US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992

Title:

Time Is Running Out in Haiti

Einaudi Source: Luigi R. Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States Description: Address before the Organization of American States (OAS) Permanent Council, Washington, DC Date: Aug, 12 19938/12/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, South America, Central America, Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: OAS, Democratization [TEXT] The United States welcomes the decision of the Secretary General [Joao Clemente Baena Soares] to lead a delegation to Haiti to facilitate negotiations to restore constitutional democracy in Haiti. We congratulate the Secretary General for his initiative. His action gives life to the mandates to "open channels of communication" and to "facilitate dialogue with a view to ensuring the modalities and guarantees that will make it possible for President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to return to office"-- mandates explicitly given to the Secretary General in the October 8 Resolution of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Haiti and reiterated in the Ministers' Resolution of May 17. We fully support Ambassador Baena Soares in his commitment to resolve the Haitian crisis and, thereby, help sustain democracy in the hemisphere. A solution is overdue. Time is running out. The statesmen and the true patriots of Haiti must step forward now before their country slides into anarchy. They must talk seriously with each other. They must bind themselves to an agreement that puts the future of Haiti--of all Haitians-- first. And they must work hard to make such an agreement real. Unfortunately, there have been signs of inflexibility from too many of those involved: from the makers of the coup d'etat, from some in the current de facto government, [and] even from some associated with the Government of Haiti we all recognize. The situation in Haiti today has an alarming volatility. Selective abuse and repression have been facts of life for 10 months now. And the killing of several police and military officials [during] the week of August 2 and the military's forceful response have raised tensions to dangerous levels. Time is running out for those Haitians who seek domestic peace. I spoke yesterday to a leading Haitian democrat who has been a steadfast supporter and constant participant in efforts to bridge differences and restore a democratic direction to Haitian life. His one-word summary of the current situation: "insupportable"--worse than insufferable and unbearable-- unsustainable. So time is running out for Haitian democrats. But perhaps some still do not understand that the bell also tolls equally and indiscriminately for supporters of revolution and for supporters of reaction. The winners in today's status quo are the exploiters of violence, the supporters of autocracy and privilege, the profiteers of the embargo, the narco-traffickers [and] all those who believe national power and international acceptance can be organized solely on a foundation of guns and money. The truth is that time is running out for them, too. Continued self- serving and short-sighted politics will lead to disaster. Time is running out for everyone and everything. Time is running out for the Haitian people who see the accelerating erosion of the fragile infrastructure in place for serving basic human needs. Enhanced relief efforts can provide "first aid" but only first aid. Relief is no substitute for long-term investment in human development. The very soil of Haiti is being impoverished for want of coordinated efforts to assist Haitians in conserving this natural resource, second only to the people themselves. Time is running out for the "modern sector" of Haiti. The rigors of competing in a global market are tough enough for any country under normal conditions. Hanging on and getting by in the face of economic isolation cannot and will not work. Even successful circumvention of economic restrictions is at best a survival tactic. The longer the crisis continues, the more ground is lost. Business confidence and prospects fade; profits evaporate; jobs are lost. Time saps even the greatest resilience. Time is running out for the Haitian military. There is a proud place for a truly professional army in a constitutional democratic order. A professional military has the internal cohesion and loyalty to civilian authority that win the uniform respect and the soldiers who wear it the full faith and confidence of the public they serve. As time runs out, the hopes for building a truly professional military in Haiti become dimmer and dimmer. The "dilatory and intimidating maneuvers" must end. The foot- dragging must stop. The piling up of conditions and preconditions for sitting down to talk must cease. All must realize that, wittingly or unwittingly, they are caught up in a zero-sum game, the kind that no one wins [and] the kind in which all end up losers.0 We are approaching the first anniversary of the September 30 coup. Later this fall, elections for legislators will come due. For now, a de facto regime claims power while a legislature derives authority from its election in a process judged internationally to be free and fair. As time slips by, the prospects of dealing with a political class devoid of legitimacy becomes more daunting, and cynicism about the future heightens. There is time yet to set things right, but we are talking about days, not months. The time has come for all those who value democracy and the interests of the people of Haiti to rally to the center, to set political differences aside for a time when they can be resolved without violence, [and] to seize upon the opportunity presented by the OAS mission to move Haiti toward peace, tolerance, and mutual respect. From the beginning of the crisis, OAS member states have realized that a solution for Haiti must be a solution reached by Haitians. At the same time, we recognized that this organization of democratic states has a responsibility and a mandate to work for democracy. That is why our foreign ministers have assembled on three occasions to take stock of the crisis and commit to action. That is why the Secretary General has worked unceasingly to carry out the mandates of the foreign ministers. That is why, now, before time runs out and this opportunity passes, we must give this mission all the support it deserves. The composition of the mission reflects broad support for the Secretary General. The affirmative response of the CARICOM [Caribbean Community and Caribbean Common Market] to the invitation of the Secretary General is especially heartening. The United States is encouraging both the Presidency of the European Community (EC) and the Secretary General of the United Nations to name participants in the mission. I understand from Ambassador (Alexander F.) Watson, deputy of the US Mission at the United Nations who is with us here this morning, that the United Nations is, in fact, doing so today and will likely inform the Secretary General to that effect very soon. And, I have just received word from our embassy in London that the Government of the United Kingdom is consulting with the EC members with the view to responding positively to the Secretary General. The participation of high-level representatives of member states which took part in the earliest OAS missions to Haiti expresses the collective resolve of the inter-American community for a solution to the crisis in Haiti. I, for one, am proud to have been authorized to join the Secretary General. The focus of the mission will be where it needs to be: getting the sectors of Haiti to talk frankly and without preconditions so as to arrest the slide into paralysis and disorder and put Haiti back on the course to constitutional democracy. The urgency for acting now lies within the volatile dynamic of the Haitian situation itself. There is yet time to forestall a slide into paralysis and hold off the violence of the extremes, but the time is running short; in fact, it has already run short. Mr. Secretary, you embark on the mission with our full support and with our ardent hope that Haitians will see this mission for what it is and can be: a chance to stop the slide toward the past, [and] a chance to right the course of events, a chance to give all Haitians reason to hope again and, thus, to work for the better future they deserve. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992 Title:

US Policy on Tuna-Dolphin Issues

Colson Source: David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs Description: Statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 23 19937/23/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, South America, Central America, Caribbean Country: Mexico, Venezuela Subject: Environment, Resource Management [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, the Administration appreciates the opportunity to appear before this committee to address the tuna-dolphin issue. This controversy has been with us for some time. It was at the heart of the concerns which led to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), it has been a matter of domestic and international debate since, and it is a matter that needs to be resolved. When this matter was before the Congress in 1988, there were at least two complaints on the international side of this question: That foreign fleets had to be brought to a level of performance comparable to the US fleet, and that the executive branch was not doing enough internationally to resolve this matter. Mr. Chairman, today I can report a dramatic change in attitude by foreign governments on this question. Foreign government commitments to dolphin conservation and protection are strong, foreign fleet performance is high, all concerned governments are cooperating with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), and, as for our efforts, the Congress has before it legislation which arises out of the Administration's proposal that provides for a 5-year moratorium on the practice of setting on dolphins [the technique of using dolphin sightings to target locations of fish] and establishes a dolphin-safe market in the United States. The Administration supports enactment of legislation that includes an international moratorium on the practice of setting on dolphins to catch tuna starting on March 1, 1994, and establishes a completely "dolphin-safe" US tuna market 3 months later. Such legislation achieves most quickly the long-standing goals of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. These important initiatives are embodied in a bill, HR 5419, currently in the House. Such legislation would restore access to foreign tuna supplies for US-based canners. Another important contribution to dolphin conservation and protection is the work of the IATTC. These two efforts both chart a course that reduces dolphin mortality and are preferable to the status quo. Both of these tuna- dolphin solutions arise out of negotiations which we have conducted. They have the support of the concerned governments. The Administration cannot support, however, any dolphin conservation bill that would install enhanced trade sanctions in US law that are so onerous as to create disincentives for international cooperation on this matter. Some background from the Admini-stration's perspective is in order. The 1988 amendments to the MMPA set in place a rigid comparability test between the kills-per-set (KPS) by the US fleet and the kills-per-set by foreign fleets. Other rules apply as well. If the comparability test is not met, or the other rules are not observed, then non-discretionary trade embargoes are imposed--these embargoes relate to yellowfin tuna caught in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. The philosophy of the 1988 amendments was to require high performance from the US fleet in protecting dolphins and to use the marketplace to induce similar high standards of performance by foreign fleets. At the time, it was known that the incidental mortality of dolphins caused by foreign fleets was much higher than that by the US fleet--both in terms of kills-per-set and total mortality. The 1988 amendments dealt with this problem by banning tuna from any country that did not implement several specific measures to reduce dolphin mortality and achieve a kills-per-set rate that was no more than 2 times the US rate in 1989 and no more than 1.25 times the US kills-per-set rate in 1990 and thereafter. The 1988 MMPA amendments and NOAA's [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] implementing regulations have specific requirements which must be met by any country wishing to export yellowfin tuna from the ETP [eastern tropical Pacific] to the United States. These requirements include: participation in the observer program of the IATTC; that vessels execute a proper backdown procedure to release dolphins; that each foreign vessel be equipped with a dolphin safety panel (Medina panel) to prevent the entanglement of dolphins during the backdown; that sundown sets and the use of explosives to drive dolphins be prohibited; that vessels have on board at least three speedboats equipped with bridles, towing lines, and snap hooks to prevent the collapse of the net; that vessels be equipped with a platform and underwater observation gear to be used for the observation and rescue of dolphin; and, finally, that vessels be equipped with long-range floodlights to be used in case the backdown channel has to be illuminated to direct the release of dolphins. The governments of the fishing countries began aggressive efforts to meet these new requirements. Each of the fishing countries adopted and implemented regulatory programs comparable to the US program to reduce dolphin mortalities to the lowest possible levels. In reviewing the programs of the foreign countries, the Secretary of Commerce has generally found that the fishing countries are in compliance with the necessary program elements of the NOAA regulations. While there have been a few minor problems, no one that I am aware of has challenged the basic point that the foreign fishing countries have adopted dolphin protection programs similar to that of the United States. In addition to measures listed above, the fishing nations regularly send their captains and other personnel to workshops sponsored by the IATTC to improve their understanding of, and skill in, the measures necessary to reduce the incidental mortality of dolphins in the fishery to the lowest possible level. Since this program began, more than 350 participants have attended these workshops, including over 200 captains--virtually every captain in the ETP tuna fishery has attended a workshop at least once. What has been the result of these efforts on the part of the foreign fleets? To answer that question, we can compare the situation in the fishery in 1988 with the situation today. In 1988, the US fleet had an average mortality rate of 5.3 kills-per-set. This was the standard against which the performance of the foreign fleets was to be measured. The mortality rate in the foreign fleet in 1988 was 10.9 KPS, more than twice that of the US fleet. It was recognized at the time that, because the US kill rate was declining steadily, foreign fleets would likely not meet the 1990 standard and that in 1991, embargoes would be imposed. Mr. Chairman, the reduction in dolphin mortality by the foreign fleets has been achieved quickly. By 1991, the mortality rate for the foreign fleet as a whole had dropped to 3.1 KPS, more than 40% below the US kills-per-set rate at the time the 1988 amendments were adopted. I should point out that Mexico consistently outperformed the foreign fleet as a whole--between 1988 and 1991, the kill rate of the Mexican fleet dropped from 8.2 to 2.9 KPS. Total mortality in the ETP tuna fishery has also dropped dramatically, from just under 100,000 in 1989 to approximately 27,000 in 1991, and this year it should drop below 20,000 dolphins. Thus, the 1988 MMPA amendments have been an unquestioned success--achieving a 75% reduction in total mortalities in just 3 years and achieving a level of mortalities for the whole fleet which is in combination comparable to the level allowed to the US fleet by the marine mammal permit which it holds. During the same period, the majority of the US fleet moved out of the eastern Pacific. Those that stayed continued to further reduce their kills- per-set rate and therefore, despite the significant progress by the foreign fleets, Mexico and Venezuela are embargoed under the 1988 MMPA amendments because their kills-per-set rates are greater than 1.25 times the kills-per-set rate of the remaining US fleet in the ETP, which for the 1991 fishing year was 1.89 KPS. Further, although there were no observed dolphin kills by the Colombian fleet during the 1991 fishing year, Colombia is also embargoed because its fleet did not achieve the required level of observer coverage during that period. I would also note that in 1991, Vanuatu had a KPS rate of 1.75, less than that of the US fleet, and thus the embargo against Vanuatu, imposed in March 1990, was lifted in January of this year. In spite of the embargoes, Mexico, Venezuela, and the other fishing nations are committed to the conservation and protection of dolphins and to working with us on this difficult issue. Subsequent to the 1988 MMPA amendments, Congress spoke to this issue in the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (PL 100-627, Sec. 901(h)). Congress called for: . . . negotiations and discussions with appropriate foreign governments, to reduce and, as soon as possible, eliminate the practice of harvesting tuna through the use of purse seine net intentionally deployed to encircle dolphins. Pursuant to the 1988 MMPA amendments, a tuna embargo was imposed against Mexico by court order on February 22, 1991. Subsequent embargoes followed on other fishing nations (Venezuela, Vanuatu, and, most recently, Colombia) as well as 20 nations identified as "intermediary nations." Some of these embargoes have since been lifted, but today 13 countries remain subject to US embargoes on yellowfin tuna as harvesting or intermediary nations. Shortly [thereafter], Mexico brought a GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] case which called into question our rights to impose such an embargo under GATT rules. A GATT panel found the embargo to be inconsistent with US obligations under the GATT. We have agreed with Mexico not to request adoption of the panel report by the full GATT Council while we work to resolve the situation through other means. However, last week, on July 14, the EC [European Community] requested and was granted a separate GATT panel to consider the intermediary embargoes currently in effect against Spain, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The panel will be established, and there is little reason to believe that the results of a second panel review will differ significantly from the first. The EC did, however, indicate that it may be willing to review its request for a panel, should legislation be passed that would lift the embargoes. The combination of these factors led the Administration to look for a solution to this long-standing controversial matter, one which would reduce dolphin mortalities even faster and remove the trade sanctions. And, in consultations with Members of Congress and staff, it was confirmed that the only way that would occur was if the Administration could propose a solution that was better for dolphins than the current provisions of the MMPA. In the period between mid-1991 and February 1992, we conducted intensive discussions with environmental groups, industry, and the countries concerned. We had several ideas which were presented to staff; in both instances, we were advised that they were not sufficiently attractive to command support in Congress. We continued our consultations. It was understood by the foreign governments that a comprehensive solution was needed, and they shared this goal. In late February, we reached agreement with Mexico and Venezuela on a proposal which would move toward the elimination of sets on dolphins and would, at the same time, lift the embargoes. While perhaps not perfect, the Administration believed it had, and has, the ingredients which should prove attractive. In essence, the understanding provided for 2 more years of fishing, during which time embargoes would not be imposed, followed by a 5-year moratorium on sets on dolphins. This arrangement would allow for intensive research during the 2-year transition and moratorium periods, a 5-year moratorium to see if alternatives could be found, and an opportunity to revisit the issue at the end of the moratorium period. The moratorium would not be imposed if, in 2 years, a way could be found to avoid dolphin mortalities during tuna fishing operations. On March 3, the Administration transmitted this proposal to both Houses of Congress, together with letters from foreign officials in support of the proposal. The essence of the proposal is to establish the policy of the United States to promote a 5-year moratorium on sets on dolphins beginning on March 1, 1994. The next 2 years would be dedicated to an intensive research campaign to find an alternative fishing method for catching large yellowfin tuna that does not involve sets on dolphins or, alternatively, a way to set on dolphins in a truly dolphin-safe manner. The proposal would lift an embargo that might otherwise be applied under the provisions of the MMPA for any country that formally communicates to the United States its commitment: -- To participate in the dolphin observer and research programs of the IATTC; -- To continue to reduce dolphin mortalities in absolute numbers in 1992 below 1991 levels and to continue reducing mortalities until March 1, 1994; -- To implement a special program of protection for eastern spinner and spotted dolphins; and -- To implement a moratorium for a 5-year period beginning March 1, 1994, on all encirclement of dolphins except for scientific purposes. On March 18, the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife held a hearing. Industry opposed the proposal as did the environmental groups. While continuing to believe we had a good proposal, our conclusion was that without either industry or environmental group support, our proposal would not succeed and further discussion with industry, environmental groups, and congressional staff was needed. On a separate track, the Administration continued to work in the Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission toward a multilateral approach to dolphin conservation. In that setting, we did not believe we could achieve a prohibition on sets on dolphins, but we did believe there was a significant opportunity to work within IATTC to further reduce dolphin mortality beyond the status quo, regardless of how our moratorium proposal might fare. On April 21-23, in La Jolla, California, the IATTC met to continue discussions on a multilateral approach to the tuna-dolphin issue. This was the third such meeting--following previous meetings in San Jose, Costa Rica, in September 1990 and at La Jolla in January 1991--neither of which had advanced much beyond the conceptual stage. At these two previous meetings, the general objectives of a multilateral dolphin protection program were agreed, and commitments were made by the participating governments to 100% observer coverage and to a research program designed to study means to reduce and eliminate dolphin mortality. These agreed objectives and commitments represented a positive move forward, but the governments did not, to that point, take the next step to elaborate a specific, enforceable regime to reduce mortalities. At that April 1 meeting, countries agreed to support a very tough program which would reduce mortalities on an annual basis from the current level to less than 5,000 during 1999. Progress continued at a fourth meeting in La Jolla on June 16-18, where a vessel quota system was agreed to by all countries in the fishery, which is the means through which the reduction in dolphin mortalities will be achieved under the IATTC approach. Thus, for the first time a good multilateral program involving all countries in the fishery, working through the IATTC, had been achieved. Let me briefly summarize this agreement. The objectives of the multilateral program are: -- Progressively reducing dolphin mortality in the eastern Pacific Ocean to levels approaching zero through the setting of annual limits; and -- To undertake a major research effort to find ways of catching large yellowfin tuna without setting on dolphins with a goal of eliminating dolphin mortality in this fishery. The dolphin mortality reduction schedule establishes annual limits leading to less than 5,000 mortalities during 1999. The governments agreed to a mechanism to ensure compliance with the annual limits on dolphin mortality through a vessel quota system and reconfirmed the commitment to 100% observer coverage. Finally, the governments agreed to embark upon an ambitious research effort to find ways to reduce and eventually eliminate dolphin mortality in the fishery. This program will be undertaken through a cooperative effort coordinated by the IATTC and funded by contributions from the fishing countries and US and foreign industry. The United States is contributing in fiscal year 1993 more than $1.2 million toward tuna-dolphin research, including a direct cash contribution of $584,000 to the IATTC, $250,000 from our State Department budget, and the remainder from NMFS [National Marine Fisheries Service]. Venezuela has committed $500,000 to the IATTC program, and Mexico has allocated $1 million for tuna-dolphin research. The IATTC has also received significant contributions from Bumble Bee Seafoods and the Italian Tuna Canners Association. This effort by all nations with vessels fishing in the region, including those like Mexico not formally a member of IATTC, is noteworthy. We believe it was the prudent and the right thing to do for dolphin conservation and protection within the IATTC, a multilateral forum, even though all parties knew their actions would not lift the embargoes. The moratorium approach, on the other hand, moves toward the elimination of setting on dolphins, consistent with congressional intent, and it would remove the trade embargoes. During this period, the Administration continued its discussions with the interested parties on moratorium-based legislation. At a meeting of Administration, industry, environmental groups, [and] congressional staff, including staff from this committee, on June 1, 1992, it appeared that strong support was developing for legislation containing a 5-year moratorium with the addition of establishing a dolphin-safe market in the United States. Unfortunately, this support does not include US tuna boat owners. As the bill moved through the legislative process on the House side, one problem emerged. When the original moratorium proposal was negotiated, it was negotiated on the assumption that if a country didn't meet its commitments, the Marine Mammal Protection Act would nonetheless apply, which would result in the immediate reimposition of a yellowfin tuna trade embargo from fish caught in the ETP. That was, itself, about a $10 million issue for Mexico and a $15 million issue for Venezuela. Early staff drafts indicated that as a matter of principle something other than a reinstatement of the status quo would be required. So, instead of yellowfin tuna from the ETP, those early drafts proposed that the sanction become an embargo on all tuna, changing the economic stakes for Mexico to about $13 million a year and for Venezuela to about $18 million a year. For certain groups, even these enhanced sanctions above current MMPA requirements were not enough. They wanted an embargo on all fisheries products. That is a very heavy club. It was and is an unreasonable demand. It involves other industries and other import, export, and consumer interests unrelated to the tuna-dolphin issue. An all-fish embargo for Mexico means about $360 million at risk and $50 million at risk for Venezuela. Frankly, there is no principle at work here: It's over-kill, pure and simple, which implicates numerous US interests that are far removed from the tuna-dolphin debate. Of particular concern to us was the inclusion of shrimp in an all-fish embargo. As you know, under Section 609 of PL 101-162, a shrimp embargo is required if other governments in the Caribbean fail to institute a turtle protection program in their shrimp fishery as we have in ours. To threaten Latin American shrimp industries for something that might happen in the tuna-dolphin arena undercuts our own leverage. The US Government and foreign governments are putting a lot of energy into ensuring that full turtle excluder device (TED) programs are in place in the Caribbean by May 1994. It makes it more difficult for these governments to work with their own shrimp industries since the shrimpers complain they are a pawn in someone else's game. To them, it says that no matter what those governments and industries do to protect endangered sea turtles by using turtle excluder devices as we require, they could still be subject to a shrimp embargo because of the even more emotional tuna-dolphin issue. Thus, the incentive to work with us is reduced, and the hurdles to overcome in implementing the requirement that foreign countries have comparable TED programs are increased. At the subcommittee markup on the House side, the Administration made clear that it opposed an amendment that would include shrimp as part of a trade sanction relating to the tuna-dolphin issue. We made clear that our understandings with the governments concerned did not go that far. Nonetheless, at the full committee markup this amendment was adopted; thus, HR 5419 as it stands would provide that all fish, including shrimp, be embargoed if a tuna-dolphin commitment is broken. The enhanced trade sanctions are unnecessary and counterproductive and raise the stakes too high. Thus, where are we? Internationally, we have negotiated two good deals for dolphins. In either case, the dolphins will be better off than at the start of the year. Either path reflects a clear understanding of the role environmental issues play in our international relations, the foreign countries' willing- ness to cooperate with us on matters of environmental concern and interest, and their willingness to take strong measures together with us for dolphin protection. What is wrong, however, is that we appear intent upon tying a tuna-dolphin solution to mandatory punitive trade sanctions that relate to industries and products that have nothing to do with the tuna-dolphin controversy. As such, they are so onerous as to create disincentives for international cooperation on the tuna-dolphin issue. Further, they are bad environmental policy, since they undermine the very efforts of other laws and negotiations designed to save endangered species of sea turtles. Simply put, the enhanced sanctions go too far, undermine our ability to accomplish another environmental mission, and raise the stakes for the other governments concerned to a point that isn't worth it. That is where we stand. We have made more progress internationally on the tuna-dolphin issue in the last year than in the previous 20. Our moratorium proposal is consistent with the direction that Congress has been headed, it is the best solution to this long-standing controversy, and the Administration supports it. But that stands to be without meaning if the Congress does not lock in the progress that has been made by passing legislation this year that will resolve this controversy once and for all. We stand today within reach of legislation that meets the goals of the 1990 congressional mandate in the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act "to reduce and, as soon as possible, eliminate the practice of harvesting tuna through the use of purse seine nets intentionally deployed to encircle dolphins." We are prepared to work with this committee to make that happen. (###)
Total Mortality and Kills-Per-Set for US and Foreign Fleets, 1988- 1991
No. of Dolphins Killed Kills-Per-Set(1) No. of Vessels US/Foreign US/Foreign US/Foreign 1988 19,700/58,200 5.3/10.9 37/95 1989 12,600/84,300 3.6/10.9 29/93 1990 5,000/47,400 2.8/6.4 29/94 1991 800/27,000 2.5(2)/3.1 2/91 (1) Number of dolphins killed in one net. (2) All figures, including 1991, are for the calendar year. However, 1991 was the first year that the comparison between US and foreign kills-per-set (KPS) was based not on a calendar year but on a fishing year running from October 1, 1990, to September 30, 1991. This shift in fishing year resulted in a drop in the US KPS from 2.54 to 1.89 for purposes of determining whether foreign KPS was within 1.25 times the US KPS. (###)
Mortality and Kills-Per-Set In the Mexican Fleet, 1988-91
No. of Dolphins No. of Killed KPS Vessels 1988 49,300 8.2 49 1989 51,200 8.5 48 1990 26,000 4.8 48 1991 16,000 2.9 43 (###)
IATTC Program Dolphin Mortality Limits
1993 19,500 1994 15,500 1995 12,000 1996 9,000 1997 7,500 1998 6,500 1999 under 5,000 (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992 Title:

US Meeting With Bosnian Foreign Minister

Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Aug, 19 19938/19/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] Today, the Acting Secretary [Lawrence S. Eagleburger] met with Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic at the Foreign Minister's request. They discussed the situation in the former Yugoslavia and preparations for the August 26-28 London Conference on Yugoslavia. The Acting Secretary told Foreign Minister Silajdzic that the United States is pleased with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 770-- authorizing "all necessary measures" to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Hercegovina--and with UN Security Council Resolution 771-- condemning reported gross violations of human rights, demanding immediate international access to all detention camps in areas of the former Yugoslavia, and asking for all relevant information which states and international organizations may have. The Acting Secretary underscored the strong US commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and legitimate Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina. He agreed with the Foreign Minister that "cantonization" of Bosnia-Hercegovina contradicts CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] principles, sets a bad precedent for future conflicts, and could well lead to partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina-- thus rewarding the use of force. The United States will continue to demand that all parties comply with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and CSCE commitments. Foreign Minister Silajdzic addressed providing food and shelter for displaced Bosnians this winter. He raised the possibility of creating a fund to provide housing both in the short term and to assist displaced Bosnians in resettling in their places of origin. The Acting Secretary emphasized that the United States considers assistance to the innocent victims of the Yugoslav conflict a major priority in general and at the upcoming conference in particular. Foreign Minister Silajdzic and the Acting Secretary agreed that sanctions compliance be tightened. The Acting Secretary assured Mr. Silajdzic that the United States is working actively with the United Nations and the international community to enhance sanctions monitoring and compliance. The Foreign Minister also noted his concern that the conflict in Bosnia not spread to other areas. This is also a very serious concern for the United States. As we have already announced, the United States is taking steps within the CSCE to provide monitors quickly to bordering areas to help prevent the conflict from spreading. The Acting Secretary and the Foreign Minister also discussed details regarding an exchange of ambassadors.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992 Title:

Aid for Repatriation Of Angolan Refugees

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Aug, 19 19938/19/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola Subject: Human Rights, Development/Relief Aid, United Nations [TEXT] The President authorized the release on August 17 of $14 million from the US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to respond to the urgent needs of Angolan refugees and returnees. This funding will be made available to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in response to its June 1992 appeal for $55,323,400 to assist Angolan refugees to return home. With the signing of the peace accords on May 31, 1991, a cease-fire began in Angola, ending 16 years of civil war. The United States was instrumental in brokering the accords and has provided the political support necessary for the two parties, UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, to implement provisions of these agreements, including demobilization of troops and preparations for multi-party elections in September 1992. An estimated 426,000 Angolans fled their country during the years of war. With the cessation of hostilities, some 50,000 refugees returned home immediately. Many of them have encountered severe hardship. Of the 376,000 Angolans who remain in exile, some 250,000 are expected to return in the coming year. In order to guarantee that they return in safety and dignity, the UNHCR has developed a plan to provide transportation and resettlement assistance. This US contribution provides much-needed humanitarian assistance to the returning refugees and reinforces US commitment to the furtherance of peace and democracy in Angola. The repatriation of 250,000 refugees represents an important step in the process of national reconciliation and healing in Angola and in the reconstruction and nation building which lie ahead.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992 Title:

US Support for Peace Process in Liberia

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Aug, 21 19938/21/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Liberia Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] The United States deplores the renewal of fighting in the Bomi Hills area of Liberia precipitated by the rebel faction called the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). We strongly oppose any resort to armed struggle in Liberia, and we condemn this violence as disruptive to the peace process. We call upon all parties to cease hostilities and immediately cooperate in implementing the Yamoussoukro and Geneva agreements under which all warring factions are to observe the cease-fire and encamp and disarm their forces under supervision of ECOMOG [cease-fire monitoring group for Liberia]. Through our diplomacy, the United States actively supports the peace process in Liberia under the leadership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ULIMO must bear responsibility for renewed bloodshed in Liberia and must share the blame with the NPFL [National Patriotic Front for Liberia] for contributing to the delay of encampment, disarmament, and elections in the country. A lasting settlement cannot be achieved in Liberia until all parties lay down their arms and take part in free and fair elections. We call upon all Liberians to give their full support to the renewed efforts of West African leaders to give peace a chance in Liberia.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992 Title:

US Meeting With Macedonian Foreign Minister

Boucher Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/ Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Aug, 21 19938/21/93 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Macedonia Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, State Department [TEXT] Today, Under Secretary [for International Security Affairs] Wisner met with Macedonian Foreign Minister Maleski. Mr. Maleski is in the United States on a private visit. He used the occasion to discuss developments in his country and the region and made his government's case for recognition. Regarding recognition, the Under Secretary emphasized that the United States strongly supports the stability and territorial integrity of Macedonia. The US view is that prompt resolution of the Macedonian recognition issue will help to bring stability to the Balkans. The United States continues to support EC [European Community] mediation efforts to resolve this impasse. Our position on recognition has not changed. The United States is prepared to support any recognition solution to which the parties agree. The Under Secretary discussed with Mr. Maleski the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the dangers of the conflict spreading to other areas, and the question of international recognition of Macedonia. He emphasized the importance of full compliance with the international sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, while acknowledging the high cost to Macedonia of this effort. The Under Secretary emphasized to Mr. Maleski the US desire to follow through rapidly on President Bush's proposal that a continuous international monitoring mission work in Macedonia, under the auspices of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], to help prevent the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina from spreading. (###)