US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 45, November 9, 1992

Title:

Security in the Americas: Challenges and Opportunities

Gelbard Source: Robert S. Gelbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Description: Address before the Inter-American Defense Board, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 9 199210/9/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, South America, Caribbean, Central America Country: Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, United States, El Salvador, Suriname Subject: Development/Relief Aid, OAS, Trade/Economics, Democratization, Arms Control [TEXT] It is a great pleasure and honor to be here with you today to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the discovery of the Americas. I am also pleased to recognize the 50th anniversary of the Inter-American Defense Board [IADB] and the 30th anniversary of the Inter-American Defense College. This is a time of extraordinary opportunity for the world. The Cold War is over. The threat of nuclear engagement has diminished greatly. The sense of promise and possibility, of palpable relief and hope for lasting peace felt by peoples the world over, has particular meaning for the peoples of the new world. In this hemisphere, the year began with the news of a peace agreement in El Salvador, and, in recent weeks both El Salvador and Honduras have welcomed the settlement of their territorial disputes. Just 2 months ago in Suriname, a historic peace agreement between the government and the insurgent force was reached. Today, the OAS [Organization of American States] is present in that country with a team of observers who are assisting in the implementation of the agreement, and it has witnessed the first turning in of weapons by the jungle command in August and September. The will to put long-standing conflicts behind us and work together has rarely been stronger. The welcome of Guyana and Belize into the OAS was made possible by reform of the OAS Charter stimulated in part by the friendship developed between the two countries and their neighbors. Just 2 days ago, a historic event took place when the trade ministers of Canada, Mexico, and the United States initialed the North American Free Trade Agreement, another major step in making a reality of our dream of creating a truly hemispheric free trade zone and [of] genuine economic integration of the Western Hemisphere. Meanwhile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, through MERCOSUR [Southern Cone Common Market], are working to create a common market in the Southern Cone. Ecuador and Colombia have just begun free trade between themselves, Bolivia and Peru between their countries, and the Andean region as a whole is moving toward greater trade liberalization. The nations of CARICOM [Caribbean Community and the Caribbean Common Market] are not part of the Inter-American Defense Board, but the efforts of the Caribbean states toward integration should be noted, as well as the formation of a regional security force, the RSS. Canada is another country which is not a member of the board. But since becoming a member of the OAS 2 years ago, it has been an active participant, raising the profile of arms and security issues at the OAS General Assembly in Santiago in 1991 and, in the previous General Assembly in Asuncion, proposing the creation of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. As I speak, the OAS democracy unit is at work in Paraguay, Peru, and Suriname. In each case, the member country has invited the unit to help, and, while its mission differs from one setting to another, its goal is the same: the consolidation of democratic institutions. In its short existence, the unit has enjoyed repeated success, observing and thus contributing to free, fair, and peaceful elections in six countries. These are new times, and there is progress on problems which seemed intractable to some. The aura of invincibility that seemed to surround the drug traffickers has faded. The individual and joint efforts of our countries have succeeded in making major inroads against this transnational threat. Our countries have adopted--at the OAS--the major elements of a framework which will enable [us] to maximize our cooperation to rid our hemisphere of the drug scourge. Tough OAS standards on precursor chemicals combined with tough OAS money-laundering standards make it possible to squeeze the traffickers at both ends of the production cycle: denying them the raw materials needed to produce their drugs and the proceeds of their illicit and deadly trade. Lastly, we are seeing that political crises need not lead to systemic breakdown. The way in which the current governance problem in Brazil is being handled--through the established constitutional process of impeachment--shows that these kinds of crises can be managed peacefully and through the application of the rule of law. In the United States, it was the possibility of impeachment under our Constitution which, many argue, occasioned a lawful transition of government in the wake of the Watergate break-in. But this is not a time of unbounded optimism. Problems continue. Insurgencies remain active in Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, and Bolivia. Indeed, one of the most violent terrorist groups in [the] world operates in Peru and, despite the recent capture of Abimael Guzman, Sendero Luminoso [Shining Path] remains a potent threat. The drug traffickers have not been routed. They have found ways to evade and to adapt to some of our best efforts to disrupt their trade. Although it is true for this hemisphere that democracy is the rule, not the exception, the sobering events in Haiti and Peru have shown the need for peaceful mechanisms to rally our countries to the defense of democracy when it is threatened by forceful and extralegal means. And, extreme poverty is a critical problem, by any statistical measure one takes. Problems like insurgency, poverty, and drug-trafficking continue, and progress in the consolidation of democracy is marked by setbacks. But even the great good news of our time brings in its wake a critical challenge and the need for major adjustments in thinking and practice. The demise of the Cold War means that we must revamp our strategies, which had been predicated on containment. The old assumptions are obviously no longer valid. This is certainly the case for the United States. For 40 years following World War II, US military assumptions were geared to the threat of a massive, quick-thrust Soviet invasion into Western Europe, involving perhaps 100 divisions. Such a conflict could quickly become global and could, perhaps, involve the use of nuclear weapons. These were the among the key assumptions that led to the force structure we maintained in the past. A changed global and regional situation has inevitably affected our decisions on force levels, force structures, and military missions. Likewise, the demise of the Soviet bloc, capable of projecting its power in various regions of the world, confronts military planners everywhere with [the] need to reassess. No military organization in this region can remain tied to old thinking about itself and hope to make a positive contribution to [the] peace and security of the region. Security, of course, is not the exclusive province of the military. First and foremost, governments must face the security challenges of a new and transformed world. Responding to the new international situation requires that governments look at the way they conduct their international relations. It demands that we strengthen our common political institutions for what my President called "collective engagement." Most important, however, is what the changed global--and especially the changed regional--situation allows us: namely, to fashion a strategic vision based on the positive value of promoting democracy. For the United States, the promotion of democracy is an overriding foreign policy goal. Representative democracy is a keystone in the architecture of the inter-American system. Democracy is also inherently a national security matter, as stable democracies provide the people of the Americas with the greatest possible protection of their rights within secure borders. We prize democracy as the only system consistent with the rights and freedoms of our peoples. We also recognize that no single factor has been more important to the progress our countries have made together--from promoting trade and development to combating the drug threat--than the advance of democracy in the Americas. It is our shared commitment to democratic values that makes our combined actions toward common objectives possible. The future of democracy in the Americas means building a democratic ethos on a foundation of respect: for elected authority, for the rule of law, and for human rights. It also means accountability, the responsiveness of governors to the governed. A democratic and free market system cannot truly function with corruption by public servants at any level. The sweeping, peaceful movement toward democratically elected governments in the Americas over the last decade and a half came with the support of the militaries of the region. That support remains critical, however, as democratic government is consolidated and strengthened. Improved civil-military cooperation requires opening new debates and lines of communication--and demands the attention of civilian policymakers as well as their military colleagues. History has shown us again and again that deviation from the democratic path exacts a high cost on nations and on military organizations. There is, today, a common awareness that political differences must be taken to the ballot box and that democracy contains within itself the means for its reformation and improvement. Internationally, cooperative security efforts in a variety of areas strengthen the prospects for democracy in this region. Cooperation is the name for democracy put into practice among countries. One example of cooperation is the IADB-coordinated de-mining project in Central America. Responding to requests from the OAS Secretary General and the concerned governments, the Board has brought the collective expertise of the militaries which belong to this organization into play. The de-mining project has already made it possible to identify the scope of the problem and establish the need for resources adequate to do the job. The first steps toward undertaking the training phase have been taken with the call of the Board president for volunteers who will acquire and then impart the skills needed to remove mines initially in Nicaragua. The de-mining project is a cooperative effort that taps the combined expertise of our countries' military organizations to assist in a project with significant humanitarian benefit to the peoples of the region. It is, in our judgment, a model for the cooperation among the militaries of the region. The Board has long recognized the potential of our militaries to use their professional skills, training facilities, [and] organizational and logistic abilities to serve the needs of the countries we serve. IADB studies on disaster relief reflect the recognition that our military organizations, with their logistic resources, training, command structure, and rapid response capability, can make a concrete contribution to planning for and, with the necessary policy decision, carrying out disaster relief efforts. IADB possesses the assets to make a positive and substantive contribution to the changed regional security situation. -- The IADB is now open region-wide to all militaries. The requirement that the IADB members be from countries which are state parties to the Rio Treaty has been removed. Thus, the IADB is capable of becoming the matrix for inter-military cooperation throughout the hemisphere. -- We have considered, as well, the wealth of professional experience that the 22 militaries bring to the organization, plus the repository of experience and skill in the staff. -- It is clear to us, too, that the IADB is actively seeking to find its place in the changed regional, international situation. The IADB committee on initiatives began its evaluation of the role and mission of the board before the comparable NATO exercise was complete. So there is great potential in the IADB in this year when it marks 50 years of existence. We see no signs of a middle-aged crisis and hope to work with you to realize the board's potential to the fullest. But let me turn to what are, for some, difficult issues which go beyond the Board and have generally to do with military. These could interfere with our cooperation, if we are not frank and say what we mean. One misconception is that my country would prefer to see the militaries of the region disappear. So long as we are a community of sovereign nations and so long as threats to security remain, there can be no talk of eliminating military forces. Another sensitive issue regards use of the military in combating the drug menace. A second misconception--even though it contradicts the first-- is that my country would prefer to see this problem taken over by the military. The US Secretary of Defense [Cheney] expressed clearly, about a year ago, to the conference of American armies our views on this. He said that in the war against illicit drugs, all resources must be brought to bear. While counter-narcotics operations are primarily a law enforcement mission, military organizations can provide unique skills to complement law enforcement efforts. Military forces can provide transportation, security, and logistics; control rivers, coast lines, and national airspace; and move directly against major concentrations of traffickers and their laboratories. We would be pleased, Secretary Cheney said, to lend our expertise to support your operations. We celebrate today an event, 500 years ago--an "encounter of two worlds"-- that led to the evolution of a "new world," to a hemisphere called the Americas. The sweep of the historic event we commemorate today prompts us to look at the place of the "new world" in the "new world order" and of our region in a changing global community. The record shows that the militaries of our region are prepared to accept the challenges of a post-Cold War world. Latin American countries joined the world in the condemnation of the brutal Iraqi attack of Kuwait and, with the sole exception of Cuba, supported the worldwide coalition's landmark victory to restore Kuwait's independence. Your countries contributed through oil production, offers of military personnel and equipment, and participation in regional peace-keeping operations after the liberation of Kuwait. For example, Argentina sent ships to the Persian Gulf during Desert Shield and Desert Storm; and Chilean helicopters and crews and military personnel from Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela have served with UN forces in Kuwait. These countries and others from the hemisphere are now serving in other UN-sponsored peace-keeping forces, including in Cambodia. These and the contributions of other Latin American countries to this successful example of international cooperation are deeply appreciated. In his remarks to the UN General Assembly last month, President Bush said, "With the Cold War's end, I believe we have a unique opportunity to go beyond artificial divisions of a first, second, and third world to forge instead a genuine global community of free and sovereign states." With this vision expressed, he went on to discuss three challenges: keeping the peace, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and prosperity. On the first of those challenges, the militaries of the Americas have shown their willingness to participate and contribute across the globe in the Middle East and Cambodia. As for proliferation, the governments of this region have been second to none in supporting the goal of non-proliferation, with 32 of the 35 OAS member states joining as cosponsors of the chemical weapons convention so far. Argentina's and Brazil's recent accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco signals again the region's seriousness about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And finally, the response of your governments and others in the hemisphere to President Bush's vision of hemispheric free trade, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, indicates that this hemisphere is ready to lead the world in embracing the challenge of prosperity. These are exceptional times. Although no amount of enthusiasm can diminish the enormity of the problems before us, there is no rhetoric that can exaggerate the opportunity which history gives us to build a safer, a more secure, and a more prosperous world--starting but not stopping in the Americas. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 45, November 9, 1992 Title:

US to Withdraw Trade Concessions as EC Fails GATT Compliance

USTR Description: Statement released by the Office of the US Trade Representative, Washington, DC Date: Nov, 5 199211/5/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Subject: EC, Trade/Economics [TEXT] In response to the failure of the European Community (EC) to bring into GATT [the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] compliance its oilseeds subsidies regime, US Trade Representative Carla A. Hills today announced that the United States will withdraw trade concessions by imposing increased duties on imports of white wine, rapeseed oil, and wheat gluten from the EC. These products have an average annual US import value of about $300 million and were chosen from a $2-billion list of products published in the June 12, 1992, Federal Register. The US Customs Service will begin assessing 200% duties on the products on December 5, 1992. "We regret that we were forced to take this action," said Ambassador Hills. "For 5 years, the EC has refused to provide the United States what it is clearly owed under international trading rules. The credibility and effectiveness of the GATT are at stake here." "We have demonstrated extraordinary patience and we are open to further negotiation in the 30 days before the duties become effective," said Ambassador Hills. "However, given the trade harm the United States is suffering, I must proceed with a compensatory trade action." Ambassador Hills today also released a list of additional EC products on which the United States is considering imposing increased duties in the event that negotiations with the EC fail to result in adequate reform. These products have an average annual import value of about $1.7 billion. The list and a request for public comment will appear in the Federal Register by November 10. The US Government estimates that the harm to US oilseed producers due to the EC subsidies is about $1 billion annually. In the event further steps are warranted, the US could draw from both the new list announced today and the remainder of the list published on June 12. A GATT panel has twice found that the European Community's oilseeds subsidies impair the benefits accruing to the United States under the duty- free tariff bindings on oilseeds granted by the EC to the United States. The United States has made clear its willingness to submit to arbitration the determination of the amount owed the United States, but the EC rejected this procedure. At yesterday's GATT Council meeting in Geneva, the EC blocked a US request for GATT authorization to suspend tariff concessions, as is our right under GATT procedures. The United States again urged the EC to accept arbitration of the trade damage, but the EC did not respond favorably. The United States began its GATT-sponsored consultations with the European Community in 1988 after the American Soybean Association filed a Section 301 petition alleging that EC oilseed subsidies were harming US exporters and impairing the duty-free commitments. After a GATT panel in 1989 ruled in favor of the United States, the European Community agreed to modify its oilseeds policies to comply with the GATT panel's recommendations. The same panel found in March this year that the EC's modifications did not remove the impairment and recommended that the EC move expeditiously to change its oilseeds regime. Since that finding, the United States has worked with the EC, both directly and within the GATT, to find a negotiated solution. However, the EC has not been willing to take the steps needed to comply with the GATT panel findings. "This action will not affect our determined effort to reach a Uruguay Round agreement," said Ambassador Hills. "The United States remains committed to a strong and effective GATT system. Indeed, failure to take this action would undermine the credibility of the GATT system." Today's announcement will be published in the Federal Register by November 10. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 45, November 9, 1992 Title:

Conflict in Liberia

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 31 199210/31/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Liberia Subject: Human Rights, Travel, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT]
Killing of Nuns
The United States is shocked and appalled to hear of the deaths of five American nuns who were killed in Liberia and condemns this cowardly act. The nuns were members of the "Precious Blood" order and were based in Gardnersville, a suburb of Monrovia. The fact that these innocent women had no role in Liberia's civil war and were in the country to work with orphaned children and other victims of the conflict makes the killings all the more repugnant. According to Catholic Archbishop Francis in Monrovia, three of the nuns were found at their compound in Gardnersville, and two were found a few miles further north near Barnersville. Heavy fighting has continued in that area since the National Patriotic Front [of Liberia] (NPFL) initiated attacks on Monrovia [on] October 15. Few details are available, but it appears the nuns were killed several days ago in an area that has been under the control of NPFL forces loyal to Charles Taylor. The United States holds the NPFL responsible for the safety of foreign nationals in territory under its control. The United States has been extremely concerned about the welfare of the nuns, and the embassy and the Department have been in contact with West African peace-keeping forces (ECOMOG) and NPFL officials repeatedly over the past week in an effort to locate the nuns and provide safe passage for them. We remain deeply concerned about threats to American citizens and other expatriates in NPFL areas. This tragedy points out the urgent necessity for an immediate cease-fire and the resumption of serious negotiations to end the civil war in Liberia. Travel advisories urging Americans to defer travel to Liberia have been in effect since 1990. Since October 20, 1992, the United States has been strongly advising Americans to depart Liberia immediately.
NPFL Artillery Attack
[Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Joseph Snyder, Washington, DC, October 29, 1992]. In the early morning hours of October 29, forces of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) fired three artillery or mortar rounds that struck or passed close to the US embassy compound on Mamba Point in Monrovia, Liberia. Two of the shells fell in the sea, and one hit an embassy residential compound. Luckily, there were no injuries, nor was there damage to US property. The United States condemns this indefensible action and holds the leader of the NPFL, Charles Taylor, personally liable for such dangerous incidents. We demand that such acts cease immediately. We also call on Mr. Taylor to release forthwith those American citizens currently held by the NPFL and refrain from detaining or harassing American civilians located in NPFL territory or seeking to leave Liberia. The United States urges all parties in Liberia to declare an immediate cease-fire and participate in serious negotiations under the aegis of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to bring about a peaceful solution.
Burkina Faso Military Support For the National Patriotic Front Of Liberia
[Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, November 5, 1992.] The United States has consistently supported the diplomatic and negotiating efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to find a solution to Liberia's civil conflict. Despite assurances to the contrary, President Compaore of Burkina Faso has actively undermined the ECOWAS peace process by providing military support to Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) forces. The situation in Liberia has deteriorated rapidly since October 15, and Burkina Faso has helped exacerbate the situation. We cannot overlook the negative social, economic, and political impact on neighboring states--as well as the threat to regional stability--posed by the broader Liberian conflict. For the past 2 years, we have made known to the Government of Burkina Faso our grave concerns about its actions in Liberia. We have heard denials, then repeated assurances that military support for Charles Taylor's NPFL had ended, only to be confronted time and time again with evidence of continued Burkinabe military aid to the NPFL. As a consequence of Burkina Faso's unhelpful role in Liberia, we have recalled our ambassador to Burkina Faso, Edward Brynn, for consultations. We also have asked the Burkinabe Government to cancel plans to send Ambassador-designate Prosper Vokouma to the United States, noting that his presence here would not be well received. We have taken these steps only after serious deliberations and as a consequence of Burkinabe President Compaore's continued covert military support for Charles Taylor. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 45, November 9, 1992 Title:

Bosnian Refugees Flee Jajce

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 31 199210/31/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest, Refugees [TEXT] A large number of refugees have fled the Bosnian town of Jajce, which is under continuing Bosnian Serb attack. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) informed us on October 31 that 25,000 refugees from Jajce have already arrived in Travnik, with 10,000 to 15,000 more expected imminently. These refugees, who are traveling on foot over treacherous mountain roads, have been fired on and, in some cases, have been caught in the cross-fire between warring parties. We call on all the warring parties to hold their fire and allow the refugees to proceed safely. Furthermore, we urge the international community to contribute the relief supplies that will be needed to provide food and shelter and to facilitate their rapid delivery. The US Government has contacted Geneva Conference Co-Chairman Cyrus Vance to offer our support for his and [Co-Chairman] Lord Owens' efforts to address the plight of these refugees. We also are in close touch with UNHCR officials to ascertain how we may support the UNHCR in providing assistance for this massive influx of refugees. US vehicles and food in the pipeline for the winter needs of refugees will be arriving in the next few days for the UNHCR to use with this new wave of refugees.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 45, November 9, 1992 Title:

US Assistance to Refugees In the Former Yugoslavia

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Nov, 3 199211/3/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former) Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Refugees, United Nations, International Organizations [TEXT] Recognizing the great human tragedy in the former Yugoslavia and the urgent need to prepare for the approaching winter, the United States is contributing a further $21 million to international organizations to provide assistance and protection to refugees and displaced persons. The United States already has contributed more than $100 million in cash and in kind to assist and protect refugees in the former Yugoslavia. The new contribution of $21 million will be divided among six international organizations as follows: -- $10 million to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for winterization programs in Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia, where timely assistance can mean the difference between life or death for thousands of persons; -- $3 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for its efforts to provide relief to released detainees and to refugees in remote areas to which ICRC has access;. -- $2 million to the International Federation of the Red Cross to help strengthen and reinforce local Red Cross offices, particularly in Croatia but also in Slovenia, which bear the burden for food and relief distributions to refugees in these areas; -- $3 million to [the] UN Children's Fund, which deals primarily with the needs of children, to support its programs. A portion of this money will be used to provide psycho-social support for children traumatized by the conflict and dislocation. -- $1 million to the World Food Program, which has taken over the responsibility for receiving shipments of relief commodities, to help ensure the allocation of emergency food commodities in a timely manner; [and] -- $2 million to the World Health Organization to support its special project of bringing medicine and equipment to hospitals in Sarajevo. Cuban Human Rights Activist Sentenced Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, November 4, 1992. The United States is disturbed by the sentencing of prominent Cuban human rights activist Sebastian Arcos on October 30 in Havana to 4 years, 8 months in prison on charges of "enemy propaganda." The trial was not conducted in a manner to ensure justice or a fair hearing. The public, press, and diplomats were not permitted to enter the courtroom, although Cuban law requires that trials be open to the public. The judge allowed the prosecution to admit as evidence a videotape of prisoners who had been in jail with Mr. Arcos giving unsworn testimony against the defendant. There was no evidence presented during the trial that linked the defendant to any crime. In addition, the official Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina, announced the sentence before the court informed Mr. Arcos. Mr. Arcos learned of the sentence from relatives who had heard the Cuban press release read over Radio Marti. Sebastian Arcos was originally arrested on January 15 along with his brother, Gustavo Arcos, and Yanes Pelletier, all members of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights (CCPDH). Gustavo Arcos and Yanes Pelletier were released a few days later. Government officials told CCPDH members that Sebastian Arcos would be tried for "rebellion." When Cuban authorities were unable to implicate Arcos in the activities of a group of infiltrators, he was accused of "enemy propaganda." The unsigned letter on which the second charge was based was subsequently lost in [the] Ministry of the Interior files and was not presented during the trial. We deplore the numerous violations of Cuban and internationally accepted judicial standards in this trial. We call on the Cuban Government to release Sebastian Arcos. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 45, November 9, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Kenya

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Nov, 3 199211/3/92 Category: Country Data Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Kenya Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Democratization, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT]
US-Kenya Relations
Kenya is scheduled to hold multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections on December 29, 1992. Such elections are key to Kenya's development of a fully democratic and open society. In November 1991, the US, in coordination with Kenya's other donors, announced that it would withhold fast-disbursing "program assistance" to Kenya pending progress on economic and political reform. In June 1992, to underscore concern about these reforms in Kenya, the United States withheld $28 million of its planned fiscal year (FY) 1992 economic development to Kenya. As the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, reported to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa on June 23, 1992, "The most disquieting development has been the recent ethnic violence in western Kenya. It has claimed hundreds of lives, left thousands homeless, and displaced over 100,000 persons." Although the United States continues to withhold fast-disbursing program assistance, it is providing $17.3 million in project-based assistance to Kenya in FY 1993. Specific US assistance objectives are reduced population growth; increased rural production, employment, and income; and efficient, basic social services. The United States continues humanitarian assistance to address the drought and refugee crisis in the northern part of the country and is exploring ways to provide, along with other donors, assistance targeted at helping Kenya hold genuinely free and fair elections. The United States supports Kenya's efforts to develop a viable economy based on free market principles. US-Kenya trade is relatively small--an estimated $180 million in 1990, and US direct investment in Kenya was about $290 million, primarily in the petroleum and tourist sectors. More than 140 US firms are represented in Kenya. US citizens in Kenya number more than 6,000, including 300 Peace Corps volunteers, who are concentrating on agriculture and education. About 35,000 Americans visit annually. The US Ambassador to Kenya is Smith Hempstone, Jr.
Political Conditions
During its 29 years of independence, Kenya has been governed by the Kenya African National Union (KANU), led by Jomo Kenyatta and, since Kenyatta's death in 1978, by Daniel Torotich arap Moi. Domestic and foreign criticism of Kenya's one-party political system has increased since 1991. After strenuously rejecting calls for political reform, in December 1991, the popularly elected National Assembly cleared the way for multi-party elections to the 188-member unicameral legislature. To date, eight opposition parties have registered and are preparing for participation in the national elections scheduled for December 1992. The major opposition party is the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), led by interim chairman Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, who was Kenya's first vice president. Other newly formed opposition parties include the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Assistant Secretary Cohen's report to the congressional committee noted that: ...harassment of the opposition is an ongoing problem. Several opposition politicians have been prosecuted by the government for their public comments. The government is preventing opposition parties from opening local offices and is creating obstacles to the holding of public rallies. It also is harassing the press. Six editors and journalists currently face sedition charges. And in March 1992, the police brutally clubbed and teargassed peaceful protestors in Nairobi, including mothers protesting the detentions of their sons. Also worrisome are attacks by unidentified thugs against opposition leaders. Several leaders have been assaulted and injured. The authorities have made no apparent effort to identify and arrest the perpetrators.
Foreign Policy
Kenyan foreign policy is based on non-alignment, promotion of African unity, support for the principles of the UN Charter, and promotion of international economic policies that will lead to an increased flow of resources and transfer of technology to developing nations. In 1991, when Somalians fled to Kenya after the collapse of their government, Kenya received 60,000 Somalian refugees. Together with refugees from Ethiopia, the total number of refugees has grown to more than 400,000.
Economy, Trade, and Investment
After independence in 1963, Kenya promoted rapid economic growth through public investment, incentives for private industrial investment, and encouragement of small-holder agricultural production. It is in the forefront of 18 Eastern and Southern African countries that form a trading bloc, the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), where the goods of member countries receive preferential treatment in tariff matters. Import licensing, duties, and sales taxes are unaffected. Government procurement for ordinary supplies as well as materials and equipment for public development programs is significant to Kenya's total trade. The government also acts to ensure domestic control of local commerce. It holds more than 200 state corporations in virtually all sectors of the economy and is a major provider of basic infrastructure and socioeconomic services. In 1987, Kenya undertook a major structural adjustment program supported by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and bilateral donors. The government committed itself to policy changes to strengthen and rejuvenate the financial sector. Since then, the International Monetary Fund has negotiated seven standby arrangements in support of economic stabilization efforts and five structural adjustment lending agreements. In 1989, the government consolidated ailing financial institutions and established an authority to develop a wider and freer capital market that will generate long-term funds required for investment. By the end of 1991, critical economic reform measures central to the structural adjustment program launched in 1987 had not been fully implemented. Given concerns about the mixed record on economic reform and slow progress on moving toward a multi-party political system, at the November 1991 Consultative Group meeting, donors agreed to suspend program (cash) assistance to Kenya. The mid-term review of Kenya's reform program by the IMF in September 1992 was inconclusive, and the donor suspension continues. The major areas of concern are budget control, civil service reform, and privatization/reorganization of the parastatal sector. The reform program has had mixed results; the government remains heavily involved in key sectors of the economy, such as agricultural marketing, and the target for a lower budget deficit has not been met. Kenya's structural adjustment policies aim to control inflation, monetary growth, and the growing budget deficit. A liberalized import regime has removed quantitative restrictions on most imports, and 22 failing parastatal industries have been sold to the public, including Kenya Airways, Ltd., Kenya Railways Corporation, and National Bank of Kenya. Kenya's economy, despite the dominance of state-owned enterprises such as oil refining, agricultural processing, and cement, includes a well-developed private sector for trade and light manufacturing. Its major industries are tourism and consumer products such as plastic items, fabrics, soap, and cigarettes. The agricultural sector provides food for local consumption and substantial exports, income for more than 75% of the population, and 29% of GDP and 50% of exports, mainly coffee and tea. In 1992-93, however, it is faced with a drought that is estimated will cause almost 1 million Kenyans to require food assistance.
Kenya at a Glance
The Republic of Kenya, formerly British East Africa, is located in the East African highlands on the Horn of Africa. It is bisected by the equator and has a coastline on the Indian Ocean. Within Kenya, which is about the size of Texas, there are nearly 164 square miles of lakes, including a portion of Lake Victoria containing the inland harbor of Kisumu. The northern 60% of the country is semi-desert, inhabited only by nomadic herders, while the southern 40% of the country contains 85% of the population and almost all of its economic activity. About 81% of the population lives in rural areas, using more than 10% of the land for agriculture. Nairobi, the capital city, has 40% of the country's urban population. The port city of Mombasa (the leading port on the East African coast) has a well-developed tourist industry along its beautiful beaches. In a preservation effort, the government has set aside 6 million acres for national parks and game preserves. The largest and one of the most popular of these is Tsavo National Park, with an area of more than 8,000 square miles. The UN maintains important offices in Nairobi, the capital, where many international conferences are held. Kenya's population of more than 25 million is expected to reach 35-37 million by the year 2000, growing at about 3.4% annually, the second- highest growth rate in the world. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 45, November 9, 1992 Title:

Treaty Actions

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Nov, 3 199211/3/92 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: Caribbean, South America, E/C Europe, MidEast/North Africa, Central America, Eurasia, Pacific Country: Australia, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Cameroon, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, Germany, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mongolia, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay Subject: Trade/Economics, International Law, Science/Technology, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control, Immigration, Cultural Exchange, Security Assistance and Sales, Narcotics, Refugees, Media/Telecommunications, Terrorism, Resource Management, United Nations [TEXT]
Multilateral
Agriculture
International agreement for the creation at Paris of an international office for epizootics, with annex. Done at Paris Jan. 25, 1924. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1925; for the US July 29, 1975. TIAS 8141; 26 UST 1840. Accession deposited: China, Feb. 18, 1992 1; Croatia, Jan. 13, 1992; Estonia, Jan. 13, 1992; Slovenia, Dec. 30, 1991. Revised text of the international plant protection convention. Done at Rome Nov. 28, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1991. Adherences deposited: Bulgaria, Nov. 8, 1991; Equatorial Guinea, Aug. 27, 1991; Ghana, Feb. 22, 1991; Guinea, May 22, 1991; Malaysia, May 17, 1991.
Arbitration
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the US Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517. Accessions deposited: Bangladesh, May 6, 1992; Latvia, Apr. 14, 1992.
Astronauts
Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 22, 1968. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1968. TIAS 6599; 19 UST 7570. Succession deposited: Slovenia, Aug. 20, 1992.
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York Oct. 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873; 8 UST 1093. Acceptances deposited: Estonia, Jan. 31, 1992; Slovenia, Sept. 21, 1992.
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062; 26 UST 583. Succession deposited: Slovenia, Aug. 20, 1992.
Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the United States Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820; 21 UST 77. Succession deposited: Croatia, Oct. 12, 1992. Accession deposited: Bahrain, Sept. 17, 1992.
Cultural Property
Statutes of the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. Done at New Delhi Nov.-Dec. 1956 and revised Apr. 24, 1963 and Apr. 14-17, 1969. Entered into force May 10, 1958; for the US Jan. 20, 1971. TIAS 7038; 22 UST 19. Accessions deposited: Angola, June 4, 1992; Haiti, May 21, 1992. Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Done at Paris Nov. 14, 1970. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972; for the US Dec. 2, 1983. Ratification deposited: Lebanon, Aug. 25, 1992.
Defense
Memorandum of understanding on cooperative research, development and demonstration of internetworking technologies to improve communications systems network interoperability, with annex. Signed at Bonn, Washington, London, and Paris Oct. 22, Nov. 7 and 14, and Dec. 16, 1991. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1991. Parties: Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, Oct. 22, 1991; US, Nov. 7, 1991; UK, Nov. 14, 1991; France, Dec. 16, 1991.
Gas Warfare
Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force Feb. 8, 1928; for the US Apr. 10, 1975. TIAS 8061; 26 UST 571. Accessions deposited: Cape Verde, May 20, 1991; Liechtenstein, Nov. 6, 1991.
Health
Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the US June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808. Acceptances deposited: Azerbaijan, Oct. 2, 1992; Turkmenistan, July 2, 1992. Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 1975. TIAS 8086; 26 UST 990. Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1984. TIAS 10930. Acceptances deposited: Azerbaijan, Oct. 2, 1992; Slovenia, May 7, 1992; Turkmenistan, July 2, 1992. Amendments to Articles 34 and 35 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 3, 1977. TIAS 8534; 28 UST 2088. Acceptances deposited: Slovenia, May 7, 1992; Turkmenistan, July 2, 1992.
Human Rights
International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.3 Accessions deposited: Angola, Jan. 10, 1992; Azerbaijan, Aug. 13, 1992; Benin, Mar. 12, 1992; Brazil, Jan. 24, 1992; Cambodia, May 26, 1992; Cote d'Ivoire, Mar. 26, 1992; Nepal, May 14, 1991; Seychelles, May 5, 1992; Switzerland, June 18, 1992; Zimbabwe, May 13, 1991. International covenant on civil and political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for the US Sept. 8, 1992. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: June 1, 1992. Ratification deposited: United States, June 8, 19924,5. Accessions deposited: Angola, Jan. 10, 1992; Azerbaijan, Aug. 13, 1992; Benin, Mar. 12, 1992; Brazil, Jan. 24, 1992; Cambodia, May 26, 1992; Cote d'Ivoire, Mar. 26, 1992; Switzerland, June 18, 19922,4.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the US July 1, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-11. Accessions deposited: Burkina Faso, May 25, 1992; Poland, Aug. 10, 1992.2
Law
Statute of The Hague conference on private international law. Done at The Hague Oct. 9-31, 1951. Entered into force July 15, 1955; for the US Oct. 15, 1967. TIAS 5710; 15 UST 2228. Acceptance deposited: Latvia, Aug. 11, 1992.
Marriage
Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1962. Entered into force Dec. 9, 1964.3 Accession deposited: Jordan, July 1, 1992.
Narcotic Drugs
Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation in the fight against illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs through the use of equipment and personnel based at Great Inagua and such other bases as may be established in the Turks and Caicos Islands, with annexes. Signed at Washington July 12, 1990. Entered into force July 12, 1990. Parties: United States, Turks and Caicos, Bahamas.
Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839; 21 UST 483. Accessions deposited: China, Mar. 9, 1992; Estonia, Jan. 7, 1992; France, Aug. 3, 1992; Latvia, Jan. 31, 1992; Namibia, Oct. 7, 1992; Niger, Oct. 9, 1992; Slovenia, Apr. 7, 1992; Uzbekistan May 7, 1992.
Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the US Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577; 19 UST 6223. Accession deposited: Honduras, Mar. 23, 1992.2
Satellite Communications Systems
Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532; 23 UST 3813. Accessions deposited: Azerbaijan, Apr. 13, 1992; Bhutan, June 23, 1992; Czechoslovakia, May 27, 1992. Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532; 23 UST 3813. Signatures: Azerbaijan, Apr. 13, 1992; Bhutan, June 23, 1992; Czechoslovakia, May 27, 1992. Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605; 31 UST 1. Signature: Cyprus, June 8, 1992. Accession deposited: Cyprus, June 8, 1992. Operating agreement on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605; 31 UST 1. Signature: Cyprus, June 8, 1992.
Seabed Disarmament
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337; 23 UST 701. Accession deposited: Latvia, Aug. 3, 1992.
Slavery
Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for the US Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418; 18 UST 3201. Accession deposited: Latvia, Apr. 14, 1992.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Jan. 27, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1967. TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410. Accession deposited: Algeria, Jan. 27, 1992. Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Mar. 29, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972; for the US Oct. 9, 1973. TIAS 7762; 24 UST 2389. Succession deposited: Slovenia, Aug. 20, 1992.
Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532; 28 UST 1975. Accession deposited: Cameroon, June 8, 1992. International convention against the taking of hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the US Jan. 6, 1985. TIAS 11081. Accession deposited: Mongolia, June 9, 1992.
Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987.3 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20. Accession deposited: Cape Verde, June 4, 1992.
Trade
United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262]. Accessions deposited: Ecuador, Jan. 27, 1992; Uganda, Feb. 12, 1992.
UNESCO
Protocol to the agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials of Nov. 22, 1950. Done at Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 2, 1982; for the US Nov. 15, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 97-2. Accession deposited: Spain, Oct. 2, 1992.
UNIDO
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force June 21, 1985. TIAS 1985. Accession deposited: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Oct. 1, 1992.
United Nations--Privileges and Immunities
Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at New York Feb 13, 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1946; for the US Apr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900; 21 UST 1418. Accession deposited: Bahrain, Sept. 17, 1992. Succession deposited: Croatia, Oct. 12, 1992.
War
Treaty providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. Signed at Paris Aug. 27, 1928. Entered into force July 24, 1929. TS 796. Succession deposited: Slovenia, Aug. 20, 1992.
Weapons
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.3 Ratification deposited: Greece, Jan. 28, 1992. Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.3 Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.3 Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.3 Acceptance deposited: Greece, Jan. 28, 1992.
Wills
Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, with annex. Done at Washington Oct. 26, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 9. 1978.3 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-29. Succession deposited: Slovenia, Aug. 20, 1992.
Women
Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the US July 7, 1967. TIAS 8289; 27 UST 1909. Accession deposited: Latvia, Apr. 14, 1992. Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Done at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.3 Ratification deposited: Jordan, July 1, 1992.2
World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226; 27 UST 37. Accession deposited: Solomon Islands, June 10, 1992.
World Meteorological Organization
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052; 1 UST 281. Accessions deposited: Armenia, Sept. 16, 1992; Croatia, Oct. 9, 1992; Estonia, Aug. 21, 1992; Latvia, May 15, 1992; Lithuania, June 3, 1992; Slovenia, Aug. 20, 1992.
Bilateral
Argentina
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with attachments. Signed at Buenos Aires Dec. 4, 1990.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-18. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 9, 1992.
Australia
Protocol amending the treaty on extradition of May 14, 1974. (TIAS 8234). Signed at Seoul Sept. 4, 1990.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-23. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 9, 1992. Agreement concerning the exchange of electronic warfare officers between the Department of Defense of the US and the Department of Defense of Australia, with annexes. Signed at Washington Aug. 26, 1992. Entered into force Aug. 26, 1992.
Bahamas
Extradition Treaty. Signed at Nassau Mar. 9, 1990.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-17. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 9, 1992.
Bahrain
Agreement regarding grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the furnishing of defense articles, related training and other defense services from the United States to Bahrain. Effected by exchange of notes at Manama July 18 and Aug. 8, 19, and 29, 1992. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1992.
Belarus
Agreement concerning emergency response and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Signed at Washington Oct. 22, 1992. Entered into force Oct. 22, 1992.
Belgium
Agreement amending the agreement of May 6 and 11, 1982, as amended, concerning provision of mutual logistic support. Signed at Brussels and Stuttgart-Vaihingen May 1 and 22, 1992. Entered into force May 22, 1992.
Cameroon
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Yaounde Aug. 19, 1992. Entered into force Oct. 12, 1992.
Chile
Agreement governing the protection of classified military information or material. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago Aug. 13 and Sept. 1, 1992. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1992.
Croatia
International express mail agreement. Signed at Zagreb and Washington Sept. 14 and 30, 1992. Enters into force Dec. 14, 1992.
Egypt
Grant agreement for cash transfer for sector policy reform. Signed at Cairo Aug. 24, 1992. Entered into force Aug. 24, 1992.
Federal Republic of Germany
Supplementary treaty to the treaty concerning extradition of June 20, 1978 (TIAS 9785). Signed at Washington Oct. 21, 1986.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-6. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 9, 1992.
Honduras
Grant agreement for structural adjustment program. Signed at Tegucigalpa Sept. 10, 1992. Entered into force Sept. 10, 1992.
Jamaica
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with attachments. Signed at Kingston July 7, 1989.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-16. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 9, 1992. Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 14, 1992, regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by or insured by the US Government and its agencies. Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston Aug. 28 and Sept. 11, 1992. Entered into force Sept. 11, 1992.
Mauritius
International express mail agreement. Signed at Port Louis and Washington Sept. 9 and Oct. 2, 1992. Enters into force Dec. 14, 1992.
Mongolia
Agreement concerning economic, technical, and related assistance with protocol and memorandum of understanding. Signed at Ulaanbaatar Sept. 8, 1992. Entered into force Sept. 8, 1992.
Paraguay
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Asuncion Sept. 24, 1992. Enters into force on date on which Paraguay notifies the US that all necessary legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Peru
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Aug. 27, 1992. Entered into force: Sept. 30, 1992.
Spain
Second supplementary treaty on extradition. Signed at Madrid Feb. 9, 1988.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-24. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 9, 1992. Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with attachments. Signed at Washington Nov. 20, 1990.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-21. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 9, 1992.
Tanzania
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Dar es Salaam Sept. 11, 1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Tanzania of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Trinidad and Tobago
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Port of Spain May 15, 1990 and July 23, 1992. Entered into force July 23, 1992.
Uruguay
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. Signed at Montevideo May 6, 1991.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-19. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 9, 1992. 1 With statement. 2 With reservation(s). 3 Not in force for the US. 4 With declaration. 5 With understanding. 6 Not in force. (###)