US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992


US, Canada, and Mexico Initial North American Free Trade Agreement

Bush Source: President Bush Description: President's Remarks at the NAFTA Initialing Ceremony. Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, San Antonio, Texas Date: Oct, 10 199210/10/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: Canada, Mexico, United States Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics, Environment, Immigration [TEXT] May I start off by saluting [Mexican] President Salinas and [Canadian] Prime Minister Mulroney, Secretary [of Commerce and Industrial Development] Serra, Minister [of International Trade] Wilson: Welcome to the City of San Antonio. I thank the other foreign dignitaries--governors, mayors, and Members of Congress and my cabinet, so many from the business community from all three countries that are here. We've just been talking about this, and this meeting marks a turning point in the history of our three countries. Today, the United States, Mexico, and Canada embark together on an extraordinary enterprise. We are creating the largest, richest, and most productive market in the entire world: a $6- trillion market of 360 million people that stretches 5,000 miles from Alaska and the Yukon to the Yucatan Peninsula. NAFTA--the North American Free Trade Agreement--is an achievement of three strong and proud nations. This accord expresses our confidence in economic freedom and personal freedom, in our peoples' energy and enterprise. The United States, Mexico, and Canada have already seen the powerful and beneficial impact of free trade and more open markets. Over the past 5 years, as President Salinas reduced trade barriers under his bold reform program and as Prime Minister Mulroney and I implemented the US-Canadian Free Trade Agreement, trade between our three countries soared. In 1992 alone, that trade will reach an estimated $223 billion, up $58 billion just since 1987. And if anyone doubts the importance of trade for creating jobs, they should come to this great state, come to the Lone Star state. In 1991, Texas exports totaled $47 billion--just from this state. Of that amount, over $15 billion went to Mexico, almost 21/2 times as much as 5 years ago. This export boom goes well beyond one state, well beyond Texas. Virtually every state has increased exports to Mexico in the past 5 years. NAFTA means more exports--and more exports mean more American jobs. Between 1987 and 1991, the increase in our exports to Mexico alone created over 300,000 new American jobs. These are high-wage jobs. In the case of merchandise exports, those jobs pay workers a full 17% more than the average wage. Free trade is the way of the future. I've set a goal for America to become, by the early years of the next century, the world's first $10-trillion economy. NAFTA is an important element in reaching that goal. With NAFTA, as more open markets stimulate growth, create new products at competitive prices for consumers, we'll create new jobs at good wages in all three countries. NAFTA will do these things and remain consistent with our other international obligations--our GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] trade obligations. Let me make clear that I remain committed to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations--this year. But NAFTA's importance is not limited to trade. We've taken particular care that our workers will benefit and the environment will be protected. And as a result of NAFTA, the United States and Mexico are working more closely than we ever have to strengthen cooperation on such important labor issues as occupational health and safety standards, child labor, and labor- management relations. And, then, on the environment--an issue of critical concern for all three leaders here today: We have agreed on practical, effective steps to address urgent issues such as border pollution, as well as longer term problems, such as preventing countries from lowering environ- mental standards to attract foreign investment. I salute the two gentlemen standing next to me--Prime Minister Mulroney and President Salinas--for their commitment and their leadership to this environment that we all share. As proof of that commitment, the United States and Mexican Governments have already developed a comprehensive, integrated plan to clean up air and water pollution and other hazardous waste along the Rio Grande River. I know, for some, NAFTA will be controversial precisely because it opens the way to change. Some of NAFTA's critics will fight the future--throw obstacles in the way of this agreement to mask a policy of protectionism. But history shows us that any nation that raises walls and turns inward is destined only for decline. We cannot make that choice for ourselves or for our children. And we must set our course for the future--for free trade. Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, this accord underscores the principle that democratic, market-oriented nations are natural partners in free trade. We owe it to our fellow citizens to bring this agreement into effect as soon as possible, and I pledge my support to that end.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: US, Canada, and Mexico Initial North American Free Trade Agreement

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, San Antonio, Texas Date: Oct, 7 199210/7/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: North America Country: Canada, Mexico, United States Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics, Environment, Immigration [TEXT] The President met with Mexican President Salinas and Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney to discuss plans for implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This was the first time the three leaders have met since the NAFTA negotiations began 16 months ago. At today's meeting, they affirmed their commitment to adopt the agreement in 1993, so that it becomes effective on January 1, 1994. The leaders also affirmed their commitment to continue cooperative efforts to safeguard and improve the environment and to use expanded trade to create more and better employment opportunities for the citizens of all three countries. After the meeting, the trade ministers who negotiated the agreement--US Trade Representative Carla Hills, Secretary Jaime Serra, and Minister Michael Wilson--initialed the NAFTA text. The next step in the process will be the formal signing of the agreement by the three heads of government. Under the US fast-track procedures for congressional review and approval of trade agreements, signing can occur on or after December 17, 1992, but no later than June 1, 1993. December 17 marks the end of the 90-day notification period that began on September 18, when the President formally notified the Congress of his intent to enter into the NAFTA. Anytime after signing the agreement, the President may transmit implementing legislation to the Congress. Once the legislation is transmitted, it will be entitled to fast-track treatment, which requires that the Congress vote up or down on the agreement without amendments within 90 session days, which can take up to 8 months. In the past, passage of trade agreements has taken considerably less time because the Congress and the Administration have collaborated on the drafting of implementing legislation. The President is committed to working closely with the Congress in developing NAFTA implementing legislation. The NAFTA eliminates tariffs and other barriers to the flow of goods and services among the United States, Mexico, and Canada. It reduces barriers to investment, strengthens the protection of intellectual property rights, and improves upon trade rules to ensure that US firms can reap the full rewards of the market opportunities NAFTA creates. NAFTA Makes America More Globally Competitive. Linking the US, Canadian, and Mexican economies puts America at the heart of the largest, richest market in the world, with more than 360 million consumers and $6.4 trillion in annual output. NAFTA will enhance the ability of American producers to compete in world markets, spur economic growth on the continent, expand US employment, and raise living standards. NAFTA Will Generate New, Higher-Paying Jobs for Americans. US exports to Mexico have created more than 600,000 US jobs. This number is expected to increase to over 1 million by 1995 with NAFTA. Over 1.5 million Americans already owe their jobs to US exports to Canada. This agreement will not only create more jobs but better jobs, because workers in export-related jobs earn 17% more per hour than the average American wage. NAFTA Will Benefit Small- and Medium-sized Companies Experiencing the Fastest Export Growth and Will Create Most New US Jobs. Unlike big companies, small- and mid-sized firms generally do not have the resources to get around high trade barriers. With trade barriers removed, US firms need not move to Mexico to sell to Mexicans. NAFTA Will Help Mexico Grow. Seventy cents of each Mexican import dollar is spent on US goods and services. Economic growth will not only make Mexico a better customer, but also a stronger and more stable neighbor, easing pressures for illegal immigration. NAFTA Improves the Environment. It maintains US environmental, safety, and health standards; allows the US to enact even tougher standards; and encourages US partners to strengthen their standards. NAFTA also has intensified US cooperation with Mexico and Canada on environmental issues. NAFTA Safeguards US Workers by ensuring a smooth transition to free trade over 15 years and by providing strict rules of origin, safeguard protections against import surges and measures to curb Mexico's artificial export incentives. To help ensure the benefits of NAFTA, the Administration has taken several parallel steps. Worker Training. On August 24, the President announced a new comprehensive worker adjustment program--Advancing Skills through Education and Training Services (ASETS). ASETS will ensure that all US workers, including the relatively few who may be affected by NAFTA, receive the assistance and training they need to compete in the global marketplace. ASETS will nearly triple the resources now available for all worker adjustment by providing $2 million annually, of which $335 million (or more, in the unlikely event it is needed) is specifically reserved for NAFTA. Labor Cooperation. On September 14, the US and Mexican Governments signed a bilateral agreement on labor, which establishes a joint commission that will involve public participation, and which will oversee cooperation programs on worker rights, child labor issues, workplace health and safety, enforcement, and other issues. Environmental Cooperation. On September 4, the US and Mexican environmental ministers initialed a US-Mexico bilateral agreement on the environment, which established a joint commission, involving public participation, that will address pollution concerns and enforcement, among other issues. In addition, on September 17, the US, Canadian, and Mexican environment ministers agreed to establish an unprecedented North American commission on the environment to address issues of common interest. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Assistance To and Trade With Afghanistan: Presidential Determination No. 93-3

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Memorandum to the Secretary of State released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, San Antonio, Texas Date: Oct, 7 199210/7/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South Asia Country: Afghanistan Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics [TEXT] By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 620D (b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2374 (b) ), I hereby determine that furnishing assistance to Afghanistan with funds authorized to be appropriated under that Act is in the national interest of the United States because of substantially changed circumstances in Afghanistan. By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 2 (b) (2) (C) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended (12 U.S.C. 635 (b) (2) (C) ), I hereby determine that Afghanistan has ceased to be a Marxist-Leninist country within the definition of such term in subparagraph (B) (i) of section 2 (b) (2) of that Act (12 U.S.C. 635 (b) (2) (B) (i) ). In accordance with section 118 (c) (1) of Public Law 99-190 (99 Stat. 1319), I hereby provide notice of my intention to restore nondiscriminatory trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan no sooner than 30 days following receipt by the Congress of this memorandum. Attached to this determination is a Statement of Justification for these actions, setting forth, among other things, a description of U.S. national interests in resuming assistance and normal trade ties with Afghanistan. You are authorized and directed to report these actions to the Congress and to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register. George Bush
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Assistance To and Trade With Afghanistan: Justification in Support of the Presidential Determination To Lift Statutory Prohibitions on Assistance and Trade With Afghanistan

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, San Antonio, Texas Date: Oct, 7 199210/7/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South Asia Country: Afghanistan Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics [TEXT]
Statement of Justification
After more than ten years of fighting against the Soviet-installed regime of President Najibullah, the Afghan resistance came to power in Afghanistan on April 28. Throughout the years of their courageous struggle, the United States was the most influential outside supporter of the Afghan resistance. They have appealed to us and all other donor countries to provide emergency food, medicines and humanitarian assistance to repair their war-ravaged country. On August 29 the two warring parties agreed to a ceasefire so that there can be a resumption of the process towards a political settlement. We are meeting some of these requests through our long-standing assistance program operated cross-border from Pakistan, but a number of statutory restrictions preclude direct bilateral assistance. The President's determinations and decision lift some but not all of these restrictions. In particular, restrictions under section 481 (h) (5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, remain in effect, which preclude bilateral and Export-Import Bank assistance to Afghanistan. Section 620D of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, prohibits economic and security assistance under that Act for Afghanistan until, inter alia, the President determines that such assistance is in the national interest of the United States because of substantially changed circumstances in Afghanistan. The decision of the Soviet-installed government of Najibullah to turn over power on April 28 constitutes "substantially changed circumstances in Afghanistan" and it would be in the national interests of the United States to provide assistance to our long- standing allies in the Afghan resistance, currently in power in Kabul. By amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act (12 U.S.C. 635 (b) (2) (B) (ii) ), Congress designated Afghanistan a "Marxist-Leninist" country and as such it has been ineligible for Ex-Im programs. The new Afghan leadership does not "maintain a centrally planned economy based on the principles of Marxism- Leninism" nor is it "economically and militarily dependent on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or any other Marxist-Leninist country". On the contrary, the new leadership is desperately seeking assistance from its traditional allies--the United States and other Western donors. Therefore Afghanistan no longer fits the definition of a "Marxist-Leninist state." In 1986, President Reagan exercised a special statutory authority to deny nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan (Proclamation 5437 pursuant to section 118 of P.L. 99-190). Providing the new Afghan leadership with nondiscriminatory trade treatment signals our commitment to help restore the Afghan economy. The foregoing determinations and decision of the President under these three statutes underscore the support of the Untied States for the leaders and people of Afghanistan as they address the ravages of a decade of war and seek to rebuild their country and their society. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Kuwait Holds Parliamentary Elections

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, San Antonio, Texas Date: Oct, 7 199210/7/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Kuwait Subject: Democratization [TEXT] The President is pleased to note that this week Kuwait held free parliamentary elections. The United States has been a strong supporter of this process since the Emir's decision to hold elections was announced during the Iraqi occupation. We have also been encouraged by the statement by the Crown Prince that the Kuwaiti Government will soon propose legislation to amend the constitution to broaden the electorate, and specifically to give women the right to vote in future elections. The Emir and the Kuwaiti people are to be congratulated on this latest stage in Kuwait's progress toward full recovery and reconstruction. These elections reaffirm Kuwait's hard-won independence and the freedoms enjoyed by the Kuwaiti people, in sharp contrast to the agony the Iraqi people still endure from Saddam. The gulf between Kuwait's determination to begin a democratic process and Saddam's brutalities against the Iraqi people is a vivid reminder of why the coalition had no choice but to use force to liberate Kuwait. The United States remains committed both to supporting Kuwait in its physical and political reconstruction and to support the efforts of the Iraqi opposition toward building a democratic future for the people of Iraq. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Croatia: UN Security Council Resolution 779

UN Source: Security Council, United Nations Description: Resolution 779, New York City Date: Oct, 6 199210/6/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Croatia Subject: United Nations, Human Rights [TEXT] Resolution 779 (October 6, 1992) The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and all subsequent resolutions relating to the activities of the United Nations Protection Force in Croatia, Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 28 September 19921 submitted pursuant to resolution 743 (1992) and 762 (1992), Concerned about the difficulties encountered by the United Nations Protection Force in the implementation of resolution 762 (1992) due to cease-fire violations and in particular to the creation of paramilitary forces in the United Nations protected areas [UNPAs] in violation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan, Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of "ethnic cleansing" in the UNPAs and of forcible expulsion of civilians and deprivation of their rights of residence and property, Welcoming the Joint Declaration signed in Geneva on 30 September 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),2 Welcoming in particular the agreement, reaffirmed in the Joint Declaration, concerning the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula, Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General including the steps taken to ensure the control of the Peruca dam by the United Nations Protection Force; 2. Authorizes the United Nations Protection Force to assume responsibility for monitoring the arrangements agreed for the complete withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Croatia, the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and the removal of heavy weapons from neighbouring areas of Croatia and Montenegro, in cooperation, as appropriate, with the European Community Monitoring Mission, looks forward to the report of the Secretary-General on how this is implemented, and calls on all parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with UNPROFOR in its performance of this new task; 3. Calls on all parties and others concerned to improve their cooperation with the United Nations Protection Force in the performance of the tasks it is already undertaking in the UNPAs and in the areas adjacent to the United Nations protected areas; 4. Urges all parties and others concerned in Croatia to comply with their obligations under the United Nations peace-keeping plan, especially with regard to the withdrawal and the disarming of all forces, including paramilitary forces; 5. Endorses the principles agreed by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on 30 September 1992 that all statements or commitments made under duress, particularly those relating to land and property, are wholly null and void and that all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to their former homes; 6. Strongly supports the current efforts of the co-chairmen of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia to ensure the restoration of power and water supplies before the coming winter, as mentioned in paragraph 38 of the report of the Secretary-General, and calls on all the parties and others concerned to cooperate in this regard; 7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0). 1S/24600. 2S/24476. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Bosnia-Hercegovina: UN Security Council Resolution 779

UN Source: Security Council, United Nations Description: Resolution 779, New York City Date: Oct, 6 199210/6/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: United Nations, Human Rights [TEXT] UN Security Council Resolution 780 On Bosnia-Hercegovina Resolution 780 (October 6, 1992) The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, Recalling paragraph 10 of its resolution 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992, in which it reaffirmed that all parties are bound to comply with the obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,1 and that persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such breaches, Recalling also its resolution 771 (1992) of 13 August 1991, in which inter alia, it demanded that all parties and others concerned in the former Yugoslavia, and all military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law, Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including reports of mass killings and the continuance of the practice of "ethnic cleansing", 1. Reaffirms its call, in para- graph 5 of resolution 771 (1992), upon States and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breeches of the Geneva Conventions being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and request States, relevant United Nations bodies, and relevant organisations to make this information available within thirty days of the adoption of the present resolution and as appropriate thereafter, and to provide other appropriate assistance to the Commission of Experts referred to in paragraph 2 below; 2. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyze the information submitted pursuant to resolution 771 (1992) and the present resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own investigations or efforts, of other persons or bodies pursuant to resolution 771 (1992), with a view to providing the Secretary- General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia; 3. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the establishment of the Commission of Experts; 4. Further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the conclusions of the Commission of Experts and to take account of these conclusions in any recommendations for further appropriate steps called for by resolution 771 (1992); 5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0). 1United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Mozambique and Angola: Prospects for Peace and Democracy

Cohen Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 8 199210/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola, Mozambique Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, Human Rights, Development/Relief Aid, Military Affairs [TEXT] Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to give the Administration's views on political developments and prospects for peace in Mozambique. I note that this is my last scheduled appearance before the subcommittee this session. I want to again express my appreciation for your long-standing interest in Africa and for the good working relationship we have enjoyed during your tenure as chairman. As you are aware, this hearing is especially timely in light of the October 4 signing in Rome of a general peace agreement between the Government of Mozambique and the Mozambique National Resistance, or RENAMO. Although much work remains to be done to implement the agreement, it appears to offer war-torn Mozambique a real opportunity for a durable peace and a democratic future. In my remarks today, I will focus on the background to and contents of the peace accords as well as on prospects for their successful implementation. I will also touch briefly on the implications of the October 4 agreement on the relief situation in Mozambique, but will leave it to my colleague from USAID [US Agency for International Development] to provide details on the scope of the challenge and how we are addressing it. Finally, I will give a brief readout of how we see the situation shaping up in Angola following last week's elections.
Until just a few years ago, Mozambique was a one-party, Marxist-Leninist state with close ties to the Soviet Union and the communist world. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the Government of Mozambique began steadily to reorient itself, both internationally and domestically. On the international front, Maputo began to distance itself from the Soviet bloc and adopted a more moderate stance, both in international forums and Southern African regional politics. Domestically, the Chissano Government formally abandoned Marxism-Leninism in 1989 and introduced significant political and economic reforms. The constitution adopted in November 1990 commits the government to political pluralism and multiparty elections. It also guarantees important civil rights and laid the basis for a more market- oriented economy. The general objective of our policy has been to encourage this policy reorientation and to support Mozambique's transition to pluralism and an open economy. At the same time, we have sought to address the country's humanitarian needs and to provide modest support for economic development. Neither of these objectives can be fully achieved, though, without an end to the long-standing civil conflict which has beset this impoverished country for more than a decade. The RENAMO insurgency has resulted directly or indirectly in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans and forced nearly 4 million to flee their homes. Over 1.5 million Mozambicans have sought sanctuary in neighboring countries. The war has severely disrupted the economy and civil administration in what is already one of the poorest countries in the world and has been a continuing source of political instability in the region. More recently, the humanitarian crisis brought about by the war has been severely exacerbated by the devastating drought which struck Southern Africa this year. In light of these circumstances, the main operational objective of the Administration's policy toward Mozambique for the last several years has been to help find a political settlement to this long-running conflict. We have worked very closely with the mediators and both Mozambican parties since direct peace talks began under Italian mediation in July 1990. The October 4 agreement is the end result of these long and arduous negotiations. I will be pleased to describe for you the main provisions of the agreement, but, first, I would like to briefly summarize how the Rome talks came about, what the US role in the negotiations has been, and how the parties ultimately arrived at a settlement. RENAMO was formed in the late 1970s with significant support from the Ian Smith regime in southern Rhodesia. After the fall of the Smith Government, South Africa became RENAMO's primary foreign patron, a role it apparently continued for several years after the 1984 Nkomati agreement. By the late 1980s, the RENAMO insurgency posed a serious challenge to the ruling FRELIMO [Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique] government. Although RENAMO never won much visible public support in Mozambique, its brutal military campaign, marked by well documented human rights abuses, succeeded in paralyzing the country. As a military stalemate between the two military forces took shape, it became clear to both sides that a negotiated political settlement was the only way out of the conflict. After several false starts, the parties agreed, in the summer of 1990, to begin direct peace talks in Rome under the joint mediation of the Italian Government, the Roman Catholic lay organization Sant Egidio, and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Beira, the second-largest city in Mozambique. The United States played a prominent facilitative role in getting these negotiations under way and then continued to consult closely with the mediators and both Mozambican parties throughout the subsequent 2 years of talks. The first real progress in the negotiations came in December 1990, when the Mozambican Government and RENAMO signed an agreement establishing a cease-fire in the important Beira and Limpopo transportation corridors. These rail and road lines are crucial to landlocked Zimbabwe, which depends on them for access to Mozambique's Indian Ocean ports. For several years, Zimbabwean military forces, at the request of the Mozambican Government, joined Mozambican forces both in protecting these corridors and in counter- insurgency operations against RENAMO. Under the terms of the December 1990 agreement, RENAMO agreed not to attack or carry out military activities in the immediate area of the corridors. In return, the government agreed to confine Zimbabwean forces and military operations to the corridors. (Malawian forces, which have similarly been providing security in the Nacala corridor, were not dealt with in the December 1990 agreement.) A 10-nation joint verification commission--which includes representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Russia, among others--was set up in Maputo to monitor compliance with the December 1990 agreement. The December 1990 partial cease-fire remained in force until the signing of the October 4 general cease-fire agreement. Although there were numerous reported violations by RENAMO in the first several months of 1991, especially in the Limpopo corridor, the partial cease-fire has held fairly well since the fall of 1991. Notably, there have been no conflict-related disruptions of the massive grain shipments that have recently traversed the corridors to meet the increased import requirements caused by the drought. After the December 1990 accord, work began on a comprehensive peace settlement. According to the formal agenda agreed to in May 1991, the parties would discuss the main topics of the negotiations sequentially, concluding work on one topic before proceeding to the next. Progress was very slow through most of 1991, as both sides showed a deep and continuing distrust of each other. Finally, in October 1991, the first component part of the comprehensive settlement was signed. This document, known as Protocol I, laid out basic principles for the agreement. Subsequent protocols on political party registration and activities and on electoral arrangements were concluded in November 1991 and March 1992. After March, discussion proceeded more or less simultaneously on the remaining protocols on military issues, cease-fire arrangements, political guarantees, and an international donor conference. A significant breakthrough occurred in early August, when President Chissano and RENAMO leader Dhlakama met face to face for the first time. After 2 days of meetings in Rome, they signed a joint declaration on August 7, committing the two sides to conclude negotiations and sign a general peace agreement by October 1. On September 19 and 20, they met again in Gaborone, Botswana, to work out remaining differences. Ultimately, following 11th-hour negotiations, the agreement was signed October 4 in the presence of representatives from several countries involved in the peace process. I represented the US Government at the signing ceremony, along with our ambassador to the Holy See. This was a long and complex negotiation, in which a number of individuals and governments played a part. Above all, the mediators--the Italian Government, Sant Egidio, and Archbishop Don Jaime Goncalves--deserve great praise and congratulations for their patient, skillful, and imaginative diplomacy. Others who made important contributions include President Mugabe of Zimbabwe; President Moi of Kenya; President Masire of Botswana; and the Governments of Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, and South Africa. We hope that all of these actors will continue to remain engaged during the all-important implementation stage of the accords. The Administration is pleased to have contributed to the efforts which resulted in the October 4 agreement. Since June of this year, we have participated in the talks as an official observer, along with Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, and the United Nations. In this capacity, we took part in working group sessions on military issues and other cease-fire- related topics. Even before that, though, we were in regular consultation with the mediators and both Mozambican parties through our embassies at the Holy See and in Maputo. We dispatched legal and military experts to Rome on several occasions to provide technical assistance for the negotiations. Also, as mentioned above, we participated in the work of the joint verification commission in Maputo. In addition, my principal deputy-- Jeffrey Davidow--and I met with President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama on several occasions in the last 2 years to help advance the agenda of the talks. The October 4 agreement is lengthy, and many details were negotiated in the last few days prior to the signing. Consequently, it is still a bit unclear how some aspects of it will be implemented. However, the main provisions of the accord are fairly straight- forward and include the following. -- The cease-fire enters into force immediately after the Mozambican legislature ratifies the agreement, which is expected to take place this week. -- The withdrawal of foreign (i.e., Zimbabwean and Malawian) forces is to begin immediately thereafter and is to be completed within 30 days. -- Multiparty presidential and legislative elections are to be held within 12 months. An impartial national elections commission, which will include members nominated by RENAMO, will develop electoral regulations and supervise preparations for and the conduct of the elections. -- The demobilization of combatants is to begin immediately upon the treaty's entry into force. Government and RENAMO troops are to proceed to designated assembly areas, where some will be selected for inclusion in the new, 30,000-member unified national armed forces; the rest will be demobilized. The demobilization process is to be completed in 6 months. -- The United Nations will deploy cease-fire monitors and will chair the joint commission responsible for overseeing implementation of the agreement. -- Separate national commissions will be established to monitor activities of the police and the government security service during the transition period. -- A donors conference is to be held within 30 days of the accord's entry into force to identify resources for the electoral process and emergency programs for the reintegration of refugees and demobilized soldiers into Mozambican society. The role of the United Nations in monitoring the cease-fire and the electoral process is critical. I understand that the UN Secretary General plans to seek Security Council approval for UN involvement in the implementation of the accord. We strongly support a UN role, but, given our broader concerns about ballooning UN peace-keeping costs worldwide, will seek to keep the UN presence as lean as possible. We believe that the UN operation envisioned for Mozambique should be no larger than the operation carried out in Angola. I want to note that a number of very important details related to demobilization and preparation for elections remain to be worked out in the joint commission and the national electoral commission. We will continue to be engaged during the transition to elections [in order] to press the two sides toward compromise and to keep the agreement on track. We plan to attend the upcoming donors conference and will consider ways, within our existing resources, in which we can provide technical and material assistance for the elections and demobilization process. We appeal to all members of the international community to contribute their fair share of the costs of bringing peace to Mozambique. As in other cease-fire situations, one of the key questions is how the respective militaries will react to the stand-down. In Mozambique, the crucial period in answering this question will come over the next few months as the two sides' forces proceed to assembly areas and prepare for demobilization and formation of the new national army. There has been speculation in some quarters about the willingness of RENAMO forces to accept the political agreement negotiated by their leader. RENAMO leader Dhlakama has stated unequivocally that his organization will adhere to the cease-fire, and we will count on him to enforce discipline within his forces. Some elements of the government forces, too, may have reservations about the provisions of the accord, since 60,000 or more government soldiers will be discharged and turned back into an already weak economy. President Chissano is seeking to address this potential problem by seeking support from the donor community for various efforts to reemploy demobilized combatants. Allow me to comment briefly on the effects of the peace agreement on the drought-induced humanitarian crisis in Mozambique. As my colleague from USAID will describe in more detail, the Southern African drought hit Mozambique harder than any other country in the region. The United States and the international donor community responded rapidly and generously. Nonetheless, because of disagreements between the Mozambican Government and RENAMO on the terms for delivery of food relief to militarily contested areas--which constitute much of the country--very little of this aid has gotten through to the neediest populations. RENAMO, especially, posed objections to most overland deliveries, citing its fear that government forces would take military advantage of the routes opened for such deliveries. Shortly before the October 4 agreement, RENAMO indicated that it would remove its hold on such shipments and allow them to proceed along certain approved routes. With agreement on a general peace accord, we believe that the main obstacle to full delivery of relief supplies has been removed. Accordingly, we call on all parties to focus their efforts on getting relief to all those in need as soon as possible. We urge RENAMO, especially, to cooperate with international relief agencies in this effort. The two sides' ability to work together to address the humanitarian crisis will be an early litmus test of how well they can cooperate during the transition to elections. We expect that there will be many ups and downs during the implementation of the October 4 peace accord. In all, though, the prospects for peace in Mozambique are more positive now than they have been in many years. I am very hopeful that Mozambique will soon join the ranks of other countries in the region which have begun or completed the difficult transition from conflict to representative democracy.
On the other side of the continent, Angola held its first multiparty elections since independence in 1975. These elections were the culmination of the Angola peace accords of 1991, which ended 16 years of bitter civil war. The United States--in conjunction with Portugal, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations--played a major role in bringing UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the [ruling] MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] to a cease-fire. Since that time, we have contributed more than $100 million toward demobilization of opposing forces, food and refugee relief, and electoral preparations. The election held on September 29 and 30 was a watershed event, both for Angola as a nation and for each of its citizens. Despite daunting logistical challenges and the tense atmosphere surrounding the political campaigns, Angola's National Electoral Council (NEC) conducted the voting process in a calm, effective, and orderly fashion. All but 3 of the 5,805 polling stations opened to voters, some of whom had waited patiently in line for hours be- fore dawn. A UN observer described the attitude of the Angolan voters as "reverential." To fulfill the promise of peace will still demand concerted efforts by the international community and all Angolans. The NEC has established a number of subcommissions to investigate seriously all allegations of irregularities and fraud. We expect these charges to be investigated conscientiously. The United Nations and other international observers have not yet certified the election as free and fair. While early statements have commented favorably on the orderly and transparent nature of the voting process itself, the tabulation process and examination of fraud charges are not complete. We hope these final steps will be completed quickly. Following the UN certification of the final results, it will be the personal responsibility of each Angolan to work cooperatively toward national unity and reconciliation. Regardless of the outcome, there is no justification for a return to violence. We believe both President Dos Santos and [UNITA's] Dr. Savimbi will honor their public commitments to this principle. We are encouraging all parties to use the appropriate mechanisms within the electoral law and National Electoral Council to investigate and address allegations of electoral irregularities. If the UN experts determine, after rigorous investigation, that the elections were free and fair, we will accept this certification. Clearly, any return to violence would be unacceptable to Angolans and the international community. Upon certification of the elections, we will formally recognize the newly elected government and establish full diplomatic relations. The post-electoral period will present numerous challenges. It is essential that UNITA, the MPLA, and their leadership have a substantial role to play in the new government. The talents and energies of both leaders, irrespective of their formal capacity, will be crucial to the development of Angola's considerable potential and to its genuine national reconciliation. We look forward to continuing our work with President Dos Santos, Dr. Savimbi, and all Angolans as they embark upon a new and democratic path. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Agreement To End Civil War in Mozambique

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 5 199210/5/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Mozambique Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization [TEXT] We welcome the agreement signed October 4 in Rome ending the civil war in Mozambique and establishing the basis for democratic multiparty elections by October 1993. We congratulate the Government of Mozambique, RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance], and the Italian mediators on this important breakthrough. Now that a cease-fire has been agreed, we expect that all parties will redouble their efforts to overcome the severe humanitarian crisis in Mozambique brought about by the war and drought. Tens of thousands of Mozambicans in remote areas of the country are reported to be facing famine. While limited deliveries have been made to some areas, a much wider effort is required to avert a large-scale human catastrophe. We call on the United Nations, international relief agencies, and all Mozambicans to work together to address this crisis promptly. The United States, which contributed over $150 million in food and other humanitarian assistance to Mozambique in FY 1992, is prepared to participate generously in this effort. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Zaire: Support During The Transition

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 6 199210/6/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Zaire Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, Refugees [TEXT] Recent ethnic disturbances in Zaire's Shaba Province have led to thousands of displaced persons. Within the next week, the United States will send a team of disaster assistance experts to Shaba to investigate the needs of displaced persons there. We will continue to provide humanitarian aid to the Zairian population through non-governmental organizations as specific requirements are identified. Together with our French and Belgian allies, we are following the situation in Zaire closely and note with particular concern recent developments that might endanger democratization and the rebuilding of the economy. The US Government confirms its endorsement of the transitional process elaborated by the Sovereign National Conference (SNC), hopes that the conference will swiftly complete its work with a view to the holding of free and fair national elections, and reiterates its support for the Tshisekedi Government as part of that process. We call upon all Zaire's political forces to support a transition government with full authority to achieve political, economic, and social recovery, including control over public finances and key appointments. We appeal to all Zairians to support national unity and reconciliation, particularly in Shaba, in order to avoid further unrest and to achieve peaceful progress toward the national recovery so much desired by all.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Conflict in Georgia

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 6 199210/6/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Georgia Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization [TEXT] The recent escalation of fighting in Abkhazia is threatening the peace of this area as Georgia tries to build democracy. The armed intervention of outside personnel and acts of violence, such as the October 3 attack on State Council Chairman Shevardnadze's helicopter, are particularly alarming. The United States supports the territorial integrity of all states of the former Soviet Union, including Georgia. We are in touch with both the Russian and Georgian Governments at the highest levels. Russian, Georgian, and Abkhazian officials agreed, on September 3, to a cease-fire and to negotiate an end to this conflict. We supported this agreement and have urged all the parties to redouble their efforts to bring it into effect. In addition, the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] has sent a representative to Georgia to look into the situation and to determine whether the CSCE can assist. We support all efforts such as this to achieve a peaceful resolution of this conflict. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 41, October 12, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Travel Advisory Program

CA Source: Bureau of Consular Affairs Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 12 199210/12/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Travel, State Department [TEXT] The State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs has announced a major revision to its travel advisory program. The new program will increase the type of information distributed to US citizens traveling and residing abroad and also will make it simpler, more understandable, and more useful to the public. The new system changes the three general categories of Travel Advisories-- warnings, cautions, and notices--to two: travel warnings and consular information sheets. Warnings will be issued when the Department recommends that Americans avoid travel to a specific country. Consular information sheets will include information on potential security or health risks--currently covered in "cautions"--and inconvenient or difficult situations, found in "travel notices." Countries where avoidance of travel is recommended will have both travel warnings and consular information sheets. Consular information sheets will be available for every country in the world. They will include: -- Location of the US embassy or consulate(s); -- Unusual immigration practices; -- Health conditions; -- Minor political disturbances; -- Unusual currency and entry regulations; and -- Crime and security information and drug penalties. If an instability exists in a country, but it is not severe enough to warrant a separate warning, an optional section--"Areas of Instability"--may be included. On limited occasions, the Department will also include in this section any Embassy advice given to official employees. These sheets will not provide advice but will include factual material so that travelers can make informed decisions about their travel plans. The Department of State believes that this expanded program will better serve the American public since it will cover every country in the world. The revised system also will make it easier for the public to determine which countries pose the greatest risk, since, under the former three-tier system, the differences in the levels of advisories were often misunderstood. Both travel warnings and the new consular information sheets will be made available to the public through the Citizens Emergency Center's automated answering system on (202) 647-5225. The information will also be available at US passport agencies, embassies, and consulates around the world, through travel agents' computer reservation systems, and through a number of electronic bulletin board services, including the Consular Affairs Bulletin Board on (202) 647-9225 and the Computer Information Delivery Service (for more information, please see inside back cover). The warnings and consular information sheets will also be provided to major media outlets for dissemination to the general public. The Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs is working on the worldwide consular information sheets, which will be phased in by region. Additionally, any new information issued about a country will be prepared in the new format. In general, consular information sheets and travel warnings will be reviewed every 6 months or when conditions warrant. By late 1992, the new advisory program will be completely in place. (###)