US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: CSCE: A New Role for a New Era
Eagleburger
Source: Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Intervention before the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Council of Ministers, Stockholm,
Sweden
Date: Dec, 14 199212/14/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia-Montenegro
Subject: CSCE, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Madame Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, we meet today in Stockholm
already well across the threshold of a new, historical era. As yet, this new
era goes unnamed. We describe it, for the time being, as merely the
negation of what went before--the post-Cold War era. Ironically, we who
cannot know the name which history will give this era are the ones whose
actions will most determine what it shall be called. Indeed, we have it
within our power to decide whether historians will call this an age of
democracy or an age of disorder.
With the demise of communism, it is clear, at least, where mankind's
aspirations lie. They lie universally with freedom and, thus, with
democracy. But it is equally clear that the collapse of the static, Cold War
international system has unleashed a dynamic of change worldwide which,
unchecked, could overwhelm those aspirations and threaten instability for a
long time to come. The Iraqi conquest of Kuwait, starvation in Somalia, and
"ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans are all emblematic of the fact that we are
in a period of transition between an old order which is dead or dying and a
new [one] still struggling to be born.
Fortunately, the international community has demonstrated the resolve to
act on behalf of a more civilized world order when confronted, at least,
with the Kuwaiti and Somali emergencies. But the more important and,
indeed, more difficult challenge we have yet to face is the need to develop
new international structures to manage global change in this new era. This,
in short, is a time for institution-building, one not dissimilar to the period
immediately following World War II.
However, whereas post-war institutions were developed over years--
indeed, decades--the ongoing carnage in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates
that we do not have the luxury of time and that we may, in fact, be losing
the race against time with the forces of hatred and disintegration which
threaten the new, democratic order in Europe. Yugoslavia is a shocking
reminder that barbarity exists within our midst and that we cannot call the
new Europe either civilized or secure until we have developed stronger
mechanisms for dealing with this and similar crises.
If we are honest, however, we will go deeper and recognize the former
Yugoslavia as a mirror of our darker selves--a mirror of what we, too, could
become if we were to succumb to the ethnic hatred and intolerance for
diversity which we have also seen this year in Western Europe and North
America alike. Yugoslavia should make us realize that our hopes for living
in a more peaceful and civilized world are inextricably linked to the way we
each conduct ourselves at home.
It is precisely for this reason, in fact, that the CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe] is of such vital importance today. CSCE
reflects our faith that a truly democratic Europe will be a peaceful Europe--
that a Europe which overcomes its history of ethnic hatreds need not repeat
its endless history of internecine strife. CSCE embodies the revolutionary
concept that security in the future will be derived more from respect for
human rights and democratic principles than from the balance-of-power
mechanisms of the past.
However, CSCE must be more than simply the conscience of Europe if it is to
fulfill its ambitious purpose. Along with other pillars of Europe's political
and security architecture, CSCE must become more operationally effective
and solution oriented in the face of mounting instabilities.
In fact, our Helsinki meeting confirmed CSCE in this role and conferred upon
it a variety of tools to manage the kinds of destabilizing change with which
we are confronted. Unfortunately, as the deteriorating situation in
Yugoslavia demonstrates, these tools were not fully developed, nor have we
used them as well or as promptly as we might have done. Our goal today,
therefore, must be to focus CSCE on the root causes of instability in Europe
and to encourage the organization to adopt a more proactive approach to
problem solving. To be sure, there are also questions of structural reforms
and of resources which we must also address. But what will be required,
above all, is the political will and leadership on the part of all member
states to utilize CSCE mechanisms to their fullest potential.
Accordingly, I would submit the following as priority items for this
meeting's agenda.
First, we should build upon the Helsinki decisions and develop a CSCE
strategy which is proactive, not reactive--one which will detect early
warnings of instability and undertake preventive diplomacy. We must seek
early enough to prevent the outbreak of conflict or else find ourselves, as in
Yugoslavia, constantly reacting to new horrors.
The CSCE has learned that lesson and has deployed several monitoring
missions in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, including to Kosovo,
Vojvodina, Sandzak, Macedonia, and Georgia. We applaud the work of each of
these missions.
However, we will ultimately be judged by results, and I believe we have not
fully tapped CSCE's potential for preventive diplomacy in the crises at hand.
Especially in the Balkans, we must endorse stronger measures to start to
reverse an intolerable situation.
-- We must identify the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in ex-
Yugoslavia by name and ensure that they will be brought to justice in
person--exactly as were Hitler's associates at Nuremberg.
-- We must expand CSCE missions to assist with the enforcement of UN
sanctions and, thereby, increase the pressure on those who continue to
prosecute the war.
-- We must redouble our efforts to prevent the war from spilling over into
neighboring regions and countries--in particular, by committing, here and
now, to increase substantially the size of the mission in Kosovo. Let me
say, in this regard, that the United States, for its part, will contribute on an
urgent basis to this expanded mission.
-- Finally, in stating our support for safe areas in Bosnia for the hundreds
of thousands of victims of "ethnic cleansing," we must ensure that this
humanitarian effort not be misused to confirm the results of that odious
policy.
CSCE must also play a more effective role in addressing the actual and
potential ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union by monitoring respect
for human rights and minority rights throughout the CIS [Commonwealth of
Independent States] states and by accelerating conflict prevention missions
in such places as Georgia and Moldova. Full support of the Minsk Group [11
nations plus Azerbaijan and Armenia working under CSCE auspices to solve
the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh] by all CSCE states is imperative to securing
peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. Of course, the international community will
have to adapt its strategies for preventing, containing, and resolving such
conflicts to the specific conditions in each region. But all efforts should
occur within the framework of CSCE principles and CSCE political
engagement. Thus, we should be prepared to support responsible peace-
keeping efforts by Russia and other CIS states within this CSCE umbrella.
Second, we need to adjust CSCE organizationally to ensure an effective
response to the challenges of conflict prevention and crisis management.
As currently constituted, CSCE is barely able administratively to cope with
present challenges, let alone those which are looming. Needed are a chief
administrative officer for the diverse CSCE institutions, an intersessional
body to manage day-to-day operations between senior officials' meetings,
and greater administrative coherence and capabilities. I am certain that
these objectives can be reached without injury to CSCE's strengths--
creativity, flexibility, and political accountability. We must ensure that the
organization continues to remain free of the ills of bureaucracy.
Finally, we must be clear that neither the enhanced CSCE role nor the
institutional reforms I have outlined will make a difference unless the
members demonstrate a commitment backed with resources. The conflict
prevention missions and the more active kinds of political engagement I
have discussed will require more from all of us in terms of finance,
equipment, and personnel. Some--and I do not hesitate to include the United
States--have made a major commitment of resources thus far, but all of us
can do more. If CSCE is to fulfill its mission, our consensus of rights must
be supported by a consensus of responsibilities.
Let me conclude by reiterating my view that, as important as our efforts to
bolster this organization may be, it is ultimately up to the member states
themselves to do the hard work of defending the peace of our democratic
order. It is up to us individually to uphold the CSCE's standards of political
conduct within our own borders. And it is up to us collectively to support
the CSCE mechanisms for conflict prevention and crisis management which I
have discussed here today.
We cannot expect a deus ex machina to solve our problems. Neither the
United States nor the CSCE itself can fulfill that role--although I can
guarantee that the United States will work with its European partners to
make CSCE succeed. But what is required, most of all, is that we sustain
the vision, courage, and solidarity with which both the democratic nations
of the West and the peoples who aspired to freedom in the East overcame
the formidable dangers and challenges of the Cold War. If we have learned
anything in this century, it is that neither peace nor freedom can be
preserved without sacrifice. Only by summoning the will to defend, both
separately and collectively, our new Europe whole and free can we ensure
that democracy will prevail over disorder as the defining feature of the
post-Cold War era. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: CSCE: A New Role for a New Era
Boucher
Source: Released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman
Description: Text of a joint statement by the United States and the
Russian Federation at the CSCE Council of Ministers meeting,
Stockholm, Sweden
Date: Dec, 14 199212/14/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, North America, E/C Europe
Country: Russia, United States, Serbia-Montenegro,
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Subject: CSCE, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Russia and the United States share a long friendship with Serbia, and both
countries deeply regret that the policies of the current government of
Serbia have resulted in the estrangement of Serbia from Russia and the
United States, as well as from the rest of the world. In this connection,
Russia and the United States are awaiting with great interest the outcome
of the Serbian elections of December 20, 1992. Both countries hope that the
people of Serbia will be given a free and fair opportunity that day to embark
upon a new course which can open the way to the restoration of the close
relations they previously enjoyed with that country.
Russia and the United States hope that the people of Serbia will weigh the
alternatives carefully. The choice is of returning to the community of
nations or remaining in a pariah status, politically isolated and
economically devastated because of the policies of the present regime. If
the correct choice is made, Russia and the United States pledge to work
with the Government of Serbia to restore its position in the world. If such a
choice is followed by the fundamental change of policies for which Russia
and the United States devoutly hope, the eventual relaxation and removal of
the sanctions would be possible. Then Serbia, together with Montenegro,
would be welcomed as a member of the UN [United Nations], CSCE
[Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], and other institutions.
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Euripe (CSCE)
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia, North America, E/C Europe, Europe
Subject: CSCE, Security Assistance and Sales, History
[TEXT]
From Vancouver to Vladivostok, the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) offers a new kind of diplomacy, based on respect for human
rights, among 51 Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries (Yugoslavia has
been suspended).
CSCE furthers European security through a wide variety of policies,
commitments, and, more recently, operational tools. It adopts a broad
concept of security, ranging from human rights through economic
cooperation to arms control and commits to the inviolability of frontiers.
The CSCE also fosters cooperation through programs centered on economics,
conflict prevention, military security, culture, and the media. It is
committed to developing democratic institutions at the grassroots level,
through local officials and activities, and through non-governmental
organizations.
Evolution of the CSCE
The CSCE began during the Cold War as a way to promote dialogue and
decrease tensions between East and West. In August 1975, 35 nations
signed the Helsinki Final Act, a politically binding declaratory
understanding of the democratic principles governing relations among
nations. The act contained a provision to continue regular discussions on a
broad range of concerns--from migrations and military security to the
environment and media relations--in what became known as the "Helsinki
Process."
During the 1980s, follow-on meetings in Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna
reviewed implementation of CSCE agreements and continued the opportunity
for discussion. Although the CSCE had no permanent headquarters and no
enforcement capability, important commitments were made to defend human
rights and to increase confidence through the advance notification of
military activities and the exchange of military information.
As it evolved, the CSCE began to explore ways to act on its rigorous
principles and to ensure that they were upheld. To do this, the CSCE
established a secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna,
and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, in
1990.
During 1992, the decision to move from principle to action was most marked
in the Helsinki decisions which established a number of practical tools that
help the CSCE work together with NATO, the European Community (EC), and
other international bodies to defend human rights and manage the
unprecedented changes now taking place in Europe. In particular, it sets out
an ambitious role for the CSCE in crisis management and "preventive
diplomacy."
The CSCE has brokered significant arms control agreements. The Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in November 1990, limits non-
nuclear ground and air forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. A separate
political agreement, concluded in July 1992, covers personnel in the same
region. Through continued negotiations, confidence-building measures have
been extended, and higher expectations for treaty compliance and
verification have been set. A new security negotiation, the Forum for
Security Cooperation, opened in Vienna on September 22, 1992.
CSCE and European Conflicts
The civil war in the former Yugoslavia has been an early test of the CSCE's
ability to take an active part in conflict prevention. On August 6, 1992,
President Bush called on the CSCE to help monitor the human rights
situation in the Balkans. He also asked that the CSCE work to inhibit the
spread of the conflict.
It quickly sent fact-finding and rapporteur missions to the region and
supported the sanctions and humanitarian measures taken by the United
Nations and the EC. The CSCE then established new "missions of long
duration" to provide an early warning system for any spillover of the
hostilities into the neighboring regions of Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak, and
Macedonia, and they also sent a signal that the international community will
not allow borders to be violated. These missions aim to dispel mistrust
between parties by promoting dialogue and providing information to promote
transparency between the conflicting parties.
In August 1992, the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia asked the
CSCE to assist in monitoring sanctions fulfillment. There are now missions
in Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania, and future operations are
planned in Croatia and Albania.
CSCE is in the forefront of conflict resolution in other parts of the region as
well.
-- Under CSCE auspices, the Minsk Group--11 nations plus Azerbaijan and
Armenia--is the focus of international efforts to solve the crisis in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
-- CSCE representatives currently are assessing the situation in the
Ossetia region of Georgia.
-- Rapporteur missions have been sent to the new Central Asian republics
to assess the governmental and human rights situations.
-- CSCE representatives will soon be sent to Estonia and Moldova to look
into ethnic conflicts in these states.
As an original participant in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the United States has been central in the promotion of
uncompromising humanitarian standards and their practical implementation.
From the beginning, CSCE has embodied America's hopes for a unified,
democratic, and prosperous Europe. Americans continually have worked to
ensure that the CSCE process remains flexible, innovative, and
unbureaucratic. The United States established the first permanent
delegation to the CSCE in Vienna in August 1992, charting a course for other
nations to follow.
CSCE and Participating States
Albania
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belgium
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Belarus
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
The Holy See
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Moldova
Monaco
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
San Marino
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia*
*Suspended (###)
Scheduled CSCE Meetings 1992-93
1992
Nov. 16-20: Seminar on Tolerance (Warsaw)
Nov. 19: CPC Consultative Committee (Vienna)
Nov. 23-25: Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) Working Group in
preparation for Stockholm Conference (Prague)
Dec. 11-13: Committee of Senior Officials (Stockholm)
Dec. 14-15: Council of Ministers (Stockholm)
1993
March 16-18: Economic Forum (Prague)
March 29-April 2: Migration Seminar (Warsaw)
April or May (3 days to be determined): CSBM [Confidence and Security
Building Measures] Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting [AIAM]
(Vienna)
May 17-21: Mediterranean Seminar (Valletta)
May (1 week): Seminar on Resolved Problems of National Minorities
(Warsaw or Croatia)
Sept. 28-Oct. 1: Seminar on Sustainable Development of Boreal and
Temperate Forests, followed by 1 week of fieldwork (Montreal)
Sept.-Oct. (3 weeks): Human Dimension Implementation Review Meeting
(Warsaw)
Fall (to be determined): Seminar on the Free Media (Warsaw)
Late 1993 (to be determined): Council of Ministers (Rome) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Fourth Report on War Crimes In the Former
Yugoslavia
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Description: Text of the Supplemental United States Submission of
Information to the UN Security Council in Accordance with
Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of
Resolution 780 (1992)
Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92
Category: Reports
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues,
United Nations
[TEXT]
[Following is the text of the Supplemental United States Submission of
Information to the UN Security Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of
Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992), released
on December 7, 1992. For the text of the first three reports, see Dispatch
Vol. 3 No. 39, p. 732, Vol. 3, No. 44, p. 802, and Vol. 3, No. 46, p. 825.
For the text of Resolution 771, see Dispatch Supplement, Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 44.
For text of Resolution 780, see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769.
Editor's Note: The following contains graphic descriptions.]
This is the fourth submission by the United States Government of
information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771
(1992) relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. As in our three previous reports, we have focused on
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with
Resolution 771, have provided information that is "substantiated," that is,
which rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or that
includes detail sufficient for corroboration. For the moment, we have also
tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other countries and
non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit reports
pursuant to Resolutions 771 and 780. The information provided is intended
to be useful to the commission of experts established pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780. The United States has further substantiating
information concerning the incidents included in this report, which we will
make available directly to the commission of experts on a confidential
basis.
In accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 780, the United States intends
to continue providing reports as additional relevant information comes into
our possession.
The United States is pleased that the commission of experts established
pursuant to resolution 780 has begun its work. We particularly welcome its
steps with regard to investigations of sites in the former Yugoslavia that
may contain important information about violations of humanitarian law.
We stand ready to assist the commission in its important work of
investigating war crimes allegations with the aim of preparing cases
suitable for prosecution and, by doing so, of establishing the record of
humanitarian offenses in the former Yugoslavia.
As in our previous reports, the notations at the end of each of the items
indicate the source from which the information was drawn. Unless
otherwise indicated, the reports refer to incidents occurring in 1992.
Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
Fourth Submission
Willful Killing
25 Sept: A 48-year-old Bosnian Muslim was picked up from the street in his
home town of Bjelina on September 25 or 26 and brought to a detention
camp at Klis, near Batkovic. The facility at Klis, formerly used for storing
agricultural produce, was guarded by men in solid green uniforms.
The witness described how three "rich men" were singled out for special
abuse; they were beaten with fists, rifle butts, and kicking: a neighbor who
traded in gold and jewelry; a coffee trader; and another with whom the
witness was not acquainted.
During the witness's second night in the camp, he saw the coffee trader and
several others taken at different times from their building to an adjacent
facility. There was lots of screaming during their absences. The others
returned eventually but the coffee trader never did. The witness learned
later that the coffee trader's corpse had been turned over to his family
sometime after that.
The gold trader suffered a similar fate on the witness's fifth night at the
Klis facility; he died from his wounds. The other "wealthy" man who was
beaten frequently along with first two victims never returned after being
summoned to a nearby building one evening. The witness said an old
cleaning man had told him that the third man also died from the beatings.
(Department of State)
25 Jul: A 14-year-old boy from the village of Zecovi, near Prijedor,
witnessed the murder of 33 people on July 25.
The boy said that on July 19 or 20 a number of Serbs in uniform, none of
whom he recognized, came to a small enclave of Muslim households near the
outskirts of Zecovi. At gunpoint, the Serbs forced people out of their homes
and incarcerated them in the cellar of one of the houses. After being held
for more than 2 days, those detained were released without explanation and
allowed to go back to their homes.
A few days later, on July 25, another group of Serbs appeared, also
uniformed. They ordered people out of their homes, but in the confusion, the
boy was able to hide behind a board leaning against the house and his
absence was not noticed. The boy witnessed these men line up 33 people and
shoot them summarily with semiautomatic rifles; they then used pistols to
finish off anyone who was still moving. (Department of State)
Asked if he had recognized any of this group, the witness said "they were
our neighbors" from the village. He was able to identify 29 victims by name
as well as five of those who took active part in the shooting.
21 Jul-4 Aug: A 36-year-old Bosnian Muslim was in his village of
Ribvanovici, near Prijedor, when the Serbian army surrounded all the
villages in the area on July 21, and took all of the adult males prisoner--an
incident reported in an earlier submission.
The Serbian soldiers beat the prisoners with their rifles. One man began to
cry, so the soldiers shot him. Half the men, including this witness, were
bussed to Keraterm camp in Prijedor, then to Omarska, and finally Trnopolje.
The witness does not know what happened to those left behind.
After a day at Trnopolje, the witness was taken back to Omarska camp and
put into the "white house," where he was kept [for] about 15 days. He was
locked in a room with dozens of men, many of whom he recognized from his
village. He said that every day prisoners were taken into one of five
interrogation rooms and beaten with iron bars and wooden sticks.
His sister's husband was beaten to death in this manner. He had been beaten
so badly one night that part of his forehead was missing, apparently taken
off by an iron bar. He died soon thereafter.
The witness once watched through the window as guards took prisoners out
of the "white house," told them to run, and then shot them in the back as
they fled. He heard what he believed were many other executions, but said
they were done behind the building where they could not be seen, or in a red
building nearby.
Each night, guards would choose two prisoners to bury the dead. This
witness was forced to help one night and saw 11 corpses. He said the
guards had them stack the bodies crosswise in a pit. Sometime around
August 4, he was transferred from Omarska. (Department of State)
20 Jul: A 52-year-old man was bussed to the Keraterm camp on July 20
with hundreds of others from Hambarine, near Prijedor. He was crammed
along with several hundred other men into the third of four halls that
formed a row on the former factory premises. From the start of his
internment, he saw Muslim men regularly beaten with iron bars and rifle
butts.
Every night until he was released on August 5, men were taken outside hall
number three and shot. A friend, Mustafa Ramolic, was hauled outside a few
days after the witness's arrival and beaten by Serb guards. His friend
collapsed, coughing blood until he died later that evening.
The witness observed a mass execution on July 24. It had been an extremely
hot day. The doors and windows were closed and the men were screaming for
water. What they finally received was contaminated so badly that it caused
about 20 men to collapse or faint. The witness and other detainees were
convinced that the water had been poisoned.
Perhaps in response to the tumult, about 15 Serb guards came in about 10
pm and began beating the prisoners with their rifle butts until they fell. As
the situation deteriorated, the guards occasionally fired their rifles into
the crowd of prisoners who gradually pulled back toward the large garage
door at one end of the hall.
When they reached the door, the guards began shooting their rifles and
machine guns into the crowd of inmates. The witness positioned himself
behind the door and feigned death. The entire incident, from the opening of
the doors until the shooting stopped, took about one half hour.
At dawn the following day, "volunteers" were chosen to load 130 bodies on
trucks; his brother was among the dead. The witness saw approximately 40
wounded, who had waited for what they were told would be another truck to
take them to a hospital, eventually loaded with the corpses and taken away.
A second massacre took place at about 6 am on July 26. Six soldiers entered
the hall and ordered about 50 prisoners outside. As the last of the prisoners
stepped outside, the six Serbian guards began firing their automatic
weapons. When all 50 had fallen, the guards went around shooting those who
were still groaning. The witness recognized those who took part in this
second mass execution.
Following this second massacre, 10 "volunteers" were again selected to load
the corpses. They had to ride in the same truck that took the bodies away.
The 10 "volunteers" never came back.
That same day, inmates were evacuated from all the halls. About one dozen
from each were tasked with cleaning and hosing down the halls. The rumor
was that the camp had received a new commander, and that some
international commission was expected to inspect the facilities. The
"commission" came on August 5, when busses took the witness and other
inmates to Trnopolje. (Department of State)
9 Jul: A 35-year-old Muslim woman from Trnopolje described her husband's
murder. On July 9, her husband was taken to a detention camp at the nearby
school, but was quickly released because the Serbs running the camp
recognized him as a famous "Yugoslav" athlete who had won the 1981
European body-building championship in London.
Soon after his return, upon hearing of Serbian evictions of Muslim residents
of the area, the family left their home. When the witness ran back to get
something she had forgotten, four soldiers standing at the nearby corner
stopped her husband and ordered his two children to keep going. The
children were further down the street when their mother--the witness--
caught up with her husband and the four soldiers. One of them, once
considered to be a friend of her husband, spoke to them briefly.
The soldiers then ordered her to move on, saying her husband had to stay
there. She tried to give him the key to their home, but he, too, told her to
move on and catch up with the children. She did so, and was about 20
meters away when shots rang out behind her. The children were about to
turn a corner at the end of the street when the shots were fired. All of
them, crying, tried to go back, but were blocked by other soldiers.
Two days later when the witness was allowed to return to her home for
food, she saw her husband's corpse, which apparently had not been moved
from the spot where he had been summarily executed 2 days earlier.
(Department of State)
11 June-10 Oct: A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Kotor Varos was
arrested as a civilian and interned in several locations in Kotor Varos from
June 11 until October 10. He described how he had been viciously and
sadistically beaten several times, had witnessed forced sex acts among
male prisoners, and had been forced at gunpoint to participate in the gang
rape/killing of a Muslim woman.
On one day, the witness and 11 other prisoners were forced to participate in
the rape of a Muslim policeman's wife. He exclaimed "They did everything.
You can't imagine or believe what they did. They are animals!" He said that
the woman died from her injuries 1 week later.
During the first 8 days of his internment, a Serbian TV news crew from
Banja Luka arrived and accused him of beating women and killing fetuses
during his tenure as a soldier for the Croatian forces. He was required to
read such a statement admitting to these acts because a Serbian army
captain threatened to kill his parents and family members if he did not.
The witness was later transferred to a room in the back of the Osnovni Sud
or town courthouse, where he said that three men died in his arms from the
beatings and injuries they endured: Enver Beharic, Mato Vatelj, and Smajo
Celinac. He named these men, and claimed that their bodies were mutilated
after their deaths. All three men were killed between August 13 and 15.
The witness stated further that the number of people killed in Kotor Varos
was almost unimaginable. On June 11 alone, 300-400 corpses lay in the
street. He and several other prisoners had to put the corpses into black
nylon body bags. The bags were then carried by a bulldozer to a nearby mass
grave, and he described the location in detail. He said that he personally put
over 70 bodies into bags that day and estimated that a minimum of 1,000
people were buried in this grave. (Department of State)
June-Jul: A 21-year-old Serbian fighter described his own shooting of 10
members of a Muslim family in late June in Ahatovici:
It was taken for granted among us that they should be killed. So when
somebody said 'Shoot,' I swung around and pulled the trigger, three times, on
automatic fire. I remember the little girl with the red dress hiding behind
her granny.
The Serbian fighter recounted another incident in which he used a 6-inch
hunting knife to cut the throats of three captured Muslims.
He claimed to have made visits every 3 or 4 days to a motel and restaurant
complex outside Vogosca--located 7 miles north of Sarajevo--known as the
Sonja Cafe, which had been converted into a prison for Muslim women. He
identified the "prison commander," who he said had established a "system"
for the Serbian fighters to rape and kill the women interned there. He and
his companions were encouraged to go to the Sonja Cafe by military
commanders because raping Muslim women was "good for raising the
fighters' morale." They were further told by the prison commander:
You can do with the women what you like. You can take them away from
here--we don't have enough food for them anyway--and don't bring them
back.
This fighter claimed to have raped and murdered eight women from the
motel prison complex.
He also said he had seen 30 men from Donja Bioca being shot and loaded--
some alive--into a furnace at a steel plant at Ilijas, a town north of
Vogosca in July. (The New York Times)
Late June: A 27-year-old Bosnian Muslim watched Serbian Chetniks conduct
mass executions on a bridge at Brod, 4 kilometers south of Foca, on three
consecutive evenings toward the end of June. He witnessed the executions
from a hiding place in the attic of a Serbian friend's home.
At about 6 pm of the first day, this witness saw Serb soldiers march small
groups of Muslim men onto the bridge in Brod. In the middle of the bridge,
which was about 100 meters long, the Chetniks interrogated the Muslims for
about 2 hours. Among the 20 to 30 Muslim men, the witness could recognize
from his hiding place four friends: Ramo Kadric, Saban Kurtovic, Nusret
Cengic, and Ibro Colakovic.
Just as it was getting dark, the haranguing stopped and the shooting started.
About eight of the 30 to 40 soldiers fired their automatic weapons at their
tied-up Muslim captives. The witness was able to identify the man in
charge of the Serbs on the bridge.
When there were no signs of life among the Muslims, the Serbs dumped their
bodies over the meter-high wall of the bridge into the Drina River, about 20
meters below.
The following evening, the Chetnik band led another column of Muslim
prisoners to the bridge from the other direction. This group was from the
witness's hamlet of Trnovac, and involved 50 to 60 captives. They were
killed in the same fashion. Among the victims he recognized were: Esad
Beckovic, Esad Dzin, Nedzao Dzin, Dzevad Beckovic, Zvijerac Beckovic,
Hamdija Beckovic, and Serif Beckovic.
The next massacre on the bridge occurred close to midnight of the third
evening. The victims were brought to the bridge by bus and truck from the
town of Miljevina, about 8 kilometers northwest of Brod, also on the
opposite side of the river. The entire operation was carried out more
quickly; this time there were about 50 men murdered.
The wives and children of the victims were kept for several days in an area
school, during which time they had to sign over the ownership papers to
their homes. (Department of State)
31 May-Jul: A 43-year-old Muslim from Hambarine was picked up on May 31
in Prijedor by Serb militiamen and herded along with other Muslims into one
of the buses and trucks waiting to take them to Keraterm. He claims the
more educated Muslims were taken to Omarska. The witness saw four of the
Muslim captives randomly shot to death as the loading process took place.
He knew two of the victims, brothers Suelgo and Ismo Dzafic.
The Keraterm facility was divided into four subdivisions or halls. The
witness was in hall number one. On July 22 or 24, a hall at the opposite end
of the facility was packed with prisoners from an area where heavy fighting
had taken place, and where the Serbs reportedly had sustained heavy
casualties.
The Serbs machine-gunned to death about 200 of the newly arrived prisoners
in that hall. The witness said many of the inmates could see the massacre
in the adjacent hall number three, so word of what was taking place spread
almost instantly. He and all the occupants could hear the firing and
screaming, which lasted for about 15 to 20 minutes.
The following morning he also observed trucks loaded with corpses driving
from hall number four past the window of hall number one where he was
detained. About five men were taken from his hall to help load the corpses.
Another man with a badly infected arm was put on a truck full of corpses
along with about 20 other injured men. The witness never saw this man
again and believes he was killed. (Department of State)
25 May: A 30-year-old Muslim was in Kozarac when the Serbs began a
massive artillery bombardment in the mid-afternoon of May 25. As he and a
crowd that he estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 headed for the shelter of the
nearby forest, the Serbs directed their fire at fleeing civilians. Five or six
women running near the witness were killed by a shell just before they
reached the tree line. (Department of State)
18 May: A 33-year-old Muslim from Grbavci--2 kilometers from Zvornik--
described a mass killing on the morning of May 18. As Serb militiamen
surrounded the village and started shooting, he and several family members
fled.
Residents of nearby houses were doing the same. Inside the village, the
Serb militia occupiers, using megaphones, ordered residents to go back to
their homes and put white sheets in their windows. Many of the neighbors
obeyed, but this witness and his family decided to wait in their hiding place
inside the tree line to assess the situation further.
As his neighbors returned to the housing area, hands over their heads, the
Serb militiamen separated men from women and children. The witness
watched from about 200 meters as the men were lined up. Shortly after
noon, one of the Serbs shouted an order to "kill the Ustasha." On this
command, about 10 of the militiamen began emptying their automatic
weapons into the line of Muslim men and continued shooting until they were
all dead. When the shooting stopped, the executioners and other Serb
militia, many of whom had been standing around watching, started
plundering houses in the village and stealing livestock.
The witness, his family, and other neighbors returned from their hiding
place 3 days later. He participated along with other neighbors in the burial
of 56 victims. They were buried about 20 meters from the edge of the
existing cemetery, between two rows of houses, near the spot where they
were shot. (Department of State)
9 May: A 41-year-old Bosnian Muslim woman witnessed the execution of a
Serbian civilian by Serbian soldiers in Sarajevo.
At about 7 am on May 9 or 10, military units wearing the insignias of
Serbian Chetniks and the Yugoslav army entered the area (near Sarajevo
airport) and ordered all its residents out of the cellars in which they had
taken refuge. Once outside, Serbs were told to stand in one place and
Muslims in another.
One Serb, a 50-year-old man known as "Ljubo," refused to be separated from
his Muslim neighbors, with whom he apparently had lived peacefully for
many years. His refusal to be separated from his neighbors enraged the
Serbian soldiers. They dragged him to the ground, and five or six of them
beat him until he was dead.
The witness and a group of about 40 other Muslims from the area were then
used as human shields and marched through a heavily contested combat zone
to waiting Serb vehicles some 300 meters away. From there, they were
driven to Trapare, a camp or assembly area some 3 kilometers away.
After their arrival at Trapare, a young girl--about 12 years old--was taken
from her father. About six men took the girl behind a nearby bunker. The
witness said she then could hear the most terrible screaming and crying she
had ever heard. After the father collapsed, he was dragged at knife point to
the bunker and forced to watch as the soldiers repeatedly raped his
daughter, an ordeal which lasted about an hour. Neither the father nor his
daughter was returned to the others afterward. The witness believes both
were killed. (Department of State)
5 May: In an October letter to President Bush, a Muslim refugee from Brcko
described in detail his internment in Brcko camp in northern Bosnia. Below
is an informal translation of segments of the letter pertaining to Brcko:
On May 5 a representative of the Yugo army in a radio broadcast instructed
the citizens in my part of the town to go to the army barracks, from where
the Yugo army would organize an evacuation to a safer place.
Upon our arrival at the barracks, we realized we were all in a trap because
there, together with the regular army, were Chetniks and other Serbian
refuse. They offered to give us rifles if we would fight against our own
people for the Serbian cause. The Muslims and Croats silently refused. Our
wives and children were put on a bus and were taken to an unknown
destination.
At gunpoint, we were also put on a bus. We were taken to one of Brcko's
places of execution, a physical education hall in the center of the town. We
noticed, from the puddles of blood on the floor, that the executions had
already begun. For the couple hundred of us who were locked up, the long
hours of torture began.
. . . they took four of us out for execution. They put one of us against the
wall and. . . shot him in the back with a machine gun. Looking at the holes in
his back. . . I lost consciousness, and my body crumbled onto pieces of glass.
My fainting awakened a bit of humanity in the Serbs' leader. He ordered
them to bring me back to the hall, where I could rest a little. One of the
Serbs took satisfaction in removing my glasses and breaking them.
The other three men were killed in the most cruel manner. First they were
beaten in another room and left to recover a little. They were taken to a
courtyard where we heard the worst sounds that a human throat can produce.
We heard the dull slashes of knives cutting into human flesh. The three men
were held by their legs and beaten while against the wall of the building
where we were imprisoned. With about 20 more shots, the Serbs assured
the three men's death.
All that I have written here can be confirmed by three other witnesses who
also managed to escape from that hell. I think we were lucky that we went
through all this in the first days of the Serbian occupation, while the
Serbian killing machinery was not so well developed yet. (Department of
State)
Torture of Prisoners
Aug-Sep: A US surgeon from California spent 2 weeks in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (including time at Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo) in late August
and early September performing remedial urological surgery.
The doctor reportedly found that Muslim and Mujahedin irregular troops--
some from Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia--had routinely performed crude,
disfiguring, non-medical circumcisions on Bosnian Serb soldiers, and he
treated one 18-year-old Bosnian Serb soldier who was so brutally
circumcised that eventually the entire organ required amputation.
(Department of State/news service)
Jul-Aug: A Croatian woman, married to a Serb, was interned for 40 days at
the Bosnian Government-run detention center at the former Yugoslav
National army (JNA) Viktor Bubanj Barracks in Sarajevo. During her
confinement, guards--whom she identified as Muslims--routinely beat the
more than 300 prisoners, including 30 women.
She saw one woman covered with bruises from head to toe after being so
abused. She herself was beaten several times. Another woman cut by glass
during a mortar attack was left overnight to bleed, as the guards taunted
her that "It is your people who are killing you, not us." This witness was
released in late August. (Department of State)
11 Jun-10 Oct: A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim agricultural technician from
Kotor Varos was arrested as a civilian and interned in several locations in
Kotor Varos.
Twelve Serbian soldiers, wearing uniforms bearing white eagles, on June 11
arrested the witness in his house and beat him in his yard before escorting
him to the Koza Proletaria Fur Factory, were he was interrogated and beaten
further.
At the fur factory, a guard put a rifle in the witness' mouth and lifted him
off the floor. Another guard pulled out two of his upper teeth with pliers.
He said he and 100 other men were beaten for eight days and forced to
perform sexual acts on each other.
He was later transferred to a room in the back of the Osnovni Sud, or town
courthouse, where he was held for 31/2 months. He said that 170 men were
held there under extremely oppressive conditions.
His room measured only about 2.5 by 3.5 meters, yet sometimes as many as
70 men were crammed into it. Serbian guards played loud music as they
beat prisoners in the adjoining rooms and in the yard. The room was filthy.
They ate spoiled, moldy food and had no access to toilet facilities. Ten to
15 men had diarrhea at any one time. The prisoners' skin turned yellow from
jaundice. He spent over 3 months in such conditions without ever taking a
bath or washing his clothes.
On October 10, the witness and two other Muslims were exchanged for one
Serb. Three Serbian guards, whom he recognized, brought him to the
courthouse yard where they beat him viciously, then tied his arms and legs
together like a sheep and forced him to "baah." Later they tied him to a land
rover Jeep and drove to the hospital, with the witness running behind the
car. Upon arrival, they forced him to crawl, baah, and eat grass, and then
they told him to throw up the grass because it was Serbian grass.
One guard brought some very acidic gun-cleaning oil and made the witness
drink half a liter of it. He began to have stomach convulsions immediately.
A second pulled up his sleeve and extinguished eight cigarettes on his arm.
Soon afterward he was released to Muslim forces in the village of Vecici.
(Department of State)
May-Nov: A woman from Zrenjanin, a town in southern Vojvodina, reported
that her husband, a Muslim, was detained by police on May 10 and remains to
this day with about 200 other Muslims, most from Bosanski Samac or its
immediate environs, in two large warehouses adjacent to the central police
station in Bosanski Samac, a town on the Croatian/Bosnian border in Bosnia.
On several occasions when this woman was able to visit the detention
facility, she talked with her husband and helped treat prisoners who had
been beaten brutally. The prisoners she treated had been beaten on the head,
arms, and torso. Many had had their arms broken.
Her husband said that he had been beaten severely during the first several
days of his incarceration, and that he had never been told why he was being
held. Other members of her husband's family--including his mother, his
sister, and his sister's children--were also detainees in Bosanski Samac.
Her husband claimed that the conditions were very bad in the facility and
that the prisoners were given only one meal a day, which often consisted of
only bread. (Department of State)
Deliberate Attacks on Non-Combatants
18 Nov: Bosnian Serbs on November 18 shelled the main north-south
highway near the city of Mostar, which forced a UN food convoy and its
escort of Spanish UN peace-keeping troops to abandon an attempt to bring
food and housing materials to Sarajevo. (The Washington Post)
6 Nov: Serbian artillery stationed in northeastern Bosnia fired 100 shells
into Croatia at Zupanja and surrounding villages, causing the death of two
persons, including a 2-year- old child, and injuring another child. Heavy
damage to houses was also reported. (Department of State)
7-8 Nov: Bosnian Serbs on November 8 halted relief convoys along the
Mostar road. An UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] (UK)-escorted convoy was
stopped by Croatian Defense Council (HVO) forces 10 kilometers north of
Mostar. (Department of State)
Bosnian Serbs on November 7 fired up to 200 rounds of machine gun, mortar,
and automatic rifle fire at a British convoy that was trying to find routes
for United Nations aid convoys near Tuzla, hitting a British Land Rover.
"This is the first time we have come under direct fire, and the first time we
have returned fire," according to a UK Ministry of Defense spokesman.
(London Press Association)
Wanton Devastation and Destruction of Property
25 May: A 43-year-old Muslim from Hambarine watched from a nearby hill
as Serbian artillery demolished the neighboring village of Kozarac on May
25. The artillery unit was part of the so-called Serbian "White Eagles"
militia organization, whose commander and tank unit leader he identified.
(Department of State)
17 May: Kozarac, in Bosnian Krajina, was flattened in May by Serbian forces.
(New York Newsday)
Apr-Oct: From the beginning of the war in April, Serbian Democratic party
(SDS) paramilitaries in the hills around Sarajevo have bombarded the city,
which has little in it that could be called a military target. The assault on
the city has damaged or destroyed hospitals, schools, residential buildings,
mosques, churches, and all kinds of other civilian facilities. (Department of
State)
Fall 1991: Serbian forces in the fall of 1991 left Vukovar and several
surrounding towns, in the Sector East United Nations Protected Area (UNPA)
of Croatia, looking like Berlin--circa 1945. Nearly every residential,
commercial, cultural, and religious structure was gutted or damaged
severely. Grain elevators, cranes in the port along the river, factories, and
high-rise apartment buildings were rendered virtually useless and
uninhabitable. (Department of State)
Other, Including Mass Forcible Expulsion and Deportation of
Civilians
Nov: Serb military authorities began in early November 1992 forcibly to
mobilize ethnic Croats and Muslims in the Banja Luka area and have taken 50
to 200 such conscripts from the suburbs of Gornji Seher and Debeljaci
because, according to a Serb official, "There are too many Muslims here."
(Department of State)
26 May: A 35-year-old Muslim woman, a resident of Trnopolje long before it
gained notoriety as the site of a brutal internment camp, was present on
May 26 when trucks and tractors hauled in thousands of children and elderly
Muslims from the nearby town of Kozarac, fol-lowing its destruction by
Serbian artillery. The newly arrived refugees were settled on the grounds
of the local elementary school.
The Muslim woman and other town residents were permitted to pass food to
them through fences that were being erected around the facility. During the
first 5 days, it was the only food the new arrivals received. Additionally,
all the homes in the area were forced to take in large number of Kozarac
residents. Her family took in 38 of those refugees.
Many of the refugees, including those in her home, were eventually
transported in railroad freight cars--about a hundred to a car--to facilities
further away. On July 8, soldiers came to the house and said the entire
village was being "ethnically cleansed." She and her family were forced
from her home. Three days later, she and her children were herded with
others into a railroad car and forced out near Muslim-controlled territory,
whence they made their way to refuge abroad. (Department of State) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: The Need To Respond to War Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia
Eagleburger
Source: Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Statement at the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia, Geneva, Switzerland
Date: Dec, 16 199212/16/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
Just under 4 months ago, an important milestone was reached with the
convening of the London International Conference on the former Yugoslavia.
Commitments were made both by the parties to the Yugoslav conflict and by
the international community itself--commitments to ensure unimpeded
delivery of humanitarian aid; to lift the barbaric siege of cities; to halt all
military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina; to group all heavy weapons under
UN monitoring; to open up and shut down all detention camps; to tighten
sanctions against the aggressor; and to prevent the conflict's spread to
neighboring regions and countries.
Some of those commitments have been kept, particularly in the area of
sanctions monitoring, and in efforts to prevent a further widening of the
war. Most importantly, London established a negotiating mechanism
centered here in Geneva, which has brought the international community and
the various ex-Yugoslav parties together on an ongoing basis, and which,
thanks to the efforts of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, remains a viable forum
for an eventual settlement of the war.
But let us be clear: We find ourselves today in Geneva because most of the
commitments made in London have not been kept, and because the situation
inside the former Yugoslavia has become increasingly desperate. Thus, we
meet to discuss how the international community will respond in order to
force compliance with the London agreements, and thereby accelerate an end
to the war.
It is clear in reviewing the record since London that the promises broken
have been largely Serbian promises broken. It is the Serbs who continue to
besiege the cities of Bosnia; Serb heavy weapons which continue to pound
the civilian populations in those cities; the Bosnian Serb air forces which
continue to fly in defiance of the London agreements; and Serbs who impede
the delivery of humanitarian assistance and continue the odious practice of
"ethnic cleansing." It is now clear, in short, that Mr. Milosevic and Mr.
Karadzic have systematically flouted agreements to which they had
solemnly, and yet cynically, given their assent. Today we must, at a
minimum, commit ourselves anew to the London agreements by:
-- Redoubling our assistance efforts and continuing to press for the opening
of routes for aid convoys, so that wide- spread starvation can be avoided
this winter;
-- Strengthening our efforts to prevent the war's spillover, particularly in
the Kosovo, which we will not tolerate; and
-- Tightening and better enforcing sanctions, the surest means of forcing
an early end to the war.
But we must also do more. It is clear that the international community
must begin now to think about moving beyond the London agreements and
contemplate more aggressive measures. That, for example, is why my
government is now recommending that the UN Security Council authorize
enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia, and why we are also willing to
have the Council re-examine the arms embargo as it applies to the
Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, my government also believes it
is time for the international community to begin identifying individuals who
may have to answer for having committed crimes against humanity. We
have, on the one hand, a moral and historical obligation not to stand back a
second time in this century while a people faces obliteration. But we have
also, I believe, a political obligation to the people of Serbia to signal
clearly the risk they currently run of sharing the inevitable fate of those
who practice ethnic cleansing in their name.
The fact of the matter is that we know that crimes against humanity have
occurred, and we know when and where they occurred. We know, moreover,
which forces committed those crimes, and under whose command they
operated. And we know, finally, who the political leaders are to whom those
military commanders were--and still are--responsible.
Let me begin with the crimes themselves, the facts of which are
indisputable:
-- The siege of Sarajevo, ongoing since April, with scores of innocent
civilians killed nearly every day by artillery shelling;
-- The continuing blockade of humanitarian assistance, which is producing
thousands upon thousands of unseen innocent victims;
-- The destruction of Vukovar in the fall of 1991, and the forced expulsion
of the majority of its population;
-- The terrorizing of Banja Luka's 30,000 Muslims, which has included
bombings, beatings, and killings;
-- The forcible imprisonment, inhumane mistreatment, and willful killing
of civilians at detention camps, including Banja Luka/Manjaca, Brcko/Luka,
Krajina/Prnjavor, Omarska, Prijedor/Keraterm, and Trnopolje/Kozarac;
-- The August 21 massacre of more than 200 Muslim men and boys by
Bosnian Serb police in the Vlasica Mountains near Varjanta;
-- The May-June murders of between 2,000 and 3,000 Muslim men, women,
and children by Serb irregular forces at a brick factory and a pig farm near
Brcko;
-- The June mass execution of about 100 Muslim men at Brod; and
-- The May 18 mass killing of at least 56 Muslim family members by Serb
militiamen in Grbavci, near Zvornik.
We know that Bosnian Serbs have not alone been responsible for the
massacres and crimes against humanity which have taken place. For
example, in late October Croatian fighters killed or wounded up to 300
Muslims in Prozor, and between September 24-26, Muslims from Kamenica
killed more than 60 Serb civilians and soldiers.
We can do more than enumerate crimes; we can also identify individuals who
committed them. For example:
-- Borislay Herak is a Bosnian Serb who has confessed to killing over 230
civilians; and
-- "Adil and Arif" are two members of a Croatian paramilitary force which
in August attacked a convoy of buses carrying more than 100 Serbian women
and children, killing over half of them.
We also know the names of leaders who directly supervised persons accused
of war crimes, and who may have ordered those crimes. These include:
-- Zeljko Raznjatovic, whose para-military forces, the "tigers," have been
linked to brutal ethnic cleansing in Zvornik, Srebrenica, Bratunac, and
Grobnica; and who were also linked
to the mass murders of up to 3,000 civilians near Brcko;
-- Vollslay Seselj, whose "White Eagles" force has been linked to atrocities
in a number of Bosnian cities, including the infamous incident at Brcko;
-- Drago Prcac, commander of the Omarska Detention Camp, where mass
murder and torture occurred; and
-- Adem Delic, the camp commander at Celebici where at least 15 Serbs
were beaten to death in August.
I want to make it clear that, in naming names, I am presenting the views of
my government alone. The information I have cited has been provided to the
UN War Crimes Commission, whose decision it will be to prosecute or not.
Second, I am not prejudging any trial proceedings that may occur; they must
be impartial and conducted in accordance with due process. Third, the above
listing of names is tentative and will be expanded as we compile further
information.
Finally, there is another category of fact which is beyond dispute--namely,
the fact of political and command responsibility for the crimes against
humanity which I have described. Leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, the
President of Serbia, Radovan Karadzic, the self-declared President of the
Serbian Bosnian Republic, and General Ratho Mladic, commander of Bosnian
Serb military forces, must eventually explain whether and how they sought
to ensure, as they must under international law, that their forces complied
with international law. They ought, if charged, to have the opportunity of
defending themselves by demonstrating whether and how they took
responsible action to prevent and punish the atrocities I have described
which were undertaken by their subordinates.
I have taken the step today of identifying individuals suspected of war
crimes and crimes against humanity for the same reason that my
government has decided to seek UN authorization for enforcing the no-fly
zone in Bosnia and why we are now willing to examine the question of
lifting the arms embargo as it applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is because
we have concluded that the deliberate flaunting of Security Council
resolutions and the London agreements by Serb authorities is not only
producing an intolerable and deteriorating situation inside the former
Yugoslavia, it is also beginning to threaten the framework of stability in the
new Europe.
It is clear that the reckless leaders of Serbia, and of the Serbs inside
Bosnia, have somehow convinced themselves that the international
community will not stand up to them now, and will be forced eventually to
recognize the fruits of their aggression and the results of ethnic cleansing.
Tragically, it also appears that they have convinced the people of Serbia to
follow them to the front lines of what they proclaim to be an historic
struggle against Islam on behalf of the Christian West.
It is time to disabuse them of these most dangerous illusions. The
solidarity of the civilized and democratic nations of the West lies with the
innocent and brutalized Muslim people of Bosnia. Thus, we must make it
unmistakably clear that we will settle for nothing less than the restoration
of the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with its territory undivided
and intact, the return of all refugees to their homes and villages, and,
indeed, a day of reckoning for those found guilty of crimes against humanity.
It will undoubtedly take some time before all these goals are realized, but
then there is time, too, though not much, for the people of Serbia to step
back from the edge of the abyss. There is time, still, to release all
prisoners; to lift the siege of cities; to permit humanitarian aid to reach the
needy; and to negotiate for peace and for a settlement guaranteeing the
rights of all minorities in the independent states of the former Yugoslavia.
But in waiting for the people of Serbia, if not their leaders, to come to their
senses, we must make them understand that their country will remain alone,
friendless, and condemned to economic ruin and exclusion from the family of
civilized nations for as long as they pursue the suicidal dream of a Greater
Serbia. They need, especially, to understand that a second Nuremberg
awaits the practitioners of ethnic cleansing, and that the judgment, and
opprobrium, of history awaits the people in whose name their crimes were
committed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Identifying Yugoslav War Criminals
Eagleburger
Source: Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Opening statement from a news conference, Geneva, en
route Brussels, Belgium
Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
I think I mentioned to you when we were coming here that I had this talk
with Elie Wiesel in Washington, [DC]. He really impressed me on the
question of how much longer we go on without focusing on the fact that
what's going on there is, on top of everything else, a humanitarian tragedy.
As I listened to him--and he's a very eloquent fellow--I decided it was time
we started. The earlier argument had been, with some merit, that if you
name names . . . if you move toward peace, it makes it harder for them to
back off where they've been because they're afraid they're going to get
accused of some crime.
We listened to that argument for awhile--a long time--but the fact of the
matter is it hasn't gotten any better. The fact of the matter is that things
are going on there that are absolutely outrageous of which ethnic cleansing
is sort of the catch-all phrase for this but, prison camps, torture, and all of
those things. So, I just decided, after listening to Elie Wiesel, that he was
probably right. We needed to take this to a different level. I don't know that
it's going to solve anything or change anything, but I think it's time, when
we have the facts--and we do in some of those cases fairly clearly--that
we begin to name names; let them understand that, over the long run, they
may be able to run but they can't hide; that we're going to pursue them and
raise some questions amongst the more senior people about the degree of
their responsibility for what these others do. And, hopefully, at the same
time--and I only hope--convince some of those who may try to pull the same
outrages that they ought to be careful and not do it, because they will be in
the same boat as those who have done these things. So, anyway, after
talking with Elie Wiesel and thinking about it a bit, I decided it was time we
started naming names.
Now, the names we put in that statement today are just some of the
highlights of all of these documents we've turned over to the United Nations.
It was an attempt to try to force the international community to pay more
attention to this issue and to send a message to Yugoslavia--what was
Yugoslavia. I'm going to make as sure as I can that we get what I said on
Voice of America to Serbia so they can hear some of that. And, for whatever
period of time is left to us, that is until the 20th of January, this is going
to be a theme. And, I hope the next administration will pick it up. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: NATO Support for the "No-Fly" Zone In the Former
Yugoslavia
Eagleburger
Source: Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Excerpts from remarks at a press conference, Brussels,
Belgium
Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
Subject: NATO
[TEXT]
First of all, I do think we made a real advance on the general question of the
relationship between NATO and peace-keeping, and fundamentally the
alliance has said that we're prepared to provide assets to help in peace-
keeping.
Now then, when you get to the specifics about Yugoslavia, which is where I
spent a lot of my time focused on that issue today, I think there are some
things that are important here.
Let me say first of all--because I watched the previous press conference--
to those of you who wonder whether this alliance did or did not support a
no-fly zone and, if not, why not, let me put it to you this way: The issue, as
such, never even really came up, and I suppose if I had wanted to push it, I
could. But I think if you take a look at the language specifically relating to
the no-fly zone, what you see is [that] they say, if the United Nations passes
a no-fly zone resolution, we're prepared to provide assets--that is, the
alliance, and that includes the United States--to enforce that no-fly zone
resolution.
Frankly, it never occurred to me in the way you've asked the question,
because it seems to me that if we say if a no-fly zone resolution is passed,
we'll support it with assets--the question that was fundamental here. I'll
also say to you [that] I didn't hear any discussion today--in the various
meetings--in which anybody really raised the question of a no-fly zone and
the wisdom of it. There was discussion--and there has been all week
everywhere I've been--over the impact of enforcing a no-fly zone resolution
on how well we are able to continue humanitarian assistance.
While I do not think that question should stand in the way of enforcement,
there is no question about it, that's a perfectly legitimate question to ask.
In other words, if we're going to enforce no-fly, how do we deal with the
questions of whether we will be able to continue humanitarian assistance
during that process.
The Yugoslav resolution also makes it clear that impeding relief shipments
is a crime, and that those who have committed those crimes will be held
responsible. The subject of criminal behavior by too many people in what
was Yugoslavia is a subject I've been talking about all week. I was glad to
see that we were able to get agreement on that. It indicates that if the
United Nations requests it, the alliance will respond, if UNPROFOR [UN
Protective Force] or other UN personnel are threatened or harmed. Again,
that obviously means we would have to use NATO assets to do that.
I would also say to you, although you may want to ask me more specifically,
that--to some degree, at least-- must be an answer to Mr. Karadzic's rather
unwise threats of yesterday.
This is another step forward, I think. The Yugoslav section clearly
demonstrated concern over Kosovo, supported the dispatch of UN forces to
prevent violence there, and did say that if there is an explosion in Kosovo, it
would be a serious threat to international peace and security. And we would
be prepared to take appropriate measures should that happen.
Again, you can ask me what "appropriate" means. I'll give you the same
answer the Secretary General did. That will be decided at the time, but it
seems to me it is a step forward from anything this alliance has said before
with regard to Kosovo.
Now, I want to go back to the fundamental communique for just a minute,
because there's a point I want to make here. In that communique, it
stressed the need to secure early ratification of the START [Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty] agreement and the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] by
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. I just want to make it clear that the
United States is not particularly happy with the delays that are taking place
with regard to the ratification of those two treaties by Ukraine.
I saw the Ukrainian Foreign Minister some time earlier this week. I don't
remember where it was. It was in Stockholm, as a matter of fact, and was
told then that the parliament--the Ukraine Parliament could not deal with
those treaties this month.
Well, we've got to live with their parliamentary procedures, but I made it
clear to him, and I don't mind making it clear publicly, that we have been
discussing the issue of ratification of those two treaties with Ukrainian
leaders for some months. We expect them to be ratified and without
reservations. And, as I indicated to the Foreign Minister when I saw him, if
they are not ratified or if the delay goes on much longer, it inevitably will
have an impact on the bilateral relationship between the United States and
Ukraine. So in a way, ladies and gentlemen, I'm taking advantage of you to
send a message publicly. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: North Atlantic Council Ministerial (NAC)
Communique
NATO
Source: NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
Description: Communique
Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
USSR (former)
Subject: NATO, CSCE, Arms Control, United Nations
[TEXT]
1. We have met today at a time of serious challenges to European security
arising from regional conflicts. We have consulted on this grave situation
and on the contributions that the Atlantic Alliance can make to meeting
these challenges. As the Harmel Report emphasized 25 years ago, the
ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting
peaceful order in Europe. This remains our goal. In our new Strategic
Concept, we have recognised the changing security environment. To meet
the new risks and challenges, we will use Alliance resources and expertise
in a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions, while continuing to
ensure an effective collective defence.
Transatlantic Link
2. The transatlantic partnership, which is embodied in our Alliance,
remains vital for European security and stability. The Alliance not only
guarantees its members' security, but also remains one of the indispensable
instruments for promoting stability and shaping change throughout Europe.
An effective Atlantic Alliance and a continuing active, broad cooperation
between Europe and North America are essential for a durable order of peace
and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area. The substantial presence of US
armed forces in Europe and the continuing political and military
commitment and active engagement in European security of both the United
States and Canada will remain essential. The tasks we face in supporting
the process of democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the
republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union underscore the
importance of maintaining a strong transatlantic partnership based on a
community of values and purpose.
NATO's Role in Peacekeeping
3. Following the decision which we took in Oslo, we have reviewed the
progress made concerning Alliance support for CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe] peacekeeping, and have instructed the Council in
Permanent Session to complete its work on this issue. We will further
strengthen Alliance coordination in peacekeeping, and develop practical
measures to enhance the Alliance's contribution in this area. The Military
Committee has already advised the Council in Permanent Session of the
resources available and the modalities for possible Alliance support for
peacekeeping. We are ready to share experiences in peacekeeping with our
Cooperation Partners and other CSCE participating states, and to join them
as required in supporting CSCE peacekeeping operations.
4. We confirm today the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case-
by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping
operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the
primary responsibility for international peace and security. We are ready to
respond positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary-General might take
to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council
Resolutions. We have asked NATO's Secretary General to maintain in this
respect, under the guidance of the Council in Permanent Session, the
necessary contacts with the Secretary-General of the UN regarding the
assistance that the Alliance could provide.
5. In this spirit, we are contributing individually and as an Alliance to the
implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions relating to the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. For the first time in its history, the
Alliance is taking part in UN peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement
operations. The Alliance, together with the WEU, is supporting with its
ships in the Adriatic the enforcement of the UN economic sanctions against
Serbia and Montenegro and of the arms embargo against all republics of
former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] is using elements from
the Alliance's NORTHAG [Northern Army Group, Central Europe] command for
its operational headquarters. NATO airborne early-warning aircraft--
AWACS--are monitoring daily the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
Relations with Cooperation Partners and NACC
6. The Alliance is helping to promote stability throughout the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia and is supporting their reform
processes. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC], created a year
ago, has developed into a valuable forum for consultations on security and
conflict prevention. We have built up a broad and diverse programme of
practical cooperation in areas where our Alliance has competence and
expertise. We intend to develop further this dynamic cooperative process
step by step, giving it a more practical focus. We have prepared, together
with our cooperation partners, a new and expanded Work Plan for 1993. The
commitment of all partners to full respect for human rights and democratic
principles, as set out in the CSCE documents and in accordance with their
international legal obligations, will continue to be the basis of our
cooperation. We welcome all positive steps taken in this regard by our
North Atlantic Cooperation Council partners, and urge continued efforts.
Strengthening the CSCE Structures
7. The CSCE has an essential role to play in developing a cooperative
approach to security and in conflict prevention and crisis management. We
support the further strengthening of CSCE structures and the extension of
the CSCE's authority and operational involvement in the prevention of
conflict. We welcome in this respect the strategy of active diplomacy
agreed at the CSCE Ministerial Council in Stockholm. We welcome, in
particular, the strengthening of the CSCE's operational capabilities through
structural reforms and the appointment of a Secretary General; the
appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities; and the
establishment of additional mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of
disputes. As required, we will support the work of the CSCE with whatever
experience and expertise we can usefully contribute.
8. We attach great importance to the Forum for Security Cooperation in
Vienna, established by the CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting as a framework
for shaping a new relationship of cooperative security among all CSCE
participating states. We have put forward, in association with other
participating states, a number of proposals for the Programme for
Immediate Action agreed in Helsinki dealing with the harmonisation of
existing arms control obligations, with defence planning and with the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms
transfers. We will continue to develop further proposals. We urge all
states of the CSCE to participate in the Vienna Forum as well as in all the
other CSCE fora.
Practical Relationship between NATO and WEU
9. We reaffirm our support for the development of a common European
foreign and security policy and defence identity as reflected in the
Declaration of Peace and Cooperation adopted by the Alliance in Rome on 8
November 1991 and in the Treaty and Declarations adopted by the European
Community and the Western European Union [WEU] in Maastricht on 9 and 10
December 1991. We believe that the Alliance's interests are best served by
a more united Europe and that the maintenance of a strong Atlantic Alliance
will be a fundamental element in any emerging European defence policy.
10. We welcome the results of the WEU Ministerial Council meeting in Rome
on 20 November, which confirmed the participation of all European Allies in
the activities of the WEU as full members, associate members or observers,
thereby reinforcing the European pillar of the Alliance. We also welcome
the progress made by the WEU in further developing its operational role and
structures. These developments will facilitate close working relations and
interaction between NATO and the WEU. Our cooperation in the Adriatic is a
case in point. We reaffirm the importance of maintaining Allies' existing
obligations and commitments of forces to NATO and we emphasise in this
regard that the primary responsibility of forces answerable to the WEU will
remain NATO's collective defence under the Washington Treaty.
11. We have endorsed an Alliance document proposing guidelines for the
practical working relations between the two organisations. These
arrangements will help to ensure that all the Allies are properly involved in
decisions that may affect their security. We look forward to the transfer of
the WEU Council and Secretariat to Brussels early in 1993, which will allow
close practical cooperation between the two Councils and Secretariats. We
welcomed the presence of the Secretary General of the WEU, Mr. Willem van
Eekelen, who participated in our meeting for the first time.
We are committed to ensuring that the two organisations continue to work
on the basis of transparency and complementarity, recognising that it is for
each of them to take its own decisions. We reiterate our appreciation of the
fact that in stating their aim of introducing joint positions into the process
of consultation in the Alliance, the WEU member states have affirmed that
the Alliance will remain the essential forum for consultation among its
members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security
and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty; and also of
WEU's stated intention to strengthen the role, responsibilities and
contributions of the WEU member states in the Alliance and to act in
conformity with the positions adopted in the Alliance.
12. We express our satisfaction at the initiative taken by the French and
German governments in submitting to the Council their joint proposal on the
relationship between the European Corps they have created and the Alliance.
This major unit, which we note is open to the other WEU partners, is a step
forward in strengthening both the European security and defence identity
and the European pillar of the Alliance.
We welcome the agreement between the French and German Chiefs of Staff
and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe on the conditions under which
the Corps is to be used within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.
This agreement will be considered by the Military Committee and submitted
expeditiously to the Council in Permanent Session for approval.
Regional Issues
13. The use of force in contravention of international law for whatever goal
is intolerable. Regional conflicts cannot be settled through violence, but
only through negotiations and full respect for human and democratic rights,
including those of persons belonging to national minorities, the territorial
integrity of all states and the inviolability of all frontiers in accordance
with CSCE principles and other relevant international commitments and
norms. We remain profoundly concerned by the continuing violence in the
former Yugoslavia, including the abhorrent practice referred to as "ethnic
cleansing," and have issued today a separate statement on this conflict.
14. We deeply regret the ongoing hostilities in and around Nagorno-
Karabakh. We urge the parties involved to establish an effective ceasefire.
We strongly support UN and CSCE principles as well as all steps and
decisions taken by the CSCE in relation to the present conflict. We continue
to believe the proposed CSCE Conference in Minsk offers an immediate
opportunity to achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict, and we
support efforts to convene the conference on the basis of the continuation
of the work begun in the framework of the Rome meeting.
15. Completion of the expeditious withdrawal of foreign troops from the
Baltic states under appropriate withdrawal agreements is important in view
of the overriding principle that military forces should be stationed on the
territory of a foreign state only with the consent of that state. The
continuation of the withdrawal process will be a major contribution to
stability in the Baltic region. We recognise that practical difficulties have
to be overcome, but temporary problems should not be allowed to delay the
overall process. This withdrawal should not be linked to other issues.
We invite all parties to exercise flexibility and moderation in negotiations
to resolve remaining problems, including those of a social and material
nature.
Arms Control
16. We welcome the definitive entry into force on 9 November of the CFE
[Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, which, together with the
Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strengths of Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1-A), we consider one of the foundations of
European security. We stress, following the end of the CFE baseline
validation period, the importance of all parties adhering to the schedule for
the reduction of Treaty-limited equipment as well as to the information
exchange, verification and other provisions of the Treaty.
17. We look forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty on Open
Skies and to adherence to it by interested states participating in the CSCE
which were not original signatories to the Treaty as provided for by Article
XVII of the Treaty and called for in the CSCE Open Skies Declaration of 24
March 1992.
18. We welcome the consolidation by CIS [Commonwealth of Independent
States] states of former Soviet tactical weapons in Russia, the adherence to
the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty by Belarus, Kazakhstan
and Ukraine, and the commitments by those three states to eliminate all
nuclear weapons on their territories. We urge the earliest possible
ratification of the START Treaty in conformity with the Lisbon Protocol by
those State Parties having not yet done so. We reiterate our expectation
that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine will take rapid steps to fulfil their
repeated commitments to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as
non-nuclear weapon states. Failure to do so would be a cause of serious
concern. We also renew our call upon them to expedite the elimination from
their territories of nuclear weapons as agreed.
We welcome all agreements concluded by Allies with Russia to facilitate
the rapid, safe and secure elimination of former Soviet nuclear weapons.
Allies underline their continuing readiness to support this process of
elimination and to consult on the matter in the Alliance.
19. We welcome the agreement last June between the United States and
Russia to reduce their nuclear forces substantially below START levels, and
in particular the decision to eliminate all multiple-warhead land-based
strategic missiles.
20. We welcome the successful achievement of a draft Chemical Weapons
Convention. We look forward to becoming original signatories of the
Convention, and commit ourselves to its early ratification. We call on all
other states to do likewise.
21. We remain fully committed to ongoing efforts to prevent proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, as well as illegal
arms transfers.
We urge all countries that have not yet done so, particularly those located in
regions where the risks of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons as well as the acquisition of relevant technology have
increased alarmingly in recent years, to become parties to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention, and to commit
themselves to signing and ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention as
soon as possible. Strict compliance with these accords is essential. We
reaffirm our support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and for its
indefinite extension in 1995.
We urge transparency and restraint in the field of conventional arms
transfers. We support the newly established UN Register of Conventional
Arms and urge all UN member states to provide by next April all required
data in order to enable this Register to be fully operational and effective.
22. We were honoured by the presence of Minister Pierre Harmel at our
meeting. Despite all that has been accomplished in recent years, we have
not yet achieved the just and lasting peaceful order in Europe which the
Harmel Report laid down as the goal of our Alliance. We had hoped that
conflict and cruelty might be banished from the continent. In the face of the
new challenges, that hope remains, and we will strive to our utmost to
realise it. The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to make an essential
contribution to securing peace and stability.
23. We have asked the Secretary General, Mr. Manfred Worner, to remain in
office until 30th June 1996, and noted with pleasure his acceptance.
24. The Spring 1993 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial
session will be held in Athens in June.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: NATO Statement on the Former Yugoslavia
NATO
Source: NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
Description: Released by the North Atlantic Council's Ministerial
Meeting, Brussels, Belgium
Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
USSR (former)
Subject: NATO, CSCE, Arms Control
[TEXT]
1. We are profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating situation in the former
Yugoslavia, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace,
security, and stability. Recent meetings in Edinburgh, Stockholm and Geneva
have made clear the international community's impatience with the
situation, its determination that the carnage and lawlessness in former
Yugoslavia be brought to a halt, and its commitment to a negotiated,
peaceful and lasting settlement. We are contributing individually and as an
Alliance to the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, and we
are prepared to respond to further requests for such contributions.
2. Primary responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies with
the present leadership of Serbia and of the Bosnian Serbs. They have sought
territorial gains by force and engaged in systematic gross violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law, including the barbarous
practice of "ethnic cleansing." There is the systematic detention and rape
of Muslim women and girls. Relief convoys are being harassed and delayed.
All such acts must cease. Those individuals responsible for atrocities,
whatever party they belong to, are accountable for their actions and liable
to be judged accordingly. To this end, we welcome consideration of the
creation of an ad hoc tribunal.
3. We reject any unilateral changes in borders, territory, or populations.
The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina must be restored. We call upon all parties in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to accept the Geneva Conference draft outline constitution as a
basis for negotiations. We strongly support the continuing efforts of the UN
and EC Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
(ICFY).
4. We are deeply concerned about possible spillover of the conflict, and
about the situation in Kosovo. We call urgently on all parties to act with
restraint and moderation. Serious negotiations on the restoration of
autonomy to Kosovo within Serbia and the guarantee of full human rights
should begin immediately under the ICFY. We are in favour of a UN
preventive presence in Kosovo. An explosion of violence in Kosovo could, by
spreading the conflict, constitute a serious threat to international peace
and security and would require an appropriate response by the international
community .
5. We support CSCE efforts and a substantial increase in international
conflict prevention measures, such as monitoring missions, and expect
cooperation from all parties. We urge further speedy preventive steps by
the UN or the CSCE to help defuse existing tensions. In that context, we
welcome the decision of the United Nations Security Council to place
peacekeeping forces on the borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia with Albania and Serbia and Montenegro.
6. Strict enforcement of UN embargoes is essential. We urge nations to
continue efforts to tighten their enforcement.
7. The Alliance has contributed personnel and equipment to the UNPROFOR II
Headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is helping to enforce UN embargoes in
the Adriatic, and is providing to the UN data obtained from NATO Airborne
Early-Warning (AWACS) aircraft to help monitor the Bosnia-Herzegovina no-
fly zone. Members of the Alliance are prepared to take further steps to
assist the UN in implementing its decisions to maintain international peace
and security.
8. The Security Council will shortly consider adopting a resolution on
enforcement of the No-Fly Zone, bearing in mind the need to continue the
current humanitarian effort in Bosnia. Should such a resolution be adopted,
and should violations continue thereafter, we would be prepared to support
the UN in enforcing that resolution.
9. In view of the continuing attacks on Sarajevo, we urge the Security
Council to consider further measures as soon as possible, as set out in the
9th December Statement of the UN Security Council President.
10. All parties, but in particular the Serbian authorities, in and outside
Bosnia-Herzegovina must cooperate fully with UNHCR [UN High
Commissioner for Refugees] and UNPROFOR. We recall that UNSCR 770
authorizes all measures necessary to ensure relief deliveries to Bosnia, and
that interference in relief activities is an international crime. All must
refrain from any action which might jeopardize the safety of UNPROFOR and
other UN personnel. If requested by the UN, the Alliance would be prepared
to take appropriate measures if any of these personnel are threatened or
harmed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe
Subject: NATO, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control
[TEXT]
NATO Today
NATO continues to provide Western governments the optimal instrument to
coordinate their efforts at defense and arms control and to build a durable
European order of peace. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact, and the progress of European integration have not ended
the need for NATO's essential commitment to safeguard the freedom and
security of all its members by political and military means in accordance
with UN principles. The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic
Alliance, issued after the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
July 1990, signaled the vitality of the alliance in adapting to security needs
in a post-Cold War world. At that meeting, NATO allies announced a
fundamental review of strategy and invited the Soviet Union and the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe to establish regular diplomatic
liaison and to develop a new partnership.
The November 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation further
underlined NATO's intention to redefine its objectives in light of changed
circumstances. The declaration took into account the broader challenges to
alliance security interests, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, regional instability, and terrorism. It outlined its future tasks
in the context of a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing
institutions, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community, and the
Council of Europe, working together to build a new European security
system. It created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to
develop an institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on
political and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries.
This initiative culminated in the participation of Foreign Ministers and
representatives from the 16 NATO countries, 6 Central and East European
countries, and the 3 new independent Baltic states at the inaugural meeting
of the NACC in December 1991. At a second meeting of the NACC in March
1992, the new independent states of the former Soviet Union became
members, except Georgia, which was admitted the following month. Albania
joined the NACC in June 1992. The "New Strategic Concept" announced at
the Rome meeting stresses the alliance's mission in crisis management and
mandates a more flexible force structure and reduced reliance on nuclear
weapons.
In June 1992, NATO Foreign Ministers expressed concern over continuing
violence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh
(Azerbaijan) and affirmed their readiness to support peace-keeping
activities under the auspices of the CSCE on a case-by-case basis. On July
10, 1992, the North Atlantic Council agreed on a NATO maritime operation in
the Adriatic, in coordination with the WEU, to monitor compliance with the
UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. On September 2, 1992, the
Council approved UN humanitarian relief efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On
November 18, 1992, NATO allies agreed to enforce a naval blockade against
Serbia and Montenegro, again in coordination with the WEU, following a UN
Security Council resolution to tighten economic sanctions. On December 17,
1992, the Council agreed to support the United Nations in enforcing its
October 9, 1992, resolution declaring a ban on military flights over Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
NATO's role as a forum for political consultation and an association of
nations committed to collective defense remains unchanged, even as its new
responsibilities in the areas of peace-keeping and crisis management
continue to evolve.
US-NATO Relations: "The Trans-Atlantic Partnership"
The decision of the United States after World War II to participate in a
regional peace-time, defensive alliance represented a fundamental change in
American foreign policy. The United States recognized that its interests no
longer could be confined to the limits of the Western hemisphere: US
security was linked inextricably to the future of the West European
democracies. Concepts of individual liberty and the rule of law, coupled
with those of a common heritage and shared values, provided the foundation
for the NATO alliance. These ideals, as well as the ongoing goal of each
member country to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe,
continue to link the fate of America to that of its NATO allies.
The history of US engagement in NATO has been one of commitment by
America and its allies to reduce tensions in Europe and to improve East-
West relations. They have pursued a series of initiatives designed to lower
levels of personnel and equipment and increase mutual confidence, while
adhering to a policy of political cohesion and military strength. Arms
control measures aimed at enhancing stability have included the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 and the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990.
The CFE Treaty between the allies and the nations and successor states of
the former Warsaw Pact provides for an unprecedented level of transparency
in the security field through an information exchange and obligatory
inspections. Most importantly, it mandates a sharp reduction in
conventional weapons throughout Europe. The NATO allies coordinate
closely to meet their own obligations under the treaty and to ensure Eastern
compliance in its information, verification, and reduction provisions.
NATO has played a leading role in developing far-reaching proposals for
CSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Alliance proposals on force
planning, non-proliferation, and harmonization of existing arms control
commitments already are being developed.
The United States supports the development of a greater European security
identity and defense role as a means of strengthening the integrity and
effectiveness of NATO. At the NATO summit in Rome, the alliance welcomed
the prospect of a European political union with a greater security and
defense dimension but underlined that this would not diminish the need for
NATO. The alliance's "New Strategic Concept" also reaffirmed the essential
nature of the trans-Atlantic partnership, recognizing as a basic principle
the indivisibility of security of all its members.
The North Atlantic alliance and the American presence in Europe have helped
keep peace for more than 40 years. Having helped to forge successful
policies toward the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact since the
foundation of NATO, the United States with its European allies must play a
central role in building the framework of the new Euro-Atlantic
architecture.
NATO Strategy
NATO collective security strategy was based on the principle of deterrence.
Defense capabilities were created to deter military aggression or other
forms of pressure. Parties to the treaty agreed to consult whenever the
territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any party was
threatened. They further pledged to maintain their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack and, should such deterrence fail, to defend
the territory of the alliance. As a purely defensive alliance, NATO would
maintain only a level of military strength sufficient to be credible. Given
the marked inferiority of allied conventional strength in Europe, the NATO
guarantee would rest primarily on the nuclear superiority of the United
States.
At the conclusion of a 1967 comprehensive review of NATO strategy, the
alliance adopted a revised approach to the common defense, based on a
balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of
aggression or threats of aggression. This reassessment of the nature of the
potential threat to member countries prompted the realization that the
alliance must increasingly look to the dangers of more limited forms of
aggression beyond the possibility of a massive Soviet attack. The basis of
the new concept of "flexible response" was the belief that NATO should be
able to deter and counter military force with a range of responses designed
to defend directly against attack at an appropriate level, or, if necessary, to
escalate the attack to the level necessary to persuade an aggressor to
desist.
At the same time, the alliance accepted the recommendations of the Harmel
report, titled "Future Tasks of the Alliance," which outlined the need to
work toward the achievement of disarmament and balanced force reductions.
The maintenance of adequate military forces would be coupled with efforts
at improving East-West relations.
Soviet deployment of new mobile theater nuclear missiles (SS-20s) called
into question the accepted NATO strategy of deterrence based on the
concepts of forward defense and flexible response and lead to a decision in
1979 to modernize its defensive capability. The resulting "dual-track"
decision by the alliance combined pursuing arms control negotiations with
responding appropriately to the increased imbalance created by the new
Soviet systems. Alliance governments agreed to deploy US ground- launched
cruise missiles in Western Europe.
The successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty in 1987, while eliminating all Soviet and US land-based,
intermediate-range missiles, required a new appraisal of NATO policy. In
response, the alliance developed its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms
Control and Disarmament," which provided a framework for alliance policy
in nuclear, conventional, and chemical fields of arms control, and tied
defense policies to progress in arms control.
The "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," issued
by the North Atlantic Council in July 1990, inaugurated a major
transformation to adapt to the new realities in Europe. The ministers
pledged to intensify political and military contacts with Moscow and with
Central and East European capitals and to work not only for the common
defense but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. They
underlined the need to undertake broader arms control and confidence-
building agreements to limit conventional armed forces in Europe. In
recognition of the radical political changes in Europe and the improved
security environment, the ministers mandated a fundamental review of the
alliance's political and military strategy.
The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in November 1991. The threat of a massive full-scale
Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's strategy during the
Cold War, had disappeared after the end of the political division of Europe.
The alliance acknowledged that the risks to its security, such as
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism and
sabotage, were now less predictable and beyond the focus of traditional
concerns. The new strategy adopts a broader approach to security, centered
more on crisis management and conflict prevention. It assumes completion
of the planned withdrawal of military forces from Central and Eastern
Europe and the full implementation of arms control agreements limiting
conventional forces in Europe. In the context of changed circumstances, the
alliance will maintain a mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in
Europe, although at a significantly lower level. To ensure effectiveness,
alliance forces will be increasingly mobile to respond to a range of
contingencies. Forces will be organized for flexible buildup to react to
regional instability and crises. Collective defense arrangements will rely
increasingly on multinational forces within the integrated military
structure. Nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in allied
strategy but will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve
stability.
The new strategy reaffirms the principle of common commitment and
mutual cooperation in support of the indivisibility of security for all
alliance members and underscores the essential political and military link
between European and North American members provided by the presence of
nuclear forces in Europe.
NATO Background
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed against the backdrop of
emerging post-war tensions engendered by the threat of Soviet
expansionism and concern over political and economic instability in Western
Europe. On April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, the Foreign Ministers of
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States signed the North
Atlantic Treaty, the political framework for an international alliance
designed to prevent aggression, or, if necessary, to resist attack against
any alliance member. In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty,
followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and by Spain in 1982.
This alliance of sovereign states pledges, through a combination of political
solidarity and military force, to preserve its mutual security. Reaffirming
faith in the principles of individual and collective self-defense embodied in
the UN Charter, the parties to the treaty pledge to defend the common
heritage and civilization of their peoples and to promote stability and well-
being in the North Atlantic area. While recognizing the need to maintain
adequate military strength to safeguard the security of its members, the
alliance also resolves to work toward the establishment of a just and
lasting peaceful order in Europe.
NATO Structure
North Atlantic Council
The Council provides the forum for consultation and cooperation between
governments on all issues affecting security. Its decisions are based on
consensus, with each member having an equal right to express its views.
Each government is represented on the NATO Council by a permanent
representative with ambassadorial rank. The Council meets on a weekly
basis, with meetings at the ministerial level twice a year. The NATO
Secretary General is chairman.
Defense Planning Committee (DPC)
Composed of representatives of all countries except France; deals with
overall issues of defense. Like the Council, it meets regularly at
ambassadorial level and twice yearly, when member countries are
represented by their defense ministers.
Nuclear Planning Group
Has authority for nuclear matters. All countries except France participate.
Iceland participates as an observer.
Military Committee
The highest military authority in the alliance; is composed of the chiefs of
staff of each country except France, which is represented by a military
mission. Iceland, which has no military forces, is represented by a civilian
member. The Military Committee advises the Council and the DPC on
military measures necessary for the common defense and provides guidance
to the NATO commanders.
Regional Commands
The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic treaty is divided into three
regional commands: Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic, and
Allied Command Channel, with a regional planning group for North America.
With the exception of France and Iceland, all countries assign forces to the
integrated military command structure. The NATO Defense area covers the
territories of member nations in North America, in the Atlantic area north
of the Tropic of Cancer, and in Europe, including Turkey. However, events
occurring outside the area which affect the preservation of peace and
security in the treaty area also may be considered by the Council.
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
Designed as a forum for consultation and cooperation on security and related
issues, the Council institutionalizes the relationship between NATO
countries and the governments of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic
states, and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. Finland
has attended as an observer. Defense planning, democratic concepts of
civilian-military relations, and defense conversion are discussed at regular
meetings of cooperation partners. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC)
NATO
Source: North Atlantic Cooperation Council
Description: Text of a communique released at the meeting of the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters,
Brussels, Belgium
Date: Dec, 18 199212/18/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tajikistan
Subject: NATO, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control,
CSCE
[TEXT]
1. We, the Foreign Ministers and Representatives of the member countries
of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council have today continued our
consultations to contribute to enhanced security and cooperation in the area
from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
2. Our area faces new and difficult challenges which give rise to serious
concern. Its stability and security will depend on how we are able to
respond to these challenges and thereby to manage the process of change.
3. During the first year of its existence, our Council has proved its
usefulness for dialogue and cooperation and for strengthening security. Its
potential will be further developed and applied. To that end, we have
adopted today a substantial Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and
Cooperation for the year 1993. It builds on the positive, mutually beneficial
results of our initial Work Plan for 1992 in the political, military,
economic, scientific, environmental and information fields, including
defence conversion and civil/-military coordination of air traffic
management.
We agreed to strengthen and broaden further our partnership as a dynamic
process and to give it a more practical focus. This would support the
continued progress in democratic and market-oriented reforms which is
essential for the success of our cooperation. Our cooperation could also
take the form of activities agreed by all the partners but carried out by
some of them in open-ended groups which reflect specific shared interests,
for example, the pilot projects on defence conversion and on defence-
related environmental issues.
Active cooperation on defence matters and military contacts under our Work
Plan are an important contribution to better mutual understanding among
armed forces and fostering responsible and cooperative behaviour in the
military field, which are essential to our efforts to help safeguard peace.
We intend thus to contribute to achieving a pattern of democratically
controlled and smaller military forces which are structured with defensive
intent, at minimum levels consistent with legitimate security
requirements. These objectives should be reflected in military doctrines.
We welcome progress already made in these areas.
Cooperation will be significantly increased in the science and environmental
fields on priority issues.
4. The further development of our cooperation is linked to respect by all our
countries for international commitments undertaken inter alia within the
framework of the CSCE. We are determined to implement these
commitments fully and thereby to enhance the security and stability in our
area.
5. Regional tensions, conflicts and ethnic violence are threatening stability
and security in our area and hampering the achievement of our goal of
enhancing peaceful cooperation. We cannot allow the current process of
transition in Europe to be undermined in this manner.
6. We welcome the decisions taken by the CSCE Council in Stockholm to
enhance the CSCE's operational and institutional capacity to prevent
conflicts, manage crises and settle disputes peacefully. We are determined
to contribute to achieving these goals.
7. Our countries are ready to support and contribute on a case by case basis
to peacekeeping operations under UN authority or CSCE responsibility, which
ensure international legitimacy for such operations.
Taking into account the decision of the 1992 CSCE Summit Meeting in
Helsinki, we will exchange experience and expertise on peacekeeping and
related matters; we will continue our consultations leading to cooperation
on this subject in conformity with the Work Plan we have adopted.
8. Our Council is continuing to contribute to the building of a new security
architecture based on cooperative relations among states and a network of
mutually reinforcing institutions.
9. We condemn the use of force not sanctioned by international law as a
means to pursue political goals. Permanent solutions to regional conflicts
can only be reached through negotiations as well as equal and full respect
for human rights, including those of persons belonging to national
minorities, the territorial integrity of all states and the inviolability of
their borders in accordance with CSCE principles and other relevant
international commitments and norms. We pledge to use our dialogue and
cooperation within the NACC to help prevent conflicts.
10. We are profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating situation in the former
Yugoslavia, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace,
security, and stability. We fully support the efforts of the UN, the CSCE and
the UN and EC Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on former
Yugoslavia to find a negotiated and just settlement to the tragic conflict in
the former Yugoslavia and call on all parties, especially the leadership of
Serbia and Montenegro and of the Bosnian Serbs to cooperate with these
efforts, in particular to implement strictly the decisions of the London
Conference and the mandatory resolutions of the UN Security Council. Any
taking of territory by force or any practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful
and unacceptable and must not be permitted to affect the outcome of the
negotiations on constitutional arrangements for the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. All displaced persons must be enabled to return in peace to
their former homes. We support all humanitarian efforts aimed at
alleviating the plight of the population and at preventing further
dislocation, e.g. through the development of safe areas for the protection of
the civilian population and a provision of refuge for particularly vulnerable
categories of refugees.
We are gravely concerned about the risk of conflict spilling over into other
areas. This would have serious implications for the region. In this
connection, we are disturbed by the dangerous situation in Kosovo,
developments in the Sandjak and Vojvodina and some recent events in the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We stress the necessity of urgent
preventive measures and support the steps that have already been taken by
the United Nations and the CSCE. We welcome the UN Security Council
decision to place preventive peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. We believe that a UN presence in Kosovo would be a
positive step.
We urge all parties concerned to strive in the framework of an overall
settlement of the crisis for a significant reduction in the level of
armaments in the region, in particular through a comprehensive regional
harmonization of arms control obligations.
We deeply regret the ongoing hostilities in the conflict being dealt with by
the CSCE Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh. We urge the parties involved to
take immediate steps in order to establish an effective ceasefire. We
strongly support UN and CSCE principles as well as all steps and decisions
taken by the CSCE in relation to the present conflict. We continue to believe
the proposed CSCE Conference in Minsk offers an immediate opportunity to
achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict and we support efforts to
convene the conference on the basis of the continuation of the work begun in
the framework of the Rome meeting.
We welcome the continuation of the democratization process in Georgia. We
are pleased that the ceasefire agreement between Georgians and Ossetians
in the area of conflict has held so far. We welcome the dispatch of the CSCE
mission to the area. We hope that it will play a constructive role in
promoting a political settlement. We hope that the Georgian-Russian-
Ossetian Peacekeeping Force will develop a relationship of cooperation,
consultation and trust with the mission. We remain deeply concerned about
the conflict in Abkhazia. We call on the parties involved to establish an
effective ceasefire and to work together with the CSCE and the UN
Secretary-General's representatives for a lasting peaceful solution.
We are pleased that the ceasefire in the Republic of Moldova is holding. We
urge further efforts towards an expeditious permanent solution to the
problem of the Left Bank Dniester Areas without further violence and
towards agreement on the status and the early, orderly and complete
withdrawal of foreign troops from the Republic of Moldova. We support
CSCE efforts to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the current situation.
We urgently call for a halt to the civil strife in Tajikistan. We welcome the
election of a new chairman of the national assembly and head of state of
Tajikistan. We hope that this transition will help end the fighting. The
restoration of peace will allow Tajikistan to focus on the challenges of
democratic development in the interest of its people.
11. Completion of the expeditious withdrawal of foreign troops from the
Baltic States under appropriate withdrawal agreements is important in
view of the overriding principle that military forces may be stationed on
the territory of a foreign state only with the consent of that state. The
continuation of the withdrawal process will be a major contribution to
stability in the Baltic region. We recognize that practical difficulties have
to be overcome but they should not be allowed to unduly delay the overall
process. We hope that international cooperation will help overcome those
difficulties. This withdrawal should not be--and is not--linked to other
issues. All parties must exercise flexibility and moderation in negotiations
to resolve remaining problems, including those of social and material
nature.
12. We have already achieved historic advances in arms control,
disarmament and confidence building. Full implementation of existing
agreements, further dialogue, transparency and confidence and security
building measures, as well as the enhancement of consultation and
cooperation are fundamental to increased security, taking into account new
political and military realities. To this end,
-- We welcome entry into force and successful completion of the baseline
validation period of the CFE Treaty, which has always received the support
of our Council. The High Level Working Group which our Council established
on 20 December 1991 has significantly contributed to this success. We are
committed to full implementation of all provisions of this vital Treaty,
including those on reductions, information exchange and verification.
-- We will work with all CSCE countries to make the Forum for Security
Cooperation a success, particularly in the areas of harmonization of
existing arms control commitments, transparency in defence planning, and
non-proliferation. We urge all CSCE participating states to take part in this
important forum.
-- We support development and definition of the concept of a code of
conduct in the security field and we welcome pioneering work undertaken in
this respect within the framework of the CSCE.
-- We urge those states concerned which have not yet ratified the START
Treaty, including the Lisbon Protocol, to do so speedily in order to permit
its prompt entry into force.
-- We are committed to preventing proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. We reiterate our support for the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and for its indefinite extension in 1995. We urge all
countries that have not yet done so to become parties to the NPT as non-
nuclear weapons states.
-- We welcome the successful achievement of a draft Chemical Weapons
Convention. We pledge to become original signatories and commit ourselves
to its early ratification. We urge other countries to do likewise.
-- We call on all countries, particularly those located in regions where the
risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increased
alarmingly, to take all appropriate steps to prevent the proliferation of such
weapons.
-- We are equally committed to responsibility and restraint with respect to
transfers of conventional weapons. We call on all countries to submit full
relevant data to the UN Register of Conventional Arms by April 1993.
-- Those of us who are signatories of the Treaty on Open Skies are
committed to early ratification and entry into force. Those of us who have
not yet signed the Treaty will consider the question of accession as soon as
possible. We look forward to wider adherence to the Treaty by interested
states which are participating in the CSCE but are not original signatories
to the Treaty as provided for by Article XVII of the Treaty and called for in
the CSCE Open Skies Declaration of 24 March 1992.
13. While we recognize the resource constraints faced by many of our
members, we nonetheless encourage the widest possible participation in
activities within the framework of our Council.
14. Having taken due notice of the statement by the Representative of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, we state our readiness to welcome the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as members of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council as of 1 January 1993.
15. Finland attended the meeting as an observer. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC)
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe
Subject: History, NATO, Security Assistance and Sales,
Arms Control, CSCE
[TEXT]
NACC Today
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) joins the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the newly free and independent states
of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union in a
program of political-security dialogue, partnership, and cooperation.
Subjects