US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992
Title: FY 1993 Refugee Admissions
Eagleburger
Source: Acting Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Refugee Affairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 23 19927/23/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Eurasia,
Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa, E/C Europe, Europe,
Central America, South America, Caribbean
Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Cambodia, Vietnam
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear today
regarding the President's proposal for the admission of 132,000 refugees to
the United States in FY 1993 [of which 122,000 will be funded by the US
Government]. I believe that the committee has already received a report
which provides the detailed information required by the Refugee Act.
Because the timing of these consultations has previously been an issue of
some concern, we welcome the fact that the Administration and the
Congress were able to arrange a date for this hearing well in advance of
September 30. This timing will allow the Congress to make its
appropriations decisions with the full knowledge of the Administration's
current views on admissions requirements.
Before turning to the refugee admissions program, I would like to comment
briefly on current trends and future directions of US refugee policy.
Refugees in the Context Of the New World Order
The image of the refugee--the individual seeking to escape from persecution
to freedom--stood among the most powerful symbols of the Cold War era.
The end of the Cold War has thus had a positive effect on a number of
serious, long-standing refugee situations. Voluntary repatriation, which is
the most desirable and durable solution for refugees, has now become
possible for hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans, Cambodians,
Angolans, and Afghans. Elsewhere in the world, there is reason to believe
that a large number of the world's 16 million refugees may be able to return
home over the next few years. Though political solutions in many areas are
less than complete, we are heartened that the overwhelming majority of
returning refugees wish to overcome differences and to proceed with
rebuilding their war-torn homelands.
Unfortunately, however, the end of the Cold War has also brought new
problems in certain parts of the world. Two noteworthy examples are in
Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Tragically, in these places,
tyranny at the hands of the state has been replaced by violent
manifestations of long-simmering ethnic and religious hatred. We are all
appalled at televised footage of innocent people being massacred while
attempting to buy bread in Sarajevo--the city that was celebrated during
the 1984 Olympic Games for having achieved social harmony within ethnic
diversity. It is hard to imagine that so much could change in just 8 short
years. Having served as the US ambassador to what was once Yugoslavia, I
am deeply saddened to see that utter madness and chaos now reign in what
could well have been one of the success stories of the post-Cold War period.
It is also ironic that scenes similar to the Berlin airlift are now being
repeated in Sarajevo in 1992. As in 1948, the international community
must be concerned not only with the welfare of beleaguered people but also
with the security of those attempting to provide relief. Whereas, then, the
motivation of those seeking to hamper relief efforts was ideology, now the
motivation is nationalism and centuries-old hatreds. Nonetheless, under the
authority of the UN Security Council and the superb coordination of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United States is participating
in efforts to ensure that humanitarian relief is delivered. This includes the
use of US military aircraft to bring vital supplies to the people of Sarajevo.
Close to home, since the September 1991 coup in Haiti, we have been
working for the restoration of democratic government in that country. But,
in recent months, the number of Haitians intercepted by the US Coast Guard
increased dramatically. As a temporary measure, we utilized the US naval
facility at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba as an asylum pre-screening facility.
However, it soon became apparent that the Guantanamo operation was,
itself, serving as a magnet and the number of Haitian migrants had
outstripped our capacity to accommodate them at the base. When our
attempts to identify additional screening locations in the region were
unsuccessful and the situation remained untenable, the President, on May
24, issued an executive order which instructed the Coast Guard to return
interdicted Haitians directly to Haiti, where refugee processing is available
to them. We continue to be hopeful that the various Haitian factions can
negotiate a democratic political solution.
Challenges To Resolving Existing And Future Refugee Problems
The United States has [played] and will continue to play an active role, both
financially and politically, in promoting refugee repatriation. However, a
significant level of international cooperation and support must be
forthcoming if these opportunities are not to be lost. As we have
experienced in Southeast Asia with the Comprehensive Plan of Action, once
it becomes clear that third-country resettlement will not be an option for
those not found to be refugees, increasing numbers of asylum seekers decide
to return home.
We have also learned in Vietnam, Iraq, and elsewhere that follow-up and
close attention to the needs of those who have returned is critical. For
example, de-mining--though both dangerous and costly--is essential if
Cambodians, Salvadorans, and Angolans are to return home safely. Roads and
irrigation systems must be rebuilt in Afghanistan. And only through the
rehabilitation and development of the economic infrastructure can Ethiopia
hope to repatriate its nationals and avoid repeated outflows of returning
refugees unable to survive on the local economy.
We have learned, as well, that cooperation between refugee and development
agencies is required if repatriation is to be successful. The needs of
returnees and of those displaced within the country must be taken into
account within national reconstruction and development programs. In
recognition of the need to bridge the gap between repatriation and
development assistance in Central America, a model incorporating both
refugee and development expertise has been created for the reintegration of
Nicaraguan and other Central American refugees. I am pleased to report that
the UNHCR and the UN Development Program (UNDP) are working on a similar
approach for Cambodia.
In addition, the international community has recognized that response
mechanisms must be appropriate to the circumstances which create
refugees. Following the [Persian] Gulf war, the United Nations encountered
considerable difficulty in mounting an effective response to the outflow of
over 1 million people in a matter of days. Coordination among UN bodies and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was a major problem. Fortunately,
the US military and our coalition partners were able to take the necessary
measures to sustain several hundred thousand lives while conditions were
created to allow their return to Iraq in relative security.
The lessons learned from the Iraqi refugee crisis have led to improvements
in UNHCR's response capabilities. Plans have been put in place to ensure
that UNHCR and external staff resources are available for immediate
assignment to an emergency. Draft agreements to allow the efficient and
expeditious involvement of [non-governmental organizations] have been
prepared, and a stockpile of items commonly needed in a refugee crisis is
being created. To enhance UN coordination further, late last year, in the
context of efforts by the United States and other countries to reform the
United Nations, the position of Under Secretary General for Humanitarian
Assistance was established, along with a $50-million emergency revolving
fund. We have already begun to reap the benefit of these initiatives in
dealing with the flow of Somalis into Kenya and Burmese Rohingyas into
Bangladesh as well as with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.
The international community is also utilizing its prior experience in an
effort to prevent future refugee crises. UNHCR and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) have been working with the new
governments of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to provide
needed technical and legal training for dealing with refugees, displaced
persons, and migrants. The United States has actively promoted and
participated in these multilateral initiatives.
We also believe that our own national experience of ethnic and cultural
diversity is worthy of sharing with others. Through a series of on-site
technical assistance projects, we are exposing relevant officials of the new
governments in the former Soviet bloc to the roles of public and private
sector institutions in the field of refugees and migration. In addition, to
address a major cause of forced migration, we continue to promote,
throughout the world, respect for human rights and fundamental individual
freedoms. The [State] Department's Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs is providing training on the rule of law for judicial
officials from Eastern Europe and the new independent states of the former
Soviet Union. We repeatedly remind such officials that our bilateral
relationships will be affected by the degree to which human rights--
particularly those of members of minority groups--are respected in their
countries. Indeed, at Secretary Baker's urging, the issue of international
migration has now been placed on the agenda of CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe].
The Future of Refugee Admissions
Regarding the US refugee admissions program, if current trends continue and
barring major unforeseen developments, the numbers of persons requiring
permanent resettlement in the United States could decline by the mid-
1990s. The President's proposal for FY 1993 allows for the funded
admission of 122,000 refugees--a reduction of 10,000 from the current
fiscal year level. You may recall that this year's figure was increased from
the President's original estimate to allow for the admission of refugees
from the Soviet Union whose departure in the previous year had been delayed
by anomalies in Soviet Government procedures. I am pleased to report that
we have succeeded in the past 12 months in making up this shortfall.
We propose that the 122,000 admissions numbers be divided as follows:
-- East Asia (including Amerasian immigrants)--52,000;
-- Former Soviet Union--50,000;
-- Near East/South Asia--7,000;
-- Africa--7,000;
-- East Europe--1,500; and
-- Latin America/Caribbean--3,500.
In addition, as in FY 1992, we have included an unallocated reserve of 1,000
numbers which, after consultation with the Congress, could be used in
regions where allocated numbers prove to be insufficient.
As is evident, our program will continue, in the near term, to address many
of the residual human problems created by communism. Former re-
education camp prisoners from Vietnam and religious minorities long denied
the right to emigrate from the Soviet Union clearly constitute the vast
majority of refugee admissions in FY 1993. In the not-too-distant future,
however, we hope to be able to fulfill our commitment to these groups.
Once that point is reached, the primary avenue to US residency for persons
from Vietnam and the former Soviet Union would be through normal
immigration channels.
Apart from these specific, large populations, the US admissions program is
designed to focus on persons of special humanitarian concern to the United
States and for whom repatriation or local integration is not a viable option.
In recent years, UNHCR's assessment of the global need for resettlement
places has shown a steady decline. While the United States consistently
resettles more than 50% of the refugees identified by UNHCR, we have been
working with UNHCR to improve further our responsiveness to refugees in
high-risk categories in a manner consistent with our own goals and
constraints.
As new refugee situations have arisen and where a resettlement component
is appropriate, we have established new processing programs. Some recent
examples are:
-- Last summer, we established admissions processing for Liberians in
West Africa.
-- Over the past year, we have initiated programs for Kurds, Christians, and
other Iraqi minority groups in Turkey.
-- At UNHCR's request, last month the United States commenced admissions
processing for certain members of the residual population of almost 30,000
Iraqi civilians and former enemy prisoners of war in Saudi Arabia.
-- In response to the massive outflow of Somalis, we have expanded our
admissions processing capacity in Kenya.
-- And earlier this year, the President directed the State Department to
establish in-country processing for Haitian nationals who are at risk of
persecution for their political activities.
Conclusion
In sum, the opportunity to remove East-West competition from the
developing world has made it possible to begin to resolve the underlying
causes of most of the world's larger refugee problems. However, the end of
the Cold War is likely to bring us new and unpredictable challenges--some
dramatic, such as the situation in the former Yugoslavia, and others slow
and pervasive, such as the pressure of population growth on social and
political stability. It is, therefore, necessary for us to recognize that
refugee problems will not disappear with the end of the Cold War. They will
undoubtedly become less clear-cut and less easily linked to a general
political cause.
We must continue to develop new solutions to refugee issues. In the current
environment--free of superpower competition--the prospects are excellent
for the United Nations to assume the leadership role envisioned in its
Charter for dealing with refugees and other issues of concern to the world
community. The United States welcomes the opportunity to contribute to
this effort. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992
Title: South Africa: The Current Situation
Cohen
Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 23 19927/23/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: South Africa
Subject: Democratization, Human Rights,
Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to testify before the
subcommittee on the current situation in South Africa. I appreciate the
opportunity to continue our dialogue.
Summary of the Current Situation
The Administration is deeply concerned about the recent developments in
South Africa which led to the suspension of the talks within the Convention
for a Democratic South Africa, known as CODESA.
The events leading to the current impasse began when the second CODESA
plenary failed to reach agreement on interim arrangements. In pre-plenary
discussions, the parties had made much progress toward agreeing on a two-
phase transition. However, the plenary ended in deadlock over a few very
significant issues. The ANC [African National Congress] claims that the
government is insisting on heavily weighted majorities which, in effect,
grant a minority veto on the new constitution. The ANC is also concerned
that the government seeks to put in place an open-ended transition which
could allow it to keep power indefinitely should negotiations reach an
impasse. The government, in turn, argues that it cannot agree to a
settlement which does not guarantee minorities some role in deciding South
Africa's future. Both the government and the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP]
seek a large measure of devolution of powers to regional governments and
local authorities.
In the wake of the breakdown, the ANC announced a program of
"unprecedented and sustained rolling mass action." As an element of this
program, the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions has announced a general
strike, to begin on August 3.
On June 17, over 40 men, women, and children were killed in the township of
Boipatong. Local residents alleged that the perpetrators were Inkatha
members living in a nearby workers' hostel. Following these killings, the
ANC told the government that it could not continue participating in
negotiations unless the government took action on the violence and made
concessions relating to the negotiating process.
Since then, the two sides have traded accusations through lengthy
memoranda and often harsh public statements. The government has taken
some action on the violence, including agreeing to disband certain security
units accused of involvement in the violence, announcing planned legislation
limiting the bearing of weapons, taking measures to upgrade and control
access to single-sex hostels, and agreeing to international participation in
the inquiries of the commission on violence headed by Justice Richard
Goldstone. These developments represent some progress, but the
government must do more to demonstrate its commitment to controlling
violence and to bringing those responsible, regardless of their affiliation, to
justice. The negotiating process, which so far has made tremendous
progress, is now at risk. Yet the key parties continue to profess their
commitments to negotiations and seem to be looking for ways back to the
table.
What the United States Has Done
The Administration has placed high priority on encouraging a compromise
which would get the negotiating process back on track. The President has
written to [ANC President] Nelson Mandela, [South African] President de
Klerk, and Chief Buthelezi [of the IFP], seeking their suggestions on how the
United States might be helpful. In our discussions with all the parties, we
have encouraged them to address the immediate issue of the violence and to
break the negotiating deadlock. We are also willing to assist in augmenting
the Goldstone commission.
The Role of the International Community
Last week, [US] Ambassador [to the United Nations] Perkins participated in
the UN Security Council discussion on South Africa. Representatives of the
major parties in South Africa and nine OAU [Organization for African Unity]
foreign ministers attended the session. The Security Council passed a
constructive resolution which urged the Government of South Africa to take
measures to end the violence, called on all the parties to cooperate in
combating violence, and invited the Secretary General to appoint a special
representative to recommend measures which would assist in ending the
violence and in creating a climate conducive to negotiations. We applaud the
Secretary General's choice of [former US Secretary of State] Cyrus Vance as
his special representative and look forward to his recommendations.
What the Parties Can Do
Nevertheless, it is ultimately up to the South Africans, themselves, to find
a way back to the negotiating table. All sides bear some responsibility for
the current situation, and all sides must be willing to make the concessions
which will be necessary to get negotiations back underway. I would like to
suggest some general concerns we believe need to be addressed.
Inflammatory rhetoric from all sides is only fueling the violence. A
moratorium on finger-pointing and name-calling would be a first step
toward achieving the necessary climate.
The government must do more to address allegations of complicity in the
violence by members of the security forces. A peaceful climate is not
possible as long as people lack confidence in the impartiality of the police.
In addition, we were concerned by Justice Goldstone's recent report stating
that the South African Government has failed to implement his
commission's recommendations. We were pleased to note that the
government has since acted on some of those recommendations. We hope to
see others, including more accountability for the security forces and
increased security at the hostels, implemented as well. We would stress
that the government's determination in investigating the Boipatong killings
and acting on the findings of the investigators is a crucial test of its
credibility.
The ANC has a responsibility to make sure that its mass action campaign
does not lead to further violence. The organization must also exert greater
discipline over its members who continue to advocate and perpetrate
violence. The ANC's leadership should make it clear that suggestions by
some of its members and alliance partners that the government can be
forced out of power through mass mobilization are unacceptable, and
suggestions that the townships should be made ungovernable and that so-
called people's courts should be activated do not represent ANC policy. We
would emphasize that the ANC must be receptive to government gestures
concerning reducing violence and restarting negotiations.
Inkatha, like the ANC, must do more to ensure that its members are
committed to peace. We are deeply disturbed by allegations linking Inkatha
members with incidents such as the Boipatong killings. Inkatha's leadership
must also convey to its membership that carrying weapons in public is not
acceptable. We continue to urge Chief Minister Buthelezi to participate
personally in the negotiating process once talks resume. Both Inkatha and
the ANC must accept the right of all South Africans to pursue lawful
political activity in all parts of the country. "No Go" areas are unacceptable.
Finally, Mandela and Buthelezi should place their differences aside and meet
in the interests of all South Africans. We note that the Goldstone
commission has clearly stated that among the "many and complicated"
sources of violence is the fact that "both ANC and IFP members and
supporters have been guilty of many incidents that have resulted in the
deaths of and injuries to large numbers of people." The international
community remains puzzled and troubled by this impasse. Unaddressed, it
contains the seeds of civil war which neither leader will be able to control
but for which they will bear much responsibility.
The Impact of Violence On Negotiations
Mr. Chairman, you asked me to discuss the impact of the violence on the
negotiating process. As we have seen in recent weeks, escalating violence
can jeopardize the process. Good-faith efforts to bring the violence under
control are now necessary to restore the climate of trust essential to
continued negotiations. But we oppose linking continued negotiations with
an end to violence. This only gives those extremist elements on both sides
who oppose negotiations a veto over the process. Negotiations are even
more essential precisely because there is violence. Furthermore, only a
negotiated settlement can bring a permanent end to the violence. The best
hope for a peaceful climate is the installation of a non-racial transitional
government as soon as possible.
Returning to the Table
Our focus here is on violence, but we must not lose sight of the real issues,
which are those that have been left on the bargaining table. These are the
issues to which the parties must return as rapidly as possible and which
demand of all the parties, but most particularly of the South African
Government and the African National Congress, the kind of leadership and
vision required to fashion compromise.
I do not believe it is useful for outsiders to become involved in the details
of this process. The compromises must be South African compromises, and
they must reflect South African realities and concerns. Nonetheless, I
would like to offer some thoughts on points which we believe are basic to a
genuine democratic solution.
-- That solution should include all relevant parties and promote tolerance
in a country of great diversity.
-- It should acknowledge the right of the majority to govern while assuring
that all South Africans have a stake in their government.
-- It should ensure that government functions within an agreed framework
which includes protection of the fundamental rights of all citizens, but it
should avoid overly complex arrangements intended to guarantee a share of
power to particular groups which will frustrate effective governance.
Minorities have the right to safeguards; they cannot expect a veto.
While there are very significant differences between the American and
South African situations, we are both nations marked by great diversity. As
Americans, we have struggled with, and continue to struggle with, the
challenge of balancing the rights of individuals and minorities with the
majority's right to govern. Clearly, one of the devices which has permitted
us to reassure Americans that their diversity will be respected has been the
reservation of extensive powers to the states and, through them, to
localities. We have sought, thereby, to guarantee that those levers of
democratic power which are most relevant to peoples' daily lives and
personal values are kept close at hand.
Unfortunately, federalism has become a politically loaded word which has
inhibited the debate over its value for a society like South Africa in spite of
the fact that none of the regions under discussion would have a white
majority. I urge South Africans to overcome this hurdle and actively
consider the degree to which devolution of power might address many of the
tensions inherent in the diversity of their society.
House Resolution 497
Mr. Chairman, the Administration shares the concerns you raise in your
resolution on the violence. You state accurately the danger the ongoing
violence poses to the negotiating process. My only disagreement would be
one of emphasis. I would suggest that the resolution, like last week's
Security Council resolution, stress the responsibility of all parties to
cooperate in combating violence. Of course, the government has a special
responsibility in this regard. But all parties must do more to establish a
peaceful climate.
If Violence Continues or Talks Remain Stalled
Finally, Mr. Chairman, you asked me to comment on what steps the United
States plans to take if the violence continues or if talks remain deadlocked.
As always, we will play the role of a concerned outsider. As we have done
in the past, we will express our concern if any party is obstructing
progress. We will support the implementation of the Security Council
resolution. We are prepared to cooperate with the European Community, the
United Nations, the OAU, and the Commonwealth in their efforts as well. We
will also continue, in our bilateral contacts, to urge the various parties to
take the actions I have already discussed and, in particular, to comply with
Justice Goldstone's recommendations. In addition, our offer to play
whatever role the parties find constructive remains open.
I have stressed throughout my remarks that we are at a critical and
potentially dangerous point in South Africa's process of change. I would like
to close on a more optimistic note. I remain fundamentally hopeful about
the prospects for democracy in South Africa. Even at this low point, the
parties remain committed to negotiations as the only way to bring about
change in South Africa. The government knows that a return to the
repressive tactics of the past is both undesirable and impossible. The ANC
knows that the days of armed struggle are over. There is no viable option
for any of the parties other than a return to talks. Once the negotiations are
underway, the parties will be able to build on the significant progress they
have already made and will be in a good position to get on with the work of
creating a non-racial democracy for South Africa. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992
Title: Peru: Shining Path Terrorism
Snyder
Source: Acting Department Spokesman Joe Snyder
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 20 19927/20/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Peru
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
We condemn in the strongest terms the recent wave of Shining Path
terrorist bombings in Peru. Last Thursday night's attacks in heavily
traveled residential and business districts of Lima cost the lives of at least
18 innocent Peruvians and injured over 100 more. They were apparently
calculated to cause maximum civilian casualties.
We also deplore the Shining Path's call for "armed strikes" in Lima and
Ayacucho on July 22-24, around the time of Peru's National Day
celebrations.
These acts of destructive violence and threats of "armed strikes" show the
Shining Path for what it is: a brutal, bloodthirsty gang interested only in
shooting its way into power. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992
Title: Czechoslovakian President Resigns
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 20 19927/20/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Czechoslovakia (former)
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
Today, President Vaclav Havel resigned from his post as the President of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. President Havel is one of the
outstanding statesmen of our time, and we regret his departure. President
Havel's courage has come to symbolize the determination of all the peoples
of Eastern Europe to reject communism and to accept the challenges of the
transition to democracy and a free market economy. He energized, as he
once wrote, "the power of the powerless." President Havel has made a
historic and heroic contribution to the cause of freedom. We are confident
he will continue to do so whatever the future may bring.
The future of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is up to its people. We
will respect their decision and are confident it will be peaceful,
cooperative, and democratic. We look forward to sustaining our
traditionally close relations with its people. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992
Title: Defense Trade Center Protects America's
Interests
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92
Category: Features
Region: South America
Country: United States
Subject: State Department, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, traditional threats to international security have changed
dramatically. New dangers have emerged, including nuclear proliferation,
chemical and biological warfare, and technology transfer.
At the same time, the importance of defense trade has grown significantly.
During the 1980s, US commercial defense trade grew significantly in both
volume and complexity, a trend that is continuing in the 1990s. Global
defense trade is a highly competitive enterprise and will remain that way
through the turn of the century.
Recognizing a need to adjust to the new global environment, the Department
of State established the Center for Defense Trade (CDT) in January 1990.
The center provides improved export-licensing services and policy guidance
on defense trade policy to US industry and the federal government.
"The United States has taken the lead in international efforts to limit the
proliferation of weapons and sensitive technologies," says Charles A.
Duelfer, director of the center. "It has urged other supplier nations to adopt
and apply export controls comparable to those of the United States."
The United States works regularly with other countries through mechanisms
such as the United Nations, NATO, and the Australia Group, says Mr. Duelfer,
who adds that such consultation "ensures that these efforts are multilateral
in scope."
The center, which is part of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, has two
principal units, the Office of Defense Trade Controls and the Office of
Defense Trade Policy (DTP). The former tracks all US manufacturers and
exporters of defense goods or services and regulates the export of US
defense goods and services under rules established by the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations and the US Munitions List. Each year, it reviews
more than 50,000 license applications for the export of defense articles,
services, and technology. More than 7,000 manufacturers and exporters are
registered in its system.
DTP provides policy guidance on commercial defense trade and advises the
US defense industry on markets overseas. The office also analyzes trends in
US defense trade and studies foreign markets to assess opportunities for US
defense companies.
Defense trade control policies are based on foreign policy and national
security considerations rather than economic ones, the director points out.
The history of controls dates back to the 1930s, when the American public
grew concerned over profiteering from armaments and was wary of
becoming entangled in European conflicts. The 1935 Neutrality Act directed
the Secretary of State to establish an office of arms and munitions
controls, with authority to register and issue export licenses to all US
entities engaged in defense-related trade. The 1954 Mutual Security Act,
the 1976 Arms Control Export Act, and several executive orders have
modified the original law. Congress continued to strengthen munitions
export controls during the Carter, Reagan, and Bush Administrations.
CDT works closely with Congress to review defense trade policy. Under the
Arms Export Control Act, CDT is required to notify Congress 30 days before
issuing any license or approval on certain defense trade applications.
Unless Congress passes a joint resolution prohibiting the export in that
time period, CDT can issue a license.
Responding to the growth in volume and complexity of defense export
applications, the center has taken steps to accelerate the review process so
that exporters receive decisions in a timely fashion. "From an industry
perspective, the best measure of CDT's performance is undoubtedly the
responsiveness of the licensing process," says Mr. Duelfer. "The center's
objective is to create and make permanent a fast, predictable export-
licensing process that ensures adherence to US law and State Department
policies but that does not impede trade through unnecessary delays."
The center has increased the number of licensing officers in the Office of
Defense Trade Controls. In August 1991, the center introduced a computer
system that enables personnel to see license case information far more
quickly, allows them through an optical scanner to store images of
applications, and permits the center to monitor individual cases more
easily. Industry users can determine the status of a specific case through
the Automated License Status System, which is accessible with a touch-
tone phone or the remote on-line bulletin board.
The new computer system and the increased number of officers help the
center achieve its goal of faster service, says Mr. Duelfer. For example,
average licensing times have decreased for 50%-70% of requests since
CDT's creation.
Foreign defense firms are concerned about pursuing joint ventures and
subcontracting agreements with American companies, fearing that US rules
will limit their capability to export products that incorporate US
components. Because of the need to maintain America's defense industrial
base, the Department of State addresses these concerns by asking foreign
companies that seek joint ventures with American firms, or vice versa, to
submit a list of prospective export destinations with their license
application. In conjunction with the Department of Defense and other
concerned agencies, the Department of State reviews the list and can grant
preliminary approval. Once exporters have initial approval they can be
reasonably certain they can avoid subsequent problems related to third-
country transfer requests. However, foreign firms that seek to export a
defense item that incorporates American technology still must obtain final
approval for third-country transfer.
The war in the Persian Gulf demonstrated the importance of assisting US
friends and allies and preserving a strong industrial base," Mr. Duelfer
declares. "The Department seeks to maintain a vigorous security assistance
program and to facilitate defense exports in accordance with US national
security and foreign policy objectives." [--Jim Pinkelman, Dispatch staff]
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 30, July 27, 1992
Title: New Ambassadors
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92
Category: Ambassadorial Appointments
Region: Subsaharan Africa, Europe, South Asia, Eurasia,
South America
Country: Ethiopia, Guernsey, India, Spain, Ukraine
Subject: United Nations, State Department
[TEXT]
April-June 1992
Ethiopia--Marc Allen Baas, June 23, 1992
Iceland--Sigmund A. Rogich, May 26, 1992
India--Thomas R. Pickering, May 26, 1992
Ireland--William Henry Gerald FitzGerald, June 19, 1992
Spain--Richard Goodwin Capen, Jr., June 18, 1992
Ukraine--Roman Popadiuk, May 26, 1992
US Mission to the UN, New York--Edward Joseph Perkins, May 7, 1992 (###)