US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992


Commitment To Reach North American Free Trade Agreement

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks following meeting with Mexican President Salinas, San Diego, California Date: Jul, 14 19927/14/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States, Mexico, Canada Subject: North America Free Trade [TEXT] President Salinas and I had an extremely constructive discussion of the status of negotiations among our two countries and Canada to create a North American Free Trade [Agreement] (NAFTA). We reaffirmed our commitment to reaching a sound NAFTA agreement as soon as possible. Let me just say a word about the importance of this historic undertaking. We live in a global economy. The fastest-growing sector of the American economy today is our export sector, and Mexico is the fastest-growing market for US exports in the world. US merchandise exports to Mexico have increased 22% per year for each of the last 5 years--twice as fast as US exports worldwide. Having added over 300,000 new jobs to our economy since 1986, we now have over 600,000 total US jobs built on our exports to Mexico. California alone exported $5.5 billion in goods and services to Mexico last year. Virtually every state has shared in that growth, not just states on the border. Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania are among the top 10 exporters to Mexico, along with California, Texas, and Arizona. By building, together, the largest free trading region in the world, Mexico, the United States, and Canada are working to ensure that the future will bring increased prosperity, trade, and new jobs for the citizens of each of our countries. Because our trade ministers and their teams have made impressive progress in recent weeks, we agreed that our meeting today marks the beginning of the final stage of negotiations. In the spirit of this evening's all-star [baseball] game, we are entering the top of the ninth inning of negotiations. President Salinas and I have instructed our trade ministers to meet on July 25 to bring this final stage of negotiations to an early and successful conclusion. We have consulted with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney, and he has similarly instructed his trade minister. We also agreed on the importance of pressing ahead with parallel efforts to assure that NAFTA enhances environmental quality and that labor issues are addressed effectively.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Chronology: Key Points in NAFTA Negotiations

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, San Diego, California Date: Jul, 13 19927/13/92 Category: Chronologies Region: North America Country: United States, Mexico, Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, History [TEXT] June 10, 1990 President Bush and Mexican President Salinas issue a joint statement endorsing the idea of a comprehensive free trade agreement between the United States and Mexico and direct their trade ministers to undertake consultations and preparatory work. August 8, 1990 US Trade Representative [USTR] Carla A. Hills and Mexican Secretary of Commerce Jaime Serra Puche report back to the two Presidents, jointly recommending the initiation of formal negotiations. August 21, 1990 President Salinas writes to President Bush proposing that the United States and Mexico negotiate a free trade agreement, a step required by US law. September 25, 1990 President Bush writes to the Chairmen of the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees notifying the committees of free trade negotiations with Mexico, a step required by US law. In his letter, the President also informs the chairmen that Canada has expressed a desire to participate in the negotiations. February 5, 1991 President Bush, President Salinas, and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announce their intention to pursue a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), creating one of the world's largest liberalized markets. February 5, 1991 President Bush writes to the Chairmen of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees of his desire to enter into trilateral negotiations with Mexico and Canada for a North American Free Trade Agreement. February 6 and 20, 1991 Senate Finance Committee holds public hearings on the proposed negotiations. February 20-21, 1991 International Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee holds public hearings on the proposed negotiations. February 27, 1991 Sixty-day legislative review period expires, during which time the Senate Finance Committee or the House Ways and Means Committee could have voted to deny fast-track procedures to legislation implementing a free trade agreement with Mexico. March 1, 1991 President Bush requests a 2-year extension of fast-track procedures for legislation implementing trade agreements, a necessary step if the procedures are to be used for NAFTA. May 1, 1991 In response to congressional concern expressed during the fast-track debate, President Bush sends a letter to Congress committing: -- To consult extensively during the course of the negotiations and conduct a broad public outreach effort; -- To work to ensure that any negative impact on employment as a result of NAFTA is minimized and to assist dislocated workers by ensuring an adequately funded worker adjustment program; -- To gradually phase out duties over time with long transition periods for sensitive sectors; -- To include an effective safeguard mechanism to provide for strict rules of origin; and -- To address environmental, labor standards, and worker rights issues. May 3, 1991 US Labor Secretary Lynn Martin and Mexican Minister of Labor and Social Welfare Arsenio Farell Cubillas sign a memorandum of understanding to promote increased standards of living and a safe and healthy work place for workers in the two countries. May 23-24, 1991 Consistent with President Bush's request, both houses of Congress vote to extend fast-track authority for 2 years for NAFTA and for other purposes. June 12, 1991 NAFTA negotiations formally launched in Toronto, Canada, with trilateral meeting of trade ministers. Nineteen working groups convene. June 23-25, 1991 US Department of Commerce and the Office of the US Trade Representative lead delegation of 19 industry sector and functional advisory committee advisers to Mexico for intensive, 2-day round of meetings with Mexican Government negotiators, the Mexican private sector, and US companies operating in Mexico. July 8-9, 1991 Plenary session in Washington, DC, chaired by chief negotiators of the three countries. August 1, 1991 Draft US-Mexico border plan released for public comment. August 6-7, 1991 Plenary session in Oaxtepec, Mexico, chaired by chief negotiators of the three countries. August 18-20, 1991 Second trilateral ministerial oversight meeting held in Seattle, Washington. August 21-September 11, 1991 Trade policy staff committee conducts public hearings held in San Diego; Houston; Atlanta; Washington, DC; Cleveland; and Boston. Several hundred witnesses testify. September 19, 1991 The United States, Canada, and Mexico exchange initial tariff staging proposals and non-tariff barrier request lists at a meeting of the tariffs and non-tariff barriers negotiating group in Dallas, Texas. October 17, 1991 USTR and EPA [US Environmental Protection Agency] submit draft review of US-Mexico environmental issues for public comment. October 25-28, 1991 Third trilateral ministerial oversight meeting in Zacatecas, Mexico. December 14, 1991 Presidents Bush and Salinas meet at Camp David [and] agree on importance of NAFTA and need for broad, comprehensive agreement. December 31, 1991 Negotiators complete composite bracketed texts. January 6-10, 1992 Meetings at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, to prepare composite texts. January 16-17, 1992 Chief negotiators meet to review negotiations in Washington, DC. February 2-3, 1992 [USTR] Ambassador Hills leads delegation of 26 private sector representatives and 11 Members of Congress to Mexico. Delegation meets with President Salinas, Secretary of Commerce Serra, and other key Mexican Government and private sector officials. February 9-10, 1992 Fourth trilateral ministerial oversight meeting held in Chantilly, Virginia. February 10-12, 1992 US and Mexican officials, along with organized labor, hold hazardous industry conference focusing on iron and steel industry. February 17-21, 1992 Plenary session in Dallas, Texas, chaired by chief negotiators. February 25, 1992 President Bush receives NAFTA environmental review and environmental border plan from USTR [Ambassador] Hills and EPA Administrator William K. Reilly in Los Angeles, California. February 26, 1992 President Bush and USTR [Ambassador] Hills discuss NAFTA progress with President Salinas and Minister Serra in San Antonio, Texas, on the margins of the drug summit. March 4-5, 1992 Plenary session in Washington, DC, chaired by chief negotiators of the three countries. March 23-27, 1992 Plenary session in Washington, DC, chaired by of the three countries. April 6-8, 1992 Fifth trilateral ministerial oversight meeting held in Montreal, Canada. April 27-May 1, 1992 Plenary session in Mexico City, Mexico, chaired by chief negotiators of the three countries. May 13-15, 1992 Plenary session in Toronto, Canada, chaired by chief negotiators of the three countries. June 1-5, 1992 Plenary session in Crystal City, Virginia, chaired by chief negotiators of the three countries. June 17-19, 1992 Chief negotiators meet to review negotiations in Washington, DC. June 29-July 3, 1992 Chief negotiators meet to review negotiations in Washington, DC. July 7-10, 1992 Chief negotiators meet to review negotiations in Washington, DC. July 14, 1992 Presidents Bush and Salinas and their trade ministers, Hills and Serra, meet to discuss status of the NAFTA talks and announce the beginning of the final stage of negotiations.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Gist: North American Free Trade Agreement

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jul, 20 19927/20/92 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: North America Country: United States, Mexico, Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, History [TEXT] The United States, Mexico, and Canada have embarked on free trade negotiations that would create a North American market of more than 360 mil-lion consumers and producers and an annual output of more than $6 trillion. The proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) seeks to eliminate restrictions on the flow of goods, services, and investment among the three countries. A successful agreement would be a catalyst for economic growth and development in North America through increased trade, investment, and job creation.
US Goals
The Bush Administration is determined to negotiate an agreement that is in the best economic interest of the United States. Specific US objectives include: -- Elimination of tariffs either immediately or over a period of years (the maximum period is 10 years in the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement); -- Elimination of non-tariff barriers on goods and services, such as import licenses and quotas; -- Establishment of an open investment climate; and -- Adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks). Achievement of these objectives will benefit a broad spectrum of US businesses, workers, farmers, and consumers.
The NAFTA negotiations began in June 1991. Nineteen working groups were established to handle issues in six broad areas--market access, trade rules, services, investment, intellectual property rights, and dispute settlement. The negotiations were made possible by US congressional action in May 1991, extending the "fast track" procedures for negotiating trade agreements, including the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks and the proposed pact with Mexico and Canada. These procedures allow the President to present a trade agreement to Congress for approval without the possibility of amendment. In December 1991, Presidents Bush and Salinas reaffirmed their commitment to concluding a good agreement as quickly as possible. There has been considerable progress in the NAFTA talks during the intensive negotiations which have continued throughout the first half of 1992. Major sessions were held by the chief negotiators in Dallas, Toronto, Mexico City, and Washington, DC. However, US, Mexican, and Canadian negotiators have agreed not to set an arbitrary deadline to conclude an agreement. When there is a negotiated agreement, the Administration will consult with Congress and make a decision when to submit it for approval. Congress and the US private sector remain an integral part of the NAFTA process. President Bush is committed to extensive consultations with both throughout the NAFTA negotiations. This is in the best interest of the United States, Mexico, and Canada, as it helps ensure speedy approval of the agreement and implementing legislation that the executive and congressional branches develop together.
Expanded Trade
Canada and Mexico are the first and third largest trading partners, respectively, of the United States. In turn, the United States accounts for more than two-thirds of the total trade of its North American neighbors. In 1991, three-way trade amounted to $243 billion, and NAFTA will eliminate economic barriers and inefficiencies that impede commerce among the three countries. Since 1986, when Mexico began a major opening of its economy (including joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--GATT), US exports to Mexico have increased from $12.4 billion to $33.3 billion in 1991. This makes Mexico the third largest US export market, and this growth of 169% is almost twice the rate of overall US export growth in the 1986-91 period. By comparison, US exports to Western Europe increased 93%. US manufacturing exports to Mexico increased from $10.4 billion to $26.7 billion during this period, almost twice the rate of overall growth in US manufacturing exports. Agricultural exports jumped from $1.1 billion to $2.8 billion, making Mexico the third largest customer of US agricultural commodities in 1991. In fact, the United States has swung from a bilateral trade deficit with Mexico of $4.9 billion in 1986 to a surplus of $2.1 billion in 1991. Excluding US petroleum imports from Mexico, the surplus was $6.6 billion. However, Mexico still has higher trade barriers than the United States. Its average tariff duty is 10%, compared with 4% in the United States, and significant Mexican non-tariff barriers remain. The United States has much to gain from the elimination or reduction of these barriers under a trade agreement. NAFTA would result in expanded trade with Mexico and the creation of jobs for US workers. It would give US exporters improved access to a market of more than 80 million people and one that is expected to reach 100 million by 2000. Traditional US competitive advantages--geographic, cultural, and historic links--in this important market would be enhanced by NAFTA. As the Mexican economy has grown, a substantial part of the increased national income generated--as much as 15%--has been spent on US goods and services. Strong growth has begun to occur as a result of President Salinas' economic reforms. Mexico's middle class is increasing as a percentage of the total population, which means a larger market for US goods and services.
Opportunities in Mexico
The United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Mexico--$21.4 billion (cumulative) as of the end of 1991. The US Government has a strong interest in encouraging favorable conditions for new and expanded investments in Mexico. US firms investing there tend to use US suppliers and US design and managerial talent. In May 1989, President Salinas expanded the percentage of allowable foreign ownership (in many cases up to as much as 100%) in sectors accounting for nearly two-thirds of Mexico's economic output. He streamlined the approval process for foreign investments. Mexico also has enacted legislation that goes far to respect intellectual property rights. A trade agreement would further improve the investment climate for US firms in Mexico. NAFTA will lead to a more open trade and investment climate that will foster further partnerships and alliances in industry, agriculture, and services. These partnerships can take advantage of the complementary strengths of the three North American economies and will result in more jobs, investment, and economic growth in the United States, Mexico, and Canada.
Benefits to US Workers
NAFTA will increase opportunities for growth, exports, and investment and help the United States keep and create good jobs at good wages. In particular, export growth will produce many new export-related jobs. NAFTA in the aggregate will be a positive development for American workers. A May 1992 study prepared by the US International Trade Commission indicates that US aggregate employment could rise by up to 2.5% of the workforce as a result of NAFTA. Earlier macroeconomic studies have suggested that NAFTA will create between 64,000 and 150,000 jobs. American workers are concerned that NAFTA will result in jobs being lost to Mexicans and in US products being replaced by Mexican imports. President Bush is working with Congress and labor to develop training and readjustment programs for US workers who may be displaced. NAFTA will include other mechanisms to ease the transition to free trade. An extended period to phase out tariffs will help ease the adjustment for American workers in sensitive industries. "Rules of origin" will ensure that the gains from preferential treatment under free trade go to NAFTA partners and their workers, rather than to countries outside the region. Furthermore, NAFTA "safeguards" will ease the effects on American workers of any sudden import surges.
Benefits to the Environment
NAFTA goes further than any other comprehensive trade agreement to address environmental concerns across the US-Mexico border and beyond. It will promote sustainable development and recognize the link between economic growth and the need to preserve the environment. Among its environmental provisions, NAFTA seeks to safeguard public welfare and promote improved enforcement of environmental, health, and safety standards. The United States also is pursuing expanded US-Mexico environmental cooperation in parallel with the NAFTA negotiations. The ongoing US- Mexican Integrated Border Environmental Plan builds on a long tradition of cooperative activity in the environmental area. The United States and Mexico are working to improve enforcement of environmental laws that address air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, and chemical spills. In February 1992, environmental groups, industry, and the public participated in the comprehensive report, US Government Review of US- Mexican Environmental Issues. It has enhanced the awareness of NAFTA negotiators of the environmental aspects of trade actions.
Greater Hemispheric Cooperation
The United States is a neighbor and friend of Canada and Mexico. NAFTA provides a unique opportunity to draw North America even closer by building a solid foundation for stronger cooperation, integration, and growth. A trade agreement will give economic and political impetus to US efforts to address other North American problems, such as the environment, the flow of drugs, and immigration. NAFTA will help forge a US-Mexican partnership that could lead to closer cooperation on other foreign policy issues. A North American trade agreement also is important as the cornerstone of a comprehensive Western Hemisphere policy. It will send a strong, encouraging signal throughout Latin America to a new generation of leaders pledged to democracy, human rights, and market economies. Its successful conclusion will provide further impetus to President Bush's long-range vision of a hemisphere-wide system of free trade. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

NAFTA: Consultations With Congress and the Public

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jul, 20 19927/20/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe, E/C Europe Country: Germany, Poland, Finland Subject: CSCE, Trade/Economics, Arms Control [TEXT] The Bush Administration is committed to regular, substantive consultations with Congress as the NAFTA negotiations proceed. A strong consultative mechanism is integral to the success of the negotiations and the fast track process. The Administration has had extensive consultations with Members of Congress and with the congressional staff of about 18 House and Senate committees having jurisdiction over the negotiations. The meetings have covered all areas of the negotiations. This process will continue until implementing legislation is passed. The Administration also relies heavily on advice from the private sector and from individual citizens. Forty advisory committees, composed of more than 1,000 private sector representatives, and one committee of state and local government officials provide advice on all US trade negotiations. In August- September 1991, the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) held public hearings on NAFTA in six American cities. USTR receives and evaluates a steady stream of recommendations from individuals, companies, trade unions, and associations. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Non-proliferation Efforts Bolstered: President's Statement

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 13 19927/13/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Russia Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] A few weeks ago, [Russian] President Boris Yeltsin and I agreed to the most far-reaching reductions in nuclear weaponry since the dawn of the atomic age. Yet even as our own arsenals diminish, the spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to US national security interests and world peace. In a world in which regional tensions may unpredictably erupt into war, these weapons could have devastating consequences. That is why this Administration has fought so hard to stem the proliferation of these terrible weapons. We look back with pride on a solid record of accomplishment. Membership in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has grown. The Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group have broadened their membership and expanded their controls against trade useful to the development of missiles and chemical and biological weapons. We have toughened our non-proliferation export controls, and other nations have followed suit. We have seen remarkable progress in building and strengthening regional arms control arrangements in Latin America, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East. Yet we need to do more. The demand for these weapons persists, and new suppliers of key technologies are emerging. Export controls alone cannot create an airtight seal against proliferation. In an era of advancing technology and trade liberalization, we need to employ the full range of political, security, intelligence, and other tools at our disposal. Therefore, I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our non-proliferation efforts in the years ahead and directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts. These steps include a decision not to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and a number of proposals to strengthen international actions against those who contribute to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them. While these steps will strengthen the barriers against proliferation, success will require hard work and, at times, hard choices. The United States, however, is committed to take a leading role in the international effort to thwart the spread of technologies and weapons that cast a cloud over our future. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Non-proliferation Efforts Bolstered: Non-proliferation Initiative

Fitzwater Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 13 19927/13/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia Country: Russia Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] Noting that the potential "spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to US national security interests," the President today announced a comprehensive initiative to bolster American efforts to stem the spread of these capabilities and to discourage any use of such weapons. The initiative seeks to integrate new and existing policies in an overall framework to guide US non-proliferation policy in the years ahead.
First, the United States will build on existing global norms against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them. Second, the United States will focus special efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean Peninsula. Third, US non-proliferation policy will seek the broadest possible multilateral support while continuing to show leadership on critical issues. Fourth, the United States will address the proliferation issue through the entire range of political, diplo-matic, economic, intelligence, regional security, export controls, and other tools available.
Nuclear Materials
Nuclear Materials Production. The United States shall not produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. This step is intended to encourage countries in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, to take similar actions, such as those proposed in the May 1991 Middle East arms control initiative. The United States will seek further multilateral support for concrete measures to discourage production or acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials in South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, or other areas where they would increase the risk of proliferation.
Multilateral Actions
Compliance With International Non-proliferation Norms. The United States will take into account other countries' performance on key international non-proliferation norms in developing its cooperation and technology transfer relationships and will consult with friends and allies on similar approaches. Enforcement of International Non-proliferation Norms. The United States will consult with friends and allies on international actions to be taken against serious violations of non-proliferation norms, e.g., the transfer of any weapon of mass destruction or key weapon facilities; violation of safeguards agreements; or confirmed use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Actions could include UN Security Council embargoes or inspections, assistance to victims of attacks by such weapons, extradition agreements, or immigration restrictions against individuals who have knowingly contributed to proliferation. Support for Special Inspections and Weapon Destruction. The United States will examine, in consultation with friends and allies, establishment of multilateral funding efforts to support special inspection regimes where necessary and to help states destroy existing weapon stockpiles. Harmonization of Export Controls. The United States will promote harmonized non-proliferation export control lists and enforcement, including an agreement among suppliers not to undercut one another's export restraint decisions.
Regional Efforts
Targeted Approaches. The United States will continue to focus special efforts on the dangers of proliferation in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula, including efforts to achieve confidence-building measures; inspection regimes; and other economic, political, and security-related measures. Former Soviet Union. The United States will continue to work with authorities from Russia and the other new states toward the following objectives: -- Implementation of all relevant international agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, and, when opened for signature, the Chemical Weapons Convention; -- Effective internal accounting and physical protection against theft or diversion of nuclear-related materials and equipment; -- Effective export controls on chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile technologies consistent with existing multilateral regimes, including appropriate laws and regulations, as well as education of exporters and customs and enforcement officials; -- Safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear warheads and effective controls over nuclear weapon material; -- Creation of opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to peaceful endeavors; and -- Consideration of requests for assistance in dismantling or destroying Russian biological weapons facilities or in converting these facilities to production of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products, provided Russia is in full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.
Global Norms
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United States reaffirms its commitment to see a CWC concluded this year and calls on all nations to commit to become original signatories. Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT] and Tlatelolco. The United States will seek the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1993. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States will work with other nations to strengthen the IAEA and will support needed increases in the safeguards budget. Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The United States will continue to urge universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention and increased support for the confidence-building measures agreed by the parties at the 1991 review conference. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The United States reiterates the call of the MTCR partners for all governments to adopt the MTCR guidelines as part of their national policy.
Non-proliferation Center. The intelligence community, including the newly created non-proliferation center, will increase support to international non-proliferation regimes and seek to enlarge the pool of experienced, well- trained experts committed to the non-proliferation mission.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Non-proliferation Efforts Bolstered: Existing Non- Proliferation Efforts

Fitzwater Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 13 19927/13/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia Country: Russia Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT]
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In the past year, China, South Africa, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and other new parties brought NPT membership to 149. France will soon be a party. In the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] protocol signed in Lisbon, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
International Atomic Energy Agency.
The IAEA confirmed its right to conduct "special inspections" at undeclared nuclear facilities. Argentina and Brazil reversed long-standing positions to adopt full-scope IAEA safeguards. After years of delay, North Korea finally complied with its NPT obligations to ratify an IAEA safeguards agreement and accept IAEA inspections.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
In April 1992, the 27 NSG members agreed to extend nuclear export controls to dual-use items and to require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply.
Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR].
The MTCR expanded its membership to 22, updated its export control list, and agreed to extend its focus to any missile intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction. China, Argentina, and Israel have pledged to observe the MTCR guidelines.
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI).
Under EPCI, the United States expanded its export controls to cover all 50 identified chemical weapon precursors, dual-use equipment relevant to chemical and biological weapons production, whole chemical plants, and knowing assistance to chemical or biological weapon or missile programs.
Strengthened National Export Controls.
Several suppliers have strengthened their domestic export control laws and enforcement mechanisms. Several countries have adopted laws or regulations similar to the EPCI, which restrict assistance by their citizens to nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile programs.
Australia Group.
The Australia Group expanded its membership to 22 nations and followed the US lead in EPCI by expanding its export controls to cover the 50 chemical weapon precursors as well as chemical weapons- related dual-use equipment. The Group has just adopted a multilateral control list of biological organisms, toxins, and equipment.
Middle East Arms Control Initiative.
In May 1991, the President launched a process among the five leading conventional arms suppliers: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. In October, the five agreed to observe guidelines of restraint in conventional transfers and to information exchange. In May 1992, the five agreed to interim guidelines for exports related to weapons of mass destruction. Under the Middle East peace process, 23 delegations (including Israel and 12 Arab states) gathered in Washington in May 1992 to discuss regional security and arms control.
United Nations.
The UN Special Commission and the IAEA have carried out 39 inspections in Iraq, identified and begun to destroy tens of thousands of chemical munitions, destroyed missile-production equipment and over 150 missiles, revealed an extensive nuclear weapons program, and oversaw destruction of nuclear weapon-related facilities.
Latin America.
In addition to adopting full-scope IAEA safeguards, Argentina and Brazil joined with Chile to ban chemical and biological weapons in their countries. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Global Protection System Against Ballistic Missiles: Joint Statement

Fitzwater Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Description: Text of joint US-Russian statement Date: Jul, 14 19927/14/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America Country: Russia, United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] U.S. and Russian high-level delegations met in Moscow on July 13 and 14 to hold consultations on establishing a Global Protection System [GPS] against ballistic missiles. The consultations were the result of agreement by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin [of Russia] at the Washington Summit. The two Presidents agreed that our two nations should work together with allies and other interested states in developing a concept for such a Global Protection System as part of an overall strategy to counter the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The two Presidents had agreed to explore on a priority basis: -- the potential for sharing ballistic missile early warning information through the establishment of an early warning center; -- the potential for cooperation with participating states in developing ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies; and -- the development of a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements and possible changes of existing agreements necessary to implement a Global Protection System. The delegations had good and fruitful discussions on all relevant issues. They agreed that their two nations were entering a radically changed security environment, one characterized by the change in the nature of threats to international security, including the growing threat of proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to the world community. They also agreed that they needed to work together and with other interested states to find solutions to these new challenges by exploring the potential benefits of a Global Protection System against ballistic missiles and agreeing that it is important to explore the role of defenses in protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks. The two sides believed that their discussions had created a promising foundation for future work. In that regard, they decided to set up three working groups in which specialists would carry forward expeditiously the task of developing the concept of a Global Protection System. -- A Global Protection System Concept Working Group would consider the structure, modalities, and functions of a future Global Protection System. It would explore the concept of the GPS and examine the relationship among its principal elements. It would create sub-groups, as appropriate, including sub-groups on analysis and concepts, early warning, and cooperation in the anti-tactical ballistic missile defense field. -- A Technology Cooperation Working Group would consider possible research, development, and testing projects and other forms of technological cooperation that could contribute--in possible cooperation with other states--to the realization of the concept of the Global Protection System. The work of this group should reflect the work of the Concept Working Group. -- A Non-proliferation Working Group would conduct joint assessments of trends in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and would explore ways and means of strengthening current international efforts to prevent such proliferation and would explore future initiatives in this area. The two sides agreed that the working groups would hold their initial meetings at an early date. They further agreed that the high-level group would have a continuing role as a steering group and would meet periodically to address issues assigned to them by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in their June 17 statement. The two sides undertook to provide the leadership of the two countries with a report on the status of these efforts at an early date. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Proclamation on Captive Nations Week, 1992

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of Proclamation 6458, dated July 15, 1992, released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Date: Jul, 15 19927/15/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Human Rights, Democratization [TEXT] When Americans first observed Captive Nations Week in 1959, repressive communist regimes had overtaken nations from Central and Eastern Europe to mainland China and overshadowed many others with the very real threat of expansionism. Three years earlier, forces of the Soviet Union had brutally suppressed a popular movement for freedom in Hungary; some 16 years before that, the Soviets had invaded Poland and achieved the forcible annexation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In 1959, the United Nations had only recently ended its efforts to thwart communist expansionism below the 38th parallel in Korea, and a communist-led insurgency had already begun to threaten South Vietnam. At a time when millions of people were enslaved by Soviet domination or subjugated by proxy, at a time when countless others were terrorized by the threat of communist aggression and subversion, Americans paused during Captive Nations Week to reaffirm our commitment to liberty and self-government and to express our solidarity with all those peoples seeking freedom, independence, and security. Today, 33 years after our first observance of Captive Nations Week, millions of people who suffered under Soviet domination and communist rule are free. The Iron Curtain and its most despised symbol, the Berlin Wall, have fallen--toppled by courageous individuals who would no longer stand the denial of their fundamental human rights. Today, we celebrate the existence of a free and unified Germany, as well as the independence of the Baltic States, Central European countries, and 12 new states that replaced the USSR. In Afghanistan and Angola, where bloody civil war against Soviet-supported, Marxist-Leninist regimes left thousands dead and millions of others homeless, chances of achieving lasting peace have reached their highest level in years. As we celebrate the hope of peace and freedom in these and other once- captive nations, we also remember the many courageous, freedom-loving men and women who resisted tyranny and oppression--often at great personal cost. These include the thousands of dissenters who risked imprisonment, exile, and death in order to demand rights that we Americans enjoy: freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, as well as the right to a fair trial and to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. They include prisoners of the gulag who remained devoted to liberty despite suffering hunger, torture, and long periods of solitary confinement. And they include selfless religious leaders such as Father Jerzy Popieluszko of Poland, Cardinal Josef Mindszenty of Hungary, and Cardinal Josyf Slipyj of Ukraine, who inspired countless others by their unshakable belief in the God-given rights and dignity of the human person. From broadcasters at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, who pierced the Iron Curtain with words of hope and truth, to freedom-fighters in Nicaragua and other Latin American countries, who led popular resistance to local despots and to political and military interference from Cuba and the Soviet Union--the men and women who we remember this week never lost their faith in freedom and in the inevitable triumph of liberty and justice. As we recall all those who labored and sacrificed to hasten the demise of imperial communism and to liberate the world's captive nations, we must also remember those peoples who remain subject to regimes that continue to deny basic human rights in stark violation of both the letter and the spirit of international human rights agreements, as well as fundamental standards of morality. The United States will continue to speak out against egregious human rights violations in Cuba and elsewhere, and we shall continue to warn the world's newly emerging democracies against another kind of subjugation: the tyranny of ethnic hatred and nationalist rivalries. History has shown how these evils can produce their own form of captivity: a vicious cycle of violence, political repression, and economic stagnation and loss. As this observance of Captive Nations Week reminds us, freedom and peace are precious blessings that require the faith, the will, and the wherewithal to preserve and strengthen them. The Congress, by Joint Resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July of each year as "Captive Nations Week." Now, therefore, I, George Bush, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning July 12, 1992, as Captive Nations Week. I call on all Americans to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities in celebration of the growth of liberty and democracy around the world and in recognition of the need for continued vigilance and resolve in the defense of human rights. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and seventeenth. George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Status of Iraqi Compliance With UN Security Council Resolutions

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Jackson Hole, Wyoming Date: Jul, 16 19927/16/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: United Nations, Military Affairs [TEXT] Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1), and as part of my continuing effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I am again reporting on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council. Since the events described in my report of May 15, 1992, the Iraqi Government has provided what it terms a "full, final, and complete" disclosure of its programs for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Iraqi report, which reached the United Nations 2 months after it was originally promised, is now under review by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The preliminary assessment of these organizations is that the Iraqis have provided little new information. The Iraqis also have provided the United Nations with a "Compliance and Monitoring Report," which aims to satisfy the requirement of U.N. Security Council Resolution 175 for a list of all sites subject to long-term monitoring. UNSCOM is assessing this report. As of July 1, UNSCOM and IAEA have conducted 38 inspections in all four weapons categories. From May 26 to June 4, the 12th nuclear inspection team oversaw the destruction of three buildings at the al Atheer nuclear weapons fabrication facility. It also inspected uranium enrichment sites at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat to prepare for the destruction and the rendering harmless of utilities and ventilations systems during the 13th inspection in July. The Iraqi Government continues to refuse IAEA requests for records detailing foreign suppliers of its nuclear weapons program. A small Chemical Destruction Group entered Iraq on June 19. This team will spend several months in Iraq establishing a base and overseeing the long- term destruction of Iraqi chemical agents and weapons at the Muthanna Establishment. The operation will be run by a large multinational group, including two Americans. UNSCOM estimates the operation will take 12 to 18 months to complete. A second combined chemical and biological weapons team was in Iraq from June 26 to July 4 conducting inspections and destroying dual-use chemical production equipment. From May 14 to 22, the 11th ballistic missile team inspected five sites, completed verification of Iraqi destruction of SCUD missile production and launcher components, and verified the destruction of missile production equipment. The 12th ballistic missile team is in Iraq from July 9 to 17 to inspect undeclared sites. We view with particular concern the refusal by Iraqi authorities to grant immediate access by UNSCOM inspectors to the Agricultural Ministry in early July. The President of the U.N. Security Council has characterized this refusal as a material and unacceptable breach of Resolution 687. We are resolved that Iraq must not be allowed to defy the Security Council and evade its responsibilities under this resolution. Continued Iraqi intransigence with respect to compliance with the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions led UNSCOM to initiate a program of aerial surveillance of WMD activity in Iraq on June 21. Utilizing UNSCOM's German helicopters, two to three flights will be flown per week, with five to six sites covered on each flight; this program will provide more immediate and accurate information about Iraqi facilities. We strongly favor this aggressive approach by UNSCOM, which will broaden UNSCOM's ability to find suspect sites as well as conduct long-term monitoring. UNSCOM continues to face a shortage of funds. U.S. efforts to alleviate this problem will result in payment of approximately $30 million for UNSCOM by the end of July. Discussions are ongoing with other nations regarding contributions by them to UNSCOM. Since my last report, there has been further progress at the U.N. Compensation Commission concerning preparations for the processing of claims from individuals, corporations, other entities, governments, and international organizations that suffered direct loss or damage as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The Governing Council of the Commission held its sixth session in Geneva from June 22 to 26 and has scheduled further meetings in September and December. (A meeting tentatively set for November has been cancelled.) At its June session, the Council approved the final part of the rules of procedure (the first three parts were approved in March). The entire set of rules was then issued as a Council decision. The rules provide a practical, nontechnical system for processing claims. The Council also decided that members of the Allied Coalition Armed Forces who were prisoners of war and mistreated in violation of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, are eligible for compensation in accordance with the claims criteria previously adopted. The Council continued its discussion of the "embargo loss" issue and agreed to a statement for the record promising that the issue of priority of payments would be considered. Also during the session of June 22 to 26, the Commission released to governments the form for corporate claims (Form E). The Council also reviewed the draft form for claims from governments and international organizations (Form F). The Executive Secretary reported that the $2 million loan from the Kuwaiti Government has been received, and the Commission has received another $1 million as a result of the U.S. contribution to the United Nations for activities under Resolution 687. The financial impasse of the past several months, however, has cost valuable time in developing computer software and other key projects. Now that operating funds have been received, the Secretariat will press ahead and try to recover as much lost time as possible. On June 26, the United States filed its first set of 200 claims with the Commission; altogether 10 governments filed claims by the end of the week. Meanwhile, the Department of State distributed to potential U.S. claimants the form for claims of individuals over $100,000 (Form D) and continued to collect and review small claims. In accordance with paragraph 20 of Resolution 687, the Sanctions Committee continues to receive notice of shipments of foodstuffs to Iraq. The Sanctions Committee also continues to consider and, when appropriate, approve requests to send to Iraq materials and supplies for essential civilian needs. Iraq, in contrast, has for months maintained a full embargo against its northern provinces. Iraq has also refused to utilize the opportunity under Resolutions 706 and 712 to sell $1.6 billion in oil, most of the proceeds from which could be used by Iraq to purchase foodstuffs, medicines, materials, and supplies for essential civilian needs of its civilian population. The Iraqi authorities bear full responsibility for any suffering in Iraq that results from their refusal to implement Resolutions 706 and 712. Through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United States, Kuwait, and our allies continue to press the Government of Iraq to comply with its obligations under Security Council resolutions to return all detained Kuwaiti and third-country nationals. Likewise, the United States and its allies continue to press the Government of Iraq to return to Kuwait all property and equipment removed from Kuwait by Iraq. Iraq continues to resist full cooperation on these issues and to resist unqualified ICRC access to detention facilities in Iraq. Mindful of the finding of the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 688 that Iraq's repression of its civilian population threatens international peace and security in the region, we will continue to monitor carefully the treatment of Iraq's citizens in concert with our Coalition partners, and together we remain prepared to take appropriate steps if the situation requires. To this end, we will continue to maintain an appropriate level of forces in the region for as long as required by the situation in Iraq. I remain grateful for the support of the Congress for these efforts, and I look forward to continued cooperation toward achieving our mutual objectives. Sincerely, George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Human Rights Issues

Perkins Source: Edward J. Perkins, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Description: Statement before the Social Committee of the UN Economic and Social Council, New York City Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe Country: Germany, Poland, Finland Subject: Human Rights, United Nations [TEXT] This is my first statement before the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); I take this opportunity to say how delighted I am to be here. The fact that I am here to speak on human rights questions is particularly meaningful to me. I would like to take this opportunity also, Mr. Chairman, to congratulate you and the other members of the bureau upon your election. I am sure that under your direction, our deliberations will be efficient and productive. Mr. Chairman, we meet today at an extraordinary time. It is an era of great advances and uplifting prospects for the full enjoyment of human rights, but it is also a time of new dangers to personal freedom. On one hand, the collapse of communism presents the world and the United Nations with unprecedented opportunities. It means freer lives for hundreds of millions who lived under the boot of repression. It means economic liberty and the chance for personal economic initiative to millions who have never known such things. On the other hand, as we observe in the tragic situation in Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Croatia, freedom from one kind of tyranny does not assure freedom from others. In too many places, the removal of central authority has been accompanied by the scourge of vicious oppression in the name of nationalist, ethnic, or religious interests. Consequently, we cannot afford a pause for self-congratulation. The great gains of recent years are not irreversible. The protection of human rights is far from complete. Our energies must turn to those who are, or who have been, the victims of oppression--the political prisoners, the tortured, the victims of discrimination, the disappeared. Our challenge today is to examine how best to strengthen the UN role in consolidating the gains of recent years. We must recognize that while our progress is great, it is also fragile. Inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, inspired by the triumph of human rights in places where those documents formerly were honored more in rhetoric than in fact, let us see how we can build on this surge of freedom to unchain even more fellow human beings and further protect their rights once they are free. Mr. Chairman, in my remarks today, I want to address my country's concerns regarding the following subjects: -- A search for common goals as we pursue the cause of human rights; -- Actions the Economic and Social Council may take to strengthen the Human Rights Commission and Sub-Commission; -- Enhanced support for the Center for Human Rights; the setting of priorities for the World Conference on Human Rights; and -- Keeping the focus on the sovereignty of the individual in the field of human rights. As we collaborate on these important matters, we must endeavor to avoid dangerous regional divisions. We must not allow the so-called North-South split to threaten the real progress we have made. We must search for common ground so we can narrow rather than exacerbate our differences. This search for common ground must begin with the promotion and protection of those rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which all member states have pledged to honor. We have found that the proliferation of human rights instruments does not necessarily ensure that core human rights are protected around the world. My government believes that the implementation of existing standards, rather than the invention of new ones, should be the primary focus of future UN activity in the field of human rights and is the common ground on which we can meet. Our own ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights less than 1 month ago was the product of a long and thoughtful national debate. The question arises, then: What is the Council's role in implementing these rights? First of all, ECOSOC is the parent body of the Human Rights Commission and the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. As such, Council members elect the members of the Human Rights Commission. This key role of the Council is often overlooked, but my government believes it deserves further attention. We believe the Council should elect to the Human Rights Commission governments who plainly demonstrate commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Of the current members of the Commission, three were subject in 1992 to country-specific resolutions establishing or continuing mandates for special rapporteurs to investigate human rights violations by their governments. Several more were mentioned by thematic rapporteurs as violators of protections against, for example, enforced or involuntary disappearances. On the other hand, there are new states from every region who are striving to protect the human rights of their citizens. These governments would make strong candidates for membership on the Commission, and we encourage more of them to take on this challenge. We urge the various regional groups to take the human rights record of the candidates into consideration when they debate which of their neighbors they wish to endorse. Secondly, ECOSOC has responsibility regarding the mandates approved by the Human Rights Commission. These mandates emerge after extensive debate and agreement. They represent the decisions of the principal UN body entrusted with substantive questions about human rights. Thus, we believe the Council should make its decisions confirming the mandates expeditiously so that work on them can begin in a timely fashion. Thirdly, we are pleased the Council agreed to an intersessional role for the Commission, and we believe this tool will be important and useful when applied in those cases of a truly emergency nature. Nevertheless, the Council needs to encourage the Commission to take a look at its mission in several areas. I think, first of all, of country-specific situations. For my government, country-specific human rights situations are the core of the UN's human rights mandate. When governments oppress individuals they are supposed to protect, we believe it is the duty of the United Nations to act on behalf of the citizen. Indeed, the last Human Rights Commission took action on a record 22 countries, counting the 1503 procedure, advisory services, and special rapporteurs. Next fall's UN General Assembly will hear human rights reports on Afghanistan, Burma, Cuba, El Salvador, Haiti, Iran, and Iraq. I would like to make a general comment on the constant proliferation of topics under the umbrella of human rights. I believe this phenomenon weakens the Commission's ability to work toward protecting the vital civil and political rights of individuals. As a coordinating body, the Council should recommend to its subsidiary bodies that each one adhere solely to its specific area of expertise. UNDP [UN Development Program] is the development agency; there is UNEP [UN Environment Program] for the environment, and UNCED [UN Conference on Environment and Development] will lead to an environmental commission. The Human Rights Commission should be devoted to protection of individual human rights. When each body addresses its primary mandate, the United Nations will become a leaner, more efficient organization. The role of the special rapporteur must be protected and enlarged. The work of the rapporteurs, special representatives, and the various working groups cannot be completed without the full cooperation of governments. It is in everyone's interest to assist by offering information to the rapporteurs, representatives, and working groups, and to facilitate visits to mandated countries. The resulting reports are too important to the ongoing monitoring of human rights for us to accept anything less than complete cooperation. Thematic rapporteurs should be encouraged to be more specific regarding individual country behavior in their field of investigation. Their reports could include summaries of their findings about, for example, arbitrary detention in a given country, along with recommendations and routine referral of information for consideration under the 1503 procedure. Turning to the Subcommission, my delegation believes that body requires serious reform. We are encouraged by the progress of the Working Group on Reform, and we hope the Subcommission will take meaningful steps to control the number and duration of costly studies. Internal conflicts involving ethnic minorities have emerged as an extremely dangerous problem that can threaten international peace and security, as well as endangering the rights of members of many of these minorities. It would be most appropriate for the Subcommission, which is charged with the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities, to take more of a leading role on this issue. My government has recently underscored to the Secretary General our view that, because of the key role of human rights in the work of the United Nations, it is important that the Human Rights Center in Geneva be given sufficient resources to carry out its mandates. We believe that is not now the case, and we urge the Secretary General, as he continues his restructuring exercise, to consider deploying resources from other parts of the United Nations to the center. The Special Procedures Branch, with its burden of supporting an ever-increasing number of mandates, and technical assistance, especially to emerging democracies, are worthy recipients of redeployed UN personnel and new equipment. We join other governments whose statements have lamented the lack of progress in preparation for the World Conference on Human Rights. We are only 1 year away from that important human rights meeting in Vienna. And we have already held two prepcoms, but we have yet to agree on an agenda. We run the risk of looking rudderless to the international community if we do not succeed in adopting a simple, achievable set of goals for the conference. We truly hope that we adopt, at the next prepcom, an agenda aimed at finding practical ways to improve implementation of human rights standards and constructive ways to elaborate the important relationship between democracy, human rights, and development. In all these efforts, our universal goal should be support for the sovereignty of the individual. The international law of human rights has largely been created in the wake of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Today, we regard individual rights as the centerpiece of our efforts in the UN to protect human rights around the world. Protection of the individual is central to the purpose of all human rights institutions and instruments. The increase in requests to the United Nations for elections assistance testifies to the interest governments have in providing the individual with that most basic human right--the right to choose freely and fairly the leaders of one's own government. Regardless of nationality, culture, religion, and ethnicity, we are all dedicated to protecting the human rights of every man, woman, and child on this globe. That should be our primary purpose, and that purpose should inform every decision we make in this body.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

UN Security Council Consideration of the Situation in South Africa

Perkins Source: Edward J. Perkins, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, New York City Date: Jul, 15 19927/15/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: South Africa Subject: Human Rights, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations [TEXT] Mr. President: The United States has watched with admiration the impressive efforts over the past year of all parties in South Africa to negotiate an end to apartheid and to create a constitution that has as its goal a democratic, non-racial government for all the peoples of South Africa. We salute the black majority in South Africa for the skill and patience with which they and their leaders have persevered on this matter, and we commend the authorities in South Africa for abolishing institutionalized apartheid and entering into difficult negotiations about the country's future, creating an irreversible process that will lead to the establishment of a democratic, non-racial government. Of that I am certain. It is the policy of my government to do all it can to further the negotiating process, and I believe that that must also be the goal of the Security Council. We welcome the present Security Council debate on the future of South Africa and thank the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for helping recently at its annual summit to focus world attention on this very important matter. The presence today of so many distinguished representatives from the OAU, other African nations, opposition movements within South Africa, and from the Government of South Africa gives us a unique opportunity to reach consensus on what must be done to suggest means of bringing all South African parties together to continue their negotiations. Momentous change bears inevitable costs, but the violence that has wracked South Africa is too great a price and must be brought under control. The world is watching, as is history. The leaders participating in the current transition in South Africa bring to the process impressive skill, experience and, in many cases, the wisdom brought by suffering. At this critical point, statesmanship is another necessary ingredient. The purpose of our meeting here is not to diagnose the origins of the violence in South Africa, nor to impose conditions on those who bear the responsibility for the violence. Our purpose is to take those steps, and only those steps, which increase the ability of South Africa to overcome the violence and get on with the important task of negotiations. We have full confidence in the commission chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone to investigate the violence, and we support the fullest implementation of the commission's findings by all parties. We also support the efforts of the National Peace Accord Forum. The UN stands ready to help these efforts, but the parties themselves must resolve to control the violence. We believe it is impossible for us to ascertain precisely what is necessary to get all the leaders of South Africa back to the negotiating table in an atmosphere free of violence. A small UN team dispatched to South Africa, however, would be able to gain a better perspective. We propose that a UN goodwill mission, under the Secretary General's good offices, travel to South Africa to meet with all leaders and to offer its services to bring the parties closer together. A goodwill team would not tamper with the complex negotiations themselves, nor would it seek to establish responsibility for the violence. The issue of violence is one of a series that must be examined to get to the heart of the matter: creating the conditions to get negotiations restarted. In summary, let me restate my government's position: the UN should help create the conditions for progress, not apportion blame nor seek to punish any of the parties. A good start has already been made by the OAU in helping to get all parties together here today. With goodwill, a measure of statesmanship, and an eye to history, we can do much more. We must not delay, as time is short, and South Africa has waited too long. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Mozambique: Agreement on Humanitarian Assistance

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 17 19927/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Mozambique Subject: Human Rights, Democratization [TEXT] The US Government welcomes the agreement on humanitarian assistance signed by the Mozambican Government and RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance] in Rome, July 16. Once implemented, the agreement should go a long way to facilitate the secure delivery of sorely needed food aid and other assistance to drought-stricken areas of Mozambique. We urge the two parties to move rapidly to identify the land corridors which will be used to deliver relief supplies. This agreement, while an important step forward, is no substitute for a general cease-fire. The serious drought now affecting Mozambique and the Southern African region adds a special urgency to the Mozam-bique peace talks now underway in Rome. We urge the government and RENAMO to redouble their efforts in Rome to find a peaceful and lasting settlement to the conflict. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Consolidating Peace and Democracy in El Salvador

Aronson Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 9 19927/9/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: El Salvador Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee: El Salvador is at peace today. A democratically elected president had the vision and perseverance to negotiate an end to the war. Former enemies are discussing how to rebuild their country together, leftist political leaders once banned from political life are sitting as elected members of the legislature, the demobilization of the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] guerrillas has begun, and the military and police are being reformed to adapt to the challenges of democracy and peace. When Secretary Baker addressed the Salvadoran National Assembly last January, he said: Let no one doubt where the Government of the United States stands: We fully support the peace agreement. We support these accords--not as a necessary evil to end a bitter conflict but because we believe the reforms that have been negotiated in the judicial system, the electoral system, the armed forces, and the police will, as President Cristiani said, strengthen El Salvador's democratic institutions, enlarge the scope of human rights, and promote national reconciliation. It is difficult to overstate the drama in the developments in El Salvador today. This subcommittee saw it last month when FMLN commander Joaquin Villalobos sat at this table with Vice Minister of the Presidency Ernesto Altschul and together called on the United States to remain engaged in their country. Consider also: -- Last fall, before the peace accords were signed, Salvadoran Government officials--along with the US ambassador--began traveling to the FMLN community of Santa Marta. The president of the national land bank explained the ways his programs could benefit the residents of Santa Marta. So did the local mayor--from the ARENA [National Republican Alliance] Party, the head of the national reconstruction agency, and electric power company representatives. This same process is repeating itself in other FMLN communities today. -- The FMLN, now becoming a political party, conducts large public rallies in San Salvador; its once clandestine radio station, Radio Venceremos, is on the air regularly and operates openly. -- On March 10, the Salvadoran delegation to a World Bank meeting in Washington included representatives of the FMLN and opposition political parties. The delegation spoke eloquently about the need for post-war reconstruction aid and received $800 million in pledges. Through efforts such as these, Salvadorans deserve full credit for achieving peace and starting the work of national reconciliation. But US foreign policy also played a large role in El Salvador during the past decade, and there are lessons we should draw from our experience. The first is that it is never too early to defend democracy. It is generally accepted today that the United States defends human rights and will only conduct normal relations with democratic governments in this hemisphere. The OAS [Organization of American States], following a doctrine reached in June 1991 in Santiago, Chile, is beginning to take collective action to defend elected governments against coups. This was not always the norm. Two decades ago, Jose Napoleon Duarte was elected president of El Salvador, but the military prevented him from taking office. Neither the United States nor the hemispheric community acted to defend the decision the Salvadoran people had freely made at the ballot box. Had this hemisphere defended democracy in 1972, it is possible El Salvador would not have experienced the closing of political space and the polarization that strengthened violent political extremes and led to the decade-long war. Second, our sustained engagement in El Salvador has helped bring about long-term democratic reform. Our military aid received the most attention, but $3 of [every] $4 we sent to El Salvador during the 1980s were economic aid. That supported a land reform program which redistributed 15% of El Salvador's arable land to 575,000 peasants. It kept the economy going during the war by repairing electric lines, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure damaged by FMLN attacks. During President Cristiani's term, our economic aid supported bold free-market policies--fiscal reform, trade liberalization, and privatization of state enterprises--which tamed inflation and made El Salvador's economy grow 3.4% in 1990, despite the war. Our military assistance helped prevent the overthrow of a fledgling democracy by anti-democratic forces, and it ultimately helped bring the FMLN to the bargaining table. It gave us important influence on the practices of the military institution, contributing to a steady decline in political violence. In the early 1980s, hundreds of Salvadoran civilians were killed monthly by all factions for political reasons. By 1990, total political killings numbered 62--less in an entire year than the weekly average a decade before. Our diplomacy and our aid helped El Salvador transform itself from a polarized, inequitable nation in conflict to a more peaceful, open, and tolerant society. No observer of El Salvador denies that the nation's political climate, its institutions, [and] its armed forces have changed profoundly in the past decade. And no other nation has ever accepted the reforms President Cristiani's Government accepted in the midst of a war-- agreement on military reductions in advance of a cease-fire agreement, a commission with members appointed by an international organization to sit in judgment of military officers' human rights records, the expansion of the legislature, [and] new laws to govern the judiciary and the electoral processes. El Salvador's transformation gives us a dramatic example of a society's capacity to change. I hope it will be viewed in the United States as the type of positive change that our influence can help bring about by backing the right principles and remaining engaged over the long term. The third lesson must be that we need to remain engaged to see that the victory of peace is consolidated. We are not alone in that work. The UN mission, ONUSAL [UN Office on El Salvador], is in place monitoring the cease-fire, demobilization, and human rights. The "Four Friends"--Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Spain--which helped bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion remain involved in the implementation of the peace accords. We need to remain engaged diplomatically to monitor compliance with the cease-fire and demobilization. As might be expected in an undertaking of this size, some deadlines were missed by both the government and the FMLN. The two sides reached a "recalendarization" agreement to set new deadlines, preserving the final October 31 deadline for demobilizing the FMLN and reintegrating its members into Salvadoran society. Nevertheless, the cease-fire has held--there have been no violations. The concentration of forces on both sides is complete, and demobilization has begun. Following that new schedule, all forces were concentrated in pre- designated zones by June 25, and the first 1,402 FMLN combatants demobilized [on] June 30. That represents 20% of the FMLN's combatants; another 20% will demobilize each month until demobilization is complete October 31. Nevertheless, we are seriously concerned about FMLN compliance with agreed procedures for demobilization of forces. The weapons inventory presented by the FMLN to ONUSAL seems to describe about one-third of the weapons the FMLN actually possesses. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in a June 1 report, stated: I have also expressed to the FMLN my doubts about whether the inventories of arms that it has presented to ONUSAL accurately reflect its true holdings. Suspicions that FMLN is retaining clandestine caches of arms and ammunition have had a destabilizing effect on the whole implementation process. Second, the FMLN inventory drastically undercounts sophisticated weapons such as surface-to-air missiles. Third, the FMLN is still receiving weapons from Nicaragua, whether from the Sandinista army or other parties, as evidenced in the interception of two clandestine shipments on March 3 and May 20 at La Libertad on the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The latter shipment included 40,000 rounds of assault rifle ammunition. Fourth, we have numerous strong indications that the FMLN is selling arms to the URNG [Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity] guerrillas in Guatemala and may be preparing to sell or transfer arms to other revolutionaries in Honduras and Peru. These are very serious issues, Mr. Chairman. If they are not resolved, they will bring more than international criticism: They have the potential to end the support the FMLN has received from the United States and others in the international community. The Salvadoran Government's record of compliance with the peace accords includes the following: -- It created the Committee for the Consolidation of the Peace (COPAZ). This committee, made up of members from the government, FMLN, armed forces, and political parties in the National Assembly, will verify compliance with the accords and mediate disputes. COPAZ, in turn, has formed subcommittees on the National Civilian Police and land issues. -- The armed forces have provided a complete arms inventory, which the United Nations has verified. It has concentrated on the 62 locations the accords specified by the deadline the accords established. Conscription to the armed forces has ended. -- The armed forces are reducing their ranks, primarily due to attrition, before the January 1993 deadline contained in the accords. Between January and May of this year, about 13,000 personnel left the Salvadoran armed forces, reducing its force to 50,300. -- Further reductions will bring the force to 40,000 by next January and 31,451--the final level stipulated in the peace accords--by January 1994. -- At the end of this month, the army's five immediate reaction battalions will begin to disband. All will be disbanded by year's end. -- We were frankly concerned that, initially, the Salvadoran Government failed to comply with the requirement that the National Guard and Treasury Police be abolished and their members transferred to the armed forces. Congress shared that concern. I am pleased to see that this issue has now been resolved. The National Guard and Treasury Police were pulled off the streets last February 1. Their units have been abolished, and their members, as provided in the accords, reassigned to other armed forces units. -- President Cristiani has pledged to cooperate in regional negotiations in the Central American Security Commission. Those talks could produce agreement for mutual reductions that would reduce the size of the Salvadoran military below the levels agreed in the peace accords. -- The Directorate of National Intelligence was dissolved last month. It is being replaced, as the accords provide, by a civilian-led office of state intelligence, which will report directly to the president. -- The National Assembly amended El Salvador's constitution, removing police powers from the armed forces and creating a new national civilian police force and police academy. -- The National Assembly also passed legislation granting a limited amnesty for political crimes committed between 1980 and 1991 and guaranteeing full civil rights to the FMLN. The amnesty will not apply to those already convicted by a jury, such as the killers of the Jesuits, or those investigated by the Truth Commission. -- Eighty political prisoners were released in early March. Another 28 cases are under review. -- A Supreme Electoral Tribunal and human rights ombudsman have been appointed. The Salvadoran Government is making real progress toward compliance with the peace agreements' provisions for a new national civilian police. It has submitted a revised list of candidates for police commander to the Peace Commission. The peace agreements were recently revised to allow the police to draw more recruits from the ranks of ex-combatants. After a transition period, no more than 20% of entering police recruits will be ex- national police, with an equal number of ex-FMLN members. We are working with the Salvadorans, the United Nations, and Spain to support the establishment of this civilian police force. In this fiscal year and the next, $20 million from the Salvadoran Demobilization and Training Fund will be used for this purpose, through the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). With our help, the new police academy should begin operations by September 1. We will provide funds for instructors, materials, and equipment, with a special emphasis on training in democratic values, human rights, and police ethics. ICITAP will supplement police academy training with courses for on-duty police officers. It also will help develop long-range planning skills, internal investigations and accountability procedures, and logistical systems so that the new civilian police can perform their proper functions effectively. The peace accords created two commissions to investigate human rights issues: an ad hoc commission to review the human rights records of military officers and a Truth Commission to investigate major human rights cases. We are supporting this work. We are providing $1 million to the United Nations to support the Truth Commission. We have held meetings with members of both commissions, and we are prepared to provide information we have on cases the commissions are investigating. It will take the full resources of our embassy in San Salvador, as well as of those who follow Salvadoran issues here and at the United Nations, to keep track of the peace process as it unfolds. I hope it will continue to unfold smoothly. But there is no guarantee that it will not need more direct involvement on the part of the United States, the UN Secretary General, or the Four Friends, as happened when the agreements were in the final stages of negotiation. To be ready for such involvement, we need to watch the process day by day, minute by minute. In this regard, let me take the liberty of addressing a matter that is frankly out of the hands of this subcommittee. The President nominated Michael G. Kozak to be US ambassador to El Salvador in October of last year. I had the privilege of having Mike Kozak as my principal deputy, and many of you know him well. He is a dedicated, hard-working, and scrupulously honest public servant in the finest traditions of the Department of State. He richly deserves to be confirmed. Our embassy in San Salvador has been without an ambassador for 4 months--4 months that have been absolutely crucial for the peace process. The Administration urges the Senate to schedule confirmation hearings for Mike Kozak and for Joseph G. Sullivan, ambassador-designate to Nicaragua, without further delay. Our economic aid is also vital to the success of El Salvador's National Reconstruction Plan. This plan, a major component of the peace accords, will provide immediate humanitarian relief and long-term social and economic assistance in former conflictive zones, help ex-combatants reintegrate into civilian pursuits, give small farmers credit to purchase land, and rebuild vital infrastructure. In its first 4 months, nearly 1.5 million Salvadorans, including over 790,000 under the age of 5 [years], have been vaccinated against infectious diseases. All but one of the 23 health centers closed because of the conflict are now open, and over 250 health workers are active in the area. Fifty-five war amputees have received treatment; 460 ex-combatants are receiving vocational training. The "Municipalities in Action" program is moving to construct 79 roads, 35 schools, 4 health centers, 4 sewage projects, and 7 rural electrification projects, while the Ministry of Public Works is rehabilitating over 100 miles of roads. The land bank set up to provide credit to small farmers reached over 1,300 families, and El Salvador's central bank has advanced $3.1 million to farmers for the current planting season. There is still much to be done. Programs to counsel ex-combatants are on the drawing boards. Over 400 schools must be reopened and staffed. More funds are needed to stimulate small business activity and to rebuild electric and telephone lines. And the programs now underway need to be expanded. The National Reconstruction Plan is more than an aid program to a poverty- stricken area. It is a way to spread the benefits of peace and democracy to those most affected by the conflict: ex-combatants, victims of violence, [and] refugees. It will ease the difficult transition to civilian life for many and give others the courage to renew their lives. In doing so, it offers the hope that reconciliation can take root and that once-bitter enemies can work side by side to rebuild the land they share. US economic aid to El Salvador will also promote changes that promise to make economic growth permanent. President Cristiani stands in the first ranks of Latin American economic reformers. Under his leadership, El Salvador has steadily lowered tariffs and barriers to investment, privatized inefficient state-owned enterprises, and embraced the wisdom of free markets. Even during the most destructive days of the war, El Salvador's economy continued to grow. Now that the burden of the conflict is over, President Cristiani's sound economic policies make economic aid a good investment. For the sake of El Salvador and the entire region, we need to pass the Administration's 1993 request for $383 million for the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI); $43.9 million of that would go to reduce El Salvador's debt to the United States. With EAI debt relief, El Salvador would save over $800 million in debt payments, while putting $21.4 million in a jointly administered fund to ease environmental problems neglected during the war. Reduced debt payments will enable El Salvador to attract more foreign investment and devote more money to social projects vital to reconciliation and post-war economic recovery. We were pleased that the House [of Representatives] rejected last week an attempt to cut in half EAI debt-reduction funding by a 78 to 333 vote. The House agriculture appropriations bill now contains $69 million for PL-480 debt reduction in FY 1993. The Administration urges your support for House and Senate passage of that appropriation and for the rest of the EAI funding this year. The FY 1992 continuing resolution provides $21.25 million in security assistance for maintenance, non-lethal equipment, training, medical services, and replacement vehicles. For FY 1993, we propose a total of $40 million: $13 million for the Demobilization and Transition Fund, to be used to reintegrate military and FMLN ex-combat- ants into civilian pursuits; and $27 million in non-lethal assistance as the Salvadoran armed forces downsize, demobilize, and take up new missions in a peaceful El Salvador. We expect to play a very active role in helping El Salvador's armed forces to reduce and restructure. Continued US support, especially our emphasis on human rights and proper administration, is critical to maintain our influence and ensure compliance with the peace agreements. Moreover, sensitive border disagreements between El Salvador and Honduras, stemming from the "soccer war" of 1969, are due to be decided soon at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. To create an imbalance between these two countries' military services would be dangerous and destabilizing at this time. Mr. Chairman, I know that you and members of this subcommittee are following these issues with close interest. The hearings you have conducted have helped focus public attention on the success that has been achieved in El Salvador and the work that remains to be done. We in the Administration look forward to working with you to do what once seemed impossible--to help consolidate a lasting, democratic peace in El Salvador. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

US Policy Regarding Refugee Women and Children

Moten Source: Sarah E. Moten, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Assistance, Bureau for Refugee Programs Description: Address before the US Catholic Conference's Biannual Conference, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 1 19927/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: Vietnam, Mozambique Subject: Refugees [TEXT] It is my pleasure to be with you this morning to discuss one of my biggest interests: refugee women and refugee children. I would like to give you a brief overview of US policy in this area and how we are working to make that policy a reality. US refugee policy, in general, stresses the need to work as a part of the larger international community. Where refugee assistance is concerned, this means stressing first and foremost the responsibilities and capabilities of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. The United States has worked hard with other member governments in the UNHCR's governing body (the executive committee) to establish UNHCR policy on refugee women and refugee children. Our work has resulted in the recently issued "Guidelines for the Protection of Refugee Women" and the previous "Guidelines for Refugee Children." I should point out that UNHCR is one of a very few UN agencies which has adopted a policy or guidelines on women or children. Now that the policies are set in the UNHCR, we have put a large emphasis on effective implementation of both sets of guidelines, and we work in several ways to achieve this. -- In the executive committee, we continue to stress--in resolutions pertaining to, for example, refugee emergencies, refugee repatriation, or personnel--the need to focus on the beneficiaries of the specific programs. If you design the program around the beneficiaries on the scene, women and children's needs will be addressed. -- We have worked closely and directly with offices in UNHCR to try to develop a clearer link between the policies and UNHCR's internal programming and budgeting. This has had its clearest reflection in discussions on the presentation of UNHCR's budget in its executive committee documents. UNHCR is working toward a document which would more clearly enumerate the populations being targeted by the budget and programs being proposed. -- In designing and implementing programs which are sensitive to the needs and abilities of refugee women and the needs of refugee children, perhaps the most important factor is awareness of the staff to the issues involved. The UNHCR Senior Advisor on Refugee Women, Anne Brazeau, has developed a training program called "people-oriented planning," which we have enthusiastically endorsed, and [we] suggested that 100% of UNHCR staff be trained. The United States has adopted the policy that attention to refugee women and children should be "mainstreamed" in the organization. This means ensuring that UNHCR deals with refugee women and children holistically-- that they are a significant part of planning for every issue and every country program. We are working to move away from special funds for special programs; we want the general funds for general programs to be sensitively used so that there is no need for special programs. The best example of this is the trust fund that was set up for anti-piracy activities, which included counseling for victims of violence. That activity should have been a part of the general program, funded by all the donors to the UNHCR, rather than a special activity which was funded almost solely by the United States. There are circumstances, however, where special efforts are required to address the particularly difficult circumstances of refugee women or refugee children. In general, these are cases where the person's vulnerability as a woman or as a child intersects with the vulnerability she or he faces as a refugee, creating a double vulnerability. Some examples of severe protection problems for refugee women and refugee children include: -- Sexual abuse of a woman during her flight to refuge; -- The need which occurs sometimes for women or children to trade sexual favors for basic goods or services in a refugee camp; -- Forced conscription of refugee children for use as military porters or, worse, as combatants; and -- The traumas and stresses caused by family separation during flight. The concept of mainstreaming can be combined with the need to do something extraordinary for a specific need such as those I've just mentioned. Under the policies adopted, UNHCR should react quickly to address any of the above protection problems. If it were necessary to continue a program longer than [for the] short term, however, we would want to see such activities become part of UNHCR's general program for refugee assistance rather than being set aside as special programs for these groups. The role of voluntary agencies in these areas is important but also complicated. UNHCR should have the lead in any refugee situation in addressing the protection problems of women or children. It usually establishes implementing partnership arrangements with voluntary agencies. The United States sometimes provides funding directly to voluntary agencies or, specifically, to an international organization for programs which benefit refugee women or refugee children. I have already referred to the counseling for victims of violence program in Southeast Asia, which, you all probably are well aware, has long been an active interest of our moderator, Dawn Calabia. Other programs include: -- Through Save the Children in Malawi, we have funded, for several years, a program to treat the mental health problems of children who have witnessed or participated in a horrific level of violence inside Mozambique. We are now working with SCF [Save the Children Fund] to establish a permanent training facility at the University of Zimbabwe, with the cooperation of Duke University and SCF. We would like to see this become a part of UNHCR's training for protection or social services officers, and UNHCR is interested in the idea. -- Over the past decade, the United States has funded voluntary agency programs in Pakistan, many of which have been geared specifically to refugee women's health and education needs. We believe that the effect of the voluntary agencies which have worked with the refugees in Pakistan will be felt long after their return to Afghanistan. -- UNHCR will be funding a Nordic consortium called Nordic Assistance to Repatriated Vietnamese (NARV) to assist in the return to Vietnam and reintegration of unaccompanied minors from the camps of first asylum in Southeast Asia. The United States will be earmarking funds for this project. It is vital that these children, who have been determined not to be refugees and who have parents in Vietnam, be helped to leave the degradation and dangers of the camps, where their lives are wasted daily. I know that most of your collective knowledge is about refugee admissions to the United States, and what you could teach me about the special needs of refugee women and children in this country is far greater than anything I could tell you today. I would, however, like to address resettlement in the United States as a special response to specific refugee protection cases. Each year, UNHCR collects statistics on the ability of resettlement nations to respond to protection cases. The United States led the world last year by resettling 50% of the cases which UNHCR determined needed to be removed from refugee camps for protection reasons. Most of these cases were refugees who had family in this country. The United States and the UNHCR have established a procedure under which the United States will consider for resettlement special protection cases identified by UNHCR, even when there is no family link in the United States. This response is, of course, easiest in those places where INS [US Immigration and Naturalization Service] has an office so that interviews can be arranged quickly, such as Southeast Asia and Nairobi, Kenya. It would be misleading for me to say that, simply because we have established a procedure, everything is fine. We know that there is a lack of knowledge both on the part of UNHCR protection officers and some of our own refugee officers in the field, especially when they are not familiar with our regular resettlement programs. My point to you here is that we have the capacity and that we stand ready to respond when a protection problem creates a need for resettlement. It is commonly regarded that, if you protect and assist a woman, you assist her child as well. In the interim, the United States contributes toward their needs through programs of overseas assistance and of admission of certain refugees for resettlement in the United States. Central to these goals is a recognition that refugee problems are matters of international concern, requiring multilateral solutions. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Malawi: Disappearance Of Labor Leader

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 15 19927/15/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Malawi Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Terrorism [TEXT] The United States is gravely concerned about the disappearance of Malawian labor leader and pro-democracy advocate Chakufwa Chihana. Mr. Chihana was arrested April 6 when he returned to Malawi after visiting Zambia and South Africa, where he spoke in support of democratic change in Malawi. He was ordered released on bail July 11. When he visited Lilongwe Central Police Headquarters July 14 to arrange his once-per-week reports to the police as required by his bail conditions, he was reportedly taken into police custody and transferred to Zomba regional police station, some 21/2 hours drive away, where police officials claim not to know anything of his whereabouts. The United States also is concerned about the Malawi Government's expulsion of the Harare representative of the African-American Labor Center, Tom Medley. He has been declared an "undesirable person" and banned from Malawi. These events are even more distressing as they contradict recent positive initiatives by President Banda, such as the recent release of nine political detainees, in response to concerns expressed by the international community about Malawi's human rights practices. We call on the Government of Malawi to take immediate steps to release Mr. Chihana from police custody and allow him to resume his normal activities freely. We also ask the government to rescind its order banning Mr. Medley from Malawi. These actions constitute an unfortunate step backwards on Malawi's road to a more open, pluralistic society. We have made these points directly to the Malawi Government. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Rwanda: Peace Agreement

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 15 19927/15/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Rwanda Subject: Democratization [TEXT] The US Government is greatly encouraged by the signing of a peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, on July 12, between the Government of Rwanda and the representatives of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The two sides agreed to a temporary truce on July 19 and a permanent cease- fire on July 31. They approved the deployment of a military observer group to monitor the cease-fire and the creation of a joint political-military commission to resolve interim disputes. They agreed on general principles to govern a transition period and on further negotiations between the government and the RPF to achieve a permanent political settlement. This agreement reflects great credit on both parties, as well as on the Government of Tanzania, which hosted the negotiations; the Organization of African Unity, which will supervise the military observer group; and the Government of France, which took a lead role in organizing the negotiations. Other African and Western observer states--Belgium, Burundi, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Zaire, and Zimbabwe--have agreed to participate in the various peace-keeping mechanisms or otherwise lend their support to its implementation. The conflict in Rwanda has generated hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons and has seriously disrupted economic activity in East Africa. We believe that this major peace agreement represents an African solution to an African problem. The United States provided technical advice during the talks and will continue to advise the parties on implementing the peace accords. In the critical period leading up to the fullscale cease-fire on July 31, we call on both the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front not to launch new military initiatives which would disrupt or destroy the prospects for peace. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 29, July 20, 1992 Title:

Burma: Release Of Political Prisoners

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Date: Jul, 16 19927/16/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Burma Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] This month marks the beginning of the fourth year of house arrest of Burmese opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. Her courage and indomitable spirit in defense of human rights and democracy have won the admiration of the world. Since April, the military Government of Burma has taken some limited steps toward political reform and has released some political prisoners. Most recently, the government began a dialogue with certain elected parliamentarians and political party representatives. We believe that the goal of such talks should be the prompt establishment of democratic, elected civilian government and national reconciliation. This should be achieved with the participation of all political figures. We once again strongly urge the release of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and the establishment of a democratically elected civilian government. (###)