US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: CSCE: A New Role for a New Era
Eagleburger
Source: Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Intervention before the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Council of Ministers, Stockholm,
Sweden
Date: Dec, 14 199212/14/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia-Montenegro
Subject: CSCE, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Madame Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, we meet today in Stockholm
already well across the threshold of a new, historical era. As yet, this new
era goes unnamed. We describe it, for the time being, as merely the
negation of what went before--the post-Cold War era. Ironically, we who
cannot know the name which history will give this era are the ones whose
actions will most determine what it shall be called. Indeed, we have it
within our power to decide whether historians will call this an age of
democracy or an age of disorder.
With the demise of communism, it is clear, at least, where mankind's
aspirations lie. They lie universally with freedom and, thus, with
democracy. But it is equally clear that the collapse of the static, Cold War
international system has unleashed a dynamic of change worldwide which,
unchecked, could overwhelm those aspirations and threaten instability for a
long time to come. The Iraqi conquest of Kuwait, starvation in Somalia, and
"ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans are all emblematic of the fact that we are
in a period of transition between an old order which is dead or dying and a
new [one] still struggling to be born.
Fortunately, the international community has demonstrated the resolve to
act on behalf of a more civilized world order when confronted, at least,
with the Kuwaiti and Somali emergencies. But the more important and,
indeed, more difficult challenge we have yet to face is the need to develop
new international structures to manage global change in this new era. This,
in short, is a time for institution-building, one not dissimilar to the period
immediately following World War II.
However, whereas post-war institutions were developed over years--
indeed, decades--the ongoing carnage in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates
that we do not have the luxury of time and that we may, in fact, be losing
the race against time with the forces of hatred and disintegration which
threaten the new, democratic order in Europe. Yugoslavia is a shocking
reminder that barbarity exists within our midst and that we cannot call the
new Europe either civilized or secure until we have developed stronger
mechanisms for dealing with this and similar crises.
If we are honest, however, we will go deeper and recognize the former
Yugoslavia as a mirror of our darker selves--a mirror of what we, too, could
become if we were to succumb to the ethnic hatred and intolerance for
diversity which we have also seen this year in Western Europe and North
America alike. Yugoslavia should make us realize that our hopes for living
in a more peaceful and civilized world are inextricably linked to the way we
each conduct ourselves at home.
It is precisely for this reason, in fact, that the CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe] is of such vital importance today. CSCE
reflects our faith that a truly democratic Europe will be a peaceful Europe--
that a Europe which overcomes its history of ethnic hatreds need not repeat
its endless history of internecine strife. CSCE embodies the revolutionary
concept that security in the future will be derived more from respect for
human rights and democratic principles than from the balance-of-power
mechanisms of the past.
However, CSCE must be more than simply the conscience of Europe if it is to
fulfill its ambitious purpose. Along with other pillars of Europe's political
and security architecture, CSCE must become more operationally effective
and solution oriented in the face of mounting instabilities.
In fact, our Helsinki meeting confirmed CSCE in this role and conferred upon
it a variety of tools to manage the kinds of destabilizing change with which
we are confronted. Unfortunately, as the deteriorating situation in
Yugoslavia demonstrates, these tools were not fully developed, nor have we
used them as well or as promptly as we might have done. Our goal today,
therefore, must be to focus CSCE on the root causes of instability in Europe
and to encourage the organization to adopt a more proactive approach to
problem solving. To be sure, there are also questions of structural reforms
and of resources which we must also address. But what will be required,
above all, is the political will and leadership on the part of all member
states to utilize CSCE mechanisms to their fullest potential.
Accordingly, I would submit the following as priority items for this
meeting's agenda.
First, we should build upon the Helsinki decisions and develop a CSCE
strategy which is proactive, not reactive--one which will detect early
warnings of instability and undertake preventive diplomacy. We must seek
early enough to prevent the outbreak of conflict or else find ourselves, as in
Yugoslavia, constantly reacting to new horrors.
The CSCE has learned that lesson and has deployed several monitoring
missions in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, including to Kosovo,
Vojvodina, Sandzak, Macedonia, and Georgia. We applaud the work of each of
these missions.
However, we will ultimately be judged by results, and I believe we have not
fully tapped CSCE's potential for preventive diplomacy in the crises at hand.
Especially in the Balkans, we must endorse stronger measures to start to
reverse an intolerable situation.
-- We must identify the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in ex-
Yugoslavia by name and ensure that they will be brought to justice in
person--exactly as were Hitler's associates at Nuremberg.
-- We must expand CSCE missions to assist with the enforcement of UN
sanctions and, thereby, increase the pressure on those who continue to
prosecute the war.
-- We must redouble our efforts to prevent the war from spilling over into
neighboring regions and countries--in particular, by committing, here and
now, to increase substantially the size of the mission in Kosovo. Let me
say, in this regard, that the United States, for its part, will contribute on an
urgent basis to this expanded mission.
-- Finally, in stating our support for safe areas in Bosnia for the hundreds
of thousands of victims of "ethnic cleansing," we must ensure that this
humanitarian effort not be misused to confirm the results of that odious
policy.
CSCE must also play a more effective role in addressing the actual and
potential ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union by monitoring respect
for human rights and minority rights throughout the CIS [Commonwealth of
Independent States] states and by accelerating conflict prevention missions
in such places as Georgia and Moldova. Full support of the Minsk Group [11
nations plus Azerbaijan and Armenia working under CSCE auspices to solve
the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh] by all CSCE states is imperative to securing
peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. Of course, the international community will
have to adapt its strategies for preventing, containing, and resolving such
conflicts to the specific conditions in each region. But all efforts should
occur within the framework of CSCE principles and CSCE political
engagement. Thus, we should be prepared to support responsible peace-
keeping efforts by Russia and other CIS states within this CSCE umbrella.
Second, we need to adjust CSCE organizationally to ensure an effective
response to the challenges of conflict prevention and crisis management.
As currently constituted, CSCE is barely able administratively to cope with
present challenges, let alone those which are looming. Needed are a chief
administrative officer for the diverse CSCE institutions, an intersessional
body to manage day-to-day operations between senior officials' meetings,
and greater administrative coherence and capabilities. I am certain that
these objectives can be reached without injury to CSCE's strengths--
creativity, flexibility, and political accountability. We must ensure that the
organization continues to remain free of the ills of bureaucracy.
Finally, we must be clear that neither the enhanced CSCE role nor the
institutional reforms I have outlined will make a difference unless the
members demonstrate a commitment backed with resources. The conflict
prevention missions and the more active kinds of political engagement I
have discussed will require more from all of us in terms of finance,
equipment, and personnel. Some--and I do not hesitate to include the United
States--have made a major commitment of resources thus far, but all of us
can do more. If CSCE is to fulfill its mission, our consensus of rights must
be supported by a consensus of responsibilities.
Let me conclude by reiterating my view that, as important as our efforts to
bolster this organization may be, it is ultimately up to the member states
themselves to do the hard work of defending the peace of our democratic
order. It is up to us individually to uphold the CSCE's standards of political
conduct within our own borders. And it is up to us collectively to support
the CSCE mechanisms for conflict prevention and crisis management which I
have discussed here today.
We cannot expect a deus ex machina to solve our problems. Neither the
United States nor the CSCE itself can fulfill that role--although I can
guarantee that the United States will work with its European partners to
make CSCE succeed. But what is required, most of all, is that we sustain
the vision, courage, and solidarity with which both the democratic nations
of the West and the peoples who aspired to freedom in the East overcame
the formidable dangers and challenges of the Cold War. If we have learned
anything in this century, it is that neither peace nor freedom can be
preserved without sacrifice. Only by summoning the will to defend, both
separately and collectively, our new Europe whole and free can we ensure
that democracy will prevail over disorder as the defining feature of the
post-Cold War era. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: CSCE: A New Role for a New Era
Boucher
Source: Released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman
Description: Text of a joint statement by the United States and the
Russian Federation at the CSCE Council of Ministers meeting,
Stockholm, Sweden
Date: Dec, 14 199212/14/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, North America, E/C Europe
Country: Russia, United States, Serbia-Montenegro,
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Subject: CSCE, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Russia and the United States share a long friendship with Serbia, and both
countries deeply regret that the policies of the current government of
Serbia have resulted in the estrangement of Serbia from Russia and the
United States, as well as from the rest of the world. In this connection,
Russia and the United States are awaiting with great interest the outcome
of the Serbian elections of December 20, 1992. Both countries hope that the
people of Serbia will be given a free and fair opportunity that day to embark
upon a new course which can open the way to the restoration of the close
relations they previously enjoyed with that country.
Russia and the United States hope that the people of Serbia will weigh the
alternatives carefully. The choice is of returning to the community of
nations or remaining in a pariah status, politically isolated and
economically devastated because of the policies of the present regime. If
the correct choice is made, Russia and the United States pledge to work
with the Government of Serbia to restore its position in the world. If such a
choice is followed by the fundamental change of policies for which Russia
and the United States devoutly hope, the eventual relaxation and removal of
the sanctions would be possible. Then Serbia, together with Montenegro,
would be welcomed as a member of the UN [United Nations], CSCE
[Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], and other institutions.
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Euripe (CSCE)
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia, North America, E/C Europe, Europe
Subject: CSCE, Security Assistance and Sales, History
[TEXT]
From Vancouver to Vladivostok, the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) offers a new kind of diplomacy, based on respect for human
rights, among 51 Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries (Yugoslavia has
been suspended).
CSCE furthers European security through a wide variety of policies,
commitments, and, more recently, operational tools. It adopts a broad
concept of security, ranging from human rights through economic
cooperation to arms control and commits to the inviolability of frontiers.
The CSCE also fosters cooperation through programs centered on economics,
conflict prevention, military security, culture, and the media. It is
committed to developing democratic institutions at the grassroots level,
through local officials and activities, and through non-governmental
organizations.
Evolution of the CSCE
The CSCE began during the Cold War as a way to promote dialogue and
decrease tensions between East and West. In August 1975, 35 nations
signed the Helsinki Final Act, a politically binding declaratory
understanding of the democratic principles governing relations among
nations. The act contained a provision to continue regular discussions on a
broad range of concerns--from migrations and military security to the
environment and media relations--in what became known as the "Helsinki
Process."
During the 1980s, follow-on meetings in Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna
reviewed implementation of CSCE agreements and continued the opportunity
for discussion. Although the CSCE had no permanent headquarters and no
enforcement capability, important commitments were made to defend human
rights and to increase confidence through the advance notification of
military activities and the exchange of military information.
As it evolved, the CSCE began to explore ways to act on its rigorous
principles and to ensure that they were upheld. To do this, the CSCE
established a secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna,
and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, in
1990.
During 1992, the decision to move from principle to action was most marked
in the Helsinki decisions which established a number of practical tools that
help the CSCE work together with NATO, the European Community (EC), and
other international bodies to defend human rights and manage the
unprecedented changes now taking place in Europe. In particular, it sets out
an ambitious role for the CSCE in crisis management and "preventive
diplomacy."
The CSCE has brokered significant arms control agreements. The Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in November 1990, limits non-
nuclear ground and air forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. A separate
political agreement, concluded in July 1992, covers personnel in the same
region. Through continued negotiations, confidence-building measures have
been extended, and higher expectations for treaty compliance and
verification have been set. A new security negotiation, the Forum for
Security Cooperation, opened in Vienna on September 22, 1992.
CSCE and European Conflicts
The civil war in the former Yugoslavia has been an early test of the CSCE's
ability to take an active part in conflict prevention. On August 6, 1992,
President Bush called on the CSCE to help monitor the human rights
situation in the Balkans. He also asked that the CSCE work to inhibit the
spread of the conflict.
It quickly sent fact-finding and rapporteur missions to the region and
supported the sanctions and humanitarian measures taken by the United
Nations and the EC. The CSCE then established new "missions of long
duration" to provide an early warning system for any spillover of the
hostilities into the neighboring regions of Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak, and
Macedonia, and they also sent a signal that the international community will
not allow borders to be violated. These missions aim to dispel mistrust
between parties by promoting dialogue and providing information to promote
transparency between the conflicting parties.
In August 1992, the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia asked the
CSCE to assist in monitoring sanctions fulfillment. There are now missions
in Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania, and future operations are
planned in Croatia and Albania.
CSCE is in the forefront of conflict resolution in other parts of the region as
well.
-- Under CSCE auspices, the Minsk Group--11 nations plus Azerbaijan and
Armenia--is the focus of international efforts to solve the crisis in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
-- CSCE representatives currently are assessing the situation in the
Ossetia region of Georgia.
-- Rapporteur missions have been sent to the new Central Asian republics
to assess the governmental and human rights situations.
-- CSCE representatives will soon be sent to Estonia and Moldova to look
into ethnic conflicts in these states.
As an original participant in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the United States has been central in the promotion of
uncompromising humanitarian standards and their practical implementation.
From the beginning, CSCE has embodied America's hopes for a unified,
democratic, and prosperous Europe. Americans continually have worked to
ensure that the CSCE process remains flexible, innovative, and
unbureaucratic. The United States established the first permanent
delegation to the CSCE in Vienna in August 1992, charting a course for other
nations to follow.
CSCE and Participating States
Albania
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belgium
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Belarus
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
The Holy See
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Moldova
Monaco
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
San Marino
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia*
*Suspended (###)
Scheduled CSCE Meetings 1992-93
1992
Nov. 16-20: Seminar on Tolerance (Warsaw)
Nov. 19: CPC Consultative Committee (Vienna)
Nov. 23-25: Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) Working Group in
preparation for Stockholm Conference (Prague)
Dec. 11-13: Committee of Senior Officials (Stockholm)
Dec. 14-15: Council of Ministers (Stockholm)
1993
March 16-18: Economic Forum (Prague)
March 29-April 2: Migration Seminar (Warsaw)
April or May (3 days to be determined): CSBM [Confidence and Security
Building Measures] Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting [AIAM]
(Vienna)
May 17-21: Mediterranean Seminar (Valletta)
May (1 week): Seminar on Resolved Problems of National Minorities
(Warsaw or Croatia)
Sept. 28-Oct. 1: Seminar on Sustainable Development of Boreal and
Temperate Forests, followed by 1 week of fieldwork (Montreal)
Sept.-Oct. (3 weeks): Human Dimension Implementation Review Meeting
(Warsaw)
Fall (to be determined): Seminar on the Free Media (Warsaw)
Late 1993 (to be determined): Council of Ministers (Rome) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Fourth Report on War Crimes In the Former
Yugoslavia
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Description: Text of the Supplemental United States Submission of
Information to the UN Security Council in Accordance with
Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of
Resolution 780 (1992)
Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92
Category: Reports
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues,
United Nations
[TEXT]
[Following is the text of the Supplemental United States Submission of
Information to the UN Security Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of
Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992), released
on December 7, 1992. For the text of the first three reports, see Dispatch
Vol. 3 No. 39, p. 732, Vol. 3, No. 44, p. 802, and Vol. 3, No. 46, p. 825.
For the text of Resolution 771, see Dispatch Supplement, Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 44.
For text of Resolution 780, see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769.
Editor's Note: The following contains graphic descriptions.]
This is the fourth submission by the United States Government of
information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771
(1992) relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. As in our three previous reports, we have focused on
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with
Resolution 771, have provided information that is "substantiated," that is,
which rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or that
includes detail sufficient for corroboration. For the moment, we have also
tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other countries and
non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit reports
pursuant to Resolutions 771 and 780. The information provided is intended
to be useful to the commission of experts established pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780. The United States has further substantiating
information concerning the incidents included in this report, which we will
make available directly to the commission of experts on a confidential
basis.
In accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 780, the United States intends
to continue providing reports as additional relevant information comes into
our possession.
The United States is pleased that the commission of experts established
pursuant to resolution 780 has begun its work. We particularly welcome its
steps with regard to investigations of sites in the former Yugoslavia that
may contain important information about violations of humanitarian law.
We stand ready to assist the commission in its important work of
investigating war crimes allegations with the aim of preparing cases
suitable for prosecution and, by doing so, of establishing the record of
humanitarian offenses in the former Yugoslavia.
As in our previous reports, the notations at the end of each of the items
indicate the source from which the information was drawn. Unless
otherwise indicated, the reports refer to incidents occurring in 1992.
Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
Fourth Submission
Willful Killing
25 Sept: A 48-year-old Bosnian Muslim was picked up from the street in his
home town of Bjelina on September 25 or 26 and brought to a detention
camp at Klis, near Batkovic. The facility at Klis, formerly used for storing
agricultural produce, was guarded by men in solid green uniforms.
The witness described how three "rich men" were singled out for special
abuse; they were beaten with fists, rifle butts, and kicking: a neighbor who
traded in gold and jewelry; a coffee trader; and another with whom the
witness was not acquainted.
During the witness's second night in the camp, he saw the coffee trader and
several others taken at different times from their building to an adjacent
facility. There was lots of screaming during their absences. The others
returned eventually but the coffee trader never did. The witness learned
later that the coffee trader's corpse had been turned over to his family
sometime after that.
The gold trader suffered a similar fate on the witness's fifth night at the
Klis facility; he died from his wounds. The other "wealthy" man who was
beaten frequently along with first two victims never returned after being
summoned to a nearby building one evening. The witness said an old
cleaning man had told him that the third man also died from the beatings.
(Department of State)
25 Jul: A 14-year-old boy from the village of Zecovi, near Prijedor,
witnessed the murder of 33 people on July 25.
The boy said that on July 19 or 20 a number of Serbs in uniform, none of
whom he recognized, came to a small enclave of Muslim households near the
outskirts of Zecovi. At gunpoint, the Serbs forced people out of their homes
and incarcerated them in the cellar of one of the houses. After being held
for more than 2 days, those detained were released without explanation and
allowed to go back to their homes.
A few days later, on July 25, another group of Serbs appeared, also
uniformed. They ordered people out of their homes, but in the confusion, the
boy was able to hide behind a board leaning against the house and his
absence was not noticed. The boy witnessed these men line up 33 people and
shoot them summarily with semiautomatic rifles; they then used pistols to
finish off anyone who was still moving. (Department of State)
Asked if he had recognized any of this group, the witness said "they were
our neighbors" from the village. He was able to identify 29 victims by name
as well as five of those who took active part in the shooting.
21 Jul-4 Aug: A 36-year-old Bosnian Muslim was in his village of
Ribvanovici, near Prijedor, when the Serbian army surrounded all the
villages in the area on July 21, and took all of the adult males prisoner--an
incident reported in an earlier submission.
The Serbian soldiers beat the prisoners with their rifles. One man began to
cry, so the soldiers shot him. Half the men, including this witness, were
bussed to Keraterm camp in Prijedor, then to Omarska, and finally Trnopolje.
The witness does not know what happened to those left behind.
After a day at Trnopolje, the witness was taken back to Omarska camp and
put into the "white house," where he was kept [for] about 15 days. He was
locked in a room with dozens of men, many of whom he recognized from his
village. He said that every day prisoners were taken into one of five
interrogation rooms and beaten with iron bars and wooden sticks.
His sister's husband was beaten to death in this manner. He had been beaten
so badly one night that part of his forehead was missing, apparently taken
off by an iron bar. He died soon thereafter.
The witness once watched through the window as guards took prisoners out
of the "white house," told them to run, and then shot them in the back as
they fled. He heard what he believed were many other executions, but said
they were done behind the building where they could not be seen, or in a red
building nearby.
Each night, guards would choose two prisoners to bury the dead. This
witness was forced to help one night and saw 11 corpses. He said the
guards had them stack the bodies crosswise in a pit. Sometime around
August 4, he was transferred from Omarska. (Department of State)
20 Jul: A 52-year-old man was bussed to the Keraterm camp on July 20
with hundreds of others from Hambarine, near Prijedor. He was crammed
along with several hundred other men into the third of four halls that
formed a row on the former factory premises. From the start of his
internment, he saw Muslim men regularly beaten with iron bars and rifle
butts.
Every night until he was released on August 5, men were taken outside hall
number three and shot. A friend, Mustafa Ramolic, was hauled outside a few
days after the witness's arrival and beaten by Serb guards. His friend
collapsed, coughing blood until he died later that evening.
The witness observed a mass execution on July 24. It had been an extremely
hot day. The doors and windows were closed and the men were screaming for
water. What they finally received was contaminated so badly that it caused
about 20 men to collapse or faint. The witness and other detainees were
convinced that the water had been poisoned.
Perhaps in response to the tumult, about 15 Serb guards came in about 10
pm and began beating the prisoners with their rifle butts until they fell. As
the situation deteriorated, the guards occasionally fired their rifles into
the crowd of prisoners who gradually pulled back toward the large garage
door at one end of the hall.
When they reached the door, the guards began shooting their rifles and
machine guns into the crowd of inmates. The witness positioned himself
behind the door and feigned death. The entire incident, from the opening of
the doors until the shooting stopped, took about one half hour.
At dawn the following day, "volunteers" were chosen to load 130 bodies on
trucks; his brother was among the dead. The witness saw approximately 40
wounded, who had waited for what they were told would be another truck to
take them to a hospital, eventually loaded with the corpses and taken away.
A second massacre took place at about 6 am on July 26. Six soldiers entered
the hall and ordered about 50 prisoners outside. As the last of the prisoners
stepped outside, the six Serbian guards began firing their automatic
weapons. When all 50 had fallen, the guards went around shooting those who
were still groaning. The witness recognized those who took part in this
second mass execution.
Following this second massacre, 10 "volunteers" were again selected to load
the corpses. They had to ride in the same truck that took the bodies away.
The 10 "volunteers" never came back.
That same day, inmates were evacuated from all the halls. About one dozen
from each were tasked with cleaning and hosing down the halls. The rumor
was that the camp had received a new commander, and that some
international commission was expected to inspect the facilities. The
"commission" came on August 5, when busses took the witness and other
inmates to Trnopolje. (Department of State)
9 Jul: A 35-year-old Muslim woman from Trnopolje described her husband's
murder. On July 9, her husband was taken to a detention camp at the nearby
school, but was quickly released because the Serbs running the camp
recognized him as a famous "Yugoslav" athlete who had won the 1981
European body-building championship in London.
Soon after his return, upon hearing of Serbian evictions of Muslim residents
of the area, the family left their home. When the witness ran back to get
something she had forgotten, four soldiers standing at the nearby corner
stopped her husband and ordered his two children to keep going. The
children were further down the street when their mother--the witness--
caught up with her husband and the four soldiers. One of them, once
considered to be a friend of her husband, spoke to them briefly.
The soldiers then ordered her to move on, saying her husband had to stay
there. She tried to give him the key to their home, but he, too, told her to
move on and catch up with the children. She did so, and was about 20
meters away when shots rang out behind her. The children were about to
turn a corner at the end of the street when the shots were fired. All of
them, crying, tried to go back, but were blocked by other soldiers.
Two days later when the witness was allowed to return to her home for
food, she saw her husband's corpse, which apparently had not been moved
from the spot where he had been summarily executed 2 days earlier.
(Department of State)
11 June-10 Oct: A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Kotor Varos was
arrested as a civilian and interned in several locations in Kotor Varos from
June 11 until October 10. He described how he had been viciously and
sadistically beaten several times, had witnessed forced sex acts among
male prisoners, and had been forced at gunpoint to participate in the gang
rape/killing of a Muslim woman.
On one day, the witness and 11 other prisoners were forced to participate in
the rape of a Muslim policeman's wife. He exclaimed "They did everything.
You can't imagine or believe what they did. They are animals!" He said that
the woman died from her injuries 1 week later.
During the first 8 days of his internment, a Serbian TV news crew from
Banja Luka arrived and accused him of beating women and killing fetuses
during his tenure as a soldier for the Croatian forces. He was required to
read such a statement admitting to these acts because a Serbian army
captain threatened to kill his parents and family members if he did not.
The witness was later transferred to a room in the back of the Osnovni Sud
or town courthouse, where he said that three men died in his arms from the
beatings and injuries they endured: Enver Beharic, Mato Vatelj, and Smajo
Celinac. He named these men, and claimed that their bodies were mutilated
after their deaths. All three men were killed between August 13 and 15.
The witness stated further that the number of people killed in Kotor Varos
was almost unimaginable. On June 11 alone, 300-400 corpses lay in the
street. He and several other prisoners had to put the corpses into black
nylon body bags. The bags were then carried by a bulldozer to a nearby mass
grave, and he described the location in detail. He said that he personally put
over 70 bodies into bags that day and estimated that a minimum of 1,000
people were buried in this grave. (Department of State)
June-Jul: A 21-year-old Serbian fighter described his own shooting of 10
members of a Muslim family in late June in Ahatovici:
It was taken for granted among us that they should be killed. So when
somebody said 'Shoot,' I swung around and pulled the trigger, three times, on
automatic fire. I remember the little girl with the red dress hiding behind
her granny.
The Serbian fighter recounted another incident in which he used a 6-inch
hunting knife to cut the throats of three captured Muslims.
He claimed to have made visits every 3 or 4 days to a motel and restaurant
complex outside Vogosca--located 7 miles north of Sarajevo--known as the
Sonja Cafe, which had been converted into a prison for Muslim women. He
identified the "prison commander," who he said had established a "system"
for the Serbian fighters to rape and kill the women interned there. He and
his companions were encouraged to go to the Sonja Cafe by military
commanders because raping Muslim women was "good for raising the
fighters' morale." They were further told by the prison commander:
You can do with the women what you like. You can take them away from
here--we don't have enough food for them anyway--and don't bring them
back.
This fighter claimed to have raped and murdered eight women from the
motel prison complex.
He also said he had seen 30 men from Donja Bioca being shot and loaded--
some alive--into a furnace at a steel plant at Ilijas, a town north of
Vogosca in July. (The New York Times)
Late June: A 27-year-old Bosnian Muslim watched Serbian Chetniks conduct
mass executions on a bridge at Brod, 4 kilometers south of Foca, on three
consecutive evenings toward the end of June. He witnessed the executions
from a hiding place in the attic of a Serbian friend's home.
At about 6 pm of the first day, this witness saw Serb soldiers march small
groups of Muslim men onto the bridge in Brod. In the middle of the bridge,
which was about 100 meters long, the Chetniks interrogated the Muslims for
about 2 hours. Among the 20 to 30 Muslim men, the witness could recognize
from his hiding place four friends: Ramo Kadric, Saban Kurtovic, Nusret
Cengic, and Ibro Colakovic.
Just as it was getting dark, the haranguing stopped and the shooting started.
About eight of the 30 to 40 soldiers fired their automatic weapons at their
tied-up Muslim captives. The witness was able to identify the man in
charge of the Serbs on the bridge.
When there were no signs of life among the Muslims, the Serbs dumped their
bodies over the meter-high wall of the bridge into the Drina River, about 20
meters below.
The following evening, the Chetnik band led another column of Muslim
prisoners to the bridge from the other direction. This group was from the
witness's hamlet of Trnovac, and involved 50 to 60 captives. They were
killed in the same fashion. Among the victims he recognized were: Esad
Beckovic, Esad Dzin, Nedzao Dzin, Dzevad Beckovic, Zvijerac Beckovic,
Hamdija Beckovic, and Serif Beckovic.
The next massacre on the bridge occurred close to midnight of the third
evening. The victims were brought to the bridge by bus and truck from the
town of Miljevina, about 8 kilometers northwest of Brod, also on the
opposite side of the river. The entire operation was carried out more
quickly; this time there were about 50 men murdered.
The wives and children of the victims were kept for several days in an area
school, during which time they had to sign over the ownership papers to
their homes. (Department of State)
31 May-Jul: A 43-year-old Muslim from Hambarine was picked up on May 31
in Prijedor by Serb militiamen and herded along with other Muslims into one
of the buses and trucks waiting to take them to Keraterm. He claims the
more educated Muslims were taken to Omarska. The witness saw four of the
Muslim captives randomly shot to death as the loading process took place.
He knew two of the victims, brothers Suelgo and Ismo Dzafic.
The Keraterm facility was divided into four subdivisions or halls. The
witness was in hall number one. On July 22 or 24, a hall at the opposite end
of the facility was packed with prisoners from an area where heavy fighting
had taken place, and where the Serbs reportedly had sustained heavy
casualties.
The Serbs machine-gunned to death about 200 of the newly arrived prisoners
in that hall. The witness said many of the inmates could see the massacre
in the adjacent hall number three, so word of what was taking place spread
almost instantly. He and all the occupants could hear the firing and
screaming, which lasted for about 15 to 20 minutes.
The following morning he also observed trucks loaded with corpses driving
from hall number four past the window of hall number one where he was
detained. About five men were taken from his hall to help load the corpses.
Another man with a badly infected arm was put on a truck full of corpses
along with about 20 other injured men. The witness never saw this man
again and believes he was killed. (Department of State)
25 May: A 30-year-old Muslim was in Kozarac when the Serbs began a
massive artillery bombardment in the mid-afternoon of May 25. As he and a
crowd that he estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 headed for the shelter of the
nearby forest, the Serbs directed their fire at fleeing civilians. Five or six
women running near the witness were killed by a shell just before they
reached the tree line. (Department of State)
18 May: A 33-year-old Muslim from Grbavci--2 kilometers from Zvornik--
described a mass killing on the morning of May 18. As Serb militiamen
surrounded the village and started shooting, he and several family members
fled.
Residents of nearby houses were doing the same. Inside the village, the
Serb militia occupiers, using megaphones, ordered residents to go back to
their homes and put white sheets in their windows. Many of the neighbors
obeyed, but this witness and his family decided to wait in their hiding place
inside the tree line to assess the situation further.
As his neighbors returned to the housing area, hands over their heads, the
Serb militiamen separated men from women and children. The witness
watched from about 200 meters as the men were lined up. Shortly after
noon, one of the Serbs shouted an order to "kill the Ustasha." On this
command, about 10 of the militiamen began emptying their automatic
weapons into the line of Muslim men and continued shooting until they were
all dead. When the shooting stopped, the executioners and other Serb
militia, many of whom had been standing around watching, started
plundering houses in the village and stealing livestock.
The witness, his family, and other neighbors returned from their hiding
place 3 days later. He participated along with other neighbors in the burial
of 56 victims. They were buried about 20 meters from the edge of the
existing cemetery, between two rows of houses, near the spot where they
were shot. (Department of State)
9 May: A 41-year-old Bosnian Muslim woman witnessed the execution of a
Serbian civilian by Serbian soldiers in Sarajevo.
At about 7 am on May 9 or 10, military units wearing the insignias of
Serbian Chetniks and the Yugoslav army entered the area (near Sarajevo
airport) and ordered all its residents out of the cellars in which they had
taken refuge. Once outside, Serbs were told to stand in one place and
Muslims in another.
One Serb, a 50-year-old man known as "Ljubo," refused to be separated from
his Muslim neighbors, with whom he apparently had lived peacefully for
many years. His refusal to be separated from his neighbors enraged the
Serbian soldiers. They dragged him to the ground, and five or six of them
beat him until he was dead.
The witness and a group of about 40 other Muslims from the area were then
used as human shields and marched through a heavily contested combat zone
to waiting Serb vehicles some 300 meters away. From there, they were
driven to Trapare, a camp or assembly area some 3 kilometers away.
After their arrival at Trapare, a young girl--about 12 years old--was taken
from her father. About six men took the girl behind a nearby bunker. The
witness said she then could hear the most terrible screaming and crying she
had ever heard. After the father collapsed, he was dragged at knife point to
the bunker and forced to watch as the soldiers repeatedly raped his
daughter, an ordeal which lasted about an hour. Neither the father nor his
daughter was returned to the others afterward. The witness believes both
were killed. (Department of State)
5 May: In an October letter to President Bush, a Muslim refugee from Brcko
described in detail his internment in Brcko camp in northern Bosnia. Below
is an informal translation of segments of the letter pertaining to Brcko:
On May 5 a representative of the Yugo army in a radio broadcast instructed
the citizens in my part of the town to go to the army barracks, from where
the Yugo army would organize an evacuation to a safer place.
Upon our arrival at the barracks, we realized we were all in a trap because
there, together with the regular army, were Chetniks and other Serbian
refuse. They offered to give us rifles if we would fight against our own
people for the Serbian cause. The Muslims and Croats silently refused. Our
wives and children were put on a bus and were taken to an unknown
destination.
At gunpoint, we were also put on a bus. We were taken to one of Brcko's
places of execution, a physical education hall in the center of the town. We
noticed, from the puddles of blood on the floor, that the executions had
already begun. For the couple hundred of us who were locked up, the long
hours of torture began.
. . . they took four of us out for execution. They put one of us against the
wall and. . . shot him in the back with a machine gun. Looking at the holes in
his back. . . I lost consciousness, and my body crumbled onto pieces of glass.
My fainting awakened a bit of humanity in the Serbs' leader. He ordered
them to bring me back to the hall, where I could rest a little. One of the
Serbs took satisfaction in removing my glasses and breaking them.
The other three men were killed in the most cruel manner. First they were
beaten in another room and left to recover a little. They were taken to a
courtyard where we heard the worst sounds that a human throat can produce.
We heard the dull slashes of knives cutting into human flesh. The three men
were held by their legs and beaten while against the wall of the building
where we were imprisoned. With about 20 more shots, the Serbs assured
the three men's death.
All that I have written here can be confirmed by three other witnesses who
also managed to escape from that hell. I think we were lucky that we went
through all this in the first days of the Serbian occupation, while the
Serbian killing machinery was not so well developed yet. (Department of
State)
Torture of Prisoners
Aug-Sep: A US surgeon from California spent 2 weeks in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (including time at Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo) in late August
and early September performing remedial urological surgery.
The doctor reportedly found that Muslim and Mujahedin irregular troops--
some from Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia--had routinely performed crude,
disfiguring, non-medical circumcisions on Bosnian Serb soldiers, and he
treated one 18-year-old Bosnian Serb soldier who was so brutally
circumcised that eventually the entire organ required amputation.
(Department of State/news service)
Jul-Aug: A Croatian woman, married to a Serb, was interned for 40 days at
the Bosnian Government-run detention center at the former Yugoslav
National army (JNA) Viktor Bubanj Barracks in Sarajevo. During her
confinement, guards--whom she identified as Muslims--routinely beat the
more than 300 prisoners, including 30 women.
She saw one woman covered with bruises from head to toe after being so
abused. She herself was beaten several times. Another woman cut by glass
during a mortar attack was left overnight to bleed, as the guards taunted
her that "It is your people who are killing you, not us." This witness was
released in late August. (Department of State)
11 Jun-10 Oct: A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim agricultural technician from
Kotor Varos was arrested as a civilian and interned in several locations in
Kotor Varos.
Twelve Serbian soldiers, wearing uniforms bearing white eagles, on June 11
arrested the witness in his house and beat him in his yard before escorting
him to the Koza Proletaria Fur Factory, were he was interrogated and beaten
further.
At the fur factory, a guard put a rifle in the witness' mouth and lifted him
off the floor. Another guard pulled out two of his upper teeth with pliers.
He said he and 100 other men were beaten for eight days and forced to
perform sexual acts on each other.
He was later transferred to a room in the back of the Osnovni Sud, or town
courthouse, where he was held for 31/2 months. He said that 170 men were
held there under extremely oppressive conditions.
His room measured only about 2.5 by 3.5 meters, yet sometimes as many as
70 men were crammed into it. Serbian guards played loud music as they
beat prisoners in the adjoining rooms and in the yard. The room was filthy.
They ate spoiled, moldy food and had no access to toilet facilities. Ten to
15 men had diarrhea at any one time. The prisoners' skin turned yellow from
jaundice. He spent over 3 months in such conditions without ever taking a
bath or washing his clothes.
On October 10, the witness and two other Muslims were exchanged for one
Serb. Three Serbian guards, whom he recognized, brought him to the
courthouse yard where they beat him viciously, then tied his arms and legs
together like a sheep and forced him to "baah." Later they tied him to a land
rover Jeep and drove to the hospital, with the witness running behind the
car. Upon arrival, they forced him to crawl, baah, and eat grass, and then
they told him to throw up the grass because it was Serbian grass.
One guard brought some very acidic gun-cleaning oil and made the witness
drink half a liter of it. He began to have stomach convulsions immediately.
A second pulled up his sleeve and extinguished eight cigarettes on his arm.
Soon afterward he was released to Muslim forces in the village of Vecici.
(Department of State)
May-Nov: A woman from Zrenjanin, a town in southern Vojvodina, reported
that her husband, a Muslim, was detained by police on May 10 and remains to
this day with about 200 other Muslims, most from Bosanski Samac or its
immediate environs, in two large warehouses adjacent to the central police
station in Bosanski Samac, a town on the Croatian/Bosnian border in Bosnia.
On several occasions when this woman was able to visit the detention
facility, she talked with her husband and helped treat prisoners who had
been beaten brutally. The prisoners she treated had been beaten on the head,
arms, and torso. Many had had their arms broken.
Her husband said that he had been beaten severely during the first several
days of his incarceration, and that he had never been told why he was being
held. Other members of her husband's family--including his mother, his
sister, and his sister's children--were also detainees in Bosanski Samac.
Her husband claimed that the conditions were very bad in the facility and
that the prisoners were given only one meal a day, which often consisted of
only bread. (Department of State)
Deliberate Attacks on Non-Combatants
18 Nov: Bosnian Serbs on November 18 shelled the main north-south
highway near the city of Mostar, which forced a UN food convoy and its
escort of Spanish UN peace-keeping troops to abandon an attempt to bring
food and housing materials to Sarajevo. (The Washington Post)
6 Nov: Serbian artillery stationed in northeastern Bosnia fired 100 shells
into Croatia at Zupanja and surrounding villages, causing the death of two
persons, including a 2-year- old child, and injuring another child. Heavy
damage to houses was also reported. (Department of State)
7-8 Nov: Bosnian Serbs on November 8 halted relief convoys along the
Mostar road. An UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] (UK)-escorted convoy was
stopped by Croatian Defense Council (HVO) forces 10 kilometers north of
Mostar. (Department of State)
Bosnian Serbs on November 7 fired up to 200 rounds of machine gun, mortar,
and automatic rifle fire at a British convoy that was trying to find routes
for United Nations aid convoys near Tuzla, hitting a British Land Rover.
"This is the first time we have come under direct fire, and the first time we
have returned fire," according to a UK Ministry of Defense spokesman.
(London Press Association)
Wanton Devastation and Destruction of Property
25 May: A 43-year-old Muslim from Hambarine watched from a nearby hill
as Serbian artillery demolished the neighboring village of Kozarac on May
25. The artillery unit was part of the so-called Serbian "White Eagles"
militia organization, whose commander and tank unit leader he identified.
(Department of State)
17 May: Kozarac, in Bosnian Krajina, was flattened in May by Serbian forces.
(New York Newsday)
Apr-Oct: From the beginning of the war in April, Serbian Democratic party
(SDS) paramilitaries in the hills around Sarajevo have bombarded the city,
which has little in it that could be called a military target. The assault on
the city has damaged or destroyed hospitals, schools, residential buildings,
mosques, churches, and all kinds of other civilian facilities. (Department of
State)
Fall 1991: Serbian forces in the fall of 1991 left Vukovar and several
surrounding towns, in the Sector East United Nations Protected Area (UNPA)
of Croatia, looking like Berlin--circa 1945. Nearly every residential,
commercial, cultural, and religious structure was gutted or damaged
severely. Grain elevators, cranes in the port along the river, factories, and
high-rise apartment buildings were rendered virtually useless and
uninhabitable. (Department of State)
Other, Including Mass Forcible Expulsion and Deportation of
Civilians
Nov: Serb military authorities began in early November 1992 forcibly to
mobilize ethnic Croats and Muslims in the Banja Luka area and have taken 50
to 200 such conscripts from the suburbs of Gornji Seher and Debeljaci
because, according to a Serb official, "There are too many Muslims here."
(Department of State)
26 May: A 35-year-old Muslim woman, a resident of Trnopolje long before it
gained notoriety as the site of a brutal internment camp, was present on
May 26 when trucks and tractors hauled in thousands of children and elderly
Muslims from the nearby town of Kozarac, fol-lowing its destruction by
Serbian artillery. The newly arrived refugees were settled on the grounds
of the local elementary school.
The Muslim woman and other town residents were permitted to pass food to
them through fences that were being erected around the facility. During the
first 5 days, it was the only food the new arrivals received. Additionally,
all the homes in the area were forced to take in large number of Kozarac
residents. Her family took in 38 of those refugees.
Many of the refugees, including those in her home, were eventually
transported in railroad freight cars--about a hundred to a car--to facilities
further away. On July 8, soldiers came to the house and said the entire
village was being "ethnically cleansed." She and her family were forced
from her home. Three days later, she and her children were herded with
others into a railroad car and forced out near Muslim-controlled territory,
whence they made their way to refuge abroad. (Department of State) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: The Need To Respond to War Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia
Eagleburger
Source: Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Statement at the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia, Geneva, Switzerland
Date: Dec, 16 199212/16/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
Just under 4 months ago, an important milestone was reached with the
convening of the London International Conference on the former Yugoslavia.
Commitments were made both by the parties to the Yugoslav conflict and by
the international community itself--commitments to ensure unimpeded
delivery of humanitarian aid; to lift the barbaric siege of cities; to halt all
military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina; to group all heavy weapons under
UN monitoring; to open up and shut down all detention camps; to tighten
sanctions against the aggressor; and to prevent the conflict's spread to
neighboring regions and countries.
Some of those commitments have been kept, particularly in the area of
sanctions monitoring, and in efforts to prevent a further widening of the
war. Most importantly, London established a negotiating mechanism
centered here in Geneva, which has brought the international community and
the various ex-Yugoslav parties together on an ongoing basis, and which,
thanks to the efforts of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, remains a viable forum
for an eventual settlement of the war.
But let us be clear: We find ourselves today in Geneva because most of the
commitments made in London have not been kept, and because the situation
inside the former Yugoslavia has become increasingly desperate. Thus, we
meet to discuss how the international community will respond in order to
force compliance with the London agreements, and thereby accelerate an end
to the war.
It is clear in reviewing the record since London that the promises broken
have been largely Serbian promises broken. It is the Serbs who continue to
besiege the cities of Bosnia; Serb heavy weapons which continue to pound
the civilian populations in those cities; the Bosnian Serb air forces which
continue to fly in defiance of the London agreements; and Serbs who impede
the delivery of humanitarian assistance and continue the odious practice of
"ethnic cleansing." It is now clear, in short, that Mr. Milosevic and Mr.
Karadzic have systematically flouted agreements to which they had
solemnly, and yet cynically, given their assent. Today we must, at a
minimum, commit ourselves anew to the London agreements by:
-- Redoubling our assistance efforts and continuing to press for the opening
of routes for aid convoys, so that wide- spread starvation can be avoided
this winter;
-- Strengthening our efforts to prevent the war's spillover, particularly in
the Kosovo, which we will not tolerate; and
-- Tightening and better enforcing sanctions, the surest means of forcing
an early end to the war.
But we must also do more. It is clear that the international community
must begin now to think about moving beyond the London agreements and
contemplate more aggressive measures. That, for example, is why my
government is now recommending that the UN Security Council authorize
enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia, and why we are also willing to
have the Council re-examine the arms embargo as it applies to the
Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, my government also believes it
is time for the international community to begin identifying individuals who
may have to answer for having committed crimes against humanity. We
have, on the one hand, a moral and historical obligation not to stand back a
second time in this century while a people faces obliteration. But we have
also, I believe, a political obligation to the people of Serbia to signal
clearly the risk they currently run of sharing the inevitable fate of those
who practice ethnic cleansing in their name.
The fact of the matter is that we know that crimes against humanity have
occurred, and we know when and where they occurred. We know, moreover,
which forces committed those crimes, and under whose command they
operated. And we know, finally, who the political leaders are to whom those
military commanders were--and still are--responsible.
Let me begin with the crimes themselves, the facts of which are
indisputable:
-- The siege of Sarajevo, ongoing since April, with scores of innocent
civilians killed nearly every day by artillery shelling;
-- The continuing blockade of humanitarian assistance, which is producing
thousands upon thousands of unseen innocent victims;
-- The destruction of Vukovar in the fall of 1991, and the forced expulsion
of the majority of its population;
-- The terrorizing of Banja Luka's 30,000 Muslims, which has included
bombings, beatings, and killings;
-- The forcible imprisonment, inhumane mistreatment, and willful killing
of civilians at detention camps, including Banja Luka/Manjaca, Brcko/Luka,
Krajina/Prnjavor, Omarska, Prijedor/Keraterm, and Trnopolje/Kozarac;
-- The August 21 massacre of more than 200 Muslim men and boys by
Bosnian Serb police in the Vlasica Mountains near Varjanta;
-- The May-June murders of between 2,000 and 3,000 Muslim men, women,
and children by Serb irregular forces at a brick factory and a pig farm near
Brcko;
-- The June mass execution of about 100 Muslim men at Brod; and
-- The May 18 mass killing of at least 56 Muslim family members by Serb
militiamen in Grbavci, near Zvornik.
We know that Bosnian Serbs have not alone been responsible for the
massacres and crimes against humanity which have taken place. For
example, in late October Croatian fighters killed or wounded up to 300
Muslims in Prozor, and between September 24-26, Muslims from Kamenica
killed more than 60 Serb civilians and soldiers.
We can do more than enumerate crimes; we can also identify individuals who
committed them. For example:
-- Borislay Herak is a Bosnian Serb who has confessed to killing over 230
civilians; and
-- "Adil and Arif" are two members of a Croatian paramilitary force which
in August attacked a convoy of buses carrying more than 100 Serbian women
and children, killing over half of them.
We also know the names of leaders who directly supervised persons accused
of war crimes, and who may have ordered those crimes. These include:
-- Zeljko Raznjatovic, whose para-military forces, the "tigers," have been
linked to brutal ethnic cleansing in Zvornik, Srebrenica, Bratunac, and
Grobnica; and who were also linked
to the mass murders of up to 3,000 civilians near Brcko;
-- Vollslay Seselj, whose "White Eagles" force has been linked to atrocities
in a number of Bosnian cities, including the infamous incident at Brcko;
-- Drago Prcac, commander of the Omarska Detention Camp, where mass
murder and torture occurred; and
-- Adem Delic, the camp commander at Celebici where at least 15 Serbs
were beaten to death in August.
I want to make it clear that, in naming names, I am presenting the views of
my government alone. The information I have cited has been provided to the
UN War Crimes Commission, whose decision it will be to prosecute or not.
Second, I am not prejudging any trial proceedings that may occur; they must
be impartial and conducted in accordance with due process. Third, the above
listing of names is tentative and will be expanded as we compile further
information.
Finally, there is another category of fact which is beyond dispute--namely,
the fact of political and command responsibility for the crimes against
humanity which I have described. Leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, the
President of Serbia, Radovan Karadzic, the self-declared President of the
Serbian Bosnian Republic, and General Ratho Mladic, commander of Bosnian
Serb military forces, must eventually explain whether and how they sought
to ensure, as they must under international law, that their forces complied
with international law. They ought, if charged, to have the opportunity of
defending themselves by demonstrating whether and how they took
responsible action to prevent and punish the atrocities I have described
which were undertaken by their subordinates.
I have taken the step today of identifying individuals suspected of war
crimes and crimes against humanity for the same reason that my
government has decided to seek UN authorization for enforcing the no-fly
zone in Bosnia and why we are now willing to examine the question of
lifting the arms embargo as it applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is because
we have concluded that the deliberate flaunting of Security Council
resolutions and the London agreements by Serb authorities is not only
producing an intolerable and deteriorating situation inside the former
Yugoslavia, it is also beginning to threaten the framework of stability in the
new Europe.
It is clear that the reckless leaders of Serbia, and of the Serbs inside
Bosnia, have somehow convinced themselves that the international
community will not stand up to them now, and will be forced eventually to
recognize the fruits of their aggression and the results of ethnic cleansing.
Tragically, it also appears that they have convinced the people of Serbia to
follow them to the front lines of what they proclaim to be an historic
struggle against Islam on behalf of the Christian West.
It is time to disabuse them of these most dangerous illusions. The
solidarity of the civilized and democratic nations of the West lies with the
innocent and brutalized Muslim people of Bosnia. Thus, we must make it
unmistakably clear that we will settle for nothing less than the restoration
of the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with its territory undivided
and intact, the return of all refugees to their homes and villages, and,
indeed, a day of reckoning for those found guilty of crimes against humanity.
It will undoubtedly take some time before all these goals are realized, but
then there is time, too, though not much, for the people of Serbia to step
back from the edge of the abyss. There is time, still, to release all
prisoners; to lift the siege of cities; to permit humanitarian aid to reach the
needy; and to negotiate for peace and for a settlement guaranteeing the
rights of all minorities in the independent states of the former Yugoslavia.
But in waiting for the people of Serbia, if not their leaders, to come to their
senses, we must make them understand that their country will remain alone,
friendless, and condemned to economic ruin and exclusion from the family of
civilized nations for as long as they pursue the suicidal dream of a Greater
Serbia. They need, especially, to understand that a second Nuremberg
awaits the practitioners of ethnic cleansing, and that the judgment, and
opprobrium, of history awaits the people in whose name their crimes were
committed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Identifying Yugoslav War Criminals
Eagleburger
Source: Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Opening statement from a news conference, Geneva, en
route Brussels, Belgium
Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
I think I mentioned to you when we were coming here that I had this talk
with Elie Wiesel in Washington, [DC]. He really impressed me on the
question of how much longer we go on without focusing on the fact that
what's going on there is, on top of everything else, a humanitarian tragedy.
As I listened to him--and he's a very eloquent fellow--I decided it was time
we started. The earlier argument had been, with some merit, that if you
name names . . . if you move toward peace, it makes it harder for them to
back off where they've been because they're afraid they're going to get
accused of some crime.
We listened to that argument for awhile--a long time--but the fact of the
matter is it hasn't gotten any better. The fact of the matter is that things
are going on there that are absolutely outrageous of which ethnic cleansing
is sort of the catch-all phrase for this but, prison camps, torture, and all of
those things. So, I just decided, after listening to Elie Wiesel, that he was
probably right. We needed to take this to a different level. I don't know that
it's going to solve anything or change anything, but I think it's time, when
we have the facts--and we do in some of those cases fairly clearly--that
we begin to name names; let them understand that, over the long run, they
may be able to run but they can't hide; that we're going to pursue them and
raise some questions amongst the more senior people about the degree of
their responsibility for what these others do. And, hopefully, at the same
time--and I only hope--convince some of those who may try to pull the same
outrages that they ought to be careful and not do it, because they will be in
the same boat as those who have done these things. So, anyway, after
talking with Elie Wiesel and thinking about it a bit, I decided it was time we
started naming names.
Now, the names we put in that statement today are just some of the
highlights of all of these documents we've turned over to the United Nations.
It was an attempt to try to force the international community to pay more
attention to this issue and to send a message to Yugoslavia--what was
Yugoslavia. I'm going to make as sure as I can that we get what I said on
Voice of America to Serbia so they can hear some of that. And, for whatever
period of time is left to us, that is until the 20th of January, this is going
to be a theme. And, I hope the next administration will pick it up. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: NATO Support for the "No-Fly" Zone In the Former
Yugoslavia
Eagleburger
Source: Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Excerpts from remarks at a press conference, Brussels,
Belgium
Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
Subject: NATO
[TEXT]
First of all, I do think we made a real advance on the general question of the
relationship between NATO and peace-keeping, and fundamentally the
alliance has said that we're prepared to provide assets to help in peace-
keeping.
Now then, when you get to the specifics about Yugoslavia, which is where I
spent a lot of my time focused on that issue today, I think there are some
things that are important here.
Let me say first of all--because I watched the previous press conference--
to those of you who wonder whether this alliance did or did not support a
no-fly zone and, if not, why not, let me put it to you this way: The issue, as
such, never even really came up, and I suppose if I had wanted to push it, I
could. But I think if you take a look at the language specifically relating to
the no-fly zone, what you see is [that] they say, if the United Nations passes
a no-fly zone resolution, we're prepared to provide assets--that is, the
alliance, and that includes the United States--to enforce that no-fly zone
resolution.
Frankly, it never occurred to me in the way you've asked the question,
because it seems to me that if we say if a no-fly zone resolution is passed,
we'll support it with assets--the question that was fundamental here. I'll
also say to you [that] I didn't hear any discussion today--in the various
meetings--in which anybody really raised the question of a no-fly zone and
the wisdom of it. There was discussion--and there has been all week
everywhere I've been--over the impact of enforcing a no-fly zone resolution
on how well we are able to continue humanitarian assistance.
While I do not think that question should stand in the way of enforcement,
there is no question about it, that's a perfectly legitimate question to ask.
In other words, if we're going to enforce no-fly, how do we deal with the
questions of whether we will be able to continue humanitarian assistance
during that process.
The Yugoslav resolution also makes it clear that impeding relief shipments
is a crime, and that those who have committed those crimes will be held
responsible. The subject of criminal behavior by too many people in what
was Yugoslavia is a subject I've been talking about all week. I was glad to
see that we were able to get agreement on that. It indicates that if the
United Nations requests it, the alliance will respond, if UNPROFOR [UN
Protective Force] or other UN personnel are threatened or harmed. Again,
that obviously means we would have to use NATO assets to do that.
I would also say to you, although you may want to ask me more specifically,
that--to some degree, at least-- must be an answer to Mr. Karadzic's rather
unwise threats of yesterday.
This is another step forward, I think. The Yugoslav section clearly
demonstrated concern over Kosovo, supported the dispatch of UN forces to
prevent violence there, and did say that if there is an explosion in Kosovo, it
would be a serious threat to international peace and security. And we would
be prepared to take appropriate measures should that happen.
Again, you can ask me what "appropriate" means. I'll give you the same
answer the Secretary General did. That will be decided at the time, but it
seems to me it is a step forward from anything this alliance has said before
with regard to Kosovo.
Now, I want to go back to the fundamental communique for just a minute,
because there's a point I want to make here. In that communique, it
stressed the need to secure early ratification of the START [Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty] agreement and the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] by
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. I just want to make it clear that the
United States is not particularly happy with the delays that are taking place
with regard to the ratification of those two treaties by Ukraine.
I saw the Ukrainian Foreign Minister some time earlier this week. I don't
remember where it was. It was in Stockholm, as a matter of fact, and was
told then that the parliament--the Ukraine Parliament could not deal with
those treaties this month.
Well, we've got to live with their parliamentary procedures, but I made it
clear to him, and I don't mind making it clear publicly, that we have been
discussing the issue of ratification of those two treaties with Ukrainian
leaders for some months. We expect them to be ratified and without
reservations. And, as I indicated to the Foreign Minister when I saw him, if
they are not ratified or if the delay goes on much longer, it inevitably will
have an impact on the bilateral relationship between the United States and
Ukraine. So in a way, ladies and gentlemen, I'm taking advantage of you to
send a message publicly. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: North Atlantic Council Ministerial (NAC)
Communique
NATO
Source: NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
Description: Communique
Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
USSR (former)
Subject: NATO, CSCE, Arms Control, United Nations
[TEXT]
1. We have met today at a time of serious challenges to European security
arising from regional conflicts. We have consulted on this grave situation
and on the contributions that the Atlantic Alliance can make to meeting
these challenges. As the Harmel Report emphasized 25 years ago, the
ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting
peaceful order in Europe. This remains our goal. In our new Strategic
Concept, we have recognised the changing security environment. To meet
the new risks and challenges, we will use Alliance resources and expertise
in a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions, while continuing to
ensure an effective collective defence.
Transatlantic Link
2. The transatlantic partnership, which is embodied in our Alliance,
remains vital for European security and stability. The Alliance not only
guarantees its members' security, but also remains one of the indispensable
instruments for promoting stability and shaping change throughout Europe.
An effective Atlantic Alliance and a continuing active, broad cooperation
between Europe and North America are essential for a durable order of peace
and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area. The substantial presence of US
armed forces in Europe and the continuing political and military
commitment and active engagement in European security of both the United
States and Canada will remain essential. The tasks we face in supporting
the process of democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the
republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union underscore the
importance of maintaining a strong transatlantic partnership based on a
community of values and purpose.
NATO's Role in Peacekeeping
3. Following the decision which we took in Oslo, we have reviewed the
progress made concerning Alliance support for CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe] peacekeeping, and have instructed the Council in
Permanent Session to complete its work on this issue. We will further
strengthen Alliance coordination in peacekeeping, and develop practical
measures to enhance the Alliance's contribution in this area. The Military
Committee has already advised the Council in Permanent Session of the
resources available and the modalities for possible Alliance support for
peacekeeping. We are ready to share experiences in peacekeeping with our
Cooperation Partners and other CSCE participating states, and to join them
as required in supporting CSCE peacekeeping operations.
4. We confirm today the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case-
by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping
operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the
primary responsibility for international peace and security. We are ready to
respond positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary-General might take
to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council
Resolutions. We have asked NATO's Secretary General to maintain in this
respect, under the guidance of the Council in Permanent Session, the
necessary contacts with the Secretary-General of the UN regarding the
assistance that the Alliance could provide.
5. In this spirit, we are contributing individually and as an Alliance to the
implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions relating to the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. For the first time in its history, the
Alliance is taking part in UN peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement
operations. The Alliance, together with the WEU, is supporting with its
ships in the Adriatic the enforcement of the UN economic sanctions against
Serbia and Montenegro and of the arms embargo against all republics of
former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] is using elements from
the Alliance's NORTHAG [Northern Army Group, Central Europe] command for
its operational headquarters. NATO airborne early-warning aircraft--
AWACS--are monitoring daily the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
Relations with Cooperation Partners and NACC
6. The Alliance is helping to promote stability throughout the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia and is supporting their reform
processes. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC], created a year
ago, has developed into a valuable forum for consultations on security and
conflict prevention. We have built up a broad and diverse programme of
practical cooperation in areas where our Alliance has competence and
expertise. We intend to develop further this dynamic cooperative process
step by step, giving it a more practical focus. We have prepared, together
with our cooperation partners, a new and expanded Work Plan for 1993. The
commitment of all partners to full respect for human rights and democratic
principles, as set out in the CSCE documents and in accordance with their
international legal obligations, will continue to be the basis of our
cooperation. We welcome all positive steps taken in this regard by our
North Atlantic Cooperation Council partners, and urge continued efforts.
Strengthening the CSCE Structures
7. The CSCE has an essential role to play in developing a cooperative
approach to security and in conflict prevention and crisis management. We
support the further strengthening of CSCE structures and the extension of
the CSCE's authority and operational involvement in the prevention of
conflict. We welcome in this respect the strategy of active diplomacy
agreed at the CSCE Ministerial Council in Stockholm. We welcome, in
particular, the strengthening of the CSCE's operational capabilities through
structural reforms and the appointment of a Secretary General; the
appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities; and the
establishment of additional mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of
disputes. As required, we will support the work of the CSCE with whatever
experience and expertise we can usefully contribute.
8. We attach great importance to the Forum for Security Cooperation in
Vienna, established by the CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting as a framework
for shaping a new relationship of cooperative security among all CSCE
participating states. We have put forward, in association with other
participating states, a number of proposals for the Programme for
Immediate Action agreed in Helsinki dealing with the harmonisation of
existing arms control obligations, with defence planning and with the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms
transfers. We will continue to develop further proposals. We urge all
states of the CSCE to participate in the Vienna Forum as well as in all the
other CSCE fora.
Practical Relationship between NATO and WEU
9. We reaffirm our support for the development of a common European
foreign and security policy and defence identity as reflected in the
Declaration of Peace and Cooperation adopted by the Alliance in Rome on 8
November 1991 and in the Treaty and Declarations adopted by the European
Community and the Western European Union [WEU] in Maastricht on 9 and 10
December 1991. We believe that the Alliance's interests are best served by
a more united Europe and that the maintenance of a strong Atlantic Alliance
will be a fundamental element in any emerging European defence policy.
10. We welcome the results of the WEU Ministerial Council meeting in Rome
on 20 November, which confirmed the participation of all European Allies in
the activities of the WEU as full members, associate members or observers,
thereby reinforcing the European pillar of the Alliance. We also welcome
the progress made by the WEU in further developing its operational role and
structures. These developments will facilitate close working relations and
interaction between NATO and the WEU. Our cooperation in the Adriatic is a
case in point. We reaffirm the importance of maintaining Allies' existing
obligations and commitments of forces to NATO and we emphasise in this
regard that the primary responsibility of forces answerable to the WEU will
remain NATO's collective defence under the Washington Treaty.
11. We have endorsed an Alliance document proposing guidelines for the
practical working relations between the two organisations. These
arrangements will help to ensure that all the Allies are properly involved in
decisions that may affect their security. We look forward to the transfer of
the WEU Council and Secretariat to Brussels early in 1993, which will allow
close practical cooperation between the two Councils and Secretariats. We
welcomed the presence of the Secretary General of the WEU, Mr. Willem van
Eekelen, who participated in our meeting for the first time.
We are committed to ensuring that the two organisations continue to work
on the basis of transparency and complementarity, recognising that it is for
each of them to take its own decisions. We reiterate our appreciation of the
fact that in stating their aim of introducing joint positions into the process
of consultation in the Alliance, the WEU member states have affirmed that
the Alliance will remain the essential forum for consultation among its
members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security
and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty; and also of
WEU's stated intention to strengthen the role, responsibilities and
contributions of the WEU member states in the Alliance and to act in
conformity with the positions adopted in the Alliance.
12. We express our satisfaction at the initiative taken by the French and
German governments in submitting to the Council their joint proposal on the
relationship between the European Corps they have created and the Alliance.
This major unit, which we note is open to the other WEU partners, is a step
forward in strengthening both the European security and defence identity
and the European pillar of the Alliance.
We welcome the agreement between the French and German Chiefs of Staff
and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe on the conditions under which
the Corps is to be used within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.
This agreement will be considered by the Military Committee and submitted
expeditiously to the Council in Permanent Session for approval.
Regional Issues
13. The use of force in contravention of international law for whatever goal
is intolerable. Regional conflicts cannot be settled through violence, but
only through negotiations and full respect for human and democratic rights,
including those of persons belonging to national minorities, the territorial
integrity of all states and the inviolability of all frontiers in accordance
with CSCE principles and other relevant international commitments and
norms. We remain profoundly concerned by the continuing violence in the
former Yugoslavia, including the abhorrent practice referred to as "ethnic
cleansing," and have issued today a separate statement on this conflict.
14. We deeply regret the ongoing hostilities in and around Nagorno-
Karabakh. We urge the parties involved to establish an effective ceasefire.
We strongly support UN and CSCE principles as well as all steps and
decisions taken by the CSCE in relation to the present conflict. We continue
to believe the proposed CSCE Conference in Minsk offers an immediate
opportunity to achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict, and we
support efforts to convene the conference on the basis of the continuation
of the work begun in the framework of the Rome meeting.
15. Completion of the expeditious withdrawal of foreign troops from the
Baltic states under appropriate withdrawal agreements is important in view
of the overriding principle that military forces should be stationed on the
territory of a foreign state only with the consent of that state. The
continuation of the withdrawal process will be a major contribution to
stability in the Baltic region. We recognise that practical difficulties have
to be overcome, but temporary problems should not be allowed to delay the
overall process. This withdrawal should not be linked to other issues.
We invite all parties to exercise flexibility and moderation in negotiations
to resolve remaining problems, including those of a social and material
nature.
Arms Control
16. We welcome the definitive entry into force on 9 November of the CFE
[Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, which, together with the
Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strengths of Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1-A), we consider one of the foundations of
European security. We stress, following the end of the CFE baseline
validation period, the importance of all parties adhering to the schedule for
the reduction of Treaty-limited equipment as well as to the information
exchange, verification and other provisions of the Treaty.
17. We look forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty on Open
Skies and to adherence to it by interested states participating in the CSCE
which were not original signatories to the Treaty as provided for by Article
XVII of the Treaty and called for in the CSCE Open Skies Declaration of 24
March 1992.
18. We welcome the consolidation by CIS [Commonwealth of Independent
States] states of former Soviet tactical weapons in Russia, the adherence to
the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty by Belarus, Kazakhstan
and Ukraine, and the commitments by those three states to eliminate all
nuclear weapons on their territories. We urge the earliest possible
ratification of the START Treaty in conformity with the Lisbon Protocol by
those State Parties having not yet done so. We reiterate our expectation
that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine will take rapid steps to fulfil their
repeated commitments to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as
non-nuclear weapon states. Failure to do so would be a cause of serious
concern. We also renew our call upon them to expedite the elimination from
their territories of nuclear weapons as agreed.
We welcome all agreements concluded by Allies with Russia to facilitate
the rapid, safe and secure elimination of former Soviet nuclear weapons.
Allies underline their continuing readiness to support this process of
elimination and to consult on the matter in the Alliance.
19. We welcome the agreement last June between the United States and
Russia to reduce their nuclear forces substantially below START levels, and
in particular the decision to eliminate all multiple-warhead land-based
strategic missiles.
20. We welcome the successful achievement of a draft Chemical Weapons
Convention. We look forward to becoming original signatories of the
Convention, and commit ourselves to its early ratification. We call on all
other states to do likewise.
21. We remain fully committed to ongoing efforts to prevent proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, as well as illegal
arms transfers.
We urge all countries that have not yet done so, particularly those located in
regions where the risks of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons as well as the acquisition of relevant technology have
increased alarmingly in recent years, to become parties to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention, and to commit
themselves to signing and ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention as
soon as possible. Strict compliance with these accords is essential. We
reaffirm our support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and for its
indefinite extension in 1995.
We urge transparency and restraint in the field of conventional arms
transfers. We support the newly established UN Register of Conventional
Arms and urge all UN member states to provide by next April all required
data in order to enable this Register to be fully operational and effective.
22. We were honoured by the presence of Minister Pierre Harmel at our
meeting. Despite all that has been accomplished in recent years, we have
not yet achieved the just and lasting peaceful order in Europe which the
Harmel Report laid down as the goal of our Alliance. We had hoped that
conflict and cruelty might be banished from the continent. In the face of the
new challenges, that hope remains, and we will strive to our utmost to
realise it. The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to make an essential
contribution to securing peace and stability.
23. We have asked the Secretary General, Mr. Manfred Worner, to remain in
office until 30th June 1996, and noted with pleasure his acceptance.
24. The Spring 1993 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial
session will be held in Athens in June.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: NATO Statement on the Former Yugoslavia
NATO
Source: NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
Description: Released by the North Atlantic Council's Ministerial
Meeting, Brussels, Belgium
Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
USSR (former)
Subject: NATO, CSCE, Arms Control
[TEXT]
1. We are profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating situation in the former
Yugoslavia, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace,
security, and stability. Recent meetings in Edinburgh, Stockholm and Geneva
have made clear the international community's impatience with the
situation, its determination that the carnage and lawlessness in former
Yugoslavia be brought to a halt, and its commitment to a negotiated,
peaceful and lasting settlement. We are contributing individually and as an
Alliance to the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, and we
are prepared to respond to further requests for such contributions.
2. Primary responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies with
the present leadership of Serbia and of the Bosnian Serbs. They have sought
territorial gains by force and engaged in systematic gross violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law, including the barbarous
practice of "ethnic cleansing." There is the systematic detention and rape
of Muslim women and girls. Relief convoys are being harassed and delayed.
All such acts must cease. Those individuals responsible for atrocities,
whatever party they belong to, are accountable for their actions and liable
to be judged accordingly. To this end, we welcome consideration of the
creation of an ad hoc tribunal.
3. We reject any unilateral changes in borders, territory, or populations.
The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina must be restored. We call upon all parties in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to accept the Geneva Conference draft outline constitution as a
basis for negotiations. We strongly support the continuing efforts of the UN
and EC Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
(ICFY).
4. We are deeply concerned about possible spillover of the conflict, and
about the situation in Kosovo. We call urgently on all parties to act with
restraint and moderation. Serious negotiations on the restoration of
autonomy to Kosovo within Serbia and the guarantee of full human rights
should begin immediately under the ICFY. We are in favour of a UN
preventive presence in Kosovo. An explosion of violence in Kosovo could, by
spreading the conflict, constitute a serious threat to international peace
and security and would require an appropriate response by the international
community .
5. We support CSCE efforts and a substantial increase in international
conflict prevention measures, such as monitoring missions, and expect
cooperation from all parties. We urge further speedy preventive steps by
the UN or the CSCE to help defuse existing tensions. In that context, we
welcome the decision of the United Nations Security Council to place
peacekeeping forces on the borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia with Albania and Serbia and Montenegro.
6. Strict enforcement of UN embargoes is essential. We urge nations to
continue efforts to tighten their enforcement.
7. The Alliance has contributed personnel and equipment to the UNPROFOR II
Headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is helping to enforce UN embargoes in
the Adriatic, and is providing to the UN data obtained from NATO Airborne
Early-Warning (AWACS) aircraft to help monitor the Bosnia-Herzegovina no-
fly zone. Members of the Alliance are prepared to take further steps to
assist the UN in implementing its decisions to maintain international peace
and security.
8. The Security Council will shortly consider adopting a resolution on
enforcement of the No-Fly Zone, bearing in mind the need to continue the
current humanitarian effort in Bosnia. Should such a resolution be adopted,
and should violations continue thereafter, we would be prepared to support
the UN in enforcing that resolution.
9. In view of the continuing attacks on Sarajevo, we urge the Security
Council to consider further measures as soon as possible, as set out in the
9th December Statement of the UN Security Council President.
10. All parties, but in particular the Serbian authorities, in and outside
Bosnia-Herzegovina must cooperate fully with UNHCR [UN High
Commissioner for Refugees] and UNPROFOR. We recall that UNSCR 770
authorizes all measures necessary to ensure relief deliveries to Bosnia, and
that interference in relief activities is an international crime. All must
refrain from any action which might jeopardize the safety of UNPROFOR and
other UN personnel. If requested by the UN, the Alliance would be prepared
to take appropriate measures if any of these personnel are threatened or
harmed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe
Subject: NATO, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control
[TEXT]
NATO Today
NATO continues to provide Western governments the optimal instrument to
coordinate their efforts at defense and arms control and to build a durable
European order of peace. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact, and the progress of European integration have not ended
the need for NATO's essential commitment to safeguard the freedom and
security of all its members by political and military means in accordance
with UN principles. The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic
Alliance, issued after the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
July 1990, signaled the vitality of the alliance in adapting to security needs
in a post-Cold War world. At that meeting, NATO allies announced a
fundamental review of strategy and invited the Soviet Union and the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe to establish regular diplomatic
liaison and to develop a new partnership.
The November 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation further
underlined NATO's intention to redefine its objectives in light of changed
circumstances. The declaration took into account the broader challenges to
alliance security interests, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, regional instability, and terrorism. It outlined its future tasks
in the context of a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing
institutions, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community, and the
Council of Europe, working together to build a new European security
system. It created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to
develop an institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on
political and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries.
This initiative culminated in the participation of Foreign Ministers and
representatives from the 16 NATO countries, 6 Central and East European
countries, and the 3 new independent Baltic states at the inaugural meeting
of the NACC in December 1991. At a second meeting of the NACC in March
1992, the new independent states of the former Soviet Union became
members, except Georgia, which was admitted the following month. Albania
joined the NACC in June 1992. The "New Strategic Concept" announced at
the Rome meeting stresses the alliance's mission in crisis management and
mandates a more flexible force structure and reduced reliance on nuclear
weapons.
In June 1992, NATO Foreign Ministers expressed concern over continuing
violence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh
(Azerbaijan) and affirmed their readiness to support peace-keeping
activities under the auspices of the CSCE on a case-by-case basis. On July
10, 1992, the North Atlantic Council agreed on a NATO maritime operation in
the Adriatic, in coordination with the WEU, to monitor compliance with the
UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. On September 2, 1992, the
Council approved UN humanitarian relief efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On
November 18, 1992, NATO allies agreed to enforce a naval blockade against
Serbia and Montenegro, again in coordination with the WEU, following a UN
Security Council resolution to tighten economic sanctions. On December 17,
1992, the Council agreed to support the United Nations in enforcing its
October 9, 1992, resolution declaring a ban on military flights over Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
NATO's role as a forum for political consultation and an association of
nations committed to collective defense remains unchanged, even as its new
responsibilities in the areas of peace-keeping and crisis management
continue to evolve.
US-NATO Relations: "The Trans-Atlantic Partnership"
The decision of the United States after World War II to participate in a
regional peace-time, defensive alliance represented a fundamental change in
American foreign policy. The United States recognized that its interests no
longer could be confined to the limits of the Western hemisphere: US
security was linked inextricably to the future of the West European
democracies. Concepts of individual liberty and the rule of law, coupled
with those of a common heritage and shared values, provided the foundation
for the NATO alliance. These ideals, as well as the ongoing goal of each
member country to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe,
continue to link the fate of America to that of its NATO allies.
The history of US engagement in NATO has been one of commitment by
America and its allies to reduce tensions in Europe and to improve East-
West relations. They have pursued a series of initiatives designed to lower
levels of personnel and equipment and increase mutual confidence, while
adhering to a policy of political cohesion and military strength. Arms
control measures aimed at enhancing stability have included the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 and the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990.
The CFE Treaty between the allies and the nations and successor states of
the former Warsaw Pact provides for an unprecedented level of transparency
in the security field through an information exchange and obligatory
inspections. Most importantly, it mandates a sharp reduction in
conventional weapons throughout Europe. The NATO allies coordinate
closely to meet their own obligations under the treaty and to ensure Eastern
compliance in its information, verification, and reduction provisions.
NATO has played a leading role in developing far-reaching proposals for
CSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Alliance proposals on force
planning, non-proliferation, and harmonization of existing arms control
commitments already are being developed.
The United States supports the development of a greater European security
identity and defense role as a means of strengthening the integrity and
effectiveness of NATO. At the NATO summit in Rome, the alliance welcomed
the prospect of a European political union with a greater security and
defense dimension but underlined that this would not diminish the need for
NATO. The alliance's "New Strategic Concept" also reaffirmed the essential
nature of the trans-Atlantic partnership, recognizing as a basic principle
the indivisibility of security of all its members.
The North Atlantic alliance and the American presence in Europe have helped
keep peace for more than 40 years. Having helped to forge successful
policies toward the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact since the
foundation of NATO, the United States with its European allies must play a
central role in building the framework of the new Euro-Atlantic
architecture.
NATO Strategy
NATO collective security strategy was based on the principle of deterrence.
Defense capabilities were created to deter military aggression or other
forms of pressure. Parties to the treaty agreed to consult whenever the
territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any party was
threatened. They further pledged to maintain their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack and, should such deterrence fail, to defend
the territory of the alliance. As a purely defensive alliance, NATO would
maintain only a level of military strength sufficient to be credible. Given
the marked inferiority of allied conventional strength in Europe, the NATO
guarantee would rest primarily on the nuclear superiority of the United
States.
At the conclusion of a 1967 comprehensive review of NATO strategy, the
alliance adopted a revised approach to the common defense, based on a
balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of
aggression or threats of aggression. This reassessment of the nature of the
potential threat to member countries prompted the realization that the
alliance must increasingly look to the dangers of more limited forms of
aggression beyond the possibility of a massive Soviet attack. The basis of
the new concept of "flexible response" was the belief that NATO should be
able to deter and counter military force with a range of responses designed
to defend directly against attack at an appropriate level, or, if necessary, to
escalate the attack to the level necessary to persuade an aggressor to
desist.
At the same time, the alliance accepted the recommendations of the Harmel
report, titled "Future Tasks of the Alliance," which outlined the need to
work toward the achievement of disarmament and balanced force reductions.
The maintenance of adequate military forces would be coupled with efforts
at improving East-West relations.
Soviet deployment of new mobile theater nuclear missiles (SS-20s) called
into question the accepted NATO strategy of deterrence based on the
concepts of forward defense and flexible response and lead to a decision in
1979 to modernize its defensive capability. The resulting "dual-track"
decision by the alliance combined pursuing arms control negotiations with
responding appropriately to the increased imbalance created by the new
Soviet systems. Alliance governments agreed to deploy US ground- launched
cruise missiles in Western Europe.
The successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty in 1987, while eliminating all Soviet and US land-based,
intermediate-range missiles, required a new appraisal of NATO policy. In
response, the alliance developed its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms
Control and Disarmament," which provided a framework for alliance policy
in nuclear, conventional, and chemical fields of arms control, and tied
defense policies to progress in arms control.
The "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," issued
by the North Atlantic Council in July 1990, inaugurated a major
transformation to adapt to the new realities in Europe. The ministers
pledged to intensify political and military contacts with Moscow and with
Central and East European capitals and to work not only for the common
defense but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. They
underlined the need to undertake broader arms control and confidence-
building agreements to limit conventional armed forces in Europe. In
recognition of the radical political changes in Europe and the improved
security environment, the ministers mandated a fundamental review of the
alliance's political and military strategy.
The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in November 1991. The threat of a massive full-scale
Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's strategy during the
Cold War, had disappeared after the end of the political division of Europe.
The alliance acknowledged that the risks to its security, such as
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism and
sabotage, were now less predictable and beyond the focus of traditional
concerns. The new strategy adopts a broader approach to security, centered
more on crisis management and conflict prevention. It assumes completion
of the planned withdrawal of military forces from Central and Eastern
Europe and the full implementation of arms control agreements limiting
conventional forces in Europe. In the context of changed circumstances, the
alliance will maintain a mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in
Europe, although at a significantly lower level. To ensure effectiveness,
alliance forces will be increasingly mobile to respond to a range of
contingencies. Forces will be organized for flexible buildup to react to
regional instability and crises. Collective defense arrangements will rely
increasingly on multinational forces within the integrated military
structure. Nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in allied
strategy but will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve
stability.
The new strategy reaffirms the principle of common commitment and
mutual cooperation in support of the indivisibility of security for all
alliance members and underscores the essential political and military link
between European and North American members provided by the presence of
nuclear forces in Europe.
NATO Background
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed against the backdrop of
emerging post-war tensions engendered by the threat of Soviet
expansionism and concern over political and economic instability in Western
Europe. On April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, the Foreign Ministers of
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States signed the North
Atlantic Treaty, the political framework for an international alliance
designed to prevent aggression, or, if necessary, to resist attack against
any alliance member. In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty,
followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and by Spain in 1982.
This alliance of sovereign states pledges, through a combination of political
solidarity and military force, to preserve its mutual security. Reaffirming
faith in the principles of individual and collective self-defense embodied in
the UN Charter, the parties to the treaty pledge to defend the common
heritage and civilization of their peoples and to promote stability and well-
being in the North Atlantic area. While recognizing the need to maintain
adequate military strength to safeguard the security of its members, the
alliance also resolves to work toward the establishment of a just and
lasting peaceful order in Europe.
NATO Structure
North Atlantic Council
The Council provides the forum for consultation and cooperation between
governments on all issues affecting security. Its decisions are based on
consensus, with each member having an equal right to express its views.
Each government is represented on the NATO Council by a permanent
representative with ambassadorial rank. The Council meets on a weekly
basis, with meetings at the ministerial level twice a year. The NATO
Secretary General is chairman.
Defense Planning Committee (DPC)
Composed of representatives of all countries except France; deals with
overall issues of defense. Like the Council, it meets regularly at
ambassadorial level and twice yearly, when member countries are
represented by their defense ministers.
Nuclear Planning Group
Has authority for nuclear matters. All countries except France participate.
Iceland participates as an observer.
Military Committee
The highest military authority in the alliance; is composed of the chiefs of
staff of each country except France, which is represented by a military
mission. Iceland, which has no military forces, is represented by a civilian
member. The Military Committee advises the Council and the DPC on
military measures necessary for the common defense and provides guidance
to the NATO commanders.
Regional Commands
The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic treaty is divided into three
regional commands: Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic, and
Allied Command Channel, with a regional planning group for North America.
With the exception of France and Iceland, all countries assign forces to the
integrated military command structure. The NATO Defense area covers the
territories of member nations in North America, in the Atlantic area north
of the Tropic of Cancer, and in Europe, including Turkey. However, events
occurring outside the area which affect the preservation of peace and
security in the treaty area also may be considered by the Council.
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
Designed as a forum for consultation and cooperation on security and related
issues, the Council institutionalizes the relationship between NATO
countries and the governments of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic
states, and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. Finland
has attended as an observer. Defense planning, democratic concepts of
civilian-military relations, and defense conversion are discussed at regular
meetings of cooperation partners. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC)
NATO
Source: North Atlantic Cooperation Council
Description: Text of a communique released at the meeting of the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters,
Brussels, Belgium
Date: Dec, 18 199212/18/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tajikistan
Subject: NATO, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control,
CSCE
[TEXT]
1. We, the Foreign Ministers and Representatives of the member countries
of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council have today continued our
consultations to contribute to enhanced security and cooperation in the area
from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
2. Our area faces new and difficult challenges which give rise to serious
concern. Its stability and security will depend on how we are able to
respond to these challenges and thereby to manage the process of change.
3. During the first year of its existence, our Council has proved its
usefulness for dialogue and cooperation and for strengthening security. Its
potential will be further developed and applied. To that end, we have
adopted today a substantial Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and
Cooperation for the year 1993. It builds on the positive, mutually beneficial
results of our initial Work Plan for 1992 in the political, military,
economic, scientific, environmental and information fields, including
defence conversion and civil/-military coordination of air traffic
management.
We agreed to strengthen and broaden further our partnership as a dynamic
process and to give it a more practical focus. This would support the
continued progress in democratic and market-oriented reforms which is
essential for the success of our cooperation. Our cooperation could also
take the form of activities agreed by all the partners but carried out by
some of them in open-ended groups which reflect specific shared interests,
for example, the pilot projects on defence conversion and on defence-
related environmental issues.
Active cooperation on defence matters and military contacts under our Work
Plan are an important contribution to better mutual understanding among
armed forces and fostering responsible and cooperative behaviour in the
military field, which are essential to our efforts to help safeguard peace.
We intend thus to contribute to achieving a pattern of democratically
controlled and smaller military forces which are structured with defensive
intent, at minimum levels consistent with legitimate security
requirements. These objectives should be reflected in military doctrines.
We welcome progress already made in these areas.
Cooperation will be significantly increased in the science and environmental
fields on priority issues.
4. The further development of our cooperation is linked to respect by all our
countries for international commitments undertaken inter alia within the
framework of the CSCE. We are determined to implement these
commitments fully and thereby to enhance the security and stability in our
area.
5. Regional tensions, conflicts and ethnic violence are threatening stability
and security in our area and hampering the achievement of our goal of
enhancing peaceful cooperation. We cannot allow the current process of
transition in Europe to be undermined in this manner.
6. We welcome the decisions taken by the CSCE Council in Stockholm to
enhance the CSCE's operational and institutional capacity to prevent
conflicts, manage crises and settle disputes peacefully. We are determined
to contribute to achieving these goals.
7. Our countries are ready to support and contribute on a case by case basis
to peacekeeping operations under UN authority or CSCE responsibility, which
ensure international legitimacy for such operations.
Taking into account the decision of the 1992 CSCE Summit Meeting in
Helsinki, we will exchange experience and expertise on peacekeeping and
related matters; we will continue our consultations leading to cooperation
on this subject in conformity with the Work Plan we have adopted.
8. Our Council is continuing to contribute to the building of a new security
architecture based on cooperative relations among states and a network of
mutually reinforcing institutions.
9. We condemn the use of force not sanctioned by international law as a
means to pursue political goals. Permanent solutions to regional conflicts
can only be reached through negotiations as well as equal and full respect
for human rights, including those of persons belonging to national
minorities, the territorial integrity of all states and the inviolability of
their borders in accordance with CSCE principles and other relevant
international commitments and norms. We pledge to use our dialogue and
cooperation within the NACC to help prevent conflicts.
10. We are profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating situation in the former
Yugoslavia, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace,
security, and stability. We fully support the efforts of the UN, the CSCE and
the UN and EC Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on former
Yugoslavia to find a negotiated and just settlement to the tragic conflict in
the former Yugoslavia and call on all parties, especially the leadership of
Serbia and Montenegro and of the Bosnian Serbs to cooperate with these
efforts, in particular to implement strictly the decisions of the London
Conference and the mandatory resolutions of the UN Security Council. Any
taking of territory by force or any practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful
and unacceptable and must not be permitted to affect the outcome of the
negotiations on constitutional arrangements for the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. All displaced persons must be enabled to return in peace to
their former homes. We support all humanitarian efforts aimed at
alleviating the plight of the population and at preventing further
dislocation, e.g. through the development of safe areas for the protection of
the civilian population and a provision of refuge for particularly vulnerable
categories of refugees.
We are gravely concerned about the risk of conflict spilling over into other
areas. This would have serious implications for the region. In this
connection, we are disturbed by the dangerous situation in Kosovo,
developments in the Sandjak and Vojvodina and some recent events in the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We stress the necessity of urgent
preventive measures and support the steps that have already been taken by
the United Nations and the CSCE. We welcome the UN Security Council
decision to place preventive peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. We believe that a UN presence in Kosovo would be a
positive step.
We urge all parties concerned to strive in the framework of an overall
settlement of the crisis for a significant reduction in the level of
armaments in the region, in particular through a comprehensive regional
harmonization of arms control obligations.
We deeply regret the ongoing hostilities in the conflict being dealt with by
the CSCE Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh. We urge the parties involved to
take immediate steps in order to establish an effective ceasefire. We
strongly support UN and CSCE principles as well as all steps and decisions
taken by the CSCE in relation to the present conflict. We continue to believe
the proposed CSCE Conference in Minsk offers an immediate opportunity to
achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict and we support efforts to
convene the conference on the basis of the continuation of the work begun in
the framework of the Rome meeting.
We welcome the continuation of the democratization process in Georgia. We
are pleased that the ceasefire agreement between Georgians and Ossetians
in the area of conflict has held so far. We welcome the dispatch of the CSCE
mission to the area. We hope that it will play a constructive role in
promoting a political settlement. We hope that the Georgian-Russian-
Ossetian Peacekeeping Force will develop a relationship of cooperation,
consultation and trust with the mission. We remain deeply concerned about
the conflict in Abkhazia. We call on the parties involved to establish an
effective ceasefire and to work together with the CSCE and the UN
Secretary-General's representatives for a lasting peaceful solution.
We are pleased that the ceasefire in the Republic of Moldova is holding. We
urge further efforts towards an expeditious permanent solution to the
problem of the Left Bank Dniester Areas without further violence and
towards agreement on the status and the early, orderly and complete
withdrawal of foreign troops from the Republic of Moldova. We support
CSCE efforts to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the current situation.
We urgently call for a halt to the civil strife in Tajikistan. We welcome the
election of a new chairman of the national assembly and head of state of
Tajikistan. We hope that this transition will help end the fighting. The
restoration of peace will allow Tajikistan to focus on the challenges of
democratic development in the interest of its people.
11. Completion of the expeditious withdrawal of foreign troops from the
Baltic States under appropriate withdrawal agreements is important in
view of the overriding principle that military forces may be stationed on
the territory of a foreign state only with the consent of that state. The
continuation of the withdrawal process will be a major contribution to
stability in the Baltic region. We recognize that practical difficulties have
to be overcome but they should not be allowed to unduly delay the overall
process. We hope that international cooperation will help overcome those
difficulties. This withdrawal should not be--and is not--linked to other
issues. All parties must exercise flexibility and moderation in negotiations
to resolve remaining problems, including those of social and material
nature.
12. We have already achieved historic advances in arms control,
disarmament and confidence building. Full implementation of existing
agreements, further dialogue, transparency and confidence and security
building measures, as well as the enhancement of consultation and
cooperation are fundamental to increased security, taking into account new
political and military realities. To this end,
-- We welcome entry into force and successful completion of the baseline
validation period of the CFE Treaty, which has always received the support
of our Council. The High Level Working Group which our Council established
on 20 December 1991 has significantly contributed to this success. We are
committed to full implementation of all provisions of this vital Treaty,
including those on reductions, information exchange and verification.
-- We will work with all CSCE countries to make the Forum for Security
Cooperation a success, particularly in the areas of harmonization of
existing arms control commitments, transparency in defence planning, and
non-proliferation. We urge all CSCE participating states to take part in this
important forum.
-- We support development and definition of the concept of a code of
conduct in the security field and we welcome pioneering work undertaken in
this respect within the framework of the CSCE.
-- We urge those states concerned which have not yet ratified the START
Treaty, including the Lisbon Protocol, to do so speedily in order to permit
its prompt entry into force.
-- We are committed to preventing proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. We reiterate our support for the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and for its indefinite extension in 1995. We urge all
countries that have not yet done so to become parties to the NPT as non-
nuclear weapons states.
-- We welcome the successful achievement of a draft Chemical Weapons
Convention. We pledge to become original signatories and commit ourselves
to its early ratification. We urge other countries to do likewise.
-- We call on all countries, particularly those located in regions where the
risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increased
alarmingly, to take all appropriate steps to prevent the proliferation of such
weapons.
-- We are equally committed to responsibility and restraint with respect to
transfers of conventional weapons. We call on all countries to submit full
relevant data to the UN Register of Conventional Arms by April 1993.
-- Those of us who are signatories of the Treaty on Open Skies are
committed to early ratification and entry into force. Those of us who have
not yet signed the Treaty will consider the question of accession as soon as
possible. We look forward to wider adherence to the Treaty by interested
states which are participating in the CSCE but are not original signatories
to the Treaty as provided for by Article XVII of the Treaty and called for in
the CSCE Open Skies Declaration of 24 March 1992.
13. While we recognize the resource constraints faced by many of our
members, we nonetheless encourage the widest possible participation in
activities within the framework of our Council.
14. Having taken due notice of the statement by the Representative of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, we state our readiness to welcome the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as members of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council as of 1 January 1993.
15. Finland attended the meeting as an observer. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC)
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe
Subject: History, NATO, Security Assistance and Sales,
Arms Control, CSCE
[TEXT]
NACC Today
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) joins the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the newly free and independent states
of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union in a
program of political-security dialogue, partnership, and cooperation.
Subjects discussed in regular meetings between allies and partner states
include defense planning and budgeting, democratic concepts of civil-
military relations, defense conversion, and scientific and environmental
topics. Members also discuss current political issues of common concern.
In this way, the NACC complements the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), NATO, the European Community, and the
Council of Europe in building a Euro-Atlantic community of stable,
democratic, and market-oriented societies from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
NACC's Origins
As the advent of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union and the
crumbling of communist control in Eastern Europe changed the nature of the
European security challenge, NATO turned from a posture of confrontation
with the East to one of dialogue and cooperation. The June 1990 Turnberry
North Atlantic Council ministerial and July 1990 London NATO summit
extended the hand of friendship to NATO's former adversaries and called for
the alliance to institute a liaison program with the Warsaw Pact states.
The June 1991 Copenhagen North Atlantic Council ministerial developed this
theme in its statement on "Partnership with the Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe."
In their October 3, 1991, joint statement, Secretary of State Baker and
German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed the
institutionalization of the NATO liaison program in a North Atlantic
Cooperation Council. The following month, the Rome NATO summit formally
established the NACC as a forum in which allies could offer their experience
and expertise to partner countries on security and related issues.
A Successful First Year
In its first year of existence, NACC developed a solid basis of cooperation
and dialogue. The first NACC ministerial, held on December 20, 1991, in
Brussels, brought together representatives of the 16 NATO allies, the Baltic
states, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.
Participants pledged to uphold CSCE principles, support arms control
efforts, and work together in building a Europe whole and free.
The second NACC ministerial, held on March 10, 1992, in Brussels, admitted
all the states of the former Soviet Union except Georgia (which joined the
following month). Ministers adopted the first NACC work plan, which
spelled out a program of intensified consultations and cooperative
activities focused on security and related issues, including political,
military, economic, scientific, and environmental subjects. Specific topics
for cooperation included defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms
control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military
coordination of air-traffic management, defense conversion, and enhanced
participation in NATO's "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental
programs. Ministers also pledged to cooperate in disseminating information
about NATO in the partner countries and gave their support to the NACC's ad
hoc High Level Group charged with facilitating CFE (Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe) entry-into-force.
The third NACC ministerial was held on June 5, 1992, in Oslo. Albania was
admitted to membership, bringing the total membership to 37. Finland
attended as an observer. Ministers reviewed progress in implementing the
work plan, reaffirmed their commitment to CSCE principles, and pledged
their support for arms control and non-proliferation initiatives. They also
discussed regional crises and problems in the former Yugoslavia, Nagorno-
Karabakh, and the Baltics.
Looking Ahead
On December 18, 1992, at the fourth NACC ministerial in Brussels,
ministers adopted a new work plan focusing on practical projects and
including a provision for joint planning and training for peace-keeping. They
expressed strong approval of CSCE efforts to resolve peacefully hostilities
in the former Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Moldova. The
Council also discussed ways to increase participation by the former Soviet
states of Central Asia and the Caucasus and welcomed the future
membership of separate Czech and Slovak states in the NACC as of January
1, 1993.
As it begins its second year, NACC already has established itself as an
important element in post-Cold War Europe's security architecture. It will
continue to develop as a complement to other European and trans-Atlantic
organizations forging the links of a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous
Euro-Atlantic community of nations. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992
Title: US-UK Policy on the Former Yugoslavia
Bush
Major
Source: President Bush, Prime Minister Major
Description: Text of a joint statement issued by the United States
and the United Kingdom and released by the White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Camp David, Maryland. Prime
Minister Major visited the United States on December 18-20,
1992.
Date: Dec, 20 199212/20/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: USSR (former), United Kingdom, United States,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights
[TEXT]
The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom have agreed as follows.
The objectives of our policy are:
a) to work for a peaceful and just settlement in the former Yugoslavia;
b) to prevent the spread of fighting in particular to Kosovo and Macedonia;
c) to maintain the humanitarian aid effort which includes over 2,000
British troops and without which many more lives will be lost this winter.
The President and Prime Minister paid tribute to the work of the United
Nations in the former Yugoslavia and to the courage and dedication of the
troops who are ensuring that convoys get through. They welcomed the
success of the UN and its agencies, despite all the odds, in delivering large
quantities of aid to those in need. They agreed on the importance of enabling
that effort to go ahead.
The United States and the United Kingdom have agreed to cooperate on a
Resolution in the United Nations to enforce compliance with the 'no-fly'
zone for Bosnia should violation of the existing ban continue. The aim of the
resolution would be to prevent flights taking place other than those
specifically authorized by the United Nations.
The President and the Prime Minister:
a) agreed that steps need to be taken to prevent the spread of fighting into
Kosovo and Macedonia;
b) welcomed the decision to deploy UN troops in Macedonia and hoped that
this UN presence would be stepped up over the coming weeks;
c) agreed also to press for the very early increase in the numbers of
observers in Kosovo;
d) agreed that our attitude to sanctions would depend on a rapid and radical
change of policy by Serbia;
e) confirmed that they would be ready, depending on Serbia's response, to
impose new sanctions. They could initially include cutting postal and
telecommunication links and could lead to closing the borders and complete
diplomatic isolation for years to come.
The President and the Prime Minister paid tribute to the work of Cy Vance
and David Owen in trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement in the former
Yugoslavia. Both Governments will continue to give the negotiators their
full support. (###)
Dispatch, Volume 4: 1993
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Signing of the North American Free Trade
Agreement
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address at signing ceremony of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, Organization of American States (OAS),
Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: Canada, Mexico, United States
Subject: North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
(introductory and closing remarks deleted)
Throughout history, the destiny of nations has often been shaped by change
and by chance. When I say chance, I'm talking about things that happen to
them. Then there are those unique nations which shape their destinies by
choice, by the things that they make happen. Three such nations come
together today: Mexico, Canada, and the United States.
By signing the North American Free Trade Agreement, we've committed
ourselves to a better future for our children and for generations yet unborn.
This agreement will remove barriers to trade and investment across the two
largest undefended borders of the globe and link the United States in a
permanent partnership of growth with our first and third largest trading
partners. The peace and friendship that we've long enjoyed as neighbors
will now be strengthened by the explosion of growth and trade let loose by
the combined energies of our 360 million citizens trading freely across our
borders.
I want to pay a personal tribute to my partners in this endeavor; two rare
and gifted leaders, two special and valued friends without whose courage
and leadership and vision this day could not possibly have come about. When
the history of our era is written, it will be said that the citizens of all the
Americas were truly fortunate that Mexico and Canada--two great nations,
two proud people--were led by President Carlos Salinas and Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney.
For Mexico, particularly, the NAFTA is a bold undertaking, made possible by
President Salinas' brave reforms to reinvigorate the Mexican economy.
It's especially fitting [that] an American president sign this agreement in
this great Hall of the Americas, the home of the Organization of American
States. NAFTA represents the first giant step toward fulfillment of a
dream that has long inspired us all--the dream of a hemisphere united by
economic cooperation and free competition.
Because of what we have begun here today, I believe the time will soon
come when trade is free from Alaska to Argentina; when every citizen of the
Americas has the opportunity to share in new growth and expanding
prosperity.
I hope and trust that the North American free trade area can be extended to
Chile, other worthy partners in South America, and Central America and the
Caribbean. Free trade throughout the Americas is an idea whose time has
come. A new generation of democratic leaders has staked its future on that
promise, and under their leadership, a tide of economic reform and trade
liberalization is transforming the hemisphere.
Today, as a result, the hemisphere is growing again. For the first time in
years, more capital is flowing into the Americas for new investment than is
flowing out. Every major debtor nation, from Mexico to Argentina, has
negotiated a successful agreement to reduce and restructure its commercial
bank debt under the Brady Plan.
Let me just offer a brief aside about the Brady Plan, if I might. I remember
telling my good friend, Nick Brady, our Secretary of the Treasury: Okay,
we'll call it the Brady Plan; but if it's successful, we're going to call it the
Bush Plan. [Laughter.] And he reluctantly accepted that guidance.
I think history will show that the leadership of our distinguished Secretary
of the Treasury did pay off and [that] the plan has been highly successful. By
the way, the name will always be, appropriately, the Brady Plan. That's the
way it's going to stay.
Now, under the Enterprise for the Americas [Initiative (EAI)], many nations-
-Jamaica, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay--have reduced, or
shortly will reduce, their official debt with the United States. EAI is
working. The initiative allows interest payments on official debt to be
channeled into trust funds that protect the environment and support
programs for child survival.
To those in other regions struggling to reform statist economies, Latin
America shines as a solid example of hope that hyperinflation can be tamed.
Growth can be revitalized, and new investment and trade can accelerate if
developing nations stay the course through the difficult challenge of
economic restructuring.
These profound economic changes are a tribute to a courageous group of
democratic leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean. Their revolutionary
vision has altered forever the face of the Americas. Their friendship and
counsel have been enormously gratifying to me as President. But these
profound changes, along with the NAFTA itself, reflect a broader and, I
believe, more fundamental change in relations between the United States
and the nations of this hemisphere.
For many decades, we've proclaimed ambitious goals for ourselves of a good
neighbor policy, of an alliance for progress, of a partnership built on mutual
respect and shared responsibility. And those goals now are rapidly
becoming a reality.
My talks with the hemisphere's leaders, in recent weeks, show a strong
consensus that relations between the United States and its neighbors have
never in our history been better and that this development is working to
benefit all of our peoples. I take great pride in the fact that, working with
those leaders, we've been a part of all of that.
I believe that, in the future, America's relations with Latin America and the
Caribbean will grow even stronger. I was pleased to hear President-elect
Bill Clinton affirm that same goal in his remarks recently, both to the Rio
Group and to the Caribbean/Latin American Action conference.
This century's epic struggle between totalitarianism and democracy is over.
It's dead. Democracy has prevailed. And today, we see unfolding around the
world a revolution of hope and courage, propelled by the aspiration of
ordinary people for freedom and a better life.
The world will long remember the images of that struggle: a citizen of
Berlin, sitting atop the Wall, chipping away with his hammer and chisel;
Boris Yeltsin and his followers waving the flag of free Russia and defying
the tanks and coup plotters. And here in this hall, it is worth remembering
that those images were preceded by a democratic revolution in Latin
America. No people struggled for freedom against oppression more bravely
than the people of this hemisphere. And, here, too, in the Americas, we are
constructing a hopeful model of the new post-Cold War world of which we
dream.
This is the first hemisphere, and the OAS is the first regional organization
in the world to take on, through the Santiago Declaration, the formal
collective responsibility to defend democracy. In this hemisphere, the
weapons of mass destruction--strategic missiles as well as nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons--have been rejected voluntarily. In this
hemisphere, we've created new models of multilateral cooperation and
success in resolving the conflicts that have tormented Central America.
As recent proof of the progress we've made, just 2 days ago we celebrated-
-and I'm sure everyone did--the end of the war in El Salvador [see p. 8]. In
this hemisphere, we have forged a new partnership to defeat the global
menace of narco-trafficking, and we must succeed in that effort. Still,
we're not satisfied. The birth of democracy has raised expectations
throughout the Americas, and now democracy must deliver. The
communications revolution has opened the eyes of this hemisphere's
citizens to the wider world. We're no longer blind to limits on legitimate
political participation, to official corruption, or to economic favoritism.
If democracy is to be consolidated, the gulfs that separate the few who are
very rich from the many who are very poor, that divide civilian from
military institutions, that split citizens of European heritage from
indigenous peoples--these gulfs must be bridged, and economic reform must
ensure upward mobility and new opportunities for a better life for all
citizens of the Americas.
To fulfill its promise, democratic government must guarantee not only the
right to regular elections but human rights and property rights, swift and
impartial justice, and the rule of law. Democratic governments must
deliver basic services. Their institutions must be strengthened and must be
modernized. To defend democracy successfully, the OAS must strengthen
the tools at its disposal. I commend the new steps that you took this week
to suspend non-democratic regimes. Together, we must also create new
means to end historic border disputes and to control the competition in
conventional weaponry.
In all of this, I believe my country, the United States of America, bears a
special responsibility. We face a moment of maximum opportunity, but also,
let's face it, continued risk. And we must remain engaged, for more than
ever before our future is bound up with the future of the Americas.
This is the fastest growing region in the world for US products. In the
struggle to defend democracy, our most cherished values are at stake.
Travel to Miami or El Paso, Los Angeles or Chicago or New York, and listen to
the language of our neighborhoods. We are tied to the Americas--not just by
geography, not just by history, but by who we are as a people. No one knows
that more profoundly than this proud grandfather.
This year marks the 500th anniversary of a voyage of discovery to the New
World. Let this also be a time of rediscovery for my country, the United
States, of the importance of our own hemisphere. If we are equal to the
challenges before us, we can build in the Americas the world's first
completely democratic hemisphere. Just think about that: think of the
importance; think of the significance; think of the example for the rest of
the world.
This hemisphere can be as well a zone of peace, where trade flows freely,
prosperity is shared, the rule of law is respected, and the gift of human
knowledge is harnessed for all.
More than 150 years ago, Simon Bolivar, the liberator whose statue stands
outside this hall, spoke about an America united in heart, subject to one law
and guided by the torch of liberty. My friends, here in this hemisphere we
are on the way to realizing Simon Bolivar's dream. And, today, with the
signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, we take another giant
step toward making the dream a reality.
Copies of NAFTA Treaty:
Copies of the official text may be obtained from the Government Printing
Office for $41 each. The US Canadian, and Mexican tariff schedules also are
available for purchase (prices vary). To place an order, call (202) 783-
3238.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Country Profile: Canada
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jan, 4 19931/4/93
Category: Country Data
Region: North America
Country: Canada
Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics,
Cultural Exchange, Democratization
[TEXT]
Official Name: Canada
Geography
Area: 10 million sq. km. (3.8 million sq. mi.); second-largest country in the
world.
Cities: Capital--Ottawa (pop. 833,000). Other major cities--Toronto (4
million), Montreal (3 million), Vancouver (1 million).
Terrain: Varied.
Climate: Temperate to arctic.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Canadian(s).
Population (1991 est.): 27 million.
Annual growth rate (1991): 1%.
Ethnic groups: British 25%, French 24%, other European 16%, indigenous
Indian and Eskimo 1.5%, mixed background 28%.
Religions: Roman Catholic 47%, United Church 16%, Anglican 10%.
Languages: English, French.
Literacy: 98% of population aged 15 and over have at least a ninth grade
education.
Health: Infant mortality rate--7/1,000. Life expectancy--73 yrs. male, 80
yrs. female.
Work force (13.8 million, 1991): Community/business/personal service--4
million. Manufacturing--2 million. Public administration--800,000.
Agriculture--400,000.
Government
Type: Confederation with parliamentary democracy.
Independence: July 1, 1867.
Constitution: The amended British North America Act of 1867 as
"repatriated" in 1982, charter of rights, and unwritten custom.
Branches: Executive--Queen Elizabeth II (head of state, represented by a
governor general), prime minister (head of government), cabinet.
Legislative--bicameral parliament (104-member Senate, 295-member
House of Commons). Judicial--Supreme Court.
Political parties: Progressive
Conservative (ruling party), Liberal, New Democratic, Reform, Bloc
Quebecois.
Subdivisions: 10 provinces, 2 territories.
Suffrage: Universal over 18.
Flag: A red maple leaf on a white background flanked by vertical red bands.
Economy
GDP (1991): $580 billion.
GDP growth rate (1991): -1.7%.
Per capita GDP (1991): $21,500.
Avg. inflation rate (1991): 5.6%.
Natural resources: Petroleum and natural gas, hydroelectric power, metals
and minerals, fish, forests, wildlife.
Agriculture: Products--wheat, livestock and meat, feed-grains, oilseeds,
dairy products, tobacco, fruits, vegetables.
Industry: Types--motor vehicles and parts, fish and forest products,
processed and unprocessed minerals.
Trade (1991): Exports--$127 billion: motor vehicles and parts, lumber,
wood-pulp and newsprint, crude and fabricated metals, natural gas, crude
petroleum, wheat. Partners--US 75%, EC 8%, Japan 5%. Imports--$122
billion: motor vehicles and parts, industrial machinery, crude petroleum,
chemicals, agricultural machinery. Partners--US 61%, EC 10%, Japan 7%.
Principal Government Officials
Prime Minister--Brian Mulroney
Secretary of State--Barbara McDougall
Ambassador to the US--Derek Burney
Ambassador to the UN--Louise Frechette (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Country Profile: Mexico
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jan, 4 19931/4/93
Category: Country Data
Region: North America
Country: Mexico
Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics,
Cultural Exchange, Democratization
[TEXT]
Official Name: United Mexican States
Geography
Area: 2 million sq. km. (764,000 sq. mi.); about three times the size of
Texas.
Cities: Capital--Mexico City (est. 20 million). Other major cities--
Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla de Zaragoza, Leon.
Terrain: Coastal lowlands, central high plateaus, and mountains up to
18,000 ft.
Climate: Tropical to desert.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Mexican(s).
Population (1991): 89 million.
Annual growth rate: 2%.
Ethnic groups: Indian-Spanish (Mestizo) 60%, American Indian 30%,
Caucasian 9%, other 1%.
Religions: Roman Catholic 90%, Protestant 5%, other 5%.
Language: Spanish.
Education: Years compulsory--8. Literacy--90%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--30/1,000. Life expectancy--68 yrs. male, 76
yrs. female.
Work force (30 million): Services--30%. Agriculture, forestry, hunting,
fishing--24%. Manufacturing--19%. Commerce--13%. Construction--7%.
Transportation and communication--4%. Mining and quarrying--0.4%.
Government
Type: Federal republic.
Independence: First proclaimed Sept. 16, 1810; republic established 1822.
Constitution: Feb. 5, 1917.
Branches: Executive--president (chief of state and head of government).
Legislative--bicameral. Judicial--Supreme Court, local and federal
systems.
Political parties: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action
Party (PAN), Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), Popular Socialist
Party (PPS), Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), Party of the
Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction (PFCRN).
Suffrage: Universal at 18.
Administrative subdivisions: 31 states and a federal district.
Flag: Green, white, and red vertical bands. Centered is an eagle holding a
snake in its beak and perching on a cactus.
Economy
GDP (1991): $282 billion.
Per capita GDP: $3,200.
Annual real GDP growth: 3.6%.
Avg. inflation rate: 19%.
Natural resources: Petroleum, silver, copper, gold, zinc, lead, natural gas,
timber.
Agriculture: Products--corn, beans, oilseeds, feedgrains, fruit, cotton,
coffee, sugarcane, winter vegetables.
Industry: Types--manufacturing, services, commerce, transportation and
communications, petroleum and mining.
Trade (1991): Exports--$27 billion: manufacturing 59%, petroleum and
derivatives 30%, agriculture 9%. Imports--$38 billion: intermediate goods
63%, capital goods 22%, consumer goods 15%. Major trading partners--US,
EC, Japan. US imports--$30 billion.
Principal Government Officials
President--Carlos Salinas de Gortari
Foreign Minister--Fernando Solana Morales
Ambassador-designate to the United States--Jorge Montano Martinez
Ambassador-designate to the United Nations--Manuel Tello Macias
Ambassador to the OAS--Alejandro Carrillo Castro (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: President's Remarks on START II and Somalia Trip
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Description: Opening remarks before the press at the White House,
Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 30 199212/30/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Russia, Somalia
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
I have just spoken this morning by telephone with Russian President Boris
Yeltsin, and I am very pleased to announce that we have completed
agreement on the START II Treaty [the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms].
US and Russian expert teams are remaining in Geneva now to complete the
formal work on the treaty text. This historic treaty will reduce by two-
thirds current nuclear arsenals and will dramatically lower the numbers of
strategic nuclear arms permitted by START I [the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty signed on July 31, 1991]. In my view, this treaty is good for all
mankind.
President Yeltsin and I have agreed to meet in Sochi, Russia, on January 2
and 3 [1993], where we will sign the treaty.1 I want to take this
opportunity to congratulate the team standing here with me today--
[Secretary of State] Larry Eagleburger, Secretary [of Defense] Cheney,
Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Powell, and others who have done a
superb job on this treaty.
We're going to use the occasion of the meeting in Sochi to consider a number
of bilateral and regional issues and then to discuss ways to fulfill the
promise and the potential of US-Russian relations.
Let me just say a word about our trip to Somalia. The trip, I hope, will show
the concern that all Americans feel for the people of Somalia and for their
condition. These are humanitarian concerns. In my view, it is proper that
the President show this concern to the people over there.
I also want to make very clear how strongly we support our troops that are
over there. They're doing a first-class job. I've had a good briefing from
General Powell and Secretary Cheney. I just can't tell you how proud I am of
the young men and women that are serving halfway around the world in this
great humanitarian cause.
We've tried to keep Governor [President-elect] Clinton closely advised--
informed--on the Somalia trip and, obviously, on the arms control
agreement. So I think these are both important events--the trip to Sochi
and the trip to Somalia.
1 Editor's note: Location subsequently was changed to Moscow, Russia.
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: START II Treaty To Be Signed
Fitzwater
Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 1 19931/1/93
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia, United States
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
On January 3, 1993, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin will sign the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
The treaty, often called START [Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty] II,
codifies the Joint Understanding signed by both Presidents at the
Washington summit on June 17, 1992. It will eliminate the most
destabilizing strategic weapons--heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and all other multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVed) ICBMs. It also will reduce by two-thirds below current levels the
total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both countries.
The treaty includes a Protocol on Elimination or Conversion concerning
heavy ICBMs and heavy ICBM silos, a Protocol on Exhibition and Inspection
concerning heavy bombers, and a Memorandum of Attribution.
Relationship to the START Treaty
START II builds upon the START Treaty signed on July 31, 1991, between the
United States and the Soviet Union but calls for far greater reductions in
strategic nuclear forces. All START provisions will pertain, except as
explicitly modified in the new treaty. Because of the close relationship
between the two treaties, START II cannot enter into force before the
START Treaty [see Background on START, p. 7]. It also will remain in force
throughout the duration of START.
Central Limits
The treaty sets equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear weapons
that can be deployed by either side. Ceilings are set for two phases: Phase
One to be completed 7 years after entry-into-force of the START Treaty
[START I] and Phase Two to be completed by the year 2003. Phase Two may
be completed by the end of the year 2000 if the United States can help
finance the elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia. The treaty
sets ranges for some of the central limits.
Phase One. By the end of this phase, each side must have reduced its total
deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250. These include the
number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) as well as the number of warheads for which heavy
bombers with nuclear missions are equipped.
Of the total 3,800-4,250 warheads, no more than 1,200 may be on deployed
MIRVed ICBMs, no more than 2,160 on deployed SLBMs, and no more than 650
on deployed heavy ICBMs.
Phase Two. By the end of the second phase, each side must have reduced its
total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500. Of those, none
may be on MIRVed ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs. Thus, all MIRVed ICBMs
must be eliminated from each side's deployed forces; only ICBMs carrying a
single warhead will be allowed. No more than 1,700-1,750 deployed
warheads may be on SLBMs. There will be no prohibition on MIRVed SLBMs.
Downloading
The treaty allows for a reduction in the number of warheads on certain
ballistic missiles. Such "downloading" is permitted in a carefully
structured fashion, modifying the rules agreed in START.
-- Each side is able to download two existing types of ballistic missiles by
up to four warheads each, in addition to the US Minuteman III and the
Russian SS-N-18. There are no aggregate limits on the number of warheads
that can be downloaded.
-- A limit of 105 ICBMs of one of those types may be downloaded by up to
five warheads each. Such an ICBM may only be deployed in silos in which it
was deployed at the time of START signature.
Thus, the three-warhead US Minuteman III ICBM, the four-warhead Russian
SS-17 ICBM, and 105 of the six-warhead Russian SS-19 ICBMs are able to be
downloaded to a single warhead, to comply with the requirement to
eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs. The US Peacekeeper ICBM and the Russian SS-
18 heavy ICBM and SS-24 ICBM, each of which carry 10 warheads, and the
remaining SS-19 ICBMs must all be eliminated, in accordance with START
procedures.
Missile System Elimination
In START, deployed SLBMs and most deployed ICBMs may be removed from
accountability either by destroying their launchers (silos for fixed ICBMs,
mobile launchers for mobile ICBMs, and launcher sections of submarines for
SLBMs), or by converting those launchers so that they can carry only another
type of permitted missile. The one exception is the SS-18. Under START,
the requirement to eliminate 154 deployed SS-18s must be met through silo
destruction, not conversion.
In the START II Treaty, those rules generally continue to apply. The major
exception is the SS-18. Ninety SS-18 silos may be converted to carry a
single-warhead missile, which Russia has said will be an SS-25 type. The
treaty lays out specific procedures, including on-site inspections, to ensure
that those converted silos will never again be able to launch a heavy ICBM.
The remaining 64 SS-18 silos subject to this treaty will have to be
destroyed.
In exchange for the right to retain up to 90 converted SS-18 silos, the
treaty requires that all SS-18 missiles and canisters, both deployed and
non-deployed, be eliminated no later than January 1, 2003. This is a major
change from the START Treaty. Generally, START did not seek destruction
of missiles. In START II, the Russians have agreed to eliminate all SS-18
missiles, both deployed and non-deployed. This fully achieves a long-
standing US goal to eliminate completely heavy ICBMs.
Heavy Bombers
In START, nuclear heavy bombers are subject to more flexible counting rules
than are ballistic missiles. Each heavy bomber equipped to carry only short-
range missiles or gravity bombs counts as one warhead. US heavy bombers
equipped to carry long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)
each count as 10 warheads, and Soviet heavy bombers equipped to carry
long-range nuclear ALCMs each count as
8 warheads.
In START II, heavy bombers will be counted using the number of nuclear
weapons--whether long-range nuclear ALCMs, short-range missiles, or
gravity bombs--for which they are actually equipped. This number is
specified in the treaty's Memorandum on Attribution and will be confirmed
by a one-time exhibition and by routine START on-site inspections.
Another new feature of this treaty is the provision that a maximum of 100
heavy bombers that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as
long-range-nuclear-ALCM heavy bombers may be reoriented to a
conventional role. Such bombers will not count against the treaty warhead
limits. They will be based separately from heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear weapons, will be used only for non-nuclear missions, and will have
observable differences from other heavy bombers of the same type that are
not reoriented to a conventional role. Such heavy bombers may be returned
to a nuclear role after 3 months' notification, but then may not be
reoriented again to a conventional role.
Verification
The comprehensive START verification regime continues to apply to the new
treaty. In addition, START II includes some new verification measures, such
as observation of SS-18 silo conversion and missile elimination procedures,
exhibitions, and inspections of all heavy bombers to confirm weapon loads,
and exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role to
confirm their observable differences.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Background on START
Fitzwater
Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 1 19931/1/93
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia, United States, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus,
USSR (former)
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
On July 31, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded almost a
decade of arduous and complex negotiations by signing the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty. The treaty was the first to call for significant reductions
in the deployed strategic nuclear forces of the two countries.
The START Treaty includes a number of Agreed Statements; Protocols; the
Definitions Annex; a Memorandum of Understanding on data; and related
agreements, letters, and supporting documents. Together, they cover not
only weapons limits but also counting rules; conversion or elimination of
weapons; verification and inspections; cooperative measures; the creation
of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission; and procedures for the
treaty's entry-into-force, amendment, duration, and withdrawal.
On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and the
Commonwealth of Independent States was established. Four independent
states with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory also came into
existence--Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.
Following extensive high-level negotiations, these four newly independent
states and the United States reached agreement on May 23, 1992, in Lisbon,
Portugal, on how they would all adhere to the START Treaty. The agreement
was codified in a new Protocol to START that makes all five states parties
to the treaty. Under the terms of the Protocol, the four new independent
states will make the necessary implementing arrangements among
themselves to carry out their responsibilities under START. In addition,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus committed to join the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states in the shortest
possible time. Russia remains a nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. In
legally binding letters to President Bush, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
also committed to eliminate all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive
arms from their territories within the 7-year START reduction period.
The US Congress and the parliaments of the Russian Federation and
Kazakhstan have since consented to START ratification. We look to early
similar action by the parliaments of Ukraine and Belarus, and to the rapid
adherence by Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to the NPT as non-nuclear
weapon states.
Comparison of Central Limits Set by START Treaties I and II
START START II START II
Phase One Phase Two
Total strategic warheads 6,000 3,800-4,250 3,000-3,500
accountable actual actual
Ballistic missile warhead 4,900 No specific No specific
sublimit sublimit
MIRVed ICBM warheads N/A 1,200 0
SLBM warheads N/A 2,160 1,700-1,750
Heavy ICBM warheads 1,540 650 0
Mobile ICBM warheads 1,100 START applies START applies
Total Strategic Nuclear 1,600 START applies START applies
Delivery Vehicles (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Implementation of Peace Accords In El Salvador
Quayle
Source: Vice President Quayle
Description: Address at the ceremony concluding implementation of
the peace accords, San Salvador, El Salvador
Date: Dec, 15 199212/15/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: El Salvador
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest,
Human Rights
[TEXT]
This is a great moment in the history of this nation and Central America.
And it is a great moment for the people of El Salvador. I am enormously
proud to be here with you and to bring you greetings from President Bush and
the American people.
At a time of year when the words "peace on earth" carry such special
meaning, we meet to celebrate a new commitment to peace in a land that
has seen too much sadness, too much suffering, and too much loss.
Men and women who once met on the field of battle now stand together as
one in their devotion to the democratic process. We share your joy and your
fresh hopes for the future on this day of national reconciliation.
National reconciliation in El Salvador embodies the hopes of all peoples.
With the end of superpower confrontation, and the active involvement of the
United Nations in the cause of peace, we hope to see a further decline in the
use of force to solve international problems. This is the promise of the new
world order.
My country's 16th President, Abraham Lincoln, once said that the ballot is
stronger than the bullet. History proves the wisdom of those words.
Democratic principles are the key to protecting individual rights; advancing
economic prosperity; and preserving the precious gift of peace.
Many observers said this day would never come. Some said that peace and
justice could only come from the barrel of a gun; others said peace could
only be attained by trampling on human rights and liberties. Both were
wrong. The guns are stilled today because democracy and human rights have
triumphed.
There are many here who deserve our gratitude for this achievement. First,
we must thank the negotiators on both sides who stepped forward in good
faith and carried out their duty with great skill. And we must pay a special
tribute to one man who is known around the world as the person who brought
peace to El Salvador, President Alfredo Cristiani. Mr. President, you will be
honored in the pages of history for all you have done to bring peace to your
people.
We thank the United Nations, and Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, for
patience and determination in this process. We also salute the Organization
of American States, and the Four Friends: Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and
Spain--whose leaders and governments played such a crucial role in the
success of the peace process.
Finally, we thank the courageous people of El Salvador, who have long prayed
that this day would come. Through all your struggles, you were sustained by
an unyielding determination to be free--and by your deep faith in the
Almighty. Today, your hopes for the triumph of democracy have been
realized. Today, your prayers for peace have been answered.
The American people are proud to extend the hand of friendship to all of you,
regardless of which side you took in the past conflict. We will continue to
support your efforts to rebuild this nation and fulfill both the letter and the
spirit of the peace accords. As a measure of our commitment, today I am
pleased to sign with your President an agreement that forgives 75% of El
Salvador's official debt to the United States.
A very dark era ends today, and a bright new one begins. You are building a
new country founded in peace and national reconciliation--and a new, more
hopeful future in which all your citizens can share. As you take these first
steps together, let me again share with you the words of our President
Lincoln, uttered near the end of America's civil war:
With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as
God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in;
to bind up the nation's wounds . . . to do all which may achieve and cherish a
just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.
Editor's note: See Joint US-Russia Statement on El Salvador. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Murder of Israeli Policeman
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Stockholm, Sweden
Date: Dec, 15 199212/15/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Terrorism
[TEXT]
We are very troubled and saddened by the violence in the territories, the
casualties among both Palestinians and Israelis, and now the kidnaping and
murder of an Israeli border policeman.
Some extremist groups like Hamas want to destroy any possibility of peace.
They offer no hope for the future except more violence and tragedy.
We should not give in to the extremists. The pathway to a different, more
hopeful future for Israelis and Palestinians lies in working out
understandings and agreements in their negotiations.
The current violence should give everyone a new sense of urgency in making
progress.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Cuba: Continuing Crackdown On Human Rights
Activists
Boucher
Description: Statement, released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 16 199212/16/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Cuba
Subject: Human Rights
[TEXT]
The US Government strongly condemns the Cuban regime's continuing
crackdown against those who have advocated respect for human rights and
peaceful democratic change. This campaign of repression began on
December 10, UN International Human Rights Day, after activists' attempts
to call for legalization of human rights groups and a democratic opening.
The regime's violent reaction to their desire for free speech and the right to
organize shows absolute intolerance for peaceful dissent and a
determination to maintain total control. We call on the Cuban Government
to release human rights activists Elizardo Sanchez and Rodolfo Gonzalez and
to stop its harassment and abuse of Cubans who advocate peaceful change.
The latest inhumane outrage in this campaign is the "cordoning off" of
human rights leaders' homes. Cuban authorities allow no one to enter or
leave; those inside suffer de facto house arrest. This has happened at the
homes of Elizardo Sanchez, Gustavo Arcos, and Vladimir Gonzalez. In
addition to this, water, gas, and electricity were cut off at the homes of
Vladimiro Roca and Alvaro Prendes. Cuban police are stationed in front of
the homes of Francisco Chaviano, Oswaldo Paya, and Aida Valdez.
As we noted on December 11, Cuban police severely beat and arrested
Elizardo Sanchez, President of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and
National Reconciliation, December 10. Although he reportedly suffers from
cracked ribs and a broken jaw, he has been moved from a hospital to a
facility for common criminals. Sanchez is still in police custody. Also last
Thursday, plainclothes police directed a mob that severely beat Cuban
Committee for Human Rights (CCPDH) activist Jesus Yanes Pelletier outside
Gustavo Arcos' home. Rodolfo Gonzalez, and executive member of the CCPDH,
was also arrested and charged with disseminating enemy propaganda and
possession of foreign currency.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Secretary Eagleburger Meets With Kosovo Leader
Eagleburger
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Brussels, Belgium
Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Albania, Serbia-Montenegro
Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest,
Democratization
[TEXT]
Secretary of State Eagleburger met on December 17, 1992, in Brussels
(following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council) with Dr. Ibrahim
Rugova, leader of the Albanian community of Kosovo.
Secretary Eagleburger assured Dr. Rugova of the deep friendship and respect
of the American people for the people of Kosovo. He emphasized the
understanding of the American people and government for the difficult
circumstances of the Albanian people of Kosovo as a consequence of the
repressive policies followed by the Government of Serbia.
The Secretary emphasized US support for peace and stability in Kosovo. He
called to Dr. Rugova's attention the strong statement issued earlier that day
by the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Council. Secretary
Eagleburger said this statement demonstrated the growing interest of the
world community in the situation in Kosovo. He also reaffirmed the US
intention to provide $5 million in humanitarian assistance to the people of
Kosovo.
Dr. Rugova described for Secretary Eagleburger recent developments in
Kosovo. He assured the Secretary of State that the people of Kosovo would
continue to use only peaceful means to gain the restoration of their
political and economic rights. Secretary Eagleburger praised Dr. Rugova's
responsible and moderate leadership under difficult conditions.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Israeli Deportations
Boucher
Description: Released by the Office of the Acting Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 18 199212/18/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel, Lebanon
Subject: Human Rights
[TEXT]
We understand that the Israeli Supreme Court decided that the government
could proceed with the order to deport over 400 Palestinians to Lebanon and
that the government has now done so.
The United States understands the difficult security problems Israel faces
with terrorist attacks and that the Government of Israel has a right and a
duty to protect its citizens.
We are deeply troubled by the recent increase in violence in the territories
and by the Palestinian and Israeli casualties, including the murder of the
Israeli policeman by Hamas, and we strongly condemn it. We have called on
Arabs and Israelis to join us in condemning all forms of violence.
At the same time, we believe every government throughout the world has an
obligation to the fundamental principles of human rights, the rule of law,
and democratic practices.
We have, therefore, repeatedly urged the Government of Israel immediately
and permanently to cease deportations and to comply fully with the Fourth
Geneva Convention as it pertains to the treatment of inhabitants of the
occupied territories.
The United States believes that charges of wrongdoing should be brought
against specific individuals in a court of law based on evidence to be argued
in a fair trial which would afford full judicial process.
We, therefore, strongly condemn the action of deportation.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Presidential Decision on Military Sales to China
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 22 199212/22/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: China
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
The President has decided it is in our national interest to close out four
cases of suspended Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the People's Republic of
China (PRC). The President's decision means that, in the coming weeks, we
will return Chinese equipment sent to the United States under the FMS
programs, reimburse unused funds in China's FMS account, and make
available for shipment to China releasable equipment already purchased by
the Chinese in connection with these cases. The President's decision closes
out this arms sales agreement between the United States and China. We
have no plans for new arms sales to China.
Consistent with Public Law 101-246, which enacted into law certain of the
sanctions imposed by the President against China in June 1989, the
President has notified Congress of his decision. These four FMS programs
were suspended to demonstrate our deep concern about the tragic events in
China. We have made our point. We now believe that continuing to hold
aging items after a 31/2-year suspension hinders rather than helps US
efforts to promote cooperative PRC behavior in a range of areas.
The four suspended programs covered by this decision involve an avionics
upgrade for the Chinese F-8 aircraft, equipment for a munitions production
line, four anti-submarine torpedoes, and two artillery-locating radars. The
equipment will be delivered as is, with no follow-on support, repairs,
maintenance, or training by the United States. More specific information
about the four programs is available from the Department of Defense.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Equatorial Guinea
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 24 199212/24/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Equatorial Guinea
Subject: Human Rights, Democratization
[TEXT]
The United States is deeply concerned by the continuing repression of
political opposition in Equatorial Guinea. Over the last week, scores of
students, teachers, priests, and opposition activists have been rounded up on
the pretext that they were involved in a minor student disturbance at the
Malabo market. Many of the detainees have been badly beaten, often in the
presence of high-ranking officials of the Obiang regime. The regime refused
permission for the medical evacuation of some of the more badly injured
detainees.
The Government of Equatorial Guinea has repeatedly pledged itself to a
process of democratization; it has just as frequently violated those pledges.
The arrest and torture of innocent members of a non-violent opposition once
again demonstrates the government's lack of good faith.
The US ambassador has attempted to protest these latest acts of political
repression to the Government of Equatorial Guinea, but government officials
have refused to receive him in the absence of President Obiang from the
country.
We call upon the Government of Equatorial Guinea to release immediately all
political prisoners, to cease the torture in the prisons, to punish those
responsible for these abuses, and to compensate those persons unjustly
detained.
Further, the United States calls for the Government of Equatorial Guinea to
cease its thinly disguised threats of violence against US citizens, including
our ambassador. The United States reminds the Government of Equatorial
Guinea that we hold it directly responsible for the safety of all resident US
citizens, including missionaries, businessmen, technicians, and Peace Corps
volunteers, as well as diplomats.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Burmese Rohingya Refugees In Bangladesh
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 24 199212/24/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Burma, Bangladesh
Subject: Refugees, United Nations
[TEXT]
The US Government has received credible reports indicating that Bangladesh
is coercing Rohingya refugees to return to Burma and that the Government of
Bangladesh is denying UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] staff free
access to the Rohingya refugee camps, thereby preventing the UNHCR from
fulfilling its international mandate to protect refugees.
Over the past several months, we and UNHCR have repeatedly raised this
problem with the Government of Bangladesh. The US Government deplores
the use of coercion by the Government of Bangladesh. The United States also
deeply regrets that the Bangladesh Government and the UNHCR have not
agreed on an effective role for the UNHCR to protect the Rohingyas both in
the refugee camps in Bangladesh and during the repatriation process to
Burma.
The US Government calls upon the Government of Bangladesh to refrain from
coerced repatriation and to negotiate with the UNHCR as soon as possible an
effective protection role for [the] UNHCR.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Joint US-Russia Statement On El Salvador
Boucher
Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: El Salvador, Russia, United States
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the United
States Department of State have agreed to release the following joint
statement:
The Russian Federation and the United States, whose constructive
interaction on Central American issues the last several years has helped
defuse tensions in this area, note with great satisfaction that the peace
process in El Salvador started at Esquipulas and pursued further within the
framework of the Chapultepec accords has entered a promising new phase.
Russia and the United States applaud the political resolve displayed by the
Government of El Salvador and the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front] leadership, which overcame mutual distrust to implement the main
provisions of the Chapultepec accords. Russia and the United States are
grateful for the role played by the United Nations, above all its Secretary
General, and for the support given the peace process by Mexico, Spain,
Colombia, and Venezuela. The high level of representation at the
reconciliation ceremony December 15 bears testimony to the intention of
the international community to continue its support of the peace process.
As El Salvador moves forward to fully implement the peace accords and to
realize the full potential of progress to date, Russia and the United States
express confidence that the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN will
continue their dialogue and cooperation with the UN, show restraint, and
demonstrate renewed determination to achieve their country's
socioeconomic reconstruction. They reiterate their readiness to continue
to assist in this effort and express hope that other interested states and
international and regional organizations will offer their support.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993
Title: Elections in Serbia And Montenegro
Snyder
Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joseph Snyder
Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 29 199212/29/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro
Subject: Democratization, Human Rights
[TEXT]
Officials in Serbia and Montenegro have issued the final results of the
December 20 elections. After examining the pre-election period and the
conduct of the elections themselves, American and other Western election
monitors have concluded that the elections in Serbia and Montenegro failed
to meet international standards for a free and fair democratic process as
outlined in CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]
documents. We agree with their conclusions.
Serbia
In Serbia, the CSCE found the pre-election period was highly unfair. The
ruling party of Slobodan Milosevic abused its position to its own advantage
and to the disadvantage of the opposition parties.
-- The Serbian-run electronic media did not grant equal access to the
opposition. It refused to air some of the opposition's advertisements, and it
used news and information programs to campaign for the ruling party and
attack the opposition. This pattern led the representative of the CSCE's
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to conclude that the
government-run media in Serbia had been an instrument of "shameless
propaganda" during the pre-election period.
-- Serbian officials used bureaucratic obstacles to hinder the opposition's
ability to campaign.
On election day, American and other Western observers found major
irregularities.
-- Voter lists were manipulated so that many eligible voters were excluded
from voting.
-- In some places, members of opposition parties were not allowed to
participate on electoral commissions that processed the votes.
-- Provisions for voter privacy were inadequate.
-- Ballot boxes were not handled properly.
-- Voters were reportedly intimidated by the presence of police.
Montenegro
Electoral conditions in Montenegro, while not free of problems, were better.
The pre-election period in Montenegro included instances of intimidation of
the opposition and consistently favorable media access and coverage for the
ruling party.
Conclusion
We applaud the courage and determination of the democratic opposition
parties, which conducted vigorous campaigns under very adverse
circumstances.
We call on the appropriate judicial authorities to review the complaints
made by opposition parties and take the steps necessary to ensure that
Serbia and Montenegro meet their international obligations for the conduct
of free and fair elections.
We have a long history of friendship with the peoples of Serbia and
Montenegro. We are prepared to respond favorably to positive changes in
Serbian policies. As long as Serbia continues to pursue its present policies,
however, it will remain outside the community of nations and face
increasing pressure from sanctions and other steps from those of us who
are opposed to the aggression perpetrated by the Serbian Government. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993
Title: America's Role in the World
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address at the West Point Military Academy, West Point,
New York
Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Country: United States, Iraq, Somalia
Subject: Military Affairs, Arms Control
[TEXT]
(opening and closing remarks deleted)
I want to share with you at this institution of leadership some of my
thinking, both about the world you will soon be called upon to enter and the
life that you have chosen. Any President has several functions. He speaks
for and to the nation. He must faithfully execute the law. And he must lead.
But no function, none of the President's hats, in my view, is more important
than his role as Commander in Chief. For it is as Commander in Chief that
the President confronts and makes decisions that [in] one way or another
affect the lives of everyone in this country as well as many others around
the world.
I have had many occasions to don this most important of hats. Over the past
4 years, the men and women who proudly and bravely wear the uniforms of
the US armed services have been called upon to go in harm's way and have
discharged their duty with honor and professionalism.
I wish I could say that such demands were a thing of the past, that with the
end of the Cold War the calls upon the United States would diminish. I
cannot. Yes, the end of the Cold War, we would all concede, is a blessing. It
is a time of great promise. Democratic governments have never been so
numerous. What happened 2 or 3 days ago in Moscow would not have been
possible in the Cold War days. Thanks to historic treaties, such as that
START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] II pact just reached with Russia
[signed on January 3; see p. 20], the likelihood of nuclear holocaust is vastly
diminished.
But this does not mean that there is no specter of war, no threats to be
reckoned with. And already, we see disturbing signs of what this new world
could become if we are passive and aloof. We would risk the emergence of a
world characterized by violence--characterized by chaos--one in which
dictators and tyrants threaten their neighbors; build arsenals brimming
with weapons of mass destruction; and ignore the welfare of their own men,
women, and children. And we could see a horrible increase in international
terrorism, with American citizens more at risk than ever before.
We cannot and we need not allow this to happen. Our objective must be to
exploit the unparalleled opportunity presented by the Cold War's end--to
work toward transforming this new world into a new world order, one of
governments that are democratic, tolerant, and economically free at home
and committed abroad to settling inevitable differences peacefully, without
the threat or use of force.
Unfortunately, not every one sub-scribes to these principles. We continue to
see leaders bent on denying fundamental human rights and seizing territory
regardless of the human cost. No, an international society--one more
attuned to the enduring principles that have made this country a beacon of
hope for so many for so long--will not just emerge on its own. It's got to be
built.
Two hundred years ago, another departing President warned of the dangers
of what he described as "entangling alliances." His was the right course for
a new nation at that point in history. But what was "entangling" in
Washington's day is now essential. This is why, at Texas A∧M a few weeks
ago [see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 51, p. 893], I spoke of the folly of isolationism,
and of the importance--morally, economically, and strategically--of the
United States remaining involved in world affairs. We must engage
ourselves if a new world order, one more compatible with our values and
congenial to our interest, is to emerge. But even more, we must lead.
Leadership takes many forms; it can be political or diplomatic; it can be
economic or military; it can be moral or spiritual. Leadership can take any
one of these forms or it can be a combination of them.
Leadership should not be confused with either unilateralism or
universalism. We need not respond by ourselves to each and every outrage of
violence. The fact that America can act does not mean that it must. A
nation's sense of idealism need not be at odds with its interests. Nor does
principle displace prudence.
No, the United States should not seek to be the world's policeman. There is
no support abroad or at home for us to play this role. Nor should there be.
We would exhaust ourselves, in the process wasting precious resources
needed to address those problems at home and abroad that we cannot afford
to ignore.
But in the wake of the Cold War, in a world where we are the only remaining
superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its moral and
material resources to promote a democratic peace. It is our responsibility-
-it is our opportunity--to lead. There is no one else.
Leadership cannot be simply asserted or demanded; it must be demonstrated.
Leadership requires formulating worthy goals, persuading others of their
virtue, and contributing one's share of the common effort and then some.
Leadership takes time; it takes patience; it takes work.
Some of this work must take place here at home. Congress does have a
constitutional role to play. Leadership, therefore, also involves working
with the Congress and the American people to provide the essential
domestic underpinning if US military commitments are to be sustainable.
This is what our Administration has tried to do. When [Iraqi President]
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, it was the United States that galvanized
the UN Security Council to act and then mobilized the successful coalition
on the battlefield. The pattern [was] not exactly the same but [was] similar
in Somalia: first, the United States underscored the importance of
alleviating the growing tragedy, and then we organized humanitarian efforts
designed to bring hope, food, and peace.
At times, real leadership requires a willingness to use military force. And
force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it, or--if need
be--a temporary alternative.
As Commander in Chief, I have made the difficult choice to use military
force. I determined we could not allow Saddam's forces to ravage Kuwait
and hold this critical region at gunpoint. I thought then, and I think now,
that using military force to implement the resolutions of the UN Security
Council was in the interest of the United States and the world community.
The need to use force arose as well in the wake of the Gulf war, when we
came to the aid of the peoples of both northern and southern Iraq. More
recently, as I'm sure you know, I determined that only the use of force could
stem this human tragedy of Somalia.
The United States should not stand by with so many lives at stake and when
a limited deployment of US forces, buttressed by the forces of other
countries and acting under the full authority of the United Nations, could
make an immediate and dramatic difference and do so without excessive
levels of risk and cost. Operations Provide Comfort and Southern Watch in
Iraq and then Operation Restore Hope in Somalia all bear witness to the
wisdom of selected use of force for selective purposes.
Sometimes the decision not to use force--to stay our hand--I can tell you,
it's just as difficult as the decision to send our soldiers into battle. The
former Yugoslavia--well, it's been such a situation. There are, we all know,
important humanitarian and strategic interests at stake there. But up to
now, it's not been clear that the application of limited amounts of force by
the United States and its traditional friends and allies would have had the
desired effect given the nature and complexity of that situation.
Our assessment of the situation in the former Yugoslavia could well change
if and as the situation changes. The stakes could grow; the conflict could
threaten to spread. Indeed, we are constantly reassessing our options and
are actively consulting with others about steps that might be taken to
contain the fighting, protect the humanitarian effort, and deny Serbia the
fruits of aggression.
Military force is never a tool to be used lightly or universally; in some
circumstances, it may be essential--in others, counterproductive. I know
that many people would like to find some easy formula to apply, to tell us
with precision when and where to intervene with force. Anyone looking for
scientific certitude is in for a disappointment. In the complex new world
we are entering, there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using
force. Inevitably, the question of military intervention requires judgment;
each and every case is unique. To adopt rigid criteria would guarantee
mistakes involving American interests and American lives. And it would
give would-be troublemakers a blueprint for determining their own actions;
it could signal US friends and allies that our support was not to be counted
on.
And, similarly, we cannot always decide in advance which interests will
require our using military force to protect them. The relative importance of
an interest is not a guide: Military force may not be the best way of
safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to
protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital.
But to warn against a futile quest for a set of hard and fast rules to govern
the use of military force is not to say there cannot be some principles to
form our decisions. Such guidelines can prove useful in sizing and, indeed,
shaping our forces and in helping us to think our way through this key
question.
Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant,
where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to
prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and
where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.
Once we are satisfied that force makes sense, we must act with the
maximum possible support. The United States can and should lead, but we
will want to act in concert, where possible, involving the United Nations or
other multinational grouping. The United States can and should contribute
to the common undertaking in a manner commensurate with our wealth, with
our strength. But others should also contribute militarily, be it by providing
combat or support forces, access to facilities or bases, or overflight rights.
And similarly, others should contribute economically; it is unreasonable to
expect the United States to bear the full financial burden of intervention
when other nations have a stake in the outcome.
A desire for international support must not become a prerequisite for
acting, though. Sometimes, a great power has to act alone. I made a tough
decision--I might say on advice of our outstanding military leaders who are
so well known to everybody here--to use military force in Panama, when
American lives and the security of the canal appeared to be threatened by
outlaws who stole power in the face of free elections. And similarly, we
moved swiftly to safeguard democracy in the Philippines.
But in every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to have a
clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the
mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing US forces once the
mission is complete. Only if we keep these principles in mind will the
potential sacrifice be one that can be explained and justified. We must
never forget that using force is not some political abstraction but a real
commitment of our fathers and mothers and sons and daughters, brothers
and sisters, friends and neighbors. You've got to look at it in human terms.
In order even to have the choice, we must have available adequate military
forces tailored for a wide range of contingencies, including peace-keeping.
Indeed, leading the effort toward a new world order will require a modern,
capable military, in some areas necessitating more rather than less defense
spending. As President, I have said that my ability to deploy force on behalf
of US interests abroad was made possible because past Presidents--and I
would single out in particular, my predecessor, Ronald Reagan--and past
secretaries of defense sustained a strong military. Consistent with this
sacred trust, I am proud to pass on to my successor, President-elect
Clinton, a military second to none. We have the very best.
And, yet, it is essential to recognize that as important as such factors are,
any military is more than simply the sum of its weapons or the state of its
technology. What makes any armed force truly effective is the quality of its
leadership, the quality of its training, the quality of its people.
We have succeeded abroad in no small part because of our people in uniform.
The men and women in our armed forces have demonstrated their ability to
master the challenges of modern warfare. At the same time, and whether on
the battlefield of Iraq or in some tiny little village in Somalia, America's
soldiers have always brought a quality of caring and kindness to their
mission. Who will ever forget--I know I won't--those terrified Iraqi
soldiers surrendering to American troops? And who will forget the way the
American soldier held out his arms and said, "It's OK--you're all right now"?
Or in Somalia, the young marine, eyes filled with tears, holding the fragile
arm of an emaciated child? There can be no doubt about it. The all-
volunteer force is one of the true success stories of modern-day America.
It is instructive to look at just why this is so. At its heart, a voluntary
military is based upon choice--you all know that--the decision freely taken
by young men and women to join, the decision by more mature men and
women to remain. And the institution of the armed forces has thrived on its
commitment to developing and promoting excellence. It is meritocracy in
action. Race, religion, wealth, background count not. Indeed, the military
offers many examples for the rest of society, showing what can be done to
eradicate the scourge of drugs, to break down the barriers of racial
discrimination, to offer equal opportunity to women.
This is not just a result of self-selection. It also reflects the military's
commitment to education and training. You know, people speak of defense
con-version, the process by which defense firms retool for civilian tasks.
Well, defense conversion within the military has been going on for years. It
is the constant process of training and retraining--which the military does
so well--that allows individuals to keep up with the latest technology, take
on more challenging assignments, and prepare for life on the outside.
Out of this culture of merit and competition have emerged hundreds of
thousands of highly skilled men and women brimming with real self-
confidence. What they possess is a special mix of discipline, a willingness
to accept direction, and the willingness to accept responsibility. Together,
discipline and confidence provide the basis for winning, for getting the job
done.
There is no higher calling, no more honorable choice, than the one that you
here today have made. To join the armed forces is to be prepared to make
the ultimate sacrifice for your country and for your fellow man.
What you have done--what you are doing--sends an important message, one
that I fear sometimes gets lost amid today's often materialist, self-
interested culture. It is important to remember, it is important to
demonstrate, that there is a higher purpose to life beyond one's self. Now, I
speak of family, of community, of ideals. I speak of duty, honor, country.
There are many forms of contributing to this country, of public service. Yes,
there is government. There is volunteerism. I love to talk about the
thousand points of light: one American helping another. The daily tasks that
require doing--in our classrooms, in our hospitals, our cities, our farms--
all can and do represent a form of service. In whatever form, service
benefits our society, and it ennobles the giver. It is a cherished American
concept, one we should continue to practice and pass on to our children.
This was what I wanted to share on this occasion. You are beginning your
service to country, and I am nearing the end of mine. Exactly half a century
ago, in June of 1942, we were at war and I was graduating from school. The
speaker that day at Andover was then-Secretary of War Henry Stimson. And
his message was one of public service but with a twist--on the importance
of finishing one's schooling before going off to fight for one's country.
I listened closely to what he had to say, but I didn't take his advice. That
day was my 18th birthday. When the commencement ceremony ended, I went
on into Boston and enlisted in the Navy as a seaman 2nd class. I never
regretted it.
You, too, have signed up. You, too, will never regret it. And I salute you for
it.
Fortunately, because of the sacrifices made in years before and still being
made, you should be able to complete this phase of your education. A half
century has passed since I left school to go into the service; a half century
has passed since that day when Stimson spoke of the challenge of creating a
new world.
You will also be entering a new world, one far better than the one I came to
know--a world with the potential to be far better yet. This is the
challenge; this is the opportunity of your lifetimes. I envy you for it, and I
wish you Godspeed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993
Title: Charting the Course: US Foreign Policy in a Time
of Transition
Eagleburger
Source: Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Address before the Council on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 7 19931/7/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, Europe, E/C Europe, MidEast/North Africa,
North America, East Asia, Central America, South America
Country: United States, Israel, Iraq, Somalia, USSR (former),
Yugoslavia (former), Germany
Subject: Democratization, North America Free Trade,
Mideast Peace Process, CSCE, EC
[TEXT]
Back in September of 1989, I gave a speech in which I discussed the unique
and difficult challenges the United States was inevitably going to face in
foreign policy as we moved from a bipolar to a multipolar world. My good
friend Peter Tarnoff was quick to take me to task in The New York Times for
having demonstrated nostalgia for the Cold War. I disputed that
characterization at the time, but today, Peter, I have a confession to make:
I am now truly nostalgic for the Cold War--and I suspect you may soon
embrace this feeling yourself.
The fact is that I had no way of foreseeing then just how tumultuous the
new era was going to be. But today, it is abundantly clear that we are in the
middle of a global revolution--a period of change and instability equaled in
modern times only by the aftermath of the French and Russian revolutions.
The status quo everywhere is under siege. For one thing, the end of the Cold
War's rigid division of the world into two superpower-led blocs has resulted
in a more wide-open international system, with [Iraqi President] Saddam
Hussein's invasion of Kuwait being but the most egregious example of the
much greater potential for global anarchy which now exists.
And for another, the post-World War II and post-colonial state system itself
is breaking down as many nations are increasingly unable to perform basic
governmental functions, to control their internal affairs, or to resist
particularist and separatist tendencies within their borders. Here, Somalia
and Yugoslavia are the most egregious--but by no means the only--examples
of this tendency toward fragmentation.
These changes, together with the fulfillment of America's Cold War mission,
now confront the United States with the existential need to redefine its
place and purpose in the world. Some view the recent global ascendance of
democracy as the defining feature of this new era and argue that the end of
the Cold War has made it both safe and necessary for the United States to
pursue a Wilsonian foreign policy on behalf of the democratic cause. Others
see a world full of unique danger and disorder and argue that a United States
no longer able to dominate politically and economically as before must
continue to pursue national security and international stability as its
highest foreign policy objectives.
I am not going to settle the debate between the partisans of idealism and
realpolitik here tonight. But what I would like to do is to examine how the
Bush Administration has handled some of the challenges it has faced over
the past 4 years. I do this not only to demonstrate--to my satisfaction if
not to yours--where we succeeded in laying a foundation for US foreign
policy in the post-Cold War era but also so that I can describe what I
believe to be some of the lessons that should be drawn from our experience.
Many have argued that we did not succeed in laying any new foundation at
all--that our foreign policy has been essentially reactive, unduly wedded to
the status quo, and lacking in strategic rationale or democratic vision. I do
not, as you would expect, agree. I believe this Administration has
successfully confronted three unique challenges:
-- To end the Cold War peacefully;
-- To deal with the instabilities generated by the Cold War's demise; and
-- To begin the construction of a new architecture for the new world order.
We may be faulted, perhaps, with having chosen to articulate our vision
more in deeds than in words. But I sincerely believe that the record of what
we have done--and how we have done it--is one that our successors can
usefully build upon as they, too, confront a world which will continue to be
unstable and unpredictable for a good many years to come.
Let me turn now to that record--the record of how we met the three
challenges noted above.
The First Challenge: Ending the Cold War
Today we take for granted something which experts and historians would
have found incredible to imagine only a decade ago--namely, that the
disengagement of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe and the dissolution
of the USSR itself could be achieved so quickly, so thoroughly, and, above
all, so peacefully. History holds few, if any, examples of an empire
collapsing without an angry spasm of violence, and no one expected the
Communist Party to relinquish its monopoly of power at home and imperial
domination abroad without a fight. It was entirely conceivable that the
Soviet Union's demise would be accompanied by civil strife, war in Europe,
and perhaps even the risk of a global nuclear exchange.
That it was not, I think, is due in part to George Bush's skillful, though
sometimes misunderstood, diplomacy. Even today, his critics argue that the
President was constantly behind the curve in his dealings with the former
Soviet Union--late and lukewarm in his embrace of [Soviet President]
Gorbachev; late and low-key in his reaction to the collapse of Soviet control
in Eastern Europe; and late to disengage from Gorbachev and to embrace the
cause of democratic reform in Russia and independence in the republics. At
each point, the President was taxed for undue attachment to the status quo
and insufficient devotion to American ideals.
But what was the President trying to achieve? His early approach was to
challenge Mr. Gorbachev to inform Soviet new thinking with a practical
content on matters ranging from regional disputes to arms control. Then, as
revolution began to engulf Eastern Europe, he worked quietly to persuade
Gorbachev and his generals that the West would not seek to exploit their
troubles and that the Soviet Union could enjoy a new kind of security in a
democratic Europe if peaceful norms were accepted. Later, he urged caution
and negotiation upon both the central government and the independence
movements, earning criticism at home but thereby denying the Soviet right
wing any pretext to co-opt Gorbachev in their efforts to destroy the process
of reform.
Successful diplomacy is a matter of timing as well as substance. In the
end, history will judge George Bush by the results of his efforts--by his
mastery of timing and substance--particularly against the many alternative
scenarios that might have come to pass. History will note that on his watch
occurred:
-- The peaceful democratic revolution in Eastern Europe;
-- The reunification of Germany and the inclusion of a united Germany in
NATO;
-- The end to regional conflicts, including, most importantly, in Central
America;
-- The halting and, later, reversal of the nuclear arms race; and
-- Finally, the peaceful collapse of a regime which commanded both the
most formidable totalitarian apparatus in history and the fate of the world
at its nuclear fingertips.
This is a legacy which by itself would qualify President Bush as one of our
nation's great diplomatists.
The Second Challenge: A Fragmenting World
But history also called upon this President to confront the multifaceted
challenges of a disintegrating world order, first in the Persian Gulf and,
later, in Africa and the Balkans.
Again, according to some, this has been a challenge largely unmet. Indeed, it
is said in some quarters that the Administration bears some responsibility
for the invasion of Kuwait by having "coddled" the Iraqi dictator and for the
tragic civil war in the former Yugoslavia by having failed to support the
various republics in their bid for independence. As in the case of our
approach to Gorbachev, however, I believe the President's diplomacy has
been misunderstood and, in some cases, deliberately distorted.
For example, our efforts to influence Saddam Hussein by diplomatic means
were demonstrably unsuccessful, but those efforts, I believe, were the
necessary predicate to our ultimate success. The fact is that there was
simply no consensus for multilateral economic sanctions against Iraq prior
to the August 2 [1990] invasion, nor was there a consensus to counter Iraq
militarily. It was Saddam Hussein himself who created such a consensus by
invading Kuwait. Until that moment, our Arab friends considered deterrent
action both unwarranted and provocative and would have rallied to Saddam
had we sought to isolate or punish him. Thus, it was thanks to the very
diplomacy for which the President is now criticized--and which was the
source of his credibility in the Arab world--that we were able to enlist the
support without which we could not have liberated Kuwait.
I also believe it is important to correct the impression that we could have
deterred Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait just prior to August 2. The
problem was that Saddam believed that we had yet to liberate ourselves
from the shame and the shadow of Vietnam. He made this very clear to our
ambassador, telling her he did not think we had the guts to face him on the
field of battle. What was she supposed to tell him--that we would send half
a million troops halfway around the globe and that the Congress, by the
slimmest of margins, would, in the end, approve the President's plan to send
those troops into battle?
I am not trying to score cheap points here but instead to make an important
matter clear. We certainly made mistakes and failed--along with everyone
else--to anticipate the Iraqi invasion. But what we did not know, and what
it took Saddam Hussein to demonstrate, was that the passing of the Cold
War had changed the international rules of the game and that regional
powers could now contemplate aggression on the assumption that the
superpowers could no longer circumscribe their freedom of maneuver. And
what Saddam Hussein did not know, and what it took George Bush to
demonstrate, was that the American people, if not the entire political class,
were no longer in the thrall of the Vietnam syndrome.
Ultimately, it was the President's dual achievement to prevent Saddam from
establishing the law of the jungle as the norm for international behavior in
the post-Cold War era and to establish a model for collective responses to
international acts of aggression. In so doing, he demonstrated how
absolutely critical American diplomacy and American willingness to use
force are to the prospects for stability in the otherwise chaotic aftermath
of the Cold War.
The President has also been faulted for his decision to end the fighting when
he did. But George Bush understood another reality of the post-Cold War
era--namely, that, having personally and necessarily assembled an
international coalition of forces, he had an obligation to consider the views
of our contributing allies and, above all, an obligation to remain within the
scope of the UN resolutions. Furthermore--and perhaps most important of
all--he understood that, having given precise definition to the purpose of
our mission, he had an obligation--to the American people and to the future-
-to withdraw US forces once the mission was completed.
A second manifestation of the global disorder inherent today is the eruption
into conflict of ancient tribal, ethnic, and religious rivalries. We see this
most obviously in the former Yugoslavia. But we need to understand that
Yugoslavia is but the most obvious manifestation of what is going on today
in many places and what will likely characterize the international landscape
for perhaps decades to come.
For many, Yugoslavia is another example of Administration policy behind the
curve and out of touch with American ideals. I personally do not believe
that violence could have been avoided under any circumstances. But I do
remain convinced that the republics' unilateral and uncoordinated
declarations of independence, which we unsuccessfully opposed, led
inexorably to civil war. Then, as now, the only alternative to perpetual
bloodshed was for the parties to negotiate their separation from each other
and, meanwhile, to guarantee respect for pluralism and the rights of
minorities within their borders. And the only responsible policy for the
United States was the one we followed--namely, to discourage unilateral
acts intended to avoid such negotiations and such guarantees. As the
President rightly said in his maligned and misunderstood speech in Kiev
[Ukraine on August 1, 1991; see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 32, p. 596], it was our
policy not to support "those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon
ethnic hatred."
Of course, all of this begs the question of what we should do when the
irrational forces of history and hatred prevail over our appeals to reason, as
they are doing today in Yugoslavia, in some parts of the former Soviet Union,
[in] Somalia, and elsewhere.
There are no simple answers. As the President stated this week at
West Point [on January 5; see p. 13], there will be times when our vital
interests are at stake and we must intervene--as we did in the Gulf. There
will be times when a human tragedy compels us to intervene, providing we
can justify the cost to the American people--as we have in Somalia and on
behalf of the Kurds of northern Iraq. And there will be times when neither
the force of American ideas nor the force of American arms can make a
difference to peoples who are truly unwilling to coexist peacefully with
each other.
The Third Challenge: Building a New World Order
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the Bush Administration's
foreign policy is that it was too reactive to changing events, with little
attention to the longer-term requirements of the new era. However, I
believe that we can, in fact, take credit for having begun what will be--and
should be--the long work of constructing an institutional framework
necessary to the establishment of a new world order. Our successors will
have to build in places we overlooked or neglected. But I believe they will
find a solid foundation in many important areas.
Among those areas of institutional creativity, I would identify the
following:
(1) Europe, where we have sought to extend the community of democracies
by helping transform the former communist nations into secure and stable
free market societies. Here, we have created two innovative institutional
structures--the G-24 [Group of 24] process, by which we have coordinated
economic assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, and the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council, through which we have aimed to enhance, over time,
the political and security relationship between both halves of Europe. I
would urge the new Administration to build upon this still embryonic
structure.
(2) North America, where we have sought to consolidate our nation's
continental base through the creation of a single market linking the United
States, Mexico, and Canada--the North American Free Trade Agreement. Our
success in this endeavor will pay dividends in political and security terms
as well as benefit the economies of all three nations.
(3) Latin America, where this Administration leaves our overall
hemispheric ties in perhaps the best shape of anytime in this century.
President Bush's landmark Enterprise for the Americas Initiative has been
greeted throughout the hemisphere as a historic turning point and an
opportunity to consolidate democracy and the free market system
throughout North and South America.
(4) Asia, where we helped to create APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation] to enhance our engagement of the most dynamic economic
region of the world and where we have begun to develop a global partnership
with Japan.
(5) The Middle East, where we built upon our Gulf war coalition victory to
launch the first direct negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors.
(6) And finally, across the broad spectrum of transnational issues, where
we have tried to advance a post-Cold War agenda of global free trade
through the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations and
through negotiations to control the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
The Bush Legacy
I know I am by no means a neutral observer, but I believe the record I have
just described is one of substantial accomplishment in the face of great
dangers and challenges. I also believe that the Bush foreign policy was
greater than the sum of its parts and that, indeed, there was a strategy
behind the President's conduct of foreign policy which we need to
understand because it is so uniquely suited to the vastly changed
international situation we now confront. I would summarize this legacy as
follows:
First, the Bush foreign policy was characterized by pragmatism and
flexibility. I think in this respect we must plead guilty to the charge that
our approach was often ad hoc. A certain degree of "ad hocery" is a virtue,
not a vice, when you are dealing with a world in crisis and in chaos--one in
which it is impossible to be certain of anything 6 months ahead. The fact of
the matter is that, for a long time to come, we will be in a post-
revolutionary transitional period which will require of us an ability to react
quickly to events. In these circumstances, good instincts are as invaluable
as a good plan.
Second, the President has been deeply committed to the principle and the
practice of diplomacy. He, more than his critics, has understood that the
end of the Cold War has meant the United States can no longer dominate
either adversaries or allies as we did in a bipolar framework. If we want to
get our way--and to get others to share our burden, as the American people
surely desire--we will increasingly have to take the views and interests of
others into account. And we will sometimes have to build ad hoc alliances
of like-minded nations as each new and often unique circumstance may
demand. In other words, we will have to practice the art of compromise
and, thus, of diplomacy.
This is an art which does not necessarily come easily to us. Our national
virtue is that we are comfortable only with a foreign policy rooted in the
values of our political tradition; our national vice is a tendency toward
moralism in foreign policy and a kind of moral hubris which views the
actions of others only through the prism of our own standards of conduct.
President Bush resisted this latter tendency throughout his presidency,
often at great political cost. But because of his commitment to working
with and maintaining leverage over governments whom his critics deemed
worthy of punishment and isolation--I am thinking principally of the
People's Republic of China, but there were other examples--he was able
consistently to forge international coalitions under UN auspices to address
critical challenges to world peace and stability, including the successful
prosecution of the war against Saddam Hussein.
Third, the Administration's foreign policy was marked by a commitment to
harnessing US power--both diplomatic and military--to realize the
President's long-term vision of a new world order. The record of the past 4
years demonstrates that the new world order is something we are not even
close to achieving--not with the forces of fragmentation currently on the
loose. But the extent to which we have been able to keep those forces at bay
has been largely a result of American willingness to act, to forge ad hoc
coalitions, and to begin to build the institutions of a better and safer world.
Looking Ahead
I will conclude, for what it is worth, with a few personal observations
about the road ahead and what I think ought to be our priorities and
objectives.
I consider our principal foreign policy challenge to be the maintenance and
strengthening of the core of democracies which won the Cold War. As I
indicated in my [September 13] 1989 speech at Georgetown [University], it
is going to be harder to keep this core together when the inherent
centrifugal forces of multipolarity will conspire to drive us apart. If,
however, we want to avoid a return to the dangerous balance of power
politics which characterized the world prior to the Cold War, we will have
to strengthen the economic, political, and military ties which link the
Western democracies, as well as the multilateral institutions we have
established over the past half century. If we do not succeed in
strengthening those collective links and institutions, we will never be able
to confront the instabilities now arising beyond the Western fold.
In this regard, there are several incomplete tasks we leave to the next
Administration: to build more comprehensive and durable political ties with
Japan; to ensure that the European Community does not build unity at the
expense of relations with the United States; and to preserve the open world
trading system through successful conclusion of the GATT negotiations and
early ratification of the North America Free Trade Agreement.
The second challenge we face is to extend the core of democracies to
include the former communist world, as well as other nations which have
embraced our political and economic values. Here, there is an absolute
convergence between our interests and our ideals. Our security is
especially linked to the fate of reform across the Eurasian landmass, which
is the most heavily armed region of the world and [has been] the source of
global conflict twice in this century. It is thus heartening that the
incoming President has identified support for democracy in Russia and
throughout Central and Eastern Europe as one of his highest priorities.
Finally, we must deal with the manifold ills afflicting what was known as
the Third World--the problems of poverty, debt, underdevelopment, and
overpopulation--which threaten to bring global chaos in their wake and thus
threaten our own security and prosperity. Among the tasks facing the next
Administration will be the development of both global non-proliferation
regimes and enhanced UN peacekeeping and peace-making capabilities.
I began these remarks by referring to the debate underway in this country
over the purpose of American foreign policy. It seems to me that we have
arrived at an important turning point in our history. We have never had a
normal attitude toward foreign policy, at least in the sense understood in
other countries. For most of our national existence, we turned our backs on
the world beyond our shores. And then, when we became a global power, we
joined the world in the name of a mission which we have now substantially
completed. Thus we find ourselves today confronting an increasingly
uncertain international environment--increasingly aware that our role and
purpose must change to meet that new environment but unclear as to what
those changes ought to be.
What we may not sufficiently realize, however, is that this uncertainty is
both normal and healthy. We are--and will be for some time to come--in the
process of discovering our purpose as we go about the everyday business of
foreign policy. It goes without saying that we bring our ideals to the table
and that our thinking is infused with a desire to see those ideals advanced.
But a growing awareness of our limited resources and power is forcing us to
decide what is important to us in foreign policy and thus to develop a sense
of hierarchy among a multitude of interests and priorities.
All this is very much to the good. I see much evidence that the American
people have accepted the lessons of the 20th century and understand that
our period of virtual supremacy is over and that our fate is now and forever
linked to what happens beyond our borders. What remains to be seen is not
so much whether we have what it takes to continue to shoulder the burdens
of global leadership which are necessarily ours. Rather, the question is
whether we will, in the coming decade, deal with the new challenges of the
post-Cold War era with the wisdom and strength of character that, on the
whole, marked our international passage over the course of the past half
century. I, for one, am proud of the part George Bush played in charting a
new course for America. And I am proud to have been a part of that
adventure. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993
Title: US and Russia Sign START II Treaty
Bush
Yelstin
Source: President Bush, Russian President Yeltsin
Description: Opening remarks at news conference on the signing of
the START II Treaty, Moscow, Russia
Date: Jan, 3 19931/3/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia, United States
Subject: Arms Control, International Law
[TEXT]
President Yeltsin:
President George Bush, Mrs. Bush, members of
the delegations, representatives of mass media, ladies and gentlemen: It is
not every century that history gives us an opportunity to witness and
participate in the event that is so significant in scale and consequences.
Today, the Presidents of the two great powers, the United States and
Russia, have signed the treaty on further radical cuts in strategic offensive
arms of Russia and the United States--START II [the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; see fact sheet in Dispatch Vol.
4, No. 1 on p. 5]. In its scale and importance, the treaty goes further than all
other treaties ever signed in the field of disarmament. This treaty is the
triumph for politicians and diplomats of Russia and the United States. It is
also an achievement for all mankind and benefits all peoples of the earth.
The START II Treaty becomes the core of the system of global security
guarantees.
The scale of this treaty is determined by a number of factors. Its historical
factor is that in the course of all its previous history, mankind was arming
itself and just dreamed of beating the swords into plowshares. The treaty
signed today represents a major step toward fulfilling mankind's centuries-
old dream of disarmament. Its political factor is that the treaty we have
signed today belongs to a new epoch. This treaty was concluded by two
friendly states, by partners who not only trust each other but also assist
each other. It testifies to our joint and determined movement toward a new
world order.
From the very outset, the new democratic Russian state has been pursuing a
policy of building equal partnership with the United States. Today, we have
every right to say that relations between the two major powers have
undergone a genuine revolution. Its political factor lies also in the fact that
during the last decade of the 20th century and at the turn of the 21st
century, the START II Treaty will affect policies not only of the United
States and Russia but of other countries of the world as well. The START II
Treaty established parameters of possible political agreements in other
spheres of interaction among states.
Thus, the military factor is determined by the scale of mutual reductions in
nuclear arms. By comparison with the START I Treaty [the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty signed on July 31, 1991], every state will have to reduce
and destroy the number of strategic offensive warheads by approximately a
threefold magnitude. The deepest cuts will affect those categories of arms
which are of greatest concern to the parties and the world. For the United
States, these are submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers;
for Russia, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles--ICBMs. This
reduces drastically the level of danger, military mistrust, and suspicion.
We opened up real prospects for cooperation based on trust between people
in military uniform--between people with military discipline and military
thinking. Thus, the START II Treaty will change and gradually replace the
very psychology of confrontation.
At the same time, as President and Supreme Commander in Chief, I can say
with absolute certainty [that] the signed treaty strengthens the security of
Russia rather than weakens it. I think that President Bush can make a
similar statement concerning the security of the United States.
The implementation of the new treaty will not be economically destructive
for Russia. We have made our calculations, and they show that the proposed
reductions would cost us much less than the mere maintenance of nuclear
weapons systems in a safe condition.
We save seriously on verification and inspections, two of the most
expensive, to put it mildly, items of expenditures. The new character of
Russian-US relations makes it possible for us to substantially simplify
verification procedures while ensuring their reliability. We expect to cut
considerably the cost of the physical destruction of armaments. We have
agreed with the United States to cooperate in developing and applying
appropriate technologies. Thus, the expenditures under this, then, will, in
fact, be shared equally.
This will enable us to eliminate our nuclear weapons not with a delay of
several years but in parallel with the United States in accordance with the
schedule provided for in the treaty. In the context of the present economic
crisis, it would be difficult for us to keep the pace without outside
assistance.
The US Congress has made a decision to support Russia in the destruction of
these nuclear warheads. Its moral factor will manifest itself in the fact
that the treaty gives all mankind the hope for a nuclear weapons-free world.
The high moral value of the treaty is that we will be able to hand over to our
children--the children of the 21st century--a more secure world. I would
call this treaty a treaty of hope. As to the purely diplomatic aspect of this
START II Treaty that has just been signed, it will undoubtedly go down into
the history of diplomacy as an example of using the potential of the
partners who are waiting to overcome the heritage of animosity and
confrontation.
As you may recall, it took 15 years to prepare the first START Treaty. The
elaboration of START II, which is of considerably great[er] magnitude, took
several months. But there was absolutely no rush in the process. Naturally,
this reflects, above all, the high level of confidence and mutual
understanding achieved between the United States and Russia--between the
Presidents of the two countries. It gives great impetus to world diplomacy
as well.
Today, I would like to express the hope that the diplomatic services of the
United States and Russia [and] diplomats of European countries will double
or even triple their efforts in order to settle conflicts that are of concern
to the world.
I would like to focus on another important aspect, the personal stand of
President George Bush, who is our guest on a working visit with us. I would
like to pay tribute to my colleague and friend, George. His remarkable
personal and political qualities and competence have contributed to a
successful transition from the Cold War to a new world order. I am grateful
to him for all he has done to establish new relations between Russia and the
United States, for his solidarity and support during the push for the
FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open
Markets] Support Act, [and] for the START II Treaty. Thank you, George.
I consider it [of] fundamental importance that the future President of the
United States, Mr. Clinton, fully supported the conclusion of the START II
Treaty. We can, without delay, proceed to the direct implementation of this
instrument and consider further steps to strengthen global stability, the
system of global protection, and international security.
President Bush and I have maintained regular contacts with President-elect
Clinton. Today's signing ceremony would not have taken place had there been
the slightest reason to doubt his solidarity with our endeavors. I would like
to personally thank the most active participants in this process and, above
all, the President of the United States, who personally took part in the
elaboration and polishing of the text of the treaty. And I would say we
spoke often. It was a rare week that we did not speak on the phone in the
last few weeks. I am also grateful, personally, to [national security adviser
General] Scowcroft, who took an active participation in the consideration of
this subject, and to [former Secretary of State] Baker, of course, who
treated globally the entire subject of the treaty and was mainly responsible
for this breakthrough. Finally, I am grateful to [Secretary of State] Mr.
Eagleburger who, on the finishing line, darted with boldness and practically
initialed the draft treaty there.
I'm thankful also to the experts--to analysts and consultants and also to the
leaders of our delegation--[Foreign Minister] Mr. Kozyrev and [Defense
Minister] Mr. Grachev and the other 48 experts who worked very hard for us
to come today to the signing of this treaty, the SALT [START] II Treaty. I'm
also grateful to all the journalists--press people--who kept their hand
constantly on the pulse of this subject and who did not criticize the treaty
before it was signed.
I do believe that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of friendly
partnership between Russia and the United States. Strategic partnership
relations serve the fundamental national interests of the two countries and
of the international community as a whole. I am deeply confident that the
signing of the START II Treaty opens new, promising prospects for the
peoples of our countries. I'm certain that this day will be a milestone in
this process.
President Bush:
Mr. President and Mr. Vice President, Mr. Prime
Minister, Minister of Justice, Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, representatives of the Russian and American delegations, and
distinguished guests: We meet at the beginning of a new year, at a moment
that is also a new era for our two nations and for the world. For half of this
century, the Soviet Union and the United States stood locked in a nuclear
standoff. For our two nations and for the world, cold war, hot words, and
the constant threat of war seemed imminent--indeed, at times inevitable.
The time that we might meet as friends and the time that we might meet in
freedom seemed distant--indeed, a dream. Today, the Cold War is over, and,
for the first time in history, an American president has set foot in a
democratic Russia. And together we're now embarked on what must be the
noblest mission of all: to turn an adversarial relationship into one of
friendship and partnership.
We stand together today in this great city at the threshold of a new world of
hope, a widening circle of freedom for us and for our children. This historic
opportunity would simply not have been possible without our combined
common effort.
Mr. President, I salute you for your unwavering commitment to democratic
reform and for the history you've written since the heroic day in August
1991 when you climbed atop that tank to defend Russia's democratic
destiny. I also want to salute the heroism of the Russian people
themselves, for it is they who will determine that Russia's democratic
course is irreversible.
Today, as we meet on Russian soil--home to 1,000 years of heritage and
history, to a people rich in scientific and creative talent--I want to assure
the Russian people on behalf of all Americans [that] we understand that
Russia faces a difficult passage. We are with you in your struggle to
strengthen and secure democratic rights, to reform your economy, to bring
to every Russian city and village a new sense of hope and the prospect of a
future forever free. Let me say clearly--we seek no special advantages
from Russia's transformation. Yes, deep arms reductions, broader and
deeper economic ties, expanded trade with Russia all are in the interest of
my country. But they're equally in the interest of the Russian people. Our
future is one of mutual advantage.
We seek a new relationship of trust between our military forces. They once
confronted each other across Europe's great divide; let them now come
together in the cause of peace. We seek full cooperation to employ our
collective capabilities to help resolve crises around the world. We seek a
new cooperation between the United States and Russia and among all states
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction. The world looks to us to consign the Cold War to history, to
ratify our new relationship by reducing the weapons that concentrate the
most destructive power known to man.
The treaty we signed today builds on the strong beginning we made with
START I. Together, these treaties will reduce by more than two-thirds the
strategic arsenals in place today. And, just as important, START II will
bring much better stability to remaining forces.
This agreement represents a common effort to overcome the contentious
differences and complexities that surround nuclear weapons. In the face of
many who doubted Russia and America's intentions and our energy, it
vindicates our insistence that arms control must do more than simply
freeze the arms race in place.
The START Treaty--START I-- reduced a quarter century of growth in our
nuclear arsenals and reversed the course that caused many to fear that
nuclear conflagration was inevitable. The treaty that we signed today goes
much further in a way that few believed possible just 1 year ago.
And may I congratulate Messrs. Kozyrev and Grachev and Eagleburger for
their outstanding work to bring this treaty to fruition. I also want to
congratulate former Secretary of State Jim Baker for his important work on
the treaty during the spring and summer.
In closing, let me tell you what this treaty means--not for presidents or
premiers, not for historians or heads of state but for parents and for their
children: It means a future far more free from fear.
As we sign today this treaty, let us pledge also to move forward together
throughout this decade and into the next century toward common aims: for
Russia, a democratic peace; for our two nations, a strong partnership
between our people and the lasting friendship that springs from a common
love of freedom.
Mr. President, may I wish you and the Russian people, at this critical
moment in history, a new year rich with hope and peace. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993
Title: Situation in Sierra Leone
Snyder
Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joe Snyder
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 4 19931/4/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Sierra Leone
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Valentine Strasser, Chairman of Sierra Leone's National Provisional Ruling
Council, announced on December 29 [1992] that a coup attempt had been
crushed. Freetown['s] radio [station] reported on December 31 that a special
tribunal had sentenced 12 coup plotters to death and that another 17
persons found guilty of treason earlier were to be executed immediately.
We understand these sentences have already been carried out. The broadcast
indicated that additional suspects are being sought.
The United States is gravely concerned over the reported executions and
calls on the Sierra Leonean authorities to respect fully human rights, due
process, and the rule of law. The United States recognizes that Sierra Leone
is currently encountering numerous problems, including the presence of
rebel forces. However, we urge that such problems be resolved through
peaceful negotiation, so that the process of economic and social
development and an early return to democratic, civilian rule can be
facilitated.
In view of the unsettled circumstances in Sierra Leone, the US embassy in
Freetown has advised resident American citizens to exercise the utmost
caution in their movements. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: US Signs Chemical Weapons Convention
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Country: United States
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
For more than 20 years, the United States and many other countries have
labored to achieve a ban on chemical weapons. The long-awaited Chemical
Weapons Convention is now completed and open for signature.
I have had a deep and abiding personal interest in the success of the effort
to ban these terrible weapons. As Vice President, I had the honor on two
occasions to address the Conference on Disarmament and to present US
proposals to give impetus to the negotiations. As President, I directed the
United States to take new initiatives to advance and conclude the
negotiations. The United States is profoundly gratified that these talks
have now been successfully concluded.
The countries that participated in the negotiations at the Conference on
Disarmament deserve special congratulations. The Chemical Weapons
Convention is uniquely important in the field of arms control agreements. It
will improve the security of all nations by eliminating a class of weapons
of mass destruction that exists in all quarters of the world and that has
been used in recent conflicts. It is a truly stabilizing and non-
discriminatory agreement.
The United States strongly supports the Chemical Weapons Convention and is
proud to be an original signatory. We are encouraged that so many other
states have also decided to take this step. This clearly demonstrates
global--international--endorsement of the convention and the new norm of
international conduct that it establishes. However, we must not cease our
efforts until the norm becomes truly universal, with all countries becoming
not only signatories but also parties to the convention.
Much work remains to make the convention fully effective. The United
States will cooperate closely with other countries to bring the convention
into force as soon as possible and to ensure that it is faithfully
implemented. Only then will we be able to say that the risk of chemical
warfare is no longer a threat to people anywhere in the world. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Chemical Weapons Convention Signing Ceremony
Eagleburger
Source: Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Remarks upon signing the Chemical Weapons Convention,
Paris, France
Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Country: United States
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
It is fitting that we meet to sign this historic Chemical Weapons Convention
in a city where, 4 years ago, the international community appealed for the
strengthening of norms against chemical warfare. I am pleased to be in
Paris, and I am especially pleased to represent my President, George Bush, a
man who, over the course of the past decade, launched some of the key
initiatives which helped to make this agreement possible. He and all those
responsible can take pride in an achievement whose revolutionary scope and
impact we can recognize today without having to await the verdict of
history.
But such has been the amazing record of the past few years. We have seen
the international community liberate itself from half a century of gridlock
and paralysis and move beyond the rhetoric of democracy to achieve real
democracy; move beyond the rhetoric of detente to achieve real peace; and
move beyond the rhetoric of disarmament to achieve real reductions in
weapons of mass destruction.
The Chemical Weapons Convention we sign today does more than simply
reduce a class of arms or mitigate against their proliferation. This
convention mandates a worldwide non-discriminatory ban on an entire class
of weapons of mass destruction--the only class of such weapons that has
been widely used in combat. By the radical terms of this agreement, all
signatory states forswear the possession, production, stockpiling, transfer,
and, indeed, the use of chemical weapons; and all signatories must destroy
all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities in their
possession. Moreover, the convention's strict verification regime, which
accommodates legitimate commercial and sovereign interests, sets an
innovative standard for future multilateral agreements.
The international community is virtually united in support of the objectives
of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, there must be truly global
adherence if the convention is to achieve its purpose and if doubts are to be
eliminated over the commitment and intentions of those who fail to sign,
ratify, and fully comply with its terms.
Nowhere is this more important today than in the Middle East, a region
which over the past 30 years has been home to more active chemical
weapons programs--and which has seen more chemical weapons use--than
any other part of the world. It is, therefore, particularly disappointing that
so many Middle Eastern states are absent from this ceremony today.
The fact of the matter is that linking this convention to other issues cannot
affect the fate of those issues, but it will surely undermine the effect of
this treaty in the one region most exposed to the danger of chemical
weapons--namely, the Middle East. The point, I believe, is to tackle the
challenge of weapons of mass destruction wherever we can, whenever we
can. I would, therefore, urge the members of the Arab League to seize this
opportunity and sign the Chemical Weapons Convention. Doing so would be a
step toward, and not away from, making the Middle East a zone free of all
weapons of mass destruction, as called for by President Mubarak of Egypt.
Today's ceremony is only the beginning of the work which lies ahead. Next
month, the Preparatory Commission will meet in The Hague [the Netherlands]
to work out the important and detailed provisions for implementing the
convention. The United States is fully committed to the success of those
efforts, which will require the same broad support and participation which
produced the successful convention itself.
As I indicated at the beginning, the past few years have been a remarkably
creative period of international achievement. Perhaps not coincidentally, I
believe that President Bush's passage across the international scene has
equally been one of tangible achievement, particularly in terms of the issue
most important to the fate and future of the planet--the issue of weapons
of mass destruction. George Bush's legacy will include landmark treaties--
START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] I, START II, and CFE [Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe]--as well as diplomatic efforts which paid non-
proliferation dividends in Africa, South America, the Middle East, and here
in Paris today. But he knows, as all of us must know, that what we have
accomplished to date will matter little unless we are prepared to confront
the even greater proliferation dangers we most certainly will face in the
years to come.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Chemical Weapons Convention: France Hosts
Signing Ceremony
ACDA
Description: Based on statement released by the US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Country: France
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
On January 13, the Government of France will host a ceremony in Paris for
the signing of a multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Representatives from more than 130 countries are expected to be present to
sign the convention.
The multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, concluded on September 3,
1992, by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and endorsed by the
United Nations on November 30, 1992, is historic in the scope of its
provisions and in the number of countries involved in its development. It
offers an opportunity to build confidence regionally and globally and to
enable signatories to play a more responsible role in the international
community.
The convention prohibits:
-- The development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and
transfer of chemical weapons;
-- The use of chemical weapons against any other state--regardless of
whether the country is a signatory to the convention;
-- Engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and
-- Assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in activities
prohibited to convention signatories.
In addition, the convention requires that:
-- Signatories declare all chemical weapons and chemical weapons
production facilities;
-- The declarations be checked;
-- Storage, production, and destruction facilities be monitored through on-
site inspection; and
-- All chemical weapons be eliminated completely within 10 years.
To further enhance security and to deter clandestine chemical weapons
production, storage, and use, the convention also provides routine
monitoring and verification of relevant chemical weapons industry
facilities. Additionally, the convention provides for a challenge inspection
regime which allows any convention signatory to initiate an inspection of
any facility or location in any other signatory state to clarify and resolve
questions of possible non-compliance.
After signature of the CWC, a preparatory commission of all signatory
states will begin work in early February to further elaborate detailed
implementation procedures and establish the CWC international
organization. These meetings will take place in The Hague, which will also
be the seat of the organization.
The US welcomes the action of the Government of France to host the signing
ceremony.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Chemical Weapons Convention: Chronology of
Events Leading to the Signing
ACDA
Description: Released by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93
Category: Chronologies
Region: Whole World
Country: United States, Russia
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
Listed below are some of the key events in the chemical weapons [CW]
negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors, the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [CCD] and the Committee on
Disarmament, which led to the completion of a draft Chemical Weapons
Convention [CWC], its approval by the United Nations, and its opening for
signature in Paris.
March 15, 1962: The United States and the Soviet Union submit plans for
general and complete disarmament to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee which include provisions for eliminating chemical and biological
weapons.
August 15, 1968: Chemical weapons are placed on the agenda of the CCD in
Geneva.
June 27-July 3, 1974: At the Moscow summit, the United States and the
Soviet Union agree to hold bilateral talks in an effort to develop a joint
proposal to be submitted to the CCD on the prohibition of chemical weapons.
March 17, 1980: The ad hoc working group on chemical weapons is
established in the Committee on Disarmament (CD), the successor to the
CCD.
February 4, 1983: At the CD, Vice President Bush announces US
requirements for a verifiable prohibition on the production, stockpiling, and
transfer of chemical weapons:
-- Declaration and systematic international on-site inspection of chemical
weapons stocks and production facilities and declaration of plans for
destruction of stocks;
-- Systematic international on-site inspection of the destruction of both
chemical weapons stocks and production facilities;
-- Declaration and on-site inspection of the operation of other facilities
for legal production of chemicals that pose a specific risk of being diverted
to chemical weapons production; and
-- A multilateral mechanism for dealing with compliance issues.
June 1983: The United States presents a paper at the CD showing how
stockpile destruction can be verified. The US approach combines extensive
use of on-site instruments with continuous monitoring by international
inspectors.
August 23, 1983: The United States invites CD member and observer
delegations to participate in a workshop at the US chemical weapons
destruction test bed facility at Tooele, Utah. The Soviet Union and Warsaw
Pact (except Romania) decline the invitation.
November 14-16, 1983: Fifty diplomats from 30 CD nations attend the
Chemical Weapons Verification Workshop at Tooele, Utah.
April 18, 1984: At the Conference on Disarmament, the new title for the
Committee on Disarmament, Vice President Bush presents a US draft treaty
that provides for a worldwide ban on the development, acquisition,
production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The plan
calls for systematic on-site inspection of chemical weapon facilities to
ensure compliance.
The Soviet Union dismisses the US draft treaty immediately. However, it is
essentially the 1984 draft which becomes the basis of discussion for the ad
hoc working group of the CD. The document, reflecting agreed changes as a
result of the CD negotiations, is informally referred to as the "rolling text."
July 10, 1986: The United States provides information to the Conference on
Disarmament about its chemical weapons stockpiles and storage site
locations--the first CD member to do so.
August 6, 1987: Soviet Foreign Minister [Shevardnadze] addresses the CD,
accepting the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the
right of refusal. He invites the CD delegations to the Shikany military
facility and extends a future invitation to the CW destruction facility under
construction near Chapayevsk. On October 3-4, 1987, a multilateral
delegation from the CD visits the Soviet CW installation at Shikany to view
munitions and a mobile destruction site.
July 28, 1988: In a speech to the CD, US Ambassador [to the Conference on
Disarmament] Max Friedersdorf declares the location of all US CW
production facilities and out-lines plans for their elimination under a CW
ban. The US calls on the Soviet Union and other states to do the same.
February 21-23, 1989: The United States conducts a trial inspection of a
private American chemical production plant. This is part of an experiment
to develop procedures for a routine inspection regime which would satisfy
confidence and security requirements without significantly disrupting the
civilian chemical industry.
The Soviet Union and other members of the CD subsequently conduct similar
trial inspections of their own chemical industries.
February 7-9, 1990: Secretary of State Baker and [Soviet] Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze agree on a framework for action to expedite the negotiation at
the CD for a Chemical Weapons Convention.
June 1, 1990: At the Washington summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev
sign the US-Soviet Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of
Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). Key provisions of this important accord are:
-- Cessation of chemical weapons production to begin upon entry into force
and destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks to start by the end of
1992--down to 5,000 tons of CW agents [weight exclusive of casings] by
2002;
-- On-site inspections during and after the destruction process to confirm
destruction; and
-- Development and use of safe and environmentally sound methods of
destruction.
May 13, 1991: President Bush announces a new series of steps to strengthen
the prospects of an early, successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. To this end, the President declared that the United States
would take the following actions:
-- Formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason--
including retaliation--against any state, effective when the convention
enters into force and propose that all states follow suit--providing the
USSR is also a party to the treaty;
-- Unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all US stocks of
chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force and propose that all
other states do likewise;
-- Offer technical assistance to others so that they can destroy their
chemical weapons stocks efficiently and safely;
-- Call for setting a target date to conclude the convention and recommend
that the conference stay in continuous session [as] necessary to meet the
target;
-- Propose new and effective verification measures for inspecting sites
suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons;
-- Propose that the convention require parties to refuse to trade in
chemical weapons-related materials with states that do not join in the
convention in order to provide tangible benefits for those states that join
the convention and significant penalties for those that fail to support it;
and
-- Reaffirm that the United States will impose all appropriate sanctions in
response to violations of the convention, especially the use of chemical
weapons.
July 15, 1991: The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan
jointly table a draft challenge inspection proposal at the CD, followed by a
US proposal on handling inspection of declared facilities.
March 19, 1992: Australian Foreign Minister Evans presents a draft treaty
offering compromise solutions to outstanding issues as a basis for early
completion of the CD negotiations. The United States applauds the
Australian effort and supports the process it represents. The Australian
text differs from US positions on a number of important issues. The United
States, however, expresses hope that it will aid resolution of remaining
issues and permit completion of the CWC in 1992, as President Bush has
repeatedly urged.
June 22, 1992: The chairman of the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons
at the CD, Adolph Ritter von Wagner of Germany, in an effort to speed the
process, released a draft "final text" for consideration. This draft is a
complete text and embodies consensus compromises as well as the
chairman's own proposed compromise language on unresolved major issues.
June 26, 1992: The second CD session concluded with meetings during the
last few days devoted to the chairman's explanations of the new text.
July 20, 1992: The CD resumes.
July 23, 1992: The United States accepts the chairman's draft Chemical
Weapons Convention.
August 7, 1992: Chairman von Wagner puts forth a package of changes to the
draft convention in an effort to satisfy the concerns of some members of
the CD.
August 13, 1992: President Bush announces strong US support for the draft
Chemical Weapons Convention completed at the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva. The President states that the United States is committed to be
an original party to the treaty once it is open for signing and calls on all
other nations to support the treaty and to pledge adherence to it.
August 26, 1992: The CD resumes.September 3, 1992: The CD concludes the
draft Chemical Weapons Convention.
September 7, 1992: The CD forwards the draft Chemical Weapons
Convention to the United Nations for endorsement.
November 12, 1992: The UN First Committee approves the draft convention
and submits it for endorsement by the entire UN membership.
November 30, 1992: The UN endorses by consensus, with 145 co-sponsors,
the draft of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
January 13, 1993: In a ceremony in Paris, the Chemical Weapons Convention
will be opened for signature.
February 8, 1993: The Preparatory Commission of all states parties to the
convention is scheduled to meet in The Hague [the Netherlands] to set up the
Chemical Weapons Convention international organization.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Chemical Weapons Convention: UN General
Assembly Resolution
UN
Description: UN General Assembly, New York City
Date: Nov, 30 199211/30/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Subject: Arms Control, United Nations
[TEXT]
Text of Resolution A/C.1/47/L.1/Rev. 2, "Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction," approved by consensus by the UN General Assembly,
New York City, November 30, 1992.
The General Assembly,
Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to
achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production,
stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, as well as
the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17
June 1925,1 as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,
Recalling in particular its resolution 46/35 C of 6 December 1991, in which
the Assembly strongly urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of
the highest priority, to resolve outstanding issues so as to achieve a final
agreement on a convention on the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their
destruction during its 1992 session,
Bearing in mind the Final Declaration2 of the Conference of States Parties
to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from
7 to 11 January 1989, in which participating States stressed their
determination to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely
eliminating them,
Determined to make progress towards general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition
and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,
Convinced, therefore, of the urgent necessity of a total ban on chemical
weapons, so as to abolish an entire category of weapons of mass
destruction, and thus eliminate the risk to mankind of renewed use of these
inhumane weapons,
Welcoming the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction,3 adopted by the Conference on Disarmament and contained in
its report dated 3 September 1992, the result of many years of intensive
negotiations, which constitutes a historic achievement in the field of arms
control and disarmament,
Convinced that the Convention, particularly as adherence to it approaches
universality, will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and
improve the security of all States, and that it therefore merits the strong
support of the entire international community,
Convinced further that the implementation of the Convention should promote
expanded international trade, technological development and economic
cooperation in the chemical sector, in order to enhance the economic and
technological development of all States parties,
Determined to ensure the efficient and cost-effective implementation of
the Convention,
Recalling the support for the prohibition of chemical weapons expressed in
the declaration by representatives of the world's chemical industry at the
Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, held at
Canberra from 18 to 22 September 1989,4
Bearing in mind the relevant reference to the Convention in the Final
Documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-
Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992,
Welcoming the invitation of the President of the French Republic to
participate in a ceremony to sign the Convention in Paris on 13 January
1993,
1. Commends the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, as contained in the report of the Conference on Disarmament
dated 3 September 1992;
2. Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to open
it for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993;
3. Calls upon all States to sign and, thereafter, according to their
respective constitutional processes, to become parties to the Convention at
the earliest possible date, thus contributing to its rapid entry into force and
to the early achievement of universal adherence;
4. Further calls upon all States to ensure the effective implementation of
this unprecedented, global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral
disarmament agreement, thereby enhancing cooperative multilateralism as a
basis for international peace and security;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide such services as may be
requested by the signatory States to initiate the work of the Preparatory
Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
6. Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to
report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on the status of
signatures and ratifications of the Convention.
1 League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.
2 A/44/88, annex.
3 Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session,
Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix I.
4 See A/C.1/44/4.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Chemical Weapons Convention: A Balance Between
Obligations and the Needs of States Parties
ACDA
Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Description: ACDA Occasional Paper, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
[The following text is taken from "Chemical Weapons Convention: A Balance
Between Obligations and the Needs of States Parties," dated January 5,
1993.]
The multilateral negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
concluded in Geneva on September 3, 1992, with the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) forwarding the draft text to the United Nations for
endorsement on September 7. On November 30, the UN General Assembly
endorsed the CWC by consensus, with 145 countries cosponsoring the
supporting resolution. The CWC will be opened for signature in Paris on
January 13, 1993. The CWC is historic in the scope of its provisions and in
the number of countries involved in its development. Additionally, the
conference of states parties established by the convention will provide
members an opportunity for building regional and global stability and for
playing a more responsible role in the international community.
The majority of the provisions of the CWC represent the long-agreed upon
consensus of the 39 members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) who
drafted the convention. In a few sections, where prior consensus had not
been attained, compromises were reached which struck an equitable balance
among varying positions.
Overview
This paper describes some of the CWC's key provisions, which were designed
to balance the need for effective convention provisions with the national
security and economic requirements of states parties in implementing such
provisions.
The Destruction of CW and CW Production Facilities
Throughout the CWC negotiations, CD participants sought ways to remove
the possibility of use or threat of use of chemical weapons (CW) through
measures which would provide confidence among states parties adhering to
the convention that their security will be enhanced. To this end, the
negotiators desired to ensure the complete elimination of CW and their
production facilities within a specific period of time; assign responsibility
for destruction of CW stocks abandoned on a state party's territory; prohibit
any right of CW retaliation; prohibit the use of herbicides and riot control
agents (RCAs) as a method of warfare; and, in the event of CW use or threat
of use, provide for protection and assistance to the victimized party.
At the same time, negotiators had to take into account such factors as the
technical difficulties associated with destruction of CW, the possible need
for commercial use of former CW production facilities, and the non-warfare
uses of herbicides and RCAs, (e.g., crop control, law enforcement). This
required negotiators to develop provisions which balance a state party's
obligations under the convention for declarations, destruction timeframes,
international monitoring, etc., with the needs and requirements of states
parties in implementing these obligations.
Thus, the CWC contains provisions which prohibit: the development,
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and direct or indirect
transfer to anyone of CW; the use of CW against anyone; engaging in any
military preparations to use CW; and assisting, encouraging, or inducing
anyone to engage in activities prohibited to states parties.
The convention requires all CW to be declared, declarations to be checked,
and all CW to be completely eliminated within 10 years, with storage and
destruction monitored through on-site inspection. An extension of a state
party's destruction program for up to 5 years is possible but not automatic.
It must be approved by the conference of states parties which will set
conditions under which the extension may be granted, including specific
verification measures and actions to mitigate the delay. The CWC requires a
state party to destroy and bear the costs of destruction of CW it abandoned
on another state party's territory; otherwise, the territorial state party
may request assistance from the CWC organization.
The CWC further requires all CW production to cease, CW production
facilities to be declared, the declarations to be checked, and the facilities
destroyed, with cessation of production and destruction monitored through
on-site inspection. In exceptional cases of compelling need, the conference
of states parties may approve conversion of former CW production facilities
for prescribed non-CW uses, subject to appropriate international
monitoring.
Finally, the convention contains provisions which prohibit the use of RCAs
as a method of warfare, reaffirms the prohibition on use of herbicides as a
method of warfare, and provides for protection and assistance in the event
of use or threat of use of CW against a state party.
Most importantly, the inspected party has final say in determining the
extent and nature of access within the challenged site. The party will
negotiate with the inspection team the following: the extent of access to
any particular place or places within the inspection site; the particular
inspection activities, including sampling; the performance of particular
activities by the inspection team; and the provision of particular
information by the inspected party.
Monitoring the Chemical Industry
In the convention, chemicals of concern have been divided into three
schedules according to the risk that they pose to the objectives of the CWC.
Facilities producing, processing, and consuming these chemicals are subject
to initial and annual declaration and international monitoring, including on-
site inspection. In addition to these facilities, other facilities capable of
producing the scheduled chemicals but not doing so are also subject to
declaration and a monitoring regime.
At the same time, the provisions for monitoring chemical industries take
into account countries' concerns about the difficulties of national
implementation of the CWC such as negative impact of the provisions on
economic and technological development, the possible loss of confidential
business information, and the difficulty of monitoring small chemical
industry facilities in developing countries. Measures are included which
provide inspection procedures and methods for handling information which
protect sensitive, non-CW-related information; require that the convention
be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering economic or
technological development; and require states parties to facilitate the
fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific and
technical information for permitted purposes.
The convention also contains provisions to allay the fears of some
developing countries about the difficulty of identifying and opening to
monitoring chemical industries capable of producing scheduled chemicals
but not doing so. In particular, there is a provision for assistance in
compiling lists of such facilities and means to address any problems of
completeness of such lists. Thresholds for declarations and inspection have
been set high enough to preclude capturing small, irrelevant chemical
industries. Finally, the inspection regime for this sector of the chemical
industry will not start until the fourth year after entry into force of the
CWC. Moreover, the implementation of this category of inspections will be
subject to further discussion and decision making by the conference of
states parties and will take into account the accrued experience of other
industry inspections.
Verification
The CWC contains two verification regimes to enhance the security of
states parties to the convention and to preclude the possibility of
clandestine CW production, storage, and use. The first regime provides a
routine monitoring regime involving declarations, initial visits, and
systematic inspections of CW storage, production, and destruction facilities
and relevant chemical industry. The second regime, challenge inspection,
allows a state party to request and have conducted an international
inspection of any facility or location in another state party in order to
clarify and resolve questions of possible noncompliance.
The challenge inspection procedures were the most sensitive and difficult
to develop, given the need to balance provision for an adequate degree of
intrusiveness to address compliance concerns with the need to protect
sensitive, non-CW-related facilities and information of national security
concern. The CWC obligates the state party to be inspected to accept a
challenge inspection and to make every reasonable effort to satisfy the
compliance concern. At the same time, the CWC provides for a system of
managing access to a challenged site which allows for protection of the
inspected party's national security concerns. It does so in two ways: first,
through procedures to deter the challenging party from abusing the process
and, second, through procedures which allow the inspected party to protect
sensitive, non-CW facilities and locations.
Deterrence of Abuse
To deter abuse, the convention contains provisions for both the requesting
and the inspected parties to have their concerns about compliance and
possible abuse of the system addressed by the Executive Council at both the
beginning and the conclusion of the inspection. A state party must submit a
request for challenge inspection to the Executive Council as well as to the
Director General of the technical secretariat of the CWC organization. If
the Executive Council considers an inspection request to be frivolous,
abusive, or clearly beyond the scope of the convention, it may, within 12
hours after having received the request decide (by a three-quarter majority
of all its members) against carrying out the challenge inspection.
After a challenge inspection, the Executive Council will review the final
report of the inspection team. In addition to addressing concerns about
whether any noncompliance occurred, the council will also address concerns
as to whether the request had been within the scope of the convention as
well as whether the right to request a challenge inspection had been abused.
If the Executive Council concludes there was abuse, it may recommend to
the conference of states parties measures to take against the requesting
party and examine whether that party should bear any of the costs of the
inspection.
In addition to specific provisions to address abuse, there is a general
provision giving state parties the right at any time to request the Executive
Council to consider concerns about abuse of the rights provided for under
the convention.
Protection Through Inspection Procedures
The convention also contains inspection procedures which provide the
inspected party with the means to protect sensitive sites. Such means
include the timeframes specified to provide access, limitations on
observers, and the process of managed access at the site.
With respect to timeframes for inspection, after receiving notification of
the site to be inspected, the inspected party has the ability to take up to 5
days to provide access to the site. This time period allows inspected parties
adequate time to prepare a site for inspection. Once at the site, the period
of inspection itself is limited to 84 hours, extendable only by agreement
with the inspected party.
Concerning limitations on observers, while the requesting party can ask to
have an observer accompany the inspection team, the inspected party has
the right to disapprove the participation of such an observer. If the
inspected party allows the participation of an observer, it can limit the
access and activities of the observer at the site.
Finally, and most importantly, the inspected party has final say in
determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged site. The
party will negotiate with the inspection team the following: the extent of
access to any particular place or places within the inspection site; the
particular inspection activities, including sampling, to be conducted by the
inspection team; the performance of particular activities by the inspection
team; and the provision of particular information by the inspected party.
For example, the party may give only individual inspectors access to certain
parts of the inspection site; it may shroud sensitive pieces of equipment
such as computer electronic systems; and it may restrict sampling and
sampling analysis. In the event the inspected party provides less than full
access to places, activities, or information, it is under the obligation to
make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to clarify the
possible noncompliance concern that generated the challenge inspection.
Organization and Costs
Two other issues of importance and concern which arose during negotiations
of the CWC were the allocation of costs for implementing the convention
and equitable participation in its organizational bodies--in particular, the
Executive Council, since it will play a large role in CWC implementation.
Provisions of the convention address these concerns by allocating costs on
an adjusted UN scale to lessen the burden on small and developing countries,
with the most expensive costs--verification of destruction--to be borne
almost entirely by the countries possessing CW. Another provision
establishes the principle of rotational seats on the Executive Council and
seat allocation on a regional basis, leaving it up to each region to designate
members and taking into account not only a state's industrial significance
but also other regional factors. Yet another provision provides for staffing
the technical secretariat, drawing from states parties in a manner which
gives due regard to recruiting on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
Provisions for Improving The Convention
Finally, the negotiators recognized the need for making the convention a
living document which will allow for the possibility of improvement based
on inspection experience and advances in verification technology.
Therefore, the CWC contains provisions to allow for technical changes and
annual and special conferences to discuss implementation and address any
particular problems.
Preparing for Implementation Of the Convention
After the convention is signed, a preparatory commission of all signatory
states will begin work in early February 1993 to further elaborate detailed
procedures and to set up the CWC international organization. Commission
meetings will take place in The Hague, the Netherlands, which will be the
seat of the organization. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Hatano
Hatano
Source: UN Security Council President Hatano
Description: New York City, New York
Date: Jan, 8 19931/8/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Iran
Subject: Military Affairs
[TEXT]
Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been
authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council.
"1. The Security Council is deeply disturbed by the Government of Iraq's
recent Notes to the Office of the Special Commission [UNSCOM] in Baghdad
and to the Headquarters of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation
Mission (UNIKOM) that it will not allow the United Nations to transport its
personnel into Iraqi territory using its own aircraft.
"2. The Security Council refers to resolution 687 (1991) [for text, see
Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 14, p. 236] requiring Iraq to permit the Special
Commission and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to undertake
immediate on-site inspection of any locations designated by the
Commission. The agreement on facilities, privileges and immunities
between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations, and resolutions 707
(1991) and 715 (1991) [for texts, see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 34, p. 644 and No.
42, p. 790, respectively] elaborated on Iraq's obligations by demanding, inter
alia, that the Special Commission and the IAEA be allowed, as they
determined necessary, to use their own aircraft throughout Iraq and any
airfield in Iraq without interference or hindrance of any kind. Concerning
UNIKOM, Iraq is obligated by resolution 687 (1991) and committed by an
exchange of letters dated 15 April 1992 and 21 June 1992 respectively to
the unrestricted freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance of its
personnel, property, supplies, equipment, spare parts and means of
transport.
"3. The implementation of the measures set out in the recent
communications of the Iraqi Government would seriously impede the
activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and UNIKOM. Such
restrictions constitute an unacceptable and material breach of the relevant
provisions of resolution 687 (1991), which established the cease-fire and
provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in
the region, as well as other relevant resolutions and agreements.
"4. The Council demands that the Government of Iraq abide by its
obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions and cooperate
fully with the activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and UNIKOM.
In particular, it demands that the Government of Iraq not interfere with the
currently envisaged United Nations flights. The Security Council warns the
Government of Iraq, as it has done in this connection in the past, of the
serious consequences which would ensue from failure to comply with its
obligations."
The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its
consideration of the item on the agenda.
The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Fitzwater
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 9 19931/9/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Iran
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
All available evidence indicates that Iraq is acceding to the requirements of
the coalition's January 6, 1993, demarche [see summary in January 13 White
House Statement, p. 34]. No Iraqi aircraft have entered the no-fly zone
south of the 32nd parallel, and the Iraqi surface-to-air missiles have been
dispersed and are no longer threatening coalition flight operations.
Once again, [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein has backed down in the face of
coalition solidarity. Iraq remains isolated and a pariah among nations due
to its flagrant attempts to violate the cease-fire regime.
The coalition's January 6 demarche remains in effect. We will continue to
scrutinize Iraqi activity. No further warning will be issued if Iraq violates
the requirements of the January 6 demarche.
This episode should make clear to Iraq that interference with UN and
coalition operations--including humanitarian relief operations, Operation
Provide Comfort, UN Special Commission and International Atomic Energy
Agency inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and the UN Iraq-
Kuwait Observer Mission force on the Iraq-Kuwait border--will not be
tolerated. In this regard, we fully support the UN Security Council
presidential statement of January 8 that demanded that Iraq comply with
its obligations. We underscore the Security Council's warning of serious
consequences if Iraq fails to do so.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Hatano
Hatano
Source: UN Security Council President Hatano
Description: New York City, New York
Date: Jan, 11 19931/11/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Iran
Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations
[TEXT]
Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been
authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:
"The Security Council notes that there have been a number of recent actions
by Iraq as part of its pattern of flouting relevant Security Council
resolutions. One was the series of border incidents involving the United
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM); another was the incident
concerning the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and UNIKOM
flights.
"The Security Council is deeply concerned at the incidents reported in the
Secretary-General's special report of 10 January 1993 on UNIKOM
(S/25085). The Security Council recalls the provisions of resolution 687
(1991) that established the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and
demanded that both countries respect the inviolability of the international
boundary between them. It reaffirms that the boundary was at the very core
of the conflict and that, in resolutions 687 (1991) and 773 (1992) [for text,
see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 39, p. 731] it guaranteed the inviolability of the
boundary and undertook to take as appropriate all necessary measures to
that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
"The Council condemns the action taken by Iraq on 10 January 1993 to
remove equipment by force from the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized zone
without prior consultation with UNIKOM, and through UNIKOM with the
Kuwaiti authorities, as set out in the letter of 8 January 1993 from the
President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General. In particular,
the Council draws attention to the removal by Iraq of four HY-2G anti-ship
missiles and other military equipment from the six bunkers in the former
Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr on Kuwaiti territory, in spite of the objections
of UNIKOM and their efforts to prevent this. This action is a direct
challenge to the authority of UNIKOM and amounts to clear-cut defiance by
Iraq of the Council, which stipulated in the letter of 3 November 1992 from
the President of the Council to the Secretary-General that the military
equipment in the six bunkers should be destroyed by or under the supervision
of UNIKOM. The Council demands that the anti-ship missiles and other
military equipment removed by force from the six bunkers at Umm Qasr in
Kuwaiti territory be returned immediately to the custody of UNIKOM for
destruction, as previously decided.
"The Council also condemns further Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of
the demilitarized zone on 11 January 1993. It demands that any future
retrieval mission be in accordance with the terms set out in the letter of 8
January 1993 from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General.
On the UNIKOM facilities at Camp Khor, the Council stresses that the land
and premises occupied by UNIKOM shall be inviolate and subject to the
exclusive control and authority of the United Nations.
"The Council invites the Secretary-General, as a first step, to explore on an
urgent basis the possibilities for restoring UNIKOM to its full strength and
to consider in an emergency such as this the need for rapid reinforcement as
set out in paragraph 18 of his report of 12 June 1991 (S/22692), as well as
any other suggestions that he might have to enhance the effectiveness of
UNIKOM, and to report back to the Council.
"The Council is also alarmed by Iraq's refusal to allow the United Nations to
transport its Special Commission and UNIKOM personnel into Iraqi territory
using its own aircraft. In this connection the Council reiterates the demand
in its statement of 8 January 1993 that Iraq permit UNSCOM and UNIKOM to
use their own aircraft to transport their personnel into Iraq. It rejects the
arguments contained in the letter of 9 January 1993 from the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the Security Council (S/25086).
"These latest developments concerning the activities of UNIKOM and UNSCOM
constitute further material breaches of resolution 687 (1991), which
established the cease-fire and provided the conditions essential for the
restoration of peace and security in the region, as well as other relevant
resolutions and agreements. The Council demands that Iraq cooperate fully
with UNIKOM, UNSCOM and other United Nations agencies in carrying out
their mandates, and again warns Iraq of the serious consequences that will
flow from such continued defiance. The Council will remain actively seized
of the matter."
The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its
consideration of the item on its agenda.
The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Fitzwater
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Iran
Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations
[TEXT]
The United States and its coalition partners today took forceful actions
against Iraq.
Coalition aircraft today attacked surface-to-air missiles and associated
infrastructure in southern Iraq. Preliminary information indicates that the
coalition aircraft accomplished their mission.
This action was taken pursuant to the coalition demarche of January 6,
1993. This communication demanded that Iraq take steps within 48 hours to
ensure that its aircraft and surface-to-air missiles did not pose a threat to
coalition aircraft operating south of the 32nd parallel to monitor Iraqi
compliance with UN Security Council Resolution [687]. After initially
responding to the terms of the January 6 demarche, Iraq violated its
requirements, and the coalition is acting to restore an environment that
poses no threat to coalition aircraft.
All requirements of the January 6 demarche regarding potential threats to
coalition air operations south of 32 degrees remain in effect. We will
continue to scrutinize Iraqi activity. No further warning will be issued if
Iraq again violates the requirements of the January 6 demarche.
Similarly, the Government of Iraq should understand that continued defiance
of UN Security Council resolutions and related coalition demarches will not
be tolerated. The US Government fully associates itself with the January 8
and January 11 statements by the President of the UN Security Council that
declared Iraq in material breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and
the cease-fire regime and warned of the serious consequences of its
actions. We stand ready to take additional, forceful actions with our
coalition partners if Iraq continues to flout the will of the international
community and disregard its international obligations. Consistent with the
above, the [US] President has directed the deployment of a battalion task
force to Kuwait to underline our continuing commitment to Kuwait's
security and independence.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: US Recognizes Czech and Slovak Republics
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 1 19931/1/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Czechoslovakia (former), Czech Republic, Slovak Republic
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
The President today recognized the new Czech and Slovak Republics and
offered to establish full diplomatic relations. In an exchange of letters,
Czech Prime Minister Klaus and Slovak Prime Minister Meciar welcomed US
recognition and accepted our offer of full diplomatic relations.
Both leaders provided assurances that the new states will fulfill the
obligations and commitments of the former Czechoslovakia and will abide
by the principles and provisions of the UN Charter, the Charter of Paris, the
Helsinki Final Act, and subsequent CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] documents. They also pledged to prevent the
proliferation of destabilizing military technology, to respect human rights
and fundamental freedoms, to uphold international standards concerning
national minorities, and to move rapidly to create free market economies.
The United States looks forward to full and mutually productive relations
with the new Czech and Slovak states. We commend both republics for the
peaceful means by which their separation was carried out. In the interest
of ensuring stability and prosperity in the region and speeding full
integration into the international community, the United States urges
continued close regional cooperation among the states of Central Europe.
Our ambassador to Czechoslovakia will remain in Prague as the US
ambassador to the Czech Republic. We look forward to appointing an
ambassador to the Slovak Republic as soon as possible. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Fact Sheet: US Policy for a New Era in Sub-
Saharan Africa
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jan, 18 19931/18/93
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Namibia, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa
Subject: Human Rights, Refugees, Terrorism, Narcotics,
Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
In a new, post-Cold War environment, Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing
unprecedented political and economic change. These dramatic shifts and the
end of superpower strategic competition in the region have resulted in a
thorough re-examination and reorientation of US policy. The US Government
intends to maintain its engagement in Africa despite resource constraints.
Progress and stability will require long-term support by the international
community and the efforts of Africans themselves. Adequate diplomatic and
financial resources will be needed to promote peaceful change, conflict
resolution, stable democracy, and sustainable development.
Just as striking as the changes outside Africa are the shifts in the attitudes
and aspirations of Africans themselves. No longer content with the
victories of the post-independence period, Africans are demanding their
just rights along with popular participation and accountability in
government. Even more insistently, they are seeking a decent standard of
living, basic public services, and economic progress free from war and
repression.
With a population of 795 million, 20% of the world's land area, and a wealth
of natural resources and biological diversity, Sub-Saharan Africa cannot and
should not be ignored or neglected. Because of conflicts and crushing
poverty worsened by deadly threats from famine and the acquired immuno-
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), there is a long-term humanitarian imperative
to help alleviate acute suffering as much as possible. On the other hand,
there also is an enormous human and natural resource potential in Africa
which Africans can use for their own betterment. The world community
also has an important stake in the realization of this potential. Finally, as
the United States is a society with a large minority of African origin,
American policy naturally reflects US domestic cultural and political ties
to the region.
US Policy Goals in Sub-Saharan Africa
Conflict resolution and peaceful change in Africa are primary US goals since
the degree of success in achieving them is the basis for progress in all
other areas. The United States actively supports the nascent efforts of
Africans to take the lead in resolving conflicts and peace-keeping efforts in
the region. However, it also is willing to play the role of catalyst, technical
adviser, and honest broker to resolve conflicts.
Democratic systems that respect human rights and seek equitable economic
growth are the best guarantees of peaceful change and stability. They
provide the peaceful, stable environment essential to sustained
development. The United States seeks greater respect for human rights, the
rule of law, accountable and honest government, and democratic political
pluralism. It neither wishes to impose a particular system nor to enforce
any legal code. Rather, it supports what Africans themselves increasingly
demand: an effective voice in their own affairs and an end to corruption and
abuse of power.
The United States will work for sustained equitable development through
market-based reforms that rely more on the private sector and promise to
reduce dependence on external aid. Ensuring access to markets, investment
opportunities, and resources in Africa is the most effective way to sustain
growth and US involvement. US assistance programs should support reform;
aid criteria should include good governance and structural reform goals
along with respect for political and human rights.
Africa is beset by a variety of transnational problems which the United
States can address. With both bilateral programs and support for
international efforts, the United States can work to ameliorate the
devastation caused by AIDS and environmental degradation in Africa.
Necessary efforts to curb population growth and refugee flows also will
involve improving the status of women. The United States and the world
community have a strong interest in preventing the spread of terrorism and
narcotics trafficking to Africa. Subversion by radical regimes on the
periphery of the region also must be countered.
US policy cannot afford to disregard the important, and often
disproportionate, role of African military and security forces in public life.
The United States will support efforts to create smaller, more professional
forces clearly subordinate to civilian control and respectful of human
rights. As some US military resources are redirected to peace-keeping and
humanitarian relief, Africans and their regional organizations will be
encouraged to take the lead in these efforts.
Programs for US Engagement in Africa
A collective response to conflict resolution. As newly empowered
democratic forces struggle for control with established governments and
elites, the potential for regional conflict could increase. Economic
desperation will cause severe pressures within many societies. In addition,
the very existence of some African states could be threatened by divisive
and violent ethnic conflicts. Political and economic reforms are subject to
reversal and repression, and in many states military establishments may
continue to intervene in factional or ethnic disputes. Such conflict and
resulting humanitarian disasters are costly in human and financial terms
and, at times, offer compelling cause for outside intervention.
The United States strives to deal with such conflicts through a well-
informed diplomacy coupled increasingly with support for multilateral
efforts to preempt and mediate strife. Collective action with US allies and
other partners can effectively support African efforts to make and keep the
peace. Although the United States will become militarily involved in such
conflicts only under rare and compelling circumstances, a strong US
diplomatic presence is required. US involvement in resolving conflicts in
Namibia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique has earned it respect and
influence internationally and in Africa and will help guide its future efforts.
To prevent conflict from reaching the point of demanding outside
intervention, the United States supports African efforts in mediating and
averting conflict both internally and between states. Strengthening the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and expanding its mandate into regular
peace-keeping operations and conflict- mediation services will be a key to
this effort. Supporting similar intervention by sub-regional organizations
such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), now
carrying out an unprecedented peace-keeping operation in Liberia, also
encourages further African efforts in collective security. Finally, active
American support for efforts to reduce armaments and military spending in
the region is an integral part of keeping the peace and resolving conflict.
Preventing further bloodshed and conflict in South Africa is another policy
priority, both because of that country's economic importance in Africa and
the world's focus on the drama of its transition to majority rule. US public
concern about apartheid and the creation of a new South African society
offers another compelling reason for current US involvement and later
assistance to South Africa under a truly representative, non-racial
government.
Helping democracy take root. The United States is committed to help
promote and sustain political reforms now being demanded by Africans. The
United States focuses on supporting broadly democratic processes and
institutions, not personalities or specific political outcomes.
Programs to support these reforms increasingly are integrated into efforts
to achieve other objectives in Africa. Stable democracy with respect for
basic rights is essential to peaceful change, and responsible and responsive
government is the basis of sustainable economic growth. This policy
responds to the near-universal recognition in Africa that the post-colonial,
authoritarian model has brought political failure and economic ruin.
An agenda of active support for human rights and democratization also
commits the United States to help build civil societies and the institutions
which sustain reform. As repressive and often corrupt institutions are
swept away by the tide of reform, the United States has a historic
opportunity to work with Africans to achieve stability and development
through responsible, democratic government.
Strong US programs to encourage democratic values and practices are
essential. Projects advancing human and civil rights, the rule of law,
freedom and diversity in the press, effective government, the status of
women, and other pillars of a democratic society should reinforce direct
assistance for holding elections. Support for democracy and good
government must be firmly integrated into all dealings with Africans,
especially those in the military and security forces who may pose the
greatest threat to reform. Efforts to reduce the size of bloated security
forces both through positive incentives and negative conditionality will be
key to these efforts.
A strong information program which shares and promotes democratic values
is integral to US efforts to encourage lasting reform. American public
diplomacy should take advantage of the information and communications
revolutions in Africa. In many African states, fragile institutions of civil
society are emerging: independent newspapers, labor unions, human rights
groups, and political parties. Imperfect but reasonably representative
elections are installing governments with genuine popular mandates. By
identifying publicly with these developments and offering flexible support,
the United States, in concert with other democracies, can solidify these
gains and help make democratic experiments permanent. Success in this
endeavor serves American political, economic, and humanitarian interests in
Africa.
Fostering economic growth and trade. The central concern of most Africans
remains how to ensure a decent standard of living and lay the groundwork
for a modern economy. Sustainable economic growth driven by the private
sector is as essential to the achievement of all other US policy goals in
Africa as it is domestically. Development assistance and economic support
programs must focus on countries committed to free market policies which
ensure equitable, long-term growth.
Popular support for government and the democratic process is essential for
tough economic reform measures to endure. The United States seeks to
broaden the role of the private sector in political and economic reform
while helping to meet basic human needs through its aid. Economic
performance and need as well as progress toward democracy and responsible
government will be the primary considerations in allocating US development
assistance. The United States also seeks to include such criteria in the
decisions of international financial institutions. To maximize assistance,
coordination with other donors will be more important than ever.
Africans must dedicate themselves to the basic economic reforms which
will lead to a decent minimum standard of living and the continent's full
participation in the world economy. US programs support these tough
decisions by African leaders and their people, for they will ultimately lead
to economic growth, a reduction in conflict, reduced dependence on aid, and
expanded markets for US goods and services.
The United States continues to respond quickly and substantially to
suffering caused by natural or man-made disasters. Drought, famine, and
population pressures will continue to afflict Africa. Wars and civil strife
will continue to generate refugees, suffering, death, and economic
destruction. The United States will seek equitable burdensharing among all
international donors to meet these crises.
The United States aims to expand its private sector commercial
relationships and presence in Africa. Improving the investment climate,
promoting non-discriminatory treatment for American business, and
enhancing private sector support and followup services needed to carry on
trade are priorities in this area. The US Government aggressively seeks out
trade and investment opportunities for American firms and equal market
access. US assistance programs promote American exports and trade.
Free trade and an open economic system are particularly important for
creating the wealth needed to spur economic growth for all sectors of
society in South Africa. Many Africans look to a democratic South Africa as
a potential economic engine for the whole region. Economic success or
failure there will have serious implications for South Africa's neighbors as
well as its own people.
The United States encourages African nations to support the application of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including the introduction of
modern intellectual property rights protections, non-discriminatory
investment policies, and support for the other provisions of the Uruguay
Round. Freer trade, especially for agricultural products and textiles, also
will be vital to Africa's economic progress. Growth through trade can
reduce Africans' dependence on aid.
Africans also face the burden of military expenditures on their economies
and societies. With renewed effort to prevent conflict, there will be even
more emphasis on reintegrating former soldiers into often devastated
economies. US economic assistance and military programs in the region
encourage appropriate reductions in military spending and help Africans
redirect these financial and human resources into productive nation
building.
Debt is a crushing economic reality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Along with other
donors, the United States continues to explore possible solutions to the
burdens of debt servicing for struggling African economies. Debt relief
should be targeted on those countries undertaking effective reforms.
Addressing regional concerns and problems. The United States supports an
expanded role for international collective action to address problems which
affect the well-being of the world community. It also actively encourages
regional solutions and organizations such as the OAU and ECOWAS as they
take on new missions ranging from peace-keeping and conflict mediation to
election and human rights monitoring. These fledgling efforts deserve US
political and financial support as well as technical assistance and training.
Stronger regional organizations will bring African solutions to African
problems, necessary for the continent's long-term stability and
development.
Other critical issues with an impact in and beyond the region include:
-- Women
--The vital role played by women in the management of
natural resources only recently has been appreciated. Women's generally
low status in Africa is an important factor in economic, social, and health
problems. US assistance and information programs should focus on women
as key actors in sustainable development and building a healthy society.
Programs for educating and training women are vital to this process.
-- Environment
--In coordination with international programs for
the environment, the United States works to preserve and restore Africa's
often ravaged ecosystems. Again, the emphasis should be on helping
Africans build their own capacity and institutions to promote better
environmental practices and the protection of the continent's unique
biological diversity. The environmental problems of cities and new
industries also require attention.
-- AIDS
--The AIDS pandemic has had a particularly devastating
effect on Africa, where more than one-half of the world's HIV [human
immuno-deficiency virus]-infected persons live. The OAU Action Plan on
AIDS is a positive first step toward a comprehensive prevention program in
all African medical systems and societies. US technical assistance to
research and to combat the spread of AIDS is joined to active efforts to
mitigate the suffering and economic costs of the epidemic. Prevention and
control of AIDS must involve every sector of development assistance, from
population control to agriculture and industry. The entire world has a stake
in stopping the pernicious spread of this disease and helping Africans devise
cost-effective care for the infected.
-- Population control
--Economic progress in Africa is contingent
upon slowing population growth. Gains in living standards and reduced
dependence on outside assistance will be impossible without vigorous
programs to support family health care and family planning. US support for
such programs is essential to its policy goals.
-- Refugees
--Africa's conflicts and internal turmoil will
continue to generate large numbers of refugees in dire need. Resources
devoted to pre-venting and mitigating such conflict will more than pay for
themselves in reduced costs for humanitarian relief and mass repatriations.
To encourage voluntary repatriation as conflicts recede, US assistance
should focus on reintegrating refugees into their own societies.
-- Terrorism and narcotics
-- While Africa thus far has been
spared the worst ravages of these global problems, desperate poverty and a
breakdown in civil order has encouraged terrorism and drug use and
trafficking. Terrorists and their state sponsors need to be countered by
strong measures and both bilateral and regional cooperation. The United
States can improve coordination of drug law enforcement and increase
education to reduce domestic demand. When African countries become
transit centers for illegal drugs, US technical assistance and training also
is appropriate.
Conclusion
The United States is following this ambitious policy agenda in Africa while
working to meet urgent needs in America and the requirement to reduce the
size of budget deficits. Active diplomacy and a firm commitment to the
objectives described above, however, will require little more than the
resources currently available, especially with more effective collaboration
by donor countries. Vigorous promotion of stable democracy, peaceful
change, and economic reform will, in fact, reduce the potential costs faced
by the United States by reducing both the intensity and frequency of conflict
and humanitarian crises. Along with strong programs to support
development which meets the basic needs of impoverished populations, the
United States will be able to ensure that Africa can realize its enormous
potential in peace and prosperity as a friend and full partner of the United
States. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on the
Former Yugoslavia
UN
Source: Commission on Human Rights of the UN Economic and
Social Council, Geneva, Switzerland
Description: Text of Resolution 1992/S-2/1, "The Situation of Human
Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Date: Dec, 1 199212/1/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former), Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia
Subject: Human Rights, United Nations
[TEXT]
The Commission on Human Rights,
Meeting in special session,
Guided by the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on
Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and international
humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for
the protection of war victims and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977,
Aware of its responsibility to promote and encourage respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all and to prevent violations of such
rights,
Deeply concerned at the human tragedy in the former Yugoslavia and at the
continuing grave, massive and systematic violations of human rights
occurring there, particularly in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under
Serbian control,
Recalling its resolution 1992/S-1/1 [for text, see Dispatch Supplement Vol.
3, No. 7, p. 46],
Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Special Rapporteur appointed
pursuant to resolution 1992/S-1/1, as well as those of the Chairman of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on
the question of torture and the Representative of the Secretary-General on
internally displaced persons, who accompanied the Special Rapporteur on
one or both of his missions,
Noting with alarm the three reports of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia (A/47/666 - S/24809,
E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9 and E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10),
Gravely concerned in particular at the continuing, odious practice of ethnic
cleansing, which is the direct cause of the vast majority of human rights
violations and whose principal victims are the Muslim population virtually
threatened with extermination, which the Special Rapporteur reports has
continued, and in some regions intensified, in an effort to create a fait
accompli in disregard of international commitments, in particular the
statement of principles and the programme of action of the London
Conference, entered into by those who carry out such ethnic cleansing, and
recalling, as stated in its resolution 1992/S-1/1, that ethnic cleansing is
aimed at the dislocation or destruction of national, ethnic, racial or
religious groups,
Alarmed that although the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a
religious conflict, it has been characterized by the systematic destruction
and profanation of mosques, Catholic churches and other places of worship,
as well as other sites of cultural heritage, in particular in areas currently
or previously under Serbian control,
Deeply concerned that the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia
has resulted in more than two and a half million refugees and displaced
persons and at the catastrophic humanitarian situation now prevailing,
Recalling with appreciation the continuing efforts of the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Co-Chairmen of its Steering
Committee, including their proposals for the constitution for the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina designed to protect human rights on the basis of
fundamental international human rights instruments,
1. Commends the Special Rapporteur for his activities to date, and in
particular his two missions and his reports;
2. Condemns in the strongest terms all violations of human rights in the
former Yugoslavia, including killings, torture, beatings, rape,
disappearances, destruction of houses and other acts or threats of violence
aimed at forcing individuals to leave their homes, as identified by the
Special Rapporteur;
3. Categorically condemns the ethnic cleansing being carried out, in
particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognizing that the Serbian
leadership in territories under their control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Yugoslav Army and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia bear
primary responsibility for this reprehensible practice;
4. Demands an immediate end to the practice of ethnic cleansing, and in
particular demands that the Republic of Serbia use its influence with the
self-proclaimed Serbian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia
to bring the practice of ethnic cleansing to an immediate end and to reverse
the effects of that practice, re-emphasizing the rights of refugees,
displaced persons and other victims of ethnic cleansing to return to their
homes and the invalidity of acts made under duress;
5. Affirms that States are to be held accountable for violations of human
rights which their agents commit upon the territory of another State;
6. Condemns in particular the violations of human rights and humanitarian
law in connection with detention, including killings, torture and the
systematic practice of rape, and calls upon all parties in the former
Yugoslavia to close immediately all detention centres not authorized by and
in compliance with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and to
release immediately in conditions of safety all persons arbitrarily or
illegally detained;
7. Condemns also the indiscriminate shelling of cities and civilian areas,
the systematic terrorization and murder of non-combatants, the destruction
of vital services, the besieging of cities, and the use of military force
against civilian populations and relief operations by all sides, recognizing
that the main responsibility lies with Serbian forces;
8. Calls upon parties in the former Yugoslavia, and especially those most
responsible, to cease violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law immediately and to take appropriate steps to apprehend
and punish those guilty of perpetrating or authorizing them;
9. Expresses deep concern at the number of disappearances and missing
persons in the former Yugoslavia and calls on all parties to make all
possible efforts to account for those missing;
10. Welcomes the establishment, pursuant to Security Council resolution
780 (1992) of 6 October 1992 [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769],
of a Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information relating to
violations of international humanitarian law and encourages the closest
possible cooperation between the Special Rapporteur and the Commission of
Experts, recommends that this Commission be granted the staff and
resources necessary to enable it to act effectively, and requests the
Commission of Experts to provide its conclusions to the Secretary-General
in order to allow the Security Council to consider further appropriate steps
towards bringing those accused to justice;
11. Reaffirms that all persons who perpetrate or authorize crimes against
humanity or other grave breaches of international humanitarian law are
individually responsible for these breaches and that the international
community will exert every effort to bring them to justice, and calls on all
parties to provide all pertinent information to the Commission of Experts in
accordance with Security Council resolution 780 (1992);
12. Calls upon all States to consider the extent to which the acts
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia constitute genocide, in
accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide;
13. Urges the Commission of Experts, with the assistance of the Centre for
Human Rights, to arrange for an immediate and urgent investigation by
qualified experts of a mass grave near Vukovar and other mass grave sites
and places where mass killings are reported to have taken place, and
requests the General Assembly to provide the resources necessary for this
undertaking;
14. Expresses its grave concern at the information contained in the third
report of the Special Rapporteur (A/47/666-S/24809) on the dangerous
situation in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, and urges all parties in those
areas to engage in a meaningful dialogue under the auspices of the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to act with utmost
restraint and to settle disputes in full observance of human rights and
freedoms, and calls on the Serbian authorities to refrain from the use of
force and immediately to stop the practice of ethnic cleansing, and to
respect fully the rights of persons belonging to ethnic communities or
minorities in order to prevent the extension of the conflict to other parts of
the former Yugoslavia;
15. Welcomes the call of the Special Rapporteur for the opening of
humanitarian relief corridors to prevent the imminent death of tens of
thousands of persons in besieged cities;
16. Welcomes Security Council resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992
[for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 47, p. 843] in which it invites the
Secretary-General in consultation with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant agencies, to study the
possibility and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for
humanitarian purposes and the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur
for the creation of such security zones for the protection of displaced
persons, while keeping in mind that the international community must not
acquiesce in demographic changes caused by ethnic cleansing;
17. Affirms that all the parties in the former Yugoslavia share the
responsibility for finding peaceful solutions through negotiations under the
auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and
welcomes the acceptance by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of
the constitutional proposals of the Co-Chairmen as a basis for negotiations;
18. Requests the Special Rapporteur to continue his efforts, especially by
carrying out such further missions to the former Yugoslavia as he deems
necessary, to call on other existing mechanisms of the Commission on
Human Rights to assist him and to report his findings and recommendations
at its forty-ninth session, and requests the Secretary-General to continue
to make the reports of the Special Rapporteur available to the Security
Council;
19. Urges the Secretary-General to take steps to ensure the full and
effective cooperation of all United Nations bodies to implement the present
resolution and calls upon those bodies entrusted with human rights
monitoring in the former Yugoslavia to cooperate closely with the Special
Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts;
20. Requests the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, within the
overall budgetary framework of the United Nations, to make all necessary
resources available for the Special Rapporteur to carry out his mandate and
to comply with the request of the Special Rapporteur for staff based in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia to enhance effective continuous
monitoring of the human rights situation there;
21. Decides to examine the situation of human rights in the former
Yugoslavia at its forty-ninth session under agenda item 12.
VOTE: 45-1-1 (Yugoslavia opposed, Cuba abstaining).(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines
Revised
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 7 19931/7/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States, Bassas da India, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales,
International Organizations
[TEXT]
The Government of the United States, together with its partners in the
missile technology control regime [MTCR], has strengthened its efforts to
combat the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
The United States and all the partners in the missile technology control
regime have adopted revised guidelines to extend the scope of the regime to
missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons as well as
nuclear weapons.
The adoption of these guidelines and their implementation confirms and
tightens existing policy. These measures will further strengthen the MTCR
and will be important factors in countering the proliferation of missile
systems.
The Government of the United States and its MTCR partners welcome the
growing number of countries which have publicly committed themselves to
respect the MTCR guidelines, and we call on all states to show a similar
spirit of responsibility in the interest of international peace and security.
A similar statement is being made simultaneously in the capitals of the 22
partners of the MTCR. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines:
Text of Revisions
Boucher
Description: Issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 7 19931/7/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States, Bassas da India, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales,
International Organizations
[TEXT]
Missile Technology Control Regime
The United States Government has, after careful consideration and subject
to its international treaty obligations, decided that, when considering the
transfer of equipment and technology related to missiles, it will act in
accordance with the attached Guidelines beginning on January 7, 1993.
These Guidelines replace those adopted on April 16, 1987.
Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers
1. The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to
delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons. The
Guidelines are not designed to impede national space programs or
international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could
not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. These
Guidelines, including the attached Annex, form the basis for controlling
transfers to any destination beyond the Government's jurisdiction or control
of all delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction, and of equipment and technology relevant to
missiles whose performance in terms of payload and range exceeds stated
parameters. Restraint will be exercised in the consideration of all
transfers of items contained within the Annex and all such transfers will be
considered on a case-by-case basis. The Government will implement the
Guidelines in accordance with national legislation.
2. The Annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes
equipment and technology. Category I items, all of which are in Annex Items
1 and 2, are those items of greatest sensitivity. If a Category I item is
included in a system, that system will also be considered as Category I,
except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, removed or
duplicated. Particular restraint will be exercised in the consideration of
Category I transfers regardless of their purpose, and there will be a strong
presumption to deny such transfers. Particular restraint will also be
exercised in the consideration of transfers of any items in the Annex, or of
any missiles (whether or not in the Annex), if the Government judges, on the
basis of all available, persuasive information, evaluated according to
factors including those in paragraph 3, that they are intended to be used for
the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, and there will be a strong
presumption to deny such transfers. Until further notice, the transfer of
Category I production facilities will not be authorized. The transfer of
other Category I items will be authorized only on rare occasions and where
the Government (A) obtains binding government-to-government undertakings
embodying the assurances from the recipient government called for in
paragraph 5 of these Guidelines and (B) assumes responsibility for taking all
steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use. It
is understood that the decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign
judgment of the United States Government.
3. In the evaluation of transfer applications for Annex items, the following
factors will be taken into account:
A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the
recipient state;
C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of
delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass
destruction;
D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the relevant
assurances of the recipient states referred to in sub-paragraphs 5.A and 5.B
below;
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.
4. The transfer of design and production technology directly associated
with any items in the Annex will be subject to as great a degree of scrutiny
and control as will the equipment itself, to the extent permitted by national
legislation.
5. Where the transfer could contribute to a delivery system for weapons of
mass destruction, the Government will authorize transfers of items in the
Annex only on receipt of appropriate assurances from the government of the
recipient state that:
A. The items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use will
not be modified nor the items modified or replicated without the prior
consent of the United States Government;
B. Neither the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will be
retransferred without the consent of the United States Government.
6. In furtherance of the effective operation of the Guidelines, the United
States Government will, as necessary and appropriate, exchange relevant
information with other governments applying the same Guidelines.
7. The adherence of all States to these Guidelines in the interest of
international peace and security would be welcome. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: Haiti: Legislative Elections
Boucher
Description: Issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 12 19931/12/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
The de facto government of Haiti has announced its intention to hold
elections for several Senate seats and other offices on January 18 and 25.
The US Government believes that free and fair elections can only be held
under a legally constituted government in an atmosphere of respect for free
expression, freedom of assembly, and open political dialogue. These
conditions do not exist in Haiti today. Consequently, we do not regard the
planned elections as legitimate.
In the same context, we remain firmly committed to restoration of
democratic, constitutional government in Haiti. We continue to recognize
Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the legitimately elected president of that
country. We urge all Haitian parties to dedicate themselves to serious
negotiations that will end the current crisis and restore democracy to
Haiti.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: US To Assist With Senegal's Withdrawal From
Liberia
Snyder
Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joseph C. Snyder
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 12 19931/12/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Liberia, Senegal
Subject: Military Affairs, International Organizations
[TEXT]
The United States wishes to commend the Senegalese military personnel in
Liberia for the important role they have played in pursuing regional stability
in West Africa. Their mission successfully completed, the Senegalese
troops in Liberia will begin returning to Dakar [Senegal] tomorrow. The
United States, which at the request of the Government of Senegal and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) assisted in the
deployment of the Senegalese troops in late 1991, will help with their
redeployment to Dakar. The operation, using military air transport and a
commercial ship, will be financed from US funds allocated when the
approximately 1,400 Senegalese troops arrived in Liberia in 1991.
The Senegalese were in Liberia as part of the West African peacekeeping
force (ECOMOG) maintained by ECOWAS. ECOMOG has significantly reinforced
its presence in Liberia since the October 15, 1992, attack on Monrovia
[Liberia] by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The
peace-keeping force repelled the NPFL attack and has now secured virtually
all territory seized by the NPFL at that time. ECOMOG will remain capable
of protecting the Liberian people from attack after the departure of the
Senegalese contingent.
We expect ECOWAS to continue pursuing implementation of the
Yamoussoukro [Cote d'Ivoire] peace agreement in accordance with the
mandate contained in UN Security Council Resolution 788 of November 19,
1992 [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 48, p. 861]. The United States
continues to support ECOWAS fully in its effort to bring peace to Liberia,
disarm and demobilize the warring factions, and create conditions in which
free and fair elections can be held. However, Charles Taylor has rejected
the ECOWAS call for a cease-fire and asserted that his irregular army will
not disarm under ECOMOG supervision. We call upon all Liberian combatants
to cease aggressive actions and cooperate with the UN-endorsed ECOWAS
plan.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993
Title: US-Pacific Island Nation Joint Commercial
Commission
Snyder
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Acting
Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 12 19931/12/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Cook Islands, Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Western Samoa
Subject: International Law, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Leaders from 13 Pacific island countries met with US officials on January
12 in Honolulu, Hawaii, to sign a memorandum of understanding establishing
the US-Pacific Island Nations Joint Commercial Commission (JCC). This
initiative, first proposed by President Bush at his October 27, 1990,
Honolulu summit meeting with island heads of government, will function as
a consultative mechanism to enhance commercial and trade links among
member nations. As such, it will complement the economic policies of the
South Pacific island governments, which stress the importance of the
private sector in their respective national development programs.
The United States currently has JCC agreements with Poland, China, South
Korea, and Thailand. The Honolulu agreement marks the first time the
United States has participated in a JCC comprised of so many nations in a
single region. The successful conclusion of this undertaking underscores
our continuing commitment to playing a constructive role in the South
Pacific.
Pacific island members of the JCC are the Cook Islands, the Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Papua
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western
Samoa. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993
Title: Excerpts From President's Inaugural Address
Clinton
Source: President Clinton
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 20 19931/20/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: State Department
[TEXT]
...To renew America, we must meet challenges abroad as well as at home.
There is no longer a clear division between what is foreign and what is
domestic. The world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS
[acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome] crisis, the world arms race--they
affect us all. Today, as an old order passes, the new world is more free but
less stable. Communism's collapse has called forth old animosities and new
dangers. Clearly, America must continue to lead the world we did so much
to make.
While America rebuilds at home, we will not shrink from the challenges nor
fail to seize the opportunities of this new world. Together with our friends
and allies, we will work to shape change lest it engulf us. When our vital
interests are challenged or the will and conscience of the international
community is defied, we will act--with peaceful diplomacy whenever
possible, with force when necessary.
The brave Americans serving our nation today in the Persian Gulf, in
Somalia, and wherever else they stand are testament to our resolve. But our
greatest strength is the power of our ideas, which are still new in many
lands. Across the world, we see them embraced, and we rejoice. Our hopes,
our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who are building
democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993
Title: Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing
Christopher
Source: Secretary-Designate Christopher
Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, East Asia, North America,
MidEast/North Africa
Country: United States, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan,
Israel, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mexico, Canada
Subject: Trade/Economics, Military Affairs, Democratization,
United Nations, Mideast Peace Process,
North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman: It is a great honor to appear before you as President-elect
Clinton's nominee for Secretary of State. This hearing room is a long way
from Scranton, North Dakota, population 300, where I was born and raised,
and I am deeply moved by being here in these circumstances.
You and the members of this committee have contributed much leadership
and wisdom to our nation's foreign policy over the past decade. Let me say
at the outset that I look forward to a close and cooperative relationship
with you. I also look forward to your questions and will try to answer them
with the ruthless candor for which diplomats are famous.
In the 3 weeks since President-elect Clinton asked me to serve as his
Secretary of State, I have received about as much commiseration as
congratulation. Friends point to this new world's raw conflicts and stress
our own limited resources. They tell me I have drawn an important but
unpleasant assignment.
I appreciate their concern. But I dispute their assessment. I believe we
have arrived at a uniquely promising moment. The signature of this era is
change, and I believe many of the changes work in our favor. The Cold War is
over. Forty years of sustained effort on behalf of collective security and
human dignity have been rewarded. Millions who lived under the stultifying
yoke of communism are free. The tide of democratic aspirations is rising
from Tibet to Central America. Freer markets are expanding the reach of
prosperity. The nuclear nightmare is receding, and I want to congratulate
President Bush and [Russian] President Yeltsin on their successful
negotiation of the START II Treaty [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]. We
now have the opportunity to create a new strategy that directs America's
resources at something other than superpower confrontation.
Perils of the New Era
Neither President-elect Clinton nor I have any illusions about the perils that
lurk in many of this era's changes. The end of the Cold War has lifted the lid
on many cauldrons of long-simmering conflict. The bloody results are
evident in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Nor will this era lack for
ruthless and expansionist despots; [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein
confirmed that fact. Yet it is also true that we are now relatively more
powerful and physically more secure. So while we are alert to this era's
dangers, we nonetheless approach it with an underlying sense of optimism.
Not since the late 1940s has our nation faced the challenge of shaping an
entirely new foreign policy for a world that has fundamentally changed.
Like our counterparts then, we need to design a new strategy for protecting
American interests by laying the foundations for a more just and stable
world. That strategy must reflect the fundamental changes that
characterize this era:
-- The surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and sectional
conflicts, especially in the former Soviet bloc;
-- The globalization of commerce and capital;
-- A worldwide democratic revolution, fueled by new information
technologies that amplify the power of ideas;
-- New and old human rights challenges, including protecting ethnic
minorities as well as political dissidents;
-- The rise of new security threats, especially terrorism and the spread of
advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction; and
-- Global challenges including overpopulation, famine, drought, refugees,
AIDS [acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome], drug-trafficking, and threats
to the earth's environment.
To adapt our foreign policy goals and institutions to these changes,
President-elect Clinton has stressed that our effort must rest on three
pillars:
First, we must elevate America's economic security as a primary goal of our
foreign policy.
Second, we must preserve our military strength as we adapt our forces to
new security challenges.
Third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of promoting the
spread of democracy and markets abroad.
As we adapt to new conditions, it is worth underscoring the essential
continuity in American foreign policy. Despite a change in administrations,
our policy in many specific instances will remain constant and will seek to
build upon the accomplishments of our predecessors. Examples include the
Middle East peace process, firm enforcement of the UN sanctions against
Iraq, ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty, and the
continuing need for US power to play a role in promoting stability in Europe
and the Pacific.
Nevertheless, our Administration inherits the task of defining a strategy for
US leadership after the Cold War. We cannot afford to careen from crisis to
crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that seeks to anticipate and prevent
crises, like those in Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia, rather than simply to manage
them. Our support for democratic institutions and human rights can help
defuse political conflicts. And our support for sustainable development and
global environmental protection can help prevent human suffering on a scale
that demands our intervention. We cannot foresee every crisis. But
preventive diplomacy can free us to devote more time and effort to
problems facing us at home.
It is not enough to articulate a new strategy; we must also justify it to the
American people. Today, foreign policy makers cannot afford to ignore the
public, for there is a real danger that the public will ignore foreign policy.
The unitary goal of containing Soviet power will have to be replaced by more
complex justifications to fit the new era. We need to show that, in this era,
foreign policy is no longer foreign.
Practitioners of statecraft sometimes forget [that] their ultimate purpose
is to improve the daily lives of the American people. They assume foreign
policy is too complex for the public to be involved in its formation. That is
a costly conceit. From Vietnam to Iran-contra, we have too often witnessed
the disastrous effects of foreign policies hatched by the experts without
proper candor or consultation with the public and their representatives in
Congress.
More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to have
"clientitis," a malady characterized by undue deference to the potential
reactions of other countries. I have long thought the State Department
needs an "America Desk." This Administration will have one--and I'll be
sitting behind it.
Guiding Principles For Foreign Policy
I will not attempt today to fit the foreign policy of the next 4 years into the
straightjacket of some neatly tailored doctrine. Yet, America's actions in
the world must be guided by consistent principles. As I have noted, I believe
there are three that should guide foreign policy in this new era.
First, we must advance America's economic security with the same energy
and resourcefulness we devoted to waging the Cold War. The new
Administration will shortly propose an economic program to empower
American firms and workers to win in world markets, reduce our reliance on
foreign borrowing, and increase our ability to sustain foreign commitments.
Despite our economic woes, we remain the world's greatest trading nation,
its largest market, and its leading exporter. That is why we must utilize all
the tools at our disposal, including a new GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] agreement and a North American Free Trade Agreement
that serves the interests of American firms, workers, and communities.
In an era in which economic competition is eclipsing ideological rivalry, it
is time for diplomacy that seeks to assure access for US businesses to
expanding global markets. This does not mean that our commercial goals
will trump other important concerns, such as non-proliferation, human
rights, and sustainable development in the Third World. But for too long, we
have made economics the poor cousin of our foreign policy. For example, in
nearly all the countries of the former Eastern bloc--nations whose
economies and markets are on the threshold of growth--we have for years
assigned only one Foreign Service officer to assist US companies. In the
case of Russia, that means one commercial officer for a nation of 150
million people. Other economic powers, such as Germany and Japan, devote
far more personnel to promoting their firms, industries, and economic
concerns.
The Clinton Administration intends to harness our diplomacy to the needs
and opportunities of American industries and workers. We will not be
bashful about linking our high diplomacy with our economic goals. We will
ask our foreign missions to do more to gather crucial information about
market opportunities and barriers and actively assist American companies
seeking to do business abroad.
Second, we must maintain a strong defense as we adapt our forces to new
and enduring security challenges. As a result of efforts begun in the late
1970s by President Carter and continued under Presidents Reagan and Bush,
our Administration inherits the best fighting force in the world. But the
world has changed.
We face a paradox. The collapse of the Soviet Union enables us to reduce our
Cold War military forces. But it also leaves American power as the main
ballast for an unstable world. Our ability to manage the transition to a
more stable system of international relations will depend on tenacious
diplomacy backed by credible strength. The President-elect and Secretary
[of Defense]-designate Aspin have described how we must adapt our armed
forces to new missions. And I agree with President-elect Clinton's
statement that we will resolve constantly to deter, sometimes to fight, and
always to win.
I have spent a good portion of my life practicing various forms of diplomacy,
negotiation, and problem solving--from the effort to secure the release of
the American hostages in Iran, to responses to urban unrest and police
brutality, to the practice of law over 4 decades. I have argued and still
believe that diplomacy is a neglected imperative. I believe we must apply
new dispute resolution techniques and forms of international arbitration to
the conflicts that plague the world.
I also know from experience that nations do not negotiate on the basis of
goodwill alone; they negotiate on the basis of interests and, therefore, on
calculations of power. As I reflect on our experience in the Cold War, it is
clear that our success flowed from our ability to harness diplomacy and
power together--both the modernization of our forces and negotiations for
arms control; both advocacy for human rights and covert and overt
opposition to Soviet expansionism.
In the years to come, Americans will be confronted with vexing questions
about the use of force--decisions about whether to intervene in border
disputes, civil wars, outright invasions, and in cases of possible genocide;
about whether to intervene for purposes that are quite different from the
traditional missions of our armed forces--purposes such as peace-keeping,
peace-making, humanitarian assistance, evacuation of Americans abroad,
and efforts to combat drug smuggling and terrorism. While there is no magic
formula to guide such decisions, I do believe that the discreet and careful
use of force in certain circumstances--and its credible threat in general--
will be essential to the success of our diplomacy and foreign policy.
Although there will always be differences at the margin, I believe we can--
and must--craft a bipartisan consensus in which these questions concerning
the use of force will no longer divide our nation as they once did.
However, we cannot respond to every alarm. I want to assure the American
people that we will not turn their blood and treasure into an open account
for use by the rest of the world. We cannot let every crisis become a choice
between inaction or American intervention. It will be this Administration's
policy to encourage other nations and the institutions of collective security,
especially the United Nations, to do more of the world's work to deter
aggression, relieve suffering, and keep the peace. In that regard, we will
work with [UN] Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and the members of the
Security Council to ensure [that] the United Nations has the means to carry
out such tasks.
The United Nations has recently shown great promise in mediating disputes
and fulfilling its promise of collective security--in Namibia, Cambodia, El
Salvador, and elsewhere. But the United Nations cannot be an effective
instrument for sharing our global burdens unless we share the burden of
supporting it. I will work to ensure that we pay our outstanding obligations.
Ultimately, when our vital interests are at stake, we will always reserve
our option to act alone. As the President-elect has said, our motto in this
era should be: Together where we can; on our own where we must.
One of the main security problems of this era will be the proliferation of
very deadly weapons--nuclear, chemical, biological, and enhanced
conventional weapons--as well as their delivery systems. The [Persian]
Gulf war highlighted the problem of a fanatical aggressor developing or
using weapons of mass destruction. We must work assiduously with other
nations to discourage proliferation through improved intelligence, export
controls, incentives, sanctions, and even force when necessary. Overall,
this Administration will give high priority to the prevention of proliferation
as we enter a new and exceedingly dangerous period.
Third, our new diplomacy will encourage the global revolution for democracy
that is transforming our world. Promoting democracy does not imply a
crusade to remake the world in our image. Rather, support for democracy
and human rights abroad can and should be a central strategic tenet in
improving our own security. Democratic movements and governments are
not only more likely to protect human and minority rights, they are also
more likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes in a
peaceful manner and to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms
accords, and global environmental protection.
A strategic approach to promoting democracy requires that we coordinate
all of our leverage, including trade, economic and security assistance, and
debt relief. By enlisting international and regional institutions in the work
of promoting democracy, the United States can leverage our own limited
resources and avoid the appearance of trying to dominate others. In the
information age, public diplomacy takes on special importance--and that is
why we will support the creation of a Radio Free Asia to ensure that the
people of all Asian nations have access to uncensored information about
their societies and about the world.
Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down but must be built from the
bottom up. Our policy should encourage patient, sustained efforts to help
others build the institutions that make democracy possible: political
parties, free media, laws that protect property and individual rights, an
impartial judiciary, labor unions, and voluntary associations that stand
between the individual and the state. American private and civic groups are
particularly well suited to help. In this regard, we will move swiftly to
establish the Democracy Corps, to put experienced Americans in contact
with foreign grassroots democratic leaders, and to strengthen the
bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy.
We must also improve our institutional capacity to provide timely and
effective aid to people struggling to establish democracy and free markets.
To that end, we need to overhaul the US Agency for International
Development [USAID]. The agency needs to take on fewer missions, narrow
the scope of its operations, and make itself less bureaucratic. As a matter
of enlightened self-interest as well as compassion, we need to extract
lessons from USAID's past successes and failures to make its future efforts
stronger.
In all this work, we must ensure that the people who carry out our nation's
foreign policy have the resources they need to do the job. I want to work
with you to ensure they have adequate facilities, training, information
systems, and security. We also need to take a new look at the way our State
Department is organized and our policy is formulated. In the coming weeks,
I intend to streamline the Department of State to enhance our capabilities
to deal with issues that transcend national boundaries and to improve the
international competitiveness of American business.
The Clinton Administration will put America back in the forefront of global
efforts to achieve sustainable development and, in the process, leave our
children a better world. We believe that sound environmental policies are a
precondition of economic growth, not a brake on it.
These three pillars for our foreign policy--economic growth, military
strength, and support for democracy--are mutually re-enforcing. A vibrant
economy will strengthen America's hand abroad, while permitting us to
maintain a strong military without sacrificing domestic needs. And by
helping others to forge democracy out of the ruins of dictatorship, we can
pacify old threats, prevent new ones, and create new markets for US trade
and investment.
Principal Challenges To US Security
Let me take a few moments to consider how this strategic approach applies
to the principal security challenges that America faces in the 1990s. None
is more important than helping Russia demilitarize, privatize, invigorate its
economy, and develop representative political institutions. President
Yeltsin's courageous economic and political reforms stand as our best hope
for reducing the still-formidable arsenal of nuclear and conventional arms
in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, and this, in turn,
permits reductions in our own defense spending. A collapse of the Russian
economy, which contracted by 20% last year, could fatally discredit
democracy, not only in the eyes of the Russians but in the eyes of their
neighbors as well. Our Administration will join with our G-7 [Group of
Seven leading industrialized nations] partners to increase support for
Russia's economic reforms. That aid must be conditioned on the willingness
of Russia to continue the difficult but essential steps necessary to move
from a command economy to a more market-oriented one.
We shall also place high priority on direct and technical assistance for
Russia's efforts to dismantle its weapons and properly dispose of its
nuclear materials, to provide civilian employment for defense technicians,
and to house its demobilized forces. We must say to the democratic
reformers in Russia that the democratic nations stand with them and that
the world's experience in coping with similar problems is available to them.
We should also orchestrate similar international action to help Ukraine, the
other Commonwealth [of Independent] States, the Baltics, and the nations of
Eastern and Central Europe.
In Europe, we remain committed to NATO, history's most successful military
and political alliance, even as we support the evolution of new security
arrangements that incorporate the emerging democracies to the east. Our
Administration will support efforts by the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe to promote human rights, democracy, free elections,
and the historic re-integration of the nations of Eastern and Western Europe.
I can also assure you that this Administration will vigorously pursue
concerted action with our European allies and international bodies to end
the slaughter in Bosnia--a slaughter that has claimed tens of thousands of
lives and that threatens to spread throughout the Balkans. Europe and the
world community in general must bring real pressures, economic and
military, to bear on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of
ethnic cleansing.
In Asia, we confront many challenges and opportunities. In particular, as
President-elect Clinton stressed during the campaign, a complex blend of
new and old forces requires us to rethink our policy toward China. On the
one hand, there is a booming economy based increasingly on free market
principles, which is giving hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens an
unprecedented degree of prosperity and a thirst for economic as well as
political reform. On the other hand, we cannot ignore continuing reports of
Chinese exports of sensitive military technology to troubled areas,
widespread violations of human rights, or abusive practices that have
contributed to a $17-billion trade imbalance between our two nations. Our
policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism
to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and political
liberalization in that great country.
Elsewhere in Asia, the countries of the Pacific Rim are becoming a global
center of economic dynamism. In 1991, our trans-Pacific trade exceeded
$316 billion, dwarfing our $221-billion trade with Western Europe. We
must devote particular attention to Japan. Japan has recently taken
important steps to meet more of its international security responsibilities,
such as assisting in peace-keeping efforts from Cambodia to Somalia. Now
it must do more to meet its economic responsibilities as well--to lower
trade barriers more quickly and to open its economy to competition.
Together, Japan and the United States account for a third or more of the
global economy. That obligates us both to steer clear of the reefs of
recrimination and the rise of regional trading blocs that could sink
prospects for global growth. But we also have an obligation to America's
firms and workers to ensure [that] they are able to benefit from the growth
of Japan's economy, just as the strength and openness of the US economy
has helped fuel Japan's prosperity over many decades.
In South Korea, we will continue to maintain our military presence as long
as North Korea poses a threat to that nation. And on Asia's subcontinent, our
interests include combating nuclear proliferation; restoring peace to
Afghanistan; seeing an end to communal strife that threatens India's
democracy; and promoting human rights and free elections in Burma,
Pakistan, and elsewhere.
In the Middle East, we must maintain the momentum behind the current
negotiations over peace and regional issues. President Bush and [former]
Secretary of State Baker deserve great credit for bringing Arabs and
Israelis to the bargaining table, and the Clinton Administration is
committed to building on that historic breakthrough. Our democracy-
centered policy underscores our special relationship with Israel, the
region's only democracy, with whom we are committed to maintaining a
strong and vibrant strategic relationship. We also believe that America's
unswerving commitment to Israel's right to exist behind secure borders is
essential to a just and lasting peace. We will continue our efforts with
both Israel and our Arab friends to address the full range of that region's
challenges.
Throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, we will work toward new
arms control agreements, particularly concerning weapons of mass
destruction. We will assume a vigilant stance toward both Iraq and Iran,
which seem determined to sow violence and disorder throughout the region
and even beyond. In this region, as well, we will champion economic reform,
more accountable governance, and increased respect for human rights. And
following a decade during which over 1,000 Americans were killed, injured,
or kidnaped by perpetrators of international terrorism, we will give no
quarter to terrorists or the states that sponsor their crimes against
humanity.
Nowhere has the march against dictators and toward democracy been more
dramatic than in our own hemisphere. It is in our self-interest to help Latin
America consolidate a decade of hard-won progress. In the past several
years, as democracy has spread in the region and market economies have
been liberalized, our exports to Latin America have doubled. In close
partnership with our hemispheric partners, Canada and Mexico, we should
explore ways to extend free trade agreements to Latin American nations
that are opening their economies and political systems. At the same time,
we expect to complete understandings regarding the North American Free
Trade Agreement as outlined by President-elect Clinton. We also need to
make the Organization of American States [OAS] a more effective forum for
addressing our region's problems. In Haiti, we strongly support the
international effort by the UN and the OAS to restore democracy. In Cuba,
we will maintain the embargo to keep pressure on the Castro regime. We
will strongly support national reconciliation and the full implementation of
peace accords in El Salvador and Nicaragua. And in the Andean countries, the
power of the drug lords must be broken to free their people and ours from
the corrupting influence of the narcotics trade.
In Africa, as well, a new generation is demanding the opportunities that
flow from multi-party democracy and open economies. They deserve our
understanding and support. We need to assist their efforts to build
institutions that can empower Africa's people to husband and benefit from
the continent's vast resources; deal with its economic, social, and
environmental problems; and address its underlying causes of political
instability. We will be equally committed to working with Congress to
redirect our foreign assistance programs to promote sustainable
development and private enterprise in Africa. In South Africa, we shall
work actively to support those, black and white, who are striving to
dismantle the hateful machinery of apartheid and working with
determination to build a multi-racial democracy.
The Triumph of Freedom
As I said on the day President-elect Clinton nominated me to be Secretary
of State, back when I was in law school, two of my heroes were [former
Secretaries of State] Gen. George Marshall and Dean Acheson. And I am
enormously honored by the opportunity to occupy the post held by them and
by many of the most revered names in our nation's history. Marshall and
Acheson were visionaries who recognized at the dawn of the Cold War that
America could not remain safe by standing aloof from the world. And the
triumph of freedom in that great struggle is the legacy of the activist
foreign policy they shaped to project our values and protect our interests.
Now, as in their day, we face a new era and the challenge of developing a
new foreign policy. Its activism must be grounded in America's enduring
interests. It must be informed by a realistic estimate of the dangers we
face. It must be shaped by the democratic convictions we share. And, to
command respect abroad, it must rest on a sturdy, bipartisan consensus here
at home.
The ultimate test of the security strategy I have outlined today will be in
the benefits it delivers to the American people. Its worth will be measured
not by its theoretical elegance but by its results. If it makes our people
more prosperous and increases their safety abroad; if it helps expand the
stabilizing and ennobling reach of democratic institutions and freer
markets; if it helps protect the global environment for our children--if it
achieves these kinds of benefits, then we will have discharged our
responsibilities to our generation as Marshall, Acheson, and the other
architects of the post-war world discharged theirs.
They have given us a high standard to emulate as we define anew the
requirements of US global leadership. I look forward to working with both
parties in Congress to construct a new framework for that leadership, a
frame-work within which healthy debate will occur but within which we
can also build a strong consensus that will help us cooperatively pursue the
national interest at home and abroad. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993
Title: Deputy Secretary-Designate's Confirmation
Hearing
Wharton
Source: Deputy Secretary-Designate Wharton
Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 22 19931/22/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: State Department, Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
When President Clinton asked me to join his new Administration, I accepted
with a sense of honor, of excitement, and a sense of great personal
fulfillment.
For more than 2 decades, I have been an executive in higher education and
finance--president of a university; chancellor of a multi-campus university
system; and head of a very large insurance company and pension fund for
employees of colleges and universities, research institutes, private
secondary schools, and foundations.
Some might ask how, with that background, I came to be considered for this
post. While I am not privy to the thoughts of President Clinton or Secretary
of State Christopher on my selection, I should point out that my career did
not suddenly begin when I was elected president of Michigan State
University in 1970.
The fact is that for some 22 years previously, my full-time career involved
technical assistance and foreign economic development. Mr. Chairman, if I
may be permitted to forego my usual diffidence, an anecdote may help to
clarify the dilemma I face when trying to rebut those who say I have no
foreign policy experience. At a recent college commencement where I was
privileged to receive an honorary degree, I was waiting in the procession
line when I was approached by a faculty member. His first comment after
congratulating me on the honorary degree was the inevitable question:
"How's my retirement money?" His second comment was to say, "I am very
happy to meet you because I use your father's book on economic development
in my course." When I pointed out to him that my ambassador father never
wrote a book on economic development but that he was referring to my book,
my faculty friend expressed amazement to learn that I was the same person.
Background
So how did all this begin? In his presentation several days ago, Warren
Christopher recalled the great influence on the post-1945 world of our
nation's Marshall Plan--surely one of the few shining episodes in the history
of relations between nations formerly at war. Perhaps the event that most
shaped my own career was my presence in the graduating class at Harvard
University on June 5, 1947. As someone who has given more than a few of
them, I can tell you that commencement speeches are usually listened to by
the boisterous seniors with half an ear, if that. But for my class, the
speaker was Secretary of State George C. Marshall himself. The address he
gave that day--the address in which he set forth the elements of the
Marshall Plan--stands as one of the great turning points in enlightened
diplomacy.
Even now I remember key thoughts from his speech:
Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of
a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political
and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.
General Marshall knew full well [that] he was laying the groundwork for a
great campaign to rebuild war-torn Europe-- physically, economically, and
politically as well. He may have been less aware of the effect his words
had on one idealistic youngster who resolved, on the spot, to dedicate
himself to the inspired and inspiring principles General Marshall had just
put before the graduating class. Nonetheless, his words guided my
educational and career choices from that moment onward. At Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies, I took my masters in international
affairs with an emphasis on Latin America-- a specialization that
eventually led to 5 years of work on assistance programs in Venezuela,
Brazil, and Costa Rica in association with Nelson Rockefeller. Later, when I
was studying for my doctorate in economics at the University of Chicago,
my mentor was the great Nobel laureate in economics, Theodore W. Shultz,
who was then evaluating US technical assistance throughout Latin America.
My dissertation was on the impact of technical assistance on agricultural
development in Brazil.
When I completed my doctorate, I faced the usual choice [of] what in the
world to do with it. My father, a career diplomat who would eventually
become our country's first black career ambassador, made no secret of his
eagerness to have me follow his footsteps into the Foreign Service. And
that was by no means an unappealing possibility.
Yet, 10 years after I heard George Marshall speak at Harvard, his message
still filled me with excitement. In Japan and Europe it was now possible to
see, in the most vivid and concrete ways, what international assistance and
trade could accomplish. And in President Truman's subsequent "Point Four"
program, the United States had already embarked on an extension of the
original Marshall Plan concept to what were then called the
"underdeveloped" nations of the Third World.
To be sure, the Point Four program was undertaken in large part, if not
entirely, to contain the expanding communist sphere of influence. Yet Point
Four struck me as potentially much more than just a Cold War gambit.
Ultimately, I thought it might be, at least, as constructive an element of US
foreign policy as traditional diplomacy. And, on that basis, I made my
choice.
Between 1957 and 1970, I worked for the private, non-profit Agricultural
Development Council headed by John D. Rockefeller III. For 6 of those years,
my family and I lived in Malaysia, while my teaching, research, and grant-
making and development activities also took me regularly to Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, and Vietnam. It was a part of the world where the majority of
people were struggling to move from bare subsistence to a higher standard
of living. They were seeking better nutrition, housing, education, and health
care--all the things we mean when we talk about the "quality of life" and
"economic development." Our efforts to help them we labeled "technical
assistance." Back in the United States, our commitments got thrown
together with a lot of other things under the catch-all heading of "foreign
aid." Then, as now, not understanding "foreign aid" didn't necessarily
prevent people from attacking it.
In 1970, I became president of Michigan State University--a huge
"megaversity" in the then-popular term and one with a large and highly
respected international studies program. These were important programs,
including scores of projects based in developing nations around the world,
many funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID).
In 1978, I became chancellor of the State University of New York (SUNY)
system, the nation's largest public university. With 64 campuses, 47,000
employees, and more than 380,000 students, SUNY also maintained major
international program commitments, and I made enhancing them one of my
key initiatives during the 9 years I worked there.
In 1987, I became chairman and chief executive officer of the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund [TIAA-
CREF]. With assets of $112 billion, TIAA-CREF is the largest private
pension fund in the world and the third-largest insurance company in the
United States.
Without belaboring the point much further, I want to stress that my
involvement in international relations did not end after my overseas
development days were over. My first foreign policy foray came in 1966 as
a member of the State Department's Advisory Committee on East Asia and
the Pacific. In the intervening years, I was chairman of the Food Advisory
Plan of Congress' Office of Technology Assistance; a member of President
Carter's Commission on World Hunger; co-chairman of Secretary of State
Shultz's Commission on Security and Economic Assistance; and the first
chairman of USAID's Board for International Food and Agricultural
Development. I have been a long-standing member of the Overseas
Development Council and trustee of the Council on Foreign Relations, where
I had the privilege of serving with Secretary Christopher. Most recently, I
have briefly served on the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and
Negotiations.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I hope you will forgive me for
the brief, though probably not brief enough, recitation of what could be
called my foreign policy portfolio. I wanted to give you some assurance
that, in this extremely demanding assignment as Deputy Secretary of State,
I will not be starting from square one. Moreover, since Secretary
Christopher provided you with his perspectives on the many challenges that
our country faces around the world, particularly in Russia, the Middle East,
and Somalia, it seemed only fair to offer you some sense of the background
and values I bring to these and other challenges that lie ahead.
Immediate Priorities
What, in fact, are some of the challenges that are uppermost in my mind?
The Deputy Secretary of State is, in one sense, the Secretary's alter ego and,
in another, the State Department's chief operating officer. As such, I
propose to concentrate, at least initially, on at least four issues.
First, I have been asked by Secretary Christopher to take an active role in
putting together both the State Department budget for FY 1994 and the
Function 150 International Affairs Budget. In that process, we will be
seeking to balance two imperatives.
-- The first is to support the Administration's key foreign policy
objectives in national security, economic competitiveness and the
promotion of democracy and free markets abroad.
-- The second is to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with
the Administration's domestic agenda. Given the obvious fiscal constraints,
we will need to take much greater care in assuring that the resources we
dedicate to advance our important interests abroad are expended in a
coordinated and effective way.
Second, I will search for ways to adapt our foreign affairs machinery to the
new realities of the post-Cold War era. As Secretary Christopher stated in
his appearance before this committee, recent changes on the global scene
make it both timely and necessary to re-examine the way our State
Department is organized and how our policy is formulated. Also, we need to
streamline the Department and the policy- making process as we enhance
our ability to deal with issues that transcend national boundaries.
Third, I intend to pay special attention to the restructuring of our aid
programs and institutions. It is clear from the many recent studies that we
need to redefine USAID and revamp its organization accordingly. In
particular, we must ensure that our aid activities directly support
democracy, free markets, and sustainable development. This will receive
my highest priority. We intend to name an Administrator of USAID and to
move quickly to develop proposals which can serve as the basis for
consultation with the Congress.
Finally, I will look for ways to strengthen and support the people who are
responsible for the day-to-day management and execution of our foreign
policy, for they constitute our most important resource. We must be sure
that they have the training and direction they need to advance our key policy
objectives, and we must see to it that they have the facilities, information
systems, and security needed to accomplish their critically important
missions.
In each of these important areas, I hope that my managerial experience in
business and academia, as well as my earlier experience in economic
development, will serve me well. But I want to emphasize that as we
consider ways to improve the Department, I will work closely with the
Congress and especially with the members of this committee. Your wisdom
and insights will be invaluable.
More broadly, as Secretary Christopher's alter ego, I expect to be fully
engaged in policy issues. As we shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world,
the United States is, by force of destiny, a nation which must act in global
terms. But we need not think about the fate of other nations for purely
altruistic reasons. The fact is, as President Clinton has said on numerous
occasions, our national interest is inextricably linked with the rest of the
world's.
Our economy now stretches to every corner of the world through
international trade and resource specialization. Oil tremors anywhere in
the world are quickly felt at the gas pumps in our towns and villages.
American exports are the source of millions of jobs in this country. Our
balance-of-trade problems and deficits are symptomatic of the global
linkages. Our ecology is the world's ecology. Whether it is global warming
or desertification, national boundaries mean nothing to the forces of nature.
The volcanic dust from Krakatoa didn't know the difference between the
United States, Canada, or Europe.
Our base of human knowledge is globally linked. It is no accident that today
American universities have the largest numbers of foreign graduate
students ever. These students will take back to their countries part of the
American culture, which will further extend American influence. The
explosion in new technologies and the speed with which they travel around
the world accelerates almost daily. Many of these new technologies are
invented here in the United States but are often more skillfully
commercialized by other nations. We must take dramatic steps to reverse
this trend, but we cannot hope to reverse it if we turn our backs on the
world.
Finally, we have to recognize the extent to which the world's peoples are
linked. The United States, with its kaleidoscope of race, religion, creed,
ethnic and national origin, is one of the most diverse nations in the world.
The influx of immigrants throughout our nation's history has strengthened
us in many ways. But it also has cemented our ties to foreign lands, allies,
and trading partners.
I belabor these points because if our foreign policy is to be a viable one, it
must reflect the fundamental reality of our global nature. Our domestic
strength is linked to our international strength and vice versa. Isolationism
is not a viable option.
To pursue peace not just through preparedness but also by eliminating
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos; to champion democracy not by
imposing it but by fostering the economic, political, and social conditions
for the development of free institutions--this is the vision that inspired me
as a young college graduate. It is a vision fed by the best and purest springs
of the American character. And it is a vision that will serve us as well in
foreign policy as it will for the Clinton Administration's agenda for
domestic economic growth and social progress in the years ahead.
Conclusion
In nominating Warren Christopher to be the architect of our nation's foreign
policy, President Clinton has chosen superbly well. Secretary Christopher is
an exemplary public servant and diplomat--a man of both vision and
experience, absolute integrity, and heartfelt love of country. I look forward
to serving with him, and I will consider it a great honor if he considers his
formidable skills in any way complemented by my own.
With your permission, I would like to conclude on a very personal note. I
spoke before of my father, a 40-year veteran of the US Foreign Service--in
fact, the first black career officer to be appointed a US ambassador. I can't
say that these things are in the genes, of course. I can't even say my father
was always in full agreement with my need to find my own way in life or
the paths I took to do so. But my father did instill in me both a thirst for
knowledge about the world and a sense of diplomacy's high calling for
resolving the conflicts that inevitably arise between nations. My one regret
is that he couldn't be in the audience today as you consider his son's
nomination as second-in-command of the Department he was so proud to
serve. If he had been here, he'd probably be nodding and saying, "Well, son,
you certainly took the long way around. Now it's about time you took my
advice." (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993
Title: START II Treaty Transmittal Letter
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of a letter to the US Senate, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 15 19931/15/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
To the Senate of the United States:
I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993
[see Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 20]. The Treaty includes the following
documents, which are integral parts thereof:
-- the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs
[intercontinental ballistic missiles] and on Procedures Governing Conversion
of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and Conversion
Protocol);
-- the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Further Reduction and Limitation on Strategic Offensive Arms (the
Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and
-- the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy
Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on Attribution).
In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate, the
report of the Department of State and letters exchanged by representatives
of the Parties. The letters are associated with, but not integral parts of,
the START II Treaty. Although not submitted for the advice and consent of
the Senate to ratification, these letters are provided because they are
relevant to the consideration of the Treaty by the Senate.
The START II Treaty is a milestone in the continuing effort by the United
States and the Russian Federation to address the threat posed by strategic
offensive nuclear weapons, especially multiple-warhead ICBMs. It builds
upon and relies on the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) signed at Moscow on July 31,
1991. At the same time, the START II Treaty goes even further than the
START Treaty.
The START Treaty was the first treaty actually to reduce strategic
offensive arms of both countries, with overall reductions of 30-40 percent
and reductions of up to 50 percent in the most threatening systems. It
enhances stability in times of crisis. It not only limits strategic arms but
also reduces them significantly below current levels. In addition, the
START Treaty allows equality of forces and is effectively verifiable.
Finally, commitments associated with the START Treaty will result in the
elimination of nuclear weapons and deployed strategic offensive arms from
the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine within 7 years after
entry into force, and accession of these three states to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon States
Parties. As a result, after 7 years, only Russia and the United States will
retain any deployed strategic offensive arms under the START Treaty.
The START II Treaty builds upon and surpasses the accomplishments of the
START Treaty by further reducing strategic offensive arms in such a way
that further increases the stability of the strategic nuclear balance. It bans
deployment of the most destabilizing type of nuclear weapons system--
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently
targetable nuclear warheads. At the same time, the START II Treaty
permits the United States to maintain a stabilizing sea-based force.
The central limits of the START II Treaty require reductions by January 1,
2003, to 3000-3500 warheads. Within this, there are sublimits of between
1700-1750 warheads on deployed SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic
missiles] for each Party, or such lower number as each Party shall decide
for itself; zero for warheads on deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs; and zero
for warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs. Thus, the Treaty reduces the
current overall deployments of strategic nuclear weapons on each side by
more than two-thirds from current levels. These limits will be reached by
the end of the year 2000 if both Parties reach agreement on a program of
assistance to the Russian Federation with regard to dismantling strategic
offensive arms within a year after entry into force of the Treaty.
Acceptance of these reductions serves as a clear indication of the ending of
the Cold War.
In a major accomplishment, START II will result in the complete
elimination of heavy ICBMs (the SS-18s) and the elimination or conversion
of their launchers. All heavy ICBMs and launch canisters will be destroyed.
All but 90 heavy ICBM silos will likewise be destroyed and these 90 silos
will be modified to be incapable of launching SS-18s. To address the
Russians' stated concern over the cost of implementing the transition to a
single-warhead ICBM force, the START II Treaty provides for the conversion
of up to 90 of the 154 Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM silos that will remain
after the START Treaty reductions. The Russians have unilaterally
undertaken to use the converted silos only for the smaller, SS-25 type
single-warhead ICBMs. When implemented, the Treaty's conversion
provisions, which include extensive on-site inspection rights, will preclude
the use of these silos to launch heavy ICBMs. Together with the elimination
of SS-18 missiles, these provisions are intended to ensure that the
strategic capability of the
SS-18 system is eliminated.
START II allows some reductions to be taken by downloading, i.e., reducing
the number of warheads attributed to existing missiles. This will allow the
United States to achieve the reductions required by the Treaty in a cost-
effective way by downloading some or all of our sea-based Trident SLBMs
and land-based Minuteman III ICBMs. The Treaty also allows downloading, in
Russia, of 105 of the 170 SS-19 multiple-warhead missiles in existing
silos to a single-warhead missile. All other Russian launchers of multiple-
warhead ICBMs--including the remaining 65 SS-19s--must be converted for
single-warhead ICBMs or eliminated in accordance with START procedures.
START II can be implemented in a fashion that is fully consistent with US
national security. To ensure that we have the ability to respond to
worldwide conventional contingencies, it allows for the reorientation,
without any conversion procedures, of 100 START-accountable heavy
bombers to a conventional role. These heavy bombers will not count against
START II warhead limits.
The START Treaty and the START II Treaty remain in force concurrently and
have the same duration. Except as explicitly modified by the START II
Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty will be used to implement
START II.
The START II Treaty provides for inspections in addition to those of the
START Treaty. These additional inspections will be carried out according to
the provisions of the START Treaty unless otherwise specified in the
Elimination and Conversion Protocol or in the Exhibitions and Inspections
Protocol. As I was convinced that the START Treaty is effectively
verifiable, I am equally confident that the START II Treaty is effectively
verifiable.
The START Treaty was an historic achievement in our long-term effort to
enhance the stability of the strategic balance through arms control. The
START II Treaty represents the capstone of that effort. Elimination of
heavy ICBMs and the effective elimination of all other multiple-warhead
ICBMs will put an end to the most dangerous weapons of the Cold War.
In sum, the START II Treaty is clearly in the interest of the United States
and represents a watershed in our efforts to stabilize the nuclear balance
and further reduce strategic offensive arms. I therefore urge the Senate to
give prompt and favorable consideration to the Treaty, including its
Protocols and Memorandum on Attribution, and to give its advice and consent
to ratification.
George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993
Title: New Hope for Haiti
Einaudi
Source: Luigi R. Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to
the Organization of American States (OAS)
Description: Address before the OAS Permanent Council, Washington,
DC
Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Democratization, OAS
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman: I thank the [OAS] Secretary General for his report, which
gives some of the reasons why we believe there is new hope for progress in
Haiti.
Indeed, I wish to convey explicitly from the outset my government's
appreciation for Secretary General Baena Soares' continuing efforts to carry
out the mandates created by the OAS Foreign Ministers during their ad hoc
meeting last December 13, as well as those that have been in place since
October of 1991.
Our Secretary General has, in our view, borne daunting responsibilities with
grace and energy in an environment characterized by rapid change and
complexity, one presenting major obstacles as well as opportunities. His
performance--both individually and in coordination with the Foreign
Minister of Bolivia--reaffirms the unique role of regional solidarity
organized in support of Haitian democracy through the OAS.
Now, a renewed effort to resolve Haiti's crisis has been taking shape for
some time. In its current form, however, the new initiative now developing
is built on three pillars that have emerged clearly only over the past month.
They are:
-- Internationally, a new pattern of coordination between the OAS and the
United Nations in which are combined the special strengths of regional
sensitivity and global power;
-- In Haiti, a desire among the most varied of sectors to put an end to this
tragic crisis; and, finally,
-- In the United States, close cooperation in the national interest between
incoming and outgoing administrations of different political parties.
The prelude took place in September [1992], when Secretary General Baena
Soares hosted a week of negotiations between personal representatives of
[Haitian] President Aristide and of Haiti's de facto government. Those
private talks led to a breakthrough agreement to station an 18-member
civilian presence in Haiti. Now headed by the gifted diplomat from Trinidad
and Tobago, Colin Granderson, that mission has faced both logistical and
political difficulties--yet it has become the inspiration for a process to
reassure all parties in Haiti that a peaceful solution is possible and that
their intrinsic human rights can be respected.
In October [1992], President Aristide reminded world leaders of the
continuing urgency of the crisis and called upon the UN to join the OAS in
enforcing measures designed to restore democracy there. His letter
stimulated November resolutions in both the OAS and the UN calling for
implementation of economic measures and--I quote the OAS--". . . with
special emphasis on the suspension of oil, arms and munitions supplies and
on the freezing of assets of the Haitian state."
At the same time, at the request of our Secretary General Baena Soares,
Jamaica's former Prime Minister Michael Manley carried out quiet shuttle
diplomacy with a view to assessing opportunities for an early solution of
the crisis. In early December, Manley met in Atlanta with UN Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali and former President Carter.
On December 11, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali nominated former
Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo as his Special Representative on
Haiti. We in the United States have a high regard for Dante Caputo, and we
are impressed that our [OAS] Secretary General has ensured greater
cooperation with the United Nations and a single voice by naming Mr. Caputo
his representative. On December 13, the hemisphere's foreign ministers met
in Washington in a reconvened OAS ministerial on Haiti. After a 31/2-hour,
closed-door debate, during which Jamaica's current Foreign Minister David
Coore made a moving statement of the need for both stronger measures and
greater humanitarian assistance, the ministers took several decisions. Of
particular significance for future events, they authorized new efforts
focused on a "substantial increase in the OAS civilian presence" and on
increasing cooperation with the United Nations, possibly even the Security
Council.
On December 19, special envoy Caputo traveled to Port au Prince and met
with all interested sectors. That week, our Secretary General met with the
Secretary General of the United Nations in New York.
On January 6 [1993], Secretary of State Eagleburger and Secretary-
designate Warren Christopher discussed the situation in Haiti [see box]. On
an exceptional basis, the Department of State issued a formal statement
that it had been coordinating closely with senior members of the Clinton
transition team in a joint effort with UN and OAS representatives to support
the initiative being developed by Mr. Caputo.
Mr. Chairman, let me quote directly from this exceptional official US
statement:
The incoming Administration and this Administration [that is, the Bush
Administration and the Clinton Administration-to-be] share the goal of
restoring democracy to Haiti--safeguarding the human rights of all Haitians
on the island and helping the parties find a lasting solution that will end
Haiti's suffering and attain new support for Haiti's economy and people. We
urge all sides to be flexible in their positions and to be responsive to the
entreaties of the United Nations and OAS.
The next day, Secretary General Baena added to the new momentum by
calling publicly again for an immediate enhancement of the OAS civilian
presence in Haiti. The United States agrees, believing that the early
augmentation of the international civilian presence on the ground in Haiti
can help create a climate of confidence for negotiations to end Haiti's
political and economic crisis and can, by its very presence, have an
immediate, positive impact in reducing human rights violations from
whatever source.
We agree entirely with Secretary General Baena Soares that the OAS civilian
presence should not be seen as a substitute for the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. We regret that the de facto government in
Port au Prince declined a request from the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights to visit Haiti to observe the human rights situation.
I might also add that we, too, are concerned by the announcement by the de
facto government that it intends to hold elections for several Senate seats
and other offices on January 18 and 25. The United States believes that free
and fair elections can only be held under a legally constituted government in
an atmosphere of respect for free expression, freedom of assembly, and
open political dialogue. These conditions do not exist in Haiti today; for
that reason the State Department yesterday publicly indicated that we do
not regard the planned elections as legitimate [see Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 3, p.
42]. My delegation would support a similar statement by the president of
this permanent council to that effect today.
The fact is that the United States is firmly committed to restoration of
democratic, constitutional government in Haiti. We continue to recognize
Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the legitimately elected president of that
country. And we urge all parties to dedicate themselves to serious
negotiations to end the current crisis by restoring democracy to Haiti.
Haiti needs a democratic solution to end its suffering--to attain new
support for its economy and people. One component of this lasting solution
is economic. The US is providing food for some 400,000-500,000 Haitians
every day and emergency medical care for up to 2 million Haitian men,
women, and children. Our purpose in joining the embargo is to help induce
negotiations and restore democracy.
Our purpose is not to deny food to the poor or to deprive the Haitian people
generally of basic needs. In fact, today the United States is publishing in
the Federal Register regulations decided upon some time ago that will allow
the export to Haiti of school books, medicine, generators, and generator
spare parts for humanitarian purposes such as hospitals. Our purpose is to
maintain pressure for a negotiated political solution, not to punish the
Haitian people. To that end, we continue to ban most trade. To that end, we
oppose access by the de facto regime to international financial institutions
or to arms. To that end, we maintain frozen the assets of the Haitian
Government in the United States.
We are not and have not been shy about this policy. Maj. Gen. John Sheehan,
USMC, is in charge of US Security Assistance Programs in the Caribbean. He
regularly consults with the military liaison officers in our embassies there.
Last week, we took advantage of his visit to Haiti to reinforce our basic
message: that there must be a peaceful solution to Haiti's crisis that
recognizes the legitimate authority of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
Finally, let me say that any lasting solution must address the tragic
conditions of the Haitian "boat people." We are very concerned that
migration by boat from Haiti is an extremely dangerous undertaking which
has led to many deaths. As we have said many times, we believe that
migration is a regional problem to which the only lasting solution is the
restoration of democracy in Haiti itself. We urge all Haitians wishing to
seek refugee status to operate through normal legal procedures that are
already in place and accessible to them.
Let me conclude by repeating that we believe this is a moment of unusual
opportunity to make progress on a terrible problem. The opportunity has
been created by an unprecedented conjunction of forces and events inside
Haiti and out.
We now have the United Nations undertaking a complementary and
reinforcing role in addition to that of the OAS, which has been involved
since the beginning of this crisis. It is crucial that the Haitian people take
advantage of this opportunity before new pressures arise and before
additional hardships affect them. It is crucial that they seek a fair and
lasting democratic solution that bolsters democratic institutions,
safeguards the rights of all citizens, and allows economic reconstruction.
We urge all sides to be flexible in their positions and to be responsive to the
UN and OAS as this new initiative develops. And we urge all countries--not
only those who have already been generous in their support but all
countries--to provide the long-term financial and human support needed to
ensure that this new initiative prospers and that the plan set forth so well
by our Secretary General today can be put into practice. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993
Title: Haiti: Diplomatic Initiative
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Description: Address before the OAS Permanent Council, Washington,
DC
Date: Jan, 6 19931/6/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Democratization, OAS
[TEXT]
In their initial meeting this morning, Secretary Eagleburger and Secretary-
designate Christopher discussed the new diplomatic initiative being under-
taken by the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS)
to find a solution to the Haiti crisis. The State Department and the Clinton
transition team have been coordinating closely in a joint effort to support
this initiative. UN and OAS representatives have been in close touch with
the Department and senior members of the Clinton transition team in recent
days.
The incoming Administration and this Administration share the goal of
restoring democracy to Haiti--safeguarding the human rights of all Haitians
on the island and helping the parties find a lasting solution that will end
Haiti's suffering and attain new support for Haiti's economy and people. We
urge all sides to be flexible in their positions and to be responsive to the
entreaties of the United Nations and OAS. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993
Title: Zaire: Need for Economic Reform
Snyder
Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joseph Snyder
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Description: Address before the OAS Permanent Council, Washington,
DC
Date: Jan, 14 19931/14/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Zaire
Subject: Democratization
In Zaire today, the ambassadors of the United States, Belgium, and France
delivered a joint demarche personally to the President, the Prime Minister,
and the Chairman of the High Council urging them to adopt a short-term
stabilization plan and other reforms in cooperation with the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The ambassadors made clear that such
economic reforms are an essential precondition for increased bilateral and
multilateral aid.
The demarche stressed that the transition government of Prime Minister
Tshisekedi must have full authority to pursue the twin objectives of
peaceful transition to democracy and economic stabilization without
interference from the presidency.
The demarche also stated that the government budget, including limited and
controlled appropriations for the presidency, should be formulated in a fully
transparent way and strictly observed. The demarche noted the absolute
importance of appointing a qualified managerial team responsible to the
prime minister, according to procedures approved by the national
conference, including the governor of the central bank.
The ambassadors emphasized that when Zaire has taken these initial steps,
the United States, Belgium, and France will be prepared to help assist
Zaire's economic recovery, according to their individual procedures.
Initially, such assistance would include increased humanitarian aid; private
voluntary organization and government programs to help establish a social
safety net; and technical support, including advice on the implementation of
necessary economic reforms. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993
Title: A New Era of Peril and Promise
Clinton
Source: President-elect Clinton
Description: Address before the Diplomatic Corps, Georgetown
University, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 18 19931/18/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Military Affairs, Trade/Economics, Democratization
[TEXT]
I came to this university at a time when a fallen president had asked my
generation to give something back to our country. I was looking for a place
to prepare for that calling.Georgetown and its School of Foreign Service
have made enormous contributions not only to my life but to public service
in general. Many of its graduates, including my classmates, are now
distinguished members of our Foreign Service, our armed forces, or serving
in other areas of public and private life. Recently, Georgetown has made yet
another contribution in my friend, Dr. Madeleine Albright, who has agreed to
be our nation's voice at the United Nations.
I also chose to speak to you here, today, because of Georgetown's historical
tradition. George Washington spoke at this building, Old North, in 1797,
when the college was not yet 10 years old. Our republic, scarcely 20 years
old, stood not with great powers then but with great hopes. The Marquis de
Lafayette, whose friendship and cooperation with our nation was so vital to
its birth, was escorted to this campus by a troop of light horse cavalry in
1824. And across America's generations, presidents, dignitaries, and
scholars have chosen this site to speak about our collective hopes for the
future of our nation and the world.
In December of 1991, as I launched my campaign for the presidency, I came
back here to Georgetown to deliver three speeches which laid out the
principles and policies that would become the heart of my candidacy. In the
first of those speeches, I recalled the lesson taught me by one of my
George-town professors, Carroll Quigley. . . .
Carroll Quigley argued that the defining idea of Western civilization and of
the United States in particular was what he called future preference--the
idea that the future can be better than the present and that each of us has a
personal, moral responsibility to make it so.
When we embraced that idea, it was a revolutionary one. Now, all around the
world, people are beginning to think that way. That idea was the heart of
my campaign for the presidency, and it is a lesson that now applies with
equal force to the community of nations at the end of the Cold War. While
we cannot yet discern all of the contours of the new age in which we are
living, we know it is clearly an era of both peril and promise when the
future for millions and millions of people around the globe can be better
than the present; when the dreams of freedom and democracy and economic
prosperity and human rights can become real--but they may or not,
depending on what we do.
This is a season for hope. The Berlin wall today exists now only in the little
remnants of stone that have become the personal mementos of a historic
triumph of freedom over tyranny. A worldwide democratic revolution has
shown its strength and tenacity, from the shipyards of Gdansk to the streets
of Moscow, from the campuses of Beijing to the villages of El Salvador and
the townships of Soweto. The spread of freer markets has brought the
possibility of better living conditions from the factories of the Baltics to
the fertile fields of Africa and Latin America.
But the events of the last week remind us anew that this era will not lack
for dangers. We are all mindful of the tension in Iraq and of Saddam
Hussein's continuing provocations against the international community and
his own people. He must understand that America's resolve during this
transition period will not waver.
I support the international community's actions designed to bring him to full
compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions, and I ask each of you in
the diplomatic corps to emphasize this point to your own governments. The
policy of this country will remain American policy after January 20.
We face many immediate other perils in this new era--the rise of ethnic
hatreds in the former republics of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the
suffering in Somalia, the turmoil in Haiti, the proliferation of advanced
weaponry, the spread of terrorism and drug trafficking, the AIDS epidemic,
and the degradation of the global environment--and each will require strong
American leadership if we are to overcome them.
The American people have called for a new Administration, yet there is an
essential continuity in our foreign policy. Our relations and actions abroad
are rooted in enduring interests, alliances, friendships, and principles. My
Administration will build on the successes of my predecessors in specific
areas: in the quest for peace in the Middle East, in the effort to secure a
safe reduction in our nuclear arsenals and stem weapons of mass
destruction from proliferation, in the bold decision to relieve the suffering
in Somalia, [in] the assistance to the process of reform in the former Soviet
Union, [and] in the search for new and expanding markets around the world.
Yet, the world has changed in fundamental ways, and we also must change
with it. We need to state clearly how we plan in the United States to adapt
our nation's foreign policy goals and institutions to this new era. Such a
clear statement is necessary if we are to rally the support of the American
people here at home behind a policy of active international engagement,
which remains as critical to our own prosperity and security today as at any
time in this century. It is critical for our nation to speak clearly about our
purposes so that the nations of the world, friend and foe alike, will
understand our intentions in the months and years to come.
We must all remember that the final test of a foreign policy is its effect on
the lives of our citizens. The foreign policy of my Administration will be
built upon three pillars.
First, we will make the economic security of our own nation a primary goal
of our foreign policy. Here in America we cannot sustain an active
engagement abroad without a sound economy at home. And yet, we cannot
prosper at home unless we are engaged abroad. We will, therefore, seek
economic strength at home through increased productivity while we seek to
ensure that global commerce is rooted in principles of openness, fairness,
and reciprocity.
Second, our foreign policy will be based on a restructuring of our armed
forces to meet new and continuing threats to our security interests and the
international peace. We will continue prudently to reduce defense spending,
but potential aggressors should be clear about American resolve. We do not
relish the prospect of military force, but, when necessary, we will not
shrink from using it when all appropriate diplomatic measures have been
exhausted.
Third, my Administration's foreign policy will be rooted in the democratic
principles and institutions which unite our own county and to which so many
now around the world aspire. The spread of democratic values has given the
hope of freedom to millions all across the world who have endured decades
of oppression.
Whenever possible we will support those who share our values, because it is
in the interests of America and the world at large for us to do so. History
has borne out these enduring truths: Democracies do not wage war against
one another; they make better partners in trade and diplomacy; and, despite
their inherent problems, they offer the best guarantee for the protection of
human rights.
Finally, I want to assure all of you--the members of the diplomatic corps--
that, as President, I will work closely with the international community
through the United Nations and other vital institutions to resolve
contentious disputes and to meet the challenges of the next century.
America cannot and should not bear the world's burdens alone. But if we
work together, we can make great progress in making this a better world for
all of our citizens. We can address such global problems [as] environmental
decay, the scourge of AIDS, the threat to our children and our communities
of narcotics trafficking, and the plight of millions of refugees around the
world.
The Gulf war and the humanitarian relief operation in Somalia demonstrate
what is best about the United Nations and what the founders had in mind
over 40 years ago: confronting aggression by outlaw nations, restoring hope
to those in need as international partners. Let us act in concert today to
achieve those laudable goals.
I welcome the diplomatic corps' participation in this, our great national
celebration, as every American takes part in what is perhaps the greatest
strength of our democracy, the willing and peaceful transfer of political
power from one president to his successor. It is an inherently democratic
tradition, one that has been a source of inspiration to freedom-loving people
since George Washington stood atop Old North almost 200 years ago. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993
Title: Family Planning Grants
Clinton
Source: President-elect Clinton
Description: Presidential Memorandum for the Acting Administrator of
the US Agency for International Development, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 22 19931/22/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that receive federal funds from using those funds "to
pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning, or to
motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions." (22U.S.C. 2151b(f) (1)).
The August 1984 announcement by President Reagan of what has become
known as the "Mexico City Policy" directed the Agency for International
Development (AID) to expand this limitation and withhold AID funds from
NGOs that engage in a wide range of activities, including providing advice,
counseling, or information regarding abortion, or lobbying a foreign
government to legalize or make abortion available. These conditions have
been imposed even where an NGO uses non-AID funds for abortion-related
activities.
These excessively broad anti-abortion conditions are unwarranted. I am
informed that the conditions are not mandated by the Foreign Assistance
Act or any other law. Moreover, they have undermined efforts to promote
safe and efficacious family planning programs in foreign nations.
Accordingly, I hereby direct that AID remove the conditions not explicitly
mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act or any other law from all current
AID grants to NGOs and exclude them from future grants.
William J. Clinton (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993
Title: Guatemalan President's Peace Initiative
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 25 19931/25/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: Guatemala
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
We welcome the proposal to reinvigorate negotiations between the
Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union
guerrilla umbrella organization announced by President Jorge Serrano
before the UN General Assembly [on] January 19.
President Serrano offered to allow UN observers to verify a human rights
agreement between his Government and the guerrillas as soon as one is
concluded. In return, he asked for a 90-day period to negotiate other issues.
At the end of that time, a cease-fire would take effect automatically. UN
observers would also verify this cease-fire.
We look forward to a constructive response from the guerrillas and hope
that renewed and intensified talks lead to an early, definitive end to
Guatemala's internal conflict. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993
Title: Togo: Casualties in Lome Demonstration
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 26 19931/26/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Togo
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
On January 25, police and gendarmes in Lome, the capital of Togo, clashed
with demonstrators attempting to approach a hotel where visiting French
and German Government ministers had scheduled a press conference. When
police fired at the crowd, numerous Togolese were killed and a substantial
number wounded.
The United States deplores the loss of life and expresses its condolences to
the families of the victims. We call on the Togolese Government to initiate
an immediate investigation to identify and swiftly bring to justice those
responsible. As head of the security forces, it is the responsibility of
President Eyadema to ensure that those forces support the democratic
process in Togo and avoid any action which might disrupt it. The United
States has consistently urged Togo's highest authorities, including the
President, and leaders of the various political groups to establish a dialogue
which will lead to reconciliation and the promotion of the democratic
process in a secure environment. The only way out of Togo's impasse is
through democratic elections where the people are permitted to express
their political will calmly and without fear.
The US ambassador in Lome is meeting with senior Togolese officials as
well as leaders of the opposition, making clear our condemnation of the
killings and urging all parties to resort to dialogue, not violence. We are
also consulting with Togo's other major donors to determine what
initiatives we might take together to help advance Togo's democratic
process and diffuse the volatile political situation in the country. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993
Title: Feature: Travel Tips on Russia
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 26 19931/26/93
Category: Features
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia
Subject: Travel
[TEXT]
The following information was taken from a pamphlet entitled Tips for
Travelers to Russia, which was released by the Bureau of Consular Affairs,
US Department of State and is available from the Superintendent of
Documents, US Government Printing Office for $1. [The pamphlet is included on this
CD]
The Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, and in its place emerged
12 independent republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan. Russia, the largest country that emerged, stretches from
the Baltic Sea, across the northern Eurasian landmass, to the Bering Strait,
where one of its islands lies only 3 miles from an Alaskan island. This
information deals primarily with Russia; however, much of it--particularly
the sections on health, safety, and travel--also applies to the other
republics.
Although Russia and the other republics are experiencing profound political
and economic changes, this is a challenging and exciting time to visit the
region. The tourism industry, like other industries that were strictly
regulated in the former Soviet Union, is undergoing a transformation that
can be confusing to customers as well as to the industry itself. Travel
conditions are changing rapidly. Therefore, the Bureau of Consular Affairs
advises travelers to carefully research and plan their trip and to be patient
and flexible once underway in order to make it successful and enjoyable.
(For information on where to inquire about the current situation in the former
Soviet Union, see page
61.)
BEFORE YOU GO
Visas
A US citizen must have a valid US passport and a visa to travel to any
country of the former Soviet Union. At present, Russia, Armenia, Belarus,
and Ukraine are issuing visas. At time of publication, the other countries of
the former USSR have not established embassies in the United States. To
travel to a country of the former USSR not yet issuing visas, a Russian visa
is still required and is valid for all such countries. Currently, travel
between countries that require a Russian visa is still considered internal
travel by local authorities, and passports are not normally checked upon
arrival or departure.
Visas for Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine may be obtained from the embassies
of those countries (see page 64). The following visa information pertains to
Russian visas only. Travelers arriving without a visa in a country that
requires a Russian visa cannot register at a hotel and must leave the
country immediately by the same route they entered. A visa is required even
for a brief transit. If possible, obtain a Russian visa in the United States,
because it can be difficult and time-consuming to obtain abroad. You cannot
obtain a Russian visa in some countries such as Ukraine, Estonia, and
Lithuania.
Visas are valid for specific dates. Before starting on your trip, be sure your
visa is valid for the dates of planned entry and departure. Delays caused by
illness or changes in plans must be approved in advance by the office that
issued your visa. US citizens may apply for the following categories of
Russian visas: transit, tourist, business, or, for a private visit to friends or
relatives, a visitor or homestay visa.
Tourist, Business, and Transit Visas. Most travelers to Russia and the other
countries of the former Soviet Union arrange for their visas and
accommodations through an American travel agent. A business visa requires
a letter of invitation from a foreign business contact. A transit visa
requires a copy of a confirmed ticket and visa (if required) to an onward
destination.
Visitor or Homestay Visas.
Visas for private trips to stay in a private home are issued by the consular
division of either the Russian embassy in Washington, DC, or the Russian
consulate general in either San Francisco or New York (see page 64). Request
application forms by mail. The person you wish to visit also must apply for
permission well in advance of your visit. In larger cities, your host can
apply at the local visa office (called OVIR, an acronym for Otdel Viz i
Registratsii). In smaller towns, your host can apply to the local police.
OVIR or police consideration of these applications can be a slow process.
Upon approval of your application, your host will be issued a notification of
permission (izveshcheniye) for your visit. Your host should then send this
notification to you.
Private Visits During Group Tours
.
An American traveling on a group tour may request permission to visit local
acquaintances or take short individual excursions away from the group
itinerary to places of personal interest. Arrangements for side trips should
be made through your American travel agent and, if possible, before you
leave the United States. On your visa application, include the names and
addresses of those citizens of countries that you wish to visit.
How To Obtain Visa Information
Your travel agent can provide visa information, although authoritative
information on visas can only be obtained from the embassies or consulates
of the countries you plan to visit. Whatever your source, make certain that
your visa information is up to date, because, during this period of
transition, visa requirements will change frequently. When you inquire
about visas, ask about price, length of validity, and the number of entries
that are permitted.
YOUR US PASSPORT
Theft of US passports continues to increase rapidly. Stolen passports are
reportedly sold for large sums of hard currency. The theft or loss of a
passport, particularly when the nearest US consular office is hundreds or
thousands of miles away, is a major source of inconvenience and expense to
travelers in Russia and the other republics.
Before starting your trip, make a record or photocopy of the data from your
passport's identification page and from your visa(s). Also make a copy of
the addresses and telephone numbers of the US embassies and consulates in
the countries you will visit (see page 64). Keep this information and two
passport photos separate from your passport in case of loss or theft. Leave
a second copy of your passport information and itinerary with a relative or
friend in the United States. Complete the address page of your passport in
pencil and update it as necessary.
While in the former Soviet Union, you may be asked to leave your passport
with hotel personnel or a tour leader for short periods of time for
registration with police or for other purposes. It should be returned within
2 or 3 days. Be sure to safeguard your passport at all other times, as its
loss can cause you delays and problems. If your passport is lost or stolen,
apply for a replacement at a US embassy or consulate and then obtain a new
or duplicate visa from the nearest visa office (OVIR). If you are with a tour,
ask your guide for assistance.
PLANNING YOUR TRIP
Many geographic names throughout the region are being changed. Try to
obtain maps before your trip, but keep in mind that some place names may
be outdated. Some street and city names may need corrections. In these
countries, if the street sign does not agree with the map, it may be because
the name was changed.
Previously, in the former Soviet Union, departure and arrival times for
planes, trains, and boats were quoted in Moscow time. In the post-Soviet
period, that practice has changed, and timetables for travel in and between
former Soviet countries usually use local time. Within Russia itself,
however, you may still find Moscow time in use--regardless of which of the
11 time zones you are in. Whenever you make reservations or purchase
tickets, learn which time zones the schedule refers to and, as you travel,
confirm all departure and arrival times.
Air Travel Within Russia
Aeroflot continues to dominate air travel in Russia and the region. Although
many international airlines have flights to Russia and the other former
Soviet republics--and some, like Turkish Airlines, even have flights
between a few of the countries--Aeroflot's domestic flights remain the
major service in and between the countries of the former USSR. Since late
1991, domestic Aeroflot flights have been delayed for hours or days and
sometimes canceled because of jet fuel shortages. Prepare for long waits
or for possible itinerary changes with little or no advance notice.
Booking domestic Aeroflot flights in the United States can be difficult.
Once in Russia or one of the other republics, you may discover that a
domestic Aeroflot flight you booked does not exist or, at least, does not
exist on the day you are confirmed to go. Before you leave the United
States, you may be informed that flights do not exist to a certain city,
when, in fact, they do. Because of the difficulty in using Aeroflot's
domestic service, it is advisable to use international carriers, including
Aeroflot, wherever possible when planning your itinerary. While Aeroflot is
in transition to meet international standards, flexibility and patience are
the keys to successful air travel.
Overland Travel
When traveling by train or automobile in former Soviet countries, carry
food and water with you. If you travel overland between Central European
countries and countries of the former USSR, be certain that you have visas
for all countries through which you will pass. For example, the train from
Warsaw, Poland to Vilnius, Lithuania passes through Grodno, Belarus, and
transit visas are not available on the train. On occasion, Americans have
been required to leave the train in Grodno and return to their point of
departure to obtain a Russian visa for Belarus. (There is a direct rail route,
however, that does not pass through Belarus. It goes between Sestokai,
Lithuania and Suwalki, Poland.)
Auto Travel
Driving conditions in Russia and the other former Soviet republics are more
rugged than in Western Europe, service stations are few, and fuel may be
scarce at those stations. Adhere to all local driving regulations. They are
strictly enforced, and violators are subject to legal penalties. All tourists
entering Russia by automobile are required to sign an obligation
guaranteeing the re-export of their automobiles. This obligation also
applies to damaged vehicles.
Your automobile should be fully insured under a policy valid for Russia and
for any other country you will enter. Insurance policies may be purchased
from Lloyds of London or from Ingosstrakh, Kuybyshev Street 11/10,
Moscow, a Russian organization that insures foreigners. Auto insurance
obtained in Russia is still accepted in some of the other former Soviet
republics.
Be aware that Russian law allows the company to refuse compensation for
damage if a driver is pronounced by the authorities to have been under the
influence of alcohol at the time of an accident. Such determinations can be
made without the benefit of any tests.
Health
Precautions. Travel in the former USSR can be strenuous, particularly for
the elderly and individuals with special health problems. When you plan
your trip, be careful not to overschedule; leave time for rest and relaxation.
Tourists in frail health are strongly advised not to visit.
Immunizations. No immunizations are required for travelers to the former
Soviet Union. However, diphtheria, tetanus, polio, typhoid, and gamma
globulin are recommended for the region and, in particular, for the Central
Asian countries.
Health Insurance Policy. Review your health insurance policy. If your
insurance does not cover you abroad, consider purchasing temporary
insurance that does. In addition to medical insurance, consider obtaining
insurance to cover evacuation in the event of an accident or serious illness.
Because conditions in many hospitals are not adequate to ensure recovery,
medical evacuation is frequently necessary for illnesses or injuries which
could be treated locally in other countries.
Minimum cost from Moscow to New York on a stretcher is more than
$10,000. Medical evacuation by hospital aircraft on the same route
approaches $100,000. Insurance companies as well as some credit card and
travelers check companies offer short-term health and emergency
assistance policies designed for travelers. Ask your travel agent about
them or look for ads in travel publications.
Medications. Bring with you any necessary medications and keep them in
their original, labeled containers in your hand luggage. Because of strict
laws on narcotics, carry a letter from your physician explaining your need
for any prescription drugs in your possession. Also bring along any
toiletries and personal hygiene items that you will need. These items can
be difficult to find in major cities and even more scarce elsewhere.
Medical Care in the Region
.
Medical care in the former Soviet Union does not meet Western standards.
There is a severe shortage of basic medical supplies, including disposable
needles, anesthetics, common medications, and antibiotics. X-rays are of
poor quality and advanced diagnostic equipment, such as CAT-scan
machines, is not widely available. Patient support services, including basic
hygiene measures, are inadequate, and travelers may expect the length of
hospitalization to exceed the duration of stay they would expect in Western
facilities.
In addition, full, frank, and empathic discussions between doctor and patient
are hampered by language barriers as well as the lack of a tradition of
patient rights. If you need medical care, ask your hotel or tour guide to
direct you to an appropriate facility. You may also contact the nearest US
embassy or consulate for a list of local medical services.
Drinking Water. The US Public Health Service warns that many US visitors
to Russia, particularly to St. Petersburg, have returned to the United States
infected with the intestinal parasite Giardia lamblia. This infection is
probably contracted by drinking tapwater. Some travelers to Russia and
surrounding countries bring drinking water with them in their luggage. If
you cannot import your drinking water, drink only bottled carbonated drinks
or beverages that have been boiled for at least 5 minutes. Avoid ice cubes,
use bottled water for brushing teeth, and avoid salads or uncooked
vegetables and fruits which cannot be peeled. In addition, carry iodine
tablets to disinfect drinking water. Travelers returning from the region
who develop a diarrheal illness lasting more than 5 days should consult a
physician and have a stool specimen examined for parasites.
Chernobyl Nuclear Accident. Recent tapwater samples from Moscow, St.
Petersburg, and Kiev show no detectable radiation. Background radiation
levels in areas outside the immediate accident site and fallout path have
been tested periodically and are considered to be within acceptable ranges.
Access to the Chernobyl zone is strictly controlled by Ukrainian authorities.
Currency
Russia, like the other 11 countries of the former Soviet Union, has a cash-
only economy. During periodic cash shortages, it can be difficult to
impossible to cash travelers checks for dollars, for other convertible (hard)
currency, or even for rubles. The fee to cash travelers checks may be as
high as 5%. In Moscow, cash may be available at Dialogbank or American
Express. In St. Petersburg, rubles may be available but not hard currency. In
Kiev, cash may be available at the Agroprombank, Export/Import Bank, or
Bank Ukraina.
Some travelers avoid a number of the currency shortage problems by taking
a prepaid tour that includes all meals and hotels. Others find it useful to
bring major credit cards because they are accepted at some hotels and
restaurants, particularly those in Moscow. Most, however, solve the
problem of the currency shortage by coming to Russia and the other
republics with a sufficient supply of hard currency to cover their
obligations in the country. Some hotel restaurants and shops will accept
payment only in dollars or other hard currency. Beware! Make it your
practice to keep your excess cash in the hotel safe.
Before you leave home, check with your credit card and travelers check
companies to learn where these instruments can be used in the former
Soviet Union.
Customs and currency laws are strict. When you arrive, make an accurate
and complete customs declaration of all money, travelers checks, and
valuables in your possession. Include all personal jewelry, such as wedding
rings and watches. Have your customs declaration stamped by the
authorities and keep it with you until you leave the country. Keep your
exchange receipts in order to account for your expenditures. Without these
records, customs officials could confiscate your cash and valuables upon
departure.
The Russian ruble is still the currency of the 12 former Soviet republics. In
Ukraine, coupons have been introduced in preparation for issuing a national
currency. The coupons are used in Ukraine along with the Russian ruble but
cannot be used outside of the country.
Customs Regulations
Attempts to bring any of the following articles into the former Soviet Union
have caused difficulties for US citizens in the past:
Narcotics. Drug laws are strict. US citizens have received long sentences
for trying to enter or transit with illegal narcotics.
Pornography. Magazines with sexually explicit photographs that may be
considered commonplace in Western countries may be regarded as
pornography and are often confiscated.
Gifts for Persons in the Former USSR. A high rate of customs duty may be
assessed on gifts that you bring into a foreign country. US citizens have had
to abandon gifts at the airport because they lacked funds to pay the customs
duty.
Video Cassettes. Customs regulations allow for the import and re-export of
a limited number of blank or commercially recorded video cassettes for
personal use. Some travelers with a large number of cassettes have had
them confiscated upon departure. Travelers are advised to leave blank video
cassettes sealed in their wrappers when entering a country.
Customs regulations prohibit the import or export of personally recorded
video cassettes. To avoid confiscation of valuable travel memories, leave
those cassettes outside the country to be picked up later, or mail them home
before entering the country.
Legal Matters
Dual Nationality. Russia's new citizenship law that went into effect
February 6, 1992, recognizes dual nationality only if there is an agreement
between the two countries that covers dual nationality. At this time, the
United States and Russia do not have a dual nationality agreement.
Therefore, if you are a dual national and encounter problems in Russia, you
may not be permitted to leave, and assistance from a US consul may be
limited.
The US Government has notified the governments of the Soviet successor
states that it considers the 1968 US-USSR consular convention to still be in
force. The United States recognizes as an established principle of F
international law that every sovereign state has the right to decide, under
the provisions of its own laws, who is and who is not its citizen. The
Department of State maintains the following:
-- US citizens, whether by birth or naturalization, possess full American
citizenship and its accompanying benefits and responsibilities despite any
additional entitlement to other citizenships;
-- A US citizen entering a country of the former USSR with a US passport
and a valid visa is to be regarded as a US citizen by that country for
purposes of the visit, regardless of whether the foreign government might
also consider them to be their citizen; and
-- US citizens cannot lose their US citizenship because of automatic
acquisition of foreign citizenship. However, if a US citizen contemplates
voluntarily accepting dual nationality in connection with assuming duties as
a government official in one of the Soviet successor states, he or she should
first consult with the Department of State's Office of Citizens Consular
Services on 202-647-3445 or with the nearest US embassy or consulate.
The countries of the former Soviet Union generally do not prevent a US
citizen possessing a US passport and appropriate visas from visiting those
countries and returning to the United States, or to his or her country of
permanent residence, even if under foreign laws he or she is considered a
citizen of a Soviet successor state. Any dual national US citizen traveling
in Russia or any other country of the former Soviet Union should contact the
nearest US embassy or consulate immediately if any question arises about
his or her US or foreign citizenship.
To avoid any possible inconvenience or uncertainty, the Department of State
urges US citizens who are or who believe they are a citizen of a former
Soviet country to consider formally renouncing that citizenship before
visiting any of the former Soviet republics. For information on how to
renounce foreign citizenship, contact, in the United States, the embassy or
consulate of the country concerned before traveling.
In any case, possible dual nationals who travel to Russia or any of the other
countries of the former Soviet Union should, upon arrival, register in
writing or in person at the consular section of the nearest US embassy or
consulate. Give your full name; passport number; date and place of birth;
occupation; hotel and room number; phone number; purpose and dates of your
visit; home address; and the name, address, and telephone number of any
relatives that you have in the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Permanent legal US residents should travel with appropriate documentation
of their legal permanent residence status in the United States. Those who
are citizens of a country of the former Soviet Union should ensure that they
have the correct entry/exit permission from the Russian or other
appropriate embassy in the United States before leaving.
Adopting a Child Abroad. Current law allows adoptions in Russia and
Ukraine, although US citizens report the process in these republics to be
long and difficult. The status of adoptions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan remains uncertain.
Russia has established a quasi-governmental bureaucratic structure in an
attempt to regulate foreign adoptions. The agency, "Rights of the Child"
(Pravo Rebyonka), was formed to coordinate international adoptions, ensure
that Russian legal procedures are followed, and establish a centralized data
bank for information on Russian children adoptable by foreigners.
US citizens interested in adopting a child from one of the countries of the
former Soviet Union are encouraged to contact the US embassy or consulate
in that country, or, in the United States, the Department of State's Office of
Citizens Consular Services on 202-647-3444 to obtain information on the
adoption process in that country.
WHILE YOU ARE ABROAD
Registration
All US citizens who visit Russia or any of the other countries of the former
Soviet Union are encouraged to register in writing or in person at the
nearest US embassy or consulate. Registration is especially important if
you are in an area experiencing civil unrest or a natural disaster, if you are
going to a place where communications are poor, or if you plan to stay for
any length of time. Registration takes only a few moments, and it may be
invaluable in case of an emergency. If your passport is lost or stolen,
having previously registered at an embassy or consulate can make it easier
to issue you a new passport without a delay.
Safety Tips Against Crime
In Russia and much of the rest of the former USSR, crimes such as robbery,
mugging, and pickpocketing are an increasing problem for tourists,
particularly in cities and around major tourist sites. Crimes are
perpetrated not only by adults, but also by adolescents or even children,
often operating in groups.
Crime aboard trains also has increased. For example, travelers have been
drugged without their knowledge and robbed on the train from Moscow to St.
Petersburg. Crime also is a problem on trains between Moscow and Warsaw,
and armed robberies have occurred on the trains between Moscow and
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. On some trains, thieves have been able to open
locked compartment doors.
Although Russian officials have expressed willingness to cooperate with US
officials in emergencies involving US citizens, communications and
transportation can be slow and difficult, and the nearest US embassy or
consulate may be more than a day's travel away. To reduce the risk of
becoming a victim of crime, exercise the same precautions that you would
in any large city and follow these tips:
-- Safety begins when you pack. Leave expensive jewelry, unnecessary
credit cards, and anything you consider invaluable at home.
-- Never display large sums of money when paying a bill. Conceal your
passport, cash, and other valuables on your person. Do not trust waist or
fanny packs, because pickpockets have learned that is where the valuables
are.
-- Do not leave valuables in your hotel room; lock them in the hotel safe.
-- Be vigilant on public transport and at tourist sites, food markets, flea
markets, art exhibitions, and all places where crowds gather.
-- Even slight intoxication is noted by professional thieves. Therefore, if
you drink in a public place, do so only with a trusted friend who has agreed
to remain sober.
If you are the victim of a crime, report it immediately to the local police
and to the nearest US embassy or consulate. Reporting a theft is
worthwhile, because stolen items are sometimes retrieved.
Russian Law
How To Avoid Legal Problems. While in a foreign country, a US citizen is
subject to its laws and regulations. Laws in the countries of the former
Soviet Union can differ significantly from those in the United States and do
not afford the protections available to the individual under US law. Exercise
caution and carefully obey local laws. Penalties for breaking the law can be
more severe than in the United States for similar offenses. Persons
violating the law, even unknowingly, may have difficulties with the
authorities and may be expelled and forced to forfeit the unused part of a
pre-purchased tour. Serious transgressions of the law can lead to arrest
and imprisonment.
Under Article 12 of the US-USSR Consular Convention of 1968, government
authorities in the Soviet successor states are required to immediately
inform the US embassy or consulate of the arrest or detention of a US
citizen and to permit, without delay, communication with the detained
citizen. If you are detained by authorities, ask that a US consular officer be
informed and that you be allowed to meet with a US consular officer
without delay.
Avoid Breaking the Law. Never take souvenirs from local hotels, no matter
how insignificant in value they may appear. Pay for your souvenirs,
handicrafts, or artwork in local currency, because most vendors do not have
permission to accept dollars or other hard currency. Travelers have been
arrested by plainclothes police after paying for a souvenir with hard
currency. The traveler is usually released after several hours of detention,
but both the hard currency and the item purchased are usually confiscated.
Only special tourist stores, usually found in large hotels, are permitted to
accept hard currency.
Marriage Abroad. Americans contemplating marriage to a citizen of the
former Soviet Union should contact the consular section of the nearest
American embassy or consulate before the marriage takes place. Consular
officers cannot perform marriages but can provide information about local
regulations concerning marriage.
Photography Restrictions. Regulations on photography are strict,
particularly regarding military installations. Because of unwitting
violations of these regulations, US citizens have had film confiscated, have
been temporarily detained or interrogated, and have even been asked to leave
the country. Be sure that your photographs do not contain forbidden
subjects, not even in the background. When in doubt, ask your tour guide or
someone else in authority.
-- Photographs are permitted of architectural monuments; cultural,
educational, and medical buildings; theaters; museums; parks; stadiums;
streets and squares; and living quarters and landscape scenes which do not
include forbidden subjects listed below.
-- If prior permission is obtained from officials of the institution
concerned, photographs may be taken of industrial enterprises which
manufacture non-military products; farms; railroad stations; airports; river
ports; and governmental, educational, and social organizations.
-- All photographs are prohibited within the 25-kilometer-wide border
zones, except in those portions not closed to foreigners. Photographs of the
following are forbidden: all military objects, institutions, and personnel;
storage facilities for combustibles; seaports; hydroelectric installations
(sluices); pumping stations; dams; railroad junctions; railroad and highway
bridges; industrial, scientific, and research establishments; electric,
telephone, and telegraph stations; and radio facilities. Photographs from
airplanes and panoramic shots of industrial cities are prohibited.
-- Foreigners may not mail exposed film out of Russia.
Shopping: Be Wary of Antiques
Artwork, souvenirs, and handicrafts purchased at special stores for tourists
may be taken out of Russia and the other former Soviet republics. However,
antiques (defined as virtually anything which may be deemed of historical or
cultural value) and artifacts, including samovars, purchased at regular
stores and secondhand shops often may not be taken out of these countries
without inspection by local cultural authorities and payment of substantial
export duty. This procedure is almost prohibitively cumbersome and time
consuming. Samovars not purchased at tourist stores and not cleared by
cultural authorities are normally confiscated at pre-departure customs
inspections.
Consular Information Sheets
To find specific travel information for a country, see the Department of
State consular information sheets. These sheets contain information such as
the location and telephone number of the nearest US embassy and crime,
health, or security problems that may affect travel.
Travel warnings, which advise Americans to defer travel to all or part of a
country, also may be issued about certain countries. There are several ways
to access consular information sheets and travel warnings:
-- A 24-hour telephone service is available by dialing 202-647-5225 from
a touchtone phone;
-- You may obtain copies by sending a self-addressed, stamped envelope to
the Citizens Emergency Center, Room 4800, Department of State,
Washington, DC 20520-4818. (Write the name of the requested country or
countries on the outside of the envelope.)
-- They are posted at the 13 regional passport agencies and at American
embassies and consulates abroad; and,
-- They also can be accessed through an airline or travel agent's computer
reservation system or by computer through many electronic bulletin boards.
In addition to consular information sheets, a good source of information on
current conditions in the former Soviet Union is Intourist (tel. 212-757-
3884). Before 1991, Intourist was the official and only Soviet tour
operator. It is now a non-governmental body and is still by far the largest
tour operator in Russia and the other 11 former Soviet republics. Intourist
has contracts with a large network of hotels and restaurants, but it must
now compete with other Russian tour operators such as Sputnik and
Intratours. There also are a number of specialized tour operators. For
example, the Host Family Association and Wild World specialize in,
respectively, stays with families and adventure tours. Book travel with
Russian tour operators through US travel agents. (###)
US Embassies and Consulates in the Former Soviet Union
Armenia
American Embassy
18 General Bagramian Street
Yerevan, ARMENIA
Tel. (7-8852) 151-122; 151-144
Azerbaijan
American Embassy
Hotel Old Intourist
63 Prospekt Neftyanikov
Baku, AZERBAIJAN
Tel. (7-8922) 92-1898
Belarus
American Embassy
Starovilenskaya Ulitsa 46
Minsk, BELARUS
Tel. (7-0172) 347-642
Georgia
American Embassy
25 Atoneli Street
Tbilisi, GEORGIA
Tel. (7-8832) 989-967/8
Kazakhstan
American Embassy
551 Seyfullina
Alma-Ata, KAZAKHSTAN
Tel. (7-3272) 631-375
Kyrgyzstan
American Embassy
Erkindik 66 (old name: Derzhinskiy)
Bishkek, KYRGYZSTAN
Tel. (7-3312) 222-693
Moldova
American Embassy
103 Strada Alexei Mateevich
277014 Chisinau, MOLDOVA
Tel. (7-0422) 233-698; 233-494 (after hours)
Russia
American Embassy
Novinskiy Bulvar 19/23 (old name: Chaykovskogo)
Moscow, RUSSIA
Tel. (7-095) 252-2451 to 9; after hours: 252-1898; 255-5123
American Consulate General: St. Petersburg
Ulitsa Furshtadskaya 15 (old name: Ul. Petra Lavrova)
St. Petersburg, RUSSIA
Tel. (7-812) 274-8235
American Consulate General: Vladivostok
12 Mordovtseva Street,
Vladivostok, RUSSIA
Tel. [7] (4232-26-79-30, 26-67-34)
Tajikistan
American Embassy
Hotel Independence (old name: Oktyabrskaya)
39 Ainii Street
Dushanbe, TAJIKISTAN
Tel. (7-3772) 248-233
Turkmenistan
American Embassy
Yubilenaya Hotel
Ashgabat
TURKMENISTAN
Tel. (7-3632) 244-925
Ukraine
American Embassy
10 Yuria Kotsyubinskoho
252053 Kiev 53, UKRAINE
Tel. (7-044) 244-7349; 244-7354
Uzbekistan
American Embassy
Chilanzarskaya 82
Tashkent, UZBEKISTAN
Tel. (7-3712) 776-986
Foreign Embassies and Consulates in the United States
Embassy of Armenia
122 C Street, NW
Suite 360
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 393-5983
Embassy of Belarus
1511 K Street, NW
Suite 619
Washington, DC 20005-1403
(202) 638-2954
Embassy of Russia
Consular Division
1825 Phelps Place, NW
Washington, DC 20008
(202) 939-8907/11/13/18
Russian Consulate General
9 East 91 Street
New York, NY 10128
(212) 348-0926
Russian Consulate General
2790 Green Street
San Francisco, CA 94123
(415) 202-9800
Embassy of Ukraine
1828 L Street, NW, Suite 711
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 296-6960 (###)
Planning Another Trip?
For general travel information, the following pamphlets may be ordered
for $1 each from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC 20402; tel: 202-783-3238. [Pamplets are included on this
CD]
Your Trip Abroad
A Safe Trip Abroad
Travel Tips for Older Americans
Tips for Americans Residing Abroad
Country-specific information can be found in the following publications,
also available for $1 each from the US Government Printing Office:
Tips for Travelers to Sub-Saharan Africa
Tips for Travelers to the Caribbean
Tips for Travelers to Central and South America
Tips for Travelers to the People's Republic of China
Tips for Travelers to Eastern Europe
Tips for Travelers to Mexico
Tips for Travelers to the Middle East and North Africa
Tips for Travelers to South Asia
General visa information for these and other countries is available in
Foreign Entry Requirements for 50 cents from the Consumer Information
Center, Pueblo, CO 81009.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993
Title: What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1958-1960 (Volume XIV, Africa)
PA
Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Description: One of 18 print volumes and 9 microfiche supplements
presenting the Department's official record of US policy for
the years 1958-60 during the administration of President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 26 19931/26/93
Category: Features
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: South Africa, Congo
Subject: History
[TEXT]
The Department of State has recently released Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. It is one of 18 print
volumes and 9 microfiche supplements presenting the Department's official
record of US policy for the years 1958-60 during the administration of
President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
During this period, 18 Sub-Saharan African nations attained independence.
US support for the principle of self-determination for these countries often
came into conflict with US obligations toward its traditional West European
allies. Relations with the Union of South Africa, already troubled by the
issue of apartheid, promised to become even more strained. US leaders,
fearing that the newly independent countries would be fertile ground for the
expansion of Soviet influence, sought to prevent them from falling under
communist domination and to minimize communist influence over them.
The crisis that followed the independence of the Republic of the Congo (now
Zaire) in July 1960 overshadowed other events in Africa and preoccupied US
policymakers. Within days of the Congo's independence, disorder broke out,
and Belgian troops returned. The Congolese Government requested the UN
Security Council to authorize UN assistance to restore order. President
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian Herter backed the UN action but
wanted to avoid committing US troops and triggering direct Soviet
involvement. The US provided extensive logistical support to a UN force
drawn from Africa, Asia, and Europe, with no troops from major powers or
the Soviet bloc.
A Congolese internal political struggle resulted, with the United States
supporting President Joseph Kasavubu and the Soviet Union backing Prime
Minister Patrice Lumumba.
This volume includes an extensive record of the Congo crisis as well as
separate compilations of documents on the Horn of Africa, Ghana, Guinea,
and the Union of South Africa.
The volume is primarily comprised of documents originating in the White
House and the Department of State, but material originating in the
Department of Defense and the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also is
included.
Volume XVI (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02339-3) may be purchased for $33
from the Superintendent of Documents, New Orders, PO Box 371954,
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. For further information, contact Glenn W.
LaFantasie, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-
1133. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993
Title: Treaty Actions: Multilateral
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Feb, 1 19932/1/93
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Subject: International Law, Trade/Economics,
Science/Technology, Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
Containers
International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes, as
amended. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for
the US Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037; 29 UST 3707, TIAS 10220, 10914.
Accessions deposited: Brazil, Apr. 3, 1992; Estonia, Aug. 18, 1992.
Notification of succession deposited: Croatia, July 27, 1992; with effect
from Oct. 8, 1991.
Amendments to annexes I and II of the international convention for safe
containers (CSC), 1972, as amended (TIAS 9037; 29 UST 3707, TIAS 10220,
10914). Done at London May 17, 1991. Entered into force: Jan. 1, 1993.
Customs
Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at
Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1952; for the US Nov. 5,
1970. TIAS 7063; 22 UST 320.
Accessions deposited: Slovenia, Sept. 7, 1992; Ukraine, Nov. 10, 1992.
International Monetary Fund
Third amendment of the articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund (TIAS 1501, 6748, 8937; 60 Stat. 1401, 20 UST 2775, 29 UST 2203).
Adopted at Washington June 28, 1990. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1992.
Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS
6839; 21 UST 483.
Accession deposited: Burma (Myanmar), Dec. 2,1992.
Scientific Cooperation
Agreement establishing an international science and technology center.
Done at Moscow Nov. 27, 1992. Enters into force on the 30th day after the
date of last notification by the signatories that all internal procedures
necessary to be bound by agreement have been completed.
World Meteorological Organization
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington
Oct. 11, 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052; 1 UST 281.
Accession deposited: Uzbekistan, Dec. 23. 1992.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993
Title: Treaty Actions: Bilateral
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Feb, 1 19932/1/93
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Region: E/C Europe, Europe, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia (former), Finland,
Ireland, New Zealand, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Uruguay
Subject: International Law
[TEXT]
Chile
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign
assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies,
with appendices. Signed at Washington and Santiago Dec. 11 and 15, 1992.
Enters into force upon receipt by Chile of written notice from the US that
all necessary domestic legal requirements for entry into force have been
fulfilled.
Colombia
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign
assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies,
with appendices. Signed at Washington Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force
upon receipt by Colombia of written notice from the US that all necessary
domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Czechoslovakia
Treaty concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of
investment, with annex, protocol, and exchanges of letters. Signed at
Washington Oct. 22, 1991. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-31.
Ratifications exchanged: Nov. 19, 1992. Entered into force: Dec. 19, 1992.
Finland
Protocol to the treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights of Feb.
13, 1934, as modified (TS 868, TIAS 2861; 49 Stat. 2659, 4 UST 2047).
Signed at Washington July 1, 1991. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-34.
Ratifications exchanged: Dec. 1, 1992. Entered into force: Dec. 1, 1992.
Ireland
Protocol to the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation of Jan. 21,
1950 (TIAS 2155; 1 UST 785). Signed at Washington June 24, 1992.
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-35.
Ratifications exchanged: Nov. 18, 1992. Entered into force: Nov. 18, 1992.
New Zealand
Agreement concerning defense communications services, with annexes.
Signed at Wellington and Arlington Aug. 12 and Nov. 18, 1992. Entered into
force Nov. 18, 1992.
Peru
Investment incentive and financial agreement. Signed at Washington Dec. 16,
1992. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1992.
Uruguay
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign
assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies,
with appendices. Signed at Washington Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force
upon receipt by Uruguay of written notice that all necessary domestic legal
requirements have been fulfilled.
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to agriculture
owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with
appendixes. Signed at Washington Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force upon
receipt by Uruguay of written notice from the US that all necessary
domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993
Title: Department of State Reorganization
Christopher
Source: Secretary Christopher
Description: Secretary's message to State Department employees and
his implementation directive on reorganization released in
Washington, DC
Date: Feb, 5 19932/5/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: State Department, Terrorism, Narcotics, Refugees,
Democratization, Arms Control, Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
As I join all of you in the challenging job of shaping and directing America's
foreign policy, it is clear that we must make changes in the way the State
Department is organized.
The organization of our Department has evolved over the years in response
to unique circumstances in the international environment. We serve in a
State Department that is far better organized for the decades past than for
the special challenges America faces in the post-Cold War era.
I want our Department to be able to deal more effectively with the new
issues of critical importance to our nation's foreign policy: strengthening
democratization efforts in the former Soviet Union and around the world,
halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strengthening
peace-keeping capabilities, dealing more effectively with global
environmental problems, elevating our concern about the global population
explosion, fighting international crime and terrorism, and penetrating new
markets for American business.
We cannot hope to respond to these and other new challenges unless we
improve the way we deal with tough and complex problems which cut across
the traditional boundaries of our bureaus. We must design creative ways to
both increase the efficiency of the policy process and enhance the
administration of the many programs we manage. This will mean:
-- Designating five Under Secretaries together with the Deputy [Secretary]
as my principal foreign policy advisers;
-- Creating new focal points for key foreign policy initiatives;
-- Eliminating redundancies and concentrating greater decision making
responsibility within the bureaus;
-- Reducing excessive layering to streamline information flow and decision
making;
-- Enhancing communication in all directions by asking most bureaus to
report to me through a designated Under Secretary who will coordinate the
activities of related bureaus and facilitate needed access to me and the
Seventh Floor; and
-- Creating a streamlined Office of the Secretary to provide me and the
Deputy Secretary with a more effective means to receive information and
make decisions.
Over the past weeks, the transition has afforded us an extended opportunity
to examine closely the organization of the Department in light of President
Clinton's foreign policy priorities. We were not alone in this endeavor,
since work was well underway by the Department's own Management Task
Force "State 2000" as well as by other groups of qualified professionals.
The changes I ask to be implemented emerge from what I believe is a
growing consensus for change within and outside the Department.
I do not seek these changes merely for the sake of change itself. When
undertaking a degree of reorganization, we must be mindful that change can
be disruptive. Thus, it must be carefully planned so as not to interfere with
the orderly functioning of the Department. While some of the changes
outlined in the attached directive can be achieved quickly by administrative
action subject to congressional consultation, others will require legislation
which we plan to seek in the very near future. We have initiated the process
of discussion with Congress and have, thus far, received a positive reaction
to our approach.
There is great talent in the Department of State among those who have
devoted themselves to careers of public service. President Clinton and I
wish better to harness this talent so critical to the interests of our nation.
We must change to do this. I am convinced that the measured changes we
now undertake can enable us to deal with both the problems and
opportunities of a new era in foreign policy.
Secretary's Implementation Directive for Reorganization
In order to implement the foreign policy priorities of the President of the
United States and to more effectively and efficiently carry out the foreign
policy responsibilities of the Department of State, I ask that the following
changes be implemented to occur upon passage of legislation or by this
directive upon completion of congressional consultations.
1. The Under Secretaries shall be the principal foreign policy advisers
to the Secretary and directly in the chain of command.
I wish to strengthen the role of the Under Secretaries. They shall serve as
my principal foreign policy advisers and assist me and the Deputy Secretary
in executing and coordinating the activities of the Department. They will be
given line responsibility to manage and coordinate the operations of the
bureaus which will report to them.
The use of Under Secretaries as senior advisers to the Secretary should be
accompanied by a realignment of the chain of command. In the future,
Assistant Secretaries will report directly to the designated Under
Secretary. Changes in reporting responsibility will not alter the important
role of the Assistant Secretaries in the formulation of foreign policy or
their access to the Office of the Secretary.
The major benefits from this change are creating a better system of
information flow from the bureaus to the Under Secretary and the Office of
the Secretary, achieving greater efficiency in Departmental decision-
making, permitting more extensive coordination of key cross-cutting issues
at the bureau and Under Secretary levels, and strengthening the Under
Secretaries in the interagency process.
Listed elsewhere in this directive are the groupings of bureaus in specific
clusters and the designated lines of reporting to specific Under Secretaries.
2. Creation of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs.
I shall ask Congress to create a fifth Under Secretary for Global Affairs (G)
needed to manage and redirect critical global issues now found at the heart
of post-Cold War foreign policy. These issues cut across nearly every
boundary of the geographic and functional bureaus. We must insure that they
are given high-level attention in a new and strengthened system of Under
Secretaries. The substantive concerns of the Under Secretary for Global
Affairs shall reside in bureaus dealing with the environment, science,
oceans policy, democracy promotion, human rights, international labor
issues, refugees, population, counter-terrorism, international narcotics, and
other international criminal issues. Better coordination of the programs
managed by these bureaus across many agencies and departments will be a
critical role for this new Under Secretary.
Given the pressing need to have an Under Secretary for Global Affairs in
place in the very near future, President Clinton intends to initially nominate
his candidate for this post as Counselor and then have Congress reconstitute
this position as the new Under Secretary. I will also ask the Congress to
establish a new Counselor position at Executive Level IV, thereby
maintaining the current number of Executive Level III posts in the
Department.
3. Creation of three new bureaus to streamline policy and consolidate
functions.
I shall ask Congress to define three new bureaus derived from existing
bureaus and functions in the Department to streamline the formulation of
policy in these important areas and to better manage the substantial
programs operated by these organizations.
a. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)--This bureau will be
created by combining the current Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs and the Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator
for Labor Affairs; the latter shall be relocated in the new bureau in a Deputy
Assistant Secretary position. This bureau will provide an organizational
home for initiatives and policies which promote democracy. By combining
associated activities related to human rights and labor affairs, the bureau
will play a major role in formulating policies designed to build and
strengthen democratic institutions. The Assistant Secretary for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor will be nominated as Assistant
Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until legislation can
be enacted to reconstitute and rename that position.
b. Bureau of Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime (NTC)--This bureau will be
created by expanding the mandate of the Bureau for International Narcotics
Matters to include counter-terrorism and international crime. The
Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism will be relocated in the new bureau at
the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. A new office of international crime
will be created to act as a policy and coordinating office for all of the
Department's activities in this area. The operational responsibility for the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) will be moved to the new bureau
from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, thus placing policy and
implementation together.
President Clinton and I place great priority on the activities encompassed
by this new bureau in view of the threats posed to our nation by terrorist
groups, narco-traffickers, and international criminal organizations.
The Assistant Secretary for Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime will be
nominated initially as the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics
Matters until a statutory name change can be enacted.
c. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)--In order to
consolidate all Departmental responsibility for refugee matters and to
upgrade policy focus on refugee issues in a single bureau, I will ask
Congress to create a new bureau headed by an Assistant Secretary. This
bureau will also be responsible for coordinating the Department's policy on
population and migration issues. The positions and functions of
Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and the Bureau of
Refugee Programs will be subsumed in the new bureau. The nominee for
Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration Affairs
will be confirmed as Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Refugee
Affairs and will hold that position until legislation can be enacted
reconstituting and renaming the position as Assistant Secretary for PRM.
4. Rename offices in order to indicate a new policy emphasis or
changed mandate.
I will ask Congress to change the names of the following Departmental
units:
a. Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs to be changed to
Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs (E). This
change reflects the need to underscore that this office will have as a major
responsibility harnessing the assets of the Department to assist the
competitive position of US companies.
b. Under Secretary for International Security Affairs to be changed to Under
Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (A). This
change reflects new arms control priorities of the Clinton Administration
to deal with the heightened threat of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. The change also recognizes that the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs will have new non-proliferation functions as a result of
consolidations discussed in this directive. (The Bureau of Administration
[formerly A] will be designated AD.)
5. Create an Office of Secretary of State.
It is necessary to streamline and reorganize the office and functions which
relate directly to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary in order to
rationalize critical policy support services, to provide a framework for
high-level decision making and to enable the Secretary and the Deputy to
establish an operational agenda for Under Secretaries, Assistant
Secretaries, and other senior officials.
There is hereby established an Office of Secretary of State which consists
of the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Executive Secretary as well
as their personal staffs. Reporting directly to the Office of the Secretary
shall be:
-- Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for
the New Independent States (S/NIS);
-- The Policy Planning Staff (S/P);
-- The Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H);
-- The Bureau of Public Affairs (PA);
-- The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR);
-- The Legal Adviser (L);
-- The Chief of Protocol (CPR);
-- Secretariat Staff and Operations Center (S/S);
-- The Ombudsman (S/CSO);
-- The Inspector General (OIG);
-- The Foreign Service Grievance Board (FSG); [and]
-- Equal Employment Opportunity and Civil Rights (EEOCR).
The Deputy Secretary shall share major policy responsibilities with the
Secretary and in the absence of the Secretary shall serve in an acting
capacity. In addition, the Deputy Secretary shall:
-- Coordinate the management of international affairs resources,
especially on an interagency basis;
-- Oversee the process of ambassadorial appointments; [and]
-- Assume other tasks and responsibilities at the request of the Secretary
of State, such as reviews of organizational structures.
To achieve the efficient operation of the Office of the Secretary,
Ambassadors-at-Large, Special Advisers, Coordinators, and independent
offices hitherto reporting to the Secretary are abolished, merged with, or
relocated in appropriate bureaus as set out below (to occur upon the passage
of legislation or by this directive upon completion of congressional
consultations).
To be abolished by legislation:
-- Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, with
functions subsumed in the Bureau of Refugee Affairs as discussed
previously; and
-- Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance.
Abolished in this directive with functions relocated as indicated:
-- Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for International
Labor Affairs (S/IL), with functions assumed by the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor (DRL);
-- Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT), with functions included in
the Bureau of Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime (NTC);
-- Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser on Non-Proliferation Policy
and Nuclear Energy Affairs (S/NP), with functions transferred to the Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs (PM); and
-- Office of the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
(S/DEL), with functions transferred to the Bureau of Political- Military
Affairs (PM).
6. Creation of an Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the
Secretary of State for the New Independent States (S/NIS).
President Clinton has nominated an Ambassador-at-Large for the New
Independent States, and this person shall also serve as Special Adviser to
the Secretary of State. This new post was created to provide a high-level
focal point for policy formulation and coordination of US assistance to the
states that were under the control of the former Soviet Union. When
confirmed, the Ambassador-at-Large will chair an interagency policy group
to formulate US policy and set US program priorities for the new
independent states.
The Office of Independent States and Commonwealth Affairs (EUR/ISCA)
shall remain in EUR [the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs], reporting
directly to the Ambassador-at-Large. The task force coordinating
assistance to those states (currently D/CISA) and the position of
Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator shall be transferred to S/NIS and shall
report directly to the Ambassador-at-Large. The Ambassador-at-Large will
also provide general policy guidance to the Coordinator for Safety, Security,
and Dismantling Nuclear Weapons (to become PM/SSD) and to the USAID [US
Agency for International Development] Task Force for the New Independent
States (AID/NIS). The task force coordinating assistance to Eastern Europe
(D/EEA) shall be transferred to the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs.
7. New reporting responsibilities for Assistant Secretaries.
The Department's bureaus shall report directly to the Under Secretaries as
discussed previously. Set forth below are the reporting responsibilities for
each Assistant Secretary:
-- To the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P)--All six regional
bureaus (ARA, EUR, SA, AF, EAP, NEA) and the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs (IO).
-- To the Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs
(E)--The Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB).
-- To the Under Secretary for Global Affairs (G)--The Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); the Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES); the Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration (PRM); and the Bureau of Narcotics, Terrorism, and
Crime (NTC).
-- To the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Affairs (A)--The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM).
-- To the Under Secretary for Management (M)--The Bureau of
Administration (AD), the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA), the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security (DS), the Bureau of Financial Management and Policy
(FMP), the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), and the Bureau of Personnel (PER).
(Note: Further reorganization of management functions may occur after an
ongoing review is completed.)
8. Functional consolidations will occur to streamline operations and
improve policy focus.
There are several functions which need to be moved to improve policy
formulation and management in key areas.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology
Affairs (OES/N) and the five offices which report to this position (OES/NTS,
OES/NEC, OES/NEP, OES/NSR, OES/NSC) will be relocated within the Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs so as to further consolidate all activities
relating to the critical issue of halting nuclear proliferation. The Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) shall
retain functions in these offices relating to non-nuclear energy.
Another goal is to improve the way the Department manages export controls
as they are applied to commercial goods and munitions. Our interest is in
preventing exports that might contribute to proliferation or to the transfer
of technology that could harm US interests and in promoting legitimate
exports that help American industry and the economy. In order, then, to
improve the coherence, consistency, and efficiency of our efforts in the
Department, we are closely reviewing our export control activities and
examining alternative ways of organizing these functions, with a decision
to be made in the next 2 weeks.
Responsibility for international space issues is fragmented and has
produced overlapping roles among the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, and the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. We will also be
examining this problem over the next 2 weeks with an eye toward
integrating our diplomacy for space cooperation with broader national
security and foreign policy objectives.
The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center shall report to the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs. The Coordinator for Safety, Security, and Dismantling of
Nuclear Weapons (SSD) shall be moved to the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs. The US Delegation to the Open Skies Conference (T/OS) shall be
abolished.
There shall be created in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs an
Office of Peacekeeping to assist the bureau and the Department in efforts to
better plan and coordinate peacekeeping activities.
There shall be created in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs an
Office of Business Facilitation to serve as a key access point in the
Department for the private sector as well as providing policy guidance on
key issues relating to improving the competitive position of US companies
in world markets. Commercial functions of the Office of Commercial,
Legislative, and Public Affairs (EB/CLP) shall be transferred to this new
office.
The Bureau of International Communications and Information Policy (CIP)
shall be merged into the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs as an
office headed by a Coordinator. The rank of Ambassador associated with
this post shall be discontinued. Legislation will be sought to achieve this
change. International telecommunications negotiations and agreements are
critical to maintaining the competitive position of this important US
industry. This can best be achieved in the context of the EB bureau, which is
the principal place of access for American business. The Department's
interagency role in the telecommunications policy arena with the Federal
Communications Commission and the Commerce Department's National
Telecommunications and Information Administration will be strengthened
by merging this office into a fully staffed bureau.
There shall be created in the Department an Office for the Permanent
Representative for the United Nations to support the Cabinet functions of
this post and to more effectively coordinate with the Bureau of
International Organization Affairs.
In a time of tight budgets and increasing demands on international affairs
resources, clearer priorities must be established for the International
Affairs Budget Function 150 Account if Administration initiatives are to be
realized. Under the direction of the Deputy Secretary, who will coordinate
management of international affairs resources, the Policy Planning Staff
shall provide policy guidance so that general spending priorities may be
established. A deputy in S/P shall work closely with the Office of Policy
and Resources (D/P∧R) to link the policy planning and resource allocation
processes.
9. Removing excessive layering.
The number of Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the Department has grown
from 46 in the 1960s to 120 today. I have asked the Under Secretaries to
work with Assistant Secretaries to reduce the number of Deputy Assistant
Secretaries [DASs] and DAS equivalents by about 40% and to reduce
significantly the number of special assistants and other Seventh Floor staff.
These reductions are designed to eliminate excessive layering, expedite
clearance procedures, and strengthen the responsibilities of office
directors and country directors.
I have asked the Deputy Secretary to oversee the implementation of these
changes in a manner consistent with the orderly functioning of the
Department. In doing so, he will work with the Under Secretary for
Management, who will coordinate the implementation of the directive. I
have asked that all affected officials be consulted so as to achieve the
changes in a timely and non-disruptive fashion. I have also asked the Deputy
Secretary to conduct a review of the operations and mandate of the US
Agency for International Development and to report his findings within 60
days so that we may propose to Congress a reorganization plan for this
agency.
Warren Christopher (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993
Title: Guatemala Murder Trial
Boucher
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Feb, 1 19932/1/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: Guatemala
Subject: Human Rights
[TEXT]
We are concerned that a Guatemalan court denied a request for official
security protection for key prosecution witnesses to the brutal September
11, 1990, murder of world-renowned Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack
Chang. Testimony free from intimidation is necessary to ensure that
justice be done.
Ms. Mack's murder and the initial lack of any serious investigation focused
international scrutiny on the Guatemalan justice system's ability to combat
human rights abuse. In spite of judicial turnover which resulted in 12
different judges dealing with the case, and notwithstanding reports of
attempted intimidation, the current trial judge recently stated that a
verdict was due this month; these witnesses may be required to give further
testimony.
We urge appropriate protection for the prosecution witnesses in the Mack
case. We reiterate our expectation that the judicial process in this case be
full, fair, and impartial. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993
Title: US Supports Ongoing Angolan Talks and Calls for
End to Fighting
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Feb, 2 19932/2/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Angola
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization
[TEXT]
The United States welcomes the resumption of direct talks between the
Government of Angola and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola] in Addis Ababa [Ethiopia]. In addition to re-establishing a
dialogue, the two parties found sufficient common ground to pursue further
negotiations next week. The United States commends and fully supports the
work of the United Nations and the Secretary General's Special
Representative, Margaret Anstee, in facilitating these discussions.
While we are encouraged by this new dialogue, both parties must recognize
the urgent need for a cease-fire. Intense fighting continues in Angola,
undermining the already fragile political and economic situation. A military
solution to Angola's problems is not possible. The United States joins the
international community in reiterating its call for an immediate end to the
violence. UNITA and the Government must continue their face-to-face talks
under UN auspices in order to resolve their conflict and fulfill the terms of
the Bicesse peace accords.
We remind all parties that any attacks on US facilities, companies, or
personnel in Angola will have the gravest implications for those
responsible. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993
Title: US Commitment To Advance The Middle East Peace
Negotiations
Clinton
Source: President Clinton
Description: Statement released by the released by the White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Feb, 3 19932/3/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria
Subject: Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
In accord with my pledge to maintain continuity in the Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations, I have decided to dispatch Secretary of State Christopher to
the Middle East. His purpose will be to convey to all the parties my
commitment to advance the peace negotiations. He will elicit their views
on how best to promote progress, and he will discuss bilateral issues and
regional problems, including Iraq.
This will be Secretary Christopher's first mission abroad. It is an
indication of the priority my Administration attaches to peace-making in
the Middle East. It also presents an opportunity for the parties to focus
their energies on the formidable challenge of achieving peace in a strife-
torn region.
With violence engulfing so much of the world, it is striking that in the
Middle East a process of direct negotiations has begun. Israel, all its Arab
neighbors, and the Palestini