US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: Humanitarian Mission to Somalia
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address to the nation, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 4 199212/4/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Subsaharan Africa
Country: Somalia
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Military Affairs, Refugees,
Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations
[TEXT]
I want to talk to you today about the tragedy in Somalia and about a mission
that can ease suffering and save lives. Every American has seen the
shocking images from Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to
imagine. Already, over a quarter of a million people--as many people as live
in Buffalo, New York--have died in the Somali famine. In the months ahead,
five times that number, 1.5 million people could starve to death.
For many months now, the United States has been actively engaged in the
massive international relief effort to ease Somalia's suffering. All told,
America has sent Somalia 200,000 tons of food, more than half the world
total. This summer, the distribution system broke down. Truck convoys
from Somalia's ports were blocked. Sufficient food failed to reach the
starving in the interior of Somalia.
And so in August, we took additional action. In concert with the United
Nations, we sent in the US Air Force to help fly food to the towns. To date,
American pilots have flown over 1,400 flights, delivering over 17,000 tons
of food aid. And when the United Nations authorized 3,500 UN guards to
protect the relief operation, we flew in the first of them--500 soldiers
from Pakistan.
But in the months since then, the security situation has grown worse. The
United Nations has been prevented from deploying its initial commitment of
troops. In many cases, food from relief flights is being looted upon landing,
food convoys have been hijacked, aid workers assaulted, [and] ships with
food have been subject to artillery attacks that prevented them from
docking.
There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down--
anarchy prevails. One image tells the story. Imagine 7,000 tons of food aid
literally bursting out of a warehouse on a dock in Mogadishu, while Somalis
starve less than a kilometer away, because relief workers cannot run the
gauntlet of armed gangs roving the city.
Confronted with these conditions, relief groups called for outside troops to
provide security so they could feed people. It's now clear that military
support is necessary to ensure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need to
survive.
It was this situation which led us to tell the United Nations that the United
States would be willing to provide more help to enable relief to be
delivered. Last night, the UN Security Council, by unanimous vote and after
the tireless efforts of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, welcomed the
United States' offer to lead a coalition to get the food through.
After consulting with my advisers, with world leaders, and the
congressional leadership, I have today told Secretary General Boutros-Ghali
that America will answer the call. I have given the order to [Defense]
Secretary Cheney to move a substantial American force into Somalia. As I
speak, a Marine amphibious ready group, which we maintain at sea, is
offshore Mogadishu. These troops will be joined by elements of the First
Marine Expeditionary Force, based out of Camp Pendleton, California, and by
the Army's 10th Mountain Division out of Fort Drum, New York.
These and other American forces will assist in Operation Restore Hope.
They are America's finest. They will perform this mission with courage and
compassion, and they will succeed.
The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help.
We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give
them hope. America must act.
In taking this action, I want to emphasize that I understand the United
States alone cannot right the world's wrongs. But we also know that some
crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that
American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of
the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to
place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and
efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death.
We will not, however, be acting alone. I expect forces from about a dozen
countries to join us in this mission. When we see Somalia's children
starving, all of America hurts. We've tried to help in many ways. And make
no mistake about it, now we and our allies will ensure that aid gets through.
Here is what we and our coalition partners will do. First, we will create a
secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia, so that food can
move from ships over land to the people in the countryside now devastated
by starvation. Second, once we have created that secure environment, we
will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN
peace-keeping force. Our mission has a limited objective--to open the
supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN
peace-keeping force to keep it moving.
This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay 1 day longer than is
absolutely necessary. Let me be very clear: Our mission is humanitarian,
but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people,
condemning them to death by starvation. [Marine] General Hoar [Commander
in Chief of US Central Command] and his troops have the authority to take
whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops
and the lives of Somalia's people.
The outlaw elements in Somalia must understand [that] this is serious
business. We will accomplish our mission. We have no intent to remain in
Somalia with fighting forces, but we are determined to do it right, to secure
an environment that will allow food to get to the starving people of
Somalia.
To the people of Somalia I promise this: We do not plan to dictate political
outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence. Based on my
conversations with other coalition leaders, I can state with confidence: We
come to your country for one reason only, to enable the starving to be fed.
Let me say to the men and women of our armed forces, we are asking you to
do a difficult and dangerous job. As commander in chief, I assure you, you
will have our full support to get the job done, and we will bring you home as
soon as possible.
Finally, let me close with a message to the families of the men and women
who take part in this mission. I under-stand it is difficult to see your loved
ones go, to send them off knowing they will not be home for the holidays,
but the humanitarian mission they undertake is in the finest traditions of
service. So, to every sailor, soldier, airman, and marine who is involved in
this mission, let me say, you're doing God's work. We will not fail. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: An Update on US-Angola Policy
Davidow
Source: Jeffrey Davidow, Acting Assistant Secretary For
African Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Nov, 19 199211/19/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Angola, Portugal, USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, this is a sad occasion. We are here to talk about strife in
Angola at a time when many of us had hoped we would be talking about
peace. The events of the past 6 weeks have been discouraging. But we are
not without hope, and our efforts to help bring peace and a democratic
future to Angola will continue. The signing of the Angola peace accords in
May 1991 brought the first hope of peace to Angola after 16 years of bitter
civil war. The United States, in conjunction with Portugal, the Soviet Union,
and the United Nations, played a major role in bringing UNITA [National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola] and the MPLA [Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola] to a cease-fire. Since that time, we have worked
long and hard to help guide that process to its conclusion through our role as
an official observer to the joint political military commission in Luanda.
We also contributed more than $100 million toward the peace process,
including over $12 million to elections alone.
The elections of September 29-30 were intended to be the culmination of
the peace process and were a watershed event, both for Angola as a nation
and for each of its citizens. Despite daunting logistical challenges and
some tensions during the political campaigns, elections were conducted in a
calm, effective, and orderly fashion.
Delays in the vote counting and the piece-meal manner in which partial
results were released quickly prompted some charges of fraud. Dr. [Jonas]
Savimbi [President of UNITA] charged in an October 3 speech from Huambo
that the elections were flawed by significant irregularities. The National
Electoral Council [NEC] received these and all subsequent allegations of
fraud and established a variety of mechanisms to address these charges.
Finally, on October 17, after examining reports of all 18 provincial councils
and four national subcommissions set up with the concurrence and
participation of UNITA to investigate the allegations, the NEC officially
announced the results of the elections. That same day, the United Nations,
which had actively participated at all stages of the electoral process, and
particularly scrutinized the process of investigation of the allegations of
fraud, issued a statement declaring that, despite some irregularities, the
elections were "generally free and fair." The United States publicly
concurred in the UN's conclusion.
As you know, President Dos Santos did not obtain the 50% majority needed
to win the presidency, although his MPLA party won 54% of the legislative
vote. Under Angolan law and the provisions of the peace accords, a
presidential run-off election was to follow within 30 days of the
announcement of the results. This was not possible, but there should be no
doubt that the goal of a complete democratic electoral process, as
envisioned by the peace accords, should remain the goal of all Angolans and
friends of Angola.
Post-electoral events have made the longer term goal of national
reconciliation more elusive. The October 5 withdrawal of UNITA generals
from the Unified National Armed Forces; its military takeover of almost
half the country; and its inflammatory media campaign to discredit the
National Electoral Council, the United Nations, foreign observers, and the
MPLA all contributed to a highly charged atmosphere. Violent incidents in
the capital itself, including two bombings, an attack on a munitions dump
near the airport, and another against the central police headquarters, were
attributed by the government to UNITA.
The MPLA, for its part, believing it had fulfilled most of its obligations
under the accords, appeared to adopt a winner-take-all attitude. In
addition, the confrontational posture of its police forces exacerbated
tensions. The government also began to distribute weapons to civilians in
major cities and towns, including Luanda. On October 31, these tensions
spilled over into 2 days of violence in Luanda during which many UNITA
supporters were killed. Among the dead were UNITA's vice president and its
representative to the joint political- military commission. The government
has acknowledged that the attacks were carried out by its security forces
and by hundreds of civilians which it had armed.
The government has alleged it was UNITA's attacks on the airport on October
30 and on police headquarters on October 31 that provoked its response.
UNITA insists that the government's attacks were unprovoked and that its
leaders had been invited to Luanda to negotiate in good faith.
The loss of life in Luanda was deplorable, and we noted this on November 4.
The government's arming of large numbers of people, many of whom have
now turned to looting and thuggery, was a grave error which promoted
unnecessary violence and loss of life. A UN-sponsored cease-fire went into
effect at midnight on November 1 and has gradually taken hold. Luanda has
nearly returned to normal. After heavy fighting in the Lobito and Benguela
areas as well as other parts of the country and UNITA takeovers of Capanda
Dam and the town of Caxito, 60 kilometers from Luanda, the provinces also
appear quiet. Nevertheless, troop movements continue around key provincial
capitals, and the general situation remains extremely tense.
The government has under custody several hundred UNITA personnel in
Luanda, and it is believed UNITA holds an undetermined number of detainees
as well, outside Luanda. The ICRC [International Committee of the Red
Cross] is exploring ways it can ameliorate the situation.
For our part, we have remained actively engaged in the search for a
negotiated solution throughout the crises. We supported thorough
investigation of electoral fraud charges by the NEC, the United Nations, and
the political parties. We encouraged the October 11-14 visit of the UN
Security Council Ad Hoc Commission of which our permanent representative
to the United Nations was a member. Shortly thereafter, Assistant
Secretary [for African Affairs Herman J.] Cohen again visited Angola as part
of a joint observer mission, which met with both Dos Santos and Savimbi to
push for an early summit. We concurred fully in the assessment of the
elections as generally free and fair and urged the two principal parties to
discuss the formation of a government of national unity following a run-off.
As tensions rose, we urged both sides, publicly and privately, to cease their
aggressive posturing. As events unfolded in Luanda [on] October 31 and
November 1, we worked around the clock to arrange an immediate cease-fire
to ensure the safety of military and civilians caught in the fighting.
We are continuing to press each side to observe the November 1 cease-fire
agreement and to ensure humanitarian treatment and early release of
detainees. We have pursued these actions in full support of UN efforts to
secure a peaceful settlement.
Our position is clear: The existing peace accords remain the only
comprehensive means of achieving a stable national reconciliation in which
the interests of all parties can be accommodated. The key provisions of the
accords--a comprehensive monitored cease-fire, a unified national armed
force, democratic political activity, UN monitoring and completion of the
electoral process--are principles that offer the only real hope of a durable
solution to Angola's conflict. We believe that after having come so far
within their framework, the Angolan parties must not abandon the
principles contained in the accords.
The accords also offer the basis for a return to meaningful dialogue. But the
resumption of dialogue must be accompanied by a cessation of military
movements. It also must be undertaken with the understanding that each
side is an indispensable partner to a solution. We have been conveying this
message at every opportunity to UNITA and the Government of the Republic
of Angola. UN Under Secretary General Goulding carried a similar message
to Angola last week in an initiative which we fully supported. Both sides
appear willing to discuss how to reactivate the negotiation process. We are
cautiously optimistic that Goulding's efforts will prove successful. We
strongly support them and are reinforcing them in our contacts. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: US Commitment to APEC
Eagleburger
Source: Acting Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Address before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Senior Officials Meeting, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 2 199212/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Distinguished guests--ladies and gentlemen--I am very pleased to welcome
you to the Department of State for this meeting of APEC senior officials.
I would like to begin by emphasizing the special importance which the
United States attaches to this gathering and to our assumption of the APEC
chair for the coming year.
In all candor, we recognize the fact that, in this past year of base closings
and the quadrennial American preoccupation with things internal, some have
questioned our commitment to remaining engaged in Asia. Others,
meanwhile, have wondered whether the progress we have achieved with
NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement] will come at the expense of
trading relationships with our APEC partners. These concerns make your
presence here today timely, indeed.
I believe you are going to witness, this week and throughout the American
chairmanship, a determined commitment on our part to APEC and to making
APEC an effective instrument of our common purpose. The fact of the
matter is that the United States cannot, in the 21st century, escape from an
Asian destiny born in the 20th century. This is not a question of inclination
or choice but of facts--geographic, political, and economic--facts which
will require us to continue assuming our responsibilities as an Asian power
no matter what political party governs in Washington, DC.
What will change, however, is the nature of our involvement in an Asia
which itself has changed so fundamentally in the wake of the Cold War.
What has changed most of all is the increasing predominance of economic
issues and the increasing economic interdependence between and among
APEC member states. Our common challenge is to manage this
interdependence in ways that promote not only continued growth and
prosperity but greater political cohesion at a time of mounting
fragmentation and instability elsewhere in the world.
It is vital, in short, that we discover the means to work more closely
together, and that is what the United States hopes to see accomplished this
week and throughout our term in the APEC chair. We believe that the next
12 months mark a time of transition for this organization. We must now
move beyond the phase of institutionalizing APEC to making it operational;
we must move, in short, from rhetoric to results.
Our goal should be to make of APEC a pre-eminent regional organization
which can serve as the Pacific community's common voice in helping to
shape the international economy of the 21st century. Our goal should be
both to help our private sector[s] in concrete ways and to challenge our
trading partners outside the Pacific region to support trade liberalization.
Here in Washington, we must seek to implement the decisions taken in
Bangkok by making recommendations for policy actions by the ministers,
especially in trade liberalization. We must also focus on practical problem-
solving, increase private sector participation in all phases of the APEC work
program, and staff the secretariat and prepare our budgets for the next 2
years.
Before closing, I would like to say a few words about regional trade
liberalization--the issue which the ministers decided would be a central
focus of the US ministerial next November. The informal group on regional
trade liberalization, under Australia's guiding hand, has accomplished good
work. Establishment of an eminent persons group and progress on the
investment, customs, standards, and tariff data projects provide us with
the foundation for the next stage--i.e., proposals for ministerial
consideration which will advance, in concrete ways, APEC's philosophy of
open regionalism and trade liberalization.
I believe we need to think boldly. We ought to be able to envisage such
things as:
-- An APEC investment agreement;
-- An APEC code of conduct for administrative measures;
-- An APEC intellectual property agreement;
-- An APEC customs cooperation treaty;
-- An APEC dispute settlement mechanism;
-- An APEC-wide, open-skies agreement in civil aviation; or
-- An APEC agreement on trade in a particular goods or services sector.
I am not suggesting that any one of these ideas is now ripe for ministerial
action. What I am suggesting is that we need to stretch our conceptual
horizons and begin to think of APEC as an organization which can produce
cooperative solutions to our common regional problems.
Over the past 3 years, all members have worked to transform APEC from a
concept to an organizational reality. Be assured that the United States will
build on the fine efforts of the four previous chairs as we enter this critical
transitional year in APEC's development.
I wish you every success over the next 3 days in achieving our common
objectives. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: Progress on POW/MIA Issues
Quinn
Source: Kenneth M. Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Description: Statement before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA
Affairs, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 1 199212/1/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, China, Russia
Subject: POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the Select Committee. In my
testimony today, I would like to provide the committee with an overview of
the diplomatic activities and other efforts of the US Government on the
POW/MIA [prisoner-of-war/missing in action] issue over the past 21/2
years since Secretary Baker's July 1990 initiative reinvigorated our
discussions with Vietnam. The government has, of course, been pursuing
answers to the POW/MIA questions since the end of the war, but the last 30
months have seen both a renewed effort and the most significant results.
Much of what we have accomplished is due to the leadership of General
Vessey, the President's Special Emissary to Hanoi, as well as the work of
hundreds of Defense Department employees and the efforts of many Members
of Congress. But I believe the many diplomatic initiatives we have
undertaken during the last 21/2 years, along with the policy framework
which we have put in place, have been crucial to the progress we have
achieved and have established the basis for continued progress in the future.
Since April 1991, the central element of this framework has been our
"roadmap" policy, which calls for a series of commensurate steps by both
sides as we move toward achieving our objectives: the fullest possible
accounting for our missing men, Vietnam's continued support for the UN
peace plan in Cambodia, and the release of re-education camp detainees in
Vietnam. The roadmap is premised on the theory--based on 16 years of
tough experience--that the only way to move forward is if both parties are
taking steps to meet the concerns of the other. As we explained to the
Vietnamese when we presented them with the roadmap, by laying out a
schedule of concrete steps, we intended to give both sides the confidence to
move forward. While we indicated that we were prepared to take
significant actions in a relatively brief period of time, we made absolutely
clear that the speed at which we make progress on the roadmap depends on
Vietnam's actions to account for our POW/MIAs and its continued support
for the UN peace plan in Cambodia.
Accomplishments of "Roadmap" Policy Toward Vietnam
Looking back over these 30 months, I believe we can point to a number of
significant accomplishments of this policy approach with Vietnam.
Two and a half years ago, we did not even have a regular channel of
diplomatic communications with Vietnam. Then, in July 1990, Secretary
Baker established a channel for dialogue with senior Vietnamese officials.
We have since aggressively used this channel for addressing our POW/MIA
and Cambodia concerns, including meetings at the secretary, under
secretary, assistant secretary, and deputy assistant secretary level. I
would note in particular the October 8 meeting which Acting Secretary
Eagleburger, [Defense] Secretary Cheney, and Assistant Secretary [of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Clark held with Foreign Minister Cam,
and Under Secretary [of State for Political Affairs] Kanter's meeting with
Vice Foreign Minister Co last summer.
Two and a half years ago, we did not have a presence in Vietnam. We now
have a POW/MIA office in Hanoi, staffed by 11 full-time Americans and
numerous TDY [temporary duty] personnel dedicated to resolving this issue.
We also have established POW/MIA offices in Phnom Penh and Vientiane
during this same timeframe.
Two and a half years ago, we had virtually no success in obtaining from
Vietnam records and other documentary materials related to our missing
men. Thanks to an initiative by General Vessey, we began to make progress
in this area in late 1990, with the first visit of an information/research
team. In February 1992, General Vessey received a copy of a document we
had long sought--an 84-page record of shootdowns of our aircraft--which
offered important information on the fates of a number of POW/MIAs. The
Vietnamese agreed to provide us further access to their records during
[former] Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Solomon's
March visit to Hanoi. Most recently, during General Vessey's October
mission, he obtained a commitment from the leadership of Vietnam to
provide us with all POW/MIA-related materials. We have a team of
researchers in Hanoi reviewing material, and the Defense Department will
be sending at least two more research teams to Vietnam in the next few
months. This archival material should provide us with a great deal of
information about POW/MIAs, information which should help us determine
the fates of more men.
Two and a half years ago, we did not have a mechanism in place for
investigating reported sightings of live Americans in Vietnam. We now have
an established process and have satisfactorily dealt with almost 50 live
sighting investigations, 15 of them on short notice. Mr. Chairman, you and
some of your colleagues participated in a number of these live sighting
investigations last month, and the work of your committee has reinforced
this process and led to its present effectiveness.
There is one specific aspect of these live sighting investigations to which I
wish to give special emphasis--access to prisons. When I visited Hanoi in
July 1991, no American official had ever had access to a prison in Vietnam
or elsewhere to search for possible live POW/MIAs. During my meeting with
Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai, I pressed for and he agreed to US investigators
having access to prisons in central Vietnam so that we could follow up the
widely publicized photo of three men identified by their families as missing
pilots. The first two prison visits followed a few days later.
Since then, and in good part due to the work of members of this committee,
American officials have been in and out of a number of other prisons in
Vietnam, including the notorious Hanoi Hilton, Thanh Liet, Bat Bat, Son Tay,
17 Ly Nam De, the Hai Phong prison, the B-5 Provincial Prison, and the Vinh
Quang Prison Camp. These are in addition to the prisons and confinement
areas--including the Citadel--visited by you, Mr. Chairman, and other
committee members during your most recent trip.
Two and a half years ago we were making little progress in our field
investigations of discrepancy cases and other related cases. In fact, from
the start of the field investigations in September 1988, at the initiative of
General Vessey, through the spring of 1991--a 31-month period--we
conducted 13 joint field operations but were only able to investigate 144
cases. Then, in April 1991, we presented Vietnam with the roadmap. The
14th field operation was the first conducted after the roadmap was in
place, and the Department of Defense investigators reported that, in that
one operation, they obtained more information on our missing men that in all
previous 13 operations combined. In the 20 months since the roadmap was
presented, we have investigated 286 cases. That is double the number of
cases investigated in the 31 months before the roadmap.
During the course of these field investigations, US experts have been able to
interview hundreds and hundreds of Vietnamese citizens--including many
who have provided first-hand accounts about the fate of US servicemen. It
is probably a failure of our process that we don't have a better yardstick to
measure this important progress--which has been painstakingly obtained by
teams operating under [the] Joint Task Force Full Accounting head, Gen. Tom
Needham--but it is essential that the American people understand just how
much has been accomplished through the thousands of hours put in by the
dedicated men and women of the Defense Department working on this issue.
Let me give you just a few examples from the several hundred reports we
have obtained in the last 12 months.
-- In one case, five separate witnesses provided firsthand reports of an
American POW killed during an escape attempt from a POW camp.
-- In another report, three witnesses described the shootdown of a US
helicopter and the death of seven Americans as a result of the crash.
-- Another witness told US investigators how he participated in an attack
and the killing of a US soldier who was walking alone down a path near a
stream.
-- Other Vietnamese veterans described how an American prisoner
sustained a minor leg injury during an aircraft crash but later contracted
malaria and died while being transported by stretcher to a dispensary in a
mountainous part of Vietnam.
-- A former staff member of the COSVN [Central Office of the South
Vietnamese Communist Party] prison camp system described how an
American prisoner was executed in retaliation for the supposed killing of a
Vietcong cadre by US forces.
-- Finally in another case, US personnel visited an extremely remote part of
northern Vietnam where they were provided eight sets of remains by local
officials. The team then set out to visit the crash site from which the
remains reportedly came. It was a 6-hour hike with ascent to the site made
only by hand-over-hand climbing on jagged limestone outcrops and areas of
loose rubble. The US team was led to the spot where the remains were said
to have been buried. Digging, they found a bone and tooth fragments along
with some aircraft wreckage and life support equipment.
It was a significant accomplishment made with great effort and some
considerable risk to the individuals involved. In commenting on the
operation, the US team leader wrote, "The spirit of cooperation and
friendship between the US and Vietnamese was on a high level. No obstacles
were encountered that could not be overcome by the Joint Team's efforts."
I would not pretend to suggest that all cooperation in Vietnam is at this
same level. It is not. Obviously, these are tragic stories. However, it is
important for us to be able at long last to provide this information to the
families of the soldiers. And as a result of all this painstaking work, the
Defense Department has been able to officially confirm the fate of 64 of our
discrepancy cases. In addition, in the last 8 months, we have received
detailed, mostly first-hand, accounts about the likely fate of another 150
men listed as POW/MIA. So, these investigations are providing the
important answers we seek, and, Mr. Chairman, the vastly improved level of
cooperation is a clear indication that our policy of both sides taking a
series of commensurate steps is working. And, while we choose to not
formally close many such cases--including discrepancy cases--because we
may still hope to recover remains or find some additional documentary
evidence, we have answers--not always perfect answers--but answers,
nonetheless, about what likely happened to the men involved.
The recovery, repatriation, and identification of remains of our missing is
an important goal of the Administration's policy. Since General Vessey
undertook his first mission to Hanoi, the United States has repatriated over
300 sets of remains from Vietnam, which has resulted in approximately 120
Americans being accounted for. Another 77 remains can't be identified but
cannot be excluded from being Americans. In addition, the Army's
identification laboratory (CILHI) also has more than 600 portions of remains
which may never be identified. Here, too, we have achieved important
results in the last 21/2 years. Since September 1990, the United States has
accepted 79 sets of remains from Vietnam. Additional remains are now
available to us, and the Defense Department is sending experts to Vietnam
later this month to evaluate those remains. Of course, we will strive to
recover many more remains, but it is important to note that the repatriation
of remains is now taking place on a regular basis.
Progress With Other Countries
I would also like to note the significant progress we have made on POW/MIA
issues with countries other than Vietnam.
Cambodia. In Cambodia, there has been a dramatic increase in POW/MIA
cooperation since July 1991. At that time, there was no meaningful
POW/MIA cooperation between the United States and the Phnom Penh
authorities. In Beijing, I met with senior state of Cambodia officials and
we agreed that for the first time a US team would travel to Cambodia to
investigate the photo of three men identified by their families as missing
Americans pilots. Since then, we have opened a POW/MIA office in Phnom
Penh, and the state of Cambodia has permitted the use of US military
helicopters in the field operations, which improves the safety conditions
for our personnel. Five joint field operations have been conducted, and we
have recovered the remains of four foreign journalists, including one
American missing since 1970. Additional field operations are scheduled
for this month and in January, April, and June of 1993. Particularly in light
of the difficult conditions in Cambodia, the authorities in Phnom Penh have
been extremely cooperative in this effort.
Laos. During the past 21/2 years, Lao cooperation has also improved
markedly, and we now have a POW/MIA office in Vientiane. In 1991, the
joint teams conducted six exercises, during which 15 surveys, 5 recovery
operations, and 5 investigations were conducted. In 1992, US and Lao field
teams conducted 7 joint activities, during which we excavated 7 crash or
grave sites and investigated or surveyed 30 cases. Of the seven sites,
remains were found in two locations. Most recently, the Lao[s] Government
has cooperated in an investigation of the site of the "USA" symbol in Sam
Nuea; that investigation was completed this week. We anticipate that the
Government of Laos will continue to expand its POW/MIA cooperation.
Russia. As the committee is aware, we have also undertaken extensive
POW/MIA work with the Government of Russia. As a member of the Joint
US-Russian Commission, I have served, along with Deputy Assistant
Secretary [of Defense] Alan Ptak, as a link to our work on Vietnam. I have
twice traveled with Ambassador Toon [Principal US Delegate to the US-
Russian Commission on POW/MIAs] to Russia where we have had the
opportunity to pursue reports of Americans having been taken to the Soviet
Union during the Vietnam war. I was also among that first group of official
Americans to enter a Russian prison and to have access to the inmates. And
I was the person who elicited the first detailed description of underground
areas near the Citadel.
China. As Charles Kartman [Director of State Department Office of Korean
Affairs] detailed for you last month, we are also working through the United
Nations to resolve Korean war cases. Our senior officials continue to ask
China for additional assistance on POW/MIA cases, and during my November
trip to Beijing, I again held extended discussions with PRC [People's
Republic of China] officials on this subject.
It is important to mention that, even as we have been obtaining answers
from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia for the POW/MIA families, we have also
been making progress on other important humanitarian concerns. In the past
21/2 years, over 1,000 political detainees have been given their freedom in
Cambodia and more than 100 in Vietnam as a direct result of our policies.
Moreover, under our Orderly Departure Program, US State Department
officers working in Ho Chi Minh city have processed more than 280,000
Vietnamese for travel to the United States; more than half of those people
have arrived since July 1990. Since that date, more than 40,000 Amerasian
children and their relatives have resettled here, and almost 50,000 re-
education camp detainees and their relatives have arrived. The roadmap
policy has directly and indirectly enhanced our ability to help these people
whose lives had been dramatically affected by US involvement in the war.
Mention also needs to be made of the assistance the United States has
received from many friendly countries on its efforts to deal with the
POW/MIA issue. I want to single out two countries, however, for their long-
term consistent support for this "endeavor." Those two countries are
Thailand and Japan, whose cooperation and support over the years has been
crucial to the success we have experienced. Japan has raised this issue
with Hanoi on many occasions over the years, and Thailand has provided
access to refugees and others with important information. Americans
should all remember that in this quest to account for our missing men--"our
highest national priority"--America has had no better friends than Japan and
Thailand.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, as I believe my testimony indicates, we have made very
significant progress on POW/MIA [issues] over the past 30 months. We now
have POW/MIA offices in Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane, and we have
conducted 29 joint field investigations in the three countries. Through
these searches, we have officially confirmed the fates of 64 of the men
listed as discrepancy cases, and we have received detailed information on
the fates of 150 other men. We have a live sighting investigation
mechanism in place in Vietnam, and we have already investigated 48
reported sightings of Americans, including through access to more than 10
prisons. We have made steady progress in repatriating remains, with 79
sets returned from Vietnam and more undergoing initial evaluation later
this month. The most important progress may have come in just the last
few months, with Vietnam's initial implementation of its unprecedented
commitment to provide us access to all POW/MIA materials in their
archives and museums. Cooperation in Cambodia has also been excellent,
and it has been steadily improving in Laos.
For Vietnam, the roadmap policy has effectively encouraged that country to
expand and accelerate its cooperation on both POW/MIA and Cambodia. This
policy has established a framework for steps by both sides which has, I
believe, the best possibility to provide us with the fullest possible
accounting for our missing men.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Select Committee, we do not yet have all of
the answers we must have, but I think the progress we have made over the
last 2 years shows that our policy is working and it produces results. As
we address the question of what to do next--to take more steps or to hold
back--we should be guided by this litmus test: What will help maintain this
unprecedented level of cooperation and progress and, indeed, increase it? I
can speak for the State Department in assuring this committee and the
American people that we have consistently been guided by this test in
determining what steps we should take toward Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
As someone who spent 6 years in Vietnam during the war and who still feels
the special bond of those who were in combat together, I want to add that,
as long as I hold my current position, we will continue to do everything
possible to ensure that the families of our missing men can know the fate of
their loved ones. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: Focus on the Environment:
A Periodic Update
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92
Category: Features
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Vietnam
Subject: POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
USAID Develops Comprehensive Environmental Strategy
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) recently has adopted a
comprehensive environmental strategy which will serve as a road map for
sustainable development. The new strategy revises and updates previous
guidelines, including the 1988 policy paper on the environment and 1990's
environment initiative.
According to USAID, the new strategy will prepare the agency for the future
because wise management of the natural resource base is an absolute
requirement of any successful development program. The new strategy also
reaffirms the belief that environmental and economic goals are best reached
in democratic societies and open markets.
Each of USAID's five regional bureaus has adopted its own strategy, which
builds on the common guidelines, criteria, and strategic approaches of the
parent document. Following are priorities in each region.
Africa. Two critical areas--unsustainable agricultural practices and the
loss of tropical forests and other critical habitats for biological diversity-
-are the top priorities of the Africa Bureau. Targeted sub-regions are the
arid and semi-arid tropics, tropical highlands, the country of Madagascar,
and the humid tropical forest of the Congo Basin.
Asia. Since more than 50% of the world's 5 billion people live in Asia, and
35% of them are under the age of 15, economic growth and population
expansion have led to some of the worst urban and industrial pollution in the
world. The Asia Bureau has identified four priority areas: loss of tropical
forests and biological diversity; urban and industrial pollution; degradation
and mismanagement of water and coastal resources; and energy shortages,
inefficiencies, and environmental impacts of energy development.
Europe. The peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are suffering the effects
of the worst pollution in the world. For example, 50% of Poland's rivers are
too polluted for industrial use or drinking. Estimates show that the costs of
environmental degradation are between 7% and 15% of each state's gross
domestic product. USAID's top priority is to reduce the immediate threats
to health and support economic restructuring and to protect the remaining
important conservation areas. The agency will concentrate on energy
efficiency and urban and industrial pollution reduction.
Latin America and the Caribbean. USAID resources in this region will be
focused on the conservation of tropical forests and other critical habitats,
sustainable agriculture, and improved management and protection of water
and coastal resources. Attention also will be given to the promotion of
environmentally sound energy production and the use and reduction of urban
and industrial pollution.
Near East. Water resources provide the most critical environmental
challenges facing this arid region where water shortages and the
degradation of water quality increases at "an alarming rate." Due to the
transnational nature of water resources in this region, these issues are the
cause and continuation of regional instability. Prospects for peace will
depend heavily on resolving these water issues. The Near East Bureau will
focus on degradation and depletion of water resources, urban and industrial
pollution, environmentally unsound energy production and use, and
unsustainable farming practices.
Development can only occur if the natural resource base on which it depends
is carefully managed. In recognition of this critical linkage, USAID's
environmental strategy is to integrate environmental concerns into all of
the agency's developmental activities and to take direct actions to work
with host countries to protect and better management their environment.
--Susan Holly, Dispatch Staff
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: USAID: 1992 Environmental Strategy
USAID
Source: US Agency for International Development
(USAID)
Description: Executive Summary, released by Office of Policy
Analysis and Resources Policy Directorate, Agency for
International Development
Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92
Category: Reports
Region: Whole World
Subject: Environment
[TEXT]
Environmental Protection Fundamental to USAID's Assistance
Programs
[Following is the text of the Executive Summary of the US Agency for
International Development's 1992 Environmental Strategy.
Public distribution of the strategy will begin in January 1993. Individual
copies can be ordered by contacting the Office of Policy Analysis and
Resources Policy Directorate, Agency for International Development, 320
21st Street, NW, Room 3947, Washington, DC, 20523.]
Wise use of natural resources and environmental protection are fundamental
to USAlD's assistance program. Broad-based development, expanded
participation in the benefits of economic growth, and improvements in the
quality of human existence throughout the developing world and other
USAlD-assisted regions are inseparably linked to environmental conditions.
USAlD's Environment Strategy for the 1990s reconfirms the environment as
an integral component of the agency's development assistance program and
ensures that, within current and anticipated budgetary and political
realities, USAID will assist nations' efforts to protect the environment. The
strategy identifies the major environmental problems threatening
development, establishes criteria for allocating resources to address the
most critical issues and for selecting appropriate actions, and identifies
priority approaches to environmentally sound development, including those
unique to each bureau.
USAID has extensive experience in integrating concern for the environment
with development objectives beginning in the 1970s with formal
environmental regulations. This strategy refines and updates previous
environmental guidelines, including the 1988 Policy Paper on Environment
and Natural Resources, the 1990 Environment Initiative and the 1992
Environmental Strategic Framework. With its strong field presence and
access to highly qualified expertise, USAID is well-positioned to enhance
its environmental programs to meet the needs of the l990s and beyond.
Environmental Constraints To Development
Environmental degradation is a significant and growing threat to
development throughout the world, and its effects are felt most acutely by
poor families in developing countries. Economic growth, as well as the
potential for such growth, is endangered by a natural resource base
declining in quality and quantity, while deteriorating economies exacerbate
and accelerate degradation of the environment. The rapid and poorly managed
growth of cities in many developing countries has led to a serious
deterioration in urban environmental conditions, adversely affecting human
health and the urban infrastructure necessary for efficient economic
development.
USAID has identified five major environmental problems that most directly
affect the developing world and the Agency's developmental objectives:
1. Loss of tropical forests and other habitats critical for biological
diversity;
2. Unsustainable agricultural practices;
3. Environmentally unsound energy production and use;
4. Urban and industrial pollution; and
5. Degradation and depletion of water and coastal resources.
Each of these threatens economic progress, biological and other natural
resources, and the health and quality of human life. Each also has impacts
well beyond national boundaries, often with global consequences.
This strategy focuses specifically on those activities designed primarily to
enhance or protect the environment. However, USAID recognizes that other
issues, such as rapid population growth, also affect the environment
significantly, although in complex and often indirect ways. Therefore,
USAlD's environment program is coordinated closely with the agency's
family planning program to ensure an integrated approach to addressing the
complex relationship between population growth rates and natural resources
management.
Targeting Environmental Problems
The five major problem areas listed above include the full range of serious
environmental threats to development. Within this overall framework,
USAID missions, supported by USAlD/Washington, are developing a program
targeted to specific problems where assistance will have the greatest
impact. Strategic allocation of resources is a basic requirement for an
effective program, because USAID simply cannot address every problem in
every country it assists.
USAID, therefore, is focusing its resources on environmental problems that
most constrain development and on those that, if not acted upon
immediately, will likely result in significant threats to human health or
irreversible damage to the natural resource base and the economy. The
agency concentrates on problems that host countries are committed to,
capable of addressing and have identified as priority issues.
Developing Effective Solutions
In its efforts to solve these problems, USAID supports activities that:
1. Attack root causes of environmental degradation;
2. Support Iocal empowerment and public participation;
3. Improve scientific understanding of environmental issues affecting aid-
recipient countries and improve data on the natural resource base; and
4. Promote cooperation with other environmental and developmental
organizations.
In carrying out this strategy, USAID emphasizes three broad approaches that
most effectively integrate environment and development: strengthening
human/institutional capacity and building public awareness; supporting
developing country efforts to change wasteful or unsustainable economic
and environmental policies and procedures; and encouraging private sector
participation in promoting environmentally sound activities.
Specific approaches to environmental activities vary considerably by region
given the unique ecological, political, and economic characteristics of the
different geographic areas. To capture this diversity, regional strategies
that apply the guidelines presented above have been developed to guide
agency environmental efforts in Europe, Asia, the Near East, Latin America
and the Caribbean, and Africa. As problems vary, regional approaches change.
For example, in Africa the program focus is on environmental problems
associated with forestry/biodiversity, sustainable agriculture, and coastal
zone management. Asia, while sharing some of these concerns, sees the
environmental problems of rapid urban and industrial growth--urban and
industrial pollution and sound energy production--as key constraints to
sustained regional growth. No matter what the focus, however, each regional
approach relies heavily on discussions of policy issues with a broad range of
host country officials as a central element in strategy implementation.
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: Libyan Terrorism
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Nov, 27 199211/27/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Libya, United Kingdom, France, United States
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
One year ago today, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom
declared that, following the investigations into the bombing of Pan Am
[flight] 103 and UTA [flight] 772, the three states have presented specific
demands to Libyan authorities related to the judicial procedures that are
underway. They require that Libya commit itself concretely and definitively
to cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups.
Libya must promptly, by concrete actions, prove its renunciation of
terrorism.
On January 21, 1992, the UN Security Council in Resolution 731 deplored
Libya's failure to respond positively and called upon it to do so immediately.
On March 27, 1992, the UN Security Council in Resolution 748 expressed its
deep concern that Libya still had not fully complied with Resolution 731 and
imposed mandatory sanctions upon Libya to persuade it to comply. These
sanctions entered into force on April 15, 1992.
Today, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom condemn Libya's
regrettable failure to comply with any of the requirements of the United
Nations Security Council. The Libyan Government continues its attempt to
escape its international obligations through equivocation and delay. By its
evasion, Libya continues to flout international law.
On this anniversary, the three states strongly reaffirm their single
objective with respect to Libya: prompt, complete, and unequivocal
compliance with [the] terms of UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and
748. Justice for all 441 victims of the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings
and international peace and security, which is threatened by Libya's support
of terrorism, require no less.
Accordingly, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom are
determined to intensify their efforts in close cooperation with the UN
Secretary General to make the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council
in March yet more effective. They call upon the Government of Libya to end
its defiance of the international community. Libya's failure to fulfill its
international obligations will only result in furthering its isolation from
the world community. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom,
together with all members of the international community, will continue
closely monitoring Libya's actions. The Government of Libya will be greatly
mistaken if it doubts their resolve.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: US Supports Venezuelan Democracy
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 7 199212/7/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Venezuela
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
President Bush spoke this morning with President Perez of Venezuela. The
President told President Perez [that] he was disturbed to hear about the
attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government of Venezuela.
President Perez assured the President that he has the situation under
control.
During their conversation, the President confirmed strong US support for
Venezuelan democracy and for President Perez. The President emphasized
that the foundation of the US policy in the region is support for democracy
and stated that--while we understand Venezuela, like a number of nations,
is going through a difficult period--authoritarian solutions just won't work.
The United States cannot have normal relations with a country that has
abandoned democracy, and we will work with like-minded governments to
support constitutional processes in any country where democracy is
threatened. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: Russian Science and Technology Center Agreement
Signed
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Nov, 27 199211/27/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia, United States, Japan
Subject: Science/Technology, EC
[TEXT]
The United States, Japan, the European Community, and Russia signed an
agreement today in Moscow to establish the International Science and
Technology Center (ISTC). The ISTC, which will be headquartered in Moscow,
will serve as a clearinghouse for developing, approving, financing, and
monitoring projects aimed at engaging weapons scientists and engineers
from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Georgia in peaceful,
civilian science and technology activities. Through its projects, the ISTC
will contribute to ongoing efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. Its wider goals include reinforcing the transition in the
CIS and Georgia to market-based economies responsive to civil needs and
supporting basic and applied research and technology development.
To support the ISTC and its projects and activities, the United States is
providing $25 million, the European Community 20 million ECU (European
Currency Unit), and Japan $17 million. The Russian Federation will provide
in-kind support to include a facility for the center, as well as its
maintenance, utilities, security, and related support.
The ISTC's activities will be directed by a governing board with
representatives of member states. Dr. Victor E. Alessi has been chosen to
serve as the US member of the ISTC Governing Board. He is currently the
Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in the
Department of Energy and is responsible for developing and monitoring a
$300 million research and development program that involves hundreds of
scientists and engineers at [the] Department of Energy's national
laboratories. Dr. Alessi also has broad experience in US negotiations with
the former Soviet Union, specifically on the treaties covering
intermediate[-range] nuclear forces (INF), conventional [armed] forces in
Europe (CFE), and strategic arms reduction (START). Most recently, Dr.
Alessi has been involved in the implementation of President Bush's nuclear
initiative and has served as a member of the US delegation to the talks with
Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union.
The United States and the other founding parties of the ISTC are strongly
committed to making the center fully operational as soon as possible. To
advance this process, the parties have formed a preparatory committee that
will be responsible for addressing administrative, staffing, financial, and
other key operational issues of the center. The preparatory committee will
also begin developing and reviewing project proposals so that projects can
be approved and funded by the center as soon as possible after the
agreement enters into force once all parties have completed all necessary
internal procedures.
The anticipated range of ISTC projects and activities will require broad
international support. The founding members look forward to expanding the
number of parties to the agreement and expect to approve the accession of
Sweden, Switzerland, and Canada once the agreement enters into force and
the center is legally constituted. The ISTC will also seek the participation
of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, foundations,
academic and scientific institutions, and the private sector.
Individuals, institutes, and governments interested in presenting project
proposals for consideration or otherwise contributing to the center and its
work may obtain a copy of the ISTC Guidelines for Proposal Preparation by
calling the Office of the Senior Coordinator at the Department of State at
202-647-8757 or [by] writing to:
The Office of the Senior Coordinator (PM/SC)
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 5214
Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520-5214.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: Heathrow Airport Arbitration
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Nov, 30 199211/30/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: United Kingdom
Subject: Travel
[TEXT]
Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC,
November 30, 1992.
The British and US Governments have today received the award of the
arbitral tribunal set up to arbitrate the dispute between the United Kingdom
and the United States over whether the British Government met its treaty
obligations to the United States regarding user charges imposed on US
airlines serving Heathrow. The 6 charging years [of] 1983-84 through 1988-
89 were [at] issue.
The tribunal found that the British Government failed to meet certain of its
obligations during part of the period in question. The decision did not deal
with the issues of damages. The governments will reserve any further
comment until the implications of this long and complex award have been
studied.
The governments thank the members of the tribunal for their work in dealing
with this difficult case.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: Zaire
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 1 199212/1/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Zaire, United States, Belgium, France
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
After consultation in Washington on November 30, the US, French, and
Belgian Governments have agreed to issue statements here as well as in
Paris and Brussels along similar lines. Our mutual concern has been
heightened by President Mobutu's intended dismissal of the Tshisekedi
government on December 1.
The United States reaffirms its support for the democratic transition
underway in Zaire, for the government of Prime Minister Tshisekedi, who
was elected by the National Conference, and for a democratization process
which will ensure greater respect for human rights. We call upon all of
Zaire's political leaders to dedicate themselves unconditionally to the
realization of these objectives.
In addition, we reiterate our profound concern that measures to solve
Zaire's economic crisis are not being pursued. We urge the transition
government to assume full control over the central bank, major public
enterprises, and all other activities essential to Zaire's economic recovery.
The transition government must establish an economic stabilization plan,
including investment priorities, acceptable to the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund without further delay. Such a plan will
establish a framework essential to the resumption of assistance by the
United States and Zaire's other friends.
We are willing to work with the Government of Zaire, our allies, and the
international financial institutions to facilitate the development of an
economic program for Zaire.
We congratulate the transition government on its efforts to confront and
deal with the financial irregularities of previous governments.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: Portsmouth National Passport Center
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Dec, 2 199212/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Immigration, Travel
[TEXT]
The Department of State has opened the largest passport processing center
in the United States at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Known as the National
Passport Center, the facility is capable of issuing 6,000 passports per day
but can be expanded to issue 9,000 passports per day. The center represents
the Department's commitment to meeting an expected passport renewal
workload surge. The increase is anticipated because of a 1983 statutory
change extending the validity of passports issued to persons over age 18
from 5 to 10 years. With the first of the 10-year passports expiring in
1993, the Department expects to issue 4.3 million this coming year. About
1.1 million of these applications are expected to be mail renewals.
The center is now processing passport mail renewal applications from
around the United States. Passport fees are deposited in Pittsburgh, with
the applications subsequently express mailed to Portsmouth for processing.
The other passport agencies will process first-time applications and any
other requests for passport services presented in person.
To renew a passport by mail, applicants must:
-- Obtain an "Application for Passport by Mail" (Form DSP-82) from a
passport acceptance facility (post office, court house, or passport agency);
-- Complete and sign the application and attach the most recent passport
issued not more than 12 years ago but after the applicant's 18th birthday,
two identical 2"x 2" passport photographs, and a check or money order for
$55; and
-- Mail the above items to the National Passport Center, Post Office Box
371971, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15250-7971. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 49, December 7, 1992
Title: What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1958-1960
HO
Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Dec, 2 199212/2/92
Category: Features
Region: Eurasia, Europe, East Asia
Country: United States, Japan, USSR (former)
Subject: History, Trade/Economics, NATO
[TEXT]
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume IV, Foreign
Economic Policy
Released by the Office of the Historian, this volume contains 350 documents
which focus on the Eisenhower Administration's initiatives to support free
markets and to counter increasing Soviet efforts at economic penetration of
less developed countries. It presents the official record of US policies on
general foreign economic matters, international finance, trade and
commerce, international investment and economic development, mutual
security and foreign aid, strategic resources and international commodities,
and economic defense. Documents for these compilations were drawn from
files of the Eisenhower Library and the Departments of State, Defense,
Commerce, and Treasury.
The Eisenhower Administration sought to expand the mutual security
program. The President, who took a personal interest in economic and
military assistance programs, met frequently with congressional leaders to
promote these programs. When opposition in Congress stiffened, the
President appointed the Draper Committee in 1959, which recommended a
major increase in military assistance. Administration officials decided to
forego future grants of military assistance to well-developed NATO
countries and Japan and to re-program available funds to programs in less-
developed nations.
Volume IV, Foreign Economic Policy 1958-1960 (GPO Stock No. 044-000-
02340-7) may be purchased for $35.00 domestic postpaid (international
customers please add 25%) from the Superintendent of Documents,
Government Printing Office, New Orders, PO Box 37154, Pittsburgh, PA
15250-7954.
For further information, contact Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor of the
Foreign Relations series at (202) 663-1133. (###)