US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992

Title:

Statements From Secretary Baker's Middle East Trip (Baker/Rabin)

Baker Rabin Source: Secretary Baker, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin Description: Opening remarks from a news conference, Jerusalem Date: Jul, 19 19927/19/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT]
Prime Minister Rabin:
Very good evening. I welcome the visit of Secretary of State Baker to Israel and the region. We had the time to discuss the basic issues today in the region and in the framework of the bilateral relationships between Israel and the United States. We touched on the possibilities to move ahead with the peace process within the framework of the Madrid conference. We discussed the issue of the guarantees for the absorption of newcomers, and we discussed bilateral issues. I believe the discussions were frank and to the point and will continue during the visit of the Secretary in another meeting to try to find out what has been achieved, in what ways we'll go, and what has to be left to be decided later on. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for coming, [and] thank you for your readiness to take part in the continuation and the acceleration of the peace process and the improvement in the relationships between our two countries.
Secretary Baker:
Prime Minister, thank you. I think that's a full and complete summary of our discussions. Let me express to you my appreciation and that of President Bush for your willingness to receive us here so soon after your taking office. Let me say that I share what I believe is your optimism with respect to the opportunities for moving forward in a positive way with respect to the peace process. I am looking forward to our continuing discussions during the course of my visit here, particularly with reference to how we can move forward with the question of US assistance for the absorption of immigrants to Israel, and I look forward, as well, to having further discussions with you about other bilateral issues as well as other issues affecting the peace process. Thank you for welcoming us here.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Statements From Secretary Baker's Middle East Trip (Baker/Hussein)

Baker Hussein Source: Secretary Baker, King Hussein of Jordan. Description: Opening remarks from a news conference in Amman, Jordan Date: Jul, 21 19927/21/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Jordan Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT]
King Hussein:
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure for me to welcome my very dear friend once again to Amman, the Secretary of State, and to welcome you all [and] to have this opportunity to speak to you. I have to say that our talks went extremely well, as they do between old friends and particularly at this time, an interesting time in terms of all the changes that have occurred in the world but also in our part of the world of late. I spoke to some of our friends who asked me about my view of recent developments in the immediate region, and I would like to repeat that, for example, we saw the Israeli electorate's choice of a change as one indicating an interest in seizing this historic moment--crucial moment--to finally, and hopefully, achieve progress and achieve results in bringing to an end long suffering for all concerned on either side of the divide-- Palestinians, Israelis, Jordanians, Arabs--by possibly, God willing, succeeding in achieving the goal that we have set ourselves for a long period of time: of establishing a just and durable peace--a kind of peace that future generations can accept, live with, and protect and one that brings the children of Abraham together again in this region, the birthplace of the three great monotheistic religions. I believe that we are on the verge of a genuinely new effort to see progress toward peace. Hopefully, what has been set on track will now accelerate toward a very dear objective. I am referring, obviously, to the peace process. So the Secretary's visit at this time is most welcome. We know, and we knew throughout, of his enthusiasm and commitment to the cause of a just and durable peace here in this area [and to] an end to the nightmare that has been with us far too long and the suffering of people. I welcome him as a dear friend, and I'll hand it all to you, sir.
Secretary Baker:
Thank you, Your Majesty, and thank you for welcoming us--welcoming my colleagues and myself at this time. I think it is an important time for us to be in the region. I am very, very pleased to be back in Amman, and I'm particularly pleased to have had the opportunity to spend the time that we have spent today in discussing the status of the peace process and how we might proceed to move it forward in a positive direction. You alluded to the fact that there is a change in the leadership in Israel. There is, indeed, and we think that that change should offer some opportunity for positive forward movement in the process that we are together engaged in--searching for peace for this region that so badly needs it and so rightly deserves it. I would like to think that there are opportunities now that should be taken advantage of and that will be taken advantage of. I found a sense of that in my discussions today with His Majesty. As those of you who are traveling with us know, I found a sense of that yesterday in discussions with Israelis and with Palestinians. I would hope that particularly the bilateral discussions could resume and resume early. I think that the suggestion of the new Prime Minister of Israel that these discussions be relatively continuous rather than interrupted periodically as much as they have been in the past is a good suggestion. Your Majesty, I look forward to continuing to work very closely with you as we have in the past in order to advance peace in the region, and I thank you very much for your hospitality.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Statements From Secretary Baker's Middle East Trip(Baker/Mubarek)

Baker Mubarek Source: Secretary Baker, Egyptian President Mubarak. Description: Opening remarks from a news conference, Cairo, Egypt Date: Jul, 22 19927/22/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Egypt Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT]
President Mubarak:
Let me welcome Secretary Baker, the man who [has given] a lot of effort for the problems of the Middle East since he [has been] the Secretary of State of the United States, and I think we need lots of progress in that sense, and we thank him for the effort and the concentration [inaudible] to reach a good settlement or a comprehensive settlement to the problem. We met today, and we have discussed the whole peace process--how to activate it [and] how to [proceed] much faster, hoping that we could achieve something in the very near future. He also met with Mr. Rabin before I [saw] Mr. Rabin yesterday, and he discussed with him several [of the same issues] I have discussed. Again, I welcome the Secretary in Cairo, appreciating all his efforts for the peace, and we hope to see him more and more in our country. Thank you.
Secretary Baker:
Mr. President, thank you for welcoming us to Cairo, and thank you particularly for receiving us at a time that I know is a very busy time for you in the midst of your national day celebrations. We have had to juggle the schedule somewhat, and we are very appreciative of your understanding with respect to that. I think that we've had some very good and productive meetings here in Egypt today, ladies and gentlemen, as we always do when we come here, particularly with respect to the peace process. Egypt, of course, has been in the forefront of efforts with respect to peace and, particularly, in the forefront of efforts with respect to peace with Israel. Egypt is a very important player in the peace process that has been developed and is ongoing now. I share President Mubarak's view that there are opportunities to enhance this process, to move it forward, [and] to make it productive, and I hope there are opportunities to make it productive in the near term. We've had a full discussion of this and other issues, and, Mr. President, I appreciate your receiving us here today.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Statements From Secretary Baker's Middle East Trip (Baker/Shara)

Baker Shara Source: Secretary Baker, Syrian Foreign Minister Shara. Description: Excerpts from opening remarks from a news conference, Damascus, Syria Date: Jul, 23 19927/23/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Syria Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT]
Secretary Baker:
We've agreed. I will start. We concluded our talks last night with the Minister and President Assad after, I think, about 4 1/2 hours. The talks were good talks. I will let the Minister speak, obviously, for the position of Syria, but I believe that there was a general feeling that, indeed, there are some new opportunities now that should be explored [and] that it would be possibly productive if that could be done at the earliest possible date. We talked about the full range, obviously, of peace process issues as those might be affected by the change in government in Israel. We talked, as well, about the situation in Lebanon and the bilateral matters that we discuss when we meet. I want to take this opportunity to once again thank President Assad for seeing us at what I know was a very difficult time for him as a consequence of the tragic loss of his mother. I want to thank you, too, Minister, for making it possible for us to be here. . . and receiving us on short notice, and making it possible for us to have these discussions that I believe will turn out to have been fruitful. . . .
Foreign Minister Shara:
I would like to thank Secretary Baker for the efforts that he has already made on the peace process. Don't forget that Secretary Baker and President Bush, for over a year, have exerted a lot of efforts to make peace possible in our region. We started in Madrid; we continued in Washington; and, then, we stopped for a while. And we hope that the new developments, especially the presence of a new government in Israel, will help all the parties concerned to resume talks as soon as possible. I also would like to say that the talks that Secretary Baker had with President Assad last night were positive [and] frank, and I hope they would be fruitful and they would serve the cause of peace in our region.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Statements From Secretary Baker's Middle East Trip (Baker/Harawi)

Baker Harawi Source: Secretary Baker, Lebanese President Harawi, and Foreign Minister Bouez Description: Excerpts from opening remarks from a press conference, Zahle, Lebanon Date: Jul, 23 19927/23/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Libya Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT]
President Harawi [through interpreter]:
Mr. Secretary, I welcome you here to my home and my country, Lebanon. [That] you are present here today, Mr. Secretary, with your great delegation, is a clear indication of the depth of the relationship between our two countries. This relationship which we have established with you [is] based on our commitment to the principles of peace and democracy and respect for human rights. Also, your presence here, personally, and your coming to Lebanon is a new and clear assurance [of] your support and your commitment to Lebanon's independence and sovereignty and all of its territories within the internationally recognized borders. Lebanon has led a painful 16 years, and, [in] your presence here among us, you are witnessing Lebanon's way out from misery of war. And that is because of the agreement among all Lebanese and the national accord documents that I swore constitutionally to implement in letter and spirit, but there is no doubt that Lebanon will not accomplish the kind of peace before the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 425. Your country, Mr. Secretary, committed itself to the success of the international peace conference and solving the crisis in the Middle East in accordance to international resolutions and laws that were issued by the UN Security Council, and Lebanon is in solidarity with its Arab brothers and the efforts seeking a comprehensive peace--a just and lasting peace--[and] is eager to end the human misery which lasted for a long time in this region. We are all full of hope that your tour of the region will be fruitful and [will] help to push forward the peace process and to accomplish its noble objectives. Here, once again, I welcome you, Mr. Secretary. I wish you to convey to President George Bush our best wishes, confirming and affirming to him and to you, our friend, our commitment to take serious decisions which will return Lebanon back to the old Lebanon--this commitment of progress and security and safety. Once again, Mr. Secretary, welcome, and I hope that I will see you soon in our capital, Beirut.
Secretary Baker:
Mr. [President], thank you for welcoming my colleagues and myself here in your home. Thank you for welcoming us to Lebanon and thank you for welcoming us to your home village. . . . I think this is an important time for this region. I think it is a important time for the peace process to which Lebanon has committed itself. I believe that there are new possibilities for progress toward peace in the aftermath of the accession of a new government in Israel. We have discussed that with the President, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and their colleagues. We have also discussed the desire of the United States to see what has been a tragedy here in Lebanon come to an end. We are pleased to be able to have this meeting in Lebanon, and we strongly support the political independence, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Lebanon. We hope that our presence here makes a statement in support of that independence and that sovereignty. Let me say, finally, that we support strongly both the letter and the spirit of the Taif agreement. We would like to see the implementation of that agreement and support that strongly. With respect to the question of elections, it is the position of the United States that this is a decision for the Lebanese Government, and the Lebanese Government alone, to make. Of course, it is critical that any elections that are held be free and fair elections and in keeping with the true tenets of democracy. It is vital that any elections be free of intimidation--any hint of intimidation or coercion. I want to thank the government for welcoming us here and compliment them on their struggle to reverse what has been a tragedy here [and] on their efforts to bring political stability and economic stability and reform to Lebanon, goals that the United States supports.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Statements From Secretary Baker's Middle East Trip (Baker/Saud)

Baker Saud Source: Secretary Baker, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Description: Excerpts from a news conference, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Date: Jul, 23 19927/23/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Saudi Arabia Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] Q: Mr. Baker, could you give us your reaction to Mr. Rabin's announcements on settlements? Is that going to be satisfactory for the loan guarantees? Secretary Baker: Well, it is an announcement that we discussed when I was in Israel. I just think it is further evidence of what I've said over the course of the past several days, and that is that you now have a government in Israel that is reordering national priorities in that country [and] moving away from building settlements in the occupied territories to devoting their energy and attention and assets to absorbing Jewish immigrants. This is an indication, I think, that there will, in fact, be a severe and significant reduction in settlement activity, and we welcome that. Q: What reordering do you detect in the Arab world in response to this new emphasis? In having talked to leaders in six countries, what new signals do you see? What has changed on the Arab side of this equation? Secretary Baker: Well, I think we answered that question to some extent in Damascus the other day when it was asked. I think we have seen statements from the Arab governments of countries we have visited welcoming this change, agreeing with our assessment that it presents some opportunities for moving the peace process forward in a positive way. I've said before, and I will say again [that] I hope very much that the parties will decide to come together again quickly, that they will pick up on Prime Minister Rabin's suggestion that the negotiations be continuous, that we test this thesis that there is, indeed, an opportunity now to generate momentum in the peace process, [and] that the parties get together and actually do some nitty-gritty negotiating instead of just meeting and talking. I hope and believe that that is what we may see in the days and weeks ahead. Q: What do you believe that Saudi Arabia can do in the peace process? Secretary Baker: What role can Saudi Arabia play? Saudi Arabia has played an extraordinarily important role in the peace process, in my opinion--that is, the peace process that was constructed last year. Without the support of King Fahd and Saudi Arabia, I do not believe we would have been able to put that process together. Saudi Arabia was one of the first Arab countries to commit to participation in the multilateral phase of the peace process, and they are actively participating in that phase of the process and doing so in a very constructive way. Q: Prince Faisal, can give us your reaction to Mr. Rabin's announcement, sir? What is Saudi Arabia's reaction? Foreign Minister Saud: Well, as you know, in the talks that the Secretary has had here with the Custodian [i.e. the King]-- [he] has explained the discussions that he had [about] the new opportunities that exist now, not only [for] continuing the peace process but moving in a meaningful way to a meaningful negotiations. We are very encouraged with the report that the Secretary has brought with him and, as you know, from its inception, have supported the peace process, and we will continue to do so with new hope now. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Joint US-Israel Technical Assistance in Central Asia

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Date: Jul, 30 19927/30/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] The United States and Israel agreed, on July 28, to begin a program to provide joint technical assistance to the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. This joint initiative follows Secretary Baker's announcement at the Lisbon coordinating conference this past May that the United States and Israel were discussing ways to provide joint assistance. Ambassador Richard Armitage [Deputy to the Coordinator for US Assistance to the New Independent States] has spent the last several days in Israel discussing priorities with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with experts from a variety of Israeli technical and academic institutions. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Ambassador Armitage have agreed to form a joint advance team which, subject to agreements or formal invitations from the five Central Asian governments, will visit those countries to define potential projects. Many of these governments have given informal assurances that this joint effort would be welcome, in addition to bilateral US technical assistance projects. Israeli efforts will concentrate on the agricultural sectors of the five economies and may also focus on public health programs. The US Government intends to provide some funding to facilitate Israeli technical assistance in Central Asia and will work closely with Israel in the design and approval of specific projects. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Secretary's Visit to Maldives

Baker Gayoom Source: Secretary Baker Description: Opening remarks from a press conference by Secretary Baker and Maldivian President Maumoon Gayoom, Male, Maldives Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Date: Jul, 24 19927/24/92 Region: South Asia Country: Maldives Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT]
President Gayoom:
First of all, let me say how happy I am that the Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker, has made this very brief visit to Male. I have just told Mr. Baker that my colleagues and I regard this visit as a very significant event in the Maldivian-American relationship and that we hope that our friendly and cordial relations will be further strengthened because of this visit. We have discussed matters of mutual concern for both our countries, and I think this will also help our understanding of each other's view of major international matters as well as our bilateral relations. Since the Secretary doesn't have much time, I will now request him to say a few words to you and also to answer whatever questions that you may have for him, and even for me, too.
Secretary Baker:
Mr. President, thank you for receiving me and receiving my colleagues. I want to say how very pleased I am to be the first Secretary of State to visit the Maldives. I want to say that I share your view that the bilateral relationship between your country and my country is very good as it is, and I hope that it will be even better as a consequence of this visit. I would like to express to you and through the press to your people the appreciation of the United States for the steadfast support which the Maldives gave to the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions having to do with the conflict in the Gulf. As you and I have discussed, it is important, I think, particularly important for small nations, that there be respect for full implementation of Security Council resolutions and that small countries not be subjected to aggression or the threat of aggression at the hands of larger countries. The President and I had an opportunity to talk about [a] number of issues of multilateral and international interest and concern. I gave him an update on the status of the Middle East peace process as I see it. We talked about the fact that in most places around the world, we are seeing rapid and substantial progress toward disarmament and toward the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. And we discussed as well some regional conflict issues. It's a pleasure to be here, Mr. President, and I thank you very much for your cordiality and hospitality. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

US-ASEAN Cooperation

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Statement at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) post-ministerial conference, Manila, Philippines Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Date: Jul, 26 19927/26/92 Region: Southeast Asia, East Asia Country: Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore Subject: ASEAN, Trade/Economics [TEXT] I am delighted to meet again with my ASEAN colleagues here in Manila so soon after the conclusion of free and fair elections. In 1986, the Filipino people were at the forefront of the democratic revolution now sweeping the rest of the world. With the recent election, they have again demonstrated their unwavering commitment to responsible democratic government and the rule of law. The last year, of course, has seen an evolution in US-Philippine relations and, as a result, an adjustment in America's security presence in the region. Our withdrawal from Clark [Air Field] and Subic Bay [naval station] means that there will no longer be permanent US bases in Southeast Asia. But this development has not altered our interest in, nor our commitment to, Asian security. The form of our presence may have changed, but the substance of our commitment is firm. The United States is a Pacific power and will remain one. Our forces are forward deployed in Japan, South Korea, and Guam. We have successfully negotiated new access agreements with other nations in Southeast Asia. Together, these arrangements ensure that our ships and our aircraft remain fully capable of achieving their missions. In this first PMC [post- ministerial conference] at which security issues are officially part of our agenda, I want to underline this point: America's resolve to honor its treaty commitments, to promote economic growth, and to support the peaceful resolution of disputes remain the bedrock of our policy toward Asia. With that said, let me highlight two areas that remain of particular concern to all of us: Cambodia and Burma. Cambodia has, of course, taken significant steps toward what we hope will be a democratic, prosperous, and peaceful future. But disturbing problems have arisen in the settlement process. Our unyielding determination to implement the Paris accords is essential if we are to reach our goal. Each of us, and in particular [Indonesian] Foreign Minister [Ali] Alatas, has contributed time, money, and effort to seeing this process succeed. With continued determination and patience, I am hopeful that by the time of next year's PMC in Singapore, we will be able to look back on a successful transition to democracy in Cambodia and the beginning of a more normal life for its long-suffering people. In Burma, we have also seen some positive but very limited changes in the last year. A handful of political prisoners have been released. A few small steps have been taken which might lead to a constitutional convention. But this minimal progress cannot obscure the reality that Burma's human rights situation remains deplorable. A few days ago, Nobel Peace Price Winner Aung San Suu Kyi began her fourth year of confinement on political charges. The legitimate results of the 1990 elections have yet to be implemented. And opposition parties and politicians suffer continued persecution. Collectively, our message to the Burmese military authorities must be loud and clear: Release all political prisoners immediately and begin a genuine dialogue aimed at rapidly transferring power to a democratically elected government. We also must not forget the tragic plight of over 270,000 Rohingya Burmese refugees who have been driven from their homes into Bangladesh and another 70,000 forced into Thailand. As I pointed out to this conference last year, until there is democratic reform and protection of human rights, Burma will remain a source of potential instability to its neighbors. We must continue to demand that Burma respect the rights of these victimized people and undertake repatriation monitored by the United Nations. The military regime in Burma must listen to the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people. And we, inside the region and outside it, must speak with one voice in our support of their cause. Economic relations between the United States and ASEAN continue to grow in importance. Investment, trade, travel, and communications are rapidly expanding. US companies are working with your own companies, bringing skills, technology, and capital which are reshaping the Asia-Pacific economy. America is the first or second largest trading partner of each of the six ASEAN states. Our investments in this region grew to $12 billion in 1990, doubling over the last 10 years. ASEAN is at the heart of the world's most dynamic economic region. Much of the international community looks to your economies as models of development. It is easy to see why. In 1991, ASEAN economies set the world's pace, growing as a group by 7%. The ASEAN free trade area, agreed to at this year's summit, will further promote high growth and increased economic integration. And it will do so by complementing, not undermining, the global free market. Toward this end, we consider APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] a key vehicle for sustaining market-oriented development, advancing regional and global trade liberalization, and fostering a more prosperous economic future for the entire Asia-Pacific region. In conclusion, let me say that the United States remains fully committed to building on our economic cooperation in Asia and the Pacific. We consider such cooperation no less vital to America's interests than the security ties we have forged over the years. As the nations around this table can bear witness, peace and prosperity are truly indivisible. I look forward to this opportunity to discuss these issues of mutual interest. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

US Relations With Asia and the Pacific: A New Era

Zoellick Source: Robert B. Zoellick, Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs and Counselor of the Department of State Description: Address before the ASEAN post-ministerial conference, Manila, Philippines Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Date: Jul, 26 19927/26/92 Region: Southeast Asia, East Asia Country: Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Burma Subject: ASEAN, Trade/Economics, Human Rights, POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] Secretary Baker has asked me to explain that his arrival in Manila has been delayed by unexpected developments in his Middle East peace talks. But he looks forward to joining you later in the proceedings. Indeed, the Secretary stressed the importance he personally places on coming to this ASEAN PMC meeting--to share views with partners, to see colleagues who have become friends. Over the past 4 years, I have also had the privilege of attending these sessions, and I appreciate this opportunity to be with you again today. Just pause for a moment to consider what we have seen--what we have done--in not many more than a thousand days. The long trial of the Cold War came to a close. History has judged Communism to be bankrupt: as an economic system, an ideology, an aspiration. This week a democratic Foreign Minister of Russia is here in Manila for constructive discussions on how we can overcome Com-munism's tragic legacy and establish a new partnership. Asians have seen dynasties rise and fall. You know that empires do not walk off the stage of history without danger. That's why my government has placed the highest priority on safely dismantling the nuclear balance of terror and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That's why we have tried to seize opportunities to defuse regional dangers, long inflamed by Communism and conflict, in all corners of the globe. That's why we are starting to help new democratic leaders move their countries out of totalitarian darkness and economic paralysis. Asians--and Americans--also know that the Cold War of Europe erupted into hot wars in the Pacific. Right after World War II, one generation of Americans waged war in North Asia, and the next generation of Americans bled in Southeast Asia. To paraphrase Napoleon, if the graves of a nation's soldiers mark the horizons of its world view, then let no one in the Pacific doubt the United States' place in this region. Yet, my country has always looked forward, not back. So it is today. And it's understandable that our Pacific partners will ask how we view our ties to the Asia-Pacific region in this new era. So let me outline briefly where we stand on three fundamental points. First, security. The US is committed to maintaining a continuous operational and deterrent capability in Asia. This means troops, fleets, and air power deployed forward. It also means our ongoing commitment to the US-Japan Security Treaty--the practical, mutually beneficial partnership of the two biggest democratic powers in the region. For the end of the Cold War does not mean the end of dangerous leaders and regimes, threats of force, and potential conflicts. Now that the universalist ideology of Communism has been laid bare in its falsehood, we face the resurgence of exclusive ideologies that pit ethnic, national, and religious groups against one another. No one wants a revival of insecurities that could lead to moves, even unintentional, that upset the peaceful balance. As the US demonstrated in the Gulf, we will not stand by when new tyrants threaten our national security interests. We have national security interests in the Pacific, too. Of course, we will adjust our forces in the region in the face of the new circumstances. We've shared our plans with you, particularly our East Asia Strategy Initiative. We've shown our willingness to adjust these plans, as in Korea, when needed. We've explained our reliance on increased access to a number of regional military facilities and our expectation that this approach will lead to a stronger sense of mutual and shared responsibility. And we've welcomed, supported, and, I hope, even inspired creative multilateral responses to multi-faceted security problems, for example, in Cambodia. In the post-Cold War world, the United States must remain a leader-- perhaps the one leader with truly global reach--but we will seek to operate through partnerships. We need to rely on one another. Therefore, we are pleased that ASEAN's leaders decided last January to add regional security issues to our PMC deliberations. ASEAN's initiative creates an opportunity for us to share our thinking on the challenges that confront the region. We may find openings for steps to bolster regional security through building trust and confidence--for example, collaboration against piracy and greater transparency on defense policies. Over time, our dialogue might foster preventive diplomacy, easing mistrust and clearing up misunderstandings before they escalate. Our second but equally fundamental interest is our economic ties to the Asia-Pacific region. In the early 1970s, our trade with the region was less than our trade with Latin America. Now our trans-Pacific trade of over $300 billion a year is more than 40% greater than our trans-Atlantic trade. Our $50 billion trade with ASEAN exceeds our trade with Germany. We export more to Singapore than to Spain or Italy. But Asians are well aware of the economic figures. So let me turn to the concerns. One great achievement of the Cold War was the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan; they became our partners as well as our allies. Now others--especially nations in Asia and Latin America--are also on the path to prosperity. Frankly, the old North-South logic is now as out of date as the Cold War division between East and West. In this post-Cold War era, we should recognize the vast differences among the so-called developing world. We should also act on our common interest in creating a better life for all our citizens. It is in our common interest to assure an international economic framework that both fosters growth and can sustain political support. We need to give the ASEAN nations and others an opportunity to benefit from their comparative advantages. At the same time, the international framework must support the outward-looking engagement of the US, EC, and Japan, both by assuring them open access for their competitive products, services, and ideas and by enabling them to make competitive transitions. Certainly, a successful Uruguay Round would be a cornerstone of this system. We want to press ahead, regardless of our elections, because we believe open markets and competitive opportunity make economic and political sense. At the Munich Summit, the US pressed two agricultural proposals in an effort to urge the EC to reduce the volume of its subsidized agricultural exports in a way most of the world has been seeking. Unfortunately, the timing was not opportune for some. But we have made more progress over the past year than many people recognize. We have no intention of giving up. Yet, to be ultimately successful, many of you will have to improve your offers on access for goods and services, too. In the meantime, we are forging ahead with NAFTA. I believe NAFTA can be the basis for stronger pan-Pacific ties. Higher growth in North America will mean more trade with Asia. The facts of the trade of all three North American nations already bear this out. A more competitive North America will be more willing to maintain and strengthen our booming Pacific trade. We have no intention of being a big island; that wouldn't be in our self- interest. To the contrary, I think we need to consider seriously how to liberalize trade throughout the Pacific. We have made a start through Trade and Investment Facilitation Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties. We also intend to build on the successful US business tour of our Ambassadors to ASEAN through both a repeat effort and by inviting ASEAN's Ambassadors to make a follow-up tour in the US. And we are taking steps to integrate our private sector in this ongoing economic diplomacy. We need to stretch our thinking further. As AFTA and NAFTA develop, we need to consider whether they might complement one another. I also hope we can advance the Pacific trade liberalization agenda within APEC. US- ASEAN cooperation has been fundamental to turning APEC from an idea into an institution. In this regard, I wish to compliment the Thai leadership in developing the idea of an APEC Secretariat. The US offers the largest fully integrated market in the world. We want it to be a competitive, global market, not part of a bloc. On the domestic side, President Bush will press initiative in education, worker training, R∧D, and science so our citizens have both opportunities and capabilities. On the international side, we will press for free trade and open markets on all fronts--globally, regionally, and bilaterally. If some say no, we'll look for those who want to join our vision of greater trade and stronger growth. We want ASEAN and APEC to have a special place in this future. Our third fundamental link with Asia in the post-Cold War world will be through our political systems and our people. In 1980, when I taught in Hong Kong, my students argued that democracy was an anomaly in Asia; Japan, they told me, was an isolated case. So what happened over 12 years? Look right here in the Philippines, where a new government has just been elected. Look at Korea . . . at Taiwan . . . Mongolia . . . the increased pluralism throughout ASEAN. And even in the victimized land of Cambodia, our common effort is based in significant part on establishing political legitimacy through free elections. I recognize there will be reversals. And the democratic process may move through new patterns reflecting ideas about the place of the individual, the family, the community. But over the past 200 years, those that failed to recognize the human spirit's call for liberty, for respect, for self-government were eventually swept aside. That's why it's our aim that this post-Cold War age will be an era of Democratic Peace, based on a shared commitment to political and economic freedom. Perhaps the great historical irony will turn out to be that the Enlightenment produced two universalist ideologies that transcended ethnic groups, nations, and regional. One of them, Marxism, is in the dustbin of history. But the other--democracy based on the Rights of Man, the rule of law, and private property--is our primary hope for creating an open, inclusive, and tolerant international system. I will close with some brief comments on a few topics that I know we will discuss at greater length. Let me begin with Cambodia. Our multilateral efforts to bring about a just and durable peace in that troubled land are a centerpiece of US-ASEAN cooperation. The Peace Accord signed in Paris last October has at last given the Cambodian people real hope that their long nightmare may be over. ASEAN must continue to play a central role in the settlement process. From absorbing Khmer refugees and facilitating their repatriation to contributing troops for UN peacekeeping efforts, ASEAN's involvement in the Cambodian peace process remains absolutely vital for its success. This is especially the case now, when UN efforts to attain national reconciliation and free and fair elections have come under threat. The position of the United States is clear; we are firmly committed to full implementation of the Paris Accords. Neither the international community nor the Cambodian people can accept anything less. We must not let Cambodia's national tragedy resume. The UN has sought to accommodate the legitimate concerns of all Cambodian parties. The generous aid of the international community pledged last month in Tokyo should go to those parties that cooperate with the UN Transitional Authority (UNTAC)--but only to those parties. Any side that chooses to undermine the peace process will discredit and isolate itself. This should be our common message. I also believe that ASEAN has been prudent in focusing on the questions related to the Spratly Islands, and I compliment the ASEAN Ministers on the useful principles they issued. Indonesia's promotion of a dialogue on the disputed islands is a good example of what one might call preventive diplomacy. We hope and expect that this process will lead to a peaceful resolution of differences. For our part, the United States sees no justification for the use of military force to resolve conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea. A just lasting solution to this dispute can result only from peaceful negotiations between the parties concerned, not from unilateral actions. Let me add here that the American Government is not involved in the activities of private firms that seek to operate in these disputed areas. Last year, I warned that the military's illegitimate and brutal action in Burma were both an offense against the civilized world and a source of instability. Unfortunately, I was right. Burma is now exporting pain and death outside its borders in staggering terms. Since we last met, we have witnessed the terrible flight of 270,000 Rohingya Muslim refugees into Bangladesh and others into Thailand. Burma is also a primary source of heroin for addicts around the world; indeed, much of this drug of death is consumed by the people of Southeast Asia. Isn't it time to say enough is enough? We know the Burmese military are not immune to world attention. The State Law and Order Restoration Council took some limited positive steps. But isn't it time for all of us, together, to tell the military regime it must release all political prisoners--including Aung San Suu Kyi--and engage them in a good-faith dialogue to restore constitutional government at an early date? UNHCR officials should be permitted to monitor the return of Rohingya refugees to their homes. By such steps, Burma could start down the path--the only path--to rejoin the family of nations. Some people always doubt the power of world condemnation. They say we should accept the world as it is; we should be realistic, they say. My response to those skeptics was in Helsinki 2 weeks ago. There I saw former prisoners of conscience seated as Presidents and Prime Ministers of new democracies. Wherever they go--whatever they do--their names are now synonymous with courage and conviction. So is the name Aung San Suu Kyi. If we forget her, we forget our humanity. Finally, I note that Laos and Vietnam have begun the process of forging a closer relationship with ASEAN, a relationship that could over time greatly benefit the region. Increased ties could help decrease tensions in Southeast Asia while facilitating economic and political reform. As this process unfolds, however, we urge that you remember our POWs and MIAs. There is no more important issue to my government and my people. We will not forget the young men who came to this region for all of us but who never came home. We ask for your ongoing support for our efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of our compatriots. I look forward to our discussions with you in the next few days. Our agenda is important, not just for Southeast Asia, but for the New World Order we hope to create as partners with you. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Category: Fact Sheets Date: Aug, 3 19928/3/92 Region: Southeast Asia, East Asia Country: Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Burma Subject: ASEAN, Trade/Economics, Human Rights, POW/MIA Issues [TEXT]
Background
Secretary Baker met in Manila, Philippines, July 25-26, with the foreign ministers of the six ASEAN countries. This was the 14th annual post- ministerial consultation with ASEAN at the foreign minister level, which immediately follows the annual meeting of the six ASEAN foreign ministers. The ministers also invite their counterparts from Australia, Canada, the European Community, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea to the post- ministerial consultation to discuss world and regional issues. The six ASEAN countries have a total population of more than 330 mil-lion people. Covering more than 3 million square kilometers (1.2 million square miles), the ASEAN countries straddle strategic sea routes linking the Pacific Ocean with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Rich in natural resources, with a talented and hard-working population and market-oriented development policies, the ASEAN countries grew more rapidly than most developing nations during the 1980s. Their trade with the rest of the world slipped to $144 billion in 1985 because of slackening world trade and falling commodity prices but rebounded quickly and, by 1991, reached $343 billion. Two-way trade with the US totaled $50 billion in 1991, making ASEAN America's fifth most important trading partner.
What Is ASEAN?
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was created in August 1967 with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration by the five original member nations (Brunei Darussalam became the sixth member on January 7, 1984, shortly after its independence). ASEAN's major purposes are to strengthen regional cohesion and self-reliance, emphasizing economic, social, and cultural cooperation. It evolved slowly because of the member countries' varied historical and colonial heritages and because their economies largely compete against each other. Cooperation increased after the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. The first two ASEAN summit conferences of heads of government, held in 1976 and 1977, initiated much closer collaboration in political as well as economic and social matters. A third ASEAN summit was held in Manila in December 1987 and a fourth in Singa-pore in January 1992. From now on, summits are to be held every 3 years. ASEAN has a loosely organized structure of ministerial meetings, committees, and a small secretariat located in Jakarta. Although the six countries have agreed to upgrade the position of ASEAN secretary general, they have not favored the development of a strong, central coordinating body.
Economic Growth
ASEAN countries averaged annual real gross domestic product growth of more than 5% during 1978-90, one of the economic success stories among developing countries. The average slipped to 0.6% in 1985 but rose to 7% in 1990. Future prospects for the ASEAN economies, which are generally among the better managed in the developing world, remain bright.
Regional Cooperation
ASEAN led efforts in the United Nations to oppose Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and end the civil war there. The United Nations convened the International Conference on Kampuchea in July 1981 at ASEAN's request. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas served as co-chairman of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia, where he and officials from the other ASEAN countries joined others in negotiating the 1991 peace settlement. Several ASEAN countries have peace-keeping forces in Cambodia under UN command, and the ASEAN countries, as a group, pledged in 1992 to play an active role in international efforts to reconstruct Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. With the end of hostilities in Southeast Asia, Vietnam and Laos have expressed interest in working with ASEAN, which has welcomed accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation by all countries in Indochina. Laos and Vietnam have expressed their intentions to accede to the treaty in 1992.
External Relations
ASEAN has strengthened its ties with the United States and other industrialized countries through periodic economic "dialogues" and the post- ministerial consultations. The ASEAN governments take a constructive, creative approach to important world issues in the United Nations and other forums. The US-ASEAN relationship is substantial and expanding. Secretary Baker's attendance at the 1992 ASEAN post-ministerial meeting in Manila marked his fourth meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers in Southeast Asia in as many years. (He also has met with them in New York during sessions of the UN General Assembly.) These annual meetings permit a regular and comprehensive review of matters of interest to the United States and to ASEAN countries and underscore the importance of the region to US foreign policy.
Bilateral Economic Cooperation
ASEAN governments support private sector entrepreneurial growth, domestic and foreign investment, and an open world trading system. US business people have found ASEAN countries good places to trade and invest. Several avenues have developed over the last 15 years to foster better cooperation and interchange. The US-ASEAN Council for Business and Technology was established in 1979 to bring together private sector leaders to discuss common interests and the enhancement of trade and investment relations. The Private Investment and Trade Opportunities project is a joint effort by the United States and ASEAN private sectors and government to expand trade, investment, and technology transfer between the United States and ASEAN. Frequent official and unofficial US-ASEAN consultations increase understanding of common interests and provide opportunities to consult on a wide range of issues. The US-ASEAN Economic Dialogue began in September 1977 in Manila. Subsequent dialogues have been held at intervals of about 18 months, with the 10th and most recent dialogue in June 1991. An Economic Coordinating Committee (ECC) was established at the Third Economic Dialogue in Manila. It comprises senior officials of the ASEAN embassies in Washington, DC, their counterparts in the US Government, and private sector representatives. The ECC generally meets monthly to review cooperative activities and economic issues. The US Trade Representative and ASEAN ambassadors signed a memorandum of understanding in December 1990 to establish regular, ministerial-level trade consultations and a working group of senior officials to explore mechanisms to enhance trade and investment relations under a program known as the ASEAN-US Initiative.
Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation
The ASEAN members agreed at their third summit to accelerate efforts to reduce tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade to promote industrial development. ASEAN leaders took an important step toward this goal in January 1992 when they established the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The AFTA is designed to eliminate most tariffs between the member countries over the next 15 years. ASEAN also is trying to foster cooperative industrial investment projects with government or private sector involvement.
Refugees
Since 1975, more than 2 million people have left Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam for "first asylum" (temporary refuge) in neighboring ASEAN countries. More than 1.6 million of those refugees have been resettled elsewhere. Concerned about the continuation of this exodus, the ASEAN countries called for an international conference, which was held in Geneva in June 1989. The conference resulted in the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), which consisted of an interlocking set of policies designed to resolve the problem while preserving first asylum. The CPA has resulted in a significant decrease in the outflow from Vietnam. Further, more than 26,000 Vietnamese from refugee camps in the region have voluntarily repatriated to Vietnam. The CPA Steering Committee has met four times since the agreement was reached. Despite some concerns about the speed with which the problem is being handled, each meeting reaffirmed agreement on the CPA and the practice of first asylum.
ASEAN Members
Brunei Philippines Indonesia Singapore Malaysia Thailand (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Iraq's Non-Compliance With UN Security Council Resolutions: Perkins

Perkins Source: Edward J. Perkins, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 29 19927/29/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: United Nations [TEXT] Chairman Hamilton, Chairman Yatron, members of the committees, I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the committee this morning. Since this is my first appearance before this body as US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, let me take this time to thank you for your support and also to state my sincere belief in the critical role of Congress in the shaping of the strongest possible US policy at the United Nations. The purpose of my testimony today is to brief the committee on our continuing efforts to ensure complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 687 establishing the terms for a cease-fire with Iraq. This morning's hearing comes at a critical time. Over the course of the last 2 months, Saddam Hussein has openly violated the decisions of the Security Council and, by word and deed, has defied the authority of the United Nations in an increasingly grave and provocative manner. Let me be specific. -- Iraq has intentionally delayed a UN chemical and ballistic missile inspection team from examining a facility believed to contain materials associated with Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. -- Iraq has permitted and, we suspect, orchestrated a general deterioration in the security of UN personnel, resulting in numerous attacks upon them, including the tragic shooting death of a UN humanitarian guard. -- Iraq has denounced the findings and repudiated the authority of the UN commission established pursuant to Resolution 687 to demarcate its border with Kuwait and has refused to participate in the most recent session of that commission. -- Disregarding its obligations under Resolution 688 to permit unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations, Iraq has failed to extend an agreement allowing the United Nations to bring humanitarian relief to millions of Iraqis who continue to be denied adequate food, medicine, and other essential needs. -- Likewise, Iraq has broken off negotiations to implement Resolutions 706 and 712, by which it would be permitted to sell oil in exchange for food to feed its population, a decision which ensures their continued suffering. -- Finally, in another violation of Resolution 688, Iraq has continued and, in fact, intensified attacks against its Shi'a population in the south. Mr. Chairman, these actions, viewed in their entirety, are nothing less than a clear and open challenge to the authority of the Security Council and the UN Charter. In the case of the denial of access to the weapons inspection team and the attacks upon UN personnel, the implications are particularly grave. Iraq should take care not to forget its status. It is subject, by virtue of its outlaw behavior, to mandatory obligations for which enforcement authority already exists. The international community cannot afford and does not intend to let Iraq repudiate those obligations. Let me now review UN efforts to ensure compliance with the main elements of the cease-fire resolution.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Resolution 687's provisions on weapons of mass destruction establish three overlapping UN functions and Iraqi obligations: -- Disclosure of all weapons, weapons-related equipment, programs and associated production, and research and development facilities and materials; -- Destruction or rendering harmless of all existing weapons of mass destruction and related items identified for destruction by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and -- Long-term and extensive monitoring of any Iraqi activities with a possible bearing on weapons of mass destruction. As we have previously noted to this committee, Iraqi performance in each of these areas repeats a constant pattern: There is a period of non-cooperation and deceit; this is followed by defiance when confronted by UN officials; when defiance calls forth Security Council threats, it gives way to limited compliance; this is followed by new deceits and non-cooperation elsewhere.
Disclosure:
Over the course of the last 2 months, UNSCOM has significantly augmented its capacity to ensure Iraqi compliance with the weapons disclosure requirements of [Resolution] 687. This is due to an increase in the number of UNSCOM personnel permanently stationed in Baghdad and to the loan of a number of helicopters. The helicopters and the larger support base have facilitated more intensive aerial surveillance of suspected sites. Information developed from these flights has been used to tag additional locations for inspection and, also, to build a baseline for long-term monitoring. I should add that, notwithstanding the increased tempo of inspections, the Iraqi Government has generally not sought to impede these activities. As required under Resolution 687, Iraq has also provided various written documents purporting to contain "full, final, and complete" disclosures of its nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile weapons programs. One set of reports, received by the United Nations in March, is still being reviewed by UNSCOM and the IAEA, as is another set dealing with dual-use items. While the review and verification process is a lengthy one, we do not now believe that either set of reports will meet the disclosure requirements of the relevant resolutions. Further, with respect to the full, final, and complete declaration required by UNSCR [UN Security Council Resolution] 707, Iraq has continued to withhold information on procurement to support its WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs, including detailed year-by-year breakdowns of production and imports, and their (foreign) sources. The Government of Iraq has lamely defended its refusal to provide this information by stating that disclosure of the name of foreign suppliers would place those companies and, particularly, their managements at risk of physical retaliation by the clandestine services of certain states. As a general comment on the disclosure provisions of [Resolution] 687, let me say that the significant progress we have made toward locating prohibited materials and facilities and toward piecing together an in-depth picture of Iraq's various weapons programs has come about despite Iraqi cooperation and not because of it. The most egregious example of non- cooperation was the refusal of Iraqi authorities to permit a weapons inspection team from the UN Special Commission [UNSCOM], to examine what the United Nations believes to be prohibited materials relating to weapons of mass destruction housed in the so-called Agriculture Ministry in Baghdad.
Destruction.
Notwithstanding the handicaps imposed by Iraq's attempts to evade full disclosure, UNSCOM has proceeded with destruction of Iraq-declared, or UN-discovered, weapons and materials. Destruction of chemical materials is the most advanced. Some 463 chemical munitions, most of which were either filled or partially filled with the chemical agent sarin, are now destroyed. Preparations continue for much larger scale destruction of chemical agents at Iraq's Al Muthanna plants, due to start this fall. No additional destruction has taken place in the biological area, and any future destruction activities must await UNSCOM decisions about possible dual-use facilities or discovery of suspect sites. The United Nations continues to make headway in the area of ballistic missile destruction. In April, the 10th inspection team oversaw destruction of 10 additional buildings and 45 items of production equipment associated with the ballistic missile program. In May, the 11th inspection team continued this process. Among other things, it inventoried equipment designed for the production of nozzles for the Badr-2000. The team also confirmed 89 Scud missiles unilaterally destroyed by Iraq. Combined with 62 previously confirmed, this brings the total number destroyed to 151 missiles. In the nuclear area, the key technical installation of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, located at Al Atheer and Al Hateen, was destroyed during the 11th and 12th IAEA inspection missions, which occurred in April and May-June, respectively. In addition, at the request of the 12th IAEA inspection team, the Iraqi side has begun preparation for the destruction of selected buildings at the Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat sites where the emis (electro-magnetic isotopic separation) process was in use. The IAEA has observed that while the Iraqi side's cooperation in implementing destruction plans at Al Atheer, Al Hateen, Tarmiya, and Ash Sharqat was very good, in the course of the 12th IAEA mission there was a definite deterioration in the Iraqi attitude to working with the inspection team. One manifestation of this was the often slow manner in which meetings, transportation, and other activities were organized. Monitoring. As has been noted here previously, the whole point of the monitoring provisions contained in Resolutions 687 and 715 is to enable the United Nations to continuously assess a factual baseline against subsequent events and developments. After more than 1 year of field work and other investigations, the IAEA and UNSCOM have now drawn reasonably accurate profiles of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. Of course, important gaps remain in all areas. These include confirmation of Iraqi claims of unilateral destruction; verification of Iraqi disclosure reports; details on the budgetary, organizational, expenditure, import sources; and prior use of weapons programs, particularly chemical weapons and so on. And, of course, there is also the continuing problem of Iraq's rejection of long-term monitoring, a self-defeating position since it will only prolong the period of intense scrutiny to which Iraq must be subjected in the meantime.
Return of Property
The UN-supervised return of Kuwaiti property stolen from Iraq continues to move slowly. Since my predecessor's testimony to the committee in April, the focus has been on securing the return of remaining military equipment, including tanks, spare parts, salvageable parts of damaged aircraft, and I- Hawk missile systems. Kuwait has indicated to the United Nations that return of the I-Hawk missile systems is now its number one priority. For the first time, Iraq has returned some boats belonging to various Kuwaiti entities. About 20 vessels were returned by sea during the past month. The UN return-of-property coordinator has gained the agreement of both sides to a land transfer point on the Iraq-Kuwait border at Safwan. Both the United Nations and Kuwait have now constructed facilities there (Kuwait on its side of the border) for the use of staff involved in the transfer. Once the final modalities are worked out by the UN, Safwan will be used for the transfer of heavy military equipment.
UNIKOM
We remain very pleased with the performance of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) and believe it should be maintained for the foreseeable future. Conditions in UNIKOM's area of operations have continued [to be] calm since my predecessor's testimony in April. UNIKOM investigates the occasional minor complaint from either side. UNIKOM's chief military observer, General Greindl of Austria, who did an excellent job in establishing UNIKOM, was replaced in July by Maj. Gen. Timothy K. Dibuama of Ghana. In addition to its observer duties, UNIKOM, on a voluntary basis, has provided engineering support and logistical assistance to staff of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission [who are] physically demarcating the land portion of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary. UNIKOM plans to continue this assistance to the commission when it resumes its laying of markers in October-November. Unfortunately, after final demarcation of the land boundary, as decided by the UN Boundary Demarcation Commission, an additional Iraqi border police post will be on the Kuwaiti side of the boundary, bringing the total to six. Once the commission issues its final report to the Secretary General and the report is officially endorsed by the Security Council, Iraq will have no alternative but to remove these posts.
UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission
As mandated under UNSCR 687, the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission has met several times to take decisions on demarcating the border based on information from a 1963 agreement in which Iraq and Kuwait agreed to respect a common border described in a 1932 exchange of letters. The commission's mandate is to "demarcate" the border, that is, to physically locate the border based on their objective evaluations of the 1963 agreement and other evidence. At the commission's April 8-16 session in New York, it reviewed the work of the joint New Zealand-Swedish survey team, which provided the basis of the orthophoto mapping of the Iraq-Kuwait border area. The commission's independent experts had also reviewed the materials requested of Iraq and Kuwait on the land boundary. Adhering to the delimitation formula and based on the findings of the independent experts and deliberations of the commission, the commission decided on the points demarcating the land portion of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary. Iraq did not participate in the vote on the land demarcation points. The commission's interim report indicates that there will be some relocation of the de facto boundary in both directions. Iraq is unhappy about losing some territory in the Umm Qasr port, especially some naval facilities, and the Rumaylah oil field areas. After deciding on the land boundary at its April session, the commission physically placed some temporary border markers. The commission plans to resume placing border markers in October-November when there are more favorable weather conditions. Iraqi officials have made numerous statements criticizing the commission's work and its demarcation of the land boundary, which cast doubt about Iraq's ultimate acceptance of the demarcation. Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmed Hussein sent a 43-page letter to the Secretary General May 21 calling into question Iraq's previous formal acceptance of both UNSCR 687 and the Secretary General's plan for implementing its border demarcation provisions, as well as the finality of the commission's decisions. It denounced the decisions adopted by the commission concerning the land boundary, as well as the mandate, composition, and working methods of the commission. The Iraqi letter also suggested Iraq may dispute the very existence of Kuwait. The Security Council responded to the Iraqi letter with a strong presidential statement adopted June 17 emphasizing the following: The inviolability of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait being demarcated by the commission and guaranteed by the council pursuant to Resolution 687 (1991), and the grave consequences that would ensue from any breach thereof. More recently, the Iraqi Foreign Minister informed the Secretary General in a July 11 letter that Iraq would not participate in the boundary demarcation commission's July 15-24 session in New York. In spite of Iraq's decision to boycott the commission's July session, the commission met, finalized its report on the land boundary section, and discussed the Khaur Abd Allah, the off-shore boundary. We expect the commission to submit its final report on demarcation of the land boundary to the Secretary General very soon, who will then transmit it to the Security Council for endorsement. The commission has scheduled another meeting in October to discuss the Khor Abdullah. The commission expects to finish demarcating the land boundary with physical markers by the end of 1992. We note that the commission's July 24 press release at the conclusion of its July session rejected Iraqi charges of partiality, of not being afforded the opportunity to provide the commission with all relevant material and evidence, and of depriving Iraq of an outlet to the sea by its demarcation decisions.
Detainees
Unfortunately, there has been very little progress since my predecessor last testified on a grave and continuing humanitarian concern: the fate of the missing persons presumed to remain in Iraq. A large number of prisoners of war, persons missing in action, and civilian detainees remain unaccounted for. Kuwait's list of 850, most recently revised in March, remains the best estimate of the number of Kuwaiti (723) and third-country (127) persons presumed to remain in Iraq. Since March, 81 persons have been repatriated, including 20 persons on the Kuwaiti list of 850. The other 61 persons were family reunification or special humanitarian cases. Kuwait is continuing its pain-staking efforts to verify and update its list of missing. Thus, about 800 missing persons still remain in Iraq, according to Kuwait. In recent months, Kuwait has focused on individual case files, submitting to Iraq four batches of files totaling 70 persons, through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which requested Iraq to conduct a thorough search. Iraq has responded--unacceptably--to the first batch of 13 files, with the curt reply that offices were notified and no information found, without providing ICRC the details of what sort of search was conducted. Iraq has also rejected ICRC requests to visit prisons and detention centers in Iraq, in accordance with ICRC's standard procedures for such visits, which are designed to facilitate ICRC's efforts to repatriate the missing and detained. Most ominously, in a letter dated April 20 from the Iraqi Foreign Minister to the Secretary General, Iraq, in effect, stated that by publishing the lists of the missing in several newspapers, it had already done all it can to search for the missing. The Iraqi letter concludes that Iraq has "no further information to furnish in the future." Iraq's uncooperative and dilatory behavior on this humanitarian issue continues to cause great mental and emotional anguish for the families of the missing. Iraq is obligated under the two cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council, 686 and 687, to facilitate ICRC's efforts to resolve this humanitarian issue.
Multilateral Economic Sanctions
The UN economic sanctions regime is a critical mechanism for maintaining pressure on Iraq to fulfill the terms of the cease-fire resolution. In view of Iraq's consistently uncooperative behavior on most aspects of Resolution 687 and related resolutions, I can report that the sanctions regime continues to have the solid support of the members of the Council. This support continues despite aggressive Iraqi diplomatic and propaganda initiatives to persuade some members to argue for a partial or complete lifting of the sanctions. The Council's determination to maintain the sanctions was amply demonstrated yet again on Monday, when it decided to maintain the full force of the regime. The maritime embargo continues to be vigorously applied through the efforts of our own and other cooperating naval forces in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aqaba. We have continued to encourage the Government of Jordan to tighten up on movements of goods across its border with Iraq. Although we believe there are still shipments which move across that border without the approval of the UN Sanctions Committee, it is worth noting that the Jordanian authorities are now regular petitioners for committee approval. We will continue to be in contact with the Jordanians on this important issue. While enforcing the sanctions regime, the Council and its sanctions committee have been continuously alert to the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. In the 16 months since the cease-fire, planned shipments to Iraq of 9.5 million tons of foodstuffs and approaching $1-billion worth of other essential goods were notified to or approved by the sanctions committee under procedures established by Resolution 687. The committee routinely approves the sale or shipment to Iraq of such necessities as medical and hospital equipment and supplies, clothing and shoes, animal feeds and agricultural seeds, supplies for primary education, essential agricultural equipment and machinery, soap and detergent, parts and materials for water treatment and sewage disposal and grain storage, food packaging, and processing materials. It also approves building materials vehicles, communications equipment, and other goods for use in the programs of the various humanitarian agencies working in Iraq. By and large, all other items are prohibited, including all items which would serve as inputs to Iraqi industry. As an example, the committee routinely approves the export of civilian finished clothing but opposes the export of fabric to be made into clothes in Iraqi factories. Any humanitarian good which might have a dual-use is also rejected unless the item will remain under the control of an appropriate humanitarian agency and will be re- exported from Iraq upon termination of the particular program. As you know, a major effort in this area was the Security Council's adoption of Resolutions 706 and 712, the resolutions which permit the export of Iraqi oil in order to finance humanitarian imports to benefit all the people of that country and to fund UN programs mandated by the cease-fire resolution. After several, protracted rounds of face-to-face discussions on the implementation of these resolutions, I regret to say that the Iraqis continue to reject 706 and 712, most recently in statements last week. We regret the Iraqi rejection, because the resolutions provide the best way to ensure that Iraq meets its humanitarian obligations to its own people. The resolutions also provide the best means to ensure financing for the other UN functions mandated by the Council. These functions are critical, and now that Iraq says it has no intention of pursuing the resolutions further, we are, together with other concerned countries, developing other options for funding those activities. Iraq should understand that the alternatives to 706 and 712 will all be less attractive from the Iraqi perspective.
Humanitarian
All available reports indicate that sufficient amounts of food and other essential civilian items are entering Iraq. The distribution of these essential items is far from equitable, however, and most items are somewhat more expensive compared to pre-1991 prices. Since October 1991, the Baghdad regime has imposed an internal embargo on shipments of essential goods to the predominantly Kurdish-held areas of northern Iraq. Although supplies reach Kurdish areas through major international humanitarian relief efforts and through traditional trade links with Turkey and Iran, the flow of rations to the area is considerably less than to provinces in the central Sunni heartland. Reports from a variety of sources indicate that there are continuing problems in the predominantly Shi'a south. The Iraqi Government has intensified military actions against the Arabs living in the marshes and has impeded distribution of clean water and cut off sanitation services. It is clear that through its continuing repression of ethnic and religious groups, its internal embargo, its denial of access by UN and other international relief agencies to many vulnerable groups, and its obstruction of relief, logistical, and supply efforts, Iraq continues to violate Resolution 688. Over the last several weeks, the United Nations has been unsuccessful in its efforts to gain an extension of the memorandum of understanding [MOU] that provided a platform for the humanitarian relief operations mounted by the United Nations and many non-governmental relief organizations. When the MOU expired on June 30, the Secretary General issued a statement which confirmed that the UN agencies would continue to carry out their programs in Iraq under "existing arrangements." However, it has been increasingly difficult for them to do so, and the plight of the non-governmental agencies in some cases is even more troublesome. Although the Iraqi authorities have told the United Nations that there will be no problem with visas and internal travel permits, the expiration of most of these documents make movement in and around the country problematic, clearly hampering operations. Recent attacks on UN guards and other humanitarian personnel--including the recent killing of one UN guard--are cause for great concern, as are repeated acts of harassment committed against UN vehicles, property, and programs. The United Nations is maintaining its presence in the face of Iraqi harassment, but several NGOs [non-governmental organizations] have concluded they must leave. Iraq's failure to renew the MOU and to take adequate steps to ensure the safety of UN and NGO relief personnel violates Iraq's obligations under Resolution 688. Although discussions between the Iraqis and senior UN personnel continue, Iraq has not given the United Nations any real indication that it is prepared to renew the MOU or permit the UN guards' contingent--on which the agencies depend for their security--to remain. We will be watching this situation carefully in the days to come.
UN Compensation Commission
To provide compensation for direct losses suffered as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the Security Council created a compensation commission to process and decide claims and a compensation fund to pay them. The governing council of the compensation commission completed its sixth session in June and has now been in existence for 1 year. Its accomplishments to date have been impressive: -- Adoption of the legal criteria for the filing of six categories of claims, including all claims of individuals, corporations, governments, and international organizations; -- Distribution of claims forms for all individual and corporate claims; -- Receipt of the first "urgent" claims of individuals who departed Kuwait or Iraq, suffered death or serious injury, or suffered losses up to $100,000; [and] -- Adoption of the rules of procedure for processing claims and of clarification on a number of key matters, for example, issues relating to business losses. Despite these achievements, the commission suffers from a critical lack of resources for its operations and has no funds to pay claims. Its revenues are to come from a percentage of the value of Iraq oil exports. However, Iraq's behavior does not justify lifting the sanctions, and it has refused to accept the terms of Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712, which would have authorized $1.6 billion in oil sales for humanitarian purposes, with 30% of this amount for the compensation process. Unfortunately, for Saddam Hussein's victims, many of whom are people without financial reserves, justice delayed means, in important respects, justice denied.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Iraq's Non-Compliance With UN Security Council Resolutions: Ward

Ward Source: George F. Ward, Jr, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 29 19927/29/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: United Nations [TEXT] Thank you, Chairman Hamilton and Chairman Yatron. I appreciate this opportunity to update you and the other members of your subcommittees on Iraq's non-compliance with the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and related issues. Since last April, when my predecessor, Deputy Assistant Secretary John Wolf, testified before you, Iraq has continued its pattern of evasion of the requirements of the United Nations. Iraq's behavior has, in fact, taken a disturbing turn for the worse in recent weeks. In the past, the Government of Iraq sought to evade UN requirements --piecemeal--through lies and other deceptions. Now, the Iraqi authorities are categorically refusing to cooperate with the United Nations on a range of issues. These extend from interfering with UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors--who are mandated by the Security Council to discover and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related programs--to blocking UN and other international humanitarian assistance to Iraq's population. In defiance of the Security Council, Saddam Hussein has renewed a campaign of murder and destruction against his own people in southern Iraq. The Government of Iraq cannot reasonably misunderstand the clear, unequivocal determination of the Security Council to see all relevant resolutions complied with. When he met with the Security Council in March, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz was informed that Iraq had no choice but to comply. Yet we have seen the Iraqi authorities continue to defy the United Nations, most recently in refusing, until yesterday, to grant the United Nations access to the agriculture ministry building in Baghdad. The Iraqis are playing a dangerous game. Their behavior has called into question the terms on which the cessation of hostilities following [Operation] Desert Storm was arranged.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
We are confident that, despite the efforts of Saddam Hussein's regime to footdrag, obfuscate, lie, and evade, the United Nations can carry out the complex and daunting task of ferreting out Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and related production facilities and programs. UNSCOM and the IAEA, aided by information and other assistance that we and other states provide, have demonstrated superb skill and dedicated perseverance in carrying out the task mandated under Resolution 687. To date, UNSCOM and the IAEA have conducted 40 inspections--13 nuclear, 12 ballistic missile, 8 chemical weapons, 2 biological weapons, 2 combined chemical-biological weapons, 2 chemical destruction, and 1 chemical destruction group (to establish a facility for the destruction of chemical munitions in Iraq). These have not been easy inspections. The Iraqis continue to try to obstruct the United Nations at every turn. But through unswerving perseverance and aggressiveness, as well as international support, the United Nations has made commendable progress uncovering details about Iraqi WMD programs. The United Nations has begun to destroy equipment and facilities that were earmarked on previous inspections. The United Nations destroyed dual-use missile production equipment at Taji. The IAEA demanded and oversaw destruction at Al Atheer, an Iraqi nuclear weapons facility. Chemical weapons destruction teams have begun the long and arduous job of demolishing thousands of munitions and vast stocks of chemicals at the Al Muthanna State Establishment. The inspections and, more recently, the destruction of equipment and facilities are deterring and eliminating Iraq's capabilities in weapons of mass destruction. The depth of Iraq's concern with this can be measured by its recent tactics. From July 5 to July 28, the Iraqi Government refused access by a team of UNSCOM inspectors to a Ministry of Agriculture building. Despite a UN Security Council statement branding this act an "unacceptable breach" of its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions and a trip to Baghdad by UNSCOM Chairman Ekeus to resolve this standoff, Iraq continued to rebuff the United Nations. Access to the building was gained only after Chairman Ekeus resolutely persisted in his demands and after Iraq was warned of the serious consequences of failure to honor its obligations. After false claims of having declared all remaining WMD and months of promising "full, final, and complete" disclosure of its WMD-related programs, Iraq submitted dossiers on all four weapons categories on June 8. Still, according to a multinational assessment at UNSCOM in July, this "final declaration" falls short. Moreover, one key issue--long-term monitoring-- remains unresolved. The most recent UNSCOM ballistic missile team (the 11th), which left Iraq May 22, verified the remainder of Iraq's March 19 declaration, verified the destruction of dual-use equipment and buildings, and inspected five undeclared sites. The IAEA has also started to destroy key components of Iraq's nuclear program. Despite Iraqi attempts to persuade the IAEA of its peaceful purpose, 8 buildings and 29 pieces of equipment at Al Atheer --the core facility of Iraq's nuclear weapons program--were destroyed in May. Destruction of chemical weapons continues. A chemical destruction group has taken residence in Baghdad and is preparing for the incineration of gas munitions and hydrolysis of nerve agents over the next 18 months. Funding for the Special Commission's essential work has been problematic. Under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 699, Iraq is to pay all costs associated with the destruction of its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs, as well as the ballistic missiles specified in UNSCR 687. But such payment can only come about after Iraq has resumed oil exports. In order to provide UNSCOM with financing, the United States has made available $14 million to date, which includes $10 million from our payment of arrears and $4 million as a voluntary contribution. We plan to provide another $30.6 million from our payment of arrears by the end of July. All these funds are to be eventually reimbursed by Iraq. I don't want to suggest that the United Nations is almost finished with inspections in Iraq or that UNSCOM is resting on its laurels. Rather, the destruction phase is complementing continuing on-site and challenge inspections. Only through continued intrusive inspections, dogged pursuit of details, and long-term careful monitoring will we ever learn the true nature of all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations continues to plan, and we maintain our strong support for, inspections even as equipment already identified is destroyed. The United Nations and we are determined to enforce a critical element of UNSCR 687-- long-term monitoring as mandated by UNSCR 715.
Return of Stolen Kuwaiti Assets
Return of stolen military and civilian property has been very slow but is finally making progress. The United Nations is overseeing and coordinating the return. When my predecessor addressed these subcommittees last fall, gold, currency, and cultural property were in the process of being returned, and we were pressing for return of the remaining civilian property and Kuwaiti military property, including I-Hawk missiles. Since then, some additional civilian equipment and part of the military property has now been returned, including boats, fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, aircraft engines, and spares. An agreement among the United Nations, Kuwait, and Iraq specifies that return of heavy military equipment, including the I-Hawks, will take place in Safwan this fall. While we are disturbed about the slow rate of return, it does appear that, with the assistance of the United Nations, progress is being made.
UNIKOM and Boundary Commission
We are very concerned by recent Iraqi behavior with regard to demarcation of the border between Iraq and Kuwait. In a letter, dated May 21, to the Security Council, Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmed Hussein appeared to call into question the finality of the work of the Boundary Commission. The letter also made historical arguments which appeared to call into question Iraq's acceptance of Kuwait. The Security Council reacted sharply to this letter with a statement issued on June 17 that reiterated the finality of the commission's work, reiterated the Council's obligation to guarantee the inviolability of the Kuwait-Iraq border, and rejected any Iraqi suggestion calling into question the work of the commission. In a press release announcing the finalization of its work on demarcating the land border, the commission stated: "Both Iraq and Kuwait had every opportunity to provide the Commission with all relevant material and evidence." In a July 12 letter to the Secretary General, the Foreign Minister of Iraq stated that the Iraqi representative would not participate in the sixth session of the Boundary Commission which was held from July 15 to 24 in New York. We commend the work of the commission and support its findings, which will allow the border between Kuwait and Iraq to be finally marked on the ground. We would note that under the terms of UNSCR 687, Iraq is obligated to accept the findings of the commission. The commission has decided to meet again in September to consider the off-shore boundary. UNIKOM is functioning well. Except for the issue of placement of five Iraqi border posts inside the de facto Kuwaiti border, there are no significant issues to raise. UNIKOM has protested the border posts on the Kuwaiti side of the border and has reported to the UN Security Council. The Iraqis claim that the posts were in their current location before the war and have told UNIKOM they intend to keep them until the final border demarcation.
Humanitarian Situation
Iraq is required by Security Council Resolution 687 to release all Kuwaiti and other hostages at once. The agony of Kuwaitis whose loved ones were taken to Iraq during or at the conclusion of Iraq's brutal occupation and whose fate is unknown is heartbreaking. The Kuwaiti Government has provided the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with a carefully prepared and reviewed list of some 850 missing citizens believed to be in Iraq. Despite numerous requests by the United Nations and the ICRC, Iraq has not permitted ICRC monitors to visit places of detention and other areas where these abducted persons are believed to be held. While the return of Kuwaiti assets and weaponry continues, the inhumanity of Iraqi stone- walling on this most fundamental humanitarian obligation remains a matter of grave concern to Kuwait and the international community. Iraq's campaign of deception extends beyond its efforts to preserve its high priority military programs. Saddam Hussein's regime has cynically trafficked on the misery of his own people in order to garner international support for the relaxation of sanctions against Iraq. The tragic plight of the Iraqi people, whose suffering is deliberately inflicted through the ruthless policies of the Government of Iraq, is mocked by official Iraqi complaints that economic sanctions are the cause of hardships faced by the Iraqi population. Well-fed henchmen of Saddam Hussein are happy to conduct foreign journalists on tours of hospital wards where mothers and young children languish or to show on Western television screens children crying for want of proper nourishment. Meanwhile, Iraqi forces continue a blockade of internationally distributed food and other humanitarian supplies to northern Iraq. Elsewhere, Iraqi authorities warn citizens not to accept internationally provided assistance under pain of being charged with espionage. Food production in northern Iraq lags behind that elsewhere in the country. While Iraq has lately circulated the ludicrous charge that Operation Provide Comfort aircraft have fire- bombed wheat fields, the truth is that Iraq has prevented the use of helicopters for aerial pesticide spraying of the fields and, thereby, diminished yields in the north. The savagery Saddam Hussein has directed against his own people has been documented in chilling detail in a UN report on the human rights situation in Iraq prepared by Ambassador Max Van der Stoel, the UN Special Rapporteur for Iraq. This report presents a very different picture from the one Iraq's propagandists would have us see. A government whose agents themselves coolly documented the methodical murder of tens of thousands of people who proved an inconvenience to the regime cannot expect credibility when it comes to pleading humanitarian concerns before international public opinion. Ambassador Van der Stoel's conclusion that the crimes committed by Saddam Hussein and his cronies against the people of Iraq are among the very worst seen by the world since the Second World War is not overstated. The discovery of a large cache of documents in northern Iraq, apparently the files of the Iraqi secret police, has provided gruesome detail of Iraq's wholesale abuses of human rights and thoroughly supports Ambassador Van der Stoel's findings. These documents were removed from Iraq and are now deposited with the National Archives. The UN Economic and Social Council has authorized another mission by Ambassador Van der Stoel to Iraq, and a further report on human rights in Iraq. A preliminary report will be presented to the General Assembly this fall. The international community continues to be deeply concerned and responsive to the plight of Iraq's needy, providing approximately 375 UN humanitarian personnel, 406 UN guards, 300 Red Cross workers, and 192 employees of private organizations in Iraq. The United Nations and its agencies have extended approximately $360 million in humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people since April 1991. The Red Cross has given another $100 million. US contributions include approximately $100 million to the United Nations, over 63,000 metric tons of food, and $6.9 million to private agencies for programs in Iraq. These amounts, together with the cost of Operation Provide Comfort, bring the total US expenditure for the people of Iraq to nearly $650 million in the past 18 months.
Blockade of the North and Repression in the South
As I mentioned earlier, the Government of Iraq apparently has no qualms about the hypocrisy of its public position on sanctions: While attacking internationally imposed trade sanctions, it restricts food, medicine, and fuel reaching minority groups in northern and southern Iraq. There have also been a number of acts of intimidation and harassment aimed at UN and other personnel engaged in the humanitarian effort in northern Iraq. Fire- bombings, car bombs, [and] refusal to grant permission to travel to international personnel are among acts for which we hold the Government of Iraq accountable. Because the Iraqi Government has severely restricted access by foreigners to southern Iraq, we do not have a clear picture of the situation in this predominantly Shi'a region. We know that in recent days, Iraqi forces using attack jet aircraft and helicopters to support elements of several divisions have been attacking Shi'a in the marsh areas north of Basra. Both these attacks in the south and the continued blockade in the north are flagrant violations of UNSCR 688, which requires Iraq to grant unimpeded access to humanitarian workers, and to refrain from any repressive measures against civilians. Mr. Van der Stoel also cites reports of other activities by the Iraqi army in the region of the southern marshes, including: -- Tightening of control over food destined for the area; -- Evacuation of all areas within 3 kilometers of the marshes; -- Killing of large numbers of animals and birds in the marshes; -- Dumping of toxic chemicals into marsh waters; and -- Military attacks that have resulted in hundreds of deaths. These repressive policies toward Iraqis living in the north and south and the array of human rights violations listed by Mr. Van der Stoel, not to mention the repression shown during Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, make the truth inescapable: The biggest problem confronting the Iraqi people is not the sanctions imposed by the United Nations; it is the policies imposed by the government of Saddam Hussein.
International Humanitarian Relief
Action must be taken to alleviate the suffering of vulnerable groups inside Iraq. After the Iraqi army chased hundreds of thousands of refugees into the mountains along the border with Turkey and Iran, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688. This resolution told Iraq to allow humanitarian organizations immediate access to those in need of assistance and requested UN agencies to meet the critical needs of Iraqi refugees and displaced persons. We recognize that UN agencies must, of necessity, work with authorities in Baghdad. For this purpose, and to establish the specifics of the UN humanitarian programs in Iraq, the United Nations had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Government of Iraq, which lapsed at the end of June. While Iraq's failure to renew this MOU is yet another example of Iraq's non-cooperation with the international community, we believe that it does not affect Iraq's basic obligations under UNSCR 688 to permit unhindered access by international humanitarian agencies to the people throughout Iraq. Since April 1991, the United Nations has been helping refugees and the displaced, along with the most needy in vulnerable groups throughout Iraq. Between March and December 1991, donors provided almost $322 million to fund UN relief efforts in the Gulf region. In January, the United Nations requested $120 million more to fund operations through June 1992. The United States responded with a pledge of $42 million, more than half the total received to date. Other donors contributed about $25 million. It is critical for the international community to continue to fund humanitarian programs in Iraq. We call on all donors who have not yet pledged to do so, quickly and generously. We recently announced a pledge of $6.5 million for the continued funding of the UN Guard Program and expect to make a further substantial contribution to other humanitarian programs shortly. The United Nations has accomplished a great deal with this money. More than 1.8 million refugees were repatriated from Turkey and Iran to Iraq last year. Materials to build winter shelters were provided to about 74,000 families. More than 87,000 metric tons of food were provided, with three- quarters of it going to displaced persons concentrated in northern Iraq. Just as important as the emergency supplies has been the maintenance of a 500-man UN Guard Contingent operating across northern Iraq and in the southern town of Basra. The guards are charged with providing security to UN personnel and equipment. They serve as de facto monitors whose presence deters violence on the part of both the Iraqi army and the Kurdish peshmerga.
Iraq Sanctions
In discussing the issues of sanctions and the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, three points should be understood: First, the sanctions imposed against Iraq by the United Nations in Security Council Resolutions 661 and 687 are designed to ensure that the Iraqi leadership lives up to obligations clearly spelled out in various UN resolutions. Resolution 687 makes no provision for any easing of sanctions before Iraq fully complies. Second, these sanctions were never intended to punish innocent Iraqi civilians. For this reason, medicine was excluded from the trade sanctions imposed before the war, and food and medicine have been excluded from the sanctions continued following the cease-fire. Finally, the international community will continue to battle the suffering which the repressive policies of the government of Saddam Hussein have brought to the Iraqi people. It will not, however, trust his government with unmonitored supervision of humanitarian assistance. Many, led by Iraqi Government officials, have overstated the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi public welfare. UN officials have assured us that there are adequate stocks of food in Iraq and that malnutrition is not a serious problem in any region, apart from instances when Iraqi Government policies block access to food. UN sanctions do not block the export of essential civilian items to Iraq. During the year ending March 1992, the UN sanctions committee was informed of plans to export 8.1 million metric tons of food to Iraq, which is actually more than Iraq's annual pre-war food imports. Recent reports from Baghdad indicate that the shelves are fully stocked with food, although at prices 30 to 100 times greater than before the Gulf crisis. Yet Iraqis continue to finance imports, evidently drawing on personal accounts of hidden private reserves held outside Iraq and probably by smuggling out Iraqi objects of value. Iraq continues to press for release of its frozen assets for humanitarian purchases, and several countries have allowed some Iraqi assets to be used. Most recently, Iraq has stepped up its pressure on the Bank for International Settlements in Basel to release $300 million for humanitarian purchases. The Bank's board has not yet acted but may feel legally bound to do so soon.
Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712
Though a share of Iraq's imports of medicine, food, and essential civilian items is being provided by relief agencies, the overwhelming majority is being purchased commercially by government and private buyers. We know that Iraq's finances are tight. Foreign exchange is in short supply, and the value of the Iraqi dinar is collapsing. To assure that Iraq had the financial resources to purchase humanitarian supplies, the Security Council offered Resolutions 706 and 712. Iraq has turned this offer of an exemption to the embargo into a travesty--refusing to implement the offer while seeking to highlight and exploit the suffering of the Iraqi people. Saddam has played on the hopes and good intentions of the world while dragging out the suffering of his citizens by engaging the United Nations in fruitless discussions on the modalities of implementation and then suspending these talks last month. The United Nations has discussed for many months with Iraq ways to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712, which allow Iraq to export oil and buy humanitarian goods under UN supervision. Negotiations were suspended the middle of last month and, on July 11, the Iraqi Government notified the United Nations that it categorically rejected 706 [and] 712, and was not willing to export oil and import goods under the conditions of UN supervision imposed by 706 and 712. Iraq, which arrived at its present circumstances by invading its neighbor, complains that the measures advocated by the United Nations would violate Iraq's sovereignty. Iraq has demanded sole control of the sale of oil and disbursement of oil revenues, without UN supervision or monitoring. We believe the Security Council has made it unmistakably clear that, until Iraq complies with all pertinent UN resolutions, any oil exported from Iraq must be pumped under the mechanisms established by Resolutions 706 and 712. The international community has made it clear to Iraq that, given Iraq's dubious record, there also must be international supervision of both the export of oil and the distribution of humanitarian relief. Saddam cannot be trusted with unfettered access to oil income, having for the past decade devoted much of Iraq's fortune to military expenditures rather than to improving the welfare of his people. Saddam is solely responsible for the unfortunate situation of many of the Iraqi people. If the Iraqi Government continues to refuse to cooperate with the implementation of Resolutions 706 and 712, there may well be a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Iraq. We will also need to ensure continued funding for the various UN operations in Iraq--such as the work of the Special Commission overseeing the elimination of weapons of mass destruction--aimed at determining full Iraqi compliance with UN mandates. We are looking at various options for dealing with this. As the committee is aware, one such option would be a new UN Security Council resolution which would make use of frozen Iraqi assets overseas to keep UN operations going and would demonstrate to Saddam Hussein that the United Nations is in charge, and that he cannot escape compliance with UN resolutions. We are in the process of consulting with other members of the Security Council and with Congress on this possible approach.
Future Plans
Until funds are available from oil pumped under Resolutions 706 and 712 or from some alternate source, the United Nations will continue to operate under its January 6-month plan of action, which has been extended now through August. On the ground, the United Nations will continue to help refugees and displaced persons. It also aims to meet the most basic needs of at-risk populations, focusing particularly on support for essential sanitation, medical, and agricultural services. While the focus will remain on northern Iraq, the United Nations is also working to expand operations in the south. In April, UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] began phasing out its operations in northern Iraq as most of the refugees and displaced have been resettled, most in their former homes. The needs of the Kurdish population have changed from those of resettlement to an emphasis on health, sanitation, and food assistance. UNICEF [UN International Children's Emergency Fund] is the nominal lead agency in northern Iraq, working closely with WHO [World Health Organization], [and] FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], as well as representatives from private voluntary organizations.
Conclusion
Nearly 18 months after Saddam Hussein's armies were expelled from Kuwait, the humanitarian situation in Iraq is still unsettled. Saddam Hussein continues to repress his people; the international community continues to respond compassionately to their suffering. Coupled with the continuation of his tyrannical practices, Saddam Hussein's efforts to evade the elimination of his weapons of mass destruction complete the portrait of a classic dictator, dangerous both to his own people and to his neighbors. In our urge to do all we can to end the suffering of Iraq's innocent population, we must not lose sight of its root cause: the disdain for the rule of law and the inhumane policies of the government of Saddam Hussein. The framework established by the 12 resolutions enacted by the Security Council since the cessation of hostilities against Iraq provides the best means for meeting the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians and for ensuring regional peace and security by dismantling the threat Saddam's arsenal could pose to his neighbors. Accomplishing these intertwined goals will be among the United Nations' highest achievements to date. The United States, along with the rest of the international community, has a strong interest in seeing the United Nations successful in this great endeavor. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Secretary's Meeting With Iraqi Opposition

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 29 19927/29/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: United Nations [TEXT] Secretary Baker met today with an ethnically and religiously diverse delegation from the Iraqi National Congress. The United States has long encouraged the development of a broad-based Iraqi opposition leadership, reflective of all the elements of Iraqi society. The Secretary and the delegation discussed our mutual interests in working toward a democratic, pluralistic government in Iraq which lives in peace with its neighbors and cares for its people. He stressed to the delegation the US commitment to see full implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 688, which forbids repression of Iraq's citizens. The United States continues to believe that it can never trust or work with Saddam Hussein. The Secretary noted that the ultimate form of government must, however, be a matter for the people of Iraq to decide. Secretary Baker encouraged the six-person delegation to continue its efforts to increase the unity among opposition groups, which was strengthened at the June 22 Vienna conference. He noted that, by a forming a consensus, the opposition was taking an important step toward establishing legitimacy within Iraq and internationally. Secretary Baker emphasized that promoting democracy, respect for human rights, equal treatment of minorities, and abiding by basic norms of international behavior are essential if Iraq is to be restored to the civilized community of nations. He urged the delegation to find ways to continue to work together and strengthen relations with Iraq's regional neighbors and indicated that high-level consultations would continue. In conclusion, Secretary Baker assured the delegation that the United States will continue to stand firmly in support of the brave Iraqis who oppose Saddam's tyranny. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

US Support for UN Action on Somalia

Perkins Source: Edward J. Perkins, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, New York City Date: Jul, 27 19927/27/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Subsaharan Africa Country: Somalia Subject: United Nations, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] As the White House has noted today, the tragedy in Somalia requires the urgent attention of the international community to deal with the vast number of Somali people suffering and dying from famine caused by the senseless civil war raging in that country. My government strongly supports the proposals of the Secretary General to mobilize the international community to meet the humanitarian needs of the people of Somalia, and the United States is ready to do its part to support the UN effort. The provision of humanitarian relief may be expedited in some areas of Somalia by the assistance of armed UN security guards to protect relief workers and to help in the distribution of supplies. We support the provision of a UN security force for such purposes both in Mogadishu and in other parts of Somalia. At the same time, we call upon all leaders of Somalia to cooperate with the United Nations in the safe distribution of assistance and in the protection of all international personnel, including UN guards, so that the necessary assistance gets quickly to those who so desperately need it. We are pleased that the deployment to Mogadishu of the 50 UN cease-fire observers took place July 23. We also call on all parties and factions in Somalia to protect these unarmed observers. We welcome proposals to send additional cease-fire observers wherever else in Somalia they may be needed. I should like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the Secretary General for his comprehensive report on what the United Nations might be able to do in Somalia, and I should also like to thank the Secretary- General's Special Representative, Ambassador Mohamad Sahnoun, for his creativity in putting forward many of the suggestions in the Secretary- General's report. Ambassador Sahnoun must also be commended for the courage he has shown in traveling the length and breadth of Somalia despite the obvious risks to his personal safety. As the White House has stated, it is imperative that the leaders of the Somali factions put the needs of their own people first in order that food can reach all those in need. It is also those same leaders who must put their country back together; the United Nations can only lend a helping hand in that process. Our goal and that of the United Nations should be to bring an end to the bloodshed in Somalia and to get urgent assistance to all those in Somalia who desperately need it. The resolution under consideration today is a good step in that direction. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

Tragedy in Somalia

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Grand Rapids, Michigan Date: Jul, 27 19927/27/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Subsaharan Africa Country: Somalia Subject: United Nations, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] The tragedy in Somalia, where vast numbers of people are suffering and dying from famine caused by a senseless civil war, requires the urgent attention of the international community. We strongly support the proposals of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to mobilize the international community to meet these urgent humanitarian needs and to convince the warring Somali factions to end the fighting. We urge the Security Council at its meeting today to take the actions needed to accelerate the delivery of food and medicine and to promote a peaceful settlement of this dispute. The United States stands ready to do its part to support these efforts. We have committed $63 million over the past 2 years for humanitarian relief, including airlifts of food and medical supplies. We will commit additional resources as needed. However, more must be done to create conditions where this vital assistance can reach the people who so desperately need it. First and foremost, it is imperative that the leaders of the Somali factions themselves put the needs of their own people first and allow the food to reach all Somalis in need. We urge the United Nations to move as quickly as possible to deploy an effective number of security guards to permit relief supplies to move into and within Somalia. We are prepared to contribute generously to fund such an effort. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

UN Security Council Resolution on Somalia

UN Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jul, 27 19927/27/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Subsaharan Africa Country: Somalia Subject: United Nations, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] Resolution 767 (July 27, 1992) The Security Council, Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445), Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992 and 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/24343), Considering the letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing him that all the parties in Mogadishu have agreed to the deployment of the fifty Military Observers, and that the advance party of the Observers arrived in Mogadishu on 5 July 1992 and that the rest of the observers arrived in the mission area on 23 July 1992 (S/24179), Deeply concerned about the availability of arms and ammunition in the hands of civilians and the proliferation of armed banditry throughout Somalia. Alarmed by the sporadic outbreak of hostilities in several parts of Somalia leading to continued loss of life and destruction of property, and putting at risk the personnel of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and other international humanitarian organizations, as well as disrupting their operations, Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent need for quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country, Recognizing that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is an important element in the effort of the Council to restore international peace and security in the area, Responding to the urgent calls by the parties in Somalia for the international community to take measures in Somalia to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, Noting the Secretary-General's proposals for a comprehensive decentralized zonal approach in the United Nations involvement in Somalia, Cognizant that the success of such an approach requires the co-operation of all parties, movements and factions in Somalia, 1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 July 1992 (S/24343); 2. Requests the Secretary-General to make full use of all available means and arrangements, including the mounting of an urgent airlift operation, with a view to facilitating the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations in accelerating the provision of humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia threatened by mass starvation; 3. Urges all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia and reiterates its call for the full respect of the security and safety of the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia; 4. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate with the United Nations with a view to the urgent deployment of the United Nations security personnel called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of its resolution 751 (1992), and otherwise assist in the general stabilization of the situation in Somalia. In the absence of such cooperation, the Security Council does not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia; 5. Reiterates its appeal to the international community to provide adequate financial and other resources, for humanitarian efforts in Somalia; 6. Encourages the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to all regions of Somalia; 7. Appeals to all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to extend full cooperation to the military observers and to take measures to ensure their security; 8. Requests the Secretary-General, as part of his continuing efforts in Somalia, to promote an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country in order to facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance and the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia; 9. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and to maintain a cease-fire throughout the country; 10. Stresses the need for the observance and strict monitoring of the general and complete embargo of all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, as decided in paragraph 5 of its resolution 733 (1992); 11. Welcomes the cooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and Organization of the Islamic Conference in resolving the situation in Somalia; 12. Approves the Secretary-General's proposal to establish four operational zones in Somalia as part of the consolidated United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSON); 13. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that his Special Representative for Somalia is provided with all the necessary support services to enable him effectively to carry out his mandate; 14. Strongly supports the Secretary-General's decision urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia, under the overall direction of the Special Representative, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraph 64 of his report (S/24343) and to submit expeditiously a report to the Security Council on this matter; 15. Affirms that all officials of the United Nations and all experts on mission for the United Nations in Somalia enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946 and in any other relevant instruments and that all parties, movements, and factions in Somalia are required to allow them full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities; 16. Requests the Secretary-General to continue urgently his consultations with all parties, movements and factions in Somalia towards the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia in close cooperation with the organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference; 17. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution; 18. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0)(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 31, August 3, 1992 Title:

The Alvarez-Machain Decision

Kreczko Source: Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal Adviser Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 24 19927/24/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Subsaharan Africa Country: Somalia Subject: United Nations, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to testify concerning the ramifications of the Supreme Court's June 15 decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain. That decision has resulted in a strong, negative response from many governments and from the press in many countries, none stronger than in Mexico. Although the Department of State believes that the Alvarez-Machain case was correctly decided, and protects important presidential prerogatives, we understand the concerns raised by Mexico and other foreign governments that want to know whether this government has changed its policy away from cooperative law enforcement operations and in favor of unilateral actions abroad. The short answer is that the United States has not changed its policy; we want to assure our friends in the world community that that is the case. Some foreign governments appear to assume that, by virtue of this decision, the Supreme Court has conferred upon the executive branch a new authority to conduct abductions on the territory of other nations. That is not correct. This case involved the much narrower legal issue of the circumstances under which US courts may take jurisdiction over a criminal defendant. The result of the Supreme Court's action is to confirm that in our system of government, it is the executive branch, not the courts, that will ultimately decide whether such arrests are within the national interest. I would like to address briefly three issues in my testimony today. The discussion of international legal issues in the Alvarez-Machain decision, the foreign reaction to the decision, and the executive branch's response to that reaction.
International Legal Issues
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-standing principle that US courts have jurisdiction over a criminal defendant regardless of the means by which that defendant was brought before the court. This is the so-called Ker-Frisbie doctrine, which reaches back to the 19th century in the Court's jurisprudence. The Court held that a breach of general international law principles would not affect the jurisdiction of a domestic court. In a dictum, the Supreme Court did acknowledge that in certain circumstances, the breach of an extradition treaty might divest a court of jurisdiction. However, after examining the text and negotiating record of the US-Mexico Extradition Treaty, the Court concluded that a non- consensual abduction from Mexican territory would not violate the treaty. The Department of State believes that the Court properly interpreted the US-Mexico Extradition Treaty. US extradition treaties--and the Mexico treaty is no exception--do not constitute the exclusive means of recovering fugitives. The United States has, for example, relied on other means such as exclusion, expulsion, or deportation to obtain a fugitive even when extradition treaties exist. We also agree with the Court that Mexico's understandable concerns about the abduction and the judicial procedures that followed are matters for diplomatic resolution. The United States and Mexico have been, and will remain, involved in intensive diplomatic discussions on this matter. Diplomatic history reveals that states have found a variety of resolutions to disputes over cross-border arrests. In some cases, individuals are returned for prosecution in the original country. In other cases, the individual is retained and prosecuted in the arresting country. We agree that the courts should not interrupt this diplomatic process absent a treaty requirement to that effect. The Justice Department will explain the reasoning of the Court on the domestic law issues. I would note, however, that the core holding of the Court--that domestic courts generally retain jurisdiction over an individual without regard to how the individual was brought before the court--is not unique to US jurisprudence. It is our understanding that this judicial approach is also followed in, for example, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.
Reactions of Foreign Governments
The Supreme Court's decision has caused considerable concern among a wide range of governments, particularly in the Americas, but elsewhere as well. Many governments have expressed outrage that the United States believes it has the right to decide unilaterally to enter their territory and abduct one of their nationals. Governments have informed us that they would regard such action as a breach of international law. They have also informed us that they would protect their nationals from such action, that such action would violate their domestic law, and that they would vigorously prosecute such violations. Some countries, as well, have told us that they believe that such actions would violate our extradition treaties with them. Some have also suggested that they will challenge the lawfulness of such abductions in international forums. Some have indicated that the decision could affect their parliaments' review of pending law enforcement agreements with the United States. At the same time, some have noted in private that the decision will cause narcotics traffickers to have an increased fear of apprehension by the United States. As would be expected, the reaction has been strongest in Mexico, and I will discuss that situation in detail. However, the reaction has been strong throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, for example: -- The Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay issued a declaration on June 26 expressing their concern with the US Supreme Court decision and requesting that the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States (OAS) issue an opinion on the "international juridical validity" of the Alvarez-Machain decision. That request was made formally to the Permanent Council of the OAS on July 15, which adopted a resolution referring this matter to the Juridical Committee. -- The lower house of the parliament of Uruguay voted on June 30 that the decision shows "a lack of understanding of the most elemental norms of international law, and in particular an absolute perversion of the function of extradition treaties." -- On June 15, the Government of Colombia stated that it "energetically rejects the judgment issued by the United States Supreme Court . . . ." Although recognizing that the decision dealt only with a treaty between the United States and Mexico, the government felt that "its substance threatens the legal stability of [all] public treaties." -- The Minister of Security and Justice of Jamaica criticized the decision as based on the principle that "might makes right." He said the ruling was "an atrocity that would disturb the world," and called on the United States to come "back to its senses." The reaction has not been confined, of course, to official government statements. Political leaders in and out of government, and commentaries in the media, have generally criticized the decision and the attitude of the US Government that that decision is supposed to represent. The kind of heated reaction that we have seen is illustrated by an extradition proceeding in Chile entirely unrelated to the Alvarez-Machain controversy. On June 25, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld by a 3-2 vote the Supreme Court president's prior decision to extradite an individual requested by the United States. The two dissenting judges voted to release the individual expressly because the United States, according to them, violates extradition treaties with other countries. Although the Chilean High Court, in summarizing the arguments of the dissent, did not refer directly to Alvarez-Machain, the motivation behind the dissenters' views was clear. Negative reactions, while strongest in Latin America and the Caribbean, have also been voiced more broadly. The Supreme Court's decision led to a rigorous debate in the Canadian Parliament. The Canadian Minister of External Affairs told the Canadian Parliament that any attempt by the United States to kidnap someone in Canada would be regarded as a criminal act and a violation of the US-Canada Extradition Treaty. Spain's President publicly criticized the decision as "erroneous." And the media in Europe generally has been critical of the decision. These negative reactions reflect a concern that the Alvarez-Machain decision constitutes a "green light" for international abductions. The reactions are grounded in the desire of countries to preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity and to reassure their nationals. We expect that countries will continue to press this concern with us, bilaterally and multilaterally. As noted above, this matter has already been brought before the OAS. The US Government has moved actively to isolate the question of whether domestic legal authority exists from the separate question of whether the President will, in fact, exercise that authority. We have reassured other countries that the United States has not changed its policies toward cooperation in international law enforcement, and that the Alvarez-Machain case does not represent a "green light" for the United States to conduct operations on foreign territory. Specifically, immediately following the Supreme Court's decision, the White House issued a public statement reaffirming that: .....the United States strongly believes in fostering respect for international rules of law, including, in particular, the principles of respect for territorial integrity and sovereign equality of states. US policy is to cooperate with foreign states in achieving law enforcement objectives. Neither the arrest of Alvarez-Machain, nor the Supreme Court decision reflects any change in this policy. The State Department also made it clear that the President has directed that a strict inter-agency procedure be followed before any such decision could be authorized that will ensure that questions of sovereignty and international law--and our foreign relations with friendly governments-- are a fundamental part of the decision-making process. At the same time, we are not prepared categorically to rule out unilateral action. It is not inconceivable that in certain extreme cases, such as the harboring by a hostile foreign country of a terrorist who has attacked US nationals and is likely to do so again, the President might decide that such an abduction is necessary and appropriate as a matter of the exercise of our right of self-defense. This necessary reservation of right for extreme cases does not, however, detract from our strong support for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity generally. To reinforce this point, the White House statement also noted the Administration has in place procedures designed to ensure that US law enforcement activities overseas fully take into account foreign relations and international law. These procedures require that decisions as to extraordinary renditions from foreign territories be subject to full inter-agency coordination and that they be considered at the highest levels of the government. While not underestimating the strength of international reaction to the Alvarez-Machain decision, we hope that these statements and procedures and, more importantly, the record of US cooperation in law enforcement matters, will allay foreign concerns. With respect to the many expressions of concern received from other countries, we are in the process of discussing these matters with them. We will assure these countries that the United States will continue to work cooperatively with them to combat the threat of world terrorism and narco-tics trafficking.
Mexican Reaction and US Response
Let me now turn to the specific case of Mexico. The Supreme Court decision provoked substantial criticism and, in many cases, outrage in that country. The popular reaction to the decision--which for many Mexicans appeared to affirm a policy of incursions into Mexican territory--was strongly negative. The Government of Mexico has told us that the rendition of Alvarez-Machain represents, in their eyes, an unacceptable infringement on their sovereignty. We knew even before the Court handed down its decision that this was a matter of the utmost seriousness for them. The Mexican Government had, since the abduction in April 1990, made its views on this matter known to the United States and filed its own amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to order the release of Alvarez-Machain. In the aftermath of the Alvarez-Machain decision, the Mexican Foreign Minister gave a press conference with the following highlights: -- Mexico repudiates as invalid and illegal the decision of the Supreme Court; -- Mexico will consider as a criminal act any attempt by foreign persons or governments to apprehend in Mexican territory any person suspected of a crime; -- Mexico demands the return of Alvarez-Machain; -- Mexico declares that the only legal means for moving persons from one nation to face trial in another are treaties and mechanisms of extradition established under international law; [and] -- Foreign law enforcement officials of any country who operate in Mexican territory will be asked to observe updated rules that the Government of Mexico will establish. Mexico also sought assurances that further abductions will not take place on Mexican territory and stated that collaboration by Mexicans with foreign governments in criminal acts that violate Mexican sovereignty would be classified as acts of treason against Mexico. The United States has responded to these Mexican concerns as follows: -- President Bush sent a letter to President Salinas containing unequivocal assurances that his Administration will "neither conduct, encourage nor condone" such trans-border abductions from Mexico. -- The two governments agreed to review the US-Mexico Extradition Treaty within the framework of the next US-Mexico Binational Commission meeting this fall, in order to analyze the implications of the recent Supreme Court decision and to avoid any possible repetitions of events such as the abduction of Alvarez-Machain. -- There was an exchange of letters between Secretary Baker and Foreign Secretary Solana of Mexico recognizing that trans-border abductions by so- called "bounty hunters" and other private individuals will be considered extraditable offenses by both nations Both nations also stated their commitment to continue their efforts to discourage transborder abductions by state and local officials. -- The two governments are also reviewing the rules governing the conduct of DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] and other US law enforcement officials to ensure full respect for Mexican sovereignty. In recent years, the United States and Mexico have made great strides in working together against narco-trafficking. It is in the interest of both nations to maintain and enhance that commitment. Our continuing discussions with the Government of Mexico concerning the Alvarez-Machain case have been conducted in that spirit. It is in both countries' interests to continue to build upon their important progress in counter-narcotics cooperation. In conclusion, the State Department is addressing the concerns of governments which approached us following the Alvarez-Machain decision. We want them to understand that there has been no change in US Government policy, which remains to cooperate with foreign governments and to respect the principles of territorial integrity and foreign sovereignty. (###)