US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992

Title:

CSCE: A New Role for a New Era

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Intervention before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Council of Ministers, Stockholm, Sweden Date: Dec, 14 199212/14/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: USSR (former), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro Subject: CSCE, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Madame Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, we meet today in Stockholm already well across the threshold of a new, historical era. As yet, this new era goes unnamed. We describe it, for the time being, as merely the negation of what went before--the post-Cold War era. Ironically, we who cannot know the name which history will give this era are the ones whose actions will most determine what it shall be called. Indeed, we have it within our power to decide whether historians will call this an age of democracy or an age of disorder. With the demise of communism, it is clear, at least, where mankind's aspirations lie. They lie universally with freedom and, thus, with democracy. But it is equally clear that the collapse of the static, Cold War international system has unleashed a dynamic of change worldwide which, unchecked, could overwhelm those aspirations and threaten instability for a long time to come. The Iraqi conquest of Kuwait, starvation in Somalia, and "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans are all emblematic of the fact that we are in a period of transition between an old order which is dead or dying and a new [one] still struggling to be born. Fortunately, the international community has demonstrated the resolve to act on behalf of a more civilized world order when confronted, at least, with the Kuwaiti and Somali emergencies. But the more important and, indeed, more difficult challenge we have yet to face is the need to develop new international structures to manage global change in this new era. This, in short, is a time for institution-building, one not dissimilar to the period immediately following World War II. However, whereas post-war institutions were developed over years-- indeed, decades--the ongoing carnage in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates that we do not have the luxury of time and that we may, in fact, be losing the race against time with the forces of hatred and disintegration which threaten the new, democratic order in Europe. Yugoslavia is a shocking reminder that barbarity exists within our midst and that we cannot call the new Europe either civilized or secure until we have developed stronger mechanisms for dealing with this and similar crises. If we are honest, however, we will go deeper and recognize the former Yugoslavia as a mirror of our darker selves--a mirror of what we, too, could become if we were to succumb to the ethnic hatred and intolerance for diversity which we have also seen this year in Western Europe and North America alike. Yugoslavia should make us realize that our hopes for living in a more peaceful and civilized world are inextricably linked to the way we each conduct ourselves at home. It is precisely for this reason, in fact, that the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] is of such vital importance today. CSCE reflects our faith that a truly democratic Europe will be a peaceful Europe-- that a Europe which overcomes its history of ethnic hatreds need not repeat its endless history of internecine strife. CSCE embodies the revolutionary concept that security in the future will be derived more from respect for human rights and democratic principles than from the balance-of-power mechanisms of the past. However, CSCE must be more than simply the conscience of Europe if it is to fulfill its ambitious purpose. Along with other pillars of Europe's political and security architecture, CSCE must become more operationally effective and solution oriented in the face of mounting instabilities. In fact, our Helsinki meeting confirmed CSCE in this role and conferred upon it a variety of tools to manage the kinds of destabilizing change with which we are confronted. Unfortunately, as the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia demonstrates, these tools were not fully developed, nor have we used them as well or as promptly as we might have done. Our goal today, therefore, must be to focus CSCE on the root causes of instability in Europe and to encourage the organization to adopt a more proactive approach to problem solving. To be sure, there are also questions of structural reforms and of resources which we must also address. But what will be required, above all, is the political will and leadership on the part of all member states to utilize CSCE mechanisms to their fullest potential. Accordingly, I would submit the following as priority items for this meeting's agenda. First, we should build upon the Helsinki decisions and develop a CSCE strategy which is proactive, not reactive--one which will detect early warnings of instability and undertake preventive diplomacy. We must seek early enough to prevent the outbreak of conflict or else find ourselves, as in Yugoslavia, constantly reacting to new horrors. The CSCE has learned that lesson and has deployed several monitoring missions in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, including to Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak, Macedonia, and Georgia. We applaud the work of each of these missions. However, we will ultimately be judged by results, and I believe we have not fully tapped CSCE's potential for preventive diplomacy in the crises at hand. Especially in the Balkans, we must endorse stronger measures to start to reverse an intolerable situation. -- We must identify the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in ex- Yugoslavia by name and ensure that they will be brought to justice in person--exactly as were Hitler's associates at Nuremberg. -- We must expand CSCE missions to assist with the enforcement of UN sanctions and, thereby, increase the pressure on those who continue to prosecute the war. -- We must redouble our efforts to prevent the war from spilling over into neighboring regions and countries--in particular, by committing, here and now, to increase substantially the size of the mission in Kosovo. Let me say, in this regard, that the United States, for its part, will contribute on an urgent basis to this expanded mission. -- Finally, in stating our support for safe areas in Bosnia for the hundreds of thousands of victims of "ethnic cleansing," we must ensure that this humanitarian effort not be misused to confirm the results of that odious policy. CSCE must also play a more effective role in addressing the actual and potential ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union by monitoring respect for human rights and minority rights throughout the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states and by accelerating conflict prevention missions in such places as Georgia and Moldova. Full support of the Minsk Group [11 nations plus Azerbaijan and Armenia working under CSCE auspices to solve the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh] by all CSCE states is imperative to securing peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. Of course, the international community will have to adapt its strategies for preventing, containing, and resolving such conflicts to the specific conditions in each region. But all efforts should occur within the framework of CSCE principles and CSCE political engagement. Thus, we should be prepared to support responsible peace- keeping efforts by Russia and other CIS states within this CSCE umbrella. Second, we need to adjust CSCE organizationally to ensure an effective response to the challenges of conflict prevention and crisis management. As currently constituted, CSCE is barely able administratively to cope with present challenges, let alone those which are looming. Needed are a chief administrative officer for the diverse CSCE institutions, an intersessional body to manage day-to-day operations between senior officials' meetings, and greater administrative coherence and capabilities. I am certain that these objectives can be reached without injury to CSCE's strengths-- creativity, flexibility, and political accountability. We must ensure that the organization continues to remain free of the ills of bureaucracy. Finally, we must be clear that neither the enhanced CSCE role nor the institutional reforms I have outlined will make a difference unless the members demonstrate a commitment backed with resources. The conflict prevention missions and the more active kinds of political engagement I have discussed will require more from all of us in terms of finance, equipment, and personnel. Some--and I do not hesitate to include the United States--have made a major commitment of resources thus far, but all of us can do more. If CSCE is to fulfill its mission, our consensus of rights must be supported by a consensus of responsibilities. Let me conclude by reiterating my view that, as important as our efforts to bolster this organization may be, it is ultimately up to the member states themselves to do the hard work of defending the peace of our democratic order. It is up to us individually to uphold the CSCE's standards of political conduct within our own borders. And it is up to us collectively to support the CSCE mechanisms for conflict prevention and crisis management which I have discussed here today. We cannot expect a deus ex machina to solve our problems. Neither the United States nor the CSCE itself can fulfill that role--although I can guarantee that the United States will work with its European partners to make CSCE succeed. But what is required, most of all, is that we sustain the vision, courage, and solidarity with which both the democratic nations of the West and the peoples who aspired to freedom in the East overcame the formidable dangers and challenges of the Cold War. If we have learned anything in this century, it is that neither peace nor freedom can be preserved without sacrifice. Only by summoning the will to defend, both separately and collectively, our new Europe whole and free can we ensure that democracy will prevail over disorder as the defining feature of the post-Cold War era. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

CSCE: A New Role for a New Era

Boucher Source: Released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman Description: Text of a joint statement by the United States and the Russian Federation at the CSCE Council of Ministers meeting, Stockholm, Sweden Date: Dec, 14 199212/14/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America, E/C Europe Country: Russia, United States, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: CSCE, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Russia and the United States share a long friendship with Serbia, and both countries deeply regret that the policies of the current government of Serbia have resulted in the estrangement of Serbia from Russia and the United States, as well as from the rest of the world. In this connection, Russia and the United States are awaiting with great interest the outcome of the Serbian elections of December 20, 1992. Both countries hope that the people of Serbia will be given a free and fair opportunity that day to embark upon a new course which can open the way to the restoration of the close relations they previously enjoyed with that country. Russia and the United States hope that the people of Serbia will weigh the alternatives carefully. The choice is of returning to the community of nations or remaining in a pariah status, politically isolated and economically devastated because of the policies of the present regime. If the correct choice is made, Russia and the United States pledge to work with the Government of Serbia to restore its position in the world. If such a choice is followed by the fundamental change of policies for which Russia and the United States devoutly hope, the eventual relaxation and removal of the sanctions would be possible. Then Serbia, together with Montenegro, would be welcomed as a member of the UN [United Nations], CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], and other institutions. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Euripe (CSCE)

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia, North America, E/C Europe, Europe Subject: CSCE, Security Assistance and Sales, History [TEXT] From Vancouver to Vladivostok, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) offers a new kind of diplomacy, based on respect for human rights, among 51 Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries (Yugoslavia has been suspended). CSCE furthers European security through a wide variety of policies, commitments, and, more recently, operational tools. It adopts a broad concept of security, ranging from human rights through economic cooperation to arms control and commits to the inviolability of frontiers. The CSCE also fosters cooperation through programs centered on economics, conflict prevention, military security, culture, and the media. It is committed to developing democratic institutions at the grassroots level, through local officials and activities, and through non-governmental organizations.
Evolution of the CSCE
The CSCE began during the Cold War as a way to promote dialogue and decrease tensions between East and West. In August 1975, 35 nations signed the Helsinki Final Act, a politically binding declaratory understanding of the democratic principles governing relations among nations. The act contained a provision to continue regular discussions on a broad range of concerns--from migrations and military security to the environment and media relations--in what became known as the "Helsinki Process." During the 1980s, follow-on meetings in Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna reviewed implementation of CSCE agreements and continued the opportunity for discussion. Although the CSCE had no permanent headquarters and no enforcement capability, important commitments were made to defend human rights and to increase confidence through the advance notification of military activities and the exchange of military information. As it evolved, the CSCE began to explore ways to act on its rigorous principles and to ensure that they were upheld. To do this, the CSCE established a secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, in 1990. During 1992, the decision to move from principle to action was most marked in the Helsinki decisions which established a number of practical tools that help the CSCE work together with NATO, the European Community (EC), and other international bodies to defend human rights and manage the unprecedented changes now taking place in Europe. In particular, it sets out an ambitious role for the CSCE in crisis management and "preventive diplomacy." The CSCE has brokered significant arms control agreements. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in November 1990, limits non- nuclear ground and air forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. A separate political agreement, concluded in July 1992, covers personnel in the same region. Through continued negotiations, confidence-building measures have been extended, and higher expectations for treaty compliance and verification have been set. A new security negotiation, the Forum for Security Cooperation, opened in Vienna on September 22, 1992.
CSCE and European Conflicts
The civil war in the former Yugoslavia has been an early test of the CSCE's ability to take an active part in conflict prevention. On August 6, 1992, President Bush called on the CSCE to help monitor the human rights situation in the Balkans. He also asked that the CSCE work to inhibit the spread of the conflict. It quickly sent fact-finding and rapporteur missions to the region and supported the sanctions and humanitarian measures taken by the United Nations and the EC. The CSCE then established new "missions of long duration" to provide an early warning system for any spillover of the hostilities into the neighboring regions of Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak, and Macedonia, and they also sent a signal that the international community will not allow borders to be violated. These missions aim to dispel mistrust between parties by promoting dialogue and providing information to promote transparency between the conflicting parties. In August 1992, the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia asked the CSCE to assist in monitoring sanctions fulfillment. There are now missions in Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania, and future operations are planned in Croatia and Albania. CSCE is in the forefront of conflict resolution in other parts of the region as well. -- Under CSCE auspices, the Minsk Group--11 nations plus Azerbaijan and Armenia--is the focus of international efforts to solve the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh. -- CSCE representatives currently are assessing the situation in the Ossetia region of Georgia. -- Rapporteur missions have been sent to the new Central Asian republics to assess the governmental and human rights situations. -- CSCE representatives will soon be sent to Estonia and Moldova to look into ethnic conflicts in these states. As an original participant in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United States has been central in the promotion of uncompromising humanitarian standards and their practical implementation. From the beginning, CSCE has embodied America's hopes for a unified, democratic, and prosperous Europe. Americans continually have worked to ensure that the CSCE process remains flexible, innovative, and unbureaucratic. The United States established the first permanent delegation to the CSCE in Vienna in August 1992, charting a course for other nations to follow.
CSCE and Participating States
Albania Armenia Austria Azerbaijan Belgium Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulgaria Belarus Canada Croatia Cyprus Czechoslovakia Denmark Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece The Holy See Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Moldova Monaco Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia San Marino Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uzbekistan Yugoslavia* *Suspended (###)
Scheduled CSCE Meetings 1992-93
1992 Nov. 16-20: Seminar on Tolerance (Warsaw) Nov. 19: CPC Consultative Committee (Vienna) Nov. 23-25: Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) Working Group in preparation for Stockholm Conference (Prague) Dec. 11-13: Committee of Senior Officials (Stockholm) Dec. 14-15: Council of Ministers (Stockholm) 1993 March 16-18: Economic Forum (Prague) March 29-April 2: Migration Seminar (Warsaw) April or May (3 days to be determined): CSBM [Confidence and Security Building Measures] Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting [AIAM] (Vienna) May 17-21: Mediterranean Seminar (Valletta) May (1 week): Seminar on Resolved Problems of National Minorities (Warsaw or Croatia) Sept. 28-Oct. 1: Seminar on Sustainable Development of Boreal and Temperate Forests, followed by 1 week of fieldwork (Montreal) Sept.-Oct. (3 weeks): Human Dimension Implementation Review Meeting (Warsaw) Fall (to be determined): Seminar on the Free Media (Warsaw) Late 1993 (to be determined): Council of Ministers (Rome) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Fourth Report on War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Description: Text of the Supplemental United States Submission of Information to the UN Security Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992) Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92 Category: Reports Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues, United Nations [TEXT] [Following is the text of the Supplemental United States Submission of Information to the UN Security Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992), released on December 7, 1992. For the text of the first three reports, see Dispatch Vol. 3 No. 39, p. 732, Vol. 3, No. 44, p. 802, and Vol. 3, No. 46, p. 825. For the text of Resolution 771, see Dispatch Supplement, Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 44. For text of Resolution 780, see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769. Editor's Note: The following contains graphic descriptions.] This is the fourth submission by the United States Government of information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. As in our three previous reports, we have focused on grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with Resolution 771, have provided information that is "substantiated," that is, which rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or that includes detail sufficient for corroboration. For the moment, we have also tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other countries and non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit reports pursuant to Resolutions 771 and 780. The information provided is intended to be useful to the commission of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780. The United States has further substantiating information concerning the incidents included in this report, which we will make available directly to the commission of experts on a confidential basis. In accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 780, the United States intends to continue providing reports as additional relevant information comes into our possession. The United States is pleased that the commission of experts established pursuant to resolution 780 has begun its work. We particularly welcome its steps with regard to investigations of sites in the former Yugoslavia that may contain important information about violations of humanitarian law. We stand ready to assist the commission in its important work of investigating war crimes allegations with the aim of preparing cases suitable for prosecution and, by doing so, of establishing the record of humanitarian offenses in the former Yugoslavia. As in our previous reports, the notations at the end of each of the items indicate the source from which the information was drawn. Unless otherwise indicated, the reports refer to incidents occurring in 1992.
Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Fourth Submission
Willful Killing
25 Sept: A 48-year-old Bosnian Muslim was picked up from the street in his home town of Bjelina on September 25 or 26 and brought to a detention camp at Klis, near Batkovic. The facility at Klis, formerly used for storing agricultural produce, was guarded by men in solid green uniforms. The witness described how three "rich men" were singled out for special abuse; they were beaten with fists, rifle butts, and kicking: a neighbor who traded in gold and jewelry; a coffee trader; and another with whom the witness was not acquainted. During the witness's second night in the camp, he saw the coffee trader and several others taken at different times from their building to an adjacent facility. There was lots of screaming during their absences. The others returned eventually but the coffee trader never did. The witness learned later that the coffee trader's corpse had been turned over to his family sometime after that. The gold trader suffered a similar fate on the witness's fifth night at the Klis facility; he died from his wounds. The other "wealthy" man who was beaten frequently along with first two victims never returned after being summoned to a nearby building one evening. The witness said an old cleaning man had told him that the third man also died from the beatings. (Department of State) 25 Jul: A 14-year-old boy from the village of Zecovi, near Prijedor, witnessed the murder of 33 people on July 25. The boy said that on July 19 or 20 a number of Serbs in uniform, none of whom he recognized, came to a small enclave of Muslim households near the outskirts of Zecovi. At gunpoint, the Serbs forced people out of their homes and incarcerated them in the cellar of one of the houses. After being held for more than 2 days, those detained were released without explanation and allowed to go back to their homes. A few days later, on July 25, another group of Serbs appeared, also uniformed. They ordered people out of their homes, but in the confusion, the boy was able to hide behind a board leaning against the house and his absence was not noticed. The boy witnessed these men line up 33 people and shoot them summarily with semiautomatic rifles; they then used pistols to finish off anyone who was still moving. (Department of State) Asked if he had recognized any of this group, the witness said "they were our neighbors" from the village. He was able to identify 29 victims by name as well as five of those who took active part in the shooting. 21 Jul-4 Aug: A 36-year-old Bosnian Muslim was in his village of Ribvanovici, near Prijedor, when the Serbian army surrounded all the villages in the area on July 21, and took all of the adult males prisoner--an incident reported in an earlier submission. The Serbian soldiers beat the prisoners with their rifles. One man began to cry, so the soldiers shot him. Half the men, including this witness, were bussed to Keraterm camp in Prijedor, then to Omarska, and finally Trnopolje. The witness does not know what happened to those left behind. After a day at Trnopolje, the witness was taken back to Omarska camp and put into the "white house," where he was kept [for] about 15 days. He was locked in a room with dozens of men, many of whom he recognized from his village. He said that every day prisoners were taken into one of five interrogation rooms and beaten with iron bars and wooden sticks. His sister's husband was beaten to death in this manner. He had been beaten so badly one night that part of his forehead was missing, apparently taken off by an iron bar. He died soon thereafter. The witness once watched through the window as guards took prisoners out of the "white house," told them to run, and then shot them in the back as they fled. He heard what he believed were many other executions, but said they were done behind the building where they could not be seen, or in a red building nearby. Each night, guards would choose two prisoners to bury the dead. This witness was forced to help one night and saw 11 corpses. He said the guards had them stack the bodies crosswise in a pit. Sometime around August 4, he was transferred from Omarska. (Department of State) 20 Jul: A 52-year-old man was bussed to the Keraterm camp on July 20 with hundreds of others from Hambarine, near Prijedor. He was crammed along with several hundred other men into the third of four halls that formed a row on the former factory premises. From the start of his internment, he saw Muslim men regularly beaten with iron bars and rifle butts. Every night until he was released on August 5, men were taken outside hall number three and shot. A friend, Mustafa Ramolic, was hauled outside a few days after the witness's arrival and beaten by Serb guards. His friend collapsed, coughing blood until he died later that evening. The witness observed a mass execution on July 24. It had been an extremely hot day. The doors and windows were closed and the men were screaming for water. What they finally received was contaminated so badly that it caused about 20 men to collapse or faint. The witness and other detainees were convinced that the water had been poisoned. Perhaps in response to the tumult, about 15 Serb guards came in about 10 pm and began beating the prisoners with their rifle butts until they fell. As the situation deteriorated, the guards occasionally fired their rifles into the crowd of prisoners who gradually pulled back toward the large garage door at one end of the hall. When they reached the door, the guards began shooting their rifles and machine guns into the crowd of inmates. The witness positioned himself behind the door and feigned death. The entire incident, from the opening of the doors until the shooting stopped, took about one half hour. At dawn the following day, "volunteers" were chosen to load 130 bodies on trucks; his brother was among the dead. The witness saw approximately 40 wounded, who had waited for what they were told would be another truck to take them to a hospital, eventually loaded with the corpses and taken away. A second massacre took place at about 6 am on July 26. Six soldiers entered the hall and ordered about 50 prisoners outside. As the last of the prisoners stepped outside, the six Serbian guards began firing their automatic weapons. When all 50 had fallen, the guards went around shooting those who were still groaning. The witness recognized those who took part in this second mass execution. Following this second massacre, 10 "volunteers" were again selected to load the corpses. They had to ride in the same truck that took the bodies away. The 10 "volunteers" never came back. That same day, inmates were evacuated from all the halls. About one dozen from each were tasked with cleaning and hosing down the halls. The rumor was that the camp had received a new commander, and that some international commission was expected to inspect the facilities. The "commission" came on August 5, when busses took the witness and other inmates to Trnopolje. (Department of State) 9 Jul: A 35-year-old Muslim woman from Trnopolje described her husband's murder. On July 9, her husband was taken to a detention camp at the nearby school, but was quickly released because the Serbs running the camp recognized him as a famous "Yugoslav" athlete who had won the 1981 European body-building championship in London. Soon after his return, upon hearing of Serbian evictions of Muslim residents of the area, the family left their home. When the witness ran back to get something she had forgotten, four soldiers standing at the nearby corner stopped her husband and ordered his two children to keep going. The children were further down the street when their mother--the witness-- caught up with her husband and the four soldiers. One of them, once considered to be a friend of her husband, spoke to them briefly. The soldiers then ordered her to move on, saying her husband had to stay there. She tried to give him the key to their home, but he, too, told her to move on and catch up with the children. She did so, and was about 20 meters away when shots rang out behind her. The children were about to turn a corner at the end of the street when the shots were fired. All of them, crying, tried to go back, but were blocked by other soldiers. Two days later when the witness was allowed to return to her home for food, she saw her husband's corpse, which apparently had not been moved from the spot where he had been summarily executed 2 days earlier. (Department of State) 11 June-10 Oct: A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Kotor Varos was arrested as a civilian and interned in several locations in Kotor Varos from June 11 until October 10. He described how he had been viciously and sadistically beaten several times, had witnessed forced sex acts among male prisoners, and had been forced at gunpoint to participate in the gang rape/killing of a Muslim woman. On one day, the witness and 11 other prisoners were forced to participate in the rape of a Muslim policeman's wife. He exclaimed "They did everything. You can't imagine or believe what they did. They are animals!" He said that the woman died from her injuries 1 week later. During the first 8 days of his internment, a Serbian TV news crew from Banja Luka arrived and accused him of beating women and killing fetuses during his tenure as a soldier for the Croatian forces. He was required to read such a statement admitting to these acts because a Serbian army captain threatened to kill his parents and family members if he did not. The witness was later transferred to a room in the back of the Osnovni Sud or town courthouse, where he said that three men died in his arms from the beatings and injuries they endured: Enver Beharic, Mato Vatelj, and Smajo Celinac. He named these men, and claimed that their bodies were mutilated after their deaths. All three men were killed between August 13 and 15. The witness stated further that the number of people killed in Kotor Varos was almost unimaginable. On June 11 alone, 300-400 corpses lay in the street. He and several other prisoners had to put the corpses into black nylon body bags. The bags were then carried by a bulldozer to a nearby mass grave, and he described the location in detail. He said that he personally put over 70 bodies into bags that day and estimated that a minimum of 1,000 people were buried in this grave. (Department of State) June-Jul: A 21-year-old Serbian fighter described his own shooting of 10 members of a Muslim family in late June in Ahatovici: It was taken for granted among us that they should be killed. So when somebody said 'Shoot,' I swung around and pulled the trigger, three times, on automatic fire. I remember the little girl with the red dress hiding behind her granny. The Serbian fighter recounted another incident in which he used a 6-inch hunting knife to cut the throats of three captured Muslims. He claimed to have made visits every 3 or 4 days to a motel and restaurant complex outside Vogosca--located 7 miles north of Sarajevo--known as the Sonja Cafe, which had been converted into a prison for Muslim women. He identified the "prison commander," who he said had established a "system" for the Serbian fighters to rape and kill the women interned there. He and his companions were encouraged to go to the Sonja Cafe by military commanders because raping Muslim women was "good for raising the fighters' morale." They were further told by the prison commander: You can do with the women what you like. You can take them away from here--we don't have enough food for them anyway--and don't bring them back. This fighter claimed to have raped and murdered eight women from the motel prison complex. He also said he had seen 30 men from Donja Bioca being shot and loaded-- some alive--into a furnace at a steel plant at Ilijas, a town north of Vogosca in July. (The New York Times) Late June: A 27-year-old Bosnian Muslim watched Serbian Chetniks conduct mass executions on a bridge at Brod, 4 kilometers south of Foca, on three consecutive evenings toward the end of June. He witnessed the executions from a hiding place in the attic of a Serbian friend's home. At about 6 pm of the first day, this witness saw Serb soldiers march small groups of Muslim men onto the bridge in Brod. In the middle of the bridge, which was about 100 meters long, the Chetniks interrogated the Muslims for about 2 hours. Among the 20 to 30 Muslim men, the witness could recognize from his hiding place four friends: Ramo Kadric, Saban Kurtovic, Nusret Cengic, and Ibro Colakovic. Just as it was getting dark, the haranguing stopped and the shooting started. About eight of the 30 to 40 soldiers fired their automatic weapons at their tied-up Muslim captives. The witness was able to identify the man in charge of the Serbs on the bridge. When there were no signs of life among the Muslims, the Serbs dumped their bodies over the meter-high wall of the bridge into the Drina River, about 20 meters below. The following evening, the Chetnik band led another column of Muslim prisoners to the bridge from the other direction. This group was from the witness's hamlet of Trnovac, and involved 50 to 60 captives. They were killed in the same fashion. Among the victims he recognized were: Esad Beckovic, Esad Dzin, Nedzao Dzin, Dzevad Beckovic, Zvijerac Beckovic, Hamdija Beckovic, and Serif Beckovic. The next massacre on the bridge occurred close to midnight of the third evening. The victims were brought to the bridge by bus and truck from the town of Miljevina, about 8 kilometers northwest of Brod, also on the opposite side of the river. The entire operation was carried out more quickly; this time there were about 50 men murdered. The wives and children of the victims were kept for several days in an area school, during which time they had to sign over the ownership papers to their homes. (Department of State) 31 May-Jul: A 43-year-old Muslim from Hambarine was picked up on May 31 in Prijedor by Serb militiamen and herded along with other Muslims into one of the buses and trucks waiting to take them to Keraterm. He claims the more educated Muslims were taken to Omarska. The witness saw four of the Muslim captives randomly shot to death as the loading process took place. He knew two of the victims, brothers Suelgo and Ismo Dzafic. The Keraterm facility was divided into four subdivisions or halls. The witness was in hall number one. On July 22 or 24, a hall at the opposite end of the facility was packed with prisoners from an area where heavy fighting had taken place, and where the Serbs reportedly had sustained heavy casualties. The Serbs machine-gunned to death about 200 of the newly arrived prisoners in that hall. The witness said many of the inmates could see the massacre in the adjacent hall number three, so word of what was taking place spread almost instantly. He and all the occupants could hear the firing and screaming, which lasted for about 15 to 20 minutes. The following morning he also observed trucks loaded with corpses driving from hall number four past the window of hall number one where he was detained. About five men were taken from his hall to help load the corpses. Another man with a badly infected arm was put on a truck full of corpses along with about 20 other injured men. The witness never saw this man again and believes he was killed. (Department of State) 25 May: A 30-year-old Muslim was in Kozarac when the Serbs began a massive artillery bombardment in the mid-afternoon of May 25. As he and a crowd that he estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 headed for the shelter of the nearby forest, the Serbs directed their fire at fleeing civilians. Five or six women running near the witness were killed by a shell just before they reached the tree line. (Department of State) 18 May: A 33-year-old Muslim from Grbavci--2 kilometers from Zvornik-- described a mass killing on the morning of May 18. As Serb militiamen surrounded the village and started shooting, he and several family members fled. Residents of nearby houses were doing the same. Inside the village, the Serb militia occupiers, using megaphones, ordered residents to go back to their homes and put white sheets in their windows. Many of the neighbors obeyed, but this witness and his family decided to wait in their hiding place inside the tree line to assess the situation further. As his neighbors returned to the housing area, hands over their heads, the Serb militiamen separated men from women and children. The witness watched from about 200 meters as the men were lined up. Shortly after noon, one of the Serbs shouted an order to "kill the Ustasha." On this command, about 10 of the militiamen began emptying their automatic weapons into the line of Muslim men and continued shooting until they were all dead. When the shooting stopped, the executioners and other Serb militia, many of whom had been standing around watching, started plundering houses in the village and stealing livestock. The witness, his family, and other neighbors returned from their hiding place 3 days later. He participated along with other neighbors in the burial of 56 victims. They were buried about 20 meters from the edge of the existing cemetery, between two rows of houses, near the spot where they were shot. (Department of State) 9 May: A 41-year-old Bosnian Muslim woman witnessed the execution of a Serbian civilian by Serbian soldiers in Sarajevo. At about 7 am on May 9 or 10, military units wearing the insignias of Serbian Chetniks and the Yugoslav army entered the area (near Sarajevo airport) and ordered all its residents out of the cellars in which they had taken refuge. Once outside, Serbs were told to stand in one place and Muslims in another. One Serb, a 50-year-old man known as "Ljubo," refused to be separated from his Muslim neighbors, with whom he apparently had lived peacefully for many years. His refusal to be separated from his neighbors enraged the Serbian soldiers. They dragged him to the ground, and five or six of them beat him until he was dead. The witness and a group of about 40 other Muslims from the area were then used as human shields and marched through a heavily contested combat zone to waiting Serb vehicles some 300 meters away. From there, they were driven to Trapare, a camp or assembly area some 3 kilometers away. After their arrival at Trapare, a young girl--about 12 years old--was taken from her father. About six men took the girl behind a nearby bunker. The witness said she then could hear the most terrible screaming and crying she had ever heard. After the father collapsed, he was dragged at knife point to the bunker and forced to watch as the soldiers repeatedly raped his daughter, an ordeal which lasted about an hour. Neither the father nor his daughter was returned to the others afterward. The witness believes both were killed. (Department of State) 5 May: In an October letter to President Bush, a Muslim refugee from Brcko described in detail his internment in Brcko camp in northern Bosnia. Below is an informal translation of segments of the letter pertaining to Brcko: On May 5 a representative of the Yugo army in a radio broadcast instructed the citizens in my part of the town to go to the army barracks, from where the Yugo army would organize an evacuation to a safer place. Upon our arrival at the barracks, we realized we were all in a trap because there, together with the regular army, were Chetniks and other Serbian refuse. They offered to give us rifles if we would fight against our own people for the Serbian cause. The Muslims and Croats silently refused. Our wives and children were put on a bus and were taken to an unknown destination. At gunpoint, we were also put on a bus. We were taken to one of Brcko's places of execution, a physical education hall in the center of the town. We noticed, from the puddles of blood on the floor, that the executions had already begun. For the couple hundred of us who were locked up, the long hours of torture began. . . . they took four of us out for execution. They put one of us against the wall and. . . shot him in the back with a machine gun. Looking at the holes in his back. . . I lost consciousness, and my body crumbled onto pieces of glass. My fainting awakened a bit of humanity in the Serbs' leader. He ordered them to bring me back to the hall, where I could rest a little. One of the Serbs took satisfaction in removing my glasses and breaking them. The other three men were killed in the most cruel manner. First they were beaten in another room and left to recover a little. They were taken to a courtyard where we heard the worst sounds that a human throat can produce. We heard the dull slashes of knives cutting into human flesh. The three men were held by their legs and beaten while against the wall of the building where we were imprisoned. With about 20 more shots, the Serbs assured the three men's death. All that I have written here can be confirmed by three other witnesses who also managed to escape from that hell. I think we were lucky that we went through all this in the first days of the Serbian occupation, while the Serbian killing machinery was not so well developed yet. (Department of State)
Torture of Prisoners
Aug-Sep: A US surgeon from California spent 2 weeks in Bosnia- Herzegovina (including time at Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo) in late August and early September performing remedial urological surgery. The doctor reportedly found that Muslim and Mujahedin irregular troops-- some from Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia--had routinely performed crude, disfiguring, non-medical circumcisions on Bosnian Serb soldiers, and he treated one 18-year-old Bosnian Serb soldier who was so brutally circumcised that eventually the entire organ required amputation. (Department of State/news service) Jul-Aug: A Croatian woman, married to a Serb, was interned for 40 days at the Bosnian Government-run detention center at the former Yugoslav National army (JNA) Viktor Bubanj Barracks in Sarajevo. During her confinement, guards--whom she identified as Muslims--routinely beat the more than 300 prisoners, including 30 women. She saw one woman covered with bruises from head to toe after being so abused. She herself was beaten several times. Another woman cut by glass during a mortar attack was left overnight to bleed, as the guards taunted her that "It is your people who are killing you, not us." This witness was released in late August. (Department of State) 11 Jun-10 Oct: A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim agricultural technician from Kotor Varos was arrested as a civilian and interned in several locations in Kotor Varos. Twelve Serbian soldiers, wearing uniforms bearing white eagles, on June 11 arrested the witness in his house and beat him in his yard before escorting him to the Koza Proletaria Fur Factory, were he was interrogated and beaten further. At the fur factory, a guard put a rifle in the witness' mouth and lifted him off the floor. Another guard pulled out two of his upper teeth with pliers. He said he and 100 other men were beaten for eight days and forced to perform sexual acts on each other. He was later transferred to a room in the back of the Osnovni Sud, or town courthouse, where he was held for 31/2 months. He said that 170 men were held there under extremely oppressive conditions. His room measured only about 2.5 by 3.5 meters, yet sometimes as many as 70 men were crammed into it. Serbian guards played loud music as they beat prisoners in the adjoining rooms and in the yard. The room was filthy. They ate spoiled, moldy food and had no access to toilet facilities. Ten to 15 men had diarrhea at any one time. The prisoners' skin turned yellow from jaundice. He spent over 3 months in such conditions without ever taking a bath or washing his clothes. On October 10, the witness and two other Muslims were exchanged for one Serb. Three Serbian guards, whom he recognized, brought him to the courthouse yard where they beat him viciously, then tied his arms and legs together like a sheep and forced him to "baah." Later they tied him to a land rover Jeep and drove to the hospital, with the witness running behind the car. Upon arrival, they forced him to crawl, baah, and eat grass, and then they told him to throw up the grass because it was Serbian grass. One guard brought some very acidic gun-cleaning oil and made the witness drink half a liter of it. He began to have stomach convulsions immediately. A second pulled up his sleeve and extinguished eight cigarettes on his arm. Soon afterward he was released to Muslim forces in the village of Vecici. (Department of State) May-Nov: A woman from Zrenjanin, a town in southern Vojvodina, reported that her husband, a Muslim, was detained by police on May 10 and remains to this day with about 200 other Muslims, most from Bosanski Samac or its immediate environs, in two large warehouses adjacent to the central police station in Bosanski Samac, a town on the Croatian/Bosnian border in Bosnia. On several occasions when this woman was able to visit the detention facility, she talked with her husband and helped treat prisoners who had been beaten brutally. The prisoners she treated had been beaten on the head, arms, and torso. Many had had their arms broken. Her husband said that he had been beaten severely during the first several days of his incarceration, and that he had never been told why he was being held. Other members of her husband's family--including his mother, his sister, and his sister's children--were also detainees in Bosanski Samac. Her husband claimed that the conditions were very bad in the facility and that the prisoners were given only one meal a day, which often consisted of only bread. (Department of State)
Deliberate Attacks on Non-Combatants
18 Nov: Bosnian Serbs on November 18 shelled the main north-south highway near the city of Mostar, which forced a UN food convoy and its escort of Spanish UN peace-keeping troops to abandon an attempt to bring food and housing materials to Sarajevo. (The Washington Post) 6 Nov: Serbian artillery stationed in northeastern Bosnia fired 100 shells into Croatia at Zupanja and surrounding villages, causing the death of two persons, including a 2-year- old child, and injuring another child. Heavy damage to houses was also reported. (Department of State) 7-8 Nov: Bosnian Serbs on November 8 halted relief convoys along the Mostar road. An UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] (UK)-escorted convoy was stopped by Croatian Defense Council (HVO) forces 10 kilometers north of Mostar. (Department of State) Bosnian Serbs on November 7 fired up to 200 rounds of machine gun, mortar, and automatic rifle fire at a British convoy that was trying to find routes for United Nations aid convoys near Tuzla, hitting a British Land Rover. "This is the first time we have come under direct fire, and the first time we have returned fire," according to a UK Ministry of Defense spokesman. (London Press Association)
Wanton Devastation and Destruction of Property
25 May: A 43-year-old Muslim from Hambarine watched from a nearby hill as Serbian artillery demolished the neighboring village of Kozarac on May 25. The artillery unit was part of the so-called Serbian "White Eagles" militia organization, whose commander and tank unit leader he identified. (Department of State) 17 May: Kozarac, in Bosnian Krajina, was flattened in May by Serbian forces. (New York Newsday) Apr-Oct: From the beginning of the war in April, Serbian Democratic party (SDS) paramilitaries in the hills around Sarajevo have bombarded the city, which has little in it that could be called a military target. The assault on the city has damaged or destroyed hospitals, schools, residential buildings, mosques, churches, and all kinds of other civilian facilities. (Department of State) Fall 1991: Serbian forces in the fall of 1991 left Vukovar and several surrounding towns, in the Sector East United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) of Croatia, looking like Berlin--circa 1945. Nearly every residential, commercial, cultural, and religious structure was gutted or damaged severely. Grain elevators, cranes in the port along the river, factories, and high-rise apartment buildings were rendered virtually useless and uninhabitable. (Department of State)
Other, Including Mass Forcible Expulsion and Deportation of Civilians
Nov: Serb military authorities began in early November 1992 forcibly to mobilize ethnic Croats and Muslims in the Banja Luka area and have taken 50 to 200 such conscripts from the suburbs of Gornji Seher and Debeljaci because, according to a Serb official, "There are too many Muslims here." (Department of State) 26 May: A 35-year-old Muslim woman, a resident of Trnopolje long before it gained notoriety as the site of a brutal internment camp, was present on May 26 when trucks and tractors hauled in thousands of children and elderly Muslims from the nearby town of Kozarac, fol-lowing its destruction by Serbian artillery. The newly arrived refugees were settled on the grounds of the local elementary school. The Muslim woman and other town residents were permitted to pass food to them through fences that were being erected around the facility. During the first 5 days, it was the only food the new arrivals received. Additionally, all the homes in the area were forced to take in large number of Kozarac residents. Her family took in 38 of those refugees. Many of the refugees, including those in her home, were eventually transported in railroad freight cars--about a hundred to a car--to facilities further away. On July 8, soldiers came to the house and said the entire village was being "ethnically cleansed." She and her family were forced from her home. Three days later, she and her children were herded with others into a railroad car and forced out near Muslim-controlled territory, whence they made their way to refuge abroad. (Department of State) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

The Need To Respond to War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Statement at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Geneva, Switzerland Date: Dec, 16 199212/16/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] Just under 4 months ago, an important milestone was reached with the convening of the London International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. Commitments were made both by the parties to the Yugoslav conflict and by the international community itself--commitments to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid; to lift the barbaric siege of cities; to halt all military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina; to group all heavy weapons under UN monitoring; to open up and shut down all detention camps; to tighten sanctions against the aggressor; and to prevent the conflict's spread to neighboring regions and countries. Some of those commitments have been kept, particularly in the area of sanctions monitoring, and in efforts to prevent a further widening of the war. Most importantly, London established a negotiating mechanism centered here in Geneva, which has brought the international community and the various ex-Yugoslav parties together on an ongoing basis, and which, thanks to the efforts of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, remains a viable forum for an eventual settlement of the war. But let us be clear: We find ourselves today in Geneva because most of the commitments made in London have not been kept, and because the situation inside the former Yugoslavia has become increasingly desperate. Thus, we meet to discuss how the international community will respond in order to force compliance with the London agreements, and thereby accelerate an end to the war. It is clear in reviewing the record since London that the promises broken have been largely Serbian promises broken. It is the Serbs who continue to besiege the cities of Bosnia; Serb heavy weapons which continue to pound the civilian populations in those cities; the Bosnian Serb air forces which continue to fly in defiance of the London agreements; and Serbs who impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance and continue the odious practice of "ethnic cleansing." It is now clear, in short, that Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic have systematically flouted agreements to which they had solemnly, and yet cynically, given their assent. Today we must, at a minimum, commit ourselves anew to the London agreements by: -- Redoubling our assistance efforts and continuing to press for the opening of routes for aid convoys, so that wide- spread starvation can be avoided this winter; -- Strengthening our efforts to prevent the war's spillover, particularly in the Kosovo, which we will not tolerate; and -- Tightening and better enforcing sanctions, the surest means of forcing an early end to the war. But we must also do more. It is clear that the international community must begin now to think about moving beyond the London agreements and contemplate more aggressive measures. That, for example, is why my government is now recommending that the UN Security Council authorize enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia, and why we are also willing to have the Council re-examine the arms embargo as it applies to the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, my government also believes it is time for the international community to begin identifying individuals who may have to answer for having committed crimes against humanity. We have, on the one hand, a moral and historical obligation not to stand back a second time in this century while a people faces obliteration. But we have also, I believe, a political obligation to the people of Serbia to signal clearly the risk they currently run of sharing the inevitable fate of those who practice ethnic cleansing in their name. The fact of the matter is that we know that crimes against humanity have occurred, and we know when and where they occurred. We know, moreover, which forces committed those crimes, and under whose command they operated. And we know, finally, who the political leaders are to whom those military commanders were--and still are--responsible. Let me begin with the crimes themselves, the facts of which are indisputable: -- The siege of Sarajevo, ongoing since April, with scores of innocent civilians killed nearly every day by artillery shelling; -- The continuing blockade of humanitarian assistance, which is producing thousands upon thousands of unseen innocent victims; -- The destruction of Vukovar in the fall of 1991, and the forced expulsion of the majority of its population; -- The terrorizing of Banja Luka's 30,000 Muslims, which has included bombings, beatings, and killings; -- The forcible imprisonment, inhumane mistreatment, and willful killing of civilians at detention camps, including Banja Luka/Manjaca, Brcko/Luka, Krajina/Prnjavor, Omarska, Prijedor/Keraterm, and Trnopolje/Kozarac; -- The August 21 massacre of more than 200 Muslim men and boys by Bosnian Serb police in the Vlasica Mountains near Varjanta; -- The May-June murders of between 2,000 and 3,000 Muslim men, women, and children by Serb irregular forces at a brick factory and a pig farm near Brcko; -- The June mass execution of about 100 Muslim men at Brod; and -- The May 18 mass killing of at least 56 Muslim family members by Serb militiamen in Grbavci, near Zvornik. We know that Bosnian Serbs have not alone been responsible for the massacres and crimes against humanity which have taken place. For example, in late October Croatian fighters killed or wounded up to 300 Muslims in Prozor, and between September 24-26, Muslims from Kamenica killed more than 60 Serb civilians and soldiers. We can do more than enumerate crimes; we can also identify individuals who committed them. For example: -- Borislay Herak is a Bosnian Serb who has confessed to killing over 230 civilians; and -- "Adil and Arif" are two members of a Croatian paramilitary force which in August attacked a convoy of buses carrying more than 100 Serbian women and children, killing over half of them. We also know the names of leaders who directly supervised persons accused of war crimes, and who may have ordered those crimes. These include: -- Zeljko Raznjatovic, whose para-military forces, the "tigers," have been linked to brutal ethnic cleansing in Zvornik, Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Grobnica; and who were also linked to the mass murders of up to 3,000 civilians near Brcko; -- Vollslay Seselj, whose "White Eagles" force has been linked to atrocities in a number of Bosnian cities, including the infamous incident at Brcko; -- Drago Prcac, commander of the Omarska Detention Camp, where mass murder and torture occurred; and -- Adem Delic, the camp commander at Celebici where at least 15 Serbs were beaten to death in August. I want to make it clear that, in naming names, I am presenting the views of my government alone. The information I have cited has been provided to the UN War Crimes Commission, whose decision it will be to prosecute or not. Second, I am not prejudging any trial proceedings that may occur; they must be impartial and conducted in accordance with due process. Third, the above listing of names is tentative and will be expanded as we compile further information. Finally, there is another category of fact which is beyond dispute--namely, the fact of political and command responsibility for the crimes against humanity which I have described. Leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, Radovan Karadzic, the self-declared President of the Serbian Bosnian Republic, and General Ratho Mladic, commander of Bosnian Serb military forces, must eventually explain whether and how they sought to ensure, as they must under international law, that their forces complied with international law. They ought, if charged, to have the opportunity of defending themselves by demonstrating whether and how they took responsible action to prevent and punish the atrocities I have described which were undertaken by their subordinates. I have taken the step today of identifying individuals suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity for the same reason that my government has decided to seek UN authorization for enforcing the no-fly zone in Bosnia and why we are now willing to examine the question of lifting the arms embargo as it applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is because we have concluded that the deliberate flaunting of Security Council resolutions and the London agreements by Serb authorities is not only producing an intolerable and deteriorating situation inside the former Yugoslavia, it is also beginning to threaten the framework of stability in the new Europe. It is clear that the reckless leaders of Serbia, and of the Serbs inside Bosnia, have somehow convinced themselves that the international community will not stand up to them now, and will be forced eventually to recognize the fruits of their aggression and the results of ethnic cleansing. Tragically, it also appears that they have convinced the people of Serbia to follow them to the front lines of what they proclaim to be an historic struggle against Islam on behalf of the Christian West. It is time to disabuse them of these most dangerous illusions. The solidarity of the civilized and democratic nations of the West lies with the innocent and brutalized Muslim people of Bosnia. Thus, we must make it unmistakably clear that we will settle for nothing less than the restoration of the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with its territory undivided and intact, the return of all refugees to their homes and villages, and, indeed, a day of reckoning for those found guilty of crimes against humanity. It will undoubtedly take some time before all these goals are realized, but then there is time, too, though not much, for the people of Serbia to step back from the edge of the abyss. There is time, still, to release all prisoners; to lift the siege of cities; to permit humanitarian aid to reach the needy; and to negotiate for peace and for a settlement guaranteeing the rights of all minorities in the independent states of the former Yugoslavia. But in waiting for the people of Serbia, if not their leaders, to come to their senses, we must make them understand that their country will remain alone, friendless, and condemned to economic ruin and exclusion from the family of civilized nations for as long as they pursue the suicidal dream of a Greater Serbia. They need, especially, to understand that a second Nuremberg awaits the practitioners of ethnic cleansing, and that the judgment, and opprobrium, of history awaits the people in whose name their crimes were committed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Identifying Yugoslav War Criminals

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Opening statement from a news conference, Geneva, en route Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: CSCE, Regional/Civil Unrest, POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] I think I mentioned to you when we were coming here that I had this talk with Elie Wiesel in Washington, [DC]. He really impressed me on the question of how much longer we go on without focusing on the fact that what's going on there is, on top of everything else, a humanitarian tragedy. As I listened to him--and he's a very eloquent fellow--I decided it was time we started. The earlier argument had been, with some merit, that if you name names . . . if you move toward peace, it makes it harder for them to back off where they've been because they're afraid they're going to get accused of some crime. We listened to that argument for awhile--a long time--but the fact of the matter is it hasn't gotten any better. The fact of the matter is that things are going on there that are absolutely outrageous of which ethnic cleansing is sort of the catch-all phrase for this but, prison camps, torture, and all of those things. So, I just decided, after listening to Elie Wiesel, that he was probably right. We needed to take this to a different level. I don't know that it's going to solve anything or change anything, but I think it's time, when we have the facts--and we do in some of those cases fairly clearly--that we begin to name names; let them understand that, over the long run, they may be able to run but they can't hide; that we're going to pursue them and raise some questions amongst the more senior people about the degree of their responsibility for what these others do. And, hopefully, at the same time--and I only hope--convince some of those who may try to pull the same outrages that they ought to be careful and not do it, because they will be in the same boat as those who have done these things. So, anyway, after talking with Elie Wiesel and thinking about it a bit, I decided it was time we started naming names. Now, the names we put in that statement today are just some of the highlights of all of these documents we've turned over to the United Nations. It was an attempt to try to force the international community to pay more attention to this issue and to send a message to Yugoslavia--what was Yugoslavia. I'm going to make as sure as I can that we get what I said on Voice of America to Serbia so they can hear some of that. And, for whatever period of time is left to us, that is until the 20th of January, this is going to be a theme. And, I hope the next administration will pick it up. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

NATO Support for the "No-Fly" Zone In the Former Yugoslavia

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Excerpts from remarks at a press conference, Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: NATO [TEXT] First of all, I do think we made a real advance on the general question of the relationship between NATO and peace-keeping, and fundamentally the alliance has said that we're prepared to provide assets to help in peace- keeping. Now then, when you get to the specifics about Yugoslavia, which is where I spent a lot of my time focused on that issue today, I think there are some things that are important here. Let me say first of all--because I watched the previous press conference-- to those of you who wonder whether this alliance did or did not support a no-fly zone and, if not, why not, let me put it to you this way: The issue, as such, never even really came up, and I suppose if I had wanted to push it, I could. But I think if you take a look at the language specifically relating to the no-fly zone, what you see is [that] they say, if the United Nations passes a no-fly zone resolution, we're prepared to provide assets--that is, the alliance, and that includes the United States--to enforce that no-fly zone resolution. Frankly, it never occurred to me in the way you've asked the question, because it seems to me that if we say if a no-fly zone resolution is passed, we'll support it with assets--the question that was fundamental here. I'll also say to you [that] I didn't hear any discussion today--in the various meetings--in which anybody really raised the question of a no-fly zone and the wisdom of it. There was discussion--and there has been all week everywhere I've been--over the impact of enforcing a no-fly zone resolution on how well we are able to continue humanitarian assistance. While I do not think that question should stand in the way of enforcement, there is no question about it, that's a perfectly legitimate question to ask. In other words, if we're going to enforce no-fly, how do we deal with the questions of whether we will be able to continue humanitarian assistance during that process. The Yugoslav resolution also makes it clear that impeding relief shipments is a crime, and that those who have committed those crimes will be held responsible. The subject of criminal behavior by too many people in what was Yugoslavia is a subject I've been talking about all week. I was glad to see that we were able to get agreement on that. It indicates that if the United Nations requests it, the alliance will respond, if UNPROFOR [UN Protective Force] or other UN personnel are threatened or harmed. Again, that obviously means we would have to use NATO assets to do that. I would also say to you, although you may want to ask me more specifically, that--to some degree, at least-- must be an answer to Mr. Karadzic's rather unwise threats of yesterday. This is another step forward, I think. The Yugoslav section clearly demonstrated concern over Kosovo, supported the dispatch of UN forces to prevent violence there, and did say that if there is an explosion in Kosovo, it would be a serious threat to international peace and security. And we would be prepared to take appropriate measures should that happen. Again, you can ask me what "appropriate" means. I'll give you the same answer the Secretary General did. That will be decided at the time, but it seems to me it is a step forward from anything this alliance has said before with regard to Kosovo. Now, I want to go back to the fundamental communique for just a minute, because there's a point I want to make here. In that communique, it stressed the need to secure early ratification of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] agreement and the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. I just want to make it clear that the United States is not particularly happy with the delays that are taking place with regard to the ratification of those two treaties by Ukraine. I saw the Ukrainian Foreign Minister some time earlier this week. I don't remember where it was. It was in Stockholm, as a matter of fact, and was told then that the parliament--the Ukraine Parliament could not deal with those treaties this month. Well, we've got to live with their parliamentary procedures, but I made it clear to him, and I don't mind making it clear publicly, that we have been discussing the issue of ratification of those two treaties with Ukrainian leaders for some months. We expect them to be ratified and without reservations. And, as I indicated to the Foreign Minister when I saw him, if they are not ratified or if the delay goes on much longer, it inevitably will have an impact on the bilateral relationship between the United States and Ukraine. So in a way, ladies and gentlemen, I'm taking advantage of you to send a message publicly. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

North Atlantic Council Ministerial (NAC) Communique

NATO Source: NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium Description: Communique Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, USSR (former) Subject: NATO, CSCE, Arms Control, United Nations [TEXT] 1. We have met today at a time of serious challenges to European security arising from regional conflicts. We have consulted on this grave situation and on the contributions that the Atlantic Alliance can make to meeting these challenges. As the Harmel Report emphasized 25 years ago, the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This remains our goal. In our new Strategic Concept, we have recognised the changing security environment. To meet the new risks and challenges, we will use Alliance resources and expertise in a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions, while continuing to ensure an effective collective defence.
Transatlantic Link
2. The transatlantic partnership, which is embodied in our Alliance, remains vital for European security and stability. The Alliance not only guarantees its members' security, but also remains one of the indispensable instruments for promoting stability and shaping change throughout Europe. An effective Atlantic Alliance and a continuing active, broad cooperation between Europe and North America are essential for a durable order of peace and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area. The substantial presence of US armed forces in Europe and the continuing political and military commitment and active engagement in European security of both the United States and Canada will remain essential. The tasks we face in supporting the process of democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union underscore the importance of maintaining a strong transatlantic partnership based on a community of values and purpose.
NATO's Role in Peacekeeping
3. Following the decision which we took in Oslo, we have reviewed the progress made concerning Alliance support for CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] peacekeeping, and have instructed the Council in Permanent Session to complete its work on this issue. We will further strengthen Alliance coordination in peacekeeping, and develop practical measures to enhance the Alliance's contribution in this area. The Military Committee has already advised the Council in Permanent Session of the resources available and the modalities for possible Alliance support for peacekeeping. We are ready to share experiences in peacekeeping with our Cooperation Partners and other CSCE participating states, and to join them as required in supporting CSCE peacekeeping operations. 4. We confirm today the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case- by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security. We are ready to respond positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary-General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. We have asked NATO's Secretary General to maintain in this respect, under the guidance of the Council in Permanent Session, the necessary contacts with the Secretary-General of the UN regarding the assistance that the Alliance could provide. 5. In this spirit, we are contributing individually and as an Alliance to the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions relating to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. For the first time in its history, the Alliance is taking part in UN peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement operations. The Alliance, together with the WEU, is supporting with its ships in the Adriatic the enforcement of the UN economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and of the arms embargo against all republics of former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] is using elements from the Alliance's NORTHAG [Northern Army Group, Central Europe] command for its operational headquarters. NATO airborne early-warning aircraft-- AWACS--are monitoring daily the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia- Hercegovina.
Relations with Cooperation Partners and NACC
6. The Alliance is helping to promote stability throughout the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia and is supporting their reform processes. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC], created a year ago, has developed into a valuable forum for consultations on security and conflict prevention. We have built up a broad and diverse programme of practical cooperation in areas where our Alliance has competence and expertise. We intend to develop further this dynamic cooperative process step by step, giving it a more practical focus. We have prepared, together with our cooperation partners, a new and expanded Work Plan for 1993. The commitment of all partners to full respect for human rights and democratic principles, as set out in the CSCE documents and in accordance with their international legal obligations, will continue to be the basis of our cooperation. We welcome all positive steps taken in this regard by our North Atlantic Cooperation Council partners, and urge continued efforts.
Strengthening the CSCE Structures
7. The CSCE has an essential role to play in developing a cooperative approach to security and in conflict prevention and crisis management. We support the further strengthening of CSCE structures and the extension of the CSCE's authority and operational involvement in the prevention of conflict. We welcome in this respect the strategy of active diplomacy agreed at the CSCE Ministerial Council in Stockholm. We welcome, in particular, the strengthening of the CSCE's operational capabilities through structural reforms and the appointment of a Secretary General; the appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities; and the establishment of additional mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. As required, we will support the work of the CSCE with whatever experience and expertise we can usefully contribute. 8. We attach great importance to the Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna, established by the CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting as a framework for shaping a new relationship of cooperative security among all CSCE participating states. We have put forward, in association with other participating states, a number of proposals for the Programme for Immediate Action agreed in Helsinki dealing with the harmonisation of existing arms control obligations, with defence planning and with the non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms transfers. We will continue to develop further proposals. We urge all states of the CSCE to participate in the Vienna Forum as well as in all the other CSCE fora.
Practical Relationship between NATO and WEU
9. We reaffirm our support for the development of a common European foreign and security policy and defence identity as reflected in the Declaration of Peace and Cooperation adopted by the Alliance in Rome on 8 November 1991 and in the Treaty and Declarations adopted by the European Community and the Western European Union [WEU] in Maastricht on 9 and 10 December 1991. We believe that the Alliance's interests are best served by a more united Europe and that the maintenance of a strong Atlantic Alliance will be a fundamental element in any emerging European defence policy. 10. We welcome the results of the WEU Ministerial Council meeting in Rome on 20 November, which confirmed the participation of all European Allies in the activities of the WEU as full members, associate members or observers, thereby reinforcing the European pillar of the Alliance. We also welcome the progress made by the WEU in further developing its operational role and structures. These developments will facilitate close working relations and interaction between NATO and the WEU. Our cooperation in the Adriatic is a case in point. We reaffirm the importance of maintaining Allies' existing obligations and commitments of forces to NATO and we emphasise in this regard that the primary responsibility of forces answerable to the WEU will remain NATO's collective defence under the Washington Treaty. 11. We have endorsed an Alliance document proposing guidelines for the practical working relations between the two organisations. These arrangements will help to ensure that all the Allies are properly involved in decisions that may affect their security. We look forward to the transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat to Brussels early in 1993, which will allow close practical cooperation between the two Councils and Secretariats. We welcomed the presence of the Secretary General of the WEU, Mr. Willem van Eekelen, who participated in our meeting for the first time. We are committed to ensuring that the two organisations continue to work on the basis of transparency and complementarity, recognising that it is for each of them to take its own decisions. We reiterate our appreciation of the fact that in stating their aim of introducing joint positions into the process of consultation in the Alliance, the WEU member states have affirmed that the Alliance will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty; and also of WEU's stated intention to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of the WEU member states in the Alliance and to act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Alliance. 12. We express our satisfaction at the initiative taken by the French and German governments in submitting to the Council their joint proposal on the relationship between the European Corps they have created and the Alliance. This major unit, which we note is open to the other WEU partners, is a step forward in strengthening both the European security and defence identity and the European pillar of the Alliance. We welcome the agreement between the French and German Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe on the conditions under which the Corps is to be used within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. This agreement will be considered by the Military Committee and submitted expeditiously to the Council in Permanent Session for approval.
Regional Issues
13. The use of force in contravention of international law for whatever goal is intolerable. Regional conflicts cannot be settled through violence, but only through negotiations and full respect for human and democratic rights, including those of persons belonging to national minorities, the territorial integrity of all states and the inviolability of all frontiers in accordance with CSCE principles and other relevant international commitments and norms. We remain profoundly concerned by the continuing violence in the former Yugoslavia, including the abhorrent practice referred to as "ethnic cleansing," and have issued today a separate statement on this conflict. 14. We deeply regret the ongoing hostilities in and around Nagorno- Karabakh. We urge the parties involved to establish an effective ceasefire. We strongly support UN and CSCE principles as well as all steps and decisions taken by the CSCE in relation to the present conflict. We continue to believe the proposed CSCE Conference in Minsk offers an immediate opportunity to achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict, and we support efforts to convene the conference on the basis of the continuation of the work begun in the framework of the Rome meeting. 15. Completion of the expeditious withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states under appropriate withdrawal agreements is important in view of the overriding principle that military forces should be stationed on the territory of a foreign state only with the consent of that state. The continuation of the withdrawal process will be a major contribution to stability in the Baltic region. We recognise that practical difficulties have to be overcome, but temporary problems should not be allowed to delay the overall process. This withdrawal should not be linked to other issues. We invite all parties to exercise flexibility and moderation in negotiations to resolve remaining problems, including those of a social and material nature.
Arms Control
16. We welcome the definitive entry into force on 9 November of the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, which, together with the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strengths of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1-A), we consider one of the foundations of European security. We stress, following the end of the CFE baseline validation period, the importance of all parties adhering to the schedule for the reduction of Treaty-limited equipment as well as to the information exchange, verification and other provisions of the Treaty. 17. We look forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty on Open Skies and to adherence to it by interested states participating in the CSCE which were not original signatories to the Treaty as provided for by Article XVII of the Treaty and called for in the CSCE Open Skies Declaration of 24 March 1992. 18. We welcome the consolidation by CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states of former Soviet tactical weapons in Russia, the adherence to the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and the commitments by those three states to eliminate all nuclear weapons on their territories. We urge the earliest possible ratification of the START Treaty in conformity with the Lisbon Protocol by those State Parties having not yet done so. We reiterate our expectation that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine will take rapid steps to fulfil their repeated commitments to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. Failure to do so would be a cause of serious concern. We also renew our call upon them to expedite the elimination from their territories of nuclear weapons as agreed. We welcome all agreements concluded by Allies with Russia to facilitate the rapid, safe and secure elimination of former Soviet nuclear weapons. Allies underline their continuing readiness to support this process of elimination and to consult on the matter in the Alliance. 19. We welcome the agreement last June between the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear forces substantially below START levels, and in particular the decision to eliminate all multiple-warhead land-based strategic missiles. 20. We welcome the successful achievement of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention. We look forward to becoming original signatories of the Convention, and commit ourselves to its early ratification. We call on all other states to do likewise. 21. We remain fully committed to ongoing efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, as well as illegal arms transfers. We urge all countries that have not yet done so, particularly those located in regions where the risks of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as the acquisition of relevant technology have increased alarmingly in recent years, to become parties to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention, and to commit themselves to signing and ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention as soon as possible. Strict compliance with these accords is essential. We reaffirm our support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and for its indefinite extension in 1995. We urge transparency and restraint in the field of conventional arms transfers. We support the newly established UN Register of Conventional Arms and urge all UN member states to provide by next April all required data in order to enable this Register to be fully operational and effective. 22. We were honoured by the presence of Minister Pierre Harmel at our meeting. Despite all that has been accomplished in recent years, we have not yet achieved the just and lasting peaceful order in Europe which the Harmel Report laid down as the goal of our Alliance. We had hoped that conflict and cruelty might be banished from the continent. In the face of the new challenges, that hope remains, and we will strive to our utmost to realise it. The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to make an essential contribution to securing peace and stability. 23. We have asked the Secretary General, Mr. Manfred Worner, to remain in office until 30th June 1996, and noted with pleasure his acceptance. 24. The Spring 1993 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session will be held in Athens in June.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

NATO Statement on the Former Yugoslavia

NATO Source: NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium Description: Released by the North Atlantic Council's Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, USSR (former) Subject: NATO, CSCE, Arms Control [TEXT] 1. We are profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace, security, and stability. Recent meetings in Edinburgh, Stockholm and Geneva have made clear the international community's impatience with the situation, its determination that the carnage and lawlessness in former Yugoslavia be brought to a halt, and its commitment to a negotiated, peaceful and lasting settlement. We are contributing individually and as an Alliance to the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, and we are prepared to respond to further requests for such contributions. 2. Primary responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies with the present leadership of Serbia and of the Bosnian Serbs. They have sought territorial gains by force and engaged in systematic gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including the barbarous practice of "ethnic cleansing." There is the systematic detention and rape of Muslim women and girls. Relief convoys are being harassed and delayed. All such acts must cease. Those individuals responsible for atrocities, whatever party they belong to, are accountable for their actions and liable to be judged accordingly. To this end, we welcome consideration of the creation of an ad hoc tribunal. 3. We reject any unilateral changes in borders, territory, or populations. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina must be restored. We call upon all parties in Bosnia- Herzegovina to accept the Geneva Conference draft outline constitution as a basis for negotiations. We strongly support the continuing efforts of the UN and EC Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). 4. We are deeply concerned about possible spillover of the conflict, and about the situation in Kosovo. We call urgently on all parties to act with restraint and moderation. Serious negotiations on the restoration of autonomy to Kosovo within Serbia and the guarantee of full human rights should begin immediately under the ICFY. We are in favour of a UN preventive presence in Kosovo. An explosion of violence in Kosovo could, by spreading the conflict, constitute a serious threat to international peace and security and would require an appropriate response by the international community . 5. We support CSCE efforts and a substantial increase in international conflict prevention measures, such as monitoring missions, and expect cooperation from all parties. We urge further speedy preventive steps by the UN or the CSCE to help defuse existing tensions. In that context, we welcome the decision of the United Nations Security Council to place peacekeeping forces on the borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with Albania and Serbia and Montenegro. 6. Strict enforcement of UN embargoes is essential. We urge nations to continue efforts to tighten their enforcement. 7. The Alliance has contributed personnel and equipment to the UNPROFOR II Headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is helping to enforce UN embargoes in the Adriatic, and is providing to the UN data obtained from NATO Airborne Early-Warning (AWACS) aircraft to help monitor the Bosnia-Herzegovina no- fly zone. Members of the Alliance are prepared to take further steps to assist the UN in implementing its decisions to maintain international peace and security. 8. The Security Council will shortly consider adopting a resolution on enforcement of the No-Fly Zone, bearing in mind the need to continue the current humanitarian effort in Bosnia. Should such a resolution be adopted, and should violations continue thereafter, we would be prepared to support the UN in enforcing that resolution. 9. In view of the continuing attacks on Sarajevo, we urge the Security Council to consider further measures as soon as possible, as set out in the 9th December Statement of the UN Security Council President. 10. All parties, but in particular the Serbian authorities, in and outside Bosnia-Herzegovina must cooperate fully with UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] and UNPROFOR. We recall that UNSCR 770 authorizes all measures necessary to ensure relief deliveries to Bosnia, and that interference in relief activities is an international crime. All must refrain from any action which might jeopardize the safety of UNPROFOR and other UN personnel. If requested by the UN, the Alliance would be prepared to take appropriate measures if any of these personnel are threatened or harmed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe Subject: NATO, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control [TEXT]
NATO Today
NATO continues to provide Western governments the optimal instrument to coordinate their efforts at defense and arms control and to build a durable European order of peace. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the progress of European integration have not ended the need for NATO's essential commitment to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with UN principles. The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued after the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council in July 1990, signaled the vitality of the alliance in adapting to security needs in a post-Cold War world. At that meeting, NATO allies announced a fundamental review of strategy and invited the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to establish regular diplomatic liaison and to develop a new partnership. The November 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation further underlined NATO's intention to redefine its objectives in light of changed circumstances. The declaration took into account the broader challenges to alliance security interests, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, and terrorism. It outlined its future tasks in the context of a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community, and the Council of Europe, working together to build a new European security system. It created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to develop an institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries. This initiative culminated in the participation of Foreign Ministers and representatives from the 16 NATO countries, 6 Central and East European countries, and the 3 new independent Baltic states at the inaugural meeting of the NACC in December 1991. At a second meeting of the NACC in March 1992, the new independent states of the former Soviet Union became members, except Georgia, which was admitted the following month. Albania joined the NACC in June 1992. The "New Strategic Concept" announced at the Rome meeting stresses the alliance's mission in crisis management and mandates a more flexible force structure and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In June 1992, NATO Foreign Ministers expressed concern over continuing violence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and affirmed their readiness to support peace-keeping activities under the auspices of the CSCE on a case-by-case basis. On July 10, 1992, the North Atlantic Council agreed on a NATO maritime operation in the Adriatic, in coordination with the WEU, to monitor compliance with the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. On September 2, 1992, the Council approved UN humanitarian relief efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On November 18, 1992, NATO allies agreed to enforce a naval blockade against Serbia and Montenegro, again in coordination with the WEU, following a UN Security Council resolution to tighten economic sanctions. On December 17, 1992, the Council agreed to support the United Nations in enforcing its October 9, 1992, resolution declaring a ban on military flights over Bosnia- Herzegovina. NATO's role as a forum for political consultation and an association of nations committed to collective defense remains unchanged, even as its new responsibilities in the areas of peace-keeping and crisis management continue to evolve.
US-NATO Relations: "The Trans-Atlantic Partnership"
The decision of the United States after World War II to participate in a regional peace-time, defensive alliance represented a fundamental change in American foreign policy. The United States recognized that its interests no longer could be confined to the limits of the Western hemisphere: US security was linked inextricably to the future of the West European democracies. Concepts of individual liberty and the rule of law, coupled with those of a common heritage and shared values, provided the foundation for the NATO alliance. These ideals, as well as the ongoing goal of each member country to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, continue to link the fate of America to that of its NATO allies. The history of US engagement in NATO has been one of commitment by America and its allies to reduce tensions in Europe and to improve East- West relations. They have pursued a series of initiatives designed to lower levels of personnel and equipment and increase mutual confidence, while adhering to a policy of political cohesion and military strength. Arms control measures aimed at enhancing stability have included the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990. The CFE Treaty between the allies and the nations and successor states of the former Warsaw Pact provides for an unprecedented level of transparency in the security field through an information exchange and obligatory inspections. Most importantly, it mandates a sharp reduction in conventional weapons throughout Europe. The NATO allies coordinate closely to meet their own obligations under the treaty and to ensure Eastern compliance in its information, verification, and reduction provisions. NATO has played a leading role in developing far-reaching proposals for CSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Alliance proposals on force planning, non-proliferation, and harmonization of existing arms control commitments already are being developed. The United States supports the development of a greater European security identity and defense role as a means of strengthening the integrity and effectiveness of NATO. At the NATO summit in Rome, the alliance welcomed the prospect of a European political union with a greater security and defense dimension but underlined that this would not diminish the need for NATO. The alliance's "New Strategic Concept" also reaffirmed the essential nature of the trans-Atlantic partnership, recognizing as a basic principle the indivisibility of security of all its members. The North Atlantic alliance and the American presence in Europe have helped keep peace for more than 40 years. Having helped to forge successful policies toward the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact since the foundation of NATO, the United States with its European allies must play a central role in building the framework of the new Euro-Atlantic architecture.
NATO Strategy
NATO collective security strategy was based on the principle of deterrence. Defense capabilities were created to deter military aggression or other forms of pressure. Parties to the treaty agreed to consult whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any party was threatened. They further pledged to maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and, should such deterrence fail, to defend the territory of the alliance. As a purely defensive alliance, NATO would maintain only a level of military strength sufficient to be credible. Given the marked inferiority of allied conventional strength in Europe, the NATO guarantee would rest primarily on the nuclear superiority of the United States. At the conclusion of a 1967 comprehensive review of NATO strategy, the alliance adopted a revised approach to the common defense, based on a balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. This reassessment of the nature of the potential threat to member countries prompted the realization that the alliance must increasingly look to the dangers of more limited forms of aggression beyond the possibility of a massive Soviet attack. The basis of the new concept of "flexible response" was the belief that NATO should be able to deter and counter military force with a range of responses designed to defend directly against attack at an appropriate level, or, if necessary, to escalate the attack to the level necessary to persuade an aggressor to desist. At the same time, the alliance accepted the recommendations of the Harmel report, titled "Future Tasks of the Alliance," which outlined the need to work toward the achievement of disarmament and balanced force reductions. The maintenance of adequate military forces would be coupled with efforts at improving East-West relations. Soviet deployment of new mobile theater nuclear missiles (SS-20s) called into question the accepted NATO strategy of deterrence based on the concepts of forward defense and flexible response and lead to a decision in 1979 to modernize its defensive capability. The resulting "dual-track" decision by the alliance combined pursuing arms control negotiations with responding appropriately to the increased imbalance created by the new Soviet systems. Alliance governments agreed to deploy US ground- launched cruise missiles in Western Europe. The successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, while eliminating all Soviet and US land-based, intermediate-range missiles, required a new appraisal of NATO policy. In response, the alliance developed its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament," which provided a framework for alliance policy in nuclear, conventional, and chemical fields of arms control, and tied defense policies to progress in arms control. The "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," issued by the North Atlantic Council in July 1990, inaugurated a major transformation to adapt to the new realities in Europe. The ministers pledged to intensify political and military contacts with Moscow and with Central and East European capitals and to work not only for the common defense but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. They underlined the need to undertake broader arms control and confidence- building agreements to limit conventional armed forces in Europe. In recognition of the radical political changes in Europe and the improved security environment, the ministers mandated a fundamental review of the alliance's political and military strategy. The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in November 1991. The threat of a massive full-scale Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's strategy during the Cold War, had disappeared after the end of the political division of Europe. The alliance acknowledged that the risks to its security, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism and sabotage, were now less predictable and beyond the focus of traditional concerns. The new strategy adopts a broader approach to security, centered more on crisis management and conflict prevention. It assumes completion of the planned withdrawal of military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full implementation of arms control agreements limiting conventional forces in Europe. In the context of changed circumstances, the alliance will maintain a mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe, although at a significantly lower level. To ensure effectiveness, alliance forces will be increasingly mobile to respond to a range of contingencies. Forces will be organized for flexible buildup to react to regional instability and crises. Collective defense arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in allied strategy but will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve stability. The new strategy reaffirms the principle of common commitment and mutual cooperation in support of the indivisibility of security for all alliance members and underscores the essential political and military link between European and North American members provided by the presence of nuclear forces in Europe.
NATO Background
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed against the backdrop of emerging post-war tensions engendered by the threat of Soviet expansionism and concern over political and economic instability in Western Europe. On April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the political framework for an international alliance designed to prevent aggression, or, if necessary, to resist attack against any alliance member. In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and by Spain in 1982. This alliance of sovereign states pledges, through a combination of political solidarity and military force, to preserve its mutual security. Reaffirming faith in the principles of individual and collective self-defense embodied in the UN Charter, the parties to the treaty pledge to defend the common heritage and civilization of their peoples and to promote stability and well- being in the North Atlantic area. While recognizing the need to maintain adequate military strength to safeguard the security of its members, the alliance also resolves to work toward the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.
NATO Structure
North Atlantic Council
The Council provides the forum for consultation and cooperation between governments on all issues affecting security. Its decisions are based on consensus, with each member having an equal right to express its views. Each government is represented on the NATO Council by a permanent representative with ambassadorial rank. The Council meets on a weekly basis, with meetings at the ministerial level twice a year. The NATO Secretary General is chairman.
Defense Planning Committee (DPC)
Composed of representatives of all countries except France; deals with overall issues of defense. Like the Council, it meets regularly at ambassadorial level and twice yearly, when member countries are represented by their defense ministers.
Nuclear Planning Group
Has authority for nuclear matters. All countries except France participate. Iceland participates as an observer.
Military Committee
The highest military authority in the alliance; is composed of the chiefs of staff of each country except France, which is represented by a military mission. Iceland, which has no military forces, is represented by a civilian member. The Military Committee advises the Council and the DPC on military measures necessary for the common defense and provides guidance to the NATO commanders.
Regional Commands
The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic treaty is divided into three regional commands: Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic, and Allied Command Channel, with a regional planning group for North America. With the exception of France and Iceland, all countries assign forces to the integrated military command structure. The NATO Defense area covers the territories of member nations in North America, in the Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, and in Europe, including Turkey. However, events occurring outside the area which affect the preservation of peace and security in the treaty area also may be considered by the Council.
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
Designed as a forum for consultation and cooperation on security and related issues, the Council institutionalizes the relationship between NATO countries and the governments of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. Finland has attended as an observer. Defense planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, and defense conversion are discussed at regular meetings of cooperation partners. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

NATO Source: North Atlantic Cooperation Council Description: Text of a communique released at the meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec, 18 199212/18/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tajikistan Subject: NATO, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control, CSCE [TEXT] 1. We, the Foreign Ministers and Representatives of the member countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council have today continued our consultations to contribute to enhanced security and cooperation in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 2. Our area faces new and difficult challenges which give rise to serious concern. Its stability and security will depend on how we are able to respond to these challenges and thereby to manage the process of change. 3. During the first year of its existence, our Council has proved its usefulness for dialogue and cooperation and for strengthening security. Its potential will be further developed and applied. To that end, we have adopted today a substantial Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation for the year 1993. It builds on the positive, mutually beneficial results of our initial Work Plan for 1992 in the political, military, economic, scientific, environmental and information fields, including defence conversion and civil/-military coordination of air traffic management. We agreed to strengthen and broaden further our partnership as a dynamic process and to give it a more practical focus. This would support the continued progress in democratic and market-oriented reforms which is essential for the success of our cooperation. Our cooperation could also take the form of activities agreed by all the partners but carried out by some of them in open-ended groups which reflect specific shared interests, for example, the pilot projects on defence conversion and on defence- related environmental issues. Active cooperation on defence matters and military contacts under our Work Plan are an important contribution to better mutual understanding among armed forces and fostering responsible and cooperative behaviour in the military field, which are essential to our efforts to help safeguard peace. We intend thus to contribute to achieving a pattern of democratically controlled and smaller military forces which are structured with defensive intent, at minimum levels consistent with legitimate security requirements. These objectives should be reflected in military doctrines. We welcome progress already made in these areas. Cooperation will be significantly increased in the science and environmental fields on priority issues. 4. The further development of our cooperation is linked to respect by all our countries for international commitments undertaken inter alia within the framework of the CSCE. We are determined to implement these commitments fully and thereby to enhance the security and stability in our area. 5. Regional tensions, conflicts and ethnic violence are threatening stability and security in our area and hampering the achievement of our goal of enhancing peaceful cooperation. We cannot allow the current process of transition in Europe to be undermined in this manner. 6. We welcome the decisions taken by the CSCE Council in Stockholm to enhance the CSCE's operational and institutional capacity to prevent conflicts, manage crises and settle disputes peacefully. We are determined to contribute to achieving these goals. 7. Our countries are ready to support and contribute on a case by case basis to peacekeeping operations under UN authority or CSCE responsibility, which ensure international legitimacy for such operations. Taking into account the decision of the 1992 CSCE Summit Meeting in Helsinki, we will exchange experience and expertise on peacekeeping and related matters; we will continue our consultations leading to cooperation on this subject in conformity with the Work Plan we have adopted. 8. Our Council is continuing to contribute to the building of a new security architecture based on cooperative relations among states and a network of mutually reinforcing institutions. 9. We condemn the use of force not sanctioned by international law as a means to pursue political goals. Permanent solutions to regional conflicts can only be reached through negotiations as well as equal and full respect for human rights, including those of persons belonging to national minorities, the territorial integrity of all states and the inviolability of their borders in accordance with CSCE principles and other relevant international commitments and norms. We pledge to use our dialogue and cooperation within the NACC to help prevent conflicts. 10. We are profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace, security, and stability. We fully support the efforts of the UN, the CSCE and the UN and EC Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on former Yugoslavia to find a negotiated and just settlement to the tragic conflict in the former Yugoslavia and call on all parties, especially the leadership of Serbia and Montenegro and of the Bosnian Serbs to cooperate with these efforts, in particular to implement strictly the decisions of the London Conference and the mandatory resolutions of the UN Security Council. Any taking of territory by force or any practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and unacceptable and must not be permitted to affect the outcome of the negotiations on constitutional arrangements for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All displaced persons must be enabled to return in peace to their former homes. We support all humanitarian efforts aimed at alleviating the plight of the population and at preventing further dislocation, e.g. through the development of safe areas for the protection of the civilian population and a provision of refuge for particularly vulnerable categories of refugees. We are gravely concerned about the risk of conflict spilling over into other areas. This would have serious implications for the region. In this connection, we are disturbed by the dangerous situation in Kosovo, developments in the Sandjak and Vojvodina and some recent events in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We stress the necessity of urgent preventive measures and support the steps that have already been taken by the United Nations and the CSCE. We welcome the UN Security Council decision to place preventive peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We believe that a UN presence in Kosovo would be a positive step. We urge all parties concerned to strive in the framework of an overall settlement of the crisis for a significant reduction in the level of armaments in the region, in particular through a comprehensive regional harmonization of arms control obligations. We deeply regret the ongoing hostilities in the conflict being dealt with by the CSCE Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh. We urge the parties involved to take immediate steps in order to establish an effective ceasefire. We strongly support UN and CSCE principles as well as all steps and decisions taken by the CSCE in relation to the present conflict. We continue to believe the proposed CSCE Conference in Minsk offers an immediate opportunity to achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict and we support efforts to convene the conference on the basis of the continuation of the work begun in the framework of the Rome meeting. We welcome the continuation of the democratization process in Georgia. We are pleased that the ceasefire agreement between Georgians and Ossetians in the area of conflict has held so far. We welcome the dispatch of the CSCE mission to the area. We hope that it will play a constructive role in promoting a political settlement. We hope that the Georgian-Russian- Ossetian Peacekeeping Force will develop a relationship of cooperation, consultation and trust with the mission. We remain deeply concerned about the conflict in Abkhazia. We call on the parties involved to establish an effective ceasefire and to work together with the CSCE and the UN Secretary-General's representatives for a lasting peaceful solution. We are pleased that the ceasefire in the Republic of Moldova is holding. We urge further efforts towards an expeditious permanent solution to the problem of the Left Bank Dniester Areas without further violence and towards agreement on the status and the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the Republic of Moldova. We support CSCE efforts to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the current situation. We urgently call for a halt to the civil strife in Tajikistan. We welcome the election of a new chairman of the national assembly and head of state of Tajikistan. We hope that this transition will help end the fighting. The restoration of peace will allow Tajikistan to focus on the challenges of democratic development in the interest of its people. 11. Completion of the expeditious withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic States under appropriate withdrawal agreements is important in view of the overriding principle that military forces may be stationed on the territory of a foreign state only with the consent of that state. The continuation of the withdrawal process will be a major contribution to stability in the Baltic region. We recognize that practical difficulties have to be overcome but they should not be allowed to unduly delay the overall process. We hope that international cooperation will help overcome those difficulties. This withdrawal should not be--and is not--linked to other issues. All parties must exercise flexibility and moderation in negotiations to resolve remaining problems, including those of social and material nature. 12. We have already achieved historic advances in arms control, disarmament and confidence building. Full implementation of existing agreements, further dialogue, transparency and confidence and security building measures, as well as the enhancement of consultation and cooperation are fundamental to increased security, taking into account new political and military realities. To this end, -- We welcome entry into force and successful completion of the baseline validation period of the CFE Treaty, which has always received the support of our Council. The High Level Working Group which our Council established on 20 December 1991 has significantly contributed to this success. We are committed to full implementation of all provisions of this vital Treaty, including those on reductions, information exchange and verification. -- We will work with all CSCE countries to make the Forum for Security Cooperation a success, particularly in the areas of harmonization of existing arms control commitments, transparency in defence planning, and non-proliferation. We urge all CSCE participating states to take part in this important forum. -- We support development and definition of the concept of a code of conduct in the security field and we welcome pioneering work undertaken in this respect within the framework of the CSCE. -- We urge those states concerned which have not yet ratified the START Treaty, including the Lisbon Protocol, to do so speedily in order to permit its prompt entry into force. -- We are committed to preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We reiterate our support for the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and for its indefinite extension in 1995. We urge all countries that have not yet done so to become parties to the NPT as non- nuclear weapons states. -- We welcome the successful achievement of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention. We pledge to become original signatories and commit ourselves to its early ratification. We urge other countries to do likewise. -- We call on all countries, particularly those located in regions where the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increased alarmingly, to take all appropriate steps to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. -- We are equally committed to responsibility and restraint with respect to transfers of conventional weapons. We call on all countries to submit full relevant data to the UN Register of Conventional Arms by April 1993. -- Those of us who are signatories of the Treaty on Open Skies are committed to early ratification and entry into force. Those of us who have not yet signed the Treaty will consider the question of accession as soon as possible. We look forward to wider adherence to the Treaty by interested states which are participating in the CSCE but are not original signatories to the Treaty as provided for by Article XVII of the Treaty and called for in the CSCE Open Skies Declaration of 24 March 1992. 13. While we recognize the resource constraints faced by many of our members, we nonetheless encourage the widest possible participation in activities within the framework of our Council. 14. Having taken due notice of the statement by the Representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, we state our readiness to welcome the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as of 1 January 1993. 15. Finland attended the meeting as an observer. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe Subject: History, NATO, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control, CSCE [TEXT]
NACC Today
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) joins the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the newly free and independent states of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union in a program of political-security dialogue, partnership, and cooperation. Subjects discussed in regular meetings between allies and partner states include defense planning and budgeting, democratic concepts of civil- military relations, defense conversion, and scientific and environmental topics. Members also discuss current political issues of common concern. In this way, the NACC complements the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), NATO, the European Community, and the Council of Europe in building a Euro-Atlantic community of stable, democratic, and market-oriented societies from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
NACC's Origins
As the advent of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union and the crumbling of communist control in Eastern Europe changed the nature of the European security challenge, NATO turned from a posture of confrontation with the East to one of dialogue and cooperation. The June 1990 Turnberry North Atlantic Council ministerial and July 1990 London NATO summit extended the hand of friendship to NATO's former adversaries and called for the alliance to institute a liaison program with the Warsaw Pact states. The June 1991 Copenhagen North Atlantic Council ministerial developed this theme in its statement on "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe." In their October 3, 1991, joint statement, Secretary of State Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed the institutionalization of the NATO liaison program in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The following month, the Rome NATO summit formally established the NACC as a forum in which allies could offer their experience and expertise to partner countries on security and related issues.
A Successful First Year
In its first year of existence, NACC developed a solid basis of cooperation and dialogue. The first NACC ministerial, held on December 20, 1991, in Brussels, brought together representatives of the 16 NATO allies, the Baltic states, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Participants pledged to uphold CSCE principles, support arms control efforts, and work together in building a Europe whole and free. The second NACC ministerial, held on March 10, 1992, in Brussels, admitted all the states of the former Soviet Union except Georgia (which joined the following month). Ministers adopted the first NACC work plan, which spelled out a program of intensified consultations and cooperative activities focused on security and related issues, including political, military, economic, scientific, and environmental subjects. Specific topics for cooperation included defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air-traffic management, defense conversion, and enhanced participation in NATO's "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental programs. Ministers also pledged to cooperate in disseminating information about NATO in the partner countries and gave their support to the NACC's ad hoc High Level Group charged with facilitating CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) entry-into-force. The third NACC ministerial was held on June 5, 1992, in Oslo. Albania was admitted to membership, bringing the total membership to 37. Finland attended as an observer. Ministers reviewed progress in implementing the work plan, reaffirmed their commitment to CSCE principles, and pledged their support for arms control and non-proliferation initiatives. They also discussed regional crises and problems in the former Yugoslavia, Nagorno- Karabakh, and the Baltics.
Looking Ahead
On December 18, 1992, at the fourth NACC ministerial in Brussels, ministers adopted a new work plan focusing on practical projects and including a provision for joint planning and training for peace-keeping. They expressed strong approval of CSCE efforts to resolve peacefully hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Moldova. The Council also discussed ways to increase participation by the former Soviet states of Central Asia and the Caucasus and welcomed the future membership of separate Czech and Slovak states in the NACC as of January 1, 1993. As it begins its second year, NACC already has established itself as an important element in post-Cold War Europe's security architecture. It will continue to develop as a complement to other European and trans-Atlantic organizations forging the links of a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Euro-Atlantic community of nations. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 52, December 28, 1992 Title:

US-UK Policy on the Former Yugoslavia

Bush Major Source: President Bush, Prime Minister Major Description: Text of a joint statement issued by the United States and the United Kingdom and released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Camp David, Maryland. Prime Minister Major visited the United States on December 18-20, 1992. Date: Dec, 20 199212/20/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: USSR (former), United Kingdom, United States, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights [TEXT] The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom have agreed as follows. The objectives of our policy are: a) to work for a peaceful and just settlement in the former Yugoslavia; b) to prevent the spread of fighting in particular to Kosovo and Macedonia; c) to maintain the humanitarian aid effort which includes over 2,000 British troops and without which many more lives will be lost this winter. The President and Prime Minister paid tribute to the work of the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia and to the courage and dedication of the troops who are ensuring that convoys get through. They welcomed the success of the UN and its agencies, despite all the odds, in delivering large quantities of aid to those in need. They agreed on the importance of enabling that effort to go ahead. The United States and the United Kingdom have agreed to cooperate on a Resolution in the United Nations to enforce compliance with the 'no-fly' zone for Bosnia should violation of the existing ban continue. The aim of the resolution would be to prevent flights taking place other than those specifically authorized by the United Nations. The President and the Prime Minister: a) agreed that steps need to be taken to prevent the spread of fighting into Kosovo and Macedonia; b) welcomed the decision to deploy UN troops in Macedonia and hoped that this UN presence would be stepped up over the coming weeks; c) agreed also to press for the very early increase in the numbers of observers in Kosovo; d) agreed that our attitude to sanctions would depend on a rapid and radical change of policy by Serbia; e) confirmed that they would be ready, depending on Serbia's response, to impose new sanctions. They could initially include cutting postal and telecommunication links and could lead to closing the borders and complete diplomatic isolation for years to come. The President and the Prime Minister paid tribute to the work of Cy Vance and David Owen in trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement in the former Yugoslavia. Both Governments will continue to give the negotiators their full support. (###)

Dispatch, Volume 4: 1993

US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993

Title:

Signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address at signing ceremony of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, DC Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: Canada, Mexico, United States Subject: North America Free Trade [TEXT] (introductory and closing remarks deleted) Throughout history, the destiny of nations has often been shaped by change and by chance. When I say chance, I'm talking about things that happen to them. Then there are those unique nations which shape their destinies by choice, by the things that they make happen. Three such nations come together today: Mexico, Canada, and the United States. By signing the North American Free Trade Agreement, we've committed ourselves to a better future for our children and for generations yet unborn. This agreement will remove barriers to trade and investment across the two largest undefended borders of the globe and link the United States in a permanent partnership of growth with our first and third largest trading partners. The peace and friendship that we've long enjoyed as neighbors will now be strengthened by the explosion of growth and trade let loose by the combined energies of our 360 million citizens trading freely across our borders. I want to pay a personal tribute to my partners in this endeavor; two rare and gifted leaders, two special and valued friends without whose courage and leadership and vision this day could not possibly have come about. When the history of our era is written, it will be said that the citizens of all the Americas were truly fortunate that Mexico and Canada--two great nations, two proud people--were led by President Carlos Salinas and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. For Mexico, particularly, the NAFTA is a bold undertaking, made possible by President Salinas' brave reforms to reinvigorate the Mexican economy. It's especially fitting [that] an American president sign this agreement in this great Hall of the Americas, the home of the Organization of American States. NAFTA represents the first giant step toward fulfillment of a dream that has long inspired us all--the dream of a hemisphere united by economic cooperation and free competition. Because of what we have begun here today, I believe the time will soon come when trade is free from Alaska to Argentina; when every citizen of the Americas has the opportunity to share in new growth and expanding prosperity. I hope and trust that the North American free trade area can be extended to Chile, other worthy partners in South America, and Central America and the Caribbean. Free trade throughout the Americas is an idea whose time has come. A new generation of democratic leaders has staked its future on that promise, and under their leadership, a tide of economic reform and trade liberalization is transforming the hemisphere. Today, as a result, the hemisphere is growing again. For the first time in years, more capital is flowing into the Americas for new investment than is flowing out. Every major debtor nation, from Mexico to Argentina, has negotiated a successful agreement to reduce and restructure its commercial bank debt under the Brady Plan. Let me just offer a brief aside about the Brady Plan, if I might. I remember telling my good friend, Nick Brady, our Secretary of the Treasury: Okay, we'll call it the Brady Plan; but if it's successful, we're going to call it the Bush Plan. [Laughter.] And he reluctantly accepted that guidance. I think history will show that the leadership of our distinguished Secretary of the Treasury did pay off and [that] the plan has been highly successful. By the way, the name will always be, appropriately, the Brady Plan. That's the way it's going to stay. Now, under the Enterprise for the Americas [Initiative (EAI)], many nations- -Jamaica, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay--have reduced, or shortly will reduce, their official debt with the United States. EAI is working. The initiative allows interest payments on official debt to be channeled into trust funds that protect the environment and support programs for child survival. To those in other regions struggling to reform statist economies, Latin America shines as a solid example of hope that hyperinflation can be tamed. Growth can be revitalized, and new investment and trade can accelerate if developing nations stay the course through the difficult challenge of economic restructuring. These profound economic changes are a tribute to a courageous group of democratic leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean. Their revolutionary vision has altered forever the face of the Americas. Their friendship and counsel have been enormously gratifying to me as President. But these profound changes, along with the NAFTA itself, reflect a broader and, I believe, more fundamental change in relations between the United States and the nations of this hemisphere. For many decades, we've proclaimed ambitious goals for ourselves of a good neighbor policy, of an alliance for progress, of a partnership built on mutual respect and shared responsibility. And those goals now are rapidly becoming a reality. My talks with the hemisphere's leaders, in recent weeks, show a strong consensus that relations between the United States and its neighbors have never in our history been better and that this development is working to benefit all of our peoples. I take great pride in the fact that, working with those leaders, we've been a part of all of that. I believe that, in the future, America's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean will grow even stronger. I was pleased to hear President-elect Bill Clinton affirm that same goal in his remarks recently, both to the Rio Group and to the Caribbean/Latin American Action conference. This century's epic struggle between totalitarianism and democracy is over. It's dead. Democracy has prevailed. And today, we see unfolding around the world a revolution of hope and courage, propelled by the aspiration of ordinary people for freedom and a better life. The world will long remember the images of that struggle: a citizen of Berlin, sitting atop the Wall, chipping away with his hammer and chisel; Boris Yeltsin and his followers waving the flag of free Russia and defying the tanks and coup plotters. And here in this hall, it is worth remembering that those images were preceded by a democratic revolution in Latin America. No people struggled for freedom against oppression more bravely than the people of this hemisphere. And, here, too, in the Americas, we are constructing a hopeful model of the new post-Cold War world of which we dream. This is the first hemisphere, and the OAS is the first regional organization in the world to take on, through the Santiago Declaration, the formal collective responsibility to defend democracy. In this hemisphere, the weapons of mass destruction--strategic missiles as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--have been rejected voluntarily. In this hemisphere, we've created new models of multilateral cooperation and success in resolving the conflicts that have tormented Central America. As recent proof of the progress we've made, just 2 days ago we celebrated- -and I'm sure everyone did--the end of the war in El Salvador [see p. 8]. In this hemisphere, we have forged a new partnership to defeat the global menace of narco-trafficking, and we must succeed in that effort. Still, we're not satisfied. The birth of democracy has raised expectations throughout the Americas, and now democracy must deliver. The communications revolution has opened the eyes of this hemisphere's citizens to the wider world. We're no longer blind to limits on legitimate political participation, to official corruption, or to economic favoritism. If democracy is to be consolidated, the gulfs that separate the few who are very rich from the many who are very poor, that divide civilian from military institutions, that split citizens of European heritage from indigenous peoples--these gulfs must be bridged, and economic reform must ensure upward mobility and new opportunities for a better life for all citizens of the Americas. To fulfill its promise, democratic government must guarantee not only the right to regular elections but human rights and property rights, swift and impartial justice, and the rule of law. Democratic governments must deliver basic services. Their institutions must be strengthened and must be modernized. To defend democracy successfully, the OAS must strengthen the tools at its disposal. I commend the new steps that you took this week to suspend non-democratic regimes. Together, we must also create new means to end historic border disputes and to control the competition in conventional weaponry. In all of this, I believe my country, the United States of America, bears a special responsibility. We face a moment of maximum opportunity, but also, let's face it, continued risk. And we must remain engaged, for more than ever before our future is bound up with the future of the Americas. This is the fastest growing region in the world for US products. In the struggle to defend democracy, our most cherished values are at stake. Travel to Miami or El Paso, Los Angeles or Chicago or New York, and listen to the language of our neighborhoods. We are tied to the Americas--not just by geography, not just by history, but by who we are as a people. No one knows that more profoundly than this proud grandfather. This year marks the 500th anniversary of a voyage of discovery to the New World. Let this also be a time of rediscovery for my country, the United States, of the importance of our own hemisphere. If we are equal to the challenges before us, we can build in the Americas the world's first completely democratic hemisphere. Just think about that: think of the importance; think of the significance; think of the example for the rest of the world. This hemisphere can be as well a zone of peace, where trade flows freely, prosperity is shared, the rule of law is respected, and the gift of human knowledge is harnessed for all. More than 150 years ago, Simon Bolivar, the liberator whose statue stands outside this hall, spoke about an America united in heart, subject to one law and guided by the torch of liberty. My friends, here in this hemisphere we are on the way to realizing Simon Bolivar's dream. And, today, with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, we take another giant step toward making the dream a reality.
Copies of NAFTA Treaty:
Copies of the official text may be obtained from the Government Printing Office for $41 each. The US Canadian, and Mexican tariff schedules also are available for purchase (prices vary). To place an order, call (202) 783- 3238.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Country Profile: Canada

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jan, 4 19931/4/93 Category: Country Data Region: North America Country: Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics, Cultural Exchange, Democratization [TEXT]
Official Name: Canada
Geography
Area: 10 million sq. km. (3.8 million sq. mi.); second-largest country in the world. Cities: Capital--Ottawa (pop. 833,000). Other major cities--Toronto (4 million), Montreal (3 million), Vancouver (1 million). Terrain: Varied. Climate: Temperate to arctic.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Canadian(s). Population (1991 est.): 27 million. Annual growth rate (1991): 1%. Ethnic groups: British 25%, French 24%, other European 16%, indigenous Indian and Eskimo 1.5%, mixed background 28%. Religions: Roman Catholic 47%, United Church 16%, Anglican 10%. Languages: English, French. Literacy: 98% of population aged 15 and over have at least a ninth grade education. Health: Infant mortality rate--7/1,000. Life expectancy--73 yrs. male, 80 yrs. female. Work force (13.8 million, 1991): Community/business/personal service--4 million. Manufacturing--2 million. Public administration--800,000. Agriculture--400,000.
Government
Type: Confederation with parliamentary democracy. Independence: July 1, 1867. Constitution: The amended British North America Act of 1867 as "repatriated" in 1982, charter of rights, and unwritten custom. Branches: Executive--Queen Elizabeth II (head of state, represented by a governor general), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. Legislative--bicameral parliament (104-member Senate, 295-member House of Commons). Judicial--Supreme Court. Political parties: Progressive Conservative (ruling party), Liberal, New Democratic, Reform, Bloc Quebecois. Subdivisions: 10 provinces, 2 territories. Suffrage: Universal over 18. Flag: A red maple leaf on a white background flanked by vertical red bands.
Economy
GDP (1991): $580 billion. GDP growth rate (1991): -1.7%. Per capita GDP (1991): $21,500. Avg. inflation rate (1991): 5.6%. Natural resources: Petroleum and natural gas, hydroelectric power, metals and minerals, fish, forests, wildlife. Agriculture: Products--wheat, livestock and meat, feed-grains, oilseeds, dairy products, tobacco, fruits, vegetables. Industry: Types--motor vehicles and parts, fish and forest products, processed and unprocessed minerals. Trade (1991): Exports--$127 billion: motor vehicles and parts, lumber, wood-pulp and newsprint, crude and fabricated metals, natural gas, crude petroleum, wheat. Partners--US 75%, EC 8%, Japan 5%. Imports--$122 billion: motor vehicles and parts, industrial machinery, crude petroleum, chemicals, agricultural machinery. Partners--US 61%, EC 10%, Japan 7%.
Principal Government Officials
Prime Minister--Brian Mulroney Secretary of State--Barbara McDougall Ambassador to the US--Derek Burney Ambassador to the UN--Louise Frechette (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Country Profile: Mexico

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jan, 4 19931/4/93 Category: Country Data Region: North America Country: Mexico Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics, Cultural Exchange, Democratization [TEXT]
Official Name: United Mexican States
Geography
Area: 2 million sq. km. (764,000 sq. mi.); about three times the size of Texas. Cities: Capital--Mexico City (est. 20 million). Other major cities-- Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla de Zaragoza, Leon. Terrain: Coastal lowlands, central high plateaus, and mountains up to 18,000 ft. Climate: Tropical to desert.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Mexican(s). Population (1991): 89 million. Annual growth rate: 2%. Ethnic groups: Indian-Spanish (Mestizo) 60%, American Indian 30%, Caucasian 9%, other 1%. Religions: Roman Catholic 90%, Protestant 5%, other 5%. Language: Spanish. Education: Years compulsory--8. Literacy--90%. Health: Infant mortality rate--30/1,000. Life expectancy--68 yrs. male, 76 yrs. female. Work force (30 million): Services--30%. Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing--24%. Manufacturing--19%. Commerce--13%. Construction--7%. Transportation and communication--4%. Mining and quarrying--0.4%.
Government
Type: Federal republic. Independence: First proclaimed Sept. 16, 1810; republic established 1822. Constitution: Feb. 5, 1917. Branches: Executive--president (chief of state and head of government). Legislative--bicameral. Judicial--Supreme Court, local and federal systems. Political parties: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN), Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), Popular Socialist Party (PPS), Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), Party of the Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction (PFCRN). Suffrage: Universal at 18. Administrative subdivisions: 31 states and a federal district. Flag: Green, white, and red vertical bands. Centered is an eagle holding a snake in its beak and perching on a cactus.
Economy
GDP (1991): $282 billion. Per capita GDP: $3,200. Annual real GDP growth: 3.6%. Avg. inflation rate: 19%. Natural resources: Petroleum, silver, copper, gold, zinc, lead, natural gas, timber. Agriculture: Products--corn, beans, oilseeds, feedgrains, fruit, cotton, coffee, sugarcane, winter vegetables. Industry: Types--manufacturing, services, commerce, transportation and communications, petroleum and mining. Trade (1991): Exports--$27 billion: manufacturing 59%, petroleum and derivatives 30%, agriculture 9%. Imports--$38 billion: intermediate goods 63%, capital goods 22%, consumer goods 15%. Major trading partners--US, EC, Japan. US imports--$30 billion.
Principal Government Officials
President--Carlos Salinas de Gortari Foreign Minister--Fernando Solana Morales Ambassador-designate to the United States--Jorge Montano Martinez Ambassador-designate to the United Nations--Manuel Tello Macias Ambassador to the OAS--Alejandro Carrillo Castro (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

President's Remarks on START II and Somalia Trip

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Description: Opening remarks before the press at the White House, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 30 199212/30/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa Country: Russia, Somalia Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] I have just spoken this morning by telephone with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and I am very pleased to announce that we have completed agreement on the START II Treaty [the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms]. US and Russian expert teams are remaining in Geneva now to complete the formal work on the treaty text. This historic treaty will reduce by two- thirds current nuclear arsenals and will dramatically lower the numbers of strategic nuclear arms permitted by START I [the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed on July 31, 1991]. In my view, this treaty is good for all mankind. President Yeltsin and I have agreed to meet in Sochi, Russia, on January 2 and 3 [1993], where we will sign the treaty.1 I want to take this opportunity to congratulate the team standing here with me today-- [Secretary of State] Larry Eagleburger, Secretary [of Defense] Cheney, Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Powell, and others who have done a superb job on this treaty. We're going to use the occasion of the meeting in Sochi to consider a number of bilateral and regional issues and then to discuss ways to fulfill the promise and the potential of US-Russian relations. Let me just say a word about our trip to Somalia. The trip, I hope, will show the concern that all Americans feel for the people of Somalia and for their condition. These are humanitarian concerns. In my view, it is proper that the President show this concern to the people over there. I also want to make very clear how strongly we support our troops that are over there. They're doing a first-class job. I've had a good briefing from General Powell and Secretary Cheney. I just can't tell you how proud I am of the young men and women that are serving halfway around the world in this great humanitarian cause. We've tried to keep Governor [President-elect] Clinton closely advised-- informed--on the Somalia trip and, obviously, on the arms control agreement. So I think these are both important events--the trip to Sochi and the trip to Somalia. 1 Editor's note: Location subsequently was changed to Moscow, Russia. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

START II Treaty To Be Signed

Fitzwater Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 1 19931/1/93 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia Country: Russia, United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] On January 3, 1993, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin will sign the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The treaty, often called START [Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty] II, codifies the Joint Understanding signed by both Presidents at the Washington summit on June 17, 1992. It will eliminate the most destabilizing strategic weapons--heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVed) ICBMs. It also will reduce by two-thirds below current levels the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both countries. The treaty includes a Protocol on Elimination or Conversion concerning heavy ICBMs and heavy ICBM silos, a Protocol on Exhibition and Inspection concerning heavy bombers, and a Memorandum of Attribution.
Relationship to the START Treaty
START II builds upon the START Treaty signed on July 31, 1991, between the United States and the Soviet Union but calls for far greater reductions in strategic nuclear forces. All START provisions will pertain, except as explicitly modified in the new treaty. Because of the close relationship between the two treaties, START II cannot enter into force before the START Treaty [see Background on START, p. 7]. It also will remain in force throughout the duration of START.
Central Limits
The treaty sets equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed by either side. Ceilings are set for two phases: Phase One to be completed 7 years after entry-into-force of the START Treaty [START I] and Phase Two to be completed by the year 2003. Phase Two may be completed by the end of the year 2000 if the United States can help finance the elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia. The treaty sets ranges for some of the central limits. Phase One. By the end of this phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250. These include the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as well as the number of warheads for which heavy bombers with nuclear missions are equipped. Of the total 3,800-4,250 warheads, no more than 1,200 may be on deployed MIRVed ICBMs, no more than 2,160 on deployed SLBMs, and no more than 650 on deployed heavy ICBMs. Phase Two. By the end of the second phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500. Of those, none may be on MIRVed ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs. Thus, all MIRVed ICBMs must be eliminated from each side's deployed forces; only ICBMs carrying a single warhead will be allowed. No more than 1,700-1,750 deployed warheads may be on SLBMs. There will be no prohibition on MIRVed SLBMs.
Downloading
The treaty allows for a reduction in the number of warheads on certain ballistic missiles. Such "downloading" is permitted in a carefully structured fashion, modifying the rules agreed in START. -- Each side is able to download two existing types of ballistic missiles by up to four warheads each, in addition to the US Minuteman III and the Russian SS-N-18. There are no aggregate limits on the number of warheads that can be downloaded. -- A limit of 105 ICBMs of one of those types may be downloaded by up to five warheads each. Such an ICBM may only be deployed in silos in which it was deployed at the time of START signature. Thus, the three-warhead US Minuteman III ICBM, the four-warhead Russian SS-17 ICBM, and 105 of the six-warhead Russian SS-19 ICBMs are able to be downloaded to a single warhead, to comply with the requirement to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs. The US Peacekeeper ICBM and the Russian SS- 18 heavy ICBM and SS-24 ICBM, each of which carry 10 warheads, and the remaining SS-19 ICBMs must all be eliminated, in accordance with START procedures.
Missile System Elimination
In START, deployed SLBMs and most deployed ICBMs may be removed from accountability either by destroying their launchers (silos for fixed ICBMs, mobile launchers for mobile ICBMs, and launcher sections of submarines for SLBMs), or by converting those launchers so that they can carry only another type of permitted missile. The one exception is the SS-18. Under START, the requirement to eliminate 154 deployed SS-18s must be met through silo destruction, not conversion. In the START II Treaty, those rules generally continue to apply. The major exception is the SS-18. Ninety SS-18 silos may be converted to carry a single-warhead missile, which Russia has said will be an SS-25 type. The treaty lays out specific procedures, including on-site inspections, to ensure that those converted silos will never again be able to launch a heavy ICBM. The remaining 64 SS-18 silos subject to this treaty will have to be destroyed. In exchange for the right to retain up to 90 converted SS-18 silos, the treaty requires that all SS-18 missiles and canisters, both deployed and non-deployed, be eliminated no later than January 1, 2003. This is a major change from the START Treaty. Generally, START did not seek destruction of missiles. In START II, the Russians have agreed to eliminate all SS-18 missiles, both deployed and non-deployed. This fully achieves a long- standing US goal to eliminate completely heavy ICBMs.
Heavy Bombers
In START, nuclear heavy bombers are subject to more flexible counting rules than are ballistic missiles. Each heavy bomber equipped to carry only short- range missiles or gravity bombs counts as one warhead. US heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) each count as 10 warheads, and Soviet heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs each count as 8 warheads. In START II, heavy bombers will be counted using the number of nuclear weapons--whether long-range nuclear ALCMs, short-range missiles, or gravity bombs--for which they are actually equipped. This number is specified in the treaty's Memorandum on Attribution and will be confirmed by a one-time exhibition and by routine START on-site inspections. Another new feature of this treaty is the provision that a maximum of 100 heavy bombers that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as long-range-nuclear-ALCM heavy bombers may be reoriented to a conventional role. Such bombers will not count against the treaty warhead limits. They will be based separately from heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons, will be used only for non-nuclear missions, and will have observable differences from other heavy bombers of the same type that are not reoriented to a conventional role. Such heavy bombers may be returned to a nuclear role after 3 months' notification, but then may not be reoriented again to a conventional role.
Verification
The comprehensive START verification regime continues to apply to the new treaty. In addition, START II includes some new verification measures, such as observation of SS-18 silo conversion and missile elimination procedures, exhibitions, and inspections of all heavy bombers to confirm weapon loads, and exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role to confirm their observable differences.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Background on START

Fitzwater Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 1 19931/1/93 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia Country: Russia, United States, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, USSR (former) Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] On July 31, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded almost a decade of arduous and complex negotiations by signing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The treaty was the first to call for significant reductions in the deployed strategic nuclear forces of the two countries. The START Treaty includes a number of Agreed Statements; Protocols; the Definitions Annex; a Memorandum of Understanding on data; and related agreements, letters, and supporting documents. Together, they cover not only weapons limits but also counting rules; conversion or elimination of weapons; verification and inspections; cooperative measures; the creation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission; and procedures for the treaty's entry-into-force, amendment, duration, and withdrawal. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and the Commonwealth of Independent States was established. Four independent states with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory also came into existence--Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Following extensive high-level negotiations, these four newly independent states and the United States reached agreement on May 23, 1992, in Lisbon, Portugal, on how they would all adhere to the START Treaty. The agreement was codified in a new Protocol to START that makes all five states parties to the treaty. Under the terms of the Protocol, the four new independent states will make the necessary implementing arrangements among themselves to carry out their responsibilities under START. In addition, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus committed to join the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states in the shortest possible time. Russia remains a nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. In legally binding letters to President Bush, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus also committed to eliminate all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive arms from their territories within the 7-year START reduction period. The US Congress and the parliaments of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan have since consented to START ratification. We look to early similar action by the parliaments of Ukraine and Belarus, and to the rapid adherence by Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
Comparison of Central Limits Set by START Treaties I and II
START START II START II Phase One Phase Two Total strategic warheads 6,000 3,800-4,250 3,000-3,500 accountable actual actual Ballistic missile warhead 4,900 No specific No specific sublimit sublimit MIRVed ICBM warheads N/A 1,200 0 SLBM warheads N/A 2,160 1,700-1,750 Heavy ICBM warheads 1,540 650 0 Mobile ICBM warheads 1,100 START applies START applies Total Strategic Nuclear 1,600 START applies START applies Delivery Vehicles (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Implementation of Peace Accords In El Salvador

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Address at the ceremony concluding implementation of the peace accords, San Salvador, El Salvador Date: Dec, 15 199212/15/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: El Salvador Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights [TEXT] This is a great moment in the history of this nation and Central America. And it is a great moment for the people of El Salvador. I am enormously proud to be here with you and to bring you greetings from President Bush and the American people. At a time of year when the words "peace on earth" carry such special meaning, we meet to celebrate a new commitment to peace in a land that has seen too much sadness, too much suffering, and too much loss. Men and women who once met on the field of battle now stand together as one in their devotion to the democratic process. We share your joy and your fresh hopes for the future on this day of national reconciliation. National reconciliation in El Salvador embodies the hopes of all peoples. With the end of superpower confrontation, and the active involvement of the United Nations in the cause of peace, we hope to see a further decline in the use of force to solve international problems. This is the promise of the new world order. My country's 16th President, Abraham Lincoln, once said that the ballot is stronger than the bullet. History proves the wisdom of those words. Democratic principles are the key to protecting individual rights; advancing economic prosperity; and preserving the precious gift of peace. Many observers said this day would never come. Some said that peace and justice could only come from the barrel of a gun; others said peace could only be attained by trampling on human rights and liberties. Both were wrong. The guns are stilled today because democracy and human rights have triumphed. There are many here who deserve our gratitude for this achievement. First, we must thank the negotiators on both sides who stepped forward in good faith and carried out their duty with great skill. And we must pay a special tribute to one man who is known around the world as the person who brought peace to El Salvador, President Alfredo Cristiani. Mr. President, you will be honored in the pages of history for all you have done to bring peace to your people. We thank the United Nations, and Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, for patience and determination in this process. We also salute the Organization of American States, and the Four Friends: Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Spain--whose leaders and governments played such a crucial role in the success of the peace process. Finally, we thank the courageous people of El Salvador, who have long prayed that this day would come. Through all your struggles, you were sustained by an unyielding determination to be free--and by your deep faith in the Almighty. Today, your hopes for the triumph of democracy have been realized. Today, your prayers for peace have been answered. The American people are proud to extend the hand of friendship to all of you, regardless of which side you took in the past conflict. We will continue to support your efforts to rebuild this nation and fulfill both the letter and the spirit of the peace accords. As a measure of our commitment, today I am pleased to sign with your President an agreement that forgives 75% of El Salvador's official debt to the United States. A very dark era ends today, and a bright new one begins. You are building a new country founded in peace and national reconciliation--and a new, more hopeful future in which all your citizens can share. As you take these first steps together, let me again share with you the words of our President Lincoln, uttered near the end of America's civil war: With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds . . . to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations. Editor's note: See Joint US-Russia Statement on El Salvador. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Murder of Israeli Policeman

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Stockholm, Sweden Date: Dec, 15 199212/15/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Terrorism [TEXT] We are very troubled and saddened by the violence in the territories, the casualties among both Palestinians and Israelis, and now the kidnaping and murder of an Israeli border policeman. Some extremist groups like Hamas want to destroy any possibility of peace. They offer no hope for the future except more violence and tragedy. We should not give in to the extremists. The pathway to a different, more hopeful future for Israelis and Palestinians lies in working out understandings and agreements in their negotiations. The current violence should give everyone a new sense of urgency in making progress.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Cuba: Continuing Crackdown On Human Rights Activists

Boucher Description: Statement, released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 16 199212/16/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Cuba Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] The US Government strongly condemns the Cuban regime's continuing crackdown against those who have advocated respect for human rights and peaceful democratic change. This campaign of repression began on December 10, UN International Human Rights Day, after activists' attempts to call for legalization of human rights groups and a democratic opening. The regime's violent reaction to their desire for free speech and the right to organize shows absolute intolerance for peaceful dissent and a determination to maintain total control. We call on the Cuban Government to release human rights activists Elizardo Sanchez and Rodolfo Gonzalez and to stop its harassment and abuse of Cubans who advocate peaceful change. The latest inhumane outrage in this campaign is the "cordoning off" of human rights leaders' homes. Cuban authorities allow no one to enter or leave; those inside suffer de facto house arrest. This has happened at the homes of Elizardo Sanchez, Gustavo Arcos, and Vladimir Gonzalez. In addition to this, water, gas, and electricity were cut off at the homes of Vladimiro Roca and Alvaro Prendes. Cuban police are stationed in front of the homes of Francisco Chaviano, Oswaldo Paya, and Aida Valdez. As we noted on December 11, Cuban police severely beat and arrested Elizardo Sanchez, President of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, December 10. Although he reportedly suffers from cracked ribs and a broken jaw, he has been moved from a hospital to a facility for common criminals. Sanchez is still in police custody. Also last Thursday, plainclothes police directed a mob that severely beat Cuban Committee for Human Rights (CCPDH) activist Jesus Yanes Pelletier outside Gustavo Arcos' home. Rodolfo Gonzalez, and executive member of the CCPDH, was also arrested and charged with disseminating enemy propaganda and possession of foreign currency.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Secretary Eagleburger Meets With Kosovo Leader

Eagleburger Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec, 17 199212/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Albania, Serbia-Montenegro Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization [TEXT] Secretary of State Eagleburger met on December 17, 1992, in Brussels (following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council) with Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Albanian community of Kosovo. Secretary Eagleburger assured Dr. Rugova of the deep friendship and respect of the American people for the people of Kosovo. He emphasized the understanding of the American people and government for the difficult circumstances of the Albanian people of Kosovo as a consequence of the repressive policies followed by the Government of Serbia. The Secretary emphasized US support for peace and stability in Kosovo. He called to Dr. Rugova's attention the strong statement issued earlier that day by the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Council. Secretary Eagleburger said this statement demonstrated the growing interest of the world community in the situation in Kosovo. He also reaffirmed the US intention to provide $5 million in humanitarian assistance to the people of Kosovo. Dr. Rugova described for Secretary Eagleburger recent developments in Kosovo. He assured the Secretary of State that the people of Kosovo would continue to use only peaceful means to gain the restoration of their political and economic rights. Secretary Eagleburger praised Dr. Rugova's responsible and moderate leadership under difficult conditions.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Israeli Deportations

Boucher Description: Released by the Office of the Acting Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 18 199212/18/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Lebanon Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] We understand that the Israeli Supreme Court decided that the government could proceed with the order to deport over 400 Palestinians to Lebanon and that the government has now done so. The United States understands the difficult security problems Israel faces with terrorist attacks and that the Government of Israel has a right and a duty to protect its citizens. We are deeply troubled by the recent increase in violence in the territories and by the Palestinian and Israeli casualties, including the murder of the Israeli policeman by Hamas, and we strongly condemn it. We have called on Arabs and Israelis to join us in condemning all forms of violence. At the same time, we believe every government throughout the world has an obligation to the fundamental principles of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic practices. We have, therefore, repeatedly urged the Government of Israel immediately and permanently to cease deportations and to comply fully with the Fourth Geneva Convention as it pertains to the treatment of inhabitants of the occupied territories. The United States believes that charges of wrongdoing should be brought against specific individuals in a court of law based on evidence to be argued in a fair trial which would afford full judicial process. We, therefore, strongly condemn the action of deportation.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Presidential Decision on Military Sales to China

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 22 199212/22/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] The President has decided it is in our national interest to close out four cases of suspended Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The President's decision means that, in the coming weeks, we will return Chinese equipment sent to the United States under the FMS programs, reimburse unused funds in China's FMS account, and make available for shipment to China releasable equipment already purchased by the Chinese in connection with these cases. The President's decision closes out this arms sales agreement between the United States and China. We have no plans for new arms sales to China. Consistent with Public Law 101-246, which enacted into law certain of the sanctions imposed by the President against China in June 1989, the President has notified Congress of his decision. These four FMS programs were suspended to demonstrate our deep concern about the tragic events in China. We have made our point. We now believe that continuing to hold aging items after a 31/2-year suspension hinders rather than helps US efforts to promote cooperative PRC behavior in a range of areas. The four suspended programs covered by this decision involve an avionics upgrade for the Chinese F-8 aircraft, equipment for a munitions production line, four anti-submarine torpedoes, and two artillery-locating radars. The equipment will be delivered as is, with no follow-on support, repairs, maintenance, or training by the United States. More specific information about the four programs is available from the Department of Defense.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Equatorial Guinea

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 24 199212/24/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Equatorial Guinea Subject: Human Rights, Democratization [TEXT] The United States is deeply concerned by the continuing repression of political opposition in Equatorial Guinea. Over the last week, scores of students, teachers, priests, and opposition activists have been rounded up on the pretext that they were involved in a minor student disturbance at the Malabo market. Many of the detainees have been badly beaten, often in the presence of high-ranking officials of the Obiang regime. The regime refused permission for the medical evacuation of some of the more badly injured detainees. The Government of Equatorial Guinea has repeatedly pledged itself to a process of democratization; it has just as frequently violated those pledges. The arrest and torture of innocent members of a non-violent opposition once again demonstrates the government's lack of good faith. The US ambassador has attempted to protest these latest acts of political repression to the Government of Equatorial Guinea, but government officials have refused to receive him in the absence of President Obiang from the country. We call upon the Government of Equatorial Guinea to release immediately all political prisoners, to cease the torture in the prisons, to punish those responsible for these abuses, and to compensate those persons unjustly detained. Further, the United States calls for the Government of Equatorial Guinea to cease its thinly disguised threats of violence against US citizens, including our ambassador. The United States reminds the Government of Equatorial Guinea that we hold it directly responsible for the safety of all resident US citizens, including missionaries, businessmen, technicians, and Peace Corps volunteers, as well as diplomats.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Burmese Rohingya Refugees In Bangladesh

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 24 199212/24/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Burma, Bangladesh Subject: Refugees, United Nations [TEXT] The US Government has received credible reports indicating that Bangladesh is coercing Rohingya refugees to return to Burma and that the Government of Bangladesh is denying UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] staff free access to the Rohingya refugee camps, thereby preventing the UNHCR from fulfilling its international mandate to protect refugees. Over the past several months, we and UNHCR have repeatedly raised this problem with the Government of Bangladesh. The US Government deplores the use of coercion by the Government of Bangladesh. The United States also deeply regrets that the Bangladesh Government and the UNHCR have not agreed on an effective role for the UNHCR to protect the Rohingyas both in the refugee camps in Bangladesh and during the repatriation process to Burma. The US Government calls upon the Government of Bangladesh to refrain from coerced repatriation and to negotiate with the UNHCR as soon as possible an effective protection role for [the] UNHCR.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Joint US-Russia Statement On El Salvador

Boucher Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 28 199212/28/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: El Salvador, Russia, United States Subject: Democratization [TEXT] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the United States Department of State have agreed to release the following joint statement: The Russian Federation and the United States, whose constructive interaction on Central American issues the last several years has helped defuse tensions in this area, note with great satisfaction that the peace process in El Salvador started at Esquipulas and pursued further within the framework of the Chapultepec accords has entered a promising new phase. Russia and the United States applaud the political resolve displayed by the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] leadership, which overcame mutual distrust to implement the main provisions of the Chapultepec accords. Russia and the United States are grateful for the role played by the United Nations, above all its Secretary General, and for the support given the peace process by Mexico, Spain, Colombia, and Venezuela. The high level of representation at the reconciliation ceremony December 15 bears testimony to the intention of the international community to continue its support of the peace process. As El Salvador moves forward to fully implement the peace accords and to realize the full potential of progress to date, Russia and the United States express confidence that the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN will continue their dialogue and cooperation with the UN, show restraint, and demonstrate renewed determination to achieve their country's socioeconomic reconstruction. They reiterate their readiness to continue to assist in this effort and express hope that other interested states and international and regional organizations will offer their support.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 1, January 4, 1993 Title:

Elections in Serbia And Montenegro

Snyder Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joseph Snyder Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 29 199212/29/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro Subject: Democratization, Human Rights [TEXT] Officials in Serbia and Montenegro have issued the final results of the December 20 elections. After examining the pre-election period and the conduct of the elections themselves, American and other Western election monitors have concluded that the elections in Serbia and Montenegro failed to meet international standards for a free and fair democratic process as outlined in CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] documents. We agree with their conclusions.
Serbia
In Serbia, the CSCE found the pre-election period was highly unfair. The ruling party of Slobodan Milosevic abused its position to its own advantage and to the disadvantage of the opposition parties. -- The Serbian-run electronic media did not grant equal access to the opposition. It refused to air some of the opposition's advertisements, and it used news and information programs to campaign for the ruling party and attack the opposition. This pattern led the representative of the CSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to conclude that the government-run media in Serbia had been an instrument of "shameless propaganda" during the pre-election period. -- Serbian officials used bureaucratic obstacles to hinder the opposition's ability to campaign. On election day, American and other Western observers found major irregularities. -- Voter lists were manipulated so that many eligible voters were excluded from voting. -- In some places, members of opposition parties were not allowed to participate on electoral commissions that processed the votes. -- Provisions for voter privacy were inadequate. -- Ballot boxes were not handled properly. -- Voters were reportedly intimidated by the presence of police.
Montenegro
Electoral conditions in Montenegro, while not free of problems, were better. The pre-election period in Montenegro included instances of intimidation of the opposition and consistently favorable media access and coverage for the ruling party.
Conclusion
We applaud the courage and determination of the democratic opposition parties, which conducted vigorous campaigns under very adverse circumstances. We call on the appropriate judicial authorities to review the complaints made by opposition parties and take the steps necessary to ensure that Serbia and Montenegro meet their international obligations for the conduct of free and fair elections. We have a long history of friendship with the peoples of Serbia and Montenegro. We are prepared to respond favorably to positive changes in Serbian policies. As long as Serbia continues to pursue its present policies, however, it will remain outside the community of nations and face increasing pressure from sanctions and other steps from those of us who are opposed to the aggression perpetrated by the Serbian Government. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993

Title:

America's Role in the World

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address at the West Point Military Academy, West Point, New York Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States, Iraq, Somalia Subject: Military Affairs, Arms Control [TEXT] (opening and closing remarks deleted) I want to share with you at this institution of leadership some of my thinking, both about the world you will soon be called upon to enter and the life that you have chosen. Any President has several functions. He speaks for and to the nation. He must faithfully execute the law. And he must lead. But no function, none of the President's hats, in my view, is more important than his role as Commander in Chief. For it is as Commander in Chief that the President confronts and makes decisions that [in] one way or another affect the lives of everyone in this country as well as many others around the world. I have had many occasions to don this most important of hats. Over the past 4 years, the men and women who proudly and bravely wear the uniforms of the US armed services have been called upon to go in harm's way and have discharged their duty with honor and professionalism. I wish I could say that such demands were a thing of the past, that with the end of the Cold War the calls upon the United States would diminish. I cannot. Yes, the end of the Cold War, we would all concede, is a blessing. It is a time of great promise. Democratic governments have never been so numerous. What happened 2 or 3 days ago in Moscow would not have been possible in the Cold War days. Thanks to historic treaties, such as that START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] II pact just reached with Russia [signed on January 3; see p. 20], the likelihood of nuclear holocaust is vastly diminished. But this does not mean that there is no specter of war, no threats to be reckoned with. And already, we see disturbing signs of what this new world could become if we are passive and aloof. We would risk the emergence of a world characterized by violence--characterized by chaos--one in which dictators and tyrants threaten their neighbors; build arsenals brimming with weapons of mass destruction; and ignore the welfare of their own men, women, and children. And we could see a horrible increase in international terrorism, with American citizens more at risk than ever before. We cannot and we need not allow this to happen. Our objective must be to exploit the unparalleled opportunity presented by the Cold War's end--to work toward transforming this new world into a new world order, one of governments that are democratic, tolerant, and economically free at home and committed abroad to settling inevitable differences peacefully, without the threat or use of force. Unfortunately, not every one sub-scribes to these principles. We continue to see leaders bent on denying fundamental human rights and seizing territory regardless of the human cost. No, an international society--one more attuned to the enduring principles that have made this country a beacon of hope for so many for so long--will not just emerge on its own. It's got to be built. Two hundred years ago, another departing President warned of the dangers of what he described as "entangling alliances." His was the right course for a new nation at that point in history. But what was "entangling" in Washington's day is now essential. This is why, at Texas A∧M a few weeks ago [see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 51, p. 893], I spoke of the folly of isolationism, and of the importance--morally, economically, and strategically--of the United States remaining involved in world affairs. We must engage ourselves if a new world order, one more compatible with our values and congenial to our interest, is to emerge. But even more, we must lead. Leadership takes many forms; it can be political or diplomatic; it can be economic or military; it can be moral or spiritual. Leadership can take any one of these forms or it can be a combination of them. Leadership should not be confused with either unilateralism or universalism. We need not respond by ourselves to each and every outrage of violence. The fact that America can act does not mean that it must. A nation's sense of idealism need not be at odds with its interests. Nor does principle displace prudence. No, the United States should not seek to be the world's policeman. There is no support abroad or at home for us to play this role. Nor should there be. We would exhaust ourselves, in the process wasting precious resources needed to address those problems at home and abroad that we cannot afford to ignore. But in the wake of the Cold War, in a world where we are the only remaining superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its moral and material resources to promote a democratic peace. It is our responsibility- -it is our opportunity--to lead. There is no one else. Leadership cannot be simply asserted or demanded; it must be demonstrated. Leadership requires formulating worthy goals, persuading others of their virtue, and contributing one's share of the common effort and then some. Leadership takes time; it takes patience; it takes work. Some of this work must take place here at home. Congress does have a constitutional role to play. Leadership, therefore, also involves working with the Congress and the American people to provide the essential domestic underpinning if US military commitments are to be sustainable. This is what our Administration has tried to do. When [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, it was the United States that galvanized the UN Security Council to act and then mobilized the successful coalition on the battlefield. The pattern [was] not exactly the same but [was] similar in Somalia: first, the United States underscored the importance of alleviating the growing tragedy, and then we organized humanitarian efforts designed to bring hope, food, and peace. At times, real leadership requires a willingness to use military force. And force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it, or--if need be--a temporary alternative. As Commander in Chief, I have made the difficult choice to use military force. I determined we could not allow Saddam's forces to ravage Kuwait and hold this critical region at gunpoint. I thought then, and I think now, that using military force to implement the resolutions of the UN Security Council was in the interest of the United States and the world community. The need to use force arose as well in the wake of the Gulf war, when we came to the aid of the peoples of both northern and southern Iraq. More recently, as I'm sure you know, I determined that only the use of force could stem this human tragedy of Somalia. The United States should not stand by with so many lives at stake and when a limited deployment of US forces, buttressed by the forces of other countries and acting under the full authority of the United Nations, could make an immediate and dramatic difference and do so without excessive levels of risk and cost. Operations Provide Comfort and Southern Watch in Iraq and then Operation Restore Hope in Somalia all bear witness to the wisdom of selected use of force for selective purposes. Sometimes the decision not to use force--to stay our hand--I can tell you, it's just as difficult as the decision to send our soldiers into battle. The former Yugoslavia--well, it's been such a situation. There are, we all know, important humanitarian and strategic interests at stake there. But up to now, it's not been clear that the application of limited amounts of force by the United States and its traditional friends and allies would have had the desired effect given the nature and complexity of that situation. Our assessment of the situation in the former Yugoslavia could well change if and as the situation changes. The stakes could grow; the conflict could threaten to spread. Indeed, we are constantly reassessing our options and are actively consulting with others about steps that might be taken to contain the fighting, protect the humanitarian effort, and deny Serbia the fruits of aggression. Military force is never a tool to be used lightly or universally; in some circumstances, it may be essential--in others, counterproductive. I know that many people would like to find some easy formula to apply, to tell us with precision when and where to intervene with force. Anyone looking for scientific certitude is in for a disappointment. In the complex new world we are entering, there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force. Inevitably, the question of military intervention requires judgment; each and every case is unique. To adopt rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and American lives. And it would give would-be troublemakers a blueprint for determining their own actions; it could signal US friends and allies that our support was not to be counted on. And, similarly, we cannot always decide in advance which interests will require our using military force to protect them. The relative importance of an interest is not a guide: Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital. But to warn against a futile quest for a set of hard and fast rules to govern the use of military force is not to say there cannot be some principles to form our decisions. Such guidelines can prove useful in sizing and, indeed, shaping our forces and in helping us to think our way through this key question. Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice. Once we are satisfied that force makes sense, we must act with the maximum possible support. The United States can and should lead, but we will want to act in concert, where possible, involving the United Nations or other multinational grouping. The United States can and should contribute to the common undertaking in a manner commensurate with our wealth, with our strength. But others should also contribute militarily, be it by providing combat or support forces, access to facilities or bases, or overflight rights. And similarly, others should contribute economically; it is unreasonable to expect the United States to bear the full financial burden of intervention when other nations have a stake in the outcome. A desire for international support must not become a prerequisite for acting, though. Sometimes, a great power has to act alone. I made a tough decision--I might say on advice of our outstanding military leaders who are so well known to everybody here--to use military force in Panama, when American lives and the security of the canal appeared to be threatened by outlaws who stole power in the face of free elections. And similarly, we moved swiftly to safeguard democracy in the Philippines. But in every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing US forces once the mission is complete. Only if we keep these principles in mind will the potential sacrifice be one that can be explained and justified. We must never forget that using force is not some political abstraction but a real commitment of our fathers and mothers and sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, friends and neighbors. You've got to look at it in human terms. In order even to have the choice, we must have available adequate military forces tailored for a wide range of contingencies, including peace-keeping. Indeed, leading the effort toward a new world order will require a modern, capable military, in some areas necessitating more rather than less defense spending. As President, I have said that my ability to deploy force on behalf of US interests abroad was made possible because past Presidents--and I would single out in particular, my predecessor, Ronald Reagan--and past secretaries of defense sustained a strong military. Consistent with this sacred trust, I am proud to pass on to my successor, President-elect Clinton, a military second to none. We have the very best. And, yet, it is essential to recognize that as important as such factors are, any military is more than simply the sum of its weapons or the state of its technology. What makes any armed force truly effective is the quality of its leadership, the quality of its training, the quality of its people. We have succeeded abroad in no small part because of our people in uniform. The men and women in our armed forces have demonstrated their ability to master the challenges of modern warfare. At the same time, and whether on the battlefield of Iraq or in some tiny little village in Somalia, America's soldiers have always brought a quality of caring and kindness to their mission. Who will ever forget--I know I won't--those terrified Iraqi soldiers surrendering to American troops? And who will forget the way the American soldier held out his arms and said, "It's OK--you're all right now"? Or in Somalia, the young marine, eyes filled with tears, holding the fragile arm of an emaciated child? There can be no doubt about it. The all- volunteer force is one of the true success stories of modern-day America. It is instructive to look at just why this is so. At its heart, a voluntary military is based upon choice--you all know that--the decision freely taken by young men and women to join, the decision by more mature men and women to remain. And the institution of the armed forces has thrived on its commitment to developing and promoting excellence. It is meritocracy in action. Race, religion, wealth, background count not. Indeed, the military offers many examples for the rest of society, showing what can be done to eradicate the scourge of drugs, to break down the barriers of racial discrimination, to offer equal opportunity to women. This is not just a result of self-selection. It also reflects the military's commitment to education and training. You know, people speak of defense con-version, the process by which defense firms retool for civilian tasks. Well, defense conversion within the military has been going on for years. It is the constant process of training and retraining--which the military does so well--that allows individuals to keep up with the latest technology, take on more challenging assignments, and prepare for life on the outside. Out of this culture of merit and competition have emerged hundreds of thousands of highly skilled men and women brimming with real self- confidence. What they possess is a special mix of discipline, a willingness to accept direction, and the willingness to accept responsibility. Together, discipline and confidence provide the basis for winning, for getting the job done. There is no higher calling, no more honorable choice, than the one that you here today have made. To join the armed forces is to be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice for your country and for your fellow man. What you have done--what you are doing--sends an important message, one that I fear sometimes gets lost amid today's often materialist, self- interested culture. It is important to remember, it is important to demonstrate, that there is a higher purpose to life beyond one's self. Now, I speak of family, of community, of ideals. I speak of duty, honor, country. There are many forms of contributing to this country, of public service. Yes, there is government. There is volunteerism. I love to talk about the thousand points of light: one American helping another. The daily tasks that require doing--in our classrooms, in our hospitals, our cities, our farms-- all can and do represent a form of service. In whatever form, service benefits our society, and it ennobles the giver. It is a cherished American concept, one we should continue to practice and pass on to our children. This was what I wanted to share on this occasion. You are beginning your service to country, and I am nearing the end of mine. Exactly half a century ago, in June of 1942, we were at war and I was graduating from school. The speaker that day at Andover was then-Secretary of War Henry Stimson. And his message was one of public service but with a twist--on the importance of finishing one's schooling before going off to fight for one's country. I listened closely to what he had to say, but I didn't take his advice. That day was my 18th birthday. When the commencement ceremony ended, I went on into Boston and enlisted in the Navy as a seaman 2nd class. I never regretted it. You, too, have signed up. You, too, will never regret it. And I salute you for it. Fortunately, because of the sacrifices made in years before and still being made, you should be able to complete this phase of your education. A half century has passed since I left school to go into the service; a half century has passed since that day when Stimson spoke of the challenge of creating a new world. You will also be entering a new world, one far better than the one I came to know--a world with the potential to be far better yet. This is the challenge; this is the opportunity of your lifetimes. I envy you for it, and I wish you Godspeed. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993 Title:

Charting the Course: US Foreign Policy in a Time of Transition

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Address before the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 7 19931/7/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, Europe, E/C Europe, MidEast/North Africa, North America, East Asia, Central America, South America Country: United States, Israel, Iraq, Somalia, USSR (former), Yugoslavia (former), Germany Subject: Democratization, North America Free Trade, Mideast Peace Process, CSCE, EC [TEXT] Back in September of 1989, I gave a speech in which I discussed the unique and difficult challenges the United States was inevitably going to face in foreign policy as we moved from a bipolar to a multipolar world. My good friend Peter Tarnoff was quick to take me to task in The New York Times for having demonstrated nostalgia for the Cold War. I disputed that characterization at the time, but today, Peter, I have a confession to make: I am now truly nostalgic for the Cold War--and I suspect you may soon embrace this feeling yourself. The fact is that I had no way of foreseeing then just how tumultuous the new era was going to be. But today, it is abundantly clear that we are in the middle of a global revolution--a period of change and instability equaled in modern times only by the aftermath of the French and Russian revolutions. The status quo everywhere is under siege. For one thing, the end of the Cold War's rigid division of the world into two superpower-led blocs has resulted in a more wide-open international system, with [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait being but the most egregious example of the much greater potential for global anarchy which now exists. And for another, the post-World War II and post-colonial state system itself is breaking down as many nations are increasingly unable to perform basic governmental functions, to control their internal affairs, or to resist particularist and separatist tendencies within their borders. Here, Somalia and Yugoslavia are the most egregious--but by no means the only--examples of this tendency toward fragmentation. These changes, together with the fulfillment of America's Cold War mission, now confront the United States with the existential need to redefine its place and purpose in the world. Some view the recent global ascendance of democracy as the defining feature of this new era and argue that the end of the Cold War has made it both safe and necessary for the United States to pursue a Wilsonian foreign policy on behalf of the democratic cause. Others see a world full of unique danger and disorder and argue that a United States no longer able to dominate politically and economically as before must continue to pursue national security and international stability as its highest foreign policy objectives. I am not going to settle the debate between the partisans of idealism and realpolitik here tonight. But what I would like to do is to examine how the Bush Administration has handled some of the challenges it has faced over the past 4 years. I do this not only to demonstrate--to my satisfaction if not to yours--where we succeeded in laying a foundation for US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era but also so that I can describe what I believe to be some of the lessons that should be drawn from our experience. Many have argued that we did not succeed in laying any new foundation at all--that our foreign policy has been essentially reactive, unduly wedded to the status quo, and lacking in strategic rationale or democratic vision. I do not, as you would expect, agree. I believe this Administration has successfully confronted three unique challenges: -- To end the Cold War peacefully; -- To deal with the instabilities generated by the Cold War's demise; and -- To begin the construction of a new architecture for the new world order. We may be faulted, perhaps, with having chosen to articulate our vision more in deeds than in words. But I sincerely believe that the record of what we have done--and how we have done it--is one that our successors can usefully build upon as they, too, confront a world which will continue to be unstable and unpredictable for a good many years to come. Let me turn now to that record--the record of how we met the three challenges noted above.
The First Challenge: Ending the Cold War
Today we take for granted something which experts and historians would have found incredible to imagine only a decade ago--namely, that the disengagement of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the USSR itself could be achieved so quickly, so thoroughly, and, above all, so peacefully. History holds few, if any, examples of an empire collapsing without an angry spasm of violence, and no one expected the Communist Party to relinquish its monopoly of power at home and imperial domination abroad without a fight. It was entirely conceivable that the Soviet Union's demise would be accompanied by civil strife, war in Europe, and perhaps even the risk of a global nuclear exchange. That it was not, I think, is due in part to George Bush's skillful, though sometimes misunderstood, diplomacy. Even today, his critics argue that the President was constantly behind the curve in his dealings with the former Soviet Union--late and lukewarm in his embrace of [Soviet President] Gorbachev; late and low-key in his reaction to the collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe; and late to disengage from Gorbachev and to embrace the cause of democratic reform in Russia and independence in the republics. At each point, the President was taxed for undue attachment to the status quo and insufficient devotion to American ideals. But what was the President trying to achieve? His early approach was to challenge Mr. Gorbachev to inform Soviet new thinking with a practical content on matters ranging from regional disputes to arms control. Then, as revolution began to engulf Eastern Europe, he worked quietly to persuade Gorbachev and his generals that the West would not seek to exploit their troubles and that the Soviet Union could enjoy a new kind of security in a democratic Europe if peaceful norms were accepted. Later, he urged caution and negotiation upon both the central government and the independence movements, earning criticism at home but thereby denying the Soviet right wing any pretext to co-opt Gorbachev in their efforts to destroy the process of reform. Successful diplomacy is a matter of timing as well as substance. In the end, history will judge George Bush by the results of his efforts--by his mastery of timing and substance--particularly against the many alternative scenarios that might have come to pass. History will note that on his watch occurred: -- The peaceful democratic revolution in Eastern Europe; -- The reunification of Germany and the inclusion of a united Germany in NATO; -- The end to regional conflicts, including, most importantly, in Central America; -- The halting and, later, reversal of the nuclear arms race; and -- Finally, the peaceful collapse of a regime which commanded both the most formidable totalitarian apparatus in history and the fate of the world at its nuclear fingertips. This is a legacy which by itself would qualify President Bush as one of our nation's great diplomatists.
The Second Challenge: A Fragmenting World
But history also called upon this President to confront the multifaceted challenges of a disintegrating world order, first in the Persian Gulf and, later, in Africa and the Balkans. Again, according to some, this has been a challenge largely unmet. Indeed, it is said in some quarters that the Administration bears some responsibility for the invasion of Kuwait by having "coddled" the Iraqi dictator and for the tragic civil war in the former Yugoslavia by having failed to support the various republics in their bid for independence. As in the case of our approach to Gorbachev, however, I believe the President's diplomacy has been misunderstood and, in some cases, deliberately distorted. For example, our efforts to influence Saddam Hussein by diplomatic means were demonstrably unsuccessful, but those efforts, I believe, were the necessary predicate to our ultimate success. The fact is that there was simply no consensus for multilateral economic sanctions against Iraq prior to the August 2 [1990] invasion, nor was there a consensus to counter Iraq militarily. It was Saddam Hussein himself who created such a consensus by invading Kuwait. Until that moment, our Arab friends considered deterrent action both unwarranted and provocative and would have rallied to Saddam had we sought to isolate or punish him. Thus, it was thanks to the very diplomacy for which the President is now criticized--and which was the source of his credibility in the Arab world--that we were able to enlist the support without which we could not have liberated Kuwait. I also believe it is important to correct the impression that we could have deterred Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait just prior to August 2. The problem was that Saddam believed that we had yet to liberate ourselves from the shame and the shadow of Vietnam. He made this very clear to our ambassador, telling her he did not think we had the guts to face him on the field of battle. What was she supposed to tell him--that we would send half a million troops halfway around the globe and that the Congress, by the slimmest of margins, would, in the end, approve the President's plan to send those troops into battle? I am not trying to score cheap points here but instead to make an important matter clear. We certainly made mistakes and failed--along with everyone else--to anticipate the Iraqi invasion. But what we did not know, and what it took Saddam Hussein to demonstrate, was that the passing of the Cold War had changed the international rules of the game and that regional powers could now contemplate aggression on the assumption that the superpowers could no longer circumscribe their freedom of maneuver. And what Saddam Hussein did not know, and what it took George Bush to demonstrate, was that the American people, if not the entire political class, were no longer in the thrall of the Vietnam syndrome. Ultimately, it was the President's dual achievement to prevent Saddam from establishing the law of the jungle as the norm for international behavior in the post-Cold War era and to establish a model for collective responses to international acts of aggression. In so doing, he demonstrated how absolutely critical American diplomacy and American willingness to use force are to the prospects for stability in the otherwise chaotic aftermath of the Cold War. The President has also been faulted for his decision to end the fighting when he did. But George Bush understood another reality of the post-Cold War era--namely, that, having personally and necessarily assembled an international coalition of forces, he had an obligation to consider the views of our contributing allies and, above all, an obligation to remain within the scope of the UN resolutions. Furthermore--and perhaps most important of all--he understood that, having given precise definition to the purpose of our mission, he had an obligation--to the American people and to the future- -to withdraw US forces once the mission was completed. A second manifestation of the global disorder inherent today is the eruption into conflict of ancient tribal, ethnic, and religious rivalries. We see this most obviously in the former Yugoslavia. But we need to understand that Yugoslavia is but the most obvious manifestation of what is going on today in many places and what will likely characterize the international landscape for perhaps decades to come. For many, Yugoslavia is another example of Administration policy behind the curve and out of touch with American ideals. I personally do not believe that violence could have been avoided under any circumstances. But I do remain convinced that the republics' unilateral and uncoordinated declarations of independence, which we unsuccessfully opposed, led inexorably to civil war. Then, as now, the only alternative to perpetual bloodshed was for the parties to negotiate their separation from each other and, meanwhile, to guarantee respect for pluralism and the rights of minorities within their borders. And the only responsible policy for the United States was the one we followed--namely, to discourage unilateral acts intended to avoid such negotiations and such guarantees. As the President rightly said in his maligned and misunderstood speech in Kiev [Ukraine on August 1, 1991; see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 32, p. 596], it was our policy not to support "those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred." Of course, all of this begs the question of what we should do when the irrational forces of history and hatred prevail over our appeals to reason, as they are doing today in Yugoslavia, in some parts of the former Soviet Union, [in] Somalia, and elsewhere. There are no simple answers. As the President stated this week at West Point [on January 5; see p. 13], there will be times when our vital interests are at stake and we must intervene--as we did in the Gulf. There will be times when a human tragedy compels us to intervene, providing we can justify the cost to the American people--as we have in Somalia and on behalf of the Kurds of northern Iraq. And there will be times when neither the force of American ideas nor the force of American arms can make a difference to peoples who are truly unwilling to coexist peacefully with each other.
The Third Challenge: Building a New World Order
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the Bush Administration's foreign policy is that it was too reactive to changing events, with little attention to the longer-term requirements of the new era. However, I believe that we can, in fact, take credit for having begun what will be--and should be--the long work of constructing an institutional framework necessary to the establishment of a new world order. Our successors will have to build in places we overlooked or neglected. But I believe they will find a solid foundation in many important areas. Among those areas of institutional creativity, I would identify the following: (1) Europe, where we have sought to extend the community of democracies by helping transform the former communist nations into secure and stable free market societies. Here, we have created two innovative institutional structures--the G-24 [Group of 24] process, by which we have coordinated economic assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, through which we have aimed to enhance, over time, the political and security relationship between both halves of Europe. I would urge the new Administration to build upon this still embryonic structure. (2) North America, where we have sought to consolidate our nation's continental base through the creation of a single market linking the United States, Mexico, and Canada--the North American Free Trade Agreement. Our success in this endeavor will pay dividends in political and security terms as well as benefit the economies of all three nations. (3) Latin America, where this Administration leaves our overall hemispheric ties in perhaps the best shape of anytime in this century. President Bush's landmark Enterprise for the Americas Initiative has been greeted throughout the hemisphere as a historic turning point and an opportunity to consolidate democracy and the free market system throughout North and South America. (4) Asia, where we helped to create APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] to enhance our engagement of the most dynamic economic region of the world and where we have begun to develop a global partnership with Japan. (5) The Middle East, where we built upon our Gulf war coalition victory to launch the first direct negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors. (6) And finally, across the broad spectrum of transnational issues, where we have tried to advance a post-Cold War agenda of global free trade through the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations and through negotiations to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The Bush Legacy
I know I am by no means a neutral observer, but I believe the record I have just described is one of substantial accomplishment in the face of great dangers and challenges. I also believe that the Bush foreign policy was greater than the sum of its parts and that, indeed, there was a strategy behind the President's conduct of foreign policy which we need to understand because it is so uniquely suited to the vastly changed international situation we now confront. I would summarize this legacy as follows: First, the Bush foreign policy was characterized by pragmatism and flexibility. I think in this respect we must plead guilty to the charge that our approach was often ad hoc. A certain degree of "ad hocery" is a virtue, not a vice, when you are dealing with a world in crisis and in chaos--one in which it is impossible to be certain of anything 6 months ahead. The fact of the matter is that, for a long time to come, we will be in a post- revolutionary transitional period which will require of us an ability to react quickly to events. In these circumstances, good instincts are as invaluable as a good plan. Second, the President has been deeply committed to the principle and the practice of diplomacy. He, more than his critics, has understood that the end of the Cold War has meant the United States can no longer dominate either adversaries or allies as we did in a bipolar framework. If we want to get our way--and to get others to share our burden, as the American people surely desire--we will increasingly have to take the views and interests of others into account. And we will sometimes have to build ad hoc alliances of like-minded nations as each new and often unique circumstance may demand. In other words, we will have to practice the art of compromise and, thus, of diplomacy. This is an art which does not necessarily come easily to us. Our national virtue is that we are comfortable only with a foreign policy rooted in the values of our political tradition; our national vice is a tendency toward moralism in foreign policy and a kind of moral hubris which views the actions of others only through the prism of our own standards of conduct. President Bush resisted this latter tendency throughout his presidency, often at great political cost. But because of his commitment to working with and maintaining leverage over governments whom his critics deemed worthy of punishment and isolation--I am thinking principally of the People's Republic of China, but there were other examples--he was able consistently to forge international coalitions under UN auspices to address critical challenges to world peace and stability, including the successful prosecution of the war against Saddam Hussein. Third, the Administration's foreign policy was marked by a commitment to harnessing US power--both diplomatic and military--to realize the President's long-term vision of a new world order. The record of the past 4 years demonstrates that the new world order is something we are not even close to achieving--not with the forces of fragmentation currently on the loose. But the extent to which we have been able to keep those forces at bay has been largely a result of American willingness to act, to forge ad hoc coalitions, and to begin to build the institutions of a better and safer world.
Looking Ahead
I will conclude, for what it is worth, with a few personal observations about the road ahead and what I think ought to be our priorities and objectives. I consider our principal foreign policy challenge to be the maintenance and strengthening of the core of democracies which won the Cold War. As I indicated in my [September 13] 1989 speech at Georgetown [University], it is going to be harder to keep this core together when the inherent centrifugal forces of multipolarity will conspire to drive us apart. If, however, we want to avoid a return to the dangerous balance of power politics which characterized the world prior to the Cold War, we will have to strengthen the economic, political, and military ties which link the Western democracies, as well as the multilateral institutions we have established over the past half century. If we do not succeed in strengthening those collective links and institutions, we will never be able to confront the instabilities now arising beyond the Western fold. In this regard, there are several incomplete tasks we leave to the next Administration: to build more comprehensive and durable political ties with Japan; to ensure that the European Community does not build unity at the expense of relations with the United States; and to preserve the open world trading system through successful conclusion of the GATT negotiations and early ratification of the North America Free Trade Agreement. The second challenge we face is to extend the core of democracies to include the former communist world, as well as other nations which have embraced our political and economic values. Here, there is an absolute convergence between our interests and our ideals. Our security is especially linked to the fate of reform across the Eurasian landmass, which is the most heavily armed region of the world and [has been] the source of global conflict twice in this century. It is thus heartening that the incoming President has identified support for democracy in Russia and throughout Central and Eastern Europe as one of his highest priorities. Finally, we must deal with the manifold ills afflicting what was known as the Third World--the problems of poverty, debt, underdevelopment, and overpopulation--which threaten to bring global chaos in their wake and thus threaten our own security and prosperity. Among the tasks facing the next Administration will be the development of both global non-proliferation regimes and enhanced UN peacekeeping and peace-making capabilities. I began these remarks by referring to the debate underway in this country over the purpose of American foreign policy. It seems to me that we have arrived at an important turning point in our history. We have never had a normal attitude toward foreign policy, at least in the sense understood in other countries. For most of our national existence, we turned our backs on the world beyond our shores. And then, when we became a global power, we joined the world in the name of a mission which we have now substantially completed. Thus we find ourselves today confronting an increasingly uncertain international environment--increasingly aware that our role and purpose must change to meet that new environment but unclear as to what those changes ought to be. What we may not sufficiently realize, however, is that this uncertainty is both normal and healthy. We are--and will be for some time to come--in the process of discovering our purpose as we go about the everyday business of foreign policy. It goes without saying that we bring our ideals to the table and that our thinking is infused with a desire to see those ideals advanced. But a growing awareness of our limited resources and power is forcing us to decide what is important to us in foreign policy and thus to develop a sense of hierarchy among a multitude of interests and priorities. All this is very much to the good. I see much evidence that the American people have accepted the lessons of the 20th century and understand that our period of virtual supremacy is over and that our fate is now and forever linked to what happens beyond our borders. What remains to be seen is not so much whether we have what it takes to continue to shoulder the burdens of global leadership which are necessarily ours. Rather, the question is whether we will, in the coming decade, deal with the new challenges of the post-Cold War era with the wisdom and strength of character that, on the whole, marked our international passage over the course of the past half century. I, for one, am proud of the part George Bush played in charting a new course for America. And I am proud to have been a part of that adventure. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993 Title:

US and Russia Sign START II Treaty

Bush Yelstin Source: President Bush, Russian President Yeltsin Description: Opening remarks at news conference on the signing of the START II Treaty, Moscow, Russia Date: Jan, 3 19931/3/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Russia, United States Subject: Arms Control, International Law [TEXT]
President Yeltsin:
President George Bush, Mrs. Bush, members of the delegations, representatives of mass media, ladies and gentlemen: It is not every century that history gives us an opportunity to witness and participate in the event that is so significant in scale and consequences. Today, the Presidents of the two great powers, the United States and Russia, have signed the treaty on further radical cuts in strategic offensive arms of Russia and the United States--START II [the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; see fact sheet in Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 1 on p. 5]. In its scale and importance, the treaty goes further than all other treaties ever signed in the field of disarmament. This treaty is the triumph for politicians and diplomats of Russia and the United States. It is also an achievement for all mankind and benefits all peoples of the earth. The START II Treaty becomes the core of the system of global security guarantees. The scale of this treaty is determined by a number of factors. Its historical factor is that in the course of all its previous history, mankind was arming itself and just dreamed of beating the swords into plowshares. The treaty signed today represents a major step toward fulfilling mankind's centuries- old dream of disarmament. Its political factor is that the treaty we have signed today belongs to a new epoch. This treaty was concluded by two friendly states, by partners who not only trust each other but also assist each other. It testifies to our joint and determined movement toward a new world order. From the very outset, the new democratic Russian state has been pursuing a policy of building equal partnership with the United States. Today, we have every right to say that relations between the two major powers have undergone a genuine revolution. Its political factor lies also in the fact that during the last decade of the 20th century and at the turn of the 21st century, the START II Treaty will affect policies not only of the United States and Russia but of other countries of the world as well. The START II Treaty established parameters of possible political agreements in other spheres of interaction among states. Thus, the military factor is determined by the scale of mutual reductions in nuclear arms. By comparison with the START I Treaty [the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed on July 31, 1991], every state will have to reduce and destroy the number of strategic offensive warheads by approximately a threefold magnitude. The deepest cuts will affect those categories of arms which are of greatest concern to the parties and the world. For the United States, these are submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers; for Russia, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles--ICBMs. This reduces drastically the level of danger, military mistrust, and suspicion. We opened up real prospects for cooperation based on trust between people in military uniform--between people with military discipline and military thinking. Thus, the START II Treaty will change and gradually replace the very psychology of confrontation. At the same time, as President and Supreme Commander in Chief, I can say with absolute certainty [that] the signed treaty strengthens the security of Russia rather than weakens it. I think that President Bush can make a similar statement concerning the security of the United States. The implementation of the new treaty will not be economically destructive for Russia. We have made our calculations, and they show that the proposed reductions would cost us much less than the mere maintenance of nuclear weapons systems in a safe condition. We save seriously on verification and inspections, two of the most expensive, to put it mildly, items of expenditures. The new character of Russian-US relations makes it possible for us to substantially simplify verification procedures while ensuring their reliability. We expect to cut considerably the cost of the physical destruction of armaments. We have agreed with the United States to cooperate in developing and applying appropriate technologies. Thus, the expenditures under this, then, will, in fact, be shared equally. This will enable us to eliminate our nuclear weapons not with a delay of several years but in parallel with the United States in accordance with the schedule provided for in the treaty. In the context of the present economic crisis, it would be difficult for us to keep the pace without outside assistance. The US Congress has made a decision to support Russia in the destruction of these nuclear warheads. Its moral factor will manifest itself in the fact that the treaty gives all mankind the hope for a nuclear weapons-free world. The high moral value of the treaty is that we will be able to hand over to our children--the children of the 21st century--a more secure world. I would call this treaty a treaty of hope. As to the purely diplomatic aspect of this START II Treaty that has just been signed, it will undoubtedly go down into the history of diplomacy as an example of using the potential of the partners who are waiting to overcome the heritage of animosity and confrontation. As you may recall, it took 15 years to prepare the first START Treaty. The elaboration of START II, which is of considerably great[er] magnitude, took several months. But there was absolutely no rush in the process. Naturally, this reflects, above all, the high level of confidence and mutual understanding achieved between the United States and Russia--between the Presidents of the two countries. It gives great impetus to world diplomacy as well. Today, I would like to express the hope that the diplomatic services of the United States and Russia [and] diplomats of European countries will double or even triple their efforts in order to settle conflicts that are of concern to the world. I would like to focus on another important aspect, the personal stand of President George Bush, who is our guest on a working visit with us. I would like to pay tribute to my colleague and friend, George. His remarkable personal and political qualities and competence have contributed to a successful transition from the Cold War to a new world order. I am grateful to him for all he has done to establish new relations between Russia and the United States, for his solidarity and support during the push for the FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act, [and] for the START II Treaty. Thank you, George. I consider it [of] fundamental importance that the future President of the United States, Mr. Clinton, fully supported the conclusion of the START II Treaty. We can, without delay, proceed to the direct implementation of this instrument and consider further steps to strengthen global stability, the system of global protection, and international security. President Bush and I have maintained regular contacts with President-elect Clinton. Today's signing ceremony would not have taken place had there been the slightest reason to doubt his solidarity with our endeavors. I would like to personally thank the most active participants in this process and, above all, the President of the United States, who personally took part in the elaboration and polishing of the text of the treaty. And I would say we spoke often. It was a rare week that we did not speak on the phone in the last few weeks. I am also grateful, personally, to [national security adviser General] Scowcroft, who took an active participation in the consideration of this subject, and to [former Secretary of State] Baker, of course, who treated globally the entire subject of the treaty and was mainly responsible for this breakthrough. Finally, I am grateful to [Secretary of State] Mr. Eagleburger who, on the finishing line, darted with boldness and practically initialed the draft treaty there. I'm thankful also to the experts--to analysts and consultants and also to the leaders of our delegation--[Foreign Minister] Mr. Kozyrev and [Defense Minister] Mr. Grachev and the other 48 experts who worked very hard for us to come today to the signing of this treaty, the SALT [START] II Treaty. I'm also grateful to all the journalists--press people--who kept their hand constantly on the pulse of this subject and who did not criticize the treaty before it was signed. I do believe that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of friendly partnership between Russia and the United States. Strategic partnership relations serve the fundamental national interests of the two countries and of the international community as a whole. I am deeply confident that the signing of the START II Treaty opens new, promising prospects for the peoples of our countries. I'm certain that this day will be a milestone in this process.
President Bush:
Mr. President and Mr. Vice President, Mr. Prime Minister, Minister of Justice, Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the Russian and American delegations, and distinguished guests: We meet at the beginning of a new year, at a moment that is also a new era for our two nations and for the world. For half of this century, the Soviet Union and the United States stood locked in a nuclear standoff. For our two nations and for the world, cold war, hot words, and the constant threat of war seemed imminent--indeed, at times inevitable. The time that we might meet as friends and the time that we might meet in freedom seemed distant--indeed, a dream. Today, the Cold War is over, and, for the first time in history, an American president has set foot in a democratic Russia. And together we're now embarked on what must be the noblest mission of all: to turn an adversarial relationship into one of friendship and partnership. We stand together today in this great city at the threshold of a new world of hope, a widening circle of freedom for us and for our children. This historic opportunity would simply not have been possible without our combined common effort. Mr. President, I salute you for your unwavering commitment to democratic reform and for the history you've written since the heroic day in August 1991 when you climbed atop that tank to defend Russia's democratic destiny. I also want to salute the heroism of the Russian people themselves, for it is they who will determine that Russia's democratic course is irreversible. Today, as we meet on Russian soil--home to 1,000 years of heritage and history, to a people rich in scientific and creative talent--I want to assure the Russian people on behalf of all Americans [that] we understand that Russia faces a difficult passage. We are with you in your struggle to strengthen and secure democratic rights, to reform your economy, to bring to every Russian city and village a new sense of hope and the prospect of a future forever free. Let me say clearly--we seek no special advantages from Russia's transformation. Yes, deep arms reductions, broader and deeper economic ties, expanded trade with Russia all are in the interest of my country. But they're equally in the interest of the Russian people. Our future is one of mutual advantage. We seek a new relationship of trust between our military forces. They once confronted each other across Europe's great divide; let them now come together in the cause of peace. We seek full cooperation to employ our collective capabilities to help resolve crises around the world. We seek a new cooperation between the United States and Russia and among all states to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The world looks to us to consign the Cold War to history, to ratify our new relationship by reducing the weapons that concentrate the most destructive power known to man. The treaty we signed today builds on the strong beginning we made with START I. Together, these treaties will reduce by more than two-thirds the strategic arsenals in place today. And, just as important, START II will bring much better stability to remaining forces. This agreement represents a common effort to overcome the contentious differences and complexities that surround nuclear weapons. In the face of many who doubted Russia and America's intentions and our energy, it vindicates our insistence that arms control must do more than simply freeze the arms race in place. The START Treaty--START I-- reduced a quarter century of growth in our nuclear arsenals and reversed the course that caused many to fear that nuclear conflagration was inevitable. The treaty that we signed today goes much further in a way that few believed possible just 1 year ago. And may I congratulate Messrs. Kozyrev and Grachev and Eagleburger for their outstanding work to bring this treaty to fruition. I also want to congratulate former Secretary of State Jim Baker for his important work on the treaty during the spring and summer. In closing, let me tell you what this treaty means--not for presidents or premiers, not for historians or heads of state but for parents and for their children: It means a future far more free from fear. As we sign today this treaty, let us pledge also to move forward together throughout this decade and into the next century toward common aims: for Russia, a democratic peace; for our two nations, a strong partnership between our people and the lasting friendship that springs from a common love of freedom. Mr. President, may I wish you and the Russian people, at this critical moment in history, a new year rich with hope and peace. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 2, January 11, 1993 Title:

Situation in Sierra Leone

Snyder Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joe Snyder Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 4 19931/4/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Sierra Leone Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Valentine Strasser, Chairman of Sierra Leone's National Provisional Ruling Council, announced on December 29 [1992] that a coup attempt had been crushed. Freetown['s] radio [station] reported on December 31 that a special tribunal had sentenced 12 coup plotters to death and that another 17 persons found guilty of treason earlier were to be executed immediately. We understand these sentences have already been carried out. The broadcast indicated that additional suspects are being sought. The United States is gravely concerned over the reported executions and calls on the Sierra Leonean authorities to respect fully human rights, due process, and the rule of law. The United States recognizes that Sierra Leone is currently encountering numerous problems, including the presence of rebel forces. However, we urge that such problems be resolved through peaceful negotiation, so that the process of economic and social development and an early return to democratic, civilian rule can be facilitated. In view of the unsettled circumstances in Sierra Leone, the US embassy in Freetown has advised resident American citizens to exercise the utmost caution in their movements. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993

Title:

US Signs Chemical Weapons Convention

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] For more than 20 years, the United States and many other countries have labored to achieve a ban on chemical weapons. The long-awaited Chemical Weapons Convention is now completed and open for signature. I have had a deep and abiding personal interest in the success of the effort to ban these terrible weapons. As Vice President, I had the honor on two occasions to address the Conference on Disarmament and to present US proposals to give impetus to the negotiations. As President, I directed the United States to take new initiatives to advance and conclude the negotiations. The United States is profoundly gratified that these talks have now been successfully concluded. The countries that participated in the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament deserve special congratulations. The Chemical Weapons Convention is uniquely important in the field of arms control agreements. It will improve the security of all nations by eliminating a class of weapons of mass destruction that exists in all quarters of the world and that has been used in recent conflicts. It is a truly stabilizing and non- discriminatory agreement. The United States strongly supports the Chemical Weapons Convention and is proud to be an original signatory. We are encouraged that so many other states have also decided to take this step. This clearly demonstrates global--international--endorsement of the convention and the new norm of international conduct that it establishes. However, we must not cease our efforts until the norm becomes truly universal, with all countries becoming not only signatories but also parties to the convention. Much work remains to make the convention fully effective. The United States will cooperate closely with other countries to bring the convention into force as soon as possible and to ensure that it is faithfully implemented. Only then will we be able to say that the risk of chemical warfare is no longer a threat to people anywhere in the world. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Chemical Weapons Convention Signing Ceremony

Eagleburger Source: Secretary Eagleburger Description: Remarks upon signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, Paris, France Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] It is fitting that we meet to sign this historic Chemical Weapons Convention in a city where, 4 years ago, the international community appealed for the strengthening of norms against chemical warfare. I am pleased to be in Paris, and I am especially pleased to represent my President, George Bush, a man who, over the course of the past decade, launched some of the key initiatives which helped to make this agreement possible. He and all those responsible can take pride in an achievement whose revolutionary scope and impact we can recognize today without having to await the verdict of history. But such has been the amazing record of the past few years. We have seen the international community liberate itself from half a century of gridlock and paralysis and move beyond the rhetoric of democracy to achieve real democracy; move beyond the rhetoric of detente to achieve real peace; and move beyond the rhetoric of disarmament to achieve real reductions in weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention we sign today does more than simply reduce a class of arms or mitigate against their proliferation. This convention mandates a worldwide non-discriminatory ban on an entire class of weapons of mass destruction--the only class of such weapons that has been widely used in combat. By the radical terms of this agreement, all signatory states forswear the possession, production, stockpiling, transfer, and, indeed, the use of chemical weapons; and all signatories must destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities in their possession. Moreover, the convention's strict verification regime, which accommodates legitimate commercial and sovereign interests, sets an innovative standard for future multilateral agreements. The international community is virtually united in support of the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, there must be truly global adherence if the convention is to achieve its purpose and if doubts are to be eliminated over the commitment and intentions of those who fail to sign, ratify, and fully comply with its terms. Nowhere is this more important today than in the Middle East, a region which over the past 30 years has been home to more active chemical weapons programs--and which has seen more chemical weapons use--than any other part of the world. It is, therefore, particularly disappointing that so many Middle Eastern states are absent from this ceremony today. The fact of the matter is that linking this convention to other issues cannot affect the fate of those issues, but it will surely undermine the effect of this treaty in the one region most exposed to the danger of chemical weapons--namely, the Middle East. The point, I believe, is to tackle the challenge of weapons of mass destruction wherever we can, whenever we can. I would, therefore, urge the members of the Arab League to seize this opportunity and sign the Chemical Weapons Convention. Doing so would be a step toward, and not away from, making the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, as called for by President Mubarak of Egypt. Today's ceremony is only the beginning of the work which lies ahead. Next month, the Preparatory Commission will meet in The Hague [the Netherlands] to work out the important and detailed provisions for implementing the convention. The United States is fully committed to the success of those efforts, which will require the same broad support and participation which produced the successful convention itself. As I indicated at the beginning, the past few years have been a remarkably creative period of international achievement. Perhaps not coincidentally, I believe that President Bush's passage across the international scene has equally been one of tangible achievement, particularly in terms of the issue most important to the fate and future of the planet--the issue of weapons of mass destruction. George Bush's legacy will include landmark treaties-- START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] I, START II, and CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]--as well as diplomatic efforts which paid non- proliferation dividends in Africa, South America, the Middle East, and here in Paris today. But he knows, as all of us must know, that what we have accomplished to date will matter little unless we are prepared to confront the even greater proliferation dangers we most certainly will face in the years to come.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Chemical Weapons Convention: France Hosts Signing Ceremony

ACDA Description: Based on statement released by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Washington, DC Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: France Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] On January 13, the Government of France will host a ceremony in Paris for the signing of a multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Representatives from more than 130 countries are expected to be present to sign the convention. The multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, concluded on September 3, 1992, by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and endorsed by the United Nations on November 30, 1992, is historic in the scope of its provisions and in the number of countries involved in its development. It offers an opportunity to build confidence regionally and globally and to enable signatories to play a more responsible role in the international community. The convention prohibits: -- The development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of chemical weapons; -- The use of chemical weapons against any other state--regardless of whether the country is a signatory to the convention; -- Engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and -- Assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in activities prohibited to convention signatories. In addition, the convention requires that: -- Signatories declare all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities; -- The declarations be checked; -- Storage, production, and destruction facilities be monitored through on- site inspection; and -- All chemical weapons be eliminated completely within 10 years. To further enhance security and to deter clandestine chemical weapons production, storage, and use, the convention also provides routine monitoring and verification of relevant chemical weapons industry facilities. Additionally, the convention provides for a challenge inspection regime which allows any convention signatory to initiate an inspection of any facility or location in any other signatory state to clarify and resolve questions of possible non-compliance. After signature of the CWC, a preparatory commission of all signatory states will begin work in early February to further elaborate detailed implementation procedures and establish the CWC international organization. These meetings will take place in The Hague, which will also be the seat of the organization. The US welcomes the action of the Government of France to host the signing ceremony.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Chemical Weapons Convention: Chronology of Events Leading to the Signing

ACDA Description: Released by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Washington, DC Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93 Category: Chronologies Region: Whole World Country: United States, Russia Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] Listed below are some of the key events in the chemical weapons [CW] negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [CCD] and the Committee on Disarmament, which led to the completion of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC], its approval by the United Nations, and its opening for signature in Paris. March 15, 1962: The United States and the Soviet Union submit plans for general and complete disarmament to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee which include provisions for eliminating chemical and biological weapons. August 15, 1968: Chemical weapons are placed on the agenda of the CCD in Geneva. June 27-July 3, 1974: At the Moscow summit, the United States and the Soviet Union agree to hold bilateral talks in an effort to develop a joint proposal to be submitted to the CCD on the prohibition of chemical weapons. March 17, 1980: The ad hoc working group on chemical weapons is established in the Committee on Disarmament (CD), the successor to the CCD. February 4, 1983: At the CD, Vice President Bush announces US requirements for a verifiable prohibition on the production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons: -- Declaration and systematic international on-site inspection of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities and declaration of plans for destruction of stocks; -- Systematic international on-site inspection of the destruction of both chemical weapons stocks and production facilities; -- Declaration and on-site inspection of the operation of other facilities for legal production of chemicals that pose a specific risk of being diverted to chemical weapons production; and -- A multilateral mechanism for dealing with compliance issues. June 1983: The United States presents a paper at the CD showing how stockpile destruction can be verified. The US approach combines extensive use of on-site instruments with continuous monitoring by international inspectors. August 23, 1983: The United States invites CD member and observer delegations to participate in a workshop at the US chemical weapons destruction test bed facility at Tooele, Utah. The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact (except Romania) decline the invitation. November 14-16, 1983: Fifty diplomats from 30 CD nations attend the Chemical Weapons Verification Workshop at Tooele, Utah. April 18, 1984: At the Conference on Disarmament, the new title for the Committee on Disarmament, Vice President Bush presents a US draft treaty that provides for a worldwide ban on the development, acquisition, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The plan calls for systematic on-site inspection of chemical weapon facilities to ensure compliance. The Soviet Union dismisses the US draft treaty immediately. However, it is essentially the 1984 draft which becomes the basis of discussion for the ad hoc working group of the CD. The document, reflecting agreed changes as a result of the CD negotiations, is informally referred to as the "rolling text." July 10, 1986: The United States provides information to the Conference on Disarmament about its chemical weapons stockpiles and storage site locations--the first CD member to do so. August 6, 1987: Soviet Foreign Minister [Shevardnadze] addresses the CD, accepting the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal. He invites the CD delegations to the Shikany military facility and extends a future invitation to the CW destruction facility under construction near Chapayevsk. On October 3-4, 1987, a multilateral delegation from the CD visits the Soviet CW installation at Shikany to view munitions and a mobile destruction site. July 28, 1988: In a speech to the CD, US Ambassador [to the Conference on Disarmament] Max Friedersdorf declares the location of all US CW production facilities and out-lines plans for their elimination under a CW ban. The US calls on the Soviet Union and other states to do the same. February 21-23, 1989: The United States conducts a trial inspection of a private American chemical production plant. This is part of an experiment to develop procedures for a routine inspection regime which would satisfy confidence and security requirements without significantly disrupting the civilian chemical industry. The Soviet Union and other members of the CD subsequently conduct similar trial inspections of their own chemical industries. February 7-9, 1990: Secretary of State Baker and [Soviet] Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agree on a framework for action to expedite the negotiation at the CD for a Chemical Weapons Convention. June 1, 1990: At the Washington summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev sign the US-Soviet Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Key provisions of this important accord are: -- Cessation of chemical weapons production to begin upon entry into force and destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks to start by the end of 1992--down to 5,000 tons of CW agents [weight exclusive of casings] by 2002; -- On-site inspections during and after the destruction process to confirm destruction; and -- Development and use of safe and environmentally sound methods of destruction. May 13, 1991: President Bush announces a new series of steps to strengthen the prospects of an early, successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. To this end, the President declared that the United States would take the following actions: -- Formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason-- including retaliation--against any state, effective when the convention enters into force and propose that all states follow suit--providing the USSR is also a party to the treaty; -- Unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all US stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force and propose that all other states do likewise; -- Offer technical assistance to others so that they can destroy their chemical weapons stocks efficiently and safely; -- Call for setting a target date to conclude the convention and recommend that the conference stay in continuous session [as] necessary to meet the target; -- Propose new and effective verification measures for inspecting sites suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons; -- Propose that the convention require parties to refuse to trade in chemical weapons-related materials with states that do not join in the convention in order to provide tangible benefits for those states that join the convention and significant penalties for those that fail to support it; and -- Reaffirm that the United States will impose all appropriate sanctions in response to violations of the convention, especially the use of chemical weapons. July 15, 1991: The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan jointly table a draft challenge inspection proposal at the CD, followed by a US proposal on handling inspection of declared facilities. March 19, 1992: Australian Foreign Minister Evans presents a draft treaty offering compromise solutions to outstanding issues as a basis for early completion of the CD negotiations. The United States applauds the Australian effort and supports the process it represents. The Australian text differs from US positions on a number of important issues. The United States, however, expresses hope that it will aid resolution of remaining issues and permit completion of the CWC in 1992, as President Bush has repeatedly urged. June 22, 1992: The chairman of the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons at the CD, Adolph Ritter von Wagner of Germany, in an effort to speed the process, released a draft "final text" for consideration. This draft is a complete text and embodies consensus compromises as well as the chairman's own proposed compromise language on unresolved major issues. June 26, 1992: The second CD session concluded with meetings during the last few days devoted to the chairman's explanations of the new text. July 20, 1992: The CD resumes. July 23, 1992: The United States accepts the chairman's draft Chemical Weapons Convention. August 7, 1992: Chairman von Wagner puts forth a package of changes to the draft convention in an effort to satisfy the concerns of some members of the CD. August 13, 1992: President Bush announces strong US support for the draft Chemical Weapons Convention completed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The President states that the United States is committed to be an original party to the treaty once it is open for signing and calls on all other nations to support the treaty and to pledge adherence to it. August 26, 1992: The CD resumes.September 3, 1992: The CD concludes the draft Chemical Weapons Convention. September 7, 1992: The CD forwards the draft Chemical Weapons Convention to the United Nations for endorsement. November 12, 1992: The UN First Committee approves the draft convention and submits it for endorsement by the entire UN membership. November 30, 1992: The UN endorses by consensus, with 145 co-sponsors, the draft of the Chemical Weapons Convention. January 13, 1993: In a ceremony in Paris, the Chemical Weapons Convention will be opened for signature. February 8, 1993: The Preparatory Commission of all states parties to the convention is scheduled to meet in The Hague [the Netherlands] to set up the Chemical Weapons Convention international organization.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Chemical Weapons Convention: UN General Assembly Resolution

UN Description: UN General Assembly, New York City Date: Nov, 30 199211/30/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Subject: Arms Control, United Nations [TEXT] Text of Resolution A/C.1/47/L.1/Rev. 2, "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," approved by consensus by the UN General Assembly, New York City, November 30, 1992. The General Assembly, Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,1 as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions, Recalling in particular its resolution 46/35 C of 6 December 1991, in which the Assembly strongly urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of the highest priority, to resolve outstanding issues so as to achieve a final agreement on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction during its 1992 session, Bearing in mind the Final Declaration2 of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, in which participating States stressed their determination to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them, Determined to make progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, Convinced, therefore, of the urgent necessity of a total ban on chemical weapons, so as to abolish an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, and thus eliminate the risk to mankind of renewed use of these inhumane weapons, Welcoming the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,3 adopted by the Conference on Disarmament and contained in its report dated 3 September 1992, the result of many years of intensive negotiations, which constitutes a historic achievement in the field of arms control and disarmament, Convinced that the Convention, particularly as adherence to it approaches universality, will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and improve the security of all States, and that it therefore merits the strong support of the entire international community, Convinced further that the implementation of the Convention should promote expanded international trade, technological development and economic cooperation in the chemical sector, in order to enhance the economic and technological development of all States parties, Determined to ensure the efficient and cost-effective implementation of the Convention, Recalling the support for the prohibition of chemical weapons expressed in the declaration by representatives of the world's chemical industry at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, held at Canberra from 18 to 22 September 1989,4 Bearing in mind the relevant reference to the Convention in the Final Documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non- Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, Welcoming the invitation of the President of the French Republic to participate in a ceremony to sign the Convention in Paris on 13 January 1993, 1. Commends the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as contained in the report of the Conference on Disarmament dated 3 September 1992; 2. Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to open it for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993; 3. Calls upon all States to sign and, thereafter, according to their respective constitutional processes, to become parties to the Convention at the earliest possible date, thus contributing to its rapid entry into force and to the early achievement of universal adherence; 4. Further calls upon all States to ensure the effective implementation of this unprecedented, global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral disarmament agreement, thereby enhancing cooperative multilateralism as a basis for international peace and security; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide such services as may be requested by the signatory States to initiate the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 6. Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on the status of signatures and ratifications of the Convention. 1 League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138. 2 A/44/88, annex. 3 Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix I. 4 See A/C.1/44/4.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Chemical Weapons Convention: A Balance Between Obligations and the Needs of States Parties

ACDA Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Description: ACDA Occasional Paper, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 5 19931/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] [The following text is taken from "Chemical Weapons Convention: A Balance Between Obligations and the Needs of States Parties," dated January 5, 1993.] The multilateral negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) concluded in Geneva on September 3, 1992, with the Conference on Disarmament (CD) forwarding the draft text to the United Nations for endorsement on September 7. On November 30, the UN General Assembly endorsed the CWC by consensus, with 145 countries cosponsoring the supporting resolution. The CWC will be opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. The CWC is historic in the scope of its provisions and in the number of countries involved in its development. Additionally, the conference of states parties established by the convention will provide members an opportunity for building regional and global stability and for playing a more responsible role in the international community. The majority of the provisions of the CWC represent the long-agreed upon consensus of the 39 members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) who drafted the convention. In a few sections, where prior consensus had not been attained, compromises were reached which struck an equitable balance among varying positions.
Overview
This paper describes some of the CWC's key provisions, which were designed to balance the need for effective convention provisions with the national security and economic requirements of states parties in implementing such provisions.
The Destruction of CW and CW Production Facilities
Throughout the CWC negotiations, CD participants sought ways to remove the possibility of use or threat of use of chemical weapons (CW) through measures which would provide confidence among states parties adhering to the convention that their security will be enhanced. To this end, the negotiators desired to ensure the complete elimination of CW and their production facilities within a specific period of time; assign responsibility for destruction of CW stocks abandoned on a state party's territory; prohibit any right of CW retaliation; prohibit the use of herbicides and riot control agents (RCAs) as a method of warfare; and, in the event of CW use or threat of use, provide for protection and assistance to the victimized party. At the same time, negotiators had to take into account such factors as the technical difficulties associated with destruction of CW, the possible need for commercial use of former CW production facilities, and the non-warfare uses of herbicides and RCAs, (e.g., crop control, law enforcement). This required negotiators to develop provisions which balance a state party's obligations under the convention for declarations, destruction timeframes, international monitoring, etc., with the needs and requirements of states parties in implementing these obligations. Thus, the CWC contains provisions which prohibit: the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and direct or indirect transfer to anyone of CW; the use of CW against anyone; engaging in any military preparations to use CW; and assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in activities prohibited to states parties. The convention requires all CW to be declared, declarations to be checked, and all CW to be completely eliminated within 10 years, with storage and destruction monitored through on-site inspection. An extension of a state party's destruction program for up to 5 years is possible but not automatic. It must be approved by the conference of states parties which will set conditions under which the extension may be granted, including specific verification measures and actions to mitigate the delay. The CWC requires a state party to destroy and bear the costs of destruction of CW it abandoned on another state party's territory; otherwise, the territorial state party may request assistance from the CWC organization. The CWC further requires all CW production to cease, CW production facilities to be declared, the declarations to be checked, and the facilities destroyed, with cessation of production and destruction monitored through on-site inspection. In exceptional cases of compelling need, the conference of states parties may approve conversion of former CW production facilities for prescribed non-CW uses, subject to appropriate international monitoring. Finally, the convention contains provisions which prohibit the use of RCAs as a method of warfare, reaffirms the prohibition on use of herbicides as a method of warfare, and provides for protection and assistance in the event of use or threat of use of CW against a state party. Most importantly, the inspected party has final say in determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged site. The party will negotiate with the inspection team the following: the extent of access to any particular place or places within the inspection site; the particular inspection activities, including sampling; the performance of particular activities by the inspection team; and the provision of particular information by the inspected party.
Monitoring the Chemical Industry
In the convention, chemicals of concern have been divided into three schedules according to the risk that they pose to the objectives of the CWC. Facilities producing, processing, and consuming these chemicals are subject to initial and annual declaration and international monitoring, including on- site inspection. In addition to these facilities, other facilities capable of producing the scheduled chemicals but not doing so are also subject to declaration and a monitoring regime. At the same time, the provisions for monitoring chemical industries take into account countries' concerns about the difficulties of national implementation of the CWC such as negative impact of the provisions on economic and technological development, the possible loss of confidential business information, and the difficulty of monitoring small chemical industry facilities in developing countries. Measures are included which provide inspection procedures and methods for handling information which protect sensitive, non-CW-related information; require that the convention be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering economic or technological development; and require states parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific and technical information for permitted purposes. The convention also contains provisions to allay the fears of some developing countries about the difficulty of identifying and opening to monitoring chemical industries capable of producing scheduled chemicals but not doing so. In particular, there is a provision for assistance in compiling lists of such facilities and means to address any problems of completeness of such lists. Thresholds for declarations and inspection have been set high enough to preclude capturing small, irrelevant chemical industries. Finally, the inspection regime for this sector of the chemical industry will not start until the fourth year after entry into force of the CWC. Moreover, the implementation of this category of inspections will be subject to further discussion and decision making by the conference of states parties and will take into account the accrued experience of other industry inspections.
Verification
The CWC contains two verification regimes to enhance the security of states parties to the convention and to preclude the possibility of clandestine CW production, storage, and use. The first regime provides a routine monitoring regime involving declarations, initial visits, and systematic inspections of CW storage, production, and destruction facilities and relevant chemical industry. The second regime, challenge inspection, allows a state party to request and have conducted an international inspection of any facility or location in another state party in order to clarify and resolve questions of possible noncompliance. The challenge inspection procedures were the most sensitive and difficult to develop, given the need to balance provision for an adequate degree of intrusiveness to address compliance concerns with the need to protect sensitive, non-CW-related facilities and information of national security concern. The CWC obligates the state party to be inspected to accept a challenge inspection and to make every reasonable effort to satisfy the compliance concern. At the same time, the CWC provides for a system of managing access to a challenged site which allows for protection of the inspected party's national security concerns. It does so in two ways: first, through procedures to deter the challenging party from abusing the process and, second, through procedures which allow the inspected party to protect sensitive, non-CW facilities and locations.
Deterrence of Abuse
To deter abuse, the convention contains provisions for both the requesting and the inspected parties to have their concerns about compliance and possible abuse of the system addressed by the Executive Council at both the beginning and the conclusion of the inspection. A state party must submit a request for challenge inspection to the Executive Council as well as to the Director General of the technical secretariat of the CWC organization. If the Executive Council considers an inspection request to be frivolous, abusive, or clearly beyond the scope of the convention, it may, within 12 hours after having received the request decide (by a three-quarter majority of all its members) against carrying out the challenge inspection. After a challenge inspection, the Executive Council will review the final report of the inspection team. In addition to addressing concerns about whether any noncompliance occurred, the council will also address concerns as to whether the request had been within the scope of the convention as well as whether the right to request a challenge inspection had been abused. If the Executive Council concludes there was abuse, it may recommend to the conference of states parties measures to take against the requesting party and examine whether that party should bear any of the costs of the inspection. In addition to specific provisions to address abuse, there is a general provision giving state parties the right at any time to request the Executive Council to consider concerns about abuse of the rights provided for under the convention.
Protection Through Inspection Procedures
The convention also contains inspection procedures which provide the inspected party with the means to protect sensitive sites. Such means include the timeframes specified to provide access, limitations on observers, and the process of managed access at the site. With respect to timeframes for inspection, after receiving notification of the site to be inspected, the inspected party has the ability to take up to 5 days to provide access to the site. This time period allows inspected parties adequate time to prepare a site for inspection. Once at the site, the period of inspection itself is limited to 84 hours, extendable only by agreement with the inspected party. Concerning limitations on observers, while the requesting party can ask to have an observer accompany the inspection team, the inspected party has the right to disapprove the participation of such an observer. If the inspected party allows the participation of an observer, it can limit the access and activities of the observer at the site. Finally, and most importantly, the inspected party has final say in determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged site. The party will negotiate with the inspection team the following: the extent of access to any particular place or places within the inspection site; the particular inspection activities, including sampling, to be conducted by the inspection team; the performance of particular activities by the inspection team; and the provision of particular information by the inspected party. For example, the party may give only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site; it may shroud sensitive pieces of equipment such as computer electronic systems; and it may restrict sampling and sampling analysis. In the event the inspected party provides less than full access to places, activities, or information, it is under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to clarify the possible noncompliance concern that generated the challenge inspection.
Organization and Costs
Two other issues of importance and concern which arose during negotiations of the CWC were the allocation of costs for implementing the convention and equitable participation in its organizational bodies--in particular, the Executive Council, since it will play a large role in CWC implementation. Provisions of the convention address these concerns by allocating costs on an adjusted UN scale to lessen the burden on small and developing countries, with the most expensive costs--verification of destruction--to be borne almost entirely by the countries possessing CW. Another provision establishes the principle of rotational seats on the Executive Council and seat allocation on a regional basis, leaving it up to each region to designate members and taking into account not only a state's industrial significance but also other regional factors. Yet another provision provides for staffing the technical secretariat, drawing from states parties in a manner which gives due regard to recruiting on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
Provisions for Improving The Convention
Finally, the negotiators recognized the need for making the convention a living document which will allow for the possibility of improvement based on inspection experience and advances in verification technology. Therefore, the CWC contains provisions to allow for technical changes and annual and special conferences to discuss implementation and address any particular problems.
Preparing for Implementation Of the Convention
After the convention is signed, a preparatory commission of all signatory states will begin work in early February 1993 to further elaborate detailed procedures and to set up the CWC international organization. Commission meetings will take place in The Hague, the Netherlands, which will be the seat of the organization. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Hatano

Hatano Source: UN Security Council President Hatano Description: New York City, New York Date: Jan, 8 19931/8/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran Subject: Military Affairs [TEXT] Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council. "1. The Security Council is deeply disturbed by the Government of Iraq's recent Notes to the Office of the Special Commission [UNSCOM] in Baghdad and to the Headquarters of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) that it will not allow the United Nations to transport its personnel into Iraqi territory using its own aircraft. "2. The Security Council refers to resolution 687 (1991) [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 14, p. 236] requiring Iraq to permit the Special Commission and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to undertake immediate on-site inspection of any locations designated by the Commission. The agreement on facilities, privileges and immunities between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations, and resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) [for texts, see Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 34, p. 644 and No. 42, p. 790, respectively] elaborated on Iraq's obligations by demanding, inter alia, that the Special Commission and the IAEA be allowed, as they determined necessary, to use their own aircraft throughout Iraq and any airfield in Iraq without interference or hindrance of any kind. Concerning UNIKOM, Iraq is obligated by resolution 687 (1991) and committed by an exchange of letters dated 15 April 1992 and 21 June 1992 respectively to the unrestricted freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance of its personnel, property, supplies, equipment, spare parts and means of transport. "3. The implementation of the measures set out in the recent communications of the Iraqi Government would seriously impede the activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and UNIKOM. Such restrictions constitute an unacceptable and material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991), which established the cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in the region, as well as other relevant resolutions and agreements. "4. The Council demands that the Government of Iraq abide by its obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions and cooperate fully with the activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and UNIKOM. In particular, it demands that the Government of Iraq not interfere with the currently envisaged United Nations flights. The Security Council warns the Government of Iraq, as it has done in this connection in the past, of the serious consequences which would ensue from failure to comply with its obligations." The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Fitzwater

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 9 19931/9/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Military Affairs [TEXT] All available evidence indicates that Iraq is acceding to the requirements of the coalition's January 6, 1993, demarche [see summary in January 13 White House Statement, p. 34]. No Iraqi aircraft have entered the no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel, and the Iraqi surface-to-air missiles have been dispersed and are no longer threatening coalition flight operations. Once again, [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein has backed down in the face of coalition solidarity. Iraq remains isolated and a pariah among nations due to its flagrant attempts to violate the cease-fire regime. The coalition's January 6 demarche remains in effect. We will continue to scrutinize Iraqi activity. No further warning will be issued if Iraq violates the requirements of the January 6 demarche. This episode should make clear to Iraq that interference with UN and coalition operations--including humanitarian relief operations, Operation Provide Comfort, UN Special Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and the UN Iraq- Kuwait Observer Mission force on the Iraq-Kuwait border--will not be tolerated. In this regard, we fully support the UN Security Council presidential statement of January 8 that demanded that Iraq comply with its obligations. We underscore the Security Council's warning of serious consequences if Iraq fails to do so.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Hatano

Hatano Source: UN Security Council President Hatano Description: New York City, New York Date: Jan, 11 19931/11/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations [TEXT] Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council: "The Security Council notes that there have been a number of recent actions by Iraq as part of its pattern of flouting relevant Security Council resolutions. One was the series of border incidents involving the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM); another was the incident concerning the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and UNIKOM flights. "The Security Council is deeply concerned at the incidents reported in the Secretary-General's special report of 10 January 1993 on UNIKOM (S/25085). The Security Council recalls the provisions of resolution 687 (1991) that established the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and demanded that both countries respect the inviolability of the international boundary between them. It reaffirms that the boundary was at the very core of the conflict and that, in resolutions 687 (1991) and 773 (1992) [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 39, p. 731] it guaranteed the inviolability of the boundary and undertook to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. "The Council condemns the action taken by Iraq on 10 January 1993 to remove equipment by force from the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized zone without prior consultation with UNIKOM, and through UNIKOM with the Kuwaiti authorities, as set out in the letter of 8 January 1993 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General. In particular, the Council draws attention to the removal by Iraq of four HY-2G anti-ship missiles and other military equipment from the six bunkers in the former Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr on Kuwaiti territory, in spite of the objections of UNIKOM and their efforts to prevent this. This action is a direct challenge to the authority of UNIKOM and amounts to clear-cut defiance by Iraq of the Council, which stipulated in the letter of 3 November 1992 from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General that the military equipment in the six bunkers should be destroyed by or under the supervision of UNIKOM. The Council demands that the anti-ship missiles and other military equipment removed by force from the six bunkers at Umm Qasr in Kuwaiti territory be returned immediately to the custody of UNIKOM for destruction, as previously decided. "The Council also condemns further Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized zone on 11 January 1993. It demands that any future retrieval mission be in accordance with the terms set out in the letter of 8 January 1993 from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General. On the UNIKOM facilities at Camp Khor, the Council stresses that the land and premises occupied by UNIKOM shall be inviolate and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the United Nations. "The Council invites the Secretary-General, as a first step, to explore on an urgent basis the possibilities for restoring UNIKOM to its full strength and to consider in an emergency such as this the need for rapid reinforcement as set out in paragraph 18 of his report of 12 June 1991 (S/22692), as well as any other suggestions that he might have to enhance the effectiveness of UNIKOM, and to report back to the Council. "The Council is also alarmed by Iraq's refusal to allow the United Nations to transport its Special Commission and UNIKOM personnel into Iraqi territory using its own aircraft. In this connection the Council reiterates the demand in its statement of 8 January 1993 that Iraq permit UNSCOM and UNIKOM to use their own aircraft to transport their personnel into Iraq. It rejects the arguments contained in the letter of 9 January 1993 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the Security Council (S/25086). "These latest developments concerning the activities of UNIKOM and UNSCOM constitute further material breaches of resolution 687 (1991), which established the cease-fire and provided the conditions essential for the restoration of peace and security in the region, as well as other relevant resolutions and agreements. The Council demands that Iraq cooperate fully with UNIKOM, UNSCOM and other United Nations agencies in carrying out their mandates, and again warns Iraq of the serious consequences that will flow from such continued defiance. The Council will remain actively seized of the matter." The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait: Fitzwater

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations [TEXT] The United States and its coalition partners today took forceful actions against Iraq. Coalition aircraft today attacked surface-to-air missiles and associated infrastructure in southern Iraq. Preliminary information indicates that the coalition aircraft accomplished their mission. This action was taken pursuant to the coalition demarche of January 6, 1993. This communication demanded that Iraq take steps within 48 hours to ensure that its aircraft and surface-to-air missiles did not pose a threat to coalition aircraft operating south of the 32nd parallel to monitor Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council Resolution [687]. After initially responding to the terms of the January 6 demarche, Iraq violated its requirements, and the coalition is acting to restore an environment that poses no threat to coalition aircraft. All requirements of the January 6 demarche regarding potential threats to coalition air operations south of 32 degrees remain in effect. We will continue to scrutinize Iraqi activity. No further warning will be issued if Iraq again violates the requirements of the January 6 demarche. Similarly, the Government of Iraq should understand that continued defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and related coalition demarches will not be tolerated. The US Government fully associates itself with the January 8 and January 11 statements by the President of the UN Security Council that declared Iraq in material breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and the cease-fire regime and warned of the serious consequences of its actions. We stand ready to take additional, forceful actions with our coalition partners if Iraq continues to flout the will of the international community and disregard its international obligations. Consistent with the above, the [US] President has directed the deployment of a battalion task force to Kuwait to underline our continuing commitment to Kuwait's security and independence.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

US Recognizes Czech and Slovak Republics

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 1 19931/1/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Czechoslovakia (former), Czech Republic, Slovak Republic Subject: Democratization [TEXT] The President today recognized the new Czech and Slovak Republics and offered to establish full diplomatic relations. In an exchange of letters, Czech Prime Minister Klaus and Slovak Prime Minister Meciar welcomed US recognition and accepted our offer of full diplomatic relations. Both leaders provided assurances that the new states will fulfill the obligations and commitments of the former Czechoslovakia and will abide by the principles and provisions of the UN Charter, the Charter of Paris, the Helsinki Final Act, and subsequent CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] documents. They also pledged to prevent the proliferation of destabilizing military technology, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, to uphold international standards concerning national minorities, and to move rapidly to create free market economies. The United States looks forward to full and mutually productive relations with the new Czech and Slovak states. We commend both republics for the peaceful means by which their separation was carried out. In the interest of ensuring stability and prosperity in the region and speeding full integration into the international community, the United States urges continued close regional cooperation among the states of Central Europe. Our ambassador to Czechoslovakia will remain in Prague as the US ambassador to the Czech Republic. We look forward to appointing an ambassador to the Slovak Republic as soon as possible. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Fact Sheet: US Policy for a New Era in Sub- Saharan Africa

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jan, 18 19931/18/93 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Namibia, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa Subject: Human Rights, Refugees, Terrorism, Narcotics, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Trade/Economics [TEXT] In a new, post-Cold War environment, Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing unprecedented political and economic change. These dramatic shifts and the end of superpower strategic competition in the region have resulted in a thorough re-examination and reorientation of US policy. The US Government intends to maintain its engagement in Africa despite resource constraints. Progress and stability will require long-term support by the international community and the efforts of Africans themselves. Adequate diplomatic and financial resources will be needed to promote peaceful change, conflict resolution, stable democracy, and sustainable development. Just as striking as the changes outside Africa are the shifts in the attitudes and aspirations of Africans themselves. No longer content with the victories of the post-independence period, Africans are demanding their just rights along with popular participation and accountability in government. Even more insistently, they are seeking a decent standard of living, basic public services, and economic progress free from war and repression. With a population of 795 million, 20% of the world's land area, and a wealth of natural resources and biological diversity, Sub-Saharan Africa cannot and should not be ignored or neglected. Because of conflicts and crushing poverty worsened by deadly threats from famine and the acquired immuno- deficiency syndrome (AIDS), there is a long-term humanitarian imperative to help alleviate acute suffering as much as possible. On the other hand, there also is an enormous human and natural resource potential in Africa which Africans can use for their own betterment. The world community also has an important stake in the realization of this potential. Finally, as the United States is a society with a large minority of African origin, American policy naturally reflects US domestic cultural and political ties to the region.
US Policy Goals in Sub-Saharan Africa
Conflict resolution and peaceful change in Africa are primary US goals since the degree of success in achieving them is the basis for progress in all other areas. The United States actively supports the nascent efforts of Africans to take the lead in resolving conflicts and peace-keeping efforts in the region. However, it also is willing to play the role of catalyst, technical adviser, and honest broker to resolve conflicts. Democratic systems that respect human rights and seek equitable economic growth are the best guarantees of peaceful change and stability. They provide the peaceful, stable environment essential to sustained development. The United States seeks greater respect for human rights, the rule of law, accountable and honest government, and democratic political pluralism. It neither wishes to impose a particular system nor to enforce any legal code. Rather, it supports what Africans themselves increasingly demand: an effective voice in their own affairs and an end to corruption and abuse of power. The United States will work for sustained equitable development through market-based reforms that rely more on the private sector and promise to reduce dependence on external aid. Ensuring access to markets, investment opportunities, and resources in Africa is the most effective way to sustain growth and US involvement. US assistance programs should support reform; aid criteria should include good governance and structural reform goals along with respect for political and human rights. Africa is beset by a variety of transnational problems which the United States can address. With both bilateral programs and support for international efforts, the United States can work to ameliorate the devastation caused by AIDS and environmental degradation in Africa. Necessary efforts to curb population growth and refugee flows also will involve improving the status of women. The United States and the world community have a strong interest in preventing the spread of terrorism and narcotics trafficking to Africa. Subversion by radical regimes on the periphery of the region also must be countered. US policy cannot afford to disregard the important, and often disproportionate, role of African military and security forces in public life. The United States will support efforts to create smaller, more professional forces clearly subordinate to civilian control and respectful of human rights. As some US military resources are redirected to peace-keeping and humanitarian relief, Africans and their regional organizations will be encouraged to take the lead in these efforts.
Programs for US Engagement in Africa
A collective response to conflict resolution. As newly empowered democratic forces struggle for control with established governments and elites, the potential for regional conflict could increase. Economic desperation will cause severe pressures within many societies. In addition, the very existence of some African states could be threatened by divisive and violent ethnic conflicts. Political and economic reforms are subject to reversal and repression, and in many states military establishments may continue to intervene in factional or ethnic disputes. Such conflict and resulting humanitarian disasters are costly in human and financial terms and, at times, offer compelling cause for outside intervention. The United States strives to deal with such conflicts through a well- informed diplomacy coupled increasingly with support for multilateral efforts to preempt and mediate strife. Collective action with US allies and other partners can effectively support African efforts to make and keep the peace. Although the United States will become militarily involved in such conflicts only under rare and compelling circumstances, a strong US diplomatic presence is required. US involvement in resolving conflicts in Namibia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique has earned it respect and influence internationally and in Africa and will help guide its future efforts. To prevent conflict from reaching the point of demanding outside intervention, the United States supports African efforts in mediating and averting conflict both internally and between states. Strengthening the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and expanding its mandate into regular peace-keeping operations and conflict- mediation services will be a key to this effort. Supporting similar intervention by sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), now carrying out an unprecedented peace-keeping operation in Liberia, also encourages further African efforts in collective security. Finally, active American support for efforts to reduce armaments and military spending in the region is an integral part of keeping the peace and resolving conflict. Preventing further bloodshed and conflict in South Africa is another policy priority, both because of that country's economic importance in Africa and the world's focus on the drama of its transition to majority rule. US public concern about apartheid and the creation of a new South African society offers another compelling reason for current US involvement and later assistance to South Africa under a truly representative, non-racial government. Helping democracy take root. The United States is committed to help promote and sustain political reforms now being demanded by Africans. The United States focuses on supporting broadly democratic processes and institutions, not personalities or specific political outcomes. Programs to support these reforms increasingly are integrated into efforts to achieve other objectives in Africa. Stable democracy with respect for basic rights is essential to peaceful change, and responsible and responsive government is the basis of sustainable economic growth. This policy responds to the near-universal recognition in Africa that the post-colonial, authoritarian model has brought political failure and economic ruin. An agenda of active support for human rights and democratization also commits the United States to help build civil societies and the institutions which sustain reform. As repressive and often corrupt institutions are swept away by the tide of reform, the United States has a historic opportunity to work with Africans to achieve stability and development through responsible, democratic government. Strong US programs to encourage democratic values and practices are essential. Projects advancing human and civil rights, the rule of law, freedom and diversity in the press, effective government, the status of women, and other pillars of a democratic society should reinforce direct assistance for holding elections. Support for democracy and good government must be firmly integrated into all dealings with Africans, especially those in the military and security forces who may pose the greatest threat to reform. Efforts to reduce the size of bloated security forces both through positive incentives and negative conditionality will be key to these efforts. A strong information program which shares and promotes democratic values is integral to US efforts to encourage lasting reform. American public diplomacy should take advantage of the information and communications revolutions in Africa. In many African states, fragile institutions of civil society are emerging: independent newspapers, labor unions, human rights groups, and political parties. Imperfect but reasonably representative elections are installing governments with genuine popular mandates. By identifying publicly with these developments and offering flexible support, the United States, in concert with other democracies, can solidify these gains and help make democratic experiments permanent. Success in this endeavor serves American political, economic, and humanitarian interests in Africa. Fostering economic growth and trade. The central concern of most Africans remains how to ensure a decent standard of living and lay the groundwork for a modern economy. Sustainable economic growth driven by the private sector is as essential to the achievement of all other US policy goals in Africa as it is domestically. Development assistance and economic support programs must focus on countries committed to free market policies which ensure equitable, long-term growth. Popular support for government and the democratic process is essential for tough economic reform measures to endure. The United States seeks to broaden the role of the private sector in political and economic reform while helping to meet basic human needs through its aid. Economic performance and need as well as progress toward democracy and responsible government will be the primary considerations in allocating US development assistance. The United States also seeks to include such criteria in the decisions of international financial institutions. To maximize assistance, coordination with other donors will be more important than ever. Africans must dedicate themselves to the basic economic reforms which will lead to a decent minimum standard of living and the continent's full participation in the world economy. US programs support these tough decisions by African leaders and their people, for they will ultimately lead to economic growth, a reduction in conflict, reduced dependence on aid, and expanded markets for US goods and services. The United States continues to respond quickly and substantially to suffering caused by natural or man-made disasters. Drought, famine, and population pressures will continue to afflict Africa. Wars and civil strife will continue to generate refugees, suffering, death, and economic destruction. The United States will seek equitable burdensharing among all international donors to meet these crises. The United States aims to expand its private sector commercial relationships and presence in Africa. Improving the investment climate, promoting non-discriminatory treatment for American business, and enhancing private sector support and followup services needed to carry on trade are priorities in this area. The US Government aggressively seeks out trade and investment opportunities for American firms and equal market access. US assistance programs promote American exports and trade. Free trade and an open economic system are particularly important for creating the wealth needed to spur economic growth for all sectors of society in South Africa. Many Africans look to a democratic South Africa as a potential economic engine for the whole region. Economic success or failure there will have serious implications for South Africa's neighbors as well as its own people. The United States encourages African nations to support the application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including the introduction of modern intellectual property rights protections, non-discriminatory investment policies, and support for the other provisions of the Uruguay Round. Freer trade, especially for agricultural products and textiles, also will be vital to Africa's economic progress. Growth through trade can reduce Africans' dependence on aid. Africans also face the burden of military expenditures on their economies and societies. With renewed effort to prevent conflict, there will be even more emphasis on reintegrating former soldiers into often devastated economies. US economic assistance and military programs in the region encourage appropriate reductions in military spending and help Africans redirect these financial and human resources into productive nation building. Debt is a crushing economic reality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Along with other donors, the United States continues to explore possible solutions to the burdens of debt servicing for struggling African economies. Debt relief should be targeted on those countries undertaking effective reforms. Addressing regional concerns and problems. The United States supports an expanded role for international collective action to address problems which affect the well-being of the world community. It also actively encourages regional solutions and organizations such as the OAU and ECOWAS as they take on new missions ranging from peace-keeping and conflict mediation to election and human rights monitoring. These fledgling efforts deserve US political and financial support as well as technical assistance and training. Stronger regional organizations will bring African solutions to African problems, necessary for the continent's long-term stability and development. Other critical issues with an impact in and beyond the region include: --
Women
--The vital role played by women in the management of natural resources only recently has been appreciated. Women's generally low status in Africa is an important factor in economic, social, and health problems. US assistance and information programs should focus on women as key actors in sustainable development and building a healthy society. Programs for educating and training women are vital to this process. --
Environment
--In coordination with international programs for the environment, the United States works to preserve and restore Africa's often ravaged ecosystems. Again, the emphasis should be on helping Africans build their own capacity and institutions to promote better environmental practices and the protection of the continent's unique biological diversity. The environmental problems of cities and new industries also require attention. --
AIDS
--The AIDS pandemic has had a particularly devastating effect on Africa, where more than one-half of the world's HIV [human immuno-deficiency virus]-infected persons live. The OAU Action Plan on AIDS is a positive first step toward a comprehensive prevention program in all African medical systems and societies. US technical assistance to research and to combat the spread of AIDS is joined to active efforts to mitigate the suffering and economic costs of the epidemic. Prevention and control of AIDS must involve every sector of development assistance, from population control to agriculture and industry. The entire world has a stake in stopping the pernicious spread of this disease and helping Africans devise cost-effective care for the infected. --
Population control
--Economic progress in Africa is contingent upon slowing population growth. Gains in living standards and reduced dependence on outside assistance will be impossible without vigorous programs to support family health care and family planning. US support for such programs is essential to its policy goals. --
Refugees
--Africa's conflicts and internal turmoil will continue to generate large numbers of refugees in dire need. Resources devoted to pre-venting and mitigating such conflict will more than pay for themselves in reduced costs for humanitarian relief and mass repatriations. To encourage voluntary repatriation as conflicts recede, US assistance should focus on reintegrating refugees into their own societies. --
Terrorism and narcotics
-- While Africa thus far has been spared the worst ravages of these global problems, desperate poverty and a breakdown in civil order has encouraged terrorism and drug use and trafficking. Terrorists and their state sponsors need to be countered by strong measures and both bilateral and regional cooperation. The United States can improve coordination of drug law enforcement and increase education to reduce domestic demand. When African countries become transit centers for illegal drugs, US technical assistance and training also is appropriate.
Conclusion
The United States is following this ambitious policy agenda in Africa while working to meet urgent needs in America and the requirement to reduce the size of budget deficits. Active diplomacy and a firm commitment to the objectives described above, however, will require little more than the resources currently available, especially with more effective collaboration by donor countries. Vigorous promotion of stable democracy, peaceful change, and economic reform will, in fact, reduce the potential costs faced by the United States by reducing both the intensity and frequency of conflict and humanitarian crises. Along with strong programs to support development which meets the basic needs of impoverished populations, the United States will be able to ensure that Africa can realize its enormous potential in peace and prosperity as a friend and full partner of the United States. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on the Former Yugoslavia

UN Source: Commission on Human Rights of the UN Economic and Social Council, Geneva, Switzerland Description: Text of Resolution 1992/S-2/1, "The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Date: Dec, 1 199212/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia Subject: Human Rights, United Nations [TEXT] The Commission on Human Rights, Meeting in special session, Guided by the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, Aware of its responsibility to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and to prevent violations of such rights, Deeply concerned at the human tragedy in the former Yugoslavia and at the continuing grave, massive and systematic violations of human rights occurring there, particularly in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Serbian control, Recalling its resolution 1992/S-1/1 [for text, see Dispatch Supplement Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 46], Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Special Rapporteur appointed pursuant to resolution 1992/S-1/1, as well as those of the Chairman of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, who accompanied the Special Rapporteur on one or both of his missions, Noting with alarm the three reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia (A/47/666 - S/24809, E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9 and E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10), Gravely concerned in particular at the continuing, odious practice of ethnic cleansing, which is the direct cause of the vast majority of human rights violations and whose principal victims are the Muslim population virtually threatened with extermination, which the Special Rapporteur reports has continued, and in some regions intensified, in an effort to create a fait accompli in disregard of international commitments, in particular the statement of principles and the programme of action of the London Conference, entered into by those who carry out such ethnic cleansing, and recalling, as stated in its resolution 1992/S-1/1, that ethnic cleansing is aimed at the dislocation or destruction of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups, Alarmed that although the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a religious conflict, it has been characterized by the systematic destruction and profanation of mosques, Catholic churches and other places of worship, as well as other sites of cultural heritage, in particular in areas currently or previously under Serbian control, Deeply concerned that the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia has resulted in more than two and a half million refugees and displaced persons and at the catastrophic humanitarian situation now prevailing, Recalling with appreciation the continuing efforts of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Co-Chairmen of its Steering Committee, including their proposals for the constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina designed to protect human rights on the basis of fundamental international human rights instruments, 1. Commends the Special Rapporteur for his activities to date, and in particular his two missions and his reports; 2. Condemns in the strongest terms all violations of human rights in the former Yugoslavia, including killings, torture, beatings, rape, disappearances, destruction of houses and other acts or threats of violence aimed at forcing individuals to leave their homes, as identified by the Special Rapporteur; 3. Categorically condemns the ethnic cleansing being carried out, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognizing that the Serbian leadership in territories under their control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Yugoslav Army and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia bear primary responsibility for this reprehensible practice; 4. Demands an immediate end to the practice of ethnic cleansing, and in particular demands that the Republic of Serbia use its influence with the self-proclaimed Serbian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to bring the practice of ethnic cleansing to an immediate end and to reverse the effects of that practice, re-emphasizing the rights of refugees, displaced persons and other victims of ethnic cleansing to return to their homes and the invalidity of acts made under duress; 5. Affirms that States are to be held accountable for violations of human rights which their agents commit upon the territory of another State; 6. Condemns in particular the violations of human rights and humanitarian law in connection with detention, including killings, torture and the systematic practice of rape, and calls upon all parties in the former Yugoslavia to close immediately all detention centres not authorized by and in compliance with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and to release immediately in conditions of safety all persons arbitrarily or illegally detained; 7. Condemns also the indiscriminate shelling of cities and civilian areas, the systematic terrorization and murder of non-combatants, the destruction of vital services, the besieging of cities, and the use of military force against civilian populations and relief operations by all sides, recognizing that the main responsibility lies with Serbian forces; 8. Calls upon parties in the former Yugoslavia, and especially those most responsible, to cease violations of human rights and international humanitarian law immediately and to take appropriate steps to apprehend and punish those guilty of perpetrating or authorizing them; 9. Expresses deep concern at the number of disappearances and missing persons in the former Yugoslavia and calls on all parties to make all possible efforts to account for those missing; 10. Welcomes the establishment, pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992 [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 41, p. 769], of a Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information relating to violations of international humanitarian law and encourages the closest possible cooperation between the Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts, recommends that this Commission be granted the staff and resources necessary to enable it to act effectively, and requests the Commission of Experts to provide its conclusions to the Secretary-General in order to allow the Security Council to consider further appropriate steps towards bringing those accused to justice; 11. Reaffirms that all persons who perpetrate or authorize crimes against humanity or other grave breaches of international humanitarian law are individually responsible for these breaches and that the international community will exert every effort to bring them to justice, and calls on all parties to provide all pertinent information to the Commission of Experts in accordance with Security Council resolution 780 (1992); 12. Calls upon all States to consider the extent to which the acts committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia constitute genocide, in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; 13. Urges the Commission of Experts, with the assistance of the Centre for Human Rights, to arrange for an immediate and urgent investigation by qualified experts of a mass grave near Vukovar and other mass grave sites and places where mass killings are reported to have taken place, and requests the General Assembly to provide the resources necessary for this undertaking; 14. Expresses its grave concern at the information contained in the third report of the Special Rapporteur (A/47/666-S/24809) on the dangerous situation in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, and urges all parties in those areas to engage in a meaningful dialogue under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to act with utmost restraint and to settle disputes in full observance of human rights and freedoms, and calls on the Serbian authorities to refrain from the use of force and immediately to stop the practice of ethnic cleansing, and to respect fully the rights of persons belonging to ethnic communities or minorities in order to prevent the extension of the conflict to other parts of the former Yugoslavia; 15. Welcomes the call of the Special Rapporteur for the opening of humanitarian relief corridors to prevent the imminent death of tens of thousands of persons in besieged cities; 16. Welcomes Security Council resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 47, p. 843] in which it invites the Secretary-General in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant agencies, to study the possibility and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes and the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur for the creation of such security zones for the protection of displaced persons, while keeping in mind that the international community must not acquiesce in demographic changes caused by ethnic cleansing; 17. Affirms that all the parties in the former Yugoslavia share the responsibility for finding peaceful solutions through negotiations under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and welcomes the acceptance by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the constitutional proposals of the Co-Chairmen as a basis for negotiations; 18. Requests the Special Rapporteur to continue his efforts, especially by carrying out such further missions to the former Yugoslavia as he deems necessary, to call on other existing mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights to assist him and to report his findings and recommendations at its forty-ninth session, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to make the reports of the Special Rapporteur available to the Security Council; 19. Urges the Secretary-General to take steps to ensure the full and effective cooperation of all United Nations bodies to implement the present resolution and calls upon those bodies entrusted with human rights monitoring in the former Yugoslavia to cooperate closely with the Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts; 20. Requests the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, within the overall budgetary framework of the United Nations, to make all necessary resources available for the Special Rapporteur to carry out his mandate and to comply with the request of the Special Rapporteur for staff based in the territory of the former Yugoslavia to enhance effective continuous monitoring of the human rights situation there; 21. Decides to examine the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia at its forty-ninth session under agenda item 12. VOTE: 45-1-1 (Yugoslavia opposed, Cuba abstaining).(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines Revised

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 7 19931/7/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States, Bassas da India, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, International Organizations [TEXT] The Government of the United States, together with its partners in the missile technology control regime [MTCR], has strengthened its efforts to combat the proliferation of ballistic missiles. The United States and all the partners in the missile technology control regime have adopted revised guidelines to extend the scope of the regime to missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons as well as nuclear weapons. The adoption of these guidelines and their implementation confirms and tightens existing policy. These measures will further strengthen the MTCR and will be important factors in countering the proliferation of missile systems. The Government of the United States and its MTCR partners welcome the growing number of countries which have publicly committed themselves to respect the MTCR guidelines, and we call on all states to show a similar spirit of responsibility in the interest of international peace and security. A similar statement is being made simultaneously in the capitals of the 22 partners of the MTCR. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines: Text of Revisions

Boucher Description: Issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 7 19931/7/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States, Bassas da India, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, International Organizations [TEXT]
Missile Technology Control Regime
The United States Government has, after careful consideration and subject to its international treaty obligations, decided that, when considering the transfer of equipment and technology related to missiles, it will act in accordance with the attached Guidelines beginning on January 7, 1993. These Guidelines replace those adopted on April 16, 1987.
Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers
1. The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons. The Guidelines are not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. These Guidelines, including the attached Annex, form the basis for controlling transfers to any destination beyond the Government's jurisdiction or control of all delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and of equipment and technology relevant to missiles whose performance in terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters. Restraint will be exercised in the consideration of all transfers of items contained within the Annex and all such transfers will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The Government will implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation. 2. The Annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes equipment and technology. Category I items, all of which are in Annex Items 1 and 2, are those items of greatest sensitivity. If a Category I item is included in a system, that system will also be considered as Category I, except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, removed or duplicated. Particular restraint will be exercised in the consideration of Category I transfers regardless of their purpose, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Particular restraint will also be exercised in the consideration of transfers of any items in the Annex, or of any missiles (whether or not in the Annex), if the Government judges, on the basis of all available, persuasive information, evaluated according to factors including those in paragraph 3, that they are intended to be used for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Until further notice, the transfer of Category I production facilities will not be authorized. The transfer of other Category I items will be authorized only on rare occasions and where the Government (A) obtains binding government-to-government undertakings embodying the assurances from the recipient government called for in paragraph 5 of these Guidelines and (B) assumes responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use. It is understood that the decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgment of the United States Government. 3. In the evaluation of transfer applications for Annex items, the following factors will be taken into account: A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state; C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction; D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances of the recipient states referred to in sub-paragraphs 5.A and 5.B below; E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements. 4. The transfer of design and production technology directly associated with any items in the Annex will be subject to as great a degree of scrutiny and control as will the equipment itself, to the extent permitted by national legislation. 5. Where the transfer could contribute to a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction, the Government will authorize transfers of items in the Annex only on receipt of appropriate assurances from the government of the recipient state that: A. The items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use will not be modified nor the items modified or replicated without the prior consent of the United States Government; B. Neither the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will be retransferred without the consent of the United States Government. 6. In furtherance of the effective operation of the Guidelines, the United States Government will, as necessary and appropriate, exchange relevant information with other governments applying the same Guidelines. 7. The adherence of all States to these Guidelines in the interest of international peace and security would be welcome. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

Haiti: Legislative Elections

Boucher Description: Issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 12 19931/12/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization [TEXT] The de facto government of Haiti has announced its intention to hold elections for several Senate seats and other offices on January 18 and 25. The US Government believes that free and fair elections can only be held under a legally constituted government in an atmosphere of respect for free expression, freedom of assembly, and open political dialogue. These conditions do not exist in Haiti today. Consequently, we do not regard the planned elections as legitimate. In the same context, we remain firmly committed to restoration of democratic, constitutional government in Haiti. We continue to recognize Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the legitimately elected president of that country. We urge all Haitian parties to dedicate themselves to serious negotiations that will end the current crisis and restore democracy to Haiti.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

US To Assist With Senegal's Withdrawal From Liberia

Snyder Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joseph C. Snyder Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 12 19931/12/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Liberia, Senegal Subject: Military Affairs, International Organizations [TEXT] The United States wishes to commend the Senegalese military personnel in Liberia for the important role they have played in pursuing regional stability in West Africa. Their mission successfully completed, the Senegalese troops in Liberia will begin returning to Dakar [Senegal] tomorrow. The United States, which at the request of the Government of Senegal and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) assisted in the deployment of the Senegalese troops in late 1991, will help with their redeployment to Dakar. The operation, using military air transport and a commercial ship, will be financed from US funds allocated when the approximately 1,400 Senegalese troops arrived in Liberia in 1991. The Senegalese were in Liberia as part of the West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) maintained by ECOWAS. ECOMOG has significantly reinforced its presence in Liberia since the October 15, 1992, attack on Monrovia [Liberia] by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The peace-keeping force repelled the NPFL attack and has now secured virtually all territory seized by the NPFL at that time. ECOMOG will remain capable of protecting the Liberian people from attack after the departure of the Senegalese contingent. We expect ECOWAS to continue pursuing implementation of the Yamoussoukro [Cote d'Ivoire] peace agreement in accordance with the mandate contained in UN Security Council Resolution 788 of November 19, 1992 [for text, see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 48, p. 861]. The United States continues to support ECOWAS fully in its effort to bring peace to Liberia, disarm and demobilize the warring factions, and create conditions in which free and fair elections can be held. However, Charles Taylor has rejected the ECOWAS call for a cease-fire and asserted that his irregular army will not disarm under ECOMOG supervision. We call upon all Liberian combatants to cease aggressive actions and cooperate with the UN-endorsed ECOWAS plan.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 3, January 18, 1993 Title:

US-Pacific Island Nation Joint Commercial Commission

Snyder Description: Statement released by the Office of the Acting Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 12 19931/12/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Cook Islands, Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Western Samoa Subject: International Law, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Leaders from 13 Pacific island countries met with US officials on January 12 in Honolulu, Hawaii, to sign a memorandum of understanding establishing the US-Pacific Island Nations Joint Commercial Commission (JCC). This initiative, first proposed by President Bush at his October 27, 1990, Honolulu summit meeting with island heads of government, will function as a consultative mechanism to enhance commercial and trade links among member nations. As such, it will complement the economic policies of the South Pacific island governments, which stress the importance of the private sector in their respective national development programs. The United States currently has JCC agreements with Poland, China, South Korea, and Thailand. The Honolulu agreement marks the first time the United States has participated in a JCC comprised of so many nations in a single region. The successful conclusion of this undertaking underscores our continuing commitment to playing a constructive role in the South Pacific. Pacific island members of the JCC are the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993

Title:

Excerpts From President's Inaugural Address

Clinton Source: President Clinton Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan, 20 19931/20/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department [TEXT] ...To renew America, we must meet challenges abroad as well as at home. There is no longer a clear division between what is foreign and what is domestic. The world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS [acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome] crisis, the world arms race--they affect us all. Today, as an old order passes, the new world is more free but less stable. Communism's collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers. Clearly, America must continue to lead the world we did so much to make. While America rebuilds at home, we will not shrink from the challenges nor fail to seize the opportunities of this new world. Together with our friends and allies, we will work to shape change lest it engulf us. When our vital interests are challenged or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act--with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary. The brave Americans serving our nation today in the Persian Gulf, in Somalia, and wherever else they stand are testament to our resolve. But our greatest strength is the power of our ideas, which are still new in many lands. Across the world, we see them embraced, and we rejoice. Our hopes, our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing

Christopher Source: Secretary-Designate Christopher Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, East Asia, North America, MidEast/North Africa Country: United States, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, Israel, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mexico, Canada Subject: Trade/Economics, Military Affairs, Democratization, United Nations, Mideast Peace Process, North America Free Trade [TEXT] Mr. Chairman: It is a great honor to appear before you as President-elect Clinton's nominee for Secretary of State. This hearing room is a long way from Scranton, North Dakota, population 300, where I was born and raised, and I am deeply moved by being here in these circumstances. You and the members of this committee have contributed much leadership and wisdom to our nation's foreign policy over the past decade. Let me say at the outset that I look forward to a close and cooperative relationship with you. I also look forward to your questions and will try to answer them with the ruthless candor for which diplomats are famous. In the 3 weeks since President-elect Clinton asked me to serve as his Secretary of State, I have received about as much commiseration as congratulation. Friends point to this new world's raw conflicts and stress our own limited resources. They tell me I have drawn an important but unpleasant assignment. I appreciate their concern. But I dispute their assessment. I believe we have arrived at a uniquely promising moment. The signature of this era is change, and I believe many of the changes work in our favor. The Cold War is over. Forty years of sustained effort on behalf of collective security and human dignity have been rewarded. Millions who lived under the stultifying yoke of communism are free. The tide of democratic aspirations is rising from Tibet to Central America. Freer markets are expanding the reach of prosperity. The nuclear nightmare is receding, and I want to congratulate President Bush and [Russian] President Yeltsin on their successful negotiation of the START II Treaty [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]. We now have the opportunity to create a new strategy that directs America's resources at something other than superpower confrontation.
Perils of the New Era
Neither President-elect Clinton nor I have any illusions about the perils that lurk in many of this era's changes. The end of the Cold War has lifted the lid on many cauldrons of long-simmering conflict. The bloody results are evident in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Nor will this era lack for ruthless and expansionist despots; [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein confirmed that fact. Yet it is also true that we are now relatively more powerful and physically more secure. So while we are alert to this era's dangers, we nonetheless approach it with an underlying sense of optimism. Not since the late 1940s has our nation faced the challenge of shaping an entirely new foreign policy for a world that has fundamentally changed. Like our counterparts then, we need to design a new strategy for protecting American interests by laying the foundations for a more just and stable world. That strategy must reflect the fundamental changes that characterize this era: -- The surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and sectional conflicts, especially in the former Soviet bloc; -- The globalization of commerce and capital; -- A worldwide democratic revolution, fueled by new information technologies that amplify the power of ideas; -- New and old human rights challenges, including protecting ethnic minorities as well as political dissidents; -- The rise of new security threats, especially terrorism and the spread of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction; and -- Global challenges including overpopulation, famine, drought, refugees, AIDS [acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome], drug-trafficking, and threats to the earth's environment. To adapt our foreign policy goals and institutions to these changes, President-elect Clinton has stressed that our effort must rest on three pillars: First, we must elevate America's economic security as a primary goal of our foreign policy. Second, we must preserve our military strength as we adapt our forces to new security challenges. Third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of promoting the spread of democracy and markets abroad. As we adapt to new conditions, it is worth underscoring the essential continuity in American foreign policy. Despite a change in administrations, our policy in many specific instances will remain constant and will seek to build upon the accomplishments of our predecessors. Examples include the Middle East peace process, firm enforcement of the UN sanctions against Iraq, ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty, and the continuing need for US power to play a role in promoting stability in Europe and the Pacific. Nevertheless, our Administration inherits the task of defining a strategy for US leadership after the Cold War. We cannot afford to careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that seeks to anticipate and prevent crises, like those in Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia, rather than simply to manage them. Our support for democratic institutions and human rights can help defuse political conflicts. And our support for sustainable development and global environmental protection can help prevent human suffering on a scale that demands our intervention. We cannot foresee every crisis. But preventive diplomacy can free us to devote more time and effort to problems facing us at home. It is not enough to articulate a new strategy; we must also justify it to the American people. Today, foreign policy makers cannot afford to ignore the public, for there is a real danger that the public will ignore foreign policy. The unitary goal of containing Soviet power will have to be replaced by more complex justifications to fit the new era. We need to show that, in this era, foreign policy is no longer foreign. Practitioners of statecraft sometimes forget [that] their ultimate purpose is to improve the daily lives of the American people. They assume foreign policy is too complex for the public to be involved in its formation. That is a costly conceit. From Vietnam to Iran-contra, we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign policies hatched by the experts without proper candor or consultation with the public and their representatives in Congress. More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to have "clientitis," a malady characterized by undue deference to the potential reactions of other countries. I have long thought the State Department needs an "America Desk." This Administration will have one--and I'll be sitting behind it.
Guiding Principles For Foreign Policy
I will not attempt today to fit the foreign policy of the next 4 years into the straightjacket of some neatly tailored doctrine. Yet, America's actions in the world must be guided by consistent principles. As I have noted, I believe there are three that should guide foreign policy in this new era. First, we must advance America's economic security with the same energy and resourcefulness we devoted to waging the Cold War. The new Administration will shortly propose an economic program to empower American firms and workers to win in world markets, reduce our reliance on foreign borrowing, and increase our ability to sustain foreign commitments. Despite our economic woes, we remain the world's greatest trading nation, its largest market, and its leading exporter. That is why we must utilize all the tools at our disposal, including a new GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] agreement and a North American Free Trade Agreement that serves the interests of American firms, workers, and communities. In an era in which economic competition is eclipsing ideological rivalry, it is time for diplomacy that seeks to assure access for US businesses to expanding global markets. This does not mean that our commercial goals will trump other important concerns, such as non-proliferation, human rights, and sustainable development in the Third World. But for too long, we have made economics the poor cousin of our foreign policy. For example, in nearly all the countries of the former Eastern bloc--nations whose economies and markets are on the threshold of growth--we have for years assigned only one Foreign Service officer to assist US companies. In the case of Russia, that means one commercial officer for a nation of 150 million people. Other economic powers, such as Germany and Japan, devote far more personnel to promoting their firms, industries, and economic concerns. The Clinton Administration intends to harness our diplomacy to the needs and opportunities of American industries and workers. We will not be bashful about linking our high diplomacy with our economic goals. We will ask our foreign missions to do more to gather crucial information about market opportunities and barriers and actively assist American companies seeking to do business abroad. Second, we must maintain a strong defense as we adapt our forces to new and enduring security challenges. As a result of efforts begun in the late 1970s by President Carter and continued under Presidents Reagan and Bush, our Administration inherits the best fighting force in the world. But the world has changed. We face a paradox. The collapse of the Soviet Union enables us to reduce our Cold War military forces. But it also leaves American power as the main ballast for an unstable world. Our ability to manage the transition to a more stable system of international relations will depend on tenacious diplomacy backed by credible strength. The President-elect and Secretary [of Defense]-designate Aspin have described how we must adapt our armed forces to new missions. And I agree with President-elect Clinton's statement that we will resolve constantly to deter, sometimes to fight, and always to win. I have spent a good portion of my life practicing various forms of diplomacy, negotiation, and problem solving--from the effort to secure the release of the American hostages in Iran, to responses to urban unrest and police brutality, to the practice of law over 4 decades. I have argued and still believe that diplomacy is a neglected imperative. I believe we must apply new dispute resolution techniques and forms of international arbitration to the conflicts that plague the world. I also know from experience that nations do not negotiate on the basis of goodwill alone; they negotiate on the basis of interests and, therefore, on calculations of power. As I reflect on our experience in the Cold War, it is clear that our success flowed from our ability to harness diplomacy and power together--both the modernization of our forces and negotiations for arms control; both advocacy for human rights and covert and overt opposition to Soviet expansionism. In the years to come, Americans will be confronted with vexing questions about the use of force--decisions about whether to intervene in border disputes, civil wars, outright invasions, and in cases of possible genocide; about whether to intervene for purposes that are quite different from the traditional missions of our armed forces--purposes such as peace-keeping, peace-making, humanitarian assistance, evacuation of Americans abroad, and efforts to combat drug smuggling and terrorism. While there is no magic formula to guide such decisions, I do believe that the discreet and careful use of force in certain circumstances--and its credible threat in general-- will be essential to the success of our diplomacy and foreign policy. Although there will always be differences at the margin, I believe we can-- and must--craft a bipartisan consensus in which these questions concerning the use of force will no longer divide our nation as they once did. However, we cannot respond to every alarm. I want to assure the American people that we will not turn their blood and treasure into an open account for use by the rest of the world. We cannot let every crisis become a choice between inaction or American intervention. It will be this Administration's policy to encourage other nations and the institutions of collective security, especially the United Nations, to do more of the world's work to deter aggression, relieve suffering, and keep the peace. In that regard, we will work with [UN] Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and the members of the Security Council to ensure [that] the United Nations has the means to carry out such tasks. The United Nations has recently shown great promise in mediating disputes and fulfilling its promise of collective security--in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and elsewhere. But the United Nations cannot be an effective instrument for sharing our global burdens unless we share the burden of supporting it. I will work to ensure that we pay our outstanding obligations. Ultimately, when our vital interests are at stake, we will always reserve our option to act alone. As the President-elect has said, our motto in this era should be: Together where we can; on our own where we must. One of the main security problems of this era will be the proliferation of very deadly weapons--nuclear, chemical, biological, and enhanced conventional weapons--as well as their delivery systems. The [Persian] Gulf war highlighted the problem of a fanatical aggressor developing or using weapons of mass destruction. We must work assiduously with other nations to discourage proliferation through improved intelligence, export controls, incentives, sanctions, and even force when necessary. Overall, this Administration will give high priority to the prevention of proliferation as we enter a new and exceedingly dangerous period. Third, our new diplomacy will encourage the global revolution for democracy that is transforming our world. Promoting democracy does not imply a crusade to remake the world in our image. Rather, support for democracy and human rights abroad can and should be a central strategic tenet in improving our own security. Democratic movements and governments are not only more likely to protect human and minority rights, they are also more likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes in a peaceful manner and to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and global environmental protection. A strategic approach to promoting democracy requires that we coordinate all of our leverage, including trade, economic and security assistance, and debt relief. By enlisting international and regional institutions in the work of promoting democracy, the United States can leverage our own limited resources and avoid the appearance of trying to dominate others. In the information age, public diplomacy takes on special importance--and that is why we will support the creation of a Radio Free Asia to ensure that the people of all Asian nations have access to uncensored information about their societies and about the world. Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down but must be built from the bottom up. Our policy should encourage patient, sustained efforts to help others build the institutions that make democracy possible: political parties, free media, laws that protect property and individual rights, an impartial judiciary, labor unions, and voluntary associations that stand between the individual and the state. American private and civic groups are particularly well suited to help. In this regard, we will move swiftly to establish the Democracy Corps, to put experienced Americans in contact with foreign grassroots democratic leaders, and to strengthen the bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy. We must also improve our institutional capacity to provide timely and effective aid to people struggling to establish democracy and free markets. To that end, we need to overhaul the US Agency for International Development [USAID]. The agency needs to take on fewer missions, narrow the scope of its operations, and make itself less bureaucratic. As a matter of enlightened self-interest as well as compassion, we need to extract lessons from USAID's past successes and failures to make its future efforts stronger. In all this work, we must ensure that the people who carry out our nation's foreign policy have the resources they need to do the job. I want to work with you to ensure they have adequate facilities, training, information systems, and security. We also need to take a new look at the way our State Department is organized and our policy is formulated. In the coming weeks, I intend to streamline the Department of State to enhance our capabilities to deal with issues that transcend national boundaries and to improve the international competitiveness of American business. The Clinton Administration will put America back in the forefront of global efforts to achieve sustainable development and, in the process, leave our children a better world. We believe that sound environmental policies are a precondition of economic growth, not a brake on it. These three pillars for our foreign policy--economic growth, military strength, and support for democracy--are mutually re-enforcing. A vibrant economy will strengthen America's hand abroad, while permitting us to maintain a strong military without sacrificing domestic needs. And by helping others to forge democracy out of the ruins of dictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new ones, and create new markets for US trade and investment.
Principal Challenges To US Security
Let me take a few moments to consider how this strategic approach applies to the principal security challenges that America faces in the 1990s. None is more important than helping Russia demilitarize, privatize, invigorate its economy, and develop representative political institutions. President Yeltsin's courageous economic and political reforms stand as our best hope for reducing the still-formidable arsenal of nuclear and conventional arms in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, and this, in turn, permits reductions in our own defense spending. A collapse of the Russian economy, which contracted by 20% last year, could fatally discredit democracy, not only in the eyes of the Russians but in the eyes of their neighbors as well. Our Administration will join with our G-7 [Group of Seven leading industrialized nations] partners to increase support for Russia's economic reforms. That aid must be conditioned on the willingness of Russia to continue the difficult but essential steps necessary to move from a command economy to a more market-oriented one. We shall also place high priority on direct and technical assistance for Russia's efforts to dismantle its weapons and properly dispose of its nuclear materials, to provide civilian employment for defense technicians, and to house its demobilized forces. We must say to the democratic reformers in Russia that the democratic nations stand with them and that the world's experience in coping with similar problems is available to them. We should also orchestrate similar international action to help Ukraine, the other Commonwealth [of Independent] States, the Baltics, and the nations of Eastern and Central Europe. In Europe, we remain committed to NATO, history's most successful military and political alliance, even as we support the evolution of new security arrangements that incorporate the emerging democracies to the east. Our Administration will support efforts by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to promote human rights, democracy, free elections, and the historic re-integration of the nations of Eastern and Western Europe. I can also assure you that this Administration will vigorously pursue concerted action with our European allies and international bodies to end the slaughter in Bosnia--a slaughter that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and that threatens to spread throughout the Balkans. Europe and the world community in general must bring real pressures, economic and military, to bear on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of ethnic cleansing. In Asia, we confront many challenges and opportunities. In particular, as President-elect Clinton stressed during the campaign, a complex blend of new and old forces requires us to rethink our policy toward China. On the one hand, there is a booming economy based increasingly on free market principles, which is giving hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens an unprecedented degree of prosperity and a thirst for economic as well as political reform. On the other hand, we cannot ignore continuing reports of Chinese exports of sensitive military technology to troubled areas, widespread violations of human rights, or abusive practices that have contributed to a $17-billion trade imbalance between our two nations. Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and political liberalization in that great country. Elsewhere in Asia, the countries of the Pacific Rim are becoming a global center of economic dynamism. In 1991, our trans-Pacific trade exceeded $316 billion, dwarfing our $221-billion trade with Western Europe. We must devote particular attention to Japan. Japan has recently taken important steps to meet more of its international security responsibilities, such as assisting in peace-keeping efforts from Cambodia to Somalia. Now it must do more to meet its economic responsibilities as well--to lower trade barriers more quickly and to open its economy to competition. Together, Japan and the United States account for a third or more of the global economy. That obligates us both to steer clear of the reefs of recrimination and the rise of regional trading blocs that could sink prospects for global growth. But we also have an obligation to America's firms and workers to ensure [that] they are able to benefit from the growth of Japan's economy, just as the strength and openness of the US economy has helped fuel Japan's prosperity over many decades. In South Korea, we will continue to maintain our military presence as long as North Korea poses a threat to that nation. And on Asia's subcontinent, our interests include combating nuclear proliferation; restoring peace to Afghanistan; seeing an end to communal strife that threatens India's democracy; and promoting human rights and free elections in Burma, Pakistan, and elsewhere. In the Middle East, we must maintain the momentum behind the current negotiations over peace and regional issues. President Bush and [former] Secretary of State Baker deserve great credit for bringing Arabs and Israelis to the bargaining table, and the Clinton Administration is committed to building on that historic breakthrough. Our democracy- centered policy underscores our special relationship with Israel, the region's only democracy, with whom we are committed to maintaining a strong and vibrant strategic relationship. We also believe that America's unswerving commitment to Israel's right to exist behind secure borders is essential to a just and lasting peace. We will continue our efforts with both Israel and our Arab friends to address the full range of that region's challenges. Throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, we will work toward new arms control agreements, particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction. We will assume a vigilant stance toward both Iraq and Iran, which seem determined to sow violence and disorder throughout the region and even beyond. In this region, as well, we will champion economic reform, more accountable governance, and increased respect for human rights. And following a decade during which over 1,000 Americans were killed, injured, or kidnaped by perpetrators of international terrorism, we will give no quarter to terrorists or the states that sponsor their crimes against humanity. Nowhere has the march against dictators and toward democracy been more dramatic than in our own hemisphere. It is in our self-interest to help Latin America consolidate a decade of hard-won progress. In the past several years, as democracy has spread in the region and market economies have been liberalized, our exports to Latin America have doubled. In close partnership with our hemispheric partners, Canada and Mexico, we should explore ways to extend free trade agreements to Latin American nations that are opening their economies and political systems. At the same time, we expect to complete understandings regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement as outlined by President-elect Clinton. We also need to make the Organization of American States [OAS] a more effective forum for addressing our region's problems. In Haiti, we strongly support the international effort by the UN and the OAS to restore democracy. In Cuba, we will maintain the embargo to keep pressure on the Castro regime. We will strongly support national reconciliation and the full implementation of peace accords in El Salvador and Nicaragua. And in the Andean countries, the power of the drug lords must be broken to free their people and ours from the corrupting influence of the narcotics trade. In Africa, as well, a new generation is demanding the opportunities that flow from multi-party democracy and open economies. They deserve our understanding and support. We need to assist their efforts to build institutions that can empower Africa's people to husband and benefit from the continent's vast resources; deal with its economic, social, and environmental problems; and address its underlying causes of political instability. We will be equally committed to working with Congress to redirect our foreign assistance programs to promote sustainable development and private enterprise in Africa. In South Africa, we shall work actively to support those, black and white, who are striving to dismantle the hateful machinery of apartheid and working with determination to build a multi-racial democracy.
The Triumph of Freedom
As I said on the day President-elect Clinton nominated me to be Secretary of State, back when I was in law school, two of my heroes were [former Secretaries of State] Gen. George Marshall and Dean Acheson. And I am enormously honored by the opportunity to occupy the post held by them and by many of the most revered names in our nation's history. Marshall and Acheson were visionaries who recognized at the dawn of the Cold War that America could not remain safe by standing aloof from the world. And the triumph of freedom in that great struggle is the legacy of the activist foreign policy they shaped to project our values and protect our interests. Now, as in their day, we face a new era and the challenge of developing a new foreign policy. Its activism must be grounded in America's enduring interests. It must be informed by a realistic estimate of the dangers we face. It must be shaped by the democratic convictions we share. And, to command respect abroad, it must rest on a sturdy, bipartisan consensus here at home. The ultimate test of the security strategy I have outlined today will be in the benefits it delivers to the American people. Its worth will be measured not by its theoretical elegance but by its results. If it makes our people more prosperous and increases their safety abroad; if it helps expand the stabilizing and ennobling reach of democratic institutions and freer markets; if it helps protect the global environment for our children--if it achieves these kinds of benefits, then we will have discharged our responsibilities to our generation as Marshall, Acheson, and the other architects of the post-war world discharged theirs. They have given us a high standard to emulate as we define anew the requirements of US global leadership. I look forward to working with both parties in Congress to construct a new framework for that leadership, a frame-work within which healthy debate will occur but within which we can also build a strong consensus that will help us cooperatively pursue the national interest at home and abroad. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

Deputy Secretary-Designate's Confirmation Hearing

Wharton Source: Deputy Secretary-Designate Wharton Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 22 19931/22/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] When President Clinton asked me to join his new Administration, I accepted with a sense of honor, of excitement, and a sense of great personal fulfillment. For more than 2 decades, I have been an executive in higher education and finance--president of a university; chancellor of a multi-campus university system; and head of a very large insurance company and pension fund for employees of colleges and universities, research institutes, private secondary schools, and foundations. Some might ask how, with that background, I came to be considered for this post. While I am not privy to the thoughts of President Clinton or Secretary of State Christopher on my selection, I should point out that my career did not suddenly begin when I was elected president of Michigan State University in 1970. The fact is that for some 22 years previously, my full-time career involved technical assistance and foreign economic development. Mr. Chairman, if I may be permitted to forego my usual diffidence, an anecdote may help to clarify the dilemma I face when trying to rebut those who say I have no foreign policy experience. At a recent college commencement where I was privileged to receive an honorary degree, I was waiting in the procession line when I was approached by a faculty member. His first comment after congratulating me on the honorary degree was the inevitable question: "How's my retirement money?" His second comment was to say, "I am very happy to meet you because I use your father's book on economic development in my course." When I pointed out to him that my ambassador father never wrote a book on economic development but that he was referring to my book, my faculty friend expressed amazement to learn that I was the same person.
Background
So how did all this begin? In his presentation several days ago, Warren Christopher recalled the great influence on the post-1945 world of our nation's Marshall Plan--surely one of the few shining episodes in the history of relations between nations formerly at war. Perhaps the event that most shaped my own career was my presence in the graduating class at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. As someone who has given more than a few of them, I can tell you that commencement speeches are usually listened to by the boisterous seniors with half an ear, if that. But for my class, the speaker was Secretary of State George C. Marshall himself. The address he gave that day--the address in which he set forth the elements of the Marshall Plan--stands as one of the great turning points in enlightened diplomacy. Even now I remember key thoughts from his speech: Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. General Marshall knew full well [that] he was laying the groundwork for a great campaign to rebuild war-torn Europe-- physically, economically, and politically as well. He may have been less aware of the effect his words had on one idealistic youngster who resolved, on the spot, to dedicate himself to the inspired and inspiring principles General Marshall had just put before the graduating class. Nonetheless, his words guided my educational and career choices from that moment onward. At Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, I took my masters in international affairs with an emphasis on Latin America-- a specialization that eventually led to 5 years of work on assistance programs in Venezuela, Brazil, and Costa Rica in association with Nelson Rockefeller. Later, when I was studying for my doctorate in economics at the University of Chicago, my mentor was the great Nobel laureate in economics, Theodore W. Shultz, who was then evaluating US technical assistance throughout Latin America. My dissertation was on the impact of technical assistance on agricultural development in Brazil. When I completed my doctorate, I faced the usual choice [of] what in the world to do with it. My father, a career diplomat who would eventually become our country's first black career ambassador, made no secret of his eagerness to have me follow his footsteps into the Foreign Service. And that was by no means an unappealing possibility. Yet, 10 years after I heard George Marshall speak at Harvard, his message still filled me with excitement. In Japan and Europe it was now possible to see, in the most vivid and concrete ways, what international assistance and trade could accomplish. And in President Truman's subsequent "Point Four" program, the United States had already embarked on an extension of the original Marshall Plan concept to what were then called the "underdeveloped" nations of the Third World. To be sure, the Point Four program was undertaken in large part, if not entirely, to contain the expanding communist sphere of influence. Yet Point Four struck me as potentially much more than just a Cold War gambit. Ultimately, I thought it might be, at least, as constructive an element of US foreign policy as traditional diplomacy. And, on that basis, I made my choice. Between 1957 and 1970, I worked for the private, non-profit Agricultural Development Council headed by John D. Rockefeller III. For 6 of those years, my family and I lived in Malaysia, while my teaching, research, and grant- making and development activities also took me regularly to Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. It was a part of the world where the majority of people were struggling to move from bare subsistence to a higher standard of living. They were seeking better nutrition, housing, education, and health care--all the things we mean when we talk about the "quality of life" and "economic development." Our efforts to help them we labeled "technical assistance." Back in the United States, our commitments got thrown together with a lot of other things under the catch-all heading of "foreign aid." Then, as now, not understanding "foreign aid" didn't necessarily prevent people from attacking it. In 1970, I became president of Michigan State University--a huge "megaversity" in the then-popular term and one with a large and highly respected international studies program. These were important programs, including scores of projects based in developing nations around the world, many funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). In 1978, I became chancellor of the State University of New York (SUNY) system, the nation's largest public university. With 64 campuses, 47,000 employees, and more than 380,000 students, SUNY also maintained major international program commitments, and I made enhancing them one of my key initiatives during the 9 years I worked there. In 1987, I became chairman and chief executive officer of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund [TIAA- CREF]. With assets of $112 billion, TIAA-CREF is the largest private pension fund in the world and the third-largest insurance company in the United States. Without belaboring the point much further, I want to stress that my involvement in international relations did not end after my overseas development days were over. My first foreign policy foray came in 1966 as a member of the State Department's Advisory Committee on East Asia and the Pacific. In the intervening years, I was chairman of the Food Advisory Plan of Congress' Office of Technology Assistance; a member of President Carter's Commission on World Hunger; co-chairman of Secretary of State Shultz's Commission on Security and Economic Assistance; and the first chairman of USAID's Board for International Food and Agricultural Development. I have been a long-standing member of the Overseas Development Council and trustee of the Council on Foreign Relations, where I had the privilege of serving with Secretary Christopher. Most recently, I have briefly served on the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I hope you will forgive me for the brief, though probably not brief enough, recitation of what could be called my foreign policy portfolio. I wanted to give you some assurance that, in this extremely demanding assignment as Deputy Secretary of State, I will not be starting from square one. Moreover, since Secretary Christopher provided you with his perspectives on the many challenges that our country faces around the world, particularly in Russia, the Middle East, and Somalia, it seemed only fair to offer you some sense of the background and values I bring to these and other challenges that lie ahead.
Immediate Priorities
What, in fact, are some of the challenges that are uppermost in my mind? The Deputy Secretary of State is, in one sense, the Secretary's alter ego and, in another, the State Department's chief operating officer. As such, I propose to concentrate, at least initially, on at least four issues. First, I have been asked by Secretary Christopher to take an active role in putting together both the State Department budget for FY 1994 and the Function 150 International Affairs Budget. In that process, we will be seeking to balance two imperatives. -- The first is to support the Administration's key foreign policy objectives in national security, economic competitiveness and the promotion of democracy and free markets abroad. -- The second is to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the Administration's domestic agenda. Given the obvious fiscal constraints, we will need to take much greater care in assuring that the resources we dedicate to advance our important interests abroad are expended in a coordinated and effective way. Second, I will search for ways to adapt our foreign affairs machinery to the new realities of the post-Cold War era. As Secretary Christopher stated in his appearance before this committee, recent changes on the global scene make it both timely and necessary to re-examine the way our State Department is organized and how our policy is formulated. Also, we need to streamline the Department and the policy- making process as we enhance our ability to deal with issues that transcend national boundaries. Third, I intend to pay special attention to the restructuring of our aid programs and institutions. It is clear from the many recent studies that we need to redefine USAID and revamp its organization accordingly. In particular, we must ensure that our aid activities directly support democracy, free markets, and sustainable development. This will receive my highest priority. We intend to name an Administrator of USAID and to move quickly to develop proposals which can serve as the basis for consultation with the Congress. Finally, I will look for ways to strengthen and support the people who are responsible for the day-to-day management and execution of our foreign policy, for they constitute our most important resource. We must be sure that they have the training and direction they need to advance our key policy objectives, and we must see to it that they have the facilities, information systems, and security needed to accomplish their critically important missions. In each of these important areas, I hope that my managerial experience in business and academia, as well as my earlier experience in economic development, will serve me well. But I want to emphasize that as we consider ways to improve the Department, I will work closely with the Congress and especially with the members of this committee. Your wisdom and insights will be invaluable. More broadly, as Secretary Christopher's alter ego, I expect to be fully engaged in policy issues. As we shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world, the United States is, by force of destiny, a nation which must act in global terms. But we need not think about the fate of other nations for purely altruistic reasons. The fact is, as President Clinton has said on numerous occasions, our national interest is inextricably linked with the rest of the world's. Our economy now stretches to every corner of the world through international trade and resource specialization. Oil tremors anywhere in the world are quickly felt at the gas pumps in our towns and villages. American exports are the source of millions of jobs in this country. Our balance-of-trade problems and deficits are symptomatic of the global linkages. Our ecology is the world's ecology. Whether it is global warming or desertification, national boundaries mean nothing to the forces of nature. The volcanic dust from Krakatoa didn't know the difference between the United States, Canada, or Europe. Our base of human knowledge is globally linked. It is no accident that today American universities have the largest numbers of foreign graduate students ever. These students will take back to their countries part of the American culture, which will further extend American influence. The explosion in new technologies and the speed with which they travel around the world accelerates almost daily. Many of these new technologies are invented here in the United States but are often more skillfully commercialized by other nations. We must take dramatic steps to reverse this trend, but we cannot hope to reverse it if we turn our backs on the world. Finally, we have to recognize the extent to which the world's peoples are linked. The United States, with its kaleidoscope of race, religion, creed, ethnic and national origin, is one of the most diverse nations in the world. The influx of immigrants throughout our nation's history has strengthened us in many ways. But it also has cemented our ties to foreign lands, allies, and trading partners. I belabor these points because if our foreign policy is to be a viable one, it must reflect the fundamental reality of our global nature. Our domestic strength is linked to our international strength and vice versa. Isolationism is not a viable option. To pursue peace not just through preparedness but also by eliminating hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos; to champion democracy not by imposing it but by fostering the economic, political, and social conditions for the development of free institutions--this is the vision that inspired me as a young college graduate. It is a vision fed by the best and purest springs of the American character. And it is a vision that will serve us as well in foreign policy as it will for the Clinton Administration's agenda for domestic economic growth and social progress in the years ahead.
Conclusion
In nominating Warren Christopher to be the architect of our nation's foreign policy, President Clinton has chosen superbly well. Secretary Christopher is an exemplary public servant and diplomat--a man of both vision and experience, absolute integrity, and heartfelt love of country. I look forward to serving with him, and I will consider it a great honor if he considers his formidable skills in any way complemented by my own. With your permission, I would like to conclude on a very personal note. I spoke before of my father, a 40-year veteran of the US Foreign Service--in fact, the first black career officer to be appointed a US ambassador. I can't say that these things are in the genes, of course. I can't even say my father was always in full agreement with my need to find my own way in life or the paths I took to do so. But my father did instill in me both a thirst for knowledge about the world and a sense of diplomacy's high calling for resolving the conflicts that inevitably arise between nations. My one regret is that he couldn't be in the audience today as you consider his son's nomination as second-in-command of the Department he was so proud to serve. If he had been here, he'd probably be nodding and saying, "Well, son, you certainly took the long way around. Now it's about time you took my advice." (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

START II Treaty Transmittal Letter

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of a letter to the US Senate, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 15 19931/15/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] To the Senate of the United States: I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993 [see Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 20]. The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: -- the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and Conversion Protocol); -- the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation on Strategic Offensive Arms (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and -- the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on Attribution). In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State and letters exchanged by representatives of the Parties. The letters are associated with, but not integral parts of, the START II Treaty. Although not submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, these letters are provided because they are relevant to the consideration of the Treaty by the Senate. The START II Treaty is a milestone in the continuing effort by the United States and the Russian Federation to address the threat posed by strategic offensive nuclear weapons, especially multiple-warhead ICBMs. It builds upon and relies on the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991. At the same time, the START II Treaty goes even further than the START Treaty. The START Treaty was the first treaty actually to reduce strategic offensive arms of both countries, with overall reductions of 30-40 percent and reductions of up to 50 percent in the most threatening systems. It enhances stability in times of crisis. It not only limits strategic arms but also reduces them significantly below current levels. In addition, the START Treaty allows equality of forces and is effectively verifiable. Finally, commitments associated with the START Treaty will result in the elimination of nuclear weapons and deployed strategic offensive arms from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine within 7 years after entry into force, and accession of these three states to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. As a result, after 7 years, only Russia and the United States will retain any deployed strategic offensive arms under the START Treaty. The START II Treaty builds upon and surpasses the accomplishments of the START Treaty by further reducing strategic offensive arms in such a way that further increases the stability of the strategic nuclear balance. It bans deployment of the most destabilizing type of nuclear weapons system-- land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads. At the same time, the START II Treaty permits the United States to maintain a stabilizing sea-based force. The central limits of the START II Treaty require reductions by January 1, 2003, to 3000-3500 warheads. Within this, there are sublimits of between 1700-1750 warheads on deployed SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] for each Party, or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself; zero for warheads on deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs; and zero for warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs. Thus, the Treaty reduces the current overall deployments of strategic nuclear weapons on each side by more than two-thirds from current levels. These limits will be reached by the end of the year 2000 if both Parties reach agreement on a program of assistance to the Russian Federation with regard to dismantling strategic offensive arms within a year after entry into force of the Treaty. Acceptance of these reductions serves as a clear indication of the ending of the Cold War. In a major accomplishment, START II will result in the complete elimination of heavy ICBMs (the SS-18s) and the elimination or conversion of their launchers. All heavy ICBMs and launch canisters will be destroyed. All but 90 heavy ICBM silos will likewise be destroyed and these 90 silos will be modified to be incapable of launching SS-18s. To address the Russians' stated concern over the cost of implementing the transition to a single-warhead ICBM force, the START II Treaty provides for the conversion of up to 90 of the 154 Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM silos that will remain after the START Treaty reductions. The Russians have unilaterally undertaken to use the converted silos only for the smaller, SS-25 type single-warhead ICBMs. When implemented, the Treaty's conversion provisions, which include extensive on-site inspection rights, will preclude the use of these silos to launch heavy ICBMs. Together with the elimination of SS-18 missiles, these provisions are intended to ensure that the strategic capability of the SS-18 system is eliminated. START II allows some reductions to be taken by downloading, i.e., reducing the number of warheads attributed to existing missiles. This will allow the United States to achieve the reductions required by the Treaty in a cost- effective way by downloading some or all of our sea-based Trident SLBMs and land-based Minuteman III ICBMs. The Treaty also allows downloading, in Russia, of 105 of the 170 SS-19 multiple-warhead missiles in existing silos to a single-warhead missile. All other Russian launchers of multiple- warhead ICBMs--including the remaining 65 SS-19s--must be converted for single-warhead ICBMs or eliminated in accordance with START procedures. START II can be implemented in a fashion that is fully consistent with US national security. To ensure that we have the ability to respond to worldwide conventional contingencies, it allows for the reorientation, without any conversion procedures, of 100 START-accountable heavy bombers to a conventional role. These heavy bombers will not count against START II warhead limits. The START Treaty and the START II Treaty remain in force concurrently and have the same duration. Except as explicitly modified by the START II Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty will be used to implement START II. The START II Treaty provides for inspections in addition to those of the START Treaty. These additional inspections will be carried out according to the provisions of the START Treaty unless otherwise specified in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or in the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol. As I was convinced that the START Treaty is effectively verifiable, I am equally confident that the START II Treaty is effectively verifiable. The START Treaty was an historic achievement in our long-term effort to enhance the stability of the strategic balance through arms control. The START II Treaty represents the capstone of that effort. Elimination of heavy ICBMs and the effective elimination of all other multiple-warhead ICBMs will put an end to the most dangerous weapons of the Cold War. In sum, the START II Treaty is clearly in the interest of the United States and represents a watershed in our efforts to stabilize the nuclear balance and further reduce strategic offensive arms. I therefore urge the Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to the Treaty, including its Protocols and Memorandum on Attribution, and to give its advice and consent to ratification. George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

New Hope for Haiti

Einaudi Source: Luigi R. Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) Description: Address before the OAS Permanent Council, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 13 19931/13/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, OAS [TEXT] Mr. Chairman: I thank the [OAS] Secretary General for his report, which gives some of the reasons why we believe there is new hope for progress in Haiti. Indeed, I wish to convey explicitly from the outset my government's appreciation for Secretary General Baena Soares' continuing efforts to carry out the mandates created by the OAS Foreign Ministers during their ad hoc meeting last December 13, as well as those that have been in place since October of 1991. Our Secretary General has, in our view, borne daunting responsibilities with grace and energy in an environment characterized by rapid change and complexity, one presenting major obstacles as well as opportunities. His performance--both individually and in coordination with the Foreign Minister of Bolivia--reaffirms the unique role of regional solidarity organized in support of Haitian democracy through the OAS. Now, a renewed effort to resolve Haiti's crisis has been taking shape for some time. In its current form, however, the new initiative now developing is built on three pillars that have emerged clearly only over the past month. They are: -- Internationally, a new pattern of coordination between the OAS and the United Nations in which are combined the special strengths of regional sensitivity and global power; -- In Haiti, a desire among the most varied of sectors to put an end to this tragic crisis; and, finally, -- In the United States, close cooperation in the national interest between incoming and outgoing administrations of different political parties. The prelude took place in September [1992], when Secretary General Baena Soares hosted a week of negotiations between personal representatives of [Haitian] President Aristide and of Haiti's de facto government. Those private talks led to a breakthrough agreement to station an 18-member civilian presence in Haiti. Now headed by the gifted diplomat from Trinidad and Tobago, Colin Granderson, that mission has faced both logistical and political difficulties--yet it has become the inspiration for a process to reassure all parties in Haiti that a peaceful solution is possible and that their intrinsic human rights can be respected. In October [1992], President Aristide reminded world leaders of the continuing urgency of the crisis and called upon the UN to join the OAS in enforcing measures designed to restore democracy there. His letter stimulated November resolutions in both the OAS and the UN calling for implementation of economic measures and--I quote the OAS--". . . with special emphasis on the suspension of oil, arms and munitions supplies and on the freezing of assets of the Haitian state." At the same time, at the request of our Secretary General Baena Soares, Jamaica's former Prime Minister Michael Manley carried out quiet shuttle diplomacy with a view to assessing opportunities for an early solution of the crisis. In early December, Manley met in Atlanta with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and former President Carter. On December 11, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali nominated former Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo as his Special Representative on Haiti. We in the United States have a high regard for Dante Caputo, and we are impressed that our [OAS] Secretary General has ensured greater cooperation with the United Nations and a single voice by naming Mr. Caputo his representative. On December 13, the hemisphere's foreign ministers met in Washington in a reconvened OAS ministerial on Haiti. After a 31/2-hour, closed-door debate, during which Jamaica's current Foreign Minister David Coore made a moving statement of the need for both stronger measures and greater humanitarian assistance, the ministers took several decisions. Of particular significance for future events, they authorized new efforts focused on a "substantial increase in the OAS civilian presence" and on increasing cooperation with the United Nations, possibly even the Security Council. On December 19, special envoy Caputo traveled to Port au Prince and met with all interested sectors. That week, our Secretary General met with the Secretary General of the United Nations in New York. On January 6 [1993], Secretary of State Eagleburger and Secretary- designate Warren Christopher discussed the situation in Haiti [see box]. On an exceptional basis, the Department of State issued a formal statement that it had been coordinating closely with senior members of the Clinton transition team in a joint effort with UN and OAS representatives to support the initiative being developed by Mr. Caputo. Mr. Chairman, let me quote directly from this exceptional official US statement: The incoming Administration and this Administration [that is, the Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration-to-be] share the goal of restoring democracy to Haiti--safeguarding the human rights of all Haitians on the island and helping the parties find a lasting solution that will end Haiti's suffering and attain new support for Haiti's economy and people. We urge all sides to be flexible in their positions and to be responsive to the entreaties of the United Nations and OAS. The next day, Secretary General Baena added to the new momentum by calling publicly again for an immediate enhancement of the OAS civilian presence in Haiti. The United States agrees, believing that the early augmentation of the international civilian presence on the ground in Haiti can help create a climate of confidence for negotiations to end Haiti's political and economic crisis and can, by its very presence, have an immediate, positive impact in reducing human rights violations from whatever source. We agree entirely with Secretary General Baena Soares that the OAS civilian presence should not be seen as a substitute for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. We regret that the de facto government in Port au Prince declined a request from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to visit Haiti to observe the human rights situation. I might also add that we, too, are concerned by the announcement by the de facto government that it intends to hold elections for several Senate seats and other offices on January 18 and 25. The United States believes that free and fair elections can only be held under a legally constituted government in an atmosphere of respect for free expression, freedom of assembly, and open political dialogue. These conditions do not exist in Haiti today; for that reason the State Department yesterday publicly indicated that we do not regard the planned elections as legitimate [see Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 42]. My delegation would support a similar statement by the president of this permanent council to that effect today. The fact is that the United States is firmly committed to restoration of democratic, constitutional government in Haiti. We continue to recognize Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the legitimately elected president of that country. And we urge all parties to dedicate themselves to serious negotiations to end the current crisis by restoring democracy to Haiti. Haiti needs a democratic solution to end its suffering--to attain new support for its economy and people. One component of this lasting solution is economic. The US is providing food for some 400,000-500,000 Haitians every day and emergency medical care for up to 2 million Haitian men, women, and children. Our purpose in joining the embargo is to help induce negotiations and restore democracy. Our purpose is not to deny food to the poor or to deprive the Haitian people generally of basic needs. In fact, today the United States is publishing in the Federal Register regulations decided upon some time ago that will allow the export to Haiti of school books, medicine, generators, and generator spare parts for humanitarian purposes such as hospitals. Our purpose is to maintain pressure for a negotiated political solution, not to punish the Haitian people. To that end, we continue to ban most trade. To that end, we oppose access by the de facto regime to international financial institutions or to arms. To that end, we maintain frozen the assets of the Haitian Government in the United States. We are not and have not been shy about this policy. Maj. Gen. John Sheehan, USMC, is in charge of US Security Assistance Programs in the Caribbean. He regularly consults with the military liaison officers in our embassies there. Last week, we took advantage of his visit to Haiti to reinforce our basic message: that there must be a peaceful solution to Haiti's crisis that recognizes the legitimate authority of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Finally, let me say that any lasting solution must address the tragic conditions of the Haitian "boat people." We are very concerned that migration by boat from Haiti is an extremely dangerous undertaking which has led to many deaths. As we have said many times, we believe that migration is a regional problem to which the only lasting solution is the restoration of democracy in Haiti itself. We urge all Haitians wishing to seek refugee status to operate through normal legal procedures that are already in place and accessible to them. Let me conclude by repeating that we believe this is a moment of unusual opportunity to make progress on a terrible problem. The opportunity has been created by an unprecedented conjunction of forces and events inside Haiti and out. We now have the United Nations undertaking a complementary and reinforcing role in addition to that of the OAS, which has been involved since the beginning of this crisis. It is crucial that the Haitian people take advantage of this opportunity before new pressures arise and before additional hardships affect them. It is crucial that they seek a fair and lasting democratic solution that bolsters democratic institutions, safeguards the rights of all citizens, and allows economic reconstruction. We urge all sides to be flexible in their positions and to be responsive to the UN and OAS as this new initiative develops. And we urge all countries--not only those who have already been generous in their support but all countries--to provide the long-term financial and human support needed to ensure that this new initiative prospers and that the plan set forth so well by our Secretary General today can be put into practice. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

Haiti: Diplomatic Initiative

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Description: Address before the OAS Permanent Council, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 6 19931/6/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, OAS [TEXT] In their initial meeting this morning, Secretary Eagleburger and Secretary- designate Christopher discussed the new diplomatic initiative being under- taken by the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) to find a solution to the Haiti crisis. The State Department and the Clinton transition team have been coordinating closely in a joint effort to support this initiative. UN and OAS representatives have been in close touch with the Department and senior members of the Clinton transition team in recent days. The incoming Administration and this Administration share the goal of restoring democracy to Haiti--safeguarding the human rights of all Haitians on the island and helping the parties find a lasting solution that will end Haiti's suffering and attain new support for Haiti's economy and people. We urge all sides to be flexible in their positions and to be responsive to the entreaties of the United Nations and OAS. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 4, January 25, 1993 Title:

Zaire: Need for Economic Reform

Snyder Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joseph Snyder Description: Statement, Washington, DC Description: Address before the OAS Permanent Council, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 14 19931/14/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Zaire Subject: Democratization In Zaire today, the ambassadors of the United States, Belgium, and France delivered a joint demarche personally to the President, the Prime Minister, and the Chairman of the High Council urging them to adopt a short-term stabilization plan and other reforms in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The ambassadors made clear that such economic reforms are an essential precondition for increased bilateral and multilateral aid. The demarche stressed that the transition government of Prime Minister Tshisekedi must have full authority to pursue the twin objectives of peaceful transition to democracy and economic stabilization without interference from the presidency. The demarche also stated that the government budget, including limited and controlled appropriations for the presidency, should be formulated in a fully transparent way and strictly observed. The demarche noted the absolute importance of appointing a qualified managerial team responsible to the prime minister, according to procedures approved by the national conference, including the governor of the central bank. The ambassadors emphasized that when Zaire has taken these initial steps, the United States, Belgium, and France will be prepared to help assist Zaire's economic recovery, according to their individual procedures. Initially, such assistance would include increased humanitarian aid; private voluntary organization and government programs to help establish a social safety net; and technical support, including advice on the implementation of necessary economic reforms. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993

Title:

A New Era of Peril and Promise

Clinton Source: President-elect Clinton Description: Address before the Diplomatic Corps, Georgetown University, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 18 19931/18/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Military Affairs, Trade/Economics, Democratization [TEXT] I came to this university at a time when a fallen president had asked my generation to give something back to our country. I was looking for a place to prepare for that calling.Georgetown and its School of Foreign Service have made enormous contributions not only to my life but to public service in general. Many of its graduates, including my classmates, are now distinguished members of our Foreign Service, our armed forces, or serving in other areas of public and private life. Recently, Georgetown has made yet another contribution in my friend, Dr. Madeleine Albright, who has agreed to be our nation's voice at the United Nations. I also chose to speak to you here, today, because of Georgetown's historical tradition. George Washington spoke at this building, Old North, in 1797, when the college was not yet 10 years old. Our republic, scarcely 20 years old, stood not with great powers then but with great hopes. The Marquis de Lafayette, whose friendship and cooperation with our nation was so vital to its birth, was escorted to this campus by a troop of light horse cavalry in 1824. And across America's generations, presidents, dignitaries, and scholars have chosen this site to speak about our collective hopes for the future of our nation and the world. In December of 1991, as I launched my campaign for the presidency, I came back here to Georgetown to deliver three speeches which laid out the principles and policies that would become the heart of my candidacy. In the first of those speeches, I recalled the lesson taught me by one of my George-town professors, Carroll Quigley. . . . Carroll Quigley argued that the defining idea of Western civilization and of the United States in particular was what he called future preference--the idea that the future can be better than the present and that each of us has a personal, moral responsibility to make it so. When we embraced that idea, it was a revolutionary one. Now, all around the world, people are beginning to think that way. That idea was the heart of my campaign for the presidency, and it is a lesson that now applies with equal force to the community of nations at the end of the Cold War. While we cannot yet discern all of the contours of the new age in which we are living, we know it is clearly an era of both peril and promise when the future for millions and millions of people around the globe can be better than the present; when the dreams of freedom and democracy and economic prosperity and human rights can become real--but they may or not, depending on what we do. This is a season for hope. The Berlin wall today exists now only in the little remnants of stone that have become the personal mementos of a historic triumph of freedom over tyranny. A worldwide democratic revolution has shown its strength and tenacity, from the shipyards of Gdansk to the streets of Moscow, from the campuses of Beijing to the villages of El Salvador and the townships of Soweto. The spread of freer markets has brought the possibility of better living conditions from the factories of the Baltics to the fertile fields of Africa and Latin America. But the events of the last week remind us anew that this era will not lack for dangers. We are all mindful of the tension in Iraq and of Saddam Hussein's continuing provocations against the international community and his own people. He must understand that America's resolve during this transition period will not waver. I support the international community's actions designed to bring him to full compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions, and I ask each of you in the diplomatic corps to emphasize this point to your own governments. The policy of this country will remain American policy after January 20. We face many immediate other perils in this new era--the rise of ethnic hatreds in the former republics of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the suffering in Somalia, the turmoil in Haiti, the proliferation of advanced weaponry, the spread of terrorism and drug trafficking, the AIDS epidemic, and the degradation of the global environment--and each will require strong American leadership if we are to overcome them. The American people have called for a new Administration, yet there is an essential continuity in our foreign policy. Our relations and actions abroad are rooted in enduring interests, alliances, friendships, and principles. My Administration will build on the successes of my predecessors in specific areas: in the quest for peace in the Middle East, in the effort to secure a safe reduction in our nuclear arsenals and stem weapons of mass destruction from proliferation, in the bold decision to relieve the suffering in Somalia, [in] the assistance to the process of reform in the former Soviet Union, [and] in the search for new and expanding markets around the world. Yet, the world has changed in fundamental ways, and we also must change with it. We need to state clearly how we plan in the United States to adapt our nation's foreign policy goals and institutions to this new era. Such a clear statement is necessary if we are to rally the support of the American people here at home behind a policy of active international engagement, which remains as critical to our own prosperity and security today as at any time in this century. It is critical for our nation to speak clearly about our purposes so that the nations of the world, friend and foe alike, will understand our intentions in the months and years to come. We must all remember that the final test of a foreign policy is its effect on the lives of our citizens. The foreign policy of my Administration will be built upon three pillars. First, we will make the economic security of our own nation a primary goal of our foreign policy. Here in America we cannot sustain an active engagement abroad without a sound economy at home. And yet, we cannot prosper at home unless we are engaged abroad. We will, therefore, seek economic strength at home through increased productivity while we seek to ensure that global commerce is rooted in principles of openness, fairness, and reciprocity. Second, our foreign policy will be based on a restructuring of our armed forces to meet new and continuing threats to our security interests and the international peace. We will continue prudently to reduce defense spending, but potential aggressors should be clear about American resolve. We do not relish the prospect of military force, but, when necessary, we will not shrink from using it when all appropriate diplomatic measures have been exhausted. Third, my Administration's foreign policy will be rooted in the democratic principles and institutions which unite our own county and to which so many now around the world aspire. The spread of democratic values has given the hope of freedom to millions all across the world who have endured decades of oppression. Whenever possible we will support those who share our values, because it is in the interests of America and the world at large for us to do so. History has borne out these enduring truths: Democracies do not wage war against one another; they make better partners in trade and diplomacy; and, despite their inherent problems, they offer the best guarantee for the protection of human rights. Finally, I want to assure all of you--the members of the diplomatic corps-- that, as President, I will work closely with the international community through the United Nations and other vital institutions to resolve contentious disputes and to meet the challenges of the next century. America cannot and should not bear the world's burdens alone. But if we work together, we can make great progress in making this a better world for all of our citizens. We can address such global problems [as] environmental decay, the scourge of AIDS, the threat to our children and our communities of narcotics trafficking, and the plight of millions of refugees around the world. The Gulf war and the humanitarian relief operation in Somalia demonstrate what is best about the United Nations and what the founders had in mind over 40 years ago: confronting aggression by outlaw nations, restoring hope to those in need as international partners. Let us act in concert today to achieve those laudable goals. I welcome the diplomatic corps' participation in this, our great national celebration, as every American takes part in what is perhaps the greatest strength of our democracy, the willing and peaceful transfer of political power from one president to his successor. It is an inherently democratic tradition, one that has been a source of inspiration to freedom-loving people since George Washington stood atop Old North almost 200 years ago. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Family Planning Grants

Clinton Source: President-elect Clinton Description: Presidential Memorandum for the Acting Administrator of the US Agency for International Development, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 22 19931/22/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that receive federal funds from using those funds "to pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning, or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions." (22U.S.C. 2151b(f) (1)). The August 1984 announcement by President Reagan of what has become known as the "Mexico City Policy" directed the Agency for International Development (AID) to expand this limitation and withhold AID funds from NGOs that engage in a wide range of activities, including providing advice, counseling, or information regarding abortion, or lobbying a foreign government to legalize or make abortion available. These conditions have been imposed even where an NGO uses non-AID funds for abortion-related activities. These excessively broad anti-abortion conditions are unwarranted. I am informed that the conditions are not mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act or any other law. Moreover, they have undermined efforts to promote safe and efficacious family planning programs in foreign nations. Accordingly, I hereby direct that AID remove the conditions not explicitly mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act or any other law from all current AID grants to NGOs and exclude them from future grants. William J. Clinton (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Guatemalan President's Peace Initiative

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 25 19931/25/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: Guatemala Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] We welcome the proposal to reinvigorate negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union guerrilla umbrella organization announced by President Jorge Serrano before the UN General Assembly [on] January 19. President Serrano offered to allow UN observers to verify a human rights agreement between his Government and the guerrillas as soon as one is concluded. In return, he asked for a 90-day period to negotiate other issues. At the end of that time, a cease-fire would take effect automatically. UN observers would also verify this cease-fire. We look forward to a constructive response from the guerrillas and hope that renewed and intensified talks lead to an early, definitive end to Guatemala's internal conflict. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Togo: Casualties in Lome Demonstration

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 26 19931/26/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Togo Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] On January 25, police and gendarmes in Lome, the capital of Togo, clashed with demonstrators attempting to approach a hotel where visiting French and German Government ministers had scheduled a press conference. When police fired at the crowd, numerous Togolese were killed and a substantial number wounded. The United States deplores the loss of life and expresses its condolences to the families of the victims. We call on the Togolese Government to initiate an immediate investigation to identify and swiftly bring to justice those responsible. As head of the security forces, it is the responsibility of President Eyadema to ensure that those forces support the democratic process in Togo and avoid any action which might disrupt it. The United States has consistently urged Togo's highest authorities, including the President, and leaders of the various political groups to establish a dialogue which will lead to reconciliation and the promotion of the democratic process in a secure environment. The only way out of Togo's impasse is through democratic elections where the people are permitted to express their political will calmly and without fear. The US ambassador in Lome is meeting with senior Togolese officials as well as leaders of the opposition, making clear our condemnation of the killings and urging all parties to resort to dialogue, not violence. We are also consulting with Togo's other major donors to determine what initiatives we might take together to help advance Togo's democratic process and diffuse the volatile political situation in the country. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Feature: Travel Tips on Russia

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 26 19931/26/93 Category: Features Region: Eurasia Country: Russia Subject: Travel [TEXT] The following information was taken from a pamphlet entitled Tips for Travelers to Russia, which was released by the Bureau of Consular Affairs, US Department of State and is available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office for $1. [The pamphlet is included on this CD] The Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, and in its place emerged 12 independent republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Russia, the largest country that emerged, stretches from the Baltic Sea, across the northern Eurasian landmass, to the Bering Strait, where one of its islands lies only 3 miles from an Alaskan island. This information deals primarily with Russia; however, much of it--particularly the sections on health, safety, and travel--also applies to the other republics. Although Russia and the other republics are experiencing profound political and economic changes, this is a challenging and exciting time to visit the region. The tourism industry, like other industries that were strictly regulated in the former Soviet Union, is undergoing a transformation that can be confusing to customers as well as to the industry itself. Travel conditions are changing rapidly. Therefore, the Bureau of Consular Affairs advises travelers to carefully research and plan their trip and to be patient and flexible once underway in order to make it successful and enjoyable. (For information on where to inquire about the current situation in the former Soviet Union, see page 61.)
BEFORE YOU GO
Visas
A US citizen must have a valid US passport and a visa to travel to any country of the former Soviet Union. At present, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine are issuing visas. At time of publication, the other countries of the former USSR have not established embassies in the United States. To travel to a country of the former USSR not yet issuing visas, a Russian visa is still required and is valid for all such countries. Currently, travel between countries that require a Russian visa is still considered internal travel by local authorities, and passports are not normally checked upon arrival or departure. Visas for Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine may be obtained from the embassies of those countries (see page 64). The following visa information pertains to Russian visas only. Travelers arriving without a visa in a country that requires a Russian visa cannot register at a hotel and must leave the country immediately by the same route they entered. A visa is required even for a brief transit. If possible, obtain a Russian visa in the United States, because it can be difficult and time-consuming to obtain abroad. You cannot obtain a Russian visa in some countries such as Ukraine, Estonia, and Lithuania. Visas are valid for specific dates. Before starting on your trip, be sure your visa is valid for the dates of planned entry and departure. Delays caused by illness or changes in plans must be approved in advance by the office that issued your visa. US citizens may apply for the following categories of Russian visas: transit, tourist, business, or, for a private visit to friends or relatives, a visitor or homestay visa. Tourist, Business, and Transit Visas. Most travelers to Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union arrange for their visas and accommodations through an American travel agent. A business visa requires a letter of invitation from a foreign business contact. A transit visa requires a copy of a confirmed ticket and visa (if required) to an onward destination.
Visitor or Homestay Visas.
Visas for private trips to stay in a private home are issued by the consular division of either the Russian embassy in Washington, DC, or the Russian consulate general in either San Francisco or New York (see page 64). Request application forms by mail. The person you wish to visit also must apply for permission well in advance of your visit. In larger cities, your host can apply at the local visa office (called OVIR, an acronym for Otdel Viz i Registratsii). In smaller towns, your host can apply to the local police. OVIR or police consideration of these applications can be a slow process. Upon approval of your application, your host will be issued a notification of permission (izveshcheniye) for your visit. Your host should then send this notification to you.
Private Visits During Group Tours
. An American traveling on a group tour may request permission to visit local acquaintances or take short individual excursions away from the group itinerary to places of personal interest. Arrangements for side trips should be made through your American travel agent and, if possible, before you leave the United States. On your visa application, include the names and addresses of those citizens of countries that you wish to visit.
How To Obtain Visa Information
Your travel agent can provide visa information, although authoritative information on visas can only be obtained from the embassies or consulates of the countries you plan to visit. Whatever your source, make certain that your visa information is up to date, because, during this period of transition, visa requirements will change frequently. When you inquire about visas, ask about price, length of validity, and the number of entries that are permitted.
YOUR US PASSPORT
Theft of US passports continues to increase rapidly. Stolen passports are reportedly sold for large sums of hard currency. The theft or loss of a passport, particularly when the nearest US consular office is hundreds or thousands of miles away, is a major source of inconvenience and expense to travelers in Russia and the other republics. Before starting your trip, make a record or photocopy of the data from your passport's identification page and from your visa(s). Also make a copy of the addresses and telephone numbers of the US embassies and consulates in the countries you will visit (see page 64). Keep this information and two passport photos separate from your passport in case of loss or theft. Leave a second copy of your passport information and itinerary with a relative or friend in the United States. Complete the address page of your passport in pencil and update it as necessary. While in the former Soviet Union, you may be asked to leave your passport with hotel personnel or a tour leader for short periods of time for registration with police or for other purposes. It should be returned within 2 or 3 days. Be sure to safeguard your passport at all other times, as its loss can cause you delays and problems. If your passport is lost or stolen, apply for a replacement at a US embassy or consulate and then obtain a new or duplicate visa from the nearest visa office (OVIR). If you are with a tour, ask your guide for assistance.
PLANNING YOUR TRIP
Many geographic names throughout the region are being changed. Try to obtain maps before your trip, but keep in mind that some place names may be outdated. Some street and city names may need corrections. In these countries, if the street sign does not agree with the map, it may be because the name was changed. Previously, in the former Soviet Union, departure and arrival times for planes, trains, and boats were quoted in Moscow time. In the post-Soviet period, that practice has changed, and timetables for travel in and between former Soviet countries usually use local time. Within Russia itself, however, you may still find Moscow time in use--regardless of which of the 11 time zones you are in. Whenever you make reservations or purchase tickets, learn which time zones the schedule refers to and, as you travel, confirm all departure and arrival times.
Air Travel Within Russia
Aeroflot continues to dominate air travel in Russia and the region. Although many international airlines have flights to Russia and the other former Soviet republics--and some, like Turkish Airlines, even have flights between a few of the countries--Aeroflot's domestic flights remain the major service in and between the countries of the former USSR. Since late 1991, domestic Aeroflot flights have been delayed for hours or days and sometimes canceled because of jet fuel shortages. Prepare for long waits or for possible itinerary changes with little or no advance notice. Booking domestic Aeroflot flights in the United States can be difficult. Once in Russia or one of the other republics, you may discover that a domestic Aeroflot flight you booked does not exist or, at least, does not exist on the day you are confirmed to go. Before you leave the United States, you may be informed that flights do not exist to a certain city, when, in fact, they do. Because of the difficulty in using Aeroflot's domestic service, it is advisable to use international carriers, including Aeroflot, wherever possible when planning your itinerary. While Aeroflot is in transition to meet international standards, flexibility and patience are the keys to successful air travel.
Overland Travel
When traveling by train or automobile in former Soviet countries, carry food and water with you. If you travel overland between Central European countries and countries of the former USSR, be certain that you have visas for all countries through which you will pass. For example, the train from Warsaw, Poland to Vilnius, Lithuania passes through Grodno, Belarus, and transit visas are not available on the train. On occasion, Americans have been required to leave the train in Grodno and return to their point of departure to obtain a Russian visa for Belarus. (There is a direct rail route, however, that does not pass through Belarus. It goes between Sestokai, Lithuania and Suwalki, Poland.)
Auto Travel
Driving conditions in Russia and the other former Soviet republics are more rugged than in Western Europe, service stations are few, and fuel may be scarce at those stations. Adhere to all local driving regulations. They are strictly enforced, and violators are subject to legal penalties. All tourists entering Russia by automobile are required to sign an obligation guaranteeing the re-export of their automobiles. This obligation also applies to damaged vehicles. Your automobile should be fully insured under a policy valid for Russia and for any other country you will enter. Insurance policies may be purchased from Lloyds of London or from Ingosstrakh, Kuybyshev Street 11/10, Moscow, a Russian organization that insures foreigners. Auto insurance obtained in Russia is still accepted in some of the other former Soviet republics. Be aware that Russian law allows the company to refuse compensation for damage if a driver is pronounced by the authorities to have been under the influence of alcohol at the time of an accident. Such determinations can be made without the benefit of any tests.
Health
Precautions. Travel in the former USSR can be strenuous, particularly for the elderly and individuals with special health problems. When you plan your trip, be careful not to overschedule; leave time for rest and relaxation. Tourists in frail health are strongly advised not to visit. Immunizations. No immunizations are required for travelers to the former Soviet Union. However, diphtheria, tetanus, polio, typhoid, and gamma globulin are recommended for the region and, in particular, for the Central Asian countries. Health Insurance Policy. Review your health insurance policy. If your insurance does not cover you abroad, consider purchasing temporary insurance that does. In addition to medical insurance, consider obtaining insurance to cover evacuation in the event of an accident or serious illness. Because conditions in many hospitals are not adequate to ensure recovery, medical evacuation is frequently necessary for illnesses or injuries which could be treated locally in other countries. Minimum cost from Moscow to New York on a stretcher is more than $10,000. Medical evacuation by hospital aircraft on the same route approaches $100,000. Insurance companies as well as some credit card and travelers check companies offer short-term health and emergency assistance policies designed for travelers. Ask your travel agent about them or look for ads in travel publications. Medications. Bring with you any necessary medications and keep them in their original, labeled containers in your hand luggage. Because of strict laws on narcotics, carry a letter from your physician explaining your need for any prescription drugs in your possession. Also bring along any toiletries and personal hygiene items that you will need. These items can be difficult to find in major cities and even more scarce elsewhere.
Medical Care in the Region
. Medical care in the former Soviet Union does not meet Western standards. There is a severe shortage of basic medical supplies, including disposable needles, anesthetics, common medications, and antibiotics. X-rays are of poor quality and advanced diagnostic equipment, such as CAT-scan machines, is not widely available. Patient support services, including basic hygiene measures, are inadequate, and travelers may expect the length of hospitalization to exceed the duration of stay they would expect in Western facilities. In addition, full, frank, and empathic discussions between doctor and patient are hampered by language barriers as well as the lack of a tradition of patient rights. If you need medical care, ask your hotel or tour guide to direct you to an appropriate facility. You may also contact the nearest US embassy or consulate for a list of local medical services. Drinking Water. The US Public Health Service warns that many US visitors to Russia, particularly to St. Petersburg, have returned to the United States infected with the intestinal parasite Giardia lamblia. This infection is probably contracted by drinking tapwater. Some travelers to Russia and surrounding countries bring drinking water with them in their luggage. If you cannot import your drinking water, drink only bottled carbonated drinks or beverages that have been boiled for at least 5 minutes. Avoid ice cubes, use bottled water for brushing teeth, and avoid salads or uncooked vegetables and fruits which cannot be peeled. In addition, carry iodine tablets to disinfect drinking water. Travelers returning from the region who develop a diarrheal illness lasting more than 5 days should consult a physician and have a stool specimen examined for parasites. Chernobyl Nuclear Accident. Recent tapwater samples from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev show no detectable radiation. Background radiation levels in areas outside the immediate accident site and fallout path have been tested periodically and are considered to be within acceptable ranges. Access to the Chernobyl zone is strictly controlled by Ukrainian authorities.
Currency
Russia, like the other 11 countries of the former Soviet Union, has a cash- only economy. During periodic cash shortages, it can be difficult to impossible to cash travelers checks for dollars, for other convertible (hard) currency, or even for rubles. The fee to cash travelers checks may be as high as 5%. In Moscow, cash may be available at Dialogbank or American Express. In St. Petersburg, rubles may be available but not hard currency. In Kiev, cash may be available at the Agroprombank, Export/Import Bank, or Bank Ukraina. Some travelers avoid a number of the currency shortage problems by taking a prepaid tour that includes all meals and hotels. Others find it useful to bring major credit cards because they are accepted at some hotels and restaurants, particularly those in Moscow. Most, however, solve the problem of the currency shortage by coming to Russia and the other republics with a sufficient supply of hard currency to cover their obligations in the country. Some hotel restaurants and shops will accept payment only in dollars or other hard currency. Beware! Make it your practice to keep your excess cash in the hotel safe. Before you leave home, check with your credit card and travelers check companies to learn where these instruments can be used in the former Soviet Union. Customs and currency laws are strict. When you arrive, make an accurate and complete customs declaration of all money, travelers checks, and valuables in your possession. Include all personal jewelry, such as wedding rings and watches. Have your customs declaration stamped by the authorities and keep it with you until you leave the country. Keep your exchange receipts in order to account for your expenditures. Without these records, customs officials could confiscate your cash and valuables upon departure. The Russian ruble is still the currency of the 12 former Soviet republics. In Ukraine, coupons have been introduced in preparation for issuing a national currency. The coupons are used in Ukraine along with the Russian ruble but cannot be used outside of the country.
Customs Regulations
Attempts to bring any of the following articles into the former Soviet Union have caused difficulties for US citizens in the past: Narcotics. Drug laws are strict. US citizens have received long sentences for trying to enter or transit with illegal narcotics. Pornography. Magazines with sexually explicit photographs that may be considered commonplace in Western countries may be regarded as pornography and are often confiscated. Gifts for Persons in the Former USSR. A high rate of customs duty may be assessed on gifts that you bring into a foreign country. US citizens have had to abandon gifts at the airport because they lacked funds to pay the customs duty. Video Cassettes. Customs regulations allow for the import and re-export of a limited number of blank or commercially recorded video cassettes for personal use. Some travelers with a large number of cassettes have had them confiscated upon departure. Travelers are advised to leave blank video cassettes sealed in their wrappers when entering a country. Customs regulations prohibit the import or export of personally recorded video cassettes. To avoid confiscation of valuable travel memories, leave those cassettes outside the country to be picked up later, or mail them home before entering the country.
Legal Matters
Dual Nationality. Russia's new citizenship law that went into effect February 6, 1992, recognizes dual nationality only if there is an agreement between the two countries that covers dual nationality. At this time, the United States and Russia do not have a dual nationality agreement. Therefore, if you are a dual national and encounter problems in Russia, you may not be permitted to leave, and assistance from a US consul may be limited. The US Government has notified the governments of the Soviet successor states that it considers the 1968 US-USSR consular convention to still be in force. The United States recognizes as an established principle of F international law that every sovereign state has the right to decide, under the provisions of its own laws, who is and who is not its citizen. The Department of State maintains the following: -- US citizens, whether by birth or naturalization, possess full American citizenship and its accompanying benefits and responsibilities despite any additional entitlement to other citizenships; -- A US citizen entering a country of the former USSR with a US passport and a valid visa is to be regarded as a US citizen by that country for purposes of the visit, regardless of whether the foreign government might also consider them to be their citizen; and -- US citizens cannot lose their US citizenship because of automatic acquisition of foreign citizenship. However, if a US citizen contemplates voluntarily accepting dual nationality in connection with assuming duties as a government official in one of the Soviet successor states, he or she should first consult with the Department of State's Office of Citizens Consular Services on 202-647-3445 or with the nearest US embassy or consulate. The countries of the former Soviet Union generally do not prevent a US citizen possessing a US passport and appropriate visas from visiting those countries and returning to the United States, or to his or her country of permanent residence, even if under foreign laws he or she is considered a citizen of a Soviet successor state. Any dual national US citizen traveling in Russia or any other country of the former Soviet Union should contact the nearest US embassy or consulate immediately if any question arises about his or her US or foreign citizenship. To avoid any possible inconvenience or uncertainty, the Department of State urges US citizens who are or who believe they are a citizen of a former Soviet country to consider formally renouncing that citizenship before visiting any of the former Soviet republics. For information on how to renounce foreign citizenship, contact, in the United States, the embassy or consulate of the country concerned before traveling. In any case, possible dual nationals who travel to Russia or any of the other countries of the former Soviet Union should, upon arrival, register in writing or in person at the consular section of the nearest US embassy or consulate. Give your full name; passport number; date and place of birth; occupation; hotel and room number; phone number; purpose and dates of your visit; home address; and the name, address, and telephone number of any relatives that you have in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Permanent legal US residents should travel with appropriate documentation of their legal permanent residence status in the United States. Those who are citizens of a country of the former Soviet Union should ensure that they have the correct entry/exit permission from the Russian or other appropriate embassy in the United States before leaving. Adopting a Child Abroad. Current law allows adoptions in Russia and Ukraine, although US citizens report the process in these republics to be long and difficult. The status of adoptions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan remains uncertain. Russia has established a quasi-governmental bureaucratic structure in an attempt to regulate foreign adoptions. The agency, "Rights of the Child" (Pravo Rebyonka), was formed to coordinate international adoptions, ensure that Russian legal procedures are followed, and establish a centralized data bank for information on Russian children adoptable by foreigners. US citizens interested in adopting a child from one of the countries of the former Soviet Union are encouraged to contact the US embassy or consulate in that country, or, in the United States, the Department of State's Office of Citizens Consular Services on 202-647-3444 to obtain information on the adoption process in that country.
WHILE YOU ARE ABROAD
Registration
All US citizens who visit Russia or any of the other countries of the former Soviet Union are encouraged to register in writing or in person at the nearest US embassy or consulate. Registration is especially important if you are in an area experiencing civil unrest or a natural disaster, if you are going to a place where communications are poor, or if you plan to stay for any length of time. Registration takes only a few moments, and it may be invaluable in case of an emergency. If your passport is lost or stolen, having previously registered at an embassy or consulate can make it easier to issue you a new passport without a delay.
Safety Tips Against Crime
In Russia and much of the rest of the former USSR, crimes such as robbery, mugging, and pickpocketing are an increasing problem for tourists, particularly in cities and around major tourist sites. Crimes are perpetrated not only by adults, but also by adolescents or even children, often operating in groups. Crime aboard trains also has increased. For example, travelers have been drugged without their knowledge and robbed on the train from Moscow to St. Petersburg. Crime also is a problem on trains between Moscow and Warsaw, and armed robberies have occurred on the trains between Moscow and Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. On some trains, thieves have been able to open locked compartment doors. Although Russian officials have expressed willingness to cooperate with US officials in emergencies involving US citizens, communications and transportation can be slow and difficult, and the nearest US embassy or consulate may be more than a day's travel away. To reduce the risk of becoming a victim of crime, exercise the same precautions that you would in any large city and follow these tips: -- Safety begins when you pack. Leave expensive jewelry, unnecessary credit cards, and anything you consider invaluable at home. -- Never display large sums of money when paying a bill. Conceal your passport, cash, and other valuables on your person. Do not trust waist or fanny packs, because pickpockets have learned that is where the valuables are. -- Do not leave valuables in your hotel room; lock them in the hotel safe. -- Be vigilant on public transport and at tourist sites, food markets, flea markets, art exhibitions, and all places where crowds gather. -- Even slight intoxication is noted by professional thieves. Therefore, if you drink in a public place, do so only with a trusted friend who has agreed to remain sober. If you are the victim of a crime, report it immediately to the local police and to the nearest US embassy or consulate. Reporting a theft is worthwhile, because stolen items are sometimes retrieved.
Russian Law
How To Avoid Legal Problems. While in a foreign country, a US citizen is subject to its laws and regulations. Laws in the countries of the former Soviet Union can differ significantly from those in the United States and do not afford the protections available to the individual under US law. Exercise caution and carefully obey local laws. Penalties for breaking the law can be more severe than in the United States for similar offenses. Persons violating the law, even unknowingly, may have difficulties with the authorities and may be expelled and forced to forfeit the unused part of a pre-purchased tour. Serious transgressions of the law can lead to arrest and imprisonment. Under Article 12 of the US-USSR Consular Convention of 1968, government authorities in the Soviet successor states are required to immediately inform the US embassy or consulate of the arrest or detention of a US citizen and to permit, without delay, communication with the detained citizen. If you are detained by authorities, ask that a US consular officer be informed and that you be allowed to meet with a US consular officer without delay. Avoid Breaking the Law. Never take souvenirs from local hotels, no matter how insignificant in value they may appear. Pay for your souvenirs, handicrafts, or artwork in local currency, because most vendors do not have permission to accept dollars or other hard currency. Travelers have been arrested by plainclothes police after paying for a souvenir with hard currency. The traveler is usually released after several hours of detention, but both the hard currency and the item purchased are usually confiscated. Only special tourist stores, usually found in large hotels, are permitted to accept hard currency. Marriage Abroad. Americans contemplating marriage to a citizen of the former Soviet Union should contact the consular section of the nearest American embassy or consulate before the marriage takes place. Consular officers cannot perform marriages but can provide information about local regulations concerning marriage. Photography Restrictions. Regulations on photography are strict, particularly regarding military installations. Because of unwitting violations of these regulations, US citizens have had film confiscated, have been temporarily detained or interrogated, and have even been asked to leave the country. Be sure that your photographs do not contain forbidden subjects, not even in the background. When in doubt, ask your tour guide or someone else in authority. -- Photographs are permitted of architectural monuments; cultural, educational, and medical buildings; theaters; museums; parks; stadiums; streets and squares; and living quarters and landscape scenes which do not include forbidden subjects listed below. -- If prior permission is obtained from officials of the institution concerned, photographs may be taken of industrial enterprises which manufacture non-military products; farms; railroad stations; airports; river ports; and governmental, educational, and social organizations. -- All photographs are prohibited within the 25-kilometer-wide border zones, except in those portions not closed to foreigners. Photographs of the following are forbidden: all military objects, institutions, and personnel; storage facilities for combustibles; seaports; hydroelectric installations (sluices); pumping stations; dams; railroad junctions; railroad and highway bridges; industrial, scientific, and research establishments; electric, telephone, and telegraph stations; and radio facilities. Photographs from airplanes and panoramic shots of industrial cities are prohibited. -- Foreigners may not mail exposed film out of Russia.
Shopping: Be Wary of Antiques
Artwork, souvenirs, and handicrafts purchased at special stores for tourists may be taken out of Russia and the other former Soviet republics. However, antiques (defined as virtually anything which may be deemed of historical or cultural value) and artifacts, including samovars, purchased at regular stores and secondhand shops often may not be taken out of these countries without inspection by local cultural authorities and payment of substantial export duty. This procedure is almost prohibitively cumbersome and time consuming. Samovars not purchased at tourist stores and not cleared by cultural authorities are normally confiscated at pre-departure customs inspections.
Consular Information Sheets
To find specific travel information for a country, see the Department of State consular information sheets. These sheets contain information such as the location and telephone number of the nearest US embassy and crime, health, or security problems that may affect travel. Travel warnings, which advise Americans to defer travel to all or part of a country, also may be issued about certain countries. There are several ways to access consular information sheets and travel warnings: -- A 24-hour telephone service is available by dialing 202-647-5225 from a touchtone phone; -- You may obtain copies by sending a self-addressed, stamped envelope to the Citizens Emergency Center, Room 4800, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520-4818. (Write the name of the requested country or countries on the outside of the envelope.) -- They are posted at the 13 regional passport agencies and at American embassies and consulates abroad; and, -- They also can be accessed through an airline or travel agent's computer reservation system or by computer through many electronic bulletin boards. In addition to consular information sheets, a good source of information on current conditions in the former Soviet Union is Intourist (tel. 212-757- 3884). Before 1991, Intourist was the official and only Soviet tour operator. It is now a non-governmental body and is still by far the largest tour operator in Russia and the other 11 former Soviet republics. Intourist has contracts with a large network of hotels and restaurants, but it must now compete with other Russian tour operators such as Sputnik and Intratours. There also are a number of specialized tour operators. For example, the Host Family Association and Wild World specialize in, respectively, stays with families and adventure tours. Book travel with Russian tour operators through US travel agents. (###)
US Embassies and Consulates in the Former Soviet Union
Armenia
American Embassy 18 General Bagramian Street Yerevan, ARMENIA Tel. (7-8852) 151-122; 151-144
Azerbaijan
American Embassy Hotel Old Intourist 63 Prospekt Neftyanikov Baku, AZERBAIJAN Tel. (7-8922) 92-1898
Belarus
American Embassy Starovilenskaya Ulitsa 46 Minsk, BELARUS Tel. (7-0172) 347-642
Georgia
American Embassy 25 Atoneli Street Tbilisi, GEORGIA Tel. (7-8832) 989-967/8
Kazakhstan
American Embassy 551 Seyfullina Alma-Ata, KAZAKHSTAN Tel. (7-3272) 631-375
Kyrgyzstan
American Embassy Erkindik 66 (old name: Derzhinskiy) Bishkek, KYRGYZSTAN Tel. (7-3312) 222-693
Moldova
American Embassy 103 Strada Alexei Mateevich 277014 Chisinau, MOLDOVA Tel. (7-0422) 233-698; 233-494 (after hours)
Russia
American Embassy Novinskiy Bulvar 19/23 (old name: Chaykovskogo) Moscow, RUSSIA Tel. (7-095) 252-2451 to 9; after hours: 252-1898; 255-5123
American Consulate General: St. Petersburg
Ulitsa Furshtadskaya 15 (old name: Ul. Petra Lavrova) St. Petersburg, RUSSIA Tel. (7-812) 274-8235
American Consulate General: Vladivostok
12 Mordovtseva Street, Vladivostok, RUSSIA Tel. [7] (4232-26-79-30, 26-67-34)
Tajikistan
American Embassy Hotel Independence (old name: Oktyabrskaya) 39 Ainii Street Dushanbe, TAJIKISTAN Tel. (7-3772) 248-233
Turkmenistan
American Embassy Yubilenaya Hotel Ashgabat TURKMENISTAN Tel. (7-3632) 244-925
Ukraine
American Embassy 10 Yuria Kotsyubinskoho 252053 Kiev 53, UKRAINE Tel. (7-044) 244-7349; 244-7354
Uzbekistan
American Embassy Chilanzarskaya 82 Tashkent, UZBEKISTAN Tel. (7-3712) 776-986
Foreign Embassies and Consulates in the United States
Embassy of Armenia
122 C Street, NW Suite 360 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 393-5983
Embassy of Belarus
1511 K Street, NW Suite 619 Washington, DC 20005-1403 (202) 638-2954
Embassy of Russia
Consular Division 1825 Phelps Place, NW Washington, DC 20008 (202) 939-8907/11/13/18
Russian Consulate General
9 East 91 Street New York, NY 10128 (212) 348-0926
Russian Consulate General
2790 Green Street San Francisco, CA 94123 (415) 202-9800
Embassy of Ukraine
1828 L Street, NW, Suite 711 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 296-6960 (###)
Planning Another Trip?
For general travel information, the following pamphlets may be ordered for $1 each from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402; tel: 202-783-3238. [Pamplets are included on this CD] Your Trip Abroad A Safe Trip Abroad Travel Tips for Older Americans Tips for Americans Residing Abroad Country-specific information can be found in the following publications, also available for $1 each from the US Government Printing Office: Tips for Travelers to Sub-Saharan Africa Tips for Travelers to the Caribbean Tips for Travelers to Central and South America Tips for Travelers to the People's Republic of China Tips for Travelers to Eastern Europe Tips for Travelers to Mexico Tips for Travelers to the Middle East and North Africa Tips for Travelers to South Asia General visa information for these and other countries is available in Foreign Entry Requirements for 50 cents from the Consumer Information Center, Pueblo, CO 81009.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 (Volume XIV, Africa)

PA Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs Description: One of 18 print volumes and 9 microfiche supplements presenting the Department's official record of US policy for the years 1958-60 during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jan, 26 19931/26/93 Category: Features Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: South Africa, Congo Subject: History [TEXT] The Department of State has recently released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. It is one of 18 print volumes and 9 microfiche supplements presenting the Department's official record of US policy for the years 1958-60 during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. During this period, 18 Sub-Saharan African nations attained independence. US support for the principle of self-determination for these countries often came into conflict with US obligations toward its traditional West European allies. Relations with the Union of South Africa, already troubled by the issue of apartheid, promised to become even more strained. US leaders, fearing that the newly independent countries would be fertile ground for the expansion of Soviet influence, sought to prevent them from falling under communist domination and to minimize communist influence over them. The crisis that followed the independence of the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) in July 1960 overshadowed other events in Africa and preoccupied US policymakers. Within days of the Congo's independence, disorder broke out, and Belgian troops returned. The Congolese Government requested the UN Security Council to authorize UN assistance to restore order. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian Herter backed the UN action but wanted to avoid committing US troops and triggering direct Soviet involvement. The US provided extensive logistical support to a UN force drawn from Africa, Asia, and Europe, with no troops from major powers or the Soviet bloc. A Congolese internal political struggle resulted, with the United States supporting President Joseph Kasavubu and the Soviet Union backing Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. This volume includes an extensive record of the Congo crisis as well as separate compilations of documents on the Horn of Africa, Ghana, Guinea, and the Union of South Africa. The volume is primarily comprised of documents originating in the White House and the Department of State, but material originating in the Department of Defense and the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also is included. Volume XVI (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02339-3) may be purchased for $33 from the Superintendent of Documents, New Orders, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. For further information, contact Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663- 1133. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Treaty Actions: Multilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 1 19932/1/93 Category: Treaties/Agreements Subject: International Law, Trade/Economics, Science/Technology, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT]
Containers
International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes, as amended. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the US Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037; 29 UST 3707, TIAS 10220, 10914. Accessions deposited: Brazil, Apr. 3, 1992; Estonia, Aug. 18, 1992. Notification of succession deposited: Croatia, July 27, 1992; with effect from Oct. 8, 1991. Amendments to annexes I and II of the international convention for safe containers (CSC), 1972, as amended (TIAS 9037; 29 UST 3707, TIAS 10220, 10914). Done at London May 17, 1991. Entered into force: Jan. 1, 1993.
Customs
Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1952; for the US Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063; 22 UST 320. Accessions deposited: Slovenia, Sept. 7, 1992; Ukraine, Nov. 10, 1992.
International Monetary Fund
Third amendment of the articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund (TIAS 1501, 6748, 8937; 60 Stat. 1401, 20 UST 2775, 29 UST 2203). Adopted at Washington June 28, 1990. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1992.
Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839; 21 UST 483. Accession deposited: Burma (Myanmar), Dec. 2,1992.
Scientific Cooperation
Agreement establishing an international science and technology center. Done at Moscow Nov. 27, 1992. Enters into force on the 30th day after the date of last notification by the signatories that all internal procedures necessary to be bound by agreement have been completed.
World Meteorological Organization
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052; 1 UST 281. Accession deposited: Uzbekistan, Dec. 23. 1992.
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 5, February 1, 1993 Title:

Treaty Actions: Bilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 1 19932/1/93 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: E/C Europe, Europe, MidEast/North Africa Country: Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia (former), Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Uruguay Subject: International Law [TEXT]
Chile
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at Washington and Santiago Dec. 11 and 15, 1992. Enters into force upon receipt by Chile of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements for entry into force have been fulfilled.
Colombia
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at Washington Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force upon receipt by Colombia of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Czechoslovakia
Treaty concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment, with annex, protocol, and exchanges of letters. Signed at Washington Oct. 22, 1991. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-31. Ratifications exchanged: Nov. 19, 1992. Entered into force: Dec. 19, 1992.
Finland
Protocol to the treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights of Feb. 13, 1934, as modified (TS 868, TIAS 2861; 49 Stat. 2659, 4 UST 2047). Signed at Washington July 1, 1991. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-34. Ratifications exchanged: Dec. 1, 1992. Entered into force: Dec. 1, 1992.
Ireland
Protocol to the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation of Jan. 21, 1950 (TIAS 2155; 1 UST 785). Signed at Washington June 24, 1992. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-35. Ratifications exchanged: Nov. 18, 1992. Entered into force: Nov. 18, 1992.
New Zealand
Agreement concerning defense communications services, with annexes. Signed at Wellington and Arlington Aug. 12 and Nov. 18, 1992. Entered into force Nov. 18, 1992.
Peru
Investment incentive and financial agreement. Signed at Washington Dec. 16, 1992. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1992.
Uruguay
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign assistance owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at Washington Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force upon receipt by Uruguay of written notice that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled. Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to agriculture owed to the Government of the United States and its agencies, with appendixes. Signed at Washington Dec. 15, 1992. Enters into force upon receipt by Uruguay of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993

Title:

Department of State Reorganization

Christopher Source: Secretary Christopher Description: Secretary's message to State Department employees and his implementation directive on reorganization released in Washington, DC Date: Feb, 5 19932/5/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department, Terrorism, Narcotics, Refugees, Democratization, Arms Control, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] As I join all of you in the challenging job of shaping and directing America's foreign policy, it is clear that we must make changes in the way the State Department is organized. The organization of our Department has evolved over the years in response to unique circumstances in the international environment. We serve in a State Department that is far better organized for the decades past than for the special challenges America faces in the post-Cold War era. I want our Department to be able to deal more effectively with the new issues of critical importance to our nation's foreign policy: strengthening democratization efforts in the former Soviet Union and around the world, halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strengthening peace-keeping capabilities, dealing more effectively with global environmental problems, elevating our concern about the global population explosion, fighting international crime and terrorism, and penetrating new markets for American business. We cannot hope to respond to these and other new challenges unless we improve the way we deal with tough and complex problems which cut across the traditional boundaries of our bureaus. We must design creative ways to both increase the efficiency of the policy process and enhance the administration of the many programs we manage. This will mean: -- Designating five Under Secretaries together with the Deputy [Secretary] as my principal foreign policy advisers; -- Creating new focal points for key foreign policy initiatives; -- Eliminating redundancies and concentrating greater decision making responsibility within the bureaus; -- Reducing excessive layering to streamline information flow and decision making; -- Enhancing communication in all directions by asking most bureaus to report to me through a designated Under Secretary who will coordinate the activities of related bureaus and facilitate needed access to me and the Seventh Floor; and -- Creating a streamlined Office of the Secretary to provide me and the Deputy Secretary with a more effective means to receive information and make decisions. Over the past weeks, the transition has afforded us an extended opportunity to examine closely the organization of the Department in light of President Clinton's foreign policy priorities. We were not alone in this endeavor, since work was well underway by the Department's own Management Task Force "State 2000" as well as by other groups of qualified professionals. The changes I ask to be implemented emerge from what I believe is a growing consensus for change within and outside the Department. I do not seek these changes merely for the sake of change itself. When undertaking a degree of reorganization, we must be mindful that change can be disruptive. Thus, it must be carefully planned so as not to interfere with the orderly functioning of the Department. While some of the changes outlined in the attached directive can be achieved quickly by administrative action subject to congressional consultation, others will require legislation which we plan to seek in the very near future. We have initiated the process of discussion with Congress and have, thus far, received a positive reaction to our approach. There is great talent in the Department of State among those who have devoted themselves to careers of public service. President Clinton and I wish better to harness this talent so critical to the interests of our nation. We must change to do this. I am convinced that the measured changes we now undertake can enable us to deal with both the problems and opportunities of a new era in foreign policy.
Secretary's Implementation Directive for Reorganization
In order to implement the foreign policy priorities of the President of the United States and to more effectively and efficiently carry out the foreign policy responsibilities of the Department of State, I ask that the following changes be implemented to occur upon passage of legislation or by this directive upon completion of congressional consultations.
1. The Under Secretaries shall be the principal foreign policy advisers to the Secretary and directly in the chain of command.
I wish to strengthen the role of the Under Secretaries. They shall serve as my principal foreign policy advisers and assist me and the Deputy Secretary in executing and coordinating the activities of the Department. They will be given line responsibility to manage and coordinate the operations of the bureaus which will report to them. The use of Under Secretaries as senior advisers to the Secretary should be accompanied by a realignment of the chain of command. In the future, Assistant Secretaries will report directly to the designated Under Secretary. Changes in reporting responsibility will not alter the important role of the Assistant Secretaries in the formulation of foreign policy or their access to the Office of the Secretary. The major benefits from this change are creating a better system of information flow from the bureaus to the Under Secretary and the Office of the Secretary, achieving greater efficiency in Departmental decision- making, permitting more extensive coordination of key cross-cutting issues at the bureau and Under Secretary levels, and strengthening the Under Secretaries in the interagency process. Listed elsewhere in this directive are the groupings of bureaus in specific clusters and the designated lines of reporting to specific Under Secretaries.
2. Creation of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs.
I shall ask Congress to create a fifth Under Secretary for Global Affairs (G) needed to manage and redirect critical global issues now found at the heart of post-Cold War foreign policy. These issues cut across nearly every boundary of the geographic and functional bureaus. We must insure that they are given high-level attention in a new and strengthened system of Under Secretaries. The substantive concerns of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs shall reside in bureaus dealing with the environment, science, oceans policy, democracy promotion, human rights, international labor issues, refugees, population, counter-terrorism, international narcotics, and other international criminal issues. Better coordination of the programs managed by these bureaus across many agencies and departments will be a critical role for this new Under Secretary. Given the pressing need to have an Under Secretary for Global Affairs in place in the very near future, President Clinton intends to initially nominate his candidate for this post as Counselor and then have Congress reconstitute this position as the new Under Secretary. I will also ask the Congress to establish a new Counselor position at Executive Level IV, thereby maintaining the current number of Executive Level III posts in the Department.
3. Creation of three new bureaus to streamline policy and consolidate functions.
I shall ask Congress to define three new bureaus derived from existing bureaus and functions in the Department to streamline the formulation of policy in these important areas and to better manage the substantial programs operated by these organizations. a. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)--This bureau will be created by combining the current Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Labor Affairs; the latter shall be relocated in the new bureau in a Deputy Assistant Secretary position. This bureau will provide an organizational home for initiatives and policies which promote democracy. By combining associated activities related to human rights and labor affairs, the bureau will play a major role in formulating policies designed to build and strengthen democratic institutions. The Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor will be nominated as Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until legislation can be enacted to reconstitute and rename that position. b. Bureau of Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime (NTC)--This bureau will be created by expanding the mandate of the Bureau for International Narcotics Matters to include counter-terrorism and international crime. The Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism will be relocated in the new bureau at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. A new office of international crime will be created to act as a policy and coordinating office for all of the Department's activities in this area. The operational responsibility for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) will be moved to the new bureau from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, thus placing policy and implementation together. President Clinton and I place great priority on the activities encompassed by this new bureau in view of the threats posed to our nation by terrorist groups, narco-traffickers, and international criminal organizations. The Assistant Secretary for Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime will be nominated initially as the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters until a statutory name change can be enacted. c. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)--In order to consolidate all Departmental responsibility for refugee matters and to upgrade policy focus on refugee issues in a single bureau, I will ask Congress to create a new bureau headed by an Assistant Secretary. This bureau will also be responsible for coordinating the Department's policy on population and migration issues. The positions and functions of Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and the Bureau of Refugee Programs will be subsumed in the new bureau. The nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration Affairs will be confirmed as Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and will hold that position until legislation can be enacted reconstituting and renaming the position as Assistant Secretary for PRM.
4. Rename offices in order to indicate a new policy emphasis or changed mandate.
I will ask Congress to change the names of the following Departmental units: a. Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs to be changed to Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs (E). This change reflects the need to underscore that this office will have as a major responsibility harnessing the assets of the Department to assist the competitive position of US companies. b. Under Secretary for International Security Affairs to be changed to Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (A). This change reflects new arms control priorities of the Clinton Administration to deal with the heightened threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The change also recognizes that the Bureau of Political- Military Affairs will have new non-proliferation functions as a result of consolidations discussed in this directive. (The Bureau of Administration [formerly A] will be designated AD.)
5. Create an Office of Secretary of State.
It is necessary to streamline and reorganize the office and functions which relate directly to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary in order to rationalize critical policy support services, to provide a framework for high-level decision making and to enable the Secretary and the Deputy to establish an operational agenda for Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other senior officials. There is hereby established an Office of Secretary of State which consists of the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Executive Secretary as well as their personal staffs. Reporting directly to the Office of the Secretary shall be: -- Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States (S/NIS); -- The Policy Planning Staff (S/P); -- The Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H); -- The Bureau of Public Affairs (PA); -- The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); -- The Legal Adviser (L); -- The Chief of Protocol (CPR); -- Secretariat Staff and Operations Center (S/S); -- The Ombudsman (S/CSO); -- The Inspector General (OIG); -- The Foreign Service Grievance Board (FSG); [and] -- Equal Employment Opportunity and Civil Rights (EEOCR). The Deputy Secretary shall share major policy responsibilities with the Secretary and in the absence of the Secretary shall serve in an acting capacity. In addition, the Deputy Secretary shall: -- Coordinate the management of international affairs resources, especially on an interagency basis; -- Oversee the process of ambassadorial appointments; [and] -- Assume other tasks and responsibilities at the request of the Secretary of State, such as reviews of organizational structures. To achieve the efficient operation of the Office of the Secretary, Ambassadors-at-Large, Special Advisers, Coordinators, and independent offices hitherto reporting to the Secretary are abolished, merged with, or relocated in appropriate bureaus as set out below (to occur upon the passage of legislation or by this directive upon completion of congressional consultations). To be abolished by legislation: -- Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, with functions subsumed in the Bureau of Refugee Affairs as discussed previously; and -- Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance. Abolished in this directive with functions relocated as indicated: -- Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for International Labor Affairs (S/IL), with functions assumed by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); -- Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT), with functions included in the Bureau of Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime (NTC); -- Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser on Non-Proliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs (S/NP), with functions transferred to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM); and -- Office of the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (S/DEL), with functions transferred to the Bureau of Political- Military Affairs (PM).
6. Creation of an Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States (S/NIS).
President Clinton has nominated an Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States, and this person shall also serve as Special Adviser to the Secretary of State. This new post was created to provide a high-level focal point for policy formulation and coordination of US assistance to the states that were under the control of the former Soviet Union. When confirmed, the Ambassador-at-Large will chair an interagency policy group to formulate US policy and set US program priorities for the new independent states. The Office of Independent States and Commonwealth Affairs (EUR/ISCA) shall remain in EUR [the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs], reporting directly to the Ambassador-at-Large. The task force coordinating assistance to those states (currently D/CISA) and the position of Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator shall be transferred to S/NIS and shall report directly to the Ambassador-at-Large. The Ambassador-at-Large will also provide general policy guidance to the Coordinator for Safety, Security, and Dismantling Nuclear Weapons (to become PM/SSD) and to the USAID [US Agency for International Development] Task Force for the New Independent States (AID/NIS). The task force coordinating assistance to Eastern Europe (D/EEA) shall be transferred to the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs.
7. New reporting responsibilities for Assistant Secretaries.
The Department's bureaus shall report directly to the Under Secretaries as discussed previously. Set forth below are the reporting responsibilities for each Assistant Secretary: -- To the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P)--All six regional bureaus (ARA, EUR, SA, AF, EAP, NEA) and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO). -- To the Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs (E)--The Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB). -- To the Under Secretary for Global Affairs (G)--The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES); the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); and the Bureau of Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime (NTC). -- To the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (A)--The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM). -- To the Under Secretary for Management (M)--The Bureau of Administration (AD), the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), the Bureau of Financial Management and Policy (FMP), the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), and the Bureau of Personnel (PER). (Note: Further reorganization of management functions may occur after an ongoing review is completed.)
8. Functional consolidations will occur to streamline operations and improve policy focus.
There are several functions which need to be moved to improve policy formulation and management in key areas. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs (OES/N) and the five offices which report to this position (OES/NTS, OES/NEC, OES/NEP, OES/NSR, OES/NSC) will be relocated within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs so as to further consolidate all activities relating to the critical issue of halting nuclear proliferation. The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) shall retain functions in these offices relating to non-nuclear energy. Another goal is to improve the way the Department manages export controls as they are applied to commercial goods and munitions. Our interest is in preventing exports that might contribute to proliferation or to the transfer of technology that could harm US interests and in promoting legitimate exports that help American industry and the economy. In order, then, to improve the coherence, consistency, and efficiency of our efforts in the Department, we are closely reviewing our export control activities and examining alternative ways of organizing these functions, with a decision to be made in the next 2 weeks. Responsibility for international space issues is fragmented and has produced overlapping roles among the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, and the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. We will also be examining this problem over the next 2 weeks with an eye toward integrating our diplomacy for space cooperation with broader national security and foreign policy objectives. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center shall report to the Bureau of Political- Military Affairs. The Coordinator for Safety, Security, and Dismantling of Nuclear Weapons (SSD) shall be moved to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. The US Delegation to the Open Skies Conference (T/OS) shall be abolished. There shall be created in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs an Office of Peacekeeping to assist the bureau and the Department in efforts to better plan and coordinate peacekeeping activities. There shall be created in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs an Office of Business Facilitation to serve as a key access point in the Department for the private sector as well as providing policy guidance on key issues relating to improving the competitive position of US companies in world markets. Commercial functions of the Office of Commercial, Legislative, and Public Affairs (EB/CLP) shall be transferred to this new office. The Bureau of International Communications and Information Policy (CIP) shall be merged into the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs as an office headed by a Coordinator. The rank of Ambassador associated with this post shall be discontinued. Legislation will be sought to achieve this change. International telecommunications negotiations and agreements are critical to maintaining the competitive position of this important US industry. This can best be achieved in the context of the EB bureau, which is the principal place of access for American business. The Department's interagency role in the telecommunications policy arena with the Federal Communications Commission and the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration will be strengthened by merging this office into a fully staffed bureau. There shall be created in the Department an Office for the Permanent Representative for the United Nations to support the Cabinet functions of this post and to more effectively coordinate with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. In a time of tight budgets and increasing demands on international affairs resources, clearer priorities must be established for the International Affairs Budget Function 150 Account if Administration initiatives are to be realized. Under the direction of the Deputy Secretary, who will coordinate management of international affairs resources, the Policy Planning Staff shall provide policy guidance so that general spending priorities may be established. A deputy in S/P shall work closely with the Office of Policy and Resources (D/P∧R) to link the policy planning and resource allocation processes.
9. Removing excessive layering.
The number of Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the Department has grown from 46 in the 1960s to 120 today. I have asked the Under Secretaries to work with Assistant Secretaries to reduce the number of Deputy Assistant Secretaries [DASs] and DAS equivalents by about 40% and to reduce significantly the number of special assistants and other Seventh Floor staff. These reductions are designed to eliminate excessive layering, expedite clearance procedures, and strengthen the responsibilities of office directors and country directors. I have asked the Deputy Secretary to oversee the implementation of these changes in a manner consistent with the orderly functioning of the Department. In doing so, he will work with the Under Secretary for Management, who will coordinate the implementation of the directive. I have asked that all affected officials be consulted so as to achieve the changes in a timely and non-disruptive fashion. I have also asked the Deputy Secretary to conduct a review of the operations and mandate of the US Agency for International Development and to report his findings within 60 days so that we may propose to Congress a reorganization plan for this agency. Warren Christopher (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993 Title:

Guatemala Murder Trial

Boucher Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 1 19932/1/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: Guatemala Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] We are concerned that a Guatemalan court denied a request for official security protection for key prosecution witnesses to the brutal September 11, 1990, murder of world-renowned Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack Chang. Testimony free from intimidation is necessary to ensure that justice be done. Ms. Mack's murder and the initial lack of any serious investigation focused international scrutiny on the Guatemalan justice system's ability to combat human rights abuse. In spite of judicial turnover which resulted in 12 different judges dealing with the case, and notwithstanding reports of attempted intimidation, the current trial judge recently stated that a verdict was due this month; these witnesses may be required to give further testimony. We urge appropriate protection for the prosecution witnesses in the Mack case. We reiterate our expectation that the judicial process in this case be full, fair, and impartial. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993 Title:

US Supports Ongoing Angolan Talks and Calls for End to Fighting

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 2 19932/2/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization [TEXT] The United States welcomes the resumption of direct talks between the Government of Angola and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] in Addis Ababa [Ethiopia]. In addition to re-establishing a dialogue, the two parties found sufficient common ground to pursue further negotiations next week. The United States commends and fully supports the work of the United Nations and the Secretary General's Special Representative, Margaret Anstee, in facilitating these discussions. While we are encouraged by this new dialogue, both parties must recognize the urgent need for a cease-fire. Intense fighting continues in Angola, undermining the already fragile political and economic situation. A military solution to Angola's problems is not possible. The United States joins the international community in reiterating its call for an immediate end to the violence. UNITA and the Government must continue their face-to-face talks under UN auspices in order to resolve their conflict and fulfill the terms of the Bicesse peace accords. We remind all parties that any attacks on US facilities, companies, or personnel in Angola will have the gravest implications for those responsible. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 4, No 6, February 8, 1993 Title:

US Commitment To Advance The Middle East Peace Negotiations

Clinton Source: President Clinton Description: Statement released by the released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 3 19932/3/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] In accord with my pledge to maintain continuity in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, I have decided to dispatch Secretary of State Christopher to the Middle East. His purpose will be to convey to all the parties my commitment to advance the peace negotiations. He will elicit their views on how best to promote progress, and he will discuss bilateral issues and regional problems, including Iraq. This will be Secretary Christopher's first mission abroad. It is an indication of the priority my Administration attaches to peace-making in the Middle East. It also presents an opportunity for the parties to focus their energies on the formidable challenge of achieving peace in a strife- torn region. With violence engulfing so much of the world, it is striking that in the Middle East a process of direct negotiations has begun. Israel, all its Arab neighbors, and the Palestini