US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Commitment To Reach North American Free Trade
Agreement
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Remarks following meeting with Mexican President
Salinas, San Diego, California
Date: Jul, 14 19927/14/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States, Mexico, Canada
Subject: North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
President Salinas and I had an extremely constructive discussion of the
status of negotiations among our two countries and Canada to create a North
American Free Trade [Agreement] (NAFTA). We reaffirmed our commitment
to reaching a sound NAFTA agreement as soon as possible. Let me just say a
word about the importance of this historic undertaking.
We live in a global economy. The fastest-growing sector of the American
economy today is our export sector, and Mexico is the fastest-growing
market for US exports in the world. US merchandise exports to Mexico have
increased 22% per year for each of the last 5 years--twice as fast as US
exports worldwide.
Having added over 300,000 new jobs to our economy since 1986, we now
have over 600,000 total US jobs built on our exports to Mexico. California
alone exported $5.5 billion in goods and services to Mexico last year.
Virtually every state has shared in that growth, not just states on the
border. Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania are among the
top 10 exporters to Mexico, along with California, Texas, and Arizona.
By building, together, the largest free trading region in the world, Mexico,
the United States, and Canada are working to ensure that the future will
bring increased prosperity, trade, and new jobs for the citizens of each of
our countries.
Because our trade ministers and their teams have made impressive progress
in recent weeks, we agreed that our meeting today marks the beginning of
the final stage of negotiations. In the spirit of this evening's all-star
[baseball] game, we are entering the top of the ninth inning of
negotiations.
President Salinas and I have instructed our trade ministers to meet on July
25 to bring this final stage of negotiations to an early and successful
conclusion. We have consulted with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney, and
he has similarly instructed his trade
minister.
We also agreed on the importance of pressing ahead with parallel efforts to
assure that NAFTA enhances environmental quality and that labor issues are
addressed effectively.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Chronology: Key Points in NAFTA Negotiations
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, San Diego, California
Date: Jul, 13 19927/13/92
Category: Chronologies
Region: North America
Country: United States, Mexico, Canada
Subject: North America Free Trade, History
[TEXT]
June 10, 1990
President Bush and Mexican President Salinas issue a joint statement
endorsing the idea of a comprehensive free trade agreement between the
United States and Mexico and direct their trade ministers to undertake
consultations and preparatory work.
August 8, 1990
US Trade Representative [USTR] Carla A. Hills and Mexican Secretary of
Commerce Jaime Serra Puche report back to the two Presidents, jointly
recommending the initiation of formal negotiations.
August 21, 1990
President Salinas writes to President Bush proposing that the United States
and Mexico negotiate a free trade agreement, a step required by US law.
September 25, 1990
President Bush writes to the Chairmen of the House Ways and Means and the
Senate Finance Committees notifying the committees of free trade
negotiations with Mexico, a step required by US law. In his letter, the
President also informs the chairmen that Canada has expressed a desire to
participate in the negotiations.
February 5, 1991
President Bush, President Salinas, and Canadian Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney announce their intention to pursue a North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), creating one of the world's largest liberalized markets.
February 5, 1991
President Bush writes to the Chairmen of the House Ways and Means and
Senate Finance Committees of his desire to enter into trilateral
negotiations with Mexico and Canada for a North American Free Trade
Agreement.
February 6 and 20, 1991
Senate Finance Committee holds public hearings on the proposed
negotiations.
February 20-21, 1991
International Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee
holds public hearings on the proposed negotiations.
February 27, 1991
Sixty-day legislative review period expires, during which time the Senate
Finance Committee or the House Ways and Means Committee could have
voted to deny fast-track procedures to legislation implementing a free
trade agreement with Mexico.
March 1, 1991
President Bush requests a 2-year extension of fast-track procedures for
legislation implementing trade agreements, a necessary step if the
procedures are to be used for NAFTA.
May 1, 1991
In response to congressional concern expressed during the fast-track
debate, President Bush sends a letter to Congress committing:
-- To consult extensively during the course of the negotiations and conduct
a broad public outreach effort;
-- To work to ensure that any negative impact on employment as a result of
NAFTA is minimized and to assist dislocated workers by ensuring an
adequately funded worker adjustment program;
-- To gradually phase out duties over time with long transition periods for
sensitive sectors;
-- To include an effective safeguard mechanism to provide for strict rules
of origin; and
-- To address environmental, labor standards, and worker rights issues.
May 3, 1991
US Labor Secretary Lynn Martin and Mexican Minister of Labor and Social
Welfare Arsenio Farell Cubillas sign a memorandum of understanding to
promote increased standards of living and a safe and healthy work place for
workers in the two countries.
May 23-24, 1991
Consistent with President Bush's request, both houses of Congress vote to
extend fast-track authority for 2 years for NAFTA and for other purposes.
June 12, 1991
NAFTA negotiations formally launched in Toronto, Canada, with trilateral
meeting of trade ministers. Nineteen working groups convene.
June 23-25, 1991
US Department of Commerce and the Office of the US Trade Representative
lead delegation of 19 industry sector and functional advisory committee
advisers to Mexico for intensive, 2-day round of meetings with Mexican
Government negotiators, the Mexican private sector, and US companies
operating in Mexico.
July 8-9, 1991
Plenary session in Washington, DC, chaired by chief negotiators of the three
countries.
August 1, 1991
Draft US-Mexico border plan released for public comment.
August 6-7, 1991
Plenary session in Oaxtepec, Mexico, chaired by chief negotiators of the
three countries.
August 18-20, 1991
Second trilateral ministerial oversight meeting held in Seattle, Washington.
August 21-September 11, 1991
Trade policy staff committee conducts public hearings held in San Diego;
Houston; Atlanta; Washington, DC; Cleveland; and Boston. Several hundred
witnesses testify.
September 19, 1991
The United States, Canada, and Mexico exchange initial tariff staging
proposals and non-tariff barrier request lists at a meeting of the tariffs
and non-tariff barriers negotiating group in Dallas, Texas.
October 17, 1991
USTR and EPA [US Environmental Protection Agency] submit draft review of
US-Mexico environmental issues for public comment.
October 25-28, 1991
Third trilateral ministerial oversight meeting in Zacatecas, Mexico.
December 14, 1991
Presidents Bush and Salinas meet at Camp David [and] agree on importance
of NAFTA and need for broad, comprehensive agreement.
December 31, 1991
Negotiators complete composite bracketed texts.
January 6-10, 1992
Meetings at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, to prepare composite
texts.
January 16-17, 1992
Chief negotiators meet to review negotiations in Washington, DC.
February 2-3, 1992
[USTR] Ambassador Hills leads delegation of 26 private sector
representatives and 11 Members of Congress to Mexico. Delegation meets
with President Salinas, Secretary of Commerce Serra, and other key Mexican
Government and private sector officials.
February 9-10, 1992
Fourth trilateral ministerial oversight meeting held in Chantilly, Virginia.
February 10-12, 1992
US and Mexican officials, along with organized labor, hold hazardous
industry conference focusing on iron and steel industry.
February 17-21, 1992
Plenary session in Dallas, Texas, chaired by chief negotiators.
February 25, 1992
President Bush receives NAFTA environmental review and environmental
border plan from USTR [Ambassador] Hills and EPA Administrator William K.
Reilly in Los Angeles, California.
February 26, 1992
President Bush and USTR [Ambassador] Hills discuss NAFTA progress with
President Salinas and Minister Serra in San Antonio, Texas, on the margins
of the drug summit.
March 4-5, 1992
Plenary session in Washington, DC, chaired by chief negotiators of the three
countries.
March 23-27, 1992
Plenary session in Washington, DC, chaired by of the three countries.
April 6-8, 1992
Fifth trilateral ministerial oversight meeting held in Montreal, Canada.
April 27-May 1, 1992
Plenary session in Mexico City, Mexico, chaired by chief negotiators of the
three countries.
May 13-15, 1992
Plenary session in Toronto, Canada, chaired by chief negotiators of the three
countries.
June 1-5, 1992
Plenary session in Crystal City, Virginia, chaired by chief negotiators of the
three countries.
June 17-19, 1992
Chief negotiators meet to review negotiations in Washington, DC.
June 29-July 3, 1992
Chief negotiators meet to review negotiations in Washington, DC.
July 7-10, 1992
Chief negotiators meet to review negotiations in Washington, DC.
July 14, 1992
Presidents Bush and Salinas and their trade ministers, Hills and Serra, meet
to discuss status of the NAFTA talks and announce the beginning of the
final stage of negotiations.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Gist: North American Free Trade Agreement
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jul, 20 19927/20/92
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: North America
Country: United States, Mexico, Canada
Subject: North America Free Trade, History
[TEXT]
The United States, Mexico, and Canada have embarked on free trade
negotiations that would create a North American market of more than 360
mil-lion consumers and producers and an annual output of more than $6
trillion. The proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) seeks
to eliminate restrictions on the flow of goods, services, and investment
among the three countries. A successful agreement would be a catalyst for
economic growth and development in North America through increased trade,
investment, and job creation.
US Goals
The Bush Administration is determined to negotiate an agreement that is in
the best economic interest of the United States. Specific US objectives
include:
-- Elimination of tariffs either immediately or over a period of years (the
maximum period is 10 years in the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement);
-- Elimination of non-tariff barriers on goods and services, such as import
licenses and quotas;
-- Establishment of an open investment climate; and
-- Adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights (such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks).
Achievement of these objectives will benefit a broad spectrum of US
businesses, workers, farmers, and consumers.
Negotiations
The NAFTA negotiations began in June 1991. Nineteen working groups were
established to handle issues in six broad areas--market access, trade rules,
services, investment, intellectual property rights, and dispute settlement.
The negotiations were made possible by US congressional action in May
1991, extending the "fast track" procedures for negotiating trade
agreements, including the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks and the
proposed pact with Mexico and Canada. These procedures allow the
President to present a trade agreement to Congress for approval without the
possibility of amendment.
In December 1991, Presidents Bush and Salinas reaffirmed their
commitment to concluding a good agreement as quickly as possible. There
has been considerable progress in the NAFTA talks during the intensive
negotiations which have continued throughout the first half of 1992. Major
sessions were held by the chief negotiators in Dallas, Toronto, Mexico City,
and Washington, DC. However, US, Mexican, and Canadian negotiators have
agreed not to set an arbitrary deadline to conclude an agreement. When
there is a negotiated agreement, the Administration will consult with
Congress and make a decision when to submit it for approval. Congress and
the US private sector remain an integral part of the NAFTA process.
President Bush is committed to extensive consultations with both
throughout the NAFTA negotiations. This is in the best interest of the
United States, Mexico, and Canada, as it helps ensure speedy approval of the
agreement and implementing legislation that the executive and
congressional branches develop together.
Expanded Trade
Canada and Mexico are the first and third largest trading partners,
respectively, of the United States. In turn, the United States accounts for
more than two-thirds of the total trade of its North American neighbors. In
1991, three-way trade amounted to $243 billion, and NAFTA will eliminate
economic barriers and inefficiencies that impede commerce among the three
countries.
Since 1986, when Mexico began a major opening of its economy (including
joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--GATT), US exports to
Mexico have increased from $12.4 billion to $33.3 billion in 1991. This
makes Mexico the third largest US export market, and this growth of 169%
is almost twice the rate of overall US export growth in the 1986-91 period.
By comparison, US exports to Western Europe increased 93%.
US manufacturing exports to Mexico increased from $10.4 billion to $26.7
billion during this period, almost twice the rate of overall growth in US
manufacturing exports. Agricultural exports jumped from $1.1 billion to
$2.8 billion, making Mexico the third largest customer of US agricultural
commodities in 1991. In fact, the United States has swung from a bilateral
trade deficit with Mexico of $4.9 billion in 1986 to a surplus of $2.1 billion
in 1991. Excluding US petroleum imports from Mexico, the surplus was $6.6
billion.
However, Mexico still has higher trade barriers than the United States. Its
average tariff duty is 10%, compared with 4% in the United States, and
significant Mexican non-tariff barriers remain. The United States has much
to gain from the elimination or reduction of these barriers under a trade
agreement.
NAFTA would result in expanded trade with Mexico and the creation of jobs
for US workers. It would give US exporters improved access to a market of
more than 80 million people and one that is expected to reach 100 million by
2000. Traditional US competitive advantages--geographic, cultural, and
historic links--in this important market would be enhanced by NAFTA.
As the Mexican economy has grown, a substantial part of the increased
national income generated--as much as 15%--has been spent on US goods
and services. Strong growth has begun to occur as a result of President
Salinas' economic reforms. Mexico's middle class is increasing as a
percentage of the total population, which means a larger market for US
goods and services.
Opportunities in Mexico
The United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment in
Mexico--$21.4 billion (cumulative) as of the end of 1991. The US
Government has a strong interest in encouraging favorable conditions for
new and expanded investments in Mexico. US firms investing there tend to
use US suppliers and US design and managerial talent.
In May 1989, President Salinas expanded the percentage of allowable foreign
ownership (in many cases up to as much as 100%) in sectors accounting for
nearly two-thirds of Mexico's economic output. He streamlined the approval
process for foreign investments. Mexico also has enacted legislation that
goes far to respect intellectual property rights. A trade agreement would
further improve the investment climate for US firms in Mexico.
NAFTA will lead to a more open trade and investment climate that will
foster further partnerships and alliances in industry, agriculture, and
services. These partnerships can take advantage of the complementary
strengths of the three North American economies and will result in more
jobs, investment, and economic growth in the United States, Mexico, and
Canada.
Benefits to US Workers
NAFTA will increase opportunities for growth, exports, and investment and
help the United States keep and create good jobs at good wages. In
particular, export growth will produce many new export-related jobs.
NAFTA in the aggregate will be a positive development for American
workers. A
May 1992 study prepared by the US International Trade Commission
indicates that US aggregate employment could rise by up to 2.5% of the
workforce as a result of NAFTA. Earlier macroeconomic studies have
suggested that NAFTA will create between 64,000 and 150,000 jobs.
American workers are concerned that NAFTA will result in jobs being lost
to Mexicans and in US products being replaced by Mexican imports. President
Bush is working with Congress and labor to develop training and
readjustment programs for US workers who may be displaced.
NAFTA will include other mechanisms to ease the transition to free trade.
An extended period to phase out tariffs will help ease the adjustment for
American workers in sensitive industries. "Rules of origin" will ensure that
the gains from preferential treatment under free trade go to NAFTA partners
and their workers, rather than to countries outside the region. Furthermore,
NAFTA "safeguards" will ease the effects on American workers of any
sudden import surges.
Benefits to the Environment
NAFTA goes further than any other comprehensive trade agreement to
address environmental concerns across the US-Mexico border and beyond. It
will promote sustainable development and recognize the link between
economic growth and the need to preserve the environment. Among its
environmental provisions, NAFTA seeks to safeguard public welfare and
promote improved enforcement of environmental, health, and safety
standards.
The United States also is pursuing expanded US-Mexico environmental
cooperation in parallel with the NAFTA negotiations. The ongoing US-
Mexican Integrated Border Environmental Plan builds on a long tradition of
cooperative activity in the environmental area. The United States and
Mexico are working to improve enforcement of environmental laws that
address air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, and chemical spills.
In February 1992, environmental groups, industry, and the public
participated in the comprehensive report, US Government Review of US-
Mexican Environmental Issues. It has enhanced the awareness of NAFTA
negotiators of the environmental aspects of trade actions.
Greater Hemispheric Cooperation
The United States is a neighbor and friend of Canada and Mexico. NAFTA
provides a unique opportunity to draw North America even closer by building
a solid foundation for stronger cooperation, integration, and growth. A
trade agreement will give economic and political impetus to US efforts to
address other North American problems, such as the environment, the flow
of drugs, and immigration. NAFTA will help forge a US-Mexican partnership
that could lead to closer cooperation on other foreign policy issues.
A North American trade agreement also is important as the cornerstone of a
comprehensive Western Hemisphere policy. It will send a strong,
encouraging signal throughout Latin America to a new generation of leaders
pledged to democracy, human rights, and market economies. Its successful
conclusion will provide further impetus to President Bush's long-range
vision of a hemisphere-wide system of free trade. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: NAFTA: Consultations With Congress and the Public
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jul, 20 19927/20/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Country: Germany, Poland, Finland
Subject: CSCE, Trade/Economics, Arms Control
[TEXT]
The Bush Administration is committed to regular, substantive consultations
with Congress as the NAFTA negotiations proceed. A strong consultative
mechanism is integral to the success of the negotiations and the fast track
process.
The Administration has had extensive consultations with Members of
Congress and with the congressional staff of about 18 House and Senate
committees having jurisdiction over the negotiations. The meetings have
covered all areas of the negotiations. This process will continue until
implementing legislation is passed.
The Administration also relies heavily on advice from the private sector and
from individual citizens. Forty advisory committees, composed of more than
1,000 private sector representatives, and one committee of state and local
government officials provide advice on all US trade negotiations. In August-
September 1991, the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) held
public hearings on NAFTA in six American cities. USTR receives and
evaluates a steady stream of recommendations from individuals, companies,
trade unions, and associations. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Non-proliferation Efforts Bolstered: President's
Statement
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 13 19927/13/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
A few weeks ago, [Russian] President Boris Yeltsin and I agreed to the most
far-reaching reductions in nuclear weaponry since the dawn of the atomic
age. Yet even as our own arsenals diminish, the spread of the capability to
produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them constitutes a growing threat to US national security interests and
world peace. In a world in which regional tensions may unpredictably erupt
into war, these weapons could have devastating consequences.
That is why this Administration has fought so hard to stem the proliferation
of these terrible weapons. We look back with pride on a solid record of
accomplishment. Membership in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
has grown. The Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group have
broadened their membership and expanded their controls against trade
useful to the development of missiles and chemical and biological weapons.
We have toughened our non-proliferation export controls, and other nations
have followed suit. We have seen remarkable progress in building and
strengthening regional arms control arrangements in Latin America, the
Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East.
Yet we need to do more. The demand for these weapons persists, and new
suppliers of key technologies are emerging. Export controls alone cannot
create an airtight seal against proliferation. In an era of advancing
technology and trade liberalization, we need to employ the full range of
political, security, intelligence, and other tools at our disposal. Therefore,
I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our non-proliferation
efforts in the years ahead and directed a number of steps to supplement our
existing efforts. These steps include a decision not to produce plutonium
and highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and a number of
proposals to strengthen international actions against those who contribute
to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver
them.
While these steps will strengthen the barriers against proliferation,
success will require hard work and, at times, hard choices. The United
States, however, is committed to take a leading role in the international
effort to thwart the spread of technologies and weapons that cast a cloud
over our future.
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Non-proliferation Efforts Bolstered:
Non-proliferation Initiative
Fitzwater
Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 13 19927/13/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
Noting that the potential "spread of the capability to produce or acquire
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a
growing threat to US national security interests," the President today
announced a comprehensive initiative to bolster American efforts to stem
the spread of these capabilities and to discourage any use of such weapons.
The initiative seeks to integrate new and existing policies in an overall
framework to guide US non-proliferation policy in the years ahead.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
First, the United States will build on existing global norms against
proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them.
Second, the United States will focus special efforts on those areas where
the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably the Middle East, the
Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean Peninsula.
Third, US non-proliferation policy will seek the broadest possible
multilateral support while continuing to show leadership on critical issues.
Fourth, the United States will address the proliferation issue through the
entire range of political, diplo-matic, economic, intelligence, regional
security, export controls, and other tools available.
POLICY OBJECTIVES
Nuclear Materials
Nuclear Materials Production. The United States shall not produce plutonium
or highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. This step is
intended to encourage countries in regions of tension, such as the Middle
East and South Asia, to take similar actions, such as those proposed in the
May 1991 Middle East arms control initiative. The United States will seek
further multilateral support for concrete measures to discourage production
or acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials in South Asia, the
Korean Peninsula, or other areas where they would increase the risk of
proliferation.
Multilateral Actions
Compliance With International Non-proliferation Norms. The United States
will take into account other countries' performance on key international
non-proliferation norms in developing its cooperation and technology
transfer relationships and will consult with friends and allies on similar
approaches.
Enforcement of International Non-proliferation Norms. The United States
will consult with friends and allies on international actions to be taken
against serious violations of non-proliferation norms, e.g., the transfer of
any weapon of mass destruction or key weapon facilities; violation of
safeguards agreements; or confirmed use of nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons. Actions could include UN Security Council embargoes or
inspections, assistance to victims of attacks by such weapons, extradition
agreements, or immigration restrictions against individuals who have
knowingly contributed to proliferation.
Support for Special Inspections and Weapon Destruction. The United States
will examine, in consultation with friends and allies, establishment of
multilateral funding efforts to support special inspection regimes where
necessary and to help states destroy existing weapon stockpiles.
Harmonization of Export Controls. The United States will promote
harmonized non-proliferation export control lists and enforcement,
including an agreement among suppliers not to undercut one another's export
restraint decisions.
Regional Efforts
Targeted Approaches. The United States will continue to focus special
efforts on the dangers of proliferation in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the
Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula, including efforts to achieve
confidence-building measures; inspection regimes; and other economic,
political, and security-related measures.
Former Soviet Union. The United States will continue to work with
authorities from Russia and the other new states toward the following
objectives:
-- Implementation of all relevant international agreements, such as the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, and, when opened
for signature, the Chemical Weapons Convention;
-- Effective internal accounting and physical protection against theft or
diversion of nuclear-related materials and equipment;
-- Effective export controls on chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile
technologies consistent with existing multilateral regimes, including
appropriate laws and regulations, as well as education of exporters and
customs and enforcement officials;
-- Safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear warheads and effective
controls over nuclear weapon material;
-- Creation of opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers to
redirect their talents to peaceful endeavors; and
-- Consideration of requests for assistance in dismantling or destroying
Russian biological weapons facilities or in converting these facilities to
production of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products, provided Russia
is in full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.
Global Norms
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United States reaffirms its
commitment to see a CWC concluded this year and calls on all nations to
commit to become original signatories.
Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT] and Tlatelolco. The United States will seek
the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and full entry into force of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1993.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States will work
with other nations to strengthen the IAEA and will support needed increases
in the safeguards budget.
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The United States will continue to
urge universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention and
increased support for the confidence-building measures agreed by the
parties at the 1991 review conference.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The United States reiterates the
call of the MTCR partners for all governments to adopt the MTCR guidelines
as part of their national policy.
Intelligence
Non-proliferation Center. The intelligence community, including the newly
created non-proliferation center, will increase support to international
non-proliferation regimes and seek to enlarge the pool of experienced, well-
trained experts committed to the non-proliferation mission.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Non-proliferation Efforts Bolstered: Existing Non-
Proliferation Efforts
Fitzwater
Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 13 19927/13/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In the past year, China, South Africa,
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and other new parties brought NPT membership to
149. France will soon be a party. In the START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty] protocol signed in Lisbon, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed
to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
International Atomic Energy Agency.
The IAEA confirmed its right
to conduct "special inspections" at undeclared nuclear facilities. Argentina
and Brazil reversed long-standing positions to adopt full-scope IAEA
safeguards. After years of delay, North Korea finally complied with its NPT
obligations to ratify an IAEA safeguards agreement and accept IAEA
inspections.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
In April 1992, the 27 NSG members
agreed to extend nuclear export controls to dual-use items and to require
full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply.
Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR].
The MTCR expanded its
membership to 22, updated its export control list, and agreed to extend its
focus to any missile intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
China, Argentina, and Israel have pledged to observe the MTCR guidelines.
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI).
Under EPCI, the
United States expanded its export controls to cover all 50 identified
chemical weapon precursors, dual-use equipment relevant to chemical and
biological weapons production, whole chemical plants, and knowing
assistance to chemical or biological weapon or missile programs.
Strengthened National Export Controls.
Several suppliers have
strengthened their domestic export control laws and enforcement
mechanisms. Several countries have adopted laws or regulations similar to
the EPCI, which restrict assistance by their citizens to nuclear, chemical,
biological, or missile programs.
Australia Group.
The Australia Group expanded its membership to
22 nations and followed the US lead in EPCI by expanding its export controls
to cover the 50 chemical weapon precursors as well as chemical weapons-
related dual-use equipment. The Group has just adopted a multilateral
control list of biological organisms, toxins, and equipment.
Middle East Arms Control Initiative.
In May 1991, the President
launched a process among the five leading conventional arms suppliers: the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. In October,
the five agreed to observe guidelines of restraint in conventional transfers
and to information exchange. In May 1992, the five agreed to interim
guidelines for exports related to weapons of mass destruction. Under the
Middle East peace process, 23 delegations (including Israel and 12 Arab
states) gathered in Washington in May 1992 to discuss regional security and
arms control.
United Nations.
The UN Special Commission and the IAEA have
carried out 39 inspections in Iraq, identified and begun to destroy tens of
thousands of chemical munitions, destroyed missile-production equipment
and over 150 missiles, revealed an extensive nuclear weapons program, and
oversaw destruction of nuclear weapon-related facilities.
Latin America.
In addition to adopting full-scope IAEA safeguards,
Argentina and Brazil joined with Chile to ban chemical and biological
weapons in their countries. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Global Protection System Against Ballistic
Missiles: Joint Statement
Fitzwater
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman,
Washington, DC
Description: Text of joint US-Russian statement
Date: Jul, 14 19927/14/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, North America
Country: Russia, United States
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
U.S. and Russian high-level delegations met in Moscow on July 13 and 14 to
hold consultations on establishing a Global Protection System [GPS] against
ballistic missiles.
The consultations were the result of agreement by Presidents Bush and
Yeltsin [of Russia] at the Washington Summit. The two Presidents agreed
that our two nations should work together with allies and other interested
states in developing a concept for such a Global Protection System as part
of an overall strategy to counter the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction.
The two Presidents had agreed to explore on a priority basis:
-- the potential for sharing ballistic missile early warning information
through the establishment of an early warning center;
-- the potential for cooperation with participating states in developing
ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies; and
-- the development of a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties
and agreements and possible changes of existing agreements necessary to
implement a Global Protection System.
The delegations had good and fruitful discussions on all relevant issues.
They agreed that their two nations were entering a radically changed
security environment, one characterized by the change in the nature of
threats to international security, including the growing threat of
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to the
world community. They also agreed that they needed to work together and
with other interested states to find solutions to these new challenges by
exploring the potential benefits of a Global Protection System against
ballistic missiles and agreeing that it is important to explore the role of
defenses in protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks.
The two sides believed that their discussions had created a promising
foundation for future work. In that regard, they decided to set up three
working groups in which specialists would carry forward expeditiously the
task of developing the concept of a Global Protection System.
-- A Global Protection System Concept Working Group would consider the
structure, modalities, and functions of a future Global Protection System.
It would explore the concept of the GPS and examine the relationship among
its principal elements. It would create sub-groups, as appropriate,
including sub-groups on analysis and concepts, early warning, and
cooperation in the anti-tactical ballistic missile defense field.
-- A Technology Cooperation Working Group would consider possible
research, development, and testing projects and other forms of
technological cooperation that could contribute--in possible cooperation
with other states--to the realization of the concept of the Global
Protection System. The work of this group should reflect the work of the
Concept Working Group.
-- A Non-proliferation Working Group would conduct joint assessments of
trends in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery and would explore ways and means of strengthening current
international efforts to prevent such proliferation and would explore future
initiatives in this area.
The two sides agreed that the working groups would hold their initial
meetings at an early date. They further agreed that the high-level group
would have a continuing role as a steering group and would meet
periodically to address issues assigned to them by Presidents Bush and
Yeltsin in their June 17 statement. The two sides undertook to provide the
leadership of the two countries with a report on the status of these efforts
at an early date. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Proclamation on Captive Nations Week, 1992
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of Proclamation 6458, dated July 15, 1992,
released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
Date: Jul, 15 19927/15/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Human Rights, Democratization
[TEXT]
When Americans first observed Captive Nations Week in 1959, repressive
communist regimes had overtaken nations from Central and Eastern Europe
to mainland China and overshadowed many others with the very real threat
of expansionism. Three years earlier, forces of the Soviet Union had
brutally suppressed a popular movement for freedom in Hungary; some 16
years before that, the Soviets had invaded Poland and achieved the forcible
annexation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In 1959, the United Nations had
only recently ended its efforts to thwart communist expansionism below
the 38th parallel in Korea, and a communist-led insurgency had already
begun to threaten South Vietnam. At a time when millions of people were
enslaved by Soviet domination or subjugated by proxy, at a time when
countless others were terrorized by the threat of communist aggression and
subversion, Americans paused during Captive Nations Week to reaffirm our
commitment to liberty and self-government and to express our solidarity
with all those peoples seeking freedom, independence, and security.
Today, 33 years after our first observance of Captive Nations Week, millions
of people who suffered under Soviet domination and communist rule are
free. The Iron Curtain and its most despised symbol, the Berlin Wall, have
fallen--toppled by courageous individuals who would no longer stand the
denial of their fundamental human rights. Today, we celebrate the
existence of a free and unified Germany, as well as the independence of the
Baltic States, Central European countries, and 12 new states that replaced
the USSR. In Afghanistan and Angola, where bloody civil war against
Soviet-supported, Marxist-Leninist regimes left thousands dead and
millions of others homeless, chances of achieving lasting peace have
reached their highest level in years.
As we celebrate the hope of peace and freedom in these and other once-
captive nations, we also remember the many courageous, freedom-loving
men and women who resisted tyranny and oppression--often at great
personal cost. These include the thousands of dissenters who risked
imprisonment, exile, and death in order to demand rights that we Americans
enjoy: freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, as well as the right to a
fair trial and to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
They include prisoners of the gulag who remained devoted to liberty despite
suffering hunger, torture, and long periods of solitary confinement. And
they include selfless religious leaders such as Father Jerzy Popieluszko of
Poland, Cardinal Josef Mindszenty of Hungary, and Cardinal Josyf Slipyj of
Ukraine, who inspired countless others by their unshakable belief in the
God-given rights and dignity of the human person.
From broadcasters at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, who pierced the Iron Curtain with words of hope and truth, to
freedom-fighters in Nicaragua and other Latin American countries, who led
popular resistance to local despots and to political and military
interference from Cuba and the Soviet Union--the men and women who we
remember this week never lost their faith in freedom and in the inevitable
triumph of liberty and justice.
As we recall all those who labored and sacrificed to hasten the demise of
imperial communism and to liberate the world's captive nations, we must
also remember those peoples who remain subject to regimes that continue
to deny basic human rights in stark violation of both the letter and the
spirit of international human rights agreements, as well as fundamental
standards of morality. The United States will continue to speak out against
egregious human rights violations in Cuba and elsewhere, and we shall
continue to warn the world's newly emerging democracies against another
kind of subjugation: the tyranny of ethnic hatred and nationalist rivalries.
History has shown how these evils can produce their own form of captivity:
a vicious cycle of violence, political repression, and economic stagnation
and loss. As this observance of Captive Nations Week reminds us, freedom
and peace are precious blessings that require the faith, the will, and the
wherewithal to preserve and strengthen them.
The Congress, by Joint Resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212),
has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation
designating the third week in July of each year as "Captive Nations Week."
Now, therefore, I, George Bush, President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim the week beginning July 12, 1992, as Captive Nations
Week. I call on all Americans to observe this week with appropriate
ceremonies and activities in celebration of the growth of liberty and
democracy around the world and in recognition of the need for continued
vigilance and resolve in the defense of human rights.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this fifteenth day of July,
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-two, and of the
Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and
seventeenth.
George Bush
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Status of Iraqi Compliance With UN Security
Council Resolutions
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate released by
the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Jackson Hole,
Wyoming
Date: Jul, 16 19927/16/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: United Nations, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution (Public Law 102-1), and as part of my continuing effort to keep
the Congress fully informed, I am again reporting on the status of efforts to
obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security
Council.
Since the events described in my report of May 15, 1992, the Iraqi
Government has provided what it terms a "full, final, and complete"
disclosure of its programs for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The
Iraqi report, which reached the United Nations 2 months after it was
originally promised, is now under review by the United Nations Special
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). The preliminary assessment of these organizations is that the
Iraqis have provided little new information. The Iraqis also have provided
the United Nations with a "Compliance and Monitoring Report," which aims to
satisfy the requirement of U.N. Security Council Resolution 175 for a list of
all sites subject to long-term monitoring. UNSCOM is assessing this report.
As of July 1, UNSCOM and IAEA have conducted 38 inspections in all four
weapons categories. From May 26 to June 4, the 12th nuclear inspection
team oversaw the destruction of three buildings at the al Atheer nuclear
weapons fabrication facility. It also inspected uranium enrichment sites at
Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat to prepare for the destruction and the rendering
harmless of utilities and ventilations systems during the 13th inspection in
July. The Iraqi Government continues to refuse IAEA requests for records
detailing foreign suppliers of its nuclear weapons program.
A small Chemical Destruction Group entered Iraq on June 19. This team will
spend several months in Iraq establishing a base and overseeing the long-
term destruction of Iraqi chemical agents and weapons at the Muthanna
Establishment. The operation will be run by a large multinational group,
including two Americans. UNSCOM estimates the operation will take 12 to
18 months to complete. A second combined chemical and biological weapons
team was in Iraq from June 26 to July 4 conducting inspections and
destroying dual-use chemical production equipment.
From May 14 to 22, the 11th ballistic missile team inspected five sites,
completed verification of Iraqi destruction of SCUD missile production and
launcher components, and verified the destruction of missile production
equipment. The 12th ballistic missile team is in Iraq from July 9 to 17 to
inspect undeclared sites.
We view with particular concern the refusal by Iraqi authorities to grant
immediate access by UNSCOM inspectors to the Agricultural Ministry in
early July. The President of the U.N. Security Council has characterized this
refusal as a material and unacceptable breach of Resolution 687. We are
resolved that Iraq must not be allowed to defy the Security Council and
evade its responsibilities under this resolution.
Continued Iraqi intransigence with respect to compliance with the relevant
U.N. Security Council resolutions led UNSCOM to initiate a program of aerial
surveillance of WMD activity in Iraq on June 21. Utilizing UNSCOM's German
helicopters, two to three flights will be flown per week, with five to six
sites covered on each flight; this program will provide more immediate and
accurate information about Iraqi facilities. We strongly favor this
aggressive approach by UNSCOM, which will broaden UNSCOM's ability to find
suspect sites as well as conduct long-term monitoring.
UNSCOM continues to face a shortage of funds. U.S. efforts to alleviate this
problem will result in payment of approximately $30 million for UNSCOM by
the end of July. Discussions are ongoing with other nations regarding
contributions by them to UNSCOM.
Since my last report, there has been further progress at the U.N.
Compensation Commission concerning preparations for the processing of
claims from individuals, corporations, other entities, governments, and
international organizations that suffered direct loss or damage as a result
of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The Governing Council
of the Commission held its sixth session in Geneva from June 22 to 26 and
has scheduled further meetings in September and December. (A meeting
tentatively set for November has been cancelled.) At its June session, the
Council approved the final part of the rules of procedure (the first three
parts were approved in March). The entire set of rules was then issued as a
Council decision. The rules provide a practical, nontechnical system for
processing claims. The Council also decided that members of the Allied
Coalition Armed Forces who were prisoners of war and mistreated in
violation of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, are eligible for compensation in accordance with the claims
criteria previously adopted.
The Council continued its discussion of the "embargo loss" issue and agreed
to a statement for the record promising that the issue of priority of
payments would be considered. Also during the session of June 22 to 26, the
Commission released to governments the form for corporate claims (Form
E). The Council also reviewed the draft form for claims from governments
and international organizations (Form F). The Executive Secretary reported
that the $2 million loan from the Kuwaiti Government has been received, and
the Commission has received another $1 million as a result of the U.S.
contribution to the United Nations for activities under Resolution 687. The
financial impasse of the past several months, however, has cost valuable
time in developing computer software and other key projects. Now that
operating funds have been received, the Secretariat will press ahead and try
to recover as much lost time as possible. On June 26, the United States
filed its first set of 200 claims with the Commission; altogether 10
governments filed claims by the end of the week. Meanwhile, the
Department of State distributed to potential U.S. claimants the form for
claims of individuals over $100,000 (Form D) and continued to collect and
review small claims.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of Resolution 687, the Sanctions
Committee continues to receive notice of shipments of foodstuffs to Iraq.
The Sanctions Committee also continues to consider and, when appropriate,
approve requests to send to Iraq materials and supplies for essential
civilian needs. Iraq, in contrast, has for months maintained a full embargo
against its northern provinces. Iraq has also refused to utilize the
opportunity under Resolutions 706 and 712 to sell $1.6 billion in oil, most
of the proceeds from which could be used by Iraq to purchase foodstuffs,
medicines, materials, and supplies for essential civilian needs of its
civilian population. The Iraqi authorities bear full responsibility for any
suffering in Iraq that results from their refusal to implement Resolutions
706 and 712.
Through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United
States, Kuwait, and our allies continue to press the Government of Iraq to
comply with its obligations under Security Council resolutions to return all
detained Kuwaiti and third-country nationals. Likewise, the United States
and its allies continue to press the Government of Iraq to return to Kuwait
all property and equipment removed from Kuwait by Iraq. Iraq continues to
resist full cooperation on these issues and to resist unqualified ICRC access
to detention facilities in Iraq.
Mindful of the finding of the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 688 that
Iraq's repression of its civilian population threatens international peace and
security in the region, we will continue to monitor carefully the treatment
of Iraq's citizens in concert with our Coalition partners, and together we
remain prepared to take appropriate steps if the situation requires. To this
end, we will continue to maintain an appropriate level of forces in the
region for as long as required by the situation in Iraq.
I remain grateful for the support of the Congress for these efforts, and I
look forward to continued cooperation toward achieving our mutual
objectives.
Sincerely,
George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Human Rights Issues
Perkins
Source: Edward J. Perkins, US Permanent Representative to
the United Nations
Description: Statement before the Social Committee of the UN
Economic and Social Council, New York City
Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Country: Germany, Poland, Finland
Subject: Human Rights, United Nations
[TEXT]
This is my first statement before the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC);
I take this opportunity to say how delighted I am to be here. The fact that I
am here to speak on human rights questions is particularly meaningful to
me. I would like to take this opportunity also, Mr. Chairman, to congratulate
you and the other members of the bureau upon your election. I am sure that
under your direction, our deliberations will be efficient and productive.
Mr. Chairman, we meet today at an extraordinary time. It is an era of great
advances and uplifting prospects for the full enjoyment of human rights, but
it is also a time of new dangers to personal freedom. On one hand, the
collapse of communism presents the world and the United Nations with
unprecedented opportunities. It means freer lives for hundreds of millions
who lived under the boot of repression. It means economic liberty and the
chance for personal economic initiative to millions who have never known
such things. On the other hand, as we observe in the tragic situation in
Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Croatia, freedom from one kind of
tyranny does not assure freedom from others. In too many places, the
removal of central authority has been accompanied by the scourge of vicious
oppression in the name of nationalist, ethnic, or religious interests.
Consequently, we cannot afford a pause for self-congratulation. The great
gains of recent years are not irreversible. The protection of human rights is
far from complete. Our energies must turn to those who are, or who have
been, the victims of oppression--the political prisoners, the tortured, the
victims of discrimination, the disappeared.
Our challenge today is to examine how best to strengthen the UN role in
consolidating the gains of recent years. We must recognize that while our
progress is great, it is also fragile. Inspired by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, inspired by the
triumph of human rights in places where those documents formerly were
honored more in rhetoric than in fact, let us see how we can build on this
surge of freedom to unchain even more fellow human beings and further
protect their rights once they are free.
Mr. Chairman, in my remarks today, I want to address my country's concerns
regarding the following subjects:
-- A search for common goals as we pursue the cause of human rights;
-- Actions the Economic and Social Council may take to strengthen the
Human Rights Commission and Sub-Commission;
-- Enhanced support for the Center for Human Rights; the setting of
priorities for the World Conference on Human Rights; and
-- Keeping the focus on the sovereignty of the individual in the field of
human rights.
As we collaborate on these important matters, we must endeavor to avoid
dangerous regional divisions. We must not allow the so-called North-South
split to threaten the real progress we have made. We must search for
common ground so we can narrow rather than exacerbate our differences.
This search for common ground must begin with the promotion and
protection of those rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which all member states have pledged to honor.
We have found that the proliferation of human rights instruments does not
necessarily ensure that core human rights are protected around the world.
My government believes that the implementation of existing standards,
rather than the invention of new ones, should be the primary focus of future
UN activity in the field of human rights and is the common ground on which
we can meet. Our own ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights less than 1 month ago was the product of a long and
thoughtful national debate.
The question arises, then: What is the Council's role in implementing these
rights?
First of all, ECOSOC is the parent body of the Human Rights Commission and
the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities. As such, Council members elect the members of the Human
Rights Commission. This key role of the Council is often overlooked, but my
government believes it deserves further attention.
We believe the Council should elect to the Human Rights Commission
governments who plainly demonstrate commitment to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Of the current members of the Commission,
three were subject in 1992 to country-specific resolutions establishing or
continuing mandates for special rapporteurs to investigate human rights
violations by their governments. Several more were mentioned by thematic
rapporteurs as violators of protections against, for example, enforced or
involuntary disappearances.
On the other hand, there are new states from every region who are striving
to protect the human rights of their citizens. These governments would
make strong candidates for membership on the Commission, and we
encourage more of them to take on this challenge. We urge the various
regional groups to take the human rights record of the candidates into
consideration when they debate which of their neighbors they wish to
endorse.
Secondly, ECOSOC has responsibility regarding the mandates approved by the
Human Rights Commission. These mandates emerge after extensive debate
and agreement. They represent the decisions of the principal UN body
entrusted with substantive questions about human rights. Thus, we believe
the Council should make its decisions confirming the mandates
expeditiously so that work on them can begin in a timely fashion.
Thirdly, we are pleased the Council agreed to an intersessional role for the
Commission, and we believe this tool will be important and useful when
applied in those cases of a truly emergency nature. Nevertheless, the
Council needs to encourage the Commission to take a look at its mission in
several areas. I think, first of all, of country-specific situations. For my
government, country-specific human rights situations are the core of the
UN's human rights mandate. When governments oppress individuals they are
supposed to protect, we believe it is the duty of the United Nations to act on
behalf of the citizen. Indeed, the last Human Rights Commission took action
on a record 22 countries, counting the 1503 procedure, advisory services,
and special rapporteurs. Next fall's UN General Assembly will hear human
rights reports on Afghanistan, Burma, Cuba, El Salvador, Haiti, Iran, and Iraq.
I would like to make a general comment on the constant proliferation of
topics under the umbrella of human rights. I believe this phenomenon
weakens the Commission's ability to work toward protecting the vital civil
and political rights of individuals. As a coordinating body, the Council
should recommend to its subsidiary bodies that each one adhere solely to its
specific area of expertise. UNDP [UN Development Program] is the
development agency; there is UNEP [UN Environment Program] for the
environment, and UNCED [UN Conference on Environment and Development]
will lead to an environmental commission. The Human Rights Commission
should be devoted to protection of individual human rights. When each body
addresses its primary mandate, the United Nations will become a leaner,
more efficient organization.
The role of the special rapporteur must be protected and enlarged. The work
of the rapporteurs, special representatives, and the various working groups
cannot be completed without the full cooperation of governments. It is in
everyone's interest to assist by offering information to the rapporteurs,
representatives, and working groups, and to facilitate visits to mandated
countries. The resulting reports are too important to the ongoing
monitoring of human rights for us to accept anything less than complete
cooperation.
Thematic rapporteurs should be encouraged to be more specific regarding
individual country behavior in their field of investigation. Their reports
could include summaries of their findings about, for example, arbitrary
detention in a given country, along with recommendations and routine
referral of information for consideration under the 1503 procedure.
Turning to the Subcommission, my delegation believes that body requires
serious reform. We are encouraged by the progress of the Working Group on
Reform, and we hope the Subcommission will take meaningful steps to
control the number and duration of costly studies. Internal conflicts
involving ethnic minorities have emerged as an extremely dangerous
problem that can threaten international peace and security, as well as
endangering the rights of members of many of these minorities. It would be
most appropriate for the Subcommission, which is charged with the
prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities, to take more
of a leading role on this issue.
My government has recently underscored to the Secretary General our view
that, because of the key role of human rights in the work of the United
Nations, it is important that the Human Rights Center in Geneva be given
sufficient resources to carry out its mandates. We believe that is not now
the case, and we urge the Secretary General, as he continues his
restructuring exercise, to consider deploying resources from other parts of
the United Nations to the center. The Special Procedures Branch, with its
burden of supporting an ever-increasing number of mandates, and technical
assistance, especially to emerging democracies, are worthy recipients of
redeployed UN personnel and new equipment.
We join other governments whose statements have lamented the lack of
progress in preparation for the World Conference on Human Rights. We are
only 1 year away from that important human rights meeting in Vienna. And
we have already held two prepcoms, but we have yet to agree on an agenda.
We run the risk of looking rudderless to the international community if we
do not succeed in adopting a simple, achievable set of goals for the
conference. We truly hope that we adopt, at the next prepcom, an agenda
aimed at finding practical ways to improve implementation of human rights
standards and constructive ways to elaborate the important relationship
between democracy, human rights, and development.
In all these efforts, our universal goal should be support for the sovereignty
of the individual. The international law of human rights has largely been
created in the wake of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Today,
we regard individual rights as the centerpiece of our efforts in the UN to
protect human rights around the world. Protection of the individual is
central to the purpose of all human rights institutions and instruments. The
increase in requests to the United Nations for elections assistance testifies
to the interest governments have in providing the individual with that most
basic human right--the right to choose freely and fairly the leaders of one's
own government. Regardless of nationality, culture, religion, and ethnicity,
we are all dedicated to protecting the human rights of every man, woman,
and child on this globe. That should be our primary purpose, and that
purpose should inform every decision we make in this body.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: UN Security Council Consideration of the Situation
in South Africa
Perkins
Source: Edward J. Perkins, US Permanent Representative to
the United Nations
Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, New York City
Date: Jul, 15 19927/15/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: South Africa
Subject: Human Rights, Democratization,
Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations
[TEXT]
Mr. President: The United States has watched with admiration the
impressive efforts over the past year of all parties in South Africa to
negotiate an end to apartheid and to create a constitution that has as its
goal a democratic, non-racial government for all the peoples of South
Africa. We salute the black majority in South Africa for the skill and
patience with which they and their leaders have persevered on this matter,
and we commend the authorities in South Africa for abolishing
institutionalized apartheid and entering into difficult negotiations about
the country's future, creating an irreversible process that will lead to the
establishment of a democratic, non-racial government. Of that I am certain.
It is the policy of my government to do all it can to further the negotiating
process, and I believe that that must also be the goal of the Security
Council.
We welcome the present Security Council debate on the future of South
Africa and thank the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for helping
recently at its annual summit to focus world attention on this very
important matter. The presence today of so many distinguished
representatives from the OAU, other African nations, opposition movements
within South Africa, and from the Government of South Africa gives us a
unique opportunity to reach consensus on what must be done to suggest
means of bringing all South African parties together to continue their
negotiations.
Momentous change bears inevitable costs, but the violence that has wracked
South Africa is too great a price and must be brought under control. The
world is watching, as is history. The leaders participating in the current
transition in South Africa bring to the process impressive skill, experience
and, in many cases, the wisdom brought by suffering. At this critical point,
statesmanship is another necessary ingredient.
The purpose of our meeting here is not to diagnose the origins of the
violence in South Africa, nor to impose conditions on those who bear the
responsibility for the violence. Our purpose is to take those steps, and only
those steps, which increase the ability of South Africa to overcome the
violence and get on with the important task of negotiations. We have full
confidence in the commission chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone to
investigate the violence, and we support the fullest implementation of the
commission's findings by all parties. We also support the efforts of the
National Peace Accord Forum. The UN stands ready to help these efforts, but
the parties themselves must resolve to control the violence.
We believe it is impossible for us to ascertain precisely what is necessary
to get all the leaders of South Africa back to the negotiating table in an
atmosphere free of violence. A small UN team dispatched to South Africa,
however, would be able to gain a better perspective. We propose that a UN
goodwill mission, under the Secretary General's good offices, travel to
South Africa to meet with all leaders and to offer its services to bring the
parties closer together. A goodwill team would not tamper with the
complex negotiations themselves, nor would it seek to establish
responsibility for the violence. The issue of violence is one of a series that
must be examined to get to the heart of the matter: creating the conditions
to get negotiations restarted.
In summary, let me restate my government's position: the UN should help
create the conditions for progress, not apportion blame nor seek to punish
any of the parties. A good start has already been made by the OAU in helping
to get all parties together here today. With goodwill, a measure of
statesmanship, and an eye to history, we can do much more. We must not
delay, as time is short, and South Africa has waited too long. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Mozambique: Agreement on Humanitarian
Assistance
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 17 19927/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Mozambique
Subject: Human Rights, Democratization
[TEXT]
The US Government welcomes the agreement on humanitarian assistance
signed by the Mozambican Government and RENAMO [Mozambique National
Resistance] in Rome, July 16. Once implemented, the agreement should go a
long way to facilitate the secure delivery of sorely needed food aid and
other assistance to drought-stricken areas of Mozambique. We urge the two
parties to move rapidly to identify the land corridors which will be used to
deliver relief supplies.
This agreement, while an important step forward, is no substitute for a
general cease-fire. The serious drought now affecting Mozambique and the
Southern African region adds a special urgency to the Mozam-bique peace
talks now underway in Rome. We urge the government and RENAMO to
redouble their efforts in Rome to find a peaceful and lasting settlement to
the conflict. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Consolidating Peace and Democracy in El
Salvador
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington,
DC
Date: Jul, 9 19927/9/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: El Salvador
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee: El Salvador is at peace today.
A democratically elected president had the vision and perseverance to
negotiate an end to the war. Former enemies are discussing how to rebuild
their country together, leftist political leaders once banned from political
life are sitting as elected members of the legislature, the demobilization of
the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] guerrillas has begun,
and the military and police are being reformed to adapt to the challenges of
democracy and peace.
When Secretary Baker addressed the Salvadoran National Assembly last
January, he said:
Let no one doubt where the Government of the United States stands: We
fully support the peace agreement. We support these accords--not as a
necessary evil to end a bitter conflict but because we believe the reforms
that have been negotiated in the judicial system, the electoral system, the
armed forces, and the police will, as President Cristiani said, strengthen El
Salvador's democratic institutions, enlarge the scope of human rights, and
promote national reconciliation.
It is difficult to overstate the drama in the developments in El Salvador
today. This subcommittee saw it last month when FMLN commander Joaquin
Villalobos sat at this table with Vice Minister of the Presidency Ernesto
Altschul and together called on the United States to remain engaged in their
country. Consider also:
-- Last fall, before the peace accords were signed, Salvadoran Government
officials--along with the US ambassador--began traveling to the FMLN
community of Santa Marta. The president of the national land bank explained
the ways his programs could benefit the residents of Santa Marta. So did
the local mayor--from the ARENA [National Republican Alliance] Party, the
head of the national reconstruction agency, and electric
power company representatives. This same process is repeating itself in
other FMLN communities today.
-- The FMLN, now becoming a political party, conducts large public rallies
in San Salvador; its once clandestine radio station, Radio Venceremos, is on
the air regularly and operates openly.
-- On March 10, the Salvadoran delegation to a World Bank meeting in
Washington included representatives of the FMLN and opposition political
parties. The delegation spoke eloquently about the need for post-war
reconstruction aid and received $800 million in pledges.
Through efforts such as these, Salvadorans deserve full credit for achieving
peace and starting the work of national reconciliation. But US foreign
policy also played a large role in El Salvador during the past decade, and
there are lessons we should draw from our experience.
The first is that it is never too early to defend democracy. It is generally
accepted today that the United States defends human rights and will only
conduct normal relations with democratic governments in this hemisphere.
The OAS [Organization of American States], following a doctrine reached in
June 1991 in Santiago, Chile, is beginning to take collective action to
defend elected governments against coups.
This was not always the norm. Two decades ago, Jose Napoleon Duarte was
elected president of El Salvador, but the military prevented him from taking
office. Neither the United States nor the hemispheric community acted to
defend the decision the Salvadoran people had freely made at the ballot box.
Had this hemisphere defended democracy in 1972, it is possible El Salvador
would not have experienced the closing of political space and the
polarization that strengthened violent political extremes and led to the
decade-long war.
Second, our sustained engagement in El Salvador has helped bring about
long-term democratic reform. Our military aid received the most attention,
but $3 of [every] $4 we sent to El Salvador during the 1980s were economic
aid. That supported a land reform program which redistributed 15% of El
Salvador's arable land to 575,000 peasants. It kept the economy going
during the war by repairing electric lines, roads, bridges, and other
infrastructure damaged by FMLN attacks. During President Cristiani's term,
our economic aid supported bold free-market policies--fiscal reform, trade
liberalization, and privatization of state enterprises--which tamed
inflation and made El Salvador's economy grow 3.4% in 1990, despite the
war.
Our military assistance helped prevent the overthrow of a fledgling
democracy by anti-democratic forces, and it ultimately helped bring the
FMLN to the bargaining table. It gave us important influence on the
practices of the military institution, contributing to a steady decline in
political violence. In the early 1980s, hundreds of Salvadoran civilians
were killed monthly by all factions for political reasons. By 1990, total
political killings numbered 62--less in an entire year than the weekly
average a decade before.
Our diplomacy and our aid helped El Salvador transform itself from a
polarized, inequitable nation in conflict to a more peaceful, open, and
tolerant society. No observer of El Salvador denies that the nation's
political climate, its institutions, [and] its armed forces have changed
profoundly in the past decade. And no other nation has ever accepted the
reforms President Cristiani's Government accepted in the midst of a war--
agreement on military reductions in advance of a cease-fire agreement, a
commission with members appointed by an international organization to sit
in judgment of military officers' human rights records, the expansion of the
legislature, [and] new laws to govern the judiciary and the electoral
processes.
El Salvador's transformation gives us a dramatic example of a society's
capacity to change. I hope it will be viewed in the United States as the type
of positive change that our influence can help bring about by backing the
right principles and remaining engaged over the long term.
The third lesson must be that we need to remain engaged to see that the
victory of peace is consolidated. We are not alone in that work. The UN
mission, ONUSAL [UN Office on El Salvador], is in place monitoring the
cease-fire, demobilization, and human rights. The "Four Friends"--Mexico,
Colombia, Venezuela, and Spain--which helped bring the negotiations to a
successful conclusion remain involved in the implementation of the peace
accords.
We need to remain engaged diplomatically to monitor compliance with the
cease-fire and demobilization. As might be expected in an undertaking of
this size, some deadlines were missed by both the government and the FMLN.
The two sides reached a "recalendarization" agreement to set new deadlines,
preserving the final October 31 deadline for demobilizing the FMLN and
reintegrating its members into Salvadoran society. Nevertheless, the
cease-fire has held--there have been no violations. The concentration of
forces on both sides is complete, and demobilization has begun.
Following that new schedule, all forces were concentrated in pre-
designated zones by June 25, and the first 1,402 FMLN combatants
demobilized [on] June 30. That represents 20% of the FMLN's combatants;
another 20% will demobilize each month until demobilization is complete
October 31.
Nevertheless, we are seriously concerned about FMLN compliance with
agreed procedures for demobilization of forces. The weapons inventory
presented by the FMLN to ONUSAL seems to describe about one-third of the
weapons the FMLN actually possesses. UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, in a June 1 report, stated:
I have also expressed to the FMLN my doubts about whether the inventories
of arms that it has presented to ONUSAL accurately reflect its true
holdings. Suspicions that FMLN is retaining clandestine caches of arms and
ammunition have had a destabilizing effect on the whole implementation
process.
Second, the FMLN inventory drastically undercounts sophisticated weapons
such as surface-to-air missiles. Third, the FMLN is still receiving weapons
from Nicaragua, whether from the Sandinista army or other parties, as
evidenced in the interception of two clandestine shipments on March 3 and
May 20 at La Libertad on the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The latter
shipment included 40,000 rounds of assault rifle ammunition. Fourth, we
have numerous strong indications that the FMLN is selling arms to the URNG
[Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity] guerrillas in Guatemala and may
be preparing to sell or transfer arms to other revolutionaries in Honduras
and Peru.
These are very serious issues, Mr. Chairman. If they are not resolved, they
will bring more than international criticism: They have the potential to end
the support the FMLN has received from the United States and others in the
international community.
The Salvadoran Government's record of compliance with the peace accords
includes the following:
-- It created the Committee for the Consolidation of the Peace (COPAZ).
This committee, made up of members from the government, FMLN, armed
forces, and political parties in the National Assembly, will verify
compliance with the accords and mediate disputes. COPAZ, in turn, has
formed subcommittees on the National Civilian Police and land issues.
-- The armed forces have provided a complete arms inventory, which the
United Nations has verified. It has concentrated on the 62 locations the
accords specified by the deadline the accords established. Conscription to
the armed forces has ended.
-- The armed forces are reducing their ranks, primarily due to attrition,
before the January 1993 deadline contained in the accords. Between January
and May of this year, about 13,000 personnel left the Salvadoran armed
forces, reducing its force to 50,300.
-- Further reductions will bring the force to 40,000 by next January and
31,451--the final level stipulated in the peace accords--by January 1994.
-- At the end of this month, the army's five immediate reaction battalions
will begin to disband. All will be disbanded by year's end.
-- We were frankly concerned that, initially, the Salvadoran Government
failed to comply with the requirement that the National Guard and Treasury
Police be abolished and their members transferred to the armed forces.
Congress shared that concern. I am pleased to see that this issue has now
been resolved. The National Guard and Treasury Police were pulled off the
streets last February 1. Their units have been abolished, and their members,
as provided in the accords, reassigned to other armed forces units.
-- President Cristiani has pledged to cooperate in regional negotiations in
the Central American Security Commission. Those talks could produce
agreement for mutual reductions that would reduce the size of the
Salvadoran military below the levels agreed in the peace accords.
-- The Directorate of National Intelligence was dissolved last month. It is
being replaced, as the accords provide, by a civilian-led office of state
intelligence, which will report directly to the president.
-- The National Assembly amended El Salvador's constitution, removing
police powers from the armed forces and creating a new national civilian
police force and police academy.
-- The National Assembly also passed legislation granting a limited
amnesty for political crimes committed between 1980 and 1991 and
guaranteeing full civil rights to the FMLN. The amnesty will not apply to
those already convicted by a jury, such as the killers of the Jesuits, or
those investigated by the Truth Commission.
-- Eighty political prisoners were released in early March. Another 28
cases are under review.
-- A Supreme Electoral Tribunal and human rights ombudsman have been
appointed.
The Salvadoran Government is making real progress toward compliance with
the peace agreements' provisions for a new national civilian police. It has
submitted a revised list of candidates for police commander to the Peace
Commission. The peace agreements were recently revised to allow the
police to draw more recruits from the ranks of ex-combatants. After a
transition period, no more than 20% of entering police recruits will be ex-
national police, with an equal number of ex-FMLN members.
We are working with the Salvadorans, the United Nations, and Spain to
support the establishment of this civilian police force. In this fiscal year
and the next, $20 million from the Salvadoran Demobilization and Training
Fund will be used for this purpose, through the Department of Justice's
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).
With our help, the new police academy should begin operations by September
1. We will provide funds for instructors, materials, and equipment, with a
special emphasis on training in democratic values, human rights, and police
ethics. ICITAP will supplement police academy training with courses for
on-duty police officers. It also will help develop long-range planning skills,
internal investigations and accountability procedures, and logistical
systems so that the new civilian police can perform their proper functions
effectively.
The peace accords created two commissions to investigate human rights
issues: an ad hoc commission to review the human rights records of
military officers and a Truth Commission to investigate major human rights
cases.
We are supporting this work. We are providing $1 million to the United
Nations to support the Truth Commission. We have held meetings with
members of both commissions, and we are prepared to provide information
we have on cases the commissions are investigating.
It will take the full resources of our embassy in San Salvador, as well as of
those who follow Salvadoran issues here and at the United Nations, to keep
track of the peace process as it unfolds. I hope it will continue to unfold
smoothly. But there is no guarantee that it will not need more direct
involvement on the part of the United States, the UN Secretary General, or
the Four Friends, as happened when the agreements were in the final stages
of negotiation. To be ready for such involvement, we need to watch the
process day by day, minute by minute.
In this regard, let me take the liberty of addressing a matter that is frankly
out of the hands of this subcommittee. The President nominated Michael G.
Kozak to be US ambassador to El Salvador in October of last year. I had the
privilege of having Mike Kozak as my principal deputy, and many of you know
him well. He is a dedicated, hard-working, and scrupulously honest public
servant in the finest traditions of the Department of State. He richly
deserves to be confirmed. Our embassy in San Salvador has been without an
ambassador for 4 months--4 months that have been absolutely crucial for
the peace process. The Administration urges the Senate to schedule
confirmation hearings for Mike Kozak and for Joseph G. Sullivan,
ambassador-designate to Nicaragua, without further delay.
Our economic aid is also vital to the success of El Salvador's National
Reconstruction Plan. This plan, a major component of the peace accords,
will provide immediate humanitarian relief and long-term social and
economic assistance in former conflictive zones, help ex-combatants
reintegrate into civilian pursuits, give small farmers credit to purchase
land, and rebuild vital infrastructure. In its first 4 months, nearly 1.5
million Salvadorans, including over 790,000 under the age of 5 [years], have
been vaccinated against infectious diseases. All but one of the 23 health
centers closed because of the conflict are now open, and over 250 health
workers are active in the area. Fifty-five war amputees have received
treatment; 460 ex-combatants are receiving vocational training. The
"Municipalities in Action" program is moving to construct 79 roads, 35
schools, 4 health centers, 4 sewage projects, and 7 rural electrification
projects, while the Ministry of Public Works is rehabilitating over 100
miles of roads. The land bank set up to provide credit to small farmers
reached over 1,300 families, and El Salvador's central bank has advanced
$3.1 million to farmers for the current planting
season.
There is still much to be done. Programs to counsel ex-combatants are on
the drawing boards. Over 400 schools must be reopened and staffed. More
funds are needed to stimulate small business activity and to rebuild
electric and telephone lines. And the programs now underway need to be
expanded.
The National Reconstruction Plan is more than an aid program to a poverty-
stricken area. It is a way to spread the benefits of peace and democracy to
those most affected by the conflict: ex-combatants, victims of violence,
[and] refugees. It will ease the difficult transition to civilian life for many
and give others the courage to renew their lives. In doing so, it offers the
hope that reconciliation can take root and that once-bitter enemies can
work side by side to rebuild the land they share.
US economic aid to El Salvador will also promote changes that promise to
make economic growth permanent. President Cristiani stands in the first
ranks of Latin American economic reformers. Under his leadership, El
Salvador has steadily lowered tariffs and barriers to investment, privatized
inefficient state-owned enterprises, and embraced the wisdom of free
markets. Even during the most destructive days of the war, El Salvador's
economy continued to grow. Now that the burden of the conflict is over,
President Cristiani's sound economic policies make economic aid a good
investment.
For the sake of El Salvador and the entire region, we need to pass the
Administration's 1993 request for $383 million for the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative (EAI); $43.9 million of that would go to reduce El
Salvador's debt to the United States. With EAI debt relief, El Salvador would
save over $800 million in debt payments, while putting $21.4 million in a
jointly administered fund to ease environmental problems neglected during
the war. Reduced debt payments will enable El Salvador to attract more
foreign investment and devote more money to social projects vital to
reconciliation and post-war economic recovery.
We were pleased that the House [of Representatives] rejected last week an
attempt to cut in half EAI debt-reduction funding by a 78 to 333 vote. The
House agriculture appropriations bill now contains $69 million for PL-480
debt reduction in FY 1993. The Administration urges your support for House
and Senate passage of that appropriation and for the rest of the EAI funding
this year.
The FY 1992 continuing resolution provides $21.25 million in security
assistance for maintenance, non-lethal equipment, training, medical
services, and replacement vehicles. For FY 1993, we propose a total of $40
million: $13 million for the Demobilization and Transition Fund, to be used
to reintegrate military and FMLN ex-combat- ants into civilian pursuits; and
$27 million in non-lethal assistance as the Salvadoran armed forces
downsize, demobilize, and take up new missions in a peaceful El Salvador.
We expect to play a very active role in helping El Salvador's armed forces to
reduce and restructure. Continued US support, especially our emphasis on
human rights and proper administration, is critical to maintain our
influence and ensure compliance with the peace agreements.
Moreover, sensitive border disagreements between El Salvador and Honduras,
stemming from the "soccer war" of 1969, are due to be decided soon at the
International Court of Justice in The Hague. To create an imbalance between
these two countries' military services would be dangerous and destabilizing
at this time.
Mr. Chairman, I know that you and members of this subcommittee are
following these issues with close interest. The hearings you have conducted
have helped focus public attention on the success that has been achieved in
El Salvador and the work that remains to be done. We in the Administration
look forward to working with you to do what once seemed impossible--to
help consolidate a lasting, democratic peace in El Salvador. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: US Policy Regarding Refugee Women and
Children
Moten
Source: Sarah E. Moten, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Assistance, Bureau for Refugee Programs
Description: Address before the US Catholic Conference's Biannual
Conference, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 1 19927/1/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Country: Vietnam, Mozambique
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
It is my pleasure to be with you this morning to discuss one of my biggest
interests: refugee women and refugee children. I would like to give you a
brief overview of US policy in this area and how we are working to make
that policy a reality.
US refugee policy, in general, stresses the need to work as a part of the
larger international community. Where refugee assistance is concerned,
this means stressing first and foremost the responsibilities and
capabilities of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR].
The United States has worked hard with other member governments in the
UNHCR's governing body (the executive committee) to establish UNHCR policy
on refugee women and refugee children. Our work has resulted in the
recently issued "Guidelines for the Protection of Refugee Women" and the
previous "Guidelines for Refugee Children." I should point out that UNHCR is
one of a very few UN agencies which has adopted a policy or guidelines on
women or children.
Now that the policies are set in the UNHCR, we have put a large emphasis on
effective implementation of both sets of guidelines, and we work in several
ways to achieve this.
-- In the executive committee, we continue to stress--in resolutions
pertaining to, for example, refugee emergencies, refugee repatriation, or
personnel--the need to focus on the beneficiaries of the specific programs.
If you design the program around the beneficiaries on the scene, women and
children's needs will be addressed.
-- We have worked closely and directly with offices in UNHCR to try to
develop a clearer link between the policies and UNHCR's internal
programming and budgeting. This has had its clearest reflection in
discussions on the presentation of UNHCR's budget in its executive
committee documents. UNHCR is working toward a document which would
more clearly enumerate the populations being targeted by the budget and
programs being proposed.
-- In designing and implementing programs which are sensitive to the needs
and abilities of refugee women and the needs of refugee children, perhaps
the most important factor is awareness of the staff to the issues involved.
The UNHCR Senior Advisor on Refugee Women, Anne Brazeau, has developed a
training program called "people-oriented planning," which we have
enthusiastically endorsed, and [we] suggested that 100% of UNHCR staff be
trained.
The United States has adopted the policy that attention to refugee women
and children should be "mainstreamed" in the organization. This means
ensuring that UNHCR deals with refugee women and children holistically--
that they are a significant part of planning for every issue and every country
program. We are working to move away from special funds for special
programs; we want the general funds for general programs to be sensitively
used so that there is no need for special programs.
The best example of this is the trust fund that was set up for anti-piracy
activities, which included counseling for victims of violence. That activity
should have been a part of the general program, funded by all the donors to
the UNHCR, rather than a special activity which was funded almost solely by
the United States.
There are circumstances, however, where special efforts are required to
address the particularly difficult circumstances of refugee women or
refugee children. In general, these are cases where the person's
vulnerability as a woman or as a child intersects with the vulnerability she
or he faces as a refugee, creating a double vulnerability. Some examples of
severe protection problems for refugee women and refugee children include:
-- Sexual abuse of a woman during her flight to refuge;
-- The need which occurs sometimes for women or children to trade sexual
favors for basic goods or services in a refugee camp;
-- Forced conscription of refugee children for use as military porters or,
worse, as combatants; and
-- The traumas and stresses caused by family separation during flight.
The concept of mainstreaming can be combined with the need to do
something extraordinary for a specific need such as those I've just
mentioned. Under the policies adopted, UNHCR should react quickly to
address any of the above protection problems. If it were necessary to
continue a program longer than [for the] short term, however, we would
want to see such activities become part of UNHCR's general program for
refugee assistance rather than being set aside as special programs for these
groups.
The role of voluntary agencies in these areas is important but also
complicated. UNHCR should have the lead in any refugee situation in
addressing the protection problems of women or children. It usually
establishes implementing partnership arrangements with voluntary
agencies. The United States sometimes provides funding directly to
voluntary agencies or, specifically, to an international organization for
programs which benefit refugee women or refugee children. I have already
referred to the counseling for victims of violence program in Southeast
Asia, which, you all probably are well aware, has long been an active
interest of our moderator, Dawn Calabia. Other programs include:
-- Through Save the Children in Malawi, we have funded, for several years,
a program to treat the mental health problems of children who have
witnessed or participated in a horrific level of violence inside Mozambique.
We are now working with SCF [Save the Children Fund] to establish a
permanent training facility at the University of Zimbabwe, with the
cooperation of Duke University and SCF. We would like to see this become a
part of UNHCR's training for protection or social services officers, and
UNHCR is interested in the idea.
-- Over the past decade, the United States has funded voluntary agency
programs in Pakistan, many of which have been geared specifically to
refugee women's health and education needs. We believe that the effect of
the voluntary agencies which have worked with the refugees in Pakistan
will be felt long after their return to Afghanistan.
-- UNHCR will be funding a Nordic consortium called Nordic Assistance to
Repatriated Vietnamese (NARV) to assist in the return to Vietnam and
reintegration of unaccompanied minors from the camps of first asylum in
Southeast Asia. The United States will be earmarking funds for this
project. It is vital that these children, who have been determined not to be
refugees and who have parents in Vietnam, be helped to leave the
degradation and dangers of the camps, where their lives are wasted daily.
I know that most of your collective knowledge is about refugee admissions
to the United States, and what you could teach me about the special needs of
refugee women and children in this country is far greater than anything I
could tell you today. I would, however, like to address resettlement in the
United States as a special response to specific refugee protection cases.
Each year, UNHCR collects statistics on the ability of resettlement nations
to respond to protection cases. The United States led the world last year by
resettling 50% of the cases which UNHCR determined needed to be removed
from refugee camps for protection reasons. Most of these cases were
refugees who had family in this country.
The United States and the UNHCR have established a procedure under which
the United States will consider for resettlement special protection cases
identified by UNHCR, even when there is no family link in the United States.
This response is, of course, easiest in those places where INS [US
Immigration and Naturalization Service] has an office so that interviews
can be arranged quickly, such as Southeast Asia and Nairobi, Kenya.
It would be misleading for me to say that, simply because we have
established a procedure, everything is fine. We know that there is a lack of
knowledge both on the part of UNHCR protection officers and some of our
own refugee officers in the field, especially when they are not familiar
with our regular resettlement programs. My point to you here is that we
have the capacity and that we stand ready to respond when a protection
problem creates a need for resettlement.
It is commonly regarded that, if you protect and assist a woman, you assist
her child as well. In the interim, the United States contributes toward their
needs through programs of overseas assistance and of admission of certain
refugees for resettlement in the United States. Central to these goals is a
recognition that refugee problems are matters of international concern,
requiring multilateral solutions. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Malawi: Disappearance Of Labor Leader
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 15 19927/15/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Malawi
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Terrorism
[TEXT]
The United States is gravely concerned about the disappearance of Malawian
labor leader and pro-democracy advocate Chakufwa Chihana. Mr. Chihana
was arrested April 6 when he returned to Malawi after visiting Zambia and
South Africa, where he spoke in support of democratic change in Malawi. He
was ordered released on bail July 11. When he visited Lilongwe Central
Police Headquarters July 14 to arrange his once-per-week reports to the
police as required by his bail conditions, he was reportedly taken into police
custody and transferred to Zomba regional police station, some 21/2 hours
drive away, where police officials claim not to know anything of his
whereabouts.
The United States also is concerned about the Malawi Government's
expulsion of the Harare representative of the African-American Labor
Center, Tom Medley. He has been declared an "undesirable person" and
banned from Malawi. These events are even more distressing as they
contradict recent positive initiatives by President Banda, such as the recent
release of nine political detainees, in response to concerns expressed by the
international community about Malawi's human rights practices.
We call on the Government of Malawi to take immediate steps to release Mr.
Chihana from police custody and allow him to resume his normal activities
freely. We also ask the government to rescind its order banning Mr. Medley
from Malawi. These actions constitute an unfortunate step backwards on
Malawi's road to a more open, pluralistic society. We have made these
points directly to the Malawi Government.
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Rwanda: Peace Agreement
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 15 19927/15/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Rwanda
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
The US Government is greatly encouraged by the signing of a peace
agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, on July 12, between the Government of
Rwanda and the representatives of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The
two sides agreed to a temporary truce on July 19 and a permanent cease-
fire on July 31. They approved the deployment of a military observer group
to monitor the cease-fire and the creation of a joint political-military
commission to resolve interim disputes. They agreed on general principles
to govern a transition period and on further negotiations between the
government and the RPF to achieve a permanent political settlement.
This agreement reflects great credit on both parties, as well as on the
Government of Tanzania, which hosted the negotiations; the Organization of
African Unity, which will supervise the military observer group; and the
Government of France, which took a lead role in organizing the negotiations.
Other African and Western observer states--Belgium, Burundi, Nigeria,
Senegal, Uganda, Zaire, and Zimbabwe--have agreed to participate in the
various peace-keeping mechanisms or otherwise lend their support to its
implementation.
The conflict in Rwanda has generated hundreds of thousands of refugees and
displaced persons and has seriously disrupted economic activity in East
Africa. We believe that this major peace agreement represents an African
solution to an African problem. The United States provided technical advice
during the talks and will continue to advise the parties on implementing the
peace accords.
In the critical period leading up to the fullscale cease-fire on July 31, we
call on both the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front not
to launch new military initiatives which would disrupt or destroy the
prospects for peace.
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992
Title: Burma: Release Of Political Prisoners
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description:
Date: Jul, 16 19927/16/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Burma
Subject: Human Rights
[TEXT]
This month marks the beginning of the fourth year of house arrest of
Burmese opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi.
Her courage and indomitable spirit in defense of human rights and
democracy have won the admiration of the world.
Since April, the military Government of Burma has taken some limited steps
toward political reform and has released some political prisoners. Most
recently, the government began a dialogue with certain elected
parliamentarians and political party representatives.
We believe that the goal of such talks should be the prompt establishment of
democratic, elected civilian government and national reconciliation. This
should be achieved with the participation of all political figures. We once
again strongly urge the release of all political prisoners, including Aung San
Suu Kyi, and the establishment of a democratically elected civilian
government. (###)