US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: Economic Summit Accomplishments
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpts from press briefing following the Group of
Seven (G-7) economic summit, Munich, Germany
Date: Jul, 8 19927/8/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: Poland, Russia
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
I've spent the past 3 days discussing the responsibilities and opportunities
that we have for encouraging stronger economic growth in our countries and,
indeed, in the entire world. And we've also discussed sustaining political
reform in the emerging democracies as well as regional political issues,
including Yugoslavia.
I would cite five key accomplishments at the Munich economic summit.
We've succeeded in achieving a solid consensus on strengthening world
growth. Recovery is underway in the United States. Japan, Germany, and
Italy . . . have taken actions in the last few days to strengthen their growth.
Also, the United States has cut its interest rates. These actions will help
our domestic economy continue its recovery.
US exports to a growing world economy will increase American jobs. We'll
work with Poland on new uses for its currency stabilization fund that will
support market reform once Poland reaches agreement with the IMF
[International Monetary Fund] on a program. I believe this is a very
important encouragement for Poland and an expression of our faith in
Poland's commitment to market reform.
We expressed strong support for [Russian] President Yeltsin's reform
efforts. This is a tribute to his leadership and vision in working to bring a
great country firmly into the family of democratic, market-oriented
countries.
We've demonstrated our commitment to the future of safe nuclear power by
agreeing on a coordinated cooperative effort with Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union to improve the safety of Soviet-designed power
reactors.
And finally, we're taking a number of steps relating to Yugoslavia, both to
relieve the horrible suffering in Bosnia and to contain the spread of ethnic
violence.
With more growth, we will create new job opportunities at home. We will
also be able to help emerging democracies establish the vibrant market
economies so vital for their political and economic development.
We had a frank exchange on views on trade. We all recognize that
completing the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] will give a major boost to world growth by expanding trade for all
countries, developed as well as developing. And I've worked hard over the
past year to identify constructive solutions to tough issues.
It's natural that as we get close to the end, the going gets tougher. But I
will persevere because the benefits of success are tremendous. And all
summit leaders expect that an agreement can be reached by the end of the
year.
Now, one thing stands out clearly from our discussions: The triumph of the
ideals of democracy and free markets throughout the world means that
distinctions between domestic and international economic policies are
increasingly meaningless. This is particularly true for the United States,
where more than 70% of our growth in the last 5 years has come from
exports. More than 7 million American jobs are related to exports. And,
clearly, America's well-being is tied closely to the health of the world
economy. What's happened here and how we all follow through on our
commitments concerns every American. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: Housing Assistance for Poland
Fitzwater
Source: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 5 19927/5/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Poland
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The President announced today [July 5] a $10-million housing technical
assistance package. This will be a 3-year program designed to facilitate
the timely implementation and disbursement of:
-- A $25-million US housing guaranty program;
-- A $200-million World Bank housing sector loan; and
-- A $65-million European Bank for Reconstruction and Development sector
loan.
The objective of US housing assistance is to help Poland create a viable
housing sector based on free market concepts and to develop the necessary
legal and financial infrastructure. Technical assistance services will be
available to banking and financial institutions involved in mortgage banking,
as well as to the Ministry of Construction's Housing Project Office, to
promote private housing projects. The assistance will cover housing
finance, real estate development, and municipal development. Advisers will
be placed in the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Construction, the Bud
[Ministry of Construction's] Bank, and a select number of municipalities
throughout the disbursement of the Housing Guaranty Program. This long-
term support will be supplemented by short-term advisers for specific
technical subjects. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: US Support for CSCE
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Remarks to the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE), Helsinki, Finland
Date: Jul, 9 19927/9/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Subject: CSCE, NATO
[TEXT]
May I first thank President Koivisto and the government and wonderful
people of Finland for their hospitality. And it's fitting that we meet again
in Helsinki, the city whose name came to symbolize hope and determination
during the Cold War. We declared the Cold War over when we met in Paris in
1990. But even then we did not appreciate what awaited us. Since 1990, a
vast empire has collapsed, a score of new states has been born, and a brutal
war rages in the Balkans.
Our world has changed beyond recognition. But our principles have not
changed. They have been proven right. With our principles as a compass, we
must work as a community to channel change toward the peaceful order that
this century has thus far failed to deliver.
The United States always has supported CSCE as a vehicle for advancing
human rights. During the Cold War, we saw the denial of human rights as a
primary source of the confrontation that's scarred Europe and threatened
global war. And now a new ideology: Intolerant nationalism is spawning
new divisions, new crimes, new conflicts.
Because we believe that the key to security in the new age is to create a
democratic peace, the United States sees an indispensable role for CSCE.
Accordingly, I'd like to suggest a five-point agenda to make CSCE more
effective.
First, let us commit ourselves to make democratic change irreversible. We
must not be so paralyzed by the turmoil around us that we lose sight of our
historic mission, completing the grand liberation of the past 3 years. We
should use CSCE to nurture democratic ways in those societies where people
have been oppressed for generations under the heal of the state. We should
reject the notion that democracy has opened Pandora's box. Democracy is
not the cause of these problems but, rather, the means by which people can
resolve their differences and bring their aspirations into harmony. We have
proof of this. In this room are leaders of nations for whom democracy has
made both aggression and civil war unthinkable.
Second, let us all agree to be held accountable to the standards of conduct
recorded in our solemn declarations. Those who violate CSCE norms must be
singled out, criticized, isolated, even punished by sanctions. And let
Serbia's absence today serve as a clear message to others.
Third, let us commit CSCE to attack the root causes of conflict. The Dutch
initiative for a high commissioner for national minorities is an important
step toward providing early warning. It will help us act before conflict
erupts.
My country has proposed a CSCE project on tolerance which can lead to
practical cooperation in fighting discrimination and racial prejudice. We
cannot fail to make this a top priority while the so-called ethnic cleansing
of Muslims occurs in Bosnia even as we meet.
Fourth, let us strengthen our mechanisms for the settlement of disputes.
CSCE should offer a flexible set of services for mediation, conciliation,
[and] arbitration so that conflicts can be averted. A prompt follow-on
meeting should take up specific means for dispute settlement, including the
US idea whereby our community can insist that disputing parties submit to
CSCE conciliation.
Fifth, let us decide here and now to develop a credible Euro-Atlantic peace-
keeping capability. This region remains heavily armed from Cold War days.
Ad hoc operations of hastily assembled units will not suffice, and this is
why I consider NATO's offer to contribute to CSCE peace-keeping so vital.
We've learned that Europe's problems are America's problems. Her hopes and
aspirations are ours as well. And because of NATO, my country will keep
substantial military capabilities in Europe that could contribute to peace-
keeping under CSCE. But it is not for NATO alone to keep the peace in Europe.
We welcome a WEU [Western European Union] role, and we also invite every
nation here to work directly with NATO in building a new Euro-Atlantic
peace-keeping force.
I must conclude these remarks with another word on the nightmare in
Bosnia. If our CSCE community is to have real meaning in this new world,
let us be of one mind about our immediate aims.
First, we should see to it that relief supplies get through no matter what it
takes.
Second, we should see to it that the UN sanctions are respected no matter
what it takes.
Third, we should do all we can to prevent this conflict from spreading.
Fourth, let us call with one voice for the guns to fall silent through a cease-
fire on all fronts.
Let me close with this thought. We know more now than we did at our last
gathering in Paris about this new era, its dangers, and, yes, about its
possibilities. There's still an abundance of uncertainty, and yet we cannot
be daunted by the unknown. The steps we take here will be only first steps,
but let them be determined first steps toward a true community of freedom
and peace. And to this end, I come to Finland to pledge the full support of
the United States of America. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: US Support for CSCE
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excepts from a news conference, Helsinki, Finland
Date: Jul, 9 19927/9/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Subject: CSCE, NATO
[TEXT]
Ladies and gentlemen, as you know, we have reviewed the CSCE, along with
NATO and the European Community, as one of the three pillars of the new
Europe. This meeting gives an opportunity for 51 heads of state to exchange
views on how to cope with the challenges facing this continent. We see the
theme of this summit meeting as one of managing change in the new Europe.
Most of the changes in Europe since the last CSCE summit in Paris in 1990
have been overwhelmingly positive. For the first time ever, the CSCE
community is virtually united in its commitment to values such as human
rights, democracy, and economic liberty. We've also seen 17 new members
join the CSCE since the Paris summit. And these countries are anxious to
join the Western community of nations.
At the same time, it is obvious that this process of historic change has led
to some worrisome conflicts and crises which require new and creative
responses. We, thus, think that this summit meeting has, in effect, a double
challenge: to reinforce the positive trends in Europe and to develop new
instruments for coping with the negative ones.
Some ideas for this were presented in the President's intervention this
afternoon in the five-point program which he outlined. When the document
of this summit meeting is released tomorrow, I think you will see that our
common efforts on this agenda have been successful.
The CSCE decided last week that Serbia and Montenegro should not be
present here or at other CSCE meetings, at least until review of this
decision in the fall. This, I think, demonstrates that the 51 states of the
CSCE will not tolerate in their midst the type of irresponsible behavior as
has been shown by the leadership of Serbia. Indeed, Serbia-Montenegro will
have to apply for CSCE membership just like any other new state if they
want to participate in this process.
The document that we will release tomorrow establishes a four-point
structure to strengthen CSCE's ability to prevent crises and to manage
crises that aren't prevented. There is a first early warning phase, which
concentrates on human rights and democratic institution-building as a way
to prevent conflicts before they develop.
A second phase of political management focuses on steps to encourage an
end to conflicts. A third phase brings in specific instruments such as fact-
finding missions and mechanisms for peaceful settlements of disputes.
A final phase involves formal peace-keeping operations if all other previous
efforts fail. For example, the CSCE will agree on procedures to initiate
peace-keeping operations and draw on the resources of other organizations,
such as NATO and the WEU [Western European Union] in their implementation.
These provisions give CSCE, for the first time, an orderly set of procedures
to prevent and manage conflicts.
In the end, of course, the resolution of problems and conflicts within the
Euro-Atlantic community will depend upon the willingness of countries to
use the instruments which the CSCE has devised and the commitment of
countries to live by the principles for which CSCE stands.
These three elements--principles for behavior by countries, tools to cope
with the problems that may arise, and the willingness of nations to use both
of these--are essential for a solid and stable new Europe.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: CSCE Forum For Security Cooperation
Fitzwater
Source: Released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary,
Description: Helsinki, Finland
Date: Jul, 10 19927/10/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Subject: CSCE
[TEXT]
Background
The participating countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) have agreed at their July 9-10 summit in Helsinki to open a
new and comprehensive security dialogue, the Forum for Security
Cooperation (FSC).
Intended to address the broad range of security issues faced by CSCE states,
the FSC will involve all CSCE members. The FSC is to begin work in fall
1992 in Vienna.
Mandate
The elements to be addressed in FSC are contained in the concluding
document of the Helsinki CSCE summit. In general, the FSC's work will
proceed in two parallel processes:
-- An enhanced dialogue on military issues, defense conversion, non-
proliferation, and regional disputes; and
-- More traditional negotiations on arms control and confidence- and
security-building measures (CSBMs).
FSC will take account of and seek to build on the existing security regimes
in Europe, including the CFE Treaty, the CFE-1A accord, the treaty on Open
Skies, and the 1992 Vienna Document on CSBMs.
As the security situation in Europe evolves with the changing political
scene, FSC will serve as a vital forum for negotiation on and discussion of
crucial issues. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: CFE Treaty and CFE-1A Agreement:
White House Statement
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement, Helsinki, Finland
Date: Jul, 10 19927/10/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Subject: CSCE, Arms Control
[TEXT]
Today, at the Helsinki summit, President Bush, along with the leaders of 28
other European nations, agreed that the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) will be applied provisionally on July 17, 1992, to
enter into force this fall with the full participation by the original
signatories and the eight new states of the former Soviet Union with
territory in CFE's zone of application.
The United States attaches great importance to this event because joining
CFE is a key indication of the new states' commitment to achieving lower
and more stable levels of conventional military forces in Europe. Along
with our treaty partners, the United States has worked hard to make CFE a
reality. In the end, it was achieved because all participants, East and West,
recognized that CFE's unprecedented force reductions, information
exchanges, and verification provisions are the cornerstone for efforts to
further improve European security in the years ahead.
CFE-1A
President Bush also signed the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on
Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, otherwise
known as the CFE-1A agreement. CFE-1A negotiations began shortly after
the CFE Treaty was signed in 1990. The CFE-1A accord places politically
binding limits on military manpower in Europe. Along with the equipment
limits of the CFE Treaty, CFE-1A establishes comprehensive and stable
levels of conventional military forces on the continent.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: CFE Treaty and CFE-1A Agreement
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Fact Sheet, Helsinki, Finland
Date: Jul, 10 19927/10/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Subject: CSCE, Arms Control
[TEXT]
The CFE Treaty was signed in Paris in November 1990 between the members
of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. The United States ratified it in
December 1991.
CFE's entry into force was delayed primarily because of dissolution of the
former Soviet Union. This required the new states with territory in the CFE
zone (Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia,
and Moldova) to reach agreement on division of the USSR's treaty obligations
and ratify the treaty by action of their new parliaments.
Treaty Limits
The CFE Treaty sets equal ceilings, from the Atlantic to the Urals, on key
armaments essential for conducting surprise attack and initiating large-
scale offensive operations. Collectively, the 29 treaty participants have
agreed that neither side of the old Cold War divide in Europe may have more
than:
-- 20,000 tanks;
-- 20,000 artillery pieces;
-- 30,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs);
-- 6,800 combat aircraft; and
-- 2,000 attack helicopters.
To further limit the readiness of armed forces, the treaty sets equal
ceilings on equipment that may be with active units. Other ground
equipment must be in designated permanent storage sites. The limits for
equipment each side may have in active units are:
-- 16,500 tanks;
-- 17,000 artillery pieces; and
-- 27,300 armored combat vehicles (ACVs);
The two groups addressed in the treaty have consulted on the division of
these limits by country. The members of NATO have consulted through NATO
mechanisms and have agreed on national entitlements.
The treaty limits the proportion of armaments that can be held by any one
country in Europe to about one-third of the total for all countries in Europe-
-the "sufficiency" rule. These limits are:
-- 13,300 tanks;
-- 13,700 artillery pieces;
-- 20,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs);
-- 5,150 combat aircraft; and
-- 1,500 attack helicopters.
Regional Arrangements
In addition to limits on the number of armaments in each category on each
side, the treaty includes regional limits to prevent destabilizing force
concentrations of ground equipment.
Destruction
Equipment reduced to meet the ceilings must be destroyed or, in a limited
number of cases, converted to non-military purposes. After the treaty
enters into force, a 4-month baseline inspection period will begin. Twenty-
five percent of the destruction must be complete by the end of 1 year, 60%
by the end of 2 years, and all destruction required by the treaty completed
by the end of 3 years.
Large amounts of equipment will be destroyed to meet the obligations of the
CFE Treaty. NATO will meet its destruction obligations by destroying its
oldest equipment. NATO members with newer equipment, including the
United States, have agreed to transfer some of this equipment to allies with
older equipment. These transfers will not reduce NATO's destruction
obligation. About 2,800 pieces of US equipment will be transferred to NATO
allies. Also, the United States will destroy about 600 older tanks.
Verification
The treaty includes unprecedented provisions for detailed information
exchanges, on-site inspections, challenge inspections, and on-site
monitoring of destruction. NATO has established a system to cooperate in
monitoring the treaty. Parties have an unlimited right to monitor the
process of destruction. The CFE Treaty is of unlimited duration.
CFE-1A
Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty called for follow-up negotiations with the
objective of concluding agreement on additional measures to strengthen
security and stability in Europe, including limitations on military
manpower. These negotiations, known as the CFE-1A talks, involved the
same participants and used the same mandate as the negotiations on the CFE
Treaty. They began in Vienna in November 1990 and were concluded on July
6, 1992.
Nature of the Agreement
CFE-1A constitutes a political commitment by its signatories to limit (and,
where applicable, reduce) the personnel strength of their conventional
armed forces. In contrast to the CFE Treaty, CFE-1A is not a legally binding
agreement and is not subject to ratification by parliaments.
The heart of the CFE-1A agreement is a "ceiling" on the military personnel
of each participating state within the CFE Treaty's area of application (i.e.,
Europe). Each participating state determined its own ceiling, taking into
consideration its national defense plans and security interests. These
numerical ceilings were not subject to negotiation among the participants,
although the levels were open to discussion before adoption of the
agreement. They are based on agreed categories of military personnel
subject to limitation that apply equally to all. In general terms, the CFE-1A
limitation applies to military personnel, based on land and in the area of
application, in these categories of conventional armed forces:
-- Land and air forces;
-- Air defense forces (including ground-based, air defense aviation, and all
other air defense forces);
-- Central headquarters, command, and staff elements;
-- Land-based naval forces that hold equipment subject to the CFE Treaty
(including land-based naval aircraft, coastal defense, and naval infantry
forces);
-- Any other forces that hold equipment limited under the CFE Treaty; and
-- Reserve personnel called up for full-time service for more than 90 days.
The CFE-1A agreement places no limits on the personnel of any sea-based
naval forces, internal security units, or forces serving under UN command.
The United States has declared a manpower limit of 250,000. This figure
far exceeds personnel the United States is likely to base in Europe in the
near future. It is high enough to ensure that the United States is able to
meet its commitments to reinforce Europe in a crisis without exceeding
agreed limits. It also is consistent with US equipment limits under the CFE
Treaty, including that in storage in Europe.
Information Exchange
The CFE-1A agreement provides for a broad, detailed exchange of
information on the military manpower of the participating states.
Information is to be provided on personnel in the categories under limitation
detailed above and also on personnel serving:
-- With forces designed and structured to perform internal security
functions during peacetime (excluding unarmed or lightly armed civil police
forces);
-- With any other element (excluding naval) of conventional armed forces;
and
-- Under UN command.
In general, information provided for most categories is broken down to show
the strength of individual units at the level of brigade/regiment and higher.
Verification/Evaluation
The regime for evaluating compliance with the declared national limits is
modest. This reflects the participants' recognition that evaluating
compliance with limits on manpower is, at best, an inexact process. It is
also in keeping with the fact that the CFE-1A limitations constitute a
political commitment, not a legal obligation.
The evaluation regime in CFE-1A is built on the system of inspections
created to verify compliance with the CFE Treaty. In essence, when
inspectors arrive at a location to inspect equipment subject to the CFE
Treaty, they also will be provided with information on the personnel serving
at the site. If the numbers they are given are at variance with the numbers
provided in the CFE-1A information exchange, the inspectors will be given
an explanation for the discrepancy.
Stabilizing Measures
To further enhance security and promote transparency among the
participating states, the CFE-1A agreement includes three stabilizing
measures:
-- A measure requiring 42-day notification if any state plans to increase
the personnel strength of any ground force unit by more than 1,000 or any
air force unit by more than 500;
-- A measure requiring 42-day notification if a state plans to call up more
than 35,000 reservists (excepting call-ups made in response to emergency
situations, such as natural disasters); and
-- A measure stating that any personnel resubordinated to forces not
subject to limitation (e.g., internal security forces) will, nonetheless,
remain subject to limitation for 1-2 years.
Timeframe of the CFE-1A Agreement
CFE-1A enters into force on July 17, 1992, simultaneously with provisional
application of the CFE Treaty. Its provisions are of unlimited duration. The
national ceilings declared by each state take effect 40 months after entry
into force. Information on manpower is to be exchanged initially within 30
days of entry into force and annually thereafter. More detailed information
on certain categories of manpower, broken down to show units at the
brigade/regiment level, will be provided after 40 months as an aid to
evaluating whether a state is observing its manpower limit. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: Meeting With the Prime Minister-Designate of
Serbia-Montenegro
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from a news conference at the Helsinki CSCE
Summit, Helsinki, Finland
Date: Jul, 8 19927/8/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Serbia-Montenegro
Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations
[TEXT]
Secretary Baker:
First of all, Mr. Panic requested this meeting. I
met with him in his capacity as Prime Minister-designate [of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, which consists of the republics of Serbia and
Montenegro]. I agreed to meet with him in the interest of making sure,
absolutely sure, that no one in Serbia or Montenegro misunderstands
America's position.
The message that I gave him is very clear, and that is that the growing
humanitarian nightmare in the former Yugoslavia, for which we think
Serbian authorities and military are overwhelmingly responsible, must end,
and Serbia-Montenegro must abide by the UN Security Council resolutions.
Those requirements include the need to allow the unhindered delivery of
humanitarian assistance to all who need it; to end interference in Bosnia-
Hercegovina and respect the territorial integrity and legitimate government
of that state; to withdraw, disband, and disarm all Serbian forces in Bosnia
and place their weapons under effective international monitoring; and to
cease immediately all forcible expulsions and any attempts to change the
ethnic composition of the population.
I told Mr. Panic quite bluntly that we do not question in any way his motives
or aims, which I think are noble--he expressed them as a desire to act in the
best interest of his country of origin [Serbia] and of his adopted country [the
United States], both, and to bring peace to that region--but that the world
would now demand deeds from Yugoslavia, not just words. We've heard
words before.
I concluded the meeting by noting the historic friendship of the Serbian and
American people and expressed our regrets that the policies of the Belgrade
leadership have come between our two countries. I made it clear to him
that America supports a free and democratic Serbia that lives in peace with
its neighbors and its own people.
Q: What did he tell you, Mr. Baker?
Secretary Baker: He told me with respect to each of the items that I
mentioned as things that we thought had to be done that he agreed with that.
He said his only aim in taking the job was to see what could be done to bring
peace and to help the people of this country at large. He said that he felt it
was a very difficult job, that he would need a lot of help from a lot of
different sources and a lot of different people.
We made it very clear at the outset that he is not a representative of the US
Government. He is not going there somehow as a special emissary from us.
There are no special deals or arrangements that we have made with him. He
is an American citizen, and we have given him a 30-day exemption from the
sanctions under our law in order to travel to Belgrade. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 8 19927/8/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Azerbaijan, Armenia
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, CSCE
[TEXT]
, July 8, 1992.
The US Government condemns the recent increase in fighting in Nagorno-
Karabakh. Of particular concern to the US Government is the heavy fighting
in northern Nagorno-Karabakh, and the assault on the regional center of
Martakert, which is causing civilian casualties and refugees.
We call upon the parties to the conflict immediately to halt all military
actions in Nagorno-Karabakh.
It remains our firm conviction that there can be no lasting gains to any
party that resorts to violence. In that light, we urge that all the parties
support and implement the call by the Chairman of the CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe] Nagorno-Karabakh Conference, former
Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Raffaelli, for a 30-day halt to hostilities in
Nagorno-Karabakh beginning on July 9. The CSCE mediation effort is the
best opportunity available to the parties for resolving this tragic conflict
by peaceful means. It is in no party's interest to see the CSCE mediation
effort falter or to bear responsibility in the eyes of the international
community for actions that frustrate the CSCE effort.
We call upon all the parties to recommit themselves to the CSCE mediation
effort and to take steps to de-escalate the conflict and create an
environment in which good faith negotiations can succeed. We also call upon
all parties to honor CSCE commitments that require disputants to refrain
from any action which may aggravate a dispute and make it more difficult or
impossible to settle.
The US Government has repeatedly stated that the quality and character of
its relationship with both Azerbaijan and Armenia will depend on their
demonstrated commitment to CSCE principles, including the peaceful
settlement of disputes. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: Talks on Northern Ireland
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 7 19927/7/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Ireland
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
The US Government welcomes the opening in London of substantive talks
between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland
constitutional parties on the future of Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish
relations. The convening of these expanded sessions of the talks reflects
the strong desire of both communities and their leaders to overcome the
problems of the past and to build a better future.
At this historic moment, we applaud the determination, courage, and
leadership that the two governments and the political parties have shown in
pursuing these talks, and we wish them every success. A successful
outcome would be a great victory for the cause of constitutional politics
and for the proponents of peace, justice, and reconciliation. It would
demonstrate to the world that progress can be made through dialogue and
that violence has no place in this process.
The United States has close ties with both the governments and peoples of
the United Kingdom and Ireland, who share our commitment to democracy,
and millions of Americans trace their ancestry to those islands. We have,
therefore, always taken keen interest in developments there. We have
supported the efforts of the British and Irish Governments to work toward a
peaceful resolution of differences in Northern Ireland and have condemned
terrorist violence, from whatever source. Through our support for the
International Fund for Ireland, we have sought to make a con-crete
contribution to peace and reconciliation through economic and social deve-
lopment. We will, of course, continue to assist and encourage the peace
process in all appropriate ways. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 28, July 13, 1992
Title: Treaty Actions: Multilateral and Bilateral
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jul, 13 19927/13/92
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Region: Eurasia, E/C Europe, Subsaharan Africa,
South America, MidEast/North Africa, East Asia
Country: Albania, Australia, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombia,
Cote d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia (former), Egypt, Finland,
France, Netherlands, Gabon, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia, Moldova,
Namibia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Russia, Seychelles
Subject: CSCE, Trade/Economics, Arms Control
[TEXT]
Multilateral
Arms Limitation
Protocol to the treaty of July 31, 1991, on the reduction and limitation of
strategic offensive arms, with related letters. Done at Lisbon May 23,
1992. Enters into force on the date of final exchange of instruments of
ratification.
Signatures: United States, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation,
Ukraine, May 23, 1992.
Health
Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22,
1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948.
TIAS 1808.
Amendment of Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health
Organization, as amended. Done at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force
May 21, 1975. TIAS 8086.
Amendments to Articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health
Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended. Done at Geneva May 22, 1973.
Entered into force Feb. 3, 1977. TIAS 8534.
Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health
Organization. Done at Geneva May 17, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 20,
1984. TIAS 10930.
Acceptances deposited: Croatia, June 11, 1992; Georgia, May 26, 1992.
Taxation--International Organizations
Agreement on state and local taxation of foreign employees of public
international organizations. Done at Washington Apr. 21, 1991.1
Signatures: International Food Policy Research Institute, May 20, 1992;
Eastern Caribbean Investment Promotion Service, May 21, 1992; World
Health Organization, May 21, 1992; Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, May 26, 1992; Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, June 1, 1992.
Notification deposited in accordance with Art. 3A: International
Telecommunication Satellite Organization, Apr. 23, 1992.
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force June 21, 1985.
Accessions deposited: Croatia, June 2, 1992; Slovenia, June 11, 1992.
Bilateral
Albania
Agreement concerning economic, technical and related assistance. Signed at
Tirana June 10, 1992. Entered into force June 10, 1992.
Australia
Agreement amending the agreement of May 9, 1963, as amended (TIAS 5377,
6527, 8338, 10610), relating to the establishment of a United States naval
communication station in Australia. Effected by exchange of notes at
Canberra May 8, 1992. Entered into force May 8, 1992.
Bolivia
Agreement supplementing the investment guaranties agreement of Dec. 19,
1985, relating to the Export-Import Bank. Signed at Washington May 20,
1992. Entered into force May 20, 1992.
Bulgaria
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles
under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET)
Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Sofia Feb. 11 and Apr. 7, 1992.
Entered into force Apr. 7, 1992.
Colombia
Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation in the seizure and
forfeiture of property and proceeds of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs.
Signed at Bogota July 24, 1990. Entered into force July 24, 1990.
Cote d'Ivoire
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Abidjan May 29, 1992. Enters into
force following signature and receipt by Cote d'Ivoire of written notice
from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been
fulfilled.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with annexes.
Signed at Washington Oct. 22, 1991. Entered into force: June 3, 1992.
Egypt
Agreement amending grant agreement of Sept. 27, 1989, as amended, for
power sector support. Signed at Cairo Feb. 12, 1992. Entered into force Feb.
12, 1992.
Finland
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Mar. 22, 1985, relating
to scientific and technical cooperation. Signed at Washington Oct. 23, 1990.
Entered into force: June 4, 1992; effective Sept. 15, 1990.
Agreement amending and bringing into force the agreement of Oct. 23, 1990,
amending and extending the agreement of Mar. 22, 1985, relating to
scientific and technical cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington May 19 and June 4, 1992. Entered into force June 4, 1992.
France
Agreement amending and extending the memorandum of understanding of
July 8 and 23, 1982, as amended and extended, covering cooperation in the
field of geological sciences. Signed at Menlo Park (Calif.) June 5, 1992.
Entered into force June 5, 1992; effective July 23, 1991.
Gabon
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Libreville May 19,
1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Gabon of written
notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have
been fulfilled.
Hungary
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with annexes.
Signed at Budapest Oct. 4, 1989.
Entered into force: Mar. 19, 1992; effective Nov. 30, 1989.
Jordan
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Amman May 10, 1992. Entered into
force
June 22, 1992.
Latvia
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles
under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET)
Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Riga Feb. 21 and Mar. 4, 1992.
Entered into force Mar. 4, 1992.
Moldova
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Washington June 19, 1992.
Enters into force on date on which Moldova communicates to the US that its
constitutional or other legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Namibia
Agreement for special development assistance. Signed at Windhoek May 27,
1992. Entered into force May 27, 1992.
Netherlands
Agreement on mutual administrative assistance in the exchange of
information in securities matters. Signed at The Hague Dec. 11, 1989.
Entered into force: July 1, 1992.
Nicaragua
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Managua May 13, 1992. Enters into
force upon receipt by Nicaragua of written notice from the US that all
necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Philippines
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at
Manila and Washington Apr. 21 and May 22, 1992. Enters into force Sept. 21,
1992.
Russian Federation
Agreement on trade relations [with the USSR], with related exchanges of
letters. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. 56 Fed. Reg. 37409. Entered
into force: June 17, 1992.
Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the field of fuels and
energy, with annex. Signed at Washington June 17, 1992. Entered into force
June 17, 1992.
Treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of
investment, with annex, protocol and exchanges of letters. Signed at
Washington June 17, 1992. Enters into force 30 days after the date of
exchange of instruments of ratification.
Agreement concerning cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space
for peaceful purposes, with annex. Signed at Washington June 17, 1992.
Entered into force June 17, 1992.
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal
evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital, with protocol. Signed
at Washington June 17, 1992. Enters into force on the date of exchange of
instruments of ratification.
Agreement concerning the activities of the Peace Corps of the United States
in the Russian Federation. Signed at Washington June 17, 1992. Enters into
force on exchange of notifications confirming the completion of domestic
procedures.
Agreement concerning the opening of a Russian Consulate General in the city
of Seattle, Washington. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June
11 and 17, 1992. Entered into force June 17, 1992.
Memorandum of mutual understanding on settlement of the problem of the
new embassy administrative buildings in Washington and Moscow. Signed at
Washington June 17, 1992. Entered into force June 17, 1992.
Seychelles
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at
Victoria and Washington May 13 and June 15, 1992. Enters into force Sept.
21, 1992.
1 Not in force. (###)