US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992

Title:

Economic Summit Accomplishments

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from press briefing following the Group of Seven (G-7) economic summit, Munich, Germany Date: Jul, 8 19927/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Poland, Russia Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] I've spent the past 3 days discussing the responsibilities and opportunities that we have for encouraging stronger economic growth in our countries and, indeed, in the entire world. And we've also discussed sustaining political reform in the emerging democracies as well as regional political issues, including Yugoslavia. I would cite five key accomplishments at the Munich economic summit. We've succeeded in achieving a solid consensus on strengthening world growth. Recovery is underway in the United States. Japan, Germany, and Italy . . . have taken actions in the last few days to strengthen their growth. Also, the United States has cut its interest rates. These actions will help our domestic economy continue its recovery. US exports to a growing world economy will increase American jobs. We'll work with Poland on new uses for its currency stabilization fund that will support market reform once Poland reaches agreement with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] on a program. I believe this is a very important encouragement for Poland and an expression of our faith in Poland's commitment to market reform. We expressed strong support for [Russian] President Yeltsin's reform efforts. This is a tribute to his leadership and vision in working to bring a great country firmly into the family of democratic, market-oriented countries. We've demonstrated our commitment to the future of safe nuclear power by agreeing on a coordinated cooperative effort with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to improve the safety of Soviet-designed power reactors. And finally, we're taking a number of steps relating to Yugoslavia, both to relieve the horrible suffering in Bosnia and to contain the spread of ethnic violence. With more growth, we will create new job opportunities at home. We will also be able to help emerging democracies establish the vibrant market economies so vital for their political and economic development. We had a frank exchange on views on trade. We all recognize that completing the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] will give a major boost to world growth by expanding trade for all countries, developed as well as developing. And I've worked hard over the past year to identify constructive solutions to tough issues. It's natural that as we get close to the end, the going gets tougher. But I will persevere because the benefits of success are tremendous. And all summit leaders expect that an agreement can be reached by the end of the year. Now, one thing stands out clearly from our discussions: The triumph of the ideals of democracy and free markets throughout the world means that distinctions between domestic and international economic policies are increasingly meaningless. This is particularly true for the United States, where more than 70% of our growth in the last 5 years has come from exports. More than 7 million American jobs are related to exports. And, clearly, America's well-being is tied closely to the health of the world economy. What's happened here and how we all follow through on our commitments concerns every American. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992 Title:

Housing Assistance for Poland

Fitzwater Source: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 5 19927/5/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: E/C Europe Country: Poland Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics [TEXT] The President announced today [July 5] a $10-million housing technical assistance package. This will be a 3-year program designed to facilitate the timely implementation and disbursement of: -- A $25-million US housing guaranty program; -- A $200-million World Bank housing sector loan; and -- A $65-million European Bank for Reconstruction and Development sector loan. The objective of US housing assistance is to help Poland create a viable housing sector based on free market concepts and to develop the necessary legal and financial infrastructure. Technical assistance services will be available to banking and financial institutions involved in mortgage banking, as well as to the Ministry of Construction's Housing Project Office, to promote private housing projects. The assistance will cover housing finance, real estate development, and municipal development. Advisers will be placed in the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Construction, the Bud [Ministry of Construction's] Bank, and a select number of municipalities throughout the disbursement of the Housing Guaranty Program. This long- term support will be supplemented by short-term advisers for specific technical subjects. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992 Title:

US Support for CSCE

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Helsinki, Finland Date: Jul, 9 19927/9/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: CSCE, NATO [TEXT] May I first thank President Koivisto and the government and wonderful people of Finland for their hospitality. And it's fitting that we meet again in Helsinki, the city whose name came to symbolize hope and determination during the Cold War. We declared the Cold War over when we met in Paris in 1990. But even then we did not appreciate what awaited us. Since 1990, a vast empire has collapsed, a score of new states has been born, and a brutal war rages in the Balkans. Our world has changed beyond recognition. But our principles have not changed. They have been proven right. With our principles as a compass, we must work as a community to channel change toward the peaceful order that this century has thus far failed to deliver. The United States always has supported CSCE as a vehicle for advancing human rights. During the Cold War, we saw the denial of human rights as a primary source of the confrontation that's scarred Europe and threatened global war. And now a new ideology: Intolerant nationalism is spawning new divisions, new crimes, new conflicts. Because we believe that the key to security in the new age is to create a democratic peace, the United States sees an indispensable role for CSCE. Accordingly, I'd like to suggest a five-point agenda to make CSCE more effective. First, let us commit ourselves to make democratic change irreversible. We must not be so paralyzed by the turmoil around us that we lose sight of our historic mission, completing the grand liberation of the past 3 years. We should use CSCE to nurture democratic ways in those societies where people have been oppressed for generations under the heal of the state. We should reject the notion that democracy has opened Pandora's box. Democracy is not the cause of these problems but, rather, the means by which people can resolve their differences and bring their aspirations into harmony. We have proof of this. In this room are leaders of nations for whom democracy has made both aggression and civil war unthinkable. Second, let us all agree to be held accountable to the standards of conduct recorded in our solemn declarations. Those who violate CSCE norms must be singled out, criticized, isolated, even punished by sanctions. And let Serbia's absence today serve as a clear message to others. Third, let us commit CSCE to attack the root causes of conflict. The Dutch initiative for a high commissioner for national minorities is an important step toward providing early warning. It will help us act before conflict erupts. My country has proposed a CSCE project on tolerance which can lead to practical cooperation in fighting discrimination and racial prejudice. We cannot fail to make this a top priority while the so-called ethnic cleansing of Muslims occurs in Bosnia even as we meet. Fourth, let us strengthen our mechanisms for the settlement of disputes. CSCE should offer a flexible set of services for mediation, conciliation, [and] arbitration so that conflicts can be averted. A prompt follow-on meeting should take up specific means for dispute settlement, including the US idea whereby our community can insist that disputing parties submit to CSCE conciliation. Fifth, let us decide here and now to develop a credible Euro-Atlantic peace- keeping capability. This region remains heavily armed from Cold War days. Ad hoc operations of hastily assembled units will not suffice, and this is why I consider NATO's offer to contribute to CSCE peace-keeping so vital. We've learned that Europe's problems are America's problems. Her hopes and aspirations are ours as well. And because of NATO, my country will keep substantial military capabilities in Europe that could contribute to peace- keeping under CSCE. But it is not for NATO alone to keep the peace in Europe. We welcome a WEU [Western European Union] role, and we also invite every nation here to work directly with NATO in building a new Euro-Atlantic peace-keeping force. I must conclude these remarks with another word on the nightmare in Bosnia. If our CSCE community is to have real meaning in this new world, let us be of one mind about our immediate aims. First, we should see to it that relief supplies get through no matter what it takes. Second, we should see to it that the UN sanctions are respected no matter what it takes. Third, we should do all we can to prevent this conflict from spreading. Fourth, let us call with one voice for the guns to fall silent through a cease- fire on all fronts. Let me close with this thought. We know more now than we did at our last gathering in Paris about this new era, its dangers, and, yes, about its possibilities. There's still an abundance of uncertainty, and yet we cannot be daunted by the unknown. The steps we take here will be only first steps, but let them be determined first steps toward a true community of freedom and peace. And to this end, I come to Finland to pledge the full support of the United States of America. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992 Title:

US Support for CSCE

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excepts from a news conference, Helsinki, Finland Date: Jul, 9 19927/9/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: CSCE, NATO [TEXT] Ladies and gentlemen, as you know, we have reviewed the CSCE, along with NATO and the European Community, as one of the three pillars of the new Europe. This meeting gives an opportunity for 51 heads of state to exchange views on how to cope with the challenges facing this continent. We see the theme of this summit meeting as one of managing change in the new Europe. Most of the changes in Europe since the last CSCE summit in Paris in 1990 have been overwhelmingly positive. For the first time ever, the CSCE community is virtually united in its commitment to values such as human rights, democracy, and economic liberty. We've also seen 17 new members join the CSCE since the Paris summit. And these countries are anxious to join the Western community of nations. At the same time, it is obvious that this process of historic change has led to some worrisome conflicts and crises which require new and creative responses. We, thus, think that this summit meeting has, in effect, a double challenge: to reinforce the positive trends in Europe and to develop new instruments for coping with the negative ones. Some ideas for this were presented in the President's intervention this afternoon in the five-point program which he outlined. When the document of this summit meeting is released tomorrow, I think you will see that our common efforts on this agenda have been successful. The CSCE decided last week that Serbia and Montenegro should not be present here or at other CSCE meetings, at least until review of this decision in the fall. This, I think, demonstrates that the 51 states of the CSCE will not tolerate in their midst the type of irresponsible behavior as has been shown by the leadership of Serbia. Indeed, Serbia-Montenegro will have to apply for CSCE membership just like any other new state if they want to participate in this process. The document that we will release tomorrow establishes a four-point structure to strengthen CSCE's ability to prevent crises and to manage crises that aren't prevented. There is a first early warning phase, which concentrates on human rights and democratic institution-building as a way to prevent conflicts before they develop. A second phase of political management focuses on steps to encourage an end to conflicts. A third phase brings in specific instruments such as fact- finding missions and mechanisms for peaceful settlements of disputes. A final phase involves formal peace-keeping operations if all other previous efforts fail. For example, the CSCE will agree on procedures to initiate peace-keeping operations and draw on the resources of other organizations, such as NATO and the WEU [Western European Union] in their implementation. These provisions give CSCE, for the first time, an orderly set of procedures to prevent and manage conflicts. In the end, of course, the resolution of problems and conflicts within the Euro-Atlantic community will depend upon the willingness of countries to use the instruments which the CSCE has devised and the commitment of countries to live by the principles for which CSCE stands. These three elements--principles for behavior by countries, tools to cope with the problems that may arise, and the willingness of nations to use both of these--are essential for a solid and stable new Europe.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: CSCE Forum For Security Cooperation

Fitzwater Source: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Description: Helsinki, Finland Date: Jul, 10 19927/10/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia Subject: CSCE [TEXT]
Background
The participating countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have agreed at their July 9-10 summit in Helsinki to open a new and comprehensive security dialogue, the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Intended to address the broad range of security issues faced by CSCE states, the FSC will involve all CSCE members. The FSC is to begin work in fall 1992 in Vienna.
Mandate
The elements to be addressed in FSC are contained in the concluding document of the Helsinki CSCE summit. In general, the FSC's work will proceed in two parallel processes: -- An enhanced dialogue on military issues, defense conversion, non- proliferation, and regional disputes; and -- More traditional negotiations on arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). FSC will take account of and seek to build on the existing security regimes in Europe, including the CFE Treaty, the CFE-1A accord, the treaty on Open Skies, and the 1992 Vienna Document on CSBMs. As the security situation in Europe evolves with the changing political scene, FSC will serve as a vital forum for negotiation on and discussion of crucial issues. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992 Title:

CFE Treaty and CFE-1A Agreement: White House Statement

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Helsinki, Finland Date: Jul, 10 19927/10/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe Subject: CSCE, Arms Control [TEXT] Today, at the Helsinki summit, President Bush, along with the leaders of 28 other European nations, agreed that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) will be applied provisionally on July 17, 1992, to enter into force this fall with the full participation by the original signatories and the eight new states of the former Soviet Union with territory in CFE's zone of application. The United States attaches great importance to this event because joining CFE is a key indication of the new states' commitment to achieving lower and more stable levels of conventional military forces in Europe. Along with our treaty partners, the United States has worked hard to make CFE a reality. In the end, it was achieved because all participants, East and West, recognized that CFE's unprecedented force reductions, information exchanges, and verification provisions are the cornerstone for efforts to further improve European security in the years ahead.
CFE-1A
President Bush also signed the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, otherwise known as the CFE-1A agreement. CFE-1A negotiations began shortly after the CFE Treaty was signed in 1990. The CFE-1A accord places politically binding limits on military manpower in Europe. Along with the equipment limits of the CFE Treaty, CFE-1A establishes comprehensive and stable levels of conventional military forces on the continent.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992 Title:

CFE Treaty and CFE-1A Agreement

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Fact Sheet, Helsinki, Finland Date: Jul, 10 19927/10/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe, E/C Europe Subject: CSCE, Arms Control [TEXT] The CFE Treaty was signed in Paris in November 1990 between the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. The United States ratified it in December 1991. CFE's entry into force was delayed primarily because of dissolution of the former Soviet Union. This required the new states with territory in the CFE zone (Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova) to reach agreement on division of the USSR's treaty obligations and ratify the treaty by action of their new parliaments.
Treaty Limits
The CFE Treaty sets equal ceilings, from the Atlantic to the Urals, on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attack and initiating large- scale offensive operations. Collectively, the 29 treaty participants have agreed that neither side of the old Cold War divide in Europe may have more than: -- 20,000 tanks; -- 20,000 artillery pieces; -- 30,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs); -- 6,800 combat aircraft; and -- 2,000 attack helicopters. To further limit the readiness of armed forces, the treaty sets equal ceilings on equipment that may be with active units. Other ground equipment must be in designated permanent storage sites. The limits for equipment each side may have in active units are: -- 16,500 tanks; -- 17,000 artillery pieces; and -- 27,300 armored combat vehicles (ACVs); The two groups addressed in the treaty have consulted on the division of these limits by country. The members of NATO have consulted through NATO mechanisms and have agreed on national entitlements. The treaty limits the proportion of armaments that can be held by any one country in Europe to about one-third of the total for all countries in Europe- -the "sufficiency" rule. These limits are: -- 13,300 tanks; -- 13,700 artillery pieces; -- 20,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs); -- 5,150 combat aircraft; and -- 1,500 attack helicopters.
Regional Arrangements
In addition to limits on the number of armaments in each category on each side, the treaty includes regional limits to prevent destabilizing force concentrations of ground equipment.
Destruction
Equipment reduced to meet the ceilings must be destroyed or, in a limited number of cases, converted to non-military purposes. After the treaty enters into force, a 4-month baseline inspection period will begin. Twenty- five percent of the destruction must be complete by the end of 1 year, 60% by the end of 2 years, and all destruction required by the treaty completed by the end of 3 years. Large amounts of equipment will be destroyed to meet the obligations of the CFE Treaty. NATO will meet its destruction obligations by destroying its oldest equipment. NATO members with newer equipment, including the United States, have agreed to transfer some of this equipment to allies with older equipment. These transfers will not reduce NATO's destruction obligation. About 2,800 pieces of US equipment will be transferred to NATO allies. Also, the United States will destroy about 600 older tanks.
Verification
The treaty includes unprecedented provisions for detailed information exchanges, on-site inspections, challenge inspections, and on-site monitoring of destruction. NATO has established a system to cooperate in monitoring the treaty. Parties have an unlimited right to monitor the process of destruction. The CFE Treaty is of unlimited duration.
CFE-1A
Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty called for follow-up negotiations with the objective of concluding agreement on additional measures to strengthen security and stability in Europe, including limitations on military manpower. These negotiations, known as the CFE-1A talks, involved the same participants and used the same mandate as the negotiations on the CFE Treaty. They began in Vienna in November 1990 and were concluded on July 6, 1992.
Nature of the Agreement
CFE-1A constitutes a political commitment by its signatories to limit (and, where applicable, reduce) the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces. In contrast to the CFE Treaty, CFE-1A is not a legally binding agreement and is not subject to ratification by parliaments. The heart of the CFE-1A agreement is a "ceiling" on the military personnel of each participating state within the CFE Treaty's area of application (i.e., Europe). Each participating state determined its own ceiling, taking into consideration its national defense plans and security interests. These numerical ceilings were not subject to negotiation among the participants, although the levels were open to discussion before adoption of the agreement. They are based on agreed categories of military personnel subject to limitation that apply equally to all. In general terms, the CFE-1A limitation applies to military personnel, based on land and in the area of application, in these categories of conventional armed forces: -- Land and air forces; -- Air defense forces (including ground-based, air defense aviation, and all other air defense forces); -- Central headquarters, command, and staff elements; -- Land-based naval forces that hold equipment subject to the CFE Treaty (including land-based naval aircraft, coastal defense, and naval infantry forces); -- Any other forces that hold equipment limited under the CFE Treaty; and -- Reserve personnel called up for full-time service for more than 90 days. The CFE-1A agreement places no limits on the personnel of any sea-based naval forces, internal security units, or forces serving under UN command. The United States has declared a manpower limit of 250,000. This figure far exceeds personnel the United States is likely to base in Europe in the near future. It is high enough to ensure that the United States is able to meet its commitments to reinforce Europe in a crisis without exceeding agreed limits. It also is consistent with US equipment limits under the CFE Treaty, including that in storage in Europe.
Information Exchange
The CFE-1A agreement provides for a broad, detailed exchange of information on the military manpower of the participating states. Information is to be provided on personnel in the categories under limitation detailed above and also on personnel serving: -- With forces designed and structured to perform internal security functions during peacetime (excluding unarmed or lightly armed civil police forces); -- With any other element (excluding naval) of conventional armed forces; and -- Under UN command. In general, information provided for most categories is broken down to show the strength of individual units at the level of brigade/regiment and higher.
Verification/Evaluation
The regime for evaluating compliance with the declared national limits is modest. This reflects the participants' recognition that evaluating compliance with limits on manpower is, at best, an inexact process. It is also in keeping with the fact that the CFE-1A limitations constitute a political commitment, not a legal obligation. The evaluation regime in CFE-1A is built on the system of inspections created to verify compliance with the CFE Treaty. In essence, when inspectors arrive at a location to inspect equipment subject to the CFE Treaty, they also will be provided with information on the personnel serving at the site. If the numbers they are given are at variance with the numbers provided in the CFE-1A information exchange, the inspectors will be given an explanation for the discrepancy.
Stabilizing Measures
To further enhance security and promote transparency among the participating states, the CFE-1A agreement includes three stabilizing measures: -- A measure requiring 42-day notification if any state plans to increase the personnel strength of any ground force unit by more than 1,000 or any air force unit by more than 500; -- A measure requiring 42-day notification if a state plans to call up more than 35,000 reservists (excepting call-ups made in response to emergency situations, such as natural disasters); and -- A measure stating that any personnel resubordinated to forces not subject to limitation (e.g., internal security forces) will, nonetheless, remain subject to limitation for 1-2 years.
Timeframe of the CFE-1A Agreement
CFE-1A enters into force on July 17, 1992, simultaneously with provisional application of the CFE Treaty. Its provisions are of unlimited duration. The national ceilings declared by each state take effect 40 months after entry into force. Information on manpower is to be exchanged initially within 30 days of entry into force and annually thereafter. More detailed information on certain categories of manpower, broken down to show units at the brigade/regiment level, will be provided after 40 months as an aid to evaluating whether a state is observing its manpower limit. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992 Title:

Meeting With the Prime Minister-Designate of Serbia-Montenegro

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from a news conference at the Helsinki CSCE Summit, Helsinki, Finland Date: Jul, 8 19927/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations [TEXT]
Secretary Baker:
First of all, Mr. Panic requested this meeting. I met with him in his capacity as Prime Minister-designate [of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which consists of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro]. I agreed to meet with him in the interest of making sure, absolutely sure, that no one in Serbia or Montenegro misunderstands America's position. The message that I gave him is very clear, and that is that the growing humanitarian nightmare in the former Yugoslavia, for which we think Serbian authorities and military are overwhelmingly responsible, must end, and Serbia-Montenegro must abide by the UN Security Council resolutions. Those requirements include the need to allow the unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance to all who need it; to end interference in Bosnia- Hercegovina and respect the territorial integrity and legitimate government of that state; to withdraw, disband, and disarm all Serbian forces in Bosnia and place their weapons under effective international monitoring; and to cease immediately all forcible expulsions and any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population. I told Mr. Panic quite bluntly that we do not question in any way his motives or aims, which I think are noble--he expressed them as a desire to act in the best interest of his country of origin [Serbia] and of his adopted country [the United States], both, and to bring peace to that region--but that the world would now demand deeds from Yugoslavia, not just words. We've heard words before. I concluded the meeting by noting the historic friendship of the Serbian and American people and expressed our regrets that the policies of the Belgrade leadership have come between our two countries. I made it clear to him that America supports a free and democratic Serbia that lives in peace with its neighbors and its own people. Q: What did he tell you, Mr. Baker? Secretary Baker: He told me with respect to each of the items that I mentioned as things that we thought had to be done that he agreed with that. He said his only aim in taking the job was to see what could be done to bring peace and to help the people of this country at large. He said that he felt it was a very difficult job, that he would need a lot of help from a lot of different sources and a lot of different people. We made it very clear at the outset that he is not a representative of the US Government. He is not going there somehow as a special emissary from us. There are no special deals or arrangements that we have made with him. He is an American citizen, and we have given him a 30-day exemption from the sanctions under our law in order to travel to Belgrade. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992 Title:

Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 8 19927/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Azerbaijan, Armenia Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, CSCE [TEXT] , July 8, 1992. The US Government condemns the recent increase in fighting in Nagorno- Karabakh. Of particular concern to the US Government is the heavy fighting in northern Nagorno-Karabakh, and the assault on the regional center of Martakert, which is causing civilian casualties and refugees. We call upon the parties to the conflict immediately to halt all military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh. It remains our firm conviction that there can be no lasting gains to any party that resorts to violence. In that light, we urge that all the parties support and implement the call by the Chairman of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Nagorno-Karabakh Conference, former Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Raffaelli, for a 30-day halt to hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh beginning on July 9. The CSCE mediation effort is the best opportunity available to the parties for resolving this tragic conflict by peaceful means. It is in no party's interest to see the CSCE mediation effort falter or to bear responsibility in the eyes of the international community for actions that frustrate the CSCE effort. We call upon all the parties to recommit themselves to the CSCE mediation effort and to take steps to de-escalate the conflict and create an environment in which good faith negotiations can succeed. We also call upon all parties to honor CSCE commitments that require disputants to refrain from any action which may aggravate a dispute and make it more difficult or impossible to settle. The US Government has repeatedly stated that the quality and character of its relationship with both Azerbaijan and Armenia will depend on their demonstrated commitment to CSCE principles, including the peaceful settlement of disputes. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992 Title:

Talks on Northern Ireland

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 7 19927/7/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: Ireland Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] The US Government welcomes the opening in London of substantive talks between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland constitutional parties on the future of Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations. The convening of these expanded sessions of the talks reflects the strong desire of both communities and their leaders to overcome the problems of the past and to build a better future. At this historic moment, we applaud the determination, courage, and leadership that the two governments and the political parties have shown in pursuing these talks, and we wish them every success. A successful outcome would be a great victory for the cause of constitutional politics and for the proponents of peace, justice, and reconciliation. It would demonstrate to the world that progress can be made through dialogue and that violence has no place in this process. The United States has close ties with both the governments and peoples of the United Kingdom and Ireland, who share our commitment to democracy, and millions of Americans trace their ancestry to those islands. We have, therefore, always taken keen interest in developments there. We have supported the efforts of the British and Irish Governments to work toward a peaceful resolution of differences in Northern Ireland and have condemned terrorist violence, from whatever source. Through our support for the International Fund for Ireland, we have sought to make a con-crete contribution to peace and reconciliation through economic and social deve- lopment. We will, of course, continue to assist and encourage the peace process in all appropriate ways. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992 Title:

Treaty Actions: Multilateral and Bilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jul, 13 19927/13/92 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: Eurasia, E/C Europe, Subsaharan Africa, South America, MidEast/North Africa, East Asia Country: Albania, Australia, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia (former), Egypt, Finland, France, Netherlands, Gabon, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia, Moldova, Namibia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Russia, Seychelles Subject: CSCE, Trade/Economics, Arms Control [TEXT]
Multilateral
Arms Limitation
Protocol to the treaty of July 31, 1991, on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, with related letters. Done at Lisbon May 23, 1992. Enters into force on the date of final exchange of instruments of ratification. Signatures: United States, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine, May 23, 1992.
Health
Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808. Amendment of Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Done at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 1975. TIAS 8086. Amendments to Articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended. Done at Geneva May 22, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 3, 1977. TIAS 8534. Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at Geneva May 17, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1984. TIAS 10930. Acceptances deposited: Croatia, June 11, 1992; Georgia, May 26, 1992.
Taxation--International Organizations
Agreement on state and local taxation of foreign employees of public international organizations. Done at Washington Apr. 21, 1991.1 Signatures: International Food Policy Research Institute, May 20, 1992; Eastern Caribbean Investment Promotion Service, May 21, 1992; World Health Organization, May 21, 1992; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, May 26, 1992; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, June 1, 1992. Notification deposited in accordance with Art. 3A: International Telecommunication Satellite Organization, Apr. 23, 1992. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force June 21, 1985. Accessions deposited: Croatia, June 2, 1992; Slovenia, June 11, 1992.
Bilateral
Albania
Agreement concerning economic, technical and related assistance. Signed at Tirana June 10, 1992. Entered into force June 10, 1992.
Australia
Agreement amending the agreement of May 9, 1963, as amended (TIAS 5377, 6527, 8338, 10610), relating to the establishment of a United States naval communication station in Australia. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra May 8, 1992. Entered into force May 8, 1992.
Bolivia
Agreement supplementing the investment guaranties agreement of Dec. 19, 1985, relating to the Export-Import Bank. Signed at Washington May 20, 1992. Entered into force May 20, 1992.
Bulgaria
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Sofia Feb. 11 and Apr. 7, 1992. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1992.
Colombia
Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation in the seizure and forfeiture of property and proceeds of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs. Signed at Bogota July 24, 1990. Entered into force July 24, 1990.
Cote d'Ivoire
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Abidjan May 29, 1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Cote d'Ivoire of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Washington Oct. 22, 1991. Entered into force: June 3, 1992.
Egypt
Agreement amending grant agreement of Sept. 27, 1989, as amended, for power sector support. Signed at Cairo Feb. 12, 1992. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1992.
Finland
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Mar. 22, 1985, relating to scientific and technical cooperation. Signed at Washington Oct. 23, 1990. Entered into force: June 4, 1992; effective Sept. 15, 1990. Agreement amending and bringing into force the agreement of Oct. 23, 1990, amending and extending the agreement of Mar. 22, 1985, relating to scientific and technical cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 19 and June 4, 1992. Entered into force June 4, 1992.
France
Agreement amending and extending the memorandum of understanding of July 8 and 23, 1982, as amended and extended, covering cooperation in the field of geological sciences. Signed at Menlo Park (Calif.) June 5, 1992. Entered into force June 5, 1992; effective July 23, 1991. Gabon Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Libreville May 19, 1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Gabon of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Hungary
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Budapest Oct. 4, 1989. Entered into force: Mar. 19, 1992; effective Nov. 30, 1989.
Jordan
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Amman May 10, 1992. Entered into force June 22, 1992.
Latvia
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Riga Feb. 21 and Mar. 4, 1992. Entered into force Mar. 4, 1992.
Moldova
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Washington June 19, 1992. Enters into force on date on which Moldova communicates to the US that its constitutional or other legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Namibia
Agreement for special development assistance. Signed at Windhoek May 27, 1992. Entered into force May 27, 1992.
Netherlands
Agreement on mutual administrative assistance in the exchange of information in securities matters. Signed at The Hague Dec. 11, 1989. Entered into force: July 1, 1992.
Nicaragua
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Managua May 13, 1992. Enters into force upon receipt by Nicaragua of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Philippines
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Manila and Washington Apr. 21 and May 22, 1992. Enters into force Sept. 21, 1992.
Russian Federation
Agreement on trade relations [with the USSR], with related exchanges of letters. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. 56 Fed. Reg. 37409. Entered into force: June 17, 1992. Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the field of fuels and energy, with annex. Signed at Washington June 17, 1992. Entered into force June 17, 1992. Treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment, with annex, protocol and exchanges of letters. Signed at Washington June 17, 1992. Enters into force 30 days after the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. Agreement concerning cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, with annex. Signed at Washington June 17, 1992. Entered into force June 17, 1992. Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital, with protocol. Signed at Washington June 17, 1992. Enters into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. Agreement concerning the activities of the Peace Corps of the United States in the Russian Federation. Signed at Washington June 17, 1992. Enters into force on exchange of notifications confirming the completion of domestic procedures. Agreement concerning the opening of a Russian Consulate General in the city of Seattle, Washington. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 11 and 17, 1992. Entered into force June 17, 1992. Memorandum of mutual understanding on settlement of the problem of the new embassy administrative buildings in Washington and Moscow. Signed at Washington June 17, 1992. Entered into force June 17, 1992.
Seychelles
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Victoria and Washington May 13 and June 15, 1992. Enters into force Sept. 21, 1992. 1 Not in force. (###)