US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992
Title: The North American Free Trade Agreement: A
Promise Fulfilled
Hills
Source: Carla A. Hills, US Trade Representative
Description: Statement before the Senate Finance Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 8 19929/8/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: Mexico, United States, Canada
Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics,
Environment
[TEXT]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to appear before this committee
to discuss the landmark North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA.
When the President launched the NAFTA negotiations 14 months ago, he
promised an agreement that was in the best interest of the American
worker and farmer, consumer and exporter. He has delivered on that promise
and more.
The agreement reached after more than a year of intense negotiations and
close consultation with Congress and the private sector will mean:
-- More jobs for auto workers in Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania;
-- More work for the New Jersey telecommunications worker;
-- More markets for the Texas petrochemical equipment maker;
-- More sales for the Illinois and Iowa corn farmer;
-- More opportunities for the Connecticut insurance broker;
-- More business for the Montana rancher;
-- More protection against piracy for the Silicon Valley software designer;
[and]
-- A more vigorous economy and a higher living standard for all Americans.
This is a historic agreement, and Americans in every state and in every
occupation can claim and share in its benefits. It is an agreement for both
blue collar and white collar workers, for factory and office workers, and for
store clerks and farm hands.
Here is why:
This agreement makes America more globally competitive. It links the
United States to our first- and third-largest trading partners, Canada and
Mexico, to create one of the largest, richest markets in the world, with 360
million producers and consumers and $6 trillion in annual output. NAFTA
will give US companies the same competitive edge that regional trade ties
give European and Japanese firms.
This agreement will generate new, higher-paying jobs for Americans. More
than 600,000 Americans now owe their jobs to our exports to Mexico. This
number is expected to swell to over 1 million by 1995 with NAFTA. Over 1.5
million Americans already owe their jobs to our exports to Canada. This
agreement will not only create more jobs but better jobs, for we know that
workers in export-related jobs earn 17% more per hour than the average
American wage.
This agreement will help Mexico grow, which has a high payback for us: 70
cents of each Mexican import dollar--and 15 cents of each additional dollar
of Mexican income--is spent on US goods and services. Economic growth
will not only make Mexico a better customer but also a stronger and more
stable neighbor, easing pressures for illegal immigration. The lesson of
history is clear: If opportunities do not go to the people, people will go to
the opportunities.
This agreement will be of particular benefit to small and medium-sized
companies that are experiencing the fastest export growth. Unlike big
companies, small and mid-sized firms often do not have the resources to
locate around high trade barriers. With trade barriers removed, US firms
need not move to Mexico to sell to Mexico.
This agreement does more to improve the environment than any other
agreement in history. It maintains US environmental, safety, and health
standards; allows us to enact even tougher standards; and encourages our
partners to strengthen their standards.
Finally, it safeguards US workers by ensuring a smooth transition to free
trade over 15 years.
Never before has a trade agreement offered such a balance of economic
growth, opportunity, worker benefits, and environmental sensitivity. NAFTA
will contribute to a higher standard of living and a better quality of life for
Americans.
I would like this afternoon to review briefly for the committee the benefits
free trade with Canada and Mexico will bring to the American people.
Lower Barriers, More Growth, Better Jobs
Mr. Chairman, I do not need to tell you, a long-time proponent of free trade,
about the advantages this country can reap from more open foreign markets-
-especially markets on our borders. You wrote in Roll Call in July that, "The
United States has much to gain from a more prosperous Latin America. The
average Mexican already buys more from us than his much richer Western
European counterpart." Indeed:
-- Mexico is now our fastest growing major export market, our second-
largest market for manufactured goods, and our third-largest market for
agricultural products.
-- US exports to Mexico will top $40 billion this year--nearly four times
what they were in 1986--yielding a projected surplus of $6-7 billion, more
than three times higher than last year.
By tearing down Mexico's remaining barriers, NAFTA will increase US
exports and jobs.
Let me highlight just some of what it will achieve:
First, tariff elimination makes US products more competitive.
Approximately 65% of US industrial and agricultural exports to Mexico will
be eligible for duty-free treatment either immediately or within 5 years.
Second, US vehicles and parts will enjoy greater access to Mexico, which
has the fastest growing major auto market in the world. The phase-out of
tariffs, import restrictions, and local-content requirements on motor
vehicles and parts expands opportunities for our auto industry. US autos and
light trucks will enjoy greater access to Mexico. With NAFTA, Mexican
tariffs will immediately be removed on light trucks and cut in half on
passenger cars. Within 5 years, duties on three-quarters of US parts
exports to Mexico will be eliminated. Mexican "trade balancing" and "local
content requirements," which have effectively kept out US exports of
vehicles and parts, will be entirely eliminated in 10 years.
Third, strict rules of origin restrict benefits of NAFTA to North American-
made products. For autos, for example, only vehicles with substantial North
American parts and labor content will benefit from tariffs cuts. NAFTA
will require that autos contain 62.5% North American content, considerably
more than the 50% required by the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, to
obtain preferential treatment. NAFTA contains tracing requirements so that
individual parts can be identified to determine the North American content
of major components and sub-assemblies, such as engines.
Fourth, NAFTA opens Mexico's $6-billion market for telecommunications
equipment and services. For equipment, Mexico has agreed to streamline its
testing and certification procedures and immediately eliminate tariffs on
over 80% of current US telecommunications exports to Mexico. It gives US
providers of voice mail or packet-switched services non-discriminatory
access to the Mexican public telephone network and eliminates all
investment restrictions by July 1995.
Fifth, elimination of barriers enhances opportunities in the textile and
apparel sectors. Barriers to trade on $250 million (over 20%) of US exports
of textiles and apparel to Mexico will be eliminated immediately, with
another $700 million freed from restrictions within 6 years. All North
American trade restrictions will be eliminated within 10 years and tough
rules of origin will ensure that benefits of trade liberalization accrue to
North American-made products.
Sixth, open markets for our agricultural goods will increase farm exports.
Mexico imported $3 billion of US agricultural goods last year, making it our
third-largest market. NAFTA will immediately eliminate Mexican import
licenses, which cover 25% of US agricultural exports, and will phase out
most remaining Mexican tariffs within 10 years and the remaining few
within 15 years.
Seventh, for the first time in 50 years, Mexico's closed financial services
markets will be opened. US banks, securities firms, and other financial
firms will be allowed to establish wholly owned subsidiaries and be treated
the same as local firms. Transitional restrictions will be phased out by
January 1, 2000.
Eighth, US insurance firms will gain new opportunities in the Mexican
market. Firms with existing joint ventures will be permitted to obtain
100% ownership by 1996, and new entrants to the market can obtain a
majority stake in Mexican firms by 1998. By the year 2000, all equity and
market-share restrictions will be eliminated, opening up completely what
is now a $3.5-billion market.
Ninth, NAFTA will create new horizons for our land transportation industry.
More than 90% of US trade with Mexico is shipped by land, but US truckers
currently are denied the right to carry cargo or set up subsidiaries in
Mexico, forcing them to "hand off" trailers to Mexican drivers and return
home empty. NAFTA will permit US trucking companies to carry
international cargo to the Mexican states contiguous to the United States by
1995 and gives them cross-border access to all of Mexico by the end of
1999. US railroads will be able to transport goods and passengers in
Mexico, and US companies can invest in and operate land-side port services.
The combination of truck, rail, and port breakthroughs will help create an
efficient, intermodal North American transport system. It also will help
reduce congestion in border cities.
Tenth, NAFTA will provide a higher level of protection for intellectual
property rights than has been achieved in any other bilateral or multilateral
agreement. US high- technology, entertainment, and consumer goods
producers that rely heavily on protection for their patents, copyrights, and
trademarks will realize substantial gains under NAFTA. The agreement will
also limit compulsory licensing, resolving an important concern with
Canada.
Eleventh, the agreement creates greater market access in energy and
petrochemicals. NAFTA allows US producers to invest and compete in
virtually all petrochemicals, and it enhances the access of US energy firms
to Mexico's electricity, gas, energy services, and equipment markets.
Finally, NAFTA offers better investment rules. NAFTA ensures that US
investors in Mexico are accorded equal treatment and eliminates "domestic
content" rules and export requirements, permitting increased sourcing of US
inputs.
New Rules Guarantee Benefits
Having negotiated these remarkable new opportunities, we also made sure to
negotiate rules and procedures to guarantee that we reap the benefits of
free trade.
-- NAFTA contains rapid and effective dispute settlement procedures. A
new trilateral trade commission will regularly review trade relations and
discuss specific problems. Dispute resolution panels will take no longer
than 8 months from start to finish. Countries that win a dispute may
demand trade compensation if the losing country does not comply with the
panel ruling and may retaliate if the compensation is inadequate.
-- NAFTA does not change US trade laws that protect American industry
from unfairly dumped or subsidized imports. But it substantially improves
the ability of US firms to challenge Mexican decisions involving allegations
of dumping or subsidized sales in the Mexican market.
US Jobs and Adjustment
These extensive and dramatic market-opening provisions and the rules
designed to support them will generate new export opportunities for our
entrepreneurs and new jobs for our workers. As a result, we believe that
adjustment pressures on the US economy will be minimal.
First, while some have raised fears that NAFTA will result in US firms
relocating en masse to Mexico to take advantage of lower-wage labor, the
fact is that labor rates are only one determinant of plant location. If wages
were the only factor, many less developed countries would be economic
superpowers. Businesses base investment decisions on a range of factors
including productivity, availability of capital, interest rates, quality of
infrastructure, and education of the work force. Based on all factors, on
average, US workers remain at least five times more productive that their
Mexican counterparts.
Second, while many have asked how we can compete against Mexican labor,
the fact is we already are competing--and successfully so. As Mexico has
unilaterally lowered its trade barriers, our trade balance has swung from an
almost $6-billion deficit in 1987 to a projected $6-7 billion surplus this
year.
Moreover, imports from Mexico account for less than one-half of 1% of US
GDP [gross domestic product], and over half of those imports today are
eligible for duty-free treatment. By tearing down Mexico's remaining
tariffs, which are 2 1/2 times as high as our own, NAFTA will level the
playing field, not flood it.
Adjustment Provisions
However, to further assure a smooth transition for sensitive US industries,
NAFTA includes an elaborate adjustment regime, as the President
committed it would, including:
-- Lengthy transition periods of up to 15 years for the lowering of US
tariffs in our most sensitive sectors;
-- Safeguards to protect US workers and farmers against injury--or the
threat of injury--from imports;
-- Tough rules of origin to ensure that only North American-made products
obtain the benefits of free trade; [and]
-- An elimination of Mexico's duty drawback program and export
performance requirements that will prevent Mexico from becoming an export
platform or "pass through" for products from non-NAFTA countries.
Worker Adjustment Assistance
In addition to these adjustment provisions within the NAFTA, the President
is committed to providing worker adjustment assistance. Last month, he
announced a new, comprehensive worker adjustment program--Advancing
Skills through Education and Training, or ASETS--a $10-billion, 5-year
commitment.
The President's plan--which is based upon information obtained from
congressional, business, and labor consultations--nearly triples the current
level of expenditures for worker training. Of the $2 billion per year, $670
million is available for workers affected by this agreement, and $1.33
billion is allocated to states without regard to the cause of worker
dislocation.
For the first time, a trade agreement will be accompanied by a program
tailored to train workers to take advantage of the new opportunities it
creates. The President's proposal features:
-- Universal coverage of all workers whose jobs may be at risk, or who
have lost their jobs, or who are on notice of job loss;
-- Continuity of program funding through a capped entitlement thereby
eliminating year-to-year funding uncertainties;
-- Rapid response services and access to a wide range of support services
and labor market information to ensure that intervention starts early, when
it is most effective;
-- "Skill grants" for retraining so workers can choose the most appropriate
training programs and providers; and
-- Income support payments to workers in training who have exhausted
their unemployment insurance benefits and who need such support to
complete their training.
Bilateral Cooperation On Labor Issues
Mexico and the United States are committed to the maintenance and
enforcement of fair labor standards, the promotion of safety and health in
the workplace, and worker rights. Economic growth in Mexico resulting
from NAFTA will provide increased economic resources to address labor
issues. At the same time, US-Mexico labor cooperation has provided an
opportunity for Mexico to accelerate benefits accruing to workers, through
US technical assistance and training.
In 1991, US Secretary of Labor Martin and her Mexican counterpart signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU), which established a framework for
US-Mexico cooperation on key labor issues. As a result, over the past year,
the US and Mexican Departments of Labor have undertaken a series of joint
initiatives relating to workplace safety, occupational hygiene, child labor,
and comparative labor-management relations.
We expect shortly to sign a new bilateral agreement that will intensify this
cooperation, enabling us to focus on issues such as industrial hygiene and
workplace safety standards and training to improve enforcement of those
standards.
Environment
Just as NAFTA has focused constructive attention on labor issues, so, too,
has it focused constructive attention on the environment. At first, many
saw NAFTA as a threat to the environment--the creation of a pollution
haven.
That's just wrong. Mexico's 1988 environmental law is patterned after ours
and is stricter in some cases. President Salinas has made enforcement a
priority, shutting down over 1,000 polluting firms in the past few years.
And the NAFTA itself, and our parallel cooperative activities, will help ease
congestion at the border and generate new resources to clean up the
environment.
Now, I believe, most view NAFTA as an opportunity. The Administration
certainly views it as such, and we have seized it.
Indeed, NAFTA goes further than any other previous trade agreement in
addressing environmental concerns and in actively promoting environmental
protection.
Specifically, it embraces the notion of "sustainable development," and
explicitly:
-- Maintains our right to enforce existing US health, safety, and
environmental standards;
-- Allows the parties, including states and cities, to enact even tougher
standards--there will be no preemption;
-- Encourages the NAFTA parties to strengthen standards by "harmonizing
upwards"; and
-- Preserves our right to enforce our international treaty obligations to
limit trade in controlled products, such as endangered species.
In addition, NAFTA's investment provisions support our environmental goals
by:
-- Discouraging countries from lowering environmental standards to
attract investment;
-- Permitting parties to impose stringent environmental requirements on
new investment, so long as they are not discriminatory; and
-- Permitting the parties to require environmental impact statements on
new investments.
The NAFTA agreement contains several other provisions that are designed to
promote environmental protection, including dispute settlement provisions
that encourage input from scientific experts on disputes involving
environmental and health issues and place on the party challenging an
environmental or health standard the burden of proving that it is
inconsistent with the agreement. Moreover, when environmental standards
are challenged, the respondent can choose to have the matter heard by a
NAFTA panel, rather than a GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
panel.
Extensive Cooperative Activities
These environmentally sensitive provisions in the NAFTA--and there are
others--are complemented by an extensive program of bilateral cooperation
with Mexico, including an integrated Border Plan, developed pursuant to the
President's May 1 commitment. As momentum has built behind NAFTA, this
cooperation has intensified.
Indeed, the United States and Mexico will shortly sign a new bilateral
environmental agreement establishing a Joint Committee for the Protection
and Improvement of the Environment. The scope of this agreement will
extend beyond the border region and will strengthen our cooperative efforts
to combat pollution and improve enforcement of environmental regulations.
To enhance environmental protection efforts, President Salinas has
increased his enforcement budget from less than $7 million to $77 million
and allocated $460 million over 3 years to the Border Plan.
In turn, President Bush's FY 1993 budget includes $241 million for border
cleanup, 70% greater than the 1992 amount. Unfortunately, Congress has not
only failed to pass these funds, it has cut them drastically: by $98 million
in the House, and by $120 million in the Senate.
At the same time Congress was cutting the President's budget request for
border cleanup, some have suggested that we levy a tax on cross-border
trade to raise funds for environmental improvement. We are opposed to this
idea. It is unsound trade policy, since the purpose of the NAFTA is to lower
barriers, not to raise taxes. To do so would defeat the very purpose of
agreement: to generate growth and jobs.
Conclusion
The successful conclusion of the NAFTA is a historic achievement for US
trade policy, which, over the past 4 years, has contributed significantly to
our nation's economic growth. Far more foreign markets are open today to
US firms than 45 months ago. As a result, last year the United States
became the world's number one exporter with a record $422 billion in
exports.
Export gains have meant more business opportunity and more jobs across all
sectors. Since 1988, all 50 states have expanded exports to the world, on
average by 72%. The surge in exporting has generated almost $120 billion
in added output for America's companies and farms and has supported 1
million new jobs. In short, the President's trade strategy is paying off.
The history-making negotiations for free trade in North America are
emblematic of this Administration's bipartisan trade strategy. Since I have
been US Trade Representative, we have worked with you, Mr. Chairman, the
members of this committee, and with other congressional leaders to
establish clear trade objectives and then to engage in tough international
negotiations and to use the trade tools at our disposal to achieve those
objectives.
Never before has a trade negotiation involved such an extensive process of
congressional and private sector consultations as has the NAFTA. The
number of congressional and private sector briefings that we have held
since the talks began over a year ago amount to more than three per day.
We want--we intend--to continue to work just as closely with you and the
members of this committee in drafting the implementing legislation for the
North American Free Trade Agreement. Our goal is to make this continental
growth package a reality as soon as possible for all Americans. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992
Title: US Policy Goals in the Near East
Djerejian
Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near
East Affairs and Acting Assistant Secretary for South Asian
Affairs
Description: Address before the National Association of Arab
Americans, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 11 19929/11/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Iran
Subject: Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
For over 4 decades, the central characteristic of international relations was
the dichotomy between the Soviet empire of dictatorial regimes and central
planning and the free world of democratic governments and market
economies. The Cold War reverberated around the globe, affecting virtually
everyone, everywhere. Today, East-West rivalry over the future of Europe
and the Third World has been transformed. Partnership has replaced
conflict. A new mode of international cooperation has replaced the
acrimony of the Cold War.
The ancient lands of the Near East are being buffeted by the same strong
winds of change which have had such a dramatic impact on East-West
relations. The geopolitical environment in this historic region is in flux,
forcing the peoples of these countries to re-evaluate their relationships to
each other, to their regional neighbors, and to the world community.
The challenge to the United States is to be responsive to this rapid change
in the region while we pursue a series of fundamental global foreign policy
objectives. These important goals include: peaceful settlement of regional
disputes, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, control of
destabilizing arms transfers, promotion of basic human rights, ending
state-supported terrorism, promotion of economic and social development
through privatization and market economies, encouragement of American
business and investment opportunities, attenuating the politics of despair,
discouraging extremist political alternatives, and winning the international
battle against drugs.
Within this general context, America has two key sets of policy goals in the
Near East. The first has to do with a lasting and comprehensive peace
between Israel and its Arab neighbors; the second [is] the creation of viable
security arrangements for our friends and allies on the Arabian Peninsula.
Arab-Israeli Peace Process
The first of these goals--the search for peace between Arabs and Israelis--
has challenged every US Administration in the last 4 decades. In the Near
East, where war has at times seemed endemic, the road to achieving lasting
peace through negotiation and compromise now stretches before us. The
first historic steps forward have been taken, and the process is gaining
momentum.
One of my colleagues commented recently that peace in the Near East could
be brought about by either of two means--a political solution or a miracle.
The political solution would, of course, be easy. God would come down to
earth and decree that all parties should henceforth live together in peace
and harmony. The miracle, on the other hand, would be if all the region's
leaders got together and decided among themselves to resolve their
differences and to live peacefully together for ever after.
Well, the miracle may be taking place. The sixth round of bilateral talks,
which began in Washington August 24, is about to resume in an atmosphere
of professionalism, cordiality, and serious commitment to achieving results
acceptable to all. Following the fifth round in April, we stressed to all
parties the need to bring to the negotiating table serious, substantive
proposals. The time for public posturing and for asserting hard-edged
positions had passed. The time has come for talks aimed at defining
possible areas of agreement and at narrowing the gaps, through compromise,
where disagreement persists. This is the essence of the art of negotiation,
and it is the essence of the negotiating process upon which the parties first
embarked nearly 11 months ago in Madrid.
The negotiating parties have responded positively to our call. The Israelis
took steps to improve the atmosphere for this round even before it began.
The new Government of Israel halted work on many of the settlements,
which we characterize as obstacles to peace, and ended many of the
incentive programs which supported settlement in the territories; it
rescinded orders to deport Palestinians; and it released hundreds of
Palestinian prisoners who had been detained for security reasons. What this
represents, as Prime Minister Rabin has said publicly, is a fundamental shift
in Israeli national priorities away from investment in the occupied
territories and toward meeting pressing social, economic, and human needs
within Israel.
At the bargaining table, substantive papers, which provide a foundation for
further negotiation, have been presented by the Syrians, Palestinians, and
Israelis. Acting Secretary Eagleburger met with all the delegations just
prior to the Labor Day break, when some of the delegations departed
Washington for consultations. The talks will resume September 14.
While I can't go into the details of the discussions, I can report the
following:
-- Syria's decision to put forward a substantive paper is a positive and,
indeed, historic step. It reinforces Syria's stated commitment to peace--a
commitment which President Assad stressed in his meeting this week with
a Druze delegation from Golan. The Syrians and Israelis are addressing core
issues--namely territory, security, and the nature of peace.
-- The Palestinians and Israelis are deeply engaged in discussing substance
and in establishing a work plan. There remain, of course, legitimate
differences over both the form and substance of interim self-government
arrangements. But, for the first time, there is a timetable for elections and
the inauguration of a transitional period. Both sides should seize this
opportunity and get down to the difficult but necessary work of engaging on
details. The prospect of the Palestinians beginning to govern themselves is
within reach. It is essential that no more time be lost and that the parties
engage in serious, detailed negotiations to make real progress in the months
ahead.
-- In the talks between Lebanon and Israel, the security situation on the
ground and especially in southern Lebanon continues to be of serious concern
to both sides. Differences between the parties focus on Lebanon's demand
for immediate implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425 and
Israel's desire for a full peace treaty and normalized relations between the
two. Notwithstanding this difference, the parties are engaged in serious
discussions, particularly in the area of mutual security. It is very
important that Israel has made clear that it has no territorial or water
claims in Lebanon.
-- In the Jordanian-Israeli negotiations, the two sides continue working on
an agenda which will set the stage for engagement on several key issues
such as water, energy, and security.
Another major accomplishment has been the beginning of the multilateral
negotiations on issues of regional concern such as arms control and regional
security, refugees, water, the environment, and economic development. The
first meetings of working groups took place in May and brought together
regional parties, including 11 Arab states, and other interested parties from
around the world to work toward resolving some of the decades-old disputes
among these bellicose neighbors. The next round of working group meetings
will begin next week in Washington and Moscow and will continue in October
and November.
Some parties--Israel, Syria, and Lebanon--stayed away from certain
previous multilateral meetings for their own reasons. We will continue our
efforts to persuade these parties that participation in all of these working
groups is truly in their best interests.
Bilateral Relations
Let me next add a word, in the context of the peace process, about our
bilateral relations with the Arab states most directly concerned and with
Israel. In so doing, I want to deal with the reality of the relationship and
not the mythology and misperceptions that crop up from time to time. Let
me start with the country with which I am most familiar--Syria.
Syria.
The United States today maintains a broad-based dialogue
with Syria on a wide range of issues. This policy of engagement has yielded
results which serve important US interests. Syria joined the US-led
coalition to reverse Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. President
Assad's affirmative response to President Bush's letter inviting Syria to
participate in the peace negotiations with Israel was one of the major
breakthroughs which allowed Secretary Baker to proceed with constructing
a peace process engaging Israel in bilateral negotiations with all its
immediate Arab neighbors.
Our engagement with Syria does not mean, however, that we overlook real
differences on outstanding issues such as human rights, narcotics, and
terrorism. These issues are on the agenda because they are part and parcel
of America's over-arching foreign policy approach. We hope that as our
dialogue with Damascus progresses, it will be possible to achieve positive
results in these areas.
Lebanon.
US policy toward Lebanon remains firm and consistent.
This policy was reiterated to both the Syrian and Lebanese leadership during
Secretary Baker's trip to Syria and Lebanon in July. We support full
implementation of both the letter and the spirit of the Taif accord and the
withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, and we have
repeatedly made this clear to all concerned parties. The Taif accord
requires coordination now by the Governments of Lebanon and Syria on the
decision to redeploy Syrian troops to the western entrances to the Bekaa
Valley. In our view, that decision should be taken by both governments this
month with redeployment occurring shortly thereafter and as soon as
possible. It also requires the completion of the process of disarming all
militias, particularly Hizballah. Implementation of this agreement helped
bring to an end the turbulent era of civil war in Lebanon. With full
adherence and compliance of the parties to the Taif agreement, we believe
it will offer the best chance of restoring the unity, independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon.
Lebanon recently conducted three rounds of voting to elect a new
parliament. These were the first parliamentary elections held in Lebanon
since 1972 and the tragic civil war which so ravaged Lebanon and its people.
In the weeks leading to the election, we repeatedly called for free and fair
voting held in an environment devoid of intimidation and coercion. We
consistently stated that the decision to proceed with elections at this time
was that of the Lebanese Government to make. Similarly, the decision of
some Lebanese political figures not to participate was theirs to make.
The United States is clearly disappointed that the elections were not
prepared and conducted in a manner to ensure the broadest national
consensus. The turnout of eligible voters in some locations was extremely
low. There were also widespread reports of irregularities, which might
have been avoided had there been impartial international observers at hand.
As a consequence, the results do not reflect the full spectrum of the
Lebanese body politic.
We fervently hope that the Lebanese people and their government will renew
their commitment to national reconciliation and to the unity and
sovereignty they deserve. We will continue to support the expansion of the
authority of the central institutions of the Lebanese Government and the
Lebanese armed forces throughout Lebanon, and we will continue to work
with other countries and international organizations to encourage and
support the Lebanese people as they get on with the priority task of
reconstruction. We have encouraged the new government to tackle the
country's serious economic problems as its first priority. Recent events
underscore the urgency of restoring the Lebanese economy and beginning the
task of reconstruction. We, along with other countries and international
financial institutions, are considering ways in which we can help.
Finally, we have also discussed our serious concern over the situation in
south Lebanon with key governments in the region, asking all to exercise
maximum restraint lest the continuing violence lead to even more serious
consequences for all concerned.
Jordan.
Jordan is playing a very constructive role in the peace
process at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. This role has helped
us make moderate progress toward the gradual restoration of a bilateral
relationship that was severely strained by the Gulf war.
When King Hussein visited the United States last March, he pledged to
President Bush Jordan's continued commitment to the peace process and to
abide by the UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq. Since then, we have
been working closely with the Government of Jordan to establish an
effective and credible sanctions enforcement regime there. In the last few
months, Jordan has tightened its enforcement procedures. The Jordanians
know that continued progress in our bilateral relationship and our ability to
provide assistance to Jordan depend not only on the peace process, but also
on sustainable and effective Jordanian actions to enforce UN sanctions
against Iraq.
Egypt
. Egypt continues to play an active role in the peace process,
participating in each of the five multilateral working groups, working
closely with the United States in urging the parties to the bilateral process
to focus on issues on the table rather than events in the region, and helping
to dampen unrealistic expectations by preparing the parties for a long-term
process. Internally, the government continues its efforts to reform an
economy debilitated by decades of socialist policy. While much remains to
be done, the Government of President Mubarak is making tough decisions and
taking steps necessary to privatize and rationalize a massive public sector.
Our bilateral relationship remains vigorous and healthy.
Israel.
The solid foundations of close US-Israeli relations remain
constant and are instrumental in promoting progress in the peace process.
The new Israeli Government has taken a number of important steps to
improve the atmosphere for the peace talks and to improve conditions in the
occupied territories. These include:
-- Halting construction of over 7,000 planned housing units in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip;
-- Halting construction of a number of "settler roads" in the occupied
territories;
-- Undertaking to reduce mortgage and other incentives which have
encouraged Israelis to settle in the territories;
-- Canceling deportation orders on 11 Palestinians and releasing almost
800 prisoners from IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] camps; and
-- Formally accepting the applicability of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 on
all fronts.
We believe these steps are significant. But, we recognize that these steps
alone are not enough. More needs to be done by all sides to keep the process
moving forward. One such important step--important for the United States
as well as the peace process--is the end of the Arab boycott of Israel. Just
3 days ago, President Bush reiterated our long-standing opposition to this
obstacle to peace. It's time for this change to happen.
Gulf Security
A second major aspect of our Near East policy is our shared interest in the
security and stability of the Persian Gulf. Events have clearly demonstrated
that the countries of the Arabian Peninsula are located in a dangerous
neighborhood. Stability in the Gulf is vital, not only to our own national
interest but also to the economic security of the whole world.
Iraq.
The most immediate and serious threat to the security of the
Gulf, and indeed of the whole region, has been Saddam Hussein's aggression
against his neighbors and against the people of Iraq. Iraq's record of
compliance with UN Security Council resolutions has been completely
unsatisfactory. Saddam is tightening the economic blockade of northern
Iraq. He has dramatically stepped up pressure against Iraqi civilians in the
south. His regime has been engaged in a program of harassment of UN and
international relief workers. And he refuses to renew the Memorandum of
Understanding with the UN, which would facilitate UN humanitarian
programs.
UN Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur Max van der Stoel recently
described continued Iraqi violations of UN Resolution 688, which calls for
an end to Saddam's repression of the Iraqi people. Van der Stoel's report
focused particular attention on the increasingly brutal tactics being used
against the people of southern Iraq. In response, the United States and its
coalition partners are monitoring the human rights situation there. To
facilitate this monitoring, they have declared a "no-fly" zone for all Iraqi
military aircraft (including helicopters) south of the 32nd parallel of
latitude. The unconditional endorsement of this step by the Gulf
Cooperation Council [GCC] is an important manifestation of the international
solidarity confronting Saddam's regime.
In announcing this step, President Bush emphasized that "we seek Iraq's
compliance, not its partition. The United States continues to support Iraq's
territorial unity and bears no ill will toward its people." We reiterated our
commitment to Iraq's unity directly to the Iraqi opposition during their July
meetings with Secretary Baker. The opposition leaders assured us they
share our view. Clearly, it is Saddam Hussein who is alienating his own
people by cracking down on Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'ite minorities.
The United States has long encouraged the development of a broad-based,
unified Iraqi opposition. We want to see a government in Baghdad which
respects the human rights of all its citizens and is at peace with its
neighbors. We support the establishment of a democratic, central
government in Baghdad which reflects the pluralistic nature of Iraqi
society.
Most of the opposition groups met in Vienna in June and took important
steps toward their aspirations of a new Iraqi leadership. Since then,
delegations of the Iraqi National Congress have met with world leaders in
various capitals and are seeking to further broaden their base of support
among Iraqi emigres and their contacts with regime opponents inside Iraq.
Arabian Peninsula.
Last February, I visited the countries which
are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In all my conversations with
their leaders and government officials, I stressed the need for individual
self-defense and for collective defense planning and arrangements among
the six GCC states--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Oman--with the goal of strengthening their ability to defend
themselves against external aggression. I also encouraged security
cooperation between the Gulf states and their friends in the region.
Furthermore, I assured the GCC leaders that the United States will
cooperate closely with them to meet their legitimate defense needs. This
includes both the sales of weapons within the context of the President's
Middle East arms control initiative, and bilateral security arrangements
such as the periodic conduct of joint military exercises, the maintenance of
an enhanced naval presence in the Gulf, and arrangements for the access and
prepositioning of critical military materiel and equipment. I emphasized
that these bilateral efforts would complement but not supersede the Gulf
states' own collective security efforts. I reiterated that we do not intend
to station ground troops permanently anywhere in the region.
We have now concluded or renewed agreements with four of the GCC states
and have excellent working arrangements with all of them. The
establishment of Operation Southern Watch is a good example of a level of
cooperation [that is] well beyond what existed 2 years ago prior to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait.
It is important to understand that the purposes of both arms sales and
collective security measures are to deter threats to our shared interests,
and to raise the threshold of future requirements for direct US military
action. As we have repeatedly proven, we stand with our friends and allies
on the Arabian Peninsula against aggression. The lost lives of our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and Marines attest to that fact. But we also expect those
friends and allies to do everything within their power, including close
coordination among themselves, to provide for their own collective defense,
and we will continue to encourage efforts in that direction.
Iran.
Across the Gulf from our friends and allies lies the Islamic
Republic of Iran, an important country that can contribute to regional
security if it chooses a constructive path. Iran knows what it has to do to
be accepted by the international community. Many hope that the Majlis
election of last spring will lead to moderate policies. We share this hope,
but actions must be the litmus test.
From our view, the normalization of relations with Iran depends on several
factors. Iran's role in sponsoring terrorism continues in ways that are
deeply disturbing. Iran's human rights practices, and its apparent pursuit of
a destabilizing arms build-up, including everything from submarines to
weapons of mass destruction, also remain matters of serious concern.
Further, Iran's policies toward the Gulf Arab states, as exemplified by its
heavy-handed assertion of authority on Abu Musa island, have shown it to be
an increasingly truculent neighbor. We welcome the firm stand that the Gulf
Cooperation Council has taken on this issue. Another serious problem is
Iran's categorical opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its
support for those, like Hizballah in Lebanon, who violently oppose it.
We have made clear from the outset that we are prepared to engage in a
dialogue with authorized representatives of the Iranian Government to
discuss these issues and US-Iranian relations. To date, the Iranian
leadership has declined to engage us in this dialogue.
Fundamental Values
Finally, I would like to say a few words about our efforts to promote the
values we Americans cherish and which form the foundation of all that has
made our country great. These fundamental values, which underlie US
foreign policy globally--basic human rights, popular participation in
government, pluralism, and minority and women's rights--also find
reflection in our approach to the countries of the Near East, including the
Arab states of North Africa.
This reality is the point of departure for our attitude toward an increasingly
important factor in the region--a phenomenon variously described as
political Islam, the Islamic revival, or Islamic fundamentalism. I addressed
this issue in some detail in an address I gave June 2 [see Dispatch Vol. 3, No.
23, p. 444]. But let me just note a few key points.
First, we do not view Islam as the next "ism" confronting the West or
threatening world peace. That is an overly simplistic reaction to a complex
reality. It is evident that the Crusades have been over for a long time.
Second, while we have no desire to impose a "made in the USA" model on
other societies, we are proud of our values and traditions and will support
those in the region who seek to broaden political participation and respect
for basic human rights.
We part company in the Near East, as elsewhere, with those--whether they
cloak their message in religious or secular terms--who practice terrorism,
oppress minorities, preach intolerance, violate human rights, or pursue their
goals through violent means.
We are wary of those who would use the democratic process to come to
power, only to destroy that very process in order to retain power and
political dominance. While we believe in the principle "one person, one
vote," we do not support "one person, one vote, one time."
In sum, religion is not a determinant of the nature or quality of our
relations with the countries of the Near East. Our quarrel is with
extremism, and the violence, denial, intolerance, intimidation, coercion, and
terror which too often accompany it.
Conclusion
Ladies and gentlemen, the principled but pragmatic view I have outlined is
reflected in the excellent relations we enjoy with many of the countries of
the region. It is an integral part of a realistic approach to achieving the US
policy goals I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks.
I have hanging in my office, in a small frame, the Chinese word for "crisis"-
-wei ji. The word is made up of two ideographs, side-by-side, depicting
"danger" and "opportunity." In the recent crisis-filled years, we have sought
to both recognize the dangers and to realize the opportunities in today's
changing world. Guided by the principles and fundamental values that have
made our country great, we hope to help secure positive and lasting changes
beneficial to both the United States and to the peoples of this historic
region. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992
Title: UN Framework Convention On Climate
Change
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of a transmittal letter to the Senate, Washington,
DC
Date: Sep, 8 19929/8/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Subject: Environment
[TEXT]
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
adopted May 9, 1992, by the resumed fifth session of the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change
("Convention"), and signed by me on behalf of the United States at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de
Janeiro on June 12, 1992. The report of the Department of State is also
enclosed for the information of the Senate.
The Convention, negotiated over a period of nearly 2 years, represents a
delicate balance of many interests. It embodies a comprehensive approach
embracing all greenhouse gases, their sources and sinks, and promotes
action to modify net emissions trends of all greenhouse gases not controlled
by the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
It supports an action-oriented approach to net emissions reduction that
takes into account specific national circumstances. It provides the basis
for assessing the impacts and effectiveness of different national responses
in light of existing scientific and economic information and new
developments. The Convention encourages cooperative arrangements by
providing for joint implementation between and among parties under
mutually agreed terms.
The ultimate objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas
concentrations (not emissions) in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. In
accordance with this objective, the Convention calls on all parties to
prepare national inventories of anthropogenic emissions, implement
appropriate national and regional programs to mitigate and adapt to climate
change, promote technology cooperation (including technology transfer),
promote scientific research and monitoring, and promote and cooperate in
the full and open exchange of information and in education, training, and
public awareness programs. In light of such provisions, this Convention
constitutes a major step in protecting the global environment from
potential adverse effects of climate change.
The Convention will enter into force 90 days after the 50th instrument of
ratification, acceptance, or approval has been deposited. Ratification by the
United States is necessary for the effective implementation of the
convention. Early ratification by the United States is likely to encourage
similar action by other countries whose participation is also essential. It
should be noted that the Convention does not permit reservations.
I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this
Convention and give its advice and consent to ratification.
George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Sep, 8 19929/8/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Pacific, Southeast Asia, East Asia
Country: Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, Canada, China, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United States
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
At the conclusion of the 1992 APEC ministerial meeting held in Bangkok,
Thailand, September 10-11, the United States assumed the chairmanship
from Thailand, which has held it for the last year. As chair, the United
States will host the 1993 meeting and oversee ministerial and regular
lower-level meetings.
Background
The Asia-Pacific region, comprised of some of the more dynamic economies
in the world, has experienced unprecedented growth in the last 2 decades.
Fueled by growing trade and financial flows, economic relations among
economies of the region also have increased dramatically.
APEC was established to better manage the effects of growing
interdependence in the Pacific region and sustain economic growth. A new
vehicle for multilateral cooperation among the market-oriented economies
of the region was needed. APEC began in 1989 as an informal grouping of 12
Asia-Pacific economies formed to meet that need. In November 1991, APEC
admitted the People's Republic of China, Chinese Taipei, and Hong Kong,
bringing membership to 15.
APEC provides a forum for discussion on a broad range of economic issues of
importance to the region. Foreign and economic ministers from the members
first met in Canberra, Australia, in November 1989. Since then, annual
ministerial meetings have been held in Singapore and Seoul, South Korea.
US-APEC Relations
The United States works closely with members of APEC and is an important
part of US engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Former Secretary Baker
called APEC "a key vehicle for sustaining market-oriented development,
advancing regional and global trade liberalization, and fostering a more
prosperous economic future for the entire Asia-Pacific region." [See
Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 31, p. 597.]
US trans-Pacific trade almost equaled trade with Western Europe in 1980.
By 1991, US trade across the Pacific ($316 billion) was 43% greater than
trade with Western Europe ($221 billion). US foreign direct investment in
economies belonging to the APEC group was more than $134 billion in 1991,
about 30% of total US foreign direct investment.
APEC Progress
APEC has made remarkable progress since November 1989. With the
addition of three members at the Seoul meeting in 1991 and the
establishment of a permanent secretariat in September 1992, APEC has
grown from an informal dialogue group to a formalized institution that
involves all major economies of the region. Its priority continues to be to
encourage market-oriented solutions to the adjustment problems associated
with quickly growing economies. To that end, APEC has made significant
contributions to negotiations during the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and is considering moves toward regional
trade liberalization. APEC senior officials oversee 10 working groups,
covering broad areas of economic, educational, and environmental
cooperation. In addition, APEC has two ad hoc groups, one on regional trade
liberalization and one on economic policy. The working groups are:
Trade and Investment Data.
Develops consistent and reliable data
in merchandise trade, trade in services, and investment.
Trade Promotion.
Develops proposals to exchange trade and industrial information and to
promote economic and trade missions among economies of the region.
Organizes international seminars and meetings to promote trade, an Asia-
Pacific trade fair, and a training course on trade promotion.
Investment and Technology Transfer.
Promotes investment in the
APEC region through such activities as an investment and technology
information network for the Asia-Pacific region.
Human Resource Development.
Seeks ways to exchange information
among Asia-Pacific economies in such areas as business administration,
industrial training and innovation, project management, and development
planning. In this working group, the United States hosted an APEC education
ministerial in Washington in August 1992 and sponsors the APEC
Partnership for Education, which will promote cooperation among
educational institutions, private sector internships, and US Government-
sponsored private sector training programs.
Regional Energy Cooperation.
Develops cooperative projects, such
as a regional database on energy supply and demand, and exchanges views on,
among other things, coal utilization, technology transfer, and resource
exploration and development.
Marine Resource Conservation.
Exchanges information on and
develops recommendations for dealing with red tide/toxic algae pollution
problems. Exchanges information on technical and policy aspects of marine
pollution and advancement of integrated coastal zone planning.
Telecommunications.
Compiles documents on APEC
telecommunications development activities, including a description of each
member country's telecommunications environment, to be updated annually.
Disseminates a manual on how to approach training in a telecommunications
organization, followed by a pilot project reviewing needs and recommending
solutions in a selected organization. Explores ways to establish and develop
regional networks, initially by encouraging electronic data interchange.
Exchanges information on policy and regulatory developments in each
member's telecommunications sector.
Transportation.
Studies and recommends ways to improve
infrastructure, facilitate movement of passengers and freight, collect and
exchange data, and enhance transportation safety and security. This US-led
working group is one of three added in March 1991. The United States
proposed it because of the importance of improved transportation links to
continued economic growth in the region.
Tourism.
Studies one of the region's most important industries
focusing on tourism data exchange, barriers to expansion, training programs,
and current projects in APEC member economies.
Fisheries.
Surveys the pattern of APEC fisheries cooperation to
develop fisheries resources. Reports on role of APEC in coordinating and
complementing the work of existing organizations and promoting
cooperative relations among APEC participants.
Participating Economies
Australia
South Korea
Brunei
Malaysia
Canada
New Zealand
China
Philippines
Chinese Taipei
Singapore
Hong Kong
Thailand
Indonesia
United States
Japan (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992
Title: Situation in Tajikistan: Department Statement
Boucher
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 5 19929/5/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Tajikistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, CSCE
[TEXT]
The Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan released a
statement on September 3 which announced the intention to deploy an
additional contingent of border troops to protect the southern borders of the
CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and other "emergency measures."
The leaders cited concern about weapons being smuggled into Tajikistan
from the south for use in the conflict. They appealed to the Tajiks to
restore peace [and] stability and to stop the civil war.
The United States strongly supports a peaceful, political settlement of the
conflict which will ensure the territorial integrity of Tajikistan. We
believe that the Tajiks themselves must assume primary responsibility for
the future of their country. We have noted the CIS Presidents' announcement
and will monitor its implementation carefully. We will consider all
developments in light of UN obligations and CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe] commitments.
We urge all parties involved in the conflict to demonstrate restraint, desist
from all acts of violence, and resume a process of good faith negotiations
leading to a peaceful settlement consistent with CSCE principles.
At the same time, the US Government is deeply concerned with the
escalating fighting in the Kurgan-Tyube region. Such an escalation only
increases human suffering and further complicates efforts to achieve a
lasting resolution to the conflict. We urge all sides to end the fighting and
bloodshed.
The US Government condemns the taking of hostages and the brutal
treatment of the hostages which took place on September 1. We call upon
all parties in this conflict to respect the human rights of all people in
Tajikistan. We hope that the parties will resolve their political differences
and return to the path of democracy. We will continue to watch events in
the region closely.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992
Title: Counter-narcotics Cooperation in Nigeria:
Department Statement
Boucher
Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Sep, 10 19929/10/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Nigeria
Subject: Narcotics
[TEXT]
Acting Secretary of State Arnold Kanter met on September 10 with Nigerian
Attorney General Clement Akpamgbo to discuss US-Nigerian counter-
narcotics cooperation. In the course of the conversation, Mr. Kanter
expressed appreciation for the Attorney General's personal commitment to
eradicating the drug trade but voiced concern about Nigeria's performance in
the fight against narcotics. Mr. Kanter also expressed US disappointment
that Nigerian magistrates summarily denied US requests for the extradition
of two Nigerians charged with heroin trafficking. Two other suspects,
wanted in the United States on similar charges, have yet to be arrested by
the Nigerian authorities. Moreover, no major trafficker has been convicted
in Nigeria.
Mr. Kanter and Attorney General Akpamgbo agreed that close and productive
cooperation on counter-narcotics issues is an integral part of the overall
bilateral relationship. They discussed the importance of continued high-
level dialogue and the urgency of intensified joint efforts to combat the
drug trade, through such possible measures as a new air carrier agreement
and improved airport security procedures. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992
Title: Treaty Actions: Multilateral and Bilateral
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Sep, 14 19929/14/92
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Region: Subsaharan Africa, Europe, South America,
Central America
Country: China, Costa Rica, Gabon, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria,
South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, Ecuador
Subject: International Law, Narcotics, Arms Control,
State Department, Immigration, Refugees, Human Rights,
Trade/Economics, International Organizations,
Security Assistance and Sales, Resource Management
[TEXT]
Multilateral
Arbitration
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the US
Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling
of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.
Done at Washington, London and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force
Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062; 26 UST 583.
Ratification deposited: Botswana, Feb. 5, 1992.
Accession deposited: Oman, Mar. 31, 1992; St. Kitts and Nevis, Apr. 2, 1991;
Swaziland, June 18, 1992; Uganda, May 12, 1991.
Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered
into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the US Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820; 21 UST 77.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Accession deposited: Azerbaijan, Aug. 13, 1992.
Copyrights
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of Sept. 9,
1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on Oct. 2, 1979.
Entered into force for the US Mar. 1, 1989.
Accession deposited: China, July 10, 1992.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961.
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the US Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502; 23
UST 3227.
Accession deposited: Azerbaijan, Aug. 13, 1992.
Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18,
1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for the US Jan. 17, 1980. TIAS 9614;
31 UST 333.
Accession deposited: Algeria, Dec. 19, 1991.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944.
Opened for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force Dec.
27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Acceptances deposited: Belarus, July 10, 1992; Estonia, June 23, 1992;
Georgia, Aug. 7, 1992; Kazakhstan, July 23, 1992; Latvia, Aug. 11, 1992;
Lithuania, July 6, 1992; Marshall Islands, May 21, 1992; Moldova, Aug. 12,
1992; Russia, June 16, 1992; Switzerland, May 29, 1992.
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at the
Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened for signature at
Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Acceptances deposited: Armenia, May 28, 1992; Belarus, July 10, 1992;
Estonia, May 26, 1992; Georgia, May 5, 1992; Kazakhstan, July 15, 1992;
Kyrgyzstan, May 8, 1992; Latvia, May 19, 1992; Lithuania, Apr. 29, 1992;
Marshall Islands, May 21, 1992; Moldova, Aug. 12, 1992; Russia, June 1,
1992; Switzerland, May 29, 1992.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done
at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the US Feb. 23,
1989.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Human Rights
International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. Done at New
York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.1
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
International covenant on political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for the US Sept. 8, 1992.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor
Organization. Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20,
1948; reentered into force for the US Feb. 18, 1980. TIAS 1868.
Acceptance deposited: Croatia, June 30, 1992; Uzbekistan, July 13, 1992.
Narcotic Drugs
Single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at New York Mar. 30, 1961.
Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the US June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298; 18
UST 1407.
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at Geneva
Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118; 26 UST 1439.
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971.
Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the US July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725; 32
UST 543.
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 20,
1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. Succession deposited: Slovenia,
July 6, 1992.
Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and
under water. Done at Moscow Aug. 5, 1963. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1963.
TIAS 5433; 14 UST 1313.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, Apr. 7, 1992.
Privileges and Immunities
Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at
New York Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1946; for the US Apr.
29, 1970. TIAS 6900; 21 UST 1418.
Accession deposited: Azerbaijan, Aug. 13, 1992.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial
discrimination. Done at New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4,
1969.1
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Red Cross
Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. Done at
Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the US Feb. 2,
1956. TIAS 3364; 6 UST 3316.
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick
and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the US Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3363;
6 UST 3217.
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and
sick in armed in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950; for the US Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362; 6 UST 3114.
Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of
war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the US Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3365; 6 UST 3516.
Succession deposited: Croatia, May 11, 1992; Slovenia, Mar. 26, 1992.
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts
(Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978.1
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating
to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol
II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.
Ratification deposited: Madagascar, May 8, 1992; Portugal, May 27, 1992.
Succession deposited: Croatia, May 11, 1992; Slovenia, Mar. 26, 1992.
Accession deposited: Brazil, May 5, 1992.
Declaration deposited: Israel, Apr. 2, 1992; Seychelles, May 22, 1992;
United Arab Emirates, Mar. 6, 1992.
Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967.
Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the US Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577; 19 UST
6223.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Seabed Disarmament
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the
subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. 11, 1971.
Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337; 23 UST 701.
Accession deposited: Algeria, Jan. 27, 1992; Latvia, Aug. 3, 1992.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, Apr. 7, 1992.
Slavery
Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and
institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 6, 1956.
Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for the US Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418; 18
UST 3201.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New
York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532; 28 UST
1975.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
International convention against the taking of hostages. Done at New York
Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the US Jan. 6, 1985.
TIAS 11081.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Weapons
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional
weapons which may be deemed excessively injurious or to have
indiscriminate effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force
Dec. 2, 1983.1
Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the convention on
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate
effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.1
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps
and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on prohibitions or
restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Done
at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.1
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons
(Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of
certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively
injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980.
Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.1
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Women
Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York Mar. 31,
1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the US July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289;
27 UST 1909
Accession deposited: Jordan, July 1, 1992.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women.
Done at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.1
Ratification deposited: Jordan, July 1, 1992.
Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Bilateral
China
Memorandum of understanding on prohibiting import and export trade in
prison labor products. Signed at Washington Aug. 7, 1992. Entered into
force Aug. 7, 1992.
Costa Rica
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government
employees. Effected by exchange of notes at San Jose June 8, 1992. Entered
into force June 8, 1992.
Ecuador
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Quito July 30, 1992.
Enters into force following signature and receipt by Ecuador of written
notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have
been fulfilled.
Gabon
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Libreville May 19,
1992. Entered into force: Aug. 14, 1992.
Mexico
Memorandum of understanding on scientific and technical cooperation in the
mapping and earth sciences, with annex. Signed at Washington Aug. 12, 1992.
Entered into force Aug. 12, 1992.
Netherlands
Memorandum of understanding concerning measures to be taken for the
transfer, security and safeguarding of technical information, software and
equipment to the Ministry of Defense to enable industry to establish North
Sea ACMI range display and debriefing system facilities in the Netherlands.
Signed at Washington July 6, 1992. Entered into force July 6, 1992.
Nigeria
INTELPOST memorandum of understanding, with detailed regulations. Signed
at Washington Aug. 13, 1992. Enters into force on the date mutually agreed
upon by the administrations.
South Africa
Insured postal parcels agreement. Signed at Pretoria and Washington June
19 and Aug. 5, 1992. Enters into force Oct. 1, 1992.
Sweden
Memorandum of understanding concerning the exchange of engineers and
scientists, with annexes. Signed at Washington and Stockholm June 9 and
15, 1992. Entered into force June 15, 1992.
United Kingdom
Memorandum of understanding concerning the establishment of a portable
radar tracking station in the Cayman Islands. Signed at Washington July 1,
1992. Entered into force July 1, 1992.
1 Not in force for the US. (###)