US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992


Significant Developments In the Middle East

Djerejian Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs and Acting Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 1 199210/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Terrorism, Democratization, Human Rights [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to meet again with the subcommittee. It has been 3 months since my last appearance. This period has been extraordinarily busy, involving a trip to the region by former Secretary of State Baker, my own earlier trip to the Maghreb, the meeting between President Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in Kennebunkport, the convening of the sixth round of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, and the UN General Assembly bilateral sessions in New York between Acting Secretary Eagleburger and Arab and Israeli Foreign Ministers. I, myself, returned last night from another round of bilateral meetings at the United Nations with Middle East officials. I would go further and state that this period has been one in which US foreign policy goals and objectives in the Near East have achieved important gains across an important agenda. Let me briefly review the most significant developments in the peace process, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gulf, after which I am prepared to take questions.
Peace Process
If you allow me, we can begin with an update of the peace process. In mid- July, shortly after the new Israeli Government was formed, former Secretary of State Baker made a trip to the Near East, where he met with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinians, and Israel. The Secretary had wanted to set the stage for a renewal of the peace talks following the brief recess for the Israeli elections. Noting that the change in leadership in Israel offered opportunities for "positive forward movement in this process," the Secretary welcomed Prime Minister Rabin's suggestion that the peace talks be "relatively continuous." The new government also announced its intention to change Israel's priorities away from settlement activities and the occupied territories and toward the resolution of pressing economic and social problems within Israel. The Israeli Government took steps to begin to improve the atmosphere on the ground in the occupied territories. Work was halted on many of the settlements, and certain incentives for settlers were reduced or eliminated. The Government of Israel rescinded orders to deport Palestinians and released hundreds of Palestinian prisoners who had been detained for security reasons. This new direction in Israel made it possible for the President to announce, on August 11, that he and Prime Minister Rabin had reached agreement on the basic principles to govern the granting of up to $10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel. The President noted that he and the Prime Minister had agreed to an approach which will assist the resettlement of immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia without frustrating the search for peace. On September 11, the Administration forwarded a legislative package to the Congress to authorize the guarantees.
Bilateral Talks
The sixth round of bilateral talks, which [began] on August 24 in Washington, was conducted in a positive atmosphere of professionalism and cordiality. Unlike previous rounds, an enhanced seriousness of purpose and substantive engagement characterized these negotiating sessions. There was a greater effort on the part of all the delegations to avoid posturing and excessive rhetoric before the media--a fact which also helped to improve communication at the bargaining table. The parties are definitely grappling with the tough, key issues of land, peace, and security. They have learned that there are no instant, simple solutions and are dealing with the substantive complexities of the issues. While there were no breakthroughs during this round, we believe the parties have laid a good foundation for future progress. In that respect, all sides- -Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian--in the talks and in the region are engaged in an historic dialogue on peace, and we must not lose sight of that fundamental fact. In each bilateral, some progress was registered in narrowing gaps and defining areas for further negotiating sessions. At the bargaining table, substantive papers, which provide a foundation for further negotiation, were presented by the Syrians, Palestinians, and Israelis. While I must refrain from delving into the details of these papers, it is important to emphasize the following: -- Significantly, Syria and Israel, for the first time, have put forward papers representing their respective views with regard to a possible joint statement of principles. The papers begin to address the core issues of this process--namely territory, security, and peace. There are some common elements in their respective positions, but important substantive differences remain. Both sides continue to explore for greater clarity on the key issues of importance to them. Moreover, some constructive statements by Prime Minister Rabin and [Syrian] President Assad have reinforced progress at the table and have focused public opinion in Israel and Syria on the prospects for peace. -- Palestinians and Israelis are engaged in discussing substance and establishing a work plan. There are legitimate differences over both the form and substance of interim self-government arrangements. But for the first time, there is a specific proposed timetable for elections and the inauguration of a transitional period. Indeed, the prospect of the Palestinians beginning to govern themselves is within reach. It is essential that no more time be lost and that the parties engage to make this possible. -- In the talks between Lebanon and Israel, discussion focused on the structure for addressing the security situation on the ground. Differences between the parties remain concerning implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425 and other issues. Israel reiterated that it has no territorial or water claims in Lebanon, however, and the parties appear ready to take up the central security issues without prejudice to these broader questions. -- In the Jordanian-Israeli bilaterals, the two sides continued working on an overall framework and agenda for future negotiations and held informal discussions on several key issues, such as water, energy, security, and finance. More work needs to be done to narrow the gaps on the agenda, and ways are being explored to achieve this, so that progress can be made on this issue. In our assessment, serious engagement has begun. Each of the parties is disappointed that not more was accomplished during this round; that in itself is a positive indicator of the continued commitment and interest of the parties in achieving progress. We were, and remain, in intensive contact with all the parties, and we have made concrete suggestions for bridging gaps that exist. Acting Secretary Eagleburger met with all the delegations, and we will be communicating with all the parties in between rounds. Through these contacts, we hope to maintain the momentum for productive engagement when the negotiations resume in Washington on October 21. In sum, we continue to play our role as a co-sponsor, honest broker, catalyst, and driving force for these negotiations.
Multilateral Talks
The third round of multilateral talks began [on] September 15 here in Washington, where the water resources working group met, and in Moscow, where Russia hosted the arms control and regional security working group. Both groups succeeded in defining practical approaches on which the parties could engage and in soliciting proposals for confidence-building measures for future study. Meetings of the working groups on refugees, the environment, and economic development will convene in other capital cities in October and November. The water resources group launched studies about both conserving and enhancing the region's limited water supply. The 2-day meeting in Washington was followed by a field trip to Knoxville hosted by the Tennessee Valley Authority. The next working group meeting is planned for Switzerland, early next year. The working group on arms control and regional security met in Moscow September 15-17 under US-Russian co-chairmanship. The meeting succeeded in its principal objective of getting the regional parties to begin discussing practical measures for reducing tension and the risk of conflict in the region. The parties have agreed to explore confidence-building measures such as crisis communications and data exchange arrangements, as part of the agenda for upcoming arms control and regional security meetings. The very fact that Arabs and Israelis are sitting together to discuss how they can avoid conflict is remarkable, and we are encouraged by the serious, business-like quality of their exchanges. Syria and Lebanon have stayed away from the multilateral process for their own reasons. Israel has decided not to participate in two of the five groups. We persist in efforts to persuade these parties that participation in all of these working groups is truly in their best interests. We continue to believe that the multilateral phase of the talks complements the bilaterals, which, of course, remain the focal point of the peace process. Initial results of the working group meetings indicate to us, however, the potential the multilaterals hold for advancing peace in the region as a whole.
Arab Boycott
One of the continuing problems in this troubled region has been the economic boycott of Israel imposed decades ago by the League of Arab States. The United States has always firmly opposed that boycott. It is outdated, contrary to the economic interests of all concerned, and inconsistent with the current political environment in the Near East. A suspension of the secondary and tertiary boycott would be an important contribution to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. We continue to press these points and have renewed our initiative to urge Arab countries to suspend the boycott. We are also urging our trading partners to adopt anti-boycott policies. We have canceled all Israel-only passports and ceased issuing new ones. We are coordinating our anti-boycott actions with the European Community and are pleased that many countries are exhibiting a new resolve to end this anachronistic measure. The time is right to do so.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like next to say a few words about our relations with Lebanon. As you know, Lebanon recently conducted three rounds of voting to elect a new parliament. These were the first parliamentary elections held in Lebanon since 1972 and the subsequent tragic civil war which so ravaged Lebanon and its people. In the weeks leading to the election, we repeatedly called for free and fair voting, to be held in an environment devoid of intimidation and coercion. We consistently stated that the decision to proceed with elections was that of the Lebanese Government to make. Similarly, the decision of some Lebanese political figures not to participate was theirs to make. The United States is disappointed that the elections were not prepared and conducted in a manner to ensure the broadest national consensus. The turnout of eligible voters in some locations was extremely low. There were also widespread reports of irregularities, which might have been avoided had there been impartial international observers at hand, as we advocated. As a consequence, the results do not reflect the full spectrum of the Lebanese body politic. We continue to support full implementation of both the letter and the spirit of the Taif accord and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, and we have repeatedly made this clear to all concerned parties. The Taif accord requires a decision and coordination now by the Governments of Lebanon and Syria on the redeployment of Syrian troops to the western entrances to the Bekaa Valley. Lebanese President Hrawi and Syrian President Assad have taken a first step by meeting to discuss the issue. We anticipate further consultations between Lebanon and Syria in preparation for the pullback of Syrian troops. As we have informed the parties directly, that decision should have been taken by both governments in September with actual redeployment taking place, in accordance with Taif, as soon as possible thereafter. Taif also requires the completion of the process of disarming all militias, particularly Hizballah. We must not forget that implementation of this agreement helped bring to an end the turbulent era of civil war in Lebanon. We will remain engaged with both Syria and Lebanon and with the Arab League Tripartite Committee members to work toward the implementation of the Taif agreement in letter and spirit. With full adherence and compliance of the parties to the Taif agreement, we believe it will offer the best chance of restoring the unity, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon. A key to the extension of government authority throughout Lebanon is the maintenance of strong Lebanese armed forces. The army has made great strides under its commander, General Lahud, in creating multi-confessional units and in recruiting and training new soldiers, including from among former adversaries. These units have succeeded in disarming most militias and are developing a renewed esprit de corps. The Lebanese army has traditionally sought training for many of its soldiers in the West, including in the United States. It remains our hope that we can resume accepting a number of Lebanese officers and enlisted personnel for training in this country under the IMET [International Military Education and Training] program. We believe that such training and exposure to our military helps foster values that are consistent with the role of the armed forces in a democratic state. In addition, we want to provide to the Lebanese armed forces non-lethal excess defense articles that would enhance the Lebanese army's mobility and range of operation. This would involve primarily transportation equipment which has been determined by our military services to be excess to our own needs. We would appreciate Congress' support for these programs.
Gulf Security
I will now briefly address another major pillar of our Near East policy--our shared interest in the stability of the Persian Gulf and the security of our friends and allies on the Arabian Peninsula.
The most immediate and serious threat to the security of the Gulf, and indeed of the whole region, has been Saddam Hussein's aggression against his neighbors and against the people of Iraq. -- Iraq's record of compliance with UN Security Council resolutions has been clearly unsatisfactory. -- Saddam maintains his economic blockade of northern Iraq. In the south, his military operations and destruction of civilian homes and property continues. -- His regime has engaged in a program of harassment of UN and international relief workers. -- He refuses to renew the memorandum of understanding with the United Nations, which would facilitate UN humanitarian programs, or to implement UNSC [UN Security Council] Resolutions 706 and 712, which would feed the Iraqi people and ensure equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies. As you are aware, Saddam Hussein's escalating repression against Iraqi citizens in southern Iraq led members of the coalition which expelled Iraq from Kuwait to begin, in August, aerial monitoring of Baghdad's compliance with the provisions of UNSC Resolution 688. A "no-fly zone" south of the 32nd parallel was established in connection with this operation-- designated [Operation] Southern Watch. The endorsement of this step by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an important manifestation of the international solidarity confronting Saddam's regime. In announcing this step, President Bush emphasized that "we seek Iraq's compliance, not its partition. The United States continues to support Iraq's territorial unity and bears no ill will toward its people." We reiterated our strong commitment to Iraq's unity directly to the Iraqi opposition during its July meetings with former Secretary Baker. The opposition leaders assured us they share our view. Clearly, it is Saddam Hussein who is alienating and dividing his own people by cracking down on Iraqi groups of whatever origin who dissent from his rule. The United States has long encouraged the development of a broad- based, unified Iraqi opposition. We support the establishment of a democratic central government of national unity. In that regard, we are pleased that initial reports of last week's meeting of Iraqi opposition groups in northern Iraq indicate that the opposition succeeded in further broadening its base and narrowing its differences. As President Bush has affirmed, we want to see a government in Baghdad which respects the human rights of all its citizens, is at peace with its neighbors, and accepts the UN resolutions. The importance of continuing UN operations in Iraq cannot be understated. They are the principal means of ensuring the provision of humanitarian aid to Iraq's most needy people--those who are deprived of the necessities of life by the Baghdad regime. UN operations are also the best means of monitoring Iraqi compliance with the Security Council's resolutions on weapons of mass destruction. These operations are imperiled by Iraqi harassment and the lack of a steady source of funding. We are pressing hard for a new Security Council resolution which would allow the United Nations to borrow frozen Iraqi funds to finance operations in Iraq, which would be paid back from future Iraqi oil sales. This money would be placed in a UN escrow account and would fund activities authorized under UNSC Resolutions 706 and 712, such as humanitarian assistance, the compensation commission, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) for weapons of mass destruction, and the work of human rights Special Rapporteur [Max] van der Stoel. Passage of this resolution, which we hope will occur this week, will be an important demonstration to Saddam of the international community's determination to continue UN activities throughout Iraq. The coalition's firm support for UNSCOM, improved sanctions enforcement, the creation of Operation Southern Watch, our meetings with the Iraqi opposition, and the new assets resolution all have put Saddam on the defensive. He is facing increasing economic difficulties and reacting with typical brutality by executing Baghdad merchants. In the Iraqi National Congress, Saddam for the first time ever faces a unified and broadened opposition with a clear alternative political program that transcends Kurdish, Shi'a, and Sunni distinctions.
We are also continuing to monitor the enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq by its neighbors. In this regard, I would like to elaborate on my earlier reference to sanctions enforcement and take note of the efforts of Jordan. This is an area about which the committee has previously expressed considerable concern--concern which the Administration has shared. When we last addressed this issue, Jordan's performance was not satisfactory. The possible benefit to Iraq of inadequate sanctions enforcement by Jordan had led the Administration to suspend our assistance to Jordan and to postpone scheduled military exercises and consultations. Today, Mr. Chairman, the situation is substantially different. Since late June, Jordan's enforcement of sanctions has tightened significantly. The Jordanian military has assumed an important role in the effort, and Iraq has received correspondingly fewer embargoed goods through Jordan. We will continue to press Jordan to keep up their tightened performance and to improve upon it even more. Accordingly, we have made policy adjustments in our bilateral relationship with Jordan to reflect the changes in Jordan's stance, and to encourage continued and further Jordanian efforts in this direction. We also, recently, conducted an air-defense exercise with Jordan. I will be happy to elaborate on these points, but I wanted to underscore this new development in this overview of Gulf security and the effort to contain Iraq.
Arabian Peninsula.
The countries most vulnerable to aggression from both Iraq and a potentially militant and resurgent Iran are our friends and allies on the Arabian Peninsula--the Gulf Cooperation Council states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. We have assured the GCC leaders that the United States will cooperate closely with them to meet their legitimate defense needs. It has also been our policy, however, that our bilateral arrangements would complement, not supersede, the Gulf states' own collective security efforts. Acting Secretary Eagleburger made this clear at his meetings with the GCC foreign ministers in New York during the UN General Assembly bilaterals. We also made clear that we were disappointed with the pace of progress on collective security. Border disputes are among the obstacles. We have now concluded or renewed bilateral security agreements with four of the GCC states and have excellent working arrangements with all of them. The establishment of Operation Southern Watch is a good example of a level of cooperation with these countries that was unimaginable a few years ago. I would stress here that the purposes of both arms sales and collective security measures are to deter threats to our shared interests and to raise the threshold of future requirements for direct US military action. It is in this policy context that President Bush has announced the sale of 72 F-15 fighter-bombers to Saudi Arabia. This sale would be fully consistent with the President's Middle East Arms Control Initiative, which is designed to prevent destabilizing arms transfers and to foster a transparent and responsible arms transfer process. The F-15 sale fully meets those criteria. It provides a credible Saudi defensive deterrent, helps protect vital American security interests in the Persian Gulf, and reduces the amount of US military force needed in the region. We have carefully considered the impact of this sale on the security of Israel. The United States remains unshakeably committed to maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge and, as Under Secretary [for International Security Affairs] Wisner and Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary Ford informed this committee [on] September 23, we are consulting closely with the Government of Israel to ensure that this advantage remains unaltered. In accordance with this commitment, President Bush and Prime Minister Rabin have reached agreement on certain measures that will be initiated by the United States in the very near future. These measures include the supply of Apache and Blackhawk helicopters and the pre-positioning of advanced defense equipment in Israel. They will be implemented pursuant to previously enacted legislation which authorized the transfer to Israel and pre-positioning in Israel of defense articles drawn from US stocks. The United States and Israel intend to continue consultations for the purpose of determining additional measures necessary to maintain Israel's qualitative military edge.
I have previously mentioned to you the obstacles to the normalization of relations with Iran. Its sponsorship of terrorism, reprehensible human rights practices, opposition to the Middle East peace process, and apparent pursuit of a destabilizing arms build-up remain matters of serious concern. Further, Iran's policies toward the Gulf Arab states, as exemplified by its heavy-handed assertion of authority on Abu Musa Island, have shown it to be an increasingly truculent neighbor. We welcome the firm stand that the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League have taken on this issue. Iran clearly understands that the United States opposes any resort to force to settle such territorial disputes and that we strongly advocate peaceful resolution of such disagreements. We have also made clear that we are prepared to discuss areas of mutual concern and interest with authorized representatives of the Iranian Government. To date, the Iranian leadership has declined to engage us in this dialogue.
Fundamental Values
I will conclude my statement, Mr. Chairman, with a brief comment on the important, continuing role the Department and our embassies play in fostering the fundamental values we as Americans cherish. Of course, promoting respect for basic human rights, encouraging broader participation in government, and supporting pluralism--including minority and women's rights--within the context of stable and secure countries, are continuing foreign policy objectives of the United States throughout the world, including the Near East. We are now preparing the State Department's annual Report to Congress on Human Rights. While I haven't yet seen any of the draft reports, I know they will document to the best of our knowledge the human rights situation in each country and the difficulties confronting many Near Eastern countries in their attempts to adapt to the modern, post- Cold War world in the context of their long-held values, traditions, and assessment of their vital national security interests. What we look for is progress in wrestling with these problems. We are, therefore, encouraged to see the countries of Kuwait and Yemen proceeding with their plans for parliamentary elections this month and in November, respectively. We have also welcomed Saudi Arabia's and Oman's initial moves to broaden the political process in the last 2 years in a manner consistent with their own traditions and history. We wish them success in these endeavors and encourage broadened political participation throughout the region. In keeping with our basic belief that countries that share our fundamental values make the best partners, we will continue to support such important steps in the conduct of our relations with the countries of the Near East. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

US-Israel Agree On Military Measures

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Sep, 26 19929/26/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Military Affairs [TEXT] In accordance with the United States' ongoing commitment to the preservation and maintenance of Israel's qualitative military edge, President Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin have reached agreement on certain measures that will be initiated by the United States in the very near future. These measures include the supply of Apache and Blackhawk helicopters and the pre-positioning of advanced defense equipment in Israel. They will be implemented pursuant to previously enacted legislation which authorized the transfer to Israel and pre-positioning in Israel of defense articles drawn from US stocks. It was further agreed that there will be closer ties between the two countries' armed forces, cooperation on technology upgrades, and the start of discussions on Israel's participation in the Global Protection System. These initiatives represent a significant effort in reaffirming the United States' long-standing commitment to a strategic partnership with Israel and will effectively maintain Israel's qualitative edge. The United States and Israel intend to continue consultations for the purpose of determining additional measures necessary to maintain Israel's qualitative military edge. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

Iraqi Assets Resolution: Department Statement

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Trade/Economics, United Nations [TEXT] On October 2, the [UN] Security Council adopted a resolution that permits the use of frozen Iraqi assets to fund crucial UN activities concerning Iraq. The resolution calls on states to transfer certain frozen Iraqi assets to the UN escrow account created by Resolutions 706 and 712; these funds will be reimbursed from Iraqi oil export revenues as soon as those exports resume. They will be used to finance UN programs such as humanitarian relief efforts, the compensation commission, and UNSCOM--the UN special commission overseeing the dismantling of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The humanitarian efforts will directly benefit the Iraqi people. Like the other UN programs, these were instituted in response to problems Iraq itself created. It is, therefore, appropriate to use Iraqi funds to pay for these operations as well as to pay for the consequences of Iraqi aggression. Adoption of the resolution demonstrates the continuing commitment of the international community to ensuring that Iraq end its defiance of the United Nations and that it comply with the UN resolutions calling for an end to Iraqi repression of its civilian populations and setting out a framework for UN activities inside Iraq. We are pleased that the international community is not wavering in its efforts to confront [Iraqi President] Saddam's intransigence.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

Iraqi Assets: UN Resolution 778

UN Source: Security Council, United Nations Description: Resolution, New York Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Trade/Economics, United Nations [TEXT] Resolution 778, October 2, 1992 The Security Council, Recalling its previous relevant resolutions and in particular resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), Taking note of the letter of 15 July 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council on Iraq's compliance with the obligations placed on it by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions, Condemning Iraq's continued failure to comply with its obligations under relevant resolutions, Reaffirming its concern about the nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi civilian population, and the risk of a further deterioration of this situation, and recalling in this regard its resolution 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which provide a mechanism for providing humanitarian relief to the Iraqi population, and resolution 688 (1991), which provides a basis for humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq, Having regard to the fact that the period of six months referred to in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) expired on 18 March 1992, Deploring Iraq's refusal to cooperate in the implementation of resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which puts its civilian population at risk, and which results in the failure by Iraq to meet its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, Recalling that the escrow account provided for in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) will consist of Iraqi funds administered by the Secretary- General which will be used to pay contributions to the Compensation Fund, the full costs of carrying out the tasks authorized by section C of resolution 687 (1991), the full costs incurred by the United Nations in facilitating the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, half the costs of the Boundary Commission, and the cost to the United Nations of implementing resolution 706 (1991) and of other necessary humanitarian activities in Iraq, Recalling that Iraq, as stated in paragraph 16 of resolution 687 (1991), is liable for all direct damages resulting from its invasion and occupation of Kuwait, without prejudice to its debts and obligations arising prior to 2 Au- gust 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, Recalling its decision in resolution 692 (1991) that the requirement for Iraqi contributions to the Compensation Fund applies to certain Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq before 2 April 1991, as well as to all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq after 2 April 1991, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that all States in which there are funds of the Government of Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations, or agencies, that represent the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products, paid for by or on behalf of the purchaser on or after 6 August 1990, shall cause the transfer of those funds (or equivalent amounts) as soon as possible to the escrow account provided for in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991); provided that this paragraph shall not require any State to cause the transfer of such funds in excess of 200 million dollars or to cause the transfer of more than fifty per cent of the total funds transferred or contributed pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this resolution; and further provided that States may exclude from the operation of this paragraph any funds which have already been released to a claimant or supplier prior to the adoption of this resolution, or any other funds subject to or required to satisfy the rights of third parties, at the time of the adoption of this resolution; 2. Decides that all States in which there are petroleum or petroleum products owned by the Government of Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations, or agencies, shall take all feasible steps to purchase or arrange for the sale of such petroleum or petroleum products at fair market value, and thereupon to transfer the proceeds as soon as possible to the escrow account provided for in resolution 706 (1991) and 712 (1991); 3. Urges all States to contribute funds from other sources to the escrow account as soon as possible; 4. Decides that all States shall provide the Secretary-General with any information needed for the effective implementation of this resolution and that they shall take the necessary measures to ensure that banks and other bodies and persons provide all relevant information necessary to identify the funds referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and details of any transactions relating thereto, or the said petroleum or petroleum products, with a view to such information being utilized by all States and by the Secretary-General in the effective implementation of this resolution; 5. Requests the Secretary-General: (a) To ascertain the whereabouts and amounts of the said petroleum and petroleum products and the proceeds of sale referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution, drawing on the work already done under the auspices of the Compensation Commission, and report the results to the Security Council as soon as possible; (b) To ascertain the costs of United Nations activities concerning the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, the provision of humanitarian relief in Iraq, and the other United Nations operations specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 706 (1991); and (c) To take the following actions: (i) transfer to the Compensation Fund, from the funds referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution, the percentage referred to in paragraph 10 of this resolution; and (ii) use the remainder of funds referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this resolution for the costs of United Nations activities concerning the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, the provision of humanitarian relief in Iraq, and the other United Nations operations specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 706 (1991), taking into account any preference expressed by States transferring or contributing funds as to the allocation of such funds among these purposes; 6. Decides that for so long as oil exports take place pursuant to the system provided in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) or to the eventual lifting of sanctions pursuant to paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), implementation of paragraphs 1 to 5 of this resolution shall be suspended and all proceeds of those oil exports shall immediately be transferred by the Secretary-General in the currency in which the transfer to the escrow account had been made, to the accounts or States from which funds had been provided under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this resolution, to the extent required to replace in full the amounts so provided (together with applicable interest); and that, if necessary for this purpose, any other funds remaining in the escrow account shall similarly be transferred to those accounts or States; provided, however, that the Secretary-General may retain and use any funds urgently needed for the purposes specified in paragraph 5 (c) (ii) of this resolution; 7. Decides that the operation of this resolution shall have no effect on rights, debts and claims existing with respect to funds prior to their transfer to the escrow account; and that the accounts from which such funds were transferred shall be kept open for retransfer of the funds in question; 8. Reaffirms that the escrow account referred to in this resolution, like the Compensation Fund, enjoys the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, including immunity from legal proceedings, or any forms of attachment, garnishment or execution; and that no claim shall lie at the instance of any person or body in connection with any action taken in compliance with or implementation of this resolution; 9. Requests the Secretary-General to repay, from any available funds in the escrow account, any sum transferred under this resolution to the account or State from which it was transferred, if the transfer is found at any time by him not to have been of funds subject to this resolution; a request for such a finding could be made by the State from which the funds were transferred; 10. Confirms that the percentage of the value of exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq for payment to the Compensation Fund shall, for the purpose of this resolution and exports of petroleum or petroleum products subject to paragraph 6 of resolution 692 (1991), be the same as the percentage decided by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 705 (1991), until such time as the Governing Council of the Compensation Fund may decide otherwise; 11. Decides that no further Iraqi assets shall be released for purposes set forth in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991) except to the sub-account of the escrow account, established pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 712 (1991), or directly to the United Nations for humanitarian activities in Iraq; 12. Decides that, for the purposes of this resolution and other relevant resolutions, the term "petroleum products" does not include petrochemical derivatives; 13. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution; 14. Decides to remain seized of this matter. VOTE: 14-0-1 (China abstaining). (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

Review of the Western Sahara and Somalia

Bolton Source: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Description: Resolution, New York Date: Oct, 1 199210/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Somalia, Morocco, Kenya, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations [TEXT] Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee on Africa, I am pleased to be here today to review with you the status of developments in the Western Sahara and Somalia. My remarks on the Western Sahara will review developments concerning the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the latest information we have on the referendum itself. My testimony on Somalia will bring you up to date on the tragedy there--particularly from the perspective of the United Nations--on our efforts to contribute to international relief efforts, and [on] our expectations for what the international community can accomplish in the coming months.
The Western Sahara and MINURSO
US policy has consistently and fully supported UN efforts to resolve definitively the status of the Western Sahara through a popular referendum. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and his special representative, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, have our full confidence in their efforts to implement the referendum plan. Let me be clear, however, that we have been frustrated that the parties have not reached accommodation on the essential point holding up the referendum: Who will be eligible to vote? Considerable distance remains between the views of the Moroccan Government and the POLISARIO [Popular Liberation Front for Rio de Oro and Saguia El Hamra] over the criteria to be used to determine voter eligibility. As I stated in February, former [UN] Secretary General Perez de Cuellar presented revised voter identification guidelines last December, shortly before he left office. Those guidelines were initially accepted by Morocco but rejected by the POLISARIO. The latest report of the UN Secretary General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, issued August 20, shows only marginal signs of progress on this issue. The efforts of the Secretary General's special representative have apparently brought about a narrowing of the differences between the two sides. Mr. Yaqub Khan is continuing his discussions with both sides to see if remaining differences can be bridged. Meanwhile, Morocco has continued to move forward with its Western Sahara policy. As it had announced it would, the Government of Morocco conducted a constitutional referendum, on September 4, in which inhabitants of Western Sahara voted as they had been allowed to do in earlier Moroccan elections. Four days later, King Hassan announced that the four provinces of Western Sahara, in the event of integration with Morocco, would be designated a region with, presumably, the same degree of autonomy as the country's other regions. The King also indicated that a Western Sahara region would be given priority in terms of the Moroccan Government's development programs. Several editorials in the semi-official press followed, claiming that the participation of the Saharan population in the constitutional referendum was a "manifestation and reaffirmation of their Moroccanness." We have inquired about these statements, and the Moroccan Government has assured us that they do not represent Morocco's official position and should not be interpreted as an attempt to preempt the planned UN referendum. In addition to the constitutional referendum, the Moroccan Government plans to have Western Saharans participate in Morocco's local and parliamentary elections planned for later this year. Inhabitants of the Western Sahara have been permitted in the past to elect representatives to Morocco's parliament. The Moroccan Government asserts that the upcoming parliamentary elections were previously postponed for 2 years (from 1990 to 1992) so as not to interfere with the conduct of the still-pending UN referendum in Western Sahara. Morocco argues that parliamentary elections cannot be postponed further solely because the eligibility issue has stalled the UN referendum in the Western Sahara. The Moroccan Government has given the Secretary General written assurances that its parliamentary elections are independent of and separate from the holding of a UN referendum on the Western Sahara. Morocco also expressed readiness to reaffirm its solemn commitment to the United Nations that it will abide by the results of the referendum. However, the POLISARIO does not accept the Moroccan right to conduct national elections in the Western Sahara. Our concern is that any disruptions be avoided in the process leading to the UN referendum. Let me now say a few words on MINURSO. As of August 31, MINURSO had 365 military personnel deployed in the Western Sahara, of whom 25 are US citizens. There are an additional 104 civilians working in MINURSO, of which 26 are locally hired. The Secretary General's plan calls for approximately 2,900 military and civilian personnel to observe the cease- fire between Morocco and the POLISARIO and to prepare for and conduct the referendum. Failure to agree on procedures for the conduct of the UN referendum remains the principal obstacle to a more complete deployment of MINURSO. In February, I referred to deployment difficulties encountered by MINURSO. There were additional problems noted by a US brigadier general when he visited the Western Sahara in April in his capacity as executive agent for US peace-keeping operations. I am pleased to say that, although challenges remain, many of the difficulties were the result of misunderstandings with the Government of Morocco and have since been resolved. Service in MINURSO remains a difficult and hazardous assignment, but it appears that the organization's worst experiences are behind it. Turning to the issue of MINURSO expenses, the UN General Assembly approved, in principle, $181 million for the operation. Member states were assessed $143 million for the first 6 months of MINURSO's operations. The US assessment for this period, which has been paid in full, was $43.4 million. Given the continued uncertainty over the implementation schedule for the referendum, it is unclear at this time when or if the United Nations will approve further assessments for this force. I wish to reiterate our commitment to a peaceful resolution of the issue of Western Sahara under the auspices of the United Nations and with the personal involvement of the Secretary General and his special representative. Mr. Yaqub Khan will be reporting soon to the Secretary General, who planned to issue another report by the end of September. While we do not know whether that report will be positive, we will continue to back the UN efforts to break the deadlock and to find a way for the Western Sahara inhabitants to have their referendum and decide their destiny.
Moving to the subject of Somalia, it is difficult to find words adequate to describe the suffering. Experienced humanitarian workers describe conditions in Somalia as the worst they have seen. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates that 1.5 million Somalis are in dire need of immediate assistance. As many as 4.5 million Somalis are in desperate need of food and other forms of assistance. Starvation and malnutrition are widespread, especially in the central and southern regions of the country. In remote areas, many people may be dying before they can reach feeding centers in the towns. While there are no accurate figures on the total number of deaths due to starvation, the estimates of humanitarian agencies in Somalia are horrifying: 1,000-2,000 per day in central and southern regions and in camps in neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, where upward of 750,000 Somalis have sought refuge. According to mid-September estimates by the ICRC, Somalia needed at least 52,000 tons of food per month to feed the hungry. That is more than a 50% increase over the amount relief agencies believed was necessary in mid-summer. Simply put, the rule of law does not exist in Somalia. Since the outbreak of civil war in 1988, factions and clans have killed thousands of people and uprooted hundreds of thousands from their homes. In the process, they destroyed the country's infrastructure and crippled its economy. Even the tenuous cease-fire in Mogadishu, brokered with great difficulty by the United Nations last March, could not stem effectively the random violence and looting throughout much of the country and even the capital. In many areas, traditional clan leaders are no longer in control of their communities, and outlaw groups operate independent of any authority. With this stark report of the situation on the record, let me focus my statement on UN and other international organizations' efforts to relieve suffering and on our contributions to those efforts. The United Nations was confronted with the challenge of leading the assistance effort in Somalia at a time when the organization, as well as most international relief agencies, was already overloaded. Apart from the major drought in southern Africa, the United Nations is also handling large- scale relief efforts in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Cambodia. In addition, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, headed by Under Secretary General Jan Eliasson, was established only last January, and Eliasson did not assume office until April. I am not trying to dismiss the shortcomings that exist in the relief effort. There is some truth to the assertion made by critics that the international community did not respond as quickly or as effectively as needed when the Somali tragedy unfolded. Organizationally, the UN system was not ready to meet fully its new responsibilities. Change in the UN system, which this Administration has spearheaded for more than 3 years, is underway. We hope that lessons learned in Somalia will accelerate reform. I believe that now, with our encouragement and support, the United Nations is fully engaged in Somalia. In his August report to the Security Council on the UN technical assessment of Somalia, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted that the lack of security was the main obstacle to delivery of substantially increased assistance. Following his report and an agreement brokered with faction leaders in Mogadishu by his special representative, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, the United States offered to airlift 500 Pakistani troops to serve as security guards. In 29 sorties by US military aircraft between September 14 and 28, the 500 guards and much of their equipment were deployed to Mogadishu, where they can begin protecting humanitarian supplies delivered to [the] Mogadishu airport and port and overseeing the storage and delivery of food in the Mogadishu area. The United States has also given its full backing to the Secretary General's recommendation for the deployment of similar units elsewhere in Somalia. We supported Security Council Resolution 775, passed on August 28, authorizing the Secretary General to deploy up to an additional 3,000 security guards. Special Representative Sahnoun is consulting with key Somali factional leaders on deploying the additional troops. We want to assist him in every way possible. Greater UN engagement in Somalia is having an impact. Most notably, the airlift of food and other supplies that began on August 15 has permitted the World Food Program (WFP) to deliver an average of 578 tons a week of food donated by the United States, [the] European Community, Australia and Germany, and others. Under Secretary Eliasson recently visited Somalia and refugee centers and is finalizing a "100-Day Plan" to accelerate assistance. In addition to a massive infusion of food aid, the plan will provide such necessities as shelter materials, blankets, clothes, and sufficient clean water. It will include projects that will create jobs and help rebuild the agricultural and livestock sectors. The United Nations will also convene a relief coordination conference in Geneva on October 12. On our part, the United States and four other countries--Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Italy--with the cooperation of Kenya, have committed aircraft to lift relief to Somalia and to refugee camps in northern Kenya. Other countries have accelerated their contributions to the Somalis. US aircraft alone have flown over 400 sorties between August 28 and today, delivering approximately 5,000 metric tons of food and other needed supplies. Having contributed over $160 million in assistance to Somalia over the past 18 months, including more than 80,000 tons of food, we have committed an additional 145,000 tons of food, which will begin to arrive over the next several months.
Improvement of UN Peace-keeping And Humanitarian Assistance
In the final analysis, the United Nations must lead the world community in humanitarian efforts to confront disasters on the scale of Somalia's. The United Nations must also, as President Bush said during his September 21 address to the 47th UN General Assembly session, improve its capacity to fulfill its responsibilities in the fields of conflict resolution and peace- keeping. On our part, the President pledged in New York that we would: -- Emphasize training of our military for peace-keeping and humanitarian activities; -- Establish a permanent peace-keeping curriculum in US military schools; and -- Work with the United Nations to best employ our lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities. He offered our capabilities for joint simulation and exercises, facilities for multinational training, and our expertise in planning and operations. The President also said that we would broaden our support for monitoring, verification, reconnaissance, and other requirements for peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance, as well as review how we fund these activities. The process to implement the President's initiative has begun. When it is in place and the UN system has undergone its needed reforms, the international community will be able to much more effectively confront disasters such as that which overtook Somalia, whether manmade or natural. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

US-Australia Joint Communique

Eagleburger Wolfowitz Evans Ray. Source: Released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Description: Joint Communique, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 1 199210/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Pacific, Southeast Asia Country: Vietnam, Australia, United States, Cambodia, New Zealand, Iraq Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control, Trade/Economics, United Nations, POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Senator Gareth Evans and Minister for Defense Senator Robert Ray, and the United States Acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Under Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz met on October 1, 1992 in Washington, D.C. to discuss global, regional, and bilateral issues. The rapid pace and dramatic scope of political and economic developments on the international scene in this period of world history made the consultations especially valuable on this occasion. These talks continued the tradition of annual high-level consultations between two close allies. Discussions focused both upon the shared interests of the alliance relationship and cooperative efforts on key international arms control and conflict resolution issues. The United States and Australia exchanged views on other new challenges emerging in the post-Cold War environment, including issues relating to the world economy and international trade, particularly the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Uruguay Round. Both sides pledged to continue close consultations on these key issues.
Defense and Security
Australia emphasized its belief that the continued involvement of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region has been a powerful stabilizing force, significantly contributing to the remarkable growth and stability achieved over recent decades. Australia thus welcomed the United States' reaffirmation of its intention to maintain its strategic engagement in the region through the maintenance of existing alliances, forward deployed forces, and new access arrangements with host governments. The United States reiterated its support for bilateral security arrangements with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand as keystones of regional security. In that regard, the United States and Australian Governments reaffirmed the importance of their security cooperation under the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States] Treaty and the need to continue close consultations on issues of mutual security concern. Both governments noted that they would welcome the return of New Zealand to ANZUS on the basis of full acceptance by New Zealand of its obligations and responsibilities under the alliance. Recalling the successful completion of the Kangaroo 92 joint military exercise, the United States and Australia pledged to continue efforts to foster military interoperability between their armed forces. This would be particularly important as both countries structured their forces to meet the challenges of the 1990s, including through the development and use of advanced technology. Australia outlined its plans for upgrading the facilities at the Delamere Air Weapons Range and the underwater tracking range off Perth and repeated its invitation to the United States to make use of these facilities in its own training and exercise programs. Australia and the United States reaffirmed the importance they attach to the joint defense facilities and to other cooperative arrangements. The United States and Australian Governments welcomed the transfer that took place that day, of Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station at North West Cape, Australia --a joint facility--from U.S. to Australian command. To complement the contribution that these bilateral arrangements make to security in Asia and the Pacific, both sides agree to encourage regional discussion on security issues. In particular, they welcome the inclusion of regional security discussions on the agenda of the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] PMC [post-ministerial conference] as an example of the sort of initiative that can help build trust, confidence, and cooperation. The United States and Australia, while noting substantial progress on many aspects of the Cambodian peace process, especially repatriation and electoral preparations, expressed concern over the continued refusal of the Khmer Rouge to join the cantonment and demobilization phase of the Cambodia peace agreement and reiterated the importance both place on the elections being held as scheduled in April/May 1993. Both governments expressed support for UNSC [United Nations Security Council] Resolution 766 and for UNSC consideration of further measures should Khmer Rouge intransigence continue. The United States outlined recent developments in U.S.-Vietnam relations, including on POW-MIA [prisoners of war/missing-in-action] issues. Australia noted these recent developments and expressed its hope that there would eventually be a normalization of relations between the two countries. The two sides welcomed the recent progress in the dialogue between South and North Korea, and especially the agreements on reconciliation and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, they remain concerned about the North Korean nuclear program and North Korea's continued export of Scud missiles and related technology. They called on the DPRK [Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea] to finalize with South Korea an arrangement for a credible and effective bilateral nuclear inspection regime, which would be an essential complement to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections and would enhance international confidence that the DPRK was fulfilling its responsibilities under both the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and the bilateral accord. Australia and the United States noted with concern the potential threat of ballistic missile proliferation and expressed their willingness to explore with each other and other countries the development of a global protection system--an international regime for protection against limited ballistic missile attack. Both governments look forward to cooperation on these matters where our common interests are engaged and agree to keep each other closely informed of developments.
Other Security Issues
Both governments reaffirmed their commitment to work in the international community to ensure Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions, and recognized the substantial contribution which each was making to the Multinational Interception Force (MIF) monitoring sanctions compliance. They agreed that renewed efforts were needed to encourage others to join the MIF. Both sides condemned Iraq's harassment of UN personnel, including UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspection teams acting under UNSC Resolution 687. The two governments pledged continued support for UNSCOM, including a willingness to provide experts for the inspection teams. The two governments also agreed to support and encourage UN humanitarian efforts under UNSC Resolution 688, which respond to the suffering of the people of Iraq. They reaffirmed their support for the aerial monitoring and consequent no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, which respond to Iraq's continued oppression of the populations living in those areas. Australia welcomed the leadership of the United States in the Middle East Peace process. The United States expressed appreciation for Australia's positive contribution to the arms control and regional security (ACRS) multilateral working group. Both governments welcomed the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) negotiations and agreed, as original co-sponsors of the draft resolution commending the CWC now before the general assembly, to continue efforts to urge all countries to support the CWC and to become original signatories. They also agreed to work actively to ensure that the CWC comes into effect at the earliest possible date. The United States commended the leadership role of Australia in fostering the successful conclusion to the negotiations. Both sides emphasized their shared commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including through the strengthening of IAEA safeguards. The two governments stressed the importance of indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995. Reviewing developments in Europe, the two sides expressed support for the efforts of the newly independent states to establish democratic, market- oriented societies. Australia and the United States discussed the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia and agreed to continue to support UN efforts to end the conflict through diplomatic and other means.
Economic and Trade Issues
The United States and Australia emphasized the importance of fostering free and undistorted trade globally and in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides agreed that a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round is the most important priority in the international economy. To this end, the two sides agreed that an urgent breakthrough on agriculture is critical and they called on the EC [European Community] and other parties to show the necessary flexibility to see this achieved. Both governments renewed calls on all GATT parties to show the political commitment to conclude the Round as a matter of urgency. They underlined their strong commitment to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and welcomed its role as a primary vehicle for achieving increased trade liberalization in the region. The United States and Australia exchanged views on NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement] and the President's goal to develop a network of free trade agreements with the Pacific, Latin America, and some Eastern European countries as a means of furthering trade liberalization. Australia and the United States emphasized the benefits of maintaining an open regional trading system on an APEC- wide basis. Australia pressed strongly its concerns at the continuing resort to export subsidies, including the Export Enhancement Program, in international agricultural trade. The United States reiterated that it will continue to use the Export Enhancement Program to counter high EC export subsidies, but assured Australia that it will also continue, where feasible, to minimize the effects on Australia and other non-subsidizers. Both governments agreed that discussions on a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) should be accelerated with the view to concluding an agreement as soon as possible. Australia confirmed its invitation to the United States to the next round of annual talks in Australia in 1993. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

Country Profile: Australia

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Oct, 5 199210/5/92 Category: Country Data Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Australia Subject: Trade/Economics, History, Military Affairs, Cultural Exchange, Resource Management [TEXT]
Area: 7.7 million sq. km. (3 million sq. mi.); about the size of the United States. Cities (1991 est.): Capital--Canberra (pop. 285,000). Other cities--Sydney (3.6 million), Melbourne (3 million), Brisbane (1.2 million), Perth (1.2 million). Terrain: Varied, but generally flat. Climate: Relatively dry, ranging from temperate in the south to tropical in the north.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Australian(s). Population (1991 est.): 17.4 million. Annual growth rate (1991 est.): 1.5%. Ethnic groups: European 94%, Asian 5%, aboriginal 1%. Religions: Anglican 24%, Roman Catholic 26%. Languages: English, aboriginal. Education: Years compulsory--to age 15 in all states except Tasmania, where it is 16. Literacy--89%. Health: Infant mortality rate--9/1,000. Life expectancy--males 73 yrs., females 79 yrs. Work force (1991 est., 8.7 million): Services--72%. Mining, manufacturing, and utilities--19%. Agriculture--5%. Public administration and defense--4%.
Type: Democratic, federal-state system recognizing British monarch as sovereign. Constitution: July 9, 1900. Independence (federation): January 1, 1901. Branches: Executive--prime minister and cabinet responsible to Parliament. Legislative--bicameral Parliament (76-member Senate, 148-member House of Representatives). Judicial--independent judiciary. Administrative subdivisions: Six states and two territories. Political parties: Liberal, National, Australian Labor, Australian Democrats. Suffrage: Universal and compulsory over 18. Flag: On a blue field, UK Union Jack in the top left corner, a large white star directly beneath symbolizing federation, and five smaller white stars on the right half representing the Southern Cross constellation.
GDP (1991 est.): $290 billion. Per capita income (1991 est.): $16,726. Inflation rate (1991 est.): 4.7%. Natural resources: Bauxite, coal, iron ore, copper, tin, silver, uranium, nickel, tungsten, mineral sands, lead, zinc, diamonds, natural gas, oil. Agriculture (1991 est., 2.8% of GDP): Products--livestock, wheat, wool, sugar. Arable land--9%. Industry (1991 est., 40% of GDP): Types--mining, manufacturing, and transportation. Trade (1991): Exports--$40 billion: coal, wool, wheat, meat, iron ore and concentrates, alumina, aluminum, petroleum oils, non-monetary gold. Major markets--Japan, US ($4.8 bil-lion), UK, South Korea, PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Germany. Imports--$38 billion: transportation equipment, capital goods, industrial supplies, petroleum products. Major suppliers--Japan, US ($9 billion), Germany, UK, Taiwan, New Zealand, Italy, South Korea. Fiscal year: July 1-June 30.
Principal Government Officials
Governor General--William G. Hayden Prime Minister--Paul Keating Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister--Gareth Evans Ambassador to the United States--Michael Cook Ambassador to the United Nations--Richard Butler (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

US-Korean Report on the Presidents' Economic Initiative

US Embassy, South Korea Source: US Embassy Seoul, South Korea Description: Statement and summary of the Presidents' Economic Initiative Report of Senior Officials to Korea-US Economic Consultation were released by the American Embassy in Seoul, South Korea and Washington, DC Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Australia Subject: Trade/Economics, International Law, Immigration, Media/Telecommunications, Science/Technology [TEXT]
The Chairmen of the Korea-US Economic Consultation today released the report of the Presidents' Economic Initiative (PEI), which was launched by President Bush and President Roh at their summit meeting in Seoul in January. The Economic Consultation studied and developed recommendations in the areas of customs and import clearance, standards and regulations, [and] investment and technology. These recommendations, when implemented, will meet the Presidents' objectives of improving the environment for doing business together and helping to lay the foundation for a new and stronger economic partnership between the two countries. The Korea-US Economic Consultation will monitor closely the implementation of the agreed recommendations and consider ways to extend the cooperative approach of the Presidents' Economic Initiative to other areas of mutual interest.
Summary of the Report
President Bush and President Roh, at their meeting in Seoul in January, launched the Presidents' Economic Initiative (PEI). Their aim was to establish a new stronger economic partnership by making it easier for Koreans and Americans to do business together. At their instructions, the Korea-U.S. Economic Consultation (which meets at the level of United States Under Secretary of State and Republic of Korea Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs) tasked working groups under the overall co-chairmanship of senior officials to review and develop recommendations to meet the Presidents' objectives in the areas of customs and other import clearance procedures, standards-making and regulatory procedures, investment and technology. The report of the working groups has been completed. In the area of customs and import clearance, recommendations, when implemented, will lead to significant reductions in time and paperwork needed to clear imports, and longer term, to expedited processing through automation. In the area of standards, the recommendations call for open, nondiscriminatory, transparent procedures for the development and implementation of standards and regulations. The investment working group took note of recent liberalizations undertaken by Korea and the need for further progress, and agreed to hold another working group meeting in 1992. Recommendations of the technology working group call for coordination of government promotion activities to bring interested U.S. and Korean commercial technology buyers and sellers together. A technology subgroup under the Korea-U.S. Economic Consultation was established to carry on this work and to address factors that affect private sector technology cooperation and transfer. The Economic Consultation welcomed the cooperative and systemic approach of these consultations, and agree that faithful implementation of the Presidents' Economic Initiative recommendations will have a positive impact on our ability to do business together. They further agreed to release the report of the Presidents' Economic Initiative working group and meet within six months, and periodically thereafter, to consider progress in implementing these recommendations and to identify and discuss other issues which could be addressed in the cooperative spirit of the Presidents' Economic Initiative, with the continuing aim of building a stronger Korea- U.S. economic partnership. Copies of the complete report may be obtained from the Office of Public Liaison, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room 5831, tel: (202) 647-6575 (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

China: Additional Conditions for Renewal Of China MFN Status Disapproved

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of a letter to the House of Representatives, Washington, DC Date: Sep, 28 19929/28/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control [TEXT] To the House of Representatives: I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 5318 the "United States- China Act of 1992," which places additional conditions on renewal of China's most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status. I share completely the goals of this legislation: to see greater Chinese adherence to international standards of human rights, free and fair trade practices, and international non-proliferation norms. However, adding broad conditions to China's MFN renewal would not lead to faster progress in advancing our goals. To those who advocate this approach, let me set the record straight. Our policy of comprehensive engagement lets the Chinese know in no uncertain terms that "business as usual" is not possible until they take steps to resolve our differences. Through multiple, focussed measures, we are eliciting the results we seek. This year, China joined global efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by declaring adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime's (MTCR) guidelines and parameters and signing the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Chinese behavior remains MTCR- consistent, and we have begun a dialogue with the Chinese on their responsibilities under the NPT. We continue to monitor vigilantly China's weapons export practices. We have used the sanction authorities available successfully and remain prepared to do so again if necessary. We have made progress on the resolution of outstanding trade issues with our agreements to protect Intellectual Property Rights and to ban prison labor exports. I will not allow, however, market access to remain a one- sided benefit in China's favor while our bilateral trade deficit grows. If China fails to reduce trade barriers, we are prepared to take trade action under the statutory guidelines of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The limited steps China has taken on human rights are inadequate. But our human rights dialogue gives us an avenue to express our views directly to China's leaders. Significant improvement in China's human rights situation, including freedom for all those imprisoned solely for the peaceful expression of their beliefs remains our objective. It is easy to be discouraged by the pace of progress in this area. But it would be a serious mistake to let our frustration lead us to gamble with policies that would undermine our goals. Withdrawing MFN or conditioning it, such that it will be withdrawn at a later date, will not promote these goals. H.R. 5318 imposes unworkable constraints on our bilateral trade. Among the casualties of this bill would be the dynamic, market-oriented regions of southern China and Hong Kong, as well as those Chinese who support reform and rely on outside contact for support. The impact of this bill would extend beyond the state enterprise system, harming independent industrial and agricultural entities that have sprung up in China since the advent of economic reform and its opening to the outside. These family-owned and operated entities are interlinked in the manufacturing process with large, state-controlled factories and marketing agencies. They would not be shielded from the effects of this bill. Americans too would be affected. This year, our exports to China will climb to about $8 billion. China's retaliation for the loss of MFN would cost us this growing market and thousands of American jobs. We would cede our market share to our foreign competitors who impose no restrictions on their trade with China, at a time when China is taking market-opening measures that our trade negotiators fought to obtain. Our policy seeks to address issues of vital concern to us and looks to the future of our relations with a country that is home to almost one-quarter of the human race. MFN is a means to bring our influence to bear on China. Comprehensive engagement is the process we use to transform this influence into positive change. The relationship between these two key elements of our China policy is a powerful one, and the absence of one element diminishes the potency of the other. We continue to advance broad U.S. objectives without imposing economic hardship on Americans because both elements of our policy are in place. Engagement through our democratic, economic, and educational institutions instead of confrontation offers the best hope for reform in China. MFN is the foundation we need to engage the Chinese. H.R. 5318 places conditions on MFN renewal for China that will jeopardize this policy and includes a requirement that infringes upon the President's exclusive authority to undertake diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the United States. In order to protect the economic and foreign policy interests of the United States, I am returning H.R. 5318 to the House of Representatives without my approval. George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

Afghanistan: Department Statement

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South Asia Country: Afghanistan Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] The US Government has long sought a stable, broad-based government in Afghanistan achieved through a political process, the return of the Afghan refugees and reconstruction of this war-torn country, and the elimination of narcotics production and trafficking. The establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan in June was a critical first step toward these objectives. The heavy fighting that occurred in Kabul in August, therefore, was of great concern to the US Government. We welcomed the implementation of a cease-fire and are pleased that it is holding. We encourage the interim government under President Rabbani to make the greatest possible effort to revive a broad-based political process. We note that preparations are being made to convene a gathering of Afghans in late October as a further step in the political process and urge that all factions work with the interim government to make this meeting a success. To provide support for the political process, the United States has already reopened full official ties with the interim government. Assistant Secretary [for Near Eastern Affairs and Acting Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs] Djerejian's meeting with acting Foreign Minister Gailani on September 30 was part of our continuing contacts with Afghan officials. We are also consulting with the United Nations and other countries interested in the future of Afghanistan. We urge all to do everything in their power to bring about a permanent end to the Afghan conflict and support a political process in which the Afghan people can choose their own leadership. The United States does not favor any Afghan faction. We support the interim government of Afghanistan and hope that it will lead the way in imple- menting a broad-based political process envisaged in the April accords. We, like people of goodwill everywhere, must oppose the actions of any individuals or factions who would attempt to disrupt the political process and seize power by force. The recent savage bombardment of Kabul by forces under the command of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar caused tremendous suffering. These actions, taken in pursuit of personal ambitions, were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of innocent people in Kabul. We condemned these ruthless actions and will continue to oppose anyone who uses violence to subvert the political process, which we believe is central to resolving the Afghan conflict.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

Execution of Sudanese USAID Employees

Boucher US Embassy, Sudan Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Text of a statement released by the US Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, and by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher in Washington, DC Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Subsaharan Africa Country: Sudan Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] The US Embassy in Khartoum, in response to the September 27 Foreign Ministry release published by Sudan News Agency, takes this opportunity to set the record straight concerning the trial and execution of employees Andrew Tombe and Baudouin Tally. The Government of Sudan asserts that Mr. Tombe "stood for trial before a just court" and was allowed the "opportunity to defend himself." The United States questions whether a formal and fair trial took place, given the fact that (1) no witnesses have yet been identified, (2) the sentence has never been announced, even weeks after the event, and (3) no evidence has been brought forth that Mr. Tombe was in any way aiding the Garang forces. We call upon the Government of Sudan, therefore, to provide full details of the trial, when and where it took place, and what evidence was represented. The United States does not dispute that human rights abuses have taken place on both sides of the conflict in the south. We have deplored the bloodshed and have consistently urged both sides to negotiate a peaceful settlement in good faith. The case of Andrew Tombe is of special concern to us because it involved the life of a US Government employee. While Mr. Tombe was a Sudanese citizen subject to Sudanese law, he was also a member of a worldwide corps of US Government employees. We cannot and will not ignore the fate of any one of these men and women. We urge the Government of Sudan to provide facts on the Tombe execution. We continue to await news on the fate of employee Tally, whom we believe has also been executed.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

US Support for Refugees In Hungary

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Hungary, Yugoslavia (former) Subject: Refugees, United Nations [TEXT] The United States is contributing nearly $900,000 to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to support programs for refugees from the former Yugoslavia. These funds are in addition to the $1.8 million the United States contributed earlier this year for UNHCR activities in Hungary. In making this contribution, the United States wishes to recognize the generous and humane response of the Hungarian people to the Yugoslav crisis. Hungary has provided temporary refuge for more than 50,000 individuals from the former Yugoslavia. Thousands of the refugees have been taken in by Hungarians and cared for in private homes. UNHCR and the Government of Hungary are working together closely to address the urgent humanitarian needs of the refugees; these funds will assist them in that effort.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

Additional Funds For Liberian Peace-keeping

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 2 199210/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Liberia Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] The United States is providing $2 million in additional Economic Support Funds to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to assist peace-keeping operations in Liberia. Intervention in Liberia by an ECOWAS peace-keeping force in 1991 helped stop the fighting and allowed the movement of relief supplies to needy Liberians. The United States has consistently supported this unprecedented example of conflict resolution in the region. In addition, the United States is making a grant of $1.3 million to the International Negotiation Network, an organization assisting with the Liberian peace process at the invitation of ECOWAS. Tragically, Liberian armed factions have resumed hostilities, breaking a 21-month cease-fire and prolonging the misery of the Liberian people. We call on all factions to support the renewed efforts of West African leaders to implement the encampment and disarmament provisions of the Yamoussoukro IV Agreement and to pursue measures which will ultimately lead to free and fair elections. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

President's Statement on START Ratification

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Oct, 1 199210/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former), Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] I am pleased that the Senate today gave its consent to the ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty--START. The START negotiations began 10 years ago. These long years of negotiations culminated in an historic agreement, first with the Soviet Union and then with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; true strategic arms reductions, not just limitations or controls. START reduces US and former Soviet strategic weapons by about 40% and makes even deeper cuts in the weapons of greatest concern--fast-flying ballistic missiles. It also helps to ensure that the demise of the Soviet Union does not stimulate nuclear proliferation. In START, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have all agreed to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear- weapon states and to guarantee the elimination of strategic nuclear forces from their territory. Finally, this historic agreement has paved the way for further path-breaking steps and far-reaching reductions. In large part because of START's verification provisions, I was able in my September 1991 and January 1992 initiatives to make major unilateral nuclear reductions and successfully challenge Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin to do the same. Of even greater significance, the START framework permitted President Yeltsin and me to reach agreement at our summit meeting last June--after just 5 months of negotiation--on extraordinary further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. All the agreements reached over the past year, beginning with START, will reduce our strategic nuclear forces by about 75% from their 1990 level. As such, START and follow-on understandings have done much to reverse the hands on the nuclear doomsday clock. With the Senate's action this morning, the United States will be prepared to ratify the START Treaty once the other four parties have acted. I would note with satisfaction that the Government of Kazakhstan has already approved START, and I urge the remaining parties--Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine--to approve this historic treaty promptly, so its mandated reductions can begin without delay. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 40, October 5, 1992 Title:

Treaty Actions: Multilateral and Bilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Oct, 5 199210/5/92 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: South America, Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia, MidEast/North Africa, Pacific Country: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Georgia, Morocco, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland Subject: International Law, Immigration, State Department, Trade/Economics, United Nations [TEXT]
Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the United States Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820; 21 UST 77. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992. Accessions deposited: Barbados, May 11, 1992; Azerbaijan, Aug. 13, 1992; Namibia, Sept. 14, 1992.
Diplomatic Relations
Convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the United States Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502; 23 UST 3227. Accession deposited: Namibia, Sept. 14, 1992.
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. Acceptances deposited: Azerbaijan, Sept. 18, 1992; San Marino, Sept. 23, 1992; Turkmenistan, Sept. 22, 1992; Ukraine, Sept. 3, 1992; Uzbekistan, Sept. 21, 1992. Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. Accessions deposited: Armenia, Sept. 16, 1992; Azerbaijan, Sept. 18, 1992; Kyrgyzstan, Sept. 18, 1992; Turkmenistan, Sept. 22, 1992; Ukraine, Sept. 3, 1992; Uzbekistan, Sept. 21, 1992.
Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808. Acceptances deposited: Armenia, May 4, 1992; Bosnia, Sept. 10, 1992; Herzegovina, Sept. 10, 1992; Kazakhstan, Aug. 19, 1992; Kyrgyzstan, Apr. 29, 1992; Moldova, May 4, 1992; Slovenia, May 7, 1992; Tajikistan, May 4, 1992. Amendment to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization. Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 1975. TIAS 8086; 26 UST 990. Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1984. TIAS 10930. Amendments to Articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization. Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 3, 1977. TIAS 8534; 28 UST 2088. Acceptances deposited: Armenia, May 4, 1992; Bosnia, Sept. 10, 1992; Herzegovina, Sept. 10, 1992; Kazakhstan, Aug. 19, 1992; Kyrgyzstan, Apr. 29, 1992; Moldova, May 4, 1992; Tajikistan, May 4, 1992.
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645. Accession deposited: New Zealand, Sept. 1, 1992. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force June 21, 1985. Accession deposited: Armenia, May 12, 1992.
Arrangement for the exchange of military personnel between the Royal Australian Navy and the US Coast Guard. Signed at Washington July 27, 1992. Entered into force July 27, 1992.
Grant agreement for the economic recovery program. Signed at La Paz Aug. 21, 1992. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1992.
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Sept. 23, 1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Brazil of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate humanitarian and technical economic assistance. Signed at Tbilisi July 31, 1992. Entered into force July 31, 1992.
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Rabat Aug. 24, 1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Morocco of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Aug. 27, 1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Peru of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Agreement on cooperation in science and technology, with annexes. Signed at Warsaw Sept. 4, 1992. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes confirming that all domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Memorandum of understanding on highway management and technology. Signed at Borlange June 15, 1992. Entered into force June 15, 1992.
Agreement concerning mapping, charting, and geodesy cooperation. Signed at Fairfax Aug. 5 and 11, 1992. Entered into force Aug. 11, 1992. (###)