US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992
Title: Time Is Running Out in Haiti
Einaudi
Source: Luigi R. Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to
the Organization of American States
Description: Address before the Organization of American States
(OAS) Permanent Council, Washington, DC
Date: Aug, 12 19938/12/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America, South America, Central America,
Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: OAS, Democratization
[TEXT]
The United States welcomes the decision of the Secretary General [Joao
Clemente Baena Soares] to lead a delegation to Haiti to facilitate
negotiations to restore constitutional democracy in Haiti.
We congratulate the Secretary General for his initiative. His action gives
life to the mandates to "open channels of communication" and to "facilitate
dialogue with a view to ensuring the modalities and guarantees that will
make it possible for President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to return to office"--
mandates explicitly given to the Secretary General in the October 8
Resolution of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Haiti and
reiterated in the Ministers' Resolution of May 17. We fully support
Ambassador Baena Soares in his commitment to resolve the Haitian crisis
and, thereby, help sustain democracy in the hemisphere.
A solution is overdue. Time is running out. The statesmen and the true
patriots of Haiti must step forward now before their country slides into
anarchy. They must talk seriously with each other. They must bind
themselves to an agreement that puts the future of Haiti--of all Haitians--
first. And they must work hard to make such an agreement real.
Unfortunately, there have been signs of inflexibility from too many of those
involved: from the makers of the coup d'etat, from some in the current de
facto government, [and] even from some associated with the Government of
Haiti we all recognize.
The situation in Haiti today has an alarming volatility. Selective abuse and
repression have been facts of life for 10 months now. And the killing of
several police and military officials [during] the week of August 2 and the
military's forceful response have raised tensions to dangerous levels. Time
is running out for those Haitians who seek domestic peace. I spoke
yesterday to a leading Haitian democrat who has been a steadfast supporter
and constant participant in efforts to bridge differences and restore a
democratic direction to Haitian life. His one-word summary of the current
situation: "insupportable"--worse than insufferable and unbearable--
unsustainable. So time is running out for Haitian democrats. But perhaps
some still do not understand that the bell also tolls equally and
indiscriminately for supporters of revolution and for supporters of reaction.
The winners in today's status quo are the exploiters of violence, the
supporters of autocracy and privilege, the profiteers of the embargo, the
narco-traffickers [and] all those who believe national power and
international acceptance can be organized solely on a foundation of guns and
money. The truth is that time is running out for them, too. Continued self-
serving and short-sighted politics will lead to disaster. Time is running out
for everyone and everything.
Time is running out for the Haitian people who see the accelerating erosion
of the fragile infrastructure in place for serving basic human needs.
Enhanced relief efforts can provide "first aid" but only first aid. Relief is
no substitute for long-term investment in human development. The very soil
of Haiti is being impoverished for want of coordinated efforts to assist
Haitians in conserving this natural resource, second only to the people
themselves.
Time is running out for the "modern sector" of Haiti. The rigors of
competing in a global market are tough enough for any country under normal
conditions. Hanging on and getting by in the face of economic isolation
cannot and will not work. Even successful circumvention of economic
restrictions is at best a survival tactic. The longer the crisis continues,
the more ground is lost. Business confidence and prospects fade; profits
evaporate; jobs are lost. Time saps even the greatest resilience.
Time is running out for the Haitian military. There is a proud place for a
truly professional army in a constitutional democratic order. A
professional military has the internal cohesion and loyalty to civilian
authority that win the uniform respect and the soldiers who wear it the full
faith and confidence of the public they serve. As time runs out, the hopes
for building a truly professional military in Haiti become dimmer and
dimmer.
The "dilatory and intimidating maneuvers" must end. The foot- dragging
must stop. The piling up of conditions and preconditions for sitting down to
talk must cease. All must realize that, wittingly or unwittingly, they are
caught up in a zero-sum game, the kind that no one wins [and] the kind in
which all end up losers.0
We are approaching the first anniversary of the September 30 coup. Later
this fall, elections for legislators will come due. For now, a de facto
regime claims power while a legislature derives authority from its election
in a process judged internationally to be free and fair. As time slips by, the
prospects of dealing with a political class devoid of legitimacy becomes
more daunting, and cynicism about the future heightens. There is time yet
to set things right, but we are talking about days, not months.
The time has come for all those who value democracy and the interests of
the people of Haiti to rally to the center, to set political differences aside
for a time when they can be resolved without violence, [and] to seize upon
the opportunity presented by the OAS mission to move Haiti toward peace,
tolerance, and mutual respect.
From the beginning of the crisis, OAS member states have realized that a
solution for Haiti must be a solution reached by Haitians. At the same time,
we recognized that this organization of democratic states has a
responsibility and a mandate to work for democracy. That is why our
foreign ministers have assembled on three occasions to take stock of the
crisis and commit to action. That is why the Secretary General has worked
unceasingly to carry out the mandates of the foreign ministers. That is
why, now, before time runs out and this opportunity passes, we must give
this mission all the support it deserves.
The composition of the mission reflects broad support for the Secretary
General. The affirmative response of the CARICOM [Caribbean Community
and Caribbean Common Market] to the invitation of the Secretary General is
especially heartening. The United States is encouraging both the Presidency
of the European Community (EC) and the Secretary General of the United
Nations to name participants in the mission. I understand from Ambassador
(Alexander F.) Watson, deputy of the US Mission at the United Nations who is
with us here this morning, that the United Nations is, in fact, doing so today
and will likely inform the Secretary General to that effect very soon. And, I
have just received word from our embassy in London that the Government of
the United Kingdom is consulting with the EC members with the view to
responding positively to the Secretary General.
The participation of high-level representatives of member states which
took part in the earliest OAS missions to Haiti expresses the collective
resolve of the inter-American community for a solution to the crisis in
Haiti. I, for one, am proud to have been authorized to join the Secretary
General.
The focus of the mission will be where it needs to be: getting the sectors
of Haiti to talk frankly and without preconditions so as to arrest the slide
into paralysis and disorder and put Haiti back on the course to
constitutional democracy. The urgency for acting now lies within the
volatile dynamic of the Haitian situation itself. There is yet time to
forestall a slide into paralysis and hold off the violence of the extremes,
but the time is running short; in fact, it has already run short.
Mr. Secretary, you embark on the mission with our full support and with our
ardent hope that Haitians will see this mission for what it is and can be: a
chance to stop the slide toward the past, [and] a chance to right the course
of events, a chance to give all Haitians reason to hope again and, thus, to
work for the better future they deserve. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992
Title: US Policy on Tuna-Dolphin Issues
Colson
Source: David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and Fisheries Affairs
Description: Statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 23 19937/23/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America, South America, Central America,
Caribbean
Country: Mexico, Venezuela
Subject: Environment, Resource Management
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, the Administration appreciates the opportunity to appear
before this committee to address the tuna-dolphin issue.
This controversy has been with us for some time. It was at the heart of the
concerns which led to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), it
has been a matter of domestic and international debate since, and it is a
matter that needs to be resolved.
When this matter was before the Congress in 1988, there were at least two
complaints on the international side of this question: That foreign fleets
had to be brought to a level of performance comparable to the US fleet, and
that the executive branch was not doing enough internationally to resolve
this matter.
Mr. Chairman, today I can report a dramatic change in attitude by foreign
governments on this question. Foreign government commitments to dolphin
conservation and protection are strong, foreign fleet performance is high,
all concerned governments are cooperating with the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), and, as for our efforts, the Congress has
before it legislation which arises out of the Administration's proposal that
provides for a 5-year moratorium on the practice of setting on dolphins [the
technique of using dolphin sightings to target locations of fish] and
establishes a dolphin-safe market in the United States.
The Administration supports enactment of legislation that includes an
international moratorium on the practice of setting on dolphins to catch
tuna starting on March 1, 1994, and establishes a completely "dolphin-safe"
US tuna market 3 months later. Such legislation achieves most quickly the
long-standing goals of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. These important
initiatives are embodied in a bill, HR 5419, currently in the House. Such
legislation would restore access to foreign tuna supplies for US-based
canners.
Another important contribution to dolphin conservation and protection is the
work of the IATTC. These two efforts both chart a course that reduces
dolphin mortality and are preferable to the status quo. Both of these tuna-
dolphin solutions arise out of negotiations which we have conducted. They
have the support of the concerned governments.
The Administration cannot support, however, any dolphin conservation bill
that would install enhanced trade sanctions in US law that are so onerous as
to create disincentives for international cooperation on this matter. Some
background from the Admini-stration's perspective is in order.
The 1988 amendments to the MMPA set in place a rigid comparability test
between the kills-per-set (KPS) by the US fleet and the kills-per-set by
foreign fleets. Other rules apply as well. If the comparability test is not
met, or the other rules are not observed, then non-discretionary trade
embargoes are imposed--these embargoes relate to yellowfin tuna caught in
the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. The philosophy of the 1988 amendments
was to require high performance from the US fleet in protecting dolphins
and to use the marketplace to induce similar high standards of performance
by foreign fleets. At the time, it was known that the incidental mortality
of dolphins caused by foreign fleets was much higher than that by the US
fleet--both in terms of kills-per-set and total mortality. The 1988
amendments dealt with this problem by banning tuna from any country that
did not implement several specific measures to reduce dolphin mortality
and achieve a kills-per-set rate that was no more than 2 times the US rate
in 1989 and no more than 1.25 times the US kills-per-set rate in 1990 and
thereafter.
The 1988 MMPA amendments and NOAA's [National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration] implementing regulations have specific requirements which
must be met by any country wishing to export yellowfin tuna from the ETP
[eastern tropical Pacific] to the United States. These requirements include:
participation in the observer program of the IATTC; that vessels execute a
proper backdown procedure to release dolphins; that each foreign vessel be
equipped with a dolphin safety panel (Medina panel) to prevent the
entanglement of dolphins during the backdown; that sundown sets and the
use of explosives to drive dolphins be prohibited; that vessels have on board
at least three speedboats equipped with bridles, towing lines, and snap
hooks to prevent the collapse of the net; that vessels be equipped with a
platform and underwater observation gear to be used for the observation and
rescue of dolphin; and, finally, that vessels be equipped with long-range
floodlights to be used in case the backdown channel has to be illuminated to
direct the release of dolphins.
The governments of the fishing countries began aggressive efforts to meet
these new requirements. Each of the fishing countries adopted and
implemented regulatory programs comparable to the US program to reduce
dolphin mortalities to the lowest possible levels. In reviewing the
programs of the foreign countries, the Secretary of Commerce has generally
found that the fishing countries are in compliance with the necessary
program elements of the NOAA regulations. While there have been a few
minor problems, no one that I am aware of has challenged the basic point
that the foreign fishing countries have adopted dolphin protection programs
similar to that of the United States.
In addition to measures listed above, the fishing nations regularly send
their captains and other personnel to workshops sponsored by the IATTC to
improve their understanding of, and skill in, the measures necessary to
reduce the incidental mortality of dolphins in the fishery to the lowest
possible level. Since this program began, more than 350 participants have
attended these workshops, including over 200 captains--virtually every
captain in the ETP tuna fishery has attended a workshop at least once.
What has been the result of these efforts on the part of the foreign fleets?
To answer that question, we can compare the situation in the fishery in
1988 with the situation today.
In 1988, the US fleet had an average mortality rate of 5.3 kills-per-set.
This was the standard against which the performance of the foreign fleets
was to be measured. The mortality rate in the foreign fleet in 1988 was
10.9 KPS, more than twice that of the US fleet. It was recognized at the
time that, because the US kill rate was declining steadily, foreign fleets
would likely not meet the 1990 standard and that in 1991, embargoes would
be imposed.
Mr. Chairman, the reduction in dolphin mortality by the foreign fleets has
been achieved quickly. By 1991, the mortality rate for the foreign fleet as a
whole had dropped to 3.1 KPS, more than 40% below the US kills-per-set
rate at the time the 1988 amendments were adopted. I should point out that
Mexico consistently outperformed the foreign fleet as a whole--between
1988 and 1991, the kill rate of the Mexican fleet dropped from 8.2 to 2.9
KPS. Total mortality in the ETP tuna fishery has also dropped dramatically,
from just under 100,000 in 1989 to approximately 27,000 in 1991, and this
year it should drop below 20,000 dolphins. Thus, the 1988 MMPA
amendments have been an unquestioned success--achieving a 75% reduction
in total mortalities in just 3 years and achieving a level of mortalities for
the whole fleet which is in combination comparable to the level allowed to
the US fleet by the marine mammal permit which it holds.
During the same period, the majority of the US fleet moved out of the
eastern Pacific. Those that stayed continued to further reduce their kills-
per-set rate and therefore, despite the significant progress by the foreign
fleets, Mexico and Venezuela are embargoed under the 1988 MMPA
amendments because their kills-per-set rates are greater than 1.25 times
the kills-per-set rate of the remaining US fleet in the ETP, which for the
1991 fishing year was 1.89 KPS. Further, although there were no observed
dolphin kills by the Colombian fleet during the 1991 fishing year, Colombia
is also embargoed because its fleet did not achieve the required level of
observer coverage during that period. I would also note that in 1991,
Vanuatu had a KPS rate of 1.75, less than that of the US fleet, and thus the
embargo against Vanuatu, imposed in March 1990, was lifted in January of
this year.
In spite of the embargoes, Mexico, Venezuela, and the other fishing nations
are committed to the conservation and protection of dolphins and to working
with us on this difficult issue.
Subsequent to the 1988 MMPA amendments, Congress spoke to this issue in
the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (PL 100-627, Sec.
901(h)). Congress called for: . . . negotiations and discussions with
appropriate foreign governments, to reduce and, as soon as possible,
eliminate the practice of harvesting tuna through the use of purse seine net
intentionally deployed to encircle dolphins.
Pursuant to the 1988 MMPA amendments, a tuna embargo was imposed
against Mexico by court order on February 22, 1991. Subsequent embargoes
followed on other fishing nations (Venezuela, Vanuatu, and, most recently,
Colombia) as well as 20 nations identified as "intermediary nations." Some
of these embargoes have since been lifted, but today 13 countries remain
subject to US embargoes on yellowfin tuna as harvesting or intermediary
nations.
Shortly [thereafter], Mexico brought a GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] case which called into question our rights to impose such an
embargo under GATT rules. A GATT panel found the embargo to be
inconsistent with US obligations under the GATT. We have agreed with
Mexico not to request adoption of the panel report by the full GATT Council
while we work to resolve the situation through other means. However, last
week, on July 14, the EC [European Community] requested and was granted a
separate GATT panel to consider the intermediary embargoes currently in
effect against Spain, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The panel will
be established, and there is little reason to believe that the results of a
second panel review will differ significantly from the first. The EC did,
however, indicate that it may be willing to review its request for a panel,
should legislation be passed that would lift the embargoes.
The combination of these factors led the Administration to look for a
solution to this long-standing controversial matter, one which would reduce
dolphin mortalities even faster and remove the trade sanctions. And, in
consultations with Members of Congress and staff, it was confirmed that
the only way that would occur was if the Administration could propose a
solution that was better for dolphins than the current provisions of the
MMPA.
In the period between mid-1991 and February 1992, we conducted intensive
discussions with environmental groups, industry, and the countries
concerned. We had several ideas which were presented to staff; in both
instances, we were advised that they were not sufficiently attractive to
command support in Congress. We continued our consultations. It was
understood by the foreign governments that a comprehensive solution was
needed, and they shared this goal.
In late February, we reached agreement with Mexico and Venezuela on a
proposal which would move toward the elimination of sets on dolphins and
would, at the same time, lift the embargoes. While perhaps not perfect, the
Administration believed it had, and has, the ingredients which should prove
attractive. In essence, the understanding provided for 2 more years of
fishing, during which time embargoes would not be imposed, followed by a
5-year moratorium on sets on dolphins. This arrangement would allow for
intensive research during the 2-year transition and moratorium periods, a
5-year moratorium to see if alternatives could be found, and an opportunity
to revisit the issue at the end of the moratorium period. The moratorium
would not be imposed if, in 2 years, a way could be found to avoid dolphin
mortalities during tuna fishing operations. On March 3, the Administration
transmitted this proposal to both Houses of Congress, together with letters
from foreign officials in support of the proposal.
The essence of the proposal is to establish the policy of the United States
to promote a 5-year moratorium on sets on dolphins beginning on March 1,
1994. The next 2 years would be dedicated to an intensive research
campaign to find an alternative fishing method for catching large yellowfin
tuna that does not involve sets on dolphins or, alternatively, a way to set on
dolphins in a truly dolphin-safe manner.
The proposal would lift an embargo that might otherwise be applied under
the provisions of the MMPA for any country that formally communicates to
the United States its commitment:
-- To participate in the dolphin observer and research programs of the
IATTC;
-- To continue to reduce dolphin mortalities in absolute numbers in 1992
below 1991 levels and to continue reducing mortalities until March 1, 1994;
-- To implement a special program of protection for eastern spinner and
spotted dolphins; and
-- To implement a moratorium for a 5-year period beginning March 1, 1994,
on all encirclement of dolphins except for scientific purposes.
On March 18, the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife held a
hearing. Industry opposed the proposal as did the environmental groups.
While continuing to believe we had a good proposal, our conclusion was that
without either industry or environmental group support, our proposal would
not succeed and further discussion with industry, environmental groups, and
congressional staff was needed.
On a separate track, the Administration continued to work in the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission toward a multilateral approach to
dolphin conservation. In that setting, we did not believe we could achieve a
prohibition on sets on dolphins, but we did believe there was a significant
opportunity to work within IATTC to further reduce dolphin mortality
beyond the status quo, regardless of how our moratorium proposal might
fare.
On April 21-23, in La Jolla, California, the IATTC met to continue
discussions on a multilateral approach to the tuna-dolphin issue. This was
the third such meeting--following previous meetings in San Jose, Costa
Rica, in September 1990 and at La Jolla in January 1991--neither of which
had advanced much beyond the conceptual stage. At these two previous
meetings, the general objectives of a multilateral dolphin protection
program were agreed, and commitments were made by the participating
governments to 100% observer coverage and to a research program designed
to study means to reduce and eliminate dolphin mortality. These agreed
objectives and commitments represented a positive move forward, but the
governments did not, to that point, take the next step to elaborate a
specific, enforceable regime to reduce mortalities.
At that April 1 meeting, countries agreed to support a very tough program
which would reduce mortalities on an annual basis from the current level to
less than 5,000 during 1999.
Progress continued at a fourth meeting in La Jolla on June 16-18, where a
vessel quota system was agreed to by all countries in the fishery, which is
the means through which the reduction in dolphin mortalities will be
achieved under the IATTC approach. Thus, for the first time a good
multilateral program involving all countries in the fishery, working through
the IATTC, had been achieved.
Let me briefly summarize this agreement. The objectives of the
multilateral program are:
-- Progressively reducing dolphin mortality in the eastern Pacific Ocean to
levels approaching zero through the setting of annual limits; and
-- To undertake a major research effort to find ways of catching large
yellowfin tuna without setting on dolphins with a goal of eliminating
dolphin mortality in this fishery.
The dolphin mortality reduction schedule establishes annual limits leading
to less than 5,000 mortalities during 1999. The governments agreed to a
mechanism to ensure compliance with the annual limits on dolphin mortality
through a vessel quota system and reconfirmed the commitment to 100%
observer coverage. Finally, the governments agreed to embark upon an
ambitious research effort to find ways to reduce and eventually eliminate
dolphin mortality in the fishery.
This program will be undertaken through a cooperative effort coordinated by
the IATTC and funded by contributions from the fishing countries and US and
foreign industry. The United States is contributing in fiscal year 1993 more
than $1.2 million toward tuna-dolphin research, including a direct cash
contribution of $584,000 to the IATTC, $250,000 from our State Department
budget, and the remainder from NMFS [National Marine Fisheries Service].
Venezuela has committed $500,000 to the IATTC program, and Mexico has
allocated $1 million for tuna-dolphin research. The IATTC has also received
significant contributions from Bumble Bee Seafoods and the Italian Tuna
Canners Association.
This effort by all nations with vessels fishing in the region, including those
like Mexico not formally a member of IATTC, is noteworthy. We believe it
was the prudent and the right thing to do for dolphin conservation and
protection within the IATTC, a multilateral forum, even though all parties
knew their actions would not lift the embargoes. The moratorium approach,
on the other hand, moves toward the elimination of setting on dolphins,
consistent with congressional intent, and it would remove the trade
embargoes.
During this period, the Administration continued its discussions with the
interested parties on moratorium-based legislation. At a meeting of
Administration, industry, environmental groups, [and] congressional staff,
including staff from this committee, on June 1, 1992, it appeared that
strong support was developing for legislation containing a 5-year
moratorium with the addition of establishing a dolphin-safe market in the
United States. Unfortunately, this support does not include US tuna boat
owners.
As the bill moved through the legislative process on the House side, one
problem emerged. When the original moratorium proposal was negotiated, it
was negotiated on the assumption that if a country didn't meet its
commitments, the Marine Mammal Protection Act would nonetheless apply,
which would result in the immediate reimposition of a yellowfin tuna trade
embargo from fish caught in the ETP. That was, itself, about a $10 million
issue for Mexico and a $15 million issue for Venezuela. Early staff drafts
indicated that as a matter of principle something other than a
reinstatement of the status quo would be required. So, instead of yellowfin
tuna from the ETP, those early drafts proposed that the sanction become an
embargo on all tuna, changing the economic stakes for Mexico to about $13
million a year and for Venezuela to about $18 million a year.
For certain groups, even these enhanced sanctions above current MMPA
requirements were not enough. They wanted an embargo on all fisheries
products. That is a very heavy club. It was and is an unreasonable demand.
It involves other industries and other import, export, and consumer
interests unrelated to the tuna-dolphin issue. An all-fish embargo for
Mexico means about $360 million at risk and $50 million at risk for
Venezuela. Frankly, there is no principle at work here: It's over-kill, pure
and simple, which implicates numerous US interests that are far removed
from the tuna-dolphin debate.
Of particular concern to us was the inclusion of shrimp in an all-fish
embargo. As you know, under Section 609 of PL 101-162, a shrimp embargo
is required if other governments in the Caribbean fail to institute a turtle
protection program in their shrimp fishery as we have in ours. To threaten
Latin American shrimp industries for something that might happen in the
tuna-dolphin arena undercuts our own leverage. The US Government and
foreign governments are putting a lot of energy into ensuring that full turtle
excluder device (TED) programs are in place in the Caribbean by May 1994.
It makes it more difficult for these governments to work with their own
shrimp industries since the shrimpers complain they are a pawn in someone
else's game. To them, it says that no matter what those governments and
industries do to protect endangered sea turtles by using turtle excluder
devices as we require, they could still be subject to a shrimp embargo
because of the even more emotional tuna-dolphin issue. Thus, the incentive
to work with us is reduced, and the hurdles to overcome in implementing the
requirement that foreign countries have comparable TED programs are
increased.
At the subcommittee markup on the House side, the Administration made
clear that it opposed an amendment that would include shrimp as part of a
trade sanction relating to the tuna-dolphin issue. We made clear that our
understandings with the governments concerned did not go that far.
Nonetheless, at the full committee markup this amendment was adopted;
thus, HR 5419 as it stands would provide that all fish, including shrimp, be
embargoed if a tuna-dolphin commitment is broken. The enhanced trade
sanctions are unnecessary and counterproductive and raise the stakes too
high.
Thus, where are we? Internationally, we have negotiated two good deals for
dolphins. In either case, the dolphins will be better off than at the start of
the year. Either path reflects a clear understanding of the role
environmental issues play in our international relations, the foreign
countries' willing- ness to cooperate with us on matters of environmental
concern and interest, and their willingness to take strong measures
together with us for dolphin protection.
What is wrong, however, is that we appear intent upon tying a tuna-dolphin
solution to mandatory punitive trade sanctions that relate to industries and
products that have nothing to do with the tuna-dolphin controversy. As
such, they are so onerous as to create disincentives for international
cooperation on the tuna-dolphin issue. Further, they are bad environmental
policy, since they undermine the very efforts of other laws and negotiations
designed to save endangered species of sea turtles. Simply put, the
enhanced sanctions go too far, undermine our ability to accomplish another
environmental mission, and raise the stakes for the other governments
concerned to a point that isn't worth it.
That is where we stand. We have made more progress internationally on the
tuna-dolphin issue in the last year than in the previous 20. Our moratorium
proposal is consistent with the direction that Congress has been headed, it
is the best solution to this long-standing controversy, and the
Administration supports it. But that stands to be without meaning if the
Congress does not lock in the progress that has been made by passing
legislation this year that will resolve this controversy once and for all.
We stand today within reach of legislation that meets the goals of the 1990
congressional mandate in the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act
"to reduce and, as soon as possible, eliminate the practice of harvesting
tuna through the use of purse seine nets intentionally deployed to encircle
dolphins." We are prepared to work with this committee to make that
happen. (###)
Total Mortality and Kills-Per-Set for US and Foreign Fleets, 1988-
1991
No. of Dolphins Killed Kills-Per-Set(1) No. of
Vessels
US/Foreign US/Foreign
US/Foreign
1988 19,700/58,200 5.3/10.9
37/95
1989 12,600/84,300 3.6/10.9
29/93
1990 5,000/47,400 2.8/6.4
29/94
1991 800/27,000 2.5(2)/3.1
2/91
(1) Number of dolphins killed in one net.
(2) All figures, including 1991, are for the calendar year. However, 1991
was the first year that the comparison between US and foreign kills-per-set
(KPS) was based not on a calendar year but on a fishing year running from
October 1, 1990, to September 30, 1991. This shift in fishing year resulted
in a drop in the US KPS from 2.54 to 1.89 for purposes of determining
whether foreign KPS was within 1.25 times the US KPS. (###)
Mortality and Kills-Per-Set In the Mexican Fleet, 1988-91
No. of Dolphins No. of
Killed KPS Vessels
1988 49,300 8.2 49
1989 51,200 8.5 48
1990 26,000 4.8 48
1991 16,000 2.9 43 (###)
IATTC Program Dolphin Mortality Limits
1993 19,500
1994 15,500
1995 12,000
1996 9,000
1997 7,500
1998 6,500
1999 under 5,000 (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992
Title: US Meeting With Bosnian Foreign Minister
Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Aug, 19 19938/19/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights,
Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
Today, the Acting Secretary [Lawrence S. Eagleburger] met with Bosnian
Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic at the Foreign Minister's request. They
discussed the situation in the former Yugoslavia and preparations for the
August 26-28 London Conference on Yugoslavia.
The Acting Secretary told Foreign Minister Silajdzic that the United States
is pleased with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 770--
authorizing "all necessary measures" to ensure the delivery of humanitarian
aid to Bosnia-Hercegovina--and with UN Security Council Resolution 771--
condemning reported gross violations of human rights, demanding immediate
international access to all detention camps in areas of the former
Yugoslavia, and asking for all relevant information which states and
international organizations may have.
The Acting Secretary underscored the strong US commitment to the
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and legitimate Government
of Bosnia-Hercegovina. He agreed with the Foreign Minister that
"cantonization" of Bosnia-Hercegovina contradicts CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe] principles, sets a bad precedent for
future conflicts, and could well lead to partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina--
thus rewarding the use of force. The United States will continue to demand
that all parties comply with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions
and CSCE commitments.
Foreign Minister Silajdzic addressed providing food and shelter for
displaced Bosnians this winter. He raised the possibility of creating a fund
to provide housing both in the short term and to assist displaced Bosnians in
resettling in their places of origin. The Acting Secretary emphasized that
the United States considers assistance to the innocent victims of the
Yugoslav conflict a major priority in general and at the upcoming conference
in particular.
Foreign Minister Silajdzic and the Acting Secretary agreed that sanctions
compliance be tightened. The Acting Secretary assured Mr. Silajdzic that
the United States is working actively with the United Nations and the
international community to enhance sanctions monitoring and compliance.
The Foreign Minister also noted his concern that the conflict in Bosnia not
spread to other areas. This is also a very serious concern for the United
States. As we have already announced, the United States is taking steps
within the CSCE to provide monitors quickly to bordering areas to help
prevent the conflict from spreading.
The Acting Secretary and the Foreign Minister also discussed details
regarding an exchange of ambassadors.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992
Title: Aid for Repatriation Of Angolan Refugees
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Aug, 19 19938/19/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Angola
Subject: Human Rights, Development/Relief Aid,
United Nations
[TEXT]
The President authorized the release on August 17 of $14 million from the
US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to respond to the
urgent needs of Angolan refugees and returnees.
This funding will be made available to the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) in response to its June 1992 appeal for $55,323,400 to
assist Angolan refugees to return home.
With the signing of the peace accords on May 31, 1991, a cease-fire began in
Angola, ending 16 years of civil war. The United States was instrumental in
brokering the accords and has provided the political support necessary for
the two parties, UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]
and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, to implement
provisions of these agreements, including demobilization of troops and
preparations for multi-party elections in September 1992.
An estimated 426,000 Angolans fled their country during the years of war.
With the cessation of hostilities, some 50,000 refugees returned home
immediately. Many of them have encountered severe hardship.
Of the 376,000 Angolans who remain in exile, some 250,000 are expected to
return in the coming year. In order to guarantee that they return in safety
and dignity, the UNHCR has developed a plan to provide transportation and
resettlement assistance.
This US contribution provides much-needed humanitarian assistance to the
returning refugees and reinforces US commitment to the furtherance of
peace and democracy in Angola. The repatriation of 250,000 refugees
represents an important step in the process of national reconciliation and
healing in Angola and in the reconstruction and nation building which lie
ahead.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992
Title: US Support for Peace Process in Liberia
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Aug, 21 19938/21/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Liberia
Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
The United States deplores the renewal of fighting in the Bomi Hills area of
Liberia precipitated by the rebel faction called the United Liberation
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). We strongly oppose any resort
to armed struggle in Liberia, and we condemn this violence as disruptive to
the peace process. We call upon all parties to cease hostilities and
immediately cooperate in implementing the Yamoussoukro and Geneva
agreements under which all warring factions are to observe the cease-fire
and encamp and disarm their forces under supervision of ECOMOG [cease-fire
monitoring group for Liberia].
Through our diplomacy, the United States actively supports the peace
process in Liberia under the leadership of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS). ULIMO must bear responsibility for renewed
bloodshed in Liberia and must share the blame with the NPFL [National
Patriotic Front for Liberia] for contributing to the delay of encampment,
disarmament, and elections in the country.
A lasting settlement cannot be achieved in Liberia until all parties lay down
their arms and take part in free and fair elections. We call upon all
Liberians to give their full support to the renewed efforts of West African
leaders to give peace a chance in Liberia.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 34, August 24, 1992
Title: US Meeting With Macedonian Foreign Minister
Boucher
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/ Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Aug, 21 19938/21/93
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Macedonia
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest,
State Department
[TEXT]
Today, Under Secretary [for International Security Affairs] Wisner met with
Macedonian Foreign Minister Maleski. Mr. Maleski is in the United States on
a private visit. He used the occasion to discuss developments in his country
and the region and made his government's case for recognition.
Regarding recognition, the Under Secretary emphasized that the United
States strongly supports the stability and territorial integrity of
Macedonia. The US view is that prompt resolution of the Macedonian
recognition issue will help to bring stability to the Balkans.
The United States continues to support EC [European Community] mediation
efforts to resolve this impasse. Our position on recognition has not
changed. The United States is prepared to support any recognition solution
to which the parties agree.
The Under Secretary discussed with Mr. Maleski the situation in the former
Yugoslavia, the dangers of the conflict spreading to other areas, and the
question of international recognition of Macedonia. He emphasized the
importance of full compliance with the international sanctions imposed on
Serbia and Montenegro, while acknowledging the high cost to Macedonia of
this effort.
The Under Secretary emphasized to Mr. Maleski the US desire to follow
through rapidly on President Bush's proposal that a continuous international
monitoring mission work in Macedonia, under the auspices of the CSCE
[Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], to help prevent the
conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina from spreading. (###)