US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992


FY 1993 Refugee Admissions

Eagleburger Source: Acting Secretary Eagleburger Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 23 19927/23/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Eurasia, Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa, E/C Europe, Europe, Central America, South America, Caribbean Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Cambodia, Vietnam Subject: Refugees [TEXT] Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear today regarding the President's proposal for the admission of 132,000 refugees to the United States in FY 1993 [of which 122,000 will be funded by the US Government]. I believe that the committee has already received a report which provides the detailed information required by the Refugee Act. Because the timing of these consultations has previously been an issue of some concern, we welcome the fact that the Administration and the Congress were able to arrange a date for this hearing well in advance of September 30. This timing will allow the Congress to make its appropriations decisions with the full knowledge of the Administration's current views on admissions requirements. Before turning to the refugee admissions program, I would like to comment briefly on current trends and future directions of US refugee policy.
Refugees in the Context Of the New World Order
The image of the refugee--the individual seeking to escape from persecution to freedom--stood among the most powerful symbols of the Cold War era. The end of the Cold War has thus had a positive effect on a number of serious, long-standing refugee situations. Voluntary repatriation, which is the most desirable and durable solution for refugees, has now become possible for hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans, Cambodians, Angolans, and Afghans. Elsewhere in the world, there is reason to believe that a large number of the world's 16 million refugees may be able to return home over the next few years. Though political solutions in many areas are less than complete, we are heartened that the overwhelming majority of returning refugees wish to overcome differences and to proceed with rebuilding their war-torn homelands. Unfortunately, however, the end of the Cold War has also brought new problems in certain parts of the world. Two noteworthy examples are in Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Tragically, in these places, tyranny at the hands of the state has been replaced by violent manifestations of long-simmering ethnic and religious hatred. We are all appalled at televised footage of innocent people being massacred while attempting to buy bread in Sarajevo--the city that was celebrated during the 1984 Olympic Games for having achieved social harmony within ethnic diversity. It is hard to imagine that so much could change in just 8 short years. Having served as the US ambassador to what was once Yugoslavia, I am deeply saddened to see that utter madness and chaos now reign in what could well have been one of the success stories of the post-Cold War period. It is also ironic that scenes similar to the Berlin airlift are now being repeated in Sarajevo in 1992. As in 1948, the international community must be concerned not only with the welfare of beleaguered people but also with the security of those attempting to provide relief. Whereas, then, the motivation of those seeking to hamper relief efforts was ideology, now the motivation is nationalism and centuries-old hatreds. Nonetheless, under the authority of the UN Security Council and the superb coordination of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United States is participating in efforts to ensure that humanitarian relief is delivered. This includes the use of US military aircraft to bring vital supplies to the people of Sarajevo. Close to home, since the September 1991 coup in Haiti, we have been working for the restoration of democratic government in that country. But, in recent months, the number of Haitians intercepted by the US Coast Guard increased dramatically. As a temporary measure, we utilized the US naval facility at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba as an asylum pre-screening facility. However, it soon became apparent that the Guantanamo operation was, itself, serving as a magnet and the number of Haitian migrants had outstripped our capacity to accommodate them at the base. When our attempts to identify additional screening locations in the region were unsuccessful and the situation remained untenable, the President, on May 24, issued an executive order which instructed the Coast Guard to return interdicted Haitians directly to Haiti, where refugee processing is available to them. We continue to be hopeful that the various Haitian factions can negotiate a democratic political solution.
Challenges To Resolving Existing And Future Refugee Problems
The United States has [played] and will continue to play an active role, both financially and politically, in promoting refugee repatriation. However, a significant level of international cooperation and support must be forthcoming if these opportunities are not to be lost. As we have experienced in Southeast Asia with the Comprehensive Plan of Action, once it becomes clear that third-country resettlement will not be an option for those not found to be refugees, increasing numbers of asylum seekers decide to return home. We have also learned in Vietnam, Iraq, and elsewhere that follow-up and close attention to the needs of those who have returned is critical. For example, de-mining--though both dangerous and costly--is essential if Cambodians, Salvadorans, and Angolans are to return home safely. Roads and irrigation systems must be rebuilt in Afghanistan. And only through the rehabilitation and development of the economic infrastructure can Ethiopia hope to repatriate its nationals and avoid repeated outflows of returning refugees unable to survive on the local economy. We have learned, as well, that cooperation between refugee and development agencies is required if repatriation is to be successful. The needs of returnees and of those displaced within the country must be taken into account within national reconstruction and development programs. In recognition of the need to bridge the gap between repatriation and development assistance in Central America, a model incorporating both refugee and development expertise has been created for the reintegration of Nicaraguan and other Central American refugees. I am pleased to report that the UNHCR and the UN Development Program (UNDP) are working on a similar approach for Cambodia. In addition, the international community has recognized that response mechanisms must be appropriate to the circumstances which create refugees. Following the [Persian] Gulf war, the United Nations encountered considerable difficulty in mounting an effective response to the outflow of over 1 million people in a matter of days. Coordination among UN bodies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was a major problem. Fortunately, the US military and our coalition partners were able to take the necessary measures to sustain several hundred thousand lives while conditions were created to allow their return to Iraq in relative security. The lessons learned from the Iraqi refugee crisis have led to improvements in UNHCR's response capabilities. Plans have been put in place to ensure that UNHCR and external staff resources are available for immediate assignment to an emergency. Draft agreements to allow the efficient and expeditious involvement of [non-governmental organizations] have been prepared, and a stockpile of items commonly needed in a refugee crisis is being created. To enhance UN coordination further, late last year, in the context of efforts by the United States and other countries to reform the United Nations, the position of Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance was established, along with a $50-million emergency revolving fund. We have already begun to reap the benefit of these initiatives in dealing with the flow of Somalis into Kenya and Burmese Rohingyas into Bangladesh as well as with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. The international community is also utilizing its prior experience in an effort to prevent future refugee crises. UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have been working with the new governments of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to provide needed technical and legal training for dealing with refugees, displaced persons, and migrants. The United States has actively promoted and participated in these multilateral initiatives. We also believe that our own national experience of ethnic and cultural diversity is worthy of sharing with others. Through a series of on-site technical assistance projects, we are exposing relevant officials of the new governments in the former Soviet bloc to the roles of public and private sector institutions in the field of refugees and migration. In addition, to address a major cause of forced migration, we continue to promote, throughout the world, respect for human rights and fundamental individual freedoms. The [State] Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs is providing training on the rule of law for judicial officials from Eastern Europe and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. We repeatedly remind such officials that our bilateral relationships will be affected by the degree to which human rights-- particularly those of members of minority groups--are respected in their countries. Indeed, at Secretary Baker's urging, the issue of international migration has now been placed on the agenda of CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe].
The Future of Refugee Admissions
Regarding the US refugee admissions program, if current trends continue and barring major unforeseen developments, the numbers of persons requiring permanent resettlement in the United States could decline by the mid- 1990s. The President's proposal for FY 1993 allows for the funded admission of 122,000 refugees--a reduction of 10,000 from the current fiscal year level. You may recall that this year's figure was increased from the President's original estimate to allow for the admission of refugees from the Soviet Union whose departure in the previous year had been delayed by anomalies in Soviet Government procedures. I am pleased to report that we have succeeded in the past 12 months in making up this shortfall. We propose that the 122,000 admissions numbers be divided as follows: -- East Asia (including Amerasian immigrants)--52,000; -- Former Soviet Union--50,000; -- Near East/South Asia--7,000; -- Africa--7,000; -- East Europe--1,500; and -- Latin America/Caribbean--3,500. In addition, as in FY 1992, we have included an unallocated reserve of 1,000 numbers which, after consultation with the Congress, could be used in regions where allocated numbers prove to be insufficient. As is evident, our program will continue, in the near term, to address many of the residual human problems created by communism. Former re- education camp prisoners from Vietnam and religious minorities long denied the right to emigrate from the Soviet Union clearly constitute the vast majority of refugee admissions in FY 1993. In the not-too-distant future, however, we hope to be able to fulfill our commitment to these groups. Once that point is reached, the primary avenue to US residency for persons from Vietnam and the former Soviet Union would be through normal immigration channels. Apart from these specific, large populations, the US admissions program is designed to focus on persons of special humanitarian concern to the United States and for whom repatriation or local integration is not a viable option. In recent years, UNHCR's assessment of the global need for resettlement places has shown a steady decline. While the United States consistently resettles more than 50% of the refugees identified by UNHCR, we have been working with UNHCR to improve further our responsiveness to refugees in high-risk categories in a manner consistent with our own goals and constraints. As new refugee situations have arisen and where a resettlement component is appropriate, we have established new processing programs. Some recent examples are: -- Last summer, we established admissions processing for Liberians in West Africa. -- Over the past year, we have initiated programs for Kurds, Christians, and other Iraqi minority groups in Turkey. -- At UNHCR's request, last month the United States commenced admissions processing for certain members of the residual population of almost 30,000 Iraqi civilians and former enemy prisoners of war in Saudi Arabia. -- In response to the massive outflow of Somalis, we have expanded our admissions processing capacity in Kenya. -- And earlier this year, the President directed the State Department to establish in-country processing for Haitian nationals who are at risk of persecution for their political activities.
In sum, the opportunity to remove East-West competition from the developing world has made it possible to begin to resolve the underlying causes of most of the world's larger refugee problems. However, the end of the Cold War is likely to bring us new and unpredictable challenges--some dramatic, such as the situation in the former Yugoslavia, and others slow and pervasive, such as the pressure of population growth on social and political stability. It is, therefore, necessary for us to recognize that refugee problems will not disappear with the end of the Cold War. They will undoubtedly become less clear-cut and less easily linked to a general political cause. We must continue to develop new solutions to refugee issues. In the current environment--free of superpower competition--the prospects are excellent for the United Nations to assume the leadership role envisioned in its Charter for dealing with refugees and other issues of concern to the world community. The United States welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this effort. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992 Title:

South Africa: The Current Situation

Cohen Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 23 19927/23/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: South Africa Subject: Democratization, Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to testify before the subcommittee on the current situation in South Africa. I appreciate the opportunity to continue our dialogue.
Summary of the Current Situation
The Administration is deeply concerned about the recent developments in South Africa which led to the suspension of the talks within the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, known as CODESA. The events leading to the current impasse began when the second CODESA plenary failed to reach agreement on interim arrangements. In pre-plenary discussions, the parties had made much progress toward agreeing on a two- phase transition. However, the plenary ended in deadlock over a few very significant issues. The ANC [African National Congress] claims that the government is insisting on heavily weighted majorities which, in effect, grant a minority veto on the new constitution. The ANC is also concerned that the government seeks to put in place an open-ended transition which could allow it to keep power indefinitely should negotiations reach an impasse. The government, in turn, argues that it cannot agree to a settlement which does not guarantee minorities some role in deciding South Africa's future. Both the government and the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] seek a large measure of devolution of powers to regional governments and local authorities. In the wake of the breakdown, the ANC announced a program of "unprecedented and sustained rolling mass action." As an element of this program, the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions has announced a general strike, to begin on August 3. On June 17, over 40 men, women, and children were killed in the township of Boipatong. Local residents alleged that the perpetrators were Inkatha members living in a nearby workers' hostel. Following these killings, the ANC told the government that it could not continue participating in negotiations unless the government took action on the violence and made concessions relating to the negotiating process. Since then, the two sides have traded accusations through lengthy memoranda and often harsh public statements. The government has taken some action on the violence, including agreeing to disband certain security units accused of involvement in the violence, announcing planned legislation limiting the bearing of weapons, taking measures to upgrade and control access to single-sex hostels, and agreeing to international participation in the inquiries of the commission on violence headed by Justice Richard Goldstone. These developments represent some progress, but the government must do more to demonstrate its commitment to controlling violence and to bringing those responsible, regardless of their affiliation, to justice. The negotiating process, which so far has made tremendous progress, is now at risk. Yet the key parties continue to profess their commitments to negotiations and seem to be looking for ways back to the table.
What the United States Has Done
The Administration has placed high priority on encouraging a compromise which would get the negotiating process back on track. The President has written to [ANC President] Nelson Mandela, [South African] President de Klerk, and Chief Buthelezi [of the IFP], seeking their suggestions on how the United States might be helpful. In our discussions with all the parties, we have encouraged them to address the immediate issue of the violence and to break the negotiating deadlock. We are also willing to assist in augmenting the Goldstone commission.
The Role of the International Community
Last week, [US] Ambassador [to the United Nations] Perkins participated in the UN Security Council discussion on South Africa. Representatives of the major parties in South Africa and nine OAU [Organization for African Unity] foreign ministers attended the session. The Security Council passed a constructive resolution which urged the Government of South Africa to take measures to end the violence, called on all the parties to cooperate in combating violence, and invited the Secretary General to appoint a special representative to recommend measures which would assist in ending the violence and in creating a climate conducive to negotiations. We applaud the Secretary General's choice of [former US Secretary of State] Cyrus Vance as his special representative and look forward to his recommendations.
What the Parties Can Do
Nevertheless, it is ultimately up to the South Africans, themselves, to find a way back to the negotiating table. All sides bear some responsibility for the current situation, and all sides must be willing to make the concessions which will be necessary to get negotiations back underway. I would like to suggest some general concerns we believe need to be addressed. Inflammatory rhetoric from all sides is only fueling the violence. A moratorium on finger-pointing and name-calling would be a first step toward achieving the necessary climate. The government must do more to address allegations of complicity in the violence by members of the security forces. A peaceful climate is not possible as long as people lack confidence in the impartiality of the police. In addition, we were concerned by Justice Goldstone's recent report stating that the South African Government has failed to implement his commission's recommendations. We were pleased to note that the government has since acted on some of those recommendations. We hope to see others, including more accountability for the security forces and increased security at the hostels, implemented as well. We would stress that the government's determination in investigating the Boipatong killings and acting on the findings of the investigators is a crucial test of its credibility. The ANC has a responsibility to make sure that its mass action campaign does not lead to further violence. The organization must also exert greater discipline over its members who continue to advocate and perpetrate violence. The ANC's leadership should make it clear that suggestions by some of its members and alliance partners that the government can be forced out of power through mass mobilization are unacceptable, and suggestions that the townships should be made ungovernable and that so- called people's courts should be activated do not represent ANC policy. We would emphasize that the ANC must be receptive to government gestures concerning reducing violence and restarting negotiations. Inkatha, like the ANC, must do more to ensure that its members are committed to peace. We are deeply disturbed by allegations linking Inkatha members with incidents such as the Boipatong killings. Inkatha's leadership must also convey to its membership that carrying weapons in public is not acceptable. We continue to urge Chief Minister Buthelezi to participate personally in the negotiating process once talks resume. Both Inkatha and the ANC must accept the right of all South Africans to pursue lawful political activity in all parts of the country. "No Go" areas are unacceptable. Finally, Mandela and Buthelezi should place their differences aside and meet in the interests of all South Africans. We note that the Goldstone commission has clearly stated that among the "many and complicated" sources of violence is the fact that "both ANC and IFP members and supporters have been guilty of many incidents that have resulted in the deaths of and injuries to large numbers of people." The international community remains puzzled and troubled by this impasse. Unaddressed, it contains the seeds of civil war which neither leader will be able to control but for which they will bear much responsibility.
The Impact of Violence On Negotiations
Mr. Chairman, you asked me to discuss the impact of the violence on the negotiating process. As we have seen in recent weeks, escalating violence can jeopardize the process. Good-faith efforts to bring the violence under control are now necessary to restore the climate of trust essential to continued negotiations. But we oppose linking continued negotiations with an end to violence. This only gives those extremist elements on both sides who oppose negotiations a veto over the process. Negotiations are even more essential precisely because there is violence. Furthermore, only a negotiated settlement can bring a permanent end to the violence. The best hope for a peaceful climate is the installation of a non-racial transitional government as soon as possible.
Returning to the Table
Our focus here is on violence, but we must not lose sight of the real issues, which are those that have been left on the bargaining table. These are the issues to which the parties must return as rapidly as possible and which demand of all the parties, but most particularly of the South African Government and the African National Congress, the kind of leadership and vision required to fashion compromise. I do not believe it is useful for outsiders to become involved in the details of this process. The compromises must be South African compromises, and they must reflect South African realities and concerns. Nonetheless, I would like to offer some thoughts on points which we believe are basic to a genuine democratic solution. -- That solution should include all relevant parties and promote tolerance in a country of great diversity. -- It should acknowledge the right of the majority to govern while assuring that all South Africans have a stake in their government. -- It should ensure that government functions within an agreed framework which includes protection of the fundamental rights of all citizens, but it should avoid overly complex arrangements intended to guarantee a share of power to particular groups which will frustrate effective governance. Minorities have the right to safeguards; they cannot expect a veto. While there are very significant differences between the American and South African situations, we are both nations marked by great diversity. As Americans, we have struggled with, and continue to struggle with, the challenge of balancing the rights of individuals and minorities with the majority's right to govern. Clearly, one of the devices which has permitted us to reassure Americans that their diversity will be respected has been the reservation of extensive powers to the states and, through them, to localities. We have sought, thereby, to guarantee that those levers of democratic power which are most relevant to peoples' daily lives and personal values are kept close at hand. Unfortunately, federalism has become a politically loaded word which has inhibited the debate over its value for a society like South Africa in spite of the fact that none of the regions under discussion would have a white majority. I urge South Africans to overcome this hurdle and actively consider the degree to which devolution of power might address many of the tensions inherent in the diversity of their society.
House Resolution 497
Mr. Chairman, the Administration shares the concerns you raise in your resolution on the violence. You state accurately the danger the ongoing violence poses to the negotiating process. My only disagreement would be one of emphasis. I would suggest that the resolution, like last week's Security Council resolution, stress the responsibility of all parties to cooperate in combating violence. Of course, the government has a special responsibility in this regard. But all parties must do more to establish a peaceful climate.
If Violence Continues or Talks Remain Stalled
Finally, Mr. Chairman, you asked me to comment on what steps the United States plans to take if the violence continues or if talks remain deadlocked. As always, we will play the role of a concerned outsider. As we have done in the past, we will express our concern if any party is obstructing progress. We will support the implementation of the Security Council resolution. We are prepared to cooperate with the European Community, the United Nations, the OAU, and the Commonwealth in their efforts as well. We will also continue, in our bilateral contacts, to urge the various parties to take the actions I have already discussed and, in particular, to comply with Justice Goldstone's recommendations. In addition, our offer to play whatever role the parties find constructive remains open. I have stressed throughout my remarks that we are at a critical and potentially dangerous point in South Africa's process of change. I would like to close on a more optimistic note. I remain fundamentally hopeful about the prospects for democracy in South Africa. Even at this low point, the parties remain committed to negotiations as the only way to bring about change in South Africa. The government knows that a return to the repressive tactics of the past is both undesirable and impossible. The ANC knows that the days of armed struggle are over. There is no viable option for any of the parties other than a return to talks. Once the negotiations are underway, the parties will be able to build on the significant progress they have already made and will be in a good position to get on with the work of creating a non-racial democracy for South Africa. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992 Title:

Peru: Shining Path Terrorism

Snyder Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joe Snyder Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 20 19927/20/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Peru Subject: Terrorism [TEXT] We condemn in the strongest terms the recent wave of Shining Path terrorist bombings in Peru. Last Thursday night's attacks in heavily traveled residential and business districts of Lima cost the lives of at least 18 innocent Peruvians and injured over 100 more. They were apparently calculated to cause maximum civilian casualties. We also deplore the Shining Path's call for "armed strikes" in Lima and Ayacucho on July 22-24, around the time of Peru's National Day celebrations. These acts of destructive violence and threats of "armed strikes" show the Shining Path for what it is: a brutal, bloodthirsty gang interested only in shooting its way into power. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992 Title:

Czechoslovakian President Resigns

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 20 19927/20/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Czechoslovakia (former) Subject: Democratization [TEXT] Today, President Vaclav Havel resigned from his post as the President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. President Havel is one of the outstanding statesmen of our time, and we regret his departure. President Havel's courage has come to symbolize the determination of all the peoples of Eastern Europe to reject communism and to accept the challenges of the transition to democracy and a free market economy. He energized, as he once wrote, "the power of the powerless." President Havel has made a historic and heroic contribution to the cause of freedom. We are confident he will continue to do so whatever the future may bring. The future of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is up to its people. We will respect their decision and are confident it will be peaceful, cooperative, and democratic. We look forward to sustaining our traditionally close relations with its people. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992 Title:

Defense Trade Center Protects America's Interests

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92 Category: Features Region: South America Country: United States Subject: State Department, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, traditional threats to international security have changed dramatically. New dangers have emerged, including nuclear proliferation, chemical and biological warfare, and technology transfer. At the same time, the importance of defense trade has grown significantly. During the 1980s, US commercial defense trade grew significantly in both volume and complexity, a trend that is continuing in the 1990s. Global defense trade is a highly competitive enterprise and will remain that way through the turn of the century. Recognizing a need to adjust to the new global environment, the Department of State established the Center for Defense Trade (CDT) in January 1990. The center provides improved export-licensing services and policy guidance on defense trade policy to US industry and the federal government. "The United States has taken the lead in international efforts to limit the proliferation of weapons and sensitive technologies," says Charles A. Duelfer, director of the center. "It has urged other supplier nations to adopt and apply export controls comparable to those of the United States." The United States works regularly with other countries through mechanisms such as the United Nations, NATO, and the Australia Group, says Mr. Duelfer, who adds that such consultation "ensures that these efforts are multilateral in scope." The center, which is part of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, has two principal units, the Office of Defense Trade Controls and the Office of Defense Trade Policy (DTP). The former tracks all US manufacturers and exporters of defense goods or services and regulates the export of US defense goods and services under rules established by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the US Munitions List. Each year, it reviews more than 50,000 license applications for the export of defense articles, services, and technology. More than 7,000 manufacturers and exporters are registered in its system. DTP provides policy guidance on commercial defense trade and advises the US defense industry on markets overseas. The office also analyzes trends in US defense trade and studies foreign markets to assess opportunities for US defense companies. Defense trade control policies are based on foreign policy and national security considerations rather than economic ones, the director points out. The history of controls dates back to the 1930s, when the American public grew concerned over profiteering from armaments and was wary of becoming entangled in European conflicts. The 1935 Neutrality Act directed the Secretary of State to establish an office of arms and munitions controls, with authority to register and issue export licenses to all US entities engaged in defense-related trade. The 1954 Mutual Security Act, the 1976 Arms Control Export Act, and several executive orders have modified the original law. Congress continued to strengthen munitions export controls during the Carter, Reagan, and Bush Administrations. CDT works closely with Congress to review defense trade policy. Under the Arms Export Control Act, CDT is required to notify Congress 30 days before issuing any license or approval on certain defense trade applications. Unless Congress passes a joint resolution prohibiting the export in that time period, CDT can issue a license. Responding to the growth in volume and complexity of defense export applications, the center has taken steps to accelerate the review process so that exporters receive decisions in a timely fashion. "From an industry perspective, the best measure of CDT's performance is undoubtedly the responsiveness of the licensing process," says Mr. Duelfer. "The center's objective is to create and make permanent a fast, predictable export- licensing process that ensures adherence to US law and State Department policies but that does not impede trade through unnecessary delays." The center has increased the number of licensing officers in the Office of Defense Trade Controls. In August 1991, the center introduced a computer system that enables personnel to see license case information far more quickly, allows them through an optical scanner to store images of applications, and permits the center to monitor individual cases more easily. Industry users can determine the status of a specific case through the Automated License Status System, which is accessible with a touch- tone phone or the remote on-line bulletin board. The new computer system and the increased number of officers help the center achieve its goal of faster service, says Mr. Duelfer. For example, average licensing times have decreased for 50%-70% of requests since CDT's creation. Foreign defense firms are concerned about pursuing joint ventures and subcontracting agreements with American companies, fearing that US rules will limit their capability to export products that incorporate US components. Because of the need to maintain America's defense industrial base, the Department of State addresses these concerns by asking foreign companies that seek joint ventures with American firms, or vice versa, to submit a list of prospective export destinations with their license application. In conjunction with the Department of Defense and other concerned agencies, the Department of State reviews the list and can grant preliminary approval. Once exporters have initial approval they can be reasonably certain they can avoid subsequent problems related to third- country transfer requests. However, foreign firms that seek to export a defense item that incorporates American technology still must obtain final approval for third-country transfer. The war in the Persian Gulf demonstrated the importance of assisting US friends and allies and preserving a strong industrial base," Mr. Duelfer declares. "The Department seeks to maintain a vigorous security assistance program and to facilitate defense exports in accordance with US national security and foreign policy objectives." [--Jim Pinkelman, Dispatch staff] (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992 Title:

New Ambassadors

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92 Category: Ambassadorial Appointments Region: Subsaharan Africa, Europe, South Asia, Eurasia, South America Country: Ethiopia, Guernsey, India, Spain, Ukraine Subject: United Nations, State Department [TEXT]
April-June 1992
Ethiopia--Marc Allen Baas, June 23, 1992 Iceland--Sigmund A. Rogich, May 26, 1992 India--Thomas R. Pickering, May 26, 1992 Ireland--William Henry Gerald FitzGerald, June 19, 1992 Spain--Richard Goodwin Capen, Jr., June 18, 1992 Ukraine--Roman Popadiuk, May 26, 1992 US Mission to the UN, New York--Edward Joseph Perkins, May 7, 1992 (###)