US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992


President's Trip to Warsaw, Munich, and Helsinki

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Opening statement at news conference, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe Country: Germany, Poland, Finland Subject: CSCE [TEXT] Before I leave for Europe, I want to say just a few words about why I believe [that] it is so important to the American people that I make this trip. Thanks to the courage [and] the sacrifice of millions of Americans, we've won the Cold War--we and our allies, standing shoulder to shoulder. Our task now is to secure the peace [and] to build an expanding world economy--one that opens new markets abroad and creates new jobs here at home. Our task will not be completed on one 5-day trip. But we can, at these meetings, advance the well-being of all of our countrymen--my countrymen. In the new global economy now emerging, America's economic interests don't stop at the water's edge. We will not prosper in a world stifled by trading blocs and tariff barriers. Seventy percent of our economic growth in the last 5 years has come from exports. I will continue to fight for more economic growth, and that means free trade. Our progress so far has been substantial. Already, the new democracies of the East are becoming attractive sites for US investment, [with] nearly $2 billion committed alone. Those investments will help our allies secure democracy's greatest gains and create jobs for American workers. That's my mission: to secure these benefits for America and the world. In Warsaw, birthplace of the revolution of [19]89, I will stand with the Polish people [and] show our support for their efforts to consolidate their hard-won freedom. In Munich, I will work with leaders of the world's great industrialized democracies to build a new world economy. I'll also meet with [Russian] President Yeltsin to build on the historic steps that we took right here at the White House and to underscore our strong support for Russia's reforms. On this one, there can be no doubt. An investment in Russian democracy is an investment in world peace. Finally, in Helsinki, I will meet, for the first time, with members of a CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] not divided East from West but united in a democratic community of more then 50 nations. So let me just add one point here on the eve of the Fourth of July. We must not forget--must never forget--that in Europe today rest . . . 20 American military cemeteries. I've been to a couple of them. We must ensure that there will never be a 21st. Look at how far we've already come. When I took office 3 years ago, adversaries faced us across a divided Europe. Today, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are our partners. The threat of nuclear war is more distant now than at any time since the advent of the nuclear age. Think of what that means, not for presidents or prime ministers [and] not for historians or heads of state, but for parents and their children. It means a future free from fear. For much of this century, it's been America's destiny to stand for liberty and against intolerance and to fight for freedom against oppression. Now, at long last, the moment has come for the lovers of freedom around the world to reap the rewards of our vigilance. The opportunity we face is historic: the first chance in more than half a century to build democratic peace and prosperity for America and for the world. This trip will, in my view, bring us just one step--but another step- -closer to our goal. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

Topics of Discussion for President's Trip to Europe

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Opening statement at news conference, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 1 19927/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe Country: Germany, Poland, Finland Subject: CSCE, Trade/Economics, Arms Control [TEXT] Ladies and gentlemen, let me quickly outline some of the specific topics that the President will be looking to discuss on his visits to Warsaw, Munich, and Helsinki. In Warsaw, the President will attend the repatriation of the remains of Poland's pre-communist Prime Minister, Paderewski; a symbolic return to an independent Poland. The President will reaffirm America's strong support 0for democracy and economic freedom in Poland and in Central and Eastern Europe, as a whole. He will want to discuss the reform process with President Walesa and explore some new ways that Poland and the international community can work together to advance these courageous reforms. He will then be in a position to share these ideas with his G-7 [Group of Seven industrialized nations] colleagues. From Warsaw, the President will travel to Munich, of course, for the G-7 summit. We hope that this summit will send a pro-growth message that will reinforce the recoveries already underway in several G-7 economies, including our own. The President's meeting with [Japanese] Prime Minister Miyazawa, today, allows us to exchange perspectives on the topic of growth a few days in advance. The President will also use the opportunity of the Munich meeting to determine what further actions may be necessary to cope with the humanitarian tragedy in Sarajevo. Our view is that we should work with our friends and allies, particularly in the UN Security Council, to see that relief supplies are delivered. At Munich, the leaders of the G-7 will also be meeting with [Russian] President Yeltsin as a signal of their strong support for Russia's bold reforms. Building on the Washington summit, President Bush will want to continue his dialogue with President Yeltsin on further developing our political partnership. He will also want to hear an update on the state of Russia's reform program, and he will discuss how we can work together to move forward with assistance from the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the World Bank, and bilateral assistance. Finally, as an important item on their collective agenda, the G-7 leaders will discuss with President Yeltsin the steps we can take to improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors throughout Eurasia. The final stop on the trip will be Helsinki, where the President will be attending the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--CSCE. In 1975, the first Helsinki summit--Helsinki I--launched the CSCE and promoted the values and the process that helped transform the shape of Europe and end the Cold War. If Helsinki I helped usher in the final act of a divided Europe, Helsinki II must help set the stage for a democratic Eurasia by equipping CSCE to address more effectively the momentous opportunities and challenges that we face today. In particular, CSCE is considering developing enhanced capacities for conflict prevention and crisis management through such steps as annual human rights meetings and a CSCE peace-keeping role that would draw on the capacities of organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and the Western European Union. In addition, in Helsinki, we will lay the foundation for a stable new European security order by encouraging the quick entry into force of the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

Great Promise for US-Japan Relations

Bush Miyazawa Source: President Bush, Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Description: Remarks upon the Prime Minister's departure, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 1 19927/1/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: Japan Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT]
President Bush:
Mr. Prime Minister, to you and to the other members of the Japanese delegation, it is a real pleasure to have you back here at the White House. We've had a very successful discussion inside, one that reaffirms the importance of the strong relationship between our two nations. We discussed, of course, our global partnership. We reviewed the prospects for the meeting that we're both attending--next week's G-7 [Group of Seven industrialized nations] summit in Munich. First on our agenda was our mutual commitment to global peace and prosperity. I'm encouraged by what the Prime Minister told me about Japan's plans to stimulate economic growth. I had a chance to fill him in on ours. Both of us confirmed our desire for a strong and lasting recovery. We also discussed the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and the necessity of redoubling our efforts to increase global prosperity. This will directly benefit both the people of the United States and Japan, and we both want to see a successful conclusion of that round. I also told the Prime Minister that I welcome the passage of Japan's Peace Cooperation Bill. That will allow Japan to participate actively in building a lasting peace in Cambodia and in other world trouble spots. We agreed to cooperate on other regional threats and problems from nuclear and missile proliferation concerns in North Korea to the resolution of the POW/MIA [prisoners-of-war/missing in action] issue with Vietnam. We talked about how at Munich we can assist in assuring the safety of nuclear power in the former Soviet Union. We reaffirmed full US support for Japan's position on the Northern Territories. Finally, I assured the Prime Minister of the importance of Asia to the United States, of our resolve to maintain our forward military presence in the Pacific, and our appreciation for Japan's host nation support. We've made progress in resolving some of the differences between us, particularly with regard to our trade relationship. Over the past 6 months, we've reached significant agreements to improve American industries' access to Japan's $9-billion computer market, to their $27-billion paper markets. These agreements are very good news to the American worker. Still, I feel we have more to do. And I want to mention our continued interest and access to your markets for automobiles and auto parts, semi- conductors, as well as cooperation on the supercollider and striking down structural impediments to freer trade. We'll track our progress on every item identified by our action plan. You can be assured we will do our part to improve our own competitiveness. I've made it clear, and I'll continue to make it clear, that this Administration and the American people are absolutely committed to trade that is both free and fair. Protectionism simply is not the answer. The record is clear: Our efforts [over] the past 3 years have substantially increased American exports to Japan. I will work to support the efforts of America's private sector to create an export vision to open foreign markets that mean more American jobs. So, we need to continue expanding, not closing, our trade relations. And whether it's protectionist measures in this country or in Japan, the result is the same thing. Protectionism punches a hole in a healthy economy. I'm confident that the Prime Minister and I depart here today knowing that we do not help our respective nations by hurting each other. He stood for that principle for a long, long time in various positions that he's held in Japan. I hope that I stand for that principle. As important as our economic interaction is, I think it's also important for us to remember that America and Japan share three very important values: our support for the free market economic system, our love of political democracy, and our mutual interest in global peace and security. I am optimistic that our two nations can work closely to advance and protect these values in the Pacific Rim and elsewhere across the globe. When these values are threatened, it's critical that our two nations unite. Our unity will be vital if these three key values are to survive and prosper in the new world that we see. Let me say that I believe that this new period in world affairs holds great promise for the American-Japanese relationship. Once again, it is an honor to host you here in Washington to reaffirm our partnership, the respect and trust between our people, and to welcome you as a friend.
Prime Minister Miyazawa:
This is my official visit to the United States as Prime Minister--first visit, really. I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak directly to the American people for whom I have profound respect. Today, I am also very pleased that, as an ally and a friend, I have had very frank and productive talks with President Bush. We will be continuing our talks in Camp David later today. But before going there, let me give you my thoughts on the following four salient issues. First, the President and I reviewed our respective relationship with Russia and other new independent states of the former Soviet Union. We agreed that it's critically important that the international community should work together to help their transition to democracy and a market economy. I am immensely grateful for the President's firm support of Japan's position on the Northern Territory issue. President Bush made clear such support in his talk with President Yeltsin the other day. It was a helpful and thoughtful step to let Mr. Yeltsin understand the global implications of this territorial problem. Secondly, the President and I talked about some of the important issues in the dynamic region of Asia and the Pacific, including the situations in the Korean Peninsula and in Cambodia. We reaffirmed our determination to work together to enhance peace and prosperity in this region. We both recognize that the American military presence and Japanese host nation support together contribute greatly to the stability of this region at this time of change. The third point is that the President and I are pleased to see the global partnership forged both in the political and economic dimensions. Politically, it has come to have a truly global extension, ranging from Asia to Russia and Eastern and Central Europe. In the economic area, such global partnership includes cooperation in bringing the Uruguay Round to an early and successful conclusion, prevention of protectionism, promotion of international structure adjustments, environmental protection, including forest conservation, and development assistance. In this connection, in the area of macroeconomic policy, the President and I shared a common view that it is essential for the moment to make sustained recovery over our two economies more certain. Taking account over a joint statement on the strategy for world growth issued in January this year, in this regard, I explained to the President the efforts made up to now by Japan for ensuring sustained growth over the Japanese economy and expressed my determination that in case these measures do not bring sufficient effect, I'll examine the situation and undertake every possible means, including necessary substantial additional fiscal measures, keeping in mind the objectives set out in the new 5-year economic plan of my government. The President, on his part, expressed his determination to reduce [the] budget deficit and to raise the competitiveness of the US industries. Finally, the management of the bilateral relations is, indeed, important. With this in mind, the President and I reviewed and confirmed that the Tokyo declaration and this plan of action have been steadily implemented, and we are committed to the further follow-ups. In this historical period of transition, I deeply admire President Bush for his bold and outstanding leadership. I have also been greatly encouraged by his sincere efforts to reduce [the] fiscal deficit and to strengthen industrial competitiveness and to maintain the open and free world economy without succumbing to protectionist pressures. America will, no doubt, remain the world leader in the post-Cold War era. I assure you that Japan, too, will work hand in hand with the United States by assuming greater roles and responsibilities in the spirit of the global partnership between our two countries. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

Recent US-Japan Economic Achievements

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 1 19927/1/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: East Asia Country: Japan Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] On January 9, 1992, during the Tokyo summit, President Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa announced a US-Japan Global Partnership Plan of Action. Consistent with a joint commitment to address bilateral trade tensions, the US and Japanese Governments are moving ahead rapidly with implementation of the action plan. Bilateral trade agreements designed to open the Japanese computer and paper markets have been negotiated and signed. Other bilateral market access discussions are underway, including talks designed to improve access for US glass, autos, and auto parts to the Japanese market. Japan is the second largest market for US goods, accounting for nearly $70 billion in American exports of goods and services in 1991. It is the largest international customer for American farm products, purchasing nearly $8 billion in US agricultural commodities annually. Since 1985, US exports to Japan have increased by nearly 113%. Manufactured goods now account for 65% of US exports to Japan, up from 55% in 1985. A Congressional Research Service study, released last fall, indicates that exports of US products covered by bilateral trade agreements have increased by 275%, showing that negotiations to remove market access barriers produce results. In the last 3 years, US exports to Japan have risen 28% while US imports from Japan have risen 2%.
Japan is implementing measures agreed to by President Bush and Prime Minister Miyazawa aimed at expanding public-sector procurement of competitive foreign computers and services, a market valued at more than $9 billion. On April 23, 1992, the United States and Japan signed an accord on access to Japan's $27-billion paper and paper products market. Japanese automakers have drawn up voluntary plans to increase auto parts procurement from the United States. Progress has been made on auto standards and certification issues. The US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) will include new commitments in the annual report to be issued later this summer.
Government Procurement of Computers.
On January 22, US Trade Representative Carla A. Hills and the former Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Ryohei Murata, signed a government-to-government agreement committing the Japanese Government to undertake measures to expand public sector procurement of competitive foreign computer products and services. These measures went into effect in April for computer products. Coverage of computer services will follow on October 1, 1992, for Japanese Government agencies subject to the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Government Procurement Code and other designated government entities. It will go into effect on April 1, 1993, for other covered Japanese entities. The 12 major US computer companies applauded the agreement, calling it an "outstanding effort by the President's trade negotiators." The agreement opens a public sector market of $9 billion that is expected to grow to nearly $16 billion by 1995, according to industry figures. Current US sales of computer products and services to the Japanese Government are only about $500 million. The US computer industry thinks its annual sales could reach $4 billion-$6 billion by 1995.
Paper and Paperboard Products.
In an April 23 White House ceremony, US and Japanese representatives signed an agreement on measures to open Japan's $27-billion market for paper and paperboard products to foreign suppliers. The paper agreement requires the Japanese Government to encourage Japanese purchasers and distributors to increase imports of competitive foreign paper products, develop long-term, buyer-supplier relationships with foreign producers, and implement open and non-discriminatory purchasing practices. The agreement affirms the Japanese Government's commitment to effectively enforce the Anti-Monopoly Act with respect to the paper market. There will be semi-annual reviews of progress in implementing the agreement for 5 years. These reviews will take into consideration factors such as changes in the level of import penetration, trade data, efforts by Japanese companies and by US paper companies, and efforts by both governments to implement the measures. The US paper industry has described the agreement as "a major achievement" that will result in "significant increases of US exports to the world's second-largest consumer" of paper and paperboard, one that will "benefit our industry and workers, benefit the Japanese consumer, and benefit our global trading system."
Autos and Auto Parts.
Competing effectively in a global economy requires US producers to establish a competitive US presence in Japan, which is a key innovator in automotive design, production, and technology. Achieving this goal will require a long-term commitment by the Big Three US producers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler), as well as supporting efforts by the US and Japanese Governments. With improvements in quality and price competitiveness of American automobiles and cooperation from Japan, the United States is optimistic that this goal can be achieved. The US auto companies have strengthened their efforts to build sales of American cars in Japan. The Big Three have announced plans for new marketing efforts in Japan, including the introduction of right-hand drive vehicles, one of which (Jeep Cherokee) will be produced this year. Two models from one US company have received "type approval" for meeting all Japanese standards. Ford has purchased 50% ownership of Mazda's plant in Flat Rock, Michigan, and increased its investment in a Ford-Mazda joint venture in Japan to distribute Ford automobiles. With the encouragement of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry, US auto and component makers plan to expand the US pavilion at the 1993 Tokyo Auto Show. In the auto parts sector, Chrysler has concluded a contract worth more than $1 billion for sales of engines and transmissions to Mitsubishi. The Auto Parts Advisory Committee's March 1992 annual membership survey indicated that, less than 2 months after the President's trip, US parts makers noted an upturn in contracts from Japanese automakers and additional cooperation in "design-ins." Total purchases of US parts reported by the Japanese Automobile Manufacturers' Association's members rose 19.1% in the 6 months ending March 31, 1992, compared with the same period a year earlier. Important and ongoing progress has been made in improving US auto and auto parts access to Japan. These efforts involve the US Government, the Big Three, and many US auto parts suppliers. In April, the former Under Secretary of Commerce, Michael Farren, held talks in Tokyo on measures to increase US auto and auto parts company access to the market in Japan. In May, the chief executive officers of the leading US and Japanese auto manufacturers held their second meeting and developed an ongoing work program. The Administration continues to oppose legislative proposals that would impose auto quotas or other forms of protectionism. It particularly opposes proposals to impose quotas on cars produced in the United States by so- called "transplant factories" owned by Japanese car producers. Such measures would threaten consumers and the large number of American jobs dependent on an open international trading system.
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII).
In 1989, the President and former Japanese Prime Minister Uno launched a "Structural Impediments Initiative" (SII) to promote structural reforms in both countries to facilitate adjustment of trade and current account imbalances. The SII was designed, in part, to address broad structural barriers to trade and investment flows. The initiative led to a joint report issued in June 1990, which included important undertakings regarding US and Japanese structural reforms. Since the President's trip, the SII principals and their deputies have met to consider new commitments to "reinvigorate the SII," especially by addressing aspects of the business environment that impede market access. These meetings have been cooperative and constructive. Additional meetings will be held over the coming weeks to review new policy commitments by both sides and to finalize the SII second annual report. The US side has proposed new commitments in five areas: keiretsu [a type of Japanese corporate relationship], exclusionary business practices, savings and investment, land use, and distribution. The United States remains convinced that additional efforts to address the causes of bilateral trade and economic tensions are needed, including government and industry actions. The agreement by both governments to make new commitments is a demonstration that the SII continues to be a unique and adaptable forum capable of dealing with the evolving nature of America's economic and trade relationship with Japan.
The Bush Administration is committed to the effective implementation of the US-Japan semiconductor arrangement. In May, the US Trade Representative initiated an interagency review of Japanese implementation of the arrangement in view of growing concern about the lack of improvement in foreign access to the Japanese semiconductor market. On June 4, Japanese electronic industry representatives and the US semiconductor industry announced an emergency plan to quickly increase Japanese purchases of US semiconductors, which have been stagnating. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry has responded positively to US concerns and has prodded Japanese companies to enhance their market access efforts. The Bush Administration will monitor these efforts and is working closely with the US industry. The United States continues to urge the Japanese Government and Japan's electronics industry to intensify their efforts to improve market access for foreign products. Ambassador Hills continues to underscore the seriousness of US concern in meetings with senior Japanese officials and has conveyed the same message to Japanese semiconductor users.
Beef and Citrus Quotas
. Based on a 1988 US-Japan beef and citrus agreement, Japan eliminated its last remaining quota on frozen concentrated orange juice and single-strength orange juice. The agreement has contributed to a steady improvement in US-Japan beef and citrus trade. For example, the value of US exports of frozen concentrated orange juice grew 70% from 1989 to 1991 in response to relaxation of Japanese quotas. Now, with all quantitative restrictions eliminated, US orange juice exports seem poised to rise sharply. A Florida agriculture official has estimated that removal of the quota will lead to a $300-million increase in orange juice trade this year and potentially $1 bil- lion by the end of the century.
Machine Tools.
On December 27, 1991, the President announced that voluntary restraint agreements (VRA) on imported machine tools would be phased out over 2 years to allow additional time for modernization efforts by the US machine tool industry, which is important to US security interests. Japan has agreed to extend a VRA covering Japanese machine tool exports to the United States to facilitate a gradual return to market- determined competition.
Surveys of Competitive Behavior.
As agreed in the action plan, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), which is responsible for Japanese anti-trust enforcement, has begun four surveys of possible anti-competitive behavior in Japan's paper, flat glass, auto, and auto parts industries. The United States welcomes the increase in JFTC scrutiny of possible anti- competitive business behavior and looks forward to appropriate enforcement actions.
Business Cooperation.
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry has made a solid start with the 88 companies and 22 industry associations that have joined its Business Global Partnership Initiative. This membership accounts for about one-half of Japan's total trade. The United States looks forward to continuation and expansion of this program, which is designed to promote imports to Japan, local procurement by Japanese firms abroad, and long-term business cooperation between US and Japanese firms. The US-Japan Business Council strives to maintain a constructive dialogue between the private sectors, since a need continues for a process to address market access concerns. The United States looks to both sides for their willingness to work to resolve specific sectoral problems and to avoid protectionist or managed trade solutions. In addition, the Manufacturing Technology Initiative, announced during the Vice President's trip to Japan, is a significant step in introducing hundreds of US engineers and managers to areas of Japanese technology. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

Nuclear Weapons Withdrawal Completed

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] In the wake of the momentous changes in what was then the Soviet Union, last September 27, in an address to the nation from the Oval Office, I directed that the United States undertake dramatic changes and reductions in our nuclear arsenal and challenged the Soviet leadership to go down the same road with us. In that speech, I directed that the United States bring home from overseas and destroy our entire worldwide inventory of ground- launched theater nuclear weapons. At the same time, I announced that the United States would withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships, attack submarines, and those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. Many of these are to be dismantled and destroyed. Today, I can tell you that all of the planned withdrawals are complete. All ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons have been returned to US territory as have all naval tactical nuclear weapons. Those weapons designated to be destroyed are being retired and scheduled for destruction. These historic measures would not have been possible without the full support of our allies around the world and without the far-sighted and courageous leadership of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, Republic of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Byelarus Stanislav Shushkevich. They pledged to honor Soviet commitments to take comparable steps reducing tactical nuclear weapons. It is important that the implementation of these commitments be successfully concluded. Now I look forward to the prompt ratification of START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] and to concluding a treaty on the even more far-reaching reductions President Yeltsin and I announced at the recent summit in Washington. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

UN Security Council Resolutions 761 and 762 on Bosnia-Hercegovina

UN Source: United Nations Date: Jun, 29 19926/29/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: United Nations, Regional/Civil Unrest, Military Affairs [TEXT] Resolution 761 (June 29, 1992) The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of September 1991, 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, 727 (1992) of 8 January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992, 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992 and 760 (1992) of 18 June 1992, Noting the considerable progress reported by the Secretary-General towards securing the evacuation of Sarajevo airport and its reopening by UNPROFOR and feeling the need to maintain this favourable momentum, Underlining the urgency of a quick delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs, 1. Authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy immediately additional elements of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with his report dated 6 June 1992 (S/24075); 2. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to comply fully with the agreement of 5 June 1992 and in particular to maintain an absolute and unconditional cease-fire; 3. Appeals to all sides to cooperate fully with UNPROFOR in the reopening of the airport, to exercise the utmost restraint and not to seek any military advantage in this situation; 4. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and international humanitarian agencies and organizations and take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of their personnel; in the absence of such cooperation, the Security Council does not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs; 5. Calls upon all States to contribute to the international humanitarian efforts in Sarajevo and its environs; 6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0). Resolution 762 (June 30, 1992) The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991, 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of 14 December 1991, 727 (1992) of 8 January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992, 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992, 760 (1992) of 18 June 1992 and 761 (1992) of 29 June 1992, Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 26 June 1992 (S/24188) submitted pursuant to resolution 752 (1992), Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Welcoming the progress made as a result of the assumption of responsibilities by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Sectors East and West, and concerned about the difficulties encountered by UNPROFOR in Sectors North and South, Commending again the efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, through the convening of a Conference on Yugoslavia, including the mechanisms set forth within it, to ensure a peaceful political settlement, 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 26 June 1992 (S/24188); 2. Urges all parties and others concerned to honour their commitments to effect a complete cessation of hostilities and to implement the United Nations peace-keeping plan (S/23280, annex III); 3. Also urges, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 727 (1992), the Government of Croatia to withdraw its army to the positions held before the offensive of 21 June 1992 and cease hostile military activities within or adjacent to the United Nations Protected Areas; 4. Urges the remaining units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), the Serb territorial defence forces in Croatia and others concerned to comply strictly with their obligations under the United Nations peace-keeping plan, in particular with regard to the withdrawal and the disarming of all forces in accordance with the plan; 5. Urges the Government of Croatia and others concerned to follow the course of action outlined in paragraph 16 of the Secretary-General's report and appeals to all parties to assist UNPROFOR in its implementation; 6. Recommends the establishment of the Joint Commission described in paragraph 16 of the Secretary-General's report which should consult, as may be necessary or appropriate, with the Belgrade authorities in performing its functions; 7. Authorizes the strengthening of UNPROFOR by the addition of up to 60 military observers and 120 civilian police to perform the functions envisaged in paragraph 16 of the Secretary General's report, with the agreement of the Government of Croatia and others concerned; 8. Reaffirms the embargo applied in paragraph 6 of resolution 713 (1991), paragraph 5 of resolution 724 (1991) and paragraph 6 of resolution 727 (1992); 9. Supports the views expressed in paragraph 18 of the Secretary-General's report about the grave consequences which the collapse of the United Nations peace-keeping plan would have throughout the region; 10. Encourages the Secretary-General to pursue his efforts to fulfil as soon as possible the terms of paragraph 12 of resolution 752 (1992); 11. Calls again upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Conference on Yugoslavia and its aim of reaching a political settlement consistent with the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and reaffirms that the United Nations peace-keeping plan and its implementation is in no way intended to prejudge the terms of a political settlement; 12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0). (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

US Policy Toward UNESCO

Bolton Source: John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on International Operations and on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Subcommittee on Environment of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 25 19926/25/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Subject: United Nations, Cultural Exchange [TEXT] I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss our policy toward UNESCO [UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. It is particularly timely to do so in the context of the recently completed GAO [General Accounting Office] report on the organization's management, administrative, budgetary, and personnel practices. It has been 7 1/2 years since the United States withdrew from UNESCO because of the organization's excessive politicization, poor management, and runaway budgets. Since then, we have been working with our allies, with the Secretariat, and with Director General Mayor to promote reform. We have maintained a presence at UNESCO through our Observer Mission, have attended every meeting of the organization's governing bodies, and have made voluntary contributions of approximately $2 million per year in support of selected activities in which we continue to participate. We are, consequently, pleased to note that the GAO report concludes that initial progress has been made in implementing management reforms. We have reviewed the report and find it a useful assessment of UNESCO's management practices. The report states that it is too soon to judge the effectiveness of some reforms. Knute Hammarskjold and Peter Wilenski, authors of a 1989 study on UNESCO's management, said much the same thing last January in a follow-up report on the implementation of their recommendations: "Extensive progress in reform has been made on a broad front but has not yet taken root. . . ." The GAO report states that UNESCO has not solved long-standing problems with consultants and program evaluation. It makes 12 formal recommendations that address policies for decentralization of activities and resources, program evaluation, procedures for the use and control of supplementary staff, budget techniques, and payroll controls. These recommendations and the other suggestions made throughout the text provide helpful guidelines and a benchmark for further progress. As we noted in the State Department comments included as an appendix to the report, each of the recommendations is consistent with goals sought by the Department of State for several years. In this regard, we believe that our policy of insistence on real change at UNESCO--before any consideration of re-entry into the organization--has been a significant factor in motivating its member states, governing bodies, and the Secretariat, itself, to achieve the progress noted in the report. In contrast to this progress, there are other areas of UNESCO policy which still deeply concern us. Particularly troubling was a UNESCO mission to Iraq in February, reportedly undertaken in cooperation with the UNDP [UN Development Program], to assess the situation of education. While sympathetic to humanitarian initiatives that meet essential medical and nutritional needs, we are not inclined to stretch "essential civilian needs" discussed in UN Security Council Resolution 687 to repairing or replacing school buildings. Last August, the UN Sanctions Committee informed UNESCO that it was unable to reach agreement on the appropriateness of such a mission, and UNESCO wisely canceled its plans to send an assessment team to Iraq. In September, the UNESCO Executive Board deferred, sine die, consideration of any discussion of the situation of the educational and cultural institutions in Iraq. In November, our Mission to the United Nations informed the UNESCO representative that we were not sympathetic to another UNESCO initiative to send a mission to Iraq to assess the status of schools and cultural sites. Nonetheless, a UNESCO/UNDP team spent 2 weeks in Iraq during the month of February. In a March 3 letter to Director General Mayor, the Kuwaiti Permanent Delegate to UNESCO expressed his surprise that UNESCO would undertake such a mission in the light of the board decision and the UN sanctions regime. The Director General responded that the mission was undertaken in consultation with the UN Interagency Humanitarian Program and did not contravene Resolution 687. The officer- in-charge of the Office of the Executive Delegate for Humanitarian Assistance indicated that the Director General did not consult his office prior to making a decision to send a mission to Iraq. We believe the action was ill-advised, potentially detrimental to the sanctions regime, and inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Executive Board decision to postpone consideration of the status of Iraqi educational institutions. Turning once more to the GAO report, we believe that particular attention should be given to the recommendation on better application of the rules on the use of supplementary staff and fee contracts to control the contract authorization procedure more effectively and make it more transparent and uniform. This is of considerable import in that supplementary staff costs and fee contracts amounted to nearly $70 million during the 1990-91 biennium. GAO found considerable gaps and inconsistencies in data on supplementary staff. This raised doubts "about whether UNESCO uses too many supplementary staff or validly employs them." We endorse the Hammarskjold-Wilenski recommendations that call for the introduction of a consistent and fair promotion system based on merit, a better career development system, and equal opportunity for women. The report underscores the need for significantly better program evaluation. We concur and believe considerable improvement in this area is needed if further program concentration is to be achieved, as recommended in the report. Impact evaluations are particularly wanting, both in number and in quality. GAO notes that UNESCO has conducted only 16 impact evaluations since 1986, covering only 8% of its activities, and that the appropriate methodologies, in some instances, were not employed even for this limited selection. Moreover, while guidelines exist for impact evaluation, there is no overall plan to ensure that a reasonable and representative selection of programs will be evaluated. Regarding decentralization, there is reason for concern at the report's observation that 73% of UNESCO's total staff of 2,697 persons is located in Paris and that the ratio of headquarters to field staff has not varied since 1984. The report notes that a higher proportion of funds are expended in the field than would be expected by the distribution of staff; 44% of the 1990- 91 regular and extra-budgetary budgets was expended in the field. This, however, is the same percentage as in 1988. Clearly, it is time for the organization to develop the systematic approach to decentralization mandated by the Executive Board at its November 1991 session. In conclusion, we concur with the GAO report's view that initial progress has been made in implementing management reforms at UNESCO. Based on the report's conclusions and the observations of the Hammarskjold/Wilenski report of last January, however, we believe that much remains to be done and that what has been accomplished needs to settle in and be institutionalized. We will have more to say on this in the report on UNESCO that Congress has asked us to submit later this summer. Finally, we will continue to implement fully our current policy and work with UNESCO's governing bodies, other governments, and the Director General to effect further reform along the lines recommended in the GAO report. At present, we do not believe the changes adopted warrant opening the question of whether to rejoin the organization, at an expenditure of approximately $55 million per year. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

Terrorism: Efforts Toward International Solutions

Burleigh Source: A. Peter Burleigh, Coordinator for Counter- Terrorism Description: Address before the 1992 Worldwide Anti-terrorism Conference, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Date: Jun, 23 19926/23/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Eurasia, East Asia Country: Iraq, Kuwait, USSR (former), North Korea, Syria, Cuba, Libya, Iran, Israel, Subject: Narcotics [TEXT] I appreciate the opportunity to address this important conference. I'd like to describe some recent noteworthy developments in our efforts to counter the threat of international terrorism. Despite the extraordinary and positive changes in the world in the last 2 years and despite an evolving international consensus to oppose terrorism, the problem is still very much with us. In fact, last year there was a sharp increase in the number of international terrorist incidents, although the number of deaths and injuries declined. The increase reflected the large number of generally small-scale incidents that occurred during the Gulf war. There were no terrorist spectaculars resulting in large loss of life in 1991. However, in 1992, we have seen the most spectacular terrorist attack in 3 years: the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. This brutal bombing killed about 2 dozen people and left 200 injured. Although the number of international terrorist incidents seems to be on a downward trend so far this year, the number of deaths and injuries has increased. There have also been a number of serious attacks by domestic terrorist groups in Spain, Peru, Turkey, and other countries. It is shocking to note that almost all of the American citizens who died in terrorist attacks during the past 2 years had some connection to the US military--either on active duty or under contract to the Defense Department. They died in Panama, the Philippines, El Salvador, Turkey, and Greece. Two weeks ago, one US serviceman was killed by gunfire and a second soldier wounded in an ambush in Panama in advance of the President's visit.
The Gulf War
One of the most important developments of the last year was the success of the coalition and the international community in trumping Saddam Hussein's terrorist "ace in the hole." I think it is clear that Saddam Hussein believed terrorism would be a strategic weapon in deterring the coalition and undermining support for the effort to liberate Kuwait. Iraq trained terrorists and Iraqi intelligence operatives and dispersed them to locations around the world in preparation for the "mother of all battles." In the months following the invasion of Kuwait, and especially during Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein called publicly and repeatedly for terrorist attacks against coalition targets. But these attacks for the most part did not materialize. As many of you here know well, it was no accident that there were no major successful terrorist attacks. It was the result of unprecedented and largely unheralded cooperation among security and law enforcement services around the world--including Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Arab world--that stifled the Iraqi terrorist threat. This cooperation involved the sharing of intelligence information, expulsion of Iraqi diplomats and agents, preemptive arrests, and enhanced security countermeasures. Those attacks that did take place were largely sporadic and uncoordinated acts of indigenous groups acting in sympathy with Saddam Hussein or exploiting the Gulf war as a pretext to commit terrorism. While we can be proud of our successes, we must remember that the Iraqi terrorist threat, while currently suppressed, is likely to re-emerge if international sanctions are loosened and Iraq is allowed to rebuild its diplomatic and intelligence operations.
End to East Bloc Support
Another new element has been the astonishing changes that have occurred in the former Soviet Union and former Soviet bloc. We note with great interest the recent reports from Moscow of documents containing evidence that the former Soviet Government supported groups that engaged in terrorism against Western interests. It is too early to discuss broad conclusions about the extent of the former Soviet Union's responsibility for international terrorism, but these fragmentary reports are disturbing. The demise of the communist governments has obviously deprived terrorist groups of material support, sanctuary, and safehaven from which to operate, arms, financing, and front companies and other infrastructure. Also important, it deprived them of the Leninist ethos of all-justifying revolutionary violence. In some circles, this had lent appeal and an aura of respectability to leftwing terrorist groups. At the same time, the disintegrations of the Soviet Union and now Yugoslavia has unleashed long-contained ethnic, religious, and territorial rivalries. While these, regrettably, have claimed a great number of lives and caused widespread suffering, they do not appear to have spilled over into international terrorist incidents. Nevertheless, it is a sobering reminder, today, that Sarajevo, site of one of the most momentous terrorist incidents in history, is again the scene of bloodshed.
State-Supported Terrorism
While Iraq was unable to incite a terrorist offensive against the coalition, and despite welcome changes in the former communist bloc, there remain states that have been and remain willing to employ terrorism as an instrument of state policy. As many of you know, the United States maintains a list of countries that support terrorism. There are six countries on that list: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. Iraq, today, is in a state of enforced quiescence. Libya, as I will discuss in greater detail shortly, is under great pressure to comply with the UN resolutions requiring it to hand over suspects in the Pan Am [Flight] 103 bombing, cooperate with French authorities' investigation into the bombing of UTA Flight 772, and cease its support for terrorism. Libya continues to provide support and facilities for a number of terrorist groups, including the Abu Nidal Organization [ANO], the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Palestine Liberation Front. Iran, regrettably, continues to sponsor terrorism in an effort to intimidate governments and individuals around the world. An Iranian-sponsored group, Islamic Jihad, has claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, and it produced videotaped footage of the embassy taken prior to the bombing in order to authenticate its claim. Iran continues to assassinate dissidents abroad. Four Iranian agents are under arrest for the murder of former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar in Paris last year. Iran has also refused to rescind the fatwa, or religious decree, calling for the murder of author Salman Rushdie because of his book, The Satanic Verses. This seems a particularly perverse and Orwellian from of terrorism--international thought crime, bearing a sentence of death. In addition, attacks on translators of Rushdie's books in Italy and Japan are believed to be linked to their work. Iran also continues to provide material and financial assistance to terrorist groups throughout the world. Last year, Iran finally helped arrange for the freeing of Western hostages held in Lebanon. The last two, both German citizens, were freed last week. We have recognized Iran's role in this, and it was an important step. As the President said, it has removed an enormous obstacle to a more normal relationship with Iran. Serious problems remain, however. Hezbollah elements in Lebanon that are fighting Israeli troops are continuously resupplied by the Government of Iran by flights to Damascus. Syria then permits these supplies to travel overland by truck. Islamic Jihad also claimed responsibility for an attack in Ankara, Turkey, that killed the Israeli Embassy's top security officer. This attack followed by a few days a handgrenade attack in front of the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul for which Hezbollah is suspected. Tehran must recognize that only by abandoning state sponsorship of terrorism can it expect to re-enter the international community. The Iranians are not acting as if they have understood this basic message. We need to work with other states to drive it home in every way possible. Syria is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist attacks outside Lebanon since 1987, and most of the groups it supports have been relatively quiet since Syria joined the allied coalition in the war with Iraq. However, Syria continues to provide support and safehaven to a number of groups that engage in international terrorism, and, for that reason, it remains on the US Government list of state sponsors. A number of terrorist attacks, particularly against Israel, have been attributed to groups based in Syria and in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon. Groups enjoying Syrian support and sanctuary include Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the ANO. Two non-Arab groups that receive Syrian support--the PKK and Dev Sol--are very active in Turkey. The PKK, or Kurdish Workers' Party, has kidnapped Western hostages, including Americans. The virulently anti-US group Dev Sol murdered two DOD [Department of Defense]-associated Americans in Turkey last year. Another non-Arab group supported by Syria is the Japanese Red Army, which has attacked the US military. It is responsible for the 1988 car bombing of a USO [United Services Organization] club in Naples that killed an American servicewoman and injured four US servicemen. Syrian efforts over the past few years to reign in terrorists under its control represent a half step. It has yet to sever its relationships with these groups and shut down their training camps.
Other Trends
I'd like to also touch briefly on two other issues. One is what you might call the growing "reach" of terrorists today. During the Gulf war, Iraqi agents attempted unsuccessful attacks in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, far from the traditional areas of operation of Middle Eastern terrorist groups. The bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires is the latest, tragic example of what may be a new strategy of seeking targets in traditionally low-threat areas of the world, where security may be less vigilant and local security forces may have little experience with the international terrorist threat. I would also like to mention the threat of narco-terrorism. This is not a new problem. In recent years, we have seen the emergence both of narcotics traffickers who employ terrorism against the state, and particularly its judicial system, to further their own criminal goals. Many of you will recall the terrible violence that struck Colombia in 1989, including the bombing of a civilian airliner and the assassinations of judges, journalists, police officials, and politicians. We have also seen more political insurgent and terrorist groups--for example, the Shining Path in Peru--turn to narcotics trafficking as an easy way to generate more income to support their terrorist and military activities. We must continue to closely monitor this phenomenon, especially as terrorist groups feel the effects of the cutoff in funding from the former East bloc countries and reduced assistance from Cuba. In Latin America and the Middle East especially, there are many areas that are both major and traditional narcotics production areas and operating areas for terrorist groups.
US Policy
I would like to turn now to the US counter-terrorism policy. Our policy is based on three tenets: -- No concessions to terrorists; -- Pressure on states to cease support for terrorism; and -- Cooperation with other governments to impose the rule of law on terrorists. This involves practical measures to help us identify, apprehend, and prosecute terrorists. I believe that over the past year this policy has produced some significant successes in our fight against terrorism. No Deals. The United States maintains a policy of refusing to make concessions to terrorists. This means that we will not pay ransom, release convicted terrorists, or pressure other countries to give in to terrorist demands. No group should believe that it can blackmail the United States. There will be no rewards for terrorism. This aspect of our policy was damaged by the Iran-contra affair, but we saw it succeed in the unconditional release, last year, of all the remaining US hostages in Lebanon. As President Bush stated last week in the wake of the release of the two remaining German hostages from captivity, the "no deals" policy, which had encountered some rough water along the way, has been vindicated by results. We are very well aware of the terrible, wrenching pressure that terrorists can bring to bear, especially on humane, democratic governments that value the lives of their citizens. But we believe this policy is the only correct one.
Pressuring State Sponsors.
I have already discussed how the international community worked together to pressure Iraq and prevent Iraqi terrorists from disrupting the coalition effort. We will continue to keep the pressure on Iraq to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 687 adopted last April, requiring Iraq to abstain from acts of terrorism or from supporting terrorist groups. We will also continue to pressure other states that sponsor terrorist groups or use terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. We seek to convince them that support for terrorism will reap diplomatic and economic isolation. Where we have evidence, we will seek to punish state sponsors and will urge others to do the same. This leads me to my final point, the importance of international cooperation. In recent months, working with the British and the French Governments and the UN Security Council, we have made great progress in our efforts to bring to justice the bombers of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA [Flight] 772. As you are well aware, following long and extremely painstaking investigations, the United States and United Kingdom developed evidence conclusively linking Libya to the 1988 Pan Am bombing, in which 270 people died, and in November 1991 issued indictments for two Libyan agents charged with carrying out the bombing. French authorities also issued warrants for four Libyan agents in connection with the 1989 bombing of the UTA flight, which killed 171 people. We believe these bombings were carried out with the knowledge and approval of the highest levels of the Libyan Government. The United States, United Kingdom, and France demanded that Libya hand over the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing, cooperate with French authorities investigating the UTA bombing, and cease all forms of terrorist action and support for terrorism. On January 21, the Security Council voted unanimously to urge Libya to comply with these demands. When Libya did not comply, the Security Council imposed sanctions to require Libyan compliance, which began on April 15. So far, we see no evidence that the Libyans are serious about meeting the demands of the Security Council. So we must continue to enforce the sanctions strictly and consider the possibility of further action if Libya continues to defy the international community. International Cooperation. There are many recent examples of successful international cooperation in bringing terrorists to justice. These include: -- Joint French and Spanish efforts to prevent Basque terrorists from disrupting the summer Olympics in Barcelona. These joint efforts have yielded important arrests of leading Basque terrorists. -- The trial and conviction in Greece of Muhammed Rashid for his role in the bombing of a Pan Am aircraft in 1982. -- In April, Italy extradited a suspected terrorist to the United States to stand trial in connection with three attempted bombings in New York in 1973--the first extradition of a Palestinian terrorist to the United States. -- Last month we saw the extradition by Switzerland of Zia Sarhadi, an Iranian suspected of involvement in the murder of Shapur Bakhtiar in Paris. -- As many of you are aware, the United States offers anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism training to law enforcement officials around the world. To date, we have trained more than 12,500 civilians from over 70 countries. We recently added the newly independent nations of the former Soviet bloc to this very successful program. These are examples of governments, on their own and in cooperation with others, working to apply the rule of law to international terrorism. Terrorists are not romantic figures; they are not freedom fighters. They are not Robin Hood or William Tell. They are criminals and must be treated as such. Not long ago, many countries--including normally responsible countries--sometimes granted terrorists dispensation for their crimes, or sought to make separate deals to ward off attacks against their own citizens and governments. Today, as the examples I mention indicate, this practice is becoming more rare. More and more terrorists are being brought to justice and are currently serving sentences for their crimes. Future Challenges. As much as we wish that terrorism had diminished to a manageable level, many recent events around the world remind us that it has not. So I would like to close by focusing on some of the challenges facing us in the future. -- We must continue to work for increased cooperation among law enforcement, diplomatic, and intelligence agencies. -- The international community must keep the pressure on Libya to meet the demands of the Security Council. We have made historic progress in working together in order to end state-supported terrorism and bring terrorists to justice. But we must keep the pressure on. We must also continue to pressure other state sponsors, such as Libya, Iran, and Syria. -- There is the possibility of renewed terrorist violence in protesting the Middle East peace process and/or in reaction to other developments in the Middle East. There is also the possibility that Iraq--itself under pressure from the international community--might make a terrible miscalculation and lash out with renewed terrorist assaults. That is also a risk with Libya. Again, such an attack would be a terrible mistake. -- This summer will see a number of high-profile events, most prominently the Barcelona Olympics and the Seville Exposition in Spain, but also the celebrations of the 500th anniversary of Columbus' voyage that could attract terrorist attention, both from indigenous groups and international terrorists. -- Many countries around the world still face indigenous irredentist, ethnic, or other terrorist threats. In Peru, we see the extraordinarily brutal Shining Path, responsible for 25,000 deaths during the past 10 years. Unlike traditional Latin American insurgent groups, the Shining Path gets the support of the Peruvian peasantry mainly through brutal intimidation, including the public torture and execution of innocent people. Also unlike traditional terrorist groups, the Shining Path is completely independent of outside support, although it has turned to involvement with cocaine trafficking to fund its activities. The Shining Path has also established political support groups in several European countries. -- In India, the complex political movements that promote Kashmiri and Sikh independence have increasingly--and very unfortunately--turned to terrorism. They get Pakistani support for these efforts. -- In the Sudan, we are concerned over recent disturbing evidence that various terrorist organizations are being allowed to increase their presence. Sudan also has close ties to both Libya and Iran. -- In Europe, in Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union we see continuing civil and ethnic conflict that could spill over into terrorism, both internally and internationally. -- Lastly, and perhaps most difficult, we must seek to come to terms with Islamic fundamentalism. Let me be clear: Neither Islam nor fundamentalism constitute or are in any fashion synonymous with terrorism. Islam is one of the three great monotheistic religions. Simplistic identification of Islam with terrorism is profoundly wrong. There is no intrinsic conflict between Islam and the West; the Crusades ended some time ago. That said, the powerful appeal of fundamentalism and the deep-seated anti- Western resentments that find expression there pose a political challenge that will continue to engage us and create a climate in which terrorist groups may flourish.
All of these developments remind us that we are a long way from eradicating terrorist violence. As long as there are resentments, antagonisms, grievances, there will be some who will turn to violence, including violence against innocent civilians, to serve their political ends. But the international community has made tremendous progress over the last decade, from a time when the civilized nations seemed paralyzed by a wave of terrorist assaults and the rule of law seemed powerless against a violent few. Today, it is the terrorists who are on the defensive. Let's keep it that way. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

US Policy Objectives and MFN Status for China

Kanter Source: Arnold Kanter, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 29 19926/29/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Administration's policy toward China and, in particular, the President's commitment to unconditional renewal of China's most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status for another year. Mr. Chairman, it has been over 3 years since the terrible tragedy of Tiananmen Square--3 years since Chinese Government troops fired on defenseless students who only sought the freedom of political expression that we Americans claim as our birthright. Even with the passage of time, those images retain their power and their message. The United States, as it has always done, will condemn this kind of brutality--whether it takes place in China or anywhere else. As Secretary Baker has emphasized, the promotion of human rights is a cornerstone our foreign policy. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, I am here today to discuss what may be a question of strategy and tactics but, surely, not one of objectives. I think all of us can agree on the basic objectives of our policy toward China: -- Promote respect for human rights; -- Encourage responsible and cooperative Chinese international behavior, particularly in the area of non-proliferation; -- Promote peaceful and democratic reform within China; and -- Improve and sustain a trade relationship from which Americans--both producers and consumers--derive great benefit. Toward these goals, the Administration's approach has been one of engagement rather than confrontation. We have sought to work actively with the Chinese on specific, targeted concerns while at the same time encouraging the changes in Chinese society that naturally follow from openness to and engagement with the outside world. This approach has led to positive results in the areas of human rights, non-proliferation, and trade that we established as central to our bilateral relations. We have achieved these results while at the same time promoting and protecting American business and consumer interests. We believe that our current course stands the best chance of promoting change in China for the better. We recognize that many Members of Congress take issue with this approach and argue that a policy of confrontation with, if not isolation of, China would be more effective in bringing about positive change. We respectfully, but emphatically, disagree. Accordingly, we continue to believe that China's unconditional MFN status provides our best approach for encouraging positive change and US interests in China, particularly when coupled with aggressive pursuit of specific issues of concern. Today, I would like to review first the legal requirements for renewing the Jackson-Vanik waiver and why China has met those requirements. Second, I will discuss why it is in the interest of the United States to renew MFN for China. Third, I will explain why conditionality of MFN for China will not work. Finally, I will discuss the main issues of concern in our relations with China--human rights, proliferation, trade--and how our targeted approach--mixing appropriate sanctions as well as incentives--has led to measurable progress in each of these areas.
China's Emigration Policy Meets the Standard of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
The Jackson-Vanik amendment requires the President to determine whether renewal of the MFN waiver for China would substantially promote freedom of emigration from that coun-try. It is clear that an extension of the waiver would advance this objective. China continues to give most of its citizens the freedom to emigrate to the United States and elsewhere. Indeed, the principal restraint on emigration is the capacity and willingness of other nations to absorb Chinese immigrants, not Chinese policy. Last year alone, China's relatively free emigration policies enabled more than 18,000 Chinese to receive US immigrant visas. In addition, US diplomatic posts in China issued almost 80,000 non-immigrant visas to PRC [People's Republic of China] nationals to study, travel, and do business in the United States. Indeed, the number of Chinese whom the PRC would allow to emigrate to the United States far exceeds our ability to accept them. In no uncertain terms, the renewal of MFN without condition continues to influence those policies that permit tens of thousands of Chinese every year to choose to leave China permanently and to travel abroad and gain exposure to the outside world. Simply put, MFN provides an important incentive for the Chinese to permit emigration.
On Its Own Merits, It Is In The Interest of the United States To Extend MFN to China
Looking beyond the letter of the law, unconditional MFN renewal makes sense on its own merits. The very phrase "most-favored-nation" is, as we all know, something of a misnomer. MFN is not a special trade status that we reserve for favored friends. It is the way we do business with almost every country in the world. Even countries such as Iraq, Cuba, and Libya retain MFN status, despite the economic embargoes against them. For more than a decade, MFN-based trade with China has opened up jobs and business opportunities benefiting Americans and Chinese alike. Normal commercial relations have encouraged positive change in China and helped strengthen the hand of those elements of Chinese society most open to political and economic reform. In short, an open China remains the best hope for a more democratic China, and MFN--without conditions--continues to provide our best instrument for promoting the changes we seek. The new era in US-Chinese relations can be traced, of course, to President Nixon's historic decision to end the long period of confrontation with China and to begin the process of bringing China out of its isolation from the modern world. But it was not until President Carter first established diplomatic relations in 1979 and then extended MFN to China in 1980 that our relationship accelerated and matured. With the granting of MFN, we profoundly magnified our ability to influence political and economic reform within Chinese society. This single act institutionalized the normalization of relations on a very practical and tangible level. Bilateral commercial treaties, consular agreements, and scientific and cultural exchanges followed, each strengthening the network of direct links between Americans and Chinese. China's leaders inaugurated, in late 1978, a program of market-oriented economic reform that led to a rapid increase in household incomes and expansion of industrial and agricultural production. China's real GNP grew at an average annual rate of 10% during the decade 1978-88. This economic growth, based on reform and MFN-based trade with the world, has dramatically improved the lives of ordinary Chinese and has given them unprecedented freedom and control over their lives. Before the extension of MFN in 1980, China had barely begun to recover from the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Ordinary Chinese avoided contact with foreigners, and those government officials authorized to meet foreigners refused even to give their names. Since the granting of MFN and in the context of the reforms of late 1978, the change has been nothing short of dramatic. Today, the Chinese are free to travel domestically, purchase foreign-made consumer goods, and wear Western or traditional dress. Non-government controlled media are more available in China today than ever before, including cable TV in parts of China and satellite dishes. American television programs are regularly shown on Beijing television, and American movies and videos are available throughout China. In addition to exposing Chinese society to Western ideas and culture, MFN has helped speed the process of economic reform in China, which continues to emphasize the decentralization of economic decision-making in both the rural and urban sectors. This process has progressed more rapidly in agriculture, where production decisions remain in the hands of individual farmers and with village and township enterprises. In the urban sector, central government and provincial authorities continue to bring market mechanisms to bear in reducing state subsidies to consumers and in organizing commodity markets and foreign exchange adjustment centers. Our country has taken the strongest stand against repression in China, and we are the most determined advocates for democratic change there. This is precisely why we advocate unconditional MFN to foster normal commercial relations that expose the Chinese people to American ideas and influence. The Administration firmly believes that economic reform and liberalization in China creates irresistible pressure for political reform. It may not be a simple equation, but we are confident that entrepreneurship and market- oriented reform in China will lead to meaningful and lasting change in the lives of the Chinese people. The best way to advance our bilateral agenda with China--which I will discuss in greater depth shortly--is through our carefully targeted approach. It is easy to be discouraged by the pace of progress, but it would be a serious mistake to let our frustration lead us to adopt counterproductive policies that would undermine our goals.
Conditionality for MFN Will Not Work
Denial of MFN--or its withdrawal through imposition of conditions that China's leadership is unlikely to meet--would work against our political and economic interests. It would do severe damage to the development of market-oriented institutions that contain the seeds of political reform. Those in Chinese society--intellectuals, students, managers, workers, even government officials--who are the most dynamic, the most open to the outside world, and the most committed to the marketplace are precisely those who have the greatest stake in unconditional MFN renewal. MFN is simply not the right vehicle to exert pressure on the Chinese with regard to particular issues. Indeed, the argument for conditionality seems based on the premise that MFN is somehow more in China's interest than our own. This is simply not so. To place conditions on MFN would hold our single most powerful instrument for promoting reform hostage to the reactions of hardliners in Beijing. We would be handing the opponents of reform their most potent lever. This year's MFN conditionality proposals implicitly acknowledge that a complete withdrawal of MFN would not serve our interests and would restrict tariff increases to Chinese state enterprises. But even this revised version of conditionality would do considerable damage to our interests.
Bad Trade Policy.
First and foremost, conditionality, even the kind advocated in the Pease/Pelosi bills, is bad trade policy. This committee knows better than anyone that the economic future of the United States depends on strong ties with all regions of the world. Our trade policy seeks to open and expand markets overseas to ensure that the United States is able to compete on a level playing field for opportunities that will advance the economic well-being of our nation. Expanded trade creates jobs at home for American workers; generates new business opportunities; and affords consumers better choices in terms of quality, quantity, and price. In this regard, conditioning MFN to the achievement of our foreign policy objectives is simply bad trade policy and strikes at the core of our commitment to free and open trade. I also want to underscore a point made in [Deputy US Trade Representative] Ambassador Moskow's testimony: The removal of MFN--which would be the likely result of conditionality--would hit American consumers hard. It would also hold the individual Americans affected by this policy hostage to the actions of a foreign power. Less affluent Americans, who are the primary consumers of China's low-cost goods, are particularly vulnerable. Intentions aside, the burdens of conditionality would be borne by those Americans least capable of sustaining another hit to their family budgets. American exporters would also be hard hit. Remember, reciprocal tariff treatment is inherently a two-way street. If China, in retaliation, denied us MFN, American farmers could lose one of their best export markets to Canadian and Australian producers, and US manufacturers would lose export shares to competitors from Japan and Europe. In the process, export-related jobs would be lost in this country, putting Americans out of work.
Targeting State Enterprises Is Unworkable.
Not only does conditionality make for bad trade policy, the provisions of the proposed legislation targeting state-owned enterprises are simply unworkable. Given the growing complexity of China's economy, the definition of a state enterprise is increasingly problematic. The silk industry is illustrative in this regard. The degree of "state" control of silk production and marketing increases as the product moves up the production chain into cloth fabrication, but the basic raw material, the silk cocoon, is produced by individual farm families and collectives, while finished silk garments are produced by joint ventures and wholly owned foreign enterprises. These quasi-capitalist farm entrepreneurs and joint ventures would be harmed as much, if not more, by MFN revocation as the "state" silk industry.
Achievements of Comprehensive Engagement
Let me reiterate our belief that MFN is simply the wrong instrument to bring about changes in other areas of concern. Using our targeted approach, we have made substantial progress on human rights, proliferation, and trade, which we have put at the center of our bilateral relationship.
Human Rights.
Let me state unequivocally that the promotion of fundamental human rights is and will remain at the forefront of our foreign policy objectives--and this includes China. Those who would try to characterize our opposition to conditioning MFN as representing indifference to human rights abuses ignore the fact that the Administration maintains serious sanctions that are better targeted and more effective. We have taken the strongest position against China's human rights abuses of any country in the world. President Bush was the first world leader to condemn the crackdown at Tiananmen. At that time, he expressed in no uncertain terms that there could be no "business as usual" with the Chinese Government under such circumstances. We have not retreated from that statement. The United States is the only nation today that has not lifted Tiananmen sanctions against China and refuses to restore normal bilateral relations until the Chinese make substantial progress in protecting basic human rights. Our Tiananmen sanctions are specifically targeted to human rights issues. Under these sanctions, we have suspended programs for military cooperation and placed an embargo on all sales to China's police and military. We have rejected proposals for easing COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] controls on China. Our trade support programs--OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] and TDP [Trade Development Program]--have been suspended since 1989. We do not support international development bank lending except for projects that meet basic human needs. Meetings between Secretary Baker and his Chinese counterpart have focused on human rights, non-proliferation, trade problems, and regional issues, such as the Middle East and Cambodia. Those meetings last November were not convivial exchanges but tough working sessions. We stated our concerns in an open and direct manner, and I reiterated these concerns in the strongest terms during my recent visit to Beijing. I can assure the committee that the Chinese know exactly where we stand. We have made progress in our dialogue with the Chinese on human rights-- though by no means as much as we would wish. With the publication of its White Paper on human rights and exchanges of delegations with other countries, China's refusal to discuss human rights internationally has ended. We continue to raise with the Chinese the issue of releasing political prisoners. The Chinese confirmed to Secretary Baker the release of 133 prisoners on our list of prisoners of human rights interest as of November 1991. Since then, China has announced the release of additional political prisoners. One dissident informed our Embassy, for example, that 70%-80% of those detained in Beijing after Tiananmen have now been released. We will continue to seek a general amnesty for political prisoners and permission for international humanitarian organizations to have access to Chinese prisons. China has also granted exit permits to a few dissidents and their relatives. The relaxation of exit controls for those Chinese who have returned from overseas and still hold valid passports and visas is also a welcome step. Recently, China unequivocally reiterated its assurance to Secretary Baker that all those not under criminal investigation can leave. We intend to hold them to it.
Non-Proliferation and International Cooperation.
We have also seen progress in the area of weapons proliferation. China's support for global non-proliferation initiatives increased significantly in the last year. Again, as a direct result of high-level discussions with Chinese leaders, assisted by the Administration's use of targeted sanctions, China agreed to observe the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines and parameters. The Chinese also have acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We believe it is important for China to adopt international non-proliferation standards and welcome the steps it has taken so far. Of course, more work needs to be done, and we continue to monitor Chinese behavior closely. We encourage further PRC participation in global and regional non-proliferation efforts and have secured China's involvement in the President's Middle East arms control initiative. China is also taking part in the chemical weapons convention negotiations in Geneva. China has played a constructive role in other international forums as well. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China cooperated with multilateral efforts to enforce sanctions against Iraq and Libya, facilitated the entry of North and South Korea into the United Nations, and opposed North Korean efforts to develop nuclear weapons. China has contributed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodia conflict and has worked hard in recent weeks to keep the settlement on track. We want to encourage these steps to act as a responsible member of the international community and not tempt China to lapse into the role of a rogue state or a trouble-maker.
Looking back over the past year, the record of our trade policy toward China has been one of considerable success. On intellectual property rights, China responded positively to our special [Section] 301 trade investigation with an agreement in January to improve protection of US patents and copyrights, including computer software. This agreement was strongly endorsed by US industry, which subsequently urged continuation of MFN for China. On market access, a fourth round of negotiations under our Section 301 investigation of Chinese trade barriers was held in May. We emphasized that Chinese exporters cannot continue to enjoy a higher degree of access to our markets than US firms are allowed in China. While we have not yet achieved everything that we seek--in particular, reducing the large trade deficit that we have with China--the Chinese are responding constructively, and progress is being made in these negotiations. I should add that China's bid for membership in the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] requires that China take further steps in trade reform. Our Section 301 investigation on market access targets the same areas of reform that China will need to address in order to qualify for GATT membership. Finally, on an issue that cuts across both trade and human rights, I should note that China is addressing our concerns over their prison labor practices. Less than 2 weeks ago, US and Chinese negotiators agreed, ad referendum, to a draft memorandum of understanding that will prohibit exports of prison labor products to the United States and will provide for US inspection of suspect Chinese facilities. Meanwhile, the US Customs Service has stepped up enforcement efforts, obtaining one criminal conviction and issuing a score of detention orders that blocked entry of alleged prisoner-produced products.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, let me restate my belief that the Administration and the proponents of conditional MFN share the same policy objectives for China. Broad trade sanctions, however, including targeted MFN withdrawal, will not advance the struggle for political liberty and reform in China. Our policy of comprehensive engagement seeks to address the current issues of vital concern to the United States and looks ahead to the future, when China can play an increasingly helpful role in maintaining the stability of the Asia-Pacific region; become a fair player in the arena of international trade; and join in the war against drugs, disease, and environmental disaster. In other words, we can develop with China a contemporary strategic relationship. If we were to withdraw, condition, or even partially revoke MFN, this would be regarded by the Chinese people, as well as the leadership, as a political symbol of hostility toward China. China would respond with a strong display of nationalism and close many of the opportunities available to ordinary Chinese. They would regard our action not as a positive effort to promote respect for human rights and freedom in China but as a callous disregard of their interests. The forces of reform would suffer, as would American businessmen and consumers. By maintaining MFN, we are helping to promote reform in the PRC. Our persistent efforts are paying off. With MFN, we are making a difference in China. Without it, we risk becoming mere spectators in a country that is home to almost one-quarter of the human race. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

US Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia

Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 30 19926/30/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa Country: Syria Subject: Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] Somalia remains a difficult and tragic situation. Although food deliveries are now getting through to Mogadishu, many vulnerable people already have died or suffered irreversibly from malnutrition. More are at risk. This is a horrendous human tragedy which is of great concern to the US Government. US assistance to Somalia since the beginning of 1991 totals about $62 million. That does not include a substantial portion of the $28 million the United States has provided to the African programs of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Twenty percent of ICRC's worldwide program is now in Somalia. It also does not include a significant portion of $30 million to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for programs in Africa, and $8.5 million for the Kenyan refugee emergency in Kenya where many Somalis have fled. The US Government continues to seek other avenues to provide international humanitarian relief to Somalia. The $62 million is being used to fund, in part, emergency food distribution operations by CARE; C-130 flights by the ICRC, Save the Children, and the International Medical Corps to deliver food and medicine; health clinics and therapeutic feeding centers in Mogadishu; and more than $36.8 million- worth of food shipments. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

Focus on the Emerging Democracies

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Description: A Periodic Update Date: Jul, 6 19927/6/92 Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies Region: Eurasia Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid, Cultural Exchange [TEXT]
Humanitarian Assistance
The US public and private sectors have donated or assisted in the transportation of 110,695 tons of humanitarian aid to date. The aid consists of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, medical equipment, US Agriculture Department (USDA) bulk food commodities, food packages, winter clothing, and planting seed. US commercial carriers, commercial sea containers, rail cars, and trucks have provided transportation, funded through the $100-million dire emergency supplemental fund.
Airlift of Humanitarian Assistance.
Operation Provide Hope demonstrated the effectiveness of the use of military aircraft to transport humanitarian commodities. As of June 12, 1992, the US Air Force had flown 124 humanitarian missions into all 12 new states under Operation Provide Hope. Aircraft have transported 4,500 tons of USDA commodities, Defense Department excess food and medicines, and humanitarian aid donated by private voluntary organizations and the private sector. About 965 tons of this aid has been donated by private voluntary organizations.
Surface Transport of Humanitarian Assistance.
Operation Provide Hope Phase II has begun with the surface movement of 21,000 tons of excess Defense Department food and medical supplies to the Commonwealth of Independent States as planned by NATO and implemented by the Defense Department and the US European Command. The excess humanitarian commodities will be distributed to all 12 new states. The Fund for Democracy and Development, a not-for-profit organization has received US Government funding to facilitate the transportation of privately donated humanitarian aid. As of June 12, 1992, about 4,120 tons of food, medicines, medical supplies, and clothing have been sent or are en route to locations such as Murmansk, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, St. Petersburg, and Moscow in Russia, and Kiev and Kharkov in Ukraine.
Private Voluntary Organizations.
Under the auspices of the Presidential Medical Initiative, Project HOPE, with assistance from the Defense Department, has delivered pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to 11 republics (Armenia, Byelarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) at a retail value of $60 million.
Sister Cities International Program.
Cities across the United States have collected humanitarian aid on behalf of their sister city in the former Soviet Union. Such relationships as Waukesha, Wisconsin, and Kokchetav, Kazakhstan; Anchorage, Alaska, and Magadan, Russia; and Yerevan, Armenia, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, have established people- to-people exchanges in addition to the collection and donation of large quantities of humanitarian aid.
USDA Assistance.
USDA has announced $4.85 billion in export credit guarantees since January 1991. More than 26 million tons of US agricultural commodities have been purchased. -- On April 1, 1992, the President announced an additional $1.1 billion in export credit guarantees. Of this, $600 million will be designated for Russia, $110 million for Ukraine, and $390 remains unallocated. -- Under the Food for Progress Program, USDA is responsible for delivering more than $165 million of grant food aid. Additional funding for transportation of the commodities has been provided from the $100-million dire emergency supplemental funding. -- As part of this program, as of June 12, 1992, USDA had signed agreements worth $150 million with 10 private voluntary organizations to deliver 100,000 tons of USDA commodities to Armenia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. -- A second part of this program is a government-to-government agreement with Russia under which USDA will provide 21,000 tons of butter. This butter will be sold in Russia with proceeds from the sales being used to provide social services.
USAID Emergency Immunization Initiative.
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has purchased vaccines, syringes, and equipment to immunize children in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Over the next 4 months, about 520,000 infants will be protected against measles, tetanus, polio, and diphtheria. A second phase of this program will be implemented later this year in some of the other states. The total value of this program is $6 million.
Technical Assistance and Credits
As of June 12, 1992, the United States has pledged more than $7.1 billion in various forms of assistance for fiscal years 1991-93. More than half of that total has been disbursed.
Multilateral Financial Assistance.
The United States supports a multilateral financial assistance program of $24 billion: $18 billion in financial support, and a $6-billion currency stabilization fund. The Group of 7 (G-7) has approved the package in principle.
Technical Assistance.
A total of $85 million in Economic Support Funds has been allocated to long-term technical assistance programs, for example: -- 250 Peace Corps volunteers, most specializing in projects on small business development, will be in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Kazakhstan by the end of 1992. -- As announced at the Lisbon conference May 23-24, 1992, the United States will establish nuclear safety training centers in Russia and Ukraine, provide immediate operational safety enhancement through improvement of emergency operating procedures and controls, provide safety technology to reduce the risk of safety problems at RBMK and VVER 440/230 reactors, and provide nuclear regulatory assistance. The United States has pledged $25 million to the International Science and Technology Center being established in Russia and $10 million to the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine. A site has been selected for the Moscow center. The agreement was signed at the Lisbon conference. The United States will fund research projects involving scientists from the former Soviet Union in civilian activities, such as environmental protection, health, energy production, nuclear reactor safety, and nuclear waste management. -- USAID teams have begun diagnostic audits of district heating plants in Armenia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine. These teams will determine areas for energy savings and decide what equipment will be procured from the United States under this program before winter 1992. -- The Special American Business Internship Training Program (SABIT) will bring 150 managers from private or privatizing companies in the new independent states (NIS) and place them in US companies. -- An extension, SABIT II, will bring some 150 defense scientists to the United States for short- and medium-term assignments with US firms. A separate program administered by the National Academy of Sciences will place 150 scientists in academic and research institutions. -- The International Resident Adviser Program will place 12 housing advisers in four of the new independent states by the end of this summer. -- The Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs has agreed to provide $500,000 to the International Organization of Migration for technical assistance in the area of migration in Russia. This contribution is about 50% of the Organization's request for funding from the international community. -- In June 1992, the United States is sending agricultural advisers to Russia and Ukraine to provide technical assistance in post-harvest loss and improved storage practices. -- Under USAID's Farmer-to-Farmer Program, more than 1,500 volunteer agriculturists will work in the NIS as management advisers in food production, distribution, and related agribusiness concerns. This is a 3-year program. -- USDA will provide an additional $5 million for technical assistance projects, including two model farms, the establishment of wholesale markets, and a loaned executive program. With USAID funding, it will establish an extension service in Armenia. -- The first US-Russian hospital partnership began in June. Nine more partnerships are expected to be established throughout the NIS by the end of August. -- The United States has concluded interagency agreements with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Department of Commerce, and the Trade and Development Program to help facilitate trade and investment in the pharmaceutical sector. -- Through the provision of essential inputs, USAID aims to improve productive capacity for new independent states' needs for DPT vaccines for 12-18 months. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992 Title:

What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United States

PA Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92 Category: Features Region: Europe, North America Subject: History, State Department [TEXT] The challenges the United States faced during the mid-1950s during the height of the Cold War is the subject of a documentary history released in June 1992 by the Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXVII (Western Europe and Canada) is the most recent volume of the Department's long-standing documentary series chronicling official American policy. Documents in this volume are drawn from the files of the Departments of State and Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Presidential papers as well as papers housed in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. This release is one of more than 70 volumes documenting the foreign policies of the Eisenhower Administration. The Foreign Relations of the United States series consists of more than 300 volumes dating from 1861. Copies of Volume XXVII (Department of State Publication No. 9931; GPO Stock No. 044-000-02316-4) may be purchased for $35.00 (domestic postpaid) from the Superintendent of Documents, New Orders, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. The Office of the Historian has prepared a summary of the volume. For further information, contact: Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at 202-663-1133. (###)