasing pressure from sanctions and other steps from those of us who are opposed to the aggression perpetrated by the Serbian Government. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993

Title:

America's Role in the World

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address at the West Point Military Academy, West Point, New York Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States, Iraq, Somalia Subject: Military Affairs, Arms Control [TEXT] (opening and closing remarks deleted) I want to share with you at this institution of leadership some of my thinking, both about the world you will soon be called upon to enter and the life that you have chosen. Any President has several functions. He speaks for and to the nation. He must faithfully execute the law. And he must lead. But no function, none of the President's hats, in my view, is more important than his role as Commander in Chief. For it is as Commander in Chief that the President confronts and makes decisions that [in] one way or another affect the lives of everyone in this country as well as many others around the world. I have had many occasions to don this most important of hats. Over the past 4 years, the men and women who proudly and bravely wear the uniforms of the US armed services have been called upon to go in harm's way and have discharged their duty with honor and professionalism. I wish I could say that such demands were a thing of the past, that with the end of the Cold War the calls upon the United States would diminish. I cannot. Yes, the end of the Cold War, we would all concede, is a blessing. It is a time of great promise. Democratic governments have never been so numerous. What happened 2 or 3 days ago in Moscow would not have been possible in the Cold War days. Thanks to historic treaties, such as that START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] II pact just reached with Russia [signed on January 3; see p. 20], the likelihood of nuclear holocaust is vastly diminished. But this does not mean that there is no specter of war, no threats to be reckoned with. And already, we see disturbing signs of what this new world could become if we are passive and aloof. We would risk the emergence of a world characterized by violence--characterized by chaos--one in which dictators and tyrants threaten their neighbors; build arsenals brimming with weapons of mass destruction; and ignore the welfare of their own men, women, and children. And we could see a horrible increase in international terrorism, with American citizens more at risk than ever before. We cannot and we need not allow this to happen. Our objective must be to exploit the unparalleled opportunity presented by the Cold War's end--to work toward transforming this new world into a new world order, one of governments that are democratic, tolerant, and economically free at home and committed abroad to settling inevitable differences peacefully, without the threat or use of force. Unfortunately, not every one sub-scribes to these principles. We continue to see leaders bent on denying fundamental human rights and seizing territory regardless of the human cost. No, an international society--one more attuned to the enduring principles that have made this country a beacon of hope for so many for so long--will not just emerge on its own. It's got to be built. Two hundred years ago, another departing President warned of the dangers of what he described as "entangling alliances." His was the right course for a new nation at that point in history. But what was "entangling" in Washington's day is now essential. This is why, at Texas A∧M a few weeks ago [see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 51, p. 893], I spoke of the folly of isolationism, and of the importance--morally, economically, and strategically--of the United States remaining involved in world affairs. We must engage ourselves if a new world order, one more compatible with our values and congenial to our interest, is to emerge. But even more, we must lead. Leadership takes many forms; it can be political or diplomatic; it can be economic or military; it can be moral or spiritual. Leadership can take any one of these forms or it can be a combination of them. Leadership should not be confused with either unilateralism or universalism. We need not respond by ourselves to each and every outrage of violence. The fact that America can act does not mean that it must. A nation's sense of idealism need not be at odds with its interests. Nor does principle displace prudence. No, the United States should not seek to be the world's policeman. There is no support abroad or at home for us to play this role. Nor should there be. We would exhaust ourselves, in the process wasting precious resources needed to address those problems at home and abroad that we cannot afford to ignore. But in the wake of the Cold War, in a world where we are the only remaining superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its moral and material resources to promote a democratic peace. It is our responsibility- -it is our opportunity--to lead. There is no one else. Leadership cannot be simply asserted or demanded; it must be demonstrated. Leadership requires formulating worthy goals, persuading others of their virtue, and contributing one's share of the common effort and then some. Leadership takes time; it takes patience; it takes work. Some of this work must take place here at home. Congress does have a constitutional role to play. Leadership, therefore, also involves working with the Congress and the American people to provide the essential domestic underpinning if US military commitments are to be sustainable. This is what our Administration has tried to do. When [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, it was the United States that galvanized the UN Security Council to act and then mobilized the successful coalition on the battlefield. The pattern [was] not exactly the same but [was] similar in Somalia: first, the United States underscored the importance of alleviating the growing tragedy, and then we organized humanitarian efforts designed to bring hope, food, and peace. At times, real leadership requires a willingness to use military force. And force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it, or--if need be--a temporary alternative. As Commander in Chief, I have made the difficult choice to use military force. I determined we could not allow Saddam's forces to ravage Kuwait and hold this critical region at gunpoint. I thought then, and I think now, that using military force to implement the resolutions of the UN Security Council was in the interest of the United States and the world community. The need to use force arose as well in the wake of the Gulf war, when we came to the aid of the peoples of both northern and southern Iraq. More recently, as I'm sure you know, I determined that only the use of force could stem this human tragedy of Somalia. The United States should not stand by with so many lives at stake and when a limited deployment of US forces, buttressed by the forces of other countries and acting under the full authority of the United Nations, could make an immediate and dramatic difference and do so without excessive levels of risk and cost. Operations Provide Comfort and Southern Watch in Iraq and then Operation Restore Hope in Somalia all bear witness to the wisdom of selected use of force for selective purposes. Sometimes the decision not to use force--to stay our hand--I can tell you, it's just as difficult as the decision to send our soldiers into battle. The former Yugoslavia--well, it's been such a situation. There are, we all know, important humanitarian and strategic interests at stake there. But up to now, it's not been clear that the application of limited amounts of force by the United States and its traditional friends and allies would have had the desired effect given the nature and complexity of that situation. Our assessment of the situation in the former Yugoslavia could well change if and as the situation changes. The stakes could grow; the conflict could threaten to spread. Indeed, we are constantly reassessing our options and are actively consulting with others about steps that might be taken to contain the fighting, protect the humanitarian effort, and deny Serbia the fruits of aggression. Military force is never a tool to be used lightly or universally; in some circumstances, it may be essential--in others, counterproductive. I know that many people would like to find some easy formula to apply, to tell us with precision when and where to intervene with force. Anyone looking for scientific certitude is in for a disappointment. In the complex new world we are entering, there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force. Inevitably, the question of military intervention requires judgment; each and every case is unique. To adopt rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and American lives. And it would give would-be troublemakers a blueprint for determining their own actions; it could signal US friends and allies that our support was not to be counted on. And, similarly, we cannot always decide in advance which interests will require our using military force to protect them. The relative importance of an interest is not a guide: Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital. But to warn against a futile quest for a set of hard and fast rules to govern the use of military force is not to say there cannot be some principles to form our decisions. Such guidelines can prove useful in sizing and, indeed, shaping our forces and in helping us to think our way through this key question. Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice. Once we are satisfied that force makes sense, we must act with the maximum possible support. The United States can and should lead, but we will want to act in concert, where possible, involving the United Nations or other multinational grouping. The United States can and should contribute to the common undertaking in a manner commensurate with our wealth, with our strength. But others should also contribute militarily, be it by providing combat or support forces, access to facilities or bases, or overflight rights. And similarly, others should contribute economically; it is unreasonable to expect the United States to bear the full financial burden of intervention when other nations have a stake in the outcome. A desire for international support must not become a prerequisite for acting, though. Sometimes, a great power has to act alone. I made a tough decision--I might say on advice of our outstanding military leaders who are so well known to everybody here--to use military force in Panama, when American lives and the security of the canal appeared to be threatened by outlaws who stole power in the face of free elections. And similarly, we moved swiftly to safeguard democracy in the Philippines. But in every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing US forces once the mission is complete. Only if we keep these principles in mind will the potential sacrifice be one that can be explained and justified. We must never forget that using force is not some political abstraction but a real commitment of our fathers and mothers and sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, friends and neighbors. You've got to look at it in human terms. In order even to have the choice, we must have available adequate military forces tailored for a wide range of contingencies, including peace-keeping. Indeed, leading the effort toward a new world order will require a modern, capable military, in some areas necessitating more rather than less defense spending. As President, I have said that my ability to deploy force on behalf of US interests abroad was made possible because past Presidents--and I would single out in particular, my predecessor, Ronald Reagan--and past secretaries of defense sustained a strong military. Consistent with this sacred trust, I am proud to pass on to my successor, President-elect Clinton, a military second to none. We have the very best. And, yet, it is essential to recognize that as important as such factors are, any military is more than simply the sum of its weapons or the state of its technology. What makes any armed force truly effective is the quality of its leadership, the quality of its training, the quality of its people. We have succeeded abroad in no small part because of our people in uniform. The men and women in our armed forces have demonstrated their ability to master the challenges of modern warfare. At the same time, and whether on the battlefield of Iraq or in some tiny little village in Somalia, America's soldiers have always brought a quality of caring and kindness to their mission. Who will ever forget--I know I won't--those terrified Iraqi soldiers surrendering to American troops? And who will forget the way the American soldier held out his arms and said, "It's OK--you're all right now"? Or in Somalia, the young marine, eyes filled with tears, holding the fragile arm of an emaciated child? There can be no doubt about it. The all- volunteer force is one of the true success stories of modern-day America. It is instructive to look at just why this is so. At its heart, a voluntary military is based upon choice--you all know that--the decision freely taken by young men and women to join, the decision by more mature men and women to remain. And the institution of the armed forces has thrived on its commitment to developing and promoting excellence. It is meritocracy in action. Race, religion, wealth, background count not. Indeed, the military offers many examples for the rest of society, showing what can be done to eradicate the scourge of drugs, to break down the barriers of racial discrimination, to offer equal opportunity to women. This is not just a result of self-selection. It also reflects the military's commitment to education and training. You know, people speak of defense con-version, the process by which defense firms retool for civilian tasks. Well, defense conversion within the military has been going on for years. It is the constant process of training and retraining--which the military does so well--that allows individuals to keep up with the latest technology, take on more challenging assignments, and prepare for life on the outside. Out of this culture of merit and competition have emerged hundreds of thousands of highly skilled men and women brimming with real self- confidence. What they possess is a special mix of discipline, a willingness to accept direction, and the willingness to accept responsibility. Together, discipline and confidence provide the basis for winning, for getting the job done. There is no higher calling, no more honorable choice, than the one that you here today have made. To join the armed forces is to be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice for your country and for your fellow man. What you have done--what you are doing--sends an important message, one that I fear sometimes gets lost amid today's often materialist, self- interested culture. It is important to remember, it is important to demonstrate, that there is a higher purpose to life beyond one's self. Now, I speak of family, of community, of ideals. I speak of duty, honor, country. There are many forms of contributing to this country, of public service. Yes, there is government. There is volunteerism. I love to talk about the thousand points of light: one American helping another. The daily tasks that require doing--in our classrooms, in our hospitals, our cities, our farms-- all can and do represent a form of service. In whatever form, service benefits our society, and it ennobles the giver. It is a cherished American concept, one we should continue to practice and pass on to our children. This was what I wanted to share on this occasion. You are beginning your service to country, and I am nearing the end of mine. Exactly half a century ago, in June of 1942, we were at war and I was graduating from school. The speaker that day at Andover was then-Secretary of War Henry Stimson. And his message was one of public service but with a twist--on the importance of finishing one's schooling before going off to fight for one's country. I listened closely to what he had to say, but I didn't take his advice. That day was my 18th birthday. When the commencement ceremony ended, I went on into Boston and enlisted in the Navy as a seaman 2nd class. I never regretted it. You, too, have signed up. You, too, will never regret it. And I salute you for it. Fortunately, because of the sacrifices made in years before and still being made, you should be able to complete this phase of your education. A half century has passed since I left school to go into the service; a half century has passed since that day when Stimson spoke of the challenge of creating a new world. You will also be entering a new world, one far better than the one I came to know--a world with the potential to be far better yet. This is the challenge; this is the opportunity of your lifetimes. I envy you for it, and I wish you Godspeed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993 Title:

Charting the Course: US Foreign Policy in a Time of Transition

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Address before the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 7 19931/7/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, Europe, E/C Europe, MidEast/North Africa, North America, East Asia, Central America, South America Country: United States, Israel, Iraq, Somalia, USSR (former), Yugoslavia (former), Germany Subject: Democratization, North America Free Trade, Mideast Peace Process, CSCE, EC [TEXT] Back in September of 1989, I gave a speech in which I discussed the unique and difficult challenges the United States was inevitably going to face in foreign policy as we moved from a bipolar to a multipolar world. My good friend Peter Tarnoff was quick to take me to task in The New York Times for having demonstrated nostalgia for the Cold War. I disputed that characterization at the time, but today, Peter, I have a confession to make: I am now truly nostalgic for the Cold War--and I suspect you may soon embrace this feeling yourself. The fact is that I had no way of foreseeing then just how tumultuous the new era was going to be. But today, it is abundantly clear that we are in the middle of a global revolution--a period of change and instability equaled in modern times only by the aftermath of the French and Russian revolutions. The status quo everywhere is under siege. For one thing, the end of the Cold War's rigid division of the world into two superpower-led blocs has resulted in a more wide-open international system, with [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait being but the most egregious example of the much greater potential for global anarchy which now exists. And for another, the post-World War II and post-colonial state system itself is breaking down as many nations are increasingly unable to perform basic governmental functions, to control their internal affairs, or to resist particularist and separatist tendencies within their borders. Here, Somalia and Yugoslavia are the most egregious--but by no means the only--examples of this tendency toward fragmentation. These changes, together with the fulfillment of America's Cold War mission, now confront the United States with the existential need to redefine its place and purpose in the world. Some view the recent global ascendance of democracy as the defining feature of this new era and argue that the end of the Cold War has made it both safe and necessary for the United States to pursue a Wilsonian foreign policy on behalf of the democratic cause. Others see a world full of unique danger and disorder and argue that a United States no longer able to dominate politically and economically as before must continue to pursue national security and international stability as its highest foreign policy objectives. I am not going to settle the debate between the partisans of idealism and realpolitik here tonight. But what I would like to do is to examine how the Bush Administration has handled some of the challenges it has faced over the past 4 years. I do this not only to demonstrate--to my satisfaction if not to yours--where we succeeded in laying a foundation for US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era but also so that I can describe what I believe to be some of the lessons that should be drawn from our experience. Many have argued that we did not succeed in laying any new foundation at all--that our foreign policy has been essentially reactive, unduly wedded to the status quo, and lacking in strategic rationale or democratic vision. I do not, as you would expect, agree. I believe this Administration has successfully confronted three unique challenges: -- To end the Cold War peacefully; -- To deal with the instabilities generated by the Cold War's demise; and -- To begin the construction of a new architecture for the new world order. We may be faulted, perhaps, with having chosen to articulate our vision more in deeds than in words. But I sincerely believe that the record of what we have done--and how we have done it--is one that our successors can usefully build upon as they, too, confront a world which will continue to be unstable and unpredictable for a good many years to come. Let me turn now to that record--the record of how we met the three challenges noted above.
The First Challenge: Ending the Cold War
Today we take for granted something which experts and historians would have found incredible to imagine only a decade ago--namely, that the disengagement of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the USSR itself could be achieved so quickly, so thoroughly, and, above all, so peacefully. History holds few, if any, examples of an empire collapsing without an angry spasm of violence, and no one expected the Communist Party to relinquish its monopoly of power at home and imperial domination abroad without a fight. It was entirely conceivable that the Soviet Union's demise would be accompanied by civil strife, war in Europe, and perhaps even the risk of a global nuclear exchange. That it was not, I think, is due in part to George Bush's skillful, though sometimes misunderstood, diplomacy. Even today, his critics argue that the President was constantly behind the curve in his dealings with the former Soviet Union--late and lukewarm in his embrace of [Soviet President] Gorbachev; late and low-key in his reaction to the collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe; and late to disengage from Gorbachev and to embrace the cause of democratic reform in Russia and independence in the republics. At each point, the President was taxed for undue attachment to the status quo and insufficient devotion to American ideals. But what was the President trying to achieve? His early approach was to challenge Mr. Gorbachev to inform Soviet new thinking with a practical content on matters ranging from regional disputes to arms control. Then, as revolution began to engulf Eastern Europe, he worked quietly to persuade Gorbachev and his generals that the West would not seek to exploit their troubles and that the Soviet Union could enjoy a new kind of security in a democratic Europe if peaceful norms were accepted. Later, he urged caution and negotiation upon both the central government and the independence movements, earning criticism at home but thereby denying the Soviet right wing any pretext to co-opt Gorbachev in their efforts to destroy the process of reform. Successful diplomacy is a matter of timing as well as substance. In the end, history will judge George Bush by the results of his efforts--by his mastery of timing and substance--particularly against the many alternative scenarios that might have come to pass. History will note that on his watch occurred: -- The peaceful democratic revolution in Eastern Europe; -- The reunification of Germany and the inclusion of a united Germany in NATO; -- The end to regional conflicts, including, most importantly, in Central America; -- The halting and, later, reversal of the nuclear arms race; and -- Finally, the peaceful collapse of a regime which commanded both the most formidable totalitarian apparatus in history and the fate of the world at its nuclear fingertips. This is a legacy which by itself would qualify President Bush as one of our nation's great diplomatists.
The Second Challenge: A Fragmenting World
But history also called upon this President to confront the multifaceted challenges of a disintegrating world order, first in the Persian Gulf and, later, in Africa and the Balkans. Again, according to some, this has been a challenge largely unmet. Indeed, it is said in some quarters that the Administration bears some responsibility for the invasion of Kuwait by having "coddled" the Iraqi dictator and for the tragic civil war in the former Yugoslavia by having failed to support the various republics in their bid for independence. As in the case of our approach to Gorbachev, however, I believe the President's diplomacy has been misunderstood and, in some cases, deliberately distorted. For example, our efforts to influence Saddam Hussein by diplomatic means were demonstrably unsuccessful, but those efforts, I believe, were the necessary predicate to our ultimate success. The fact is that there was simply no consensus for multilateral economic sanctions against Iraq prior to the August 2 [1990] invasion, nor was there a consensus to counter Iraq militarily. It was Saddam Hussein himself who created such a consensus by invading Kuwait. Until that moment, our Arab friends considered deterrent action both unwarranted and provocative and would have rallied to Saddam had we sought to isolate or punish him. Thus, it was thanks to the very diplomacy for which the President is now criticized--and which was the source of his credibility in the Arab world--that we were able to enlist the support without which we could not have liberated Kuwait. I also believe it is important to correct the impression that we could have deterred Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait just prior to August 2. The problem was that Saddam believed that we had yet to liberate ourselves from the shame and the shadow of Vietnam. He made this very clear to our ambassador, telling her he did not think we had the guts to face him on the field of battle. What was she supposed to tell him--that we would send half a million troops halfway around the globe and that the Congress, by the slimmest of margins, would, in the end, approve the President's plan to send those troops into battle? I am not trying to score cheap points here but instead to make an important matter clear. We certainly made mistakes and failed--along with everyone else--to anticipate the Iraqi invasion. But what we did not know, and what it took Saddam Hussein to demonstrate, was that the passing of the Cold War had changed the international rules of the game and that regional powers could now contemplate aggression on the assumption that the superpowers could no longer circumscribe their freedom of maneuver. And what Saddam Hussein did not know, and what it took George Bush to demonstrate, was that the American people, if not the entire political class, were no longer in the thrall of the Vietnam syndrome. Ultimately, it was the President's dual achievement to prevent Saddam from establishing the law of the jungle as the norm for international behavior in the post-Cold War era and to establish a model for collective responses to international acts of aggression. In so doing, he demonstrated how absolutely critical American diplomacy and American willingness to use force are to the prospects for stability in the otherwise chaotic aftermath of the Cold War. The President has also been faulted for his decision to end the fighting when he did. But George Bush understood another reality of the post-Cold War era--namely, that, having personally and necessarily assembled an international coalition of forces, he had an obligation to consider the views of our contributing allies and, above all, an obligation to remain within the scope of the UN resolutions. Furthermore--and perhaps most important of all--he understood that, having given precise definition to the purpose of our mission, he had an obligation--to the American people and to the future- -to withdraw US forces once the mission was completed. A second manifestation of the global disorder inherent today is the eruption into conflict of ancient tribal, ethnic, and religious rivalries. We see this most obviously in the former Yugoslavia. But we need to understand that Yugoslavia is but the most obvious manifestation of what is going on today in many places and what will likely characterize the international landscape for perhaps decades to come. For many, Yugoslavia is another example of Administration policy behind the curve and out of touch with American ideals. I personally do not believe that violence could have been avoided under any circumstances. But I do remain convinced that the republics' unilateral and uncoordinated declarations of independence, which we unsuccessfully opposed, led inexorably to civil war. Then, as now, the only alternative to perpetual bloodshed was for the parties to negotiate their separation from each other and, meanwhile, to guarantee respect for pluralism and the rights of minorities within their borders. And the only responsible policy for the United States was the one we followed--namely, to discourage unilateral acts intended to avoid such negotiations and such guarantees. As the President rightly said in his maligned and misunderstood speech in Kiev [Ukraine on August 1, 1991; see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 32, p. 596], it was our policy not to support "those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred." Of course, all of this begs the question of what we should do when the irrational forces of history and hatred prevail over our appeals to reason, as they are doing today in Yugoslavia, in some parts of the former Soviet Union, [in] Somalia, and elsewhere. There are no simple answers. As the President stated this week at West Point [on January 5; see p. 13], there will be times when our vital interests are at stake and we must intervene--as we did in the Gulf. There will be times when a human tragedy compels us to intervene, providing we can justify the cost to the American people--as we have in Somalia and on behalf of the Kurds of northern Iraq. And there will be times when neither the force of American ideas nor the force of American arms can make a difference to peoples who are truly unwilling to coexist peacefully with each other.
The Third Challenge: Building a New World Order
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the Bush Administration's foreign policy is that it was too reactive to changing events, with little attention to the longer-term requirements of the new era. However, I believe that we can, in fact, take credit for having begun what will be--and should be--the long work of constructing an institutional framework necessary to the establishment of a new world order. Our successors will have to build in places we overlooked or neglected. But I believe they will find a solid foundation in many important areas. Among those areas of institutional creativity, I would identify the following: (1) Europe, where we have sought to extend the community of democracies by helping transform the former communist nations into secure and stable free market societies. Here, we have created two innovative institutional structures--the G-24 [Group of 24] process, by which we have coordinated economic assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, through which we have aimed to enhance, over time, the political and security relationship between both halves of Europe. I would urge the new Administration to build upon this still embryonic structure. (2) North America, where we have sought to consolidate our nation's continental base through the creation of a single market linking the United States, Mexico, and Canada--the North American Free Trade Agreement. Our success in this endeavor will pay dividends in political and security terms as well as benefit the economies of all three nations. (3) Latin America, where this Administration leaves our overall hemispheric ties in perhaps the best shape of anytime in this century. President Bush's landmark Enterprise for the Americas Initiative has been greeted throughout the hemisphere as a historic turning point and an opportunity to consolidate democracy and the free market system throughout North and South America. (4) Asia, where we helped to create APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] to enhance our engagement of the most dynamic economic region of the world and where we have begun to develop a global partnership with Japan. (5) The Middle East, where we built upon our Gulf war coalition victory to launch the first direct negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors. (6) And finally, across the broad spectrum of transnational issues, where we have tried to advance a post-Cold War agenda of global free trade through the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations and through negotiations to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The Bush Legacy
I know I am by no means a neutral observer, but I believe the record I have just described is one of substantial accomplishment in the face of great dangers and challenges. I also believe that the Bush foreign policy was greater than the sum of its parts and that, indeed, there was a strategy behind the President's conduct of foreign policy which we need to understand because it is so uniquely suited to the vastly changed international situation we now confront. I would summarize this legacy as follows: First, the Bush foreign policy was characterized by pragmatism and flexibility. I think in this respect we must plead guilty to the charge that our approach was often ad hoc. A certain degree of "ad hocery" is a virtue, not a vice, when you are dealing with a world in crisis and in chaos--one in which it is impossible to be certain of anything 6 months ahead. The fact of the matter is that, for a long time to come, we will be in a post- revolutionary transitional period which will require of us an ability to react quickly to events. In these circumstances, good instincts are as invaluable as a good plan. Second, the President has been deeply committed to the principle and the practice of diplomacy. He, more than his critics, has understood that the end of the Cold War has meant the United States can no longer dominate either adversaries or allies as we did in a bipolar framework. If we want to get our way--and to get others to share our burden, as the American people surely desire--we will increasingly have to take the views and interests of others into account. And we will sometimes have to build ad hoc alliances of like-minded nations as each new and often unique circumstance may demand. In other words, we will have to practice the art of compromise and, thus, of diplomacy. This is an art which does not necessarily come easily to us. Our national virtue is that we are comfortable only with a foreign policy rooted in the values of our political tradition; our national vice is a tendency toward moralism in foreign policy and a kind of moral hubris which views the actions of others only through the prism of our own standards of conduct. President Bush resisted this latter tendency throughout his presidency, often at great political cost. But because of his commitment to working with and maintaining leverage over governments whom his critics deemed worthy of punishment and isolation--I am thinking principally of the People's Republic of China, but there were other examples--he was able consistently to forge international coalitions under UN auspices to address critical challenges to world peace and stability, including the successful prosecution of the war against Saddam Hussein. Third, the Administration's foreign policy was marked by a commitment to harnessing US power--both diplomatic and military--to realize the President's long-term vision of a new world order. The record of the past 4 years demonstrates that the new world order is something we are not even close to achieving--not with the forces of fragmentation currently on the loose. But the extent to which we have been able to keep those forces at bay has been largely a result of American willingness to act, to forge ad hoc coalitions, and to begin to build the institutions of a better and safer world.
Looking Ahead
I will conclude, for what it is worth, with a few personal observations about the road ahead and what I think ought to be our priorities and objectives. I consider our principal foreign policy challenge to be the maintenance and strengthening of the core of democracies which won the Cold War. As I indicated in my [September 13] 1989 speech at Georgetown [University], it is going to be harder to keep this core together when the inherent centrifugal forces of multipolarity will conspire to drive us apart. If, however, we want to avoid a return to the dangerous balance of power politics which characterized the world prior to the Cold War, we will have to strengthen the economic, political, and military ties which link the Western democracies, as well as the multilateral institutions we have established over the past half century. If we do not succeed in strengthening those collective links and institutions, we will never be able to confront the instabilities now arising beyond the Western fold. In this regard, there are several incomplete tasks we leave to the next Administration: to build more comprehensive and durable political ties with Japan; to ensure that the European Community does not build unity at the expense of relations with the United States; and to preserve the open world trading system through successful conclusion of the GATT negotiations and early ratification of the North America Free Trade Agreement. The second challenge we face is to extend the core of democracies to include the former communist world, as well as other nations which have embraced our political and economic values. Here, there is an absolute convergence between our interests and our ideals. Our security is especially linked to the fate of reform across the Eurasian landmass, which is the most heavily armed region of the world and [has been] the source of global conflict twice in this century. It is thus heartening that the incoming President has identified support for democracy in Russia and throughout Central and Eastern Europe as one of his highest priorities. Finally, we must deal with the manifold ills afflicting what was known as the Third World--the problems of poverty, debt, underdevelopment, and overpopulation--which threaten to bring global chaos in their wake and thus threaten our own security and prosperity. Among the tasks facing the next Administration will be the development of both global non-proliferation regimes and enhanced UN peacekeeping and peace-making capabilities. I began these remarks by referring to the debate underway in this country over the purpose of American foreign policy. It seems to me that we have arrived at an important turning point in our history. We have never had a normal attitude toward foreign policy, at least in the sense understood in other countries. For most of our national existence, we turned our backs on the world beyond our shores. And then, when we became a global power, we joined the world in the name of a mission which we have now substantially completed. Thus we find ourselves today confronting an increasingly uncertain international environment--increasingly aware that our role and purpose must change to meet that new environment but unclear as to what those changes ought to be. What we may not sufficiently realize, however, is that this uncertainty is both normal and healthy. We are--and will be for some time to come--in the process of discovering our purpose as we go about the everyday business of foreign policy. It goes without saying that we bring our ideals to the table and that our thinking is infused with a desire to see those ideals advanced. But a growing awareness of our limited resources and power is forcing us to decide what is important to us in foreign policy and thus to develop a sense of hierarchy among a multitude of interests and priorities. All this is very much to the good. I see much evidence that the American people have accepted the lessons of the 20th century and understand that our period of virtual supremacy is over and that our fate is now and forever linked to what happens beyond our borders. What remains to be seen is not so much whether we have what it takes to continue to shoulder the burdens of global leadership which are necessarily ours. Rather, the question is whether we will, in the coming decade, deal with the new challenges of the post-Cold War era with the wisdom and strength of character that, on the whole, marked our international passage over the course of the past half century. I, for one, am proud of the part George Bush played in charting a new course for America. And I am proud to have been a part of that adventure. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993 Title:

US and Russia Sign START II Treaty

Bush Yelstin Source: President Bush, Russian President Yeltsin Description: Opening remarks at news conference on the signing of the START II Treaty, Moscow, Russia Date: Jan, 3 19931/3/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Russia, United States Subject: Arms Control, International Law [TEXT]
President Yeltsin:
President George Bush, Mrs. Bush, members of the delegations, representatives of mass media, ladies and gentlemen: It is not every century that history gives us an opportunity to witness and participate in the event that is so significant in scale and consequences. Today, the Presidents of the two great powers, the United States and Russia, have signed the treaty on further radical cuts in strategic offensive arms of Russia and the United States--START II [the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; see fact sheet in Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 1 on p. 5]. In its scale and importance, the treaty goes further than all other treaties ever signed in the field of disarmament. This treaty is the triumph for politicians and diplomats of Russia and the United States. It is also an achievement for all mankind and benefits all peoples of the earth. The START II Treaty becomes the core of the system of global security guarantees. The scale of this treaty is determined by a number of factors. Its historical factor is that in the course of all its previous history, mankind was arming itself and just dreamed of beating the swords into plowshares. The treaty signed today represents a major step toward fulfilling mankind's centuries- old dream of disarmament. Its political factor is that the treaty we have signed today belongs to a new epoch. This treaty was concluded by two friendly states, by partners who not only trust each other but also assist each other. It testifies to our joint and determined movement toward a new world order. From the very outset, the new democratic Russian state has been pursuing a policy of building equal partnership with the United States. Today, we have every right to say that relations between the two major powers have undergone a genuine revolution. Its political factor lies also in the fact that during the last decade of the 20th century and at the turn of the 21st century, the START II Treaty will affect policies not only of the United States and Russia but of other countries of the world as well. The START II Treaty established parameters of possible political agreements in other spheres of interaction among states. Thus, the military factor is determined by the scale of mutual reductions in nuclear arms. By comparison with the START I Treaty [the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed on July 31, 1991], every state will have to reduce and destroy the number of strategic offensive warheads by approximately a threefold magnitude. The deepest cuts will affect those categories of arms which are of greatest concern to the parties and the world. For the United States, these are submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers; for Russia, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles--ICBMs. This reduces drastically the level of danger, military mistrust, and suspicion. We opened up real prospects for cooperation based on trust between people in military uniform--between people with military discipline and military thinking. Thus, the START II Treaty will change and gradually replace the very psychology of confrontation. At the same time, as President and Supreme Commander in Chief, I can say with absolute certainty [that] the signed treaty strengthens the security of Russia rather than weakens it. I think that President Bush can make a similar statement concerning the security of the United States. The implementation of the new treaty will not be economically destructive for Russia. We have made our calculations, and they show that the proposed reductions would cost us much less than the mere maintenance of nuclear weapons systems in a safe condition. We save seriously on verification and inspections, two of the most expensive, to put it mildly, items of expenditures. The new character of Russian-US relations makes it possible for us to substantially simplify verification procedures while ensuring their reliability. We expect to cut considerably the cost of the physical destruction of armaments. We have agreed with the United States to cooperate in developing and applying appropriate technologies. Thus, the expenditures under this, then, will, in fact, be shared equally. This will enable us to eliminate our nuclear weapons not with a delay of several years but in parallel with the United States in accordance with the schedule provided for in the treaty. In the context of the present economic crisis, it would be difficult for us to keep the pace without outside assistance. The US Congress has made a decision to support Russia in the destruction of these nuclear warheads. Its moral factor will manifest itself in the fact that the treaty gives all mankind the hope for a nuclear weapons-free world. The high moral value of the treaty is that we will be able to hand over to our children--the children of the 21st century--a more secure world. I would call this treaty a treaty of hope. As to the purely diplomatic aspect of this START II Treaty that has just been signed, it will undoubtedly go down into the history of diplomacy as an example of using the potential of the partners who are waiting to overcome the heritage of animosity and confrontation. As you may recall, it took 15 years to prepare the first START Treaty. The elaboration of START II, which is of considerably great[er] magnitude, took several months. But there was absolutely no rush in the process. Naturally, this reflects, above all, the high level of confidence and mutual understanding achieved between the United States and Russia--between the Presidents of the two countries. It gives great impetus to world diplomacy as well. Today, I would like to express the hope that the diplomatic services of the United States and Russia [and] diplomats of European countries will double or even triple their efforts in order to settle conflicts that are of concern to the world. I would like to focus on another important aspect, the personal stand of President George Bush, who is our guest on a working visit with us. I would like to pay tribute to my colleague and friend, George. His remarkable personal and political qualities and competence have contributed to a successful transition from the Cold War to a new world order. I am grateful to him for all he has done to establish new relations between Russia and the United States, for his solidarity and support during the push for the FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act, [and] for the START II Treaty. Thank you, George. I consider it [of] fundamental importance that the future President of the United States, Mr. Clinton, fully supported the conclusion of the START II Treaty. We can, without delay, proceed to the direct implementation of this instrument and consider further steps to strengthen global stability, the system of global protection, and international security. President Bush and I have maintained regular contacts with President-elect Clinton. Today's signing ceremony would not have taken place had there been the slightest reason to doubt his solidarity with our endeavors. I would like to personally thank the most active participants in this process and, above all, the President of the United States, who personally took part in the elaboration and polishing of the text of the treaty. And I would say we spoke often. It was a rare week that we did not speak on the phone in the last few weeks. I am also grateful, personally, to [national security adviser General] Scowcroft, who took an active participation in the consideration of this subject, and to [former Secretary of State] Baker, of course, who treated globally the entire subject of the treaty and was mainly responsible for this breakthrough. Finally, I am grateful to [Secretary of State] Mr. Eagleburger who, on the finishing line, darted with boldness and practically initialed the draft treaty there. I'm thankful also to the experts--to analysts and consultants and also to the leaders of our delegation--[Foreign Minister] Mr. Kozyrev and [Defense Minister] Mr. Grachev and the other 48 experts who worked very hard for us to come today to the signing of this treaty, the SALT [START] II Treaty. I'm also grateful to all the journalists--press people--who kept their hand constantly on the pulse of this subject and who did not criticize the treaty before it was signed. I do believe that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of friendly partnership between Russia and the United States. Strategic partnership relations serve the fundamental national interests of the two countries and of the international community as a whole. I am deeply confident that the signing of the START II Treaty opens new, promising prospects for the peoples of our countries. I'm certain that this day will be a milestone in this process.
President Bush:
Mr. President and Mr. Vice President, Mr. Prime Minister, Minister of Justice, Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the Russian and American delegations, and distinguished guests: We meet at the beginning of a new year, at a moment that is also a new era for our two nations and for the world. For half of this century, the Soviet Union and the United States stood locked in a nuclear standoff. For our two nations and for the world, cold war, hot words, and the constant threat of war seemed imminent--indeed, at times inevitable. The time that we might meet as friends and the time that we might meet in freedom seemed distant--indeed, a dream. Today, the Cold War is over, and, for the first time in history, an American president has set foot in a democratic Russia. And together we're now embarked on what must be the noblest mission of all: to turn an adversarial relationship into one of friendship and partnership. We stand together today in this great city at the threshold of a new world of hope, a widening circle of freedom for us and for our children. This historic opportunity would simply not have been possible without our combined common effort. Mr. President, I salute you for your unwavering commitment to democratic reform and for the history you've written since the heroic day in August 1991 when you climbed atop that tank to defend Russia's democratic destiny. I also want to salute the heroism of the Russian people themselves, for it is they who will determine that Russia's democratic course is irreversible. Today, as we meet on Russian soil--home to 1,000 years of heritage and history, to a people rich in scientific and creative talent--I want to assure the Russian people on behalf of all Americans [that] we understand that Russia faces a difficult passage. We are with you in your struggle to strengthen and secure democratic rights, to reform your economy, to bring to every Russian city and village a new sense of hope and the prospect of a future forever free. Let me say clearly--we seek no special advantages from Russia's transformation. Yes, deep arms reductions, broader and deeper economic ties, expanded trade with Russia all are in the interest of my country. But they're equally in the interest of the Russian people. Our future is one of mutual advantage. We seek a new relationship of trust between our military forces. They once confronted each other across Europe's great divide; let them now come together in the cause of peace. We seek full cooperation to employ our collective capabilities to help resolve crises around the world. We seek a new cooperation between the United States and Russia and among all states to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The world looks to us to consign the Cold War to history, to ratify our new relationship by reducing the weapons that concentrate the most destructive power known to man. The treaty we signed today builds on the strong beginning we made with START I. Together, these treaties will reduce by more than two-thirds the strategic arsenals in place today. And, just as important, START II will bring much better stability to remaining forces. This agreement represents a common effort to overcome the contentious differences and complexities that surround nuclear weapons. In the face of many who doubted Russia and America's intentions and our energy, it vindicates our insistence that arms control must do more than simply freeze the arms race in place. The START Treaty--START I-- reduced a quarter century of growth in our nuclear arsenals and reversed the course that caused many to fear that nuclear conflagration was inevitable. The treaty that we signed today goes much further in a way that few believed possible just 1 year ago. And may I congratulate Messrs. Kozyrev and Grachev and Eagleburger for their outstanding work to bring this treaty to fruition. I also want to congratulate former Secretary of State Jim Baker for his important work on the treaty during the spring and summer. In closing, let me tell you what this treaty means--not for presidents or premiers, not for historians or heads of state but for parents and for their children: It means a future far more free from fear. As we sign today this treaty, let us pledge also to move forward together throughout this decade and into the next century toward common aims: for Russia, a democratic peace; for our two nations, a strong partnership between our people and the lasting friendship that springs from a common love of freedom. Mr. President, may I wish you and the Russian people, at this critical moment in history, a new year rich with hope and peace. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993 Title:

Situation in Sierra Leone

Snyder Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joe Snyder Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 4 19931/4/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Sierra Leone Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Valentine Strasser, Chairman of Sierra Leone's National Provisional Ruling Council, announced on December 29 [1992] that a coup attempt had been crushed. Freetown['s] radio [station] reported on December 31 that a special tribunal had sentenced 12 coup plotters to death and that another 17 persons found guilty of treason earlier were to be executed immediately. We understand these sentences have already been carried out. The broadcast indicated that additional suspects are being sought. The United States is gravely concerned over the reported executions and calls on the Sierra Leonean authorities to respect fully human rights, due process, and the rule of law. The United States recognizes that Sierra Leone is currently encountering numerous problems, including the presence of rebel forces. However, we urge that such problems be resolved through peaceful negotiation, so that the process of economic and social development and an early return to democratic, civilian rule can be facilitated. In view of the unsettled circumstances in Sierra Leone, the US embassy in Freetown has advised resident American citizens to exercise the utmost caution in their movements. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993

Title:

US Signs Chemical Weapons Convention

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] For more than 20 years, the United States and many other countries have labored to achieve a ban on chemical weapons. The long-awaited Chemical Weapons Convention is now completed and open for signature. I have had a deep and abiding personal interest in the success of the effort to ban these terrible weapons. As Vice President, I had the honor on two occasions to address the Conference on Disarmament and to present US proposals to give impetus to the negotiations. As President, I directed the United States to take new initiatives to advance and conclude the negotiations. The United States is profoundly gratified that these talks have now been successfully concluded. The countries that participated in the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament deserve special congratulations. The Chemical Weapons Convention is uniquely important in the field of arms control agreements. It will improve the security of all nations by eliminating a class of weapons of mass destruction that exists in all quarters of the world and that has been used in recent conflicts. It is a truly stabilizing and non- discriminatory agreement. The United States strongly supports the Chemical Weapons Convention and is proud to be an original signatory. We are encouraged that so many other states have also decided to take this step. This clearly demonstrates global--international--endorsement of the convention and the new norm of international conduct that it establishes. However, we must not cease our efforts until the norm becomes truly universal, with all countries becoming not only signatories but also parties to the convention. Much work remains to make the convention fully effective. The United States will cooperate closely with other countries to bring the convention into force as soon as possible and to ensure that it is faithfully implemented. Only then will we be able to say that the risk of chemical warfare is no longer a threat to people anywhere in the world. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Chemical Weapons Convention Signing Ceremony

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Remarks upon signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, Paris, France Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] It is fitting that we meet to sign this historic Chemical Weapons Convention in a city where, 4 years ago, the international community appealed for the strengthening of norms against chemical warfare. I am pleased to be in Paris, and I am especially pleased to represent my President, George Bush, a man who, over the course of the past decade, launched some of the key initiatives which helped to make this agreement possible. He and all those responsible can take pride in an achievement whose revolutionary scope and impact we can recognize today without having to await the verdict of history. But such has been the amazing record of the past few years. We have seen the international community liberate itself from half a century of gridlock and paralysis and move beyond the rhetoric of democracy to achieve real democracy; move beyond the rhetoric of detente to achieve real peace; and move beyond the rhetoric of disarmament to achieve real reductions in weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention we sign today does more than simply reduce a class of arms or mitigate against their proliferation. This convention mandates a worldwide non-discriminatory ban on an entire class of weapons of mass destruction--the only class of such weapons that has been widely used in combat. By the radical terms of this agreement, all signatory states forswear the possession, production, stockpiling, transfer, and, indeed, the use of chemical weapons; and all signatories must destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities in their possession. Moreover, the convention's strict verification regime, which accommodates legitimate commercial and sovereign interests, sets an innovative standard for future multilateral agreements. The international community is virtually united in support of the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, there must be truly global adherence if the convention is to achieve its purpose and if doubts are to be eliminated over the commitment and intentions of those who fail to sign, ratify, and fully comply with its terms. Nowhere is this more important today than in the Middle East, a region which over the past 30 years has been home to more active chemical weapons programs--and which has seen more chemical weapons use--than any other part of the world. It is, therefore, particularly disappointing that so many Middle Eastern states are absent from this ceremony today. The fact of the matter is that linking this convention to other issues cannot affect the fate of those issues, but it will surely undermine the effect of this treaty in the one region most exposed to the danger of chemical weapons--namely, the Middle East. The point, I believe, is to tackle the challenge of weapons of mass destruction wherever we can, whenever we can. I would, therefore, urge the members of the Arab League to seize this opportunity and sign the Chemical Weapons Convention. Doing so would be a step toward, and not away from, making the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, as called for by President Mubarak of Egypt. Today's ceremony is only the beginning of the work which lies ahead. Next month, the Preparatory Commission will meet in The Hague [the Netherlands] to work out the important and detailed provisions for implementing the convention. The United States is fully committed to the success of those efforts, which will require the same broad support and participation which produced the successful convention itself. As I indicated at the beginning, the past few years have been a remarkably creative period of international achievement. Perhaps not coincidentally, I believe that President Bush's passage across the international scene has equally been one of tangible achievement, particularly in terms of the issue most important to the fate and future of the planet--the issue of weapons of mass destruction. George Bush's legacy will include landmark treaties-- START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] I, START II, and CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]--as well as diplomatic efforts which paid non- proliferation dividends in Africa, South America, the Middle East, and here in Paris today. But he knows, as all of us must know, that what we have accomplished to date will matter little unless we are prepared to confront the even greater proliferation dangers we most certainly will face in the years to come.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Chemical Weapons Convention: France Hosts Signing Ceremony

ACDA Description: Based on statement released by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Washington, DC Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: France Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] On January 13, the Government of France will host a ceremony in Paris for the signing of a multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Representatives from more than 130 countries are expected to be present to sign the convention. The multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, concluded on September 3, 1992, by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and endorsed by the United Nations on November 30, 1992, is historic in the scope of its provisions and in the number of countries involved in its development. It offers an opportunity to build confidence regionally and globally and to enable signatories to play a more responsible role in the international community. The convention prohibits: -- The development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of chemical weapons; -- The use of chemical weapons against any other state--regardless of whether the country is a signatory to the convention; -- Engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and -- Assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in activities prohibited to convention signatories. In addition, the convention requires that: -- Signatories declare all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities; -- The declarations be checked; -- Storage, production, and destruction facilities be monitored through on- site inspection; and -- All chemical weapons be eliminated completely within 10 years. To further enhance security and to deter clandestine chemical weapons production, storage, and use, the convention also provides routine monitoring and verification of relevant chemical weapons industry facilities. Additionally, the convention provides for a challenge inspection regime which allows any convention signatory to initiate an inspection of any facility or location in any other signatory state to clarify and resolve questions of possible non-compliance. After signature of the CWC, a preparatory commission of all signatory states will begin work in early February to further elaborate detailed implementation procedures and establish the CWC international organization. These meetings will take place in The Hague, which will also be the seat of the organization. The US welcomes the action of the Government of France to host the signing ceremony.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Chemical Weapons Convention: Chronology of Events Leading to the Signing

ACDA Description: Released by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Washington, DC Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93 Category: Chronologies Region: Whole World Country: United States, Russia Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] Listed below are some of the key events in the chemical weapons [CW] negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [CCD] and the Committee on Disarmament, which led to the completion of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC], its approval by the United Nations, and its opening for signature in Paris. March 15, 1962: The United States and the Soviet Union submit plans for general and complete disarmament to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee which include provisions for eliminating chemical and biological weapons. August 15, 1968: Chemical weapons are placed on the agenda of the CCD in Geneva. June 27-July 3, 1974: At the Moscow summit, the United States and the Soviet Union agree to hold bilateral talks in an effort to develop a joint proposal to be submitted to the CCD on the prohibition of chemical weapons. March 17, 1980: The ad hoc working group on chemical weapons is established in the Committee on Disarmament (CD), the successor to the CCD. February 4, 1983: At the CD, Vice President Bush announces US requirements for a verifiable prohibition on the production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons: -- Declaration and systematic international on-site inspection of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities and declaration of plans for destruction of stocks; -- Systematic international on-site inspection of the destruction of both chemical weapons stocks and production facilities; -- Declaration and on-site inspection of the operation of other facilities for legal production of chemicals that pose a specific risk of being diverted to chemical weapons production; and -- A multilateral mechanism for dealing with compliance issues. June 1983: The United States presents a paper at the CD showing how stockpile destruction can be verified. The US approach combines extensive use of on-site instruments with continuous monitoring by international inspectors. August 23, 1983: The United States invites CD member and observer delegations to participate in a workshop at the US chemical weapons destruction test bed facility at Tooele, Utah. The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact (except Romania) decline the invitation. November 14-16, 1983: Fifty diplomats from 30 CD nations attend the Chemical Weapons Verification Workshop at Tooele, Utah. April 18, 1984: At the Conference on Disarmament, the new title for the Committee on Disarmament, Vice President Bush presents a US draft treaty that provides for a worldwide ban on the development, acquisition, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The plan calls for systematic on-site inspection of chemical weapon facilities to ensure compliance. The Soviet Union dismisses the US draft treaty immediately. However, it is essentially the 1984 draft which becomes the basis of discussion for the ad hoc working group of the CD. The document, reflecting agreed changes as a result of the CD negotiations, is informally referred to as the "rolling text." July 10, 1986: The United States provides information to the Conference on Disarmament about its chemical weapons stockpiles and storage site locations--the first CD member to do so. August 6, 1987: Soviet Foreign Minister [Shevardnadze] addresses the CD, accepting the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal. He invites the CD delegations to the Shikany military facility and extends a future invitation to the CW destruction facility under construction near Chapayevsk. On October 3-4, 1987, a multilateral delegation from the CD visits the Soviet CW installation at Shikany to view munitions and a mobile destruction site. July 28, 1988: In a speech to the CD, US Ambassador [to the Conference on Disarmament] Max Friedersdorf declares the location of all US CW production facilities and out-lines plans for their elimination under a CW ban. The US calls on the Soviet Union and other states to do the same. February 21-23, 1989: The United States conducts a trial inspection of a private American chemical production plant. This is part of an experiment to develop procedures for a routine inspection regime which would satisfy confidence and security requirements without significantly disrupting the civilian chemical industry. The Soviet Union and other members of the CD subsequently conduct similar trial inspections of their own chemical industries. February 7-9, 1990: Secretary of State Baker and [Soviet] Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agree on a framework for action to expedite the negotiation at the CD for a Chemical Weapons Convention. June 1, 1990: At the Washington summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev sign the US-Soviet Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Key provisions of this important accord are: -- Cessation of chemical weapons production to begin upon entry into force and destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks to start by the end of 1992--down to 5,000 tons of CW agents [weight exclusive of casings] by 2002; -- On-site inspections during and after the destruction process to confirm destruction; and -- Development and use of safe and environmentally sound methods of destruction. May 13, 1991: President Bush announces a new series of steps to strengthen the prospects of an early, successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. To this end, the President declared that the United States would take the following actions: -- Formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason-- including retaliation--against any state, effective when the convention enters into force and propose that all states follow suit--providing the USSR is also a party to the treaty; -- Unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all US stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force and propose that all other states do likewise; -- Offer technical assistance to others so that they can destroy their chemical weapons stocks efficiently and safely; -- Call for setting a target date to conclude the convention and recommend that the conference stay in continuous session [as] necessary to meet the target; -- Propose new and effective verification measures for inspecting sites suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons; -- Propose that the convention require parties to refuse to trade in chemical weapons-related materials with states that do not join in the convention in order to provide tangible benefits for those states that join the convention and significant penalties for those that fail to support it; and -- Reaffirm that the United States will impose all appropriate sanctions in response to violations of the convention, especially the use of chemical weapons. July 15, 1991: The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan jointly table a draft challenge inspection proposal at the CD, followed by a US proposal on handling inspection of declared facilities. March 19, 1992: Australian Foreign Minister Evans presents a draft treaty offering compromise solutions to outstanding issues as a basis for early completion of the CD negotiations. The United States applauds the Australian effort and supports the process it represents. The Australian text differs from US positions on a number of important issues. The United States, however, expresses hope that it will aid resolution of remaining issues and permit completion of the CWC in 1992, as President Bush has repeatedly urged. June 22, 1992: The chairman of the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons at the CD, Adolph Ritter von Wagner of Germany, in an effort to speed the process, released a draft "final text" for consideration. This draft is a complete text and embodies consensus compromises as well as the chairman's own proposed compromise language on unresolved major issues. June 26, 1992: The second CD session concluded with meetings during the last few days devoted to the chairman's explanations of the new text. July 20, 1992: The CD resumes. July 23, 1992: The United States accepts the chairman's draft Chemical Weapons Convention. August 7, 1992: Chairman von Wagner puts forth a package of changes to the draft convention in an effort to satisfy the concerns of some members of the CD. August 13, 1992: President Bush announces strong US support for the draft Chemical Weapons Convention completed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The President states that the United States is committed to be an original party to the treaty once it is open for signing and calls on all other nations to support the treaty and to pledge adherence to it. August 26, 1992: The CD resumes.September 3, 1992: The CD concludes the draft Chemical Weapons Convention. September 7, 1992: The CD forwards the draft Chemical Weapons Convention to the United Nations for endorsement. November 12, 1992: The UN First Committee approves the draft convention and submits it for endorsement by the entire UN membership. November 30, 1992: The UN endorses by consensus, with 145 co-sponsors, the draft of the Chemical Weapons Convention. January 13, 1993: In a ceremony in Paris, the Chemical Weapons Convention will be opened for signature. February 8, 1993: The Preparatory Commission of all states parties to the convention is scheduled to meet in The Hague [the Netherlands] to set up the Chemical Weapons Convention international organization.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Chemical Weapons Convention: UN General Assembly Resolution

UN Description: UN General Assembly, New York City Date: Nov, 30 199211/30/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Subject: Arms Control, United Nations [TEXT] Text of Resolution A/C.1/47/L.1/Rev. 2, "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," approved by consensus by the UN General Assembly, New York City, November 30, 1992. The General Assembly, Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,1 as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions, Recalling in particular its resolution 46/35 C of 6 December 1991, in which the Assembly strongly urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of the highest priority, to resolve outstanding issues so as to achieve a final agreement on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction during its 1992 session, Bearing in mind the Final Declaration2 of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, in which participating States stressed their determination to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them, Determined to make progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, Convinced, therefore, of the urgent necessity of a total ban on chemical weapons, so as to abolish an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, and thus eliminate the risk to mankind of renewed use of these inhumane weapons, Welcoming the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,3 adopted by the Conference on Disarmament and contained in its report dated 3 September 1992, the result of many years of intensive negotiations, which constitutes a historic achievement in the field of arms control and disarmament, Convinced that the Convention, particularly as adherence to it approaches universality, will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and improve the security of all States, and that it therefore merits the strong support of the entire international community, Convinced further that the implementation of the Convention should promote expanded international trade, technological development and economic cooperation in the chemical sector, in order to enhance the economic and technological development of all States parties, Determined to ensure the efficient and cost-effective implementation of the Convention, Recalling the support for the prohibition of chemical weapons expressed in the declaration by representatives of the world's chemical industry at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, held at Canberra from 18 to 22 September 1989,4 Bearing in mind the relevant reference to the Convention in the Final Documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non- Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, Welcoming the invitation of the President of the French Republic to participate in a ceremony to sign the Convention in Paris on 13 January 1993, 1. Commends the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as contained in the report of the Conference on Disarmament dated 3 September 1992; 2. Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to open it for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993; 3. Calls upon all States to sign and, thereafter, according to their respective constitutional processes, to become parties to the Convention at the earliest possible date, thus contributing to its rapid entry into force and to the early achievement of universal adherence; 4. Further calls upon all States to ensure the effective implementation of this unprecedented, global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral disarmament agreement, thereby enhancing cooperative multilateralism as a basis for international peace and security; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide such services as may be requested by the signatory States to initiate the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 6. Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on the status of signatures and ratifications of the Convention. 1 League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138. 2 A/44/88, annex. 3 Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix I. 4 See A/C.1/44/4.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Chemical Weapons Convention: A Balance Between Obligations and the Needs of States Parties

ACDA Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Description: ACDA Occasional Paper, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] [The following text is taken from "Chemical Weapons Convention: A Balance Between Obligations and the Needs of States Parties," dated January 5, 1993.] The multilateral negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) concluded in Geneva on September 3, 1992, with the Conference on Disarmament (CD) forwarding the draft text to the United Nations for endorsement on September 7. On November 30, the UN General Assembly endorsed the CWC by consensus, with 145 countries cosponsoring the supporting resolution. The CWC will be opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. The CWC is historic in the scope of its provisions and in the number of countries involved in its development. Additionally, the conference of states parties established by the convention will provide members an opportunity for building regional and global stability and for playing a more responsible role in the international community. The majority of the provisions of the CWC represent the long-agreed upon consensus of the 39 members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) who drafted the convention. In a few sections, where prior consensus had not been attained, compromises were reached which struck an equitable balance among varying positions.
Overview
This paper describes some of the CWC's key provisions, which were designed to balance the need for effective convention provisions with the national security and economic requirements of states parties in implementing such provisions.
The Destruction of CW and CW Production Facilities
Throughout the CWC negotiations, CD participants sought ways to remove the possibility of use or threat of use of chemical weapons (CW) through measures which would provide confidence among states parties adhering to the convention that their security will be enhanced. To this end, the negotiators desired to ensure the complete elimination of CW and their production facilities within a specific period of time; assign responsibility for destruction of CW stocks abandoned on a state party's territory; prohibit any right of CW retaliation; prohibit the use of herbicides and riot control agents (RCAs) as a method of warfare; and, in the event of CW use or threat of use, provide for protection and assistance to the victimized party. At the same time, negotiators had to take into account such factors as the technical difficulties associated with destruction of CW, the possible need for commercial use of former CW production facilities, and the non-warfare uses of herbicides and RCAs, (e.g., crop control, law enforcement). This required negotiators to develop provisions which balance a state party's obligations under the convention for declarations, destruction timeframes, international monitoring, etc., with the needs and requirements of states parties in implementing these obligations. Thus, the CWC contains provisions which prohibit: the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and direct or indirect transfer to anyone of CW; the use of CW against anyone; engaging in any military preparations to use CW; and assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in activities prohibited to states parties. The convention requires all CW to be declared, declarations to be checked, and all CW to be completely eliminated within 10 years, with storage and destruction monitored through on-site inspection. An extension of a state party's destruction program for up to 5 years is possible but not automatic. It must be approved by the conference of states parties which will set conditions under which the extension may be granted, including specific verification measures and actions to mitigate the delay. The CWC requires a state party to destroy and bear the costs of destruction of CW it abandoned on another state party's territory; otherwise, the territorial state party may request assistance from the CWC organization. The CWC further requires all CW production to cease, CW production facilities to be declared, the declarations to be checked, and the facilities destroyed, with cessation of production and destruction monitored through on-site inspection. In exceptional cases of compelling need, the conference of states parties may approve conversion of former CW production facilities for prescribed non-CW uses, subject to appropriate international monitoring. Finally, the convention contains provisions which prohibit the use of RCAs as a method of warfare, reaffirms the prohibition on use of herbicides as a method of warfare, and provides for protection and assistance in the event of use or threat of use of CW against a state party. Most importantly, the inspected party has final say in determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged site. The party will negotiate with the inspection team the following: the extent of access to any particular place or places within the inspection site; the particular inspection activities, including sampling; the performance of particular activities by the inspection team; and the provision of particular information by the inspected party.
Monitoring the Chemical Industry
In the convention, chemicals of concern have been divided into three schedules according to the risk that they pose to the objectives of the CWC. Facilities producing, processing, and consuming these chemicals are subject to initial and annual declaration and international monitoring, including on- site inspection. In addition to these facilities, other facilities capable of producing the scheduled chemicals but not doing so are also subject to declaration and a monitoring regime. At the same time, the provisions for monitoring chemical industries take into account countries' concerns about the difficulties of national implementation of the CWC such as negative impact of the provisions on economic and technological development, the possible loss of confidential business information, and the difficulty of monitoring small chemical industry facilities in developing countries. Measures are included which provide inspection procedures and methods for handling information which protect sensitive, non-CW-related information; require that the convention be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering economic or technological development; and require states parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific and technical information for permitted purposes. The convention also contains provisions to allay the fears of some developing countries about the difficulty of identifying and opening to monitoring chemical industries capable of producing scheduled chemicals but not doing so. In particular, there is a provision for assistance in compiling lists of such facilities and means to address any problems of completeness of such lists. Thresholds for declarations and inspection have been set high enough to preclude capturing small, irrelevant chemical industries. Finally, the inspection regime for this sector of the chemical industry will not start until the fourth year after entry into force of the CWC. Moreover, the implementation of this category of inspections will be subject to further discussion and decision making by the conference of states parties and will take into account the accrued experience of other industry inspections.
Verification
The CWC contains two verification regimes to enhance the security of states parties to the convention and to preclude the possibility of clandestine CW production, storage, and use. The first regime provides a routine monitoring regime involving declarations, initial visits, and systematic inspections of CW storage, production, and destruction facilities and relevant chemical industry. The second regime, challenge inspection, allows a state party to request and have conducted an international inspection of any facility or location in another state party in order to clarify and resolve questions of possible noncompliance. The challenge inspection procedures were the most sensitive and difficult to develop, given the need to balance provision for an adequate degree of intrusiveness to address compliance concerns with the need to protect sensitive, non-CW-related facilities and information of national security concern. The CWC obligates the state party to be inspected to accept a challenge inspection and to make every reasonable effort to satisfy the compliance concern. At the same time, the CWC provides for a system of managing access to a challenged site which allows for protection of the inspected party's national security concerns. It does so in two ways: first, through procedures to deter the challenging party from abusing the process and, second, through procedures which allow the inspected party to protect sensitive, non-CW facilities and locations.
Deterrence of Abuse
To deter abuse, the convention contains provisions for both the requesting and the inspected parties to have their concerns about compliance and possible abuse of the system addressed by the Executive Council at both the beginning and the conclusion of the inspection. A state party must submit a request for challenge inspection to the Executive Council as well as to the Director General of the technical secretariat of the CWC organization. If the Executive Council considers an inspection request to be frivolous, abusive, or clearly beyond the scope of the convention, it may, within 12 hours after having received the request decide (by a three-quarter majority of all its members) against carrying out the challenge inspection. After a challenge inspection, the Executive Council will review the final report of the inspection team. In addition to addressing concerns about whether any noncompliance occurred, the council will also address concerns as to whether the request had been within the scope of the convention as well as whether the right to request a challenge inspection had been abused. If the Executive Council concludes there was abuse, it may recommend to the conference of states parties measures to take against the requesting party and examine whether that party should bear any of the costs of the inspection. In addition to specific provisions to address abuse, there is a general provision giving state parties the right at any time to request the Executive Council to consider concerns about abuse of the rights provided for under the convention.
Protection Through Inspection Procedures
The convention also contains inspection procedures which provide the inspected party with the means to protect sensitive sites. Such means include the timeframes specified to provide access, limitations on observers, and the process of managed access at the site. With respect to timeframes for inspection, after receiving notification of the site to be inspected, the inspected party has the ability to take up to 5 days to provide access to the site. This time period allows inspected parties adequate time to prepare a site for inspection. Once at the site, the period of inspection itself is limited to 84 hours, extendable only by agreement with the inspected party. Concerning limitations on observers, while the requesting party can ask to have an observer accompany the inspection team, the inspected party has the right to disapprove the participation of such an observer. If the inspected party allows the participation of an observer, it can limit the access and activities of the observer at the site. Finally, and most importantly, the inspected party has final say in determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged site. The party will negotiate with the inspection team the following: the extent of access to any particular place or places within the inspection site; the particular inspection activities, including sampling, to be conducted by the inspection team; the performance of particular activities by the inspection team; and the provision of particular information by the inspected party. For example, the party may give only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site; it may shroud sensitive pieces of equipment such as computer electronic systems; and it may restrict sampling and sampling analysis. In the event the inspected party provides less than full access to places, activities, or information, it is under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to clarify the possible noncompliance concern that generated the challenge inspection.
Organization and Costs
Two other issues of importance and concern which arose during negotiations of the CWC were the allocation of costs for implementing the convention and equitable participation in its organizational bodies--in particular, the Executive Council, since it will play a large role in CWC implementation. Provisions of the convention address these concerns by allocating costs on an adjusted UN scale to lessen the burden on small and developing countries, with the most expensive costs--verification of destruction--to be borne almost entirely by the countries possessing CW. Another provision establishes the principle of rotational seats on the Executive Council and seat allocation on a regional basis, leaving it up to each region to designate members and taking into account not only a state's industrial significance but also other regional factors. Yet another provision provides for staffing the technical secretariat, drawing from states parties in a manner which gives due regard to recruiting on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
Provisions for Improving The Convention
Finally, the negotiators recognized the need for making the convention a living document which will allow for the possibility of improvement based on inspection experience and advances in verification technology. Therefore, the CWC contains provisions to allow for technical changes and annual and special conferences to discuss implementation and address any particular problems.
Preparing for Implementation Of the Convention
After the convention is signed, a preparatory commission of all signatory states will begin work in early February 1993 to further elaborate detailed procedures and to set up the CWC international organization. Commission meetings will take place in The Hague, the Netherlands, which will be the seat of the organization. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Hatano

Hatano Source: UN Security Council President Hatano Description: New York City, New York Date: Jan, 8 19931/8/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran Subject: Military Affairs [TEXT] Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council. "1. The Security Council is deeply disturbed by the Government of Iraq's recent Notes to the Office of the Special Commission [UNSCOM] in Baghdad and to the Headquarters of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) that it will not allow the United Nations to transport its personnel into Iraqi territory using its own aircraft. "2. The Security Council refers to resolution 687 (1991) [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 14, p. 236] requiring Iraq to permit the Special Commission and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to undertake immediate on-site inspection of any locations designated by the Commission. The agreement on facilities, privileges and immunities between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations, and resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) [for texts, see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 34, p. 644 and No. 42, p. 790, respectively] elaborated on Iraq's obligations by demanding, inter alia, that the Special Commission and the IAEA be allowed, as they determined necessary, to use their own aircraft throughout Iraq and any airfield in Iraq without interference or hindrance of any kind. Concerning UNIKOM, Iraq is obligated by resolution 687 (1991) and committed by an exchange of letters dated 15 April 1992 and 21 June 1992 respectively to the unrestricted freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance of its personnel, property, supplies, equipment, spare parts and means of transport. "3. The implementation of the measures set out in the recent communications of the Iraqi Government would seriously impede the activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and UNIKOM. Such restrictions constitute an unacceptable and material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991), which established the cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in the region, as well as other relevant resolutions and agreements. "4. The Council demands that the Government of Iraq abide by its obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions and cooperate fully with the activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and UNIKOM. In particular, it demands that the Government of Iraq not interfere with the currently envisaged United Nations flights. The Security Council warns the Government of Iraq, as it has done in this connection in the past, of the serious consequences which would ensue from failure to comply with its obligations." The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Fitzwater

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 9 19931/9/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Military Affairs [TEXT] All available evidence indicates that Iraq is acceding to the requirements of the coalition's January 6, 1993, demarche [see summary in January 13 White House Statement, p. 34]. No Iraqi aircraft have entered the no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel, and the Iraqi surface-to-air missiles have been dispersed and are no longer threatening coalition flight operations. Once again, [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein has backed down in the face of coalition solidarity. Iraq remains isolated and a pariah among nations due to its flagrant attempts to violate the cease-fire regime. The coalition's January 6 demarche remains in effect. We will continue to scrutinize Iraqi activity. No further warning will be issued if Iraq violates the requirements of the January 6 demarche. This episode should make clear to Iraq that interference with UN and coalition operations--including humanitarian relief operations, Operation Provide Comfort, UN Special Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and the UN Iraq- Kuwait Observer Mission force on the Iraq-Kuwait border--will not be tolerated. In this regard, we fully support the UN Security Council presidential statement of January 8 that demanded that Iraq comply with its obligations. We underscore the Security Council's warning of serious consequences if Iraq fails to do so.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Hatano

Hatano Source: UN Security Council President Hatano Description: New York City, New York Date: Jan, 11 19931/11/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations [TEXT] Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council: "The Security Council notes that there have been a number of recent actions by Iraq as part of its pattern of flouting relevant Security Council resolutions. One was the series of border incidents involving the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM); another was the incident concerning the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and UNIKOM flights. "The Security Council is deeply concerned at the incidents reported in the Secretary-General's special report of 10 January 1993 on UNIKOM (S/25085). The Security Council recalls the provisions of resolution 687 (1991) that established the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and demanded that both countries respect the inviolability of the international boundary between them. It reaffirms that the boundary was at the very core of the conflict and that, in resolutions 687 (1991) and 773 (1992) [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 39, p. 731] it guaranteed the inviolability of the boundary and undertook to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. "The Council condemns the action taken by Iraq on 10 January 1993 to remove equipment by force from the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized zone without prior consultation with UNIKOM, and through UNIKOM with the Kuwaiti authorities, as set out in the letter of 8 January 1993 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General. In particular, the Council draws attention to the removal by Iraq of four HY-2G anti-ship missiles and other military equipment from the six bunkers in the former Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr on Kuwaiti territory, in spite of the objections of UNIKOM and their efforts to prevent this. This action is a direct challenge to the authority of UNIKOM and amounts to clear-cut defiance by Iraq of the Council, which stipulated in the letter of 3 November 1992 from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General that the military equipment in the six bunkers should be destroyed by or under the supervision of UNIKOM. The Council demands that the anti-ship missiles and other military equipment removed by force from the six bunkers at Umm Qasr in Kuwaiti territory be returned immediately to the custody of UNIKOM for destruction, as previously decided. "The Council also condemns further Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized zone on 11 January 1993. It demands that any future retrieval mission be in accordance with the terms set out in the letter of 8 January 1993 from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General. On the UNIKOM facilities at Camp Khor, the Council stresses that the land and premises occupied by UNIKOM shall be inviolate and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the United Nations. "The Council invites the Secretary-General, as a first step, to explore on an urgent basis the possibilities for restoring UNIKOM to its full strength and to consider in an emergency such as this the need for rapid reinforcement as set out in paragraph 18 of his report of 12 June 1991 (S/22692), as well as any other suggestions that he might have to enhance the effectiveness of UNIKOM, and to report back to the Council. "The Council is also alarmed by Iraq's refusal to allow the United Nations to transport its Special Commission and UNIKOM personnel into Iraqi territory using its own aircraft. In this connection the Council reiterates the demand in its statement of 8 January 1993 that Iraq permit UNSCOM and UNIKOM to use their own aircraft to transport their personnel into Iraq. It rejects the arguments contained in the letter of 9 January 1993 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the Security Council (S/25086). "These latest developments concerning the activities of UNIKOM and UNSCOM constitute further material breaches of resolution 687 (1991), which established the cease-fire and provided the conditions essential for the restoration of peace and security in the region, as well as other relevant resolutions and agreements. The Council demands that Iraq cooperate fully with UNIKOM, UNSCOM and other United Nations agencies in carrying out their mandates, and again warns Iraq of the serious consequences that will flow from such continued defiance. The Council will remain actively seized of the matter." The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Fitzwater

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations [TEXT] The United States and its coalition partners today took forceful actions against Iraq. Coalition aircraft today attacked surface-to-air missiles and associated infrastructure in southern Iraq. Preliminary information indicates that the coalition aircraft accomplished their mission. This action was taken pursuant to the coalition demarche of January 6, 1993. This communication demanded that Iraq take steps within 48 hours to ensure that its aircraft and surface-to-air missiles did not pose a threat to coalition aircraft operating south of the 32nd parallel to monitor Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council Resolution [687]. After initially responding to the terms of the January 6 demarche, Iraq violated its requirements, and the coalition is acting to restore an environment that poses no threat to coalition aircraft. All requirements of the January 6 demarche regarding potential threats to coalition air operations south of 32 degrees remain in effect. We will continue to scrutinize Iraqi activity. No further warning will be issued if Iraq again violates the requirements of the January 6 demarche. Similarly, the Government of Iraq should understand that continued defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and related coalition demarches will not be tolerated. The US Government fully associates itself with the January 8 and January 11 statements by the President of the UN Security Council that declared Iraq in material breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and the cease-fire regime and warned of the serious consequences of its actions. We stand ready to take additional, forceful actions with our coalition partners if Iraq continues to flout the will of the international community and disregard its international obligations. Consistent with the above, the [US] President has directed the deployment of a battalion task force to Kuwait to underline our continuing commitment to Kuwait's security and independence.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

US Recognizes Czech and Slovak Republics

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 1 19931/1/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Czechoslovakia (former), Czech Republic, Slovak Republic Subject: Democratization [TEXT] The President today recognized the new Czech and Slovak Republics and offered to establish full diplomatic relations. In an exchange of letters, Czech Prime Minister Klaus and Slovak Prime Minister Meciar welcomed US recognition and accepted our offer of full diplomatic relations. Both leaders provided assurances that the new states will fulfill the obligations and commitments of the former Czechoslovakia and will abide by the principles and provisions of the UN Charter, the Charter of Paris, the Helsinki Final Act, and subsequent CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] documents. They also pledged to prevent the proliferation of destabilizing military technology, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, to uphold international standards concerning national minorities, and to move rapidly to create free market economies. The United States looks forward to full and mutually productive relations with the new Czech and Slovak states. We commend both republics for the peaceful means by which their separation was carried out. In the interest of ensuring stability and prosperity in the region and speeding full integration into the international community, the United States urges continued close regional cooperation among the states of Central Europe. Our ambassador to Czechoslovakia will remain in Prague as the US ambassador to the Czech Republic. We look forward to appointing an ambassador to the Slovak Republic as soon as possible. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Fact Sheet: US Policy for a New Era in Sub- Saharan Africa

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jan, 18 19931/18/93 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Namibia, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa Subject: Human Rights, Refugees, Terrorism, Narcotics, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Trade/Economics [TEXT] In a new, post-Cold War environment, Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing unprecedented political and economic change. These dramatic shifts and the end of superpower strategic competition in the region have resulted in a thorough re-examination and reorientation of US policy. The US Government intends to maintain its engagement in Africa despite resource constraints. Progress and stability will require long-term support by the international community and the efforts of Africans themselves. Adequate diplomatic and financial resources will be needed to promote peaceful change, conflict resolution, stable democracy, and sustainable development. Just as striking as the changes outside Africa are the shifts in the attitudes and aspirations of Africans themselves. No longer content with the victories of the post-independence period, Africans are demanding their just rights along with popular participation and accountability in government. Even more insistently, they are seeking a decent standard of living, basic public services, and economic progress free from war and repression. With a population of 795 million, 20% of the world's land area, and a wealth of natural resources and biological diversity, Sub-Saharan Africa cannot and should not be ignored or neglected. Because of conflicts and crushing poverty worsened by deadly threats from famine and the acquired immuno- deficiency syndrome (AIDS), there is a long-term humanitarian imperative to help alleviate acute suffering as much as possible. On the other hand, there also is an enormous human and natural resource potential in Africa which Africans can use for their own betterment. The world community also has an important stake in the realization of this potential. Finally, as the United States is a society with a large minority of African origin, American policy naturally reflects US domestic cultural and political ties to the region.
US Policy Goals in Sub-Saharan Africa
Conflict resolution and peaceful change in Africa are primary US goals since the degree of success in achieving them is the basis for progress in all other areas. The United States actively supports the nascent efforts of Africans to take the lead in resolving conflicts and peace-keeping efforts in the region. However, it also is willing to play the role of catalyst, technical adviser, and honest broker to resolve conflicts. Democratic systems that respect human rights and seek equitable economic growth are the best guarantees of peaceful change and stability. They provide the peaceful, stable environment essential to sustained development. The United States seeks greater respect for human rights, the rule of law, accountable and honest government, and democratic political pluralism. It neither wishes to impose a particular system nor to enforce any legal code. Rather, it supports what Africans themselves increasingly demand: an effective voice in their own affairs and an end to corruption and abuse of power. The United States will work for sustained equitable development through market-based reforms that rely more on the private sector and promise to reduce dependence on external aid. Ensuring access to markets, investment opportunities, and resources in Africa is the most effective way to sustain growth and US involvement. US assistance programs should support reform; aid criteria should include good governance and structural reform goals along with respect for political and human rights. Africa is beset by a variety of transnational problems which the United States can address. With both bilateral programs and support for international efforts, the United States can work to ameliorate the devastation caused by AIDS and environmental degradation in Africa. Necessary efforts to curb population growth and refugee flows also will involve improving the status of women. The United States and the world community have a strong interest in preventing the spread of terrorism and narcotics trafficking to Africa. Subversion by radical regimes on the periphery of the region also must be countered. US policy cannot afford to disregard the important, and often disproportionate, role of African military and security forces in public life. The United States will support efforts to create smaller, more professional forces clearly subordinate to civilian control and respectful of human rights. As some US military resources are redirected to peace-keeping and humanitarian relief, Africans and their regional organizations will be encouraged to take the lead in these efforts.
Programs for US Engagement in Africa
A collective response to conflict resolution. As newly empowered democratic forces struggle for control with established governments and elites, the potential for regional conflict could increase. Economic desperation will cause severe pressures within many societies. In addition, the very existence of some African states could be threatened by divisive and violent ethnic conflicts. Political and economic reforms are subject to reversal and repression, and in many states military establishments may continue to intervene in factional or ethnic disputes. Such conflict and resulting humanitarian disasters are costly in human and financial terms and, at times, offer compelling cause for outside intervention. The United States strives to deal with such conflicts through a well- informed diplomacy coupled increasingly with support for multilateral efforts to preempt and mediate strife. Collective action with US allies and other partners can effectively support African efforts to make and keep the peace. Although the United States will become militarily involved in such conflicts only under rare and compelling circumstances, a strong US diplomatic presence is required. US involvement in resolving conflicts in Namibia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique has earned it respect and influence internationally and in Africa and will help guide its future efforts. To prevent conflict from reaching the point of demanding outside intervention, the United States supports African efforts in mediating and averting conflict both internally and between states. Strengthening the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and expanding its mandate into regular peace-keeping operations and conflict- mediation services will be a key to this effort. Supporting similar intervention by sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), now carrying out an unprecedented peace-keeping operation in Liberia, also encourages further African efforts in collective security. Finally, active American support for efforts to reduce armaments and military spending in the region is an integral part of keeping the peace and resolving conflict. Preventing further bloodshed and conflict in South Africa is another policy priority, both because of that country's economic importance in Africa and the world's focus on the drama of its transition to majority rule. US public concern about apartheid and the creation of a new South African society offers another compelling reason for current US involvement and later assistance to South Africa under a truly representative, non-racial government. Helping democracy take root. The United States is committed to help promote and sustain political reforms now being demanded by Africans. The United States focuses on supporting broadly democratic processes and institutions, not personalities or specific political outcomes. Programs to support these reforms increasingly are integrated into efforts to achieve other objectives in Africa. Stable democracy with respect for basic rights is essential to peaceful change, and responsible and responsive government is the basis of sustainable economic growth. This policy responds to the near-universal recognition in Africa that the post-colonial, authoritarian model has brought political failure and economic ruin. An agenda of active support for human rights and democratization also commits the United States to help build civil societies and the institutions which sustain reform. As repressive and often corrupt institutions are swept away by the tide of reform, the United States has a historic opportunity to work with Africans to achieve stability and development through responsible, democratic government. Strong US programs to encourage democratic values and practices are essential. Projects advancing human and civil rights, the rule of law, freedom and diversity in the press, effective government, the status of women, and other pillars of a democratic society should reinforce direct assistance for holding elections. Support for democracy and good government must be firmly integrated into all dealings with Africans, especially those in the military and security forces who may pose the greatest threat to reform. Efforts to reduce the size of bloated security forces both through positive incentives and negative conditionality will be key to these efforts. A strong information program which shares and promotes democratic values is integral to US efforts to encourage lasting reform. American public diplomacy should take advantage of the information and communications revolutions in Africa. In many African states, fragile institutions of civil society are emerging: independent newspapers, labor unions, human rights groups, and political parties. Imperfect but reasonably representative elections are installing governments with genuine popular mandates. By identifying publicly with these developments and offering flexible support, the United States, in concert with other democracies, can solidify these gains and help make democratic experiments permanent. Success in this endeavor serves American political, economic, and humanitarian interests in Africa. Fostering economic growth and trade. The central concern of most Africans remains how to ensure a decent standard of living and lay the groundwork for a modern economy. Sustainable economic growth driven by the private sector is as essential to the achievement of all other US policy goals in Africa as it is domestically. Development assistance and economic support programs must focus on countries committed to free market policies which ensure equitable, long-term growth. Popular support for government and the democratic process is essential for tough economic reform measures to endure. The United States seeks to broaden the role of the private sector in political and economic reform while helping to meet basic human needs through its aid. Economic performance and need as well as progress toward democracy and responsible government will be the primary considerations in allocating US development assistance. The United States also seeks to include such criteria in the decisions of international financial institutions. To maximize assistance, coordination with other donors will be more important than ever. Africans must dedicate themselves to the basic economic reforms which will lead to a decent minimum standard of living and the continent's full participation in the world economy. US programs support these tough decisions by African leaders and their people, for they will ultimately lead to economic growth, a reduction in conflict, reduced dependence on aid, and expanded markets for US goods and services. The United States continues to respond quickly and substantially to suffering caused by natural or man-made disasters. Drought, famine, and population pressures will continue to afflict Africa. Wars and civil strife will continue to generate refugees, suffering, death, and economic destruction. The United States will seek equitable burdensharing among all international donors to meet these crises. The United States aims to expand its private sector commercial relationships and presence in Africa. Improving the investment climate, promoting non-discriminatory treatment for American business, and enhancing private sector support and followup services needed to carry on trade are priorities in this area. The US Government aggressively seeks out trade and investment opportunities for American firms and equal market access. US assistance programs promote American exports and trade. Free trade and an open economic system are particularly important for creating the wealth needed to spur economic growth for all sectors of society in South Africa. Many Africans look to a democratic South Africa as a potential economic engine for the whole region. Economic success or failure there will have serious implications for South Africa's neighbors as well as its own people. The United States encourages African nations to support the application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including the introduction of modern intellectual property rights protections, non-discriminatory investment policies, and support for the other provisions of the Uruguay Round. Freer trade, especially for agricultural products and textiles, also will be vital to Africa's economic progress. Growth through trade can reduce Africans' dependence on aid. Africans also face the burden of military expenditures on their economies and societies. With renewed effort to prevent conflict, there will be even more emphasis on reintegrating former soldiers into often devastated economies. US economic assistance and military programs in the region encourage appropriate reductions in military spending and help Africans redirect these financial and human resources into productive nation building. Debt is a crushing economic reality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Along with other donors, the United States continues to explore possible solutions to the burdens of debt servicing for struggling African economies. Debt relief should be targeted on those countries undertaking effective reforms. Addressing regional concerns and problems. The United States supports an expanded role for international collective action to address problems which affect the well-being of the world community. It also actively encourages regional solutions and organizations such as the OAU and ECOWAS as they take on new missions ranging from peace-keeping and conflict mediation to election and human rights monitoring. These fledgling efforts deserve US political and financial support as well as technical assistance and training. Stronger regional organizations will bring African solutions to African problems, necessary for the continent's long-term stability and development. Other critical issues with an impact in and beyond the region include: --
Women
--The vital role played by women in the management of natural resources only recently has been appreciated. Women's generally low status in Africa is an important factor in economic, social, and health problems. US assistance and information programs should focus on women as key actors in sustainable development and building a healthy society. Programs for educating and training women are vital to this process. --
Environment
--In coordination with international programs for the environment, the United States works to preserve and restore Africa's often ravaged ecosystems. Again, the emphasis should be on helping Africans build their own capacity and institutions to promote better environmental practices and the protection of the continent's unique biological diversity. The environmental problems of cities and new industries also require attention. --
AIDS
--The AIDS pandemic has had a particularly devastating effect on Africa, where more than one-half of the world's HIV [human immuno-deficiency virus]-infected persons live. The OAU Action Plan on AIDS is a positive first step toward a comprehensive prevention program in all African medical systems and societies. US technical assistance to research and to combat the spread of AIDS is joined to active efforts to mitigate the suffering and economic costs of the epidemic. Prevention and control of AIDS must involve every sector of development assistance, from population control to agriculture and industry. The entire world has a stake in stopping the pernicious spread of this disease and helping Africans devise cost-effective care for the infected. --
Population control
--Economic progress in Africa is contingent upon slowing population growth. Gains in living standards and reduced dependence on outside assistance will be impossible without vigorous programs to support family health care and family planning. US support for such programs is essential to its policy goals. --
Refugees
--Africa's conflicts and internal turmoil will continue to generate large numbers of refugees in dire need. Resources devoted to pre-venting and mitigating such conflict will more than pay for themselves in reduced costs for humanitarian relief and mass repatriations. To encourage voluntary repatriation as conflicts recede, US assistance should focus on reintegrating refugees into their own societies. --
Terrorism and narcotics
-- While Africa thus far has been spared the worst ravages of these global problems, desperate poverty and a breakdown in civil order has encouraged terrorism and drug use and trafficking. Terrorists and their state sponsors need to be countered by strong measures and both bilateral and regional cooperation. The United States can improve coordination of drug law enforcement and increase education to reduce domestic demand. When African countries become transit centers for illegal drugs, US technical assistance and training also is appropriate.
Conclusion
The United States is following this ambitious policy agenda in Africa while working to meet urgent needs in America and the requirement to reduce the size of budget deficits. Active diplomacy and a firm commitment to the objectives described above, however, will require little more than the resources currently available, especially with more effective collaboration by donor countries. Vigorous promotion of stable democracy, peaceful change, and economic reform will, in fact, reduce the potential costs faced by the United States by reducing both the intensity and frequency of conflict and humanitarian crises. Along with strong programs to support development which meets the basic needs of impoverished populations, the United States will be able to ensure that Africa can realize its enormous potential in peace and prosperity as a friend and full partner of the United States. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on the Former Yugoslavia

UN Source: Commission on Human Rights of the UN Economic and Social Council, Geneva, Switzerland Description: Text of Resolution 1992/S-2/1, "The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Date: Dec, 1 199212/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia Subject: Human Rights, United Nations [TEXT] The Commission on Human Rights, Meeting in special session, Guided by the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, Aware of its responsibility to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and to prevent violations of such rights, Deeply concerned at the human tragedy in the former Yugoslavia and at the continuing grave, massive and systematic violations of human rights occurring there, particularly in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Serbian control, Recalling its resolution 1992/S-1/1 [for text, see Dispatch Supplement Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 46], Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Special Rapporteur appointed pursuant to resolution 1992/S-1/1, as well as those of the Chairman of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, who accompanied the Special Rapporteur on one or both of his missions, Noting with alarm the three reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia (A/47/666 - S/24809, E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9 and E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10), Gravely concerned in particular at the continuing, odious practice of ethnic cleansing, which is the direct cause of the vast majority of human rights violations and whose principal victims are the Muslim population virtually threatened with extermination, which the Special Rapporteur reports has continued, and in some regions intensified, in an effort to create a fait accompli in disregard of international commitments, in particular the statement of principles and the programme of action of the London Conference, entered into by those who carry out such ethnic cleansing, and recalling, as stated in its resolution 1992/S-1/1, that ethnic cleansing is aimed at the dislocation or destruction of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups, Alarmed that although the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a religious conflict, it has been characterized by the systematic destruction and profanation of mosques, Catholic churches and other places of worship, as well as other sites of cultural heritage, in particular in areas currently or previously under Serbian control, Deeply concerned that the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia has resulted in more than two and a half million refugees and displaced persons and at the catastrophic humanitarian situation now prevailing, Recalling with appreciation the continuing efforts of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Co-Chairmen of its Steering Committee, including their proposals for the constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina designed to protect human rights on the basis of fundamental international human rights instruments, 1. Commends the Special Rapporteur for his activities to date, and in particular his two missions and his reports; 2. Condemns in the strongest terms all violations of human rights in the former Yugoslavia, including killings, torture, beatings, rape, disappearances, destruction of houses and other acts or threats of violence aimed at forcing individuals to leave their homes, as identified by the Special Rapporteur; 3. Categorically condemns the ethnic cleansing being carried out, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognizing that the Serbian leadership in territories under their control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Yugoslav Army and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia bear primary responsibility for this reprehensible practice; 4. Demands an immediate end to the practice of ethnic cleansing, and in particular demands that the Republic of Serbia use its influence with the self-proclaimed Serbian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to bring the practice of ethnic cleansing to an immediate end and to reverse the effects of that practice, re-emphasizing the rights of refugees, displaced persons and other victims of ethnic cleansing to return to their homes and the invalidity of acts made under duress; 5. Affirms that States are to be held accountable for violations of human rights which their agents commit upon the territory of another State; 6. Condemns in particular the violations of human rights and humanitarian law in connection with detention, including killings, torture and the systematic practice of rape, and calls upon all parties in the former Yugoslavia to close immediately all detention centres not authorized by and in compliance with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and to release immediately in conditions of safety all persons arbitrarily or illegally detained; 7. Condemns also the indiscriminate shelling of cities and civilian areas, the systematic terrorization and murder of non-combatants, the destruction of vital services, the besieging of cities, and the use of military force against civilian populations and relief operations by all sides, recognizing that the main responsibility lies with Serbian forces; 8. Calls upon parties in the former Yugoslavia, and especially those most responsible, to cease violations of human rights and international humanitarian law immediately and to take appropriate steps to apprehend and punish those guilty of perpetrating or authorizing them; 9. Expresses deep concern at the number of disappearances and missing persons in the former Yugoslavia and calls on all parties to make all possible efforts to account for those missing; 10. Welcomes the establishment, pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992 [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769], of a Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information relating to violations of international humanitarian law and encourages the closest possible cooperation between the Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts, recommends that this Commission be granted the staff and resources necessary to enable it to act effectively, and requests the Commission of Experts to provide its conclusions to the Secretary-General in order to allow the Security Council to consider further appropriate steps towards bringing those accused to justice; 11. Reaffirms that all persons who perpetrate or authorize crimes against humanity or other grave breaches of international humanitarian law are individually responsible for these breaches and that the international community will exert every effort to bring them to justice, and calls on all parties to provide all pertinent information to the Commission of Experts in accordance with Security Council resolution 780 (1992); 12. Calls upon all States to consider the extent to which the acts committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia constitute genocide, in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; 13. Urges the Commission of Experts, with the assistance of the Centre for Human Rights, to arrange for an immediate and urgent investigation by qualified experts of a mass grave near Vukovar and other mass grave sites and places where mass killings are reported to have taken place, and requests the General Assembly to provide the resources necessary for this undertaking; 14. Expresses its grave concern at the information contained in the third report of the Special Rapporteur (A/47/666-S/24809) on the dangerous situation in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, and urges all parties in those areas to engage in a meaningful dialogue under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to act with utmost restraint and to settle disputes in full observance of human rights and freedoms, and calls on the Serbian authorities to refrain from the use of force and immediately to stop the practice of ethnic cleansing, and to respect fully the rights of persons belonging to ethnic communities or minorities in order to prevent the extension of the conflict to other parts of the former Yugoslavia; 15. Welcomes the call of the Special Rapporteur for the opening of humanitarian relief corridors to prevent the imminent death of tens of thousands of persons in besieged cities; 16. Welcomes Security Council resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 47, p. 843] in which it invites the Secretary-General in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant agencies, to study the possibility and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes and the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur for the creation of such security zones for the protection of displaced persons, while keeping in mind that the international community must not acquiesce in demographic changes caused by ethnic cleansing; 17. Affirms that all the parties in the former Yugoslavia share the responsibility for finding peaceful solutions through negotiations under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and welcomes the acceptance by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the constitutional proposals of the Co-Chairmen as a basis for negotiations; 18. Requests the Special Rapporteur to continue his efforts, especially by carrying out such further missions to the former Yugoslavia as he deems necessary, to call on other existing mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights to assist him and to report his findings and recommendations at its forty-ninth session, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to make the reports of the Special Rapporteur available to the Security Council; 19. Urges the Secretary-General to take steps to ensure the full and effective cooperation of all United Nations bodies to implement the present resolution and calls upon those bodies entrusted with human rights monitoring in the former Yugoslavia to cooperate closely with the Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts; 20. Requests the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, within the overall budgetary framework of the United Nations, to make all necessary resources available for the Special Rapporteur to carry out his mandate and to comply with the request of the Special Rapporteur for staff based in the territory of the former Yugoslavia to enhance effective continuous monitoring of the human rights situation there; 21. Decides to examine the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia at its forty-ninth session under agenda item 12. VOTE: 45-1-1 (Yugoslavia opposed, Cuba abstaining).(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines Revised

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 7 19931/7/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States, Bassas da India, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, International Organizations [TEXT] The Government of the United States, together with its partners in the missile technology control regime [MTCR], has strengthened its efforts to combat the proliferation of ballistic missiles. The United States and all the partners in the missile technology control regime have adopted revised guidelines to extend the scope of the regime to missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons as well as nuclear weapons. The adoption of these guidelines and their implementation confirms and tightens existing policy. These measures will further strengthen the MTCR and will be important factors in countering the proliferation of missile systems. The Government of the United States and its MTCR partners welcome the growing number of countries which have publicly committed themselves to respect the MTCR guidelines, and we call on all states to show a similar spirit of responsibility in the interest of international peace and security. A similar statement is being made simultaneously in the capitals of the 22 partners of the MTCR. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines: Text of Revisions

Boucher Description: Issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 7 19931/7/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States, Bassas da India, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, International Organizations [TEXT]
Missile Technology Control Regime
The United States Government has, after careful consideration and subject to its international treaty obligations, decided that, when considering the transfer of equipment and technology related to missiles, it will act in accordance with the attached Guidelines beginning on January 7, 1993. These Guidelines replace those adopted on April 16, 1987.
Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers
1. The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons. The Guidelines are not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. These Guidelines, including the attached Annex, form the basis for controlling transfers to any destination beyond the Government's jurisdiction or control of all delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and of equipment and technology relevant to missiles whose performance in terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters. Restraint will be exercised in the consideration of all transfers of items contained within the Annex and all such transfers will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The Government will implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation. 2. The Annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes equipment and technology. Category I items, all of which are in Annex Items 1 and 2, are those items of greatest sensitivity. If a Category I item is included in a system, that system will also be considered as Category I, except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, removed or duplicated. Particular restraint will be exercised in the consideration of Category I transfers regardless of their purpose, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Particular restraint will also be exercised in the consideration of transfers of any items in the Annex, or of any missiles (whether or not in the Annex), if the Government judges, on the basis of all available, persuasive information, evaluated according to factors including those in paragraph 3, that they are intended to be used for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Until further notice, the transfer of Category I production facilities will not be authorized. The transfer of other Category I items will be authorized only on rare occasions and where the Government (A) obtains binding government-to-government undertakings embodying the assurances from the recipient government called for in paragraph 5 of these Guidelines and (B) assumes responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use. It is understood that the decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgment of the United States Government. 3. In the evaluation of transfer applications for Annex items, the following factors will be taken into account: A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state; C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction; D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances of the recipient states referred to in sub-paragraphs 5.A and 5.B below; E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements. 4. The transfer of design and production technology directly associated with any items in the Annex will be subject to as great a degree of scrutiny and control as will the equipment itself, to the extent permitted by national legislation. 5. Where the transfer could contribute to a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction, the Government will authorize transfers of items in the Annex only on receipt of appropriate assurances from the government of the recipient state that: A. The items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use will not be modified nor the items modified or replicated without the prior consent of the United States Government; B. Neither the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will be retransferred without the consent of the United States Government. 6. In furtherance of the effective operation of the Guidelines, the United States Government will, as necessary and appropriate, exchange relevant information with other governments applying the same Guidelines. 7. The adherence of all States to these Guidelines in the interest of international peace and security would be welcome. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Haiti: Legislative Elections

Boucher Description: Issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 12 19931/12/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization [TEXT] The de facto government of Haiti has announced its intention to hold elections for several Senate seats and other offices on January 18 and 25. The US Government believes that free and fair elections can only be held under a legally constituted government in an atmosphere of respect for free expression, freedom of assembly, and open political dialogue. These conditions do not exist in Haiti today. Consequently, we do not regard the planned elections as legitimate. In the same context, we remain firmly committed to restoration of democratic, constitutional government in Haiti. We continue to recognize Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the legitimately elected president of that country. We urge all Haitian parties to dedicate themselves to serious negotiations that will end the current crisis and restore democracy to Haiti.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

US To Assist With Senegal's Withdrawal From Liberia

Snyder Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joseph C. Snyder Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 12 19931/12/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Liberia, Senegal Subject: Military Affairs, International Organizations [TEXT] The United States wishes to commend the Senegalese military personnel in Liberia for the important role they have played in pursuing regional stability in West Africa. Their mission successfully completed, the Senegalese troops in Liberia will begin returning to Dakar [Senegal] tomorrow. The United States, which at the request of the Government of Senegal and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) assisted in the deployment of the Senegalese troops in late 1991, will help with their redeployment to Dakar. The operation, using military air transport and a commercial ship, will be financed from US funds allocated when the approximately 1,400 Senegalese troops arrived in Liberia in 1991. The Senegalese were in Liberia as part of the West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) maintained by ECOWAS. ECOMOG has significantly reinforced its presence in Liberia since the October 15, 1992, attack on Monrovia [Liberia] by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The peace-keeping force repelled the NPFL attack and has now secured virtually all territory seized by the NPFL at that time. ECOMOG will remain capable of protecting the Liberian people from attack after the departure of the Senegalese contingent. We expect ECOWAS to continue pursuing implementation of the Yamoussoukro [Cote d'Ivoire] peace agreement in accordance with the mandate contained in UN Security Council Resolution 788 of November 19, 1992 [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 48, p. 861]. The United States continues to support ECOWAS fully in its effort to bring peace to Liberia, disarm and demobilize the warring factions, and create conditions in which free and fair elections can be held. However, Charles Taylor has rejected the ECOWAS call for a cease-fire and asserted that his irregular army will not disarm under ECOMOG supervision. We call upon all Liberian combatants to cease aggressive actions and cooperate with the UN-endorsed ECOWAS plan.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

US-Pacific Island Nation Joint Commercial Commission

Snyder Description: Statement released by the Office of the Acting Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 12 19931/12/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Cook Islands, Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Western Samoa Subject: International Law, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Leaders from 13 Pacific island countries met with US officials on January 12 in Honolulu, Hawaii, to sign a memorandum of understanding establishing the US-Pacific Island Nations Joint Commercial Commission (JCC). This initiative, first proposed by President Bush at his October 27, 1990, Honolulu summit meeting with island heads of government, will function as a consultative mechanism to enhance commercial and trade links among member nations. As such, it will complement the economic policies of the South Pacific island governments, which stress the importance of the private sector in their respective national development programs. The United States currently has JCC agreements with Poland, China, South Korea, and Thailand. The Honolulu agreement marks the first time the United States has participated in a JCC comprised of so many nations in a single region. The successful conclusion of this undertaking underscores our continuing commitment to playing a constructive role in the South Pacific. Pacific island members of the JCC are the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993

Title:

Excerpts From President's Inaugural Address

Clinton Source: President Clinton Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan, 20 19931/20/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department [TEXT] ...To renew America, we must meet challenges abroad as well as at home. There is no longer a clear division between what is foreign and what is domestic. The world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS [acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome] crisis, the world arms race--they affect us all. Today, as an old order passes, the new world is more free but less stable. Communism's collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers. Clearly, America must continue to lead the world we did so much to make. While America rebuilds at home, we will not shrink from the challenges nor fail to seize the opportunities of this new world. Together with our friends and allies, we will work to shape change lest it engulf us. When our vital interests are challenged or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act--with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary. The brave Americans serving our nation today in the Persian Gulf, in Somalia, and wherever else they stand are testament to our resolve. But our greatest strength is the power of our ideas, which are still new in many lands. Across the world, we see them embraced, and we rejoice. Our hopes, our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing

Christopher Source: Secretary-Designate Christopher Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, East Asia, North America, MidEast/North Africa Country: United States, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, Israel, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mexico, Canada Subject: Trade/Economics, Military Affairs, Democratization, United Nations, Mideast Peace Process, North America Free Trade [TEXT] Mr. Chairman: It is a great honor to appear before you as President-elect Clinton's nominee for Secretary of State. This hearing room is a long way from Scranton, North Dakota, population 300, where I was born and raised, and I am deeply moved by being here in these circumstances. You and the members of this committee have contributed much leadership and wisdom to our nation's foreign policy over the past decade. Let me say at the outset that I look forward to a close and cooperative relationship with you. I also look forward to your questions and will try to answer them with the ruthless candor for which diplomats are famous. In the 3 weeks since President-elect Clinton asked me to serve as his Secretary of State, I have received about as much commiseration as congratulation. Friends point to this new world's raw conflicts and stress our own limited resources. They tell me I have drawn an important but unpleasant assignment. I appreciate their concern. But I dispute their assessment. I believe we have arrived at a uniquely promising moment. The signature of this era is change, and I believe many of the changes work in our favor. The Cold War is over. Forty years of sustained effort on behalf of collective security and human dignity have been rewarded. Millions who lived under the stultifying yoke of communism are free. The tide of democratic aspirations is rising from Tibet to Central America. Freer markets are expanding the reach of prosperity. The nuclear nightmare is receding, and I want to congratulate President Bush and [Russian] President Yeltsin on their successful negotiation of the START II Treaty [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]. We now have the opportunity to create a new strategy that directs America's resources at something other than superpower confrontation.
Perils of the New Era
Neither President-elect Clinton nor I have any illusions about the perils that lurk in many of this era's changes. The end of the Cold War has lifted the lid on many cauldrons of long-simmering conflict. The bloody results are evident in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Nor will this era lack for ruthless and expansionist despots; [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein confirmed that fact. Yet it is also true that we are now relatively more powerful and physically more secure. So while we are alert to this era's dangers, we nonetheless approach it with an underlying sense of optimism. Not since the late 1940s has our nation faced the challenge of shaping an entirely new foreign policy for a world that has fundamentally changed. Like our counterparts then, we need to design a new strategy for protecting American interests by laying the foundations for a more just and stable world. That strategy must reflect the fundamental changes that characterize this era: -- The surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and sectional conflicts, especially in the former Soviet bloc; -- The globalization of commerce and capital; -- A worldwide democratic revolution, fueled by new information technologies that amplify the power of ideas; -- New and old human rights challenges, including protecting ethnic minorities as well as political dissidents; -- The rise of new security threats, especially terrorism and the spread of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction; and -- Global challenges including overpopulation, famine, drought, refugees, AIDS [acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome], drug-trafficking, and threats to the earth's environment. To adapt our foreign policy goals and institutions to these changes, President-elect Clinton has stressed that our effort must rest on three pillars: First, we must elevate America's economic security as a primary goal of our foreign policy. Second, we must preserve our military strength as we adapt our forces to new security challenges. Third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of promoting the spread of democracy and markets abroad. As we adapt to new conditions, it is worth underscoring the essential continuity in American foreign policy. Despite a change in administrations, our policy in many specific instances will remain constant and will seek to build upon the accomplishments of our predecessors. Examples include the Middle East peace process, firm enforcement of the UN sanctions against Iraq, ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty, and the continuing need for US power to play a role in promoting stability in Europe and the Pacific. Nevertheless, our Administration inherits the task of defining a strategy for US leadership after the Cold War. We cannot afford to careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that seeks to anticipate and prevent crises, like those in Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia, rather than simply to manage them. Our support for democratic institutions and human rights can help defuse political conflicts. And our support for sustainable development and global environmental protection can help prevent human suffering on a scale that demands our intervention. We cannot foresee every crisis. But preventive diplomacy can free us to devote more time and effort to problems facing us at home. It is not enough to articulate a new strategy; we must also justify it to the American people. Today, foreign policy makers cannot afford to ignore the public, for there is a real danger that the public will ignore foreign policy. The unitary goal of containing Soviet power will have to be replaced by more complex justifications to fit the new era. We need to show that, in this era, foreign policy is no longer foreign. Practitioners of statecraft sometimes forget [that] their ultimate purpose is to improve the daily lives of the American people. They assume foreign policy is too complex for the public to be involved in its formation. That is a costly conceit. From Vietnam to Iran-contra, we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign policies hatched by the experts without proper candor or consultation with the public and their representatives in Congress. More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to have "clientitis," a malady characterized by undue deference to the potential reactions of other countries. I have long thought the State Department needs an "America Desk." This Administration will have one--and I'll be sitting behind it.
Guiding Principles For Foreign Policy
I will not attempt today to fit the foreign policy of the next 4 years into the straightjacket of some neatly tailored doctrine. Yet, America's actions in the world must be guided by consistent principles. As I have noted, I believe there are three that should guide foreign policy in this new era. First, we must advance America's economic security with the same energy and resourcefulness we devoted to waging the Cold War. The new Administration will shortly propose an economic program to empower American firms and workers to win in world markets, reduce our reliance on foreign borrowing, and increase our ability to sustain foreign commitments. Despite our economic woes, we remain the world's greatest trading nation, its largest market, and its leading exporter. That is why we must utilize all the tools at our disposal, including a new GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] agreement and a North American Free Trade Agreement that serves the interests of American firms, workers, and communities. In an era in which economic competition is eclipsing ideological rivalry, it is time for diplomacy that seeks to assure access for US businesses to expanding global markets. This does not mean that our commercial goals will trump other important concerns, such as non-proliferation, human rights, and sustainable development in the Third World. But for too long, we have made economics the poor cousin of our foreign policy. For example, in nearly all the countries of the former Eastern bloc--nations whose economies and markets are on the threshold of growth--we have for years assigned only one Foreign Service officer to assist US companies. In the case of Russia, that means one commercial officer for a nation of 150 million people. Other economic powers, such as Germany and Japan, devote far more personnel to promoting their firms, industries, and economic concerns. The Clinton Administration intends to harness our diplomacy to the needs and opportunities of American industries and workers. We will not be bashful about linking our high diplomacy with our economic goals. We will ask our foreign missions to do more to gather crucial information about market opportunities and barriers and actively assist American companies seeking to do business abroad. Second, we must maintain a strong defense as we adapt our forces to new and enduring security challenges. As a result of efforts begun in the late 1970s by President Carter and continued under Presidents Reagan and Bush, our Administration inherits the best fighting force in the world. But the world has changed. We face a paradox. The collapse of the Soviet Union enables us to reduce our Cold War military forces. But it also leaves American power as the main ballast for an unstable world. Our ability to manage the transition to a more stable system of international relations will depend on tenacious diplomacy backed by credible strength. The President-elect and Secretary [of Defense]-designate Aspin have described how we must adapt our armed forces to new missions. And I agree with President-elect Clinton's statement that we will resolve constantly to deter, sometimes to fight, and always to win. I have spent a good portion of my life practicing various forms of diplomacy, negotiation, and problem solving--from the effort to secure the release of the American hostages in Iran, to responses to urban unrest and police brutality, to the practice of law over 4 decades. I have argued and still believe that diplomacy is a neglected imperative. I believe we must apply new dispute resolution techniques and forms of international arbitration to the conflicts that plague the world. I also know from experience that nations do not negotiate on the basis of goodwill alone; they negotiate on the basis of interests and, therefore, on calculations of power. As I reflect on our experience in the Cold War, it is clear that our success flowed from our ability to harness diplomacy and power together--both the modernization of our forces and negotiations for arms control; both advocacy for human rights and covert and overt opposition to Soviet expansionism. In the years to come, Americans will be confronted with vexing questions about the use of force--decisions about whether to intervene in border disputes, civil wars, outright invasions, and in cases of possible genocide; about whether to intervene for purposes that are quite different from the traditional missions of our armed forces--purposes such as peace-keeping, peace-making, humanitarian assistance, evacuation of Americans abroad, and efforts to combat drug smuggling and terrorism. While there is no magic formula to guide such decisions, I do believe that the discreet and careful use of force in certain circumstances--and its credible threat in general-- will be essential to the success of our diplomacy and foreign policy. Although there will always be differences at the margin, I believe we can-- and must--craft a bipartisan consensus in which these questions concerning the use of force will no longer divide our nation as they once did. However, we cannot respond to every alarm. I want to assure the American people that we will not turn their blood and treasure into an open account for use by the rest of the world. We cannot let every crisis become a choice between inaction or American intervention. It will be this Administration's policy to encourage other nations and the institutions of collective security, especially the United Nations, to do more of the world's work to deter aggression, relieve suffering, and keep the peace. In that regard, we will work with [UN] Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and the members of the Security Council to ensure [that] the United Nations has the means to carry out such tasks. The United Nations has recently shown great promise in mediating disputes and fulfilling its promise of collective security--in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and elsewhere. But the United Nations cannot be an effective instrument for sharing our global burdens unless we share the burden of supporting it. I will work to ensure that we pay our outstanding obligations. Ultimately, when our vital interests are at stake, we will always reserve our option to act alone. As the President-elect has said, our motto in this era should be: Together where we can; on our own where we must. One of the main security problems of this era will be the proliferation of very deadly weapons--nuclear, chemical, biological, and enhanced conventional weapons--as well as their delivery systems. The [Persian] Gulf war highlighted the problem of a fanatical aggressor developing or using weapons of mass destruction. We must work assiduously with other nations to discourage proliferation through improved intelligence, export controls, incentives, sanctions, and even force when necessary. Overall, this Administration will give high priority to the prevention of proliferation as we enter a new and exceedingly dangerous period. Third, our new diplomacy will encourage the global revolution for democracy that is transforming our world. Promoting democracy does not imply a crusade to remake the world in our image. Rather, support for democracy and human rights abroad can and should be a central strategic tenet in improving our own security. Democratic movements and governments are not only more likely to protect human and minority rights, they are also more likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes in a peaceful manner and to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and global environmental protection. A strategic approach to promoting democracy requires that we coordinate all of our leverage, including trade, economic and security assistance, and debt relief. By enlisting international and regional institutions in the work of promoting democracy, the United States can leverage our own limited resources and avoid the appearance of trying to dominate others. In the information age, public diplomacy takes on special importance--and that is why we will support the creation of a Radio Free Asia to ensure that the people of all Asian nations have access to uncensored information about their societies and about the world. Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down but must be built from the bottom up. Our policy should encourage patient, sustained efforts to help others build the institutions that make democracy possible: political parties, free media, laws that protect property and individual rights, an impartial judiciary, labor unions, and voluntary associations that stand between the individual and the state. American private and civic groups are particularly well suited to help. In this regard, we will move swiftly to establish the Democracy Corps, to put experienced Americans in contact with foreign grassroots democratic leaders, and to strengthen the bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy. We must also improve our institutional capacity to provide timely and effective aid to people struggling to establish democracy and free markets. To that end, we need to overhaul the US Agency for International Development [USAID]. The agency needs to take on fewer missions, narrow the scope of its operations, and make itself less bureaucratic. As a matter of enlightened self-interest as well as compassion, we need to extract lessons from USAID's past successes and failures to make its future efforts stronger. In all this work, we must ensure that the people who carry out our nation's foreign policy have the resources they need to do the job. I want to work with you to ensure they have adequate facilities, training, information systems, and security. We also need to take a new look at the way our State Department is organized and our policy is formulated. In the coming weeks, I intend to streamline the Department of State to enhance our capabilities to deal with issues that transcend national boundaries and to improve the international competitiveness of American business. The Clinton Administration will put America back in the forefront of global efforts to achieve sustainable development and, in the process, leave our children a better world. We believe that sound environmental policies are a precondition of economic growth, not a brake on it. These three pillars for our foreign policy--economic growth, military strength, and support for democracy--are mutually re-enforcing. A vibrant economy will strengthen America's hand abroad, while permitting us to maintain a strong military without sacrificing domestic needs. And by helping others to forge democracy out of the ruins of dictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new ones, and create new markets for US trade and investment.
Principal Challenges To US Security
Let me take a few moments to consider how this strategic approach applies to the principal security challenges that America faces in the 1990s. None is more important than helping Russia demilitarize, privatize, invigorate its economy, and develop representative political institutions. President Yeltsin's courageous economic and political reforms stand as our best hope for reducing the still-formidable arsenal of nuclear and conventional arms in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, and this, in turn, permits reductions in our own defense spending. A collapse of the Russian economy, which contracted by 20% last year, could fatally discredit democracy, not only in the eyes of the Russians but in the eyes of their neighbors as well. Our Administration will join with our G-7 [Group of Seven leading industrialized nations] partners to increase support for Russia's economic reforms. That aid must be conditioned on the willingness of Russia to continue the difficult but essential steps necessary to move from a command economy to a more market-oriented one. We shall also place high priority on direct and technical assistance for Russia's efforts to dismantle its weapons and properly dispose of its nuclear materials, to provide civilian employment for defense technicians, and to house its demobilized forces. We must say to the democratic reformers in Russia that the democratic nations stand with them and that the world's experience in coping with similar problems is available to them. We should also orchestrate similar international action to help Ukraine, the other Commonwealth [of Independent] States, the Baltics, and the nations of Eastern and Central Europe. In Europe, we remain committed to NATO, history's most successful military and political alliance, even as we support the evolution of new security arrangements that incorporate the emerging democracies to the east. Our Administration will support efforts by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to promote human rights, democracy, free elections, and the historic re-integration of the nations of Eastern and Western Europe. I can also assure you that this Administration will vigorously pursue concerted action with our European allies and international bodies to end the slaughter in Bosnia--a slaughter that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and that threatens to spread throughout the Balkans. Europe and the world community in general must bring real pressures, economic and military, to bear on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of ethnic cleansing. In Asia, we confront many challenges and opportunities. In particular, as President-elect Clinton stressed during the campaign, a complex blend of new and old forces requires us to rethink our policy toward China. On the one hand, there is a booming economy based increasingly on free market principles, which is giving hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens an unprecedented degree of prosperity and a thirst for economic as well as political reform. On the other hand, we cannot ignore continuing reports of Chinese exports of sensitive military technology to troubled areas, widespread violations of human rights, or abusive practices that have contributed to a $17-billion trade imbalance between our two nations. Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and political liberalization in that great country. Elsewhere in Asia, the countries of the Pacific Rim are becoming a global center of economic dynamism. In 1991, our trans-Pacific trade exceeded $316 billion, dwarfing our $221-billion trade with Western Europe. We must devote particular attention to Japan. Japan has recently taken important steps to meet more of its international security responsibilities, such as assisting in peace-keeping efforts from Cambodia to Somalia. Now it must do more to meet its economic responsibilities as well--to lower trade barriers more quickly and to open its economy to competition. Together, Japan and the United States account for a third or more of the global economy. That obligates us both to steer clear of the reefs of recrimination and the rise of regional trading blocs that could sink prospects for global growth. But we also have an obligation to America's firms and workers to ensure [that] they are able to benefit from the growth of Japan's economy, just as the strength and openness of the US economy has helped fuel Japan's prosperity over many decades. In South Korea, we will continue to maintain our military presence as long as North Korea poses a threat to that nation. And on Asia's subcontinent, our interests include combating nuclear proliferation; restoring peace to Afghanistan; seeing an end to communal strife that threatens India's democracy; and promoting human rights and free elections in Burma, Pakistan, and elsewhere. In the Middle East, we must maintain the momentum behind the current negotiations over peace and regional issues. President Bush and [former] Secretary of State Baker deserve great credit for bringing Arabs and Israelis to the bargaining table, and the Clinton Administration is committed to building on that historic breakthrough. Our democracy- centered policy underscores our special relationship with Israel, the region's only democracy, with whom we are committed to maintaining a strong and vibrant strategic relationship. We also believe that America's unswerving commitment to Israel's right to exist behind secure borders is essential to a just and lasting peace. We will continue our efforts with both Israel and our Arab friends to address the full range of that region's challenges. Throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, we will work toward new arms control agreements, particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction. We will assume a vigilant stance toward both Iraq and Iran, which seem determined to sow violence and disorder throughout the region and even beyond. In this region, as well, we will champion economic reform, more accountable governance, and increased respect for human rights. And following a decade during which over 1,000 Americans were killed, injured, or kidnaped by perpetrators of international terrorism, we will give no quarter to terrorists or the states that sponsor their crimes against humanity. Nowhere has the march against dictators and toward democracy been more dramatic than in our own hemisphere. It is in our self-interest to help Latin America consolidate a decade of hard-won progress. In the past several years, as democracy has spread in the region and market economies have been liberalized, our exports to Latin America have doubled. In close partnership with our hemispheric partners, Canada and Mexico, we should explore ways to extend free trade agreements to Latin American nations that are opening their economies and political systems. At the same time, we expect to complete understandings regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement as outlined by President-elect Clinton. We also need to make the Organization of American States [OAS] a more effective forum for addressing our region's problems. In Haiti, we strongly support the international effort by the UN and the OAS to restore democracy. In Cuba, we will maintain the embargo to keep pressure on the Castro regime. We will strongly support national reconciliation and the full implementation of peace accords in El Salvador and Nicaragua. And in the Andean countries, the power of the drug lords must be broken to free their people and ours from the corrupting influence of the narcotics trade. In Africa, as well, a new generation is demanding the opportunities that flow from multi-party democracy and open economies. They deserve our understanding and support. We need to assist their efforts to build institutions that can empower Africa's people to husband and benefit from the continent's vast resources; deal with its economic, social, and environmental problems; and address its underlying causes of political instability. We will be equally committed to working with Congress to redirect our foreign assistance programs to promote sustainable development and private enterprise in Africa. In South Africa, we shall work actively to support those, black and white, who are striving to dismantle the hateful machinery of apartheid and working with determination to build a multi-racial democracy.
The Triumph of Freedom
As I said on the day President-elect Clinton nominated me to be Secretary of State, back when I was in law school, two of my heroes were [former Secretaries of State] Gen. George Marshall and Dean Acheson. And I am enormously honored by the opportunity to occupy the post held by them and by many of the most revered names in our nation's history. Marshall and Acheson were visionaries who recognized at the dawn of the Cold War that America could not remain safe by standing aloof from the world. And the triumph of freedom in that great struggle is the legacy of the activist foreign policy they shaped to project our values and protect our interests. Now, as in their day, we face a new era and the challenge of developing a new foreign policy. Its activism must be grounded in America's enduring interests. It must be informed by a realistic estimate of the dangers we face. It must be shaped by the democratic convictions we share. And, to command respect abroad, it must rest on a sturdy, bipartisan consensus here at home. The ultimate test of the security strategy I have outlined today will be in the benefits it delivers to the American people. Its worth will be measured not by its theoretical elegance but by its results. If it makes our people more prosperous and increases their safety abroad; if it helps expand the stabilizing and ennobling reach of democratic institutions and freer markets; if it helps protect the global environment for our children--if it achieves these kinds of benefits, then we will have discharged our responsibilities to our generation as Marshall, Acheson, and the other architects of the post-war world discharged theirs. They have given us a high standard to emulate as we define anew the requirements of US global leadership. I look forward to working with both parties in Congress to construct a new framework for that leadership, a frame-work within which healthy debate will occur but within which we can also build a strong consensus that will help us cooperatively pursue the national interest at home and abroad. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

Deputy Secretary-Designate's Confirmation Hearing

Wharton Source: Deputy Secretary-Designate Wharton Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 22 19931/22/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] When President Clinton asked me to join his new Administration, I accepted with a sense of honor, of excitement, and a sense of great personal fulfillment. For more than 2 decades, I have been an executive in higher education and finance--president of a university; chancellor of a multi-campus university system; and head of a very large insurance company and pension fund for employees of colleges and universities, research institutes, private secondary schools, and foundations. Some might ask how, with that background, I came to be considered for this post. While I am not privy to the thoughts of President Clinton or Secretary of State Christopher on my selection, I should point out that my career did not suddenly begin when I was elected president of Michigan State University in 1970. The fact is that for some 22 years previously, my full-time career involved technical assistance and foreign economic development. Mr. Chairman, if I may be permitted to forego my usual diffidence, an anecdote may help to clarify the dilemma I face when trying to rebut those who say I have no foreign policy experience. At a recent college commencement where I was privileged to receive an honorary degree, I was waiting in the procession line when I was approached by a faculty member. His first comment after congratulating me on the honorary degree was the inevitable question: "How's my retirement money?" His second comment was to say, "I am very happy to meet you because I use your father's book on economic development in my course." When I pointed out to him that my ambassador father never wrote a book on economic development but that he was referring to my book, my faculty friend expressed amazement to learn that I was the same person.
Background
So how did all this begin? In his presentation several days ago, Warren Christopher recalled the great influence on the post-1945 world of our nation's Marshall Plan--surely one of the few shining episodes in the history of relations between nations formerly at war. Perhaps the event that most shaped my own career was my presence in the graduating class at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. As someone who has given more than a few of them, I can tell you that commencement speeches are usually listened to by the boisterous seniors with half an ear, if that. But for my class, the speaker was Secretary of State George C. Marshall himself. The address he gave that day--the address in which he set forth the elements of the Marshall Plan--stands as one of the great turning points in enlightened diplomacy. Even now I remember key thoughts from his speech: Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. General Marshall knew full well [that] he was laying the groundwork for a great campaign to rebuild war-torn Europe-- physically, economically, and politically as well. He may have been less aware of the effect his words had on one idealistic youngster who resolved, on the spot, to dedicate himself to the inspired and inspiring principles General Marshall had just put before the graduating class. Nonetheless, his words guided my educational and career choices from that moment onward. At Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, I took my masters in international affairs with an emphasis on Latin America-- a specialization that eventually led to 5 years of work on assistance programs in Venezuela, Brazil, and Costa Rica in association with Nelson Rockefeller. Later, when I was studying for my doctorate in economics at the University of Chicago, my mentor was the great Nobel laureate in economics, Theodore W. Shultz, who was then evaluating US technical assistance throughout Latin America. My dissertation was on the impact of technical assistance on agricultural development in Brazil. When I completed my doctorate, I faced the usual choice [of] what in the world to do with it. My father, a career diplomat who would eventually become our country's first black career ambassador, made no secret of his eagerness to have me follow his footsteps into the Foreign Service. And that was by no means an unappealing possibility. Yet, 10 years after I heard George Marshall speak at Harvard, his message still filled me with excitement. In Japan and Europe it was now possible to see, in the most vivid and concrete ways, what international assistance and trade could accomplish. And in President Truman's subsequent "Point Four" program, the United States had already embarked on an extension of the original Marshall Plan concept to what were then called the "underdeveloped" nations of the Third World. To be sure, the Point Four program was undertaken in large part, if not entirely, to contain the expanding communist sphere of influence. Yet Point Four struck me as potentially much more than just a Cold War gambit. Ultimately, I thought it might be, at least, as constructive an element of US foreign policy as traditional diplomacy. And, on that basis, I made my choice. Between 1957 and 1970, I worked for the private, non-profit Agricultural Development Council headed by John D. Rockefeller III. For 6 of those years, my family and I lived in Malaysia, while my teaching, research, and grant- making and development activities also took me regularly to Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. It was a part of the world where the majority of people were struggling to move from bare subsistence to a higher standard of living. They were seeking better nutrition, housing, education, and health care--all the things we mean when we talk about the "quality of life" and "economic development." Our efforts to help them we labeled "technical assistance." Back in the United States, our commitments got thrown together with a lot of other things under the catch-all heading of "foreign aid." Then, as now, not understanding "foreign aid" didn't necessarily prevent people from attacking it. In 1970, I became president of Michigan State University--a huge "megaversity" in the then-popular term and one with a large and highly respected international studies program. These were important programs, including scores of projects based in developing nations around the world, many funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). In 1978, I became chancellor of the State University of New York (SUNY) system, the nation's largest public university. With 64 campuses, 47,000 employees, and more than 380,000 students, SUNY also maintained major international program commitments, and I made enhancing them one of my key initiatives during the 9 years I worked there. In 1987, I became chairman and chief executive officer of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund [TIAA- CREF]. With assets of $112 billion, TIAA-CREF is the largest private pension fund in the world and the third-largest insurance company in the United States. Without belaboring the point much further, I want to stress that my involvement in international relations did not end after my overseas development days were over. My first foreign policy foray came in 1966 as a member of the State Department's Advisory Committee on East Asia and the Pacific. In the intervening years, I was chairman of the Food Advisory Plan of Congress' Office of Technology Assistance; a member of President Carter's Commission on World Hunger; co-chairman of Secretary of State Shultz's Commission on Security and Economic Assistance; and the first chairman of USAID's Board for International Food and Agricultural Development. I have been a long-standing member of the Overseas Development Council and trustee of the Council on Foreign Relations, where I had the privilege of serving with Secretary Christopher. Most recently, I have briefly served on the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I hope you will forgive me for the brief, though probably not brief enough, recitation of what could be called my foreign policy portfolio. I wanted to give you some assurance that, in this extremely demanding assignment as Deputy Secretary of State, I will not be starting from square one. Moreover, since Secretary Christopher provided you with his perspectives on the many challenges that our country faces around the world, particularly in Russia, the Middle East, and Somalia, it seemed only fair to offer you some sense of the background and values I bring to these and other challenges that lie ahead.
Immediate Priorities
What, in fact, are some of the challenges that are uppermost in my mind? The Deputy Secretary of State is, in one sense, the Secretary's alter ego and, in another, the State Department's chief operating officer. As such, I propose to concentrate, at least initially, on at least four issues. First, I have been asked by Secretary Christopher to take an active role in putting together both the State Department budget for FY 1994 and the Function 150 International Affairs Budget. In that process, we will be seeking to balance two imperatives. -- The first is to support the Administration's key foreign policy objectives in national security, economic competitiveness and the promotion of democracy and free markets abroad. -- The second is to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the Administration's domestic agenda. Given the obvious fiscal constraints, we will need to take much greater care in assuring that the resources we dedicate to advance our important interests abroad are expended in a coordinated and effective way. Second, I will search for ways to adapt our foreign affairs machinery to the new realities of the post-Cold War era. As Secretary Christopher stated in his appearance before this committee, recent changes on the global scene make it both timely and necessary to re-examine the way our State Department is organized and how our policy is formulated. Also, we need to streamline the Department and the policy- making process as we enhance our ability to deal with issues that transcend national boundaries. Third, I intend to pay special attention to the restructuring of our aid programs and institutions. It is clear from the many recent studies that we need to redefine USAID and revamp its organization accordingly. In particular, we must ensure that our aid activities directly support democracy, free markets, and sustainable development. This will receive my highest priority. We intend to name an Administrator of USAID and to move quickly to develop proposals which can serve as the basis for consultation with the Congress. Finally, I will look for ways to strengthen and support the people who are responsible for the day-to-day management and execution of our foreign policy, for they constitute our most important resource. We must be sure that they have the training and direction they need to advance our key policy objectives, and we must see to it that they have the facilities, information systems, and security needed to accomplish their critically important missions. In each of these important areas, I hope that my managerial experience in business and academia, as well as my earlier experience in economic development, will serve me well. But I want to emphasize that as we consider ways to improve the Department, I will work closely with the Congress and especially with the members of this committee. Your wisdom and insights will be invaluable. More broadly, as Secretary Christopher's alter ego, I expect to be fully engaged in policy issues. As we shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world, the United States is, by force of destiny, a nation which must act in global terms. But we need not think about the fate of other nations for purely altruistic reasons. The fact is, as President Clinton has said on numerous occasions, our national interest is inextricably linked with the rest of the world's. Our economy now stretches to every corner of the world through international trade and resource specialization. Oil tremors anywhere in the world are quickly felt at the gas pumps in our towns and villages. American exports are the source of millions of jobs in this country. Our balance-of-trade problems and deficits are symptomatic of the global linkages. Our ecology is the world's ecology. Whether it is global warming or desertification, national boundaries mean nothing to the forces of nature. The volcanic dust from Krakatoa didn't know the difference between the United States, Canada, or Europe. Our base of human knowledge is globally linked. It is no accident that today American universities have the largest numbers of foreign graduate students ever. These students will take back to their countries part of the American culture, which will further extend American influence. The explosion in new technologies and the speed with which they travel around the world accelerates almost daily. Many of these new technologies are invented here in the United States but are often more skillfully commercialized by other nations. We must take dramatic steps to reverse this trend, but we cannot hope to reverse it if we turn our backs on the world. Finally, we have to recognize the extent to which the world's peoples are linked. The United States, with its kaleidoscope of race, religion, creed, ethnic and national origin, is one of the most diverse nations in the world. The influx of immigrants throughout our nation's history has strengthened us in many ways. But it also has cemented our ties to foreign lands, allies, and trading partners. I belabor these points because if our foreign policy is to be a viable one, it must reflect the fundamental reality of our global nature. Our domestic strength is linked to our international strength and vice versa. Isolationism is not a viable option. To pursue peace not just through preparedness but also by eliminating hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos; to champion democracy not by imposing it but by fostering the economic, political, and social conditions for the development of free institutions--this is the vision that inspired me as a young college graduate. It is a vision fed by the best and purest springs of the American character. And it is a vision that will serve us as well in foreign policy as it will for the Clinton Administration's agenda for domestic economic growth and social progress in the years ahead.
Conclusion
In nominating Warren Christopher to be the architect of our nation's foreign policy, President Clinton has chosen superbly well. Secretary Christopher is an exemplary public servant and diplomat--a man of both vision and experience, absolute integrity, and heartfelt love of country. I look forward to serving with him, and I will consider it a great honor if he considers his formidable skills in any way complemented by my own. With your permission, I would like to conclude on a very personal note. I spoke before of my father, a 40-year veteran of the US Foreign Service--in fact, the first black career officer to be appointed a US ambassador. I can't say that these things are in the genes, of course. I can't even say my father was always in full agreement with my need to find my own way in life or the paths I took to do so. But my father did instill in me both a thirst for knowledge about the world and a sense of diplomacy's high calling for resolving the conflicts that inevitably arise between nations. My one regret is that he couldn't be in the audience today as you consider his son's nomination as second-in-command of the Department he was so proud to serve. If he had been here, he'd probably be nodding and saying, "Well, son, you certainly took the long way around. Now it's about time you took my advice." (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

START II Treaty Transmittal Letter

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of a letter to the US Senate, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 15 19931/15/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] To the Senate of the United States: I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993 [see Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 20]. The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: -- the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and Conversion Protocol); -- the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation on Strategic Offensive Arms (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and -- the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on Attribution). In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State and letters exchanged by representatives of the Parties. The letters are associated with, but not integral parts of, the START II Treaty. Although not submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, these letters are provided because they are relevant to the consideration of the Treaty by the Senate. The START II Treaty is a milestone in the continuing effort by the United States and the Russian Federation to address the threat posed by strategic offensive nuclear weapons, especially multiple-warhead ICBMs. It builds upon and relies on the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991. At the same time, the START II Treaty goes even further than the START Treaty. The START Treaty was the first treaty actually to reduce strategic offensive arms of both countries, with overall reductions of 30-40 percent and reductions of up to 50 percent in the most threatening systems. It enhances stability in times of crisis. It not only limits strategic arms but also reduces them significantly below current levels. In addition, the START Treaty allows equality of forces and is effectively verifiable. Finally, commitments associated with the START Treaty will result in the elimination of nuclear weapons and deployed strategic offensive arms from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine within 7 years after entry into force, and accession of these three states to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. As a result, after 7 years, only Russia and the United States will retain any deployed strategic offensive arms under the START Treaty. The START II Treaty builds upon and surpasses the accomplishments of the START Treaty by further reducing strategic offensive arms in such a way that further increases the stability of the strategic nuclear balance. It bans deployment of the most destabilizing type of nuclear weapons system-- land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads. At the same time, the START II Treaty permits the United States to maintain a stabilizing sea-based force. The central limits of the START II Treaty require reductions by January 1, 2003, to 3000-3500 warheads. Within this, there are sublimits of between 1700-1750 warheads on deployed SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] for each Party, or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself; zero for warheads on deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs; and zero for warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs. Thus, the Treaty reduces the current overall deployments of strategic nuclear weapons on each side by more than two-thirds from current levels. These limits will be reached by the end of the year 2000 if both Parties reach agreement on a program of assistance to the Russian Federation with regard to dismantling strategic offensive arms within a year after entry into force of the Treaty. Acceptance of these reductions serves as a clear indication of the ending of the Cold War. In a major accomplishment, START II will result in the complete elimination of heavy ICBMs (the SS-18s) and the elimination or conversion of their launchers. All heavy ICBMs and launch canisters will be destroyed. All but 90 heavy ICBM silos will likewise be destroyed and these 90 silos will be modified to be incapable of launching SS-18s. To address the Russians' stated concern over the cost of implementing the transition to a single-warhead ICBM force, the START II Treaty provides for the conversion of up to 90 of the 154 Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM silos that will remain after the START Treaty reductions. The Russians have unilaterally undertaken to use the converted silos only for the smaller, SS-25 type single-warhead ICBMs. When implemented, the Treaty's conversion provisions, which include extensive on-site inspection rights, will preclude the use of these silos to launch heavy ICBMs. Together with the elimination of SS-18 missiles, these provisions are intended to ensure that the strategic capability of the SS-18 system is eliminated. START II allows some reductions to be taken by downloading, i.e., reducing the number of warheads attributed to existing missiles. This will allow the United States to achieve the reductions required by the Treaty in a cost- effective way by downloading some or all of our sea-based Trident SLBMs and land-based Minuteman III ICBMs. The Treaty also allows downloading, in Russia, of 105 of the 170 SS-19 multiple-warhead missiles in existing silos to a single-warhead missile. All other Russian launchers of multiple- warhead ICBMs--including the remaining 65 SS-19s--must be converted for single-warhead ICBMs or eliminated in accordance with START procedures. START II can be implemented in a fashion that is fully consistent with US national security. To ensure that we have the ability to respond to worldwide conventional contingencies, it allows for the reorientation, without any conversion procedures, of 100 START-accountable heavy bombers to a conventional role. These heavy bombers will not count against START II warhead limits. The START Treaty and the START II Treaty remain in force concurrently and have the same duration. Except as explicitly modified by the START II Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty will be used to implement START II. The START II Treaty provides for inspections in addition to those of the START Treaty. These additional inspections will be carried out according to the provisions of the START Treaty unless otherwise specified in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or in the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol. As I was convinced that the START Treaty is effectively verifiable, I am equally confident that the START II Treaty is effectively verifiable. The START Treaty was an historic achievement in our long-term effort to enhance the stability of the strategic balance through arms control. The START II Treaty represents the capstone of that effort. Elimination of heavy ICBMs and the effective elimination of all other multiple-warhead ICBMs will put an end to the most dangerous weapons of the Cold War. In sum, the START II Treaty is clearly in the interest of the United States and represents a watershed in our efforts to stabilize the nuclear balance and further reduce strategic offensive arms. I therefore urge the Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to the Treaty, including its Protocols and Memorandum on Attribution, and to give its advice and consent to ratification. George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

New Hope for Haiti

Einaudi Source: Luigi R. Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) Description: Address before the OAS Permanent Council, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, OAS [TEXT] Mr. Chairman: I thank the [OAS] Secretary General for his report, which gives some of the reasons why we believe there is new hope for progress in Haiti. Indeed, I wish to convey explicitly from the outset my government's appreciation for Secretary General Baena Soares' continuing efforts to carry out the mandates created by the OAS Foreign Ministers during their ad hoc meeting last December 13, as well as those that have been in place since October of 1991. Our Secretary General has, in our view, borne daunting responsibilities with grace and energy in an environment characterized by rapid change and complexity, one presenting major obstacles as well as opportunities. His performance--both individually and in coordination with the Foreign Minister of Bolivia--reaffirms the unique role of regional solidarity organized in support of Haitian democracy through the OAS. Now, a renewed effort to resolve Haiti's crisis has been taking shape for some time. In its current form, however, the new initiative now developing is built on three pillars that have emerged clearly only over the past month. They are: -- Internationally, a new pattern of coordination between the OAS and the United Nations in which are combined the special strengths of regional sensitivity and global power; -- In Haiti, a desire among the most varied of sectors to put an end to this tragic crisis; and, finally, -- In the United States, close cooperation in the national interest between incoming and outgoing administrations of different political parties. The prelude took place in September [1992], when Secretary General Baena Soares hosted a week of negotiations between personal representatives of [Haitian] President Aristide and of Haiti's de facto government. Those private talks led to a breakthrough agreement to station an 18-member civilian presence in Haiti. Now headed by the gifted diplomat from Trinidad and Tobago, Colin Granderson, that mission has faced both logistical and political difficulties--yet it has become the inspiration for a process to reassure all parties in Haiti that a peaceful solution is possible and that their intrinsic human rights can be respected. In October [1992], President Aristide reminded world leaders of the continuing urgency of the crisis and called upon the UN to join the OAS in enforcing measures designed to restore democracy there. His letter stimulated November resolutions in both the OAS and the UN calling for implementation of economic measures and--I quote the OAS--". . . with special emphasis on the suspension of oil, arms and munitions supplies and on the freezing of assets of the Haitian state." At the same time, at the request of our Secretary General Baena Soares, Jamaica's former Prime Minister Michael Manley carried out quiet shuttle diplomacy with a view to assessing opportunities for an early solution of the crisis. In early December, Manley met in Atlanta with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and former President Carter. On December 11, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali nominated former Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo as his Special Representative on Haiti. We in the United States have a high regard for Dante Caputo, and we are impressed that our [OAS] Secretary General has ensured greater cooperation with the United Nations and a single voice by naming Mr. Caputo his representative. On December 13, the hemisphere's foreign ministers met in Washington in a reconvened OAS ministerial on Haiti. After a 31/2-hour, closed-door debate, during which Jamaica's current Foreign Minister David Coore made a moving statement of the need for both stronger measures and greater humanitarian assistance, the ministers took several decisions. Of particular significance for future events, they authorized new efforts focused on a "substantial increase in the OAS civilian presence" and on increasing cooperation with the United Nations, possibly even the Security Council. On December 19, special envoy Caputo traveled to Port au Prince and met with all interested sectors. That week, our Secretary General met with the Secretary General of the United Nations in New York. On January 6 [1993], Secretary of State Eagleburger and Secretary- designate Warren Christopher discussed the situation in Haiti [see box]. On an exceptional basis, the Department of State issued a formal statement that it had been coordinating closely with senior members of the Clinton transition team in a joint effort with UN and OAS representatives to support the initiative being developed by Mr. Caputo. Mr. Chairman, let me quote directly from this exceptional official US statement: The incoming Administration and this Administration [that is, the Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration-to-be] share the goal of restoring democracy to Haiti--safeguarding the human rights of all Haitians on the island and helping the parties find a lasting solution that will end Haiti's suffering and attain new support for Haiti's economy and people. We urge all sides to be flexible in their positions and to be responsive to the entreaties of the United Nations and OAS. The next day, Secretary General Baena added to the new momentum by calling publicly again for an immediate enhancement of the OAS civilian presence in Haiti. The United States agrees, believing that the early augmentation of the international civilian presence on the ground in Haiti can help create a climate of confidence for negotiations to end Haiti's political and economic crisis and can, by its very presence, have an immediate, positive impact in reducing human rights violations from whatever source. We agree entirely with Secretary General Baena Soares that the OAS civilian presence should not be seen as a substitute for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. We regret that the de facto government in Port au Prince declined a request from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to visit Haiti to observe the human rights situation. I might also add that we, too, are concerned by the announcement by the de facto government that it intends to hold elections for several Senate seats and other offices on January 18 and 25. The United States believes that free and fair elections can only be held under a legally constituted government in an atmosphere of respect for free expression, freedom of assembly, and open political dialogue. These conditions do not exist in Haiti today; for that reason the State Department yesterday publicly indicated that we do not regard the planned elections as legitimate [see Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 42]. My delegation would support a similar statement by the president of this permanent council to that effect today. The fact is that the United States is firmly committed to restoration of democratic, constitutional government in Haiti. We continue to recognize Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the legitimately elected president of that country. And we urge all parties to dedicate themselves to serious negotiations to end the current crisis by restoring democracy to Haiti. Haiti needs a democratic solution to end its suffering--to attain new support for its economy and people. One component of this lasting solution is economic. The US is providing food for some 400,000-500,000 Haitians every day and emergency medical care for up to 2 million Haitian men, women, and children. Our purpose in joining the embargo is to help induce negotiations and restore democracy. Our purpose is not to deny food to the poor or to deprive the Haitian people generally of basic needs. In fact, today the United States is publishing in the Federal Register regulations decided upon some time ago that will allow the export to Haiti of school books, medicine, generators, and generator spare parts for humanitarian purposes such as hospitals. Our purpose is to maintain pressure for a negotiated political solution, not to punish the Haitian people. To that end, we continue to ban most trade. To that end, we oppose access by the de facto regime to international financial institutions or to arms. To that end, we maintain frozen the assets of the Haitian Government in the United States. We are not and have not been shy about this policy. Maj. Gen. John Sheehan, USMC, is in charge of US Security Assistance Programs in the Caribbean. He regularly consults with the military liaison officers in our embassies there. Last week, we took advantage of his visit to Haiti to reinforce our basic message: that there must be a peaceful solution to Haiti's crisis that recognizes the legitimate authority of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Finally, let me say that any lasting solution must address the tragic conditions of the Haitian "boat people." We are very concerned that migration by boat from Haiti is an extremely dangerous undertaking which has led to many deaths. As we have said many times, we believe that migration is a regional problem to which the only lasting solution is the restoration of democracy in Haiti itself. We urge all Haitians wishing to seek refugee status to operate through normal legal procedures that are already in place and accessible to them. Let me conclude by repeating that we believe this is a moment of unusual opportunity to make progress on a terrible problem. The opportunity has been created by an unprecedented conjunction of forces and events inside Haiti and out. We now have the United Nations undertaking a complementary and reinforcing role in addition to that of the OAS, which has been involved since the beginning of this crisis. It is crucial that the Haitian people take advantage of this opportunity before new pressures arise and before additional hardships affect them. It is crucial that they seek a fair and lasting democratic solution that bolsters democratic institutions, safeguards the rights of all citizens, and allows economic reconstruction. We urge all sides to be flexible in their positions and to be responsive to the UN and OAS as this new initiative develops. And we urge all countries--not only those who have already been generous in their support but all countries--to provide the long-term financial and human support needed to ensure that this new initiative prospers and that the plan set forth so well by our Secretary General today can be put into practice. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

Haiti: Diplomatic Initiative

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Description: Address before the OAS Permanent Council, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 6 19931/6/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, OAS [TEXT] In their initial meeting this morning, Secretary Eagleburger and Secretary- designate Christopher discussed the new diplomatic initiative being under- taken by the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) to find a solution to the Haiti crisis. The State Department and the Clinton transition team have been coordinating closely in a joint effort to support this initiative. UN and OAS representatives have been in close touch with the Department and senior members of the Clinton transition team in recent days. The incoming Administration and this Administration share the goal of restoring democracy to Haiti--safeguarding the human rights of all Haitians on the island and helping the parties find a lasting solution that will end Haiti's suffering and attain new support for Haiti's economy and people. We urge all sides to be flexible in their positions and to be responsive to the entreaties of the United Nations and OAS. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

Zaire: Need for Economic Reform

Snyder Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joseph Snyder Description: Statement, Washington, DC Description: Address before the OAS Permanent Council, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 14 19931/14/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Zaire Subject: Democratization In Zaire today, the ambassadors of the United States, Belgium, and France delivered a joint demarche personally to the President, the Prime Minister, and the Chairman of the High Council urging them to adopt a short-term stabilization plan and other reforms in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The ambassadors made clear that such economic reforms are an essential precondition for increased bilateral and multilateral aid. The demarche stressed that the transition government of Prime Minister Tshisekedi must have full authority to pursue the twin objectives of peaceful transition to democracy and economic stabilization without interference from the presidency. The demarche also stated that the government budget, including limited and controlled appropriations for the presidency, should be formulated in a fully transparent way and strictly observed. The demarche noted the absolute importance of appointing a qualified managerial team responsible to the prime minister, according to procedures approved by the national conference, including the governor of the central bank. The ambassadors emphasized that when Zaire has taken these initial steps, the United States, Belgium, and France will be prepared to help assist Zaire's economic recovery, according to their individual procedures. Initially, such assistance would include increased humanitarian aid; private voluntary organization and government programs to help establish a social safety net; and technical support, including advice on the implementation of necessary economic reforms. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993

Title:

A New Era of Peril and Promise

Clinton Source: President-elect Clinton Description: Address before the Diplomatic Corps, Georgetown University, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 18 19931/18/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Military Affairs, Trade/Economics, Democratization [TEXT] I came to this university at a time when a fallen president had asked my generation to give something back to our country. I was looking for a place to prepare for that calling.Georgetown and its School of Foreign Service have made enormous contributions not only to my life but to public service in general. Many of its graduates, including my classmates, are now distinguished members of our Foreign Service, our armed forces, or serving in other areas of public and private life. Recently, Georgetown has made yet another contribution in my friend, Dr. Madeleine Albright, who has agreed to be our nation's voice at the United Nations. I also chose to speak to you here, today, because of Georgetown's historical tradition. George Washington spoke at this building, Old North, in 1797, when the college was not yet 10 years old. Our republic, scarcely 20 years old, stood not with great powers then but with great hopes. The Marquis de Lafayette, whose friendship and cooperation with our nation was so vital to its birth, was escorted to this campus by a troop of light horse cavalry in 1824. And across America's generations, presidents, dignitaries, and scholars have chosen this site to speak about our collective hopes for the future of our nation and the world. In December of 1991, as I launched my campaign for the presidency, I came back here to Georgetown to deliver three speeches which laid out the principles and policies that would become the heart of my candidacy. In the first of those speeches, I recalled the lesson taught me by one of my George-town professors, Carroll Quigley. . . . Carroll Quigley argued that the defining idea of Western civilization and of the United States in particular was what he called future preference--the idea that the future can be better than the present and that each of us has a personal, moral responsibility to make it so. When we embraced that idea, it was a revolutionary one. Now, all around the world, people are beginning to think that way. That idea was the heart of my campaign for the presidency, and it is a lesson that now applies with equal force to the community of nations at the end of the Cold War. While we cannot yet discern all of the contours of the new age in which we are living, we know it is clearly an era of both peril and promise when the future for millions and millions of people around the globe can be better than the present; when the dreams of freedom and democracy and economic prosperity and human rights can become real--but they may or not, depending on what we do. This is a season for hope. The Berlin wall today exists now only in the little remnants of stone that have become the personal mementos of a historic triumph of freedom over tyranny. A worldwide democratic revolution has shown its strength and tenacity, from the shipyards of Gdansk to the streets of Moscow, from the campuses of Beijing to the villages of El Salvador and the townships of Soweto. The spread of freer markets has brought the possibility of better living conditions from the factories of the Baltics to the fertile fields of Africa and Latin America. But the events of the last week remind us anew that this era will not lack for dangers. We are all mindful of the tension in Iraq and of Saddam Hussein's continuing provocations against the international community and his own people. He must understand that America's resolve during this transition period will not waver. I support the international community's actions designed to bring him to full compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions, and I ask each of you in the diplomatic corps to emphasize this point to your own governments. The policy of this country will remain American policy after January 20. We face many immediate other perils in this new era--the rise of ethnic hatreds in the former republics of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the suffering in Somalia, the turmoil in Haiti, the proliferation of advanced weaponry, the spread of terrorism and drug trafficking, the AIDS epidemic, and the degradation of the global environment--and each will require strong American leadership if we are to overcome them. The American people have called for a new Administration, yet there is an essential continuity in our foreign policy. Our relations and actions abroad are rooted in enduring interests, alliances, friendships, and principles. My Administration will build on the successes of my predecessors in specific areas: in the quest for peace in the Middle East, in the effort to secure a safe reduction in our nuclear arsenals and stem weapons of mass destruction from proliferation, in the bold decision to relieve the suffering in Somalia, [in] the assistance to the process of reform in the former Soviet Union, [and] in the search for new and expanding markets around the world. Yet, the world has changed in fundamental ways, and we also must change with it. We need to state clearly how we plan in the United States to adapt our nation's foreign policy goals and institutions to this new era. Such a clear statement is necessary if we are to rally the support of the American people here at home behind a policy of active international engagement, which remains as critical to our own prosperity and security today as at any time in this century. It is critical for our nation to speak clearly about our purposes so that the nations of the world, friend and foe alike, will understand our intentions in the months and years to come. We must all remember that the final test of a foreign policy is its effect on the lives of our citizens. The foreign policy of my Administration will be built upon three pillars. First, we will make the economic security of our own nation a primary goal of our foreign policy. Here in America we cannot sustain an active engagement abroad without a sound economy at home. And yet, we cannot prosper at home unless we are engaged abroad. We will, therefore, seek economic strength at home through increased productivity while we seek to ensure that global commerce is rooted in principles of openness, fairness, and reciprocity. Second, our foreign policy will be based on a restructuring of our armed forces to meet new and continuing threats to our security interests and the international peace. We will continue prudently to reduce defense spending, but potential aggressors should be clear about American resolve. We do not relish the prospect of military force, but, when necessary, we will not shrink from using it when all appropriate diplomatic measures have been exhausted. Third, my Administration's foreign policy will be rooted in the democratic principles and institutions which unite our own county and to which so many now around the world aspire. The spread of democratic values has given the hope of freedom to millions all across the world who have endured decades of oppression. Whenever possible we will support those who share our values, because it is in the interests of America and the world at large for us to do so. History has borne out these enduring truths: Democracies do not wage war against one another; they make better partners in trade and diplomacy; and, despite their inherent problems, they offer the best guarantee for the protection of human rights. Finally, I want to assure all of you--the members of the diplomatic corps-- that, as President, I will work closely with the international community through the United Nations and other vital institutions to resolve contentious disputes and to meet the challenges of the next century. America cannot and should not bear the world's burdens alone. But if we work together, we can make great progress in making this a better world for all of our citizens. We can address such global problems [as] environmental decay, the scourge of AIDS, the threat to our children and our communities of narcotics trafficking, and the plight of millions of refugees around the world. The Gulf war and the humanitarian relief operation in Somalia demonstrate what is best about the United Nations and what the founders had in mind over 40 years ago: confronting aggression by outlaw nations, restoring hope to those in need as international partners. Let us act in concert today to achieve those laudable goals. I welcome the diplomatic corps' participation in this, our great national celebration, as every American takes part in what is perhaps the greatest strength of our democracy, the willing and peaceful transfer of political power from one president to his successor. It is an inherently democratic tradition, one that has been a source of inspiration to freedom-loving people since George Washington stood atop Old North almost 200 years ago. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Family Planning Grants

Clinton Source: President-elect Clinton Description: Presidential Memorandum for the Acting Administrator of the US Agency for International Development, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 22 19931/22/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that receive federal funds from using those funds "to pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning, or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions." (22U.S.C. 2151b(f) (1)). The August 1984 announcement by President Reagan of what has become known as the "Mexico City Policy" directed the Agency for International Development (AID) to expand this limitation and withhold AID funds from NGOs that engage in a wide range of activities, including providing advice, counseling, or information regarding abortion, or lobbying a foreign government to legalize or make abortion available. These conditions have been imposed even where an NGO uses non-AID funds for abortion-related activities. These excessively broad anti-abortion conditions are unwarranted. I am informed that the conditions are not mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act or any other law. Moreover, they have undermined efforts to promote safe and efficacious family planning programs in foreign nations. Accordingly, I hereby direct that AID remove the conditions not explicitly mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act or any other law from all current AID grants to NGOs and exclude them from future grants. William J. Clinton (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Guatemalan President's Peace Initiative

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 25 19931/25/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: Guatemala Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] We welcome the proposal to reinvigorate negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union guerrilla umbrella organization announced by President Jorge Serrano before the UN General Assembly [on] January 19. President Serrano offered to allow UN observers to verify a human rights agreement between his Government and the guerrillas as soon as one is concluded. In return, he asked for a 90-day period to negotiate other issues. At the end of that time, a cease-fire would take effect automatically. UN observers would also verify this cease-fire. We look forward to a constructive response from the guerrillas and hope that renewed and intensified talks lead to an early, definitive end to Guatemala's internal conflict. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Togo: Casualties in Lome Demonstration

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 26 19931/26/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Togo Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] On January 25, police and gendarmes in Lome, the capital of Togo, clashed with demonstrators attempting to approach a hotel where visiting French and German Government ministers had scheduled a press conference. When police fired at the crowd, numerous Togolese were killed and a substantial number wounded. The United States deplores the loss of life and expresses its condolences to the families of the victims. We call on the Togolese Government to initiate an immediate investigation to identify and swiftly bring to justice those responsible. As head of the security forces, it is the responsibility of President Eyadema to ensure that those forces support the democratic process in Togo and avoid any action which might disrupt it. The United States has consistently urged Togo's highest authorities, including the President, and leaders of the various political groups to establish a dialogue which will lead to reconciliation and the promotion of the democratic process in a secure environment. The only way out of Togo's impasse is through democratic elections where the people are permitted to express their political will calmly and without fear. The US ambassador in Lome is meeting with senior Togolese officials as well as leaders of the opposition, making clear our condemnation of the killings and urging all parties to resort to dialogue, not violence. We are also consulting with Togo's other major donors to determine what initiatives we might take together to help advance Togo's democratic process and diffuse the volatile political situation in the country. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Feature: Travel Tips on Russia

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 26 19931/26/93 Category: Features Region: Eurasia Country: Russia Subject: Travel [TEXT] The following information was taken from a pamphlet entitled Tips for Travelers to Russia, which was released by the Bureau of Consular Affairs, US Department of State and is available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office for $1. [The pamphlet is included on this CD] The Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, and in its place emerged 12 independent republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Russia, the largest country that emerged, stretches from the Baltic Sea, across the northern Eurasian landmass, to the Bering Strait, where one of its islands lies only 3 miles from an Alaskan island. This information deals primarily with Russia; however, much of it--particularly the sections on health, safety, and travel--also applies to the other republics. Although Russia and the other republics are experiencing profound political and economic changes, this is a challenging and exciting time to visit the region. The tourism industry, like other industries that were strictly regulated in the former Soviet Union, is undergoing a transformation that can be confusing to customers as well as to the industry itself. Travel conditions are changing rapidly. Therefore, the Bureau of Consular Affairs advises travelers to carefully research and plan their trip and to be patient and flexible once underway in order to make it successful and enjoyable. (For information on where to inquire about the current situation in the former Soviet Union, see page 61.)
BEFORE YOU GO
Visas
A US citizen must have a valid US passport and a visa to travel to any country of the former Soviet Union. At present, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine are issuing visas. At time of publication, the other countries of the former USSR have not established embassies in the United States. To travel to a country of the former USSR not yet issuing visas, a Russian visa is still required and is valid for all such countries. Currently, travel between countries that require a Russian visa is still considered internal travel by local authorities, and passports are not normally checked upon arrival or departure. Visas for Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine may be obtained from the embassies of those countries (see page 64). The following visa information pertains to Russian visas only. Travelers arriving without a visa in a country that requires a Russian visa cannot register at a hotel and must leave the country immediately by the same route they entered. A visa is required even for a brief transit. If possible, obtain a Russian visa in the United States, because it can be difficult and time-consuming to obtain abroad. You cannot obtain a Russian visa in some countries such as Ukraine, Estonia, and Lithuania. Visas are valid for specific dates. Before starting on your trip, be sure your visa is valid for the dates of planned entry and departure. Delays caused by illness or changes in plans must be approved in advance by the office that issued your visa. US citizens may apply for the following categories of Russian visas: transit, tourist, business, or, for a private visit to friends or relatives, a visitor or homestay visa. Tourist, Business, and Transit Visas. Most travelers to Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union arrange for their visas and accommodations through an American travel agent. A business visa requires a letter of invitation from a foreign business contact. A transit visa requires a copy of a confirmed ticket and visa (if required) to an onward destination.
Visitor or Homestay Visas.
Visas for private trips to stay in a private home are issued by the consular division of either the Russian embassy in Washington, DC, or the Russian consulate general in either San Francisco or New York (see page 64). Request application forms by mail. The person you wish to visit also must apply for permission well in advance of your visit. In larger cities, your host can apply at the local visa office (called OVIR, an acronym for Otdel Viz i Registratsii). In smaller towns, your host can apply to the local police. OVIR or police consideration of these applications can be a slow process. Upon approval of your application, your host will be issued a notification of permission (izveshcheniye) for your visit. Your host should then send this notification to you.
Private Visits During Group Tours
. An American traveling on a group tour may request permission to visit local acquaintances or take short individual excursions away from the group itinerary to places of personal interest. Arrangements for side trips should be made through your American travel agent and, if possible, before you leave the United States. On your visa application, include the names and addresses of those citizens of countries that you wish to visit.
How To Obtain Visa Information
Your travel agent can provide visa information, although authoritative information on visas can only be obtained from the embassies or consulates of the countries you plan to visit. Whatever your source, make certain that your visa information is up to date, because, during this period of transition, visa requirements will change frequently. When you inquire about visas, ask about price, length of validity, and the number of entries that are permitted.
YOUR US PASSPORT
Theft of US passports continues to increase rapidly. Stolen passports are reportedly sold for large sums of hard currency. The theft or loss of a passport, particularly when the nearest US consular office is hundreds or thousands of miles away, is a major source of inconvenience and expense to travelers in Russia and the other republics. Before starting your trip, make a record or photocopy of the data from your passport's identification page and from your visa(s). Also make a copy of the addresses and telephone numbers of the US embassies and consulates in the countries you will visit (see page 64). Keep this information and two passport photos separate from your passport in case of loss or theft. Leave a second copy of your passport information and itinerary with a relative or friend in the United States. Complete the address page of your passport in pencil and update it as necessary. While in the former Soviet Union, you may be asked to leave your passport with hotel personnel or a tour leader for short periods of time for registration with police or for other purposes. It should be returned within 2 or 3 days. Be sure to safeguard your passport at all other times, as its loss can cause you delays and problems. If your passport is lost or stolen, apply for a replacement at a US embassy or consulate and then obtain a new or duplicate visa from the nearest visa office (OVIR). If you are with a tour, ask your guide for assistance.
PLANNING YOUR TRIP
Many geographic names throughout the region are being changed. Try to obtain maps before your trip, but keep in mind that some place names may be outdated. Some street and city names may need corrections. In these countries, if the street sign does not agree with the map, it may be because the name was changed. Previously, in the former Soviet Union, departure and arrival times for planes, trains, and boats were quoted in Moscow time. In the post-Soviet period, that practice has changed, and timetables for travel in and between former Soviet countries usually use local time. Within Russia itself, however, you may still find Moscow time in use--regardless of which of the 11 time zones you are in. Whenever you make reservations or purchase tickets, learn which time zones the schedule refers to and, as you travel, confirm all departure and arrival times.
Air Travel Within Russia
Aeroflot continues to dominate air travel in Russia and the region. Although many international airlines have flights to Russia and the other former Soviet republics--and some, like Turkish Airlines, even have flights between a few of the countries--Aeroflot's domestic flights remain the major service in and between the countries of the former USSR. Since late 1991, domestic Aeroflot flights have been delayed for hours or days and sometimes canceled because of jet fuel shortages. Prepare for long waits or for possible itinerary changes with little or no advance notice. Booking domestic Aeroflot flights in the United States can be difficult. Once in Russia or one of the other republics, you may discover that a domestic Aeroflot flight you booked does not exist or, at least, does not exist on the day you are confirmed to go. Before you leave the United States, you may be informed that flights do not exist to a certain city, when, in fact, they do. Because of the difficulty in using Aeroflot's domestic service, it is advisable to use international carriers, including Aeroflot, wherever possible when planning your itinerary. While Aeroflot is in transition to meet international standards, flexibility and patience are the keys to successful air travel.
Overland Travel
When traveling by train or automobile in former Soviet countries, carry food and water with you. If you travel overland between Central European countries and countries of the former USSR, be certain that you have visas for all countries through which you will pass. For example, the train from Warsaw, Poland to Vilnius, Lithuania passes through Grodno, Belarus, and transit visas are not available on the train. On occasion, Americans have been required to leave the train in Grodno and return to their point of departure to obtain a Russian visa for Belarus. (There is a direct rail route, however, that does not pass through Belarus. It goes between Sestokai, Lithuania and Suwalki, Poland.)
Auto Travel
Driving conditions in Russia and the other former Soviet republics are more rugged than in Western Europe, service stations are few, and fuel may be scarce at those stations. Adhere to all local driving regulations. They are strictly enforced, and violators are subject to legal penalties. All tourists entering Russia by automobile are required to sign an obligation guaranteeing the re-export of their automobiles. This obligation also applies to damaged vehicles. Your automobile should be fully insured under a policy valid for Russia and for any other country you will enter. Insurance policies may be purchased from Lloyds of London or from Ingosstrakh, Kuybyshev Street 11/10, Moscow, a Russian organization that insures foreigners. Auto insurance obtained in Russia is still accepted in some of the other former Soviet republics. Be aware that Russian law allows the company to refuse compensation for damage if a driver is pronounced by the authorities to have been under the influence of alcohol at the time of an accident. Such determinations can be made without the benefit of any tests.
Health
Precautions. Travel in the former USSR can be strenuous, particularly for the elderly and individuals with special health problems. When you plan your trip, be careful not to overschedule; leave time for rest and relaxation. Tourists in frail health are strongly advised not to visit. Immunizations. No immunizations are required for travelers to the former Soviet Union. However, diphtheria, tetanus, polio, typhoid, and gamma globulin are recommended for the region and, in particular, for the Central Asian countries. Health Insurance Policy. Review your health insurance policy. If your insurance does not cover you abroad, consider purchasing temporary insurance that does. In addition to medical insurance, consider obtaining insurance to cover evacuation in the event of an accident or serious illness. Because conditions in many hospitals are not adequate to ensure recovery, medical evacuation is frequently necessary for illnesses or injuries which could be treated locally in other countries. Minimum cost from Moscow to New York on a stretcher is more than $10,000. Medical evacuation by hospital aircraft on the same route approaches $100,000. Insurance companies as well as some credit card and travelers check companies offer short-term health and emergency assistance policies designed for travelers. Ask your travel agent about them or look for ads in travel publications. Medications. Bring with you any necessary medications and keep them in their original, labeled containers in your hand luggage. Because of strict laws on narcotics, carry a letter from your physician explaining your need for any prescription drugs in your possession. Also bring along any toiletries and personal hygiene items that you will need. These items can be difficult to find in major cities and even more scarce elsewhere.
Medical Care in the Region
. Medical care in the former Soviet Union does not meet Western standards. There is a severe shortage of basic medical supplies, including disposable needles, anesthetics, common medications, and antibiotics. X-rays are of poor quality and advanced diagnostic equipment, such as CAT-scan machines, is not widely available. Patient support services, including basic hygiene measures, are inadequate, and travelers may expect the length of hospitalization to exceed the duration of stay they would expect in Western facilities. In addition, full, frank, and empathic discussions between doctor and patient are hampered by language barriers as well as the lack of a tradition of patient rights. If you need medical care, ask your hotel or tour guide to direct you to an appropriate facility. You may also contact the nearest US embassy or consulate for a list of local medical services. Drinking Water. The US Public Health Service warns that many US visitors to Russia, particularly to St. Petersburg, have returned to the United States infected with the intestinal parasite Giardia lamblia. This infection is probably contracted by drinking tapwater. Some travelers to Russia and surrounding countries bring drinking water with them in their luggage. If you cannot import your drinking water, drink only bottled carbonated drinks or beverages that have been boiled for at least 5 minutes. Avoid ice cubes, use bottled water for brushing teeth, and avoid salads or uncooked vegetables and fruits which cannot be peeled. In addition, carry iodine tablets to disinfect drinking water. Travelers returning from the region who develop a diarrheal illness lasting more than 5 days should consult a physician and have a stool specimen examined for parasites. Chernobyl Nuclear Accident. Recent tapwater samples from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev show no detectable radiation. Background radiation levels in areas outside the immediate accident site and fallout path have been tested periodically and are considered to be within acceptable ranges. Access to the Chernobyl zone is strictly controlled by Ukrainian authorities.
Currency
Russia, like the other 11 countries of the former Soviet Union, has a cash- only economy. During periodic cash shortages, it can be difficult to impossible to cash travelers checks for dollars, for other convertible (hard) currency, or even for rubles. The fee to cash travelers checks may be as high as 5%. In Moscow, cash may be available at Dialogbank or American Express. In St. Petersburg, rubles may be available but not hard currency. In Kiev, cash may be available at the Agroprombank, Export/Import Bank, or Bank Ukraina. Some travelers avoid a number of the currency shortage problems by taking a prepaid tour that includes all meals and hotels. Others find it useful to bring major credit cards because they are accepted at some hotels and restaurants, particularly those in Moscow. Most, however, solve the problem of the currency shortage by coming to Russia and the other republics with a sufficient supply of hard currency to cover their obligations in the country. Some hotel restaurants and shops will accept payment only in dollars or other hard currency. Beware! Make it your practice to keep your excess cash in the hotel safe. Before you leave home, check with your credit card and travelers check companies to learn where these instruments can be used in the former Soviet Union. Customs and currency laws are strict. When you arrive, make an accurate and complete customs declaration of all money, travelers checks, and valuables in your possession. Include all personal jewelry, such as wedding rings and watches. Have your customs declaration stamped by the authorities and keep it with you until you leave the country. Keep your exchange receipts in order to account for your expenditures. Without these records, customs officials could confiscate your cash and valuables upon departure. The Russian ruble is still the currency of the 12 former Soviet republics. In Ukraine, coupons have been introduced in preparation for issuing a national currency. The coupons are used in Ukraine along with the Russian ruble but cannot be used outside of the country.
Customs Regulations
Attempts to bring any of the following articles into the former Soviet Union have caused difficulties for US citizens in the past: Narcotics. Drug laws are strict. US citizens have received long sentences for trying to enter or transit with illegal narcotics. Pornography. Magazines with sexually explicit photographs that may be considered commonplace in Western countries may be regarded as pornography and are often confiscated. Gifts for Persons in the Former USSR. A high rate of customs duty may be assessed on gifts that you bring into a foreign country. US citizens have had to abandon gifts at the airport because they lacked funds to pay the customs duty. Video Cassettes. Customs regulations allow for the import and re-export of a limited number of blank or commercially recorded video cassettes for personal use. Some travelers with a large number of cassettes have had them confiscated upon departure. Travelers are advised to leave blank video cassettes sealed in their wrappers when entering a country. Customs regulations prohibit the import or export of personally recorded video cassettes. To avoid confiscation of valuable travel memories, leave those cassettes outside the country to be picked up later, or mail them home before entering the country.
Legal Matters
Dual Nationality. Russia's new citizenship law that went into effect February 6, 1992, recognizes dual nationality only if there is an agreement between the two countries that covers dual nationality. At this time, the United States and Russia do not have a dual nationality agreement. Therefore, if you are a dual national and encounter problems in Russia, you may not be permitted to leave, and assistance from a US consul may be limited. The US Government has notified the governments of the Soviet successor states that it considers the 1968 US-USSR consular convention to still be in force. The United States recognizes as an established principle of F international law that every sovereign state has the right to decide, under the provisions of its own laws, who is and who is not its citizen. The Department of State maintains the following: -- US citizens, whether by birth or naturalization, possess full American citizenship and its accompanying benefits and responsibilities despite any additional entitlement to other citizenships; -- A US citizen entering a country of the former USSR with a US passport and a valid visa is to be regarded as a US citizen by that country for purposes of the visit, regardless of whether the foreign government might also consider them to be their citizen; and -- US citizens cannot lose their US citizenship because of automatic acquisition of foreign citizenship. However, if a US citizen contemplates voluntarily accepting dual nationality in connection with assuming duties as a government official in one of the Soviet successor states, he or she should first consult with the Department of State's Office of Citizens Consular Services on 202-647-3445 or with the nearest US embassy or consulate. The countries of the former Soviet Union generally do not prevent a US citizen possessing a US passport and appropriate visas from visiting those countries and returning to the United States, or to his or her country of permanent residence, even if under foreign laws he or she is considered a citizen of a Soviet successor state. Any dual national US citizen traveling in Russia or any other country of the former Soviet Union should contact the nearest US embassy or consulate immediately if any question arises about his or her US or foreign citizenship. To avoid any possible inconvenience or uncertainty, the Department of State urges US citizens who are or who believe they are a citizen of a former Soviet country to consider formally renouncing that citizenship before visiting any of the former Soviet republics. For information on how to renounce foreign citizenship, contact, in the United States, the embassy or consulate of the country concerned before traveling. In any case, possible dual nationals who travel to Russia or any of the other countries of the former Soviet Union should, upon arrival, register in writing or in person at the consular section of the nearest US embassy or consulate. Give your full name; passport number; date and place of birth; occupation; hotel and room number; phone number; purpose and dates of your visit; home address; and the name, address, and telephone number of any relatives that you have in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Permanent legal US residents should travel with appropriate documentation of their legal permanent residence status in the United States. Those who are citizens of a country of the former Soviet Union should ensure that they have the correct entry/exit permission from the Russian or other appropriate embassy in the United States before leaving. Adopting a Child Abroad. Current law allows adoptions in Russia and Ukraine, although US citizens report the process in these republics to be long and difficult. The status of adoptions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan remains uncertain. Russia has established a quasi-governmental bureaucratic structure in an attempt to regulate foreign adoptions. The agency, "Rights of the Child" (Pravo Rebyonka), was formed to coordinate international adoptions, ensure that Russian legal procedures are followed, and establish a centralized data bank for information on Russian children adoptable by foreigners. US citizens interested in adopting a child from one of the countries of the former Soviet Union are encouraged to contact the US embassy or consulate in that country, or, in the United States, the Department of State's Office of Citizens Consular Services on 202-647-3444 to obtain information on the adoption process in that country.
WHILE YOU ARE ABROAD
Registration
All US citizens who visit Russia or any of the other countries of the former Soviet Union are encouraged to register in writing or in person at the nearest US embassy or consulate. Registration is especially important if you are in an area experiencing civil unrest or a natural disaster, if you are going to a place where communications are poor, or if you plan to stay for any length of time. Registration takes only a few moments, and it may be invaluable in case of an emergency. If your passport is lost or stolen, having previously registered at an embassy or consulate can make it easier to issue you a new passport without a delay.
Safety Tips Against Crime
In Russia and much of the rest of the former USSR, crimes such as robbery, mugging, and pickpocketing are an increasing problem for tourists, particularly in cities and around major tourist sites. Crimes are perpetrated not only by adults, but also by adolescents or even children, often operating in groups. Crime aboard trains also has increased. For example, travelers have been drugged without their knowledge and robbed on the train from Moscow to St. Petersburg. Crime also is a problem on trains between Moscow and Warsaw, and armed robberies have occurred on the trains between Moscow and Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. On some trains, thieves have been able to open locked compartment doors. Although Russian officials have expressed willingness to cooperate with US officials in emergencies involving US citizens, communications and transportation can be slow and difficult, and the nearest US embassy or consulate may be more than a day's travel away. To reduce the risk of becoming a victim of crime, exercise the same precautions that you would in any large city and follow these tips: -- Safety begins when you pack. Leave expensive jewelry, unnecessary credit cards, and anything you consider invaluable at home. -- Never display large sums of money when paying a bill. Conceal your passport, cash, and other valuables on your person. Do not trust waist or fanny packs, because pickpockets have learned that is where the valuables are. -- Do not leave valuables in your hotel room; lock them in the hotel safe. -- Be vigilant on public transport and at tourist sites, food markets, flea markets, art exhibitions, and all places where crowds gather. -- Even slight intoxication is noted by professional thieves. Therefore, if you drink in a public place, do so only with a trusted friend who has agreed to remain sober. If you are the victim of a crime, report it immediately to the local police and to the nearest US embassy or consulate. Reporting a theft is worthwhile, because stolen items are sometimes retrieved.
Russian Law
How To Avoid Legal Problems. While in a foreign country, a US citizen is subject to its laws and regulations. Laws in the countries of the former Soviet Union can differ significantly from those in the United States and do not afford the protections available to the individual under US law. Exercise caution and carefully obey local laws. Penalties for breaking the law can be more severe than in the United States for similar offenses. Persons violating the law, even unknowingly, may have difficulties with the authorities and may be expelled and forced to forfeit the unused part of a pre-purchased tour. Serious transgressions of the law can lead to arrest and imprisonment. Under Article 12 of the US-USSR Consular Convention of 1968, government authorities in the Soviet successor states are required to immediately inform the US embassy or consulate of the arrest or detention of a US citizen and to permit, without delay, communication with the detained citizen. If you are detained by authorities, ask that a US consular officer be informed and that you be allowed to meet with a US consular officer without delay. Avoid Breaking the Law. Never take souvenirs from local hotels, no matter how insignificant in value they may appear. Pay for your souvenirs, handicrafts, or artwork in local currency, because most vendors do not have permission to accept dollars or other hard currency. Travelers have been arrested by plainclothes police after paying for a souvenir with hard currency. The traveler is usually released after several hours of detention, but both the hard currency and the item purchased are usually confiscated. Only special tourist stores, usually found in large hotels, are permitted to accept hard currency. Marriage Abroad. Americans contemplating marriage to a citizen of the former Soviet Union should contact the consular section of the nearest American embassy or consulate before the marriage takes place. Consular officers cannot perform marriages but can provide information about local regulations concerning marriage. Photography Restrictions. Regulations on photography are strict, particularly regarding military installations. Because of unwitting violations of these regulations, US citizens have had film confiscated, have been temporarily detained or interrogated, and have even been asked to leave the country. Be sure that your photographs do not contain forbidden subjects, not even in the background. When in doubt, ask your tour guide or someone else in authority. -- Photographs are permitted of architectural monuments; cultural, educational, and medical buildings; theaters; museums; parks; stadiums; streets and squares; and living quarters and landscape scenes which do not include forbidden subjects listed below. -- If prior permission is obtained from officials of the institution concerned, photographs may be taken of industrial enterprises which manufacture non-military products; farms; railroad stations; airports; river ports; and governmental, educational, and social organizations. -- All photographs are prohibited within the 25-kilometer-wide border zones, except in those portions not closed to foreigners. Photographs of the following are forbidden: all military objects, institutions, and personnel; storage facilities for combustibles; seaports; hydroelectric installations (sluices); pumping stations; dams; railroad junctions; railroad and highway bridges; industrial, scientific, and research establishments; electric, telephone, and telegraph stations; and radio facilities. Photographs from airplanes and panoramic shots of industrial cities are prohibited. -- Foreigners may not mail exposed film out of Russia.
Shopping: Be Wary of Antiques
Artwork, souvenirs, and handicrafts purchased at special stores for tourists may be taken out of Russia and the other former Soviet republics. However, antiques (defined as virtually anything which may be deemed of historical or cultural value) and artifacts, including samovars, purchased at regular stores and secondhand shops often may not be taken out of these countries without inspection by local cultural authorities and payment of substantial export duty. This procedure is almost prohibitively cumbersome and time consuming. Samovars not purchased at tourist stores and not cleared by cultural authorities are normally confiscated at pre-departure customs inspections.
Consular Information Sheets
To find specific travel information for a country, see the Department of State consular information sheets. These sheets contain information such as the location and telephone number of the nearest US embassy and crime, health, or security problems that may affect travel. Travel warnings, which advise Americans to defer travel to all or part of a country, also may be issued about certain countries. There are several ways to access consular information sheets and travel warnings: -- A 24-hour telephone service is available by dialing 202-647-5225 from a touchtone phone; -- You may obtain copies by sending a self-addressed, stamped envelope to the Citizens Emergency Center, Room 4800, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520-4818. (Write the name of the requested country or countries on the outside of the envelope.) -- They are posted at the 13 regional passport agencies and at American embassies and consulates abroad; and, -- They also can be accessed through an airline or travel agent's computer reservation system or by computer through many electronic bulletin boards. In addition to consular information sheets, a good source of information on current conditions in the former Soviet Union is Intourist (tel. 212-757- 3884). Before 1991, Intourist was the official and only Soviet tour operator. It is now a non-governmental body and is still by far the largest tour operator in Russia and the other 11 former Soviet republics. Intourist has contracts with a large network of hotels and restaurants, but it must now compete with other Russian tour operators such as Sputnik and Intratours. There also are a number of specialized tour operators. For example, the Host Family Association and Wild World specialize in, respectively, stays with families and adventure tours. Book travel with Russian tour operators through US travel agents. (###)
US Embassies and Consulates in the Former Soviet Union
Armenia
American Embassy 18 General Bagramian Street Yerevan, ARMENIA Tel. (7-8852) 151-122; 151-144
Azerbaijan
American Embassy Hotel Old Intourist 63 Prospekt Neftyanikov Baku, AZERBAIJAN Tel. (7-8922) 92-1898
Belarus
American Embassy Starovilenskaya Ulitsa 46 Minsk, BELARUS Tel. (7-0172) 347-642
Georgia
American Embassy 25 Atoneli Street Tbilisi, GEORGIA Tel. (7-8832) 989-967/8
Kazakhstan
American Embassy 551 Seyfullina Alma-Ata, KAZAKHSTAN Tel. (7-3272) 631-375
Kyrgyzstan
American Embassy Erkindik 66 (old name: Derzhinskiy) Bishkek, KYRGYZSTAN Tel. (7-3312) 222-693
Moldova
American Embassy 103 Strada Alexei Mateevich 277014 Chisinau, MOLDOVA Tel. (7-0422) 233-698; 233-494 (after hours)
Russia
American Embassy Novinskiy Bulvar 19/23 (old name: Chaykovskogo) Moscow, RUSSIA Tel. (7-095) 252-2451 to 9; after hours: 252-1898; 255-5123
American Consulate General: St. Petersburg
Ulitsa Furshtadskaya 15 (old name: Ul. Petra Lavrova) St. Petersburg, RUSSIA Tel. (7-812) 274-8235
American Consulate General: Vladivostok
12 Mordovtseva Street, Vladivostok, RUSSIA Tel. [7] (4232-26-79-30, 26-67-34)
Tajikistan
American Embassy Hotel Independence (old name: Oktyabrskaya) 39 Ainii Street Dushanbe, TAJIKISTAN Tel. (7-3772) 248-233
Turkmenistan
American Embassy Yubilenaya Hotel Ashgabat TURKMENISTAN Tel. (7-3632) 244-925
Ukraine
American Embassy 10 Yuria Kotsyubinskoho 252053 Kiev 53, UKRAINE Tel. (7-044) 244-7349; 244-7354
Uzbekistan
American Embassy Chilanzarskaya 82 Tashkent, UZBEKISTAN Tel. (7-3712) 776-986
Foreign Embassies and Consulates in the United States
Embassy of Armenia
122 C Street, NW Suite 360 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 393-5983
Embassy of Belarus
1511 K Street, NW Suite 619 Washington, DC 20005-1403 (202) 638-2954
Embassy of Russia
Consular Division 1825 Phelps Place, NW Washington, DC 20008 (202) 939-8907/11/13/18
Russian Consulate General
9 East 91 Street New York, NY 10128 (212) 348-0926
Russian Consulate General
2790 Green Street San Francisco, CA 94123 (415) 202-9800
Embassy of Ukraine
1828 L Street, NW, Suite 711 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 296-6960 (###)
Planning Another Trip?
For general travel information, the following pamphlets may be ordered for $1 each from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402; tel: 202-783-3238. [Pamplets are included on this CD] Your Trip Abroad A Safe Trip Abroad Travel Tips for Older Americans Tips for Americans Residing Abroad Country-specific information can be found in the following publications, also available for $1 each from the US Government Printing Office: Tips for Travelers to Sub-Saharan Africa Tips for Travelers to the Caribbean Tips for Travelers to Central and South America Tips for Travelers to the People's Republic of China Tips for Travelers to Eastern Europe Tips for Travelers to Mexico Tips for Travelers to the Middle East and North Africa Tips for Travelers to South Asia General visa information for these and other countries is available in Foreign Entry Requirements for 50 cents from the Consumer Information Center, Pueblo, CO 81009.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 (Volume XIV, Africa)

PA Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs Description: One of 18 print volumes and 9 microfiche supplements presenting the Department's official record of US policy for the years 1958-60 during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 26 19931/26/93 Category: Features Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: South Africa, Congo Subject: History [TEXT] The Department of State has recently released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. It is one of 18 print volumes and 9 microfiche supplements presenting the Department's official record of US policy for the years 1958-60 during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. During this period, 18 Sub-Saharan African nations attained independence. US support for the principle of self-determination for these countries often came into conflict with US obligations toward its traditional West European allies. Relations with the Union of South Africa, already troubled by the issue of apartheid, promised to become even more strained. US leaders, fearing that the newly independent countries would be fertile ground for the expansion of Soviet influence, sought to prevent them from falling under communist domination and to minimize communist influence over them. The crisis that followed the independence of the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) in July 1960 overshadowed other events in Africa and preoccupied US policymakers. Within days of the Congo's independence, disorder broke out, and Belgian troops returned. The Congolese Government requested the UN Security Council to authorize UN assistance to restore order. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian Herter backed the UN action but wanted to avoid committing US troops and triggering direct Soviet involvement. The US provided extensive logistical support to a UN force drawn from Africa, Asia, and Europe, with no troops from major powers or the Soviet bloc. A Congolese internal political struggle resulted, with the United States supporting President Joseph Kasavubu and the Soviet Union backing Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. This volume includes an extensive record of the Congo crisis as well as separate compilations of documents on the Horn of Africa, Ghana, Guinea, and the Union of South Africa. The volume is primarily comprised of documents originating in the White House and the Department of State, but material originating in the Department of Defense and the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also is included. Volume XVI (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02339-3) may be purchased for $33 from the Superintendent of Documents, New Orders, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. For further information, contact Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663- 1133. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Treaty Actions: Multilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 1 19932/1/93 Category: Treaties/Agreements Subject: International Law, Trade/Economics, Science/Technology, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT]
Containers
International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes, as amended. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the US Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037; 29 UST 3707, TIAS 10220, 10914. Accessions deposited: Brazil, Apr. 3, 1992; Estonia, Aug. 18, 1992. Notification of succession deposited: Croatia, July 27, 1992; with effect from Oct. 8, 1991. Amendments to annexes I and II of the international convention for safe containers (CSC), 1972, as amended (TIAS 9037; 29 UST 3707, TIAS 10220, 10914). Done at London May 17, 1991. Entered into force: Jan. 1, 1993.
Customs
Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1952; for the US Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063; 22 UST 320. Accessions deposited: Slovenia, Sept. 7, 1992; Ukraine, Nov. 10, 1992.
International Monetary Fund
Third amendment of the articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund (TIAS 1501, 6748, 8937; 60 Stat. 1401, 20 UST 2775, 29 UST 2203). Adopted at Washington June 28, 1990. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1992.
Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839; 21 UST 483. Accession deposited: Burma (Myanmar), Dec. 2,1992.
Scientific Cooperation
Agreement establishing an international science and technology center. Done at Moscow Nov. 27, 1992. Enters into force on the 30th day after the date of last notification by the signatories that all internal procedures necessary to be bound by agreement have been completed.
World Meteorological Organization
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052; 1 UST 281. Accession deposited: Uzbekistan, Dec. 23. 1992.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Treaty Actions: Bilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 1 19932/1/93 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: E/C Europe, Europe, MidEast/North Africa Country: Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia (former), Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Uruguay Subject: International Law [TEXT]
Chile
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at Washington and Santiago Dec. 11 and 15, 1992. Enters into force upon receipt by Chile of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements for entry into force have been fulfilled.
Colombia
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at Washington Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force upon receipt by Colombia of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Czechoslovakia
Treaty concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment, with annex, protocol, and exchanges of letters. Signed at Washington Oct. 22, 1991. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-31. Ratifications exchanged: Nov. 19, 1992. Entered into force: Dec. 19, 1992.
Finland
Protocol to the treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights of Feb. 13, 1934, as modified (TS 868, TIAS 2861; 49 Stat. 2659, 4 UST 2047). Signed at Washington July 1, 1991. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-34. Ratifications exchanged: Dec. 1, 1992. Entered into force: Dec. 1, 1992.
Ireland
Protocol to the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation of Jan. 21, 1950 (TIAS 2155; 1 UST 785). Signed at Washington June 24, 1992. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-35. Ratifications exchanged: Nov. 18, 1992. Entered into force: Nov. 18, 1992.
New Zealand
Agreement concerning defense communications services, with annexes. Signed at Wellington and Arlington Aug. 12 and Nov. 18, 1992. Entered into force Nov. 18, 1992.
Peru
Investment incentive and financial agreement. Signed at Washington Dec. 16, 1992. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1992.
Uruguay
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at Washington Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force upon receipt by Uruguay of written notice that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled. Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to agriculture owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendixes. Signed at Washington Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force upon receipt by Uruguay of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993

Title:

Department of State Reorganization

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Secretary's message to State Department employees and his implementation directive on reorganization released in Washington, DC Date: Feb, 5 19932/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department, Terrorism, Narcotics, Refugees, Democratization, Arms Control, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] As I join all of you in the challenging job of shaping and directing America's foreign policy, it is clear that we must make changes in the way the State Department is organized. The organization of our Department has evolved over the years in response to unique circumstances in the international environment. We serve in a State Department that is far better organized for the decades past than for the special challenges America faces in the post-Cold War era. I want our Department to be able to deal more effectively with the new issues of critical importance to our nation's foreign policy: strengthening democratization efforts in the former Soviet Union and around the world, halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strengthening peace-keeping capabilities, dealing more effectively with global environmental problems, elevating our concern about the global population explosion, fighting international crime and terrorism, and penetrating new markets for American business. We cannot hope to respond to these and other new challenges unless we improve the way we deal with tough and complex problems which cut across the traditional boundaries of our bureaus. We must design creative ways to both increase the efficiency of the policy process and enhance the administration of the many programs we manage. This will mean: -- Designating five Under Secretaries together with the Deputy [Secretary] as my principal foreign policy advisers; -- Creating new focal points for key foreign policy initiatives; -- Eliminating redundancies and concentrating greater decision making responsibility within the bureaus; -- Reducing excessive layering to streamline information flow and decision making; -- Enhancing communication in all directions by asking most bureaus to report to me through a designated Under Secretary who will coordinate the activities of related bureaus and facilitate needed access to me and the Seventh Floor; and -- Creating a streamlined Office of the Secretary to provide me and the Deputy Secretary with a more effective means to receive information and make decisions. Over the past weeks, the transition has afforded us an extended opportunity to examine closely the organization of the Department in light of President Clinton's foreign policy priorities. We were not alone in this endeavor, since work was well underway by the Department's own Management Task Force "State 2000" as well as by other groups of qualified professionals. The changes I ask to be implemented emerge from what I believe is a growing consensus for change within and outside the Department. I do not seek these changes merely for the sake of change itself. When undertaking a degree of reorganization, we must be mindful that change can be disruptive. Thus, it must be carefully planned so as not to interfere with the orderly functioning of the Department. While some of the changes outlined in the attached directive can be achieved quickly by administrative action subject to congressional consultation, others will require legislation which we plan to seek in the very near future. We have initiated the process of discussion with Congress and have, thus far, received a positive reaction to our approach. There is great talent in the Department of State among those who have devoted themselves to careers of public service. President Clinton and I wish better to harness this talent so critical to the interests of our nation. We must change to do this. I am convinced that the measured changes we now undertake can enable us to deal with both the problems and opportunities of a new era in foreign policy.
Secretary's Implementation Directive for Reorganization
In order to implement the foreign policy priorities of the President of the United States and to more effectively and efficiently carry out the foreign policy responsibilities of the Department of State, I ask that the following changes be implemented to occur upon passage of legislation or by this directive upon completion of congressional consultations.
1. The Under Secretaries shall be the principal foreign policy advisers to the Secretary and directly in the chain of command.
I wish to strengthen the role of the Under Secretaries. They shall serve as my principal foreign policy advisers and assist me and the Deputy Secretary in executing and coordinating the activities of the Department. They will be given line responsibility to manage and coordinate the operations of the bureaus which will report to them. The use of Under Secretaries as senior advisers to the Secretary should be accompanied by a realignment of the chain of command. In the future, Assistant Secretaries will report directly to the designated Under Secretary. Changes in reporting responsibility will not alter the important role of the Assistant Secretaries in the formulation of foreign policy or their access to the Office of the Secretary. The major benefits from this change are creating a better system of information flow from the bureaus to the Under Secretary and the Office of the Secretary, achieving greater efficiency in Departmental decision- making, permitting more extensive coordination of key cross-cutting issues at the bureau and Under Secretary levels, and strengthening the Under Secretaries in the interagency process. Listed elsewhere in this directive are the groupings of bureaus in specific clusters and the designated lines of reporting to specific Under Secretaries.
2. Creation of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs.
I shall ask Congress to create a fifth Under Secretary for Global Affairs (G) needed to manage and redirect critical global issues now found at the heart of post-Cold War foreign policy. These issues cut across nearly every boundary of the geographic and functional bureaus. We must insure that they are given high-level attention in a new and strengthened system of Under Secretaries. The substantive concerns of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs shall reside in bureaus dealing with the environment, science, oceans policy, democracy promotion, human rights, international labor issues, refugees, population, counter-terrorism, international narcotics, and other international criminal issues. Better coordination of the programs managed by these bureaus across many agencies and departments will be a critical role for this new Under Secretary. Given the pressing need to have an Under Secretary for Global Affairs in place in the very near future, President Clinton intends to initially nominate his candidate for this post as Counselor and then have Congress reconstitute this position as the new Under Secretary. I will also ask the Congress to establish a new Counselor position at Executive Level IV, thereby maintaining the current number of Executive Level III posts in the Department.
3. Creation of three new bureaus to streamline policy and consolidate functions.
I shall ask Congress to define three new bureaus derived from existing bureaus and functions in the Department to streamline the formulation of policy in these important areas and to better manage the substantial programs operated by these organizations. a. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)--This bureau will be created by combining the current Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Labor Affairs; the latter shall be relocated in the new bureau in a Deputy Assistant Secretary position. This bureau will provide an organizational home for initiatives and policies which promote democracy. By combining associated activities related to human rights and labor affairs, the bureau will play a major role in formulating policies designed to build and strengthen democratic institutions. The Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor will be nominated as Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until legislation can be enacted to reconstitute and rename that position. b. Bureau of Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime (NTC)--This bureau will be created by expanding the mandate of the Bureau for International Narcotics Matters to include counter-terrorism and international crime. The Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism will be relocated in the new bureau at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. A new office of international crime will be created to act as a policy and coordinating office for all of the Department's activities in this area. The operational responsibility for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) will be moved to the new bureau from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, thus placing policy and implementation together. President Clinton and I place great priority on the activities encompassed by this new bureau in view of the threats posed to our nation by terrorist groups, narco-traffickers, and international criminal organizations. The Assistant Secretary for Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime will be nominated initially as the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters until a statutory name change can be enacted. c. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)--In order to consolidate all Departmental responsibility for refugee matters and to upgrade policy focus on refugee issues in a single bureau, I will ask Congress to create a new bureau headed by an Assistant Secretary. This bureau will also be responsible for coordinating the Department's policy on population and migration issues. The positions and functions of Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and the Bureau of Refugee Programs will be subsumed in the new bureau. The nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration Affairs will be confirmed as Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and will hold that position until legislation can be enacted reconstituting and renaming the position as Assistant Secretary for PRM.
4. Rename offices in order to indicate a new policy emphasis or changed mandate.
I will ask Congress to change the names of the following Departmental units: a. Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs to be changed to Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs (E). This change reflects the need to underscore that this office will have as a major responsibility harnessing the assets of the Department to assist the competitive position of US companies. b. Under Secretary for International Security Affairs to be changed to Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (A). This change reflects new arms control priorities of the Clinton Administration to deal with the heightened threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The change also recognizes that the Bureau of Political- Military Affairs will have new non-proliferation functions as a result of consolidations discussed in this directive. (The Bureau of Administration [formerly A] will be designated AD.)
5. Create an Office of Secretary of State.
It is necessary to streamline and reorganize the office and functions which relate directly to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary in order to rationalize critical policy support services, to provide a framework for high-level decision making and to enable the Secretary and the Deputy to establish an operational agenda for Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other senior officials. There is hereby established an Office of Secretary of State which consists of the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Executive Secretary as well as their personal staffs. Reporting directly to the Office of the Secretary shall be: -- Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States (S/NIS); -- The Policy Planning Staff (S/P); -- The Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H); -- The Bureau of Public Affairs (PA); -- The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); -- The Legal Adviser (L); -- The Chief of Protocol (CPR); -- Secretariat Staff and Operations Center (S/S); -- The Ombudsman (S/CSO); -- The Inspector General (OIG); -- The Foreign Service Grievance Board (FSG); [and] -- Equal Employment Opportunity and Civil Rights (EEOCR). The Deputy Secretary shall share major policy responsibilities with the Secretary and in the absence of the Secretary shall serve in an acting capacity. In addition, the Deputy Secretary shall: -- Coordinate the management of international affairs resources, especially on an interagency basis; -- Oversee the process of ambassadorial appointments; [and] -- Assume other tasks and responsibilities at the request of the Secretary of State, such as reviews of organizational structures. To achieve the efficient operation of the Office of the Secretary, Ambassadors-at-Large, Special Advisers, Coordinators, and independent offices hitherto reporting to the Secretary are abolished, merged with, or relocated in appropriate bureaus as set out below (to occur upon the passage of legislation or by this directive upon completion of congressional consultations). To be abolished by legislation: -- Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, with functions subsumed in the Bureau of Refugee Affairs as discussed previously; and -- Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance. Abolished in this directive with functions relocated as indicated: -- Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for International Labor Affairs (S/IL), with functions assumed by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); -- Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT), with functions included in the Bureau of Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime (NTC); -- Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser on Non-Proliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs (S/NP), with functions transferred to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM); and -- Office of the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (S/DEL), with functions transferred to the Bureau of Political- Military Affairs (PM).
6. Creation of an Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States (S/NIS).
President Clinton has nominated an Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States, and this person shall also serve as Special Adviser to the Secretary of State. This new post was created to provide a high-level focal point for policy formulation and coordination of US assistance to the states that were under the control of the former Soviet Union. When confirmed, the Ambassador-at-Large will chair an interagency policy group to formulate US policy and set US program priorities for the new independent states. The Office of Independent States and Commonwealth Affairs (EUR/ISCA) shall remain in EUR [the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs], reporting directly to the Ambassador-at-Large. The task force coordinating assistance to those states (currently D/CISA) and the position of Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator shall be transferred to S/NIS and shall report directly to the Ambassador-at-Large. The Ambassador-at-Large will also provide general policy guidance to the Coordinator for Safety, Security, and Dismantling Nuclear Weapons (to become PM/SSD) and to the USAID [US Agency for International Development] Task Force for the New Independent States (AID/NIS). The task force coordinating assistance to Eastern Europe (D/EEA) shall be transferred to the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs.
7. New reporting responsibilities for Assistant Secretaries.
The Department's bureaus shall report directly to the Under Secretaries as discussed previously. Set forth below are the reporting responsibilities for each Assistant Secretary: -- To the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P)--All six regional bureaus (ARA, EUR, SA, AF, EAP, NEA) and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO). -- To the Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs (E)--The Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB). -- To the Under Secretary for Global Affairs (G)--The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES); the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); and the Bureau of Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime (NTC). -- To the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (A)--The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM). -- To the Under Secretary for Management (M)--The Bureau of Administration (AD), the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), the Bureau of Financial Management and Policy (FMP), the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), and the Bureau of Personnel (PER). (Note: Further reorganization of management functions may occur after an ongoing review is completed.)
8. Functional consolidations will occur to streamline operations and improve policy focus.
There are several functions which need to be moved to improve policy formulation and management in key areas. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs (OES/N) and the five offices which report to this position (OES/NTS, OES/NEC, OES/NEP, OES/NSR, OES/NSC) will be relocated within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs so as to further consolidate all activities relating to the critical issue of halting nuclear proliferation. The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) shall retain functions in these offices relating to non-nuclear energy. Another goal is to improve the way the Department manages export controls as they are applied to commercial goods and munitions. Our interest is in preventing exports that might contribute to proliferation or to the transfer of technology that could harm US interests and in promoting legitimate exports that help American industry and the economy. In order, then, to improve the coherence, consistency, and efficiency of our efforts in the Department, we are closely reviewing our export control activities and examining alternative ways of organizing these functions, with a decision to be made in the next 2 weeks. Responsibility for international space issues is fragmented and has produced overlapping roles among the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, and the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. We will also be examining this problem over the next 2 weeks with an eye toward integrating our diplomacy for space cooperation with broader national security and foreign policy objectives. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center shall report to the Bureau of Political- Military Affairs. The Coordinator for Safety, Security, and Dismantling of Nuclear Weapons (SSD) shall be moved to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. The US Delegation to the Open Skies Conference (T/OS) shall be abolished. There shall be created in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs an Office of Peacekeeping to assist the bureau and the Department in efforts to better plan and coordinate peacekeeping activities. There shall be created in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs an Office of Business Facilitation to serve as a key access point in the Department for the private sector as well as providing policy guidance on key issues relating to improving the competitive position of US companies in world markets. Commercial functions of the Office of Commercial, Legislative, and Public Affairs (EB/CLP) shall be transferred to this new office. The Bureau of International Communications and Information Policy (CIP) shall be merged into the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs as an office headed by a Coordinator. The rank of Ambassador associated with this post shall be discontinued. Legislation will be sought to achieve this change. International telecommunications negotiations and agreements are critical to maintaining the competitive position of this important US industry. This can best be achieved in the context of the EB bureau, which is the principal place of access for American business. The Department's interagency role in the telecommunications policy arena with the Federal Communications Commission and the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration will be strengthened by merging this office into a fully staffed bureau. There shall be created in the Department an Office for the Permanent Representative for the United Nations to support the Cabinet functions of this post and to more effectively coordinate with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. In a time of tight budgets and increasing demands on international affairs resources, clearer priorities must be established for the International Affairs Budget Function 150 Account if Administration initiatives are to be realized. Under the direction of the Deputy Secretary, who will coordinate management of international affairs resources, the Policy Planning Staff shall provide policy guidance so that general spending priorities may be established. A deputy in S/P shall work closely with the Office of Policy and Resources (D/P∧R) to link the policy planning and resource allocation processes.
9. Removing excessive layering.
The number of Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the Department has grown from 46 in the 1960s to 120 today. I have asked the Under Secretaries to work with Assistant Secretaries to reduce the number of Deputy Assistant Secretaries [DASs] and DAS equivalents by about 40% and to reduce significantly the number of special assistants and other Seventh Floor staff. These reductions are designed to eliminate excessive layering, expedite clearance procedures, and strengthen the responsibilities of office directors and country directors. I have asked the Deputy Secretary to oversee the implementation of these changes in a manner consistent with the orderly functioning of the Department. In doing so, he will work with the Under Secretary for Management, who will coordinate the implementation of the directive. I have asked that all affected officials be consulted so as to achieve the changes in a timely and non-disruptive fashion. I have also asked the Deputy Secretary to conduct a review of the operations and mandate of the US Agency for International Development and to report his findings within 60 days so that we may propose to Congress a reorganization plan for this agency. Warren Christopher (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993 Title:

Guatemala Murder Trial

Boucher Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 1 19932/1/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: Guatemala Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] We are concerned that a Guatemalan court denied a request for official security protection for key prosecution witnesses to the brutal September 11, 1990, murder of world-renowned Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack Chang. Testimony free from intimidation is necessary to ensure that justice be done. Ms. Mack's murder and the initial lack of any serious investigation focused international scrutiny on the Guatemalan justice system's ability to combat human rights abuse. In spite of judicial turnover which resulted in 12 different judges dealing with the case, and notwithstanding reports of attempted intimidation, the current trial judge recently stated that a verdict was due this month; these witnesses may be required to give further testimony. We urge appropriate protection for the prosecution witnesses in the Mack case. We reiterate our expectation that the judicial process in this case be full, fair, and impartial. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993 Title:

US Supports Ongoing Angolan Talks and Calls for End to Fighting

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 2 19932/2/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization [TEXT] The United States welcomes the resumption of direct talks between the Government of Angola and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] in Addis Ababa [Ethiopia]. In addition to re-establishing a dialogue, the two parties found sufficient common ground to pursue further negotiations next week. The United States commends and fully supports the work of the United Nations and the Secretary General's Special Representative, Margaret Anstee, in facilitating these discussions. While we are encouraged by this new dialogue, both parties must recognize the urgent need for a cease-fire. Intense fighting continues in Angola, undermining the already fragile political and economic situation. A military solution to Angola's problems is not possible. The United States joins the international community in reiterating its call for an immediate end to the violence. UNITA and the Government must continue their face-to-face talks under UN auspices in order to resolve their conflict and fulfill the terms of the Bicesse peace accords. We remind all parties that any attacks on US facilities, companies, or personnel in Angola will have the gravest implications for those responsible. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993 Title:

US Commitment To Advance The Middle East Peace Negotiations

Clinton Source: President Clinton Description: Statement released by the released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 3 19932/3/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] In accord with my pledge to maintain continuity in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, I have decided to dispatch Secretary of State Christopher to the Middle East. His purpose will be to convey to all the parties my commitment to advance the peace negotiations. He will elicit their views on how best to promote progress, and he will discuss bilateral issues and regional problems, including Iraq. This will be Secretary Christopher's first mission abroad. It is an indication of the priority my Administration attaches to peace-making in the Middle East. It also presents an opportunity for the parties to focus their energies on the formidable challenge of achieving peace in a strife- torn region. With violence engulfing so much of the world, it is striking that in the Middle East a process of direct negotiations has begun. Israel, all its Arab neighbors, and the Palestinians have been engaged in a common endeavor to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States, together with our Russian co-sponsor, played a critical role in launching these negotiations. It is my intention to see that we continue that role. We cannot impose a solution in the Middle East. Only the leaders of the region can make peace. Theirs is an awesome responsibility. Those who oppose the process, who seek to subvert it through violence and intimidation, will find no tolerance here for their methods. But those who are willing to make peace will find in me and my Administration a full partner. This is a historic moment. It can slip away all too easily. But if we seize the opportunity, we can begin now to construct a peaceful Middle East for future generations. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993 Title:

Fifth Report on War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia

UN Source: UN Security Council, United Nations Description: Supplemental United States Submission of Information to the UN Security Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992) Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92 Category: Reports Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations [TEXT] [Following is the text of the Supplemental United States Submission of Information to the UN Security Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992), released on December 7, 1992. For the text of the first four reports, see Dispatch Vol. 3 No. 39, p. 732; Vol. 3, No. 44, p. 802; Vol. 3, No. 46, p. 825; and Vol. 3, No. 52, p. 917.] For the text of Resolution 771, see Dispatch Supplement, Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 44. For text of Resolution 780, see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769. Editor's Note: The following contains graphic descriptions. This is the fifth submission by the United States Government of information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. As in our three previous reports, we have focused on grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with Resolution 771, have provided information that is "substantiated," that is, which rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or that includes detail sufficient for corroboration. For the moment, we have also tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other countries and non- governmental sources, which we understand will submit reports pursuant to Resolutions 771 and 780. The information provided is intended to be useful to the commission of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780. The United States has further substantiating information concerning the incidents included in this report, which we will make available directly to the commission of experts on a confidential basis. In accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution 780, the United States intends to continue providing reports as additional relevant information comes into our possession. We wish to note that in addition to the categories of violations of humanitarian law and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions cited in our previous reports, we have added a new category, "Impeding Delivery of Food and Medical Supplies to the Civilian Population." As in our previous reports, the notations at the end of each of the items indicate the source from which the information was drawn. Unless otherwise indicated, the reports refer to incidents occurring in 1992. Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Fifth Submission
Willful Killing
8 Jan 93: A Bosnian Serb army soldier killed Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic on January 8. Turajlic was sitting inside a UN vehicle at a UN command post near Sarajevo's airport. French General Morillon, a UN commander in Bosnia, blamed the commander of the Bosnian Serbs' Lukavica corps for the assassination. (The Washington Post) Jan 93: Armed Serbian groups are killing and wounding people of all ages every day, destroying abandoned Muslim and Croat buildings, and looting homes and stores in Banja Luka and in the surrounding countryside, according to witnesses. (Department of State) 14 Dec: Bosnian Muslim forces from Srebrenica killed at least 60 Serbs, mostly civilians, in villages near the Bosnian town of Bratunac, according to a resident of the town. As a result of the hostilities, up to 5,000 people-- primarily women, children, elderly, and wounded--have fled across the Drina River into Ljubovija from the Bosnian villages of Bjelovac, Sikiric, Voljevica, Jugovici, and Loznicka Rijeka. (Department of State) Sep: A 44-year-old Muslim witnessed Serbian soldiers beating four men in early September outside a detention facility in Batkovic. Two were able to enter the facility; another two young men did not have the strength to flee the beating. Four or five soldiers continued attacking those two until one of them, about 20 years old, died. The second bled from the ears and was so badly injured that he could not recognize his own father, a fellow prisoner. Fifteen men were killed during his stay at Batkovic camp. The witness was able to identify the most brutal of the guards at Batkovic. (Department of State) Sep: A 44-year-old Serbian civilian, who had been detained in Celebici since May 30, witnessed the beating deaths of 15-16 Serbs by a Muslim guard and the deputy camp director, Azem Delic--a "green beret" (member of the Bosnian Muslim Paramilitary Forces in Konjic). (Department of State) 24 Jul: A 39-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor, who was held in Keraterm camp from May 31 until August 5, witnessed the July 24-25 massacre at Keraterm camp. Though we have reported the massacre in previous reports, this witness provided some additional details about the events on the evening of July 24. The witness was in the room next door, where he could see much of what took place because the large factory doors separating the rooms had slats with openings between them. He said that soon after the disturbances in the room next door had begun, he saw two trucks full of soldiers drive into the camp. Floodlights were turned on, and three additional machine guns were brought from the trucks and placed next to the two that had already been in the camp. All five machine guns were used to fire into the room. At around six the next morning, the witness was among the prisoners chosen to load bodies into the trucks. He said they stacked more than 100 bodies in the trucks, piling them in three layers. (Department of State) 26 Jun: A 19-year-old Serbian civilian from Visoko witnessed the beating death of Milivoje Samardzic when Muslims arrested him and brought him to Visoko camp. He identified those responsible for the death. (Department of State) 20 Jun: A 27-year-old Serbian civilian from Okolisce, a village near Visoko, witnessed the killing of six unarmed Serb civilians by a Bosnian Territorial Defense soldier on June 20 in Okolisce. He witnessed these shootings from his neighbor's house, and stated that among the victims were the wife and son of a Serb neighbor. During this attack, a Muslim neighbor saved the life of the witness. Later on June 20, this man witnessed the beating death of Bosko Rakovic at Visoko camp by a Muslim guard whom he identified. (Department of State) 13 Jun: A 24-year-old Serbian civilian from Visoko was arrested with his father and two brothers by Bosnian Muslim Territorial Defense Forces on June 13. He witnessed the beating death of Slobodan Gogic on that day. Pointing to a wound on his elbow as evidence of his own torture, the witness identified those who had beaten himself, Gogic, and other prisoners. (Department of State)
Torture of Prisoners
May-Oct: A 33-year-old Muslim doctor from Prijedor, who had been interned in Trnopolje camp from May 25 until his release to the Karlovac transit center for ex-detainees on October 1, described the operation of a medical clinic in Trnopolje camp--the only reported clinic in any of the camps in the Prijedor area. Trnopolje is a small village within the municipality of Kozarac, about 6 kilometers away. It lies on the railroad track between Prijedor and Omarska. Most maps identify it as "Kozarac Station." Trains came often through Trnopolje traveling to Banja Luka. Women, children, boys under 16, men over 65, and the very sick were loaded on through trains; able-bodied men remained in Trnopolje. The witness said that Serbian soldiers wandered through Trnopolje camp nightly, brutally beating the male prisoners and randomly raping female prisoners. They did this with the knowledge and permission of camp guards stationed at several locations in Trnopolje. The witness examined some of the raped women but was not allowed to indicate on any documents that they had been raped. The doctors kept a log of patients for a few weeks, until they were stopped by the Serbs. The doctors were not allowed to indicate in the log that patients had been beaten or raped, but the witness and others used a code to indicate who had been raped and beaten. The witness smuggled these logs out of the camp and turned them over to the Muslim Club of Kozarac in Zagreb. Several times the employees of the clinic came under suspicion, and their lives were threatened. One of the female aides was a Serb, and she was repeatedly interrogated and told to stop working at the clinic, but she stayed. The witness believes the presence of this Serb saved the lives of the other staff many times. (Department of State) May-Oct: Serbian paramilitary police picked up a 44-year-old Muslim on May 14 and drove him to a kindergarten on the western side of Zvornik. There one member of the paramilitary beat him with a stick for 1 hour, while another aimed his pistol at him, and a third went through documents. The witness said the three were Serbs from Serbia, not Bosnia. They wore white belts and camouflage fatigues. The witness and another captive were driven about 5 minutes to a former textile plant called "Alhos." The facility was occupied by many Serb soldiers, but he and the other Muslim appeared to be the only prisoners at that time. They were kept for several days in a small room, which was stained with what they assumed was the blood of earlier prisoners. They were generally left alone until May 16, when from 8 pm until 4 am the following morning, they underwent the most severe and intensive beating during 4 months of captivity. Three Serbs carried out the beatings, two of whom he recognized from the area around Svornik. The two men were forced to stand against the wall and sing Serbian nationalist songs. Unfamiliar with the lyrics, the two Muslims were beaten by the soldiers with fists, boots, and rifles. On the verge of unconsciousness, the witness was forced to clean his own blood from the floor and walls around him. Upon completion of this "task," the beating was resumed. During the course of the beatings, both of his cheek bones were smashed and the entire bone structure enclosing his upper teeth was loosened so much that his teeth protruded from his mouth. His release from the Alhos textile plant on May 20 was arranged by a sympathetic Serb soldier. His next place of detention was the Zvornik court house, where guards did not molest the prisoners, but every day several Serb soldiers from outside the facility were allowed in to beat a few of the prisoners at random. According to the routine, the prisoners had to stand when these uniformed outsiders entered the room. Victims were selected quickly, then punched and kicked, frequently in the kidneys-- sometimes until they lost consciousness. On June 4, the prisoners at the court house were moved to a neighboring house and joined by another 120 Muslim detainees from a detention facility at the Celopek cultural center. Here, too, the daily beatings continued. During the approximately 6 weeks at that house, men from the Seselj unit carved crosses into the foreheads of 10 Muslim men. Another group of Bosnian Serb "police" also specialized in tightening wires around victims' necks. On July 15, most of the prisoners were bused to a detention facility in Batkovic. As soon as they arrived, the witness and others were beaten with sticks. The beatings were a regular part of life at the Batkovic facility. The witness was released from Serb detention on October 1 as part of a prisoner exchange. (Department of State) Aug: A 40-year-old woman described how followers of Serbian leader Milan Martic selected women from her city and put hundreds of them in a school in Doboj. In front of a few hundred prisoners they raped and tortured women and girls for days. It was unbearable to watch girls being raped in front of their fathers. I was raped and tortured too, because they knew that I am a wife of a leader of the Muslim party. In August, some prisoners were exchanged, including me and my sons. Many women and girls who were pregnant remained in the camp. They were transferred to a hospital and fed twice a day because, as the Chetniks said, they had to bear their offspring. (The New York Times) May-Aug: A 39-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor was held in Keraterm camp from May 31 until August 5. Upon his arrival at Keraterm, one guard-- whom he identified--used a knife to saw off the witness's left index finger at the first knuckle and chopped off the tip of his left ring finger. During his detention, the witness saw four guards cut another prisoner across the face and torso with a knife. One of the guards cut off the bottom half of the man's left ear. After the beating, they left him in the room without any medical care. The man survived his injuries, but, after a few days his wounds became infected, and the witness said he could see maggots moving around inside the open wounds. The witness believes the man remains in Prijedor. The witness described another form of cruelty he witnessed at Keraterm. The Serbian guards gathered two-liter glass bottles from a nearby bottling plant. A bottle would be placed on the ground and a prisoner, trousers and underwear pulled down, would be forced to sit upon it. The guards would then push down on the prisoner's shoulders until the man's buttocks touched the ground, forcing the bottle all the way up the man's anus. Of the guards he said: "Whatever they imagined, they tried; if they liked the effect, they would do it to other prisoners." (Department of State) May-Aug: A 36-year-old Serbian medical doctor was arrested on May 5 by Paraga's Black Shirts (HOS) in Capljina. She was taken to Dretelj, a fuel storage garrison transformed into a detention facility for 64 female and 100 male detainees, where she witnessed torture and could identify some of the perpetrators. All men were mercilessly beaten at arrival and during all interrogations. They were hit with hands, feet, night sticks, two-by-fours, and rifle butts. They were slashed with knives and degraded in every conceivable manner. (An) owner of several catering establishments, heavily over-weight, was supposed to be transferred to another prison but was not because he literally could not be moved: he was so badly beaten. (Another) received about 50 blows to his head, which was badly gashed. Female fighters assisted in the beating by kicking him. During interrogation . . . prisoners would be slapped, the tips of their fingers would be cut off, their fingers would be crushed. Needles were driven under my nails, I was cut with a 'kama' over the face and breasts. The treatment of women was in no way less inhuman than that of men. On the contrary, several women were raped, even some very old ones. (Archmandrite Simeon Biberdzic, Monastery of Ostrog) 18 Jun: A 42-year-old Muslim from Kevljani was interned at Omarska camp from May 27 until August 28. On June 18 or 19, he was called out of Building 11 and taken to Building 10, to a room with four soldiers. The soldiers made the witness undress to his underwear and lie down on his stomach on the tile floor. One guard took an iron chair, put it on his back, and sat down. Another guard took a large caliber automatic rifle and beat him on his spine with the butt of the rifle, pounding each vertebrae twice. A third guard continually kicked him along his legs and groin. The other guard pounded his rib cage continuously, which resulted in the witness sustaining four broken ribs. The witness lost consciousness, but when he awoke, the four guards were standing around him, and began to beat him again, on his legs, shoulders, and head. One guard took a police baton, straddled the witness' back, and beat his back and ribs continuously. He felt the pain of only the first 10 blows, then felt no more. Another guard pulled out a knife and said he would "circumcize" him. The guard then cut his knee cap, but the witness said he did not even feel the knife as he watched blood pour out of his leg. (Department of State) Jun: A 22-year-old Serbian civilian from Drivusa was shot three times in his left arm when Bosnian Government Forces captured Serb positions in Zenica in June. He was beaten in Zenica camp for the first 10 days of his capture and still bore a scar on his leg where it had been cut "just for being a Serb." He witnessed the case of one elderly man who had stepped on a mine but received no medical treatment, and who was removed from the camp immediately before a visit by UN Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki. This inmate was returned after Mazowiecki's departure and died a few days later. Food and tea often were contaminated with soap. (Department of State)
Abuse of Civilians in Detention Centers
1992: A representative of the Zenica Center for the Investigation of War Crimes claimed the center had interviewed witnesses of rape and violence who described the rape of 30,000 women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Department of State) Aug: A 12-year-old girl from Jelec was raped by several Serbian soldiers over nine nights at the Partizan Hall detention center in Foca. On one occasion, a Serbian soldier raped the girl and her mother. A 20-year-old woman, who had been raped by a Serb policeman, said that some 100 "young Muslim woman and girls were raped" in Miljevina, an eastern Bosnian town described as a possible "rape camp." (Newsweek) 27 Jul: A 29-year-old Serbian civilian from Srebrenik was taken to Zenica camp on July 27 by Bosnian Government forces. He was beaten continuously--every 10 minutes for 96 hours after his arrival--with ropes and sticks. He showed evidence of beatings, particularly on his head. He also reported deliberate contamination of food. (Department of State)
Impeding Delivery of Food and Medical Supplies to the Civilian Population
10 Jan 93: Bosnian Serb forces fired on British troops escorting a UN aid convoy on January 10 near the town of Kladanj. (Reuters) 6 Jan 93: Bosnian Serb forces stopped UN attempts to repair the power grid in Sarajevo on January 6 and prevented a load of firewood from entering Sarajevo. (Department of State) Dec: Bosnian Serbs in December continued to obstruct UNHCR convoys to eastern Bosnia, to shell the Mostar Road, and to endanger UNHCR personnel in Sarajevo via snipers and mortar attacks. The Bosnian Serbs also impeded deliveries to Bihac and the oversight of relief in Banja Luka. Bosnian Croats interfered with UNHCR convoys on the Mostar-Sarajevo Road: At first the Bosnian Croats told UNHCR that the road was unsafe and could not be used. When UNHCR insisted that they would deal with the risk of Serb shelling, they were allowed to proceed, but have since been subject to frequent checkpoints, diversions to difficult back roads, insults at checkpoints, and shooting in the air. Bosnian Muslims frequently have shot at UNHCR vehicles and personnel and harassed UNHCR personnel at Muslim-manned barricades. A major impediment to humanitarian shipments to Bosnian Government- controlled areas in December was the military activity initiated by Muslim forces in the Bratunac area, which halted relief supplies for Srebrenica, and in the Rogatica area, which blocked a convoy destined for Gorazde. Serbian guards outside Banja Luka continued to harass relief workers, waving around rifles and pistols, and prohibited them from distributing food. (Department of State) 12 Dec: Serbian gunmen on December 12 stopped a Belgrade-to-Sarajevo humanitarian aid convoy at Han Pijesak and threatened to kill the relief workers. (Paris AFP) 1 Dec: Small arms fire pierced the stabilizer of a US C-130 during an approach into Sarajevo airport on December 1, which resulted in the temporary suspension of the UNHCR airlift. At least five planes participating in the humanitarian airlift have been hit by small arms fire since November 4. (Department of State)
Deliberate Attacks on Non-Combatants
16 Dec: A gunman shot a French soldier with UN forces in Bosnia- Herzegovina on December 16 while he was on guard at Sarajevo airport. (Paris AFP) While traveling to Sarajevo in an armored and marked UN vehicle, Hans Stercken, Bundestag deputy and chairman of the [German] Foreign Affairs Committee, and a German embassy staff member were attacked. The vehicle, which was driven by an Egyptian crew, was hit by several shots. Stercken said the UN "could not have expressed more clearly" the identity of the vehicle; it was painted white and carried a UN sign. (Hamburg DPA) 6 Dec: A UNHCR representative's car in Prijedor was hit four times by bullets on December 6. (Department of State) 5 Dec: A mortar round that hit Sarajevo's airport terminal on December 5 wounded two Portuguese police attached to the UN peace-keeping mission. The shelling of the airport continued throughout the day. (Reuters) 4 Dec: During a battle for Otes during the first week of December, two UN planes were shot at, the UN headquarters in Sarajevo was shelled, and the radar at the airport, southwest of the capital, was destroyed by artillery fire. (Paris AFP)
Wanton Devastation and Destruction of Property
27 May: A 42-year-old Muslim described the Serbian attack on Kevljani on May 26. The villagers fled to the woods, but after spending the night under heavy shelling, many women wanted to surrender. The witness and an imam [a Muslim cleric] led a group of women and children under a white flag to the school to surrender. A Serbian officer nicknamed Cigo, who was the head of the tank regiment that attacked Kevljani, told the group [that] the whole village had 2 hours to surrender. The witness said [that] he surrendered to Cigo all the weapons the group had in hopes that the village would be spared. The Serbian army, however, burned most houses to the ground. They sent all Muslims and Croatians in buses to Prijedor. (Department of State) Jun: The Orthodox Bishop of Herzegovina testified publicly on September 28 that the regular army of the Republic of Croatia from the coast and Croatian armed forces from western Herzegovina, from the beginning of June, had destroyed the following property in his diocese: -- The Orthodox cathedral and Episcopal headquarters in Mostar, on June 15 and 16; -- Churches in Bjelo Polje, Bobani plateau, Capljina, Dubrovnik, Duvno, Gabela, Metkovic, Stolac, Zacula, and Zalanik; -- The Serbian villages of Brdjani, Zukici, Djepi (or Cepi), Blace, Vrdolje, Zagorice, Zivanje, Ljuta, Ovcari, Ribari, Sitnik, Donje Selo, Cerici, Bjelovcani, Celebici, Pokojiste, Obri, Nevizdraci, Idbor, Ostrozac, Dobrigosce, Paprasko, Repovac, Shunje, Hondici, Gnojnica, Buna, Hodbina, and Pijesci; -- The 15th century Byzantine-style monastery at Zavala, the 16th century Byzantine-style monastery at Zitomislic, and the Serbian villages of Tasovcic, Klepci, and Prebilovci on the east bank of the Neretva River-- where, on June 7 and 8, the church with the bones of almost 2,000 Serbian people killed between 1941 and 1945 was burned down and plowed into the ground. (Orthodox Bishop of Herzegovina)
Other, Including Mass Forcible Expulsion and Deportation of Civilians
12 Jan 93: As many as 35,000 men, women, and children risk death by illness and starvation in Zepa. Bosnian Serbs refuse to permit food, medicines, and other supplies into the town. To this date, they are not allowing any UN humanitarian aid convoys into Zepa. (Department of State) 5 Jan 93: A social worker in a Nedzarici nursing home, located in a Serb- held section of Sarajevo, said that 10 of his patients had died in the past 36 hours, and that 26 residents of the home had died in the past 2 weeks due to lack of heating. He also said that snipers or direct hits on the building had caused the death of 20 to 25 residents since April 1992. According to a UNHCR official, the nursing home was without water, electricity, or heating. Most utility services in Sarajevo (electricity, natural gas, and water) are under Serbian control. (The Washington Post/API/Department of State) Dec: Serbian "police" in UNPA Sector East during the first 2 weeks of December expelled 65 non-Serbs from Baranja, mostly from Darda, Bilje, and Knezevi Vinogradi. Another 24 families were under heavy Serbian "police" pressure to leave Knezevi Vinogradi. (Department of State) 5 Dec: A Muslim man, who reported that only 3,000 Muslims remained in Sanski Most where 15,000 had lived, described recent attacks by armed Serbs: They robbed us. They took the cars, the bicycles. The police now drive my personal car. They said if we did not give the cars, they would take us to the camps. The man said that Serb militia forces continued to shell villages surrounding Sanski Most every night. (The Washington Post) Dec: Members of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force for Yugoslavia] civil police escorted to Zadar the last six Croats from Zemunik Gornji, four elderly women and two older men. They said they had been living in a virtual prison and fled to save their lives. All Croatian homes in the area have been destroyed, except for two. (Department of State) 25 May: A 33-year-old Muslim from Prijedor watched Serbian forces bringing in heavy tanks and cannons to Kozarac on May 25. Many villagers escaped to a nearby house in the woods, where they hid in a basement shelter. At noon, those in hiding organized the women, children, and wounded in groups of 30, bearing white flags, to surrender to the Serbs. The Serbian army fired on some of the groups attempting to surrender. The witness watched soldiers loot and burn houses, cars, and whatever else they found. He saw Serbian tanks fire on private homes. The men eventually were separated from the women and children and taken to Trnopolje. (Department of State) (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 7, February 15, 1993

Title:

New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution In the Former Yugoslavia

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Opening statement at a news conference, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 10 19932/10/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations [TEXT] Today I am announcing a series of new steps that President Clinton has decided to take with regard to the former Yugoslavia. The President believes it is time for the United States to become actively and directly engaged in the multilateral effort to reach a just and workable resolution to this dangerous conflict. We inherit, at this early point in our Administration, a tragic and dangerous situation. Over the past 2 years, the states of the former Yugoslavia have descended into a dark period of terror and bloodshed. During that period, the West missed repeated opportunities to engage early and effectively in ways that might have prevented the conflict from deepening. As President Clinton stressed during the campaign, an early and forceful signal might well have deterred much of the aggression, bloodshed, and "ethnic cleansing.'' Because those actions were not taken, we now face a much more intractable situation with vastly more difficult options. Yet, now we must address the circumstances as we find them, and we are resolved to do so. Those circumstances have deep roots. The death of [Yugoslav] President Tito and the end of communist domination of the former Yugoslavia raised the lid on the cauldron of ancient ethnic hatreds. This is a land where at least three religions and a half-dozen ethnic groups have vied across the centuries. It was the birthplace of World War I. It has long been a cradle of European conflict, [and] it remains so today. Over the past year, [US Special Envoy] Cyrus Vance and [European Community Special Envoy] Lord David Owen have tirelessly pursued a negotiated settlement. While they have made progress, their proposed settlement has not been accepted by the parties to the dispute, and the killing continues. This conflict may be far from our shores, but it is not distant to our concerns. We cannot afford to ignore it. Let me explain why. We cannot ignore the human toll. Serbian "ethnic cleansing" has been pursued through mass murders, systematic beatings and rapes of Muslims and others, prolonged shelling of innocents in Sarajevo and elsewhere, forced displacement of entire villages, inhumane treatment of prisoners in detention camps, and the blockading of relief to sick and starving civilians. Atrocities have been committed by other parties as well. Our conscience revolts at the idea of passively accepting such brutality. Beyond these humanitarian interests, we have direct strategic concerns as well. The continuing destruction of a new UN member state challenges the principle that internationally recognized borders should not be altered by force. In addition, this conflict itself has no natural borders. It threatens to spill over into new regions, such as Kosovo and Macedonia. It could then become a greater Balkan war, like those that preceded World War I. Broader hostilities could touch additional nations, such as Greece, Albania, and Turkey. The river of fleeing refugees, which has already reached the hundreds of thousands, would swell. The political and economic vigor of Europe, already tested by the integration of former communist states, would be further strained. There is a broader imperative here. The world's response to the violence in the former Yugoslavia is an early and crucial test of how it will address the concerns of ethnic and religious minorities in the post-Cold War world. That question reaches throughout Eastern Europe. It reaches to the states of the former Soviet Union, where the fall of communism has left some 25 million ethnic Russians living as minorities in other republics, and it reaches to other continents as well. The events in the former Yugoslavia raise the question of whether a state may address the rights of its minorities by eradicating those minorities to achieve "ethnic purity." Bold tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see whether "ethnic cleansing" is a policy [that] the world will tolerate. If we hope to promote the spread of freedom or if we hope to encourage the emergence of peaceful multi-ethnic democracies, our answer must be a resounding no. This is why President Clinton has decided to take the following six steps. First, the President has decided [that] the United States will engage actively and directly in the Vance-Owen negotiations, bringing the weight of American diplomacy to bear. We know [that] these negotiations will not be easy; we know the options have narrowed because of past inaction. We do not expect miracles, but we believe [that] we can make a difference. We strongly support the efforts of the United Nations and the European Community, through the Vance-Owen negotiations, to arrive at any agreement that would bring peace to Bosnia. Now, in order to ensure the most effective possible communication between us, President Clinton has, today, named one of our top diplomats to be our government's envoy to those talks, Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew. Mr. Bartholomew has served as our ambassador to Lebanon and Spain and is currently the ambassador to NATO. He is no stranger to crises; he is the right person for this task. Through Ambassador Bartholomew's efforts, working with [former US] Secretary [of State] Vance and Lord Owen, and through other means, the United States will help explore creative solutions to the conflict that we hope all parties can accept. Second, the President is communicating to the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croatians that the only way to end this conflict is through negotiation. No settlement can be imposed on the parties, both on grounds of principle and on grounds that an imposed settlement would be far more difficult to sustain than one the parties have voluntarily embraced. At the same time, we believe that each party must be prepared to accept a resolution that falls short of its goals. Therefore, we are taking steps to urge the parties not to hold back from earnest negotiation. The responsibility for crafting a workable solution is fundamentally on the parties involved, but we will lend our earnest support. Third, the President will take actions to tighten the enforcement of economic sanctions, increase political pressure on Serbia, and deter Serbia from widening the war. We have informed the Serbians that we plan to raise the economic and political price for aggression. We will work with our allies, the Russians, and others to achieve this result. We remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. In addition, we will work to strengthen the international presence in Macedonia. Fourth, the President is taking steps to reduce the suffering and bloodshed as these negotiations proceed. He is calling on all parties to stop the shelling and other violence. He has communicated to all concerned that the no-fly zone over Bosnia should be enforced under a UN resolution. He has urged that humanitarian aid be allowed to flow to those in need, and we are considering further actions to promote greater delivery of aid. Moreover, we are putting together a US Government team to assess further humanitarian needs on an urgent basis. The President is seeking the urgent creation of a war crimes tribunal at the United Nations to bring justice and deter further atrocities. Fifth, the President has taken steps to make clear to all concerned that the United States is prepared to do its share to help implement and enforce an agreement that is acceptable to all parties. If there is a viable agreement containing enforcement provisions, the United States would be prepared to join with the United Nations, NATO, and others in implementing and enforcing it, including possible US military participation. This is a shared problem and must be a shared burden. Sixth and finally, the President has consulted widely with our friends and allies on these actions. He and I have communicated to dozens of world leaders regarding our intentions. In particular, earlier today the President spoke with [Russian] President Yeltsin by phone to convey his personal request that both our nations work closely and cooperatively in this search for a peaceful resolution. He is also sending Ambassador Bartholomew to Moscow to discuss our approach before Ambassador Bartholomew returns to New York for the negotiations. Let me make clear what we hope to achieve through these steps. We will attempt to help build on the Vance-Owen negotiations in a way that can move toward a just, workable, and durable solution. We will seek to preserve the survivability of Bosnia as a state. We hope that our direct involvement in the negotiations, as well as the other steps I have announced, will encourage the parties to move quickly to negotiate and embrace a solution that is mutually acceptable and that, therefore, has a real chance to work. In particular, we expect that our willingness to participate in the enforcement of such an agreement will help allay concerns [that] the Bosnian Government and others have expressed about an agreement's workability. Let me also make clear what we do not intend by these steps. We do not intend to impose a solution on the parties. We believe the quickest, best, and most sustainable way to stop the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia is to help create an environment in which all parties see it in their own self- interest to negotiate a political settlement. The United States is not the world's policeman. We cannot interpose our forces to stop every armed conflict in the world. Yet, we are the United States of America. We have singular powers and influence. We are committed to Europe's stability. Our values and interests give us reason to help create an international standard for the fair treatment of minorities. Therefore, we have reasons to participate actively in this effort. This is an important moment for our nation's post-Cold War role in Europe and the world. It tests our ability to adopt new approaches to foreign policy in a world that has changed fundamentally. It tests our commitment to the nurturing of democracy and the support of environments in which democracy can take root and grow. It tests our willingness and that of our allies to help our institutions of collective security, such as NATO, evolve in ways that meet the demands of this new age. It tests what wisdom we have gathered from this bloody century and measures our resolve to take early, concerted action against systematic ethnic persecution. In the wake of the devastating struggles of the 20th century, no great power today can take lightly the risks of involvement in a Balkan conflict. Yet no great power can dismiss the likely consequences of letting a Balkan conflict rage. Acting now, in close cooperation with our friends and allies, offers the best chance to contain these flames of conflict before they become an underground fire that could later erupt and become all-consuming. By acting now, we can demonstrate that not every crisis need become a choice between inaction and unilateral American intervention. In the face of great suffering and the imperative of our own interest, we cannot afford to miss any further opportunities to help pursue a resolution of this conflict. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 7, February 15, 1993 Title:

Progress on Resolving Israeli Deportation Issue

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Excerpts from opening statement at a news conference at the US Mission to the United Nations, New York City Date: Feb, 1 19932/1/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] I have come here on my first trip outside Washington as Secretary of State, taking an early opportunity to confer personally with the Secretary General of the United Nations [Boutros Boutros-Ghali]. I came here at this early juncture to underscore my support for the role of the United Nations at this critical time, and at this time as we enter the post-Cold War era. We're very grateful to the Secretary General for his determined efforts to guide the United Nations into this new period. He's really an extraordinary Secretary General, and I look forward to working with him during my tenure. I'm also pleased to be here on the occasion of Ambassador Madeleine Albright's first day here at the United Nations. She's an outstanding American who's a long-time friend of mine and a close adviser to President Clinton. His regard for her is such that he has named her to be a member of his Cabinet and has asked that she come to Washington for all of the critical meetings on the United Nations matters which, I must say, include virtually all matters these days. She'll be a superb UN Ambassador, and I look forward to working closely with her during her tenure. We've had a very constructive day here at the United Nations. I want to express my admiration for the Secretary General's efforts to come to grips with the pressures placed on the United Nations and its expanding role in the world. As the largest contributor to the United Nations, the United States will play an aggressive and strong role in connection with UN affairs. Now, I do have a specific announcement that I'd like to make with respect to the deportation issue, a matter that I discussed at some length with the Secretary General this afternoon. President Clinton and I are pleased to announce that based upon intensive efforts and consultations over the last several days, there has been a breakthrough in our efforts with respect to the deportation issue. Under the terms of the process that Israel has announced today, Israel will permit a significant number of the deportees to return either to Israel or to the Occupied Territories within the next several days. Israel also will reduce the sentences of all other deportees, and, as a matter of arithmetic, this means that all the deportees will be able to return before the end of this calendar year. Israel also will maintain an appeals and review process for the deportees, which means that some of them may be returned even before the end of the calendar year. And, finally--and this is important to us--the process that Israel is announcing assures the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the deportees where they are at the present time. The United States believes that this process, which is being announced by Israel today, is consistent with UN Resolution 799 on the deportees. As a consequence of the steps that Israel will take, we believe that further action by the Security Council is unnecessary and could even undercut the process, which is already underway. The United States will consult further with the Secretary General about this matter, but, I repeat, we believe that further steps here in the Security Council are unnecessary, and that taking of further steps might undercut the process which is underway and which we think is very important. With the steps announced today, the United States believes it's time to look ahead and to concentrate our efforts on invigorating and restarting the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. We reiterate our commitment to this negotiating process, and we hope to help bring the negotiations to fruition. The United States and Russia as co-sponsors will be conferring on these matters shortly in an attempt to help bring the parties back to the table. The peace negotiations offer the only real opportunity to address the underlying problems that give rise to the tension, violence, and confrontations among the Arabs, Israelis, and the Palestinians. . . . I want to emphasize . . . that we believe that the peace negotiations are the only practical avenue by which we can attain the kind of peace and tranquility which has been so long denied to the people of this region. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 7, February 15, 1993 Title:

US-Canadian Relations

Clinton Mulroney Source: President Clinton, Prime Minister Mulroney Description: Excerpts from a news conference, The White House, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 5 19932/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics [TEXT]
President Clinton:
...I'm delighted that my first meeting as President with a foreign leader is with the Prime Minister of Canada, Brian Mulroney. On the day after I was elected, I spoke of the essential continuity of our country's foreign policy. Our steadfast relationship with Canada is an indispensable element of that continuity. Prime Minister Mulroney and the people of Canada should know that the United States is still their friend and their partner. It is worth noting that the United States and Canada share the world's longest undefended border and that we haven't had a battle between us since the War of 1812. Now, having said that, Mr. Prime Minister, I will tell you that I look forward to winning back the World Series. Canada has long stood as our partner in promoting democracy and human rights around the world. Today, Canada is demonstrating her international leadership for peace and freedom through her commitment in peace-keeping efforts around the world--in Somalia, in Bosnia, and elsewhere. Canada is our largest trading partner. Both our nations benefit enormously from the immense river of goods and services flowing across our border, with an increase of $30 billion just since the free trade agreement went into effect. It is remarkable how relatively few disputes have attended the vigorous trading between us. Yet, it is inevitable that there will be some disagreements even among close partners. And we agreed today to maintain high-level attention to that trading relationship to ensure that the problems are addressed before they become crises. The Prime Minister and I discussed the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]. I assured him that my Administration intends to move forward with NAFTA while establishing a process to provide adequate protection to workers, to farmers, and to the environment. Canada was our partner in working with Mexico to negotiate NAFTA, and Canada will be our partner as we move forward to put it and its related agreements into effect. We've made a good start here today in setting the stage for working together. We also discussed the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] agreement, and I reassured the Prime Minister that the United States will do what it can to secure an agreement at GATT that all the world can be proud of and can be a prosperous part of. We reviewed a broad range of global issues, including the developments in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the crisis in the Balkans, the situation in Somalia and [in] Haiti. We also discussed our participation in the Group of Seven [leading industrial nations--G-7] and what the United States and Canada might hope to achieve this year, and especially this summer when the G-7 [meets] in Tokyo, to help move the global economy out of recession and into a strong recovery. This was a very good beginning. I want to thank Prime Minister Mulroney for coming down from Canada and tell him that he'll always be welcome here. And I look forward to visiting you on your home turf soon.
Prime Minister Mulroney:
Thank you, Mr. President. I'll simply say that, as the President indicated, we had a very full review of quite a large number of items in the few hours we spent together and a very productive working lunch. I thought it was a very good meeting and a very good beginning of the relationship of Canada with the new Administration. The President has indicated [that] the complex issues that we've touched on, tried to deal with, principally, of course--and I think you'll understand--the relationship between Canada and the United States itself. The relationship is by far the most important one [that] the United States has in the world. This is the biggest trading relationship ever between two nations. And at the end of the year, the important thing is it tends to be in rough balance, which indicates that you can have free trade and prosper. And so we're very concerned about the GATT, and we're very concerned about the trading currents generally and very reassured by the President's strong commitments and strong positions in respect of the manner in which you bring back and re-energize prosperity around the world. So, we covered our bilateral arrangements, and we covered a lot of hot spots around the world. . . .
President Clinton:
Let me say that I am committed to restoring democracy to Haiti. I am doing my best to work through the United Nations and the Organization of American States with [UN special envoy] Mr. [Dante] Caputo. I am, frankly, disappointed that the Prime Minister in Haiti has apparently backed off a little bit of his original willingness to let us send in some third- party observers, not just to protect the petitions for refugee status but also to try to stabilize conditions leading toward a restoration of democracy there. And we're going to talk to Mr. Caputo [to] see where he thinks things are and then reassess our position. But I share the Prime Minister's determination. The United States and Canada should be and are one in our commitment to restoring democracy to Haiti. And we will continue to push ahead either on the course we're now on or, if that fails, on a more vigorous course toward that end. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 7, February 15, 1993 Title:

Restoring Democracy in Haiti

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Statement by Secretary Christopher released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 9 19932/9/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, OAS, United Nations [TEXT] Today, UN and Organization of American States (OAS) Special Envoy Dante Caputo announced agreement between all parties on an international civilian observer mission for Haiti. The Clinton Administration is encouraged by this progress. As the UN statement made clear, this is the first step in what must be a continuing process to reach a comprehensive political solution to the crisis in Haiti. Still, it is a ray of hope in a country that has known little hope for many months. I applaud the efforts of the UN and OAS Special Envoy, Mr. Caputo, and also give credit to all of the Haitian parties that made this agreement possible. It is now crucial that the civilian mission deploy quickly and begin to carry out its important mandate throughout Haiti. We must also move forward immediately to begin negotiations on resolving the political crisis, provide assistance to strengthen and reform Haitian institutions, rebuild Haiti's economy, and restore Haiti's democracy. The United States will contribute actively and generously to fulfill these important goals. We believe Haiti must rejoin this hemisphere's democratic community; if good will continues on all sides, deployment of the civilian mission can be the first step in reaching that vital goal.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 7, February 15, 1993 Title:

Restoring Democracy in Haiti

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Excerpts from remarks before a meeting with Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 5 19932/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, United Nations [TEXT] As you know, 2 years ago this week, President Aristide was inaugurated as the first democratically elected President of Haiti, and that's an important anniversary. Tragically, not long after he was elected, he was overthrown by a coup, and, in the period since then, the people of Haiti have been through great anguish and suffering. As a result, I thought it was appropriate at the present time, on this anniversary, to ask to see [President Aristide] to assure him that the Clinton Administration is strongly committed to work through the United Nations and the OAS [Organization of American States] to restore democracy in Haiti and to see that he returns to finish out his mandate and to have a restoration of democracy in Haiti. The time in Haiti has been a very difficult one. It's frustrating and a very tough situation. But those who hold illegal power there should know that they're swimming against the tide of history and that they will not prevail. And so, on this anniversary, we are very pleased to welcome President Aristide here to the State Department and to assure him of our strong support for the restoration of democracy in Haiti and for his return when that is possible. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 7, February 15, 1993 Title:

Rwandan Violence

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Acting Assistant Secretary and Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 5 19932/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Rwanda Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] The US Government deplores the outbreak of violence in Rwanda and calls upon the Government of Rwanda, leaders of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and Rwandan political leaders to renew their public and private commitment to dialogue. We especially deplore the Rwandan Patriotic Front attacks of February 8 and 9 in violation of the negotiated cease-fire of August 1, 1992. These attacks have caused many of the 350,000 persons displaced by the conflict of the last 2 years to again flee and will necessitate even greater humanitarian efforts in the immediate future. As our ambassador and those of other donor nations have stated to the President and the Prime Minister and noted publicly in Kigali, we condemn the ethnic and political violence, motivated by partisan political activists, that has left more than 300 dead and some 4,500 homeless. We take note of the decision of the coalition government to discipline officials in positions of responsibility. We call upon the Rwandan Patriotic Front to respect the terms of the cease- fire and urge both the front and the Government of Rwanda to return to the negotiations at Arusha [Tanzania]. Negotiation and dialogue provide the only real prospect for a durable solution to the long-standing pattern of violence that has plagued the country in recent decades. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 7, February 15, 1993 Title:

1992 Human Rights Report

Diaz Dennis Source: Patricia Diaz Dennis, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Description: Introduction, 1992 report, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 19 19931/19/93 Category: Reports Region: Whole World Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] The Report to Congress on Human Rights Practices for 1992, released by the US Department of State, is available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office (#052-070-06851-5). Electronic distribution of the full report is now available through GPO's Federal Bulletin Board (see inside back cover for more details.) Looking back over the past year, the American-led landing of multinational armed forces in Somalia on December 8, 1992, marked a defining moment in the role that human rights and humanitarian concerns play in world affairs. Created after the UN Security Council accepted an American offer of military assistance, these forces were able to break the stranglehold of local Somali warlords and bandits on the delivery of food, medicine, and other humanitarian assistance. Although less dramatic, these reports represent a no less important example of this country's continuing and long-standing commitment to human rights in the world. This is the 17th year this Department has submitted these reports to Congress. The reports cover countries that receive aid from the United States and countries that are members of the United Nations, as required by law. As in recent years, this volume also includes reports on countries which are neither aid recipients nor UN members. These country reports show that, despite the advancement of human rights policy evidenced by the world's response to Somalia, the balance sheet of human rights practices had many negative entries in 1992. The hope for more widespread respect for human rights--buttressed in previous years by the demise of the Soviet Union and by democratic transformations elsewhere in the world--was undercut by horrific abuses of the most fundamental rights. In continued ethnic and religious conflicts in Europe, Africa, and Asia, hundreds of thousands of people, denied humanitarian relief by inhuman governments and warlords, suffered and died. On a scale and scope not seen for half a century, barbarous leaders consciously used atrocities of the most vile nature, including wholesale rape of women in Bosnia, to drive ethnic populations from their homes. During the past year, false prophets of nationalism and "ethnic cleansing" and religious extremists openly flouted the values enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although discredited as an ideology, fidelity to Leninism remained the pretext for several regimes in Asia and Castro's Cuba to try to justify continued denial of their citizens' most basic political and civil rights. Without any serious philosophical pretext, authoritarian regimes in far too many other countries continued to deny the inter-nationally recognized human rights of their peoples. In several of the countries of the former Soviet Union, the process of democratic transformation stalled, in part due to the residual influence of old regime elites. But the multinational humanitarian efforts in Somalia were not the only positive entries on the human rights ledger for the year. While these reports document the holdouts, footdraggers and backsliders, the process of democratic transformation continued to make significant headway, particularly in Africa. Another example of progress occurred in El Salvador, with the ongoing implementation of last year's New Year's Eve peace accords. Ground-breaking, albeit sometimes imperfect, elections occurred in several countries, such as Kenya, Kuwait, and Cameroon. Democracy was restored in Thailand, and the process of reconciliation offered a glimmer of hope in war-torn Mozambique. Although democratic norms did not guarantee consistent respect for human rights, the human rights observance trend line remained, on balance, positive. The international community was more responsive to widespread violations of human rights, adopting unprecedented means to alleviate them in several instances in addition to Somalia. The UN Human Rights Commission is becoming more active in dealing with human rights crises. Its rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia periodically reported to the Secretary General, laying the groundwork for real time responses to human rights abuses. For the first time, at US initiative, the Commission met in extraordinary session, again allowing it to confront a humanitarian crisis within a time frame for practical responses. The Security Council mandated extraordinary responses, not only in Somalia, but to crises in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq, as well. The General Assembly passed a resolution that other African governments widely supported expressing concern about the serious human rights situation in Sudan. The donor community increasingly linked financial aid to human rights performance. The donor countries more effectively coordinated their responses to major problems as in Malawi. Legislation requiring the United States to oppose loans to the most serious human rights abusers was amended to cover IMF [International Monetary Fund] loans. This action strengthened an important tool we use to encourage greater respect for human rights abroad. Human rights advocates here and abroad warmly welcomed the Senate's approval of the Administration-backed International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. So now we look forward to next year--the United States will continue to nurture respect for human rights through strengthening fledgling democracies, supporting the growth of the rule of law and promoting individual liberties. We will have an historic opportunity to further these three fundamental cornerstones of civil and political rights when the World Conference on Human Rights convenes in June 1993. We can all hope [that] next year's country reports, when reviewing 1993, will mark it a milestone year and that the human rights ledger will have more positive than negative entries. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 7, February 15, 1993 Title:

Fact Sheet: European Community

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 15 19932/15/93 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe Country: France, Germany, Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic Subject: EC [TEXT]
Institutions
Since July 1967, the three communities have functioned with common institutions. The main EC institutions are: the Council of Ministers, which has final decision-making authority; the European Commission, which formulates policies and legislation and implements decisions of the Council; the European Parliament, which advises the EC on policy development and proposals emanating from the Commission; and the European Court of Justice, which interprets the EC treaties and legislation. Other EC institutions are the Court of Auditors, which oversees financial management of the Community, and the Economic and Social Committee, an advisory body. Member states have agreed to relinquish a degree of national sovereignty to EC institutions and to cooperate in the joint administration of these powers.
The European Commission.
The Commission, headquartered in Brussels, is made up of 17 commissioners appointed by common agreement of the 12 governments. Each country is represented. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy each supply two commissioners. According to the treaties, members of the Commission act independently of their governments and of the Council and represent the interests of the Community as a whole. Each member has responsibility for one or more policy areas. The Commission's major responsibility is to oversee the implementation of the EC treaties and applications of decisions by Community institutions. The Commission has investigative authority and can take legal action against persons, companies, or member states that violate Community rules. The Commission initiates EC policy by making proposals to the Council of Ministers and steers its proposals through the Council. These may include measures beyond the scope of trade and commerce, such as education, public health, consumer protection, the environment, research and technology, and aid to developing countries. The collection and disbursement of EC funds is a third important Commission responsibility. The 1987 Single European Act gave the Commission authority to implement Council decisions; for example, the commissioners may negotiate trade agreements with non-member states on behalf of the Community. The Com- mission's independence and its "right of initiation" of policy account for much of its supranational authority. To balance that independence, the Commission is subject to censure by the Parliament, which can force the entire Commission to resign as a body by a two-thirds majority vote. (This action never has been taken.) The President of the Commission is appointed to a renewable 2-year term by the Council of Ministers. The Com-mission's administrative staff of 16,700 is divided into 23 Directorates-General. In 1995, the terms of the commissioners will be expanded to 5 years to correspond to the terms of members of the European Parliament.
Council of Ministers.
The Council of Ministers is the primary decision- making body of the Community. It is composed of ministers representing national governments. Each member state serves as Council President for 6 months in rotation. The presidency country presides at all meetings of the member states and serves as spokesman in dealing with countries on inter- governmental matters, including efforts to coordinate the foreign policies of the member states. A member state's foreign minister is regarded as its principal representative in the Council. Foreign ministers deal with the most important and wide-reaching topics, while more specific decisions are made by the ministers of agriculture, finance, industry, energy, social affairs, and others, depending on the issue to be discussed. EC members have the following votes in the Council: Germany (10), France (10), Italy (10), United Kingdom (10), Spain (8), Belgium (5), Greece (5), Netherlands (5), Portugal (5), Denmark (3), Ireland (3), and Luxembourg (2). The 1987 Single European Act created a less restrictive decision-making process by allowing most voting in the Council by qualified majority (54 out of a total of 76 votes), rather than unanimity especially in areas relating to the internal market. Exceptions include certain health and safety and taxation proposals. The various ministerial groups meet monthly. A Committee of Permanent Representatives, consisting of member country ambassadors to the Community in Brussels, and the Council Secretariat assist the Council.
European Council.
The Single European Act formally established the European Council, which had met on a regular basis since 1975. The European Council includes the Heads of State and Government and the President of the Commission. It meets at the end of each member's council presidency to discuss general problems regarding the Community, the progress of political cooperation, and foreign policy issues.
European Parliament.
The European Parliament is the only EC institution that directly represents European citizens. It serves as a public forum to debate issues of importance to the Community. The Commission must consult the Parliament before proposals are forwarded to the Council of Ministers for decision. The Parliament has significant power over budgetary matters and can amend or reject the budget as well as approve its adoption. Since 1987, it also has had the right to amend or reject certain legislation approved by the Council, which can overrule the Parliament only by a unanimous vote. Although it cannot veto individual ministers, the Parliament has the power to pass a vote of no-confidence in the Commission by a "motion of censure," which would require the entire Commission to resign. The Parliament also may approve or disapprove applications of non- member countries to join the Community as well as new association agreements. The European Parliament has been elected by universal suffrage since 1979. Previously, deputies had been nominated by national legislatures. The 518 deputies of the Parliament are elected to 5-year terms and are grouped by political affiliation, rather than by nationality. They include Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives, Communists, and Greens. Many of the Parliament's specialized committees have emphasized development of truly European policies in areas such as the internal market, energy, industrial restructuring, and regional development funding. Direct elections ensure full public representation in the Community, and important tasks for the deputies include promoting the Community's work within their constituencies and increasing public support for an integrated Europe. The Parliament meets monthly in week-long plenary sessions in Strasbourg. The Secretariat staff of 3,500 is located in Luxembourg; most committee and political group meetings are held in Brussels.
Court of Justice.
The Court is the final authority for the interpretation of EC laws as embodied in its treaties, regulations, and directives. Complaints about member-state treaty violations may be lodged by other member states or by the Commission. Member governments, EC institutions, and individuals have the right to contest Commission and Council actions in the Court. The Court resolves conflicts between Community and national laws. EC judgments in the area of EC law overrule those of national courts. The Court's decisions are binding on all parties and are not subject to appeal. Court decisions generally have tended to strengthen EC institutions and promote integrated EC policies. Member governments appoint 13 justices, one from each member state plus a president of the Court for renewable 6-year terms. The judges are assisted by six advocates-general. Court decisions are reached by a simple majority. The Court meets in Luxembourg. The Single European Act introduced a new Court of First Instance, which essentially serves as a lower court. It has jurisdiction in matters covered by the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), in the field of competition law, and in actions brought by EC officials.
Economic and Social Committee.
This advisory body of 189 members represents various economic and social sectors, including labor, employers, and other interest groups such as consumers, agriculture, and professional associations. The Committee enables a broad spectrum of groups to be represented in EC decision-making. Through a mandatory consultation process, the Committee submits its opinions on EC policies and legislative proposals to both the Council of Ministers and the Commission.
Budget
Since 1975, the Community has been fully funded from its own resources. These are derived from customs duties levied under the Common Customs Tariff, levies on agricultural imports from non-member states, and a 1.4% value-added tax collected on the goods and services consumed in member countries. Faced with the additional costs associated with the implementation of the 1992 single market program, in 1988, the Council approved the introduction of a fourth source of revenue, based on a percentage of member countries' gross domestic product. Budget expenditures are principally for agricultural support, regional and social measures, development assistance to Third World countries and to Central and Eastern Europe, and administrative costs. The Commission prepares the preliminary draft of each year's EC budget. The Council discusses the preliminary report and then submits a draft budget to the Parliament, which can amend or reject the budget and is responsible for its final adoption. The approved EC budget for 1992 is $86 billion. The largest budget item, accounting for about two-thirds of the total, is agricultural expenditures under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Other major budget items are energy and industrial programs, research, and development assistance to poorer regions of the Community, Central and Eastern Europe, and Third World nations.
Path to European Integration
Peaceful union of European countries had been a dream for centuries, but not until the period following World War II did the process of economic and political integration begin. After the economic chaos of the war, governments sought ways to rebuild their economies and avoid future conflict. The Brussels Pact of 1948 created the first post-war European intergovernmental organization. The United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg agreed to establish a common defense system and to consult on economic and cultural matters. Since governments remained reluctant to cede authority to a supranational body, the organization was based on cooperation rather than on formal integration. The military aspects of the pact were soon overshadowed by the creation in 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an expanded military alliance including the United States and Canada. In the political sphere, the Council of Europe--organized the same year by the five members of the Brussels Pact with Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Sweden--had as its goal greater European unity and the protection of human rights. However, all decisions were made by unanimous agreement, which weakened the Council. In May 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed that French and German coal and steel production be managed by a common authority within an institution open to other European countries. Ratified by the Governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg (the Six), the European Coal and Steel Community began functioning in 1952. It was the first international organization with an integrated federal governing body, the ECSC High Authority. Members of the High Authority were independent of national governments, and decisions were binding on member states. A long-term objective of both Schuman and ECSC President Jean Monnet was to establish a structure for the eventual political unification of Europe through economic integration. With Europe's immediate defense problem met by NATO, efforts were concentrated on economic questions. Under the direction of Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak, the foreign ministers of the Six met to discuss proposals for an integrated economic system and a common structure for the development of nuclear energy. In 1957, the Six agreed to establish the European Economic Community (the EEC or Common Market) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The two treaties formally establishing the new communities to work with the ECSC were signed by the Six in Rome on March 25, 1957. The EEC and EURATOM began operating on January 1, 1958. The wide-reaching EEC was given less supra-national authority than the ECSC, although economic union was viewed as a prerequisite for eventual political integration. In 1973, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland were admitted, creating the EC Nine. The Government of Norway also had agreed to accession, but membership was rejected in a referendum. Greece joined the Community in 1981, and Spain and Portugal became members in 1986, creating the EC Twelve. In 1990, the five states of the former German Democratic Republic entered the Community as part of a united Germany. The primary aim of the Paris and Rome treaties establishing the European Communities was to remove the economic barriers that divided the member countries as the first steps toward political unity. To accomplish this, the treaties called for members to establish a common market, a common customs tariff, and common economic, agricultural, transport, and nuclear policies. The institutions and policies established by the treaties provided a framework within which the 12 EC members agreed to integrate their economies and eventually consider forming a political union.
Customs Union.
The authors of the EC treaties recognized that the economic keystone of unity would be a customs union permitting the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people within member states. In 1958, the Community began the difficult process of eliminating all trade barriers among its members. Ten years later, all member-to-member duties were abolished, and a common external tariff of the Six was established. By 1977, this union was extended to include the new EC members--the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland. The common external tariff is key to the customs union. Each EC member charges the same duty on a given import from a non-member country. Agricultural imports are subject to the Common Agricultural Policy, which places variable levies on agricultural imports to raise their prices to those of EC-produced commodities. Although tariffs have been eliminated within the Community, several kinds of non-tariff barriers still exist. Some member states maintain protectionist measures that the Community has not yet been able to eliminate entirely, such as limiting public works contracts and adopting unilateral technical or safety standards that restrict trade. Numerous health and safety barriers to agricultural trade still exist. Individual firms and governments can register trade restriction complaints with the Commission, which attempts to eliminate the barriers through binding judicial action. In 1991, exports among Community members were $859 billion, while external exports were $522 billion, accounting for 17.1% of world commerce. This makes the EC the world's largest trading unit. EC imports from third countries in 1991 were $812 billion, mostly raw materials and unprocessed goods. Most EC exports are processed goods such as machinery and vehicles. As provided for in Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, all member states adhere to a common EC commercial policy. It provides for major decisions on trade policy to be taken by the Council of Ministers by majority vote and assigns to the Commission considerable executive and negotiating authority. The Community's trade policy is based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to which all community members are contracting parties. Single European Act and EC '92. The establishment of a customs union among the Six resulted in an expansion of trade which grew from $7 billion in 1958 to $60 billion in 1972. The enlargement of the Community to include Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973 marked the beginning of a period of limited growth, inflation, and high unemployment. By the mid-1980s, the Community recognized that, despite progress in many areas, its aim of creating a true common market (the dismantling of all barriers within the Community restricting the free movement of people and trade) had not been realized. In March 1985, Jacques Delors, President of the EC Commission, outlined to the European Parliament the "single market" program, designed to chart a course for completion of an integrated market by the end of 1992. A Commission White Paper in June 1985 listed legislative measures needed to eliminate all physical, technical, and fiscal barriers to the completion of a unified economic area with free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital. By October 31, 1992, the Commission had tabled 282 proposals. Of these, 216 have been approved by the European Council and the European Parliament. However, only 68 have been implemented in all 12 EC member states. On July 1, 1987, after ratification by member governments, the Single European Act (SEA) came into force. The act contained revisions in the treaties necessary to assure completion of the 1992 program. It extended the principle of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers (thus streamlining the decision-making process). It also gave the Community new responsibilities (in the areas of social policy, promotion of research and technological development, and improvement of the environment) and increased support for the least developed member states. Budgetary measures adopted in February 1988, which placed limits on the growth of agricultural spending and doubled the allocation for structural funds (resources targeted for regions that are underdeveloped or affected by industrial decline or unemployment), signaled the commitment of member states to implement these provisions. In addition to defining an action program for achieving the single market, the SEA endorsed the objective of economic and monetary union, including a single currency. Institutional decisions in this area would continue to be subject to unanimity in the Council and ratification by member states. The SEA also formalized procedures for cooperation in foreign policy among member states and renewed support for the objective of European political union.
European Monetary System.
In 1970, the Werner Report (named after the Luxembourg Prime Minister) proposed a plan for economic and monetary union within the Community. As a first step in harmonizing policy, the currency "snake" (a set of upper and lower limits of exchange rates) was established in 1972. Central banks of participating countries pledged to intervene in the currency market to keep the value of their currencies within fixed limits. In 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) replaced the snake in an effort to reduce exchange rate fluctuations. The EMS provides for frequent discussions among central bankers and for intervention in foreign exchange markets to maintain the value of each currency within a narrow range (generally 2.25%) of the European Currency Unit (ecu). All Community members belong to the EMS, though not all participate in the system's exchange rate mechanism. In addition to currency swap arrangements for defense of currency parities, the EMS includes a reserve fund. The EMS created the ecu in 1979. It is the Community's budget and accounting unit, created by member states depositing 20% of their gold and US dollar reserves with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund. It is a combination of differing proportions of 12 member currencies, reflecting the size of their economies.
Economic and Monetary Union.
The concept of economic and monetary union, characterized by irrevocably fixed exchange rates, a single currency, a single monetary authority, and a common monetary and exchange rate policy, was a natural corollary to the completion of the internal market. At the December 1991 summit in Maastricht, Netherlands, EC heads of government reached agreement on a draft treaty on European economic and monetary union (EMU). The EMU treaty provides a timetable for moving to full economic and monetary union. Stage 1 (1990-93). Involves strengthening economic coordination, bringing all EC members' currencies into the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, and lifting restrictions on internal EC capital flows. Stage 2 (1994-96). A transitional period, will involve increased economic convergence (in terms of inflation, fiscal policy, interest rates, and exchange rate stability) and creation of a transitional European monetary authority. Stage 3. In 1997, if a majority of EC members are politically willing and economically prepared for full EMU, exchange rates will be irrevocably fixed, monetary powers will be transferred from national central banks to a European central bank, and a single currency will be created. (If the move to Stage 3 does not occur in 1997, it will start definitely by January 1, 1999, for those countries which have met the treaty's economic convergence criteria.) EMU will not go into effect until the Maastricht Treaty package is ratified by all 12 member states. As of January 1993, the ratification process was still underway.
Political Cooperation
The original EC treaties give the Community wide economic powers but little political authority. As the Community has begun to consolidate economic and monetary union, it also has re-examined its political responsibilities. The Single European Act underlined the commitment of Community members to achieving "European Union." At a landmark summit held in Maastricht, Netherlands, in December 1991, the heads of state and government agreed to further amendments in the EC treaties to move the Community toward greater political union, including more unified foreign and defense policies. The Maastricht treaty increased the scope of the Commission's authority to include the areas of environment, consumer and health protection, education, and culture. It established a "citizenship of the union," giving an EC citizen the right to live anywhere in the Community and vote in local and European elections. It committed member states to work for common rules regarding immigration and asylum policy and to exchange information on terrorism and drug trafficking. The treaty also proposed an economic "cohesion" fund to channel re-sources to poorer countries and expanded language on protection of workers' rights. Although coordination of foreign policy was not included in the original EC treaties, it has been undertaken voluntarily since 1970, when a limited form of European political cooperation, based on regular meetings of foreign ministers, began to occur. The 12 foreign ministers now meet regularly to coordinate broad lines of members' international policies. These meetings take place in the context of European political cooperation, which also includes regular meetings of EC political directors, who oversee numerous working groups made up of officials from all EC states, responsible for geographic and functional areas of foreign policy. Under the Maastricht treaty, the Council of Ministers, after consultation with member states, the Parliament, and the Commission, would approve common foreign policy and security measures by unanimous vote. A new defense dimension will be added to the scope of the Community's activities by expanding the role of the Western European Union (WEU), an alliance of 10 EC countries (Denmark and Ireland are not members), to provide for a European defense alliance. The WEU will implement EC decisions with defense implications. The Maastricht treaty must be approved by all EC countries prior to implementation. Ratification ran into difficulties when the treaty was rejected by the Danes in a referendum in June 1992. Ratification in the United Kingdom has been delayed until Danish objections are overcome, unlikely before mid-1993. An intergovernmental conference scheduled to take place in 1996 will evaluate progress toward political union.
Third World Relations
Improving relations with developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific area has been a high priority for the Community since its creation. The Community has concluded cooperation agreements with more than 100 Third World countries. In addition to its desire to contribute to the economic and social advancement of less developed countries, the Community seeks reliable supplies of primary products and markets for its exports. The European Community has become one of the major providers of Third World assistance with programs such as food aid, rural development, and refugee relief. In 1991, assistance was about $7.3 billion. (The EC program is separate from assistance programs provided by member states.) The Community's most notable accomplishment has been the creation of a series of conventions creating a framework for development cooperation with more than 60 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states, most of which were former colonies of the EC states. Launched in Yaounde in 1963 and 1968 and expanded at Lome in 1975, the agreements provide aid for development projects, free access to EC markets for almost all ACP manufactured imports, and incentives to promote European investment in the developing states. The conventions were renewed in 1979, 1985, and in 1989 for a 10-year period be-ginning in 1990. The most recent agreement (Lome IV) puts greater emphasis on market-oriented economic reform in recipient countries and on human rights. About 40% of EC aid is directed to the ACP states. Since 1978, 40% of ACP exports have gone to the Community, which imports about 10% of its raw materials from the Lome signatories. Community exports to ACP markets enjoy most-favored-nation treatment. One of the most important and innovative aspects of the Lome Convention is Stabex (export receipts stabilization system). A kind of insurance policy against poor trade years, Stabex provides currency transfers to countries heavily dependent on a small number of commodities for export earnings in years when export receipts drop significantly because of poor harvests or low world prices. Lome IV is designed to encourage diversification to other crops. The Lome Convention provides a similar export receipts stabilization system, Sysmin, to cover mineral export earning losses. The EC has been an active participant in the multilateral side of the Middle East peace process. It is a co-organizer of working groups on economic development, water resources, refugees, and the environment. The Community is linked with almost all the countries of the Mediterranean by a network of agreements which provide duty-free access for industrial products and some agricultural products as well as direct grants and loans from the European Investment Bank. Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta have applied for EC membership. The Community's ties to the developing countries of Asia and Latin America are less structured. These usually take the form of bilateral agreements, which allow for preferential trade treatment under the Community's Generalized System of Preferences and certain types of development aid.
Relations With EFTA Countries
Relations with the group of countries participating in the European Free Trade Association (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Switzerland, and Austria) are strongly influenced by the progress of the single market program. Founded in 1960 as an alternative to the Community, EFTA is now the Community's largest trading partner. Free trade agreements were concluded between the Community and each of the EFTA countries in 1972- 73, after two EFTA members, Denmark and the United Kingdom, joined the EC (Portugal followed in 1986). The EC and EFTA countries signed an agreement to create a European Economic Area (EEA) in February 1992. The agreement will create an enlarged single market in which goods, services, capital, and persons move freely between all member states. EC and EFTA countries also will expand cooperation in research and development, environmental issues, education, and social policy. EFTA states will have to adopt certain EC regulations relating to the single market but will not be able to participate in the EC legislative process. The treaty also contains provision for the establishment of an EEA court, council of ministers, and joint committee. Once it is ratified by all 19 national parliaments and by the European Parliament, the EEA will create a trading zone of 495 million people. It was scheduled to enter into force on January 1, 1993. However, in a December 1992 referendum, Switzerland rejected participation in the EEA, requiring the other countries to adjust the conditions of the agreement. Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland have applied for membership in the EC. Accession negotiations with all except Switzerland will start on February 1, 1993.
Relations With Central And Eastern Europe
Between 1988 and 1990, the EC established limited economic and cooperation agreements with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Since then, the Community has designed a new type of association agreement which goes beyond economic cooperation. In addition to a phased approach to free trade between the EC and each nation (whereby the Community will reduce its tariff and other import barriers more rapidly than association countries), these agreements consist of industrial, technical, and scientific cooperation; financial assistance; and political dialogue. In December 1991, association agreements were signed between the EC and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. As a result of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993, the Czechoslovak agreement is being renegotiated with the successor states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania were concluded in late 1992. Pending ratification of these agreements by the parliaments of all participants and the approval of the European Parliament, the Community's generalized system of trade preferences has been extended to these countries on an ad hoc basis. The EC also signed trade and cooperation agreements with Albania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in May 1992. These agreements provide for reduction of quantitative trade restrictions, reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment, and economic cooperation. In November 1992, the EC concluded a similar pact with Slovenia. The Commission provides substantial assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Grant technical assistance is provided through the PHARE program (Poland and Hungary--Assistance with Restructuring the Economy), which has been extended to Albania, the Baltics, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania, and Slovenia. Its aim is to strengthen the process of political and economic reform, with special emphasis on developing and improving the private sector. In addition to the Community's bilateral efforts, after the economic summit of industrialized countries in 1989, the EC Commission began coordinating aid to Central and Eastern Europe by the Group of 24 (G-24) countries--the EC, EFTA, US, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey. The Community also was instrumental in the creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a multilateral endeavor to support investment and development of market economies in these countries. Relations With the New Independent States In January 1992, the Community announced its plan to negotiate partnership and cooperation agreements with the states of the former Soviet Union to replace the trade and cooperation agreement signed by the EC and the Soviet Union in 1989. This agreement had included most-favored-nation status as well as financial aid and was prompted by the introduction of efforts at political and economic reform. The new agreements would provide for close political and economic relations, including trade, economic, and financial cooperation, political dialogue, and cultural cooperation. Negotiations will begin first with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. EC officials have indicated that assistance to the new independent states in their transition to democratic institutions and free market economies is an important priority, and the Commission ranks among the top donors to the new states.
US-EC Relations
The United States continues to support European efforts to achieve economic and political integration. The United States and the Community maintain a continuing dialogue on political and economic issues of mutual interest and engage in direct negotiations on trade and investment issues. While the US has expressed its support for the EC's efforts to develop an integrated market, it is concerned that the economic and business opportunities offered by the single market not be offset by the introduction of new trade barriers. The US holds regular meetings with the EC to discuss aspects of the Single Market program and to resolve differences, many concerning agriculture. The "Declaration on US-EC Relations" of November 23, 1990, identifies common goals and principles of the US-EC partnership. It institutionalizes regular consultation and cooperation on economic, scientific, educational, and cultural matters and establishes a framework for regular and intensive consultation. Biannual consultations between the US President and the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission take place every 6 months. The US Secretary of State and the 12 EC Foreign Ministers also meet on a biannual basis to discuss foreign policy issues; ad hoc consultations between the foreign minister of the presidency country or the foreign ministers of the Troika (the current presidency country and its immediate predecessor and successor) and the US Secretary of State are scheduled as necessary. Delegations from the US House of Representatives and the European Parliament meet twice yearly to discuss US-EC relations. Close consultation is further maintained through the US Mission to the European Communities, headed by an ambassador in Brussels, and through the delegation of the European Communities in Washington, DC, headed by the EC ambassador. The US has an important economic relationship with the EC. As a bloc, the EC is America's largest trading partner. Total US-EC trade exceeded $190 billion in both 1990 and 1991. In 1991, US imports from the EC were $86 billion and represented 18% of total US imports. US exports to the EC were $103 billion and represented 24% of total US exports. In 1991, the US trade surplus with the EC rose to $17 billion, up from $6 billion in 1990. EC exports to the United States consist mainly of machinery, precision equipment, iron and steel, and other manufactured products. US exports to the EC include machinery and transportation equipment, agricultural products, chemicals, and mineral fuels. The US and the Community also have significant ties in the area of direct investment. By the end of 1991, the EC had invested $232 billion in the US, while the US had invested $189 billion in the EC. The United States and the Community cooperate closely in several multilateral organizations, including GATT, OECD, and the "Quadrilaterals" (periodic meetings of the EC, US, Japan, and Canada). The US is hopeful that progress will continue in the GATT multilateral trade negotiations and that both sides will succeed in resolving differences on agricultural policies. The Community's CAP has allowed the EC to become self-sufficient in many agricultural commodities and has provided stable incomes to the European farming population. However, through its complicated network of protection, price supports, and subsidies, it has created large surpluses of many agricultural products, displaced some US farm exports, and increased prices to European consumers. The global reform of agricultural policies, including the CAP, remains an important US objective. The need to provide financial and technical aid to the new emerging democracies in Eurasia led to a new phase of cooperation between the Community and the US. Through the G-24 process, the 1992 coordinating conferences on assistance to the former Soviet Union, and the international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the EC and the US assist those countries committed to achieving democracy and market reform.
Diplomatic Representation
The United States maintains close relations with the Community through its mission in Brussels. The US Mission is directed by Ambassador James F. Dobbins and is located at 40 Boulevard du Regent, B-1000, Brussels, Belgium; Tel. 32-2-513-4450; Telex 846-21336. The EC Delegation to the United States is headed by Ambassador Andreas Van Agt. Its Press and Public Affairs Office is located at 2100 M Street, NW, 7th floor, Washington, DC, 20037; Tel. 202-862-9500. The EC Press and Public Affairs Office in New York City is at Three Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, 245 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017; Tel. 212-371-3804.
Future Developments
Since its foundation as a customs union, the EC's authority and influence have expanded greatly as its role in managing the process of integration has evolved. The possibility of a united Europe, once only an ideal, is now closer to reality than ever before. Spurred by revolutionary political change and the continued success of its efforts to achieve economic and monetary integration, the Community now faces a new agenda, quite different from the challenges it has confronted in the past. Of the measures required to complete the internal market, some of the most complicated issues--such as tax harmonization, border controls, and social policy--have not yet been reviewed by the Council of Ministers, and many have not yet been ratified by member states. Meeting the 1992 deadline and implementing the reforms outlined in the Single Act will test the commitment of EC members to the principle of true integration. Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Malta, and Cyprus have applied for EC membership. No decision has been reached on Turkey's long-standing application for EC membership. Possible enlargement of the Community to 16 or more members may require reform of EC institutions, especially the Presidency and the Parliament. The eventual expansion of the Community to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and possibly some of the new independent states of the former Soviet Union also must be considered, although no decision is expected before the end of the decade. A major intergovernmental conference scheduled for 1996 will evaluate progress in economic and monetary union and consider greater coordination of foreign policy and security matters. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 7, February 15, 1993 Title:

Treaty Actions: Multilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 15 19932/15/93 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: Whole World Subject: International Law, Trade/Economics, Science/Technology, Human Rights, Security Assistance and Sales, Refugees [TEXT]
Copyrights
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on Sept. 28, 1979. Entered into force for the United States Mar. 1, 1989. Accession deposited: The Gambia, Dec. 7, 1992.
Finance
Convention establishing the multilateral investment guarantee agency (MIGA), with annexes and schedules. Done at Seoul Oct. 11, 1985. Entered into force Apr. 12, 1988. Ratification deposited: Uruguay, Dec. 9, 1992.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Adopted at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the US Feb. 23, 1989. Succession deposited: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec. 29, 1992. Accession deposited: Latvia, Apr. 14, 1992.
Investment Disputes
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington Mar. 18, 1965. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1966. TIAS 6090; 17 UST 1270. Ratification deposited: People's Republic of China, Jan. 7, 1993.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the US July 1, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-11. Accession deposited: Romania, Nov. 20, 1992.
Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Dated at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948. TIAS 1868; 62 Stat. 3485. Accession deposited: Armenia, Nov. 26, 1992.
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645. Accessions deposited: Niger, Dec. 21, 1992; Vietnam, Dec. 10, 1992.
Prisoner Transfer
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1985. (TIAS 10824). Signature: Czechoslovakia, Feb. 13, 1992. Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia, Apr. 15, 1992; Norway, Dec. 9, 1992.1,2
Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the US Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577; 19 UST 6223. Accessions deposited: Albania, Aug. 18, 1992; Cambodia, Oct. 15, 1992; Republic of Korea, Dec. 3, 1992.
Weapons
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and Protocols I, II, and III. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.3 Accession deposited: Niger, Nov. 10, 1992. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 7, February 15, 1993 Title:

Treaty Actions: Bilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 15 19932/15/93 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: Subsaharan Africa, East Asia, Europe, Eurasia, E/C Europe, South America, MidEast/North Africa Country: Argentina, Armenia, Cameroon, El Salvador, France, Japan, Luxembourg, Morocco, Netherlands, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Tunisia Subject: International Law [TEXT]
Argentina
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Jan. 13, 1993. Enters into force on the later date of an exchange of letters in which the parties notify one another that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled. Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at Washington and Buenos Aires Jan. 13 and 15, 1993. Enters into force upon the exchange of written notice that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Armenia
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of humanitarian and technical economic assistance. Signed at Yerevan Dec. 15, 1992. Entered into force Dec. 15, 1992.
Cameroon
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 7, 1992 and Jan. 15, 1993. Entered into force Jan. 15, 1993.
El Salvador
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at San Salvador Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force upon agreement between El Salvador and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on El Salvador's 1993 fiscal targets and receipt by El Salvador of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled. Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to agriculture owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at San Salvador Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force upon agreement between El Salvador and the IMF on El Salvador's 1993 fiscal targets and receipt by El Salvador of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
France
Agreement extending the interim agreement of Feb. 24, 1987 relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris Dec. 31, 1992. Entered into force Dec. 31, 1992.
Japan
Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 31, 1989, as amended, concerning the acquisition and production in Japan of the SH-60J and UH- 60J aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Jan. 8, 1993. Entered into force Jan. 8, 1993. Agreement concerning the acquisition and production in Japan of the Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and related equipment and materials. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Jan. 8, 1993. Entered into force Jan. 8, 1993.
Luxembourg
Agreement concerning the reciprocal exemption from income tax of income derived from the international operation of ships and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Luxembourg Apr. 11 and June 22, 1989. Entered into force: Jan. 8, 1993.
Morocco
Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 31, 1961, as supplemented, relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Rabat Sept. 21 and Nov. 30, 1992. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1992.
Netherlands
Agreement regarding mutual cooperation in the tracing, freezing, seizure, and forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and the sharing of forfeited assets. Signed at Washington Nov. 20, 1992. Enters into force thirty (30) days after the Parties have notified each other in writing that their constitutional requirements have been met.
Philippines
Agreement relating to the Export-Import Bank of the United States supplementing the agreement of Feb. 25, 1965 and Aug. 15, 1966 (TIAS 6111; 17 UST 1557) which supplemented the investment guaranties agreement of Feb. 18 and 19, 1952 (TIAS 2517; 3 UST 3878). Signed at Manila Jan. 5, 1993. Entered into force Jan. 5, 1993.
Romania
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the US International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Effected by exchange of notes at Bucharest Nov. 23 and Dec. 7, 1992. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1992.
Russian Federation
Treaty on further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, with memorandum of understanding, protocols, and exchanges of letters. Signed at Moscow Jan. 3, 1993. Enters into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification, but not prior to entry into force of the START Treaty. Article II(8) applied provisionally from date of signature.
Tunisia
Memorandum of understanding concerning the operation of the INTELPOST service, with details of implementation. Signed at Tunis and Washington Dec. 19, 1989 and Oct. 3, 1991. Entered into force: Feb. 1, 1993. 1 With declarations. 2 Territorial application: Bouvet Island, Peter I's Island, Queen Maud Land. 3 Not in force for the US. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 8, February 22, 1993

Title:

Report on Iraqi Developments

Clinton Source: President Clinton Description: Text of a letter to Congress Date: Feb, 22 19932/22/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: United Nations, Trade/Economics [TEXT] To the Congress of the United States: I hereby report to the Congress on the developments since the last report of August 3, 1992, concerning the national emergency with respect to Iraq that was declared in Executive Order No. 12722 of August 2, 1990. This report is submitted pursuant to sections 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act ("NEA"), 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c). Executive Order No. 12722 ordered the immediate blocking of all property and interests in property of the Government of Iraq (including the Central Bank of Iraq) then or thereafter located in the United States or within the possession or control of a U.S. person. That order also prohibited the importation into the United States of goods and services of Iraqi origin, as well as the exportation of goods, services, and technology from the United States to Iraq. The order prohibited travel-related transactions to or from Iraq and the performance of any contract in support of any industrial, commercial, or governmental project in Iraq. U.S. persons were also prohibited from granting or extending credit or loans to the Government of Iraq. The foregoing prohibitions (as well as the blocking of Government of Iraq property) were continued and augmented on August 9, 1990, by Executive Order No. 12724, which was issued in order to align the sanctions imposed by the United States with United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990. This report discusses only matters concerning the national emergency with respect to Iraq that was declared in Executive Order No. 12722 and matters relating to Executive Orders Nos. 12724 and 12817 (the "Executive Orders"). The report covers events from August 2, 1992, through February 1, 1993. 1. On October 21, 1992, President Bush issued Executive Order No. 12817, implementing in the United States measures adopted in United Nations Security Council Resolution ("UNSCR") No. 778 of October 2, 1992. UNSCR No. 778 requires U.N. member states temporarily to transfer to a U.N. escrow account up to $200 million apiece in Iraqi oil proceeds paid by the purchaser after the imposition of U.N. sanctions on Iraq. These funds finance Iraq's obligations for U.N. activities with respect to Iraq, including expenses to verify Iraqi weapons destruction and to provide humanitarian assistance in Iraq on a nonpartisan basis. A portion of the escrowed funds will also fund the activities of the U.N. Compensation Commission in Geneva, which will handle claims from victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The funds placed in the escrow account are to be returned, with interest, to the member states that transferred them to the U.N., as funds are received from future sales of Iraqi oil authorized by the United Nations Security Council. No member state is required to fund more than half of the total contributions to the escrow account. Executive Order No. 12817 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury (the "Secretary") to identify the proceeds of the sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products paid for by or on behalf of the purchaser on or after August 6, 1990, and directed United States financial institutions holding such funds to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ("FRBNY") in the manner required by the Secretary. Executive Order No. 12817 further directs the FRBNY to receive, hold, and transfer funds in which the Government of Iraq has an interest at the direction of the Secretary to fulfill U.S. rights and obligations pursuant to UNSCR No. 778. 2. The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq by the Executive Orders are administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("FAC") pursuant to the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 575 ("ISR"). The ISR were amended on September 1, 1992, to revoke section 575.603, which had required U.S. financial institutions to file monthly reports regarding certain bank accounts in which the Government of Iraq has an interest. While this information was needed during the early implementation of the regulations and for a period thereafter, it is no longer required on a monthly basis and can be obtained by FAC on a case-by- case basis as required. The amendment is in harmony with President Bush's Regulatory Initiative. 3. Investigations of possible violations of the Iraqi sanctions continue to be pursued and appropriate enforcement actions taken. These are intended to deter future activities in violation of the sanctions. Additional civil penalty notices were prepared during the reporting period for violations of the IEEPA and ISR with respect to transactions involving Iraq. Penalties were collected, principally from financial institutions which engaged in unauthorized, albeit apparently inadvertent, transactions with respect to Iraq. 4. Investigation also continues into the roles played by various individuals and firms outside Iraq in [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein's procurement network. These investigations may lead to additions to the FAC listing of individuals and organizations determined to be Specially Designated Nationals ("SDNs") of the Government of Iraq. 5. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12817 implementing UNSCR No. 778, on October 26, 1992, FAC directed the FRBNY to establish a blocked account for receipt of certain post-August 6, 1990, Iraqi oil sales proceeds, and to hold, invest, and transfer these funds as required by the order. On the same date, FAC directed the eight United States financial institutions holding the affected oil proceeds, on an allocated, pro rata basis, to transfer a total of $200 million of these blocked Iraqi assets to the FRBNY account. On December 15, 1992, following the payment of $20 million by the Government of Kuwait and $30 million by the Government of Saudi Arabia to a special United Nations-controlled account, entitled UNSCR No. 778 Escrow Account, the FRBNY was directed to transfer a corresponding amount of $50 million from the blocked account it holds to the United Nations-controlled account. Future transfers from the blocked FRBNY account will be made on a matching basis up to the $200 million for which the United States is potentially obligated pursuant to UNSCR No. 778. 6. Since the last report, one case filed against the Government of Iraq has gone to judgment. Consarc Corporation v. Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals et al., No. 90-2269 (D.D.C., filed December 29, 1992), arose out of a contract for the sale of furnaces by plaintiff to the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals ("MIM"), an Iraqi governmental entity. In connection with the contract, the Iraqi defendants opened an irrevocable letter of credit with an Iraqi bank in favor of Consarc, which was advised by Pittsburgh National Bank ("PNB"), with the Bank of New York ("BoNY") entering into a confirmed reimbursement agreement with the advising bank. Funds were set aside at BoNY, in an account of the Iraqi bank, for reimbursement of BoNY if PNB made a payment to Consarc on the letter of credit and sought reimbursement from BoNY. Consarc received a down payment from the Iraqi MIM and manufactured the furnaces. No goods were shipped prior to imposition of sanctions on August 2, 1990, and the United States claimed that the funds on deposit in the Iraqi bank account at BoNY were blocked, as well as the furnaces manufactured for the Iraqi Government or the proceeds of the sale of the furnaces to third parties. The district court ruled that the furnaces or their sales proceeds were properly blocked pursuant to the declaration of the national emergency and blocking of Iraqi Government property interests, but that, due to fraud on MIM's part in concluding the sales contract, the funds on deposit in an Iraqi bank account at BoNY were not the property of the Government of Iraq, and ordered FAC to unblock these funds. FAC has noted its appeal of this ruling. 7. FAC has issued a total of 337 specific licenses regarding transactions pertaining to Iraq or Iraqi assets since August 1990. Since the last report, 49 specific licenses have been issued. Licenses were issued for transactions such as the filing of legal actions involving Iraqi interests, for legal representation of Iraq, and the exportation to Iraq of donated medicine, medical supplies, and food intended for humanitarian relief purposes. To ensure compliance with the terms of the licenses which have been issued, stringent reporting requirements have been imposed that are closely monitored. Licensed accounts are regularly audited by FAC compliance personnel and deputized auditors from other regulatory agencies. FAC compliance personnel continue to work closely with both State and Federal bank regulatory and law enforcement agencies in conducting special audits of Iraqi accounts subject to the ISR. 8. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the 6-month period from August 2, 1992, through February 1, 1993, that are directly attributable to the exercise of powers and authorities conferred by the declaration of a national emergency with respect to Iraq are estimated at about $2 million, most of which represents wage and salary costs for Federal personnel. Personnel costs were largely centered in the Department of the Treasury (particularly in FAC, the U.S. Customs Service, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, and the Office of the General Counsel), the Department of State (particularly of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, the Bureau[s] of Near East [Affairs] and South Asian Affairs, the Bureau of International Organization [Affairs], and the Office of the Legal Adviser), the Department of Transportation (particularly the U.S. Coast Guard), and the Department of Commerce (particularly in the Bureau of Export Administration and the Office of the General Counsel). 9. The United States imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait, a clear act of brutal aggression. The United States, together with the international community, is maintaining economic sanctions against Iraq because the Iraqi regime has failed to comply fully with United Nations Security Council resolutions, including those calling for the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the inviolability of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary, the release of Kuwaiti and other third country nationals, compensation for victims of Iraqi aggression, long-term monitoring of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, and the return of Kuwaiti assets stolen during its illegal occupation of Kuwait. The U.N. sanctions remain in place; the United States will continue to enforce those sanctions. The Saddam Hussein regime continued to violate basic human rights by repressing the Iraqi civilian population and depriving it of humanitarian assistance. The United Nations Security Council passed resolutions that permit Iraq to sell $1.6 billion of oil under U.N. auspices to fund the provision of food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies to the people of Iraq. Under the U.N. resolutions, the equitable distribution within Iraq of this assistance would be supervised and monitored by the United Nations. The Iraqi regime continued to refuse to accept these resolutions and has thereby chosen to perpetuate the suffering of its civilian population. The regime of Saddam Hussein continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, as well as to regional peace and security. Because of Iraq's failure to comply fully with United Nations Security Council resolutions, the United States will therefore continue to apply economic sanctions to deter Iraq from threatening peace and stability in the region, and I will continue to report periodically to the Congress on significant developments, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1703(c). William J. Clinton (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 8, February 22, 1993 Title:

Update on Progress in Somalia

Houdek Source: Robert Houdek, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 17 19932/17/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Subsaharan Africa Country: Somalia Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations, Military Affairs [TEXT] Thank you, Mr. Chairman [Harry Johnstone, D., Fla.] for this opportunity to testify before your subcommittee on the progress we are making in Somalia. But first, let me offer congratulations as you take up your duties as chairman. Your committee historically has played a vital and constructive role in US-African relations. This is a period of dramatic change in Africa offering both new opportunities and some daunting challenges. We look forward to working closely with you, the members, and your staffs. Mr. Chairman, exactly 2 months ago, Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs Herman J.] Cohen came before this committee and discussed the horrific humanitarian crisis in Somalia. At that time, Ambassador Cohen explained that the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) under UN auspices had a clearly defined and do-able mission: establishing a secure environment for the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid in Somalia. Once sufficient order was established, the mission would be handed over to an expanded UN peace-keeping operation. UNITAF has made remarkable progress toward achieving that goal. The 32,000 UNITAF troops presently in Somalia, of which approximately 18,000 are American, have performed with great professionalism and devotion. Their discipline has minimized casualties on both sides and won the admiration and support of the vast majority of Somalis.
Security Assessment
I want to share with you our assessment of the current security and political environment. UNITAF forces have secured nine key areas in southern Somalia, including airports and the ports of Mogadishu and Kismaayo. Daily surface convoys deliver supplies to relief organizations around these key points. Relief corridors are open, and regular convoys are sent to Baidoa, which is being used as a staging site for humanitarian distribution into the Somali interior. Death rates are falling dramatically. In Baidoa, one relief agency estimates that death rates for children under 5 [years] have dropped from 50 to 15 per 10,000 per day (mostly from disease rather than starvation). More needs to be done, but we are seeing a dramatic impact. Circumstances have dictated that UNITAF forces be increasingly active in disarming armed Somalis to help ensure the sustainability of a secure environment and to protect the lives of UNITAF forces. In Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, and Bardera, technicals [vehicles used by warring factions] and heavy weapons have been moved to cantonment areas under UNITAF supervision. The so-called green line in Mogadishu dividing previously warring factions is no more. The agreement of factional leaders Ali Mahdi and Aideed to get their technicals and heavy weapons out of Mogadishu and dismantle the "green line" was a major achievement. Further, in Addis Ababa [Ethiopia] last month, leaders of 15 Somali factions agreed to a cease-fire and to turn over all heavy weaponry to UNITAF and UN troops. The accords also called for creation of a committee of representatives of Somali factions to work with the United Nations and UNITAF. Somali factional leaders have been asked to inventory their weapons and have been invited by UN Special Representative Ismat Kittani to discuss [the] next steps in disarmament and monitoring the cease-fire. We view this as a promising initiative whic0h should further bolster the security environment. But it would be misleading to leave the impression that southern Somalia is now a safe place. Many former militiamen and gang members, denied the opportunity to extort from relief agencies or steal relief shipments, have turned to preying on less lucrative, unprotected targets. To counter the upsurge in common crime and banditry and to relieve UNITAF troops from routine security duties, priority is being given to the establishment of Somali police forces. The United Nations will help fund auxiliary, interim police forces in Mogadishu and other population centers. These units, which UNITAF helped to establish, will report to local combined committees of elders [and] community and religious leaders. Local police began operating in Mogadishu on February 6. We expect that interim police forces will be followed by establishment of trained, professional, [and] neutral regional or national police. International police experts are now in Somalia developing recommendations for the United Nations as to how this can be best accomplished. This is a difficult but central task.
Political Appraisal
The vast majority of the Somali people have welcomed UNITAF forces not only because UNITAF brought an end to anarchy and starvation but also because UNITAF made it clear [that] it came in peace to help, not to impose a settlement. We have supported the UN's previously articulated strategy of building political reconciliation from the grassroots up. We have seen broad, if somewhat uneven, progress in the Somali political situation. The improved security climate and reduced threats by warlords have encouraged establishment of representative local committees of Somalis to discuss security and relief issues among themselves and with UNITAF and UN leaders, US liaison officers, and USAID/OFDA representatives. While the process of rebuilding community organizations is in its early stages, the re- emergence of the influence of elders, religious leaders, intellectuals, and women's groups in local affairs is encouraging. Last month's UN-sponsored Addis Ababa conference of factional leaders was a significant first step in the dialogue of old-time enemies. A successful followup on implementing the cease-fire and disarmament accords will be crucial. Progress on the security and political fronts are closely interrelated. UNITAF and UNOSOM [UN Operation in Somalia] are working together to maintain the momentum in implementing the Addis [Ababa] cease-fire and disarmament accords. We are continuing to give full backing to the UN's political reconciliation efforts. But we should not expect quick results. Lasting reconciliation will require further control of arms and broad participation of the Somali people--local and regional involvement--not just a deal at the top at the national level. This political process will take time.
Transition From UNITAF To UNOSOM
We anticipate a smooth, phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II; in fact, parts of the transition have already occurred. Some US forces have returned home, replaced by non-American UNITAF troops, some of whom will become part of UNOSOM II. US military planners are working with their UN counterparts on the transition. Secretary of State Christopher has assured UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali that the United States is prepared to aid UNOSOM II with logistics and other support, as well as with a quick reaction force, if necessary. The United States will also provide an officer to be the deputy commander of UNOSOM II. Neither the exact number of American personnel nor the total number of UNOSOM forces has been decided at this point. Those decisions must await issuance of the Secretary General's report, the subsequent Security Council resolution authorizing formation of UNOSOM II, and final discussions among UNOSOM II participants, the United Nations and contributing countries' military experts. However, I can assure you that the vast majority of UNOSOM II forces will not be American. The UN Secretary General is expected to present his latest report on Somalia to the UN Security Council this week, opening the way for prompt Security Council debate on a new resolution. We anticipate that the report will reflect the close consultations in New York and Somalia between the United Nations, the United States, and the UNITAF coalition. From our consultations, we believe that the Secretary General's report will coincide with much that is in our own general approach: most importantly that the new UNOSOM should have sufficient size, capabilities, and rules of engagement to enable it to enforce the peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter throughout all of Somalia. We share the view that without improved security the political process cannot prosper. We also agree that the new mandate must include prevention of the resumption of violence; control of heavy weapons; maintenance of the cease-fire; and the building of a new professional police force to ensure that the UN's efforts to promote political reconciliation and rehabilitation can progress. While the elements of UNOSOM's new mandate are important, equally important is international support for UNOSOM. The earlier UN Operation in Somalia has been criticized; but, in a real sense, the success of UNOSOM's future operations depends on widespread international support. We have assured the Secretary General of our military backing for UNOSOM's peace enforcement operations. We are heartened by the offers of many UNITAF troop contingents to remain in Somalia under UNOSOM, as well as the offers of other countries to send troops to be part of UNOSOM. We are confident that the United Nations will field a force that will accomplish its mission. Additionally, we have told the United Nations [that] we are willing to assist on the civilian side, with some staff if needed, to contribute to progress on the rehabilitation and reconciliation fronts. We also are urging our friends to help. This is not a time for self-congratulation; the starving and the suffering continue in areas of Somalia. But I would be remiss if I did not highlight the superb cooperative work of [Head of US Command in Somalia Lieutenant] General Johnston and [US Special envoy] Ambassador Oakley. They, and the men and women who work with them, have made an incredibly difficult job look deceptively easy. Here I would like to emphasize the essential contributions of our coalition partners. International cooperation has worked under harsh conditions and in an unprecedented state of anarchy. We are moving to a new phase of our efforts in Somalia--from UNITAF to UNOSOM; from the job of re-establishing a secure environment to get relief to the most needy to the challenge of consolidating security gains and promoting political reconciliation and rehabilitation. While progress has been swift under UNITAF, patience and endurance will now be needed, because there are no shortcuts to restoring trust and rebuilding a civil society. Television images of starving Somalis, which moved the American conscience last fall, are now replaced by those of suffering peoples elsewhere. The Somalis are a resilient people. They are returning to their villages and are planting crops. Markets are coming alive; children are leaving feeding kitchens, some to return to school. But this picture of normalcy is deceptive. A tremendous amount needs to be done before Somalia is a normal society. The essential work of UNOSOM may well take place without great public pressure for international involvement. But if we are to avoid the risk of forfeiting the gains of Operation Restore Hope, continued American and allied assistance will be essential. This Administration is committed to such a course and looks forward to Congress' continued cooperation and support. In this spirit, we welcome congressional support--as expressed in S. J. [Senate Joint] Resolution 45, for the efforts we have been making in creating a secure environment for provision of humanitarian relief alleviating the massive suffering of the Somali people. The dual catastrophes of famine and merciless civil strife have been devastating to Somalia. Although the Administration does not believe specific statutory authorization for the deployment of US forces to Somalia is necessary, we are immensely gratified that the Hill and the Administration have cooperated so well in delivering an appropriate and urgent response. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 8, February 22, 1993 Title:

Cuban Crackdown on Labor Union Leaders

Boucher Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 16 19932/16/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Cuba Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] The United States is concerned about the Cuban Government's treatment of Cuba's nascent free trade unions. Free trade union leaders Juan Guarino, Javier Troncoso, Jorge Bonet, Eduardo Rois, Roberto Trobajo, Leonardo Varo, Omar Fernandez, and Lazaro Corp were detained by police on February 5 while they met to discuss details of the merger of the unions they represent. Police reportedly threatened them if they continued their free union activities. All were issued a written warning and released at 3 am the following day. On February 6, Rafael Gutierrez Santos, head of the Labor Union of Cuban Workers, was arrested by plainclothes security agents. He is being held incommunicado, in violation of Cuban law, at state security headquarters. Cuba has ignored International Labor Organization (ILO) criticisms of its abuse of worker rights. The ILO reminded Cuba in 1992 that arresting trade unionists without a warrant or when no grounds for conviction exist is a violation of trade union rights; concluded that Cuba violates ILO norms on freedom of association and the right to organize; and found that Cuban Government restrictions on the freedom to choose or change employment are incompatible with ILO conventions prohibiting forced labor. We call on the Cuban Government to release Mr. Gutierrez without delay, to comply with the conclusions of the ILO, and to permit free trade unions to register legally and operate freely and independently for the benefit of Cuban workers.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 8, February 22, 1993 Title:

Support for Colombian Democracy

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Acting Assistant Secretary and Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 17 19932/17/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: Colombia Subject: Democratization [TEXT] Colombian democracy, one of the oldest and most stable in our hemisphere, is under attack from a vicious combination of narcotics traffickers and guerrillas. We condemn the recent series of bombings against innocent civilians as well as civil and police officials who are the true heroes of Colombia's struggle to preserve its democratic institutions. We extend our sympathy to the families of these people. We admire the Colombian Government and people who continue to defend and develop Colombia's democratic institutions and its economy despite the terrible violence. We support the Colombian Government's condemnation of all terrorist acts. We strongly support Colombia's efforts, under the leadership of President Gaviria, to improve law enforcement measures against major drug traffickers, to bring about significant judicial reform, and to achieve greater economic prosperity. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 8, February 22, 1993 Title:

Fact Sheet: Cuba

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 22 19932/22/93 Category: Fact Sheets Category: Country Data Region: North America Country: Colombia Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics, Human Rights, Cultural Exchange, History, Military Affairs [TEXT]
PEOPLE
Cuba is a multi-racial society with a population of mainly Spanish and African origins. The largest organized religion is the Roman Catholic Church. Officially, Cuba has been an atheist state for most of the Castro era. How-ever, a constitutional amendment adopted on July 12, 1992, changed the nature of the Cuban state from atheist to secular, enabling religious believers to belong to the Cuban Communist Party (PCC).
HISTORY
Before the arrival of Columbus in 1492, Cuba was inhabited by three groups- -Siboneys, Guanahabibes, and Tainos--the last of which introduced agriculture, including maize and tobacco, to the island. As Spain developed its colonial empire in the Western Hemisphere, Havana became an important commercial port. Settlers eventually moved inland, devoting themselves mainly to sugar cane and tobacco. As the native Indian population died out, African slaves were imported to work the plantations. A 1774 census in Cuba recorded 96,000 whites, 31,000 free blacks, and 44,000 slaves. Slavery was abolished in 1886. Cuba was the last major Spanish colony to gain independence in a movement which began in 1850, when Cuban planters financed and led several expeditions against Spanish garrisons. In 1868, the Ten Years' War for independence began under the leadership of Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, whom the Cubans consider to be the father of their country. Jose Marti, Cuba's greatest national hero, initiated plans for a general uprising 24 years later. In 1895, Marti announced the Grito de Baire, heralding the beginning of Cuba's final struggle for independence. Shortly after, he died in battle. The United States entered the conflict on the side of the revolutionaries when the USS Maine, anchored in Havana Harbor to protect US citizens, was sunk by an explosion of unknown origin on February 15, 1898. On December 10, 1898, Spain signed the Treaty of Paris, ending the Spanish-American War and relinquishing control of Cuba to the United States. The United States administered the island for 3 years. Independence was proclaimed May 20, 1902, although the United States retained the right to intervene to preserve Cuban independence and stability under the Platt Amendment, which established conditions mandated by Congress for the withdrawal of US troops from Cuba. In 1934, the amendment was repealed in keeping with the Roosevelt Administration's "Good Neighbor" policy. Later the same year, the United States and Cuba reaffirmed by treaty the 1903 agreement which leased the Guantanamo Bay naval base to the United States. This agreement remains in force today and can only be terminated by mutual agreement or abandonment by the United States. Cubans elected General Gerardo Machado as president in 1924, but he forcibly extended his rule until a popular uprising deposed him in 1933. Army Sergeant Fulgencio Batista led the revolt and established himself as Cuba's dominant leader for more than 25 years. He ruled through a series of presidents and was himself elected in 1940 for 4 years. In March 1952, shortly before regularly scheduled elections, Batista seized the presidency in a bloodless coup. On July 26, 1953, an armed opposition group led by Fidel Castro attacked the Moncada army barracks at Santiago de Cuba. The attack was unsuccessful, and many, including Castro, were captured and imprisoned. Castro, released by Batista under a May 1955 amnesty, went into exile in Mexico, where he formed a revolutionary group, the "26th of July Movement." On December 2, 1956, Castro and 81 of his followers landed in eastern Cuba aboard the yacht Granma. All but 12 were soon captured, killed, or dispersed. From this nucleus, Castro's forces eventually grew to several thousand. While other groups also actively opposed Batista, Castro's "26th of July" forces became predominant when Batista fled on January 1, 1959. Castro's assumption of power was acclaimed in Cuba and abroad because he seemed to embody the hopes of most Cubans for a return to democratic government and an end to graft and corruption. Within months, Castro moved to consolidate his power and to set up an authoritarian government. Many leaders of the opposition to Batista were executed or sentenced to lengthy prison terms for opposing Castro's policies. Moderates were forced out of the government, and hundreds of thousands of Cubans fled the island. During an April 1959 visit to Washington, Castro addressed concerns about a reported leftist tilt to his regime by saying, "We are against all kinds of dictators, whether of a man, or a country, or a class, or an oligarchy, or by the military. That is why we are against communism." On December 2, 1961, Castro publicly declared himself a Marxist- Leninist. Representative democracy was abolished, effective freedom of expression ended, and all opposition political activity was soon terminated.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the East-West conflict. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment, and to drum up opposition to US policy toward Cuba, especially the trade embargo and the Cuban Democracy Act. Support for revolutionary movements, once an article of faith for the regime, is largely a thing of the past. Cuba has relations with nearly 140 countries and has civilian assistance workers-- principally medical--in more than 20 nations. When it first came to power, the Castro Government supported the spread of revolution by aiming to reproduce throughout Latin America its rural-based guerrilla warfare experience. In 1959, Cuba aided armed expeditions against Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. During the 1960s, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia all faced serious Cuban- backed attempts to develop guerrilla insurgencies. These movements failed to attract popular support. The most conspicuous failure occurred in 1967. Castro had sent Che Guevara--a charismatic revolutionary hero from Argentina and symbol of Cuban efforts to spread the revolution throughout Latin America--to lead an insurgency in Bolivia. Guevara's efforts were opposed by both the peasantry and the Bolivian Communist Party. Guevara was killed, and the insurgency collapsed. Cuba's support for Latin revolutionaries, along with the openly Marxist- Leninist character of its government and its alignment with the USSR, contributed to its isolation in the hemisphere. In January 1962, the Organization of American States (OAS) excluded Cuba from active participation. Two years later, OAS foreign ministers resolved that member nations should have no diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba and should suspend all trade and sea transportation. In the late 1960s, Cuba de-emphasized its policy of supporting revolutions abroad and began to pursue normal government-to-government relations with other Latin American nations. By the mid-1970s, Cuba had reestablished diplomatic relations with a number of countries in the region. In 1975, the OAS lifted comprehensive sanctions and deferred to individual member states the option of diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad--deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the USSR, backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), one of the movements competing for power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war in the Ogaden region against Somalia, 1977-78, and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia; Cuba met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991; and Cuba ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat. In January 1992, following the peace agreement in El Salvador, Castro stated that Cuban support for insurgents was a thing of the past.
Cuban-Soviet Relations
Ties between Cuba and the Soviet Union were close from 1960 until perestroika and the subsequent demise of the USSR. Cuba received critical economic and military assistance, which kept its economy afloat and enabled it to maintain a disproportionately large military establishment. However, as the former USSR's economy experienced growing problems, its reliability as a trade and aid partner for Cuba declined. Russia has drastically reduced economic and military aid to Cuba. In November 1992, Cuba and Russia signed a number of economic and commercial agreements. Russian officials have stated that all trade will be at world prices. Cuban-Soviet ties led to a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962 over the installation of nuclear-equipped missiles in Cuba, resolved only when Moscow agreed to the withdrawal of the missiles and other offensive weapons. In late 1970, the possibility that the Soviet Union would establish submarine bases in Cuba became an issue. However, they were never established. In 1971, President Nixon affirmed the existence of an understanding between the United States and the USSR that the Soviet Union would not install any offensive weapons systems in Cuba nor operate such systems from there, including sea-based systems. Cuba's special relationship with the Soviet Union began to disintegrate during perestroika, due to growing economic difficulties and ideological differences. During a visit in April 1989, President Gorbachev spoke out against the "export of revolution." Following Gorbachev's trip, Castro and the Cuban press began to harshly criticize reforms in the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union undertook a worldwide reduction of its military forces. Soviet military personnel in Cuba, numbering around 15,000 in 1990, today total under 4,000 Russian troops. In September 1991, then-President Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of the 2,800-man Soviet combat brigade. An estimated 1,600 soldiers still in Cuba are to be withdrawn by June 1993. Russia maintains a signal intelligence-gathering facility, the largest of the former USSR, at Lourdes. It is staffed by 2,100 technicians and monitors US civilian and military communications.
US-Cuban Relations
After Castro came to power, bilateral relations deteriorated sharply, primarily because of its imposition of a repressive dictatorship, its uncompensated nationalization of American property valued at about $1.8 billion in 1962, and its support for violent subversive groups. The United States broke diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961, after the Cuban Government demanded that the US embassy in Havana be reduced to a skeleton staff. In 1962, the United States imposed a comprehensive economic embargo against Cuba. Tensions between the two governments peaked during the abortive "Bay of Pigs" invasion by anti-Castro Cubans supported by the United States in April 1961 and the October 1962 missile crisis. Following Cuba's de-emphasis of the export of revolution in the 1970s, the United States did not oppose the OAS decision to make discretionary the application of sanctions against Cuba and began to discuss normalization of relations with Cuba. Talks began but were halted when Cuba launched a large-scale intervention in Angola. Subsequent efforts undertaken to improve relations led to the establishment of interests sections in the two capitals on September 1, 1977. Currently, the US interests section in Havana and the Cuban interests section in Washington, DC, are under the protection of the Swiss embassy. New differences in the late 1970s--Cuba's failure to withdraw troops from Angola, intervention in Ethiopia, increasing subversion in the Caribbean Basin and Central America, the delivery of sophisticated Soviet weaponry, and the Cuban Government's deliberate efforts to violate US sovereignty and immigration laws through the 1980 Mariel exodus--eroded the possibility of improvement in bilateral relations. Quiet efforts to explore the prospects for improving relations were initiated by the United States in 1981-82; however, the Cuban Government refused to alter its conduct with regard to US concerns about Cuba's support for violent political change and its close political and military cooperation with the Soviet Union. The liberation of Grenada by the United States and regional allies in 1983 and the expulsion of Cuban forces based there was a setback for Cuba's plans to expand its regional sphere of influence. One year later, the United States and Cuba negotiated an agreement to normalize immigration and return to Cuba the "excludables" (criminals or insane persons who, under US law, are not allowed to reside in the United States) who had arrived during the 1980 Mariel boatlift. Cuba suspended this agreement in May 1985 following the US initiation of the Radio Marti by the Voice of America (VOA), which broadcasts news to Cuba. The Mariel agreement, reinstated in November 1987, allowed normal migration to occur between the two countries. In March 1990, VOA began transmitting TV Marti to Cuba. Since its inception, Cuba has jammed TV Marti and blocked Radio Marti on the AM band. Radio Marti on short wave has a large audience. With the peace settlement in El Salvador and establishment of democracy in Nicaragua, US concerns focused on Cuban resistance to democratic reforms and its denial of human rights--two major obstacles to improved bilateral relations. In May 1991, President Bush said that if Cuba holds free and fair elections under international supervision, respects human rights, and stops subverting its neighbors, US-Cuban relations could improve significantly. In October 1992, President Bush signed into law the Cuban Democracy Act. This bipartisan legislation was intended as a statement of US policy toward a free and democratic Cuba. Its principal provisions ban most US subsidiary trade with Cuba and exclude any vessel which stops in Cuba from entering US ports for 180 days . It also provides for humanitarian donations to non- govern- mental organizations in Cuba and improved telecommunications. Despite existing tensions, the United States continues to discuss areas of mutual concern, such as immigration, with the Government of Cuba.
Interests Sections
Havana: US Interests Section, Calzada between L and M, Vedado. Tel. 33- 3551 through 33-3559. Principal Officer--Alan Flanigan Deputy Principal Officer--Vincent Mayer Consul--William H. Griffith Public Affairs Adviser--Gene Bigler Washington, DC: Cuban Interests Section, 2630 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20009. Tel. 202-797-8518. Principal Officer--Alfonso Fraga Perez Deputy Principal Officer--Miguel Nunez
GOVERNMENT
Cuba is a totalitarian state dominated by Fidel Castro, who is President of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Castro exercises control over nearly all aspects of Cuban life through a network of directorates ultimately responsible to him through the Cuban Communist Party. From January 1959 until December 1976, Castro ruled by decree. The 1976 constitution, extensively revised in July 1992, provides for a system of government in which the PCC is "the highest leading force of the society and state." The center of party power is the Politburo, which has 24 members, in addition to Fidel Castro and his brother, Raul Castro. There are 205 members in the Central Committee. Executive and administrative power is vested in the Council of Ministers; its president since 1959, Fidel Castro, is head of government. There are 10 other vice presidents on the Council of Ministers. Legislative authority rests with the National Assembly of People's Government, which meets for about 5 days per year. When the assembly is not in session, it is represented by the Council of State, of which Fidel Castro is the president and Raul Castro is first vice president. The PCC is Cuba's only legal political party. It monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. All pre-1959 political parties and political organizations have been abolished. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although non-party members have been elected to the National Assembly. Cuba's trade unions, women's federation, and youth and other mass organizations are controlled by the government and party. These organizations attempt to extend Cuban Government and PCC control over each citizen's daily activities at home, work, and school. The Cuban Communist Party is composed of the pre-revolution communist party which, along with two other political groups supporting the revolution, was absorbed into a new political entity formed by Castro in July 1961. Further refinements resulted in the emergence in late 1965 of the PCC. The party's Politburo and Central Committee together include most of the country's military and civilian leaders. In July 1992, the National Assembly convened for 3 days to amend the 1976 constitution. Changes included abolishing references to the former Soviet bloc; outlawing discrimination for religious beliefs; permitting foreign investment; giving Fidel Castro new emergency powers; and allowing direct elections to the National Assembly, although candidates will still be approved by quasi-governmental bodies, and campaigns will not be allowed. Cubans do not possess equal protection under the law, the right to choose freely government representatives, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, or freedom to travel to and from Cuba without restriction. The government and party control all electronic and print media. Cuba has no independent judiciary. Although the constitution specifies that the courts shall be "a system of state organs independent of all others," it explicitly subordinates the judiciary to the National Assembly and, thus, to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. Due process safeguards can be circumvented constitutionally, and defense attorneys face severe disadvantages under the Cuban judicial system. The Ministry of Interior ensures political and social conformity as well as internal security: It operates border and police forces, orchestrates public demonstrations, investigates evidence of non-conformity, regulates migration, and maintains pervasive vigilance through a network of informers and 80,000 block committees (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution--CDR). In practice, the top leadership determines the degree to which civil liberties are exercised. In February 1992, member states of the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) voted 23-8 (with 21 abstentions) to approve a resolution expressing "alarm at continuing reports of human rights abuses" and profound concern at "numerous uncontradicted reports of continued violations . . . of human rights." Cuba refused to cooperate with 1991 and 1992 UNHRC resolutions creating special envoys to investigate Cuba's human rights situation. Human rights activists continue to be the subject of arbitrary arrest, court procedures that violate even Cuban constitutional guarantees, and lengthy prison sentences based on the flimsiest of evidence.
Principal Government Officials
President, Council of State and Council of Ministers; First Secretary of the Communist Party; and Commander in Chief--Fidel Castro First Vice President, Council of State and Council of Ministers; Second Secretary of the Communist Party; General of the Army and Minister of Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)--Raul Castro Minister of Foreign Relations--Ricardo Alarcon Ambassador to the United Nations--Alcibiades Hidalgo
ECONOMY
Since the late 18th century, the Cuban economy has been dominated by sugar production and has prospered or suffered due to fluctuations in sugar prices. The Castro regime has been unable to break that pattern, and sugar accounts for about three-quarters of export earnings. Cuba's famous tobacco provides a second source of export earnings, but it is also subject to market forces. Cuba has never diversified from its basic monocultural economy despite some development of natural resources such as nickel, iron ore, copper and timber and a well-educated work force. For more than 30 years, the defects in Cuba's economy and the effects of the economic embargo imposed by the United States in 1962 were at least partially offset by heavy subsidies from the former Soviet Union and favorable trade relationships with the countries of the former Soviet bloc. But those supports ended abruptly with the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s and with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Cuba's break with its former patron and its failure to undertake needed reforms combined to produce an unprecedented economic crisis. Its economy is estimated to have declined by 40% from 1989 through 1992. The economic prospects are not good, largely because of the Castro regime's decision to maintain the state's highly centralized control over economic decision-making, the lack of inputs for industry, and the "Special Period in Peacetime," which relies upon strict rationing of food, fuel, and electricity. The "Special Period" gives priority to domestic food production, development of tourism, and biotechnology production. Responsibility for running the economy and for economic policy rests with the Council of State. Basic public services are provided by the state, either free of charge or for minimal fees. Access to education generally is adequate, but urban housing and medical care have deteriorated, as have communications and transportation. The Central Planning Board, working closely with the Banco Nacional de Cuba, directs nearly all economic activity and sets prices and targets for production, imports, and exports. Five-year plans have fallen into disuse with the advent of the "Special Period" and the disintegration of the trading relationship with the former Soviet bloc. The last 5-year plan was for 1986-1990. The state owns and operates most of Cuba's farms and all industrial enterprises. State farms occupy about 70% of farmland, while peasant cooperatives account for about 20%. Private farms account for about 10% of Cuba's agriculture. Cuba's manufacturing sector emphasizes import substitution and provision of basic industrial materials. In recent years, many Cuban firms have closed or reduced production because of shortages of foreign exchange and limited access to spare parts and imported components. Castro's efforts to diversify the economy and reduce Cuba's dependence on sugar exports in the country's international trade have been unsuccessful. Sugar continues to account for about 75% of export earnings, although sugar production and exports have declined over the past 5 years. Cuba specializes in the production of sugar byproducts and, to a lesser extent, light industry, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology. Tobacco and tobacco products traditionally have been Cuba's second-largest agricultural export. Other important crops include coffee and citrus. Cuba's light industrial sector, which grew in the 1970s and 1980s, has declined because of a lack of spare parts and components. Hard hit are the electrical power, food processing, cigar, chemical, petroleum, textile, and metallurgy industries. Cuba has three large oil refineries--two expropriated from US firms--and a recently completed refinery at Cienfuegos, built with Soviet technology and capital. The two older refineries are operating well below capacity, while the one at Cienfuegos has never opened. Traditionally, Cuba's mining sector has accounted for a significant part of export earnings. The country's nickel reserves are the fourth largest in the world. The ore is processed on the island in two formerly US-owned plants at Nicaro and Moa Bay. Plants are also located at Punta Gorda and Las Camariocas. Much of Cuba's transportation network was developed in pre-revolutionary Cuba to serve the sugar industry. The road network exceeds 30,000 kilometers (19,000 mi.), of which about half is paved. The island has a 14,640 kilometer (5,600 mi.) railway system. Buses are found throughout urban areas but are notoriously crowded and in disrepair. Public transport has been crippled by the lack of fuel. A significant portion of rural public transport is provided by horse and buggy, while in urban areas bicycles largely have replaced private vehicles. Havana is the most important of the country's 11 major ports. The national airline, Cubana de Aviacion, serves major cities in Cuba and a shrinking number of foreign cities in Europe and Latin America. Aero-Caribbean, a charter company formed in 1982, provides unscheduled passenger and cargo service to the Caribbean Basin and Western Europe. During the 1980s, more than 80% of Cuba's external trade was with the former Soviet bloc, of which the Soviet share normally was more than 70%. The Soviet Union alone imported 80% of all Cuban sugar and 40% of all Cuban citrus. Cuba's trade with the Soviet bloc involved use of non-convertible currencies. Annual trade protocols set the volume of goods to be exchanged between Cuba and these countries. This system was abandoned as the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union introduced market- oriented economic policies that affected trade with Cuba. Currently, Cuban trade with Russia is only a fraction of its trade with the former Soviet Union, which had subsidized Cuban oil imports. Cuban oil imports from the former Soviet Union of an estimated 13 million tons in 1989 have fallen to about 5 million tons in 1992 from all sources. An oil- for-sugar barter agreement with Russia was completed in June 1992. Russia has announced the end of all trade subsidies to Cuba. In November 1992, Cuba and Russia announced that agreements for trade, scientific, and maritime relations had been signed. Among the cooperative programs discussed was how to continue financing and construction of the Juragua, Cuba, nuclear power plant, begun in 1983 with the former Soviet Union. Completion of the power plant is a Cuban priority, but construction lagged during the 1980s and fell further behind schedule due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1992, Cuba suspended work because it could not afford the cost of Russian technical assistance. However, the November 1992 agreement between the two states would result in completion of the plant if a financier can be found for the nuclear safety and control equipment. Although Cuba is not a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a Latin American regional non- proliferation regime, it is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards normally applied to non-NPT parties. Cuba has entered into an agreement with the IAEA to apply safeguards to individual facilities including the Juragua power plant. The reactors that would be installed are of the VVER-400 type, an advanced model of the Soviet pressurized water reactor. They are not the same as those installed at Chernobyl. In addition, the Cuban reactors are housed in a reinforced concrete containment dome. The United States has imposed a comprehensive trade embargo on Cuba. Legislation signed into law in October 1992 revoked Treasury authority to issue licenses for most US subsidiary trade with Cuba and bans for 180 days vessels which have entered a Cuban port from loading or unloading in US ports. The legislation provides support for the Cuban people by permitting licensing for "efficient and adequate" telecommunications and for humanitarian donations to non-governmental organizations in Cuba. With the loss of trade and aid from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Cuba has attempted to attract foreign investment and Western buyers for its sugar and nickel, as well as for its biotech products. Except in tourism, Cuba has had limited success in attracting investors because of the deterioration of the economy, its unpaid debt to Western countries, and the lack of clear titles to expropriated property. In 1990, tourism generated $325 million; most of the visitors came from Western Europe and Canada. Since July 1986, Cuba has not serviced its roughly $7-billion debt owed to Western, mainly governmental, creditors. Consequently, Cuba has not received rescheduling either from the Paris Club (an association of international governmental lenders) or from private institutions. Cuba is not servicing its debts to Russia--perhaps as high as $20 billion--or to Eastern Europe.
"Rectification" Policy
In April 1986, Castro called for "rectification of errors and negative tendencies" and mandated the observance of strict Marxist orthodoxy in running the economy. The policy, which continues today, is the antithesis of the Soviet perestroika (restructuring) concept. "Rectification" emphasizes centralized direction over market forces and moral and ideological, as opposed to material, incentives to spur productivity. It calls upon Cubans to make greater sacrifices to further the collective good. In 1986, as a part of the "rectification" effort, the government closed farmers' markets through which some people had been able to sell produce grown on their own garden plots at uncontrolled prices since 1980. It also sought to eliminate many bonuses and overtime pay for workers. The Castro Government encourages voluntary labor, in the form of "micro-brigades" and "contingents," especially in the construction sector, and has tried to reduce corruption and black marketeering.
"Special Period"
In October 1990, Castro announced that Cuba had entered a "special period in time of peace" and that the economy would function as if in time of war until the crisis had passed. Cubans are feeling the effects of the end of Havana's special relationship with Moscow. Most goods are now rationed, and many previously imported from the Soviet Union simply have disappeared. Total Cuban imports in 1992 are expected to be less than 60% of the 1989 total. Economic production may have decreased by more than 40% from 1989 to 1992. Underemployment, a chronic problem, has worsened with the idling of thousands of industrial workers whose jobs depended on inputs from abroad. Labor has been shifted to agriculture to compensate for fuel and machinery shortages affecting food and production. Education and medical care generally are accessible, although both have been affected by nationwide austerity. Many pharmaceutical products are in short supply or unavailable. Urban housing, as well as transportation and communications services, remain seriously inadequate. Havana's bus system, for example, has reduced service by more than 40% in the last 2 years.
DEFENSE
Under Castro, Cuba has become one of the most highly militarized societies in the world. In Latin America, only Brazil, with a population more than 12 times that of Cuba, has a larger military. In 1958, in the middle of an insurrection, Cuba's armed forces numbered 46,000. Today, the Revolutionary Armed Forces contain about 270,000 active duty and ready reserves--235,000 army, 17,000 air force/air defense, and 13,500 navy, plus some military units under the Ministry of Interior. More than 1 million Cubans belong to the country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army. Cuba's military establishment is considered to be one of the most modern in the region. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build- up during the 1962 missile crisis. In 1990, Cuba's air force, with about 150 Soviet-supplied fighters, including advanced MiG-23 Floggers and MiG-29 Fulcrums, was probably the best equipped in Latin America. The Cuban army has more than 1,000 Soviet-supplied T-62 and T-54/55 main battle tanks. Cuban military power has been drastically reduced by the loss of the special relationship between the former Soviet Union and Cuba. Lack of fuel has resulted in reduced training and military exercises. Lack of spare parts and new materiel has resulted in the moth-balling of planes, tanks, and other military equipment. Due to the end of the Cold War, Cuban forces are no longer used as a surrogate for Soviet geopolitical objectives. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 8, February 22, 1993 Title:

Country Profile: Cuba

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 22 19932/22/93 Category: Country Data Region: North America Country: Colombia Subject: Trade/Economics, Cultural Exchange, History [TEXT]
Official Name: Republic of Cuba
People
Nationality: Noun--Cuban(s); adjective--Cuban. Population: 10.8 million; 70% urban, 30% rural. Avg. annual growth rate: 1%. Density: 97/sq. km. (244/sq. mi.). Ethnic groups: Spanish-African mixture. Language: Spanish. Education: Compulsory--6 years. Attendance: 92% (ages 6-16). Literacy: 99%. Health: Infant mortality rate--12/1,000. Life expectancy--77 years for women, 74 years for men. Work force: 3.6 million; 30% government and services, 22% industry, 20% agriculture, 11% commerce, 10% construction, 7% transportation and communications (June 1990).
Geography
Area: 110,860 sq. km. (44,200 sq. mi.); about the size of Pennsylvania. Capital: Havana (pop. 2 million). Other cities: Santiago de Cuba, Camaguey, Santa Clara, Holguin, Guantanamo, Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Pinar del Rio. Terrain: Flat or gently rolling plains, hills, mountains up to 2,000 meters (6,000 ft.) in the southeast. Climate: Tropical, moderated by trade winds; dry season (November-April); rainy season (May-October).
Government
Type: Communist state; current government assumed power January 1, 1959. Independence: May 20, 1902. Constitution: February 24, 1976. Branches: Executive--President, Council of Ministers. Legislative-- National Assembly of People's Government. Judicial--People's Supreme Court. Political party: Cuban Communist Party (PCC). Suffrage: All citizens age 16 and older, except those who have applied for permanent emigration. Indirect National Assembly elections were held in 1986. Administrative subdivisions: 14 provinces including the city of Havana, and one special municipality (Isle of Youth). Flag: White star centered on red triangle at staff side, three blue and two white horizontal bands.
Economy
Gross social product (This economic measure is not convertible to GNP/GDP) (1991 est.): $21 billion. Real annual growth rate: -20% (1991). Per capita income: $1,500. Natural resources: Nickel, cobalt, iron ore, copper, manganese, salt, timber. Agriculture: Products--sugar, citrus and tropical fruits, tobacco, coffee, rice, beans, meat, and vegetables. Industry: Types--sugar, food processing, oil refining, cement, electric power, light consumer and industrial products. Trade: Exports--$3.6 billion (f.o.b. 1991): Sugar and its by-products, petroleum, nickel, seafood, citrus, tobacco products, rum. Major markets in 1991: former USSR 63%; OECD 17%; China 6%. Imports--$3.7 billion (c.i.f. 1991): Capital goods, industrial raw materials, food, petroleum, consumer goods. Major suppliers in 1991: former USSR 47%; OECD 24%; China 6%. Official exchange rate: 1 Cuban peso=US $1 for trade. 1 Cuban peso=US $1.33 for tourists and diplomats. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 8, February 22, 1993 Title:

Fact Sheet: Council of Europe

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 22 19932/22/93 Category: Country Data Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe Country: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Cyprus, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Turkey, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Malta, Poland, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, Israel, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic Subject: Trade/Economics, Cultural Exchange, History, EC, Human Rights [TEXT]
Background
The Council of Europe is the oldest European post-World War II organization. It was founded in 1949 to encourage greater European unity and cooperation, pluralistic democracy, and human rights. The location of its headquarters on the French-German border in Strasbourg, France, symbolized post-war reconciliation. The Council includes the 12 members of the European Community (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom), as well as Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Poland, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Israel is an observer. The Council is perhaps best known for its work in developing a multilateral system of human rights safeguards and for its contributions in harmonizing European laws and policies with more than 140 intergovernmental conventions. The Council's most important responsibility is the enforcement of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, which all member states must ratify. The Council also gives priority to other areas, such as promoting pluralist democracy, enhancing Europe's cultural identity, harmonizing legal practices, and protecting the environment and social welfare. As Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) develop democratic institutions, a primary focus of the Council over the next several years will be on aiding that transition and expanding its membership as newly democratized states meet the Council's requirements. Hungary became a full member on November 6, 1990, the first formerly communist state to meet the Council of Europe's admission criteria of pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law. Poland and the former Czechoslovakia became full members in 1991, followed by Bulgaria in 1992. With the January 1, 1993, dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the successor states of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic now have "special guest" status and await full membership.
Structure
The Council includes the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, the European Commission of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights--all supported by a 900-member secretariat. Each of the Council's 26 member countries is represented on the Committee of Ministers by a permanent representative with the rank of ambassador. The committee, the main decision-making body, meets for 1 week each month and at least twice a year at the foreign minister level to discuss matters of common concern to Europe. Many committees of experts work to harmonize European laws and regulations and to formulate European and international conventions. The Parliamentary Assembly, composed of 202 national representatives selected by member-state legislatures, holds four plenary sessions each year. The assembly has no major decision-making power but is a significant voice within Europe on regional and international issues. The Commission on Human Rights and the Court of Human Rights serve as a multilateral system to safeguard European civil and political rights.
Relations With the European Community
The growing authority during the 1980s of the European Community (EC) over a wide range of economic, technical, and political matters sparked concern about the possible division of Europe into community and non- community states. In response, the Colombo Commission, created in 1985, urged closer cooperation between the EC and the Council, reinforced Council activities among its members, and expanded contacts between the Council and Eastern Europe and between the Council and the United States. In 1989, the EC and the Council began to hold regular "quadripartite" meetings including the Council's Secretary General, its chair of the Committee of Ministers, and the presidents of the Council of Europe and the EC Commission. Working-level contacts between the EC and the Council of Europe also have increased. A joint statement issued at the October 1990 quadripartite meeting in Venice gave the Council the leading role in welcoming Central and East European states back into the European family. Leaders of the two organizations also pledged to explore ways to bring Council members who are not in the EC closer to European political cooperation. The Council expanded its own activities on subjects such as terrorism, narcotics, and the environment. In 1989, it opened for signature a convention on cross-border broadcasting and, in 1990, conventions on international bankruptcy and on the seizure of the proceeds of crime. The Council continues to be a principal European forum for social, legal, health, and environmental affairs.
Relations With Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS
In a policy declaration issued on its 40th anniversary, May 5, 1989, the Council underlined its role as a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe as well as between EC members and non-members. Then Soviet President Gorbachev addressed the Council's Parliamentary Assembly in July 1989. By January 1993, Albania, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine had been granted "special guest" status in the Parliamentary Assembly and were being initiated step-by-step into selected intergovernmental activities. Most of these countries expressed interest in full membership. (The former Yugoslavia's special guest status was suspended in 1992.) By policy and statute, Council membership requires governments to practice pluralistic democracy and to respect human rights and the rule of law. The Council established a program, Project Demosthenes, for preparing new democracies to meet its standards.
Activities Beyond Europe
The Council's Parliamentary Assembly takes an active role in fostering the worldwide development of democracy. Together with the European Parliament, the assembly sponsors major international conferences on parliamentary democracy in Strasbourg, with the next scheduled for 1995, and annual regional conferences such as the one held in Guatemala in 1992. The United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are active partners in organizing this endeavor, which created the Strasbourg-based International Institute for Democracy in 1989. As an offshoot of its North- South campaign, the Council established in 1990 a Lisbon-based center to promote awareness of global interdependence. The Council has worked to strengthen its relations in the West as well as the East and is open to closer cooperation with the United States and Canada. On several occasions during 1990, it offered its resources and expertise to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, particularly for activities related to the human dimension. In this regard, the Council has proposed that its Parliamentary Assembly form the basis for a CSCE parliamentary body. The United States recently gained observer status in the Council's European Commission for Democracy Through Law and has participated in meetings on human rights, migration, minorities, data protection, and narcotics. It is a signatory to the Council's convention on repatriation of prisoners and has participated in the development of others on use of drugs in sports and seizure of the proceeds from crime. Council Secretary General Catherine Lalumiere met with President Bush in 1992, and a delegation from the assembly's Political Affairs Committee visited Washington, DC, in March 1990. The Council assembly invites US Members of Congress to attend at least one plenary session each year. It seeks closer relations with the United States and the other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 8, February 22, 1993 Title:

Fact Sheet: Who Belongs To What

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 22 19932/22/93 Category: Country Data Category: Fact Sheets Region: Whole World Subject: International Organizations [TEXT] Membership by country in selected international organizations.
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)
participating economies 15 members: Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Thailand, United States
Arab League
20 members: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Arab Maghreb Union
5 members: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
6 members: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
Cairns Group
(Named after a town in Australia where the group first met in August 1986.) 13 members: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)
11 members: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls)
17 members: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
Common Market
--See European Community
Council of Baltic Sea States
10 members, plus EC Commission: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden
Council of Europe
26 members, plus EC Commission: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe)
53 members, plus EC Commission: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia (participation suspended)
EC (European Community)
12 members: Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom
EFTA (European Free Trade Association)
7 members: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)
6 members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
Group of 5
5 members: France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States
Group of 7
7 members, plus EC Commission: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States
Group of 24
--Same members as OECD
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
16 members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council)
38 members: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan
Nordic Council
5 members: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden
OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries)
11 members: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates
OAS (Organization of American States)
35 members: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (participation suspended), Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela
OAU (Organization of African Unity)
51 members: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'lvoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)
24 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)
48 members: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijian, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgystan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)
12 members: Algeria, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela
WEU (Western European Union)
10 members: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 8, February 22, 1993 Title:

New Ambassadors: October-December 1992

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 22 19932/22/93 Category: Ambassadorial Appointments Region: Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa Subject: State Department [TEXT]
Benin
--Ruth A. Davis, October 8, 1992
Cape Verde
--Joseph Monroe Segars, December 4, 1992
Central African Republic
--Robert E. Gribbin III, November 25, 1992
Oman
--David J. Dunford, October 23, 1992
United Arab Emirates
--William Arthur Rugh, October 16, 1992 (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 9, March 1, 1993

Title:

American Leadership And Global Change

Clinton Source: President Clinton Description: Address at the Centennial Celebration, American University, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 26 19932/26/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States, Russia Subject: Democratization, Science/Technology, Trade/Economics, Environment [TEXT] (opening remarks deleted) Thirty years ago in the last year of his short but brilliant life, John Kennedy came to this university to address the paramount challenge of that time: the imperative of pursuing peace in the face of nuclear confrontation. Many Americans still believe it was the finest speech he ever delivered. Today, I come to this same place to deliver an address about what I consider to be the great challenge of this day: the imperative of American leadership in the face of global change. Over the past year, I have tried to speak at some length about what we must do to update our definition of national security and to promote it and to protect it--and to foster democracy and human rights around the world. Today, I want to allude to those matters but to focus on the economic leadership we must exert at home and abroad as a new global economy unfolds before our eyes. Twice before in this century, history has asked the United States and other great powers to provide leadership for a world ravaged by war. After World War I, that call went unheeded. Britain was too weakened to lead the world to reconstruction. The United States was too unwilling. The great powers together turned inward as violent, totalitarian power emerged. We raised trade barriers. We sought to humiliate rather than rehabilitate the vanquished. And the result was instability, inflation, then depression and, ultimately, a second world war. After the second war, we refused to let history repeat itself. Led by a great American President, Harry Truman, a man of very common roots but uncommon vision, we drew together with other Western powers to reshape a new era. We established NATO to oppose the aggression of communism. We rebuilt the American economy with investments like the GI Bill and a national highway system. We carried out the Marshall Plan to rebuild war- ravaged nations abroad. General MacArthur's vision prevailed in Japan, which built a massive economy and a remarkable democracy. We built new institutions to foster peace and prosperity--the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and more. These actions helped to usher in four decades of robust economic growth and collective security. Yet the Cold War was a draining time. We devoted trillions of dollars to it, much more than many of our more visionary leaders thought we should have. We posted our sons and daughters around the world. We lost tens of thousands of them in the defense of freedom and in the pursuit of a containment of communism. We, my generation, grew up going to school assemblies, learning about what we would do in the event a nuclear war broke out. We were taught to practice ducking under our desks and praying that somehow they might shield us from nuclear radiation. We all learned about whether we needed a bomb shelter in our neighborhood to which we could run in the event that two great superpowers rained nuclear weapons on one another. And that fate, frankly, seemed still frighteningly possible just months before President Kennedy came here to speak in 1963. Now, thanks to his leadership and that of every American president since the Second World War from Harry Truman to George Bush, the Cold War is over. The Soviet Union itself has disintegrated. The nuclear shadow is receding in the face of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] I and START II agreements and others that we have made and others yet to come. Democracy is on the march everywhere in the world. It is a new day and a great moment for America. Yet, across America I hear people raising central questions about our place and our prospects in this new world we have done so much to make. They ask: Will we and our children really have good jobs, first-class opportunities, world-class education, quality affordable health care, safe streets? After having fully defended freedom's ramparts, they want to know if we will share in freedom's bounty. One of the young public school students [American University] President Duffey just introduced was part of the children's program that I did last Saturday with children from around America. If you saw their stories, so many of them raised troubling questions about our capacity to guarantee the fruits of the American dream to all of our own people. I believe we can do that, and I believe we must. For in a new global economy, still recovering from the after-effects of the Cold War, a prosperous America is not only good for Americans, as the prime minister of Great Britain reminded me just a couple of days ago, it is absolutely essential for the prosperity of the rest of the world. Washington can no longer remain caught in the death grip of gridlock, governed by an outmoded ideology that says change is to be resisted, the status quo is to be preserved like King Canute ordering the tide to recede. We cannot do that. And so, my fellow Americans, I submit to you that we stand at the third great moment of decision in the 20th century. Will we repeat the mistakes of the 1920s or the 1930s by turning inward, or will we repeat the successes of the 1940s and the 1950s by reaching outward and improving ourselves as well? I say that if we set a new direction at home, we can set a new direction for the world as well. The change confronting us in the 1990s is in some ways more difficult than previous times because it is less distinct. It is more complex and in some ways the path is less clear to most of our people still today, even after 20 years of declining relative productivity and a decade or more of stagnant wages and greater effort. The world clearly remains a dangerous place. Ethnic hatreds, religious strife, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the violation of human rights flagrantly in altogether too many places around the world still call on us to have a sense of national security in which our national defense is an integral part. And the world still calls on us to promote democracy, for even though democracy is on the march in many places in the world, you and I know that it has been thwarted in many places, too. And yet we still face, overarching everything else, this amorphous but profound challenge in the way humankind conducts its commerce. We cannot let these changes in the global economy carry us passively toward a future of insecurity and instability. For change is the law of life. Whether you like it or not, the world will change much more rapidly in your lifetime than it has in mine. It is absolutely astonishing the speed with which the sheer volume of knowledge in the world is doubling every few years. And a critical issue before us, and especially before the young people here in this audience, is whether you will grow up in a world where change is your friend or your enemy. We must challenge the changes now engulfing our world toward America's enduring objectives of peace and prosperity, of democracy and human dignity. And we must work to do it at home and abroad. It is important to understand the monumental scope of these changes. When I was growing up, business was mostly a local affair. Most farms and firms were owned locally, they borrowed locally, they hired locally, they shipped most of their products to neighboring communities or states within the United States. It was the same for the country as a whole. By and large, we had a domestic economy. But now we are woven inextricably into the fabric of a global economy. Imports and exports, which accounted for about 1 in 10 dollars when I was growing up, now represent 1 dollar in every 5. Nearly three-quarters of the things that we make in America are subject to competition at home or abroad from foreign producers and foreign providers of services. Whether we see it or not, our daily lives are touched everywhere by the flows of commerce that cross national borders as inexorably as the weather. Capital clearly has become global. Some $3 trillion of capital race around the world every day. And when a firm wants to build a new factory, it can turn to financial markets now open 24 hours a day, from London to Tokyo, from New York to Singapore. Products have clearly become more global. Now, if you buy an American car, it may be an American car built with some parts from Taiwan, designed by Germans, sold with British-made advertisements, or a combination of others in a different mix. Services have become global. The accounting firm that keeps the books for a small business in Wichita may also be helping new entrepreneurs in Warsaw. And the same fast food restaurant that your family goes to--or at least that I go to--also may well be serving families from Manila to Moscow, and managing its business globally with information, technologies, and satellites. And most important of all, information has become global and has become king of the global economy. In earlier history, wealth was measured in land, in gold, in oil, in machines. Today, the principal measure of our wealth is information--its quality, its quantity, and the speed with which we acquire it and adapt to it. We need, more than anything else, to measure our wealth and our potential by what we know and what we can learn, and what we can do with it. The value and volume of information has soared; the half-life of new ideas has trumped. Just a few days ago, I was out in Silicon Valley at a remarkable company called Silicon Graphics that has expanded exponentially, partly by developing computer software with a life of 12 months to 18 months, knowing that it will be obsolete after that, and always being ready with a new product to replace it. We are in a constant race toward innovation that will not end in the lifetime of anyone in this room. What all this means is that the best investment we can make today is in the one resource firmly rooted in our own borders. That is, in the education, the skills, the reasoning capacity, and the creativity of our own people. For all the adventure and opportunity in this global economy, an American cannot approach it without mixed feelings. We still sometimes wish wistfully that everything we really want, particularly those things that produce good wages, could be made in America. We recall simpler times when one product line would be made to endure and last for years. We're angry when we see jobs and factories moving overseas or across the borders or depressing wages here at home when we think there is nothing we can do about it. We worry about our own prosperity being so dependent on events and forces beyond our shores. Could it be that the world's most powerful nation has also given up a significant measure of its sovereignty in the quest to lift the fortunes of people throughout the world? It is ironic and even painful that the global village we have worked so hard to create has done so much to be the source of higher unemployment and lower wages for some of our people. But that is no wonder. For years, our leaders have failed to take the steps that would harness the global economy to the benefit of all of our people. Steps such as investing in our people and their skills, enforcing our trade laws, helping communities hurt by change-- in short, putting the American people first without withdrawing from the world and people beyond our borders. The truth of our age is this--and must be this: Open and competitive commerce will enrich us as a nation. It spurs us to innovate. It forces us to compete. It connects us with new customers. It promotes global growth without which no rich country can hope to grow wealthier. It enables our producers, who are themselves consumers of services and raw materials, to prosper. And so I say to you, in the face of all the pressures to do the reverse, we must compete, not retreat. Our exports are especially important to us. As bad as the recent recession was, it would have gone on for twice as long had it not been for what we were able to sell to other nations. Every $1 billion of our exports creates nearly 20,000 jobs here, and we now have over 7 million export-related jobs in America. They tend to involve better work and better pay. Most are in manufacturing and, on average, they pay almost $3,500 more per year than the average American job. They are exactly the kind of jobs we need for a new generation of Americans. American jobs and prosperity are reason enough for us to be working at mastering the essentials of the global economy. But far more is at stake. For this new fabric of commerce will also shape global prosperity or the lack of it, and with it, the prospects of people around the world for democracy, freedom and peace. We must remember that even with all our problems today, the United States is still the world's strongest engine of growth and progress. We remain the world's largest producer and its largest and most open market. Other nations, such as Germany and Japan, are moving rapidly. They have done better than we have in certain areas. We should respect them for it, and where appropriate, we should learn from that. But we must also say to them, you, too, must act as engines of global prosperity. Nonetheless, the fact is that for now and for the foreseeable future, the world looks to us to be the engine of global growth and to be the leaders. Our leadership is especially important for the world's new and emerging democracies. To grow and deepen their legitimacy, to foster a middle class and a civic culture, they need the ability to tap into a growing global economy. And our security and our prosperity will be greatly affected in the years ahead by how many of these nations can become and stay democracies. All you have to do to know that is to look at the problems in Somalia, to look at Bosnia, to look at the other trouble spots in the world. If we could make a garden of democracy and prosperity and free enterprise in every part of this globe, the world would be a safer and a better and a more prosperous place for the United States and for all of you to raise your children in. Let us not minimize the difficulty of this task. Democracy's prospects are dimmed, especially in the developing world by trade barriers and slow global growth. Even though 60 developing nations have reduced their trade barriers in recent years, when you add up the sum of their collective actions, 20 of the 24 developed nations have actually increased their trade barriers in recent years. This is a powerful testament to the painful difficulty of trying to maintain a high-wage economy in a global economy where production is mobile and can quickly fly to a place with low wages. We have got to focus on how to help our people adapt to these changes, how to maintain a high-wage economy in the United States without ourselves adding to the protectionist direction that so many of the developed nations have taken in the last few years. These barriers in the end will cost the developing world more in lost exports and incomes than all the foreign assistance that developed nations provide, but after that they will begin to undermine our economic prosperity as well. It's more than a matter of incomes, I remind you--it's a matter of culture and stability. Trade, of course, cannot ensure the survival of new democracies, and we have seen the enduring power of ethnic hatred, the incredible power of ethnic divisions--even among people literate and allegedly understanding--to splinter democracy and to savage the nation state. But as philosophers from Thucydides to Adam Smith have noted, the habits of commerce run counter to the habits of war. Just as neighbors who raise each other's barns are less likely to become arsonists, people who raise each other's living standards through commerce are less likely to become combatants. So if we believe in the bonds of democracy, we must resolve to strengthen the bonds of commerce. Our own nation has the greatest potential to benefit from the emerging economy, but to do so we have to confront the obstacles that stand in our way. Many of our trading partners cling to unfair practices. Protectionist voices here at home and abroad call for new barriers. Indifferent policies have left too many of our workers and communities exposed to the harsh winds of trade without letting them share in the sheltering prosperity trade has also brought, and without helping them in any way to build new ways to work so they can be rewarded for their efforts in global commerce. Cooperation among the major powers toward world growth is not working well at all today. And most of all, we simply haven't done enough to prepare our own people and to produce our own resources so that we can face with success the rigors of the new world. We can change all that if we have the will to do it. Leonardo da Vinci said that God sells all things at the price of labor. Our labor must be to make this change. I believe there are five steps we can and must take to set a new direction at home and to help create a new direction for the world. First, we simply have to get our own economic house in order. I have outlined a new national economic strategy that will give America the new direction we require to meet our challenges. It seeks to do what no generation of Americans has ever been called upon to do before: to increase investment in our productive future, and to reduce our deficit at the same time. We must do both. A plan that only plays down the deficit without investing in those things that make us more productive will not make us stronger. A plan that only invests more money without bringing down the deficit will weaken the fabric of our overall economy such that even educated and productive people cannot succeed in it. It is more difficult to do both. The challenges are more abrasive--you have to cut more other spending and raise more other taxes. But it is essential that we do both--invest so that we can compete; bring down the debt so that we can compete. The future of the American dream and the fate of our economy and much of the world's economy hangs in the balance on what happens in this city in the next few months. Already the voices of inertia and self-interest have said, well, we shouldn't do this or this, or that detail is wrong with that plan. But almost no one has taken up my original challenge that anyone who has any specific ideas about how we can cut more should simply come forward with them. I am genuinely open to new ideas to cut inessential spending and to make the kinds of dramatic changes in the way government works that all of us know we have to make. I don't care whether they come from Republicans or Democrats or I don't even care whether they come from home or abroad. I don't care who gets the credit, but I do care that we not vary from our determination to pass a plan that increases investment and reduces the deficit. I think every one of you who is a student at this university has a far bigger stake in the future than I do. I have lived in all probability more than half my life with benefits far beyond anything I ever dreamed or deserve because my country worked. And I want my country to work for you. The plan I have offered is assuredly not perfect, but it is an honest and bold attempt to honestly confront the challenges before us, to secure the foundations of our economic growth, to expand the resources, the confidence, and the moral suasion we need to continue our global leadership into the next century. And I plead with all of you to do everything you can to replace the blame game that has dominated this city too long with the bigger game of competing and winning in the global economy. Second, it is time for us to make trade a priority element of American security. For too long, debates over trade have been dominated by voices from the extremes. One says government should build walls to protect firms from competition. Another says government should do nothing in the face of foreign competition, no matter what the dimension and shape of that competition is, no matter what the consequences are in terms of job losses, trade dislocations, or crushed incomes. Neither view takes on the hard work of creating a more open trading system that enables us and our trading partners to prosper. Neither steps up to the task of empowering our workers to compete or of ensuring that there is some compact of shared responsibility regarding trade's impact on our people, or of guaranteeing a continuous flow of investment into emerging areas of new technology which will create the high-wage jobs of the 21st century. Our Administration is now developing a comprehensive trade policy that will step up to those challenges. And I want to describe the principles upon which it will rest. It will not be a policy of blame, but one of responsibility. It will say to our trading partners that we value their business, but none of us should expect something for nothing. We will continue to welcome foreign products and services into our markets but insist that our products and services be able to enter theirs on equal terms. We will welcome foreign investment in our businesses knowing that with it come new ideas as well as capital--new technologies, new management techniques, and new opportunities for us to learn from one another and grow. But as we welcome that investment, we insist that our investors should be equally welcome in other countries. We welcome the subsidiaries of foreign companies on our soil. We appreciate the jobs they create and the products and services they bring. But we do insist simply that they pay the same taxes on the same income that our companies do for doing the same business. Our trade policy will be part of an integrated economic program, not just something we use to compensate for the lack of a domestic agenda. We must enforce our trade laws and our agreements with all the tools and energy at our disposal. But there is much about our competitive posture that simply cannot be straightened out by trade retaliation. Better- educated and trained workers, a lower deficit, stable, low interest rates, a reformed health care system, world-class technologies, revived cities: these must be the steel of our competitive edge. And there must be a continuing quest by business and labor and, yes, by government for higher and higher and higher levels of productivity. Too many of the chains that have hobbled us in world trade have been made in America. Our trade policy will also bypass the distracting debates over whether efforts should be multilateral, regional, bilateral, unilateral. The fact is that each of these efforts has its place. Certainly we need to seek to open other nations' markets and to establish clear and enforceable rules on which to expand trade. That is why I'm committed to a prompt and successful completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks. That round has dragged on entirely too long. But it still holds the potential, if other nations do their share and we do ours to boost American wages and living standards significantly and to do the same for other nations around the world. We also know that regional and bilateral agreements provide opportunities to explore new kinds of trade concerns, such as how trade relates to policies affecting the environment and labor standards and the antitrust laws. And these agreements, once concluded, can act as a magnet, inducing other countries to drop barriers and to open their trading systems. The North American Free Trade Agreement is a good example. It began as an agreement with Canada, which I strongly supported, which has now led to a pact with Mexico as well. That agreement holds the potential to create many, many jobs in America over the next decade if it is joined with others to ensure that the environment, that living standards, that working conditions, are honored--that we can literally know that we are going to raise the condition of people in America and in Mexico. We have a vested interest in a wealthier, stronger Mexico, but we need to do it on terms that are good for our people. And we should work with organizations, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, to liberalize our trade across the Pacific as well. And let me [talk] just a moment about this. I am proud of the contribution America has made to prosperity in Asia and to the march of democracy. I have seen it in Japan after World War II. I have seen it, then, in Taiwan as a country became more progressive and less repressive at the same time. I have seen it in Korea as a country has become more progressive and more open. And we are now making a major contribution to the astonishing revitalization of the Chinese economy, now growing at 10% a year, with the United States buying a huge percentage of those imports. And I say I want to continue that partnership, but I also think we have a right to expect progress in human rights and democracy and should support that progress. Third, it is time for us to do our best to exercise leadership among the major financial powers to improve our coordination on behalf of global economic growth. At a time when capital is mobile and highly fungible, we simply cannot afford to work at cross-purposes with the other major industrial democracies. Our major partners must work harder and more closely with us to reduce interest rates, stimulate investment, reduce structural barriers to trade and to restore robust global growth. And we must look anew at institutions we use to chart our way in the global economy and ask whether they are serving our interests in this new world, or whether we need to modify them or create others. Tomorrow, our Treasury secretary, Secretary Bentsen, and the Federal Reserve Board chairman, Alan Greenspan, will meet with their counterparts from these Group of Seven nations to begin that work. And I look forward to meeting with the G-7 heads of state and the representatives of the European Community at our Tokyo summit in July. I am especially hopeful that by then our economic package here at home will have been substantially enacted by the Congress. And if that is so, I will be able to say to my counterparts, you have been telling us for years that America must reduce its debt and put its own house in order. You have been saying to us for years we must increase investment in our own education and technology to improve productivity. We have done it. We have done it for ourselves, we have done it for you, now you must work with us in Germany and Japan and other nations to promote global growth. We have to work with these nations. None of us are very good at it. America doesn't want to give up its prerogatives. The Japanese don't want to give up theirs. The Germans don't want to give up theirs. There are deep and ingrained traditions in all these nations. But the fact is that the world can't grow if America is in recession, but it will be difficult for us to grow coming out of this recovery unless we can spark a renewed round of growth in Europe and in Japan. We have got to try to work more closely together. Fourth, we need to promote the steady expansion of growth in the developing world, not only because it's in our interests, but because it will help them as well. These nations are a rapidly expanding market for our products-- some 3 million American jobs flow from exports to the developing world. Indeed, because of unilateral actions taken by Mexico over the last few years, the volume of our trade has increased dramatically, and our trade deficit has disappeared. Our ability to protect the global environment and our ability to combat the flow of illegal narcotics also rests in large measure on the relationships we develop commercially with the developing world. There is a great deal that we can do to open the flow of goods and services. Our aid policies must do more to address population pressures; to support environmentally responsible, sustainable development; to promote more accountable government--and to foster a fair distribution of the fruits of growth among an increasingly restive world population--where over 1 billion people still exist on barely $1 a day. These efforts will reap us dividends of trade, of friendship and peace. The fifth step we must take, my fellow Americans, is toward the success of democracy in Russia and in the world's other new democracies. The perils facing Russia and other former Soviet republics are especially acute and especially important to our future. For the reductions in our defense spending that are an important part of our economic program over the long run here at home are only tenable as long as Russia and the other nuclear republics pose a diminishing threat to our security and to the security of our allies and the democracies throughout the world. Most worrisome is Russia's precarious economic condition. If the economic reforms begun by President Yeltsin are abandoned, if hyperinflation cannot be stemmed, the world will suffer. Consider the implications for Europe if millions of Russian citizens decide they have no alternative but to flee to the West where wages are 50 times higher. Consider the implication for the global environment if all the Chernobyl-style nuclear plants are forced to start operating there without spare parts, when we should be in a phased stage of building them and shutting them down--building them down, closing them up, cleaning them up. If we are willing to spend trillions of dollars to ensure communism's defeat in the Cold War, surely we should be willing to invest a tiny fraction of that to support democracy's success where communism failed. To be sure, the former Soviet republics, and especially Russia, must be willing to assume most of the hard work and high cost of the reconstruction process. But then again, remember that the Marshall Plan itself financed only a small fraction of postwar investments in Europe. It was a magnet, a beginning, a confidence-building measure, a way of starting a process that turned out to produce an economic miracle. Like Europe then, these republics now have a wealth of resources and talent and potential. And with carefully targeted assistance, conditioned on progress toward reform and arms control and non-proliferation, we can improve our own security and our future prosperity at the same time we extend democracy's reach. These five steps constitute an agenda for American action in a global economy. As such, they constitute an agenda for our own prosperity as well. Some may wish we could pursue our own domestic effort strictly through domestic policies, as we have understood them in the past. But in this global economy, there is no such thing as a purely domestic policy. This thing we call the global economy is unruly; it's a bucking bronco that often lands with its feet on different sides of old lines, and sometimes with its whole body on us. But if we are to ride the bronco into the next century, we must harness the whole horse, not just part of it. I know there are those in this country, in both political parties and all across the land, who say that we should not try to take this ride, that these goals are too ambitious, that we should withdraw and focus only on those things which we have to do at home. But I believe that would be a sad mistake and a great loss. For the new world toward which we are moving actually favors us. We are better equipped than any other people on earth by reason of our history, our culture and our disposition, to change, to lead, and to prosper. The experience of the last few years where we have stubbornly refused to make the adjustments [that] we need to compete and win are actually atypical and unusual seen against the backdrop of our nation's history. Look now at our immigrant nation and think of the world toward which we are tending. Look at how diverse and multi-ethnic and multi-lingual we are- -in a world in which the ability to communicate with all kinds of people from all over the world and to understand them will be critical. Look at our civic habits of tolerance and respect. They are not perfect in our own eyes. It grieved us all when there was so much trouble a year ago in Los Angeles. But Los Angeles is a [city] with 150 different ethnic groups of widely differing levels of education and access to capital and income. It is a miracle that we get along as well as we do. And all you have to do is to look at Bosnia, where the differences were not so great, to see how well we have done in spite of all of our difficulties. And look at the way our culture has merged technology and values. This is an expressive land that produced CNN and MTV. We were all born for the information age. This is a jazzy nation, thank goodness, for my sake. It created be-bop and hip-hop and all those other things. We are wired for real time. And we have always been a nation of pioneers. Consider the astonishing outpouring of support for the challenges I laid down last week in an economic program that violates every American's narrow special interest if you just take part of it out and look at it. And, yet, here we are again, ready to accept a new challenge, ready to seek new change because we're curious and restless and bold. It flows out of our heritage. It's ingrained in the soul of Americans. It's no accident that our nation has steadily expanded the frontiers of democracy, of religious tolerance, of racial justice, of equality for all people, of environmental protection and technology and, indeed, the cosmos itself. For it is our nature to reach out, and reaching out has served not only ourselves, but the world as well. Now, together, it is time for us to reach out again. Toward tomorrow's economy. Toward a better future. Toward a new direction. Toward securing for you, the students at American University, the American dream. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 9, March 1, 1993 Title:

NATO and US Foreign Policy

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Excerpts from the intervention at the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium Date: Feb, 26 19932/26/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe, Europe Country: United States, Russia, Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: NATO, Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] It is an honor for me to address the North Atlantic Council and to convey greetings from President Clinton. Since this is our first meeting, I thought I might cast my remarks a bit more broadly than is customary. In addition to offering some views on our important work in NATO, and Europe more generally, I'd like to outline for you the principal elements of President Clinton's foreign policy. I will also report on my trip to the Middle East [see p. 122], my meeting with [Russian] Foreign Minister Kozyrev [see Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 10], and address an issue of immediate concern to us all--the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia.
Creation and Renewal
We in the Clinton Administration consider ourselves fortunate to have been called to leadership at a time of unprecedented change, hope, and opportunity. Only yesterday, the Berlin Wall defined the European landscape, and a massive Soviet threat hung over the continent. In its place, however, new dangers have arisen. Communism's legacy of economic and political bankruptcy impedes Europe's integration. Ethnic antagonisms and splintering nations spawn violence. Today, global threats--arms proliferation, environmental degradation, and rapid population growth-- menace Europe as well. These new threats remind us of the continuing need for NATO as a guarantor of our collective defense. They also underscore the need to continue adapting all of our institutions and policies to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Of course, we must adapt responsibly. Amid change, we cannot lose sight of certain core truths. If this turbulent century has taught us anything, it's that our security is indivisible and that our dreams and destiny are linked. All of us are best served by a thriving transatlantic partnership. NATO and its principles of political partnership give us a foundation of strength upon which to build for a better tomorrow. The United States welcomes a strong and integrated Europe. We want Europe to be a real partner: our partner in democracy; our partner in growth; our partner in the maintenance of peace. For our part, President Clinton intends to conduct what our great post-war statesman, Dean Acheson [Secretary of State, 1949-52], called "total diplomacy"--a diplomacy that views domestic and foreign issues as inseparable. We recognize that only an America that is strong at home can act as an effective partner abroad. President Clinton has identified [see Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 57] three pillars upon which America's total diplomacy must rest: First, elevating global economic growth as a primary foreign policy goal; Second, updating our forces and security arrangements to meet new threats; and Third, organizing our foreign policy to help promote the spread of democracy and free markets abroad. Achieving these goals depends on partnership with our allies and friends in Europe.
Enhancing Global Economic Growth
In his economic address, President Clinton put forward a plan for America's economic renewal. The promise of his plan is simple. America must focus more on investment than consumption. We must take bold steps to raise American skills and lower American deficits so that we can enjoy a more secure future. The President understands that a healthy US economy requires a growing global economy. We are taking steps to ensure a return to global growth. The first is the President's domestic plan I just mentioned. The second is enhancing cooperation among the Group of Seven [Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States]. One of our top priorities is ensuring that this summer's economic summit in Tokyo leads to better macroeconomic coordination. We seek renewed growth in each of our nations. Global growth also requires expanding exports; investment; and the exchange of technology, culture, and ideas. That is why the President announced that we would seek an extension of fast track authority to complete the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. We are determined to have fair and reasonable access to world markets. We are also determined to do away with protectionist policies and subsidized competition because they undermine growth. Barriers will beget barriers, but prosperity will beget prosperity. President Clinton, at the very outset of his Administration, is taking the difficult steps at home that Europe and Japan have long urged. We believe it is now time for our friends and allies to make similarly tough choices and to demonstrate the necessary leadership to bring the Uruguay Round to a quick and equitable conclusion. Updating Security Arrangements To Meet New Threats For over 4 decades, this alliance has successfully harnessed political goals and military power. Today, in the Cold War's aftermath, NATO continues to safeguard the core of the world's democratic coalition. It reaches eastward with a steadying hand to the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. America's commitment to Europe's security is undiminished and unwavering. The Clinton Administration will maintain a level of US forces in Europe equal to the challenges of the new security environment. And we will work with the Congress to provide adequate levels of US funding for NATO's infrastructure program. We are all reducing our forces, given the reduced threats we face. But we all must continue to field a force structure that is credible, capable, and sustainable--one strong enough to deter and, when necessary, defeat, any threat to our vital interests. NATO remains fundamental for preserving our security in a changing strategic environment. That environment includes the important work of the Western European Union. I am pleased to note that Secretary General Van Ekelen has joined us today. Working together with other entities, NATO must improve its ability to deal with the disorder of ethnic conflict and aggressive nationalism, proliferation, and political and economic instability. This would be a logical extension of the alliance's traditional and, still, vital collective defense function. We must also continue our efforts to develop cooperative security arrangements with the nations of the former Warsaw Pact. By enhancing their security, we reinforce our own. There can be no better way to establish a new and secure Europe than to have soldiers from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, and the other new democracies work with NATO to address their most pressing security problems. We believe NATO and our Eastern colleagues should establish joint planning and training, and joint exercises for peace-keeping. Such cooperation can help ensure that all European peace-keeping operations are conducted in accordance with UN and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] principles.
Promoting Democracy and Free Markets
Promoting democracy and economic freedom is a strategic element of America's national security policy, not a tactic. Democracy and economic freedom are values we share. Together, we made Europe secure by containing communism until it collapsed. But the absence of communist aggression and repression is not enough to secure Europe's future. Europe's long-term security--like America's--requires that we actively foster the spread of democracy and market economies. Democracies tend not to make war on each other. They are more likely to protect human rights and ensure equal rights for minorities. They are more likely to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and environmental protection. A compelling challenge faces us right here and now. The states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, need our help. These countries are trying to develop into free market democracies. Assisting them is not charity; it is essential to our common security. We must provide political support for reform, keep our markets open to their products, and target our assistance programs for maximum positive effect. It would be the height of folly to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to overcome communism and then refuse to invest in the survival of the new democracies that are emerging. With this background, let me now turn to a discussion of my recent meetings with Arab and Israeli leaders, and with Foreign Minister Kozyrev.
Discussions in the Middle East
As you know, there has been a growing sense of stalemate in the Middle East peace negotiations. President Clinton asked me to go to the Middle East to see if we could help to reactivate the peace process. In sending me, he said that he was prepared to have the United States play the role of full partner, provided the parties would come back to the tables and negotiate seriously. My trip to the area, my first as Secretary of State, symbolized our commitment and priority to pursuing Middle East peace. Our willingness to change our approach qualitatively and to become more active in an "honest broker" role clearly demonstrates our seriousness. The parties welcomed this renewed American commitment and reaffirmed their own commitment to the peace process and their involvement in it. All believed that the US partnership role was essential to making progress toward peace. And many of the leaders I spoke to said they felt this was a historic opportunity--a-once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to make peace. I firmly believe that you can help build the momentum we have established in the region over the last few days. Together we can help promote a new day of hope in the Middle East.
Meeting With Foreign Minister Kozyrev
I had a good first meeting yesterday with Foreign Minister Kozyrev. He welcomed my pledge that President Clinton intends that there will be no pause in our relationship with Russia, and I believe we gave meaning to the point by what we did in our first session. Setting a summit date was a priority for the meeting, and we agreed to April 4 [1993], with the venue to be worked out later. After I briefed him on my Middle East trip, Foreign Minister Kozyrev enthusiastically agreed to join the effort to get the peace talks started in April, promising, among other things, to encourage the Palestinians and others to be supportive. On Yugoslavia, he was forthcoming in offering political support for our humanitarian airdrops and did not rule out possible Russian participation. We discussed the volatility of the problem of minorities subject to mistreatment in states across Europe. I agreed with him that it is important for the United States and the West to stand up for the rights of minorities, including the Russian minorities in the Baltic states and the former Soviet Union. We must do this if we are to achieve a more stable and just continent and a just peace. I reiterated the President's commitment to support the Yeltsin program at a most difficult time. Kozyrev underscored the importance for them of opening opportunities for Russian industry to find responsible customers in the world market. I expressed understanding for that problem but noted we could offer little more than a competitive opportunity.
Former Yugoslavia
Finally, let me turn to the issue that has been at the forefront in recent weeks: the ongoing crisis in Bosnia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia. None of us takes lightly the risks of involvement in a Balkan conflict. But we cannot ignore the risks of letting it rage to consume more lives and lands. A whole new generation is being convulsed in violence and condemned to a cycle of brute force and blind hate. That cycle must be broken. I greatly appreciate your thoughtful responses to my letters outlining President Clinton's six-point plan of engagement in the effort to restore peace. We have also consulted with Russia and others. My discussions with Foreign Minister Kozyrev were very positive. President Clinton believes that we must move toward a settlement, building on the [former Secretary of State Cyrus] Vance-[Lord David] Owen plan, that is just, workable, and durable, and that preserves Bosnia as a state. US participation comes with the expectation that Europe, which is most directly affected, will play a leading role and redouble its concerted efforts. The addition of the United States should certainly not occasion any relaxation by others. If a viable agreement can be negotiated that all parties accept and that has practical enforcement mechanisms, the United States is ready to join with the United Nations, the European Community, NATO, and others in implementing it. This includes possible US military participation. NATO's special capabilities and command structure can play a key role in this regard, in combination with contributions from non-allies. It behooves the alliance to make preparations now. We must be ready to act effectively if and when a viable agreement is accepted by all the warring sides. With respect to humanitarian assistance, I stated on February 10 that we were considering steps to ensure delivery of aid to those in Bosnia who are starving and in need of medicine. As you know, we announced yesterday that the United States will conduct air drops to the needy in eastern Bosnia, in coordination with the United Nations and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. We would welcome such broad participation in this effort. We must, today, admit frankly a fact that now haunts our search for peace. The West missed too may opportunities to prevent or contain this suffering, bloodshed, and destruction when the conflict was in its infancy. The lesson to be learned from this tragedy is the importance of early and decisive engagement against ethnic persecution and aggressive nationalism. The treatment of minorities is an issue that begs for the application of preventive diplomacy. Minority concerns exist not only in the Balkans but throughout the countries that comprise our new North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Our security interest in resolving minority issues is clear. When democratic institutions are new, memories of historic injustices are fresh, and people are undergoing the painful dislocation of market reform, we must all be especially mindful of the treatment accorded minorities. We must urge restraint and tolerance on all sides. We must speak out when human rights are violated. And we must promote early and effective problem- solving. The Clinton Administration is prepared to do its part. We look to you to do yours.
Moving Forward Together
The great post-war leaders were years ahead of their time. From history's vantage, we marvel at their far-sightedness. Of course, Acheson, Monnet, Schuman, and Adenauer* could not know how kindly history would judge their work. They were struggling to get beyond the moment, counter the pressing threat, and craft the policy that would serve their nations' long- term interests to speed the dawn of a better day. That day has dawned. Hard work lies ahead of us. And we must act today to ensure our tomorrows. But do we have the needed tools at our disposal? Will we use them wisely? Most important of all, can we summon the political will to accomplish our mission? Those questions go to the heart of our NATO work. We can--we must-- answer them in the affirmative. We can and we must move forward together. In that spirit, I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet here now. (###) *Dispatch Editors' Note: All were proponents of greater European integration. In 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed a plan for the formation of a West European coal and steel organization that was the forerunner of the European Community (EC). This "Schuman Plan" was drafted by French economist Jean Monnet and supported by Secretary Acheson and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 9, March 1, 1993 Title:

Secretary Christopher's Visit To the Middle East

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher; Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres; Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah; Lebanese President Hraoui and Foreign Minister Bouez; Saudi Foreign Minister Saud; Syrian Foreign Minister Shara; Jordanian King Hussein and Foreign Minister Abu Jaber; and Egyptian President Mubarak Description: Collection of statements, including a joint US- Russian statement, released in Switzerland, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman Date: Feb, 25 19932/25/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Russia Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT]
Joint US-Russian statement on the Middle East
Released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman. February 25, 1993 in Geneva, Switzerland The United States and Russia attach the utmost importance to the Arab- Israeli peace process launched at Madrid and the need for the parties to resume negotiations promptly. In intensive conversations with the co- sponsors, the Israelis, Arabs, and the Palestinians have reaffirmed their strong commitment to the peace process and emphasized their determination to resume the negotiations in the near future. The Russian side notes the positive effect of Secretary Christopher's visit to the region. The co-sponsors are convinced that at this point all sides must take additional steps to realize a[n] historic opportunity to make progress toward a comprehensive, just, and lasting Arab-Israeli peace settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 238. Russia and the United States agreed to intensify their role as hon-est brokers in the negotiations to promote forward movement in the peace process. Accordingly, the co-sponsors will soon extend invitations to the ninth round of negotiations to be held in Washington during the month of April.
Secretary Christopher and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin: Joint News Conference
Excerpts from opening statements, released by the US Information Service, February 24, 1993--Jerusalem
Prime Minister Rabin:
The Secretary of State of the United States, his colleagues, ladies and gentlemen of the media. We more than appreciate the decision of President Clinton and the Secretary of State to have the first visit of the Secretary of State after President Clinton took the office of the President of the United States to come to the Middle East with the purpose to bring about the resumption of the peace negotiations. I believe that the visit of the Secretary of State, the discussions, the talks that were held now in Israel, no doubt will serve as a landmark in the relationship between our two countries, in the efforts to invigorate the peace negotiations and to bring their resumption. I believe that during the visit of the Secretary of State here in Israel, I had the opportunity and the pleasure to have talks, deep to the issues, and I hope that . . . we succeeded to establish special relations--relations of friendship, understanding, and [candor]. I believe that in the talks that were held here, we discussed a variety of issues: first and foremost, what has to be done to bring about the resumption of the peace negotiations, how to make sure that once they will be resumed, they lead in 1993 to results--results that I believe all the peoples, all the countries of this region expect them to achieve. It is to say to have a breakthrough that will lead to peace between Israel and its neighboring countries and the Palestinians. I hope and I believe that the visit of the Secretary of State, not only to Israel but also to the other capitals of the Arab countries that are directly involved in the peace negotiations .will create a new atmosphere in the region, an atmosphere that will be conducive to bring about more meaningful peace negotiations. We have discussed at length the special relations between the United States and Israel, and there's no doubt in my mind that these relations will be developed and strengthened in the interest of the two countries. And no doubt, this development will bring about and will facilitate many things that we, together, try to achieve in this region. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your patience, your readiness to listen, to travel, to see. I believe that we put on you quite a burden of work during the two days that you stay[ed] in Israel. Allow me through you to send my thanks and congratulation to President Clinton about his decision to give such a high priority to solve the difficulties that prevent[ed] until now the achievement of the peace negotiations. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Christopher:
Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for those very warm words. I've just concluded the last of my meetings here in Jerusalem, and let me say I've tremendously enjoyed my stay here. The detailed discussions that I've had with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and their colleagues were serious and productive and very helpful to me. I've had three separate meetings with the Prime Minister, and he and his wife were gracious enough to host me and my delegation last night for dinner. And all in all, it was a splendid time for me. Over these last 3 days, we have strengthened and deepened the special relationship between our two nations. On a personal note, as the Prime Minister so generously said, I am pleased that we've developed a close and personal relationship. I know that President Clinton is looking forward to greeting Prime Minister Rabin in Washington in the very near future and looking forward to that development of a similar relationship. The relationship that the Prime Minister and I have established is symbolic of the friendship between our two nations--a friendship that's based upon deep and enduring interest, shared values, and common interests. My stay here was all too short, but it did give me an opportunity to learn just a little bit about the rich history of this ancient land and to feel a sense of the dynamism of the modern, vibrant democracy. In my visit to Yad Vashem, I was reminded again of the extraordinary uniqueness of the Jewish state. And this morning in my visit to northern Israel, I was again reminded that the Jewish state continues to face very substantial security challenges. It's high time for Israel to be able to enjoy the acceptance of its neighbors in the security that comes from having a just and lasting peace. I know that the people of Israel yearn for that day, and I know that the Israeli Government is doing all that [it] can to achieve it. After visiting with the leaders of the significant parties to the negotiations, I have a very real sense that all the parties want the negotiations to succeed. They want them to resume and succeed at an early date, and they agree that they should redouble their efforts to that end. I've also had in the last 2 days serious and thoughtful discussions with the Palestinians. The Palestinian representatives with whom I spoke emphasized their commitment to seek peace with Israel, and they expressed their understanding of the stake that they have in seeking that peace. I leave the Middle East hopeful but cognizant that there still are obstacles-- obstacles that will have to be overcome. But I sense among all the parties that they want to seek and make peace. If that translates into an early resumption of the peace talks, as I hope it will, the United States stands ready to be a full partner. Before I left Washington, I said that I was coming to the region to learn, to find the facts, to get to know the leaders in this area. I have accomplished far more in that sense than I'd expected, and I've had substantive discussions far deeper than I'd anticipated. This is a region that has known too much war and too much violence in its past. The parties are at a historic crossroad. This is an opportunity which I hope all the parties will embrace, and we'll do our part to help them in that regard. Thank you very much.
Secretary Christopher and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres
Joint remarks released by the US Information Service, February 22, 1993--Jerusalem
Foreign Minister Peres:
Secretary Christopher, I would like to welcome you here in our country as a cherished guest, representing a mission of the utmost importance for us, for the region, for peace. We know that you are representing an administration that has raised the hopes of the whole of the free world, that has started anew the process of peace, and we do hope that is the first step in the renewal of the peace negotiations--something that we are awaiting anxiously, with great expectation. We welcome you here with great respect, hope, and friendship. You know how dear the relations between the United States and Israel are to all of us, and I am sure that you will represent it with great devotion and talent. Welcome to Israel.
Secretary Christopher:
Thank you Mr. Foreign Minister. It is a great honor to be welcomed by the distinguished Foreign Minister who has a worldwide reputation as a person who has sought peace for most of his adult life and someone who has great respect in my country. Thank you ever so much for the honor you have served me by being out to welcome me. It is a great pleasure to visit Israel on my first trip abroad as Secretary of State. I have much to learn about this ancient land and this modern state. I hope to use this opportunity to begin to know and see Israel and its people. I want to gain a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities that you face. As I arrive in Israel this evening, there are several things about which President Clinton and I are very certain. First, the relationship between the United States and Israel is a special relationship for special reasons. It is based upon shared interests, shared values, and a shared commitment to democracy, pluralism, and respect for the individual. The ties between our two countries have proved strong and resilient, and President Clinton is determined to make them even stronger and more resilient. Second, I know that to understand Israel--Israel's present and its future--it is essential to understand Israel's past. History has cast a long shadow over the people of this Jewish state. The Israeli people have had to fight war and terrorism to defend the state. I understand this struggle for survival. That's why the United States is unalterably committed to Israel's security. That commitment will not change. Third, real security can only be brought about by real peace. But we also know that peace won't be possible unless Israel is fully secure. The Israeli people want peace--not just peace meaning the absence of war, but peace reflected in lasting treaties, normalized relationships, and real reconciliation. It is with this in mind that President Clinton has sent me to this region to assess, to consult, and to focus the parties--all the parties--on the importance of resuming negotiations at the very earliest date. So I am very much looking forward to my meetings with Prime Minister Rabin, with Foreign Minister Peres, and later with the Palestinians. As in the period before Madrid, and now with the help of the United States as a full partner, the parties can build on the substance of structure of real peace through direct negotiations. Working together, the United States, Israel, and the Arab and the Palestinian negotiating parties can turn this process into one of real breakthroughs and achievements rather than missed opportunities.
Secretary Christopher and Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah
Joint remarks released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman. February 22, 1993--Kuwait City, Kuwait
Secretary Christopher:
Good morning. Mr. Minister, thank you very much for your warm welcome. Two years ago almost to the day, American soldiers liberated this airport, sealing the commitment of the United States to Kuwait's independence and security. President Clinton sent me here on my first trip outside of the United States to reaffirm that commitment to the people of Kuwait, to our other friends in the [Persian] Gulf, and to any who might be tempted again to pose a threat in this region. I want to take this occasion to stress the importance that the Clinton Administration attaches to the full implementation of all the UN Security Council resolutions relating to Kuwait as well as the measures enacted to monitor and enforce those resolutions. None should doubt the resolve of the United States to see that the will of the United Nations is carried out and carried out fully and completely. Let me be clear about these matters. We bear no ill will to the suffering people of Iraq. We seek no military confrontation, but the pain inflicted on the Iraqi people is the responsibility of [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein's regime, not the international community. Saddam Hussein's regime is well aware [of] what they must do to meet the requirements of the United Nations, including the requirement that it end the repression of the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein must know that there is no substitute for full compliance. In this regard, I want to affirm that we will not forget the hundreds of Kuwaitis and others who remain unaccounted for in defiance of UN requirements. No one who has witnessed the vivid scenes of devastation perpetrated on Kuwait by the Saddam Hussein regime could fail to be impressed by the remarkable progress which has been made since the liberation. And those who have stood side by side with Kuwait in rolling back Saddam's aggression will welcome the restoration of Kuwait's active parliamentary system. We hope to see further steps in this direction of democratization. On behalf of President Clinton, let me say how glad I am to have an opportunity to come here and to underscore in person the President's commitment to our continued obligations with respect to security and stability in the region. Our friends can rest assured that the United States will be with them in the future as we have been in the past. As long as the people of this region are subject to the threat of aggression, our friends can rely on the steadfast vigilance of the United States. Thank you very much, Mr. Minister, again for welcoming me here. I am very pleased to be here for a stay that is much too short but, nevertheless, is meaningful to me. Thank you, Mr. Minister.
Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah
(Kuwaiti translation): I am pleased to welcome His Excellency, Warren Christopher, the Foreign Minister of the United States. I am pleased as well to praise, on this occasion, the excellent relations binding two friendly countries and to laud the stand of both President Clinton and the US Administration that supports the Kuwaiti just causes and [that] truly reflect[s] the extent of the US awareness of its role and its international responsibilities and the respect of the principles of justice and right. We should keep in mind the respect of the great role that the United States has played and still [plays] with all peace-loving countries in the world to establish peace and stability in the world. [There is] no doubt that this tour by His Excellency in the Middle East represents the true and constructive role of the United States as a great power and its belief in its obligations toward defending international peace and security. This visit comes while our area still [is] suffering the consequences of the brutal Iraqi aggression as a result of Iraqi regime reluctance and obstinacy in implementing the [UN] Security Council resolution[s] related to its aggression against the state of Kuwait--in particular, those related to the Kuwaiti POWs [prisoners of war] and detainees and [to] the repeated violations by that regime to the inviolability of the international Kuwait borders and his [that regime's] continuance of false claims against Kuwait. This visit is considered a good opportunity to have consultations about the current situation in the Gulf area, due to the common faith that the security in this area is an integral part of the security and stability in accord[ance] with international resolutions [and] is an important and vital factor in [the] peace-making process in the world. We are looking to have fruitful relations with the visiting [delegation], just aiming at serving the interests of our two friendly countries and enforcing the international position and its solidarity in standing against [the] Iraqi regime, which [in] its continuity in power represents a deviation from the simplest international norms and regulations and a direct threat to the international peace and security.
Opening Statement by Secretary Christopher (Lebanon)
at a news conference with Lebanese President Hraoui and Foreign Minister Bouez Released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman February 22, 1993--Beirut, Lebanon
Secretary Christopher:
Thank you, Mr. President. I'm very happy to be here in Beirut tonight. As the President says, my visit has come at a time when the Lebanese people are finally beginning to achieve the national reconciliation and economic reconstruction that they have so long sought. This country has been hurried by confrontation and violence for much too long. Its greatest treasure, the resources of its people, has been wasted by civil war. I hope that period is now behind us. My visit to Beirut today is the first for a Secretary of State of the United States in a decade. It symbolizes our commitment and support for the Lebanese Government, for its efforts to achieve independence and territorial integrity, [and] for the dissolution of the armed militias and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces. We continue to believe that the Taif agreement represents the best pathway and the best foundation on which to build a better future. The United States has always had a special relationship with Lebanon and a special feeling for the people of Lebanon. We want to work with others-- others in the international community--to help Lebanon get back on its feet through the strenuous efforts that it is now making. My visit also reflects the US commitment to moving forward in the peace process--the Arab-Israeli negotiations--and I have told the President that the United States is prepared to commit itself to be a full partner in helping to move this process forward. As co-sponsor of the process, we vow to take an active role. These negotiations carry great importance for Lebanon. As one of the parties involved in the negotiating process launched in Madrid, Lebanon would benefit greatly, as would all the people in the region around here, from a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace. I'm glad that I heard today from the Lebanese leaders--the President, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister--that they all agree, with the other countries in this region that I have spoken to on my trip so far to four other Arab countries, that there should be an early return to negotiations. The parties should return to the table as soon as possible. Let me also say how pleased I was to be able to come to Beirut to have discussions on some of the substantive issues which have faced the negotiations with the President, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister. Our consultations have given me a better sense of the road ahead. It won't be easy, but I think that we've begun a process here which will enable us to work effectively together in the future, provided the parties are prepared to come back to the negotiations and do their part. The United States will do its part. Thank you very much.
Secretary Christopher and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud
Excerpts from joint statements, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman. February 21, 1993--Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Secretary Christopher:
I am pleased to be in Saudi Arabia on the eve of the holy month of Ramadan, a very special and important time when Muslims all over the world reflect on events which occurred not very far from here some 1,400 years ago. I am very much looking forward to my meeting with King Fahd and Foreign Minister Saud. It will be an important and very pleasant time for me, I am sure. The United States has a close and cooperative relationship with Saudi Arabia, and my visit here abroad as Secretary of State underscores that close relationship. Our shared commitment was demonstrated most recently in our shoulder-to-shoulder defense of peace and security in the [Persian] Gulf during our successful Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations. President Clinton's commitment to the security of friends in the Gulf, like that of every President since Franklin Roosevelt, is firm and constant. We share with Saudi Arabia a determination to see that Iraq fully complies with all the UN Security Council resolutions as well as the measures required to monitor and enforce those regulations. We appreciate Saudi Arabia's support for measures undertaken to ensure full compliance. We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people who are long-suffering under Saddam Hussein's regime. But no one should doubt our resolve in seeing to it that the will of the Security Council and its resolutions are carried out. I also want to convey personally President Clinton's commitment to our being a full partner in re-energizing the peace negotiations. We will be asking the Saudis to help us in efforts to establish an early resumption of the negotiations and to take other steps to promote peace. We are gratified by the continuing participation of Saudi Arabia in the multilateral peace process and the working groups. These are very important, as they complement the bilateral process. Thank you very much, Mr. Foreign Minister, for welcoming me, my wife Marie, and our delegation. I am very pleased to be here with old friends. I notice that Ambassador Prince Bandar is here, as well. We look forward to a good discussion, but most of all, I look forward to the opportunity to reaffirm old ties and [a] shared commitment.
Foreign Minister Saud:
I would like to welcome the Secretary to our country, as an old friend and not only to renew our acquaintance but also to continue the fruitful endeavors between our two countries in many areas that he touched upon, whether it regards peace in the region or the stability of the region. I hope that the Secretary will himself touch the strong relations that bind our two people[s]. We look forward to his discussions. He will meet this evening with the Custodian [of the Two Mosques of Medina and Mecca], and we look forward to a very fruitful discussion. We also appreciate the fact that the Secretary has taken his first trip abroad to the region, and this indicates to us further commitment of the United States to the pursuit of peace in this region.
Secretary Christopher and Syrian Foreign Minister Shara
Opening remarks from a news conference, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman. February 21, 1993--Damascus, Syria
Foreign Minister Shara:
Let me say in brief that the discussions which Minister [Secretary] Christopher had with President Asad were positive and fruitful, and I can describe them as good discussions. The topics and the issues which were discussed--probably you are aware of--is the peace process and how and when to resume the peace talks [and] the obstacles that stand in resuming the peace talks, mainly the deportees issue. The bilateral issues between the United States of America and Syria have been discussed, all of the regional situation, in general. I will give it to Secretary Christopher to describe his talks with His Excellency, President Asad.
Secretary Christopher:
As the Foreign Minister has said, we had very good and productive discussions today with President Asad. Earlier, I had a bilateral discussion with the Foreign Minister. Our discussions were quite wide-ranging. We had a candid and useful exchange on bilateral and regional issues. The principal focus of our discussion, however, was on reactivating the Middle East peace process. Syria has played and continues to play a central role in that process, and it must do so if they are to be successful. We talked about the desirability of an early resumption of the negotiations and the need to make substantive progress. To that end, I conveyed to President Asad President Clinton's commitment to have the United States play the role of a full partner in the negotiating process. Of course, to be able to play that role, the parties must return to the negotiations soon. President Asad emphasized his commitment to the process of direct negotiations that were launched at Madrid, and he welcomed the US role as a full partner in the process. Also, and very importantly, I think President Asad agreed that the negotiations should be recommenced soon. My discussions with President Asad have been very useful to me in gaining a fuller understanding and assessing the key substantive issues involved in the negotiations. Frankly, I can say [that] I have been encouraged by our substantive discussions. From here, I'll travel tonight to Saudi Arabia, where I'll continue my discussions on the peace process and will again address regional and bilateral issues. I look forward to ongoing contact with both President Asad and Foreign Minister Shara and will continue to work to try to invigorate the peace process.
Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Shara
Joint remarks, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman February 20, 1993--Damascus, Syria
Secretary Christopher:
I'm very pleased to be here in this great and venerable city of Damascus. I look very much forward to meeting with President Asad and Foreign Minister Shara to discuss the Middle East peace process and a number of bilateral and regional issues. I've come here to convey, personally, President Clinton's strong commitment to working as a full partner in trying to reactivate the peace process. We're in the region to encourage the parties to return to negotiations and to ensure that the negotiations produce results. The United States remains determined to help the parties to achieve a just and lasting solution based upon UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We're quite prepared to do our part as sponsors of these bilateral and multilateral negotiations provided that the parties do their part. We look forward to working with the parties to sustain their strong commitment to meaningful negotiations so that the progress can be made in a very timely manner. In recent years, the United States and Syria have worked together to advance the peace process and regional security. We anticipate that this cooperation will continue, and we look forward to it. Syria's agreement to attend the Madrid peace conference was essential to launching it. We're very pleased that Syria joined with us and other nations in reversing Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Syria and Israel have already engaged substantially on core issues in the peace process, and we look forward to their continuing this progress. To repeat my ambitions for tomorrow, I look forward to our discussions with both President Asad and foreign Minister Shara. I thank the Foreign Minister and his wife for welcoming me and my wife, Marie, and our delegation to Syria.
Foreign Minister Shara:
Just a few words to welcome Secretary Christopher and Mrs. Christopher in Damascus. I hope that his visit will be a success. We and the United States and the other parties concerned hope to be able to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the region and to remove the obstacles standing in the way. We hope that the discussion tomorrow between Secretary Christopher and His Excellency President Asad [will] prove to be positive and constructive and to help in implementing all UN Security Council resolutions. That is, the deportees issue as an obstacle so far. We hope that all the deportees will be able to go back home, and that the parties concerned [will] be able to resume the bilateral peace talks as soon as possible.
Secretary Christopher and Jordanian King Hussein
Opening statements at a news conference, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman. February 20, 1993--Amman, Jordan
King Hussein:
Mr. Secretary, ladies, and gentlemen, it is a very great pleasure for us to welcome Secretary and Mrs. Christopher and the accompanying delegation here in Amman. I do so on behalf of the Government and the people of Jordan and Queen Noor. It is a wonderful opportunity for us to re-establish contact and to welcome an old and dear friend to this country again. We are, indeed, hopeful and encouraged by the genuine desire to (inaudible) which we know we have and we hope that our friends have in the United States to renew and reinvigorate the friendship of many, many years between our two countries and nations and--certainly in my case--one that has prevailed over the last 4 decades based on trust, a feeling of partnership, mutual respect, and a desire to cooperate in all fields and areas. Mr. Secretary, your visit at this time has given me the opportunity, together with my colleagues, to discuss with you once again frankly and openly and to hear from you views, ideas, and concerns at this critical juncture in the life of this area and this region. And it has been a pleasure for me to restate our total commitment to the cause of a just and durable peace that future generations can enjoy, live with, and protect in the region. I would like to say that the United States, without a doubt, is the most powerful nation in the world of today. And I feel greatly encouraged at this point in time with President Clinton and the new Administration assuming their responsibilities; and, hopefully, it will be far greater in terms of its impact on the world--on our large global village--when it can, hopefully, in the times ahead put together its physical and material strengths together with the principles and ideals on which the United States was founded, which had such an impact on our world and which, hopefully, again will be the case in the times ahead. I thank you, and I will leave it to you, sir, to make any comment you would make, and then we will take it from there and see what we will face from our friends [members of the media]. Thank you very, very much. And you are most welcome.
Secretary Christopher:
Your Majesty, ladies, and gentlemen, this morning I had very good and wide-ranging meetings here with His Majesty, the King, and with the Prime Minister and with the Foreign Minister. We have discussed a number of issues: the peace process, our bilateral relations, [and] regional issues, and we discussed at some length, and with great pleasure on my part, the progress of His Majesty's government toward democratization and broader political participation--subjects [in] which I found great interest as I've moved around the country. President Clinton sent me to this region to convey personally his strong commitment to play a full partnership role in the peace process, to re- energizing [and] reactivating that process, and to assess the commitments of the parties in this region to that important process. I am here to encourage the resumption of the negotiations, particularly because I think all of the countries in this region are committed to positive results in the long run. I'd like the people of Jordan to know--and, of course, I have told His Majesty, the King, with as much emphasis as I could summon--that the United States intends to play an active, full partnership role in this process to help the parties to the maximum extent to achieve an important result for this region. I am very pleased to have heard from His Majesty, the King, an important commitment to the peace process in which Jordan has played such an important role. No country was more important, I believe, in the Madrid conference, and no country has made more progress--or, indeed, as much progress--as Jordan has in the bilateral and multilateral negotiations. We look forward with great anticipation to working closely with His Majesty to seek a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace based upon UN [Security Council] Resolutions 242 and 338. I'll be leaving here for Damascus [Syria] tonight. I do want the government here to know--and particularly His Majesty, the King--that we'll stay in close touch, contacting him after I have completed my rounds or earlier if that should serve the process of peace. Thank you very much.
Secretary Christopher and Jordanian Foreign Minister Abu Jaber
Joint remarks, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman. February 19, 1993--Amman, Jordan
Foreign Minister Abu Jaber:
Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to welcome you, sir, to Jordan, as well as your accompanying delegation. Your visit at this particular moment illustrates the depths of US commitment to the cause of peace in this region. It also provides us with the opportunity to discuss with you our bilateral relations and to explore the ways to further strengthen peace. We look forward to our talks seeking how best to advance and accelerate the peace process and to ensure its success, currently facing serious threats. It is our hope, sir, that your offer will bring about the viable solution that we all seek. Mr. Christopher, I would like to reiterate, on this occasion, Jordan's firm commitment to the process that was launched in Madrid with the aim of achieving comprehensive, just, and lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli and the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts on the basis of [UN] Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the concept of land for peace. This commitment has been clearly demonstrated, especially in the efforts leading to Madrid as well as all the rounds of both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. However, sir, since Madrid, the tension in the region has not subsided, with the level of Israeli violence in the occupied territories increasing--the current [Palestinian] deportees problem being demonstrative. We will listen attentively to your assessment of the situation in the whole region, and we will share with you our views regarding the need for a comprehensive peace--a comprehensive peace that will enhance regional security, that will enhance democratization, that will enhance human rights, and [that] also will end the suffering of all the people in this part of the world. Once again, sir, I welcome you and Mrs. Christopher as well as your accompanying delegation. I wish you all a pleasant and productive stay in Jordan. Thank you.
Secretary Christopher:
Foreign Minister, thank you very much for that warm and thoughtful welcome. It's a great pleasure to be in Amman tonight as I go about my process of trying to reactivate the peace process. President Clinton has sent me to this region--as you recognized and acknowledged, Mr. Foreign Minister--as a sign of his commitment to the cause of Middle East peace. He said--and I want to reiterate this upon my arrival here in Jordan- -[that] the United States is prepared to be a full partner in pursuit of that cause, provided [that] the other parties share our determination to resume the negotiations and to promote peace. We will do our part if they do theirs. I look forward to my discussions with you, Mr. Foreign Minister, and with King Hussein, knowing the critical role that Jordan has played in connection with the Madrid launching of the peace negotiations and in carrying them forward. I am interested in hearing the King's views and yours on what Jordan and the United States can do together to re-energize the peace negotiations. Of course, also, we will be discussing a wide range of other issues of mutual interest--regional issues, local issues, and global issues. In particular, I look forward to discussing the King's commitment to democratic values and to a broadened political participation, a commitment that we very much applaud. Mr. Foreign Minister, Jordan is a long-time and valued friend of the United States, and I look forward to discussing ways that we can strengthen and improve that long-standing friendship. Thank you so much for greeting me tonight, Mr. Foreign Minister, and I look forward to a good day with you tomorrow. Thank you.
Secretary Christopher and Egyptian President Mubarak
Opening statements at news conference, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman. February 19, 1993--Cairo, Egypt
President Mubarak:
I had a very good meeting with the Secretary, and we discussed lots of issues--mainly the Middle East problem--and I'm sure, after I had these talks with the Secretary, that the United States is committed to peace and is giving great attention for the peace process to move forward. We are very eager, and we are willing to help, because peace in this area is very important, and [it] is very precious--which I said several times--to have any kind of concessions. I had an invitation from President Clinton, and I accepted it; and [a visit] will take place in the first 10 days in April. I find it a very good opportunity to exchange views with the President and to see what could be done in the peace process so as to move forward. We are very keen for the peace process to continue and the negotiations to start as soon as possible. We discussed, also, the problem of the [Palestinian] deportees, and we are working so as to resolve and solve this problem so [as] not to hinder the negotiations for the peace process. Thank you.
Secretary Christopher:
Thank you, Mr. President. First, let me say how honored I was to be received by President Mubarak today and to have a chance to have a wide-ranging discussion with him and to have luncheon with him and his colleagues. I also greatly enjoyed a wide-ranging discussion with Foreign Minister Moussa. On behalf of President Clinton, I was pleased to extend an invitation to visit the United States to visit with President Clinton, and I'm very pleased that President Mubarak has accepted that invitation. As I said yesterday, President Clinton and President Mubarak have already been working together, and I am sure that this meeting in the first part of April will enable them to deepen their relationship and provide further leadership for the peace process and many other aspects of world peace and order. The United States and Egypt share a common interest in promoting peace and tackling the broader problems of regional instability. We've today agreed, as the President said, to in4tensify our joint efforts to re-energize the peace process, to encourage the partners to return to negotiations, and to ensure that these negotiations are fruitful and produce results. We've also agreed that we would work together to achieve an early resumption of the next round of talks. I'll be leaving here tonight for Amman [Jordan] and other capitals in the region. As I go there, I'll be personally conveying President Clinton's commitment, as I did here today, to moving the peace process forward. I leave here knowing that President Mubarak and Foreign Minister Moussa will be working with the parties to promote our common agenda for peace in the region. Mr. President, thank you ever so much for your warm hospitality. I've greatly enjoyed my visit here to Egypt and especially with you, sir.
Secretary Christopher and Egyptian Foreign Minister Moussa,
Joint statements, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman. February 18, 1993--Cairo, Egypt
Foreign Minister Moussa:
I wish to welcome the Secretary of State and Mrs. Christopher on their first visit to Egypt and to the Middle East. We look forward to the consultations and talks with the Secretary, exchanging views, [and] coordinating our activities in order to push forward the peace process and ensure a smooth and successful resumption of the talks. The presence of the Secretary of State of the United States here today and tomorrow will give us an opportunity to exchange views about a lot of issues of mutual concern. I welcome again the Secretary and give him the floor.
Secretary Christopher:
Thank you very much, Mr. Foreign Minister. It's no coincidence that President Clinton chose to send me to Egypt as the first stop on my first journey outside the United States as Secretary of State. Egypt's ancient society has made an enormous contribution to modern life, and Egypt plays a pivotal role in this region. Today, President Clinton and I are proud to count Egypt as a close and important friend of the United States. After a gap of 14 years since my meeting with President Sadat in 1979, I want to tell all the people of Egypt how pleased my wife, Marie, and I are to be back in your country. I have undertaken this trip to the Middle East to personally underscore and demonstrate the commitment of President Clinton and the United States to re-energizing the Middle East peace process. We believe that there are important opportunities that the parties should not miss. We have come to the region ready to do our part, and we will be assessing whether the other states and parties here are prepared to do theirs. I will be spending the next week or so personally meeting with the leaders of countries of this region, trying to obtain their views on how best to move the peace process forward. The issues I have come to discuss here are certainly difficult and will demand the close cooperation of all the parties involved. Egypt plays an invaluable leadership role in the search for peace and in helping the parties to understand each other and their positions. In achieving its peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has proven that commitment and diplomacy can work to the betterment of all. I am particularly looking forward to meeting with President Mubarak and Foreign Minister Moussa. We have appreciated greatly their wise counsel and leadership on the many issues faced by the two countries together. President Clinton, President Mubarak, Foreign Minister Moussa, and I have already worked directly on several issues, and we've demonstrated the value of the close partnership between our two countries. We look forward to seeing and learning more about this great country, and we look forward to productive meetings over the next several days.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 9, March 1, 1993 Title:

President's Meeting With UN Secretary General

Clinton Boutros-Ghali Source: President Clinton, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali Description: Joint statement released by Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 23 19932/23/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Subsaharan Africa, Caribbean Country: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro Subject: Democratization [TEXT] During their meeting on February 23, the President and the Secretary General of the United Nations [Boutros Boutros-Ghali] discussed the role of the United Nations and the support of the United States, Somalia, Haiti, and a wide range of other issues. They also discussed the tragic situation in the former Yugoslavia. They agreed on the urgent need for an end to the fighting and the violations of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the President and the Secretary General urge the leaders of the parties involved in the peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina to come to New York immediately to resume discussions in pursuit of an agreement to end the conflict. In view of emergency humanitarian needs in Bosnia, the Secretary General welcomed the President's explanation of the possible use of airdrops into isolated areas that are in critical need of relief and cannot be reached at this time by ground. They agreed that such drops would be temporary and supplemental to land convoys in accordance with existing procedures. The President stressed the US intention to coordinate such operations closely with the UN relief effort. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 10, March 8, 1993

Title:

US-UK Special Relationship

Clinton Major Source: President Clinton, UK Prime Minister Major Description: Opening remarks at a news conference, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 24 19932/24/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: United Kingdom Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT]
President Clinton:
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I want to formally welcome Prime Minister Major to the White House and to the United States. We are delighted to have him here. As I'm sure you know, he has already met earlier today with people on [Capitol] Hill and with members of my Cabinet. We have just finished the first of two meetings. We talked for about an hour, and then, this evening, we'll have a working dinner. About the conversations we've had so far, I'd just like to make two points. First, we covered a wide range of topics. We talked about Bosnia, as you might imagine we would. We talked about the Middle East. And then the rest of our time was spent virtually exclusively talking about economic matters- -about the upcoming meeting of the G-7 [Group of Seven leading industrialized nations]; about the importance of trying to get an agreement under GATT [the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and my commitment to that; about the absolute necessity of the United States, Europe, and Japan working together during this difficult time to try to prevent a contraction of the global economy and instead to, hopefully, promote growth, not only here at home but throughout the world. And we talked about that in some considerable detail. The Prime Minister, as you know, has been in office a lot longer than I have. And I asked him for his advice about a number of things and his opinion about others. We had a very, very good meeting, and I'm looking forward to our dinner tonight. A second point I would like to make reaffirms something that some of you asked me during the photo opportunity, and that is whether the United States will continue to have a very special relationship with Great Britain. The answer to that from my point of view is an unqualified yes. I think that only two presidents ever lived in England--I think I'm one of only two; there may have been more somewhere in the past centuries. But this is a very important relationship to me, and I think it's off to a very good start. And I would like to say again how much I appreciate the candor with which the Prime Minister has approached the issues [and] with which we've discussed our mutual interests. Mr. Prime Minister.
Prime Minister Major:
Mr. President, firstly, thank you for your welcome today. I've found our meeting extremely useful, and I look forward to continuing it this evening. And I certainly had some very useful meetings this morning on the Hill and with other members of your Cabinet earlier this morning, with [Treasury Secretary] Lloyd Bentsen and, of course, over lunch as well with some of your colleagues. It's nice, having had a number of telephone conversations over the last few months, to actually see a face across the table rather than just hear a voice across the phone. And I look forward to continuing that dialogue this evening. You set out some of the things we were able to discuss over the last hour or so. I was particularly pleased we were able to reach such a meeting of minds on the importance of reaching an agreement to the Uruguay Round [of GATT] as speedily as possible. I think we share the view that for a raft of reasons it's important to get a satisfactory and fair agreement to the GATT round, not just because of the impetus that will give to trade growth and, hopefully, to prosperity and job growth as well, but also because of the very remarkable advantage that will give not just to the industrialized but to the non-industrialized world with the many difficulties that are faced economically at the moment. So I was particularly pleased at our meeting of minds on that particular subject. We found also a complete agreement about the need for the [UN] Security Council resolutions that have been imposed in respect to Iraq to be fully met and to be fully honored in the future. I had the pleasure of being able to welcome the President's initiative of humanitarian airdrops in Bosnia. The United Kingdom--we've got a number of thousands of troops actually delivering humanitarian aid in central Bosnia. They've been doing that for some time. I think as a result of their activities, many people who otherwise might not have lived through this winter have done [so]. And I think this new initiative by the President is thoroughly welcome. So it's been a very worthwhile and a very enjoyable meeting thus far, and I look forward to continuing it this evening. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 10, March 8, 1993 Title:

US-Russia Summit and Invitations To Middle East Peace Talks Announced

Clinton Kozyrev Source: Secretary Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev Description: Opening statements at a news conference, Geneva, Switzerland Date: Feb, 25 19932/25/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Russia, United States Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] Foreign Minister Kozyrev (through interpreter): Ladies and gentlemen, I would like, in the first place, to express my satisfaction with the very businesslike meeting that we had, especially with the fact that it was not just a get-acquainted session--although, of course, I am quite happy to meet personally the Secretary and also with the atmosphere that we developed right from the very outset. But I am also satisfied with the very businesslike discussion that we've just had. This meeting made it possible for us to see once again that in the multipolar world that we live now, Russia and the United States, instead of confronting each other, are in a position to realize the partnership relationship and the cooperative relationship that has been already agreed to. And a major event that would make it possible to broaden that cooperation, to remove all artificial delays, and to accelerate it would be a summit meeting of the two Presidents. At least we agreed--and this is something that we want to recommend to the two Presidents--that the summit meeting take place [on] April the 4th. I can tell you that this date has been suggested by the US side. The US side also suggested several other dates--earlier dates--but we believe that the meeting calls for additional preparation; therefore, we picked out of the dates suggested by the US side a later date so [that], we believe, it could be better prepared. We also agreed that we would proceed forthwith with preparations for the summit meeting on all levels, including a possibility--if there is a need for that--of an additional meeting between the two of us. We discussed several questions related, among other things, to the fact that the two sides are now concentrating on their domestic economic situation. But this is not to suggest that there is less interest in cooperation between the two sides. On the contrary, we believe that cooperation and assistance to Russian reforms is in the agenda--in the domestic agenda--of the two countries. We also discussed the possibility for and the need for strategic cooperation, including: -- Opening access to markets; -- State support of investment; -- Promoting the rescheduling of Russia's external debt; [and] -- The possibility of Russia gaining access to conventional arms markets-- of course, under the condition that there would be full compliance with the existing international norms and standards. We also discussed situations in several flash points, and I appreciate the fact that the Secretary of State shared some of the information that he brought back from his trip to the Middle East. And I must also note that that trip has resulted in some positive movement in the direction in which we intend to move further as co-sponsors--that is, the direction of the peace process. And I believe that [the] Secretary will have a few words to say on his trip. I can tell you that there is a symbolic coincidence in our bilateral movement, although from Geneva we intend to go in different geographic directions. I'm leaving for Copenhagen [Denmark] and [the] Secretary for Brussels [Belgium]. But Brussels is the headquarters of the European Economic Community and NATO, while Copenhagen--and Denmark--is the coordinator of the European Economic Community. Therefore, in the political sense, we will be moving in the same direction--that is, the direction of broader European cooperation. Secretary Christopher: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. Foreign Minister Kozyrev and I have had a very good and, as he said, a businesslike session. I believe we have established a good working relationship, building on our prior contacts and building on contacts between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. We've been in touch quite frequently and have been since the first days of our new Administration. Our meeting today has set the stage for a summit between the two Presidents. As the Minister said, we are pleased to announce that Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin will be meeting together on the 4th of April at a site to [be] mutually agreed upon during the interregnum between now and then. President Clinton sent me to this meeting today to underscore his strong personal support for the reform policies of the Yeltsin Administration. It is of the utmost importance to the United States and, indeed, to the world that President Yeltsin's reform efforts succeed. A strong and cooperative US-Russian relationship, a relationship of genuine partnership, is of the highest priority for President Clinton and his Administration. The United States and Russia have important interests in common. Today, as Minister Kozyrev and I prepared the ground for the summit, we discussed a full range of these common interests. I gave Minister Kozyrev a thumbnail sketch of my trip to seven Middle East countries, and we discussed the respective consultations that I've had with the parties in those countries. It is an important beginning for our relationship--a very hopeful reflection on what the partnership may mean--that Mr. Kozyrev and I today are able to jointly announce that we will be extending invitations for the ninth round of the bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiations, to be held in Washington [DC] during the month of April. We also exchanged views on the continuing bloodshed and suffering in the former Yugoslavia, and we explored ways to promote a peaceful settlement there. We are committed, both of us and our governments, to consulting and coordinating very carefully and closely in pursuit of that goal. In addition to the matters I've mentioned, we also dealt with questions of arms control, including the important matter of proliferation. And we discussed economic cooperation, which can serve our mutual interests. The United States is determined to support the cause of reform in Russia. It is in the interest of the world as well as being in the interest of the Russian people. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 10, March 8, 1993 Title:

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Clinton Kozyrev Source: Secretary Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev Description: Joint US-Russian statement, Geneva, Switzerland Date: Feb, 25 19932/25/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Russia, United States Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] The Russian Federation and the United States of America confirm their determination to continue efforts within the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]-sponsored Minsk Group to obtain a peaceful settlement to the conflict on and around Nagorno-Karabakh. The course of events once again demonstrates the danger for the Armenian and Azeri peoples of any attempt to settle the conflict by military means. All sides should look to remove obstacles to serious negotiations within the framework of the CSCE Minsk Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh with the participation of all interested parties. Only a compromise political agreement on the basis of mutual concessions and mutual benefit can be strong and durable enough to bring peace and stability back to this region. Russia and the United States strongly appeal to all parties to the conflict to accept their historic responsibility for the destiny of their peoples and to demonstrate the political will to settle the conflict solely through peaceful means. The most important task now is to put an immediate end to the bloodshed. They urge the conflicting parties, as a gesture of goodwill and as the first step toward overcoming mutual distrust, voluntarily to refrain from offensive operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and neighboring areas and to stop the use of military aviation and missile-artillery systems, the employment of which causes needless civilian casualties. Russia and the United States await a positive response to this proposal. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 10, March 8, 1993 Title:

Statement at Confirmation Hearing

Tarnoff Source: Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political Affairs-Designate Description: Opening statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 4 19933/4/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is an honor and a privilege for me to appear before you as President Clinton's nominee for Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Administration, the Congress, and the country face a very different set of international challenges compared to those we have successfully confronted in the last half-century. Thanks to our steadfast and bipartisan opposition to international communism, our promotion of democracy and human rights, our resolute commitment to military preparedness, and the vitality of our economic systems, the West-- led by the United States--has prevailed over our former adversaries in what came to be known as the Cold War. However, our success compels us to change how we conduct the business of foreign affairs. Secretary Christopher has spoken to you about our changed priorities: harnessing America's influence abroad to improve the quality of life at home and fostering the spread of free thought, free association, and free markets around the world. My role, today, is not to repeat his objectives but to talk to you about how I, as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, would help fulfill them. Doing Business Differently To meet the challenges we face today, we will have to change how we go about formulating foreign policy and how the Department of State goes about implementing it. First, we will need to begin to practice the politics of inclusion in formulating policy: -- By including America's domestic priorities, like free trade, open markets, and a clean and safe environment, high on our policy agenda; -- By including the counsel of leaders of business, labor, environmental, human rights, and other private organizations in our deliberations; and -- By including the Congress through meaningful and close consultations between us, so we can ensure that our foreign policy objectives serve the best interests of the American people. Second, we need to reshape the Department of State so it can effectively implement our foreign policy. Deputy Secretary Wharton has described the new structure of the Department. I would like to outline what my role would be in this new structure.
The Role of the Under Secretary For Political Affairs
As the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, my primary task would be to assist Secretary Christopher and Deputy Secretary Wharton in fulfilling our country's foreign policy objectives. The emphasis will be on team work. The men and women whom President Clinton has designated to lead the State Department know each other--and the leaders of the other agencies concerned with foreign affairs--very well. I served under Secretary Christopher when he was Deputy Secretary. Clif Wharton, Strobe Talbott, and I know each other from the Board of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the other Under Secretaries-designate--Lynn Davis, Tim Wirth, Joan Spero, Brian Atwood--and I are old friends. Although there may be differences of opinion among us, I am confident that our basic sense of mutual trust will serve the Department well. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs oversees the coordination of our bilateral relationships. My responsibility would be to work closely with the Assistant Secretaries for Regional Affairs and International Organizations to see that our policies are developed creatively and then faithfully implemented. I will also do my best to ensure that the conduct of these relations is well integrated with our global policy objectives. Today, many of America's vital national interests transcend national borders, such as promoting human rights and democracy, fostering economic cooperation, or countering threats from weapons proliferation and terrorism. The Department's under secretaries and the assistant secretaries who support them will coordinate their activities closely, all of us recognizing that no single issue now determines our bilateral relationship with most other nations. My Contribution to the Team The role of the Under Secretary for State for Political Affairs would require me to be familiar with all of the principal policy issues the Department will face as well as the countries which affect our interests and the foreign leaders who are instrumental in matters of importance to the United States Regarding my own qualifications, I feel that I have been preparing for this position for all of my adult life. Immediately after college and graduate school, from 1961 until 1982, I was a career Foreign Service officer at the Department of State. I had a wonderfully fulfilling personal and professional experience during that period, serving in Africa, Asia, and Europe as well as in Washington. For several years I worked directly for Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and, during my last assignment in Washington, I was the Executive Secretary of the Department and Special Assistant to Secretaries Vance and Muskie. I also have a keen appreciation for the high quality of the men and women of the Department of State, and I will devote a good part of my attention to the need to streamline its operations so as to better serve America's new and traditional interests around the world. For the past 10 years, I have analyzed US foreign policy from a perspective outside government: first at the World Affairs Council of Northern California in San Francisco and then at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. It was enormously valuable for me to be able to reflect on questions of American foreign policy from a vantage point in the private sector. In San Francisco and New York, my work involved discussing these issues with representatives of business, labor, the universities, and the communications industry, as well as with countless public and private foreign leaders whom I met both at home and abroad. Over the years, I learned to appreciate the enormous diversity of America's foreign interests and the deep reserves of talent available in this country to help chart our nation's course in the post-Cold War era.
The Importance of Political Consensus and Open Debate
As I stated earlier, a strong bipartisan consensus firmly based on the support of an informed public was the foundation for the success of American foreign policy in defeating the military and ideological threat of communism. This was achieved by previous administrations in part as a result of close consultation and cooperation between the executive branch and Congress. Real consultation, with this committee and this Congress, will be a hallmark of this Administration and its Department of State. I regard this consultation as extremely valuable to those in policy-making positions. In my 20 years of service in the State Department--under Democratic and Republican presidents--and 10 years in the private sector, I have learned to respect the advice of Americans in all walks of life and the views of public and private thinkers on both sides of the aisle. I will actively seek out their counsel for several reasons: First, I have seen that where America's international interests are concerned, there is considerable bipartisan consensus on our policy objectives; Second, I know well that no party and no individual has a monopoly on creativity or common sense; and Third, I have seen that there is great benefit to encouraging full and free debate on policy means and ends. Some views will not win the day, and others may prove, in hindsight, to have been less than far-sighted. But that is the price--well worth paying--of open discussion, and that, of course, is also the American way. For my part, I look forward to encouraging such debate and candor among the fine and diverse minds in the Foreign Service and the Civil Service in the Department of State, and I would expect the same degree of openness from this committee. Let me thank you once again for this privilege and promise you that I would work closely with this committee and the Congress in helping to fashion a foreign policy which serves our nation's interests and ideals. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 10, March 8, 1993 Title:

President Meets With NATO Secretary General

Myers Source: White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 2 19933/2/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: United States Subject: NATO, Military Affairs, Arms Control [TEXT] The President welcomed NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to the White House today. The President reaffirmed the fundamental importance of NATO and the trans-Atlantic relationship and his commitment to maintaining a significant American military presence in Europe to defend the interests of the United States and its allies and friends. The President and Secretary General Woerner discussed the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and what actions NATO could take to support the efforts of the international community to bring that tragedy to a peaceful conclusion. In addition, the President and Secretary General Woerner discussed the ongoing work in NATO to develop the alliance's peace-keeping capabilities in support of the United Nations and the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and with the involvement of NATO's partners in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The President thanked Secretary General Woerner for his continued stewardship of the Atlantic alliance and looks forward to working closely with him in continuing to adapt the alliance to meet the common challenges of the future.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 10, March 8, 1993 Title:

Repatriation Policy For Haitian Asylum- Seekers

Stephanopoulous Source: White House Director of Communications George Stephanopoulos Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 2 19933/2/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Immigration [TEXT] Today, the Supreme Court heard arguments concerning the current repatriation policy regarding Haitian asylum-seekers. At that time, the Justice Department supported the President's legal authority to carry out the practice of direct return. The President believes [that] it is essential that he retain the ability to implement such measures when exceptional circumstances demand. The current practice of direct returns is based on the President's conviction that it is necessary to avert a humanitarian tragedy that could result from a large boat exodus. Hundreds, if not thousands, could lose their lives in overloaded, unseaworthy vessels if the United States reversed the practice of direct return precipitously. At the same time, the President regards the current practice of direct return as a policy for exceptional circumstances. It is continually under review and will be adjusted when conditions permit. In addition, the President is taking a series of initiatives to promote human rights and democratization in Haiti and to enhance the safety and well-being of those who have reason to fear persecution. First, the Clinton Administration strongly has supported the negotiating process undertaken by the United Nations and the Organization of American States (UN/OAS) and has urged other nations, both within and outside the hemisphere, to provide diplomatic and financial support to the UN/OAS effort. A UN/OAS civilian monitoring team now is being deployed in Haiti. We hope and expect that their presence will create an atmosphere conducive to respect for human rights and political dialogue, including progress on a settlement to this crisis. The President will continue efforts to move the negotiating process forward as expeditiously as possible, leading to the restoration of constitutional government and the return of [Haitian] President Aristide. President Clinton will meet with President Aristide on March 16 to review the progress that has been achieved and the challenges that lie ahead. Second, the President is committed to enhancing the safety and well-being of those in Haiti who have reason to fear reprisal for their political activities and affiliations and has taken a number of actions to improve in- country processing of Haitian refugees--the procedures by which Haitians may apply in Haiti for refugee status and resettlement in the United States. Shortly after January 20, the President directed that US officials double our capacity for the interviewing of refugee applicants in Haiti by officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]. The President also directed the State Department to send a technical mission to Haiti to develop detailed proposals for: -- More rapid refugee processing; -- Making it easier for Haitians outside Port-au-Prince to apply for refugee status and US resettlement; and -- Enhancing the safety of the repatriation process for returnees. Since return of the technical team, we have streamlined procedures and added staff in Port-au-Prince and have reduced considerably the processing time for refugee applications in Haiti. We have already developed the capacity to reduce processing time for high-priority cases from 2 months or more to about 7 working days. The technical team, which also included congressional staff and representatives from the INS, made a series of additional recommendations for improvements in procedures, including: -- The addition of personnel at the US Refugee Processing Center in Haiti to serve as liaison with human rights groups and as a resource for INS adjudicators; -- Procedures for identifying those who may be especially at risk; and -- The establishment of processing centers outside Port-au-Prince to enhance access to the program for Haitians throughout Haiti. Based on these and other recommendations made by the team, the President has directed that US officials implement further improvements in the process. To accomplish these goals, the President is authorizing expenditure of up to $5 million from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance fund. The United States has been in the forefront of refugee protection around the world. We will continue to play this important role in the years to come. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 10, March 8, 1993 Title:

Hostages Held in Zaire

Snyder Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joseph Snyder Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 25 19932/25/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Zaire Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization [TEXT] Since yesterday, Zairian troops in Kinshasa have been holding hostage the members of the High Council, demanding that they reverse a government decision demonetizing controversial banknotes. Meanwhile, members of the military high command have denounced the President of the High Council, Archbishop Monsengwo. These actions constitute a severe threat to the democratic process in Zaire, a process which the United States has consistently supported. Zaire's economic crisis is the cause of the government's inability to pay the army and of the recent military rioting. This crisis can only be solved by allowing the transition government to function free from presidential interference. We call on President Mobutu immediately to instruct his military commanders to release the High Council and allow the transition process to continue. The US Government and world opinion will hold him responsible for the lives and welfare of those being held. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 10, March 8, 1993 Title:

Chinese Treatment Of Foreign Journalists

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 2 19933/2/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Media/Telecommunications [TEXT] Last June, ABC News correspondent Todd Carrel was among several foreign journalists beaten and detained by Chinese police while covering the anniversary of the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square. On February 25, 1993, a spokesman for the Chinese Government stated that Carrel and his colleagues had gone to Tiananmen Square last year for "illegal reporting activities" and had been attacked by "indignant" Chinese citizens before being "rescued" by police. This Chinese statement came after the Foreign Correspondents Club of Beijing recently renewed its protest over the incident, having received no reply to its original letter to the Chinese Government. The journalists were covering a news story in conformity with recognized international practice. At the time of the incident, we protested strongly both in Beijing and Washington, DC, as did other foreign correspondents in Beijing. We understand Mr. Carrel has not recovered from injuries received during the beating and still has difficulty walking. We reject this latest Chinese statement, which is not consistent with the facts. In our discussions with the Chinese Government, we have pressed them not to interfere with the ability of journalists to report openly on events in China and to observe international standards concerning the treatment of journalists as they carry out their responsibilities to report the news. We will continue to raise this issue. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993

Title:

Budget Priorities for Shaping A New Foreign Policy

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 10 19933/10/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department, Military Affairs, Trade/Economics, Democratization [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'm pleased to make my first official congressional appearance as Secretary of State before this subcommittee. I realize how important you are to the work of the committee and to the work of the State Department. Our joint challenge, of course, is to shape a new foreign policy in a world that's fundamentally changed. Today, I want to try to discuss, as you say, an overview as to how we can best direct our resources to meet this extraordinary challenge. Mr. Chairman, because it's my first official appearance on Capitol Hill, with your permission I'll impose on your time, perhaps more than I would under other circumstances, by making a somewhat longer than usual statement. Of course, the members of your committee are uniquely qualified to take on the hard work of determining the priorities and organizing the resources of the State Department to achieve those priorities. My appearance here begins what I hope will be a relationship that's marked by candor and cooperation on all sides. I think that kind of candor and cooperation will be essential if we are to meet the challenges that this fundamentally new world presents to us. We'll work closely with you to try to determine the priorities and to articulate the new strategies. But I think, Mr. Chairman, it's important that we work together to explain and justify our foreign policy to the American people. As I said at my confirmation hearing, foreign policymakers cannot afford to ignore the public, for there's a real danger that then the public will ignore us. We must work together to explain the stake that the American people have in an activist and an internationalist foreign policy, to explain clearly the need for preventive diplomacy, to deal with problems before they become crises, [and] to stress the priority that we all feel for ensuring open and fair trade and the expansion of new markets; and we must underscore the benefits that will flow to our nation from active promotion of democracy, including, hopefully, from a reduced [Department of] Defense budget, greater economic opportunity, a cleaner environment, and a safer world. Along these lines, Mr. Chairman, I intend to travel around the country to explain our foreign policy initiatives and seek the support of the American people. I'm going to Chicago on the 22nd of this month to begin that process, and, if it's proper, I might encourage you and the members of your committee to do the same in your districts and around the country. I know [that] you do that on a regular basis. Collectively, I think we have a responsibility to try to define our foreign policy to the American people and to define America's role in the new world. We need to think about how to deal with the new threats we're facing, how to deal with the difficult challenges as well as the breath-taking opportunities that come to us in this new era. And, very relevant to this committee and to the budget, we need to take a look at the foreign policy institutions to make sure that they take into account the realities of the new age and not be stuck with those of the prior era. I really can't stress this last point too much. The State Department as we know it, the US Agency for International Development [USAID], the US Information Agency [USIA], [and] the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] are all creatures of the Cold War period. They evolved during an era when our nation was facing a single, overwhelming challenge--that is, the challenge of containing the communist threat. With the demise of communism, that threat is passed. Containment has served its purpose, and it's taken its rightful place in our history. And yet our foreign policy institutions continue in large measure to mirror the Cold War imperatives. Maps have changed considerably faster than mind-sets. Budgets and bureaucracies still reflect the reality of a world that's passed. For our institutions, including the State Department, it may be that it was easier to deal in an earlier time when almost any program could be justified in terms of the global struggle against communism. That struggle is passed, and that easy rationale of the past is also a thing of the past. Here, as elsewhere, I think the American people are ahead of us and have proven themselves to be wise. They know our policies must be tested and retested against the facts of the new and uncertain world we face. They demand very rightfully that we get money back--value back--for every dollar we spend; to make sure that the dollars we spend promote their interests and their values. They understand that foreign policy must conform to new functions, not the old world, and they expect action. It's our determination--President Clinton and the Administration--to provide that kind of action. Although our Administration is only 2 months old, we've already begun to redirect our American foreign policy, to refocus our aid budgets, and to reform our institutions. I'd like to share my thoughts on each of these topics with you today.
A New Foundation For Foreign Policy
American foreign policy in the years ahead will be grounded in what President Clinton has called the three "pillars" of our national interest: first, revitalizing our economy; second, updating our security forces for a new era; and, third, protecting democracy as the best means to protect our own national security while expanding the reach of freedom, human rights, prosperity, and peace. Our watchword always must be action, not reaction; timely prevention, rather than costly cure. Let me speak a paragraph or so on each one of these three pillars, Mr. Chairman. First, we must renew the American economy. The single most important thing that Congress can do to ensure that American foreign policy is effective is to enact the President's economic program and to do so as soon as possible. We certainly cannot be strong abroad unless we're strong at home. In the post-Cold War global economy, there's no such thing as a purely domestic policy. Over and over again, I heard in my recent 9-day trip to the Middle East and Europe that the whole world is watching our economic policy and how well we deal with our economic situation. President Clinton's economic program, which he laid out, of course, in his [State of the Union] address to Congress, as well as his recent speech at American University [Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 9, p. 113], challenges American firms, workers, and farmers to win in world markets, to reduce our national reliance on foreign creditors, and to sustain our foreign commitments. We remain the world's most powerful economy with vast manufacturing, service, and agriculture sectors. We're the world's largest exporter, and we are the world's largest market. We must use all the tools at our disposal to generate growth here at home and bring down barriers to our goods and services worldwide. And by "all of our barriers," I mean GATT [the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement]--with the parallel agreements--as well as vigorous export promotion. As a second pillar, we must update our security structures to meet the realities of the post-Cold War period. This begins with adapting our military forces to meet the new and old threats to national security. But we must even go further than that. In tandem with our partners, we must continue to mold our alliances like NATO to meet new missions. More robust peace-keeping and even peace-making capabilities are needed, given the potential for ethnic conflicts that challenge our conscience and threaten international peace. Strengthened non-proliferation regimes are also essential if we are to prevent new and dangerous threats from emerging on the international landscape. Let me emphasize the strong commitment I feel personally to making strides on non-proliferation now that we're in this new era. Third--as the third pillar--we must encourage the democratic revolution that has swept so much of the world. By promoting democracy and free markets, we do more to honor the universal values upon which our nation is founded. We must go beyond just the moral aspect of it to ensure our own security and prosperity. Democracies tend not to make war on other democracies. They are more reliable partners in diplomacy, business, trade, arms agreements, and global environmental protection. We should have no illusions. Democracy cannot be imposed from above. By its very nature it must be built from underneath, from the bottom up. We should embrace and promote this process by sustained support for democratic institution-building in the former Soviet bloc and elsewhere. And we should by collective engagement, working in partnership with other great democracies, promote democracy around the globe.
Financial Constraints And Foreign Policy
Successful foreign policy, of course, doesn't just happen. It's not just a statement of policy. It requires resources--financial resources and human resources. Like all of you committee members, I am acutely aware of the budgetary constraints under which we operate. Our fiscal crisis is real, and so is President Clinton's commitment to tackling it. Foreign affairs constitutes only a very small part of the overall budget [and] State Department operations, even a smaller part. But the time has long since passed when we could overlook even the most minute line in the federal budget. The FY 1994 budget, as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, is something we'll submit in a few weeks, and it will reflect that reality. It will be a tough budget for tough times. It will be a flexible budget that seeks austerity, not as a hardship to be endured but as a challenge to innovate and do our job better. Above all, we hope that this budget will mark a transitional step to a truly focused budget that sets priorities and puts resources behind them. As you indicated, Mr. Chairman, I'm not able to discuss our funding requests in detail because they have not yet been finalized. But I will say this: All reflect one or more of the pillars I mentioned--economic renewal, new security structures, and promotion of democracy. But our priorities also stress another important theme. They all reflect and represent our investment in the future. Our budget will stress the importance of US business internationally and our support for US business. State must work closely with our agencies like [the] Commerce [Department], the Export-Import [Exim] Bank, and USAID to create a comprehensive and coordinated export strategy. We must do even more than that by upgrading the Department's own economic and business support capabilities. We must turn State into what I've termed an "American desk"--an American desk for businessmen here and abroad, complementing the important work of the foreign commercial service. The dividend from this will be economic growth and job creation here at home. As I indicated, another top priority will be non-proliferation. If the lawlessness of [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein has taught us any single lesson, it is that weapons of mass destruction, especially when combined with missile technology, can transform a petty tyrant into a threat to world peace and stability. We must assist the new states of the former Soviet Union to control and account for nuclear material. We must help them and other countries to establish effective support and control systems for the weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and we must strengthen international supplier regimes and support existing and new arms control agreements. All of this must be part of a comprehensive strategy to halt and, indeed, reverse proliferation. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize the importance of moving forward to ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaties around the world--in the former Soviet Union--and also to move forward with the ratification of START II here in the United States. Another priority is enhanced multinational peace-keeping and peace-making. The end of the Cold War has unleashed long-suppressed ethnic and religious and sectional conflict in the former Soviet bloc and elsewhere. But it has opened up new possibilities also for international cooperation. Our task is to harness that cooperation to contain and to prevent future conflict. The tragedies in Somalia and the Balkans bear grim witness to the price of international delay--a human price paid daily in pain, privation, and death. Here, international peacekeeping--especially by the United Nations--can and must play a critical role. Capabilities must be enhanced to permit prompt, effective, preventive action, and the United States must be prepared to pay its fair share. Millions invested in peace-keeping now may save hundreds of millions of dollars in relief later. We can never forget either that peace-keeping saves more than dollars. Rightly done, it also saves lives. It may avert greater dangers that would require even larger military expenditures down the road. I know [that] this committee has supported peace-keeping funds in the past, and I look forward to working with you--all the members of the committee- -to meet our responsibilities in the future. Our budget will also promote democracy, especially in the states of the former Soviet Union. If a democratic government and free enterprise prevail in the former Soviet bloc, America will gain not only partners in peace but a vast, growing market for American goods and services. On the other hand, if this brave experiment in freedom fails, we could see an insecure Europe once again, and once again we would see our defense budgets rise. Assisting democracy in the Soviet Union and, indeed, around the world is more than a helping hand--it's an investment in American security and prosperity. As the President pointed out in his speech at American University just a few days ago: If we were willing to spend trillions of dollars to ensure communism's defeat in the Cold War, surely we should be willing to invest a tiny fraction of that to support democracy's success where communism failed. Our FY 1994 budget will also advance our global agenda. Population control and protection of the environment cannot be second-tier foreign policy priorities any longer. By encouraging responsible population programs, we assist poor countries to achieve sustainable growth. By actively moving to combat environmental degradation, we can improve the quality of life in poor and rich countries alike and open up new possibilities for US business. By combating international scourges like nepotism, narcotics, and terrorism, we make America and the world a safer place. These are investments with real human returns. These priorities--these investments--will be prominent in our 1994 fiscal year budget presentations. Some may require modest increases in funding. Others may not. But all reflect this new focus. All will be met within overall stringent limitations.
Reorganization of the State Department
Just as important as how much we spend is how we spend it. The challenges of the 1990s have already brought new flexibility and discipline to the State Department. Confronted by the collapse of the Soviet empire, we've opened 20 new posts in just 2 years. Faced with budget realities, we're moving in cooperation with Congress to close about an equal number of posts, and we're evaluating staffing levels of State and other agencies at both new and established missions. The State Department must do more than just accept the hard decisions thrust on us. We must fundamentally reorganize ourselves for the post-Cold War era, and I want to speak a bit more about that. I'm convinced that the Department of State cannot hope to respond to the many challenges of this era unless we improve the way we deal with tough and complex problems that cut across traditional bureaucratic boundaries. We must find creative ways both to increase the efficiency of the policy process and to enhance the administration of the many programs we manage. A stifling bureaucracy, an obsolete division of duties, or cumbersome decision-making are luxuries that we just cannot afford in this new period. I'm therefore committed, Mr. Chairman, to a broad-based reform of the State Department's organization and operations. The reorganization plan that I announced last month [Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 6, p. 69] includes the designation of the Deputy Secretary and five Under Secretaries as my principal foreign policy advisers. Portfolios have been shifted and modified to mirror the post-Cold War missions. More importantly, we intend to create a new Under Secretary for Global Affairs responsible for issues as varied--but critical--as human rights, democratization, the environment, refugees, narcotics, and terrorism. President Clinton's nomination of Senator Tim Wirth--a person who I think you all know and whose accomplishments are well known to you--sends a clear signal on the importance that the Administration attaches to these global responsibilities. Our reorganization will also create new focal points for key foreign policy initiatives--notably, an Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser for the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. President Clinton has nominated Strobe Talbott--a trusted friend and an eminent expert in this area--to manage the full range of our relations with this vital and volatile region. I can say that we're already benefiting from Strobe Talbott's advice as the President prepares for the summit with [Russian] President Yeltsin on April 4 in Vancouver, British Columbia [Canada]. Our reorganization plan not only adds these two new important positions, but it also will reduce excessive layering within the Department of State and do much to streamline our policy processes. We've set a target of cutting back the number of our Deputy Assistant Secretaries and their equivalents by up to 40%, and we're well on the way to doing that. Wherever possible, we intend to force decision-making down. Our objective is a quicker policy-making, more open policy-making, and better policy-making. Mr. Chairman, we also intend to eliminate 11 bureaus or important positions, all in the way of trying to be more economical and to streamline our processes. I think we can do the job better with fewer resources and [by] cutting out a substantial amount of an intermediate layer. I've implemented some of these initiatives. Some will require congressional action, and we'll seek the counsel of you and your other colleagues in the House and Senate as we move forward with this very important institutional reform to which I am strongly committed. It's so important that I've asked Deputy Secretary Clif Wharton--a man of extraordinary ability and very broad experience in business--to direct our efforts to create a State Department for the 21st century. In addition to implementing the current reorganization plan, I've asked Dr. Wharton to oversee and improve the way the executive branch manages the international affairs budget. We simply must do a better job of assessing our priorities and allocating our resources. I've also asked other key members of the State Department's team-- especially Under Secretary-designate [for Management] Brian Atwood--to focus efforts on modernizing the Department of State. We must assure clearer financial accountability for our operations. We must invest in better training for our personnel, both Foreign Service and Civil Service. And we must work unceasingly to ensure that the face the Department shows to the world is an American face of diversity. In short, we must remake the State Department. As I've gone around the world, especially on my recent trip, I've been struck by the lack of diversity in the representatives of other governments. We can't solve that problem, but we can deal with our own problem, and I'm going to make one of our highest priorities to increase the diversity within the higher ranks of the State Department. We're doing considerably better at the entry levels, but there's much room for improvement here. I've also asked Dr. Wharton to examine the role of the US Agency for International Development and to report to me his recommendations before the end of April. USAID, like the State Department as a whole, must plainly change. And we look forward to working with Congress to restructure our assistance program to reflect our foreign policy priorities, such as promoting democracy, enhancing competitiveness, and supporting the peace process. We also need to reorganize--and we need your thinking on this--we need to reorganize ACDA, the USIA, and the Board for International Broadcasting to take into account the new world priorities. The need for a truly integrated foreign policy certainly demands this kind of a reorganization and nothing less.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, as I conclude, let me say [that] I was struck as I prepared this testimony by the extent to which the challenges confronting the State Department closely parallel those confronting our nation as a whole. President Clinton's call for investment, for innovation, for putting people first, resonates as strongly in Foggy Bottom as it does on Main Street. I'm really dedicated to seeing that the State Department, along with the other departments of government, answers the President's call. This is a call for a renewal, and it really touches a deeply American chord. It echoes with our history. In 1862, Abraham Lincoln wrote that as our case is new, we must think anew and act anew. Our case is, thankfully, somewhat less grave than that facing Lincoln, but the injunction remains as compelling, then, today as it was a hundred years ago. It holds true for American foreign policy, just as it does for American domestic policy. The Cold War has ended and with it the imperatives that define America's role in the world. With it we must have new policies, and we must reorganize our foreign policy establishment. It's time to think anew and to act anew. This will take vision on your part and on our part. We'll have to work hard. It will take courage to shift away from old priorities. It will take a real partnership--between Democrats and Republicans, between Congress and the executive branch--and also a partnership between government and the American people, to convince the American people that we're acting in their interest. So far as I'm concerned, my partnership with this committee begins today, and I look forward to a good relationship. I know I can count on you, and I'll tell you that you can count on me. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

Resumption of Middle East Peace Negotiations

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Opening statement at news conference, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 10 19933/10/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] President Clinton has asked me to make an announcement today on our efforts in the Middle East. Events in the Middle East have historically captured the attention of the world. Unfortunately, too often this has been because of war. This is a region that since 1948 has known five Arab- Israeli wars. And every time there has been a war, the world has held its breath because the risk of a superpower confrontation was ever present. That risk is now a thing of the past. The end of the Cold War has created an unusual opportunity for progress toward peace in the region, and now all of us must act to seize and enhance that opportunity. In the Middle East, such opportunities are unlikely to last very long, and the cost of lost opportunity would be very high. It's precisely because of the recognition of these costs that every Administration, for over the last 4 decades--Democratic and Republican alike--has played an active role in the search for peace in the Middle East. This enduring and bipartisan commitment to promote peace reflects an unassailable reality. The search for peace in the Middle East is in America's vital national interest. It reflects the fact that conflict in this region, especially given the abundance of very destructive weapons in the region, contains the seeds of dangerous escalation. It reflects the fact that a great majority of the world's oil supplies could be put at risk; and it reflects the fact that the United States has a special commitment to Israel's security, a country that is a solid and trusted ally with whom we share a deep and abiding commitment to democratic values. I believe we now have an opportunity to promote peace that will serve the interests of Israel, the Arab states, the Palestinians, and the entire world community. A passive American role is not enough. What is called for is an active, positive effort that will take advantage of what many believe to be a historic moment in that region. We must now seize this opportunity to play the role of full partner, just as we did in the achievement of the Israeli-Egyptian peace 14 years ago. We have been repaid in full over the years by strong friendship and ties with both Israel and Egypt. The visits to Washington by [Israeli] Prime Minister Rabin this week and by [Egyptian] President Mubarak in April are testimony to the enduring nature of the relationships that were forged out of this negotiation. It is time for the people in this region to set aside violence and work together for reconciliation and peace. The important steps taken at the Madrid conference have opened up a wide vista of possibilities. Over the years, Arabs and Israelis have sat together--that is, over the course of the last year they have sat together--in bilateral negotiations, seeking to achieve a comprehensive settlement based upon UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. They have also joined in multilateral negotiations on such diverse and pressing issues as arms control and regional security, economic development, water, refugees, and the environment. They have sought to build a Middle East in which neighbors work together to resolve common problems. President Clinton is committed to helping the parties confront and overcome the difficult challenges that lie ahead. In asking me to take my first trip to the Middle East to consult with leaders in that region, the President offered our full assistance as an active, full partner in the search for peace. In doing so, he underscored the enduring reality of an American involvement in Middle East peace efforts. It is good for us as Americans, and it is good for our friends and interests in the region. The resumption of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, which we are announcing today, is important but not an end in itself. Our objective and the objective of all parties must be to make real, tangible progress soon. Nearly everyone I spoke to on my trip in the Middle East agreed that there may be now a one-time opportunity to promote peace. History tells us that such opportunities may be fleeting, especially in the Middle East, and we believe it is now time to re-launch the negotiations. Toward this end, the United States and Russia, as co-sponsors of the Middle East peace negotiations, are today inviting the parties to resume bilateral negotiations here in Washington for the 2-week period commencing on Tuesday, April 20 [1993]. We're also announcing the reconvening of the multilateral working groups [on] a specified series of dates beginning with the water group on April 27 in Geneva [for text of joint statement, see p. 142]. To prepare the ground for these important bilateral negotiations and multilateral negotiations, we'll also be inviting the parties to send representatives to Washington in late March or early April to have substantive discussions with our enhanced US team. And so we must now all roll up our sleeves to make 1993 a year marked by real progress toward peace and reconciliation. The United States is prepared to do its part, and now the other parties must be prepared to do theirs. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

Sponsors Issue Invitations To Middle East Peace Talks

Boucher Description: US-Russian joint statement, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 10 19933/10/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Russia, United States, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] The United States and Russia, as co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, have extended invitations to Israel, Jordan, Syria, Palestinians, and Lebanon to resume bilateral negotiations in Washington on Tuesday, April 20 [1993]. This ninth round of negotiations will continue until Thursday, May 6. In conveying this invitation to the parties, the co-sponsors have re- emphasized their commitment and determination to achieve substantive progress toward the common objective of a comprehensive peace settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The co-sponsors have conveyed to the parties their intention to work with the parties actively to promote substantive progress in the negotiations. The co-sponsors have also notified host countries for the next round of multilateral working groups that the working groups have been rescheduled. The co-sponsors have proposed that the Water Working Group convene in Geneva, April 27-29; that the Economic Development Working Group convene in Rome, May 4-5; that the Refugee Working Group convene in Oslo, May 11- 13; that the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group convene in Washington, May 17-20; and that the Environment Working Group convene in Tokyo, May 24-25. With the resumption of both bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the co- sponsors join the parties in expressing their conviction that 1993 should be a year of substantive progress toward peace and reconciliation. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

US-French Cooperation in the Post-Cold War World

Clinton Mitterrand Source: President Clinton, French President Mitterrand Description: Opening statements at news conference, released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 9 19933/9/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: France Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT]
President Clinton:
It is a great pleasure for me to welcome President Mitterrand to the White House at this early date in our Administration. Our two nations share a friendship--which dates back to the revolutionary birth of both countries--rooted in common values of equality, liberty, and democracy. These bonds of culture, of history, and of common purpose have made possible a remarkable amount of cooperation in recent days in meeting the challenges in Iraq and Somalia and Bosnia. Today President Mitterrand and I discussed the global partnership that we must bring to the post-Cold War world--new uncertainties and new opportunities. Both our nations and both our continents are renewing institutions of security and economic growth for this era. I salute President Mitterrand and the French people for their leadership. Their exemplary contribution to the UN peace-keeping operations around the globe is just one of many examples of the contributions they have [made] and will continue to make. This morning, we discussed Russia, Bosnia, and the progress toward European union. Over lunch, we will discuss other issues, including the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] of trade talks. We have differences on some issues. Clearly, we need French leadership to resolve some outstanding differences but also to make common cause in the areas in which we agree. Both our nations are great trading nations and have much to gain by resolving the differences between us and moving the world toward a growing global economy. I am very, very hopeful that the United States and France can be partners in updating our common interests and in leading the G-7 [Group of 7 industrialized nations] toward coordinated policies of global economic growth and especially toward action in dealing with Russia. President Mitterrand is going to Russia soon, and he will be there and back before I have an opportunity to meet with [Russian] President Yeltsin in April in Canada, and I look forward to closely consulting with him about that again after his trip to Russia. We talked a little bit about the Vance-Owen peace process [on the former Yugoslavia] today, and you might want to ask President Mitterrand about his views on that. Let me say that I have been very pleased with the comments that he has made today and with the possibilities that we might have toward working together to secure a peace in Bosnia. There are many challenges facing the great democracies of the world today. We have to reaffirm our support for the difficult transformations to democracy now taking place in the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe [and] to reaffirm our interest in closely cooperating to advance peace in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world and to promote democracy and economic growth throughout the world. We made a very good beginning this morning, and I want to publicly thank the President, as I have privately, for the enormously helpful conversations we had this morning. He has been at this work longer than I have by several years. I learned a lot today; I appreciated his candor and the insights which he brought to our discussion. I look forward to continuing over lunch and to continuing a long and significant relationship between the United States and France.
President Mitterrand:
I think everything that needs to be said has been said. At least everything has been said about what we talked about and about what we will be talking about during the time that remains for our meeting. So I haven't really anything to add while waiting for questions that you may wish to ask. On the other hand, I would like to recall--just as President Clinton has just done--I'd like to recall that for Frenchmen, it's always a very important moment, it's a real event, and it's a very happy moment to be coming to Washington in order to meet with the President of the United States of America. And so it is with the same keen interest that, today, I'm here in this capital city in order to meet a President whose fame has already encompassed the world several times but whom I'd never met. Now we have had useful conversations. The subjects that we've talked about--as mentioned by President Clinton--these subjects have given us the opportunity of seeing that our positions were very similar. It is pleasant to note, particularly as the subjects are very difficult subjects--Bosnia, former Yugoslavia, the revolution that is taking place in Russia and in all the countries of the former Soviet Union--and all this is very important. President Clinton has shown a keen interest in the future of the European unity. I gave him my feelings and what I was committed to myself. We still have matters to talk about. There are [opposing interests], which is perfectly natural, between our countries. That's in the nature of things. But there is a real determination to reach agreement. And that is, I think, [what] is the [leitmotif] of all our conversations. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

US Trade Policy and the Post-Cold War World

Kantor Source: Mickey Kantor, US Trade Representative Description: Statement before the Senate Finance Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 9 19933/9/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States, Japan, China Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade, EC, Human Rights [TEXT] I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Finance Committee today to discuss the approach and direction of the trade policy of the Clinton Administration. This is my first public appearance before a congressional committee since I assumed my responsibilities. I am delighted that I can appear first before this committee, which recommended me for confirmation to the position of US Trade Representative [USTR]. In his February 26 [1993] speech at the American University [Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 9, p. 113], President Clinton set forth his vision of America's role in the global economy, confronting the third defining moment of the 20th century. Our role in the world emerges quite clearly from that important speech. As we and other nations struggle to face the new realities in the aftermath of the fall of communism, the United States will be fully engaged internationally, not turning inward. We see our prosperity bound up with [the] prosperity of our trading partners in Canada, Europe, Japan, and Mexico. We will work with them to promote global growth, aid the development of other less prosperous nations, address the emerging issues of environmental degradation and proliferation, and focus on the central importance of what is at stake in Russia. Where trade policy is concerned, the United States will continue to champion open markets and expanded trade, but we will insist that the markets of other nations be open to our products and services. As the President said, we will compete, not retreat. The trade policy of this Administration starts from the same point its economic policy does: Our prosperity and that of our children depends on our ability to compete and win in the global markets. A little more than a generation ago, American industrial and technological superiority were unquestioned. Our workers, consumers, and companies lived almost entirely within the American economy and prospered there. But those days, when the world was a far simpler place, are long gone. Today, our exports and imports represent more than a quarter of our entire economy. And in the new global marketplace--where capital, management, production, technology, and even labor are increasingly mobile--more than 70% of our products face competition from products produced in other countries.
Principles of Clinton Administration Trade Policy
Let me start with the principles that will guide Clinton Administration trade policy, as articulated in the President's American University speech. 1. In this Administration, trade policy is a part of integrated economic policy, and the fundamental goal is economic growth and the creation of high-wage jobs for American workers. The trade deficits which have grown up since 1980 are a fair measure of our competitive slippage, but they represent many factors beyond trade policy and trade agreements. If, as a nation, we increase public and private investment, if we attack our budget deficits, if we take control over our health care system, if we educate our children and train our workers, we will have taken enormous steps toward prospering in global competition. If we do not take those actions, trade agreements alone will not produce prosperity for our people. Nothing is more important to our economic prosperity, our competitive success, and our trade policy than the adoption of the President's economic package. Bill Clinton was elected to get the economy back on track and to fix the track--to ensure that we came out of recession in the short term and to lay the groundwork for long-term prosperity. The lack of investment and the deficits have crippled our economic performance. If unaddressed, they could consign this country and its children to a diminished economic future. America and all of us in political life will benefit if we can come together to pass the President's program. A real attack on the budget deficits will reduce long-term interest rates, leading to increased investment and job growth. US companies, choosing where to invest, will find contributing to our own country's growth a more attractive option. Over the longer term, increased investment in the education and training of our workers, our transportation and communications infrastructure, and research and development generally are vital to our ability to compete globally. In that connection, the Administration's new technology initiative, unveiled by the President and Vice President Gore on February 24, is a concerted effort to bolster US civilian technology, which has too often been slighted because of our traditional focus on defense technologies. Moreover, the link between the President's program and our ability to promote global growth is inescapable. The economic stagnation of the past few years has not been confined to the United States. Growth will resume through concerted action by the leading economic powers: our attack on the budget deficits, Germany's willingness to lower interest rates, [and] Japan's readiness to stimulate its domestic economy. For each of us, hard steps with short-term costs are necessary to produce growth and prosperity. President Clinton's call to arms makes it possible for him to enlist other nations in joining us in a concerted effort to promote global growth. 2. Past Administrations have often neglected US economic and trading interests because of foreign policy and defense concerns. The days when we could afford to do so are long past. In the post-Cold War world, our national security depends on our economic strength. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States led the free world in creating a free and open trading system. The Bretton Woods Agreement, the Marshall Plan, the creation of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and the IMF [International Monetary Fund] are all testimony to the vitality of the free world in creating a postwar economic framework. This framework was both geo-political and economic in its origin. The United States recognized the military threat imposed by communism: that our vital interests would almost always be defined in national security terms. At the same time, we realized that the expansion of trade and investment was one of the free world's most potent weapons. This policy was virtually painless for the United States. Although the United States was the world's economic giant, US trade amounted to relatively little. In 1950, for example, US exports and imports each amounted to only about 4% of the GNP, or 8% for trade as a whole. For Britain and France, on the other hand, trade was their economic lifeline, representing 30-45% of their GNP. As a result, the United States tolerated "infant industries" policies in both Europe and Japan and other forms of protectionist economic policy in the postwar environment. Indeed, the creation and support of these economic policies by our allies was seen as an essential element of our national security interests. Our foreign and economic policy in the postwar era deserves credit for its historic accomplishments. We contained communism and rebuilt the economic strength of the free world. In the 4 decades following World War II, growth in the non-communist world tripled. More importantly, communism as a political system failed to maintain its toehold in Western Europe. By the early 1970s, however, our trading partners had begun to come of age, and external shocks, such as the oil embargo of 1973, jolted our economy. The United States ran its first merchandise deficit of the century in 1971 and confronted the first wave of popularity of cars from Japan. Accustomed to steady economic growth and a secure domestic market, American business and workers had difficulty adjusting to the new dynamics of world trade. Equally important, government policy did not change. American jobs and economic interests continued to take a back seat to foreign policy concerns. The deep recession of 1981-82 took a devastating toll on US manufacturers, but, even when the economy recovered strongly, the overvalued dollar saddled US exporters with a serious competitive disadvantage. Confronted with the reality of Japan's trade and industrial policies, the Reagan Administration's principal response was laissez faire and, after the 1985 Plaza Accord, dollar devaluation. By 1987, the US merchandise trade deficit was $150 billion, $57 billion of which was with Japan. The weakness infecting basic industries spread to our leading-edge high technology sectors as well. The truth is [that] there is ample blame for everyone. The great majority of US companies were very slow to adjust to the blast of competition; there was no excuse for their failure to see what was happening years ago. But it is also true that US Government policy saddled our companies with every conceivable burden: higher costs of capital; increasingly serious health care costs; and, most relevant to us, a trade policy that for many years failed to enforce our laws at home or open markets abroad. The fundamental question that I am asked about trade policy is: how much continuity and how much change? There will be a great deal of continuity, largely because of the 6-year, bipartisan congressional effort, in which this committee was instrumental, which culminated in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Thanks to that act, the United States has a trade policy with clear objectives that have broad support from Congress and the private sector. Obviously, there will be no shortage of difficult decisions to make, but the United States Trade Representative is charged with enforcing the laws and opening foreign markets and given the tools to do so. At the negotiating table, I will be representing the interests of American workers, farmers, and businessmen and -women, just as my counterparts represent theirs. We will continue to play our part in making the international trading system work, but we will insist on our trading partners bearing their share of the responsibility as well. 3. We will compete, and we have proven that we can. Because of failed government policies and the difficulty of adjusting to the new global economy, the United States has had serious competitiveness problems in many areas of the economy. But I have no doubt about the ability of our corporations, our farmers, and our workers to compete. In many sectors--computers, aircraft, machinery, agriculture, motion pictures, financial services--American companies and American workers set the standard of excellence in the world. Our universities and our entrepreneurs are the envy of the world. We will build and maintain a strong manufacturing base, and we will manufacture a full range of products from semiconductors to steel. We welcome the products of other nations, but we will not prosper if we are content to simply buy, sell, assemble, and distribute high quality and low cost goods from abroad. Export expansion has been the bright spot in an otherwise dismal economic picture over the past few years. From 1985 through 1992, US merchandise exports increased from $222 billion to $445 billion in current dollars, a virtual doubling. We regained our position as the world's number one exporter. By 1990, more than one in six US manufacturing jobs were related to merchandise exports, and the average wages for workers in manufacturing and service exporting sectors, where American products are most competitive, substantially exceeded the US average. This dramatic increase in exports has occurred even though 85% of US exports come from only 15% of US companies. The export potential of our vibrant small and mid-sized businesses remain to be realized, and that is a high priority for this Administration. 4. We will seek to expand trade by opening foreign markets, and we will enforce the laws at home. One of my principal responsibilities as USTR is to open foreign markets and break down barriers to US manufactured goods, agricultural products, and services. This includes pursuing the strong protection of US intellectual property so important to our high technology industries. When all is said and done, opening foreign markets is our main objective in the Uruguay Round [of the GATT]; it is the impetus, from our standpoint, for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); it will be a principal focus of our efforts with respect to Japan and China, as well as in other nations around the world. We are not a perfectly open market, of course, but, because of history, practice, and our concern for maximizing consumer choice, this market will always be basically open. Consequently, we need to use every tool at our disposal--multilaterally where possible and bilaterally where necessary-- to make sure that other markets are comparably open to our own. That includes resort, where legitimate and necessary, to Section 301, strengthened by Congress in 1988. Both Super and Special 301, used appropriately, have proven to be valuable tools for breaking down significant barriers to our products and services, including the failure to protect our intellectual property. It should be understood: While there are many factors beyond trade policy that contribute to trade deficits, trade policy matters. In today's global economy, allowing other nations to promote and protect their industries, building profits from secure home markets while targeting our open market, is a formula for competitive suicide. We will not stand by and pretend that other nations share our commitment to expanded trade and open markets if the real world evidence suggests that they do not. 5. We will ask companies and workers to join in partnership with government to build competitive industries. Nor will we stand by, indifferent, when companies, workers, and communities are hard hit by foreign competition--fair or unfair. In appropriate cases, our Administration will offer trade relief to industries under pressure, but we will expect in return that the affected companies and workers will commit to actions that will build the future competitiveness of the industry. This Administration is asking all Americans to join in the effort to rebuild our country's economic strength; there will be no free rides. We will not protect industries only to watch them raise salaries for their CEOs [chief executive officers] and prices for their customers. Let me address specifically a number of the major issues facing us.
North American Free Trade Agreement
President Clinton has consistently affirmed his support for the North American Free Trade Agreement, provided it is accompanied by effective US domestic economic policies and supplemented by additional agreements and domestic actions to address concerns regarding labor, the environment, and safeguards against import surges. Addressing these concerns does not mean reopening the NAFTA text. Our goal is rather to negotiate the necessary supplemental agreements and to work with Congress to develop implementing legislation so that the NAFTA and the supplemental agreements and domestic measures can by in place by January 1, 1994. An enhanced NAFTA package can contribute to the ability of our companies and farmers to compete at home and abroad and help improve working conditions, living standards, and environmental quality throughout North America. We have already seen the benefits [that] we can gain as Mexico opens its markets. Thanks to the economic liberalization program enacted by [Mexican] President Salinas, our merchandise exports already have grown from about $12.4 billion in 1987 to $40.6 billion in 1992. This export growth has reversed what was a $6-billion trade deficit in 1987 and turned it into a trade surplus of nearly $6 billion last year. And these increased exports have come from every region of the United States. Mexico is one of the top 10 overseas markets for 38 states, and 20 states each shipped roughly $250 million or more to Mexico in 1991. Mexico is our fastest-growing major export market, our second-largest market for manufactured goods, and our third-largest market for agricultural products. Seventy percent of Mexico's imports come from the United States, and Mexicans already consume more US goods per person than either the Europeans or the Japanese. The NAFTA will open still greater opportunities for US exporters by eliminating Mexican tariffs (which are more than twice as high as US duties, on average), knocking down other forms of Mexican trade restrictions, and eliminating discrimination against US providers of goods and services. On March 17 [1993], we will begin negotiation of the supplemental agreements on labor standards and safety, the environment, and import surges which the President called for during his campaign. We will pursue these agreements vigorously. Let me assure you that we will not sacrifice substance for speed, nor will we delay our efforts in the name of an artificial timetable. We will not ask you to vote on NAFTA implementing legislation until these negotiations result in comprehensive, enforceable agreements. In the supplemental agreements on environment and labor, we are looking for concrete improvements. We want the agreements to have mechanisms and provisions to help raise standards where they are deficient; strengthen national enforcement of national laws; improve the US-Mexico border environment; and ensure, so far as possible, that the NAFTA promotes prosperity and improved social conditions in all three countries. I am optimistic that we can achieve these goals. My Mexican counterpart, [Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development] Jaime Serra Puche, has told me that he would like to view these talks not as a negotiation but a collaboration. Mexico has excellent labor and environmental standards on its books, and President Salinas has repeatedly recognized the need for strengthened enforcement. I see the labor standards and environmental agreements covering three basic areas: -- Improved cooperation on worker and environmental safeguards, including technical assistance and data sharing, with a goal of attaining the best protections possible; -- Improving enforcement of standards and national laws, both through the administrative and judicial processes of each country and new labor and environmental commissions which will provide independent scrutiny of measures taken to enforce national laws; and -- Encouraging a positive impact of the NAFTA on North America's working conditions and the environment. In these negotiations, we will be breaking new ground for the United States and for our continent. We want to promote the strongest possible improvements in all areas. At the same time, we have to bear in mind that the agreements will apply to us as well as our neighbors. This could raise tough issues for us, including matters of prosecutorial discretion, state/federal relationships, the operations of the courts, and Constitutional guarantees of due process. My staff and I will be looking to you and to our experts in the labor and the environmental communities to find ways to address these problems as the negotiations progress. At the same time, USTR, along with OMB [Office of Management and Budget], [Department of] Treasury, [Department of] Labor, and EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], will be studying the various options for funding critical environmental cleanup efforts. In the area of import surges, we are not looking to change the mechanisms in NAFTA but, rather, want to ensure that these provisions can be effectively and fairly used for all sectors. I know there are concerns in certain industries about whether NAFTA's provisions could result in an import surge, and I want to address those concerns. At the same time, we should remember that our exports are a much greater share of the Mexican and Canadian domestic markets than are their exports in our much larger economy. So any new measures may be more likely used against US exports. As with labor standards and the environment, I will be looking to you and the private sector for guidance on these matters.
The Uruguay Round Of the GATT
President Clinton is committed to the successful completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations which has been ongoing since 1986. When Sir Leon Brittan, the EC [European Community] Trade Minister, was here on February 11, I announced the President's decision to seek the renewal of fast-track procedures to complete the round. I indicated at that time that timing of the request and the duration of the authority we would seek would be determined only after further discussions within the Administration and consultation with Congress and the private sector. We are in the midst of that process, and no final decision on timing or duration has yet been made. [Former USTR] Ambassador Hills and the staff at USTR expended enormous effort for 4 years to reach a strong Uruguay Round agreement. Others committed to the round, including the Director General of the GATT, Arthur Dunkel, have done the same. Through discussions with the private sector and Congress, we are developing a good sense of the accomplishments to date and the remaining obstacles to be overcome before the round is completed. I think we can complete the round in a way that will benefit the United States and the world economy, but, based on our discussions to date, I do not believe that we were as close to completion as some have reported in early January. I told Sir Leon that our goal was a good agreement, not just a quick one. Sir Leon pointed out the danger that whatever consensus that has emerged so far behind the draft final act, known as the Dunkel text, could dissipate if quick agreement was not reached and the United States and other nations tried to reopen the text to address issues where we have concerns. While I recognize this concern, the fact remains that we are not going to reach agreement until some of our major problem areas with the draft final act are dealt with seriously and effectively. Moreover, the question of whether we can reach an agreement depends very much on the market access commitments for goods and services which are still being negotiated. If we reach ambitious agreements on market access- -cutting tariffs, breaking down non-tariff barriers--the round will hold out potential benefits of the magnitude that will inspire enthusiasm in the American business community and their workers that has been, to date, muted at best. We chose to announce the decision to seek fast-track procedures when Sir Leon was here, because the round depends, in the first instance, on US and EC leadership in setting out the ambitious objectives to be achieved in areas such as market access for goods and services. The 3-year deadlock between the rest of the world and the EC over agriculture stalemated the round and gave other nations, most notably Japan, the ability to avoid contributing meaningfully to the successful completion of the talks. We will not complete the round without some leadership by the US and the EC, but we will also not complete it if Japan continues to behave as if it has little stake in the outcome. We also need to see meaningful contributions from other trading partners--the newly industrializing countries in Asia and Latin America--and the developing countries who owe their economic gains to a strong, open multilateral system. It is time to address the free riders in this round. A successful round would give an immediate boost of confidence to the world economy, sorely in need of one. It would contribute to increased economic growth over the next decade by lowering barriers to trade in goods; bringing new rules and discipline to services, agriculture, and textiles; and creating, for the first time, a set of enforceable rules for protecting intellectual property and governing investment. But the round is not a favor that the United States is doing for the world. If it is ambitious enough, US companies and workers stand to gain a great deal because of lowered barriers in our existing markets and the creation of new markets. But our criterion should be clear: Despite the sometimes single-minded focus on agriculture and the preoccupation with the so-called new issues of intellectual property and services, support for the round in the United States will turn on the benefits that result for US exports of manufactured goods, agricultural goods, and services produced by workers and farmers here in the United States. However, in pursuit of those benefits, we will not weaken the provisions of current law such as those that provide remedies for our industries against the unfairly traded products of other countries and those that protect health, safety, and the environment.
European Community
We have our share of current difficult issues with the European Community. Despite this, our trading relationship with the European Community is one of the most important in the world and is critical to the integrity and vitality of the multilateral trading system. We are each others' largest trading partners and maintain a diverse and largely balanced trade relationship. Last year, two-way trade amounted to $197 billion, with the United States running a surplus of nearly $9 billion. The evolution of the European Single Market (EC 1992), which officially came into effect on January 1 of this year, has been a prominent feature in our trade relations with the EC in recent years. We have welcomed the European project for its elimination of trade barriers between 12 of our most important trading partners, creating a single market comparable in size to our own. But we insist that European integration legislation and policies treat US firms fairly. When European policies create new barriers to US exports, we will act firmly to protect our interests. I have already moved to address the barriers to US firms created by the newly implemented EC directive on procurement by utilities. As the EC proceeds to form the European Economic Area with other West European countries, to deepen its own economic and monetary integration, and to add associate members from Eastern Europe, we will continue to make full use of the tools in our international agreements and US trade laws to keep markets open.
Japan
No aspect of our trade policy has proven more complex or contentious than our relationship with Japan. In the past decade, our trade deficit with Japan has totaled nearly $500 billion. The bilateral deficit peaked at $57 billion in 1987 and then came down over the next 4 years to $43 billion. US exports did increase from $28 billion in 1987 to $48 billion in 1991 but have leveled off since as the Japanese economy has stalled. This year, the bilateral deficit has again increased to $49 billion. As always, the disproportionate amount of the deficit is made up of autos and auto parts and electronics. A year ago, in the immediate aftermath of President Bush's trip to Japan, there was significant anger on both sides of the Pacific, particularly as the recession deepened. The presidential campaign, which had the potential for inflaming the relationship further, did not. A great deal of credit goes to President Clinton, who steadfastly refrained from criticizing Japan and, instead, ran a campaign focused on dealing with our problems at home to strengthen our economy. Nonetheless, the US-Japan trade relationship needs immediate and serious attention. Clearly, the Japanese market has gradually become more open to our products and services and those of other nations over time, but the progress has not been rapid enough to produce the level playing field that we have sought for years. Numerous barriers remain in Japan which prevent or dramatically reduce the sale of US products and services which are highly sought after in other countries around the world. At the same time, Japan feels that it has been bombarded by demands from the United States--export less, import more, strengthen the yen, negotiate about individual products, negotiate about sectors, talk about structural impediments--demands that frequently change but never end. After years of a booming economy, Japan faces its own economic difficulties, making government and business leaders even more hostile to pressure from the United States, even while many in Japan express the view that change can occur only as a result of outside pressure. Resentments on both sides of the Pacific have built as a result of a decade of almost constant acrimony over one trade issue after another, but, despite efforts by both sides, we still find ourselves with an intolerable trade deficit and still-limited access to this critical market. In the first instance, we must insist that Japan fully implement the range of agreements already negotiated and implement them in such a way that they provide important and concrete benefits to the United States and other non-Japanese suppliers. Very early on, we have a chance to gauge the efficacy of these agreements. In the coming weeks, we will be reviewing the progress on the semiconductor agreement to monitor the progress being made toward the expectation of a 20% market share in Japan for foreign semiconductors. We intend to vigorously follow up on commitments that were made in January 1992 with respect to the auto parts market in Japan. Recent developments in our supercomputer agreement are troubling, and we are evaluating our next steps. On all these issues, we will be consulting closely with this committee and other interested Members of Congress. Above and beyond the series of individual disputes, we need to find a better approach for dealing with Japan trade issues--one that will lead steadily in the direction of a more equitable balance of economic benefits and responsibilities. The beginning of a new Administration is the natural juncture for a careful review of the overall US-Japan relationship, to underscore the importance of the relationship by collaborating on problems that we can move on jointly while moving to address the very real bilateral problems between us. President Clinton's commitment to dealing with our problems at home, without blaming Japan or any of our other trading partners, provides a more promising starting point for discussions about hard steps that Japan needs to take on its part.
China
With the highest growth rate in the world over the past decade and an entrepreneurial boom in the south, China has enormous potential as a market for American goods and services. At the same time, China's human rights practices do not conform with international standards; we are concerned that its arms sales behavior jeopardizes our global non-proliferation efforts; significant barriers to our products and services continue while China sends an increasing share of its exports to the United States. All these factors raise serious questions about the nature of the relationship. These issues have come together in the annual most-favored-nation [MFN] debate in the Congress. The Bush Administration was adamant in rejecting every effort to put conditions on extension of MFN to China. The Clinton Administration will address all of these concerns--human rights, proliferation, and trade--and we will address them aggressively. We are currently reviewing our policy toward China, including MFN, and I can tell you that we will consult closely with the Congress. On trade, an interagency team was in China last week following up on the two trade agreements that Ambassador Hills negotiated last year on intellectual property rights [IPR] and on market access. So far, the Chinese are abiding by the terms of the IPR agreements. On market access, there are some problems, and I am following up with my Chinese counterparts. We are leading the process to negotiate China's entry into the GATT, and we will ensure that significant further changes in China's trade regime are made before that happens. Finally, we are looking at other areas, such as services, that were not the subject of earlier negotiations yet are very important to our businessmen. We expect an equitable and balanced trading relationship with China, and we will settle for no less. The Administration and Congress also face the issues of renewing the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, which we are reviewing carefully as we consider our overall policies of trade and aid with developing and East and Central European countries. As the President noted in his speech, the steady expansion of growth in the developing world is in our interest and theirs as well. We need to do our part to alleviate the grinding poverty which afflicts much of the world at the same time [that] we are building markets for products made by our workers here. Let me close on a personal note, which I mentioned in my confirmation hearing. There is nothing theoretical about the job I have or the work that we will do together. I traveled around the country during the last campaign, and I have seen the pain inflicted on people and communities from jobs lost as a result of a changing global economy. I have spoken with many of you, and, through you, I have heard the concerns of those you represent. Together, we need to find the mix of policies that rebuild the US economy so that our children have the opportunities that we were fortunate enough to have. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

US Policy in the Middle East

Djerejian Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 9 19933/9/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Human Rights [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to meet again with you and the distinguished members of the subcommittee. As you know, Secretary Christopher returned 11 days ago from his first journey outside the United States as Secretary of State, a trip that took us to Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Cyprus, Lebanon, [and] Israel; to Geneva, where he met with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev; and, finally, to Brussels for meetings with the North Atlantic Council. President Clinton asked Secretary Christopher to travel to the Middle East with several important objectives in mind: First, to demonstrate his belief that the Middle East peace process presented an opportunity for real progress in the period ahead and, conversely, to signal our awareness that this is a region which, if left unattended, can do much harm to vital US interests; [and] Second, to promote other important objectives of our policy, namely: -- Concern about human rights and broader political participation in the region; -- Promotion of American business and commercial opportunities abroad and the need to end the secondary and tertiary aspects of the Arab economic boycott; -- Reassurance to allies that we would expect Iraq's full compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions; [and] -- Recognition of the importance we attach to Lebanon's continuing to make progress toward full independence and economic recovery. The Secretary returned from the trip satisfied that we made some progress on these issues, which enables us to move forward in meeting these objectives in the period ahead. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly review for the subcommittee the status of our relations and interests in the Middle East following the Secretary's trip, after which I will be happy to take your questions. I will endeavor to bring you up to date on the peace process, on our bilateral relations with some of the countries in the region, on our efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, and on broader concerns such as our economic and commercial interests and the prospects for democracy and human rights.
Peace Process
On the peace process: Since the eighth round of bilaterals adjourned in mid- December [1992], there has been a hiatus in the negotiations. President Clinton sent Secretary Christopher to the Middle East last month not only to re-energize and reactivate the peace talks but also to assess the determination and commitment of the parties to the goal of a negotiated peace. The President and Secretary especially wanted to emphasize the commitment of the United States to a full partnership role in this complex and difficult process if, and this is important, the parties come to the table prepared to engage in serious and meaningful negotiations in order to narrow the substantive differences between them. Much work needs to be done. Not only are the substantive positions between the parties still far apart, but the political environment has been made more difficult by the resurgence of violence directed against Israel by terrorists and by the deportation of Hamas activists.
Deportees
The Secretary recognized and acted on the specific challenge of the deportees issue in the earliest days of the new Administration. He engaged in intensive discussions with [Israeli] Prime Minister Rabin to move the issue off dead center. In this regard, the understandings reached with Israel and announced by Prime Minister Rabin on February 1 and the Security Council's endorsement of the process for carrying out Resolution 799 were positive steps forward to resolve this issue. Further, while the Secretary was in Jerusalem, he worked closely with Prime Minister Rabin and the Palestinians, represented by Faisal Husseini and his colleagues, to determine what more could be done to move the parties to resume negotiations at the earliest possible date. As a result of these close consultations and discussions, more progress was achieved which allowed the Secretary and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev to announce in Geneva the intention of the co-sponsors to extend invitations to the parties very soon for a ninth round of negotiations in Washington in April.
Discussions With Arab Leaders
The Secretary's discussions with Arab leaders were positive and substantive. Each of them emphasized privately their commitment to the negotiating process and their strong intent to return to the table of negotiations as soon as possible. Equally important, each said the same thing publicly and, thus, placed their countries squarely behind an early resumption of the bilateral negotiations. In delivering letters to each of the leaders from President Clinton, the Secretary focused on the key elements of the President's policy: -- The United States remains committed to the process of peace- making launched at Madrid, including the terms of reference for the negotiations and the letters of assurances provided by the US Government to each party. -- Our policy remains directed at the achievement of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement, achieved through direct negotiations based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. -- The United States is prepared to play an active role to help narrow and overcome substantive differences if, as I stated earlier, the parties, on their part, are prepared to come to the table and engage in meaningful negotiations. In playing this role, which the Secretary characterized as "full partner," he stressed that in no way would we substitute ourselves for the parties themselves; but, rather, we would assist the parties who are engaged in direct, face-to-face negotiations as an active intermediary--an honest broker and facilitator--in helping to move the talks forward and to narrow substantive differences. The parties appreciated the continuity in US policy which this approach indicated; they were buoyed by the willingness of the United States to play a more active role; they indicated their understanding that such a role would not substitute for the direct talks between themselves.
Discussions With Israelis And Palestinians
The Secretary's talks in Israel on a range of bilateral, regional, and peace process issues benefited from his previous engagement with Prime Minister Rabin in arranging the process for dealing with the deportations issue. Through that effort, a positive relationship was begun, characterized by mutual trust and personal rapport that, as a result of this visit, has intensified and provides an excellent basis for Prime Minister Rabin's meeting with President Clinton this month. The Secretary's discussions with Palestinian leaders were also frank and substantive. The Palestinians expressed their continued concerns about the human rights situation in the occupied territories, and there was an extensive discussion of issues involving the negotiations on interim self- government arrangements and final status talks. After these detailed exchanges with both Israelis and Palestinians, we left the region persuaded that there was broad agreement in principle on the steps that were needed to restart the peace negotiations. In sum, the Secretary's trip allowed us to refocus the parties on resuming the negotiations and to sensitize the parties that it is time to delve into substance and that the United States will be there to assist them to reach agreements.
Bilateral Relations
A primary aim of the Secretary in undertaking his trip was to get to know the region's leaders, to listen and to learn of their concerns, and to establish good personal relationships that would facilitate the conduct of our formal bilateral relations. In this respect, we were very encouraged by the results.
Egypt.
In Cairo, the Secretary renewed the friendship and cooperative relationship the United States has enjoyed with Egypt for many years. Recognizing the "pivotal role" Egypt plays in the region, the Secretary saluted Egypt's invaluable leadership under President Mubarak in the search for peace and expressed his appreciation for the "wise counsel" proffered by Egypt's leaders on issues of mutual concern.
Jordan.
In Jordan, the Secretary noted substantial progress toward democratization and King Hussein's commitment to protection of human rights. Jordan is taking concrete steps toward economic reform and a strengthened free market economy. Of course, Jordan has been a key participant in the peace process, and we look forward to its continued positive role. King Hussein also assured the Secretary that Jordan would continue to adhere to UN sanctions against Iraq. To support Jordan's positive role in the peace process and its adherence to UN sanctions, we will recommend soon to the Secretary that he release the remaining $50 million in FY 1992 security assistance funds. We will, of course, discuss our plans with you and other Members of Congress before disbursement.
Syria.
In Damascus, the Secretary consulted extensively with President Assad on the peace process and a wide range of bilateral issues. The Syrian President assured the Secretary that he remains firmly committed to the peace process and to re-engaging as soon as possible in the next round of bilateral negotiations. The Secretary also established with the Syrians the basis for continuing our dialogue to address high-priority bilateral concerns, including terrorism, narcotics, and human rights, with a view toward obtaining positive results. In this latter respect, the Secretary raised the issue of Syrian Jewry, and President Assad reconfirmed his decision to allow Syrian Jews full freedom of travel. Secretary Christopher also made clear the importance we continue to attach to the redeployment of Syrian forces in Lebanon.
Lebanon.
The Secretary identified as one of his objectives the recognition of the progress achieved by the Lebanese Government in reconciling and reconstructing that war-torn nation. His dramatic visit to Beirut--the first by an American Secretary of State since 1983--underscored our continuing support for Lebanon's efforts to restore its economy and to regain full control of its territory and its political independence and was welcomed by the Lebanese leadership--President Hraoui, Prime Minister Hariri, and Foreign Minister Buouez--as a powerful symbol of the US commitment to Lebanon. We continue to support full implementation of both the letter and the spirit of the Taif accord and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, and the Secretary made this clear during his trip. In Lebanon, a key to the extension of government authority throughout the country is the maintenance of strong Lebanese armed forces. The Lebanese army has traditionally sought training for many of its soldiers in the West, including in the United States. It remains our hope that we can resume accepting a number of Lebanese officers and enlisted personnel for training in this country under the IMET [International Military Education and Training] program, and we would appreciate Congress' support in this endeavor.
Israel.
Upon his arrival in Israel, Secretary Christopher reconfirmed the special relationship, based on shared democratic values and common interests, that exists between Israel and the United States. Citing President Clinton's determination to make the ties binding our two countries "even stronger and more resilient," the Secretary also reaffirmed the United States' unalterable commitment to Israel's security and its qualitative military edge, a commitment based on our recognition of Israel's continuing security challenges. The Secretary observed that real security for Israel can only be brought about by real peace--not just the absence of war but peace reflected in lasting treaties, normalized relations, and genuine reconciliation with her neighbors and with the Palestinians. To that end, and recognizing that obstacles still existed, he reiterated the US commitment to the role of full partner in a reinvigorated peace process.
Gulf Security
Turning now to the Persian Gulf, we continue to work on two fronts to assure the security of this economically vital region. Those two fronts are our continuing efforts to encourage and help provide a credible defense of our friends and allies on the Arabian Peninsula and the full enforcement of UN resolutions on Iraq. The Arabian Peninsula. In helping provide for the defense of the Gulf states, it must first be noted that the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries- -allies and important trading partners of the United States--remain vulnerable to aggression from an unrepentant Iraq or a rearmed and ideologically assertive Iran. Secretary Christopher reaffirmed the US position on Gulf security when he told the Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders that "President Clinton's commitment to the security of friends in the Gulf, like that of every President since Franklin Roosevelt, is firm and constant." As you know, the US Government has encouraged regional security cooperation and collective defense arrangements within the GCC and has been engaged in our own bilateral security agreements with the individual Gulf states. Further, we have made arms sales to those states to satisfy their legitimate defense needs.
Iraq.
The Baghdad Government has lately been trying to convince anyone who will listen that it seeks a more amicable relationship with the Clinton Administration and that there is no longer any reason for the United Nations to retain sanctions against Iraq. This has been characterized as Iraq's "charm offensive." Let me make clear, as President Clinton and Secretary Christopher already have, that we are not charmed. Iraq must comply with all UN Security Council resolutions. In his semi-annual report to Congress on the Iraq sanctions, released just 3 weeks ago [Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 8, p. 97], President Clinton reaffirmed the continuity of our policy toward Iraq. He noted that the Iraqi regime's continued refusal to accept the UN resolutions has perpetuated the suffering of the Iraqi people. The President stressed that Iraq must fully comply with the UN resolutions, which mandate an end to repression of the Iraqi people as well as measures designed to achieve the security of Iraq's neighbors, before lifting of economic sanctions can be considered. Recent incidents of Iraqi threats against UN helicopters are further examples of Iraq's non- compliance with the most basic of its obligations--to permit full and free access to UN inspectors seeking to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and to establish long-term monitoring of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities. In Riyadh [Saudi Arabia] and Kuwait 2 weeks ago, the Secretary stressed yet again the importance the Clinton Administration attaches to the full implementation of all UN resolutions on Iraq and of implementing the means chosen by the coalition to do so. He emphasized that "we bear no ill will to the suffering people of Iraq. . . . The pain inflicted on the Iraqi people is the responsibility of Saddam Hussein's regime." In fact, we continue to fund relief programs in northern Iraq, to support UN efforts to establish relief in central and southern Iraq, and to support the recent recommendations of UN Special Representative Max van der Stoel that the United Nations should station human rights monitors throughout Iraq. We also support the work of the opposition Iraqi National Congress to draw all Iraqis into the creation of a future and, hopefully, democratic regime that can allow the Iraqi people to live in peace. A future Iraqi Government which is representative of all the people of Iraq, which is committed to the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq, and which does not threaten its neighbors or its own people remains a key US foreign policy goal. Mr. Chairman, the message is clear: No one should doubt the continued and undiminished resolve of the US Government under the leadership of President Clinton to see that the will of the international community, as defined by the UN Security Council, is heeded and fully complied with.
Economic and Commercial Interests
The United States has important economic and commercial interests in the Middle East, and especially in the Gulf region, which we continue to pursue actively. Throughout his trip, the Secretary raised with several of his interlocutors the Administration's support for US companies that are bidding on significant local contracts. Regarding American business interests in Saudi Arabia, I am pleased to report that, as Secretary [of Defense] Aspin has written to you, we are achieving progress in resolving a number of the commercial disputes with that country. Several have been concluded recently, and Saudi Ambassador Bandar is working to conclude agreements with the remaining claimants. We will continue our strong efforts in this regard. During his visit, the Secretary strongly urged the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to work to eliminate the Arab League boycott of Israel. Since the Gulf war, these countries have quietly reduced enforcement of the boycott against American companies. The Secretary emphasized clearly that more needs to be done, however. We continue to press Arab states hard to end these anachronistic measures, and we have urged immediate action to eliminate the secondary and tertiary aspects of the boycott, especially as they affect American companies. We are also working with our trading partners, and the European Community and Japan have both made their own demarches.
Democracy, Human Rights, And Islam
I have previously mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that we have been encouraged to see concrete steps being taken toward expanding political participation in a number of Arab countries. During his trip, Secretary Christopher applauded [Jordanian] King Hussein's ongoing process of democratization and, in Kuwait, the reinstitution of its parliament. He encouraged the Kuwaiti Government's consideration of expanding suffrage and specifically raised the right of women to vote in Kuwaiti elections. We also note that Yemen is scheduled to hold its first-ever parliamentary elections in late April, and we are encouraging the Yemenis in this effort. We have encouraged American bipartisan and non-government[al] organization observers to be present during the polling, with the endorsement of the Government of Yemen. In keeping with Muslim tradition, the other Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, are in the process of creating or reviving appointed consultative councils, which is a step toward broader political participation. As Secretary Christopher stated before his visit, we hope the respective governments will move forward on these intentions and will use these councils to provide broader and more formal public access to and participation in the process of governance. Several of the region's governments are struggling to cope with rhetorical, political, and sometimes violent challenges justified on the basis of religious precepts. While we recognize the seriousness of some of these challenges and have stated our position on Islamic and extremist groups in the speech I gave at Meridian House last June--and which you were kind enough to enter into the Congressional Record--we call on all concerned-- secular or religious activists and governments alike--to practice the respect for human rights, pluralism, and tolerance of others inherent in the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian traditions. These are values we Americans cherish and, without attempting to impose our own model on other governments, these are values we are convinced will well serve the peoples of this turbulent region. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

Situation in Sudan

Cohen Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 10 19933/10/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa Country: Sudan Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights [TEXT] I want to thank the members of this committee for the opportunity to review the situation in Sudan. I would especially like to congratulate Congressman Johnston on assuming the chairmanship of this subcommittee, which plays such an important role in developing US policy toward Africa. This may well be my last appearance before Congress, and I wish that the subject matter were a more uplifting one. But I am very grateful for the Congress' continuing interest in Sudan, as demonstrated by the resolution passed last November, the numerous letters, and the personal visit of Congressman Wolf. We in the Administration value Congress' help in drawing attention to the civil war, human rights, and humanitarian crises in Sudan and in seeking new ways to bring assistance to suffering people there. Khartoum needs to know that American concerns about its behavior extend beyond the State Department, and you in Congress have helped to make that clear. Sudan presents us with a raft of thorny problems which, taken as a whole, constitute one of our biggest policy challenges in Africa. Civil war, systematic abuse of human rights, intense humanitarian suffering, concerns about terrorism, and regional instability--these are the pieces of the Sudan policy puzzle. I can tell you that putting the puzzle together in a way that satisfies America's concerns and interests is a top priority for the Administration in its approach to Africa. I would like to frame my remarks to you today by first discussing the humanitarian situation and our response to it, then addressing our other policy concerns, and, finally, reviewing some options for a more vigorous approach to the Sudanese crisis. Humanitarian Disaster and US Response As you've heard from your colleague Congressman Wolf, southern Sudan has become one of the world's darkest humanitarian nightmares. It is a chaotic territory where civil war, disease, homelessness, and hunger form a tapestry of tragedy for millions of Sudanese. You will receive a detailed report on the situation from Ms. Richards [Acting Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, US Agency for International Development (USAID)], but it is clear that several hundred thousand people face starvation if they do not receive assistance in the coming months. In at least some areas, people are already dying in large numbers, at rates comparable to the worst situations in Somalia. Sudan's civil war is at the very heart of this human catastrophe. Fighting between government forces and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and between factions of the SPLA has driven people from their homes, disrupted agricultural production, and prevented relief organizations from reaching the victims of war and drought. Recent UN initiatives have produced some progress in resolving obstacles to delivering relief to southern Sudan, and some relief supplies are now beginning to move along the Nile, railroads, and overland routes. An increasing number of NGOs [non-governmental organizations] are willing to go back into southern Sudan, and the food pipeline is in good shape. But access to affected populations will remain a problem as long as the civil war continues. Government bombing of rebel-held towns in the south and rebel looting of relief deliveries are examples of the problems facing the relief effort. With the humanitarian crisis reaching new depths, it is critical that all sides in the conflict permit access. If this access is not granted to avoid further catastrophe, we will certainly be considering other options to ensure the delivery of relief assistance. Ms. Richards will provide details on what the United States has done and is doing to meet the needs of the southern Sudanese. Let me just pre- face those details by saying that our contribution has been substantial, with over $53 million in humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people provided in FY 1992. Beyond our contributions in cash and in kind, we have pursued active diplomacy with both the Sudanese Government and the SPLA to press for increased access for relief operations. The recent marginal improvements in the access situation tell us that our efforts have had some success. As we explore new approaches to the Sudanese crisis--and I'll have more on that later--one thing is certain: The United States will remain actively engaged with UN agencies, non-government[al] organizations, and other donor countries to help meet the needs of suffering populations in southern Sudan. Our ambassador in Khartoum, Don Petterson, has recently traveled to the south, as have a number of relief experts from OFDA [USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance]. We will be closely examining their recommendations as we seek a more vigorous approach to this crisis. While we will do everything we can to meet the needs of this crisis, it is very clear that the only long-term solution to southern Sudan's humanitarian nightmare is an end to civil strife. As long as southern populations are regularly dislocated by warfare, the international relief community will be playing an endless game of catch-up. In this regard, the recent announcement that talks between the government and John Garang's faction of the SPLA will resume in Nigeria is welcome news. We hope that both sides will bring a more serious commitment to these talks than has been the case in the past, and we have told all sides that we are willing to facilitate the peace process.
Other Bilateral Concerns
Let me turn for a moment from the central issue of the humanitarian crisis to touch on some other matters in our relationship with the Khartoum Government. Our bilateral relations with Sudan remain badly strained--and for good reason. Our shock and outrage over the government's execution of two of our Sudanese employees in Juba last August have in no way diminished with the passage of time. The Government in Khartoum has informed us that an independent commission is investigating these killings. We have yet to receive any results from this investigation, and we continue to make clear to the government that the lack of a satisfactory response on this issue remains a very serious problem in our bilateral relationship. I'd like to briefly summarize our principal human rights concerns with respect to Sudan. The forced removal of Khartoum's squatter populations has been a long-standing concern, as have the forced relocations and systematic abuses perpetrated against people in the Nuba Mountains. Infringement of the rights of women, arbitrary detention, torture, repression of the press, and restrictions on labor unions are routinely used by the government to suppress dissent. We also remain deeply worried about Khartoum's policy of coercive Islamization of non-Muslim Sudanese. As we have consistently stressed to the government, the fact that the Sudanese Government has an Islamic orientation is not at issue. Our objection, rather, is to a state-sponsored effort to impose a specific religion and religious law on those whose beliefs lie elsewhere. The Pope's recent visit to Khartoum usefully called attention to the persecution of Christians, and we are encouraged by the government's pledges, before and during the Pope's visit, to take a more tolerant approach to the Christian community. Now Khartoum's actions must meet its word. The United States also continues to watch Sudan closely in connection with our worldwide efforts to combat terrorism. Khartoum harbors known terrorists and terrorist groups, including Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It maintains close ties to Libya and Iraq, which it tacitly supported during the Gulf war. Most disturbing, however, is the increasing level of Iranian activity in Sudan since [Iranian] President Rafsanjani's visit to Khartoum in December 1991. Iranian Revolutionary Guards operate in Sudan, and Khartoum has become a venue for contact with Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups and North African extremists. We are monitoring the situation closely and have made it clear to the Sudanese that, under US law, they are extremely close to being designated a state sponsor of terrorism.
Diplomatic Actions
We are working hard, and with some success, to maintain international pressure on Khartoum in order to moderate the regime's human rights behavior. A resolution, which we sponsored at the UN General Assembly in December, called attention to Sudan's human rights record and its unproductive approach to the humanitarian needs of its own population. Due to consistent US pressure, Sudan figured prominently in the debate of the recently concluded UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The United States has taken the lead in seeking to have a special rapporteur appointed to examine alleged abuses in Sudan. Aside from these successful efforts within the UN system, we have pursued bilateral approaches to engage our allies in an attempt to isolate Khartoum. One focus of this effort has been on diplomatic efforts to discourage shipments of arms to Sudan. For our own part, we have formalized a policy of disapproving all license applications for military-related exports to Sudan and have asked our allies to do the same. Further, we have urged our donor partners to follow our lead in suspending non-humanitarian development assistance to Sudan. There is some indication that these measures have helped to shake Khartoum's leaders into a realization, however faint, that internationally unacceptable behavior has economic and political consequences. While Khartoum continues to respond to our concerns mainly with half-measures and promises of positive action, there are some signs that elements within the government understand the need to be more forthcoming. The government's marginally more cooperative approach to humanitarian relief in recent months is one such indication. A dialogue with the government on human rights and other issues continues, and we believe that this dialogue holds the potential for additional constructive moves by Khartoum.
Next Steps
Our concerns are, however, far from being satisfied. Clearly, we need to maintain and increase our pressure to produce results on the humanitarian and human rights fronts. The Administration has recently embarked on a comprehensive review of US policy toward Sudan, designed to cover all of our outstanding concerns--the humanitarian crisis, human rights, terrorism, and the civil war. I want to stress that we are at the early stages of this review. We are developing options, and I expect that decisions on these options will be made within the next month. So while I can't be specific about policies that are still under review, I would like to discuss some broad options and to hear your reactions and your own ideas. The humanitarian issue is at the top of the agenda as we review our policy toward Sudan. We will continue to explore ways to keep the relief lines open through our contacts with both the government and the SPLA. More importantly, we will continue to press for serious peace talks between the government and the SPLA. We have no illusions about the difficulty of this process. Khartoum's lack of enthusiasm for negotiations has been amply demonstrated in the past, and internal fractures within the SPLA are bound to reduce the chances for serious breakthroughs. An end to this conflict will require greater efforts by both sides. As many of you may be aware, a number of non-government[al] organizations are pressing for the establishment of "secure zones" within the south, where drought- and war-affected Sudanese could take refuge and receive relief. This idea merits consideration, although implementation would be a complex affair. First, it seems likely that any action along these lines would require a UN mandate. The real concern, however, is that identification of secure zones would almost certainly become subject to the ambitions and objectives of the parties to warfare in the south. Given the tremendous difficulty in soliciting cooperation from the government and SPLA for existing relief efforts, a mandate to create these zones in disputed territory could well encounter significant resistance which would have to be countered with solid, coordinated international pressure. We are also examining ways to encourage a moderation of Sudan's human rights performance through concerted international attention and action. We believe that our efforts in the UN General Assembly and at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva have helped to reinforce to Khartoum that its behavior is unacceptable and that the international community is determined to focus a harsh spotlight on the regime's political repression and its brutal treatment of significant portions of Sudan's population. Unfortunately, we are dealing with a government which answers international concern with half-measures, if at all. We will continue to explore ways of using our political and economic leverage, in coordination with other concerned nations, to bring the maximum pressure to bear in support of human rights in Sudan. Again, as we continue to focus on the situation in Sudan, Congress can play a critical role. The congressional resolution passed last November sent a strong message to Khartoum. Congressman Wolf's visit and his activist approach on Sudan since his return have been extremely constructive. By publicly demonstrating interest and concern, the Congress can continue to play an important role. The Administration looks forward to continued close contact with this committee as our Sudan policy evolves. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

Fact Sheet: Open Skies Treaty

ACDA Source: Office of Public Affairs, US Office of Public Affairs, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Description: Fact Sheet, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 4 19933/4/93 Category: Fact Sheets Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: Europe, Eurasia, E/C Europe, North America Country: Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Russia, Romania, Slovak Republic, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, United Kingdom Subject: Military Affairs, International Law [TEXT]
Introduction
The Treaty on Open Skies establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its participants. The treaty is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information about military forces and activities of concern to them. Open Skies is the most wide-ranging international effort to date to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities.
Current Status
The Treaty on Open Skies was signed in Helsinki, Finland, on March 24, 1992. It was negotiated between the members of NATO and members of the Warsaw Pact; the latter dissolved during the course of the talks. The following states have signed the Open Skies Treaty: Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The other independent states on the territory of the former Soviet Union are eligible to sign the treaty. Other members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe may apply for participation in the Open Skies regime as soon as the treaty enters into force. Six months after entry into force, the Treaty on Open Skies will be open to application for participation by any interested state. Applications for participation after entry into force are subject to consensus agreement by the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC), a forum of all states parties charged with facilitating the implementation of the treaty. Provisional application of portions of the Open Skies Treaty began on March 24, 1992, and can be extended beyond the initial 1-year term. The treaty will enter into force 60 days after the deposit of 20 instruments of ratification, including those of the two depositaries, Canada and Hungary, and states parties with a passive quota of eight or more (which include Belarus, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The Open Skies Treaty was submitted to the US Senate for its advice and consent on August 12, 1992.
Basic Elements of the Treaty
Territory. The treaty specifies that all territory of the participating states is open to observation. Observed countries may not restrict observation flights for national security reasons, only for legitimate reasons of flight safety. Aircraft. Observation aircraft may be provided by either the observing party or by the observed party, at the latter's option. All Open Skies aircraft and sensors must pass specific certification and pre-flight inspection procedures to ensure that they meet treaty standards and that only treaty- permitted sensors are installed. The US Open Skies aircraft will be a modified WC-135B aircraft (a military version of the Boeing 707). Sensors. Open Skies aircraft may have video, optical panoramic, and framing cameras for daylight photography, infrared line scanners for a day/night capability, and synthetic aperture radar for a day/night all- weather capability. Photographic image quality will permit recognition of major military equipment--the ability to distinguish a tank from a truck-- thus allowing significant transparency of military forces and activities. Sensor categories may be added and capabilities improved by agreement among states parties. All equipment used in Open Skies must be commercially available to all participants. Quotas. Each participant has agreed to an annual quota of observation flights it is willing to receive--its passive quota of observation flights. Each participant may conduct as many observation flights--its active quota--as its passive quota. The full passive quota for the US and the Russia/Belarus group of states parties is 42 flights each. During the first 3 years after entry into force, countries will have to accept only 75% of their passive quotas. The initial US and Russia/Belarus passive quota is 31 flights each. For the first year of the treaty's operation, only 4 of the 31 potential flights over the United States were requested, all by Russia/Belarus. The United States is entitled to 8 of the 31 flights available over Russia/Belarus. Additionally, the United States is entitled to one flight over Ukraine, to be shared with Canada. Data Availability. The treaty provides that the observing state will provide a copy of the data that it collects during an overflight to the observed state. In addition, all participating states have the right to purchase the data collected by any state. As a result, the data available to each Open Skies participating state is much greater than that which it can collect itself under the treaty quota system.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

Fact Sheet: Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons

ACDA Source: Office of Public Affairs, US Office of Public Affairs, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Description: Fact Sheet, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 5 19933/5/93 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe, Eurasia, E/C Europe, North America Country: Subject: Arms Control, International Organizations [TEXT] The following fact sheet was released by the Office of Public Affairs, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, March 5, 1993. From February 8-12, 1993, the Preparatory Commission of all signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) met in The Hague, the Netherlands, to set up the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to further elaborate detailed CWC implementing procedures. The purpose of the OPCW will be to ensure implementation of the CWC, signed in Paris on January 13 [1993] by 130 nations. The CWC bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.
Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons.
All countries ratifying the convention will become states parties to the CWC and will make up the membership of the OPCW. The OPCW, with headquarters in The Hague, will consist of the Conference of the States Parties and its Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat.
Conference of the States Parties.
The first meeting of the Conference of the States Parties will be convened not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the CWC. (The CWC will enter into force 180 days after the 65th ratification but not earlier than 2 years after January 13, 1993.) The first meeting is expected to occur in the spring of 1995. As the principal organ of the OPCW, the conference will oversee the implementation of the CWC and act in order to promote its object and purpose, including reviewing compliance with the CWC. The conference also will oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines in accordance with the CWC to either of them for the exercise of their functions. Not later than 1 year after the expiration of the fifth and tenth year after entry into force of the CWC, and at such other times as may be decided upon within that time period, the conference shall convene in special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of the CWC. Such reviews will take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. At intervals of 5 years thereafter, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the conference will be convened with the same objective.
Executive Council.
The Executive Council will consist of 41 members, with each state party having the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to serve on the council. The members of the council will be elected by the conference for a 2-year term. (For the first election of the Executive Council, 20 members shall be elected for a 1-year term.) In order to ensure the effective functioning of the CWC, the composition of the council will be made up in a way that gives due regard to equitable geographical distribution, to the importance of chemical industry, and to political and security interests. The council will be the executive organ of the OPCW and shall be responsible to the Conference of the States Parties for its actions. In this capacity, the council will carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it under the CWC, as well as those functions delegated to it by the conference. In so doing, it will act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions, and guidelines of the conference and assure their proper and continuous implementation. In addition to promoting the effective implementation of and compliance with the CWC, the council will supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat, cooperate with the national authority of each state party, and facilitate consultations and cooperation among states parties at their request. The council has the right and duty to consider any issue or matter within its competence affecting the CWC and its implementation, including concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance, and, as appropriate, inform states parties and bring the issue or matter to the attention of the conference. In cases of particular gravity and urgency, the council will bring the matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. At the same time, the council will inform all states parties of its action.
Technical Secretariat.
The Technical Secretariat will be comprised of a director general, who will be its head and chief administrative officer; inspectors; and such scientific, technical, and other personnel as may be required. The conference will appoint the director general upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, and he [or she] will be responsible to them for the appointment of the staff and the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The secretariat will assist the conference and the council in the performance of their functions as well as carry out the verification measures provided for in the CWC. The secretariat also will carry out the other functions entrusted to it under the CWC and those functions delegated to it by the conference and the council. A major responsibility of the secretariat is to inform the council of any problem that arises with regard to the discharge of its functions, including doubts, ambiguities, or uncertainties about compliance with the CWC that have come to its notice in the performance of its verification activities and that it has been unable to resolve or clarify through its consultations with the state party concerned. It is the responsibility of each state party to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the director general, the inspectors, and other members of the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

US To Enforce Moratorium on Driftnet Fishing

Boucher Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 8 19933/8/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Resource Management [TEXT] The United States announced plans today to enforce a moratorium on large- scale driftnet fishing on the high seas. The moratorium was agreed to at the UN General Assembly in 1991. Under UN Resolution 46/215, which was adopted by consensus, a global moratorium on all large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing operations on the high seas took effect on January 1, 1993. All members of the international community agreed to take measures individually and collectively to implement the resolution. The United States plans to take the following steps in the event US enforcement authorities have reasonable grounds to believe that any foreign flag vessel encountered on the high seas is conducting or has conducted large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing operations in violation of the UN resolution: 1. US authorities will contact the authorities of the territory whose flag the vessel is flying to seek confirmation that the vessel is in fact registered by those authorities. If the vessel is not flying a flag, US authorities will contact the authorities of the territory in which the vessel claims to be registered to seek confirmation of the same information. The US Government will expect a prompt response to such a request to facilitate enforcement operations. 2. If the contacted authorities verify that the vessel in question is registered in their territory, US authorities will take appropriate action in accordance with agreements in force between the United States and those authorities or any other bilateral or multilateral arrangements that may be made to prevent large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing operations on the high seas [which are] inconsistent with the UN resolution. If there are no pre- existing arrangements, the United States will seek a special arrangement to take law enforcement or other appropriate action on behalf of the authorities in whose territory the vessel is registered. 3. If the contacted authorities deny that the vessel in question is registered in their territory, or if the vessel refuses to reveal or claim a territory of registry, US authorities will, consistent with Article 92 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, treat the vessel as stateless. It is noted that, under customary international and US law, a stateless vessel conducting large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing operations on the high seas would be subject to penalty in the United States.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

Rwanda: Department Statement

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 9 19933/9/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Rwanda Subject: Democratization [TEXT] The Government of the United States welcomes the communique signed by the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front in Dar es Salaam [Tanzania on] March 7 calling for renewed negotiations in Arusha [Tanzania] and consolidation of the Nsele cease-fire agreement. We commend the two parties for their recognition of the need for reconciliation and a negotiated settlement to the conflict that has devastated Rwanda since 1990 and displaced up to a million people. We call on both parties to abide by the commitments and timetable they have agreed to and facilitate the return of the displaced to their homes, as announced in the communique. The government also wishes to commend the facilitator, the Government of Tanzania, and representatives of the Organization of African Unity for their work in helping the two parties reach agreement. We have been participating as observers in the Arusha negotiations since July 1992. A State Department political-military specialist is currently in the region to meet with both sides and attend the Arusha talks. In recognition of Rwanda's recent progress toward democratization and economic reform, we are providing approximately $20 million in bilateral assistance programs in FY 1993. Continued assistance depends upon further progress on democratization, good governance, and a renewed commitment to human rights and the rule of law. Continued violence could jeopardize our bilateral assistance programs. Last year, we provided almost $3 million in humanitarian assistance to the 350,000 persons displaced by previous fighting. The US Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has already committed an additional $1 mil-lion to assist the newly displaced, food airlifts have begun, and a US planeload of blankets and other relief items arrived [on] March 4.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 11, March 15, 1993 Title:

Secretary Names Special Adviser for Haiti

Boucher Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 11 19933/11/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: State Department, OAS [TEXT] The Secretary is today announcing the appointment of Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, a distinguished retired Foreign Service officer, as his special adviser for Haiti. Haiti is a full-time concern of this Administration, and the Secretary wanted to have a high-level official devoting full time to Haiti. Ambassador Pezzullo will fill that role. With the UN/OAS [Organization of American States] mission in place and with UN/OAS Special Envoy Dante Caputo undertaking renewed efforts to promote a negotiated solution in Haiti, the Secretary anticipates the need in coming months for the United States and other parties to engage intensively to support diplomatic efforts. As we move forward, Ambassador Pezzullo will advise the Secretary on Haitian matters, and he will support in particular Mr. Caputo's efforts to promote negotiations. The President and the Secretary place a very high priority on resolving Haiti's crisis. This Administration wants to see democracy restored, [Haitian] President Aristide returned to office, and a resumed international effort to promote Haiti's economic and democratic development. Ambassador Pezzullo will begin work at the Department tomorrow. He has been Executive Director of Catholic Relief Services since 1983. He entered the Foreign Service in 1957 and served as ambassador to Uruguay (1977-79) and Nicaragua (1979-81). (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 12, March 22, 1993

Title:

Strengthening US-Israeli Relations To Benefit America's Interests

Clinton Rabin Source: President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin Description: Opening statements at a news conference released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 15 19933/15/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel Subject: Trade/Economics, Mideast Peace Process [TEXT]
President Clinton:
It is a great pleasure for me to welcome Prime Minister Rabin back to Washington. Since we first met here last August, much has changed. But one thing I can say definitely will never change is the unique bond that unites the United States and Israel. It is a bond that goes back to the founding of the state of Israel and beyond, based on shared values and shared ideals. Israel's democracy is the bedrock on which our relationship stands. It's a shining example for people around the world who are on the front line of the struggle for democracy in their own lands. Our relationship is also based on our common interest in a more stable and peaceful Middle East--a Middle East that will finally accord Israel the recognition and acceptance that its people have yearned for [for] so long and have been too long denied; a Middle East that will know greater democracy for all its peoples. I believe strongly in the benefit to American interests from strengthened relationships with Israel. Our talks today have been conducted in that context. We have begun a dialogue intended to raise our relationship to a new level of strategic partnership--partners in the pursuit of peace; partners in the pursuit of security. We focus today on our common objective of turning 1993 into a year of peace-making in the Middle East.Prime Minister Rabin has made clear to me today that pursuing peace with security is his highest mission. I have pledged that my Administration will be active in helping the parties to achieve that end. At the same time, Prime Minister Rabin and I agree that our common objective should be real, lasting, just, and comprehensive peace, based on [UN Security Council] Resolutions 242 and 338. It must involve full normalization, diplomatic relations, open borders, commerce, tourism--the human bonds that are both the fruits and the best guarantee of peace. And Israel's security must be assured. The Israeli people cannot be expected to make peace unless they feel secure, and they cannot be expected to feel secure unless they come to know real peace. Those like Prime Minister Rabin who genuinely seek peace in the Middle East will find in me and my Administration a full partner. But those who seek to subvert the peace process will find zero tolerance here for their deplorable acts of violence and terrorism. Prime Minister Rabin has told me that he is prepared to take risks for peace. He has told his own people the same thing. I have told him that our role is to help to minimize those risks. We will do that by further reinforcing our commitment to maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge. Another way we can strengthen Israel and the United States is to combine the skills of its people with those of our own. I am pleased to announce today the establishment of a US-Israel science and technology commission, chaired on the American side by our Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown. The commission will enhance cooperation to create technology-based jobs for the 21st century in both Israel and the United States. Our economies will also benefit from a lifting of the Arab boycott. And I hope that this boycott can end soon. Prime Minister Rabin, this year will be a year of enhanced relations between our countries. It should also be a year of peace in the Middle East, as you have declared. We have a historic responsibility and a historic opportunity. We stand here together today resolved not to let that opportunity pass.
Prime Minister Rabin:
President Clinton, in just a few days I will return to Israel, but I know, and will tell everyone in my country, Israel has a friend in the White House. Our home is many miles away, but, Mr. President, we feel very close. We thank you for the hours we spent with you and your team, for the atmosphere of friendship, and the openness and the depth of our discussions. The leadership which you have displayed in coping with America's domestic problems is inspiring and stands out like a beacon in the night. Today, we were happy to learn that, at the same time, you are also willing to invest efforts in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. In this effort, Mr. President, you will find us to be full partners. You are aware that no one wants peace more than [we] and that there is no country more resolved to defend itself when necessary. We are veterans of many wars. And, today, we say, no more blood and tears. We now wish to experience lasting and meaningful peace. In our talks today, I presented to you Israel's approach to peace-making, and we are willing to take upon ourselves risks for peace. But we are determined to protect our security. Peace has many enemies. Terror is used by the enemies of peace in an effort to undermine it. We will combat it while we continue to seek a solution that will lead to peace. Since the formation of my government, we have invested efforts in trying to advance toward peace in the framework of the Madrid formula. We introduced new ideas in the negotiation tracks with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians. Some progress has been made, but more is needed in order to come to agreement. We are ready for compromise, but compromises cannot be one-sided. We call on our partners, the Arab states, the Palestinians from the territories, to seize the moment to return to the negotiating table so that we can use this historic opportunity. We call upon them to respond openly and willingly to our positions. Our children and grandchildren in Jerusalem and the Arab children and grandchildren in Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and elsewhere in the Arab world will not forgive us if we all fail to act now. We have heard today with satisfaction, Mr. President, your concept of the role of the full partner as an intermediary. We shall continue our direct talks with our Arab neighbors. But in order to expedite the dialogue between the parties, we welcome your good offices and hope to rely on your role as facilitator. President Clinton, we are deeply indebted to you and to your predecessors who helped us in hours of need. We do appreciate and greatly value the decision to maintain the current level of aid to Israel. This decision will help us to integrate new immigrants into our society and to bear the heavy burden of our security. You know, [Mr.] President, that we will not be able to win the battle for peace without a qualitative edge. Therefore, I wish to thank you and your colleagues on behalf of the Israeli soldiers and their parents and the citizens of Israel for your decision to help to maintain that edge. Moreover, such a qualitative edge enables the Israeli Defense Forces to contribute to the overall effort to maintain stability in our stormy region. The decision made today to raise the level of strategic dialogue between our two countries will open new doors of opportunity. The fact that [in] the next months we will renew the memorandum of agreement between us for 5 more years, and that we do it as a matter of course is a proof of the kind of mutually beneficial relationships that we enjoy. The formation of new high-level forum[s] for strategic dialogue will further upgrade this relationship. We will also have a turn in the near future with much urgency to address the struggle against various kinds of fanaticism, which give berth to murderous terror, the kind that recently landed even on these shores. We must institutionalize our dialogue and include all free countries in consultations on the ways to curb the threatening extremism. We attach much importance to the decision made today to create the high- level joint commission for the development of projects of science and technology. The investment in research and industrial applications in Israel and in America will explore new frontiers of knowledge. And they are a telling example of how our two countries can mutually benefit from this cooperation. President Clinton, thank you for your invitation and reception, for the warmth on a wintery day, and for your good will. I came from Jerusalem, the city of the prophets. I return to Jerusalem, the city that witnessed so many wars and wants so dearly peace, because she knows that in war there are no winners and in peace no losers. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 12, March 22, 1993 Title:

Secretary Christopher Meets With Israeli Prime Minister Rabin

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Statement, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 16 19933/16/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel Subject: Trade/Economics, Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] In light of his announced early departure, it was my pleasure to pay a courtesy call this afternoon on Prime Minister Rabin following his official meetings with President Clinton, the Vice President, myself, Secretary [of Defense] Aspin, and other members of the Administration. We reviewed the results of the very productive talks we had on a broad range of issues and how we plan to follow up on these discussions to enhance our close bilateral relationship and move forward on the Arab- Israeli peace process. Both the President and I are very pleased with the positive tone and substance of our discussions with the Prime Minister. I regret that the Prime Minister is going to have to cut short his visit to the United States. And let me say here that we are deeply troubled by the mounting violence and acts of terrorism. Those who carry out these acts of violence are seeking to undermine the hopes and prospects for peace. They won't succeed. Violence and terrorism don't work and will never work. Negotiations do work and can produce peace and reconciliation. In this respect, we urge all the parties to return to the negotiations on April 20. Prime Minister Rabin, the other parties to the peace process, and President Clinton have been working hard to end the violence that has been so much a part of the Middle East landscape. It's time to end violence and promote peace, to give the next generation a reason to hope and not to hate, and to make reconciliation and not continued conflict the hallmark of a new Middle East. The peace process provides us with the best opportunity to build this new Middle East. We call on all in the region to look to the future and seize this historic opportunity for peace. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 12, March 22, 1993 Title:

US Support for Democracy in Haiti

Clinton Aristide Source: President Clinton, Haitian President Aristide Description: Opening statements at a news conference released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 16 19933/16/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Development/Relief Aid [TEXT]
President Clinton:
It's been a great honor for all of us to have President Aristide and members of his government and the Ambassador from Haiti to the United States here in the Oval Office today. We wanted to have the opportunity to speak to the American people and to the people of Haiti from the Oval Office to emphasize how important it is to me, personally, and to the United States to restore democracy in Haiti and to restore President Aristide as the elected leader of that country. To those who have blocked the restoration of democracy, I want to make it clear in the strongest possible terms that we will not now or ever support the continuation of an illegal government in Haiti and that we want to step up dramatically the pace of negotiations to restore President Aristide under conditions of national reconciliation and mutual respect for human rights with a program of genuine economic progress. The Secretary of State has named an experienced diplomat, Lawrence Pezzullo, who is here now, to be his special representative in Haiti, to work with the [UN/OAS Special Envoy on Haiti Dante] Caputo mission through the United Nations and the Organization of American States to push forward with a rapid settlement of these issues. I would urge the de facto government of Haiti and the military officials in that country and police officials to support this process. Any opposition, any delay will only result in stronger measures taken by the United States and more difficulty and hardship for the people of Haiti, who have been the innocent sufferers in this whole sad saga. I look forward to working with President Aristide. I look forward to the success of Mr. Pezzullo. And I want to make it clear that the United States is committed strongly to a much more aggressive effort to restore Mr. Aristide to his presidency and to, over the long run, work with the people of Haiti to restore conditions of economic prosperity. I am prepared to commit the United States to its fair portion of a 5-year, multinational $1 billion effort to rebuild the Haitian economy. And we are going to begin on this project in earnest now. I'd like to now invite President Aristide to make whatever remarks he would like to make and then open the floor for your questions.
President Aristide:
Mr. President Clinton, we are delighted to be here with you, with the Vice President, Secretary of State, Ambassador Pezzullo. We want to thank you on behalf of the Haitian people for your support. We want to thank you for what you just said. That went directly to the heart of the Haitian people working peacefully for the restoration of democracy. I grasp this opportunity to thank the American people for their solidarity because with our American brothers and sisters these 18 months, we realize how beautiful it is to work in a non-violent way for the restoration of democracy. The Haitian people today hear your voice and, on behalf of them, I can say, in the past, we wanted to be with you--we are with you; in the future, we will be with you, and you will be welcome in Haiti when I will be there after the restoration of democracy. We have a lot of people suffering these 18 months. Today, I'm sure they are happy, because they realize, finally, the day for the restoration of democracy will come. And since today they can continue to build . . . that democracy, always in a non-violent way. The refugees can feel happy. Those who are in Guantanamo can feel happy. Those who are in Haiti working peacefully for that democracy can feel happy, because that day is coming because of you, because of the American Government, because of the United States, because of the OAS [Organization of American States]. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 12, March 22, 1993 Title:

Need for a Just and Lasting Peace In Northern Ireland

Clinton Smith Reynolds Source: President Clinton, US Ambassador-designate Smith, Irish Prime Minister Reynolds Description: Excerpts from opening statements at a news conference released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 17 19933/17/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: Ireland Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, Trade/Economics, State Department [TEXT]
President Clinton:
Good day, ladies and gentlemen. On this St. Patrick's Day, I am delighted to welcome Prime Minister Reynolds, called Taoiseach in his country, to the White House. We both share a love of music and a love of Ireland, and I'm looking forward to working with him in the years ahead. I accept with honor this beautiful bowl of shamrocks he has presented from the people of Ireland to the people of the United States. And it will be proudly displayed in the White House as [a] symbol of our shared values and common heritage. The Prime Minister's visit is an opportunity not only to recall our kinship but also to work together on issues of critical importance to both our nations. We just concluded a good meeting which covered many issues, and I benefited greatly from the Prime Minister's advice and counsel. We discussed the importance of bringing the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] to a successful conclusion. We reviewed the humanitarian relief effort in Somalia, including the generous contributions of Irish citizens working in such organizations as [World] Concern and UNICEF [UN Children's Fund]. Let me take a moment here, Mr. Prime Minister, to extend to the families and friends of [relief workers] Valerie Place and Sean Devereux the heartfelt condolences of the American people over their tragic deaths and our gratitude for their service. Their dedication to the relief efforts in Somalia will serve as an inspiration to us as we seek to extend the hand of comfort to victims of strife. The Prime Minister and I also discussed the continuing tragic conflict in Northern Ireland that has cost 3,000 lives over the last 2 decades. I congratulate both the Irish and the [UK] Governments for their joint efforts to promote the necessary dialogue to bring about a just and lasting peace. And I want to underscore my strong support for that important goal. We agree that such an outcome cannot be coerced or imposed and that those who resort to violence must not be tolerated. Violence condemns generation[s] to harvest the seeds of bitterness, not peace. Nor can the problem be resolved by the language of victories or defeats. It must be resolved in the language and spirit of compromise and conciliation. I told the Prime Minister that the United States stands ready to do whatever we can to help in bringing peace to Northern Ireland. We are a nation of diversity. We are prepared to help in any way that we can. I think that it is important to say that the most significant thing I should be doing now is to encourage the resumption of the dialogue between the Irish and the [UK] Governments, which I think is a critical precondition to any establishment of a lasting peace. Our support for the international fund for Ireland is an important demonstration of our commitment to encourage investment and economic growth and to advance the cause of peace and tolerance. My discussions with Prime Minister Reynolds, as with [UK] Prime Minister Major, were the first of many that I think you will see our governments having as we offer our assistance in trying to end the troubles. Let me close by saying that the ties of culture, history, and friendship between the United States and Ireland mean a great deal to me. Last night, the Prime Minister and I joined together in singing "When Irish Eyes Are Smiling." He did a slightly better job than I did. Today we pause to renew our ties to Ireland and the challenges ahead. Let me add that Ireland will have a friend in the White House, Mr. Prime Minister, not just on St. Patrick's Day but on every day of the year. I also want to take advantage of the Prime Minister's visit here to announce my intention to nominate as ambassador to Ireland a distinguished individual, as Irish as Americans can be, Jean Kennedy Smith. I can think of no one who better captures the bonds between Ireland and the United States or who will work harder to advance our relationship. In many ways she's already been an unofficial international ambassador. Since she founded Very Special Arts 2 decades ago, she has traveled tirelessly throughout the United States and the world. Very Special Arts provides opportunities for the disabled and creative arts in all 50 states and over 50 countries, including Ireland. As a testament to her success, a play from her young playwrights program in Dublin [Ireland] will open shortly off Broadway. I know firsthand Jean's achievements from the Arkansas Very Special Arts program and remember well when [First Lady] Hillary [Rodham Clinton] joined her in our state for the competition to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the White House. The people of the United States will be proud of our new ambassador. I am proud of her, and I'm glad to have a couple of her relatives--the Senator [Kennedy] from the State of Massachusetts and Congressman Kennedy--to join with us today. . . .
Ambassador-designate Smith:
Thank you very much. It is a great honor for me to be nominated as Ambassador to Ireland. And I'm extremely grateful to President Clinton for his confidence in me. I will do all I can to repay this confidence. It's a wonderful St. Patrick's Day. Thank you.
Prime Minister Reynolds:
Thank you, [Mr.] President. And, first of all, may I take the first opportunity of saying (speaks in Gaelic), which is congratulations to Jean Kennedy Smith to be the US ambassador to Ireland. The United States is proud of her. We are more proud still to welcome home Jean Kennedy Smith. She has been a regular visitor to our shores. She has done marvelous work throughout the world, as the President has just said, in relation to her work for the disabled arts. And I know she'll get plenty of opportunity to continue that creative work in Ireland. Thank you, [Mr.] President (speaks in Gaelic). St. Patrick's Day, Mr. President, is an occasion which bonds and brings together our two communities and peoples in a uniquely meaningful way. It is not simply about shamrock and symbols, important though these are; rather [it has] as its core a deep, abiding, and shared belief in democracy and freedom and in the protection and extension of human rights. It was because these values were incorporated in the foundation of the American republic that Thomas Jefferson could proclaim in his first inaugural address what might then have seemed a paradox, and I quote: "I believe this the strongest government on Earth." It is a day; and this is a unique occasion, standing as we are here in the house which, as President Clinton remarked last night at that very enjoyable function--that this house was designed just over 200 years ago by an Irishman, James Hoban. That's one of the reasons why we are contemplating the extraordinary success of Irish America. You will have no difficulty, Mr. President, if on this day I characterize you-- you yourself--as reflecting on that Irish American success story. Like John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, Andrew Jackson, Ulysses S. Grant, and other Presidents of Irish extraction before you, you have risen to the highest position in the land adopted by your ancestors and demonstrated again that the great American dream, which inspired so many of your forbears, is alive and well and in very good hands. The success story that is Irish America today began as one of political, economic, and social struggle in the home country. It should not be surprising, therefore, that when the earlier waves of our immigrants reached these shores, they were to the forefront in the American war of independence and in the drafting and promulgation of the American Declaration of Independence and that later waves of immigrants quickly and enthusiastically embraced that declaration--to quote just one historian-- not as a tired formula but as an ideal to be reached out for and grasped. It is against that background, Mr. President, for I have always believed that the constructive interest and support of the United States has the potential to be uniquely helpful in finding a solution to the situation in Northern Ireland--that last residual problem of a long and often sad history between Ireland and [the UK]. My government [is] determined not to allow another generation to suffer the scourge and savagery of violence or its demeaning and related manifestations--disadvantage, harassment, and discrimination. There are no immediate answers, no simple solutions, but there is a way forward. It involves courage, commitment, and imagination. It will require, above all, the letting go of all vestiges of triumphalism on every side and replacing it with a willingness and a determination to work together in partnership within new structures which will embrace and seek to reconcile the two conflicting rights and aspirations in our small country. We warmly welcome your concern, Mr. President, your commitment, and your active support as we take on this daunting but vital challenge. If we can succeed, Mr. President, in establishing in Ireland structures that achieve these goals, the benefits may not just be for Ireland alone. In a world where deeper ethnic divisions have assumed a new and violent prominence, it may well be that the model we create in Ireland will have application in similar conflict situations around the world. So, in conclusion, Mr. President, may I thank you again for the hospitable American reception you have given us here today at the White House. In so doing, you acknowledge and honor the contribution of the millions of fellow Irish who have made their homes and built their dreams in this great land. You make us all proud. As we travel together now for a gathering on Capitol Hill, hosted by another outstanding Irishman, [House] Speaker Foley, may I extend to you, Mrs. Clinton, and your family our warmest, best wishes on this very special day for all of us and convey our sincerest wish for the success of your Administration. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 12, March 22, 1993 Title:

UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 808 on War Crimes Tribunal

Albright Source: US Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Description: Statement to the UN Security Council, New York City Date: Feb, 22 19932/22/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro Subject: United Nations, Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT]
Statement by US Ambassador Albright
There is an echo in this chamber today. The Nuremberg principles have been reaffirmed. We have preserved the long-neglected compact made by the community of civilized nations 48 years ago in San Francisco: to create the United Nations and enforce the Nuremberg principles. The lesson that we are all accountable to international law may have finally taken hold in our collective memory. This will be no victors' tribunal. The only victor that will prevail in this endeavor is the truth. And, unlike the world of the 1940s, international humanitarian law today is impressively codified, well understood, agreed upon, and enforceable. The debates over the state of international law that so encumbered the Nuremberg trials will not burden this tribunal. The United States strongly supports the Council's adoption of today's historic resolution, which takes the first step in establishing an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute persons accused of war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Virtually all of the parties who have examined this issue-- including the General Assembly, the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and the Commission of Experts established by UN Security Council Resolution 780--have urged the creation of such a tribunal. President Clinton has long supported the establishment of a war crimes tribunal at the United Nations to bring justice and deter further atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. Just 12 days ago, Secretary Christopher, speaking on the President's behalf, explained why the United States believes this and other actions are urgently required. As the Secretary said: We cannot ignore the human toll. Serbian 'ethnic cleansing' has been pursued through mass murders, systematic beatings and the rapes of Muslims and others, prolonged shellings of innocents in Sarajevo and elsewhere, forced displacement of entire villages, inhumane treatment of prisoners in detention camps and the blockading of relief of the sick and starving civilians. Atrocities have been committed by other parties as well. Our conscience revolts at the idea of passively accepting such brutality. The Secretary also explained that there is another reason for urgent action now--that there is a broader imperative here. The world's response to the violence in the former Yugoslavia is an early and concrete test of how we will address the concerns of the ethnic and religious minorities in the post- Cold War world. And I quote from the Secretary again: The events in the former Yugoslavia raise the question of whether a state may address the rights of its minorities by eradicating those minorities to achieve 'ethnic purity.' Bold tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see whether 'ethnic cleansing' is a policy the world will tolerate. If we hope to promote the spread of freedom or if we hope to encourage the emergence of peaceful multi-ethnic democracies, our answer must be a resounding no. The United States has so far submitted five reports to the Council pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 771, which contain substantiated information about the atrocities that have taken place in the former Yugoslavia. The Council's action, today, begins the process of establishing a war crimes tribunal. We look forward to working with the Secretary-General to expeditiously accomplish his task of providing the Council with options for the statute and rules of procedure for such a tribunal. Once the Secretary-General's report is received, we, along with the other members, will act quickly within the Council to establish a tribunal under Chapter VII. We will also, in cooperation with the United Nations, exert every effort to ensure that those individuals involved in these outrageous, heinous crimes are identified and held accountable for their actions which so affront the world's collective conscience. It is worth recalling that the Nuremberg principles on war crimes, crimes against the peace, and crimes against humanity were adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. By its action today with Resolution 808, the Security Council has shown that the will of this organization can be exercised, even if it has taken nearly a half century for the wisdom of our earliest principles to take hold. I hope that it will not take another half century to achieve the peace and security that will render the hideous crimes [which] we suspect have been committed strictly historical phenomena. Thank you very much.
Resolution 808 (February 22, 1993)
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, Recalling paragraph 10 of its resolution 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992, in which it reaffirmed that all parties are bound to comply with the obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such breaches, Recalling also its resolution 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992, in which, inter alia, it demanded that all parties and others concerned in the former Yugoslavia, and all military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law, Recalling further its resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992, in which it requested the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse the information submitted pursuant to resolutions 771 (1992) and 780 (1992), together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may obtain,with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Having considered the interim report of the Commission of Experts established by resolution 780 (1992) (S/25274), in which the Commission observed that a decision to establish an ad hoc international tribunal in relation to events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia would be consistent with the direction of its work, Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including reports of mass killings and the continuance of the practice of "ethnic cleansing", Determining that this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them, Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the establishment of an international tribunal would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace, Noting in this regard the recommendation by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia for the establishment of such a tribunal (S/25221), Noting also with grave concern the "report of the European Community investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim women in the former Yugoslavia" (S/25240, annex I), Noting further the report of the committee of jurists submitted by France (S/25266), the report of the commission of jurists submitted by Italy (S/25300), and the report transmitted by the Permanent Representative of Sweden on behalf of the Chairman-in-Office of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (S/25307), 1. Decides that an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991; 2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit for consideration by the Council at the earliest possible date, and if possible no later than 60 days after the adoption of the present resolution, a report on all aspects of this matter, including specific proposals and where appropriate options for the effective and expeditious implementation of the decision contained in paragraph 1 above, taking into account suggestions put forward in this regard by Member States; 3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 12, March 22, 1993 Title:

UN Security Council Calls for an End To Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina

O'Brien Source: UN Security Council President O'Brien Description: Statement, New York City Date: Mar, 3 19933/3/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro Subject: United Nations, Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] The Security Council, recalling all its relevant resolutions and statements, expresses its grave concern at and condemns the continuing unacceptable military attacks in eastern Bosnia and the resulting deterioration in the humanitarian situation in that region. It is appalled that even as peace talks are continuing attacks by Serb paramilitary units, including, reportedly, the killings of innocent civilians, continue in eastern Bosnia. In this connection, the Security Council is particularly concerned about the fall of the town of Cerska and the imminent fall of neighbouring villages. The Security Council demands that the killings and atrocities must stop and reaffirms that those guilty of crimes against international humanitarian law will be held individually responsible by the world community. The Security Council demands that the leaders of all the parties to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina remain fully engaged in New York in a sustained effort with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to reach quickly a fair and workable settlement. In this connection, the Security Council also demands that all sides immediately cease all forms of military action throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, cease acts of violence against civilians, comply with their previous commitments including the ceasefire, and redouble their efforts to settle the conflict. The Security Council further demands that the Bosnian Serb side as well as all other parties refrain from taking any action which might endanger the lives and well-being of the inhabitants of eastern Bosnia, particularly in the areas near the town of Cerska, and that all concerned allow the unimpeded access of humanitarian relief supplies throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially humanitarian access to the besieged cities of eastern Bosnia, and permit the evacuation of the wounded. Having determined in the relevant resolutions that this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council insists that these steps must be taken immediately. The Security Council also requests the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to increase UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] presence in eastern Bosnia. The Security Council remains seized of the matter and is ready to meet at any moment to consider further action. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 12, March 22, 1993 Title:

Statement at Confirmation Hearing

Atwood Source: J. Brian Atwood, Under Secretary-designate for Management Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 17 19933/17/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before this committee today as President Clinton's nominee for Under Secretary of State for Management. I am very pleased to have the opportunity, if confirmed, to work closely with the members of this committee in addressing the many challenges facing the Department of State. I am also very pleased once again to have an opportunity to work with Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The Secretary is a man of many strengths. His intelligence and diplomatic skills rest on a strong bedrock of personal integrity and a keen appreciation for America's most important national values. Mr. Chairman, after a brief internship at the National Security Agency, I began what I then thought would be a long career in the Foreign Service in 1966. I left the service in 1972 to accept a position as legislative assistant to Senator Eagleton, but my work with the State Department has continued over the years. Whether on the inside--as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations or Dean of Professional Studies at the Foreign Service Institute-- or on the outside--as President of the National Democratic Institute--I have had almost constant exposure to the Department and its dedicated work force over the past 27 years. When I walked back into the Department in November to assume my responsibilities as transition team leader for the incoming Administration, I was returning to my professional home. If I am confirmed by this body to undertake the responsibilities of Under Secretary for Management, I will, of course, draw from each of my previous experiences. I will also draw from an extraordinary group of leaders for whom I have been privileged to work directly. In addition to Warren Christopher and Tom Eagleton, about whom I have already spoken, these include such outstanding Americans as Cyrus Vance, Edmund Muskie, Lloyd Bentsen, and Walter Mondale. These are very different men, but they share a common love of country, a commitment to service, and a personal integrity that distinguishes them as public servants. If even a little of their influence has rubbed off, it will serve me well. I have also learned in my years in Washington that partisanship has its place, but it is of limited value between campaigns. I believe strongly that our foreign policy must have bipartisan support if it is to succeed, and our State Department will work to earn that support. Mr. Chairman, in the past 8 years I have been engaged in the task of helping others build democratic institutions in transitional societies around the world. As President of the National Democratic Institute, I have worked in such diverse nations as the Philippines, Chile, Haiti, South Africa, Hungary, and Russia to assist people as they seek to create new civil societies, election systems, and governing bodies. This work and the courageous people from these new democracies with whom I have worked have had a profound impact on me. Developing democracy in a society that has not practiced it in recent memory causes one to go back to basics, to recall first principles. I have learned, for example, that beyond respect for human rights and the pursuit of liberty lies the challenge of developing the concept of citizenship--respect for one's countrymen and -women and one's responsibility to society. Beyond holding a multiparty election lies the challenge of promoting acceptance of the role of the loyal opposition. Beyond the writing of democratic constitutions lies the challenge of developing respect for laws, procedures, and values. And beyond the paper creation of governmental institutions lies the challenge of making them work democratically and efficiently, with both openness and discipline. These principles and lessons can be applied to the institutions of our own government as well. Left to grow unfettered, bureaucracies over time tend to accentuate their own weaknesses while losing their strength and vitality. It will be our challenge to reverse this trend at the Department of State and to build a foreign affairs institution that can address the problems our nation faces at the end of this century and beyond. With the active involvement of Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Wharton, and the career service, that process has already begun. We have announced a major reorganization of the Department [Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 6, p. 69], creating a new capacity to handle global issues, eliminating or consolidating a dozen offices and bureaus, streamlining the clearance process, reducing bureaucratic layering, and reducing the number of high- level executives while pushing responsibility down to the levels where the expertise resides. This reorganization, some of which will require legislation to implement, is just the beginning of a process of renewal. We need next to turn to our overseas posts and begin to rationalize staffing on an interagency basis. Our goal must be to move from Cold War patterns of representation to a new alignment of resources that reflects both new interests and our abiding concerns. The Department can lead this interagency undertaking if it will begin to take more seriously its responsibility to determine objectively and advise the President on the relationship of policy goals to resources. We are also aware that we must effect positive change with fewer resources. This places a premium on determining priorities and developing budgets that will enable us to do more with less. We must also invest in the future. The Department cannot do more with less if it continues to use information technology that was state of the art in the 1960s. Our most important resource, Mr. Chairman, is our people. I am familiar with the many changes that have been made or recommended in the Department's personnel system over the years. I am familiar with the complaint that Under Secretaries for Management like to "tinker" with the system, changing this part or that. I am familiar with the complaint that we are constantly moving the goal posts for those within the system. Being sensitive to these concerns, however, in no way prejudices me against change. We must change if we are to be ready for new challenges. The problems facing today's career service have been well documented in numerous studies. Despite these problems, we still have the most talented group of public servants in the world. I see this group as a single community, but over the years we have inadvertently encouraged the individuals within this community to focus more on themselves and their differences than on their collective mission. The promotion and assignments system has produced too much negative competition and self- promotion--"careerism" as some call it. The Foreign Service and the Civil Service are viewed as separate and unequal entities--this despite the fact that our Civil Service has become the mainstay of the Department here in the interagency world of Washington. The cone system not only fails to encompass all the specialties we need in the modern Foreign Service, it is a system that accentuates differences. It is not possible to change this situation by tinkering. What is needed is a comprehensive approach that examines discrete aspects to determine the effects of the incentives and disincentives we offer our people. We must examine the role of training, a much neglected but essential part of preparing our career services for the future. And we must examine the interrelationship of the various specialities in meeting the overall objective--carrying out the foreign policy of the United States. We must also create a community of foreign affairs specialists that reflects the diversity of our larger American community. Secretary Christopher's appointments at the subcabinet level have thus far achieved that goal. We now need to invigorate efforts to bring more women and minorities into the Department and to keep them with us until they reach the senior ranks. Mr. Chairman, if I am confirmed by the Senate I will look forward to working with this committee and the Congress as we seek to address this agenda for change. I know from my previous work that much can be accomplished if we earn your trust and sustain it. I look forward to a meaningful partnership with Congress as we work together to build an institution that will be capable of managing our foreign policy into the next century. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to take your questions. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 12, March 22, 1993 Title:

Statement at Confirmation Hearing

Davis Source: Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary-designate for International Security Affairs Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 17 19933/17/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control, Science/Technology, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am pleased to appear before your committee as President Clinton's nominee for the position of Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs. I am excited and honored to have been asked to be part of Secretary Christopher's foreign policy team. I am at the same time frankly sobered by the immensity of the potential task. We find ourselves in a time of tremendous change and facing many uncertainties. The role of the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs will require me to be familiar with the principal security policy issues, which encompass arms control and non-proliferation, export controls and security assistance, as well as regional security issues. While most of these issues call for new concepts and ways of thinking, I believe I bring to this position a good foundation in my 20 years of study and practice in the field of international security affairs. I began my career as a professor of international relations at Barnard College and then Columbia University, and later I taught military strategy at the National War College. In the late 1970s, I directed Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's policy planning office, with responsibility, among others, for NATO's nuclear planning and arms control policies. I have served on the staffs of the NSC [National Security Council] and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I had the opportunity to direct the research program in the mid-1980s at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. We focused on security problems throughout the world and drew our researchers from every continent. I began by writing on the origins of the Cold War but then turned primarily to the analysis of strategic and arms control policies. I have just recently completed a project sponsored by the Ford Foundation on the future of arms control in Europe. At Rand [Corporation] for the past 2 years, as Vice President of the Army Research Division, I have been involved in helping the Army design and restructure its forces and operations to meet the demands of the post-Cold War world.
New Concepts of Security And Cooperation
Let me briefly describe the major issues which I see as forming the future international security agenda and the areas of my potential responsibility. Secretary Christopher focused in his confirmation hearing before this committee on the guiding principles of our foreign policy, one of which was to "maintain a strong defense as we adapt our forces to new and enduring security challenges." These new challenges will require us to define new concepts of security and cooperation for a world in which many new states and groups are seeking for themselves the goals which Americans have fostered throughout our history--freedom, self-determination, democracy, and collective security. The Clinton Administration's policies in Somalia and Bosnia provide the elements of a future approach: support for the United Nations; multilateral diplomacy to bring warring factions to a political settlement; [and] steps to provide humanitarian aid--all backed up by the possibility of applying American military forces. The goal is to resolve these conflicts while seeking to prevent their spilling over into other areas.
Arms Control
Let me now turn to arms control, where the Clinton Administration inherits the achievements of the Bush Administration in its negotiation of agreements covering strategic nuclear weapons--START I and START II [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties]; conventional forces in Europe--CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] and Open Skies; and chemical weapons--Chemical Weapons Convention. Secretary Christopher has indicated the critical importance he places on moving forward to ratification of the START Treaties around the world, in the former Soviet Union, and also here in the United States. These treaties will reduce significantly, and equitably, the strategic nuclear weapons of both the United States and Russia. And priority will be given to the immediate goal of ensuring the control and dismantling of the nuclear weapons within the new states that emerged from the former Soviet Union. "Nunn-Lugar" funds will be directed toward programs for the dismantling of strategic nuclear weapons, the disposal of nuclear materials, the establishment of science and technology centers, and defense conversion.
Non-Proliferation
When Secretary Christopher discussed this position with me, he focused on non-proliferation and the priority which the Clinton Administration would be giving to countering the proliferation of very deadly weapons--nuclear, chemical, biological, and enhanced conventional weapons, as well as their delivery systems. He asked me to be prepared to design a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy, building on the [Nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty, the various regimes and mechanisms which are in place today for controlling exports, as well as the existing export control legislation. I recall the success the United States had in the late 1960s when the Administration worked closely with this committee in achieving the Non- Proliferation Treaty. If confirmed, I would hope we might recreate that atmosphere, spirit, and approach so as to fashion a non-proliferation strategy for the 21st century.
Organizing To Meet Security Challenges
Let me now conclude by briefly describing the steps which Secretary Christopher is taking with respect to the organization of the State Department to address these international security challenges. Secretary Christopher announced last month his plans for designating the Deputy Secretary and five Under Secretaries as his principal foreign policy advisers. Portfolios have been shifted and modified to mirror the post-Cold War missions. Indeed, Secretary Christopher proposes to change--with the consent of Congress--the title of the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs to Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs to reflect the new arms control priorities of the Clinton Administration to deal with the heightened threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, my portfolio as this Under Secretary will include all aspects of non-proliferation policy, such as nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons proliferation. This also includes our policy on the control of exports that contribute to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or otherwise harm US interests such as controls on sensitive dual-use technologies. The negotiation and implementation of arms control treaties--strategic and conventional--will be part of my portfolio, as well as activities for achieving the dismantling of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. The Bureau of Political Military Affairs will report to the Secretary of State through me. The bureau is currently restructuring its activities so as to define new concepts and approaches to international and regional security in the post-Cold War world. Security assistance and arms transfers will remain the responsibility of the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs. Let me conclude by saying again how much I look forward to working with each of you on this committee and trust that you will provide me your counsel on what I hope to be my new responsibilities and challenges. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 12, March 22, 1993 Title:

Mine Clearing In Central America

Boucher Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 17 19933/17/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department [TEXT] We applaud the efforts of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia, in bringing the first phase of a program of mine clearance in Central America to fruition. The tens of thousands of mines that remain in the wake of that region's civil conflicts continue to kill and injure innocent civilians and hamper much-needed social and economic development, particularly in rural areas. Training of demining instructors began March 8 at the School of the Americas. Following their training, the 15 instructors on loan from Latin American militaries will travel to Nicaragua in mid-April to train Nicaraguan personnel who will do the actual demining. The Nicaraguan demining project is a priority effort of the multilateral Partnership for Democracy and Development in Central America (PDD). The first step in a regional demining program that will eventually expand to Honduras, Costa Rica, and other countries in the region, the project's goal is to remove 60,000 mines in its initial phase. As a member of the PDD, the US Government strongly supports regional demining efforts. We have worked closely with the OAS and the IADB in helping to create this program and look forward to its successful implementation in Nicaragua and its expansion of other countries in the region. We have contributed or pledged a total of $755,000 to a special OAS fund for demining in Central America. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 13, March 29, 1993

Title:

Securing US Interests While Supporting Russian Reform

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the Executives' Club of Chicago, and the Mid-America Committee, Chicago, Illinois Date: Mar, 22 19933/22/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Russia Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] It is a pleasure for me to be here today. This might surprise you, but I am happy to be here on a white and snowy morning. It reminds me of growing up in North Dakota--walking home from school and having my mother greet me with a cup of hot chocolate. You can see I have happy memories of the Midwest, so I'm especially happy to be here. I'm particularly pleased to be speaking to this very audience. Secretaries of State spend probably too much of their time explaining American foreign policy to foreign diplomats, and they might tend to take for granted audiences such as this, the audiences that really count: the American people. I want to say a special welcome today to the students that are here from the congressional districts of Congressmen Reynolds and Rush