US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: The United Nations: Forging A Genuine Global
Community
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address before the UN General Assembly, New York City
Date: Sep, 21 19929/21/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa, E/C Europe,
Subsaharan Africa
Country: USSR (former), Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus,
Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Cyprus, Croatia,
Cambodia, Lebanon
Subject: United Nations, Democratization, Arms Control, NATO,
CSCE, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Thank you, Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, and distinguished guests.
Forty-seven years ago, I was a young man of 21, and, like thousands of
others of my generation, I'd gone off to war to help keep freedom alive. But
47 years ago this month, the war was finally over, and I was looking
forward to peace and the chance to begin my life in earnest. Nineteen forty-
five marked a moment of promise, not just for me but for all of mankind. A
great struggle against dictatorship had been fought and won.
Across the globe, we all looked forward to a future free of war, a world
where we might raise our children in peace and freedom. And this
institution, the United Nations, born amidst the ashes of war, embodied
those hopes and dreams like no other.
But the hopes and dreams [of] 1945 remained unfulfilled. Communist
imperialism divided the world in two; our hopes for peace and our dreams of
freedom were frozen in the grip of [the] Cold War. Instead of finding a
common ground, we found ourselves at ground zero. Instead of living on
Churchill's broad, sunlit uplands, millions found that there was, as Arthur
Koestler so chillingly wrote, darkness at noon. And instead of uniting the
nations, this body became a forum for distrust and division among nations.
In a cruel irony, the United Nations, created to free the world of conflict,
became itself conflict's captive.
I, too, lived through those disputes. I sat where you sit, proudly so, served
in this assembly. I saw in my time the consequences of the Cold War's hot
words on the higher missions of the United Nations. Now, 47 years later, we
stand at the end of another war, the Cold War, and our hopes and dreams
have awakened again.
Driven by its own internal contradictions and banished by the people's
undying thirst for freedom, imperial communism has collapsed in its
birthplace. Today, Russia has awakened--democratic, independent, and free.
The Baltic states are free; and so, too, are Ukraine and Armenia and Belarus,
and Kazakhstan and the other independent states joining the nations of
Central and Eastern Europe in freedom.
The fear of nuclear Armageddon between the superpowers has vanished. We
are proud to have done our part to ensure that our schoolchildren do not have
to practice hiding under their desks for fear of nuclear attack as the
generation before them.
And I am proud, also, to salute the courageous leaders with nuclear
responsibilities--Presidents Yeltsin [Russia], Kravchuk [Ukraine], Nazarbaev
[Kazakhstan], Shushkevich [Belarus]--who join me in ending the superpower
standoff that risked nuclear nightmare. This is the first General Assembly
to seat you as truly independent and free nations. To you and the leaders of
the other independent states, I say: Welcome home; we are now truly United
Nations.
With the Cold War's end, I believe we have a unique opportunity to go beyond
artificial divisions of a first, second, and third world to forge, instead, a
genuine global community of free and sovereign nations--a community built
on respect for principle, of peaceful settlements of disputes, fundamental
human rights, and the twin pillars of freedom: democracy and free markets.
Already the United Nations, especially the Security Council, has done much
to fulfill its original mission and to build this global community. UN
leadership has been critical in resolving conflicts and brokering peace the
entire world over. But securing democracy and securing the peace in the
century ahead will be no simple task. Imperial communism may have been
vanquished, but that does not end the challenges of our age--challenges that
must be overcome, if we are finally to end the divisions between east and
west, north and south that fuel strife and strain and conflict and war.
As we support the historic growth of democracy around the world, I believe
the community of nations and the United Nations face three critical,
interrelated challenges as we enter the 21st century:
First, we face the political challenge of keeping today's peace and
preventing tomorrow's wars. As we see daily in Bosnia and Somalia and
Cambodia, everywhere [that] conflict claims innocent lives, the need for
enhanced peace-keeping capabilities has never been greater, the conflicts
we deal with more intractable, the costs of conflict higher.
Second, we face the strategic challenge of the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction--truly the fastest growing security challenge to
international peace and order.
And, third, we face the common economic challenge of promoting prosperity
for all, of strengthening an open, growth-oriented, free-market
international economic order while safeguarding the environment.
Meeting these challenges will require us to strengthen our collective
engagement. It will require us to transform our collective institutions.
And, above all, it will require that each of us look seriously at our own
governments and how we conduct our international affairs. We, too, must
change our institutions and our practices if we are to make a new world of
the promise of today, if we're to secure a 21st century peace.
With you, today, I would like to discuss these three challenges--peace-
keeping, proliferation, and prosperity. I'd like to use this opportunity to
begin to sketch how I believe the international community can work
together to meet these three challenges and how the United States is
changing its institutions and policies to catalyze this effort.
Let me begin with peace-keeping. The United Nations has a long and
distinguished history of peace-keeping and humanitarian relief. From
Cyprus and Lebanon to Cambodia and Croatia, the blue beret has become a
symbol of hope amid all that hostility. The United Nations has long played a
central role in preventing conflicts from turning into wars, and
strengthened peace-keeping capabilities can help buttress these diplomatic
efforts.
But, as much as the United Nations has done, it can do much more.
Peacekeepers are stretched to the limit, while demands for their services
increase by the day. The need for monitoring and preventive peace-keeping,
putting people on the ground before the fighting starts, may become
especially critical in volatile regions. This is especially the case because
of the rapid and turbulent change that continues to shake Eastern Europe and
Eurasia.
Across the lands that once were imprisoned behind an Iron Curtain, peoples
are reasserting their historical identities that were frozen in commu-
nism's catacomb. Where this is taking place in a democratic manner with
tolerance and civility and respect for fundamental human rights and
freedoms, this new democratic nationalism is all to the good.
But, unfortunately, we need only look to the bloody battles raging in places
such as the former Yugoslavia to see the dangers of ethnic violence. This is
the greatest threat to the democratic peace we hope to build with Eastern
Europe, with Russia and Eurasia, even more so than economic deprivation.
We fully support the efforts of NATO and CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] and WEU [Western European Union], the CIS
[Commonwealth of Independent States] and other competent regional
organizations to develop peace-keeping capabilities. We are convinced that
enhanced UN capabilities, however, are a necessary complement to these
regional efforts, not just in Europe and Eurasia but across the globe.
I welcome the Secretary General's call for a new agenda to strengthen the
United Nations' ability to prevent, contain, and resolve conflict across the
globe. Today, I call upon all members to join me in taking bold steps to
advance that agenda. I, therefore, will be discussing with my colleagues the
merits of a special meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the
Secretary General's proposals and to develop concrete responses in five key
areas.
1. Robust peace-keeping requires men and equipment that only member
states can provide. Nations should develop and train military units for
possible peace-keeping operations and humanitarian relief. These forces
must be available on short notice at the request of the Security Council and
with the approval, of course, of the governments providing them.
2. If multinational units are to work together, they must train together.
Many nations--for example, Fiji, Norway, Canada, and Finland--have a long
history of peace-keeping. We can all tap into that experience as we train
for expanded operations. Effective multinational action will also require
coordinated command-and-control and interoperability of both equipment
and communications. Multinational planning, training, [and] field exercises
will be needed. These efforts should link up with regional organizations.
3. We also need to provide adequate logistical support for peace-
keeping and humanitarian operations. Member states should designate
stockpiles of resources necessary to meet humanitarian emergencies,
including famines, floods, [and] civil disturbances. This will save valuable
time in a crisis.
4. We will need to develop planning, crisis management, and intelligence
capabilities for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations.
5. We must ensure adequate, equitable financing for UN and associated
peace-keeping efforts.
As I said, we must change our national institutions if we are to change our
international relations. So let me assure you: The United States is ready to
do its part to strengthen world peace by strengthening international peace-
keeping.
For decades, the American military has served as a stabilizing presence
around the globe. I want to draw on our extensive experience in winning
wars and keeping the peace to support UN peace-keeping.
I have directed the US Secretary of Defense [Richard Cheney] to place a new
emphasis on peace-keeping. Because of peace-keeping's growing importance
as a mission for the US military, we will emphasize training of combat,
engineering, and logistical units for the full range of peace-keeping and
humanitarian activities.
We will work with the United Nations to best employ our considerable lift,
logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities to support peace-
keeping operations. We will offer our capabilities for joint simulations and
exercises to strengthen our ability to undertake joint peace-keeping
operations. There is room for all countries, large and small, and I hope all
will play a part.
Member states, as always, must retain the final decision on the use of their
troops, of course. But we must develop our ability to coordinate peace-
keeping efforts so that we can mobilize quickly when a threat to peace
arises or when people in need look to the world for help.
I have further directed the establishment of a permanent peace-keeping
curriculum in US military schools. Training, plainly, is key. The United
States is prepared to make available our bases and facilities for
multinational training and field exercises. One such base, nearby, with
facilities is Fort Dix. America used these bases to win the Cold War. And,
today, with that war over, they can help build a lasting peace.
The United States is willing to provide our military expertise to the United
Nations to help the UN strengthen its planning and operations for peace-
keeping. We will also broaden American support for monitoring,
verification, reconnaissance, and other requirements of UN peace-keeping or
humanitarian assistance operations.
And, finally, the United States will review how we fund peace-keeping and
explore new ways to ensure adequate American financial support for UN
peace-keeping and UN humanitarian activities. I do believe that we must
think differently about how we ensure and pay for our security in this new
era.
While the end of the Cold War may have ended the superpower nuclear arms
competition, regional competition [and] weapons of mass destruction
continue. Over 20 countries have or are developing nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons and the means to deliver them. At a time when the
United States and its former adversaries are engaged in deep, historic cuts
in our nuclear arsenals, our children and grandchildren will never forgive us
if we allow new and unstable nuclear standoffs to develop around the world.
We believe the Security Council should become a key forum for non-
proliferation enforcement. The Security Council should make clear its
intention to stem proliferation and sanction proliferators. Reaffirming
assurances made at the time the Nu-clear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT]
was negotiated, I proposed that the Security Council reassure the non-
nuclear states that it will seek immediate action to provide assistance in
accordance with the charter to any non-nuclear weapons state party to the
NPT that is a victim of an act of ag-gression or an object of threat of
aggression involving nuclear weapons.
I also call for the indefinite renewal of the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty when it is reviewed in 1995. I believe we must explore ways that
we can strengthen linkages between these suppliers' clubs, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control
Regime, and specialized UN agencies. Here, I would like to note UNSCOM's
[UN Security Council Observer's Mission in Iraq] productive efforts to
dismantle the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program and the
International Atomic Energy Agency's continuing good work.
But as the UN organizations adapt to stop proliferation, so, too, must every
member state change its structures to advance our non-proliferation goals.
In that spirit, I want to announce my intention, today, to work with the US
Congress to redirect the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--known
to some of you as ACDA--to refocus its talents on providing technical
support for non-proliferation, weapons monitoring and destruction, and
global defense conversion.
Under the direction of the Secretary of State, ACDA should be used not only
in completing the traditional arms control agenda but, just as importantly,
in providing technical assistance on our new security agenda,
Even as we work to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
we must be realistic and guard ourselves against proliferation that has
already taken place. And, therefore, we're working toward a cooperative
system for defense against limited ballistic missile attacks. We fully
intend to have other nations participate in this global protection system.
While expanded peace-keeping capabilities and improved non-proliferation
efforts will be critical for building an enduring peace, shared economic
growth is the long-term foundation for a brighter future, well into the next
century. That's why I stated yesterday, during a moment of international
uncertainty, that the United States would be strongly engaged with its
global partners in building a global economic, financial, and trading
structure for this new era. At the same time, I urged that our global
responsibilities lead us to examine ways to strengthen the G-7 [Group of
Seven industrialized nations] coordination process. I affirmed America's
support for European integration that opens markets and enhances Europe's
capability to be our partner in the great challenges that we face in this new
era.
While the exact form of integration is, of course, for Europeans to
determine, we will stand by them. Economic growth is not a zero-sum
process. All of us will benefit from the expanded trade and investment that
comes from a vibrant, growing world economy.
To ensure that the benefits of this growth are sustained and shared by all,
fair and open competition should be the fuel for the global economic engine.
That's why the United States wants to complete the Uruguay Round of the
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations as soon as
possible and to create a network of free trade agreements beginning with
the North American Free Trade Agreement. At the same time, we need to
recognize that we have a shared responsibility to foster and support the
free market reforms necessary to build growing economies and vibrant
democracies in the developing world and in the new democratic states. This
should be done by promoting the private sector to build these new
economies, not by fostering dependency with traditional government-to-
government foreign aid.
Since World War II, foreign assistance often served as a weapon in the Cold
War. Obviously, we will still use critical foreign assistance funds to meet
legitimate security needs. As our humanitarian operations in Somalia and
northern Iraq, Bosnia, and the former Soviet Union will testify, we will
continue our robust humanitarian assistance efforts to help those suffering
from man-made and natural disasters.
But foreign aid, as we've known it, needs to be transformed. The notion of
the handout to less-developed countries needs to give way to cooperation in
mutually productive economic relationships. We know that the more a
nation relies on the private sector and free markets, the higher its rate of
growth. The more open to trade, the higher its rate of growth. And the
better a country's investment climate, the higher its rate of growth.
To move from aid--what I would call "aid dependency"--to economic
partnership, we propose to alter fundamentally the focus of US assistance
programs to building strong, independent economies that can become
contributors to a healthy, growing global economy.
Now, that means that our new emphasis should be on building economic
partnership among our private sectors that will promote prosperity at home
and abroad, also. Working with our Congress, I will propose a top-to-bottom
overhaul of our institutions that plan and administer foreign assistance,
drastically reducing the bureaucracy that has built up around government-
based programs, streamlining our delivery systems, and strengthening
support for private sector development and economic reform.
The Agency for International Development--USAID--another institution born
during the Cold War, needs to be fundamentally and radically overhauled.
Promoting economic security, opportunity, and competitiveness will become
a primary mission of the State Department.
Our assistance efforts should not be charity. On the contrary, they should
promote mutual prosperity. Therefore, using existing foreign affairs
resources, I will propose creating a $1-billion growth fund. The fund will
provide grants and credits to support US businesses in providing expertise,
goods, and services desperately needed in countries undertaking economic
restructuring.
I will also support significantly increasing the programs of the Export-
Import Bank to ensure that US products and technology promote investment
in worldwide economic growth. The United States will work with its global
partners, especially the G-7 nations, to enhance global growth at this key
point in world history as we end one era and begin another. None of us can
afford insular policies. Each of us must contribute through greater
coordinated action to build a stronger world economy.
Ladies and gentlemen, I realize that what I've outlined today is an ambitious
agenda. But we live in remarkable times--times when empires collapse,
ideologies dissolve, and walls crumble; times when change can come so fast
that we sometimes forget how far and how fast we've progressed in
achieving our hopes for a global community of democratic nations.
In the face of today's changes, with the loss of so much that was familiar
and predictable, there is now a great temptation for people everywhere to
turn inward and to build walls around themselves--walls against trade,
walls against people, walls against ideas and investment, walls against
anything at all that appears new and different.
As the Berlin Wall fell, these walls, too, must fall. They must fall because
we cannot separate our fate from that of others. Our peace is so
interconnected, our security so intertwined, our prosperity so
interdependent, that to turn inward and retreat from the world is to invite
disaster and defeat. At the threshold of a new century we can truly say
[that] a more peaceful, more secure, more prospering future beckons to us.
For the sake of our children and our grandchildren; for the sake of those
who perished during the Cold War; and for the sake of every man, woman, and
child who kept freedom's flame alive even during the darkest noon, let us
pledge ourselves to make that future real. Let us pledge ourselves to fulfill
the promise of a truly United Nations. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: Global Economic Coordination
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address before finance ministers and central bank
governors, the White House, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 20 19929/20/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
(introductory and closing remarks deleted)
Given the important events in Europe this week--in particular, the turmoil
in the financial markets and the vote in France on the European Community's
Maastricht Treaty--I believe it is important for me to share with you my
views. And together, we must establish an international economic system
that meets the demands of the post-Cold War era.
While the topics may be complex, they affect the day-to-day life of all of
our citizens--the interest rates they pay on mortgages; inflation that can
eat away at pensions; trade and, then, growth that creates jobs.
First and foremost, I want to assure you of the US commitment to be
strongly engaged in a positive, steady fashion to help build global
prosperity. I am working to strengthen America to compete with you, not
retreat from you.
Next, I want to affirm our country's support for a European integration that
opens markets and, in the process, enhances Europe's capa-bility to be our
partner in the great challenges we face in this new era. The exact form of
integration is, of course, for our partners to determine. And we will stand
with them as they do so.
Over recent years, we've been largely successful in returning to a regime of
price stability. And this stability will enable our entrepreneurs, our
businesses, [and] our workers to concentrate on building new technologies,
real productive assets, savings, and jobs. We must combine this price
stability with more vigorous economic growth. And, therefore, we must
examine ways to strengthen our international economic and monetary
systems further--not only in Europe, which is experiencing exchange rate
instability at the moment, but in the global economy.
And in this context, I believe it is important in the months ahead for the G-7
[Group of Seven industrialized countries] nations--the United States, our
European partners, Canada, and Japan--to enhance the efforts we made in
the past to review our economic policies and strengthen our economic
coordination process. The aim of the coordination process in this new era
should be to promote a healthy and progressive world economy and a stable
monetary system.
I believe the political leadership of our nations will need to play an
increasingly active role in this work by reviewing our different economic
perspectives and reinforcing possible agreements.
In seeking to strengthen the coordination process over the longer term, the
United States will advocate to our economic partners that we explore the
development of an independent reference point for our multilateral
surveillance process.
We believe it could be useful in strengthening the coordination process to
more intensely utilize an economic indicator that compares the relation
among our currency and a basket of commodities, including gold. This
commodity price indicator should be used in conjunction with other
measures of economic performance, such as growth, exchange rates, [and]
external imbalances as we work to coordinate our economic policies.
Finally, the United States also pledges its full commitment to policies that
will strengthen the fundamentals for sustainable long-term growth. That
includes a successful Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade--GATT] to expand world trade for all market economies, old and
new. No politics of this country, let me just assure you, will interfere with
our efforts for the US side to conclude a successful--[for] the successful
conclusion of the GATT round.
It also includes limits on the growth of our mandatory spending programs
here in this country so that we can reduce our deficits. And it includes an
effort to dismantle internal rigidities that obstruct the creative process of
building new businesses, helping people to develop new skills, and shifting
capital to investments where it will contribute to greater growth.
Over the past few years, we have succeeded beyond our greatest
expectations in offering hundreds of millions of free people the opportunity
to build a secure economic future. But the very scope of the change has left
all our publics uncertain, anxious about the future. And it is our duty to
build a global, economic, financial, and trading structure for this new era,
one that will help people translate hope into peace and prosperity for
generations to come.
I know that together we can create an exciting future if we proceed
cooperatively and confidently. I just wanted to get everybody together to
tell you that I pledge the United States to the fulfillment of that task. We
will work with you. Once again, congratulations on the way you're
approaching the situation that faces us all now, the situation of cooperation
and determination that I think really is capturing the imagination of the
people all around the world. The United States will stay with you. We will
stay in here as partners, doing our level best to be a part of the solution.
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: Letter to Congress on North American Free Trade
Agreement
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of a letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate, released by
the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Basking
Ridge, New Jersey
Date: Sep, 18 19929/18/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: Mexico, Cambodia, United States
Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
In accordance with section 1103 (a) (1) of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("Act"), I am pleased to notify the House of
Representatives and the Senate of my intent to enter into a North American
Free Agreement (NAFTA) with the Governments of Mexico and Canada.
This historic agreement represents a comprehensive charter to liberalize
trade and investment flows on this continent. NAFTA will link us to our
first- and third-largest trading partners, Canada and Mexico, respectively,
to create one of the world's largest and richest markets, with over 360
million consumers and over $6.4 trillion in annual output. It will enhance
the ability of North American producers to compete in world markets, spur
economic growth on the continent, expand employment, and raise living
standards.
We are at the dawn of a new era. The threat of global nuclear warfare is
gone. The prolonged Cold War struggle against totalitarianism, fought over
half a century through immense sacrifices by countless American men and
women, has ended in freedom's victory.
Just as America prevailed in the Cold War, we must continue to lead the
world in the global economy of the next century. Exports are vital to the
health of the US economy, accounting for 70% of our economic growth since
1988 and supporting the jobs of more than 7.5 million Americans. We must
continue to expand our exports by strengthening our lead in technological
innovation, by giving American firms and workers the tools to compete and
win in international competition, and by negotiating effective agreements
to open foreign markets to US goods and services.
The NAFTA eliminates tariffs and other barriers to the flow of goods and
services between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. It lifts barriers to
investment, strengthens the protection of intellectual property, and
improves upon trade rules that govern our bilateral trade relations to ensure
that US firms can reap the full rewards of the market opportunities NAFTA
creates.
Fifteen months ago, the Congress endorsed the extension of the fast-track
procedures to allow the NAFTA negotiations to proceed. The fast track has
been a shining example of bipartisan cooperation to enhance our Nation's
future.
I am deeply mindful of the commitment I made during the fast-track debate
to achieve a balance in the NAFTA that will not only expand our economic
growth but also facilitate adjustment for US workers and protect the
environment.
While NAFTA will create new, high-wage export-oriented jobs through
expanded trade, we have a responsibility to ensure that all US workers,
including those affected by NAFTA, have the skills to compete in global
markets. Accordingly, last month, I proposed a comprehensive new Federal
job training program for all dislocated US workers, including the relatively
small number who face adjustments because of NAFTA. It will be funded at
$2 billion annually--nearly triple the current budget for all of our existing
worker training and assistance services.
I remain equally committed to ensuring that NAFTA improves environmental
protection. The NAFTA contains unprecedented provisions to benefit the
environment. In addition, we are moving forward with a comprehensive
environmental agenda with the Government of Mexico--an agenda that
NAFTA made possible.
The trade of a nation reflects its aims and aspirations. The choice before us
is stark--to retreat into protectionism or move forward to new horizons of
challenge and opportunity in an ex-panding global economy. Our Nation won
the Cold War because of its faith in the abiding power of free people, free
markets, and free trade in goods and ideas. We must continue to lead and to
trade, confident of our ideals and principles and the ability of American
firms and workers to prevail in free and fair competition.
I look forward to working closely with the Congress to develop appropriate
legislation to approve and implement this historic agreement.
Sincerely,
0
George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: Sale of F-15 Aircraft to Saudi Arabia
Wisner
Source: Frank Wisner, Under Secretary for International
Security Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on Arms Control,
International Security and Science, and on Europe and the
Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 23 19929/23/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Eurasia
Country: Saudi Arabia, USSR (former)
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, we are here today to discuss with you the Administration's
plan to sell F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, valued at $9 billion. The
sale will consist overall of 72 F-15XP aircraft. Twenty-four F-15s will be
configured to perform defensive air-to-air combat missions. These aircraft
are comparable to the F-15C and D models already sold to Saudi Arabia. The
other 48 F-15s in this package will be configured to perform defensive air-
to-ground interdiction missions against an aggressor; for example, Iraqi
tanks or Iranian patrol boats menacing the Gulf sea lanes.
I will not get into the technical features of the F-15XP configuration, since
[Principal Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs] Carl Ford will be addressing this in his remarks.
Sale of F-15s Promotes US Security Interests
Instead, I would like to explain how this sale promotes vital US foreign
policy and security interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a watershed. We knew at the time, as we
know now, that once the Iraqi army was compelled to withdraw from
Kuwait, we and our friends in the region would have to take concrete steps
to:
-- Help build an increased capability to deter and defend against future
aggression;
-- Buy more time, in the event deterrence fails, for mobilization of
support from friendly governments;
-- Develop the interoperability that will allow the United States and
other friendly forces to reinforce our friends in the region more effectively
should that ever again be necessary; and
-- Help contribute to stronger and more stable post-crisis security
arrangements, regardless of the fate of Saddam Hussein.
In developing a plan to achieve these vital objectives, we also made clear
what we did not want. We did not want the security of the Persian Gulf to
depend on the long-term presence of US combat forces, and we did not want
to depend solely on a strategy of repeating Operation Desert Storm.
Neither the states in the region, nor we, think that they can build, by
themselves, the full range of force that in itself can deter and defeat
potential aggressor states--states which have a far larger population base
than our Desert Storm partners enjoy. In this context, and given our overall
interests, the sale of additional F-15s will enable Saudi Arabia to play a
larger role in defending itself, deterring aggression from Iraq and Iran, and
promoting stability throughout the Persian Gulf region.
By increasing its defensive capability, Saudi Arabia will be able to confront
and contain smaller contingencies on its own. That will reduce the
likelihood that US forces will have to be employed.
Moreover, in cases where it is necessary for US forces to be introduced, an
enhanced Saudi F-15 capability will increase their ability to operate jointly
with US forces, using Saudi infrastructure.
This sale will further strengthen US-Saudi security relations and raise
Saudi confidence, an important factor in Riyadh's long-term willingness to
continue an active role in promoting regional peace between Israel and the
Arab states and, eventually, to engage in regional arms control.
Sale is Consistent With US Policy
The sale of F-15s is fully consistent with the President's Middle East Arms
Control Initiative. You will recall that one aspect of that initiative calls
upon the five largest exporters of arms to the region (the United States,
United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) to establish a system of
guidelines to:
-- Prevent destabilizing transfers of conventional arms;
-- Eliminate all transfers of weapons of mass destruction and their
components and precursors;
-- Bring transparency to the arms transfer process; and
-- Foster responsible arms transfer behavior.
The five have agreed to observe these guidelines, although more work needs
to be done to establish a mechanism by which the five consult before making
arms transfers.
The emphasis of the President's arms control initiative is responsibility.
The exporters have pledged that sales would be made on the basis of
legitimate defensive needs and with a view toward promoting regional
stability. The proposed sale of F-15s satisfies these requirements and,
indeed, is a model of the kind of consideration that should go into any
responsible arms sale decision.
The Royal Saudi Air Force has an exemplary record of using US military
equipment for purely defensive purposes. Take, for example, two previous
sales which were controversial at the time--F-15C/D aircraft and the
AWACS [airborne warning and control system] system. The Saudi air
force has deployed these aircraft largely for the defense of the eastern
province, site of the world's largest oil reserves.
A test of their deterrent value occurred during the 8-year war between Iraq
and Iran. In June 1984, an Iranian intruder aircraft headed toward the vital
coastal oil installations was shot down by a Saudi F-15C fighter vectored to
its target by a Saudi-controlled US AWACS.
The availability of these aircraft to the Saudi air force was one reason why
US forces were able to limit the scope of their own direct involvement in
the defense of the Gulf oil resources and transit routes from Iranian
domination.
F-15s Will Enhance Saudi Defensive Capabilities
We have worked closely with the government and armed forces of Saudi
Arabia. We have a very clear understanding of their needs and military
requirements. We support this sale because it provides a basic, defensive
capability that can be absorbed by the Saudi air force.
I know that some of you will be concerned about the air-to-ground
capabilities that some of the F-15s in this package will possess. I urge you
not to draw hasty conclusions, equating this capability with providing Saudi
Arabia with an offensive air force that can threaten neighboring states. If
you will consider the overall force structure of Saudi Arabia and compare
that to the size of its population and the vast extent of its borders, the
defensive nature of the Saudi force is clear. Selling 48 F-15s with ground
attack capabilities will not alter this essential fact. Rather, it will
reinforce the defensive orientation of Saudi forces.
Maintaining US Aerospace-Industrial Base
I would also like you to consider the value this sale will have in helping us
to maintain our aerospace-industrial base. As Under Secretary for
International Security Affairs, I am constantly struck by the extent to
which superior US defense technologies contribute positively to the
achievement of vital US security goals.
Possession of the best weapons in the world enable us not only to deter or,
if deterrence fails, to prevail over an aggressor, it also fosters a confidence
in our friends and allies. That, in turn, enhances our influence and ability to
pursue our interests. Our willingness to sell appropriately configured, top-
quality military capabilities enables us to respond meaningfully to
legitimate defensive needs of our friends.
This is crucial to cementing the close ties that the United States
can rely on in a crisis. The US-Saudi security relationship is a case study
on the validity of this, as was amply demonstrated during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, and continues to be demonstrated in Operation
Southern Watch.
Our ability to maintain this kind of industrial base through prudent arms
sales enables us to continue producing the best defense items in the world,
such as the F-15. It is of vital importance to US security and foreign policy.
Need to Move Forward Now
Given the substantial benefits that will accrue to the United States by
selling
F-15s to Saudi Arabia, now is the time to move ahead with the sale.
Fighter aircraft sales involve long lead times. Even if the sale were
approved today, the aircraft will only become fully operational in three
phases--in 1996, 1997, and 1999. The threat to Saudi Arabia and other
states in the region is real and mounting.
Saddam has pledged to rebuild his still formidable military force
comprising over 400,000 men and 2,000 tanks. Iran is rebuilding its
military at an unprecedented rate, emphasizing offensive capabilities. US
agreement to approve the sale now will send an important signal of
commitment to Saudi Arabia and of warning to any potential aggressor.
No Harm to Israel's Security
Before concluding my remarks, let me say a few words about the impact of
the sale of 72 F-15XP's on Israel's security. Put briefly: Israel's security
will be unimpaired by this sale. I say this based on two sets of
considerations.
First, the qualitative edge which has enabled Israel confidently to face any
threat to its security in the region remains intact, and we are continuing to
consult with Israel to ensure this qualitative edge is maintained. Israel
will continue to enjoy clear air superiority over any combination of foes,
based, first of all, on a fighter pilot force that has no rival in the region.
Israel's top-notch pilot cadre is coupled with an integrated defense system
that brings to bear superior intelligence, command and control, tactics,
doctrine, and maintenance in a way no other country in the area can hope to
match now or in the foreseeable future.
But a second set of factors also needs to be considered when assessing the
impact of this F-15 sale on Israel. The Middle East remains a dangerous
neighborhood, as I have suggested earlier, but the dynamics of the region
have changed radically in the past 2 years. The notion of a unified Arab
camp motivated by its most radical elements to confront Israel militarily
was dealt a serious blow by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and defeat in the Gulf
war.
The Gulf war, in which American, other Western, and Arab troops fought
together against a common aggressor, was a watershed. Realization of the
importance of the event lay behind President Bush's and Mr. Baker's attempt
last year to seize the window of opportunity created by the war to break
down taboos which had existed for over 40 years and to substitute dialogue
for confrontation between Israel and its neighbors. That initiative, as you
know, led to the historic Madrid peace conference and the subsequent
launching of serious, face-to-face discussions between Israel and its
neighbors on bilateral issues, as well as to multilateral talks on issues of
regional concern. Saudi Arabia has fully supported this process.
As a result of the war and the peace process which has followed it, the
geostrategic picture in the Middle East today is vastly different from that
in which the Carter Administration consulted with Congress on the first
F-15 sales in 1978, or in which the Reagan Administration sought approval
for AWACS sales in 1983.
Saudi Arabia has scrupulously observed the understandings on
which those earlier sales were based. It has served as a reliable security
partner with the United States in a variety of circumstances since,
including Operation Southern Watch today, and it has played a critical role
in the wake of the Gulf war, at the Madrid conference, and since in helping
to forge what we hope will be a new, more constructive, and more secure
Middle East reality for all our friends in the region.
A strong US-Saudi security re-lationship is the best way to ensure there is
no contradiction in the US support for Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Russian Biological Weapons Program
Before turning the floor over to Carl Ford, I wanted to take this opportunity
to speak about the important strides we have made recently in addressing
our concerns over the illegal biological weapons program Russia inherited
from the former Soviet Union. President Yeltsin made a key breakthrough
earlier this year when he acknowledged the existence of the program and
made a commitment to end it. I have only recently returned from a trip to
Moscow to establish a process by which we can assure ourselves that
President Yeltsin's pledge is carried out.
Our joint statement with Russia and the United Kingdom acknowledges the
important steps Russia has already taken in dismantling this program,
which violates the 1972 biological weapons convention. However, we also
acknowledged that there is still quite a way to go. Last week in Moscow,
the Russians took the crucial step of promising us access to all of the
facilities we are concerned about so that we can satisfy ourselves that the
program is shut down. Further, we have set in motion a cooperative process
whereby we can work with the Russians to make sure all necessary
steps are taken to end this program. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that the
highest levels of the Russian Government are committed to achieve full
compliance with their international obligations regarding biological
weapons, and I am convinced that we have now set off on the right path for
getting there. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: Status of Middle East Peace Talks
Djerejian
Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near
East Affairs and Acting Assistant Secretary for South Asian
Affairs
Description: Opening statement from news briefing, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 24 19929/24/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria
Subject: Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
I would like to discuss, first, the general characteristics of this, the sixth
round of the Arab-Israeli negotiations.
Unlike previous rounds, there was a different and more cordial tone between
the parties in the talks. These talks were conducted with a seriousness of
purpose and in a positive, constructive, and businesslike way.
The parties are definitely grappling with the tough key issues of territory,
peace, and security. They have learned that there are no instant, simple
solutions, and are dealing with the substantive complexities of the issues.
Now, while there were no so-called breakthroughs during this round, we
believe the parties have achieved a good foundation for future progress. In
that respect, all sides--Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian--in the talks and in
the region are engaged in a dialogue on peace, and we must not lose sight of
that fundamental fact.
The continuity of the talks in the 11 months since Madrid shows the
durability of the process and the commitment by the parties to the process
of peace-making. There should be no doubt at this time of the steady
engagement of the parties to these negotiations.
In our discussions with the delegations today, we understand the parties
will return to Washington on October 21 for a period of about 4 weeks, until
November 19, for the seventh round of negotiations.
Concerning our role--the role of the United States as a co-sponsor--we have
been actively engaged, with the support of all parties, in the thinking-
through of issues and ways to solve problems. Acting Secretary Eagleburger
has met with all the delegations and communicated with the leaders in the
region and with officials in New York during the UN General Assembly
meetings at the ministerial level. All the parties have conveyed to the
Acting Secretary their desire to make progress and have this peace-making
process succeed.
Of course, President Bush and Chief of Staff Baker have been kept informed
of the progress of these talks on a daily basis.
Now, let me make some brief comments on the various negotiations
themselves. On the Israeli-Syrian negotiations in this track, for the first
time, both exchanged authoritative documents on their views of the
principles in the negotiations. While no joint statement was agreed at this
time, there are some common elements in their respective positions on the
key issues of territory, peace, and security. There were also positive public
signals and statements back home, on both sides, which will help condition
the environment for peace.
On the Israeli-Palestinian track, for the first time, both sides are fully
engaged in negotiating substantive issues, and they began a more detailed
discussion on the elements of interim self-governing arrangements. There
was definitely a seriousness of purpose in these talks. They exchanged
agendas and other papers reflecting questions on each other's proposals.
Again, while there were no breakthroughs, they are engaged in meaningful
exchanges which we think can definitely be built upon.
On the Israeli-Jordanian track, it has continued in a very positive
atmosphere, as has been characteristic of this track in the earlier rounds.
Both sides continue to discuss agenda, and there were experts' discussions
on a variety of functional issues. More work needs to be done to narrow the
gaps on the agenda, and ways are being explored to achieve this.
In the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations, both sides continued in a constructive
manner to focus on the key issues between them and appeared to be moving
forward with constructive discussion on security issues relating to
southern Lebanon. We have urged all sides to do what can be done to
maintain stability in the south of Lebanon and avoid acts which could ignite
a cycle of confrontation.
Both Israelis and Lebanese acknowledge the seriousness of purpose of the
other side and expressed their intent to remain engaged to move the process
forward.
Let me make some brief comments on the multilaterals. Two of the five
working groups scheduled to meet this fall have met. The working group on
arms control and regional security met in Moscow; and on water resources,
in Washington. Both of these working groups went very well, and they
developed practical proposals for future progress.
We continue to believe that the multilateral phase of the talks compliments
the bilaterals, which, of course, remain the focal point of the peace process,
but the initial results indicate to us the potential the multilaterals hold.
Looking briefly ahead, the parties will now go back home and prepare for the
next round. We hope the parties use the intervening time to think seriously
about the issues and possible solutions; how to bridge the gaps, narrow
differences. We will be consulting with the parties in the region and in
Washington during this break in the rounds and look forward to their return
next month. (###)
Title: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 773 ON IRAQ-
KUWAIT BOUNDARY
UN
Source: UN Security Council, The United Nations, New York,
New York
Description: Resolution 773
Date: Aug, 26 19928/26/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: United Nations
[TEXT]
Resolution 773 (August 26, 1992)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, and in particular
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 thereof, and its resolution 689 (1991) of 9 April
1991,
Recalling the report of the Secretary-General dated 2 May 1991 concerning
the establishment of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation
Commission (the Commission) and the subsequent exchange of letters of 6
and 13 May 1991 (S/22558, S/22592 and S/22593),
Having considered the Secretary-General's letter of 12 August 1992 to the
President of the Security Council transmitting the further report of the
Commission,
Recalling in this connection that through the demarcation process the
Commission is not reallocating territory between Kuwait and Iraq, but it is
simply carrying out the technical task necessary to demarcate for the first
time the precise coordinates of the boundary set out in the Agreed Minutes
between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the
restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters signed by
them on 4 October 1963, and that this task is being carried out in the
special circumstances following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and pursuant to
resolution 687 (1991) and the Secretary-General's report for implementing
paragraph 3 of that resolution
(S/22558),
1. Welcomes the Secretary-General's letter of 12 August to the President
of the Council and the further report of the Commission enclosed therewith;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Commission for its work on the
demarcation of the land boundary, and welcomes its demarcation decisions;
3. Welcomes also the decision of the Commission to consider the Eastern
section of the boundary, which includes the offshore boundary, at its next
session and urges the Commission to demarcate this part of the boundary as
soon as possible and thus complete its work;
4. Underlines its guarantee of the inviolability of the above-mentioned
international boundary and its decision to take as appropriate all necessary
measures to that end in accordance with the Charter, as provided for in
paragraph 4 of resolution 687 (1991);
5. Welcomes further the Secretary-General's intention to carry out at the
earliest practicable time the realignment of the demilitarized zone referred
to in paragraph 5 of resolution 687 (1991) to correspond to the
international boundary demarcated by the Commission, with the consequent
removal of the Iraqi police posts;
6. Urges the two States concerned to cooperate fully with the work of the
Commission;
7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
VOTE: 14-0-1 (Ecuador abstaining). (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: UN General Assembly Resolution 47/1 On Serbia-
Montenegro
UN
Source: General Assembly, The United Nations, New York
Description: Resolution 47/1
Date: Sep, 22 19929/22/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, United States
Subject: United Nations, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Resolution 47/1 (September 22, 1992)
The General Assembly,
Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 19
September 1992 that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it
shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,1
1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, and therefore
decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not
participate in the work of the General Assembly;
2. Takes note of the intention of the Security Council to consider the
matter again before the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of
the General Assembly.
VOTE: 127-6-26 (Kenya, Swaziland, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia,
Zimbabwe against; Angola, The Bahamas, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi,
Cameroon, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ghana, Guyana, India, Iraq, Jamaica,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Sri
Lanka, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Zaire abstaining).
1 A/47/456 (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Department
Statement
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, New York City
Date: Sep, 22 19929/22/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, United States
Subject: United Nations, Human Rights
[TEXT]
The United States today transmitted to the UN Secretary General its initial
report on information concerning violations of humanitarian law and grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. We are taking this step pursuant to UN Security Council
Resolution 771 which requests member states to collect such information
and provide it to the United Nations.
The report details allegations of willful killing, torture of prisoners, abuse
of civilians in detention centers, deliberate attacks on non-combatants,
wanton devastation and destruction of property, and others including mass
forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians (ethnic cleansing).
We are working actively with others on a resolution to create a UN
commission to look into these charges, to establish the facts, and to
prepare for possible prosecution of individuals found guilty of those crimes.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: First US Report on War Crimes In the Former
Yugoslavia
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Description: Submission of Information to the United Nations
Security Council in Accordance With Paragraph 5 of Resolution
771 (1992)
Date: Sep, 22 19929/22/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro, United States
Subject: United Nations, Human Rights, POW/MIA Issues,
Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Introduction
In paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992), the United Nations Security Council
called upon States and international humanitarian organizations to collate
substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating
to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia and to make this information available to the Council. This
report is in response to that request.
Paragraph 1 of Resolution 771 reaffirms that all parties to the conflict in
the territory of former Yugoslavia are bound to comply with their
obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons who commit or
order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually
responsible in respect of such breaches. Paragraph 2 of the Resolution
strongly condemns any violations of international humanitarian law,
including those involved in the practice of "ethnic cleansing." The third
preambular paragraph of the resolution lists some of the violations of
international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
that have been reported:
"...mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and
abuse of civilians in detention centres, deliberate attacks on non-
combatants, hospitals and ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and
medical supplies to the civilian population, and wanton devastation and
destruction of property."
In collating substantiated information on violations of humanitarian law
pursuant to paragraph 5 of Resolution 771, the United States has focused on
the violations identified in the Resolution and other grave breaches as
defined in Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,
1949). Consequently the information contained in this report is categorized
in accordance with the list of reported violations contained in Resolution
771 as quoted above and the other grave breaches listed in Article 147 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention that do not correspond to those mentioned in
Resolution 771 (i.e., willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment;
compelling a civilian or prisoner of war to serve in the forces of a hostile
power; willfully depriving a civilian or prisoner of war [of] the rights of
fair and regular trial; and hostage taking).
The discrete incidents reported herein contain indications that they are part
of a systematic campaign toward a single objective--the creation of an
ethnically "pure" state. We have not identified "ethnic cleansing," which is
condemned in paragraph 2 of Resolution 771, as a separate category of
violations. Nevertheless, the rubric of ethnic cleansing may unite events
that appear unconnected and may therefore prove useful in identifying
persons and institutions that may be responsible for violations of
established international humanitarian law.
The United States has obtained the information in our report from a variety
of sources, including eyewitness accounts reported to the United States.
Because Resolution 771 calls upon international humanitarian organizations
also to submit the substantiated information in their possession to the
Council, the United States has mentioned but has not summarized the
reports it has received from such organizations. Because press reports are
[a] matter of public knowledge and often are hearsay, the United States has
described only such media reports in which the reporter stated that he/she
personally witnessed violations of international humanitarian law. The
United States has provided the most reliable information available to us and
has relied to the extent possible on eyewitness accounts. Dates at the left
margin of the attached report refer to approximate dates of incidents.
For the convenience of the Security Council, we have attached several
relevant reports of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The United
States will, as appropriate, submit supplemental reports when additional
information comes into its possession.
Former Yugoslavia:
Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention
Willful Killing
25 August: At Manjaca prison camp, south of Banja Luka, 25 bodies of
emaciated men, believed to be prisoners, were discovered with their throats
cut. The camp was operated by the Serbian Army of Bosnia-Hercegovina
under General Ratho Mladic. (Department of State)
24 August: A resident of Pososje, Bosnia saw 24 men, 2 women, and 2
boys machine-gunned by Serbs in her neighbor's garden. (Reuters)
24 July: A former inmate of the Serb-run Keraterm camp in Prijedor, in
northwestern Bosnia, said that more than 100 prisoners died, due to riots
after prisoners were denied water for an unspecified time; most suf-
focated in a crowd of prisoners trying to escape through a window, others
were shot while escaping or summarily executed for participating in the
riots. (Department of State)
8 July: Several hundred Muslim men were taken prisoner by Serb
paramilitaries during a forced evacuation of Gacko, and 36 were murdered.
(Department of State)
July: A man interned at the Djakovo Refugee camp witnessed the murder of
an acquaintance with the handle of an axe or pick. "He was over 55, and I
saw him beaten . . . with my own eyes." The guards in the camp wore
fatigues and hats with Chetnik symbols. (Congress)
17 June: A 37-year-old male from Doboj, the village of Pridjel Gornji,
described the killing of seven people and the destruction of the mosque by
the Chetniks. "Some wore white bands; some wore read caps; some wore
JNA [Yugoslav National Army] uniforms. They beat us with rifle butts."
(Congress)
June: The Citizens Council of Kozarac appealed for international observers
about June 6 claiming that a large-scale massacre had occurred in Kozarac
and that truckloads of bodies had been taken away to cover up the crimes
committed there. (Department of State)
27 May: A 55-year-old woman from Kozarac was brought to camp in
Trnopolje on May 27 where she and a group of 300-400 witnessed the killing
by machine gun of Besic Jusuf (50), Karabasic Ismet (35), Ekrem Karabasic
(25), Sejdo Karabasic (21), and Meho Vukanovic (25). "They (Chetniks and
Serbs) killed them because they had haircuts that made them think they
were Ustashi." (Congress)
26 May: About 200 Muslim refugees from Visegrad heading for Macedonia
were turned back at the Mokra Gora border crossing into Serbia on May 26.
An employee of the bus company that was transporting the refugees said
that the group was stopped outside Bosanska Jagodina later that day by a
group of armed men, and that he saw 17 male refugees taken from the buses
and "liquidated." The killers were members of two Serbian "volunteer"
groups operating in the local Serb "territorial defense" formation, which had
been systematically abducting and murdering Muslims in the region.
(Department of State)
2-22 May: A man reliably believed to be a former inmate of the Serb-run
Luka camp in Brcko described evidence of violence in the camp, including
bloodstains. According to other inmates, he said, as many as 1,000 killings
took place at Luka camp between May 2-22, after which the bodies were
buried in a mass grave near a livestock farm called Bimex-Brcko.
(Department of State)
21 May: A 29-year-old woman from Kabljami, in the vicinity of Prijedor, on
May 21 witnessed the killing of five or six policemen. "They also killed
some men who possessed tractors." (Congress)
18 May: "I saw my father and mother being killed," said a resident of
Kozarac. "Both were 67 years old." The killer was a 21-year-old neighbor.
"He probably slaughtered 30 elderly people that day." (Congress)
16 May-14 July: A Muslim man, taken to Prnjavor camp in Bosnian Serb
Krajina, described beatings by Serbian military police. He saw one man die
during a beating on May 17 and another died on June 6. The alleged killers
were members of groups called White Eagles or White Wolves. (Congress)
7 May: A private citizen reported that he had visited a cattle
slaughterhouse near Brcko, near the Luka camp. He heard screams and shots.
He spoke with a survivor of the facility, who said that 100-300 persons
were killed each day from May 7-14. (Department of State)
7 May: A resident of Brcko told of mass killings during the first week of
May when Brcko surrendered to Serb forces with little resistance.
(Department of State)
2 May: A 38-year-old inmate at the Djakovo Refugee camp in Croatia said
that she was taken on May 9 to Luka camp near Brcko, where she saw 10
people being killed every day with rifle butts and bottles.
Two prisoners were required to slap each other. The one who didn't slap as
hard was killed. One time, I saw them cut off the ears of the weak slapper,
then cut off his nose and then kill him by cutting his throat.
(Congress)
May: Four relatives of a Bosnian refugee were chopped up by Chet-niks and
burned, according to May 21 testimony given to the Carinthian provincial
government of Austria. During the same testimony, the refugee described
how the Chetniks had cut his cousin with razor blades and pulled off his skin
with pliers. (Department of State)
May: An American citizen, in the custody of Serbian forces after serving in
the Croatian army, said that he saw Serbian soldiers torture a Croatian
soldier to death in a camp near Bileca, Bosnia. He saw the same soldiers
torture another group of Croatian prisoners. He saw one die being carried
away. (Department of State)
10 April: A Serb who had been married to a Bosnian Muslim told US Embassy
officers in Budapest on September 9 that several Yugoslav army tanks had
come in to Zvornik on April 10. About 30 masked irregulars, who she
claimed belonged to a unit under "Arkan," conducted a house-to-house search
for Muslim men by checking identity cards. The Serbs then allegedly cut off
the heads, hands, and feet of their victims. (Department of State)
Torture of Prisoners
6 August: ITN [a UK television network] and The Guardian reported on a visit
by journalists to Trnopolje, in northeastern Bosnia, where the journalists
witnessed emaciated prisoners and were given smuggled pictures of men
with terrible injuries from beatings allegedly inflicted by Serb soldiers at
Omarska and other camps. (London Press Association)
July: A 62-year-old inmate described his 18-day ordeal at the Djakovo
Refugee camp in Croatia.
There were 199 of us in the camp. I know the number because I counted the
pieces of bread that were given out. While in the camp, I was hit and beaten
up. My legs were swollen, I had bruises on my face, and my eyes were
swollen. They would pour water on me and continue beating me.
(Congress)
June-July: A 60-year-old man signed in as prisoner number 519 in the
Bosanski Samac camp.
"They hit me with a stick and burned me with cigarettes. They would throw
water on me to wake me up so they could continue the beatings. I got
pneumonia because of the cold water."
On the day he was released, he was beaten in the stomach. A certificate
from Slavanski Brod Medical Center showed that he was treated July 5-17
for contusions, fractured ribs, and psychotic depression. He had burn marks
on his left arm and a large scar on the top of his head. (Congress)
March-May: Two American citizens who enlisted and served in the Croatian
army were incarcerated from March to May in three separate POW camps
during which time they were beaten daily with gun stocks. They also
witnessed daily beatings of other prisoners. The prisoners were subjected
to electric shock treatment, use of a "stun gun," and sexual assaults. Scars
and bruises were still evident on at least one of the Americans when he was
turned over to the US ambassador in Belgrade. (Department of State)
Abuse of Civilians in Detention Centers
1 September: Congressman Frank Wolf visited a prison camp, operated by
paramilitaries of the Serbian Democratic party (SDS) at Batkovic.
Reportedly 1,280 men were held in two grossly overcrowded sheds where
they slept on straw. Most of the prisoners were apparently being held for no
reason other than their ethnic identity. (Department of State)
30-31 August: CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]
mission member John Zerolis, a US Foreign Service Officer assigned to the
US Embassy in Zagreb, inspected the Serb-run prison camp of Manjaca in
northwest Bosnia. He observed several thousand prisoners, none of whom
was wearing any form of uniform. At that time his group was told by
prisoners that they were non-combatants, that they had been summoned
from their homes or simply called to the door, and that they were then
arrested. Asked about attempted escapes from Manjaca, camp commander
Lt. Col. Popovic said there had never been any, and there "never would be
any." (Department of State)
14 August: "Tens--possibly scores" of women were confined uncomfortably
in an overheated metal shed that appeared to be a former munitions
warehouse in a disused Yugoslav Army barracks outside Capljina run by
Major Miro Hrstic of the Croatian Defense Association of HOS. In response
to questions from journalists about the shed, Hrstic said, "Let that remain a
secret." (London, The Guardian)
August: Serbian civilian inmates, including a pregnant woman and elderly
people, are subjected to beatings at the former JNA Victor Bubanj barracks
in Sarajevo, a camp run by Bosnian Muslims. (Belgrade's opposition weekly,
Vreme)
August: Women inmates were raped while being held at the Croat-run Odzak
camp, according to a Western reporter who interviewed Serb refugees.
(Department of State)
15 July: A Serbian artillery attack on Bosanski Brod killed 9 and wounded
over 30 at a nearby refugee center. (Department of State)
26 May-26 June: A 43-year-old woman who was interviewed on August 10
at the Spnsko Water Facility near Zagreb had been taken on May 26 to
Prijedor to the Trnoplje Camp. During her 30-day captivity, "drunk soldiers
came into the room to get women and girls as young as 12 and 13 . . . the
girls said they had been raped. Some of the girls didn't return." (Congress)
Deliberate Attacks on Non-Combatants
August-8 September: Rexhep Osmani, president of the Naim Frasheri
Teachers' Association in Kosovo, has been in jail since mid-August facing
undefined charges. Forty-one school administrators and teachers were
"brutally treated" during the week of September 1 by Serb authorities.
Serbian police "opened fire" against high school students in early September
at the PEC Technical School Shaben Spahija, according to Kosova education
officials. (Department of State)
6 September: A convoy of UN trucks carrying aid supplies to Bosnian
civilians was mortared on September 6. Snipers fired all day at UN
personnel as they distributed food to people in Sarajevo. (Hamburg DPA)
5 September: Serb militia--who control the main water reservoir outside
of Sarajevo--were reducing water supplies to the city in "another attack on
civilians," according to the deputy commander of the Bosnian forces. (API)
3 September: Marco Betti, Cesare Buttaglieri, Giuliano Velardi, and Marco
Rigliaco were killed on September 3 when their G-222 aircraft--which was
carrying five tons of blankets to Sarajevo on a UN relief mission--was
shot down by up to three ground-to-air missiles. (Rome, ANSA; London, The
Independent)
Wanton Devastation and Destruction of Property
4 September: Destruction and damage to homes is occurring at the rate of
hundreds each day, making them unsuitable for habitation during the winter,
according to UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] Zagreb program
coordinator Anthony Land. (Department of State)
August: The Chetniks burned down houses, threw grenades, and planted
bombs in Montenegro, according to refugee Ms. Medina, who was recorded on
May 21 by the Carinthian provincial government of Austria. (Department of
State)
June: Yugoslav military aircraft bombed a tobacco factory in the Bosnian
town of Grude to stunt the struggling economy, according to the US Senate
staff report. (Congress)
26 May: On May 26, the 200-year-old mosque of Prijedor was destroyed.
(MAGYAR SZO)
April: In a letter to the US Secretary of State dated May 1, Professor
Muhamed Dresevljakovic--the major of Sarajevo--wrote that militant parts
of the Serbian Democratic party had destroyed
. . . civil sections, vital economy and communal buildings, schools and
nursery schools, monuments of culture, boards of health, sacred monuments.
The mayor begged, "Don't let Sarajevo become a second Vukovar, Bosanski
Brod, or Foca--cities vanished from the face of the earth." (Department of
State)
March-July: The Croatian city of Slavonski Brod has been hit by over 10,000
artillery rounds, bombs, mortars, and ground-to-ground rockets since March.
As of July 16, over 70 civilians had been killed, including 18 children, and
over 200 wounded. The 3,000 buildings that had been damaged included 15%
of the local residential housing. (Department of State)
Other, Including Mass Forcible Expulsion and Deportation of
Civilians
3 September: Almost 200 judges were dismissed from positions in Kosovo
because of their Albanian ethnic identity. (Department of State)
1 September: Inmates in the Manjaca camp, south of Banja Luka and
operated by the Bosnian Serb army, are civilians arrested because of their
ethnic identity, according to US Embassy sources in Banja Luka.
(Department of State)
24 August: A resident of Pososje was taken by Serbs and, with other
persons, robbed and turned loose near Muslim lines at Travnik. (Reuters)
20 August: More than 1,500 primarily Muslim refugees were forced to leave
the northwestern Bosnian town of Sanski Most and travel through the night-
-many by foot--to Travnik. Along the way, more than 40 of their vehicles
were stolen. (AFI)
4 August: Serbian Democratic party (SDS) strategy is to expel Muslim Slavs
from most of Bosnia, according to the US Embassy in Belgrade. The SDS
campaign of ethnic cleansing is causing misery and death for large numbers
of Bosnian Muslims. (Department of State)
2 August: Albanian leaders described the Serbian intention of changing the
ethnic balance in Kosovo. Since 1989, over 100,000 Albanians have been
deprived of their jobs. This fall, 64,000 Albanian secondary school students
may boycott classes, refusing a required Serbian curriculum. (Department
of State)
8 July: Ethnic Muslims were forced from the district of Gacko, on the
southern border with Montenegro. (Department of State)
24 June: SDS/JNA forces drove non-Serbs--as well as Serbs married to
Muslims or Croats, and Serbs who were "disloyal"--out of their homes.
Those expelled were given as little as 30 minutes to gather their
belongings. (Department of State)
9 June: Serb paramilitaries who had taken control of the Muslim-majority
districts of Zvornik, Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Vlasenica were
systematically expelling Muslims. Muslims in the settlement of Grobnica,
near Zvornik, were given a 24-hour ultimatum to leave, and were not being
allowed to carry any possessions with them. The nearby town of Kozluk,
whose population of 6,000 was predominantly Muslim, was under SDS
occupation and "cleansed" as well. (Department of State)
4 June: The "war presidency" has been established following the Serb
paramilitary occupation of Visegrad. Much of the district's Muslim
population has fled and the Serbs have been confiscating the property of "all
those citizens whose return to the territory of the Visegrad district has
been forbidden." The "war presidency" has been inviting "Serb refugees from
other areas" to move into vacant homes in Visegrad. (Department of State)
2 June: Serb paramilitaries have destroyed neighborhoods with large Muslim
populations and killed some people in the towns of Sanski Most and Prijedor,
in northwestern Bosnia. An office of emigration was established in Banja
Luka to "facilitate" population transfers, since "more and more citizens of
all nationalities want to change their place and area of residence."
(Department of State)
17 March: A source close to Bosnian President Izetbegovic suggested that
the upsurge of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina was coordinated by the
Serbian Democratic party (SDS) and others, perhaps including the Croatian
Democratic Union (HDZ), and the army. The army reportedly had provided
arms to the Serb militants in Bosanski Brod, Zenica, Kalinovik, and near
Sarajevo. (Department of State) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: South Africa: A Time for Leadership
Cohen
Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 23 19929/23/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: South Africa
Subject: Democratization, Human Rights,
Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to give
the Administration's views on the situation in South Africa. I welcome this
opportunity to continue our fruitful dialogue on South Africa's transition
from apartheid.
Two months ago today, I testified on this subject before the Africa
Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. At that time, I
expressed the Administration's deep concern about developments that led
to suspension in June of talks within the Convention for a Democratic South
Africa, or CODESA. Those talks, which had begun with such hope in
December 1991, stalled over fundamental differences on basic issues such
as rights for minorities, the degree of devolution of power to regional
governments and local authorities, and the length of time for effecting a
transition to a government based on a new constitution.
Following the June 17 killing of over 40 men, women, and children in the
township of Boipatong, allegedly by residents of a nearby workers' hostel,
the African National Congress (ANC) declared it would not resume the talks
until the government addressed its demands for action to stop the violence
and for concessions relating to the negotiations. Addressing this impasse 2
months ago, I urged all sides to take the steps necessary to get the
negotiations back underway.
The Violence Must End
Tragically, this has not happened. The consequences of the continuing
impasse are clear for all to see. Violence has continued unrelentingly, and
the daily death toll mounts. Earlier this month, as we Americans were
celebrating Labor Day, security forces of the Ciskei homeland mowed down
with automatic gunfire hundreds of ANC demonstrators in the streets of its
capital, Bisho. When the firing stopped, two dozen people lay dead, and over
200 were injured. These killings and those that now are commonplace every
day in South Africa are senseless, and they must stop. It is time for South
Africans to put aside posturing and brinksmanship and to resolve the few,
albeit difficult, remaining issues that divide them. Fortunately, there are
indications that South African leaders may be coming to that same
conclusion.
A Return to the Negotiating Table
We remain convinced that negotiations offer the only viable means for South
Africa's peaceful transition to non-racial democracy. Given the continuing
violence and the related deterioration of South Africa's economy, we believe
these negotiations must resume soon. There can be no return to the
repression of the apartheid era, nor does armed revolution offer an
alternative path to democracy.
The Bisho tragedy seemingly shocked all parties into recognizing the costs
and risks of escalating violence. We, along with the international
community and many in South Africa, placed the responsibility for the
bloodshed where it belonged--on both sides. Subsequently, the two sides
drew back from the brink and have made gestures toward restoring
negotiations. President de Klerk made the dramatic offer of a summit
meeting; ANC President Mandela accepted conditionally. The ANC has
narrowed its previous preconditions to three "undertakings" by the
government concerning bans on carrying traditional weapons, increased
security at workers' hostels, and movement on release of individuals the
ANC considers "political prisoners." The government, for its part, has
accepted that violence is a major obstacle to restoring a constructive
climate for negotiations, thus opening the way to addressing these issues
that have been a major source of anger and frustration for the ANC.
Adding to this momentum is the growing recognition by all sides that every
day of delay in the transition to a democratic South Africa contributes to
further economic decline and makes eventual recovery more difficult. A
further weakened economy is in no one's best interests. South Africa needs
a strong, vibrant free-market economy if it is to redress effectively the
appalling socioeconomic legacy of apartheid.
While the country thus appears to have weathered the most recent crisis,
tensions remain high, and elements within the constituencies of the various
parties remain restive. Before the summit can take place, there will have
to be agreement on concrete steps to be taken to curb violence, most
notably, bans on the public display of all weapons and securing hostels.
These measures have been advocated by the Goldstone Commission and
endorsed by the UN Secretary General's special representative. We are
hopeful that agreement is within grasp on these issues as well as on the
contentious issue of political prisoners.
President de Klerk, ANC President Mandela, and other South African political
leaders must now once again demonstrate the decisive leadership so amply
shown in the past. They must find common ground to resolve those issues
which have blocked resumption of the talks. Their failure to do so can only
result in more bloodshed as South Africa's transition to democracy is
further delayed.
As leader of the government, President de Klerk bears special responsibility
to take effective steps to address the continuing violence. We hold the
South African Government ultimately responsible for the actions of the
defense forces of the so-called independent homelands. The government
must take steps to ensure there are no repetitions of the excessive and
unjustified use of lethal force used by the Ciskei security force against ANC
demonstrators on September 7.
Similarly, mass actions aimed at confrontations that add to the already
unacceptable level of violence are clearly ill advised. This is particularly
the case when mass action proceeds from the false premise that easy
victories can be gained on issues already the subject of serious
negotiations. The ANC must contribute to creating a constructive
atmosphere for resumption of the talks. All South Africans have a
fundamental right to organize peaceful protest and to be adequately
protected while exercising that right. We are encouraged that the ANC
recently decided to postpone marches into Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu,
demonstrations that would have led to further bloodshed. We hope the ANC
will seriously reconsider its tactic of confrontation with the homeland
governments before rescheduling these marches.
Furthermore, we believe President Mandela and Chief Buthelezi must move
decisively to address the enduring differences between the ANC and the
Inkatha Freedom Party--differences that fuel much of today's violence. In
this regard, and in the context of the other actions I have suggested, I hope
that these two leaders will soon meet to begin bridging the gap that divides
them, thereby giving a clear signal to their communities that their political
objectives must be pursued through peaceful means. Inkatha and the ANC
must encourage the basic right of all South Africans to pursue lawful
political activity in all parts of the country--"no go" areas are not
acceptable.
I realize these steps will not be easy, but these are critical times for South
Africa--the future of the nation is at stake. I call on these leaders to rise
to the demands of the occasion and make the necessary tough decisions that
will enable South Africa to resume the path toward peaceful transition to
non-racial democracy.
US Role
My thoughts today outlined the continuing role of the United States as
concerned outsider. We have sought consistently to help foster a process
which will facilitate a rapid, peaceful transition to non-racial democracy.
We maintain an ongoing dialogue with South African leaders across the
spectrum, urging an end to the violence and helping refocus attention on
negotiations. And we continue our assistance programs with the objectives
of preparing black South Africans for positions of leadership in a new South
Africa and addressing the broad development concerns of the country's black
population.
The United States has also supported strongly the involvement of the United
Nations in South Africa. In July, Special Representative Cyrus Vance visited
South Africa to assess how the United Nations could support the peace
process. On the basis of his findings, the United Nations is now dispatching
50 observers to South Africa to cooperate with the existing structures of
the national peace accord. Some of these observers are already on the job;
the others will arrive shortly. The Secretary General also has dispatched
his special envoy, Virendra Dayal, to further facilitate efforts to restore
the negotiating environment. The effectiveness of UN observers has already
been demonstrated. In early August, they were instrumental in negotiating
on-the-ground arrangements that successfully avoided bloodshed during an
earlier ANC March on Ciskei. We expect the UN observers--as well as others
to be provided by the EC [European Community] and the Commonwealth--will
be an important resource in checking the violence. We are encouraged by the
South African Government's willingness to accept and, indeed, welcome this
international involvement.
Next Steps
The United States remains determined to do whatever we can to assist
South Africa's transition to a free, non-racial democracy with a vibrant,
market-based economy. Ultimately, however, the future of South Africa lies
in the hands of the South Africans themselves. Only they can make and
implement the decisions needed to heal the deep wounds left by decades of
apartheid. Only they can take the steps to redress the socioeconomic legacy
of apartheid. I have already set forth the steps that I believe must be taken
by the major players to get the talks underway once again and to bring them
to a successful conclusion.
In earlier testimony, I set forth several points which we believe are basic
to a genuine democratic solution in South Africa. They bear repeating:
-- A solution must include all relevant parties and promote tolerance in a
country of great diversity;
-- It should acknowledge the right of the majority to govern while
assuring that all South Africans have a stake in their government; and
-- It should ensure that government functions within an agreed framework
which includes protection of the fundamental rights of all citizens, but it
should avoid overly complex arrangements intended to guarantee a share of
power to particular groups, an arrangement that would frustrate effective
governance. Minorities have a right to safeguards; they cannot expect a
veto.
In that same testimony, I urged South Africans to consider seriously the
degree to which federalism might address many of the tensions inherent in
their society. Subsequent debate has revealed that some in South Africa
portray federalism as a facade for stripping the central government of most
significant authority. It is just such efforts to corrupt the purposes of
federalism and turn it to the defense of the status quo that have earned it
the enmity of so many in the disenfranchised majority and stifled serious
debate. All South Africans should understand that effective federalism is a
framework fully consistent with strong, responsive government at the
national, regional, and local levels with power and responsibility reserved
for those levels most responsive to citizen needs and desires.
I remain hopeful [that] the negotiations will soon resume. All South Africa's
leading parties remain committed to the negotiating process, realizing full
well that it is the only viable alternative. I fully expect that once
negotiations resume, the parties will build on the substantial progress they
have already made. I firmly believe that the elements of a final agreement
are within reach. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: US Relief Effort in Somalia
Natsios
Source: Andrew S. Natsios, President's Special Coordinator
for Somali Relief, US Agency for International
Development
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 16 19929/16/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Somalia
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, United Nations
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, my current and previous positions have made me witness over
the past several years to most of the world's major famines and many other
humanitarian crises. I can tell you that what I saw in Somalia a few weeks
ago is the most unspeakably tragic human suffering I have ever seen. And it
is tragedy compounded by profound intractability.
One recent week in Baidoa, one of the worst-hit towns, the ICRC
[International Committee of the Red Cross] collected 1,334 bodies--young
and old victims of starvation and Somalia's latest killer: disease. My
survey of Baidoa provided haunting images too horrific and too numerous for
the mind to fully absorb: the body of a 12-year-old boy who had just died
being carted out of a feeding center in a wheelbarrow; the bodies of two
elderly women who had just died lying in the corridor of that center, as yet
uncollected because desperate relief workers were absorbed with the needs
of the dying; an 11-year-old girl in that center, with no mother or father,
scrounging food for her 5-year-old sister--she would become her family's
lone and lonely survivor when the 5-year-old died before the afternoon was
over.
Review of US Government Activities
International relief organizations, with consistent US Government support,
are battling this catastrophe, despite the enormity of the Somali tragedy
and unprecedented chaos in which relief workers risk their lives. As you
know, the US Government has been involved in providing humanitarian relief
to Somalia since the crisis began 19 months ago. To date, we have pledged
over $146 million in humanitarian aid, including 225,000 mt [metric tons] of
food. We will ship a total of 120,000 mt of food this fiscal year.
The United States [has] activated a range of interventions since December
1990: press conferences and briefings to raise awareness of the Somalia
crisis; demarches to other donors to do more; relief assessment missions to
Somalia and neighboring refugee-impacted countries; allocation of
additional food resources; and a steady stream of grants to those
courageous private voluntary organizations (PVOs) willing to work in
Somalia and with refugees.
In the summer of 1991, USAID [US Agency for International Development]
called upon the ICRC to initiate a massive feeding program in Somalia. The
ICRC's outstanding--indeed, heroic--work has staved off starvation for
hundreds of thousands of Somalis.
In December 1991, we asked the United Nations to re-enter Somalia.
It did so in January 1992 but has been unable to address the enormous needs.
This summer, I asked Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance Director Jim
Kunder to lead a mission to the region, a mission on which Senator
Kassenbaum played a key role. That assessment trip coincided with the
President's reading a cable by US Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone on
the current situation along the Kenya-Somalia border. The President, deeply
disturbed by what he read in the ambassador's report and heard from the
Kunder mission, ordered an expanded US initiative. On August 14, the
President announced that:
-- The Department of Defense (DOD) would initiate emergency airlifts to
Somalia and drought- and refugee-impacted areas of northern Kenya;
-- The United States would seek a [UN] Security Council resolution that
would authorize the use of additional measures to move food into Somalia;
-- The United States would urge the United Nations to convene a donors'
conference to help accelerate delivery of relief supplies; and
-- The United States would provide an additional 145,000 mt of food for
the Somalia relief effort.
At that time, the President also named me as his Special Coordinator for
Somali Relief.
Current Situation
Despite all of our efforts to help avert disaster in Somalia, we are now
facing, in all its horror and wasting, mass starvation--mass starvation
directly attributable to insecurity that prevents relief groups from saving
lives. The magnitude of the tragedy today is staggering:
-- An estimated one-third of the Somali population of 6.5 million is
estimated to be at risk of starvation;
-- Relief groups estimate that 25% of all children under 5 have died and
that the remaining could soon perish; as many as 1,000 to 2,000 people
could be dying daily;
-- There are now over 800,000 Somali refugees in nearby countries--many
living in barbarous conditions.
Observations From Somalia Trip
During my travel to Somalia, I observed actions that are working. The US
airlift, both into northern Kenya and Somalia, is running smoothly. Although
the United Nations, ICRC, and PVOs had some initial reservations about our
initiative, they are now working closely with the DOD, USAID, [and the]
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to move relief supplies. General
Libutti, who manages the DOD airlift, and Bill Garvelink, DART team leader,
are to be commended for their outstanding leadership and commitment to
making this program work.
As of September 14, 2,934 mt of food have been moved to a total of five
locations: Wajir and Garissa in northern Kenya, and Baidoa; Belet Huen and
Oddur in south-central Somalia. In the Somali towns supplied by DOD
airlifts, we are welcomed by the clan elders, and security conditions, in
general, are adequate to permit relief operations to take place.
I observed in one of those towns, Belet Huen, that the airlift has already had
a positive impact on the price of food in the market place. Rice prices there
have dropped from 120,000 to 80,000 Somali shillings per 50-kilo bag; ($1
equals 7,000 Somali shillings in Belet Huen). In addition, there are
indications that our initiative has reduced the current refugee flow from
Somalia to Kenya by 90%.
In many areas, the clan elders said they would be pleased to have UN troops
to help control the young thugs who sometimes terrorize the towns.
In these areas, banditry is the cause of disruptions in relief operations, not
organized clan violence.
I also observed some of the over 600 ICRC soup kitchens, at which almost 1
million Somalis receive meals daily. Without a doubt, ICRC has done an
extraordinary job under impossible conditions and clearly has the pre-
eminent operational position in the relief effort. It deserves a Nobel Peace
Prize for the life-saving work it is performing there. Other outstanding
organizations I met with include Save the Children (United Kingdom), Irish
Concern, and the US groups--International Medical Corps and CARE.
The UN system is attempting to strengthen its performance in the
coordination and implementation of relief to date. While in Nairobi, I urged
the World Food Program (WFP) to establish a logistics coordination center--
an essential step if the United Nations is to provide strong leadership and
fully coordinate the relief effort. USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance will provide close to $1 million to WFP for the establishment of
that center. WFP has already initiated UN/PVO/donor coordination meetings
on flight logistics.
The United Nations has also recently set forth an "Accelerated Humanitarian
Action Plan for Somalia," which it hopes will provide a comprehensive
framework for relief and rehabilitation.
US Strategy
It is critical, especially in this fluid and complex crisis, that we have a
clear plan for moving Somalia from this plague of utter destitution toward a
viable economy and workable political reconciliation. Without these, a
generation of Somalis will be condemned, at best, to survival in the soup
lines and, at worst, widespread death preceded by obscene suffering.
We have worked hard at discerning a viable relief strategy for Somalia--a
strategy with six elements. I would like to briefly describe each of these
elements.
Emergency Airlifts. Until security improves and a road network for relief is
established, targeted airlifts will be necessary. We anticipate that our
military airlift initiative will, over time, transition to an airlift operation
run by civilian companies and supported by a wide range of donors. To that
end, USAID has contracted with Southern Air Transport to make available
two C-130 aircraft for relief operations.
I want to stress, however, that airlifts are only a small component of our
relief strategy and, by themselves, will probably deliver no more than
10% of the food requirements in any month.
Targeted Decentralized Feeding Programs. Free food distribution will be
required for a large segment of the Somalia population for a considerable
time to come. We will continue to support the ICRC soup kitchens as well as
supplementary feeding programs for malnourished children.
As the quantity of food in Somalia increases and prices decline, we
anticipate that it will be less of a target for looters. We encourage large-
scale dry food distributions through the United Nations, ICRC, and PVOs in
rural areas. This is essential if we are to stop forced migrations into
cities--a trek that kills many already-weakened Somalis.
Market Interventions. In order to "flood" Somalia with food, more use must
be made of commercial channels. We propose the sale of food to Somali
merchants to drive down and stabilize market prices. A reduction in food
prices should allow more Somalis to access the markets for food. In
addition, it should reduce the overall value of food, removing it as a
substitute currency.
PVOs will be responsible for monitoring market prices. Proceeds from the
food sales would be used by the PVO community to initiate cash-for-work
and other relief and rehabilitation programs.
At this time, we have food experts looking at ways to set up sales to local
traders "offshore" in Djibouti and Kenya. The US PVO, CARE, is initiating
this kind of program in northwest Somalia and is planning a similar program
in the south. The International Rescue Committee and World Vision are also
interested in getting involved.
Rehabilitation. Interventions in the livestock, agriculture, and water
sectors are critically important if we are to help restore the Somalia
economy. We propose that rehabilitation interventions be targeted at stable
cities and regions--for example, Belet Huen, Oddur, and the northeast--
where clan leaders are able to resolve their disputes peacefully. By
supporting those responsible local leaders, we hope to send a message to
other clan and political leaders that continued violence will prevent them
from having access to rehabilitation efforts of the United States.
Decentralization of UN Security Guards. We support the notion of placing
additional UN troops in areas outside Mogadishu in calmer areas where clan
leaders welcome their presence. They could play an important role by
protecting airstrips and feeding centers and could reinforce the leadership
role of local authorities, with whom they would work closely.
We will focus our rehabilitation efforts in areas where the security guards
and local authorities are working together, thereby reinforcing the linkages
between security, responsible leadership, and international aid.
Promoting UN Leadership in Relief and Reconciliation. We commend UN
Special Representative for Somalia Ambassador Sahnoun's diplomatic
initiatives in Somalia and fully support his initiatives for promoting
reconciliation. Without this diplomatic element, there can be no resolution
of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.
In addition, we fully support a transition to a UN-coordinated multilateral
relief effort. We welcome the UN plans to hold a relief coordination
conference later this month. In addition, we have offered resources to UN
agencies to expand their staff for Somalia programs. We will continue to
support UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees], WFP, and other UN
agencies that demonstrate competence in managing Somali relief programs.
Other Donors
In addition to these six elements, I should note that the United States is
also working hard to solicit additional support from other donors. We are
urging that previous pledges be honored and that additional resources be
committed for the relief effort. The EC [European Community] has been the
most involved donor aside from the United States; the United Kingdom,
Canada, Belgium, Italy, Australia, and Japan have also been energized by the
crisis and are responding.
The Need for Somali Leadership
Ultimately, we must all call on the Somali leaders to resolve this crisis.
Without an end to clan and sub-clan conflicts, innocent victims of this
tragedy will continue to die, despite the best efforts of relief agencies and
donor governments.
I cannot emphasize enough the vital links that exist between political
reconciliation, improved security, and the international community's ability
to help Somalia move from emergency relief to long-term rehabilitation of
the country. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: Execution of Sudanese USAID Employee
Snyder
Source: Acting Spokesman Joseph Snyder
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 22 19929/22/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Sudan
Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
We have learned with sadness and outrage that Mr. Andrew Tombe, a
Sudanese citizen employed by the USAID [US Agency for International
Development] mission in Sudan, has been executed by the Government of
Sudan. The Government of Sudan maintains that Mr. Tombe was tried and
convicted of treason by a military tribunal; if such a trial took place, it
would have been held in secret and would have been a clear violation of
international legal standards pertaining to his detention and alleged trial.
The Government of Sudan has supplied no evidence to us that would indicate
that Mr. Tombe was guilty of treason. We believe him to be innocent.
We have reliable information that a second USAID employee, Mr. Baudouin
Tally, has also been executed. Employees of the United Nations and other
organizations are also reported missing. Several credible sources indicate
widespread killing and abuse of the civilian population in Juba by the army
and militia of the Government of Sudan.
In spite of our repeated requests in Washington and Khartoum, Sudanese
authorities have not provided us with information on the whereabouts of our
Foreign Service national employees at the USAID compound in Juba, nor have
they allowed travel by US embassy officials to Juba. Our Foreign Service
nationals in Sudan have given us faithful service under very difficult
conditions.
We strongly condemn the Sudanese Government for its unwarranted
execution of Mr. Tombe. We demand that the Sudanese Government
immediately provide a full accounting of Mr. Tombe's detention, trial, and
execution and also provide information on the whereabouts and condition of
Mr. Tally. We further call on the Sudanese Government to allow an
immediate inspection of the condition of the civilian population in Juba by
the International Committee of the Red Cross, including access to those
being held in detention. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: Vietnam: Funding for Assistance to Voluntary
Returnees to Vietnam
Boucher
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 16 19929/16/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Vietnam
Subject: Immigration, Refugees, Development/Relief Aid,
POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
The United States will contribute up to $2 million to non-governmental
organizations working in Vietnam, for programs to assist Vietnamese
asylum seekers who have voluntarily returned home from camps of first
asylum in Southeast Asia.
The provision of assistance to those returning to Vietnam is important to
the United States, both for humanitarian reasons and because it reflects the
US commitment to the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). The voluntary
repatriation program under the Comprehensive Plan of Action is a major
element in the international response to the problem of refugees and asylum
seekers in Southeast Asia.
This contribution also represents another effort by the United States to
address the humanitarian concerns of the Vietnamese people--in recognition
of Vietnamese cooperation in addressing our concerns, notably accounting
for our POW/MIAs.
Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations Trinh Xuan Lang, during his
introductory call on Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs William Clark, Jr., and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugee
Programs Sarah Moten, was informed of this program today. Discussion also
focused on efforts by the US and Vietnamese Governments to address
humanitarian concerns--especially the fullest possible accounting for US
POW/MIAs and the implementation of the UN settlement in Cambodia.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Community,
and other groups also have assistance programs in place to assist returnees.
Examples of the kind of initial reintegration project activities to be
undertaken include vocational training, micro-business enterprise
development training, and employment development.
In addition to this funding, the United States is contributing some $800,000
to UNHCR for a program to assist in the reintegration of minors who are
returning from the camps in Southeast Asia to be reunited with their
families.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: Russia: US Opens Consulate General In
Vladivostok
Snyder
Source: Acting Spokesman Joseph Snyder
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 21 19929/21/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia
Subject: State Department
[TEXT]
The US Consulate General in Vladivostok, Russia, will open on Tuesday,
September 22.
This step is being taken following the exchange of diplomatic notes
regarding the establishment of consulates general in Seattle and
Vladivostok by Presidents Yeltsin and Bush during their June summit
meeting.
Our consul general will be Randall LeCocq. He and four other Department of
State officers will work initially in temporary quarters. Embassy
officials, business representatives, and Russian and local government
officials will mark the opening at a formal ceremony.
Plans are under way by the Russian Federation to open its consulate in
Seattle in the near future. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 39, September 28, 1992
Title: Focus on the Emerging Democracies A Periodic
Update
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Sep, 28 19929/28/92
Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies
Region: Eurasia
Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Georgia
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics,
Cultural Exchange
[TEXT]
Points of Contact For US Firms Seeking Business Opportunities in The
New Independent States
Acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger serves as Coordinator of
US Assistance Policy for the New Republics of the Former Soviet Union.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood, Council of Economic Advisors
Chairman Dr. Michael Boskin, Deputy Treasury Secretary John Robson, US
Agency for International Development Administrator Ronald W. Roskens, and
Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman are the Deputy Coordinators.
In addition, each US Government agency listed below has identified key
individuals as points of contact.
Department of State
The Office of the Deputy to the Coordinator is headed by Ambassador Richard
L. Armitage, who reports to the Acting Secretary of State. Ambassador
Armitage is responsible for overall coordination of US assistance policy,
and technical assistance programs (ongoing or planned) for the new
independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. This office is the
initial point of contact for US firms interested in business and investment
opportunities.
Priscilla Rabb-Ayres
Senior Adviser, Private Sector Programs
D/CISA, Rm. 1004
US Department of State 2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520
Tel: 202-647-2626
Fax: 202-647-2636
US Agency for International Development (USAID)
The Center for Trade and Investment Services provides specific information
about USAID programs and activities.
Mr. Caesar Gonzmart
USAID, SA-2, Room 100
Washington, DC 20523-0229
Tel: 202-663-2660
or 1-800-USAID-4-U
(1-800-872-4348)
Fax: 202-663-2670
Department of Commerce
The Business Information Service for the New Independent States (BISNIS)
provides information on business opportunities, foreign trade legislation,
sources of financing, as well as contact information. It will publish a
monthly BISNIS Bulletin on trade-related US Government programs and trade
promotional events. BISNIS will have a match-making service and publish a
"Search for Partners" newsletter.
Linda Nemec
Director, Business Information Service for the NIS
US Department of Commerce
Rm. 7413
Herbert C. Hoover Building
Washington, DC 20230
Tel: 202-482-4655
Fax: 202-482-2293
Foreign Commercial Service Offices in the NIS:
Moscow, Russia
Dale Slaght, Senior Commercial Officer
c/o US Embassy
Novinsky Bulvar 15
Tel: 011-7-502-224-1105
Fax: 011-7-502-224-1106
St. Petersburg, Russia
Karen Zens, Commercial Officer
c/o American Consulate General
Ulitsa, Petra Lavrova St. 15
Tel: 011-7-812-274-8235
Fax: 011-7-812-271-4554
Kiev, Ukraine
Stephen Wasylko, Senior Commercial Officer
c/o US Embassy
10 vul. Kotsynskovo
252053 Kiev 53
Tel: 011-7-044-244-7349
Fax: 011-7-044-244-7350
US Trade and Development Program (TDP)
TDP promotes US exports for major development projects in the NIS. It
funds feasibility studies, consultancies, training programs, and other
project planning services related to major projects.
Daniel Stein
US Trade and Development Program
SA-16, Rm. 309
Washington, DC 20523-1602
Tel: 703-875-4357
Fax: 703-875-4009
Export/Import Bank (Eximbank)
The Eximbank and its insurance contractor, the Foreign Credit Insurance
Association (FCIA), provide insurance, guarantees, and loans to US exporters
and commercial banks to facilitate financing for the export of goods and
services from the United States to many of the NIS emerging markets.
FCIA Insurance:
Mitchell McCauley
Loan Officer
Eximbank of the US
811 Vermont Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20571
Tel: 202-566-8190
Fax: 202-566-7524
Guarantees and Loans, including Oil and Gas Sector:
John Lentz
(same address as above)
Tel: 202-566-8208
Fax: 202-566-7524
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
OPIC promotes economic growth in more than 125 developing nations and
emerging economies (including all NIS states except Uzbekistan, which is
expected to sign an agreement very shortly) by encouraging US private
investment in those nations. OPIC assists American investors through three
principal programs:
-- Financing investment projects through direct loans and loan guarantees;
-- Insuring investment projects against a broad range of political risks;
and
-- Providing a variety of investor services including advisory services,
project development funding, investment missions, computer-assisted joint
venture partner matching, and country and regional information kits.
OPIC
1100 New York Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20527
OPIC NIS contacts:
Dave Cahn, Legal Affairs
Tel: 202-336-8423
Fax: 202-408-0297
Tom Mansbach, Managing
Director, Insurance
Tel: 202-336-8588
Fax: 202-408-5142
Michael Oxman, Insurance
Tel: 202-336-8589
Fax: 202-408-5142
James Glucksman, Insurance
Tel: 202-336-8590
Fax: 202-408-5142
Burton Bostwick, Finance
Tel: 202-336-8475
Fax: 202-408-9866
Dan Riordan, Investor Services
Tel: 202-336-8620
Fax: 202-408-5145
Barbara Brereton, Investor Services
Tel: 202-336-8617
Fax: 202-408-5145
US Department Of Agriculture (USDA)
USDA is responsible for commercial export programs and several food aid
programs including concessional loans, Food for Peace Programs, and
commodity grants. A wide array of US agricultural food commodities are
eligible for export under these different programs.
USDA also sponsors technical assistance programs for the NIS that support
the transition to a private agriculture system.
Glenn Whiteman
USDA, Rm. 4079
SUSDA/FAS/EC
Washington, DC 20250-1000
Tel: 202-720-4274
Fax: 202-690-0727
US Information Agency (USIA)
USIA is responsible for educational and cultural exchanges, information
programs, internships, and training activities that support US policy goals
in the new countries. USIA programs aim to assist democratic and economic
reform in the new states. In addition to USIA Foreign Service officers
posted in NIS Embassies, USIA Washington headquarters works through a
number of private sector exchange organizations in the United States.
Rosemary DiCarlo
USIA, Rm. 751
301 4th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20547
Tel: 202-619-5057
Fax: 202-619-5958
Department of the Treasury
The Treasury Department provides technical assistance in macroeconomic
policy, government financial operations, and financial sector reform to
support development and operation of central and commercial banking
institutions.
Alexis Rieffel
Office of Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union Policy
1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Rm. 4138
Main Treasury Department
Washington, DC 20220
Tel: 202-622-2130
Fax: 202-622-2308 (###)