US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: President's Trip to Warsaw, Munich, and Helsinki
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Opening statement at news conference, the White House,
Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Country: Germany, Poland, Finland
Subject: CSCE
[TEXT]
Before I leave for Europe, I want to say just a few words about why I
believe [that] it is so important to the American people that I make this
trip. Thanks to the courage [and] the sacrifice of millions of Americans,
we've won the Cold War--we and our allies, standing shoulder to shoulder.
Our task now is to secure the peace [and] to build an expanding world
economy--one that opens new markets abroad and creates new jobs here at
home.
Our task will not be completed on one 5-day trip. But we can, at these
meetings, advance the well-being of all of our countrymen--my countrymen.
In the new global economy now emerging, America's economic interests
don't stop at the water's edge. We will not prosper in a world stifled by
trading blocs and tariff barriers. Seventy percent of our economic growth in
the last 5 years has come from exports. I will continue to fight for more
economic growth, and that means free trade.
Our progress so far has been substantial. Already, the new democracies of
the East are becoming attractive sites for US investment, [with] nearly $2
billion committed alone. Those investments will help our allies secure
democracy's greatest gains and create jobs for American workers. That's
my mission: to secure these benefits for America and the world.
In Warsaw, birthplace of the revolution of [19]89, I will stand with the
Polish people [and] show our support for their efforts to consolidate their
hard-won freedom. In Munich, I will work with leaders of the world's great
industrialized democracies to build a new world economy. I'll also meet
with [Russian] President Yeltsin to build on the historic steps that we took
right here at the White House and to underscore our strong support for
Russia's reforms. On this one, there can be no doubt. An investment in
Russian democracy is an investment in world peace.
Finally, in Helsinki, I will meet, for the first time, with members of a CSCE
[Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] not divided East from
West but united in a democratic community of more then 50 nations.
So let me just add one point here on the eve of the Fourth of July. We must
not forget--must never forget--that in Europe today rest . . . 20 American
military cemeteries. I've been to a couple of them. We must ensure that
there will never be a 21st.
Look at how far we've already come. When I took office 3 years ago,
adversaries faced us across a divided Europe. Today, the new democracies
of Central and Eastern Europe are our partners. The threat of nuclear war is
more distant now than at any time since the advent of the nuclear age.
Think of what that means, not for presidents or prime ministers [and] not
for historians or heads of state, but for parents and their children. It means
a future free from fear.
For much of this century, it's been America's destiny to stand for liberty and
against intolerance and to fight for freedom against oppression. Now, at
long last, the moment has come for the lovers of freedom around the world
to reap the rewards of our vigilance.
The opportunity we face is historic: the first chance in more than half a
century to build democratic peace and prosperity for America and for the
world. This trip will, in my view, bring us just one step--but another step-
-closer to our goal. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: Topics of Discussion for President's Trip to
Europe
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Opening statement at news conference, the White House,
Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 1 19927/1/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Country: Germany, Poland, Finland
Subject: CSCE, Trade/Economics, Arms Control
[TEXT]
Ladies and gentlemen, let me quickly outline some of the specific topics
that the President will be looking to discuss on his visits to Warsaw,
Munich, and Helsinki.
In Warsaw, the President will attend the repatriation of the remains of
Poland's pre-communist Prime Minister, Paderewski; a symbolic return to an
independent Poland. The President will reaffirm America's strong support
0for democracy and economic freedom in Poland and in Central and Eastern
Europe, as a whole. He will want to discuss the reform process with
President Walesa and explore some new ways that Poland and the
international community can work together to advance these courageous
reforms. He will then be in a position to share these ideas with his G-7
[Group of Seven industrialized nations] colleagues.
From Warsaw, the President will travel to Munich, of course, for the G-7
summit. We hope that this summit will send a pro-growth message that
will reinforce the recoveries already underway in several G-7 economies,
including our own.
The President's meeting with [Japanese] Prime Minister Miyazawa, today,
allows us to exchange perspectives on the topic of growth a few days in
advance.
The President will also use the opportunity of the Munich meeting to
determine what further actions may be necessary to cope with the
humanitarian tragedy in Sarajevo. Our view is that we should work with our
friends and allies, particularly in the UN Security Council, to see that relief
supplies are delivered.
At Munich, the leaders of the G-7 will also be meeting with [Russian]
President Yeltsin as a signal of their strong support for Russia's bold
reforms.
Building on the Washington summit, President Bush will want to continue
his dialogue with President Yeltsin on further developing our political
partnership. He will also want to hear an update on the state of Russia's
reform program, and he will discuss how we can work together to move
forward with assistance from the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the
World Bank, and bilateral assistance.
Finally, as an important item on their collective agenda, the G-7 leaders
will discuss with President Yeltsin the steps we can take to improve the
safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors throughout Eurasia.
The final stop on the trip will be Helsinki, where the President will be
attending the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe--CSCE. In 1975, the first Helsinki summit--Helsinki I--launched
the CSCE and promoted the values and the process that helped transform the
shape of Europe and end the Cold War.
If Helsinki I helped usher in the final act of a divided Europe, Helsinki II
must help set the stage for a democratic Eurasia by equipping CSCE to
address more effectively the momentous opportunities and challenges that
we face today.
In particular, CSCE is considering developing enhanced capacities for
conflict prevention and crisis management through such steps as annual
human rights meetings and a CSCE peace-keeping role that would draw on
the capacities of organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and the Western European Union.
In addition, in Helsinki, we will lay the foundation for a stable new European
security order by encouraging the quick entry into force of the CFE
[Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: Great Promise for US-Japan Relations
Bush
Miyazawa
Source: President Bush, Japanese Prime Minister
Miyazawa
Description: Remarks upon the Prime Minister's departure,
Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 1 19927/1/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: Japan
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
President Bush:
Mr. Prime Minister, to you and to the other
members of the Japanese delegation, it is a real pleasure to have you back
here at the White House. We've had a very successful discussion inside, one
that reaffirms the importance of the strong relationship between our two
nations. We discussed, of course, our global partnership. We reviewed the
prospects for the meeting that we're both attending--next week's G-7
[Group of Seven industrialized nations] summit in Munich.
First on our agenda was our mutual commitment to global peace and
prosperity. I'm encouraged by what the Prime Minister told me about Japan's
plans to stimulate economic growth. I had a chance to fill him in on ours.
Both of us confirmed our desire for a strong and lasting recovery. We also
discussed the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
and the necessity of redoubling our efforts to increase global prosperity.
This will directly benefit both the people of the United States and Japan,
and we both want to see a successful conclusion of that round.
I also told the Prime Minister that I welcome the passage of Japan's Peace
Cooperation Bill. That will allow Japan to participate actively in building a
lasting peace in Cambodia and in other world trouble spots. We agreed to
cooperate on other regional threats and problems from nuclear and missile
proliferation concerns in North Korea to the resolution of the POW/MIA
[prisoners-of-war/missing in action] issue with Vietnam.
We talked about how at Munich we can assist in assuring the safety of
nuclear power in the former Soviet Union. We reaffirmed full US support for
Japan's position on the Northern Territories.
Finally, I assured the Prime Minister of the importance of Asia to the United
States, of our resolve to maintain our forward military presence in the
Pacific, and our appreciation for Japan's host nation support.
We've made progress in resolving some of the differences between us,
particularly with regard to our trade relationship. Over the past 6 months,
we've reached significant agreements to improve American industries'
access to Japan's $9-billion computer market, to their $27-billion paper
markets. These agreements are very good news to the American worker.
Still, I feel we have more to do. And I want to mention our continued
interest and access to your markets for automobiles and auto parts, semi-
conductors, as well as cooperation on the supercollider and striking down
structural impediments to freer trade.
We'll track our progress on every item identified by our action plan. You can
be assured we will do our part to improve our own competitiveness.
I've made it clear, and I'll continue to make it clear, that this
Administration and the American people are absolutely committed to trade
that is both free and fair. Protectionism simply is not the answer. The
record is clear: Our efforts [over] the past 3 years have substantially
increased American exports to Japan. I will work to support the efforts of
America's private sector to create an export vision to open foreign markets
that mean more American jobs.
So, we need to continue expanding, not closing, our trade relations. And
whether it's protectionist measures in this country or in Japan, the result is
the same thing. Protectionism punches a hole in a healthy economy.
I'm confident that the Prime Minister and I depart here today knowing that
we do not help our respective nations by hurting each other. He stood for
that principle for a long, long time in various positions that he's held in
Japan. I hope that I stand for that principle.
As important as our economic interaction is, I think it's also important for
us to remember that America and Japan share three very important values:
our support for the free market economic system, our love of political
democracy, and our mutual interest in global peace and security.
I am optimistic that our two nations can work closely to advance and
protect these values in the Pacific Rim and elsewhere across the globe.
When these values are threatened, it's critical that our two nations unite.
Our unity will be vital if these three key values are to survive and prosper
in the new world that we see.
Let me say that I believe that this new period in world affairs holds great
promise for the American-Japanese relationship. Once again, it is an honor
to host you here in Washington to reaffirm our partnership, the respect and
trust between our people, and to welcome you as a friend.
Prime Minister Miyazawa:
This is my official visit to the United
States as Prime Minister--first visit, really. I am delighted to have this
opportunity to speak directly to the American people for whom I have
profound respect.
Today, I am also very pleased that, as an ally and a friend, I have had very
frank and productive talks with President Bush. We will be continuing our
talks in Camp David later today. But before going there, let me give you my
thoughts on the following four salient issues.
First, the President and I reviewed our respective relationship with Russia
and other new independent states of the former Soviet Union. We agreed
that it's critically important that the international community should work
together to help their transition to democracy and a market economy.
I am immensely grateful for the President's firm support of Japan's position
on the Northern Territory issue. President Bush made clear such support in
his talk with President Yeltsin the other day. It was a helpful and
thoughtful step to let Mr. Yeltsin understand the global implications of this
territorial problem.
Secondly, the President and I talked about some of the important issues in
the dynamic region of Asia and the Pacific, including the situations in the
Korean Peninsula and in Cambodia. We reaffirmed our determination to work
together to enhance peace and prosperity in this region. We both recognize
that the American military presence and Japanese host nation support
together contribute greatly to the stability of this region at this time of
change.
The third point is that the President and I are pleased to see the global
partnership forged both in the political and economic dimensions.
Politically, it has come to have a truly global extension, ranging from Asia
to Russia and Eastern and Central Europe. In the economic area, such global
partnership includes cooperation in bringing the Uruguay Round to an early
and successful conclusion, prevention of protectionism, promotion of
international structure adjustments, environmental protection, including
forest conservation, and development assistance.
In this connection, in the area of macroeconomic policy, the President and I
shared a common view that it is essential for the moment to make sustained
recovery over our two economies more certain. Taking account over a joint
statement on the strategy for world growth issued in January this year, in
this regard, I explained to the President the efforts made up to now by Japan
for ensuring sustained growth over the Japanese economy and expressed my
determination that in case these measures do not bring sufficient effect,
I'll examine the situation and undertake every possible means, including
necessary substantial additional fiscal measures, keeping in mind the
objectives set out in the new 5-year economic plan of my government.
The President, on his part, expressed his determination to reduce [the]
budget deficit and to raise the competitiveness of the US industries.
Finally, the management of the bilateral relations is, indeed, important.
With this in mind, the President and I reviewed and confirmed that the
Tokyo declaration and this plan of action have been steadily implemented,
and we are committed to the further follow-ups.
In this historical period of transition, I deeply admire President Bush for
his bold and outstanding leadership. I have also been greatly encouraged by
his sincere efforts to reduce [the] fiscal deficit and to strengthen industrial
competitiveness and to maintain the open and free world economy without
succumbing to protectionist pressures.
America will, no doubt, remain the world leader in the post-Cold War era. I
assure you that Japan, too, will work hand in hand with the United States by
assuming greater roles and responsibilities in the spirit of the global
partnership between our two countries. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: Recent US-Japan Economic Achievements
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 1 19927/1/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: East Asia
Country: Japan
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
On January 9, 1992, during the Tokyo summit, President Bush and Prime
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa announced a US-Japan Global Partnership Plan of
Action. Consistent with a joint commitment to address bilateral trade
tensions, the US and Japanese Governments are moving ahead rapidly with
implementation of the action plan. Bilateral trade agreements designed to
open the Japanese computer and paper markets have been negotiated and
signed. Other bilateral market access discussions are underway, including
talks designed to improve access for US glass, autos, and auto parts to the
Japanese market.
Japan is the second largest market for US goods, accounting for nearly $70
billion in American exports of goods and services in 1991. It is the largest
international customer for American farm products, purchasing nearly $8
billion in US agricultural commodities annually. Since 1985, US exports to
Japan have increased by nearly 113%. Manufactured goods now account for
65% of US exports to Japan, up from 55% in 1985. A Congressional Research
Service study, released last fall, indicates that exports of US products
covered by bilateral trade agreements have increased by 275%, showing that
negotiations to remove market access barriers produce results. In the last
3 years, US exports to Japan have risen 28% while US imports from Japan
have risen 2%.
Summary
Japan is implementing measures agreed to by President Bush and Prime
Minister Miyazawa aimed at expanding public-sector procurement of
competitive foreign computers and services, a market valued at more than
$9 billion.
On April 23, 1992, the United States and Japan signed an accord on access to
Japan's $27-billion paper and paper products market.
Japanese automakers have drawn up voluntary plans to increase auto parts
procurement from the United States. Progress has been made on auto
standards and certification issues.
The US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) will include new
commitments in the annual report to be issued later this summer.
Government Procurement of Computers.
On January 22, US Trade
Representative Carla A. Hills and the former Japanese Ambassador to the
United States, Ryohei Murata, signed a government-to-government
agreement committing the Japanese Government to undertake measures to
expand public sector procurement of competitive foreign computer products
and services. These measures went into effect in April for computer
products. Coverage of computer services will follow on October 1, 1992,
for Japanese Government agencies subject to the GATT [General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade] Government Procurement Code and other designated
government entities. It will go into effect on April 1, 1993, for other
covered Japanese entities.
The 12 major US computer companies applauded the agreement, calling it an
"outstanding effort by the President's trade negotiators." The agreement
opens a public sector market of $9 billion that is expected to grow to nearly
$16 billion by 1995, according to industry figures. Current US sales of
computer products and services to the Japanese Government are only about
$500 million. The US computer industry thinks its annual sales could reach
$4 billion-$6 billion by 1995.
Paper and Paperboard Products.
In an April 23 White House
ceremony, US and Japanese representatives signed an agreement on
measures to open Japan's $27-billion market for paper and paperboard
products to foreign suppliers.
The paper agreement requires the Japanese Government to encourage
Japanese purchasers and distributors to increase imports of competitive
foreign paper products, develop long-term, buyer-supplier relationships
with foreign producers, and implement open and non-discriminatory
purchasing practices. The agreement affirms the Japanese Government's
commitment to effectively enforce the Anti-Monopoly Act with respect to
the paper market. There will be semi-annual reviews of progress in
implementing the agreement for 5 years. These reviews will take into
consideration factors such as changes in the level of import penetration,
trade data, efforts by Japanese companies and by US paper companies, and
efforts by both governments to implement the measures.
The US paper industry has described the agreement as "a major achievement"
that will result in "significant increases of US exports to the world's
second-largest consumer" of paper and paperboard, one that will "benefit
our industry and workers, benefit the Japanese consumer, and benefit our
global trading system."
Autos and Auto Parts.
Competing effectively in a global economy
requires US producers to establish a competitive US presence in Japan,
which is a key innovator in automotive design, production, and technology.
Achieving this goal will require a long-term commitment by the Big Three
US producers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler), as well as supporting
efforts by the US and Japanese Governments. With improvements in quality
and price competitiveness of American automobiles and cooperation from
Japan, the United States is optimistic that this goal can be achieved.
The US auto companies have strengthened their efforts to build sales of
American cars in Japan. The Big Three have announced plans for new
marketing efforts in Japan, including the introduction of right-hand drive
vehicles, one of which (Jeep Cherokee) will be produced this year. Two
models from one US company have received "type approval" for meeting all
Japanese standards. Ford has purchased 50% ownership of Mazda's plant in
Flat Rock, Michigan, and increased its investment in a Ford-Mazda joint
venture in Japan to distribute Ford automobiles. With the encouragement of
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry, US auto and component
makers plan to expand the US pavilion at the 1993 Tokyo Auto Show.
In the auto parts sector, Chrysler has concluded a contract worth more than
$1 billion for sales of engines and transmissions to Mitsubishi. The Auto
Parts Advisory Committee's March 1992 annual membership survey
indicated that, less than 2 months after the President's trip, US parts
makers noted an upturn in contracts from Japanese automakers and
additional cooperation in "design-ins." Total purchases of US parts reported
by the Japanese Automobile Manufacturers' Association's members rose
19.1% in the 6 months ending March 31, 1992, compared with the same
period a year earlier.
Important and ongoing progress has been made in improving US auto and auto
parts access to Japan. These efforts involve the US Government, the Big
Three, and many US auto parts suppliers. In April, the former Under
Secretary of Commerce, Michael Farren, held talks in Tokyo on measures to
increase US auto and auto parts company access to the market in Japan. In
May, the chief executive officers of the leading US and Japanese auto
manufacturers held their second meeting and developed an ongoing work
program.
The Administration continues to oppose legislative proposals that would
impose auto quotas or other forms of protectionism. It particularly opposes
proposals to impose quotas on cars produced in the United States by so-
called "transplant factories" owned by Japanese car producers. Such
measures would threaten consumers and the large number of American jobs
dependent on an open international trading system.
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII).
In 1989, the President
and former Japanese Prime Minister Uno launched a "Structural Impediments
Initiative" (SII) to promote structural reforms in both countries to
facilitate adjustment of trade and current account imbalances. The SII was
designed, in part, to address broad structural barriers to trade and
investment flows. The initiative led to a joint report issued in June 1990,
which included important undertakings regarding US and Japanese structural
reforms.
Since the President's trip, the SII principals and their deputies have met to
consider new commitments to "reinvigorate the SII," especially by
addressing aspects of the business environment that impede market access.
These meetings have been cooperative and constructive. Additional
meetings will be held over the coming weeks to review new policy
commitments by both sides and to finalize the SII second annual report. The
US side has proposed new commitments in five areas: keiretsu [a type of
Japanese corporate relationship], exclusionary business practices, savings
and investment, land use, and distribution. The United States remains
convinced that additional efforts to address the causes of bilateral trade
and economic tensions are needed, including government and industry
actions.
The agreement by both governments to make new commitments is a
demonstration that the SII continues to be a unique and adaptable forum
capable of dealing with the evolving nature of America's economic and trade
relationship with Japan.
Semiconductors.
The Bush Administration is committed to the
effective implementation of the US-Japan semiconductor arrangement. In
May, the US Trade Representative initiated an interagency review of
Japanese implementation of the arrangement in view of growing concern
about the lack of improvement in foreign access to the Japanese
semiconductor market. On June 4, Japanese electronic industry
representatives and the US semiconductor industry announced an emergency
plan to quickly increase Japanese purchases of US semiconductors, which
have been stagnating. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry
has responded positively to US concerns and has prodded Japanese
companies to enhance their market access efforts.
The Bush Administration will monitor these efforts and is working closely
with the US industry. The United States continues to urge the Japanese
Government and Japan's electronics industry to intensify their efforts to
improve market access for foreign products. Ambassador Hills continues to
underscore the seriousness of US concern in meetings with senior Japanese
officials and has conveyed the same message to Japanese semiconductor
users.
Beef and Citrus Quotas
. Based on a 1988 US-Japan beef and citrus
agreement, Japan eliminated its last remaining quota on frozen
concentrated orange juice and single-strength orange juice.
The agreement has contributed to a steady improvement in US-Japan beef
and citrus trade. For example, the value of US exports of frozen
concentrated orange juice grew 70% from 1989 to 1991 in response to
relaxation of Japanese quotas. Now, with all quantitative restrictions
eliminated, US orange juice exports seem poised to rise sharply. A Florida
agriculture official has estimated that removal of the quota will lead to a
$300-million increase in orange juice trade this year and potentially $1 bil-
lion by the end of the century.
Machine Tools.
On December 27, 1991, the President announced
that voluntary restraint agreements (VRA) on imported machine tools would
be phased out over 2 years to allow additional time for modernization
efforts by the US machine tool industry, which is important to US security
interests. Japan has agreed to extend a VRA covering Japanese machine tool
exports to the United States to facilitate a gradual return to market-
determined competition.
Surveys of Competitive Behavior.
As agreed in the action plan, the
Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), which is responsible for Japanese
anti-trust enforcement, has begun four surveys of possible anti-competitive
behavior in Japan's paper, flat glass, auto, and auto parts industries. The
United States welcomes the increase in JFTC scrutiny of possible anti-
competitive business behavior and looks forward to appropriate
enforcement actions.
Business Cooperation.
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and
Industry has made a solid start with the 88 companies and 22 industry
associations that have joined its Business Global Partnership Initiative.
This membership accounts for about one-half of Japan's total trade. The
United States looks forward to continuation and expansion of this program,
which is designed to promote imports to Japan, local procurement by
Japanese firms abroad, and long-term business cooperation between US and
Japanese firms.
The US-Japan Business Council strives to maintain a constructive dialogue
between the private sectors, since a need continues for a process to address
market access concerns. The United States looks to both sides for their
willingness to work to resolve specific sectoral problems and to avoid
protectionist or managed trade solutions.
In addition, the Manufacturing Technology Initiative, announced during the
Vice President's trip to Japan, is a significant step in introducing hundreds
of US engineers and managers to areas of Japanese technology. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: Nuclear Weapons Withdrawal Completed
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
In the wake of the momentous changes in what was then the Soviet Union,
last September 27, in an address to the nation from the Oval Office, I
directed that the United States undertake dramatic changes and reductions
in our nuclear arsenal and challenged the Soviet leadership to go down the
same road with us. In that speech, I directed that the United States bring
home from overseas and destroy our entire worldwide inventory of ground-
launched theater nuclear weapons. At the same time, I announced that the
United States would withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface
ships, attack submarines, and those nuclear weapons associated with our
land-based naval aircraft. Many of these are to be dismantled and destroyed.
Today, I can tell you that all of the planned withdrawals are complete. All
ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons have been returned to US
territory as have all naval tactical nuclear weapons. Those weapons
designated to be destroyed are being retired and scheduled for destruction.
These historic measures would not have been possible without the full
support of our allies around the world and without the far-sighted and
courageous leadership of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Ukrainian
President Leonid Kravchuk, Republic of Kazakhstan President Nursultan
Nazarbayev, and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Byelarus
Stanislav Shushkevich. They pledged to honor Soviet commitments to take
comparable steps reducing tactical nuclear weapons. It is important that
the implementation of these commitments be successfully concluded.
Now I look forward to the prompt ratification of START [Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty] and to concluding a treaty on the even more far-reaching
reductions President Yeltsin and I announced at the recent summit in
Washington. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: UN Security Council Resolutions 761 and 762 on
Bosnia-Hercegovina
UN
Source: United Nations
Date: Jun, 29 19926/29/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
Subject: United Nations, Regional/Civil Unrest,
Military Affairs
[TEXT]
Resolution 761 (June 29, 1992)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of September 1991, 721 (1991) of
27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, 727 (1992) of 8
January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February
1992, 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992, 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, 757 (1992)
of 30 May 1992, 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992 and 760 (1992)
of 18 June 1992,
Noting the considerable progress reported by the Secretary-General towards
securing the evacuation of Sarajevo airport and its reopening by UNPROFOR
and feeling the need to maintain this favourable momentum,
Underlining the urgency of a quick delivery of humanitarian assistance to
Sarajevo and its environs,
1. Authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy immediately additional
elements of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to ensure the
security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of
humanitarian assistance in accordance with his report dated 6 June 1992
(S/24075);
2. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to comply fully with the
agreement of 5 June 1992 and in particular to maintain an absolute and
unconditional cease-fire;
3. Appeals to all sides to cooperate fully with UNPROFOR in the reopening of
the airport, to exercise the utmost restraint and not to seek any military
advantage in this situation;
4. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with
UNPROFOR and international humanitarian agencies and organizations and
take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of their personnel; in the
absence of such cooperation, the Security Council does not exclude other
measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs;
5. Calls upon all States to contribute to the international humanitarian
efforts in Sarajevo and its environs;
6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).
Resolution 762 (June 30, 1992)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991, 721 (1991)
of 27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of 14 December 1991, 727 (1992) of 8
January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February
1992, 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992, 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, 757 (1992)
of 30 May 1992, 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992, 760 (1992) of 18 June 1992 and
761 (1992) of 29 June 1992,
Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 26 June 1992 (S/24188)
submitted pursuant to resolution 752 (1992),
Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations
for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Welcoming the progress made as a result of the assumption of
responsibilities by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in
Sectors East and West, and concerned about the difficulties encountered by
UNPROFOR in Sectors North and South,
Commending again the efforts undertaken by the European Community and its
member States, with the support of the States participating in the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, through the convening of a
Conference on Yugoslavia, including the mechanisms set forth within it, to
ensure a peaceful political settlement,
1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 26 June 1992
(S/24188);
2. Urges all parties and others concerned to honour their commitments to
effect a complete cessation of hostilities and to implement the United
Nations peace-keeping plan (S/23280, annex III);
3. Also urges, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 727 (1992), the
Government of Croatia to withdraw its army to the positions held before the
offensive of 21 June 1992 and cease hostile military activities within or
adjacent to the United Nations Protected Areas;
4. Urges the remaining units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), the Serb
territorial defence forces in Croatia and others concerned to comply
strictly with their obligations under the United Nations peace-keeping plan,
in particular with regard to the withdrawal and the disarming of all forces
in accordance with the plan;
5. Urges the Government of Croatia and others concerned to follow the
course of action outlined in paragraph 16 of the Secretary-General's report
and appeals to all parties to assist UNPROFOR in its implementation;
6. Recommends the establishment of the Joint Commission described in
paragraph 16 of the Secretary-General's report which should consult, as may
be necessary or appropriate, with the Belgrade authorities in performing its
functions;
7. Authorizes the strengthening of UNPROFOR by the addition of up to 60
military observers and 120 civilian police to perform the functions
envisaged in paragraph 16 of the Secretary General's report, with the
agreement of the Government of Croatia and others concerned;
8. Reaffirms the embargo applied in paragraph 6 of resolution 713 (1991),
paragraph 5 of resolution 724 (1991) and paragraph 6 of resolution 727
(1992);
9. Supports the views expressed in paragraph 18 of the Secretary-General's
report about the grave consequences which the collapse of the United
Nations peace-keeping plan would have throughout the region;
10. Encourages the Secretary-General to pursue his efforts to fulfil as soon
as possible the terms of paragraph 12 of resolution 752 (1992);
11. Calls again upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the
Conference on Yugoslavia and its aim of reaching a political settlement
consistent with the principles of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe and reaffirms that the United Nations peace-keeping
plan and its implementation is in no way intended to prejudge the terms of a
political settlement;
12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful
solution is achieved.
VOTE: Unanimous (15-0). (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: US Policy Toward UNESCO
Bolton
Source: John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on International
Operations and on Human Rights and International
Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the
Subcommittee on Environment of the House Science, Space, and
Technology Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jun, 25 19926/25/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Subject: United Nations, Cultural Exchange
[TEXT]
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss our policy
toward UNESCO [UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. It is
particularly timely to do so in the context of the recently completed GAO
[General Accounting Office] report on the organization's management,
administrative, budgetary, and personnel practices.
It has been 7 1/2 years since the United States withdrew from UNESCO
because of the organization's excessive politicization, poor management,
and runaway budgets. Since then, we have been working with our allies,
with the Secretariat, and with Director General Mayor to promote reform.
We have maintained a presence at UNESCO through our Observer Mission,
have attended every meeting of the organization's governing bodies, and have
made voluntary contributions of approximately $2 million per year in
support of selected activities in which we continue to participate.
We are, consequently, pleased to note that the GAO report concludes that
initial progress has been made in implementing management reforms. We
have reviewed the report and find it a useful assessment of UNESCO's
management practices. The report states that it is too soon to judge the
effectiveness of some reforms. Knute Hammarskjold and Peter Wilenski,
authors of a 1989 study on UNESCO's management, said much the same thing
last January in a follow-up report on the implementation of their
recommendations: "Extensive progress in reform has been made on a broad
front but has not yet taken root. . . ."
The GAO report states that UNESCO has not solved long-standing problems
with consultants and program evaluation. It makes 12 formal
recommendations that address policies for decentralization of activities
and resources, program evaluation, procedures for the use and control of
supplementary staff, budget techniques, and payroll controls. These
recommendations and the other suggestions made throughout the text
provide helpful guidelines and a benchmark for further progress.
As we noted in the State Department comments included as an appendix to
the report, each of the recommendations is consistent with goals sought by
the Department of State for several years. In this regard, we believe that
our policy of insistence on real change at UNESCO--before any consideration
of re-entry into the organization--has been a significant factor in
motivating its member states, governing bodies, and the Secretariat, itself,
to achieve the progress noted in the report.
In contrast to this progress, there are other areas of UNESCO policy which
still deeply concern us. Particularly troubling was a UNESCO mission to Iraq
in February, reportedly undertaken in cooperation with the UNDP [UN
Development Program], to assess the situation of education. While
sympathetic to humanitarian initiatives that meet essential medical and
nutritional needs, we are not inclined to stretch "essential civilian needs"
discussed in UN Security Council Resolution 687 to repairing or replacing
school buildings. Last August, the UN Sanctions Committee informed
UNESCO that it was unable to reach agreement on the appropriateness of
such a mission, and UNESCO wisely canceled its plans to send an assessment
team to Iraq.
In September, the UNESCO Executive Board deferred, sine die, consideration
of any discussion of the situation of the educational and cultural
institutions in Iraq. In November, our Mission to the United Nations
informed the UNESCO representative that we were not sympathetic to
another UNESCO initiative to send a mission to Iraq to assess the status of
schools and cultural sites. Nonetheless, a UNESCO/UNDP team spent 2
weeks in Iraq during the month of February. In a March 3 letter to Director
General Mayor, the Kuwaiti Permanent Delegate to UNESCO expressed his
surprise that UNESCO would undertake such a mission in the light of the
board decision and the UN sanctions regime. The Director General responded
that the mission was undertaken in consultation with the UN Interagency
Humanitarian Program and did not contravene Resolution 687. The officer-
in-charge of the Office of the Executive Delegate for Humanitarian
Assistance indicated that the Director General did not consult his office
prior to making a decision to send a mission to Iraq. We believe the action
was ill-advised, potentially detrimental to the sanctions regime, and
inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Executive Board
decision to postpone consideration of the status of Iraqi educational
institutions.
Turning once more to the GAO report, we believe that particular attention
should be given to the recommendation on better application of the rules on
the use of supplementary staff and fee contracts to control the contract
authorization procedure more effectively and make it more transparent and
uniform. This is of considerable import in that supplementary staff costs
and fee contracts amounted to nearly $70 million during the 1990-91
biennium. GAO found considerable gaps and inconsistencies in data on
supplementary staff. This raised doubts "about whether UNESCO uses too
many supplementary staff or validly employs them." We endorse the
Hammarskjold-Wilenski recommendations that call for the introduction of a
consistent and fair promotion system based on merit, a better career
development system, and equal opportunity for women.
The report underscores the need for significantly better program evaluation.
We concur and believe considerable improvement in this area is needed if
further program concentration is to be achieved, as recommended in the
report. Impact evaluations are particularly wanting, both in number and in
quality. GAO notes that UNESCO has conducted only 16 impact evaluations
since 1986, covering only 8% of its activities, and that the appropriate
methodologies, in some instances, were not employed even for this limited
selection. Moreover, while guidelines exist for impact evaluation, there is
no overall plan to ensure that a reasonable and representative selection of
programs will be evaluated.
Regarding decentralization, there is reason for concern at the report's
observation that 73% of UNESCO's total staff of 2,697 persons is located in
Paris and that the ratio of headquarters to field staff has not varied since
1984. The report notes that a higher proportion of funds are expended in the
field than would be expected by the distribution of staff; 44% of the 1990-
91 regular and extra-budgetary budgets was expended in the field. This,
however, is the same percentage as in 1988. Clearly, it is time for the
organization to develop the systematic approach to decentralization
mandated by the Executive Board at its November 1991 session.
In conclusion, we concur with the GAO report's view that initial progress
has been made in implementing management reforms at UNESCO. Based on
the report's conclusions and the observations of the Hammarskjold/Wilenski
report of last January, however, we believe that much remains to be done
and that what has been accomplished needs to settle in and be
institutionalized. We will have more to say on this in the report on UNESCO
that Congress has asked us to submit later this summer. Finally, we will
continue to implement fully our current policy and work with UNESCO's
governing bodies, other governments, and the Director General to effect
further reform along the lines recommended in the GAO report. At present,
we do not believe the changes adopted warrant opening the question of
whether to rejoin the organization, at an expenditure of approximately $55
million per year. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: Terrorism: Efforts Toward International
Solutions
Burleigh
Source: A. Peter Burleigh, Coordinator for Counter-
Terrorism
Description: Address before the 1992 Worldwide Anti-terrorism
Conference, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Date: Jun, 23 19926/23/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Eurasia, East Asia
Country: Iraq, Kuwait, USSR (former), North Korea, Syria, Cuba,
Libya, Iran, Israel,
Subject: Narcotics
[TEXT]
I appreciate the opportunity to address this important conference.
I'd like to describe some recent noteworthy developments in our efforts to
counter the threat of international terrorism.
Despite the extraordinary and positive changes in the world in the last 2
years and despite an evolving international consensus to oppose terrorism,
the problem is still very much with us. In fact, last year there was a sharp
increase in the number of international terrorist incidents, although the
number of deaths and injuries declined. The increase reflected the large
number of generally small-scale incidents that occurred during the Gulf
war. There were no terrorist spectaculars resulting in large loss of life in
1991. However, in 1992, we have seen the most spectacular terrorist
attack in 3 years: the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. This
brutal bombing killed about 2 dozen people and left 200 injured.
Although the number of international terrorist incidents seems to be on a
downward trend so far this year, the number of deaths and injuries has
increased. There have also been a number of serious attacks by domestic
terrorist groups in Spain, Peru, Turkey, and other countries.
It is shocking to note that almost all of the American citizens who died in
terrorist attacks during the past 2 years had some connection to the US
military--either on active duty or under contract to the Defense
Department. They died in Panama, the Philippines, El Salvador, Turkey, and
Greece. Two weeks ago, one US serviceman was killed by gunfire and a
second soldier wounded in an ambush in Panama in advance of the
President's visit.
The Gulf War
One of the most important developments of the last year was the success of
the coalition and the international community in trumping Saddam Hussein's
terrorist "ace in the hole." I think it is clear that Saddam Hussein believed
terrorism would be a strategic weapon in deterring the coalition and
undermining support for the effort to liberate Kuwait. Iraq trained
terrorists and Iraqi intelligence operatives and dispersed them to locations
around the world in preparation for the "mother of all battles." In the
months following the invasion of Kuwait, and especially during Operation
Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein called publicly and repeatedly for terrorist
attacks against coalition targets. But these attacks for the most part did
not materialize.
As many of you here know well, it was no accident that there were no major
successful terrorist attacks. It was the result of unprecedented and largely
unheralded cooperation among security and law enforcement services around
the world--including Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Arab world--that
stifled the Iraqi terrorist threat. This cooperation involved the sharing of
intelligence information, expulsion of Iraqi diplomats and agents,
preemptive arrests, and enhanced security countermeasures. Those attacks
that did take place were largely sporadic and uncoordinated acts of
indigenous groups acting in sympathy with Saddam Hussein or exploiting the
Gulf war as a pretext to commit terrorism.
While we can be proud of our successes, we must remember that the Iraqi
terrorist threat, while currently suppressed, is likely to re-emerge if
international sanctions are loosened and Iraq is allowed to rebuild its
diplomatic and intelligence operations.
End to East Bloc Support
Another new element has been the astonishing changes that have occurred in
the former Soviet Union and former Soviet bloc. We note with great interest
the recent reports from Moscow of documents containing evidence that the
former Soviet Government supported groups that engaged in terrorism
against Western interests. It is too early to discuss broad conclusions
about the extent of the former Soviet Union's responsibility for
international terrorism, but these fragmentary reports are disturbing.
The demise of the communist governments has obviously deprived terrorist
groups of material support, sanctuary, and safehaven from which to operate,
arms, financing, and front companies and other infrastructure. Also
important, it deprived them of the Leninist ethos of all-justifying
revolutionary violence. In some circles, this had lent appeal and an aura of
respectability to leftwing terrorist groups.
At the same time, the disintegrations of the Soviet Union and now
Yugoslavia has unleashed long-contained ethnic, religious, and territorial
rivalries. While these, regrettably, have claimed a great number of lives
and caused widespread suffering, they do not appear to have spilled over
into international terrorist incidents. Nevertheless, it is a sobering
reminder, today, that Sarajevo, site of one of the most momentous terrorist
incidents in history, is again the scene of bloodshed.
State-Supported Terrorism
While Iraq was unable to incite a terrorist offensive against the coalition,
and despite welcome changes in the former communist bloc, there remain
states that have been and remain willing to employ terrorism as an
instrument of state policy.
As many of you know, the United States maintains a list of countries that
support terrorism. There are six countries on that list: Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, and Syria.
Iraq, today, is in a state of enforced quiescence. Libya, as I will discuss in
greater detail shortly, is under great pressure to comply with the UN
resolutions requiring it to hand over suspects in the Pan Am [Flight] 103
bombing, cooperate with French authorities' investigation into the bombing
of UTA Flight 772, and cease its support for terrorism. Libya continues to
provide support and facilities for a number of terrorist groups, including the
Abu Nidal Organization [ANO], the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command, and the Palestine Liberation Front.
Iran, regrettably, continues to sponsor terrorism in an effort to intimidate
governments and individuals around the world. An Iranian-sponsored group,
Islamic Jihad, has claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Israeli
Embassy in Buenos Aires, and it produced videotaped footage of the embassy
taken prior to the bombing in order to authenticate its claim.
Iran continues to assassinate dissidents abroad. Four Iranian agents are
under arrest for the murder of former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur
Bakhtiar in Paris last year.
Iran has also refused to rescind the fatwa, or religious decree, calling for
the murder of author Salman Rushdie because of his book, The Satanic
Verses. This seems a particularly perverse and Orwellian from of
terrorism--international thought crime, bearing a sentence of death. In
addition, attacks on translators of Rushdie's books in Italy and Japan are
believed to be linked to their work.
Iran also continues to provide material and financial assistance to terrorist
groups throughout the world. Last year, Iran finally helped arrange for the
freeing of Western hostages held in Lebanon. The last two, both German
citizens, were freed last week. We have recognized Iran's role in this, and
it was an important step. As the President said, it has removed an
enormous obstacle to a more normal relationship with Iran. Serious
problems remain, however.
Hezbollah elements in Lebanon that are fighting Israeli troops are
continuously resupplied by the Government of Iran by flights to Damascus.
Syria then permits these supplies to travel overland by truck.
Islamic Jihad also claimed responsibility for an attack in Ankara, Turkey,
that killed the Israeli Embassy's top security officer. This attack followed
by a few days a handgrenade attack in front of the Neve Shalom Synagogue in
Istanbul for which Hezbollah is suspected.
Tehran must recognize that only by abandoning state sponsorship of
terrorism can it expect to re-enter the international community. The
Iranians are not acting as if they have understood this basic message. We
need to work with other states to drive it home in every way possible.
Syria is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist attacks
outside Lebanon since 1987, and most of the groups it supports have been
relatively quiet since Syria joined the allied coalition in the war with Iraq.
However, Syria continues to provide support and safehaven to a number of
groups that engage in international terrorism, and, for that reason, it
remains on the US Government list of state sponsors.
A number of terrorist attacks, particularly against Israel, have been
attributed to groups based in Syria and in Syrian-controlled areas of
Lebanon. Groups enjoying Syrian support and sanctuary include Hezbollah,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the ANO. Two non-Arab groups that receive
Syrian support--the PKK and Dev Sol--are very active in Turkey. The PKK, or
Kurdish Workers' Party, has kidnapped Western hostages, including
Americans. The virulently anti-US group Dev Sol murdered two DOD
[Department of Defense]-associated Americans in Turkey last year. Another
non-Arab group supported by Syria is the Japanese Red Army, which has
attacked the US military. It is responsible for the 1988 car bombing of a
USO [United Services Organization] club in Naples that killed an American
servicewoman and injured four US servicemen.
Syrian efforts over the past few years to reign in terrorists under its
control represent a half step. It has yet to sever its relationships with
these groups and shut down their training camps.
Other Trends
I'd like to also touch briefly on two other issues. One is what you might call
the growing "reach" of terrorists today. During the Gulf war, Iraqi agents
attempted unsuccessful attacks in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines,
far from the traditional areas of operation of Middle Eastern terrorist
groups. The bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires is the latest,
tragic example of what may be a new strategy of seeking targets in
traditionally low-threat areas of the world, where security may be less
vigilant and local security forces may have little experience with the
international terrorist threat.
I would also like to mention the threat of narco-terrorism. This is not a
new problem. In recent years, we have seen the emergence both of narcotics
traffickers who employ terrorism against the state, and particularly its
judicial system, to further their own criminal goals. Many of you will recall
the terrible violence that struck Colombia in 1989, including the bombing of
a civilian airliner and the assassinations of judges, journalists, police
officials, and politicians.
We have also seen more political insurgent and terrorist groups--for
example, the Shining Path in Peru--turn to narcotics trafficking as an easy
way to generate more income to support their terrorist and military
activities.
We must continue to closely monitor this phenomenon, especially as
terrorist groups feel the effects of the cutoff in funding from the former
East bloc countries and reduced assistance from Cuba. In Latin America and
the Middle East especially, there are many areas that are both major and
traditional narcotics production areas and operating areas for terrorist
groups.
US Policy
I would like to turn now to the US counter-terrorism policy. Our policy is
based on three tenets:
-- No concessions to terrorists;
-- Pressure on states to cease support for terrorism; and
-- Cooperation with other governments to impose the rule of law on
terrorists. This involves practical measures to help us identify, apprehend,
and prosecute terrorists.
I believe that over the past year this policy has produced some significant
successes in our fight against terrorism.
No Deals. The United States maintains a policy of refusing to make
concessions to terrorists. This means that we will not pay ransom, release
convicted terrorists, or pressure other countries to give in to terrorist
demands. No group should believe that it can blackmail the United States.
There will be no rewards for terrorism.
This aspect of our policy was damaged by the Iran-contra affair, but we saw
it succeed in the unconditional release, last year, of all the remaining US
hostages in Lebanon. As President Bush stated last week in the wake of the
release of the two remaining German hostages from captivity, the "no deals"
policy, which had encountered some rough water along the way, has been
vindicated by results. We are very well aware of the terrible, wrenching
pressure that terrorists can bring to bear, especially on humane, democratic
governments that value the lives of their citizens. But we believe this
policy is the only correct one.
Pressuring State Sponsors.
I have already discussed how the
international community worked together to pressure Iraq and prevent Iraqi
terrorists from disrupting the coalition effort. We will continue to keep the
pressure on Iraq to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 687 adopted
last April, requiring Iraq to abstain from acts of terrorism or from
supporting terrorist groups.
We will also continue to pressure other states that sponsor terrorist groups
or use terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. We seek to convince them that
support for terrorism will reap diplomatic and economic isolation. Where
we have evidence, we will seek to punish state sponsors and will urge
others to do the same. This leads me to my final point, the importance of
international cooperation.
In recent months, working with the British and the French Governments and
the UN Security Council, we have made great progress in our efforts to bring
to justice the bombers of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA [Flight] 772. As you
are well aware, following long and extremely painstaking investigations,
the United States and United Kingdom developed evidence conclusively
linking Libya to the 1988 Pan Am bombing, in which 270 people died, and in
November 1991 issued indictments for two Libyan agents charged with
carrying out the bombing. French authorities also issued warrants for four
Libyan agents in connection with the 1989 bombing of the UTA flight, which
killed 171 people. We believe these bombings were carried out with the
knowledge and approval of the highest levels of the Libyan Government.
The United States, United Kingdom, and France demanded that Libya hand
over the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing, cooperate with French
authorities investigating the UTA bombing, and cease all forms of terrorist
action and support for terrorism.
On January 21, the Security Council voted unanimously to urge Libya to
comply with these demands. When Libya did not comply, the Security
Council imposed sanctions to require Libyan compliance, which began on
April 15.
So far, we see no evidence that the Libyans are serious about meeting the
demands of the Security Council. So we must continue to enforce the
sanctions strictly and consider the possibility of further action if Libya
continues to defy the international community.
International Cooperation. There are many recent examples of successful
international cooperation in bringing terrorists to justice. These include:
-- Joint French and Spanish efforts to prevent Basque terrorists from
disrupting the summer Olympics in Barcelona. These joint efforts have
yielded important arrests of leading Basque terrorists.
-- The trial and conviction in Greece of Muhammed Rashid for his role in the
bombing of a Pan Am aircraft in 1982.
-- In April, Italy extradited a suspected terrorist to the United States to
stand trial in connection with three attempted bombings in New York in
1973--the first extradition of a Palestinian terrorist to the United States.
-- Last month we saw the extradition by Switzerland of Zia Sarhadi, an
Iranian suspected of involvement in the murder of Shapur Bakhtiar in Paris.
-- As many of you are aware, the United States offers anti-terrorism and
counter-terrorism training to law enforcement officials around the world.
To date, we have trained more than 12,500 civilians from over 70 countries.
We recently added the newly independent nations of the former Soviet bloc
to this very successful program.
These are examples of governments, on their own and in cooperation with
others, working to apply the rule of law to international terrorism.
Terrorists are not romantic figures; they are not freedom fighters. They are
not Robin Hood or William Tell. They are criminals and must be treated as
such. Not long ago, many countries--including normally responsible
countries--sometimes granted terrorists dispensation for their crimes, or
sought to make separate deals to ward off attacks against their own
citizens and governments. Today, as the examples I mention indicate, this
practice is becoming more rare. More and more terrorists are being brought
to justice and are currently serving sentences for their crimes.
Future Challenges. As much as we wish that terrorism had diminished to a
manageable level, many recent events around the world remind us that it has
not. So I would like to close by focusing on some of the challenges facing us
in the future.
-- We must continue to work for increased cooperation among law
enforcement, diplomatic, and intelligence agencies.
-- The international community must keep the pressure on Libya to meet
the demands of the Security Council. We have made historic progress in
working together in order to end state-supported terrorism and bring
terrorists to justice. But we must keep the pressure on. We must also
continue to pressure other state sponsors, such as Libya, Iran, and Syria.
-- There is the possibility of renewed terrorist violence in protesting the
Middle East peace process and/or in reaction to other developments in the
Middle East. There is also the possibility that Iraq--itself under pressure
from the international community--might make a terrible miscalculation
and lash out with renewed terrorist assaults. That is also a risk with Libya.
Again, such an attack would be a terrible mistake.
-- This summer will see a number of high-profile events, most prominently
the Barcelona Olympics and the Seville Exposition in Spain, but also the
celebrations of the 500th anniversary of Columbus' voyage that could
attract terrorist attention, both from indigenous groups and international
terrorists.
-- Many countries around the world still face indigenous irredentist,
ethnic, or other terrorist threats. In Peru, we see the extraordinarily brutal
Shining Path, responsible for 25,000 deaths during the past 10 years. Unlike
traditional Latin American insurgent groups, the Shining Path gets the
support of the Peruvian peasantry mainly through brutal intimidation,
including the public torture and execution of innocent people.
Also unlike traditional terrorist groups, the Shining Path is completely
independent of outside support, although it has turned to involvement with
cocaine trafficking to fund its activities. The Shining Path has also
established political support groups in several European countries.
-- In India, the complex political movements that promote Kashmiri and
Sikh independence have increasingly--and very unfortunately--turned to
terrorism. They get Pakistani support for these efforts.
-- In the Sudan, we are concerned over recent disturbing evidence that
various terrorist organizations are being allowed to increase their presence.
Sudan also has close ties to both Libya and Iran.
-- In Europe, in Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union we see continuing
civil and ethnic conflict that could spill over into terrorism, both internally
and internationally.
-- Lastly, and perhaps most difficult, we must seek to come to terms with
Islamic fundamentalism. Let me be clear: Neither Islam nor
fundamentalism constitute or are in any fashion synonymous with terrorism.
Islam is one of the three great monotheistic religions. Simplistic
identification of Islam with terrorism is profoundly wrong. There is no
intrinsic conflict between Islam and the West; the Crusades ended some
time ago.
That said, the powerful appeal of fundamentalism and the deep-seated anti-
Western resentments that find expression there pose a political challenge
that will continue to engage us and create a climate in which terrorist
groups may flourish.
Conclusion
All of these developments remind us that we are a long way from
eradicating terrorist violence. As long as there are resentments,
antagonisms, grievances, there will be some who will turn to violence,
including violence against innocent civilians, to serve their political ends.
But the international community has made tremendous progress over the
last decade, from a time when the civilized nations seemed paralyzed by a
wave of terrorist assaults and the rule of law seemed powerless against a
violent few. Today, it is the terrorists who are on the defensive. Let's keep
it that way. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: US Policy Objectives and MFN Status for China
Kanter
Source: Arnold Kanter, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House
Ways and Means Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jun, 29 19926/29/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: China
Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights,
Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Administration's policy toward China and, in particular, the President's
commitment to unconditional renewal of China's most-favored-nation (MFN)
trade status for another year.
Mr. Chairman, it has been over 3 years since the terrible tragedy of
Tiananmen Square--3 years since Chinese Government troops fired on
defenseless students who only sought the freedom of political expression
that we Americans claim as our birthright. Even with the passage of time,
those images retain their power and their message. The United States, as it
has always done, will condemn this kind of brutality--whether it takes
place in China or anywhere else. As Secretary Baker has emphasized, the
promotion of human rights is a cornerstone our foreign policy.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, I am here today to discuss what may be a question of
strategy and tactics but, surely, not one of objectives. I think all of us can
agree on the basic objectives of our policy toward China:
-- Promote respect for human rights;
-- Encourage responsible and cooperative Chinese international behavior,
particularly in the area of non-proliferation;
-- Promote peaceful and democratic reform within China; and
-- Improve and sustain a trade relationship from which Americans--both
producers and consumers--derive great benefit.
Toward these goals, the Administration's approach has been one of
engagement rather than confrontation. We have sought to work actively
with the Chinese on specific, targeted concerns while at the same time
encouraging the changes in Chinese society that naturally follow from
openness to and engagement with the outside world. This approach has led
to positive results in the areas of human rights, non-proliferation, and trade
that we established as central to our bilateral relations. We have achieved
these results while at the same time promoting and protecting American
business and consumer interests.
We believe that our current course stands the best chance of promoting
change in China for the better. We recognize that many Members of Congress
take issue with this approach and argue that a policy of confrontation with,
if not isolation of, China would be more effective in bringing about positive
change. We respectfully, but emphatically, disagree. Accordingly, we
continue to believe that China's unconditional MFN status provides our best
approach for encouraging positive change and US interests in China,
particularly when coupled with aggressive pursuit of specific issues of
concern.
Today, I would like to review first the legal requirements for renewing the
Jackson-Vanik waiver and why China has met those requirements. Second, I
will discuss why it is in the interest of the United States to renew MFN for
China. Third, I will explain why conditionality of MFN for China will not
work. Finally, I will discuss the main issues of concern in our relations
with China--human rights, proliferation, trade--and how our targeted
approach--mixing appropriate sanctions as well as incentives--has led to
measurable progress in each of these areas.
China's Emigration Policy Meets the Standard of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment
The Jackson-Vanik amendment requires the President to determine whether
renewal of the MFN waiver for China would substantially promote freedom
of emigration from that coun-try. It is clear that an extension of the
waiver would advance this objective.
China continues to give most of its citizens the freedom to emigrate to the
United States and elsewhere. Indeed, the principal restraint on emigration
is the capacity and willingness of other nations to absorb Chinese
immigrants, not Chinese policy. Last year alone, China's relatively free
emigration policies enabled more than 18,000 Chinese to receive US
immigrant visas. In addition, US diplomatic posts in China issued almost
80,000 non-immigrant visas to PRC [People's Republic of China] nationals to
study, travel, and do business in the United States. Indeed, the number of
Chinese whom the PRC would allow to emigrate to the United States far
exceeds our ability to accept them.
In no uncertain terms, the renewal of MFN without condition continues to
influence those policies that permit tens of thousands of Chinese every year
to choose to leave China permanently and to travel abroad and gain exposure
to the outside world. Simply put, MFN provides an important incentive for
the Chinese to permit emigration.
On Its Own Merits, It Is In The Interest of the United States To Extend
MFN to China
Looking beyond the letter of the law, unconditional MFN renewal makes
sense on its own merits. The very phrase "most-favored-nation" is, as we
all know, something of a misnomer. MFN is not a special trade status that
we reserve for favored friends. It is the way we do business with almost
every country in the world. Even countries such as Iraq, Cuba, and Libya
retain MFN status, despite the economic embargoes against them.
For more than a decade, MFN-based trade with China has opened up jobs and
business opportunities benefiting Americans and Chinese alike. Normal
commercial relations have encouraged positive change in China and helped
strengthen the hand of those elements of Chinese society most open to
political and economic reform. In short, an open China remains the best
hope for a more democratic China, and MFN--without conditions--continues
to provide our best instrument for promoting the changes we seek.
The new era in US-Chinese relations can be traced, of course, to President
Nixon's historic decision to end the long period of confrontation with China
and to begin the process of bringing China out of its isolation from the
modern world. But it was not until President Carter first established
diplomatic relations in 1979 and then extended MFN to China in 1980 that
our relationship accelerated and matured. With the granting of MFN, we
profoundly magnified our ability to influence political and economic reform
within Chinese society.
This single act institutionalized the normalization of relations on a very
practical and tangible level. Bilateral commercial treaties, consular
agreements, and scientific and cultural exchanges followed, each
strengthening the network of direct links between Americans and Chinese.
China's leaders inaugurated, in late 1978, a program of market-oriented
economic reform that led to a rapid increase in household incomes and
expansion of industrial and agricultural production. China's real GNP grew
at an average annual rate of 10% during the decade 1978-88. This economic
growth, based on reform and MFN-based trade with the world, has
dramatically improved the lives of ordinary Chinese and has given them
unprecedented freedom and control over their lives.
Before the extension of MFN in 1980, China had barely begun to recover from
the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Ordinary Chinese avoided contact
with foreigners, and those government officials authorized to meet
foreigners refused even to give their names.
Since the granting of MFN and in the context of the reforms of late 1978, the
change has been nothing short of dramatic. Today, the Chinese are free to
travel domestically, purchase foreign-made consumer goods, and wear
Western or traditional dress. Non-government controlled media are more
available in China today than ever before, including cable TV in parts of
China and satellite dishes. American television programs are regularly
shown on Beijing television, and American movies and videos are available
throughout China.
In addition to exposing Chinese society to Western ideas and culture, MFN
has helped speed the process of economic reform in China, which continues
to emphasize the decentralization of economic decision-making in both the
rural and urban sectors. This process has progressed more rapidly in
agriculture, where production decisions remain in the hands of individual
farmers and with village and township enterprises. In the urban sector,
central government and provincial authorities continue to bring market
mechanisms to bear in reducing state subsidies to consumers and in
organizing commodity markets and foreign exchange adjustment centers.
Our country has taken the strongest stand against repression in China, and
we are the most determined advocates for democratic change there. This is
precisely why we advocate unconditional MFN to foster normal commercial
relations that expose the Chinese people to American ideas and influence.
The Administration firmly believes that economic reform and liberalization
in China creates irresistible pressure for political reform. It may not be a
simple equation, but we are confident that entrepreneurship and market-
oriented reform in China will lead to meaningful and lasting change in the
lives of the Chinese people.
The best way to advance our bilateral agenda with China--which I will
discuss in greater depth shortly--is through our carefully targeted
approach. It is easy to be discouraged by the pace of progress, but it would
be a serious mistake to let our frustration lead us to adopt
counterproductive policies that would undermine our goals.
Conditionality for MFN Will Not Work
Denial of MFN--or its withdrawal through imposition of conditions that
China's leadership is unlikely to meet--would work against our political and
economic interests. It would do severe damage to the development of
market-oriented institutions that contain the seeds of political reform.
Those in Chinese society--intellectuals, students, managers, workers, even
government officials--who are the most dynamic, the most open to the
outside world, and the most committed to the marketplace are precisely
those who have the greatest stake in unconditional MFN renewal. MFN is
simply not the right vehicle to exert pressure on the Chinese with regard to
particular issues.
Indeed, the argument for conditionality seems based on the premise that
MFN is somehow more in China's interest than our own. This is simply not
so. To place conditions on MFN would hold our single most powerful
instrument for promoting reform hostage to the reactions of hardliners in
Beijing. We would be handing the opponents of reform their most potent
lever.
This year's MFN conditionality proposals implicitly acknowledge that a
complete withdrawal of MFN would not serve our interests and would
restrict tariff increases to Chinese state enterprises. But even this revised
version of conditionality would do considerable damage to our interests.
Bad Trade Policy.
First and foremost, conditionality, even the kind
advocated in the Pease/Pelosi bills, is bad trade policy. This committee
knows better than anyone that the economic future of the United States
depends on strong ties with all regions of the world. Our trade policy seeks
to open and expand markets overseas to ensure that the United States is
able to compete on a level playing field for opportunities that will advance
the economic well-being of our nation. Expanded trade creates jobs at home
for American workers; generates new business opportunities; and affords
consumers better choices in terms of quality, quantity, and price. In this
regard, conditioning MFN to the achievement of our foreign policy objectives
is simply bad trade policy and strikes at the core of our commitment to free
and open trade.
I also want to underscore a point made in [Deputy US Trade Representative]
Ambassador Moskow's testimony: The removal of MFN--which would be the
likely result of conditionality--would hit American consumers hard. It
would also hold the individual Americans affected by this policy hostage to
the actions of a foreign power. Less affluent Americans, who are the
primary consumers of China's low-cost goods, are particularly vulnerable.
Intentions aside, the burdens of conditionality would be borne by those
Americans least capable of sustaining another hit to their family budgets.
American exporters would also be hard hit. Remember, reciprocal tariff
treatment is inherently a two-way street. If China, in retaliation, denied us
MFN, American farmers could lose one of their best export markets to
Canadian and Australian producers, and US manufacturers would lose export
shares to competitors from Japan and Europe. In the process, export-related
jobs would be lost in this country, putting Americans out of work.
Targeting State Enterprises Is Unworkable.
Not only does
conditionality make for bad trade policy, the provisions of the proposed
legislation targeting state-owned enterprises are simply unworkable. Given
the growing complexity of China's economy, the definition of a state
enterprise is increasingly problematic. The silk industry is illustrative in
this regard. The degree of "state" control of silk production and marketing
increases as the product moves up the production chain into cloth
fabrication, but the basic raw material, the silk cocoon, is produced by
individual farm families and collectives, while finished silk garments are
produced by joint ventures and wholly owned foreign enterprises. These
quasi-capitalist farm entrepreneurs and joint ventures would be harmed as
much, if not more, by MFN revocation as the "state" silk industry.
Achievements of Comprehensive Engagement
Let me reiterate our belief that MFN is simply the wrong instrument to bring
about changes in other areas of concern. Using our targeted approach, we
have made substantial progress on human rights, proliferation, and trade,
which we have put at the center of our bilateral relationship.
Human Rights.
Let me state unequivocally that the promotion of
fundamental human rights is and will remain at the forefront of our foreign
policy objectives--and this includes China. Those who would try to
characterize our opposition to conditioning MFN as representing indifference
to human rights abuses ignore the fact that the Administration maintains
serious sanctions that are better targeted and more effective. We have
taken the strongest position against China's human rights abuses of any
country in the world. President Bush was the first world leader to condemn
the crackdown at Tiananmen. At that time, he expressed in no uncertain
terms that there could be no "business as usual" with the Chinese
Government under such circumstances. We have not retreated from that
statement. The United States is the only nation today that has not lifted
Tiananmen sanctions against China and refuses to restore normal bilateral
relations until the Chinese make substantial progress in protecting basic
human rights.
Our Tiananmen sanctions are specifically targeted to human rights issues.
Under these sanctions, we have suspended programs for military cooperation
and placed an embargo on all sales to China's police and military. We have
rejected proposals for easing COCOM [Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls] controls on China. Our trade support
programs--OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] and TDP [Trade
Development Program]--have been suspended since 1989. We do not support
international development bank lending except for projects that meet basic
human needs.
Meetings between Secretary Baker and his Chinese counterpart have focused
on human rights, non-proliferation, trade problems, and regional issues,
such as the Middle East and Cambodia. Those meetings last November were
not convivial exchanges but tough working sessions. We stated our concerns
in an open and direct manner, and I reiterated these concerns in the
strongest terms during my recent visit to Beijing. I can assure the
committee that the Chinese know exactly where we stand.
We have made progress in our dialogue with the Chinese on human rights--
though by no means as much as we would wish. With the publication of its
White Paper on human rights and exchanges of delegations with other
countries, China's refusal to discuss human rights internationally has ended.
We continue to raise with the Chinese the issue of releasing political
prisoners. The Chinese confirmed to Secretary Baker the release of 133
prisoners on our list of prisoners of human rights interest as of November
1991. Since then, China has announced the release of additional political
prisoners. One dissident informed our Embassy, for example, that 70%-80%
of those detained in Beijing after Tiananmen have now been released. We
will continue to seek a general amnesty for political prisoners and
permission for international humanitarian organizations to have access to
Chinese prisons.
China has also granted exit permits to a few dissidents and their relatives.
The relaxation of exit controls for those Chinese who have returned from
overseas and still hold valid passports and visas is also a welcome step.
Recently, China unequivocally reiterated its assurance to Secretary Baker
that all those not under criminal investigation can leave. We intend to hold
them to it.
Non-Proliferation and International Cooperation.
We have also
seen progress in the area of weapons proliferation. China's support for
global non-proliferation initiatives increased significantly in the last year.
Again, as a direct result of high-level discussions with Chinese leaders,
assisted by the Administration's use of targeted sanctions, China agreed to
observe the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines and parameters.
The Chinese also have acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We
believe it is important for China to adopt international non-proliferation
standards and welcome the steps it has taken so far. Of course, more work
needs to be done, and we continue to monitor Chinese behavior closely. We
encourage further PRC participation
in global and regional non-proliferation efforts and have secured China's
involvement in the President's Middle East arms control initiative. China is
also taking part in the chemical weapons convention negotiations in Geneva.
China has played a constructive role in other international forums as well.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China cooperated with
multilateral efforts to enforce sanctions against Iraq and Libya, facilitated
the entry of North and South Korea into the United Nations, and opposed
North Korean efforts to develop nuclear weapons. China has contributed to a
comprehensive settlement of the Cambodia conflict and has worked hard in
recent weeks to keep the settlement on track. We want to encourage these
steps to act as a responsible member of the international community and
not tempt China to lapse into the role of a rogue state or a trouble-maker.
Trade.
Looking back over the past year, the record of our trade
policy toward China has been one of considerable success. On intellectual
property rights, China responded positively to our special [Section] 301
trade investigation with an agreement in January to improve protection of
US patents and copyrights, including computer software. This agreement
was strongly endorsed by US industry, which subsequently urged
continuation of MFN for China.
On market access, a fourth round of negotiations under our Section 301
investigation of Chinese trade barriers was held in May. We emphasized
that Chinese exporters cannot continue to enjoy a higher degree of access to
our markets than US firms are allowed in China. While we have not yet
achieved everything that we seek--in particular, reducing the large trade
deficit that we have with China--the Chinese are responding constructively,
and progress is being made in these negotiations. I should add that China's
bid for membership in the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
requires that China take further steps in trade reform. Our Section 301
investigation on market access targets the same areas of reform that China
will need to address in order to qualify for GATT membership.
Finally, on an issue that cuts across both trade and human rights, I should
note that China is addressing our concerns over their prison labor practices.
Less than 2 weeks ago, US and Chinese negotiators agreed, ad referendum, to
a draft memorandum of understanding that will prohibit exports of prison
labor products to the United States and will provide for US inspection of
suspect Chinese facilities. Meanwhile, the US Customs Service has stepped
up enforcement efforts, obtaining one criminal conviction and issuing a
score of detention orders that blocked entry of alleged prisoner-produced
products.
Conclusion
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, let me restate my belief that the Administration
and the proponents of conditional MFN share the same policy objectives for
China. Broad trade sanctions, however, including targeted MFN withdrawal,
will not advance the struggle for political liberty and reform in China.
Our policy of comprehensive engagement seeks to address the current issues
of vital concern to the United States and looks ahead to the future, when
China can play an increasingly helpful role in maintaining the stability of
the Asia-Pacific region; become a fair player in the arena of international
trade; and join in the war against drugs, disease, and environmental
disaster. In other words, we can develop with China a contemporary
strategic relationship.
If we were to withdraw, condition, or even partially revoke MFN, this would
be regarded by the Chinese people, as well as the leadership, as a political
symbol of hostility toward China. China would respond with a strong
display of nationalism and close many of the opportunities available to
ordinary Chinese. They would regard our action not as a positive effort to
promote respect for human rights and freedom in China but as a callous
disregard of their interests. The forces of reform would suffer, as would
American businessmen and consumers.
By maintaining MFN, we are helping to promote reform in the PRC. Our
persistent efforts are paying off. With MFN, we are making a difference in
China. Without it, we risk becoming mere spectators in a country that is
home to almost one-quarter of the human race. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: US Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia
Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Jun, 30 19926/30/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Syria
Subject: Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
Somalia remains a difficult and tragic situation. Although food deliveries
are now getting through to Mogadishu, many vulnerable people already have
died or suffered irreversibly from malnutrition. More are at risk. This is a
horrendous human tragedy which is of great concern to the US Government.
US assistance to Somalia since the beginning of 1991 totals about $62
million. That does not include a substantial portion of the $28 million the
United States has provided to the African programs of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Twenty percent of ICRC's worldwide
program is now in Somalia. It also does not include a significant portion of
$30 million to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for programs
in Africa, and $8.5 million for the Kenyan refugee emergency in Kenya where
many Somalis have fled. The US Government continues to seek other avenues
to provide international humanitarian relief to Somalia.
The $62 million is being used to fund, in part, emergency food distribution
operations by CARE; C-130 flights by the ICRC, Save the Children, and the
International Medical Corps to deliver food and medicine; health clinics and
therapeutic feeding centers in Mogadishu; and more than $36.8 million-
worth of food shipments. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: Focus on the Emerging Democracies
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Description: A Periodic Update
Date: Jul, 6 19927/6/92
Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies
Region: Eurasia
Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics,
Development/Relief Aid, Cultural Exchange
[TEXT]
Humanitarian Assistance
The US public and private sectors have donated or assisted in the
transportation of 110,695 tons of humanitarian aid to date. The aid
consists of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, medical equipment, US
Agriculture Department (USDA) bulk food commodities, food packages,
winter clothing, and planting seed. US commercial carriers, commercial sea
containers, rail cars, and trucks have provided transportation, funded
through the $100-million dire emergency supplemental fund.
Airlift of Humanitarian Assistance.
Operation Provide Hope
demonstrated the effectiveness of the use of military aircraft to transport
humanitarian commodities.
As of June 12, 1992, the US Air Force had flown 124 humanitarian missions
into all 12 new states under Operation Provide Hope. Aircraft have
transported 4,500 tons of USDA commodities, Defense Department excess
food and medicines, and humanitarian aid donated by private voluntary
organizations and the private sector. About 965 tons of this aid has been
donated by private voluntary organizations.
Surface Transport of Humanitarian Assistance.
Operation Provide
Hope Phase II has begun with the surface movement of 21,000 tons of
excess Defense Department food and medical supplies to the Commonwealth
of Independent States as planned by NATO and implemented by the Defense
Department and the US European Command. The excess humanitarian
commodities will be distributed to all 12 new states.
The Fund for Democracy and Development, a not-for-profit organization has
received US Government funding to facilitate the transportation of privately
donated humanitarian aid. As of June 12, 1992, about 4,120 tons of food,
medicines, medical supplies, and clothing have been sent or are en route to
locations such as Murmansk, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Chelyabinsk,
St. Petersburg, and Moscow in Russia, and Kiev and Kharkov in Ukraine.
Private Voluntary Organizations.
Under the auspices of the
Presidential Medical Initiative, Project HOPE, with assistance from the
Defense Department, has delivered pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to
11 republics (Armenia, Byelarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) at a retail value
of $60 million.
Sister Cities International Program.
Cities across the United
States have collected humanitarian aid on behalf of their sister city in the
former Soviet Union. Such relationships as Waukesha, Wisconsin, and
Kokchetav, Kazakhstan; Anchorage, Alaska, and Magadan, Russia; and
Yerevan, Armenia, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, have established people-
to-people exchanges in addition to the collection and donation of large
quantities of humanitarian aid.
USDA Assistance.
USDA has announced $4.85 billion in export
credit guarantees since January 1991. More than 26 million tons of US
agricultural commodities have been purchased.
-- On April 1, 1992, the President announced an additional $1.1 billion in
export credit guarantees. Of this, $600 million will be designated for
Russia, $110 million for Ukraine, and $390 remains unallocated.
-- Under the Food for Progress Program, USDA is responsible for delivering
more than $165 million of grant food aid. Additional funding for
transportation of the commodities has been provided from the $100-million
dire emergency supplemental funding.
-- As part of this program, as of June 12, 1992, USDA had signed
agreements worth $150 million with 10 private voluntary organizations to
deliver 100,000 tons of USDA commodities to Armenia, Byelarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan.
-- A second part of this program is a government-to-government agreement
with Russia under which USDA will provide 21,000 tons of butter. This
butter will be sold in Russia with proceeds from the sales being used to
provide social services.
USAID Emergency Immunization Initiative.
The US Agency for
International Development (USAID) has purchased vaccines, syringes, and
equipment to immunize children in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan. Over the next 4 months, about 520,000 infants will be
protected against measles, tetanus, polio, and diphtheria. A second phase of
this program will be implemented later this year in some of the other
states. The total value of this program is $6 million.
Technical Assistance and Credits
As of June 12, 1992, the United States has pledged more than $7.1 billion in
various forms of assistance for fiscal years 1991-93. More than half of
that total has been disbursed.
Multilateral Financial Assistance.
The United States supports a
multilateral financial assistance program of $24 billion: $18 billion in
financial support, and a $6-billion currency stabilization fund. The Group of
7 (G-7) has approved the package in principle.
Technical Assistance.
A total of $85 million in Economic Support
Funds has been allocated to long-term technical assistance programs, for
example:
-- 250 Peace Corps volunteers, most specializing in projects on small
business development, will be in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Kazakhstan
by the end of 1992.
-- As announced at the Lisbon conference May 23-24, 1992, the United
States will establish nuclear safety training centers in Russia and Ukraine,
provide immediate operational safety enhancement through improvement of
emergency operating procedures and controls, provide safety technology to
reduce the risk of safety problems at RBMK and VVER 440/230 reactors, and
provide nuclear regulatory assistance.
The United States has pledged $25 million to the International Science and
Technology Center being established in Russia and $10 million to the
Science and Technology Center in Ukraine. A site has been selected for the
Moscow center. The agreement was signed at the Lisbon conference. The
United States will fund research projects involving scientists from the
former Soviet Union in civilian activities, such as environmental protection,
health, energy production, nuclear reactor safety, and nuclear waste
management.
-- USAID teams have begun diagnostic audits of district heating plants in
Armenia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine. These
teams will determine areas for energy savings and decide what equipment
will be procured from the United States under this program before winter
1992.
-- The Special American Business Internship Training Program (SABIT) will
bring 150 managers from private or privatizing companies in the new
independent states (NIS) and place them in US companies.
-- An extension, SABIT II, will bring some 150 defense scientists to the
United States for short- and medium-term assignments with US firms. A
separate program administered by the National Academy of Sciences will
place 150 scientists in academic and research institutions.
-- The International Resident Adviser Program will place 12 housing
advisers in four of the new independent states by the end of this summer.
-- The Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs has agreed to
provide $500,000 to the International Organization of Migration for
technical assistance in the area of migration in Russia. This contribution is
about 50% of the Organization's request for funding from the international
community.
-- In June 1992, the United States is sending agricultural advisers to
Russia and Ukraine to provide technical assistance in post-harvest loss and
improved storage practices.
-- Under USAID's Farmer-to-Farmer Program, more than 1,500 volunteer
agriculturists will work in the NIS as management advisers in food
production, distribution, and related agribusiness concerns. This is a 3-year
program.
-- USDA will provide an additional $5 million for technical assistance
projects, including two model farms, the establishment of wholesale
markets, and a loaned executive program. With USAID funding, it will
establish an extension service in Armenia.
-- The first US-Russian hospital partnership began in June. Nine more
partnerships are expected to be established throughout the NIS by the end of
August.
-- The United States has concluded interagency agreements with the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Department of Commerce, and
the Trade and Development Program to help facilitate trade and investment
in the pharmaceutical sector.
-- Through the provision of essential inputs, USAID aims to improve
productive capacity for new independent states' needs for DPT vaccines for
12-18 months. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 27, July 6, 1992
Title: What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United
States
PA
Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jul, 2 19927/2/92
Category: Features
Region: Europe, North America
Subject: History, State Department
[TEXT]
The challenges the United States faced during the mid-1950s during the
height of the Cold War is the subject of a documentary history released in
June 1992 by the Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1955-1957, Volume XXVII (Western Europe and Canada) is the most
recent volume of the Department's long-standing documentary series
chronicling official American policy.
Documents in this volume are drawn from the files of the Departments of
State and Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Presidential papers
as well as papers housed in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene,
Kansas.
This release is one of more than 70 volumes documenting the foreign
policies of the Eisenhower Administration. The Foreign Relations of the
United States series consists of more than 300 volumes dating from 1861.
Copies of Volume XXVII (Department of State Publication No. 9931; GPO
Stock No. 044-000-02316-4) may be purchased for $35.00 (domestic
postpaid) from the Superintendent of Documents, New Orders, PO Box
371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954.
The Office of the Historian has prepared a summary of the volume. For
further information, contact: Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor of the
Foreign Relations series, at 202-663-1133. (###)