US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: Significant Developments In the Middle
East
Djerejian
Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near
East Affairs and Acting Assistant Secretary for South Asian
Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Oct, 1 199210/1/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon
Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Terrorism, Democratization,
Human Rights
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to meet again with the
subcommittee. It has been 3 months since my last appearance. This period
has been extraordinarily busy, involving a trip to the region by former
Secretary of State Baker, my own earlier trip to the Maghreb, the meeting
between President Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in Kennebunkport,
the convening of the sixth round of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, and the
UN General Assembly bilateral sessions in New York between Acting
Secretary Eagleburger and Arab and Israeli Foreign Ministers. I, myself,
returned last night from another round of bilateral meetings at the United
Nations with Middle East officials.
I would go further and state that this period has been one in which US
foreign policy goals and objectives in the Near East have achieved important
gains across an important agenda. Let me briefly review the most
significant
developments in the peace process, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gulf, after which I
am prepared to take questions.
Peace Process
If you allow me, we can begin with an update of the peace process. In mid-
July, shortly after the new Israeli Government was formed, former
Secretary of State Baker made a trip to the Near East, where he met with
the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinians, and Israel.
The Secretary had wanted to set the stage for a renewal of the peace talks
following the brief recess for the Israeli elections. Noting that the change
in leadership in Israel offered opportunities for "positive forward movement
in this process," the Secretary welcomed Prime Minister Rabin's suggestion
that the peace talks be "relatively continuous."
The new government also announced its intention to change Israel's
priorities away from settlement activities and the occupied territories and
toward the resolution of pressing economic and social problems within
Israel. The Israeli Government took steps to begin to improve the
atmosphere on the ground in the occupied territories. Work was halted on
many of the settlements, and certain incentives for settlers were reduced
or eliminated. The Government of Israel rescinded orders to deport
Palestinians and released hundreds of Palestinian prisoners who had been
detained for security reasons.
This new direction in Israel made it possible for the President to announce,
on August 11, that he and Prime Minister Rabin had reached agreement on
the basic principles to govern the granting of up to $10 billion in loan
guarantees to Israel. The President noted that he and the Prime Minister had
agreed to an approach which will assist the resettlement of immigrants
from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia without frustrating the search
for peace. On September 11, the Administration forwarded a legislative
package to the Congress to authorize the guarantees.
Bilateral Talks
The sixth round of bilateral talks, which [began] on August 24 in Washington,
was conducted in a positive atmosphere of professionalism and cordiality.
Unlike previous rounds, an enhanced seriousness of purpose and substantive
engagement characterized these negotiating sessions. There was a greater
effort on the part of all the delegations to avoid posturing and excessive
rhetoric before the media--a fact which also helped to improve
communication at the bargaining table.
The parties are definitely grappling with the tough, key issues of land,
peace, and security. They have learned that there are no instant, simple
solutions and are dealing with the substantive complexities of the issues.
While there were no breakthroughs during this round, we believe the parties
have laid a good foundation for future progress. In that respect, all sides-
-Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian--in the talks and in the region are engaged in
an historic dialogue on peace, and we must not lose sight of that
fundamental fact.
In each bilateral, some progress was registered in narrowing gaps and
defining areas for further negotiating sessions. At the bargaining table,
substantive papers, which provide a foundation for further negotiation, were
presented by the Syrians, Palestinians, and Israelis. While I must refrain
from delving into the details of these papers, it is important to emphasize
the following:
-- Significantly, Syria and Israel, for the first time, have put forward
papers representing their respective views with regard to a possible joint
statement of principles. The papers begin to address the core issues of this
process--namely territory, security, and peace. There are some common
elements in their respective positions, but important substantive
differences remain. Both sides continue to explore for greater clarity on
the key issues of importance to them. Moreover, some constructive
statements by Prime Minister Rabin and [Syrian] President Assad have
reinforced progress at the table and have focused public opinion in Israel
and Syria on the prospects for peace.
-- Palestinians and Israelis are engaged in discussing substance and
establishing a work plan. There are legitimate differences over both the
form and substance of interim self-government arrangements. But for the
first time, there is a specific proposed timetable for elections and the
inauguration of a transitional period. Indeed, the prospect of the
Palestinians beginning to govern themselves is within reach. It is essential
that no more time be lost and that the parties engage to make this possible.
-- In the talks between Lebanon and Israel, discussion focused on the
structure for addressing the security situation on the ground. Differences
between the parties remain concerning implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 425 and other issues. Israel reiterated that it has no
territorial or water claims in Lebanon, however, and the parties appear
ready to take up the central security issues without prejudice to these
broader questions.
-- In the Jordanian-Israeli bilaterals, the two sides continued working on
an overall framework and agenda for future negotiations and held informal
discussions on several key issues, such as water, energy, security, and
finance. More work needs to be done to narrow the gaps on the agenda, and
ways are being explored to achieve this, so that progress can be made on
this issue.
In our assessment, serious engagement has begun. Each of the parties is
disappointed that not more was accomplished during this round; that in
itself is a positive indicator of the continued commitment and interest of
the parties in achieving progress. We were, and remain, in intensive contact
with all the parties, and we have made concrete suggestions for bridging
gaps that exist. Acting Secretary Eagleburger met with all the delegations,
and we will be communicating with all the parties in between rounds.
Through these contacts, we hope to maintain the momentum for productive
engagement when the negotiations resume in Washington on October 21. In
sum, we continue to play our role as a co-sponsor, honest broker, catalyst,
and driving force for these negotiations.
Multilateral Talks
The third round of multilateral talks began [on] September 15 here in
Washington, where the water resources working group met, and in Moscow,
where Russia hosted the arms control and regional security working group.
Both groups succeeded in defining practical approaches on which the parties
could engage and in soliciting proposals for confidence-building measures
for future study. Meetings of the working groups on refugees, the
environment, and economic development will convene in other capital cities
in October and November.
The water resources group launched studies about both conserving and
enhancing the region's limited water supply. The 2-day meeting in
Washington was followed by a field trip to Knoxville hosted by the
Tennessee Valley Authority. The next working group meeting is planned for
Switzerland, early next year.
The working group on arms control and regional security met in Moscow
September 15-17 under US-Russian co-chairmanship. The meeting
succeeded in its principal objective of getting the regional parties to begin
discussing practical measures for reducing tension and the risk of conflict
in the region. The parties have agreed to explore confidence-building
measures such as crisis communications and data exchange arrangements,
as part of the agenda for upcoming arms control and regional security
meetings.
The very fact that Arabs and Israelis are sitting together to discuss how
they can avoid conflict is remarkable, and we are encouraged by the serious,
business-like quality of their exchanges.
Syria and Lebanon have stayed away from the multilateral process for their
own reasons. Israel has decided not to participate in two of the five groups.
We persist in efforts to persuade these parties that participation in all of
these working groups is truly in their best interests.
We continue to believe that the multilateral phase of the talks complements
the bilaterals, which, of course, remain the focal point of the peace process.
Initial results of the working group meetings indicate to us, however, the
potential the multilaterals hold for advancing peace in the region as a
whole.
Arab Boycott
One of the continuing problems in this troubled region has been the economic
boycott of Israel imposed decades ago by the League of Arab States. The
United States has always firmly opposed that boycott. It is outdated,
contrary to the economic interests of all concerned, and inconsistent with
the current political environment in the Near East. A suspension of the
secondary and tertiary boycott would be an important contribution to a
negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
We continue to press these points and have renewed our initiative to urge
Arab countries to suspend the boycott.
We are also urging our trading partners to adopt anti-boycott policies. We
have canceled all Israel-only passports and ceased issuing new ones. We are
coordinating our anti-boycott actions with the European Community and are
pleased that many countries are exhibiting a new resolve to end this
anachronistic measure. The time is right to do so.
Lebanon
Mr. Chairman, I'd like next to say a few words about our relations with
Lebanon. As you know, Lebanon recently conducted three rounds of voting to
elect a new parliament. These were the first parliamentary elections held
in Lebanon since 1972 and the subsequent tragic civil war which so ravaged
Lebanon and its people. In the weeks leading to the election, we repeatedly
called for free and fair voting, to be held in an environment devoid of
intimidation and coercion. We consistently stated that the decision to
proceed with elections was that of the Lebanese Government to make.
Similarly, the decision of some Lebanese political figures not to participate
was theirs to make.
The United States is disappointed that the elections were not prepared and
conducted in a manner to ensure the broadest national consensus. The
turnout of eligible voters in some locations was extremely low. There were
also widespread reports of irregularities, which might have been avoided
had there been impartial international observers at hand, as we advocated.
As a consequence, the results do not reflect the full spectrum of the
Lebanese body politic.
We continue to support full implementation of both the letter and the spirit
of the Taif accord and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from
Lebanon, and we have repeatedly made this clear to all concerned parties.
The Taif accord requires a decision and coordination now by the
Governments of Lebanon and Syria on the redeployment of Syrian troops to
the western entrances to the Bekaa Valley. Lebanese President Hrawi and
Syrian President Assad have taken a first step by meeting to discuss the
issue. We anticipate further consultations between Lebanon and Syria in
preparation for the pullback of Syrian troops. As we have informed the
parties directly, that decision should have been taken by both governments
in September with actual redeployment taking place, in accordance with
Taif, as soon as possible thereafter.
Taif also requires the completion of the process of disarming all militias,
particularly Hizballah. We must not forget that implementation of this
agreement helped bring to an end the turbulent era of civil war in Lebanon.
We will remain engaged with both Syria and Lebanon and with the Arab
League Tripartite Committee members to work toward the implementation
of the Taif agreement in letter and spirit. With full adherence and
compliance of the parties to the Taif agreement, we believe it will offer the
best chance of restoring the unity, independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity of Lebanon.
A key to the extension of government authority throughout Lebanon is the
maintenance of strong Lebanese armed forces. The army has made great
strides under its commander, General Lahud, in creating multi-confessional
units and in recruiting and training new soldiers, including from among
former adversaries. These units have succeeded in disarming most militias
and are developing a renewed esprit de corps.
The Lebanese army has traditionally sought training for many of its soldiers
in the West, including in the United States. It remains our hope that we can
resume accepting a number of Lebanese officers and enlisted personnel for
training in this country under the IMET [International Military Education and
Training] program. We believe that such training and exposure to our
military helps foster values that are consistent with the role of the armed
forces in a democratic state.
In addition, we want to provide to the Lebanese armed forces non-lethal
excess defense articles that would enhance the Lebanese army's mobility
and range of operation. This would involve primarily transportation
equipment which has been determined by our military services to be excess
to our own needs. We would appreciate Congress' support for these
programs.
Gulf Security
I will now briefly address another major pillar of our Near East policy--our
shared interest in the stability of the Persian Gulf and the security of our
friends and allies on the Arabian Peninsula.
Iraq.
The most immediate and serious threat to the security of the
Gulf, and indeed of the whole region, has been Saddam Hussein's aggression
against his neighbors and against the people of Iraq.
-- Iraq's record of compliance with UN Security Council resolutions has
been clearly unsatisfactory.
-- Saddam maintains his economic blockade of northern Iraq. In the south,
his military operations and destruction of civilian homes and property
continues.
-- His regime has engaged in a program of harassment of UN and
international relief workers.
-- He refuses to renew the memorandum of understanding with the United
Nations, which would facilitate UN humanitarian programs, or to implement
UNSC [UN Security Council] Resolutions 706 and 712, which would feed the
Iraqi people and ensure equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies.
As you are aware, Saddam Hussein's escalating repression against Iraqi
citizens in southern Iraq led members of the coalition which expelled Iraq
from Kuwait to begin, in August, aerial monitoring of Baghdad's compliance
with the provisions of UNSC Resolution 688. A "no-fly zone" south of the
32nd parallel was established in connection with this operation--
designated [Operation] Southern Watch. The endorsement of this step by the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an important manifestation of the
international solidarity confronting Saddam's regime.
In announcing this step, President Bush emphasized that "we seek Iraq's
compliance, not its partition. The United States continues to support Iraq's
territorial unity and bears no ill will toward its people." We reiterated our
strong commitment to Iraq's unity directly to the Iraqi opposition during its
July meetings with former Secretary Baker. The opposition leaders assured
us they share our view.
Clearly, it is Saddam Hussein who is alienating and dividing his own people
by cracking down on Iraqi groups of whatever origin who dissent from his
rule. The United States has long encouraged the development of a broad-
based, unified Iraqi opposition. We support the establishment of a
democratic central government of national unity. In that regard, we are
pleased that initial reports of last week's meeting of Iraqi opposition
groups in northern Iraq indicate that the opposition succeeded in further
broadening its base and narrowing its differences. As President Bush has
affirmed, we want to see a government in Baghdad which respects the
human rights of all its citizens, is at peace with its neighbors, and accepts
the UN resolutions.
The importance of continuing UN operations in Iraq cannot be understated.
They are the principal means of ensuring the provision of humanitarian aid
to Iraq's most needy people--those who are deprived of the necessities of
life by the Baghdad regime. UN operations are also the best means of
monitoring Iraqi compliance with the Security Council's resolutions on
weapons of mass destruction. These operations are imperiled by Iraqi
harassment and the lack of a steady source of funding. We are pressing hard
for a new Security Council resolution which would allow the United Nations
to borrow frozen Iraqi funds to finance operations in Iraq, which would be
paid back from future Iraqi oil sales. This money would be placed in a UN
escrow account and would fund activities authorized under UNSC
Resolutions 706 and 712, such as humanitarian assistance, the
compensation commission, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) for
weapons of mass destruction, and the work of human rights Special
Rapporteur [Max] van der Stoel. Passage of this resolution, which we hope
will occur this week, will be an important demonstration to Saddam of the
international community's determination to continue UN activities
throughout Iraq.
The coalition's firm support for UNSCOM, improved sanctions enforcement,
the creation of Operation Southern Watch, our meetings with the Iraqi
opposition, and the new assets resolution all have put Saddam on the
defensive. He is facing increasing economic difficulties and reacting with
typical brutality by executing Baghdad merchants. In the Iraqi National
Congress, Saddam for the first time ever faces a unified and broadened
opposition with a clear alternative political program that transcends
Kurdish, Shi'a, and Sunni distinctions.
Jordan.
We are also continuing to monitor the enforcement of UN
sanctions against Iraq by its neighbors. In this regard, I would like to
elaborate on my earlier reference to sanctions enforcement and take note of
the efforts of Jordan. This is an area about which the committee has
previously expressed considerable concern--concern which the
Administration has shared. When we last addressed this issue, Jordan's
performance was not satisfactory. The possible benefit to Iraq of
inadequate sanctions enforcement by Jordan had led the Administration to
suspend our assistance to Jordan and to postpone scheduled military
exercises and consultations.
Today, Mr. Chairman, the situation is substantially different. Since late
June, Jordan's enforcement of sanctions has tightened significantly. The
Jordanian military has assumed an important role in the effort, and Iraq has
received correspondingly fewer embargoed goods through Jordan. We will
continue to press Jordan to keep up their tightened performance and to
improve upon it even more.
Accordingly, we have made policy adjustments in our bilateral relationship
with Jordan to reflect the changes in Jordan's stance, and to encourage
continued and further Jordanian efforts in this direction. We also, recently,
conducted an air-defense exercise with Jordan. I will be happy to elaborate
on these points, but I wanted to underscore this new development in this
overview of Gulf security and the effort to contain Iraq.
Arabian Peninsula.
The countries most vulnerable to aggression
from both Iraq and a potentially militant and resurgent Iran are our friends
and allies on the Arabian Peninsula--the Gulf Cooperation Council states of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.
We have assured the GCC leaders that the United States will cooperate
closely with them to meet their legitimate defense needs. It has also been
our policy, however, that our bilateral arrangements would complement, not
supersede, the Gulf states' own collective security efforts. Acting
Secretary Eagleburger made this clear at his meetings with the GCC foreign
ministers in New York during the UN General Assembly bilaterals. We also
made clear that we were disappointed with the pace of progress on
collective security. Border disputes are among the obstacles.
We have now concluded or renewed bilateral security agreements with four
of the GCC states and have excellent working arrangements with all of them.
The establishment of Operation Southern Watch is a good example of a level
of cooperation with these countries that was unimaginable a few
years ago.
I would stress here that the purposes of both arms sales and collective
security measures are to deter threats to our shared interests and to raise
the threshold of future requirements for direct US military action. It is
in this policy context that President Bush has announced the sale of 72 F-15
fighter-bombers to Saudi Arabia. This sale would be fully consistent with
the President's Middle East Arms Control Initiative, which is designed to
prevent destabilizing arms transfers and to foster a transparent and
responsible arms transfer process. The F-15 sale fully meets those
criteria. It provides a credible Saudi defensive deterrent, helps protect
vital American security interests in the Persian Gulf, and reduces the
amount of US military force needed in the region.
We have carefully considered the impact of this sale on the security of
Israel. The United States remains unshakeably committed to maintaining
Israel's qualitative military edge and, as Under Secretary [for International
Security Affairs] Wisner and Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary Ford
informed this committee [on] September 23, we are consulting closely with
the Government of Israel to ensure that this advantage remains unaltered.
In accordance with this commitment, President Bush and Prime Minister
Rabin have reached agreement on certain measures that will be initiated by
the United States in the very near future. These measures include the
supply of Apache and Blackhawk helicopters and the pre-positioning of
advanced defense equipment in Israel. They will be implemented pursuant to
previously enacted legislation which authorized the transfer to Israel and
pre-positioning in Israel of defense articles drawn from US stocks.
The United States and Israel intend to continue consultations for
the purpose of determining additional measures necessary to maintain
Israel's qualitative military edge.
Iran.
I have previously mentioned to you the obstacles to the
normalization of relations with Iran. Its sponsorship of terrorism,
reprehensible human rights practices, opposition to the Middle East peace
process, and apparent pursuit of a destabilizing arms build-up remain
matters of serious concern. Further, Iran's policies toward the Gulf Arab
states, as exemplified by its heavy-handed assertion of authority on Abu
Musa Island, have shown it to be an increasingly truculent neighbor. We
welcome the firm stand that the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab
League have taken on this issue. Iran clearly understands that the United
States opposes any resort to force to settle such territorial disputes and
that we strongly advocate peaceful resolution of such disagreements.
We have also made clear that we are prepared to discuss areas of mutual
concern and interest with authorized representatives of the Iranian
Government. To date, the Iranian leadership has declined to engage us in
this dialogue.
Fundamental Values
I will conclude my statement, Mr. Chairman, with a brief comment on the
important, continuing role the Department and our embassies play in
fostering the fundamental values we as Americans cherish. Of course,
promoting respect for basic human rights, encouraging broader participation
in government, and supporting pluralism--including minority and women's
rights--within the context of stable and secure countries, are continuing
foreign policy objectives of the United States throughout the world,
including the Near East. We are now preparing the State Department's
annual Report to Congress on Human Rights. While I haven't yet seen any of
the draft reports, I know they will document to the best of our knowledge
the human rights situation in each country and the difficulties confronting
many Near Eastern countries in their attempts to adapt to the modern, post-
Cold War world in the context of their long-held values, traditions, and
assessment of their vital national security interests.
What we look for is progress in wrestling with these problems. We are,
therefore, encouraged to see the countries of Kuwait and Yemen proceeding
with their plans for parliamentary elections this month and in November,
respectively. We have also welcomed Saudi Arabia's and Oman's initial
moves to broaden the political process in the last 2 years in a manner
consistent with their own traditions and history. We wish them success in
these endeavors and encourage broadened political participation throughout
the region. In keeping with our basic belief that countries that share our
fundamental values make the best partners, we will continue to support
such important steps in the conduct of our relations with the countries of
the Near East. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: US-Israel Agree On Military Measures
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 26 19929/26/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
In accordance with the United States' ongoing commitment to the
preservation and maintenance of Israel's qualitative military edge,
President Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin have reached agreement on
certain measures that will be initiated by the United States in the very near
future. These measures include the supply of Apache and Blackhawk
helicopters and the pre-positioning of advanced defense equipment in Israel.
They will be implemented pursuant to previously enacted legislation which
authorized the transfer to Israel and pre-positioning in Israel of defense
articles drawn from US stocks.
It was further agreed that there will be closer ties between the two
countries' armed forces, cooperation on technology upgrades, and the start
of discussions on Israel's participation in the Global Protection System.
These initiatives represent a significant effort in reaffirming the United
States' long-standing commitment to a strategic partnership with Israel
and will effectively maintain Israel's qualitative edge. The United States
and Israel intend to continue consultations for the purpose of determining
additional measures necessary to maintain Israel's qualitative military
edge. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: Iraqi Assets Resolution: Department Statement
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Trade/Economics, United Nations
[TEXT]
On October 2, the [UN] Security Council adopted a resolution that permits the
use of frozen Iraqi assets to fund crucial UN activities concerning Iraq. The
resolution calls on states to transfer certain frozen Iraqi assets to the UN
escrow account created by Resolutions 706 and 712; these funds will be
reimbursed from Iraqi oil export revenues as soon as those exports resume.
They will be used to finance UN programs such as humanitarian relief
efforts, the compensation commission, and UNSCOM--the UN special
commission overseeing the dismantling of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction. The humanitarian efforts will directly benefit the Iraqi people.
Like the other UN programs, these were instituted in response to problems
Iraq itself created. It is, therefore, appropriate to use Iraqi funds to pay for
these operations as well as to pay for the consequences of Iraqi aggression.
Adoption of the resolution demonstrates the continuing commitment of the
international community to ensuring that Iraq end its defiance of the United
Nations and that it comply with the UN resolutions calling for an end to
Iraqi repression of its civilian populations and setting out a framework for
UN activities inside Iraq. We are pleased that the international community
is not wavering in its efforts to confront [Iraqi President] Saddam's
intransigence.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: Iraqi Assets: UN Resolution 778
UN
Source: Security Council, United Nations
Description: Resolution, New York
Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Trade/Economics, United Nations
[TEXT]
Resolution 778, October 2, 1992
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions and in particular resolutions 706
(1991) and 712 (1991),
Taking note of the letter of 15 July 1992 from the Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council on Iraq's compliance with the obligations
placed on it by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions,
Condemning Iraq's continued failure to comply with its obligations under
relevant resolutions,
Reaffirming its concern about the nutritional and health situation of the
Iraqi civilian population, and the risk of a further deterioration of this
situation, and recalling in this regard its resolution 706 (1991) and 712
(1991), which provide a mechanism for providing humanitarian relief to the
Iraqi population, and resolution 688 (1991), which provides a basis for
humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq,
Having regard to the fact that the period of six months referred to in
resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) expired on 18 March 1992,
Deploring Iraq's refusal to cooperate in the implementation of resolutions
706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which puts its civilian population at risk, and
which results in the failure by Iraq to meet its obligations under relevant
Security Council resolutions,
Recalling that the escrow account provided for in resolutions 706 (1991)
and 712 (1991) will consist of Iraqi funds administered by the Secretary-
General which will be used to pay contributions to the Compensation Fund,
the full costs of carrying out the tasks authorized by section C of resolution
687 (1991), the full costs incurred by the United Nations in facilitating the
return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, half the costs of the Boundary
Commission, and the cost to the United Nations of implementing resolution
706 (1991) and of other necessary humanitarian activities in Iraq,
Recalling that Iraq, as stated in paragraph 16 of resolution 687 (1991), is
liable for all direct damages resulting from its invasion and occupation of
Kuwait, without prejudice to its debts and obligations arising prior to 2 Au-
gust 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms,
Recalling its decision in resolution 692 (1991) that the requirement for
Iraqi contributions to the Compensation Fund applies to certain Iraqi
petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq before 2 April 1991,
as well as to all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq
after 2 April 1991,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that all States in which there are funds of the Government of
Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations, or agencies, that represent the
proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products, paid for by or on
behalf of the purchaser on or after 6 August 1990, shall cause the transfer
of those funds (or equivalent amounts) as soon as possible to the escrow
account provided for in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991); provided
that this paragraph shall not require any State to cause the transfer of such
funds in excess of 200 million dollars or to cause the transfer of more than
fifty per cent of the total funds transferred or contributed pursuant to
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this resolution; and further provided that States
may exclude from the operation of this paragraph any funds which have
already been released to a claimant or supplier prior to the adoption of this
resolution, or any other funds subject to or required to satisfy the rights of
third parties, at the time of the adoption of this resolution;
2. Decides that all States in which there are petroleum or petroleum
products owned by the Government of Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations,
or agencies, shall take all feasible steps to purchase or arrange for the sale
of such petroleum or petroleum products at fair market value, and thereupon
to transfer the proceeds as soon as possible to the escrow account provided
for in resolution 706 (1991) and 712 (1991);
3. Urges all States to contribute funds from other sources to the escrow
account as soon as possible;
4. Decides that all States shall provide the Secretary-General with any
information needed for the effective implementation of this resolution and
that they shall take the necessary measures to ensure that banks and other
bodies and persons provide all relevant information necessary to identify
the funds referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and details of any
transactions relating thereto, or the said petroleum or petroleum products,
with a view to such information being utilized by all States and by the
Secretary-General in the effective implementation of this resolution;
5. Requests the Secretary-General:
(a) To ascertain the whereabouts and amounts of the said petroleum and
petroleum products and the proceeds of sale referred to in paragraphs 1 and
2 of this resolution, drawing on the work already done under the auspices of
the Compensation Commission, and report the results to the Security
Council as soon as possible;
(b) To ascertain the costs of United Nations activities concerning the
elimination of weapons of mass destruction, the provision of humanitarian
relief in Iraq, and the other United Nations operations specified in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 706 (1991); and
(c) To take the following actions:
(i) transfer to the Compensation Fund, from the funds referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution, the percentage referred to in
paragraph 10 of this resolution; and
(ii) use the remainder of funds referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this
resolution for the costs of United Nations activities concerning the
elimination of weapons of mass destruction, the provision of humanitarian
relief in Iraq, and the other United Nations operations specified in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 706 (1991), taking into account any
preference expressed by States transferring or contributing funds as to the
allocation of such funds among these purposes;
6. Decides that for so long as oil exports take place pursuant to the system
provided in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) or to the eventual lifting
of sanctions pursuant to paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991),
implementation of paragraphs 1 to 5 of this resolution shall be suspended
and all proceeds of those oil exports shall immediately be transferred by
the Secretary-General in the currency in which the transfer to the escrow
account had been made, to the accounts or States from which funds had been
provided under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this resolution, to the extent
required to replace in full the amounts so provided (together with applicable
interest); and that, if necessary for this purpose, any other funds remaining
in the escrow account shall similarly be transferred to those accounts or
States; provided, however, that the Secretary-General may retain and use
any funds urgently needed for the purposes specified in paragraph 5 (c) (ii)
of this resolution;
7. Decides that the operation of this resolution shall have no effect on
rights, debts and claims existing with respect to funds prior to their
transfer to the escrow account; and that the accounts from which such
funds were transferred shall be kept open for retransfer of the funds in
question;
8. Reaffirms that the escrow account referred to in this resolution, like the
Compensation Fund, enjoys the privileges and immunities of the United
Nations, including immunity from legal proceedings, or any forms of
attachment, garnishment or execution; and that no claim shall lie at the
instance of any person or body in connection with any action taken in
compliance with or implementation of this resolution;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to repay, from any available funds in the
escrow account, any sum transferred under this resolution to the account or
State from which it was transferred, if the transfer is found at any time by
him not to have been of funds subject to this resolution; a request for such a
finding could be made by the State from which the funds were transferred;
10. Confirms that the percentage of the value of exports of petroleum and
petroleum products from Iraq for payment to the Compensation Fund shall,
for the purpose of this resolution and exports of petroleum or petroleum
products subject to paragraph 6 of resolution 692 (1991), be the same as
the percentage decided by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution
705 (1991), until such time as the Governing Council of the Compensation
Fund may decide otherwise;
11. Decides that no further Iraqi assets shall be released for purposes set
forth in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991) except to the sub-account of
the escrow account, established pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 712
(1991), or directly to the United Nations for humanitarian activities in Iraq;
12. Decides that, for the purposes of this resolution and other relevant
resolutions, the term "petroleum products" does not include petrochemical
derivatives;
13. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully in the implementation of this
resolution;
14. Decides to remain seized of this matter.
VOTE: 14-0-1 (China abstaining). (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: Review of the Western Sahara and Somalia
Bolton
Source: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC
Description: Resolution, New York
Date: Oct, 1 199210/1/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Somalia, Morocco, Kenya, Belgium, Germany, Italy,
Canada, Australia
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest,
United Nations
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee on Africa, I am pleased to
be here today to review with you the status of developments in the Western
Sahara and Somalia. My remarks on the Western Sahara will review
developments concerning the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western
Sahara (MINURSO) and the latest information we have on the referendum
itself. My testimony on Somalia will bring you up to date on the tragedy
there--particularly from the perspective of the United Nations--on our
efforts to contribute to international relief efforts, and [on] our
expectations for what the international community can accomplish in the
coming months.
The Western Sahara and MINURSO
US policy has consistently and fully supported UN efforts to resolve
definitively the status of the Western Sahara through a popular referendum.
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and his special representative, Sahabzada
Yaqub Khan, have our full confidence in their efforts to implement the
referendum plan. Let me be clear, however, that we have been frustrated
that the parties have not reached accommodation on the essential point
holding up the referendum: Who will be eligible to vote? Considerable
distance remains between the views of the Moroccan Government and the
POLISARIO [Popular Liberation Front for Rio de Oro and Saguia El Hamra] over
the criteria to be used to determine voter eligibility.
As I stated in February, former [UN] Secretary General Perez de Cuellar
presented revised voter identification guidelines last December, shortly
before he left office. Those guidelines were initially accepted by Morocco
but rejected by the POLISARIO. The latest report of the UN Secretary
General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, issued August 20,
shows only marginal signs of progress on this issue. The efforts of the
Secretary General's special representative have apparently brought about a
narrowing of the differences between the two sides. Mr. Yaqub Khan is
continuing his discussions with both sides to see if remaining differences
can be bridged.
Meanwhile, Morocco has continued to move forward with its Western Sahara
policy. As it had announced it would, the Government of Morocco conducted
a constitutional referendum, on September 4, in which inhabitants of
Western Sahara voted as they had been allowed to do in earlier Moroccan
elections. Four days later, King Hassan announced that the four provinces of
Western Sahara, in the event of integration with Morocco, would be
designated a region with, presumably, the same degree of autonomy as the
country's other regions. The King also indicated that a Western Sahara
region would be given priority in terms of the Moroccan Government's
development programs. Several editorials in the semi-official press
followed, claiming that the participation of the Saharan population in the
constitutional referendum was a "manifestation and reaffirmation of their
Moroccanness." We have inquired about these statements, and the Moroccan
Government has assured us that they do not represent Morocco's official
position and should not be interpreted as an attempt to preempt the planned
UN referendum.
In addition to the constitutional referendum, the Moroccan Government plans
to have Western Saharans participate in Morocco's local and parliamentary
elections planned for later this year. Inhabitants of the Western Sahara
have been permitted in the past to elect representatives to Morocco's
parliament. The Moroccan Government asserts that the upcoming
parliamentary elections were previously postponed for 2 years (from 1990
to 1992) so as not to interfere with the conduct of the still-pending UN
referendum in Western Sahara. Morocco argues that parliamentary elections
cannot be postponed further solely because the eligibility issue has stalled
the UN referendum in the Western Sahara.
The Moroccan Government has given the Secretary General written
assurances that its parliamentary elections are independent of and separate
from the holding of a UN referendum on the Western Sahara. Morocco also
expressed readiness to reaffirm its solemn commitment to the United
Nations that it will abide by the results of the referendum. However, the
POLISARIO does not accept the Moroccan right to conduct national elections
in the Western Sahara. Our concern is that any disruptions be avoided in the
process leading to the UN referendum.
Let me now say a few words on MINURSO. As of August 31, MINURSO had 365
military personnel deployed in the Western Sahara, of whom 25 are US
citizens. There are an additional 104 civilians working in MINURSO, of
which 26 are locally hired. The Secretary General's plan calls for
approximately 2,900 military and civilian personnel to observe the cease-
fire between Morocco and the POLISARIO and to prepare for and conduct the
referendum. Failure to agree on procedures for the conduct of the UN
referendum remains the principal obstacle to a more complete deployment
of MINURSO.
In February, I referred to deployment difficulties encountered by MINURSO.
There were additional problems noted by a US brigadier general when he
visited the Western Sahara in April in his capacity as executive agent for US
peace-keeping operations. I am pleased to say that, although challenges
remain, many of the difficulties were the result of misunderstandings with
the Government of Morocco and have since been resolved. Service in
MINURSO remains a difficult and hazardous assignment, but it appears that
the organization's worst experiences are behind it.
Turning to the issue of MINURSO expenses, the UN General Assembly
approved, in principle, $181 million for the operation. Member states were
assessed $143 million for the first 6 months of MINURSO's operations. The
US assessment for this period, which has been paid in full, was $43.4
million. Given the continued uncertainty over the implementation schedule
for the referendum, it is unclear at this time when or if the United Nations
will approve further assessments for this force.
I wish to reiterate our commitment to a peaceful resolution of the issue of
Western Sahara under the auspices of the United Nations and with the
personal involvement of the Secretary General and his special
representative. Mr. Yaqub Khan will be reporting soon to the Secretary
General, who planned to issue another report by the end of September. While
we do not know whether that report will be positive, we will continue to
back the UN efforts to break the deadlock and to find a way for the Western
Sahara inhabitants to have their referendum and decide their destiny.
Somalia
Moving to the subject of Somalia, it is difficult to find words adequate to
describe the suffering. Experienced humanitarian workers describe
conditions in Somalia as the worst they have seen. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates that 1.5 million Somalis are in
dire need of immediate assistance. As many as 4.5 million Somalis are in
desperate need of food and other forms of
assistance.
Starvation and malnutrition are widespread, especially in the central and
southern regions of the country. In remote areas, many people may be dying
before they can reach feeding centers in the towns. While there are no
accurate figures on the total number of deaths due to starvation, the
estimates of humanitarian agencies in Somalia are horrifying: 1,000-2,000
per day in central and southern regions and in camps in neighboring Kenya,
Ethiopia, and Djibouti, where upward of 750,000 Somalis have sought
refuge. According to mid-September estimates by the ICRC, Somalia needed
at least 52,000 tons of food per month to feed the hungry. That is more than
a 50% increase over the amount relief agencies believed was necessary in
mid-summer.
Simply put, the rule of law does not exist in Somalia. Since the outbreak of
civil war in 1988, factions and clans have killed thousands of people and
uprooted hundreds of thousands from their homes. In the process, they
destroyed the country's infrastructure and crippled its economy. Even the
tenuous cease-fire in Mogadishu, brokered with great difficulty by the
United Nations last March, could not stem effectively the random violence
and looting throughout much of the country and even the capital. In many
areas, traditional clan leaders are no longer in control of their communities,
and outlaw groups operate independent of any authority.
With this stark report of the situation on the record, let me focus my
statement on UN and other international organizations' efforts to relieve
suffering and on our contributions to those efforts.
The United Nations was confronted with the challenge of leading the
assistance effort in Somalia at a time when the organization, as well as
most international relief agencies, was already overloaded. Apart from the
major drought in southern Africa, the United Nations is also handling large-
scale relief efforts in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Cambodia. In addition,
the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, headed by Under Secretary
General Jan Eliasson, was established only last January, and Eliasson did not
assume office until April.
I am not trying to dismiss the shortcomings that exist in the relief effort.
There is some truth to the assertion made by critics that the international
community did not respond as quickly or as effectively as needed when the
Somali tragedy unfolded. Organizationally, the UN system was not ready to
meet fully its new responsibilities. Change in the UN system, which this
Administration has spearheaded for more than 3 years, is underway. We
hope that lessons learned in Somalia will accelerate reform.
I believe that now, with our encouragement and support, the United Nations
is fully engaged in Somalia. In his August report to the Security Council on
the UN technical assessment of Somalia, UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali noted that the lack of security was the main obstacle to
delivery of substantially increased assistance. Following his report and an
agreement brokered with faction leaders in Mogadishu by his special
representative, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, the United States offered to
airlift 500 Pakistani troops to serve as security guards. In 29 sorties by US
military aircraft between September 14 and 28, the 500 guards and much of
their equipment were deployed to Mogadishu, where they can begin
protecting humanitarian supplies delivered to [the] Mogadishu airport and
port and overseeing the storage and delivery of food in the Mogadishu area.
The United States has also given its full backing to the Secretary General's
recommendation for the deployment of similar units elsewhere in Somalia.
We supported Security Council Resolution 775, passed on August 28,
authorizing the Secretary General to deploy up to an additional 3,000
security guards. Special Representative Sahnoun is consulting with key
Somali factional leaders on deploying the additional troops. We want to
assist him in every way possible.
Greater UN engagement in Somalia is having an impact. Most notably, the
airlift of food and other supplies that began on August 15 has permitted the
World Food Program (WFP) to deliver an average of 578 tons a week of food
donated by the United States, [the] European Community, Australia and
Germany, and others. Under Secretary Eliasson recently visited Somalia and
refugee centers and is finalizing a "100-Day Plan" to accelerate assistance.
In addition to a massive infusion of food aid, the plan will provide such
necessities as shelter materials, blankets, clothes, and sufficient clean
water. It will include projects that will create jobs and help rebuild the
agricultural and livestock sectors. The United Nations will also convene a
relief coordination conference in Geneva on October 12.
On our part, the United States and four other countries--Belgium, Canada,
Germany, and Italy--with the cooperation of Kenya, have committed aircraft
to lift relief to Somalia and to refugee camps in northern Kenya. Other
countries have accelerated their contributions to the Somalis. US aircraft
alone have flown over 400 sorties between August 28 and today, delivering
approximately 5,000 metric tons of food and other needed supplies. Having
contributed over $160 million in assistance to Somalia over the past 18
months, including more than 80,000 tons of food, we have committed an
additional 145,000 tons of food, which will begin to arrive over the next
several months.
Improvement of UN Peace-keeping And Humanitarian Assistance
In the final analysis, the United Nations must lead the world community in
humanitarian efforts to confront disasters on the scale of Somalia's. The
United Nations must also, as President Bush said during his September 21
address to the 47th UN General Assembly session, improve its capacity to
fulfill its responsibilities in the fields of conflict resolution and peace-
keeping. On our part, the President pledged in New York that we would:
-- Emphasize training of our military for peace-keeping and humanitarian
activities;
-- Establish a permanent peace-keeping curriculum in US military schools;
and
-- Work with the United Nations to best employ our lift, logistics,
communications, and intelligence capabilities.
He offered our capabilities for joint simulation and exercises, facilities for
multinational training, and our expertise in planning and operations. The
President also said that we would broaden our support for monitoring,
verification, reconnaissance, and other requirements for peace-keeping and
humanitarian assistance, as well as review how we fund these activities.
The process to implement the President's initiative has begun. When it is in
place and the UN system has undergone its needed reforms, the international
community will be able to much more effectively confront disasters such
as that which overtook Somalia, whether manmade or natural. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: US-Australia Joint Communique
Eagleburger
Wolfowitz
Evans
Ray.
Source: Released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Description: Joint Communique, Washington, DC
Date: Oct, 1 199210/1/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Pacific, Southeast Asia
Country: Vietnam, Australia, United States, Cambodia,
New Zealand, Iraq
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control,
Trade/Economics, United Nations, POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Senator Gareth Evans
and Minister for Defense Senator Robert Ray, and the United States Acting
Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Under Secretary of Defense
Paul D. Wolfowitz met on October 1, 1992 in Washington, D.C. to discuss
global, regional, and bilateral issues. The rapid pace and dramatic scope of
political and economic developments on the international scene in this
period of world history made the consultations especially valuable on this
occasion.
These talks continued the tradition of annual high-level consultations
between two close allies. Discussions focused both upon the shared
interests of the alliance relationship and cooperative efforts on key
international arms control and conflict resolution issues. The United States
and Australia exchanged views on other new challenges emerging in the
post-Cold War environment, including issues relating to the world economy
and international trade, particularly the GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] Uruguay Round. Both sides pledged to continue close
consultations on these key issues.
Defense and Security
Australia emphasized its belief that the continued involvement of U.S.
forces in the Asia-Pacific region has been a powerful stabilizing force,
significantly contributing to the remarkable growth and stability achieved
over recent decades. Australia thus welcomed the United States'
reaffirmation of its intention to maintain its strategic engagement in the
region through the maintenance of existing alliances, forward deployed
forces, and new access arrangements with host governments.
The United States reiterated its support for bilateral security arrangements
with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand
as keystones of regional security. In that regard, the United States and
Australian Governments reaffirmed the importance of their security
cooperation under the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States] Treaty
and the need to continue close consultations on issues of mutual security
concern. Both governments noted that they would welcome the return of
New Zealand to ANZUS on the basis of full acceptance by New Zealand of its
obligations and responsibilities under the alliance.
Recalling the successful completion of the Kangaroo 92 joint military
exercise, the United States and Australia pledged to continue efforts to
foster military interoperability between their armed forces. This would be
particularly important as both countries structured their forces to meet the
challenges of the 1990s, including through the development and use of
advanced technology. Australia outlined its plans for upgrading the
facilities at the Delamere Air Weapons Range and the underwater tracking
range off Perth and repeated its invitation to the United States to make use
of these facilities in its own training and exercise programs. Australia and
the United States reaffirmed the importance they attach to the joint
defense facilities and to other cooperative arrangements. The United States
and Australian Governments welcomed the transfer that took place that day,
of Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station at North West Cape,
Australia --a joint facility--from U.S. to Australian command.
To complement the contribution that these bilateral arrangements make to
security in Asia and the Pacific, both sides agree to encourage regional
discussion on security issues. In particular, they welcome the inclusion of
regional security discussions on the agenda of the ASEAN [Association of
Southeast Asian Nations] PMC [post-ministerial conference] as an example
of the sort of initiative that can help build trust, confidence, and
cooperation.
The United States and Australia, while noting substantial progress on many
aspects of the Cambodian peace process, especially repatriation and
electoral preparations, expressed concern over the continued refusal of the
Khmer Rouge to join the cantonment and demobilization phase of the
Cambodia peace agreement and reiterated the importance both place on the
elections being held as scheduled in April/May 1993. Both governments
expressed support for UNSC [United Nations Security Council] Resolution 766
and for UNSC consideration of further measures should Khmer Rouge
intransigence continue.
The United States outlined recent developments in U.S.-Vietnam relations,
including on POW-MIA [prisoners of war/missing-in-action] issues.
Australia noted these recent developments and expressed its hope that there
would eventually be a normalization of relations between the two countries.
The two sides welcomed the recent progress in the dialogue between South
and North Korea, and especially the agreements on reconciliation and
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, they remain concerned
about the North Korean nuclear program and North Korea's continued export
of Scud missiles and related technology. They called on the DPRK
[Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea] to finalize with South Korea an
arrangement for a credible and effective bilateral nuclear inspection
regime, which would be an essential complement to IAEA [International
Atomic Energy Agency] inspections and would enhance international
confidence that the DPRK was fulfilling its responsibilities under both the
NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and the bilateral accord.
Australia and the United States noted with concern the potential threat of
ballistic missile proliferation and expressed their willingness to explore
with each other and other countries the development of a global protection
system--an international regime for protection against limited ballistic
missile attack. Both governments look forward to cooperation on these
matters where our common interests are engaged and agree to keep each
other closely informed of developments.
Other Security Issues
Both governments reaffirmed their commitment to work in the international
community to ensure Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions, and
recognized the substantial contribution which each was making to the
Multinational Interception Force (MIF) monitoring sanctions compliance.
They agreed that renewed efforts were needed to encourage others to join
the MIF.
Both sides condemned Iraq's harassment of UN personnel, including UN
Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspection teams acting under UNSC
Resolution 687. The two governments pledged continued support for
UNSCOM, including a willingness to provide experts for the inspection
teams. The two governments also agreed to support and encourage UN
humanitarian efforts under UNSC Resolution 688, which respond to the
suffering of the people of Iraq. They reaffirmed their support for the aerial
monitoring and consequent no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, which
respond to Iraq's continued oppression of the populations living in those
areas.
Australia welcomed the leadership of the United States in the Middle East
Peace process. The United States expressed appreciation for Australia's
positive contribution to the arms control and regional security (ACRS)
multilateral working group.
Both governments welcomed the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) negotiations and agreed, as original co-sponsors of the
draft resolution commending the CWC now before the general assembly, to
continue efforts to urge all countries to support the CWC and to become
original signatories. They also agreed to work actively to ensure that the
CWC comes into effect at the earliest possible date. The United States
commended the leadership role of Australia in fostering the successful
conclusion to the negotiations.
Both sides emphasized their shared commitment to preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including through the
strengthening of IAEA safeguards. The two governments stressed the
importance of indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in 1995.
Reviewing developments in Europe, the two sides expressed support for the
efforts of the newly independent states to establish democratic, market-
oriented societies. Australia and the United States discussed the ongoing
conflict in the former Yugoslavia and agreed to continue to support UN
efforts to end the conflict through diplomatic and other means.
Economic and Trade Issues
The United States and Australia emphasized the importance of fostering
free and undistorted trade globally and in the Asia-Pacific region. Both
sides agreed that a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round is the most
important priority in the international economy. To this end, the two sides
agreed that an urgent breakthrough on agriculture is critical and they called
on the EC [European Community] and other parties to show the necessary
flexibility to see this achieved. Both governments renewed calls on all
GATT parties to show the political commitment to conclude the Round as a
matter of urgency.
They underlined their strong commitment to Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and welcomed its role as a primary vehicle for achieving
increased trade liberalization in the region. The United States and Australia
exchanged views on NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement] and the
President's goal to develop a network of free trade agreements with the
Pacific, Latin America, and some Eastern European countries as a means of
furthering trade liberalization. Australia and the United States emphasized
the benefits of maintaining an open regional trading system on an APEC-
wide basis.
Australia pressed strongly its concerns at the continuing resort to export
subsidies, including the Export Enhancement Program, in international
agricultural trade. The United States reiterated that it will continue to use
the Export Enhancement Program to counter high EC export subsidies, but
assured Australia that it will also continue, where feasible, to minimize
the effects on Australia and other non-subsidizers.
Both governments agreed that discussions on a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA) should be accelerated with the view to
concluding an agreement as soon as possible.
Australia confirmed its invitation to the United States to the next round of
annual talks in Australia in 1993. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: Country Profile: Australia
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Oct, 5 199210/5/92
Category: Country Data
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Australia
Subject: Trade/Economics, History, Military Affairs,
Cultural Exchange, Resource Management
[TEXT]
Geography
Area: 7.7 million sq. km. (3 million sq. mi.); about the size of the United
States.
Cities (1991 est.): Capital--Canberra (pop. 285,000). Other cities--Sydney
(3.6 million), Melbourne (3 million), Brisbane (1.2 million), Perth (1.2
million).
Terrain: Varied, but generally flat.
Climate: Relatively dry, ranging from temperate in the south to tropical in
the north.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Australian(s).
Population (1991 est.): 17.4 million.
Annual growth rate (1991 est.): 1.5%.
Ethnic groups: European 94%, Asian 5%, aboriginal 1%.
Religions: Anglican 24%, Roman Catholic 26%.
Languages: English, aboriginal.
Education: Years compulsory--to age 15 in all states except Tasmania,
where it is 16. Literacy--89%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--9/1,000. Life expectancy--males 73 yrs.,
females 79 yrs.
Work force (1991 est., 8.7 million): Services--72%. Mining,
manufacturing, and utilities--19%. Agriculture--5%. Public administration
and defense--4%.
Government
Type: Democratic, federal-state
system recognizing British monarch as sovereign.
Constitution: July 9, 1900.
Independence (federation): January 1, 1901.
Branches: Executive--prime minister and cabinet responsible to Parliament.
Legislative--bicameral Parliament (76-member Senate, 148-member House
of Representatives). Judicial--independent judiciary.
Administrative subdivisions: Six states and two territories.
Political parties: Liberal, National, Australian Labor, Australian Democrats.
Suffrage: Universal and compulsory over 18.
Flag: On a blue field, UK Union Jack in the top left corner, a large white star
directly beneath symbolizing federation, and five smaller white stars on the
right half representing the Southern Cross constellation.
Economy
GDP (1991 est.): $290 billion.
Per capita income (1991 est.): $16,726.
Inflation rate (1991 est.): 4.7%.
Natural resources: Bauxite, coal, iron ore, copper, tin, silver, uranium,
nickel, tungsten, mineral sands, lead, zinc, diamonds, natural gas, oil.
Agriculture (1991 est., 2.8% of GDP): Products--livestock, wheat, wool,
sugar. Arable land--9%.
Industry (1991 est., 40% of GDP): Types--mining, manufacturing, and
transportation.
Trade (1991): Exports--$40 billion: coal, wool, wheat, meat, iron ore and
concentrates, alumina, aluminum, petroleum oils, non-monetary gold. Major
markets--Japan, US ($4.8 bil-lion), UK, South Korea, PRC, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Germany. Imports--$38 billion: transportation equipment, capital
goods, industrial supplies, petroleum products. Major suppliers--Japan, US
($9 billion), Germany, UK, Taiwan, New Zealand, Italy, South Korea.
Fiscal year: July 1-June 30.
Principal Government Officials
Governor General--William G. Hayden
Prime Minister--Paul Keating
Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister--Gareth Evans
Ambassador to the United States--Michael Cook
Ambassador to the United Nations--Richard Butler (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: US-Korean Report on the Presidents' Economic
Initiative
US Embassy, South Korea
Source: US Embassy Seoul, South Korea
Description: Statement and summary of the Presidents' Economic
Initiative Report of Senior Officials to Korea-US Economic
Consultation were released by the American Embassy in Seoul,
South Korea and Washington, DC
Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Australia
Subject: Trade/Economics, International Law, Immigration,
Media/Telecommunications, Science/Technology
[TEXT]
Statement
The Chairmen of the Korea-US Economic Consultation today released the
report of the Presidents' Economic Initiative (PEI), which was launched by
President Bush and President Roh at their summit meeting in Seoul in
January. The Economic Consultation studied and developed recommendations
in the areas of customs and import clearance, standards and regulations,
[and] investment and technology. These recommendations, when
implemented, will meet the Presidents' objectives of improving the
environment for doing business together and helping to lay the foundation
for a new and stronger economic partnership between the two countries.
The Korea-US Economic Consultation will monitor closely the
implementation of the agreed recommendations and consider ways to extend
the cooperative approach of the Presidents' Economic Initiative to other
areas of mutual interest.
Summary of the Report
President Bush and President Roh, at their meeting in Seoul in January,
launched the Presidents' Economic Initiative (PEI). Their aim was to
establish a new stronger economic partnership by making it easier for
Koreans and Americans to do business together. At their instructions, the
Korea-U.S. Economic Consultation (which meets at the level of United States
Under Secretary of State and Republic of Korea Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs) tasked working groups under the overall co-chairmanship of senior
officials to review and develop recommendations to meet the Presidents'
objectives in the areas of customs and other import clearance procedures,
standards-making and regulatory procedures, investment and technology.
The report of the working groups has been completed. In the area of
customs and import clearance, recommendations, when implemented, will
lead to significant reductions in time and paperwork needed to clear
imports, and longer term, to expedited processing through automation. In
the area of standards, the recommendations call for open,
nondiscriminatory, transparent procedures for the development and
implementation of standards and regulations. The investment working group
took note of recent liberalizations undertaken by Korea and the need for
further progress, and agreed to hold another working group meeting in 1992.
Recommendations of the technology working group call for coordination of
government promotion activities to bring interested U.S. and Korean
commercial technology buyers and sellers together. A technology subgroup
under the Korea-U.S. Economic Consultation was established to carry on this
work and to address factors that affect private sector technology
cooperation and transfer.
The Economic Consultation welcomed the cooperative and systemic approach
of these consultations, and agree that faithful implementation of the
Presidents' Economic Initiative recommendations will have a positive
impact on our ability to do business together. They further agreed to
release the report of the Presidents' Economic Initiative working group and
meet within six months, and periodically thereafter, to consider progress in
implementing these recommendations and to identify and discuss other
issues which could be addressed in the cooperative spirit of the Presidents'
Economic Initiative, with the continuing aim of building a stronger Korea-
U.S. economic partnership.
Copies of the complete report may be obtained from the Office of Public
Liaison, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room 5831, tel: (202) 647-6575 (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: China: Additional Conditions for Renewal Of China
MFN Status Disapproved
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of a letter to the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 28 19929/28/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: China
Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights,
Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control
[TEXT]
To the House of Representatives:
I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 5318 the "United States-
China Act of 1992," which places additional conditions on renewal of China's
most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status.
I share completely the goals of this legislation: to see greater Chinese
adherence to international standards of human rights, free and fair trade
practices, and international non-proliferation norms. However, adding broad
conditions to China's MFN renewal would not lead to faster progress in
advancing our goals. To those who advocate this approach, let me set the
record straight.
Our policy of comprehensive engagement lets the Chinese know in no
uncertain terms that "business as usual" is not possible until they take
steps to resolve our differences. Through multiple, focussed measures, we
are eliciting the results we seek.
This year, China joined global efforts to control the spread of nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles by declaring adherence to the Missile
Technology Control Regime's (MTCR) guidelines and parameters and signing
the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Chinese behavior remains MTCR-
consistent, and we have begun a dialogue with the Chinese on their
responsibilities under the NPT. We continue to monitor vigilantly China's
weapons export practices. We have used the sanction authorities available
successfully and remain prepared to do so again if necessary.
We have made progress on the resolution of outstanding trade issues with
our agreements to protect Intellectual Property Rights and to ban prison
labor exports. I will not allow, however, market access to remain a one-
sided benefit in China's favor while our bilateral trade deficit grows. If
China fails to reduce trade barriers, we are prepared to take trade action
under the statutory guidelines of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
The limited steps China has taken on human rights are inadequate. But our
human rights dialogue gives us an avenue to express our views directly to
China's leaders. Significant improvement in China's human rights situation,
including freedom for all those imprisoned solely for the peaceful
expression of their beliefs remains our objective. It is easy to be
discouraged by the pace of progress in this area. But it would be a serious
mistake to let our frustration lead us to gamble with policies that would
undermine our goals.
Withdrawing MFN or conditioning it, such that it will be withdrawn at a
later date, will not promote these goals. H.R. 5318 imposes unworkable
constraints on our bilateral trade. Among the casualties of this bill would
be the dynamic, market-oriented regions of southern China and Hong Kong, as
well as those Chinese who support reform and rely on outside contact for
support.
The impact of this bill would extend beyond the state enterprise system,
harming independent industrial and agricultural entities that have sprung up
in China since the advent of economic reform and its opening to the outside.
These family-owned and operated entities are interlinked in the
manufacturing process with large, state-controlled factories and marketing
agencies. They would not be shielded from the effects of this bill.
Americans too would be affected. This year, our exports to China will climb
to about $8 billion. China's retaliation for the loss of MFN would cost us
this growing market and thousands of American jobs. We would cede our
market share to our foreign competitors who impose no restrictions on their
trade with China, at a time when China is taking market-opening measures
that our trade negotiators fought to obtain.
Our policy seeks to address issues of vital concern to us and looks to the
future of our relations with a country that is home to almost one-quarter of
the human race. MFN is a means to bring our influence to bear on China.
Comprehensive engagement is the process we use to transform this
influence into positive change. The relationship between these two key
elements of our China policy is a powerful one, and the absence of one
element diminishes the potency of the other. We continue to advance broad
U.S. objectives without imposing economic hardship on Americans because
both elements of our policy are in place.
Engagement through our democratic, economic, and educational institutions
instead of confrontation offers the best hope for reform in China. MFN is
the foundation we need to engage the Chinese. H.R. 5318 places conditions
on MFN renewal for China that will jeopardize this policy and includes a
requirement that infringes upon the President's exclusive authority to
undertake diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the United States.
In order to protect the economic and foreign policy interests of the United
States, I am returning H.R. 5318 to the House of Representatives without my
approval.
George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: Afghanistan: Department Statement
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South Asia
Country: Afghanistan
Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights,
Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
The US Government has long sought a stable, broad-based government in
Afghanistan achieved through a political process, the return of the Afghan
refugees and reconstruction of this war-torn country, and the elimination of
narcotics production and trafficking. The establishment of an interim
government in Afghanistan in June was a critical first step toward these
objectives. The heavy fighting that occurred in Kabul in August, therefore,
was of great concern to the US Government. We welcomed the
implementation of a cease-fire and are pleased that it is holding.
We encourage the interim government under President Rabbani to make the
greatest possible effort to revive a broad-based political process. We note
that preparations are being made to convene a gathering of Afghans in late
October as a further step in the political process and urge that all factions
work with the interim government to make this meeting a success.
To provide support for the political process, the United States has already
reopened full official ties with the interim government. Assistant
Secretary [for Near Eastern Affairs and Acting Assistant Secretary for
South Asian Affairs] Djerejian's meeting with acting Foreign Minister
Gailani on September 30 was part of our continuing contacts with Afghan
officials. We are also consulting with the United Nations and other
countries interested in the future of Afghanistan. We urge all to do
everything in their power to bring about a permanent end to the Afghan
conflict and support a political process in which the Afghan people can
choose their own leadership.
The United States does not favor any Afghan faction. We support the interim
government of Afghanistan and hope that it will lead the way in imple-
menting a broad-based political process envisaged in the April accords. We,
like people of goodwill everywhere, must oppose the actions of any
individuals or factions who would attempt to disrupt the political process
and seize power by force.
The recent savage bombardment of Kabul by forces under the command of
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar caused tremendous suffering. These actions, taken in
pursuit of personal ambitions, were responsible for the deaths of hundreds
of innocent people in Kabul. We condemned these ruthless actions and will
continue to oppose anyone who uses violence to subvert the political
process, which we believe is central to resolving the Afghan conflict.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: Execution of Sudanese USAID Employees
Boucher
US Embassy, Sudan
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Text of a statement released by the US Embassy in
Khartoum, Sudan, and by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher
in Washington, DC
Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Subsaharan Africa
Country: Sudan
Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
The US Embassy in Khartoum, in response to the September 27 Foreign
Ministry release published by Sudan News Agency, takes this opportunity to
set the record straight concerning the trial and execution of employees
Andrew Tombe and Baudouin Tally.
The Government of Sudan asserts that Mr. Tombe "stood for trial before a
just court" and was allowed the "opportunity to defend himself." The United
States questions whether a formal and fair trial took place, given the fact
that (1) no witnesses have yet been identified, (2) the sentence has never
been announced, even weeks after the event, and (3) no evidence has been
brought forth that Mr. Tombe was in any way aiding the Garang forces.
We call upon the Government of Sudan, therefore, to provide full details of
the trial, when and where it took place, and what evidence was represented.
The United States does not dispute that human rights abuses have taken
place on both sides of the conflict in the south. We have deplored the
bloodshed and have consistently urged both sides to negotiate a peaceful
settlement in good faith. The case of Andrew Tombe is of special concern to
us because it involved the life of a US Government employee. While Mr.
Tombe was a Sudanese citizen subject to Sudanese law, he was also a
member of a worldwide corps of US Government employees. We cannot and
will not ignore the fate of any one of these men and women. We urge the
Government of Sudan to provide facts on the Tombe execution. We continue
to await news on the fate of employee Tally, whom we believe has also been
executed.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: US Support for Refugees In Hungary
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Hungary, Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: Refugees, United Nations
[TEXT]
The United States is contributing nearly $900,000 to the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to support programs for refugees from
the former Yugoslavia. These funds are in addition to the $1.8 million the
United States contributed earlier this year for UNHCR activities in Hungary.
In making this contribution, the United States wishes to recognize the
generous and humane response of the Hungarian people to the Yugoslav
crisis. Hungary has provided temporary refuge for more than 50,000
individuals from the former Yugoslavia. Thousands of the refugees have
been taken in by Hungarians and cared for in private homes. UNHCR and the
Government of Hungary are working together closely to address the urgent
humanitarian needs of the refugees; these funds will assist them in that
effort.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: Additional Funds For Liberian Peace-keeping
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Liberia
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
The United States is providing $2 million in additional Economic Support
Funds to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to
assist peace-keeping operations in Liberia. Intervention in Liberia by an
ECOWAS peace-keeping force in 1991 helped stop the fighting and allowed
the movement of relief supplies to needy Liberians. The United States has
consistently supported this unprecedented example of conflict resolution in
the region.
In addition, the United States is making a grant of $1.3 million to the
International Negotiation Network, an organization assisting with the
Liberian peace process at the invitation of ECOWAS.
Tragically, Liberian armed factions have resumed hostilities, breaking a
21-month cease-fire and prolonging the misery of the Liberian people. We
call on all factions to support the renewed efforts of West African leaders
to implement the encampment and disarmament provisions of the
Yamoussoukro IV Agreement and to pursue measures which will ultimately
lead to free and fair elections. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: President's Statement on START Ratification
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Oct, 1 199210/1/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
I am pleased that the Senate today gave its consent to the ratification of
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty--START. The START negotiations began
10 years ago. These long years of negotiations culminated in an historic
agreement, first with the Soviet Union and then with Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan; true strategic arms reductions, not just
limitations or controls.
START reduces US and former Soviet strategic weapons by about 40% and
makes even deeper cuts in the weapons of greatest concern--fast-flying
ballistic missiles.
It also helps to ensure that the demise of the Soviet Union does not
stimulate nuclear proliferation. In START, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
have all agreed to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-
weapon states and to guarantee the elimination of strategic nuclear forces
from their territory.
Finally, this historic agreement has paved the way for further path-breaking
steps and far-reaching reductions. In large part because of START's
verification provisions, I was able in my September 1991 and January 1992
initiatives to make major unilateral nuclear reductions and successfully
challenge Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin to do the same. Of even greater
significance, the START framework permitted President Yeltsin and me to
reach agreement at our summit meeting last June--after just 5 months of
negotiation--on extraordinary further reductions in strategic nuclear
weapons. All the agreements reached over the past year, beginning with
START, will reduce our strategic nuclear forces by about 75% from their
1990 level. As such, START and follow-on understandings have done much
to reverse the hands on the nuclear doomsday clock.
With the Senate's action this morning, the United States will be prepared to
ratify the START Treaty once the other four parties have acted. I would
note with satisfaction that the Government of Kazakhstan has already
approved START, and I urge the remaining parties--Russia, Belarus, and
Ukraine--to approve this historic treaty promptly, so its mandated
reductions can begin without delay. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992
Title: Treaty Actions: Multilateral and Bilateral
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Oct, 5 199210/5/92
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Region: South America, Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia,
MidEast/North Africa, Pacific
Country: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Georgia, Morocco, Peru,
Poland, Sweden, Switzerland
Subject: International Law, Immigration, State Department,
Trade/Economics, United Nations
[TEXT]
Multilateral
Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered
into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the United States Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820;
21 UST 77.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992. Accessions deposited:
Barbados, May 11, 1992; Azerbaijan, Aug. 13, 1992; Namibia, Sept. 14, 1992.
Diplomatic Relations
Convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered
into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the United States
Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502; 23 UST 3227.
Accession deposited: Namibia, Sept. 14, 1992.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at the
Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945.
TIAS 1501.
Acceptances deposited: Azerbaijan, Sept. 18, 1992; San Marino, Sept. 23,
1992; Turkmenistan, Sept. 22, 1992; Ukraine, Sept. 3, 1992; Uzbekistan,
Sept. 21, 1992.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944.
Opened for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force Dec.
27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Accessions deposited: Armenia, Sept. 16, 1992; Azerbaijan, Sept. 18, 1992;
Kyrgyzstan, Sept. 18, 1992; Turkmenistan, Sept. 22, 1992; Ukraine, Sept. 3,
1992; Uzbekistan, Sept. 21, 1992.
Health
Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22,
1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948.
TIAS 1808.
Acceptances deposited: Armenia, May 4, 1992; Bosnia, Sept. 10, 1992;
Herzegovina, Sept. 10, 1992; Kazakhstan, Aug. 19, 1992; Kyrgyzstan, Apr. 29,
1992; Moldova, May 4, 1992; Slovenia, May 7, 1992; Tajikistan, May 4, 1992.
Amendment to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health
Organization. Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21,
1975. TIAS 8086; 26 UST 990.
Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health
Organization. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 20,
1984. TIAS 10930.
Amendments to Articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health
Organization. Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 3,
1977. TIAS 8534; 28 UST 2088.
Acceptances deposited: Armenia, May 4, 1992; Bosnia, Sept. 10, 1992;
Herzegovina, Sept. 10, 1992; Kazakhstan, Aug. 19, 1992; Kyrgyzstan, Apr. 29,
1992; Moldova, May 4, 1992; Tajikistan, May 4, 1992.
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19,
1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.
Accession deposited: New Zealand, Sept. 1, 1992.
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization,
with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force June 21,
1985.
Accession deposited: Armenia, May 12, 1992.
Bilateral
Australia
Arrangement for the exchange of military personnel between the Royal
Australian Navy and the US Coast Guard. Signed at Washington July 27,
1992. Entered into force July 27, 1992.
Bolivia
Grant agreement for the economic recovery program. Signed at La Paz Aug.
21, 1992. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1992.
Brazil
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Sept. 23,
1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Brazil of written
notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have
been fulfilled.
Georgia
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate humanitarian and technical
economic assistance. Signed at Tbilisi July 31, 1992. Entered into force
July 31, 1992.
Morocco
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Rabat Aug. 24, 1992.
Enters into force following signature and receipt by Morocco of written
notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have
been fulfilled.
Peru
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Aug. 27,
1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Peru of written
notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have
been fulfilled.
Poland
Agreement on cooperation in science and technology, with annexes. Signed
at Warsaw Sept. 4, 1992. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes
confirming that all domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Sweden
Memorandum of understanding on highway management and technology.
Signed at Borlange June 15, 1992. Entered into force June 15, 1992.
Switzerland
Agreement concerning mapping, charting, and geodesy cooperation. Signed
at Fairfax Aug. 5 and 11, 1992. Entered into force Aug. 11, 1992. (###)