US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992


The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Promise Fulfilled

Hills Source: Carla A. Hills, US Trade Representative Description: Statement before the Senate Finance Committee, Washington, DC Date: Sep, 8 19929/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: Mexico, United States, Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics, Environment [TEXT] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to appear before this committee to discuss the landmark North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA. When the President launched the NAFTA negotiations 14 months ago, he promised an agreement that was in the best interest of the American worker and farmer, consumer and exporter. He has delivered on that promise and more. The agreement reached after more than a year of intense negotiations and close consultation with Congress and the private sector will mean: -- More jobs for auto workers in Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania; -- More work for the New Jersey telecommunications worker; -- More markets for the Texas petrochemical equipment maker; -- More sales for the Illinois and Iowa corn farmer; -- More opportunities for the Connecticut insurance broker; -- More business for the Montana rancher; -- More protection against piracy for the Silicon Valley software designer; [and] -- A more vigorous economy and a higher living standard for all Americans. This is a historic agreement, and Americans in every state and in every occupation can claim and share in its benefits. It is an agreement for both blue collar and white collar workers, for factory and office workers, and for store clerks and farm hands. Here is why: This agreement makes America more globally competitive. It links the United States to our first- and third-largest trading partners, Canada and Mexico, to create one of the largest, richest markets in the world, with 360 million producers and consumers and $6 trillion in annual output. NAFTA will give US companies the same competitive edge that regional trade ties give European and Japanese firms. This agreement will generate new, higher-paying jobs for Americans. More than 600,000 Americans now owe their jobs to our exports to Mexico. This number is expected to swell to over 1 million by 1995 with NAFTA. Over 1.5 million Americans already owe their jobs to our exports to Canada. This agreement will not only create more jobs but better jobs, for we know that workers in export-related jobs earn 17% more per hour than the average American wage. This agreement will help Mexico grow, which has a high payback for us: 70 cents of each Mexican import dollar--and 15 cents of each additional dollar of Mexican income--is spent on US goods and services. Economic growth will not only make Mexico a better customer but also a stronger and more stable neighbor, easing pressures for illegal immigration. The lesson of history is clear: If opportunities do not go to the people, people will go to the opportunities. This agreement will be of particular benefit to small and medium-sized companies that are experiencing the fastest export growth. Unlike big companies, small and mid-sized firms often do not have the resources to locate around high trade barriers. With trade barriers removed, US firms need not move to Mexico to sell to Mexico. This agreement does more to improve the environment than any other agreement in history. It maintains US environmental, safety, and health standards; allows us to enact even tougher standards; and encourages our partners to strengthen their standards. Finally, it safeguards US workers by ensuring a smooth transition to free trade over 15 years. Never before has a trade agreement offered such a balance of economic growth, opportunity, worker benefits, and environmental sensitivity. NAFTA will contribute to a higher standard of living and a better quality of life for Americans. I would like this afternoon to review briefly for the committee the benefits free trade with Canada and Mexico will bring to the American people. Lower Barriers, More Growth, Better Jobs Mr. Chairman, I do not need to tell you, a long-time proponent of free trade, about the advantages this country can reap from more open foreign markets- -especially markets on our borders. You wrote in Roll Call in July that, "The United States has much to gain from a more prosperous Latin America. The average Mexican already buys more from us than his much richer Western European counterpart." Indeed: -- Mexico is now our fastest growing major export market, our second- largest market for manufactured goods, and our third-largest market for agricultural products. -- US exports to Mexico will top $40 billion this year--nearly four times what they were in 1986--yielding a projected surplus of $6-7 billion, more than three times higher than last year. By tearing down Mexico's remaining barriers, NAFTA will increase US exports and jobs. Let me highlight just some of what it will achieve: First, tariff elimination makes US products more competitive. Approximately 65% of US industrial and agricultural exports to Mexico will be eligible for duty-free treatment either immediately or within 5 years. Second, US vehicles and parts will enjoy greater access to Mexico, which has the fastest growing major auto market in the world. The phase-out of tariffs, import restrictions, and local-content requirements on motor vehicles and parts expands opportunities for our auto industry. US autos and light trucks will enjoy greater access to Mexico. With NAFTA, Mexican tariffs will immediately be removed on light trucks and cut in half on passenger cars. Within 5 years, duties on three-quarters of US parts exports to Mexico will be eliminated. Mexican "trade balancing" and "local content requirements," which have effectively kept out US exports of vehicles and parts, will be entirely eliminated in 10 years. Third, strict rules of origin restrict benefits of NAFTA to North American- made products. For autos, for example, only vehicles with substantial North American parts and labor content will benefit from tariffs cuts. NAFTA will require that autos contain 62.5% North American content, considerably more than the 50% required by the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, to obtain preferential treatment. NAFTA contains tracing requirements so that individual parts can be identified to determine the North American content of major components and sub-assemblies, such as engines. Fourth, NAFTA opens Mexico's $6-billion market for telecommunications equipment and services. For equipment, Mexico has agreed to streamline its testing and certification procedures and immediately eliminate tariffs on over 80% of current US telecommunications exports to Mexico. It gives US providers of voice mail or packet-switched services non-discriminatory access to the Mexican public telephone network and eliminates all investment restrictions by July 1995. Fifth, elimination of barriers enhances opportunities in the textile and apparel sectors. Barriers to trade on $250 million (over 20%) of US exports of textiles and apparel to Mexico will be eliminated immediately, with another $700 million freed from restrictions within 6 years. All North American trade restrictions will be eliminated within 10 years and tough rules of origin will ensure that benefits of trade liberalization accrue to North American-made products. Sixth, open markets for our agricultural goods will increase farm exports. Mexico imported $3 billion of US agricultural goods last year, making it our third-largest market. NAFTA will immediately eliminate Mexican import licenses, which cover 25% of US agricultural exports, and will phase out most remaining Mexican tariffs within 10 years and the remaining few within 15 years. Seventh, for the first time in 50 years, Mexico's closed financial services markets will be opened. US banks, securities firms, and other financial firms will be allowed to establish wholly owned subsidiaries and be treated the same as local firms. Transitional restrictions will be phased out by January 1, 2000. Eighth, US insurance firms will gain new opportunities in the Mexican market. Firms with existing joint ventures will be permitted to obtain 100% ownership by 1996, and new entrants to the market can obtain a majority stake in Mexican firms by 1998. By the year 2000, all equity and market-share restrictions will be eliminated, opening up completely what is now a $3.5-billion market. Ninth, NAFTA will create new horizons for our land transportation industry. More than 90% of US trade with Mexico is shipped by land, but US truckers currently are denied the right to carry cargo or set up subsidiaries in Mexico, forcing them to "hand off" trailers to Mexican drivers and return home empty. NAFTA will permit US trucking companies to carry international cargo to the Mexican states contiguous to the United States by 1995 and gives them cross-border access to all of Mexico by the end of 1999. US railroads will be able to transport goods and passengers in Mexico, and US companies can invest in and operate land-side port services. The combination of truck, rail, and port breakthroughs will help create an efficient, intermodal North American transport system. It also will help reduce congestion in border cities. Tenth, NAFTA will provide a higher level of protection for intellectual property rights than has been achieved in any other bilateral or multilateral agreement. US high- technology, entertainment, and consumer goods producers that rely heavily on protection for their patents, copyrights, and trademarks will realize substantial gains under NAFTA. The agreement will also limit compulsory licensing, resolving an important concern with Canada. Eleventh, the agreement creates greater market access in energy and petrochemicals. NAFTA allows US producers to invest and compete in virtually all petrochemicals, and it enhances the access of US energy firms to Mexico's electricity, gas, energy services, and equipment markets. Finally, NAFTA offers better investment rules. NAFTA ensures that US investors in Mexico are accorded equal treatment and eliminates "domestic content" rules and export requirements, permitting increased sourcing of US inputs. New Rules Guarantee Benefits Having negotiated these remarkable new opportunities, we also made sure to negotiate rules and procedures to guarantee that we reap the benefits of free trade. -- NAFTA contains rapid and effective dispute settlement procedures. A new trilateral trade commission will regularly review trade relations and discuss specific problems. Dispute resolution panels will take no longer than 8 months from start to finish. Countries that win a dispute may demand trade compensation if the losing country does not comply with the panel ruling and may retaliate if the compensation is inadequate. -- NAFTA does not change US trade laws that protect American industry from unfairly dumped or subsidized imports. But it substantially improves the ability of US firms to challenge Mexican decisions involving allegations of dumping or subsidized sales in the Mexican market.
US Jobs and Adjustment
These extensive and dramatic market-opening provisions and the rules designed to support them will generate new export opportunities for our entrepreneurs and new jobs for our workers. As a result, we believe that adjustment pressures on the US economy will be minimal. First, while some have raised fears that NAFTA will result in US firms relocating en masse to Mexico to take advantage of lower-wage labor, the fact is that labor rates are only one determinant of plant location. If wages were the only factor, many less developed countries would be economic superpowers. Businesses base investment decisions on a range of factors including productivity, availability of capital, interest rates, quality of infrastructure, and education of the work force. Based on all factors, on average, US workers remain at least five times more productive that their Mexican counterparts. Second, while many have asked how we can compete against Mexican labor, the fact is we already are competing--and successfully so. As Mexico has unilaterally lowered its trade barriers, our trade balance has swung from an almost $6-billion deficit in 1987 to a projected $6-7 billion surplus this year. Moreover, imports from Mexico account for less than one-half of 1% of US GDP [gross domestic product], and over half of those imports today are eligible for duty-free treatment. By tearing down Mexico's remaining tariffs, which are 2 1/2 times as high as our own, NAFTA will level the playing field, not flood it. Adjustment Provisions However, to further assure a smooth transition for sensitive US industries, NAFTA includes an elaborate adjustment regime, as the President committed it would, including: -- Lengthy transition periods of up to 15 years for the lowering of US tariffs in our most sensitive sectors; -- Safeguards to protect US workers and farmers against injury--or the threat of injury--from imports; -- Tough rules of origin to ensure that only North American-made products obtain the benefits of free trade; [and] -- An elimination of Mexico's duty drawback program and export performance requirements that will prevent Mexico from becoming an export platform or "pass through" for products from non-NAFTA countries. Worker Adjustment Assistance In addition to these adjustment provisions within the NAFTA, the President is committed to providing worker adjustment assistance. Last month, he announced a new, comprehensive worker adjustment program--Advancing Skills through Education and Training, or ASETS--a $10-billion, 5-year commitment. The President's plan--which is based upon information obtained from congressional, business, and labor consultations--nearly triples the current level of expenditures for worker training. Of the $2 billion per year, $670 million is available for workers affected by this agreement, and $1.33 billion is allocated to states without regard to the cause of worker dislocation. For the first time, a trade agreement will be accompanied by a program tailored to train workers to take advantage of the new opportunities it creates. The President's proposal features: -- Universal coverage of all workers whose jobs may be at risk, or who have lost their jobs, or who are on notice of job loss; -- Continuity of program funding through a capped entitlement thereby eliminating year-to-year funding uncertainties; -- Rapid response services and access to a wide range of support services and labor market information to ensure that intervention starts early, when it is most effective; -- "Skill grants" for retraining so workers can choose the most appropriate training programs and providers; and -- Income support payments to workers in training who have exhausted their unemployment insurance benefits and who need such support to complete their training.
Bilateral Cooperation On Labor Issues
Mexico and the United States are committed to the maintenance and enforcement of fair labor standards, the promotion of safety and health in the workplace, and worker rights. Economic growth in Mexico resulting from NAFTA will provide increased economic resources to address labor issues. At the same time, US-Mexico labor cooperation has provided an opportunity for Mexico to accelerate benefits accruing to workers, through US technical assistance and training. In 1991, US Secretary of Labor Martin and her Mexican counterpart signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which established a framework for US-Mexico cooperation on key labor issues. As a result, over the past year, the US and Mexican Departments of Labor have undertaken a series of joint initiatives relating to workplace safety, occupational hygiene, child labor, and comparative labor-management relations. We expect shortly to sign a new bilateral agreement that will intensify this cooperation, enabling us to focus on issues such as industrial hygiene and workplace safety standards and training to improve enforcement of those standards.
Just as NAFTA has focused constructive attention on labor issues, so, too, has it focused constructive attention on the environment. At first, many saw NAFTA as a threat to the environment--the creation of a pollution haven. That's just wrong. Mexico's 1988 environmental law is patterned after ours and is stricter in some cases. President Salinas has made enforcement a priority, shutting down over 1,000 polluting firms in the past few years. And the NAFTA itself, and our parallel cooperative activities, will help ease congestion at the border and generate new resources to clean up the environment. Now, I believe, most view NAFTA as an opportunity. The Administration certainly views it as such, and we have seized it. Indeed, NAFTA goes further than any other previous trade agreement in addressing environmental concerns and in actively promoting environmental protection. Specifically, it embraces the notion of "sustainable development," and explicitly: -- Maintains our right to enforce existing US health, safety, and environmental standards; -- Allows the parties, including states and cities, to enact even tougher standards--there will be no preemption; -- Encourages the NAFTA parties to strengthen standards by "harmonizing upwards"; and -- Preserves our right to enforce our international treaty obligations to limit trade in controlled products, such as endangered species. In addition, NAFTA's investment provisions support our environmental goals by: -- Discouraging countries from lowering environmental standards to attract investment; -- Permitting parties to impose stringent environmental requirements on new investment, so long as they are not discriminatory; and -- Permitting the parties to require environmental impact statements on new investments. The NAFTA agreement contains several other provisions that are designed to promote environmental protection, including dispute settlement provisions that encourage input from scientific experts on disputes involving environmental and health issues and place on the party challenging an environmental or health standard the burden of proving that it is inconsistent with the agreement. Moreover, when environmental standards are challenged, the respondent can choose to have the matter heard by a NAFTA panel, rather than a GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] panel.
Extensive Cooperative Activities
These environmentally sensitive provisions in the NAFTA--and there are others--are complemented by an extensive program of bilateral cooperation with Mexico, including an integrated Border Plan, developed pursuant to the President's May 1 commitment. As momentum has built behind NAFTA, this cooperation has intensified. Indeed, the United States and Mexico will shortly sign a new bilateral environmental agreement establishing a Joint Committee for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment. The scope of this agreement will extend beyond the border region and will strengthen our cooperative efforts to combat pollution and improve enforcement of environmental regulations. To enhance environmental protection efforts, President Salinas has increased his enforcement budget from less than $7 million to $77 million and allocated $460 million over 3 years to the Border Plan. In turn, President Bush's FY 1993 budget includes $241 million for border cleanup, 70% greater than the 1992 amount. Unfortunately, Congress has not only failed to pass these funds, it has cut them drastically: by $98 million in the House, and by $120 million in the Senate. At the same time Congress was cutting the President's budget request for border cleanup, some have suggested that we levy a tax on cross-border trade to raise funds for environmental improvement. We are opposed to this idea. It is unsound trade policy, since the purpose of the NAFTA is to lower barriers, not to raise taxes. To do so would defeat the very purpose of agreement: to generate growth and jobs.
The successful conclusion of the NAFTA is a historic achievement for US trade policy, which, over the past 4 years, has contributed significantly to our nation's economic growth. Far more foreign markets are open today to US firms than 45 months ago. As a result, last year the United States became the world's number one exporter with a record $422 billion in exports. Export gains have meant more business opportunity and more jobs across all sectors. Since 1988, all 50 states have expanded exports to the world, on average by 72%. The surge in exporting has generated almost $120 billion in added output for America's companies and farms and has supported 1 million new jobs. In short, the President's trade strategy is paying off. The history-making negotiations for free trade in North America are emblematic of this Administration's bipartisan trade strategy. Since I have been US Trade Representative, we have worked with you, Mr. Chairman, the members of this committee, and with other congressional leaders to establish clear trade objectives and then to engage in tough international negotiations and to use the trade tools at our disposal to achieve those objectives. Never before has a trade negotiation involved such an extensive process of congressional and private sector consultations as has the NAFTA. The number of congressional and private sector briefings that we have held since the talks began over a year ago amount to more than three per day. We want--we intend--to continue to work just as closely with you and the members of this committee in drafting the implementing legislation for the North American Free Trade Agreement. Our goal is to make this continental growth package a reality as soon as possible for all Americans. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992 Title:

US Policy Goals in the Near East

Djerejian Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs and Acting Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs Description: Address before the National Association of Arab Americans, Washington, DC Date: Sep, 11 19929/11/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Iran Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] For over 4 decades, the central characteristic of international relations was the dichotomy between the Soviet empire of dictatorial regimes and central planning and the free world of democratic governments and market economies. The Cold War reverberated around the globe, affecting virtually everyone, everywhere. Today, East-West rivalry over the future of Europe and the Third World has been transformed. Partnership has replaced conflict. A new mode of international cooperation has replaced the acrimony of the Cold War. The ancient lands of the Near East are being buffeted by the same strong winds of change which have had such a dramatic impact on East-West relations. The geopolitical environment in this historic region is in flux, forcing the peoples of these countries to re-evaluate their relationships to each other, to their regional neighbors, and to the world community. The challenge to the United States is to be responsive to this rapid change in the region while we pursue a series of fundamental global foreign policy objectives. These important goals include: peaceful settlement of regional disputes, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, control of destabilizing arms transfers, promotion of basic human rights, ending state-supported terrorism, promotion of economic and social development through privatization and market economies, encouragement of American business and investment opportunities, attenuating the politics of despair, discouraging extremist political alternatives, and winning the international battle against drugs. Within this general context, America has two key sets of policy goals in the Near East. The first has to do with a lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors; the second [is] the creation of viable security arrangements for our friends and allies on the Arabian Peninsula.
Arab-Israeli Peace Process
The first of these goals--the search for peace between Arabs and Israelis-- has challenged every US Administration in the last 4 decades. In the Near East, where war has at times seemed endemic, the road to achieving lasting peace through negotiation and compromise now stretches before us. The first historic steps forward have been taken, and the process is gaining momentum. One of my colleagues commented recently that peace in the Near East could be brought about by either of two means--a political solution or a miracle. The political solution would, of course, be easy. God would come down to earth and decree that all parties should henceforth live together in peace and harmony. The miracle, on the other hand, would be if all the region's leaders got together and decided among themselves to resolve their differences and to live peacefully together for ever after. Well, the miracle may be taking place. The sixth round of bilateral talks, which began in Washington August 24, is about to resume in an atmosphere of professionalism, cordiality, and serious commitment to achieving results acceptable to all. Following the fifth round in April, we stressed to all parties the need to bring to the negotiating table serious, substantive proposals. The time for public posturing and for asserting hard-edged positions had passed. The time has come for talks aimed at defining possible areas of agreement and at narrowing the gaps, through compromise, where disagreement persists. This is the essence of the art of negotiation, and it is the essence of the negotiating process upon which the parties first embarked nearly 11 months ago in Madrid. The negotiating parties have responded positively to our call. The Israelis took steps to improve the atmosphere for this round even before it began. The new Government of Israel halted work on many of the settlements, which we characterize as obstacles to peace, and ended many of the incentive programs which supported settlement in the territories; it rescinded orders to deport Palestinians; and it released hundreds of Palestinian prisoners who had been detained for security reasons. What this represents, as Prime Minister Rabin has said publicly, is a fundamental shift in Israeli national priorities away from investment in the occupied territories and toward meeting pressing social, economic, and human needs within Israel. At the bargaining table, substantive papers, which provide a foundation for further negotiation, have been presented by the Syrians, Palestinians, and Israelis. Acting Secretary Eagleburger met with all the delegations just prior to the Labor Day break, when some of the delegations departed Washington for consultations. The talks will resume September 14. While I can't go into the details of the discussions, I can report the following: -- Syria's decision to put forward a substantive paper is a positive and, indeed, historic step. It reinforces Syria's stated commitment to peace--a commitment which President Assad stressed in his meeting this week with a Druze delegation from Golan. The Syrians and Israelis are addressing core issues--namely territory, security, and the nature of peace. -- The Palestinians and Israelis are deeply engaged in discussing substance and in establishing a work plan. There remain, of course, legitimate differences over both the form and substance of interim self-government arrangements. But, for the first time, there is a timetable for elections and the inauguration of a transitional period. Both sides should seize this opportunity and get down to the difficult but necessary work of engaging on details. The prospect of the Palestinians beginning to govern themselves is within reach. It is essential that no more time be lost and that the parties engage in serious, detailed negotiations to make real progress in the months ahead. -- In the talks between Lebanon and Israel, the security situation on the ground and especially in southern Lebanon continues to be of serious concern to both sides. Differences between the parties focus on Lebanon's demand for immediate implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425 and Israel's desire for a full peace treaty and normalized relations between the two. Notwithstanding this difference, the parties are engaged in serious discussions, particularly in the area of mutual security. It is very important that Israel has made clear that it has no territorial or water claims in Lebanon. -- In the Jordanian-Israeli negotiations, the two sides continue working on an agenda which will set the stage for engagement on several key issues such as water, energy, and security. Another major accomplishment has been the beginning of the multilateral negotiations on issues of regional concern such as arms control and regional security, refugees, water, the environment, and economic development. The first meetings of working groups took place in May and brought together regional parties, including 11 Arab states, and other interested parties from around the world to work toward resolving some of the decades-old disputes among these bellicose neighbors. The next round of working group meetings will begin next week in Washington and Moscow and will continue in October and November. Some parties--Israel, Syria, and Lebanon--stayed away from certain previous multilateral meetings for their own reasons. We will continue our efforts to persuade these parties that participation in all of these working groups is truly in their best interests.
Bilateral Relations
Let me next add a word, in the context of the peace process, about our bilateral relations with the Arab states most directly concerned and with Israel. In so doing, I want to deal with the reality of the relationship and not the mythology and misperceptions that crop up from time to time. Let me start with the country with which I am most familiar--Syria.
The United States today maintains a broad-based dialogue with Syria on a wide range of issues. This policy of engagement has yielded results which serve important US interests. Syria joined the US-led coalition to reverse Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. President Assad's affirmative response to President Bush's letter inviting Syria to participate in the peace negotiations with Israel was one of the major breakthroughs which allowed Secretary Baker to proceed with constructing a peace process engaging Israel in bilateral negotiations with all its immediate Arab neighbors. Our engagement with Syria does not mean, however, that we overlook real differences on outstanding issues such as human rights, narcotics, and terrorism. These issues are on the agenda because they are part and parcel of America's over-arching foreign policy approach. We hope that as our dialogue with Damascus progresses, it will be possible to achieve positive results in these areas.
US policy toward Lebanon remains firm and consistent. This policy was reiterated to both the Syrian and Lebanese leadership during Secretary Baker's trip to Syria and Lebanon in July. We support full implementation of both the letter and the spirit of the Taif accord and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, and we have repeatedly made this clear to all concerned parties. The Taif accord requires coordination now by the Governments of Lebanon and Syria on the decision to redeploy Syrian troops to the western entrances to the Bekaa Valley. In our view, that decision should be taken by both governments this month with redeployment occurring shortly thereafter and as soon as possible. It also requires the completion of the process of disarming all militias, particularly Hizballah. Implementation of this agreement helped bring to an end the turbulent era of civil war in Lebanon. With full adherence and compliance of the parties to the Taif agreement, we believe it will offer the best chance of restoring the unity, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Lebanon recently conducted three rounds of voting to elect a new parliament. These were the first parliamentary elections held in Lebanon since 1972 and the tragic civil war which so ravaged Lebanon and its people. In the weeks leading to the election, we repeatedly called for free and fair voting held in an environment devoid of intimidation and coercion. We consistently stated that the decision to proceed with elections at this time was that of the Lebanese Government to make. Similarly, the decision of some Lebanese political figures not to participate was theirs to make. The United States is clearly disappointed that the elections were not prepared and conducted in a manner to ensure the broadest national consensus. The turnout of eligible voters in some locations was extremely low. There were also widespread reports of irregularities, which might have been avoided had there been impartial international observers at hand. As a consequence, the results do not reflect the full spectrum of the Lebanese body politic. We fervently hope that the Lebanese people and their government will renew their commitment to national reconciliation and to the unity and sovereignty they deserve. We will continue to support the expansion of the authority of the central institutions of the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese armed forces throughout Lebanon, and we will continue to work with other countries and international organizations to encourage and support the Lebanese people as they get on with the priority task of reconstruction. We have encouraged the new government to tackle the country's serious economic problems as its first priority. Recent events underscore the urgency of restoring the Lebanese economy and beginning the task of reconstruction. We, along with other countries and international financial institutions, are considering ways in which we can help. Finally, we have also discussed our serious concern over the situation in south Lebanon with key governments in the region, asking all to exercise maximum restraint lest the continuing violence lead to even more serious consequences for all concerned.
Jordan is playing a very constructive role in the peace process at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. This role has helped us make moderate progress toward the gradual restoration of a bilateral relationship that was severely strained by the Gulf war. When King Hussein visited the United States last March, he pledged to President Bush Jordan's continued commitment to the peace process and to abide by the UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq. Since then, we have been working closely with the Government of Jordan to establish an effective and credible sanctions enforcement regime there. In the last few months, Jordan has tightened its enforcement procedures. The Jordanians know that continued progress in our bilateral relationship and our ability to provide assistance to Jordan depend not only on the peace process, but also on sustainable and effective Jordanian actions to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq.
. Egypt continues to play an active role in the peace process, participating in each of the five multilateral working groups, working closely with the United States in urging the parties to the bilateral process to focus on issues on the table rather than events in the region, and helping to dampen unrealistic expectations by preparing the parties for a long-term process. Internally, the government continues its efforts to reform an economy debilitated by decades of socialist policy. While much remains to be done, the Government of President Mubarak is making tough decisions and taking steps necessary to privatize and rationalize a massive public sector. Our bilateral relationship remains vigorous and healthy.
The solid foundations of close US-Israeli relations remain constant and are instrumental in promoting progress in the peace process. The new Israeli Government has taken a number of important steps to improve the atmosphere for the peace talks and to improve conditions in the occupied territories. These include: -- Halting construction of over 7,000 planned housing units in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; -- Halting construction of a number of "settler roads" in the occupied territories; -- Undertaking to reduce mortgage and other incentives which have encouraged Israelis to settle in the territories; -- Canceling deportation orders on 11 Palestinians and releasing almost 800 prisoners from IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] camps; and -- Formally accepting the applicability of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 on all fronts. We believe these steps are significant. But, we recognize that these steps alone are not enough. More needs to be done by all sides to keep the process moving forward. One such important step--important for the United States as well as the peace process--is the end of the Arab boycott of Israel. Just 3 days ago, President Bush reiterated our long-standing opposition to this obstacle to peace. It's time for this change to happen.
Gulf Security
A second major aspect of our Near East policy is our shared interest in the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. Events have clearly demonstrated that the countries of the Arabian Peninsula are located in a dangerous neighborhood. Stability in the Gulf is vital, not only to our own national interest but also to the economic security of the whole world.
The most immediate and serious threat to the security of the Gulf, and indeed of the whole region, has been Saddam Hussein's aggression against his neighbors and against the people of Iraq. Iraq's record of compliance with UN Security Council resolutions has been completely unsatisfactory. Saddam is tightening the economic blockade of northern Iraq. He has dramatically stepped up pressure against Iraqi civilians in the south. His regime has been engaged in a program of harassment of UN and international relief workers. And he refuses to renew the Memorandum of Understanding with the UN, which would facilitate UN humanitarian programs. UN Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur Max van der Stoel recently described continued Iraqi violations of UN Resolution 688, which calls for an end to Saddam's repression of the Iraqi people. Van der Stoel's report focused particular attention on the increasingly brutal tactics being used against the people of southern Iraq. In response, the United States and its coalition partners are monitoring the human rights situation there. To facilitate this monitoring, they have declared a "no-fly" zone for all Iraqi military aircraft (including helicopters) south of the 32nd parallel of latitude. The unconditional endorsement of this step by the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] is an important manifestation of the international solidarity confronting Saddam's regime. In announcing this step, President Bush emphasized that "we seek Iraq's compliance, not its partition. The United States continues to support Iraq's territorial unity and bears no ill will toward its people." We reiterated our commitment to Iraq's unity directly to the Iraqi opposition during their July meetings with Secretary Baker. The opposition leaders assured us they share our view. Clearly, it is Saddam Hussein who is alienating his own people by cracking down on Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'ite minorities. The United States has long encouraged the development of a broad-based, unified Iraqi opposition. We want to see a government in Baghdad which respects the human rights of all its citizens and is at peace with its neighbors. We support the establishment of a democratic, central government in Baghdad which reflects the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society. Most of the opposition groups met in Vienna in June and took important steps toward their aspirations of a new Iraqi leadership. Since then, delegations of the Iraqi National Congress have met with world leaders in various capitals and are seeking to further broaden their base of support among Iraqi emigres and their contacts with regime opponents inside Iraq.
Arabian Peninsula.
Last February, I visited the countries which are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In all my conversations with their leaders and government officials, I stressed the need for individual self-defense and for collective defense planning and arrangements among the six GCC states--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman--with the goal of strengthening their ability to defend themselves against external aggression. I also encouraged security cooperation between the Gulf states and their friends in the region. Furthermore, I assured the GCC leaders that the United States will cooperate closely with them to meet their legitimate defense needs. This includes both the sales of weapons within the context of the President's Middle East arms control initiative, and bilateral security arrangements such as the periodic conduct of joint military exercises, the maintenance of an enhanced naval presence in the Gulf, and arrangements for the access and prepositioning of critical military materiel and equipment. I emphasized that these bilateral efforts would complement but not supersede the Gulf states' own collective security efforts. I reiterated that we do not intend to station ground troops permanently anywhere in the region. We have now concluded or renewed agreements with four of the GCC states and have excellent working arrangements with all of them. The establishment of Operation Southern Watch is a good example of a level of cooperation [that is] well beyond what existed 2 years ago prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It is important to understand that the purposes of both arms sales and collective security measures are to deter threats to our shared interests, and to raise the threshold of future requirements for direct US military action. As we have repeatedly proven, we stand with our friends and allies on the Arabian Peninsula against aggression. The lost lives of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines attest to that fact. But we also expect those friends and allies to do everything within their power, including close coordination among themselves, to provide for their own collective defense, and we will continue to encourage efforts in that direction.
Across the Gulf from our friends and allies lies the Islamic Republic of Iran, an important country that can contribute to regional security if it chooses a constructive path. Iran knows what it has to do to be accepted by the international community. Many hope that the Majlis election of last spring will lead to moderate policies. We share this hope, but actions must be the litmus test. From our view, the normalization of relations with Iran depends on several factors. Iran's role in sponsoring terrorism continues in ways that are deeply disturbing. Iran's human rights practices, and its apparent pursuit of a destabilizing arms build-up, including everything from submarines to weapons of mass destruction, also remain matters of serious concern. Further, Iran's policies toward the Gulf Arab states, as exemplified by its heavy-handed assertion of authority on Abu Musa island, have shown it to be an increasingly truculent neighbor. We welcome the firm stand that the Gulf Cooperation Council has taken on this issue. Another serious problem is Iran's categorical opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its support for those, like Hizballah in Lebanon, who violently oppose it. We have made clear from the outset that we are prepared to engage in a dialogue with authorized representatives of the Iranian Government to discuss these issues and US-Iranian relations. To date, the Iranian leadership has declined to engage us in this dialogue.
Fundamental Values
Finally, I would like to say a few words about our efforts to promote the values we Americans cherish and which form the foundation of all that has made our country great. These fundamental values, which underlie US foreign policy globally--basic human rights, popular participation in government, pluralism, and minority and women's rights--also find reflection in our approach to the countries of the Near East, including the Arab states of North Africa. This reality is the point of departure for our attitude toward an increasingly important factor in the region--a phenomenon variously described as political Islam, the Islamic revival, or Islamic fundamentalism. I addressed this issue in some detail in an address I gave June 2 [see Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 23, p. 444]. But let me just note a few key points. First, we do not view Islam as the next "ism" confronting the West or threatening world peace. That is an overly simplistic reaction to a complex reality. It is evident that the Crusades have been over for a long time. Second, while we have no desire to impose a "made in the USA" model on other societies, we are proud of our values and traditions and will support those in the region who seek to broaden political participation and respect for basic human rights. We part company in the Near East, as elsewhere, with those--whether they cloak their message in religious or secular terms--who practice terrorism, oppress minorities, preach intolerance, violate human rights, or pursue their goals through violent means. We are wary of those who would use the democratic process to come to power, only to destroy that very process in order to retain power and political dominance. While we believe in the principle "one person, one vote," we do not support "one person, one vote, one time." In sum, religion is not a determinant of the nature or quality of our relations with the countries of the Near East. Our quarrel is with extremism, and the violence, denial, intolerance, intimidation, coercion, and terror which too often accompany it.
Ladies and gentlemen, the principled but pragmatic view I have outlined is reflected in the excellent relations we enjoy with many of the countries of the region. It is an integral part of a realistic approach to achieving the US policy goals I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks. I have hanging in my office, in a small frame, the Chinese word for "crisis"- -wei ji. The word is made up of two ideographs, side-by-side, depicting "danger" and "opportunity." In the recent crisis-filled years, we have sought to both recognize the dangers and to realize the opportunities in today's changing world. Guided by the principles and fundamental values that have made our country great, we hope to help secure positive and lasting changes beneficial to both the United States and to the peoples of this historic region. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992 Title:

UN Framework Convention On Climate Change

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of a transmittal letter to the Senate, Washington, DC Date: Sep, 8 19929/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Subject: Environment [TEXT] To the Senate of the United States: I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted May 9, 1992, by the resumed fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change ("Convention"), and signed by me on behalf of the United States at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro on June 12, 1992. The report of the Department of State is also enclosed for the information of the Senate. The Convention, negotiated over a period of nearly 2 years, represents a delicate balance of many interests. It embodies a comprehensive approach embracing all greenhouse gases, their sources and sinks, and promotes action to modify net emissions trends of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. It supports an action-oriented approach to net emissions reduction that takes into account specific national circumstances. It provides the basis for assessing the impacts and effectiveness of different national responses in light of existing scientific and economic information and new developments. The Convention encourages cooperative arrangements by providing for joint implementation between and among parties under mutually agreed terms. The ultimate objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations (not emissions) in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. In accordance with this objective, the Convention calls on all parties to prepare national inventories of anthropogenic emissions, implement appropriate national and regional programs to mitigate and adapt to climate change, promote technology cooperation (including technology transfer), promote scientific research and monitoring, and promote and cooperate in the full and open exchange of information and in education, training, and public awareness programs. In light of such provisions, this Convention constitutes a major step in protecting the global environment from potential adverse effects of climate change. The Convention will enter into force 90 days after the 50th instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval has been deposited. Ratification by the United States is necessary for the effective implementation of the convention. Early ratification by the United States is likely to encourage similar action by other countries whose participation is also essential. It should be noted that the Convention does not permit reservations. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this Convention and give its advice and consent to ratification. George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Sep, 8 19929/8/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Pacific, Southeast Asia, East Asia Country: Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, Canada, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United States Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] At the conclusion of the 1992 APEC ministerial meeting held in Bangkok, Thailand, September 10-11, the United States assumed the chairmanship from Thailand, which has held it for the last year. As chair, the United States will host the 1993 meeting and oversee ministerial and regular lower-level meetings.
The Asia-Pacific region, comprised of some of the more dynamic economies in the world, has experienced unprecedented growth in the last 2 decades. Fueled by growing trade and financial flows, economic relations among economies of the region also have increased dramatically. APEC was established to better manage the effects of growing interdependence in the Pacific region and sustain economic growth. A new vehicle for multilateral cooperation among the market-oriented economies of the region was needed. APEC began in 1989 as an informal grouping of 12 Asia-Pacific economies formed to meet that need. In November 1991, APEC admitted the People's Republic of China, Chinese Taipei, and Hong Kong, bringing membership to 15. APEC provides a forum for discussion on a broad range of economic issues of importance to the region. Foreign and economic ministers from the members first met in Canberra, Australia, in November 1989. Since then, annual ministerial meetings have been held in Singapore and Seoul, South Korea.
US-APEC Relations
The United States works closely with members of APEC and is an important part of US engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Former Secretary Baker called APEC "a key vehicle for sustaining market-oriented development, advancing regional and global trade liberalization, and fostering a more prosperous economic future for the entire Asia-Pacific region." [See Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 31, p. 597.] US trans-Pacific trade almost equaled trade with Western Europe in 1980. By 1991, US trade across the Pacific ($316 billion) was 43% greater than trade with Western Europe ($221 billion). US foreign direct investment in economies belonging to the APEC group was more than $134 billion in 1991, about 30% of total US foreign direct investment.
APEC Progress
APEC has made remarkable progress since November 1989. With the addition of three members at the Seoul meeting in 1991 and the establishment of a permanent secretariat in September 1992, APEC has grown from an informal dialogue group to a formalized institution that involves all major economies of the region. Its priority continues to be to encourage market-oriented solutions to the adjustment problems associated with quickly growing economies. To that end, APEC has made significant contributions to negotiations during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and is considering moves toward regional trade liberalization. APEC senior officials oversee 10 working groups, covering broad areas of economic, educational, and environmental cooperation. In addition, APEC has two ad hoc groups, one on regional trade liberalization and one on economic policy. The working groups are:
Trade and Investment Data.
Develops consistent and reliable data in merchandise trade, trade in services, and investment.
Trade Promotion.
Develops proposals to exchange trade and industrial information and to promote economic and trade missions among economies of the region. Organizes international seminars and meetings to promote trade, an Asia- Pacific trade fair, and a training course on trade promotion.
Investment and Technology Transfer.
Promotes investment in the APEC region through such activities as an investment and technology information network for the Asia-Pacific region.
Human Resource Development.
Seeks ways to exchange information among Asia-Pacific economies in such areas as business administration, industrial training and innovation, project management, and development planning. In this working group, the United States hosted an APEC education ministerial in Washington in August 1992 and sponsors the APEC Partnership for Education, which will promote cooperation among educational institutions, private sector internships, and US Government- sponsored private sector training programs.
Regional Energy Cooperation.
Develops cooperative projects, such as a regional database on energy supply and demand, and exchanges views on, among other things, coal utilization, technology transfer, and resource exploration and development.
Marine Resource Conservation.
Exchanges information on and develops recommendations for dealing with red tide/toxic algae pollution problems. Exchanges information on technical and policy aspects of marine pollution and advancement of integrated coastal zone planning.
Compiles documents on APEC telecommunications development activities, including a description of each member country's telecommunications environment, to be updated annually. Disseminates a manual on how to approach training in a telecommunications organization, followed by a pilot project reviewing needs and recommending solutions in a selected organization. Explores ways to establish and develop regional networks, initially by encouraging electronic data interchange. Exchanges information on policy and regulatory developments in each member's telecommunications sector.
Studies and recommends ways to improve infrastructure, facilitate movement of passengers and freight, collect and exchange data, and enhance transportation safety and security. This US-led working group is one of three added in March 1991. The United States proposed it because of the importance of improved transportation links to continued economic growth in the region.
Studies one of the region's most important industries focusing on tourism data exchange, barriers to expansion, training programs, and current projects in APEC member economies.
Surveys the pattern of APEC fisheries cooperation to develop fisheries resources. Reports on role of APEC in coordinating and complementing the work of existing organizations and promoting cooperative relations among APEC participants.
Participating Economies
Australia South Korea Brunei Malaysia Canada New Zealand China Philippines Chinese Taipei Singapore Hong Kong Thailand Indonesia United States Japan (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992 Title:

Situation in Tajikistan: Department Statement

Boucher Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Sep, 5 19929/5/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Tajikistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, CSCE [TEXT] The Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan released a statement on September 3 which announced the intention to deploy an additional contingent of border troops to protect the southern borders of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and other "emergency measures." The leaders cited concern about weapons being smuggled into Tajikistan from the south for use in the conflict. They appealed to the Tajiks to restore peace [and] stability and to stop the civil war. The United States strongly supports a peaceful, political settlement of the conflict which will ensure the territorial integrity of Tajikistan. We believe that the Tajiks themselves must assume primary responsibility for the future of their country. We have noted the CIS Presidents' announcement and will monitor its implementation carefully. We will consider all developments in light of UN obligations and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] commitments. We urge all parties involved in the conflict to demonstrate restraint, desist from all acts of violence, and resume a process of good faith negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement consistent with CSCE principles. At the same time, the US Government is deeply concerned with the escalating fighting in the Kurgan-Tyube region. Such an escalation only increases human suffering and further complicates efforts to achieve a lasting resolution to the conflict. We urge all sides to end the fighting and bloodshed. The US Government condemns the taking of hostages and the brutal treatment of the hostages which took place on September 1. We call upon all parties in this conflict to respect the human rights of all people in Tajikistan. We hope that the parties will resolve their political differences and return to the path of democracy. We will continue to watch events in the region closely.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992 Title:

Counter-narcotics Cooperation in Nigeria: Department Statement

Boucher Source: Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Sep, 10 19929/10/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Nigeria Subject: Narcotics [TEXT] Acting Secretary of State Arnold Kanter met on September 10 with Nigerian Attorney General Clement Akpamgbo to discuss US-Nigerian counter- narcotics cooperation. In the course of the conversation, Mr. Kanter expressed appreciation for the Attorney General's personal commitment to eradicating the drug trade but voiced concern about Nigeria's performance in the fight against narcotics. Mr. Kanter also expressed US disappointment that Nigerian magistrates summarily denied US requests for the extradition of two Nigerians charged with heroin trafficking. Two other suspects, wanted in the United States on similar charges, have yet to be arrested by the Nigerian authorities. Moreover, no major trafficker has been convicted in Nigeria. Mr. Kanter and Attorney General Akpamgbo agreed that close and productive cooperation on counter-narcotics issues is an integral part of the overall bilateral relationship. They discussed the importance of continued high- level dialogue and the urgency of intensified joint efforts to combat the drug trade, through such possible measures as a new air carrier agreement and improved airport security procedures. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 37, September 14, 1992 Title:

Treaty Actions: Multilateral and Bilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Sep, 14 19929/14/92 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: Subsaharan Africa, Europe, South America, Central America Country: China, Costa Rica, Gabon, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, Ecuador Subject: International Law, Narcotics, Arms Control, State Department, Immigration, Refugees, Human Rights, Trade/Economics, International Organizations, Security Assistance and Sales, Resource Management [TEXT]
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the US Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062; 26 UST 583. Ratification deposited: Botswana, Feb. 5, 1992. Accession deposited: Oman, Mar. 31, 1992; St. Kitts and Nevis, Apr. 2, 1991; Swaziland, June 18, 1992; Uganda, May 12, 1991.
Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the US Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820; 21 UST 77. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992. Accession deposited: Azerbaijan, Aug. 13, 1992.
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on Oct. 2, 1979. Entered into force for the US Mar. 1, 1989. Accession deposited: China, July 10, 1992.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the US Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502; 23 UST 3227. Accession deposited: Azerbaijan, Aug. 13, 1992.
Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for the US Jan. 17, 1980. TIAS 9614; 31 UST 333. Accession deposited: Algeria, Dec. 19, 1991.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. Acceptances deposited: Belarus, July 10, 1992; Estonia, June 23, 1992; Georgia, Aug. 7, 1992; Kazakhstan, July 23, 1992; Latvia, Aug. 11, 1992; Lithuania, July 6, 1992; Marshall Islands, May 21, 1992; Moldova, Aug. 12, 1992; Russia, June 16, 1992; Switzerland, May 29, 1992. Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. Acceptances deposited: Armenia, May 28, 1992; Belarus, July 10, 1992; Estonia, May 26, 1992; Georgia, May 5, 1992; Kazakhstan, July 15, 1992; Kyrgyzstan, May 8, 1992; Latvia, May 19, 1992; Lithuania, Apr. 29, 1992; Marshall Islands, May 21, 1992; Moldova, Aug. 12, 1992; Russia, June 1, 1992; Switzerland, May 29, 1992.
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the US Feb. 23, 1989. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Human Rights
International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.1 Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992. International covenant on political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for the US Sept. 8, 1992. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948; reentered into force for the US Feb. 18, 1980. TIAS 1868. Acceptance deposited: Croatia, June 30, 1992; Uzbekistan, July 13, 1992.
Narcotic Drugs
Single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at New York Mar. 30, 1961. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the US June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298; 18 UST 1407. Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118; 26 UST 1439. Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the US July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725; 32 UST 543. United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow Aug. 5, 1963. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1963. TIAS 5433; 14 UST 1313. Succession deposited: Slovenia, Apr. 7, 1992.
Privileges and Immunities
Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at New York Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1946; for the US Apr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900; 21 UST 1418. Accession deposited: Azerbaijan, Aug. 13, 1992.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.1 Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Red Cross
Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the US Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364; 6 UST 3316. Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the US Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3363; 6 UST 3217. Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the US Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362; 6 UST 3114. Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the US Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3365; 6 UST 3516. Succession deposited: Croatia, May 11, 1992; Slovenia, Mar. 26, 1992. Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.1 Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978. Ratification deposited: Madagascar, May 8, 1992; Portugal, May 27, 1992. Succession deposited: Croatia, May 11, 1992; Slovenia, Mar. 26, 1992. Accession deposited: Brazil, May 5, 1992. Declaration deposited: Israel, Apr. 2, 1992; Seychelles, May 22, 1992; United Arab Emirates, Mar. 6, 1992.
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the US Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577; 19 UST 6223. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Seabed Disarmament
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337; 23 UST 701. Accession deposited: Algeria, Jan. 27, 1992; Latvia, Aug. 3, 1992. Succession deposited: Slovenia, Apr. 7, 1992.
Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 6, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for the US Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418; 18 UST 3201. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532; 28 UST 1975. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992. International convention against the taking of hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the US Jan. 6, 1985. TIAS 11081. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.1 Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.1 Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.1 Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.1 Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the US July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289; 27 UST 1909 Accession deposited: Jordan, July 1, 1992. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992. Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Done at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.1 Ratification deposited: Jordan, July 1, 1992. Succession deposited: Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Memorandum of understanding on prohibiting import and export trade in prison labor products. Signed at Washington Aug. 7, 1992. Entered into force Aug. 7, 1992.
Costa Rica
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at San Jose June 8, 1992. Entered into force June 8, 1992.
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Quito July 30, 1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Ecuador of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Libreville May 19, 1992. Entered into force: Aug. 14, 1992.
Memorandum of understanding on scientific and technical cooperation in the mapping and earth sciences, with annex. Signed at Washington Aug. 12, 1992. Entered into force Aug. 12, 1992. Netherlands Memorandum of understanding concerning measures to be taken for the transfer, security and safeguarding of technical information, software and equipment to the Ministry of Defense to enable industry to establish North Sea ACMI range display and debriefing system facilities in the Netherlands. Signed at Washington July 6, 1992. Entered into force July 6, 1992.
INTELPOST memorandum of understanding, with detailed regulations. Signed at Washington Aug. 13, 1992. Enters into force on the date mutually agreed upon by the administrations.
South Africa
Insured postal parcels agreement. Signed at Pretoria and Washington June 19 and Aug. 5, 1992. Enters into force Oct. 1, 1992.
Memorandum of understanding concerning the exchange of engineers and scientists, with annexes. Signed at Washington and Stockholm June 9 and 15, 1992. Entered into force June 15, 1992.
United Kingdom
Memorandum of understanding concerning the establishment of a portable radar tracking station in the Cayman Islands. Signed at Washington July 1, 1992. Entered into force July 1, 1992. 1 Not in force for the US. (###)