US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992

Title:

Humanitarian Mission to Somalia

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address to the nation, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 4 199212/4/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Subsaharan Africa Country: Somalia Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Military Affairs, Refugees, Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations [TEXT] I want to talk to you today about the tragedy in Somalia and about a mission that can ease suffering and save lives. Every American has seen the shocking images from Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to imagine. Already, over a quarter of a million people--as many people as live in Buffalo, New York--have died in the Somali famine. In the months ahead, five times that number, 1.5 million people could starve to death. For many months now, the United States has been actively engaged in the massive international relief effort to ease Somalia's suffering. All told, America has sent Somalia 200,000 tons of food, more than half the world total. This summer, the distribution system broke down. Truck convoys from Somalia's ports were blocked. Sufficient food failed to reach the starving in the interior of Somalia. And so in August, we took additional action. In concert with the United Nations, we sent in the US Air Force to help fly food to the towns. To date, American pilots have flown over 1,400 flights, delivering over 17,000 tons of food aid. And when the United Nations authorized 3,500 UN guards to protect the relief operation, we flew in the first of them--500 soldiers from Pakistan. But in the months since then, the security situation has grown worse. The United Nations has been prevented from deploying its initial commitment of troops. In many cases, food from relief flights is being looted upon landing, food convoys have been hijacked, aid workers assaulted, [and] ships with food have been subject to artillery attacks that prevented them from docking. There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down-- anarchy prevails. One image tells the story. Imagine 7,000 tons of food aid literally bursting out of a warehouse on a dock in Mogadishu, while Somalis starve less than a kilometer away, because relief workers cannot run the gauntlet of armed gangs roving the city. Confronted with these conditions, relief groups called for outside troops to provide security so they could feed people. It's now clear that military support is necessary to ensure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need to survive. It was this situation which led us to tell the United Nations that the United States would be willing to provide more help to enable relief to be delivered. Last night, the UN Security Council, by unanimous vote and after the tireless efforts of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, welcomed the United States' offer to lead a coalition to get the food through. After consulting with my advisers, with world leaders, and the congressional leadership, I have today told Secretary General Boutros-Ghali that America will answer the call. I have given the order to [Defense] Secretary Cheney to move a substantial American force into Somalia. As I speak, a Marine amphibious ready group, which we maintain at sea, is offshore Mogadishu. These troops will be joined by elements of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, based out of Camp Pendleton, California, and by the Army's 10th Mountain Division out of Fort Drum, New York. These and other American forces will assist in Operation Restore Hope. They are America's finest. They will perform this mission with courage and compassion, and they will succeed. The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act. In taking this action, I want to emphasize that I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs. But we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death. We will not, however, be acting alone. I expect forces from about a dozen countries to join us in this mission. When we see Somalia's children starving, all of America hurts. We've tried to help in many ways. And make no mistake about it, now we and our allies will ensure that aid gets through. Here is what we and our coalition partners will do. First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia, so that food can move from ships over land to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation. Second, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN peace-keeping force. Our mission has a limited objective--to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peace-keeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay 1 day longer than is absolutely necessary. Let me be very clear: Our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by starvation. [Marine] General Hoar [Commander in Chief of US Central Command] and his troops have the authority to take whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops and the lives of Somalia's people. The outlaw elements in Somalia must understand [that] this is serious business. We will accomplish our mission. We have no intent to remain in Somalia with fighting forces, but we are determined to do it right, to secure an environment that will allow food to get to the starving people of Somalia. To the people of Somalia I promise this: We do not plan to dictate political outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence. Based on my conversations with other coalition leaders, I can state with confidence: We come to your country for one reason only, to enable the starving to be fed. Let me say to the men and women of our armed forces, we are asking you to do a difficult and dangerous job. As commander in chief, I assure you, you will have our full support to get the job done, and we will bring you home as soon as possible. Finally, let me close with a message to the families of the men and women who take part in this mission. I under-stand it is difficult to see your loved ones go, to send them off knowing they will not be home for the holidays, but the humanitarian mission they undertake is in the finest traditions of service. So, to every sailor, soldier, airman, and marine who is involved in this mission, let me say, you're doing God's work. We will not fail. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

An Update on US-Angola Policy

Davidow Source: Jeffrey Davidow, Acting Assistant Secretary For African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Nov, 19 199211/19/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola, Portugal, USSR (former) Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, this is a sad occasion. We are here to talk about strife in Angola at a time when many of us had hoped we would be talking about peace. The events of the past 6 weeks have been discouraging. But we are not without hope, and our efforts to help bring peace and a democratic future to Angola will continue. The signing of the Angola peace accords in May 1991 brought the first hope of peace to Angola after 16 years of bitter civil war. The United States, in conjunction with Portugal, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations, played a major role in bringing UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] to a cease-fire. Since that time, we have worked long and hard to help guide that process to its conclusion through our role as an official observer to the joint political military commission in Luanda. We also contributed more than $100 million toward the peace process, including over $12 million to elections alone. The elections of September 29-30 were intended to be the culmination of the peace process and were a watershed event, both for Angola as a nation and for each of its citizens. Despite daunting logistical challenges and some tensions during the political campaigns, elections were conducted in a calm, effective, and orderly fashion. Delays in the vote counting and the piece-meal manner in which partial results were released quickly prompted some charges of fraud. Dr. [Jonas] Savimbi [President of UNITA] charged in an October 3 speech from Huambo that the elections were flawed by significant irregularities. The National Electoral Council [NEC] received these and all subsequent allegations of fraud and established a variety of mechanisms to address these charges. Finally, on October 17, after examining reports of all 18 provincial councils and four national subcommissions set up with the concurrence and participation of UNITA to investigate the allegations, the NEC officially announced the results of the elections. That same day, the United Nations, which had actively participated at all stages of the electoral process, and particularly scrutinized the process of investigation of the allegations of fraud, issued a statement declaring that, despite some irregularities, the elections were "generally free and fair." The United States publicly concurred in the UN's conclusion. As you know, President Dos Santos did not obtain the 50% majority needed to win the presidency, although his MPLA party won 54% of the legislative vote. Under Angolan law and the provisions of the peace accords, a presidential run-off election was to follow within 30 days of the announcement of the results. This was not possible, but there should be no doubt that the goal of a complete democratic electoral process, as envisioned by the peace accords, should remain the goal of all Angolans and friends of Angola. Post-electoral events have made the longer term goal of national reconciliation more elusive. The October 5 withdrawal of UNITA generals from the Unified National Armed Forces; its military takeover of almost half the country; and its inflammatory media campaign to discredit the National Electoral Council, the United Nations, foreign observers, and the MPLA all contributed to a highly charged atmosphere. Violent incidents in the capital itself, including two bombings, an attack on a munitions dump near the airport, and another against the central police headquarters, were attributed by the government to UNITA. The MPLA, for its part, believing it had fulfilled most of its obligations under the accords, appeared to adopt a winner-take-all attitude. In addition, the confrontational posture of its police forces exacerbated tensions. The government also began to distribute weapons to civilians in major cities and towns, including Luanda. On October 31, these tensions spilled over into 2 days of violence in Luanda during which many UNITA supporters were killed. Among the dead were UNITA's vice president and its representative to the joint political- military commission. The government has acknowledged that the attacks were carried out by its security forces and by hundreds of civilians which it had armed. The government has alleged it was UNITA's attacks on the airport on October 30 and on police headquarters on October 31 that provoked its response. UNITA insists that the government's attacks were unprovoked and that its leaders had been invited to Luanda to negotiate in good faith. The loss of life in Luanda was deplorable, and we noted this on November 4. The government's arming of large numbers of people, many of whom have now turned to looting and thuggery, was a grave error which promoted unnecessary violence and loss of life. A UN-sponsored cease-fire went into effect at midnight on November 1 and has gradually taken hold. Luanda has nearly returned to normal. After heavy fighting in the Lobito and Benguela areas as well as other parts of the country and UNITA takeovers of Capanda Dam and the town of Caxito, 60 kilometers from Luanda, the provinces also appear quiet. Nevertheless, troop movements continue around key provincial capitals, and the general situation remains extremely tense. The government has under custody several hundred UNITA personnel in Luanda, and it is believed UNITA holds an undetermined number of detainees as well, outside Luanda. The ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] is exploring ways it can ameliorate the situation. For our part, we have remained actively engaged in the search for a negotiated solution throughout the crises. We supported thorough investigation of electoral fraud charges by the NEC, the United Nations, and the political parties. We encouraged the October 11-14 visit of the UN Security Council Ad Hoc Commission of which our permanent representative to the United Nations was a member. Shortly thereafter, Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs Herman J.] Cohen again visited Angola as part of a joint observer mission, which met with both Dos Santos and Savimbi to push for an early summit. We concurred fully in the assessment of the elections as generally free and fair and urged the two principal parties to discuss the formation of a government of national unity following a run-off. As tensions rose, we urged both sides, publicly and privately, to cease their aggressive posturing. As events unfolded in Luanda [on] October 31 and November 1, we worked around the clock to arrange an immediate cease-fire to ensure the safety of military and civilians caught in the fighting. We are continuing to press each side to observe the November 1 cease-fire agreement and to ensure humanitarian treatment and early release of detainees. We have pursued these actions in full support of UN efforts to secure a peaceful settlement. Our position is clear: The existing peace accords remain the only comprehensive means of achieving a stable national reconciliation in which the interests of all parties can be accommodated. The key provisions of the accords--a comprehensive monitored cease-fire, a unified national armed force, democratic political activity, UN monitoring and completion of the electoral process--are principles that offer the only real hope of a durable solution to Angola's conflict. We believe that after having come so far within their framework, the Angolan parties must not abandon the principles contained in the accords. The accords also offer the basis for a return to meaningful dialogue. But the resumption of dialogue must be accompanied by a cessation of military movements. It also must be undertaken with the understanding that each side is an indispensable partner to a solution. We have been conveying this message at every opportunity to UNITA and the Government of the Republic of Angola. UN Under Secretary General Goulding carried a similar message to Angola last week in an initiative which we fully supported. Both sides appear willing to discuss how to reactivate the negotiation process. We are cautiously optimistic that Goulding's efforts will prove successful. We strongly support them and are reinforcing them in our contacts. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

US Commitment to APEC

Eagleburger Source: Acting Secretary Eagleburger Description: Address before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Senior Officials Meeting, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 2 199212/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] Distinguished guests--ladies and gentlemen--I am very pleased to welcome you to the Department of State for this meeting of APEC senior officials. I would like to begin by emphasizing the special importance which the United States attaches to this gathering and to our assumption of the APEC chair for the coming year. In all candor, we recognize the fact that, in this past year of base closings and the quadrennial American preoccupation with things internal, some have questioned our commitment to remaining engaged in Asia. Others, meanwhile, have wondered whether the progress we have achieved with NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement] will come at the expense of trading relationships with our APEC partners. These concerns make your presence here today timely, indeed. I believe you are going to witness, this week and throughout the American chairmanship, a determined commitment on our part to APEC and to making APEC an effective instrument of our common purpose. The fact of the matter is that the United States cannot, in the 21st century, escape from an Asian destiny born in the 20th century. This is not a question of inclination or choice but of facts--geographic, political, and economic--facts which will require us to continue assuming our responsibilities as an Asian power no matter what political party governs in Washington, DC. What will change, however, is the nature of our involvement in an Asia which itself has changed so fundamentally in the wake of the Cold War. What has changed most of all is the increasing predominance of economic issues and the increasing economic interdependence between and among APEC member states. Our common challenge is to manage this interdependence in ways that promote not only continued growth and prosperity but greater political cohesion at a time of mounting fragmentation and instability elsewhere in the world. It is vital, in short, that we discover the means to work more closely together, and that is what the United States hopes to see accomplished this week and throughout our term in the APEC chair. We believe that the next 12 months mark a time of transition for this organization. We must now move beyond the phase of institutionalizing APEC to making it operational; we must move, in short, from rhetoric to results. Our goal should be to make of APEC a pre-eminent regional organization which can serve as the Pacific community's common voice in helping to shape the international economy of the 21st century. Our goal should be both to help our private sector[s] in concrete ways and to challenge our trading partners outside the Pacific region to support trade liberalization. Here in Washington, we must seek to implement the decisions taken in Bangkok by making recommendations for policy actions by the ministers, especially in trade liberalization. We must also focus on practical problem- solving, increase private sector participation in all phases of the APEC work program, and staff the secretariat and prepare our budgets for the next 2 years. Before closing, I would like to say a few words about regional trade liberalization--the issue which the ministers decided would be a central focus of the US ministerial next November. The informal group on regional trade liberalization, under Australia's guiding hand, has accomplished good work. Establishment of an eminent persons group and progress on the investment, customs, standards, and tariff data projects provide us with the foundation for the next stage--i.e., proposals for ministerial consideration which will advance, in concrete ways, APEC's philosophy of open regionalism and trade liberalization. I believe we need to think boldly. We ought to be able to envisage such things as: -- An APEC investment agreement; -- An APEC code of conduct for administrative measures; -- An APEC intellectual property agreement; -- An APEC customs cooperation treaty; -- An APEC dispute settlement mechanism; -- An APEC-wide, open-skies agreement in civil aviation; or -- An APEC agreement on trade in a particular goods or services sector. I am not suggesting that any one of these ideas is now ripe for ministerial action. What I am suggesting is that we need to stretch our conceptual horizons and begin to think of APEC as an organization which can produce cooperative solutions to our common regional problems. Over the past 3 years, all members have worked to transform APEC from a concept to an organizational reality. Be assured that the United States will build on the fine efforts of the four previous chairs as we enter this critical transitional year in APEC's development. I wish you every success over the next 3 days in achieving our common objectives. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

Progress on POW/MIA Issues

Quinn Source: Kenneth M. Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Statement before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 1 199212/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, China, Russia Subject: POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the Select Committee. In my testimony today, I would like to provide the committee with an overview of the diplomatic activities and other efforts of the US Government on the POW/MIA [prisoner-of-war/missing in action] issue over the past 21/2 years since Secretary Baker's July 1990 initiative reinvigorated our discussions with Vietnam. The government has, of course, been pursuing answers to the POW/MIA questions since the end of the war, but the last 30 months have seen both a renewed effort and the most significant results. Much of what we have accomplished is due to the leadership of General Vessey, the President's Special Emissary to Hanoi, as well as the work of hundreds of Defense Department employees and the efforts of many Members of Congress. But I believe the many diplomatic initiatives we have undertaken during the last 21/2 years, along with the policy framework which we have put in place, have been crucial to the progress we have achieved and have established the basis for continued progress in the future. Since April 1991, the central element of this framework has been our "roadmap" policy, which calls for a series of commensurate steps by both sides as we move toward achieving our objectives: the fullest possible accounting for our missing men, Vietnam's continued support for the UN peace plan in Cambodia, and the release of re-education camp detainees in Vietnam. The roadmap is premised on the theory--based on 16 years of tough experience--that the only way to move forward is if both parties are taking steps to meet the concerns of the other. As we explained to the Vietnamese when we presented them with the roadmap, by laying out a schedule of concrete steps, we intended to give both sides the confidence to move forward. While we indicated that we were prepared to take significant actions in a relatively brief period of time, we made absolutely clear that the speed at which we make progress on the roadmap depends on Vietnam's actions to account for our POW/MIAs and its continued support for the UN peace plan in Cambodia.
Accomplishments of "Roadmap" Policy Toward Vietnam
Looking back over these 30 months, I believe we can point to a number of significant accomplishments of this policy approach with Vietnam. Two and a half years ago, we did not even have a regular channel of diplomatic communications with Vietnam. Then, in July 1990, Secretary Baker established a channel for dialogue with senior Vietnamese officials. We have since aggressively used this channel for addressing our POW/MIA and Cambodia concerns, including meetings at the secretary, under secretary, assistant secretary, and deputy assistant secretary level. I would note in particular the October 8 meeting which Acting Secretary Eagleburger, [Defense] Secretary Cheney, and Assistant Secretary [of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Clark held with Foreign Minister Cam, and Under Secretary [of State for Political Affairs] Kanter's meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Co last summer. Two and a half years ago, we did not have a presence in Vietnam. We now have a POW/MIA office in Hanoi, staffed by 11 full-time Americans and numerous TDY [temporary duty] personnel dedicated to resolving this issue. We also have established POW/MIA offices in Phnom Penh and Vientiane during this same timeframe. Two and a half years ago, we had virtually no success in obtaining from Vietnam records and other documentary materials related to our missing men. Thanks to an initiative by General Vessey, we began to make progress in this area in late 1990, with the first visit of an information/research team. In February 1992, General Vessey received a copy of a document we had long sought--an 84-page record of shootdowns of our aircraft--which offered important information on the fates of a number of POW/MIAs. The Vietnamese agreed to provide us further access to their records during [former] Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Solomon's March visit to Hanoi. Most recently, during General Vessey's October mission, he obtained a commitment from the leadership of Vietnam to provide us with all POW/MIA-related materials. We have a team of researchers in Hanoi reviewing material, and the Defense Department will be sending at least two more research teams to Vietnam in the next few months. This archival material should provide us with a great deal of information about POW/MIAs, information which should help us determine the fates of more men. Two and a half years ago, we did not have a mechanism in place for investigating reported sightings of live Americans in Vietnam. We now have an established process and have satisfactorily dealt with almost 50 live sighting investigations, 15 of them on short notice. Mr. Chairman, you and some of your colleagues participated in a number of these live sighting investigations last month, and the work of your committee has reinforced this process and led to its present effectiveness. There is one specific aspect of these live sighting investigations to which I wish to give special emphasis--access to prisons. When I visited Hanoi in July 1991, no American official had ever had access to a prison in Vietnam or elsewhere to search for possible live POW/MIAs. During my meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai, I pressed for and he agreed to US investigators having access to prisons in central Vietnam so that we could follow up the widely publicized photo of three men identified by their families as missing pilots. The first two prison visits followed a few days later. Since then, and in good part due to the work of members of this committee, American officials have been in and out of a number of other prisons in Vietnam, including the notorious Hanoi Hilton, Thanh Liet, Bat Bat, Son Tay, 17 Ly Nam De, the Hai Phong prison, the B-5 Provincial Prison, and the Vinh Quang Prison Camp. These are in addition to the prisons and confinement areas--including the Citadel--visited by you, Mr. Chairman, and other committee members during your most recent trip. Two and a half years ago we were making little progress in our field investigations of discrepancy cases and other related cases. In fact, from the start of the field investigations in September 1988, at the initiative of General Vessey, through the spring of 1991--a 31-month period--we conducted 13 joint field operations but were only able to investigate 144 cases. Then, in April 1991, we presented Vietnam with the roadmap. The 14th field operation was the first conducted after the roadmap was in place, and the Department of Defense investigators reported that, in that one operation, they obtained more information on our missing men that in all previous 13 operations combined. In the 20 months since the roadmap was presented, we have investigated 286 cases. That is double the number of cases investigated in the 31 months before the roadmap. During the course of these field investigations, US experts have been able to interview hundreds and hundreds of Vietnamese citizens--including many who have provided first-hand accounts about the fate of US servicemen. It is probably a failure of our process that we don't have a better yardstick to measure this important progress--which has been painstakingly obtained by teams operating under [the] Joint Task Force Full Accounting head, Gen. Tom Needham--but it is essential that the American people understand just how much has been accomplished through the thousands of hours put in by the dedicated men and women of the Defense Department working on this issue. Let me give you just a few examples from the several hundred reports we have obtained in the last 12 months. -- In one case, five separate witnesses provided firsthand reports of an American POW killed during an escape attempt from a POW camp. -- In another report, three witnesses described the shootdown of a US helicopter and the death of seven Americans as a result of the crash. -- Another witness told US investigators how he participated in an attack and the killing of a US soldier who was walking alone down a path near a stream. -- Other Vietnamese veterans described how an American prisoner sustained a minor leg injury during an aircraft crash but later contracted malaria and died while being transported by stretcher to a dispensary in a mountainous part of Vietnam. -- A former staff member of the COSVN [Central Office of the South Vietnamese Communist Party] prison camp system described how an American prisoner was executed in retaliation for the supposed killing of a Vietcong cadre by US forces. -- Finally in another case, US personnel visited an extremely remote part of northern Vietnam where they were provided eight sets of remains by local officials. The team then set out to visit the crash site from which the remains reportedly came. It was a 6-hour hike with ascent to the site made only by hand-over-hand climbing on jagged limestone outcrops and areas of loose rubble. The US team was led to the spot where the remains were said to have been buried. Digging, they found a bone and tooth fragments along with some aircraft wreckage and life support equipment. It was a significant accomplishment made with great effort and some considerable risk to the individuals involved. In commenting on the operation, the US team leader wrote, "The spirit of cooperation and friendship between the US and Vietnamese was on a high level. No obstacles were encountered that could not be overcome by the Joint Team's efforts." I would not pretend to suggest that all cooperation in Vietnam is at this same level. It is not. Obviously, these are tragic stories. However, it is important for us to be able at long last to provide this information to the families of the soldiers. And as a result of all this painstaking work, the Defense Department has been able to officially confirm the fate of 64 of our discrepancy cases. In addition, in the last 8 months, we have received detailed, mostly first-hand, accounts about the likely fate of another 150 men listed as POW/MIA. So, these investigations are providing the important answers we seek, and, Mr. Chairman, the vastly improved level of cooperation is a clear indication that our policy of both sides taking a series of commensurate steps is working. And, while we choose to not formally close many such cases--including discrepancy cases--because we may still hope to recover remains or find some additional documentary evidence, we have answers--not always perfect answers--but answers, nonetheless, about what likely happened to the men involved. The recovery, repatriation, and identification of remains of our missing is an important goal of the Administration's policy. Since General Vessey undertook his first mission to Hanoi, the United States has repatriated over 300 sets of remains from Vietnam, which has resulted in approximately 120 Americans being accounted for. Another 77 remains can't be identified but cannot be excluded from being Americans. In addition, the Army's identification laboratory (CILHI) also has more than 600 portions of remains which may never be identified. Here, too, we have achieved important results in the last 21/2 years. Since September 1990, the United States has accepted 79 sets of remains from Vietnam. Additional remains are now available to us, and the Defense Department is sending experts to Vietnam later this month to evaluate those remains. Of course, we will strive to recover many more remains, but it is important to note that the repatriation of remains is now taking place on a regular basis.
Progress With Other Countries
I would also like to note the significant progress we have made on POW/MIA issues with countries other than Vietnam. Cambodia. In Cambodia, there has been a dramatic increase in POW/MIA cooperation since July 1991. At that time, there was no meaningful POW/MIA cooperation between the United States and the Phnom Penh authorities. In Beijing, I met with senior state of Cambodia officials and we agreed that for the first time a US team would travel to Cambodia to investigate the photo of three men identified by their families as missing Americans pilots. Since then, we have opened a POW/MIA office in Phnom Penh, and the state of Cambodia has permitted the use of US military helicopters in the field operations, which improves the safety conditions for our personnel. Five joint field operations have been conducted, and we have recovered the remains of four foreign journalists, including one American missing since 1970. Additional field operations are scheduled for this month and in January, April, and June of 1993. Particularly in light of the difficult conditions in Cambodia, the authorities in Phnom Penh have been extremely cooperative in this effort. Laos. During the past 21/2 years, Lao cooperation has also improved markedly, and we now have a POW/MIA office in Vientiane. In 1991, the joint teams conducted six exercises, during which 15 surveys, 5 recovery operations, and 5 investigations were conducted. In 1992, US and Lao field teams conducted 7 joint activities, during which we excavated 7 crash or grave sites and investigated or surveyed 30 cases. Of the seven sites, remains were found in two locations. Most recently, the Lao[s] Government has cooperated in an investigation of the site of the "USA" symbol in Sam Nuea; that investigation was completed this week. We anticipate that the Government of Laos will continue to expand its POW/MIA cooperation. Russia. As the committee is aware, we have also undertaken extensive POW/MIA work with the Government of Russia. As a member of the Joint US-Russian Commission, I have served, along with Deputy Assistant Secretary [of Defense] Alan Ptak, as a link to our work on Vietnam. I have twice traveled with Ambassador Toon [Principal US Delegate to the US- Russian Commission on POW/MIAs] to Russia where we have had the opportunity to pursue reports of Americans having been taken to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam war. I was also among that first group of official Americans to enter a Russian prison and to have access to the inmates. And I was the person who elicited the first detailed description of underground areas near the Citadel. China. As Charles Kartman [Director of State Department Office of Korean Affairs] detailed for you last month, we are also working through the United Nations to resolve Korean war cases. Our senior officials continue to ask China for additional assistance on POW/MIA cases, and during my November trip to Beijing, I again held extended discussions with PRC [People's Republic of China] officials on this subject. It is important to mention that, even as we have been obtaining answers from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia for the POW/MIA families, we have also been making progress on other important humanitarian concerns. In the past 21/2 years, over 1,000 political detainees have been given their freedom in Cambodia and more than 100 in Vietnam as a direct result of our policies. Moreover, under our Orderly Departure Program, US State Department officers working in Ho Chi Minh city have processed more than 280,000 Vietnamese for travel to the United States; more than half of those people have arrived since July 1990. Since that date, more than 40,000 Amerasian children and their relatives have resettled here, and almost 50,000 re- education camp detainees and their relatives have arrived. The roadmap policy has directly and indirectly enhanced our ability to help these people whose lives had been dramatically affected by US involvement in the war. Mention also needs to be made of the assistance the United States has received from many friendly countries on its efforts to deal with the POW/MIA issue. I want to single out two countries, however, for their long- term consistent support for this "endeavor." Those two countries are Thailand and Japan, whose cooperation and support over the years has been crucial to the success we have experienced. Japan has raised this issue with Hanoi on many occasions over the years, and Thailand has provided access to refugees and others with important information. Americans should all remember that in this quest to account for our missing men--"our highest national priority"--America has had no better friends than Japan and Thailand.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, as I believe my testimony indicates, we have made very significant progress on POW/MIA [issues] over the past 30 months. We now have POW/MIA offices in Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane, and we have conducted 29 joint field investigations in the three countries. Through these searches, we have officially confirmed the fates of 64 of the men listed as discrepancy cases, and we have received detailed information on the fates of 150 other men. We have a live sighting investigation mechanism in place in Vietnam, and we have already investigated 48 reported sightings of Americans, including through access to more than 10 prisons. We have made steady progress in repatriating remains, with 79 sets returned from Vietnam and more undergoing initial evaluation later this month. The most important progress may have come in just the last few months, with Vietnam's initial implementation of its unprecedented commitment to provide us access to all POW/MIA materials in their archives and museums. Cooperation in Cambodia has also been excellent, and it has been steadily improving in Laos. For Vietnam, the roadmap policy has effectively encouraged that country to expand and accelerate its cooperation on both POW/MIA and Cambodia. This policy has established a framework for steps by both sides which has, I believe, the best possibility to provide us with the fullest possible accounting for our missing men. Mr. Chairman, members of the Select Committee, we do not yet have all of the answers we must have, but I think the progress we have made over the last 2 years shows that our policy is working and it produces results. As we address the question of what to do next--to take more steps or to hold back--we should be guided by this litmus test: What will help maintain this unprecedented level of cooperation and progress and, indeed, increase it? I can speak for the State Department in assuring this committee and the American people that we have consistently been guided by this test in determining what steps we should take toward Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. As someone who spent 6 years in Vietnam during the war and who still feels the special bond of those who were in combat together, I want to add that, as long as I hold my current position, we will continue to do everything possible to ensure that the families of our missing men can know the fate of their loved ones. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

Focus on the Environment: A Periodic Update

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92 Category: Features Region: Southeast Asia Country: Vietnam Subject: POW/MIA Issues [TEXT]
USAID Develops Comprehensive Environmental Strategy
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) recently has adopted a comprehensive environmental strategy which will serve as a road map for sustainable development. The new strategy revises and updates previous guidelines, including the 1988 policy paper on the environment and 1990's environment initiative. According to USAID, the new strategy will prepare the agency for the future because wise management of the natural resource base is an absolute requirement of any successful development program. The new strategy also reaffirms the belief that environmental and economic goals are best reached in democratic societies and open markets. Each of USAID's five regional bureaus has adopted its own strategy, which builds on the common guidelines, criteria, and strategic approaches of the parent document. Following are priorities in each region. Africa. Two critical areas--unsustainable agricultural practices and the loss of tropical forests and other critical habitats for biological diversity- -are the top priorities of the Africa Bureau. Targeted sub-regions are the arid and semi-arid tropics, tropical highlands, the country of Madagascar, and the humid tropical forest of the Congo Basin. Asia. Since more than 50% of the world's 5 billion people live in Asia, and 35% of them are under the age of 15, economic growth and population expansion have led to some of the worst urban and industrial pollution in the world. The Asia Bureau has identified four priority areas: loss of tropical forests and biological diversity; urban and industrial pollution; degradation and mismanagement of water and coastal resources; and energy shortages, inefficiencies, and environmental impacts of energy development. Europe. The peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are suffering the effects of the worst pollution in the world. For example, 50% of Poland's rivers are too polluted for industrial use or drinking. Estimates show that the costs of environmental degradation are between 7% and 15% of each state's gross domestic product. USAID's top priority is to reduce the immediate threats to health and support economic restructuring and to protect the remaining important conservation areas. The agency will concentrate on energy efficiency and urban and industrial pollution reduction. Latin America and the Caribbean. USAID resources in this region will be focused on the conservation of tropical forests and other critical habitats, sustainable agriculture, and improved management and protection of water and coastal resources. Attention also will be given to the promotion of environmentally sound energy production and the use and reduction of urban and industrial pollution. Near East. Water resources provide the most critical environmental challenges facing this arid region where water shortages and the degradation of water quality increases at "an alarming rate." Due to the transnational nature of water resources in this region, these issues are the cause and continuation of regional instability. Prospects for peace will depend heavily on resolving these water issues. The Near East Bureau will focus on degradation and depletion of water resources, urban and industrial pollution, environmentally unsound energy production and use, and unsustainable farming practices. Development can only occur if the natural resource base on which it depends is carefully managed. In recognition of this critical linkage, USAID's environmental strategy is to integrate environmental concerns into all of the agency's developmental activities and to take direct actions to work with host countries to protect and better management their environment. --Susan Holly, Dispatch Staff
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

USAID: 1992 Environmental Strategy

USAID Source: US Agency for International Development (USAID) Description: Executive Summary, released by Office of Policy Analysis and Resources Policy Directorate, Agency for International Development Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92 Category: Reports Region: Whole World Subject: Environment [TEXT]
Environmental Protection Fundamental to USAID's Assistance Programs
[Following is the text of the Executive Summary of the US Agency for International Development's 1992 Environmental Strategy. Public distribution of the strategy will begin in January 1993. Individual copies can be ordered by contacting the Office of Policy Analysis and Resources Policy Directorate, Agency for International Development, 320 21st Street, NW, Room 3947, Washington, DC, 20523.] Wise use of natural resources and environmental protection are fundamental to USAlD's assistance program. Broad-based development, expanded participation in the benefits of economic growth, and improvements in the quality of human existence throughout the developing world and other USAlD-assisted regions are inseparably linked to environmental conditions. USAlD's Environment Strategy for the 1990s reconfirms the environment as an integral component of the agency's development assistance program and ensures that, within current and anticipated budgetary and political realities, USAID will assist nations' efforts to protect the environment. The strategy identifies the major environmental problems threatening development, establishes criteria for allocating resources to address the most critical issues and for selecting appropriate actions, and identifies priority approaches to environmentally sound development, including those unique to each bureau. USAID has extensive experience in integrating concern for the environment with development objectives beginning in the 1970s with formal environmental regulations. This strategy refines and updates previous environmental guidelines, including the 1988 Policy Paper on Environment and Natural Resources, the 1990 Environment Initiative and the 1992 Environmental Strategic Framework. With its strong field presence and access to highly qualified expertise, USAID is well-positioned to enhance its environmental programs to meet the needs of the l990s and beyond.
Environmental Constraints To Development
Environmental degradation is a significant and growing threat to development throughout the world, and its effects are felt most acutely by poor families in developing countries. Economic growth, as well as the potential for such growth, is endangered by a natural resource base declining in quality and quantity, while deteriorating economies exacerbate and accelerate degradation of the environment. The rapid and poorly managed growth of cities in many developing countries has led to a serious deterioration in urban environmental conditions, adversely affecting human health and the urban infrastructure necessary for efficient economic development. USAID has identified five major environmental problems that most directly affect the developing world and the Agency's developmental objectives: 1. Loss of tropical forests and other habitats critical for biological diversity; 2. Unsustainable agricultural practices; 3. Environmentally unsound energy production and use; 4. Urban and industrial pollution; and 5. Degradation and depletion of water and coastal resources. Each of these threatens economic progress, biological and other natural resources, and the health and quality of human life. Each also has impacts well beyond national boundaries, often with global consequences. This strategy focuses specifically on those activities designed primarily to enhance or protect the environment. However, USAID recognizes that other issues, such as rapid population growth, also affect the environment significantly, although in complex and often indirect ways. Therefore, USAlD's environment program is coordinated closely with the agency's family planning program to ensure an integrated approach to addressing the complex relationship between population growth rates and natural resources management.
Targeting Environmental Problems
The five major problem areas listed above include the full range of serious environmental threats to development. Within this overall framework, USAID missions, supported by USAlD/Washington, are developing a program targeted to specific problems where assistance will have the greatest impact. Strategic allocation of resources is a basic requirement for an effective program, because USAID simply cannot address every problem in every country it assists. USAID, therefore, is focusing its resources on environmental problems that most constrain development and on those that, if not acted upon immediately, will likely result in significant threats to human health or irreversible damage to the natural resource base and the economy. The agency concentrates on problems that host countries are committed to, capable of addressing and have identified as priority issues.
Developing Effective Solutions
In its efforts to solve these problems, USAID supports activities that: 1. Attack root causes of environmental degradation; 2. Support Iocal empowerment and public participation; 3. Improve scientific understanding of environmental issues affecting aid- recipient countries and improve data on the natural resource base; and 4. Promote cooperation with other environmental and developmental organizations. In carrying out this strategy, USAID emphasizes three broad approaches that most effectively integrate environment and development: strengthening human/institutional capacity and building public awareness; supporting developing country efforts to change wasteful or unsustainable economic and environmental policies and procedures; and encouraging private sector participation in promoting environmentally sound activities. Specific approaches to environmental activities vary considerably by region given the unique ecological, political, and economic characteristics of the different geographic areas. To capture this diversity, regional strategies that apply the guidelines presented above have been developed to guide agency environmental efforts in Europe, Asia, the Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa. As problems vary, regional approaches change. For example, in Africa the program focus is on environmental problems associated with forestry/biodiversity, sustainable agriculture, and coastal zone management. Asia, while sharing some of these concerns, sees the environmental problems of rapid urban and industrial growth--urban and industrial pollution and sound energy production--as key constraints to sustained regional growth. No matter what the focus, however, each regional approach relies heavily on discussions of policy issues with a broad range of host country officials as a central element in strategy implementation. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

Libyan Terrorism

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Nov, 27 199211/27/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Libya, United Kingdom, France, United States Subject: Terrorism [TEXT] One year ago today, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom declared that, following the investigations into the bombing of Pan Am [flight] 103 and UTA [flight] 772, the three states have presented specific demands to Libyan authorities related to the judicial procedures that are underway. They require that Libya commit itself concretely and definitively to cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups. Libya must promptly, by concrete actions, prove its renunciation of terrorism. On January 21, 1992, the UN Security Council in Resolution 731 deplored Libya's failure to respond positively and called upon it to do so immediately. On March 27, 1992, the UN Security Council in Resolution 748 expressed its deep concern that Libya still had not fully complied with Resolution 731 and imposed mandatory sanctions upon Libya to persuade it to comply. These sanctions entered into force on April 15, 1992. Today, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom condemn Libya's regrettable failure to comply with any of the requirements of the United Nations Security Council. The Libyan Government continues its attempt to escape its international obligations through equivocation and delay. By its evasion, Libya continues to flout international law. On this anniversary, the three states strongly reaffirm their single objective with respect to Libya: prompt, complete, and unequivocal compliance with [the] terms of UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748. Justice for all 441 victims of the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings and international peace and security, which is threatened by Libya's support of terrorism, require no less. Accordingly, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom are determined to intensify their efforts in close cooperation with the UN Secretary General to make the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council in March yet more effective. They call upon the Government of Libya to end its defiance of the international community. Libya's failure to fulfill its international obligations will only result in furthering its isolation from the world community. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom, together with all members of the international community, will continue closely monitoring Libya's actions. The Government of Libya will be greatly mistaken if it doubts their resolve.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

US Supports Venezuelan Democracy

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Venezuela Subject: Democratization [TEXT] President Bush spoke this morning with President Perez of Venezuela. The President told President Perez [that] he was disturbed to hear about the attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government of Venezuela. President Perez assured the President that he has the situation under control. During their conversation, the President confirmed strong US support for Venezuelan democracy and for President Perez. The President emphasized that the foundation of the US policy in the region is support for democracy and stated that--while we understand Venezuela, like a number of nations, is going through a difficult period--authoritarian solutions just won't work. The United States cannot have normal relations with a country that has abandoned democracy, and we will work with like-minded governments to support constitutional processes in any country where democracy is threatened. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

Russian Science and Technology Center Agreement Signed

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Nov, 27 199211/27/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Russia, United States, Japan Subject: Science/Technology, EC [TEXT] The United States, Japan, the European Community, and Russia signed an agreement today in Moscow to establish the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). The ISTC, which will be headquartered in Moscow, will serve as a clearinghouse for developing, approving, financing, and monitoring projects aimed at engaging weapons scientists and engineers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Georgia in peaceful, civilian science and technology activities. Through its projects, the ISTC will contribute to ongoing efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Its wider goals include reinforcing the transition in the CIS and Georgia to market-based economies responsive to civil needs and supporting basic and applied research and technology development. To support the ISTC and its projects and activities, the United States is providing $25 million, the European Community 20 million ECU (European Currency Unit), and Japan $17 million. The Russian Federation will provide in-kind support to include a facility for the center, as well as its maintenance, utilities, security, and related support. The ISTC's activities will be directed by a governing board with representatives of member states. Dr. Victor E. Alessi has been chosen to serve as the US member of the ISTC Governing Board. He is currently the Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in the Department of Energy and is responsible for developing and monitoring a $300 million research and development program that involves hundreds of scientists and engineers at [the] Department of Energy's national laboratories. Dr. Alessi also has broad experience in US negotiations with the former Soviet Union, specifically on the treaties covering intermediate[-range] nuclear forces (INF), conventional [armed] forces in Europe (CFE), and strategic arms reduction (START). Most recently, Dr. Alessi has been involved in the implementation of President Bush's nuclear initiative and has served as a member of the US delegation to the talks with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. The United States and the other founding parties of the ISTC are strongly committed to making the center fully operational as soon as possible. To advance this process, the parties have formed a preparatory committee that will be responsible for addressing administrative, staffing, financial, and other key operational issues of the center. The preparatory committee will also begin developing and reviewing project proposals so that projects can be approved and funded by the center as soon as possible after the agreement enters into force once all parties have completed all necessary internal procedures. The anticipated range of ISTC projects and activities will require broad international support. The founding members look forward to expanding the number of parties to the agreement and expect to approve the accession of Sweden, Switzerland, and Canada once the agreement enters into force and the center is legally constituted. The ISTC will also seek the participation of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, foundations, academic and scientific institutions, and the private sector. Individuals, institutes, and governments interested in presenting project proposals for consideration or otherwise contributing to the center and its work may obtain a copy of the ISTC Guidelines for Proposal Preparation by calling the Office of the Senior Coordinator at the Department of State at 202-647-8757 or [by] writing to: The Office of the Senior Coordinator (PM/SC) Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Room 5214 Department of State 2201 C Street, NW Washington, DC 20520-5214.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

Heathrow Airport Arbitration

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Nov, 30 199211/30/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: United Kingdom Subject: Travel [TEXT] Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, November 30, 1992. The British and US Governments have today received the award of the arbitral tribunal set up to arbitrate the dispute between the United Kingdom and the United States over whether the British Government met its treaty obligations to the United States regarding user charges imposed on US airlines serving Heathrow. The 6 charging years [of] 1983-84 through 1988- 89 were [at] issue. The tribunal found that the British Government failed to meet certain of its obligations during part of the period in question. The decision did not deal with the issues of damages. The governments will reserve any further comment until the implications of this long and complex award have been studied. The governments thank the members of the tribunal for their work in dealing with this difficult case.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

Zaire

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 1 199212/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Zaire, United States, Belgium, France Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] After consultation in Washington on November 30, the US, French, and Belgian Governments have agreed to issue statements here as well as in Paris and Brussels along similar lines. Our mutual concern has been heightened by President Mobutu's intended dismissal of the Tshisekedi government on December 1. The United States reaffirms its support for the democratic transition underway in Zaire, for the government of Prime Minister Tshisekedi, who was elected by the National Conference, and for a democratization process which will ensure greater respect for human rights. We call upon all of Zaire's political leaders to dedicate themselves unconditionally to the realization of these objectives. In addition, we reiterate our profound concern that measures to solve Zaire's economic crisis are not being pursued. We urge the transition government to assume full control over the central bank, major public enterprises, and all other activities essential to Zaire's economic recovery. The transition government must establish an economic stabilization plan, including investment priorities, acceptable to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund without further delay. Such a plan will establish a framework essential to the resumption of assistance by the United States and Zaire's other friends. We are willing to work with the Government of Zaire, our allies, and the international financial institutions to facilitate the development of an economic program for Zaire. We congratulate the transition government on its efforts to confront and deal with the financial irregularities of previous governments.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

Portsmouth National Passport Center

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Dec, 2 199212/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Immigration, Travel [TEXT] The Department of State has opened the largest passport processing center in the United States at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Known as the National Passport Center, the facility is capable of issuing 6,000 passports per day but can be expanded to issue 9,000 passports per day. The center represents the Department's commitment to meeting an expected passport renewal workload surge. The increase is anticipated because of a 1983 statutory change extending the validity of passports issued to persons over age 18 from 5 to 10 years. With the first of the 10-year passports expiring in 1993, the Department expects to issue 4.3 million this coming year. About 1.1 million of these applications are expected to be mail renewals. The center is now processing passport mail renewal applications from around the United States. Passport fees are deposited in Pittsburgh, with the applications subsequently express mailed to Portsmouth for processing. The other passport agencies will process first-time applications and any other requests for passport services presented in person. To renew a passport by mail, applicants must: -- Obtain an "Application for Passport by Mail" (Form DSP-82) from a passport acceptance facility (post office, court house, or passport agency); -- Complete and sign the application and attach the most recent passport issued not more than 12 years ago but after the applicant's 18th birthday, two identical 2"x 2" passport photographs, and a check or money order for $55; and -- Mail the above items to the National Passport Center, Post Office Box 371971, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15250-7971. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992 Title:

What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960

HO Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Dec, 2 199212/2/92 Category: Features Region: Eurasia, Europe, East Asia Country: United States, Japan, USSR (former) Subject: History, Trade/Economics, NATO [TEXT] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume IV, Foreign Economic Policy Released by the Office of the Historian, this volume contains 350 documents which focus on the Eisenhower Administration's initiatives to support free markets and to counter increasing Soviet efforts at economic penetration of less developed countries. It presents the official record of US policies on general foreign economic matters, international finance, trade and commerce, international investment and economic development, mutual security and foreign aid, strategic resources and international commodities, and economic defense. Documents for these compilations were drawn from files of the Eisenhower Library and the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Treasury. The Eisenhower Administration sought to expand the mutual security program. The President, who took a personal interest in economic and military assistance programs, met frequently with congressional leaders to promote these programs. When opposition in Congress stiffened, the President appointed the Draper Committee in 1959, which recommended a major increase in military assistance. Administration officials decided to forego future grants of military assistance to well-developed NATO countries and Japan and to re-program available funds to programs in less- developed nations. Volume IV, Foreign Economic Policy 1958-1960 (GPO Stock No. 044-000- 02340-7) may be purchased for $35.00 domestic postpaid (international customers please add 25%) from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, New Orders, PO Box 37154, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. For further information, contact Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series at (202) 663-1133. (###)