US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992


From Cold War to Democratic Peace

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address before the World Affairs Council of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts Date: Jun, 25 19926/25/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Subject: Democratization [TEXT] I am pleased and honored to be here today to receive the Christian A. Herter Memorial Award. Twice in his lifetime, Christian Herter saw the world utterly transformed. First as a young man, then in full maturity, he watched great wars sweep away old orders, raising nations to greatness, reducing others, redrawing borders, and revising the very terms by which we defined the world and America's place in it. Today we stand at a similar moment of change--a moment symbolized by last week's Washington summit between President Bush and President Yeltsin. In 2 days, the leaders of the United States and the Russian Federation began to close one historic chapter and to open another: -- Russia and the United States agreed to slash our nuclear arsenals, reversing what once seemed to be an irreversible nuclear arms competition, and leaving far, far behind the time when schoolchildren knelt beneath their desks and prepared for nuclear Armageddon; -- We concluded treaties to accelerate trade and investment between our two countries, opening up vast economic opportunities for the Russian and American peoples; -- We forged an unprecedented partnership in fields as broad as defense conversion, space, science and technology, and in regions as diverse as the Balkans and the Korean Peninsula; and -- We issued the Washington charter on partnership and friendship, committing our two countries to uphold the principles of democracy, economic freedom, and peaceful settlement of disputes. The progress achieved by President Bush and President Yeltsin at the Washington summit was, indeed, a cause for celebration--for Americans, for Russians, and for the world. But it is also a call to action. Because the summit marked not just an end but a beginning.
Disarming Fear
Nothing so defined the Cold War--or so revealed its terror--as the nuclear arms competition. Future generations will find it difficult to understand how pervasive the threat of nuclear war was, not only in our foreign policy but in our daily lives. There was always the fear--not on the surface, perhaps, but always just beneath it--that the next crisis might be the terrifying last. For my generation, that fear was there at night when we put our children to bed, and there in the morning when we read about the latest flare-up over Cuba, Berlin, or the Middle East. Americans lived at Ground Zero. There were those who told us that we would have to accept the threat of nuclear war as a horrifying but inevitable fact of life. They said that agreements could only slow the arms race, never halt or reverse it. But President Bush made his first priority as Commander in Chief to reduce the threat to America and the danger to Americans. Working with a democratic Russia and the other new states of the former Soviet Union, we have pursued a comprehensive and integrated approach that in less than 10 months has radically reduced the nuclear danger: -- All tactical nuclear weapons have been consolidated in Russia; -- By 2003 and, hopefully, by the year 2000, Russia and the United States will cut our strategic nuclear weapons by two-thirds, reducing our inventories to no more than 3,500 warheads each; -- Russia and the United States will eliminate all multiple warhead land- based missiles, the most destructive and destabilizing weapons in the history of humanity; -- Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--still host to a fourth of Soviet strategic forces--will responsibly forswear the nuclear option and become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and -- Finally, we will put in place the most intensive and extensive verification regimes ever developed. We have gone far in putting 40 years of fear behind us. We have moved far from Ground Zero and nuclear confrontation. But another task has just begun: We must create a real, enduring peace with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.
A Spirit of Change
Because, just as important as the weapons limits and the timetables and the verification regimes is the spirit that made these changes possible: The spirit of historic change that last week moved even world-weary Washington. That spirit was embodied in Boris Yeltsin. President Yeltsin came to Washington as the leader of a reborn Russia. He came as a freely elected president, fully committed to democracy and private enterprise. He came, in short, as a partner: a partner ready to transcend both his nation's tragic history and the legacy of the Cold War; a partner prepared to work with us to build a democratic peace, a peace grounded in political and economic freedom.
A Democratic Peace
A democratic peace is a real and enduring peace: a peace rooted in a shared commitment to democratic government; a peace nurtured by the prosperity that only the free market can provide. It is a peace based on the same values upon which our own great nation is founded: responsible representative government, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and private property. The peace we hope to build with Russia and the other new and independent states is the peace that we enjoy today with Western Europe and Japan--a peace that has let us flourish as no other nations in history, attaining unprecedented peace and prosperity. It's a peace that makes even the idea of war between the United States and its allies the stuff of fantasy. Building a democratic peace with Russia and the other new and independent states will not occur overnight. Neither did the peace we enjoy today with old enemies like Germany and Japan. And building a democratic peace will not be easy. But neither was re- creating a world from the ruins of World War II. Our task today--to extend democracy to Russia and the other new and independent states--is no less daunting. Our success will depend on developments there--above all, on the political and economic transformation of the states of the former Soviet Union. Only then can these nations become full members in the world's democratic community. And only then can they successfully integrate into the world economy and share in--and add to--its abundance. President Yeltsin and other brave democrats have put their political lives-- and more--on the line to achieve that transformation. They've asked not for charity but for our partnership.
The FREEDOM Support Act
The FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act, proposed by President Bush on April 1, is our answer. The act directly addresses the military, political, and economic transformation of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Byelarus, and the other new states. It supports threat reduction, defense conversion, non-proliferation, and nuclear safety. It strengthens democratization and people-to-people programs. And it encourages free markets through technical assistance, trade and investment promotion, and macroeconomic stabilization. Let me explain the act--what it is and what it's supposed to do: First, the FREEDOM Support Act supports freedom by bolstering reform. With the International Monetary Fund, Russia has embarked on a broad, bold program to free prices, privatize property, and create a convertible currency. President Yeltsin and other reformers are attempting to build modern, free-market economies from the ground up. Their efforts are hampered by political turmoil, economic hardship, and the simple fact that no one has ever done what they are trying to do. Our help is no hand-out. The reformers must take the hard decisions. They must do the hard work. But we, and all who want to see this courageous experiment in freedom prevail, can help them succeed. Second, the act will underpin America's share in an international effort-- our fair share. The problems of the former Soviet Union are too huge for any one country to tackle. Last January, President Bush convened a coordinating conference in Washington to forge a broad coalition of more than 50 nations and international institutions to support reform in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and the other new and independent states. That coalition is at work today. And this is only right. Both we and our partners will all benefit from a democratic peace. And together we must share the responsibility of helping make it a reality. Third, the act creates economic opportunity--there and here. The current hardship in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and the other new states of the former Soviet Union obscures their great economic potential. These nations straddle two continents and stretch across 11 time zones. They possess vast material and human resources, much of it still untapped. Russia and the other new states comprise one of the world's largest markets--one that today cries out for American goods, American services, American technology. Visionary American investors and traders are already on the scene doing business. By catalyzing the private sector, the FREEDOM Support Act will help create opportunities for Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Byelarussians, for all the peoples of the former Soviet Union--and for Americans and American business. Fourth, and most importantly, the act is an investment in America's security, now and in the future. There are two peace dividends. The first is financial and important. The second is human, and it is critical: The freedom from fear that we wish for all Americans. Let there be no doubt: If Russia and the other new democracies fail, if democracy collapses and authoritarianism returns, we stand to lose both dividends. Defense budgets could rise again, and the fear we knew during the Cold War could return. We could find ourselves setting back the clock and putting forward the time when we can consign the nuclear nightmare to a memory. In sum, the FREEDOM Support Act represents our part in a partnership for a democratic peace--and a chance to seize a historic opportunity.
A Moment of Opportunity
For decades, Soviet communism not only enslaved peoples but kept change itself captive. In the Soviet Empire and the petty tyrannies it spawned in Eastern Europe, communism froze economic and political development. Abroad, it locked the world into a dangerous contest known as the Cold War. Now Soviet communism is gone. Change, suddenly, is everywhere we look, sweeping empires and ideologies before it, shaping a new era even as we watch. Such moments are rare. They have occurred only twice before in this century, and they are precious. Because such moments offer us a unique opportunity to create a better world. But they do not last. Today, we stand at such a moment. President Bush and the Administration have acted. With the START Treaty [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] and last week's agreement, we can begin to close forever the tragic chapter of the arms fear. But, no less importantly, we can press forward with the FREEDOM Support Act to build a democratic peace. By doing so we begin to open a new chapter--a chapter of hope. Both the START Treaty and the FREEDOM Support Act are before the Congress. Congress may hesitate, but history will not. It is time for the Senate and the House to act and act now. Times here at home have been tough. The budget is tight, and it is an election year. There should be no wonder, then, when we hear arguments against support for Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. But all these arguments reduce to one excuse: America can't afford it. To which I say: We can. Because we, as a people, are rich in the best sense of the word: -- Rich in the courage it takes to put partisanship aside to do what is right for our country; -- Rich in the common sense it requires to see that an investment in democracy in Russia today is better than paying trillions later for defense against her; -- Rich in the generosity it takes to foster abroad the very values upon which our own great nation was founded; and -- Above all, rich in the imagination it requires to seize a once-in-a- lifetime opportunity to ensure that our children and grandchildren will never know the uncertainty and fear of another Cold War.
Ladies and gentlemen: Christian A. Herter would not hesitate. Whether as congressman, governor of this great state, or secretary of state, he believed that history is not something that happens to men and women, but something that men and women make happen. Like others of his generation who came of age during World War I, Christian Herter fostered high hopes that the end of that bloody conflict would usher in a new era of peace. But the historic moment passed: America turned inward and Europe plunged again into discord and, in time, into another horrifying war. After World War II, Herter and the other statesman of his era made sure that America wouldn't make the same mistake twice: This time, we seized the historic opportunity and forged the great alliance that would fight the Cold War and finally prevail. Today, we face a similar challenge, a similar choice. Like Herter, we must act and, by acting, leave to future generations of Americans an inheritance of hope, not a legacy of "what ifs." If we fail, history will judge us harshly: not just the history of textbooks, but the human history that will be read in the lives of our children and grandchildren--a history that we today, by our decisions, have already begun to write. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

The START Treaty: Foundation of a Safer World

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 23 19926/23/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Russia Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] One week ago today, President Bush and President Yeltsin revolutionized the nuclear age. In the Rose Garden of the White House, they announced that over the course of the next 10 years Russia and the United States will dramatically slash nuclear weapons levels to previously unthinkable levels. By this agreement, MIRVed [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle] ICBMs--the hydra-headed monsters that threatened to destabilize our strategic relationship--will be eliminated. While we reduce nuclear weapons to the minimum levels necessary for ensuring our security, Russia and America--working with our allies and friends--will also engage in what we hope will be a productive dialogue to develop a concept for the deployment of a global protection system against limited ballistic missile attacks on both our peoples and our friends and allies. Historians may well mark last Tuesday as the end of the Cold War nuclear arms competition. But the history of the end of the arms competition will only be complete when you finish one of the most important last chapters: when you exercise your constitutional duty and give your advice and consent to the ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). For, as I believe you'll agree, START is critical to the end of the nuclear arms competition. For the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, we have agreed to real reductions in our nuclear weapons levels, rather than simply setting limits on their rate of increase. In a very real sense, START is the means by which we will begin to turn back the nuclear clock, advancing both strategic stability and predictability. And while nailing down the end of the Cold War, START also addresses what is perhaps the most important security challenge of our time--nuclear non- proliferation--through its legally binding protocol. Moreover, it locks in these achievements through the most extensive and intrusive verification regime ever, institutionalizing a safer world with its legally binding provisions. With START ratification, the foundation of a safer world will be set in place and the prospect of nuclear Armageddon safely locked away. But if START were not to be ratified, last Tuesday's historic agreement would be meaningless, our security less sure, and the prospect for a renewed nuclear arms competition and increased nuclear proliferation more possible. For as President Bush and President Yeltsin made clear, the new agreement for further reductions assumes that the START Treaty--with its effective verification regime--will be ratified and implemented. And, of course, we will be proceeding as quickly as possible with codifying last week's agreement into a treaty. With you today, Mr. Chairman, I would like to review briefly the essential provisions of the treaty, discuss the importance of its protocol, and show how START ratification is an essential step in building the democratic peace we seek with Russia and the other new independent states.
START: Locking in Stability and Predictability
One of START's fundamental goals is to reduce the risk of nuclear war by enhancing strategic stability and predictability, especially in times of crisis. First and foremost, START will reduce the risk of nuclear war by reducing levels of strategic forces in a stabilizing manner. To put START's reductions into perspective, consider this: In order to meet START's limits, on average, an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] launcher, an SLBM [sea-launched ballistic missile] launcher, or a heavy bomber from the former Soviet inventory must be destroyed every 68 hours throughout the first 7 years of implementation. Last week's agreement to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs is the logical culmination of a process begun in START to eliminate those weapons whose combination of vulnerability and effectiveness risked pushing both sides into a hair-trigger posture. Eliminating these "use 'em, or lose 'em weapons," eliminates almost any rationale for launching first in a crisis. Heavy MIRVed ICBMs became a prime symbol of the Soviet threat. Now democratic Russia has agreed to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs by no later than 2003--and, hopefully, by the year 2000 if that can be worked out technically and, with US help, financially. Strategic stability will be buttressed by the predictability START mandates through its openness and transparency provisions. START institutionalizes the most extensive notification, inspection, monitoring, and data exchange regimes ever negotiated. Implementation of these regimes will create military transparency and openness heretofore unthinkable. Those regimes are also a critical prerequisite for last week's agreement. Let me emphasize that such transparency and openness is ensured by the treaty requirements. For example, with ratification of START, there will be an end to the historic Soviet penchant for secrecy of ballistic missile telemetry data, as START dictates the cessation of the encryption of such data. A major accomplishment of the treaty--once considered unattainable- -is that it gives the sides complete access to one another's missile telemetry, with only a few minor exceptions. This access will allow us to monitor missile tests more carefully than ever and will help us verify the treaty's limits on missile warheads and throw-weight, its ban on new types of heavy ICBMs, and other provisions. In addition, every year we will receive plans for the elimination of strategic offensive arms on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and we will be continually notified of the movements and disposition of these strategic offensive arms. Mr. Chairman, by implementing the START Treaty, we ensure the right to basic equality in forces. START's overall ceilings apply equally to the United States and to the forces of the former Soviet Union while preserving each side's flexibility in the make-up of its forces. At the same time, the treaty does not inhibit the development and deployment of non-nuclear military technologies such as conventional cruise missiles, whose effectiveness and value to our armed forces was underscored during the Gulf war.
START Protocol
Let me turn to the protocol to the START Treaty that we signed in Lisbon. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, this committee recognized that the question of exactly who would be our treaty partner was a critical issue for START. Through our many exchanges, I assured you that the President and I strongly believed that the four new states with strategic offensive arms and declared treaty-related facilities on their territories--Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine--must be legally obligated to observe and implement START. At the same time, we wanted to ensure the safe command and control of former Soviet nuclear forces and to ensure that the proliferation of new states in Eurasia did not also lead to a proliferation of new nuclear powers. The protocol does all these things and more. The protocol legally obligates Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to observe and implement START as parties to the treaty. By the protocol, ratification and implementation of the START Treaty now furthers our most fundamental non-proliferation objectives. It ensures that, despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, the number of nuclear-weapon states shall not increase. The protocol thus expands the treaty's role by obligating Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to become parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. Combined with the legally binding obligations in the associated letters from the heads of state of each of these countries, implementation of START means that 7 years after entry into force there will no longer be any nuclear weapons or deployed strategic offensive arms in Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Those forces currently amount to over one-quarter of the declared strategic nuclear warheads of the former Soviet military. Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have viewed START as a means to establish non-nuclear weapon zones on their territories, to enhance their standing as sovereign, independent states, and to show the world that they can act responsibly, thus deserving full inclusion in the family of nations. In this regard, I hope the committee will join with the President in saluting the Governments of Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine for the important commitments they have made in the interests of international peace and security. Through their renunciation of nuclear weapons, they have set an example other states need to follow. In this, START serves as a concrete example of our determination to fulfill our commitments under Article VI of the NPT. This article calls for each of the parties to the treaty to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.
START and a Democratic Peace
Mr. Chairman, the START Treaty is a product of the Cold War, but it is by no means a relic. Instead, START is the gateway to this new era of cooperation that will help control and destroy the military remnants of the Cold War. This effort complements the efforts underway to build democracy and free market systems in the new independent states and to build a democratic peace with them. Having the START Treaty in force also complements our new, practical steps to help Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine disable and dismantle nuclear weapons. It is consistent with our efforts to create international science centers in Russia and Ukraine that will encourage weapons scientists in the former Soviet Union to turn their talents to peaceful purposes, rather than auctioning their deadly skills off to the highest foreign bidder. Collectively, these efforts will show practical benefits not only in eliminating the effects of the Cold War but in helping us address some of the most pressing challenges arising out of the Cold War's demise. And while it serves as a framework for next steps on deeper reductions, the treaty also ensures that significant reductions will begin now, even as Russia and the United States pursue the codification of the agreement reached last week. I would hope you would resist any temptation to delay START ratification until the de-MIRVing treaty is codified. We need to put START into place now. Finally, let me add one additional aspect of START implementation that relates to our four treaty partners. Although there is continued, significant progress toward building democratic governments in Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine and establishing stable relationships between them, there is uncertainty about the future due to the enormous economic strains these states and societies are experiencing. If you are concerned about uncertainty, ratify START. START provides a legally binding basis that locks in stabilizing changes. With START in place, we have a powerful instrument at our disposal to manage change safely and surely under almost any political circumstances, ensuring that our interests are protected. Without START, however, we will simply have added strategic uncertainty to the considerable economic and political uncertainty that already exists, doing a disservice not only to the states of the former Soviet Union, but, worst of all, to the American people as well.
In short, Mr. Chairman, START is a good agreement--indeed, a historic one. But, just as important as the limits and the timetables and the verification regimes is the spirit that moves our relations with the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. You saw that spirit last week embodied in President Boris Yeltsin: It is the spirit of the new and democratic Russia. It is a spirit that brings the hope of freedom and prosperity to millions enslaved and impoverished by communism. And it is the spirit that gives us hope that we can build a true democratic peace--based on shared values, not the balance of terror--for ourselves and for generations of Americans to come. Because, as President Bush so eloquently put it, "Democrats in the Kremlin can assure our security in a way nuclear missiles never could." Through START and the FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging European Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act, we help assure that security-- and help foster that spirit. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: We stand at history's hingepoint. With the START Treaty, we begin to close a tragic 40-year chapter of nuclear competition. With the FREEDOM Support Act, we can begin to open another chapter--one of partnership and friendship with Russia and the independent states. I ask the Senate to fulfill its solemn responsibility and move history forward by prompt approval of both. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

START Treaty Protocol Sent to the Senate

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of transmittal letter released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Newport Beach, California Date: Jun, 19 19926/19/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Russia Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] To the Senate of the United States: I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Protocol) signed at Lisbon, Portugal, on May 23, 1992. The Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty), which I transmitted for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification on November 25, 1991. The Protocol is designed to enable implementation of the START Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Protocol constitutes an amendment to the START Treaty, and I therefore request that it be considered along with the START Treaty for advice and consent to ratification. I also transmit for the information of the Senate documents that are associated with, but not integral parts of, the Protocol or the START Treaty. These documents are letters containing legally binding commitments from the heads of state of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine concerning the removal of nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms from their territories. Although not submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, these documents are relevant to the consideration of the START Treaty by the Senate. No new US security assurances or guarantees--beyond the assurances previously extended to all nonnuclear-weapon States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty--are associated with any of these letters. The START Treaty represents a nearly decade-long effort by the United States and the former Soviet Union to address the nature and magnitude of the threat that strategic nuclear weapons pose to both countries and to the world in general. As I indicated in transmitting that Treaty to the Senate, the United States had several objectives in the START negotiations. First, we consistently held the view that the START Treaty must enhance stability in times of crisis. Second, we sought an agreement that did not simply limit strategic arms, but that reduced them significantly below current levels. Third, we sought a treaty that would allow equality of US strategic forces relative to those of the former Soviet Union. Fourth, we sought an agreement that would be effectively verifiable. And, finally, the United States placed great emphasis during the negotiations in seeking an agreement that would be supported by the American and allied publics. I was fully convinced in 1991 and I remain fully convinced that the START Treaty achieves these objectives. In addition, the Protocol transmitted herewith has allowed us to achieve another important objective: ensuring that only one state emerging from the former Soviet Union will have nuclear weapons. To gain the benefits of START in the new international situation following the demise of the Soviet Union, it is necessary that Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine--the four former Soviet republics within whose territory all strategic offensive arms are based and all declared START-related facilities are located--be legally bound by the START Treaty. The Protocol accomplishes this, while recognizing the sovereign and independent status of each of these four states. Of equal importance, the Protocol obligates Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear- weapon States Parties in the shortest possible time. In addition, the letters transmitted with the Protocol legally obligate these three states to eliminate all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive arms located on their territories within 7 years following the date of entry into force of the START Treaty. The Protocol and the associated letters thus further one of our most fundamental non-proliferation objectives--that the number of nuclear-weapon states shall not be increased. Together with the START Treaty, the Protocol helps ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used in the future. The START Treaty serves the interest of the United States and represents an important step in the stabilization of the strategic nuclear balance. With the addition of the Protocol, the START Treaty can be implemented in a manner consistent with the changed political circumstances following the demise of the Soviet Union and in a manner that achieves important non- proliferation goals. I therefore urge the Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to the START Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, Memorandum of Understanding, and this new Protocol, and to give advice and consent to its ratification. George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

US-Moldova Trade Relations

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jun, 19 19926/19/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia Country: Moldova Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT]
Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment
The trade agreement between the United States and Moldova provides for reciprocal most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment to the products of each country. A trade agreement was originally concluded with the Soviet Union in June 1990 and approved by the Congress in November 1991. The United States and Moldova recently reached agreement on technical adjustments to that agreement to reflect the establishment of an independent Moldova. US congressional reapproval is not required. The agreement will permit Moldovans to export goods to the United States while receiving non-discriminatory treatment of their goods. The United States expects that this agreement will create commercial opportunities for emerging Moldovan enterprises and promote the development of a market-based economy in Moldova. At the same time, it will lay the groundwork for enhanced opportunities for US business. In addition to providing MFN for both parties, the agreement: -- Provides improved market access and non-discriminatory treatment for US goods and services in Moldova and also calls for step-by-step provision of national treatment for US products and services; -- Facilitates business by allowing free operation of commercial representations in each country and by permitting companies to engage and serve as agents and consultants and to conduct market studies; and -- Offers strong intellectual property rights protection by reaffirming commitments to the Paris Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention; obligating adherence to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; providing copyright protection for computer programs and data bases and protection for sound recordings; giving product and process patent protection for virtually all areas of technology; and providing comprehensive coverage of trade secrets.
OPIC Agreement
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) President and Chief Executive Officer Fred M. Zeder and Moldovan Minister of Economic Relations Andrei Chaptine signed a bilateral OPIC agreement this morning at the State Department. The US-Moldovan OPIC agreement will enable OPIC to provide investment insurance, project financing, and investor services for US private investors in the Republic of Moldova. Signature of this agreement demonstrates US commitment to help the private sector in Moldova develop and assist US companies seeking to invest there. OPIC is a US Government agency that provides assistance to American investors in more than 120 developing countries and emerging economies throughout the world. Projects supported by OPIC also create US jobs and exports and strengthen America's international competitiveness. OPIC already has signed agreements with five other new independent states: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

US-Albania Trade Relations

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 15 19926/15/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: E/C Europe Country: Albania Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) In accordance with section 407 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93- 618, January 3, 1975; 88 Stat. 1978), as amended (the "Trade Act"), I am transmitting a copy of a proclamation that extends nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of Albania. I also enclose the text of the "Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the Republic of Albania," including exchanges of letters that form an integral part of the Agreement, which was signed on May 14, 1992, and which is included as an annex to the proclamation. The Agreement will provide a nondiscriminatory framework for our bilateral trade relations and thus strengthen both economic and political relations between the United States and Albania. Conclusion of this Agreement is an important step we can take to provide greater economic benefits to both countries. It will also give further impetus to the progress we have made in our overall diplomatic relations since last year and help to reinforce political and economic reform in Albania. In that context, the United States is encouraging Albania to continue to strive for a democratic, pluralistic society. I believe that the Agreement is consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Trade Act. It provides for mutual extension of nondiscriminatory tariff treatment while seeking to ensure overall reciprocity of economic benefits. It includes safeguard arrangements to ensure that our trade with Albania will grow without causing disruption to the U.S. market and consequent injury to domestic firms or loss of jobs for American workers. The Agreement also confirms and expands for American businesses certain basic rights in conducting commercial transactions both within Albania and with Albanian nationals and business entities. Other provisions include those dealing with settlement of commercial disputes, financial transactions, and government commercial offices. Through this Agreement, Albania also undertakes obligations to modernize and upgrade very substantially its protection of intellectual property rights. Once fully implemented, the Albanian intellectual property regime will be on a par with that of our principal industrialized trading partners. This Agreement will not alter U.S. law or practice with respect to the protection of intellectual property. On May 20, 1992, I waived application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Trade Act to Albania. I determined that this waiver will substantially promote the objectives of section 402, and, pursuant to section 402 (c) (2) of the Trade Act, notified the Congress that I have received assurances that the emigration practices of Albania will henceforth lead substantially to achievement of those objectives. I urge that the Congress act as soon as possible to approve the "Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the Republic of Albania" and the proclamation extending nondiscriminatory treatment to products of Albania by enactment of a joint resolution referred to in section 151 of the Trade Act. Sincerely, George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

US-Romania Trade Relations

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 22 19926/22/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: E/C Europe Country: Romania Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) In accordance with section 407 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93- 618, January 3, 1975; 88 Stat. 1978), as amended (the "Trade Act"), I am transmitting a copy of a proclamation that extends nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of Romania. I also enclose the text of the "Agreement on Trade Relations Between the Government of United States of America and the Government of Romania," including exchanges of letters that form an integral part of the Agreement, which was signed on April 3, 1992, and which is included as an annex to the proclamation. The Agreement will provide a nondiscriminatory framework for our bilateral trade relations and thus strengthen both economic and political relations between the United States and Romania. Conclusion of this Agreement is an important step we can take to provide greater economic benefits to both countries. It will also give further impetus to the progress we have made in our overall diplomatic relations since last year and help to reinforce political and economic reform in Romania. In that context, the United States is encouraging Romania to continue to strive for a democratic, pluralistic society, particularly through the conduct of early, free, and fair national elections. I believe that the Agreement is consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Trade Act. It provides for mutual extension of nondiscriminatory tariff treatment while seeking to ensure overall reciprocity of economic benefits. It includes safeguard arrangements to ensure that our trade with Romania will grow without causing disruption to the U.S. market and consequent injury to domestic firms or loss of jobs for American workers. The Agreement also confirms and expands for American businesses certain basic rights in conducting commercial transactions both within Romania and with Romanian nationals and business entities. Other provisions include those dealing with settlement of commercial disputes, financial transactions, and government commercial offices. Through this Agreement, Romania also undertakes obligations to modernize and upgrade very substantially its protection of intellectual property rights. Once fully implemented, the Romanian intellectual property regime will be on a par with that of our principal industrialized trading partners. This Agreement will not alter U.S. law or practice with respect to the protection of intellectual property. On August 17, 1991, I waived application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Trade Act to Romania. I determined that this waiver will substantially promote the objectives of section 402, and, pursuant to section 402 (c) (2) of the Trade Act, notified the Congress that I have received assurances that the emigration practices of Romania will henceforth lead substantially to achievement of those objectives. I urge that the Congress act as soon as possible to approve the "Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the Government of Romania" and the proclamation extending nondiscriminatory treatment to products of Romania by enactment of a joint resolution referred to in section 151 of the Trade Act. Sincerely, George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

US Condemns Nagorno-Karabakh Fighting

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 18 19926/18/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: E/C Europe Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, CSCE [TEXT] The US Government strongly condemns the recent fighting in the Nagorno- Karabakh crisis. The military actions now underway threaten to undermine the prospects for good-faith negotiations to resolve the conflict. The US Government has consistently stated that a lasting solution to this conflict cannot be achieved through violence. Rather, the only path toward a peaceful settlement is through good-faith negotiation based on CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] principles. We call upon all sides to end the violence immediately, recommit themselves to the CSCE mediation effort, and take steps to de-escalate the conflict and create an environment in which good-faith negotiations can succeed. The CSCE mediation effort is the best opportunity for resolving this tragic conflict. The US Government calls upon all parties to the conflict to honor CSCE commitments that require disputants to refrain from any action which may aggravate a dispute and make it more difficult or impossible to settle. We urge all parties in the region to act with restraint and to cooperate with the ongoing CSCE mediation effort. We call upon the representatives of the Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh to attend the preliminary meeting, now underway in Rome, of the participants in the CSCE conference on Nagorno-Karabakh. The US Government has repeatedly stated that the quality and character of its relationship with both Armenia and Azerbaijan will depend on their demonstrated commitment to CSCE principles, including the peaceful settlement of disputes. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

New Policy on Federal Defense Procurement

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Newport Beach, California Date: Jun, 19 19926/19/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia Country: United States, Russia Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, State Department, International Law [TEXT] As part of his regulatory reform initiative, President Bush announced on June 19 an important change in federal defense procurement policy that will ease the transition by American businesses and workers to the post-Cold War era. When fully implemented, the policy will enable American firms to compete more effectively for billions of dollars [of] additional business and preserve tens of thousands of American jobs. The end of the Cold War and the accompanying reduction of the US military have created dislocations in the American economy. To excel in this new environment and avoid significant layoffs, many defense-oriented companies have tried to redirect their efforts toward commercial products by, for example, adapting military technologies to commercial use. One obstacle to a successful transition is the Defense Department's "recoupment of non-recurring costs" rule, adopted in the early 1960s as a way of sharing weapons development costs with US allies. It requires contractors to pay fees to the government on non-government sales of products and technologies developed under government contracts, as well as commercial spinoffs of those technologies. In today's environment, the rule operates as a sales tax imposed only on US companies. It hurts American workers by limiting the ability of their employers to compete for business in the United States and abroad. This burden is no longer justified in light of the historic political changes in the last 3 years. Accordingly, the President has announced a policy that will eliminate all recoupment fees as expeditiously as possible.
How the New Policy Works
The Department of Defense and Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the Office of Management and Budget developed the policy in consultation with the Council on Competitiveness, the President's Export Council, and the Department of State. By administrative action, the Department of Defense will immediately abolish recoupment fees on all products other than "major defense equipment" (MDE) exported for military uses. This action eliminates recoupment fees on all non-military products, including spinoffs and derivatives of military products. Recoupment no longer would be required if, for example, a company decided to use aircraft cockpit display technology in making dashboard displays for automobiles. The policy eliminates recoupment on military products that are unclassified as MDE or exported for non-military uses. Thus, recoupment no longer will be required on the sale of aircraft engines for use on commercial airliners. The Department's action will eliminate recoupment under new non-MDE contracts and, to the extent permitted by law, existing non-MDE contracts as well. In addition, the Administration will work with Congress to eliminate recoupment fees on MDE exported for military uses. The Arms Export Control Act requires the Department of Defense to collect recoupment fees on MDE sales through the Foreign Military Sales program, which accounts for most MDE sales. The Administration will work with Congress to lift this requirement and find budget offsets.
The new policy will produce several important benefits: -- It will make US companies more competitive against foreign suppliers, which typically are not subject to recoupment requirements. The policy will enhance the capability of American firms to compete for billions of dollars of business that they might otherwise lose. It also will eliminate administrative costs associated with the present policy, which, according to industry estimates, exceed $40 million each year. -- It will facilitate efforts by defense-oriented companies to shift to commercial activities. It will give defense contractors an incentive to develop products and technologies with larger markets. The policy also will eliminate costly tracking requirements that otherwise would discourage contractors from consolidating military and commercial operations. This will facilitate the transfer of technology and ideas within companies and allow enhanced economies of scale and scope. -- It will contribute to US national security by strengthening defense- oriented US companies. The new policy also will reduce defense costs by encouraging defense contractors to incorporate commercial technologies into military products. Eliminating recoupment will have no effect on national security controls such as export licensing requirements, which will continue to ensure that sophisticated US technology never falls into the wrong hands. -- It will preserve thousands of American jobs in high-technology firms throughout the country. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

Review of US Efforts To Achieve Near East Policy Goals

Djerejian Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 24 19926/24/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements RRegion: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait Subject: Democratization, Terrorism, International Law, United Nations [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you and the distinguished members of the subcommittee again. It has been 3 months since we last met, and I would like, today, to review our efforts to achieve the broad policy goals of the United States in the Near East. Let me discuss some of the steps we have taken to achieve these goals since I last spoke with you.
Middle East Peace Process
The Arab-Israeli peace process is on a firm footing, and progress is being made. Away from the glare of publicity, negotiations involving Israel, Arab states, and Palestinians have become an established fact in the region. Five rounds of direct, bilateral negotiations have taken place. Five multilateral working groups met during May to discuss regional cooperative activities in such areas as water, the environment, arms control and regional security, refugees, and economic development. The multilateral steering committee convened to ensure that the multilateral track fulfilled its promise of complementing in a pragmatic manner--but not substituting for--the direct bilateral negotiations. Throughout this whole process, we are working closely with our co-sponsor, Russia.
Bilateral Negotiations
In the bilateral negotiations, the parties have taken tentative steps toward serious engagement on the core issues. Israel and the Palestinians have tabled proposals containing models or outlines for interim self-government arrangements. During the last round of talks in Washington, the two sides engaged more intensively on several aspects of these models. As would be expected, each party also sought to modify the positions of the other side. Israel asserted that the Palestinian model was too much like a Palestinian state rather than an interim self-government. The Palestinians countered that the Israeli outline minimized the scope of powers and authorities to be transferred and did not include some key elements from the Camp David accords, such as elections. Palestinians have also used the negotiations to focus attention on Israeli occupation practices, settlements, and the human rights situation. Israel has called for an end of intifada [uprising] violence and the economic boycott. In the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations, the two sides have engaged in practical discussions on several key issues, such as water, energy, and security. In the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, the security situation on the ground continues to be of serious concern. Differences between the parties focus on two main points. Israel seeks a full peace treaty and normalization with Lebanon. Lebanon seeks immediate implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425. Notwithstanding this difference of view, the parties are engaged in serious discussions, particularly in the area of security. It is helpful that Israel has made it clear that it makes no claim to Lebanese territory or resources. In the Israeli-Syrian talks, the two sides continue to focus on the meaning of a peace settlement under UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Each side has presented its views and has been testing and probing the position of the other side. There have been serious exchanges on the issue of mutual security. All of the parties have now agreed to conduct the next round of bilateral negotiations in Rome, at a time to be determined. As a co-sponsor of the peace process, we are working closely with the Italian Government to ensure that the upcoming negotiations proceed smoothly. With their basic positions now on the table, we believe the parties can usefully begin defining possible areas of agreement and narrowing the gaps. This will require hard work, careful listening, hard-nosed realism, and some calculated risk-taking. At the same time, the parties need to focus on the issues being negotiated and not be distracted by events away from the table. We hope all sides will undertake measures designed to assure that the negotiations take place in a political environment conducive to making progress and instilling confidence in the peace process.
Multilateral Negotiations
Mr. Chairman, even as the bilateral negotiating process was underway, the Administration worked with our co-sponsor, Russia, the parties in the region, and many of our friends and allies around the world to structure multilateral negotiations on issues of regional concern. These negotiations hold promise of allowing the parties to deal with issues that have been neglected for too long. The multilateral negotiations were conceived as a means of complementing the bilateral negotiations, not substituting for them. These forums help bring into the process additional parties from the region as well as extra-regional parties who can contribute expertise, experience, and resources. In May, the multilateral working groups held their initial meetings in capitals around the world. In all cases, the results were encouraging, as all parties engaged seriously and pragmatically on a range of issues. In the environment working group in Tokyo, a number of practical measures were identified that hold the potential for resolving some festering environmental problems in the Gulf of Aqaba and in refugee camps in the occupied territories. In Vienna, the water working group agreed to study ways to enhance the supply of water and the availability of data on water resources. The Canadians hosted the refugee working group. In Ottawa, the parties identified a range of possible practical steps that could be taken to alleviate the plight of refugees and displaced persons without prejudice to the ultimate political settlement. In the economic development working group, which met in Brussels, the parties agreed to compile an inventory of priority areas for cooperation. Here in Washington, the arms control and regional security working group convened and began the important process of familiarization with each other and with the concepts, methods, and history of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. We were heartened by the participation of so many parties from inside and outside the region. Most Arab states participated in all of the working groups, including Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Yemen. Palestinians also participated in four of the working groups. The contributions of these Arab delegations to the launching of the multilateral process with Israel were significant. Also in May, I co-chaired the multilateral steering committee in Lisbon. This committee coordinates the efforts of the working groups. This first meeting after the Moscow organizational session was successful and productive. The reports from the five working groups demonstrated that all parties are approaching the issues seriously and pragmatically. The committee agreed on venues and timeframes for the next round of working group meetings to be held in the fall. Clearly, we were disappointed that Syria and Lebanon decided not to attend the multilateral negotiations. We were equally disappointed that Israel decided not to attend the working groups on economic development and refugees. We intend to keep these parties fully briefed in the hope that they will decide to attend future meetings of the working groups and the steering committee.
Bilateral Relations
Mr. Chairman, let me also add a word, in the context of the peace process, about our bilateral relations with the parties most directly concerned. In so doing, I want to deal with the reality of the relationship and not the mythology and misperceptions that crop up from time to time. Let me start with Israel.
The US-Israel relationship remains rock solid. It is based on the firmest of foundations, as Secretary Baker has made clear: shared democratic ideals and values, profound and extensive ties from the grassroots to the official level, and an unshakable US commitment to Israel's security. US-Israel relations in every sphere remain active and vibrant. This has been fully reflected in this Administration's approach to a range of issues of great importance to Israel. -- We succeeded in overturning the Zionism/racism equation in the UN General Assembly. -- We helped Israel achieve the recognition it deserves, with the establishment or upgrading of Israel's diplomatic ties with Russia, Turkey, India, China, and other countries. -- We were proud to play a key role in the exodus of Ethiopian Jews and Jews from the former Soviet Union. -- We helped Israel defend itself against Saddam Hussein's aggression and eliminated Iraq's ability to project significant force against Israel. -- We played a key role with Syria on the travel status of Syrian Jews. -- Most importantly, we successfully brought about a negotiating process on terms long sought by Israel--namely, direct negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors. This does not mean--and has never meant--that the United States and Israel see eye to eye on every issue. Our differences on such substantial questions as settlements are a matter of record. We have had discussions over technology transfer concerns. We have tried, and will continue to try, to deal with such matters in a businesslike fashion and on a basis of mutual respect, as befits close friends. We hope we will be able to arrive at mutually acceptable terms that would allow us to extend loan guarantees to facilitate immigration absorption in a manner compatible with US policies. Our differences should not obscure--as they have threatened to recently-- the fact that the United States and Israel share fundamental values and that we remain unshakably committed to Israel's security and to preserving Israel's qualitative edge over any likely combination of aggressors.
The Administration has maintained a broad-based dialogue with the Syrian leadership on a wide range of issues. This policy of engagement has yielded results which serve important US interests. Syria joined the US-led coalition to reverse Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. President Assad's affirmative response to President Bush's letter inviting Syria to participate in the peace negotiations with Israel was one of the major breakthroughs which allowed Secretary Baker to proceed with constructing a peace process which engages Israel with bilateral negotiations with all its immediate Arab neighbors. Most recently, we have welcomed the Syrian Government's decision to lift discriminatory restrictions on travel and the disposition of property by the Syrian Jewish community. We are in close contact with the Syrian Government concerning the implementation of this policy. Our engagement with Syria does not mean that we overlook real differences on outstanding issues such as human rights, narcotics, and terrorism. Syria remains on the list of state sponsors of terrorism as it continues to support and provide safehaven for terrorist groups. We are engaged in a continuous and direct dialogue with the Syrian Government in an effort to resolve these issues and will work to try to achieve positive results, as we have on other issues.
In Lebanon, US policy remains firm and consistent. We believe that the Taif agreement continues to offer the best chance of regaining the unity, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Implementation of this agreement helped bring to an end the turbulent era of civil war in Lebanon. Under the terms of the Taif accords, the Lebanese and Syrian Governments should decide on the redeployment of Syrian troops to the western end of the Bekaa Valley no later than September 1992--which is 2 years from the ratification of the constitutional reforms in Lebanon. Syria has pledged to abide by the letter and the spirit of the Taif agreement. It will be of great importance that that commitment be honored in all its aspects. The Government of Lebanon has made important progress in re-constituting the institutions of the state. The United States hopes to see free and fair parliamentary elections held there when adequate preparations can assure their reliability. It is important that the elections be held in an environment free of intimidation and coercion. Accordingly, it is up to the Lebanese Government to determine when such free and fair elections can be held. We have encouraged the new government to tackle the country's serious economic problems as its first priority. Recent events underscore the urgency of restoring the Lebanese economy and beginning the task of reconstruction. We, along with other countries and international financial institutions, are considering ways in which we can help. We continue to support the extension of central government authority throughout all of Lebanon, the disarming of all militias, and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces. We have also discussed our serious concern over the situation in South Lebanon with key governments in the region, asking all to exercise maximum restraint lest the continuing violence lead to even more serious consequences for all concerned.
Jordan is playing a very constructive role in the peace process at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. This role has helped us make moderate progress toward the gradual restoration of a bilateral relationship that was severely strained by the Gulf war. When King Hussein visited the United States last March, he pledged to the President Jordan's continued commitment to the peace process and to abide by the UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq. We have since been working closely with the Government of Jordan to establish an effective and credible sanctions enforcement regime there. Unfortunately, I cannot yet report to you that we have accomplished this task. Establishment of such a regime is particularly important, because reports continue of contraband entering Iraq via Jordan. We have informed the Jordanians that further progress in our bilateral relationship and our ability to provide assistance to Jordan depend not only on the peace process but also on effective Jordanian cooperation and measures to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq.
Egypt continues to play an active role in the peace process, participating in each of the five multilateral working groups, working closely with the United States in urging the parties to the bilateral process to focus on issues on the table rather than events in the region, and helping to dampen unrealistic expectations by preparing the parties for a long-term process. Internally, the government continues its efforts to reform an economy crippled by decades of socialist policy. While much remains to be done, the Government of President Mubarak is making tough decisions and taking steps necessary to privatize and rationalize a massive public sector. Our bilateral relationship remains vigorous and healthy.
In the context of this review of our policy, I would like to briefly mention Libya. We are cooperating closely with the United Nations and a coalition of allies to end Libyan-sponsored terrorism. The United States is playing a leading role in the international effort to ensure that the Libyan Government complies with all aspects of UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748, including bringing the perpetrators of the Pan Am [flight] 103 and UTA [flight] 772 bombings to justice and ceasing its support for terrorism and pursuit of non-conventional weapons.
Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula
Along with the Middle East peace process, the Persian Gulf has remained a focus of US policy.
In Iraq, we continue our leading role in the international effort to maintain sanctions and pressure on Saddam Hussein. Iraq has failed to comply with Security Council requirements in many areas. In light of this clear record of non-compliance, we joined in the Security Council vote last month to maintain economic sanctions against Iraq. As President Bush has made clear, we favor the continuation of sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein continues to hold on to power. Because of the Iraqi Government's threats to its own people, we have asked Turkey for further extension of Operation Provide Comfort. This presence, particularly low-level aircraft flights, was significant in keeping recent Kurdish elections free of Iraqi interference. We welcomed those elections in the context of Kurdish statements that they did not challenge Iraqi territorial unity. Let me make it clear that Iraq's territorial integrity remains an important part of US policy and a vital element of regional stability. We look forward one day to elections throughout Iraq so that the Iraqi people can freely choose their representatives and a government that reflects the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society. Currently, we are closely monitoring Saddam Hussein's actions throughout the country and will not tolerate violations of the UN resolutions, including UN Council Resolution 688, which demands an end to acts of repression. Overall, our policy toward Iraq is on track, and international support for and compliance with UN sanctions remains strong, albeit not perfect. The UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have made substantial progress toward eliminating Iraq's programs in weapons of mass destruction and offensive missiles. We will continue to provide support to this process, which is vital to regional security and to curbing Iraq's ability to again threaten its neighbors, including Saudi Arabia and Israel. The UN Boundary Commission has made good progress on its mission of demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait border. Hundreds of international relief workers are acting to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Clearly, Saddam hopes to frustrate and outlast the will of the Security Council. However, he should have no illusion that the international community will forget his record of lawless brutality or accept anything less than full compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions. He is simply, in our view, unredeemable. We will enforce the UN sanctions fully. The Iraqi people deserve new leadership which will not only be representative of the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society but ready to live a peace with Iraq's neighbors. To that end, we applaud the Iraqi opposition for their courage in standing up to a ruthless regime by meeting last week in Vienna. We hope this is a step toward greater unity under freely chosen leaders and toward a future in which all Iraqis can enjoy the freedoms so long denied them by Saddam Hussein.
In Iran, we would like to see a return to the international community and constructive participation in regional stability. Many hope that the recent Majlis [parliament] election will lead to moderate policies. We share this hope, but actions must be the litmus test. Our normalization of relations with Iran depends on several factors, particularly an end to support for terrorism. We recognized Iran's role in the release of American hostages in Lebanon, but that was only a subset of the overall problem of terrorism where Iranian performance remains unacceptable. Iran's human rights practices and its apparent pursuit of a destabilizing arms buildup also remain matters of serious concern. Further, Iran's policies toward its neighbors in the Gulf, where we have vital interests, and in Central Asia and Afghanistan need to be watched closely. Another serious problem is Iran's categoric opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and its support for those, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, who violently oppose it. Iran has not taken up our offer to hold a direct dialogue through authorized representatives. The offer remains, as does our desire for a more normal relationship if Iranian behavior comes to reflect international norms.
Arabian Peninsula
On the Arabian Peninsula, there are signs of increasing willingness on the part of governments to expand political participation, and we have made progress toward our goal of increased security for the area. Security cooperation between the United States and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] includes military and political consultations, joint exercises and planning for multilateral exercises, and agreements with GCC governments to provide a basis for responding rapidly to future security contingencies. Thus far, we have updated an agreement with Oman and concluded new agreements with Kuwait and Bahrain and, just yesterday, with Qatar. We are continuing discussions with the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and Saudi Arabia and hope to make progress on these agreements as soon as possible. As for steps toward broader political participation, which we urge, Kuwait is preparing for parliamentary elections and resumption of constitutional rule in October. In Saudi Arabia, King Fahd has announced that he will appoint a consultative council. A similar structure of consultative councils was established in Oman last December. In Yemen, multiparty elections are scheduled to be held in November, and many restrictions on the press have been removed. We welcome these developments and will continue to monitor the progress of the Gulf countries as they take steps to permit fuller political participation and increased civil liberties.
Fundamental Values
We are encouraged by these developments. The fundamental values which inspire US foreign policy globally--support for human rights, for popular participation in government, for pluralism, and for the rights of women and minorities--also find reflection in our approach to the countries of the Near East. This reality is the point of departure for our attitude toward an increasingly important factor in the region--a phenomenon variously described as political Islam, the Islamic revival, or Islamic fundamentalism. I addressed this issue in some detail in remarks I gave at Meridian House June 2, the text of which I can leave with you today [see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 23, p. 444]. But let me just note a few key points. -- First, we do not view Islam as the next "ism" confronting the West or threatening world peace. That is an overly simplistic reaction to a complex reality. It is evident the Crusades have been over for a long time. -- Second, while we have no desire to impose a "made in the USA" model on other societies, we are proud of our values and traditions and will support those in the region who seek to broaden political participation and respect for basic human values. -- We part company in the Middle East, as elsewhere, with those--whether they cloak their message in religious or other terms--who practice terrorism, oppress minorities, preach intolerance, violate human rights, or pursue their goals through violent means. -- Those who seek to broaden political participation in the Middle East will find us supportive, as we have been elsewhere in the world. At the same time, we are suspect of those who would use the democratic process to come to power only to destroy that very process in order to retain power and political dominance. While we believe in the principle "one person, one vote," we do not support "one person, one vote, one time." -- In sum, religion is not a determinant of the nature or quality of our relations with the countries of the Middle East. Our quarrel is with extremism and the violence, denial, intolerance, intimidation, coercion, and terror which too often accompany it.
Support to American Business
Finally, I would like to say a few words about our efforts toward a more immediate and material goal and one in which I know you, Mr. Chairman, have expressed a special interest--namely, the promotion of American business and economic interests in the Middle East. There are two important aspects to the work of the State Department and our Embassies toward this objective. First, we strive in each country to assure that American companies are afforded every opportunity to compete energetically and equally with foreign contenders. Our promotion of fair, free, and open markets is aimed at opening foreign doors and keeping them open for American businesses and their products. Second, we in the Department of State, along with our colleagues at Commerce and our Embassy staffs, work actively with American companies to promote their products and services. That these efforts are paying off can be illustrated by a few examples. -- Our Embassies in the GCC countries are assisting American manufacturers to sell passenger aircraft to the region's airlines in the face of fierce international competition. -- The largest proportion of contracts for expansion and modernization of Saudi oil facilities has been awarded to American firms. Embassy Riyadh has played an active role in these and other commercial matters. Total US exports to Saudi Arabia were $6.6 bil-lion in 1991 and, for the first quarter of 1992, are 26% ahead of last year's pace. We are actively working with the Saudi Government to resolve some longstanding commercial disputes and to establish a dispute resolution mechanism. -- Kuwait, with a population of around 1 million, purchased $1.2 billion of US goods and services during war-ravaged 1991 and has increased its imports of American products this year. In fact, US exports to Kuwait alone provided jobs for 23,000 Americans in 1991, according to Department of Commerce figures. These are just a few examples. The [State] Department is active, in Wash- ington and at our Embassies, on a daily basis to assist and promote US business throughout the Middle East, the Maghreb, and South Asia. We know from experience that sound economic and business ties between the United States and our friends and allies create a broader, more stable community of interests as well as directly benefiting the American worker and economy.
Mr. Chairman, the principled but pragmatic view I have outlined is reflected in the excellent relations we enjoy with so many of the countries of the region--from Israel to countries whose systems of government are based on Islamic principles. It is an integral part of a realistic approach to achieving the US policy goals I mentioned at the beginning of my statement. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

US Policy and Current Events In Kenya, Malawi, and Somalia

Cohen Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 23 19926/23/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Kenya, Malawi, Syria Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Development/Relief Aid, Human Rights [TEXT] I am pleased to be here to review US policies and current events in Kenya, Malawi, and Somalia. US policy in Africa is designed to promote maximum African participation in the political and economic lives of their countries. We support fair, equitable, and open systems as we, like Africans, believe that these are the keys to sustainable democracy, development, and progress. We are responding to African demands for better and fairer political and economic programs--multiple centers of power, open participation, transparency in government, structures which allow free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and respect for civil and political rights. Today, three-quarters of Sub-Saharan countries are in some phase of democratization. Eighteen African countries have scheduled democratic elections within the next 18 months. Throughout Africa there is interest in economic, as well as political, liberalization. Economic reform is urgently needed to alleviate the harsh poverty which afflicts the continent. Growth has been constrained by natural disaster and political instability. In spite of these problems, Africa has reached a turning point in its economic history. Almost 30 African governments have launched economic reform programs supported by the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and World Bank. The United States strongly supports this fundamental shift and believes it is fully compatible with and complementary to moves toward political reform. With this framework in mind, I turn to the specific--and very different and difficult--cases of Kenya, Malawi, and Somalia.
On December 8, 1991, the Government of Kenya authorized multiple parties. Some 6 months into this new era of multipartyism, Kenya's record on human rights and democracy remains mixed. There have been genuine advances but also serious setbacks. I will review both in turn. The first key advance was the government decision, after lengthy opposition, to authorize multiple parties. Eight opposition parties have been registered, and the opposition has held numerous mass rallies. Equally positive is the government's stated commitment to hold free and fair elections within the constitutional timeframe. The constitution requires the government to hold elections no later than February 1993, although it may call early elections before then. In June, the government began registering new voters, traditionally the prelude to general elections. Moreover, the government has agreed that Commonwealth observers can monitor the elections. And, in recent months, it has released key opponents from jail. Simultaneously, however, negative developments have been undermining the progress achieved. Harassment of the opposition is an ongoing problem. Several opposition politicians have been charged by the government with rumor-mongering for their public comments. The government is preventing opposition parties from opening local offices and creating obstacles to the holding of public rallies. It is also harassing the press. Six editors and journalists currently face sedition charges. And last March, the police brutally clubbed and teargassed peaceful protestors in Nairobi, including mothers protesting the detentions of their sons. Also worrisome are attacks by unidentified thugs against opposition leaders. Several leaders have been assaulted and injured. The authorities have made no apparent effort to identify and arrest the perpetrators. The most disquieting development, however, has been the recent ethnic violence in western Kenya. It has claimed hundreds of lives, left thousands homeless, and displaced over 100,000 persons. Many observers, including church leaders, believe the government is behind these attacks. While this cannot be confirmed, it does appear that, at first, security forces did little to stop the violence. In the past few weeks, there appears to be a change in the government's attitude--security forces have begun responding more effectively to the communal violence, which has decreased. The Attorney General and the opposition have begun to meet. Hopefully, a broader government-opposition dialogue on the election process and procedures will ensue. Despite the setbacks, Kenya is more democratic today than 6 months ago under one-party rule. But more progress is needed for democracy and respect for human rights to take root firmly. US policy toward Kenya is to urge it to follow the path to a fully democratic and open society. The key to this is free and fair elections. We are urging the government to hold such elections soon and to accept widespread monitoring by international and domestic election observers. This can best ensure the election outcome is fully democratic and credible. In November 1991, to underscore our concern about the need for political and economic reform in Kenya, we decided, with other donors, to withhold fast-disbursing assistance to Kenya. The United States withheld $28 million of its planned fiscal year 1992 economic development to Kenya. Progress remains too modest, and the setbacks too profound, to warrant releasing these funds at this time. Significant additional progress is required. We are, however, prepared to provide, in concert with the other donors, election assistance to help Kenya hold genuinely free and fair elections. We are urging the government to create a climate conducive to truly free and fair elections. This includes announcing a firm election date, thus eliminating a key element of uncertainty. It also means creating a level playing field by stopping harassment of the opposition and ending the ethnic violence. The government should also move to ensure that the election commission has the confidence of a broad spectrum of Kenyan society. The recent appointment of new commission members who enjoy widespread respect is a step in the right direction, which should be continued. We are also urging the government and opposition alike to move beyond the rhetoric of confrontation to embrace dialogue, thus ensuring a successful substantive transition to democracy. In this regard, we believe the opposition call to boycott voter registration is ill advised. There are irregularities in the registration, and the government should extend the registration period beyond 1 month, which is insufficient to get the job done. But it is still unclear whether the irregularities are a deliberate attempt at fraud or the result of poor organization. Unless there is widespread registration, many abuses will go undocumented, making it difficult to determine whether there is truly a systematic attempt at fraud. And Kenyans who fail to register will lose any say in the choice of Kenya's leaders in the event of free and fair elections. The government, for its part, should move promptly to address effectively the complaints about the fairness of the registration process and the composition of the election commission. Besides these political issues, I must mention two other matters that demand attention. One is the drought that is afflicting Kenya. The United Nations estimates that almost 1 million Kenyans will require food assistance due to drought. In the worst hit areas of the northeast, malnutrition rates among children under five are as high as 72%--with 28% of those categorized as acutely malnourished. These shocking statistics parallel conditions in some parts of war-torn Somalia. The international community is now mo-bilizing assistance. The US Government has committed $700,000 in disaster assistance funds to move food by air and road. We are working on providing 6,000 metric tons of blended foods, worth over $3.4 million, as soon as possible. We will continue to work with other donors and seek additional resources for food and non-food relief for those suffering from the drought. Before ending my comments on Kenya, I must underscore our concern about the influx of refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. In less than a year, the number of refugees in Kenya has soared from under 50,000 to over 300,000. To its great credit, Kenya, previously a reluctant host of refugees, has generously accepted the recent inflows and is cooperating well with international relief organizations. But it cannot cope by itself with the burden. In response to the crisis, we have given $8.5 million to the UNHCR's [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] emergency appeal for Kenya. We have also provided funds to NGOs [non-governmental organizations] such as CARE and the International Rescue Committee to work with the UNHCR in assisting refugees in Kenya.
The United States and Malawi historically have enjoyed cordial relations. However, we remain concerned about the Government of Malawi's lack of respect for fundamental human rights and the absence of progress toward a more open political environment in Malawi. We appreciate that despite enormous financial costs and severe social dislocation, Malawi has been an exceedingly hospitable host to a Mozambican refugee population that totals 10% of its own population (over 950,000 refugees in a country of 10 million people). The burden is compounded by the worst drought in living memory now afflicting all of Southern Africa. Our commitment to assist all victims of the drought remains as strong as ever. We are working to provide substantial emergency food and other humanitarian assistance to all people at risk in Malawi. In addition to welcoming the overwhelming influx of refugees, Malawi has contributed to the Mozambican peace process by committing its army to securing the Nacala line in Mozambique and cooperating with efforts to promote negotiations between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance]. We have encouraged the government to do all it can to promote the peace process in Mozambique. Malawi's otherwise positive record as a responsible, stable, strongly pro- Western government is marred by a human rights performance which includes political detentions, a controlled press, harsh laws curbing speech and expression, and a single-party political system. The United States, as a long-time friend, has raised its concerns about the lack of basic freedoms in high-level contacts with Malawian authorities, including during a visit by Vice President Quayle in September 1991. Despite occasional positive developments--for example, the release of some 90 political detainees in January 1991 and eight more last week--there have been no fundamental changes. In December 1991, the United States joined with members of the European Community to urge the Malawi Government to take certain steps prior to the consultative group donor meeting in May, including the charging or release of all detainees, the external inspection of prisons, and respect for the right of free speech. We had hoped they would do so, but they did not. The lack of basic freedoms was dramatically evident in the Malawi Government's harsh reaction to the March 1992 Malawi Catholic bishops' pastoral letter: It declared the letter seditious and banned its possession and circulation. We found the letter to be a measured and conciliatory effort by religious leaders to work for the betterment of the country. Our Ambassador strongly protested the government's response and did so again when one of its authors, Monsignor Roche, was expelled. We pointed out that such actions indicated a lack of commitment by the Government of Malawi to constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, particularly of speech, association, and religion. More recently, we expressed our disappointment at the arrest of pro- democracy advocate and labor leader Chakufwa Chihana. Chihana was arrested when he returned to Malawi after visiting Zambia and South Africa where he spoke in support of democratic change in Malawi. We called for his immediate release and urged the government to allow him to freely express his political views. We have continued to closely monitor the proceedings against him and his treatment while in custody. In May 1992, in direct response to the Malawi Government's intransigence and to underscore our concern about the need for democratic reforms, we decided, together with other Western donors, to reduce non-humanitarian assistance to Malawi. Our reduction was 33%--from $34 million to $22 million. We also withheld an additional $15 million in quick-disbursing balance-of-payments support. At the same time, we made clear that we remain committed to providing humanitarian assistance for the Mozambican refugees and to the drought-stricken people of Malawi. We hope that, over the next 6 months, Malawi will take steps to institute the basic freedoms of speech, expression, and association, including the abolition of preventive detention legislation and the reintroduction of habeas corpus legislation. We do not seek to prescribe to Malawians (or anyone else) the specific form of government that is most appropriate to their circumstances, but we do believe that it is fundamental that the Government of Malawi recognize that its citizens should be permitted to criticize their government and to change it, if they wish, through peaceful, democratic means. By doing all these things, Malawi will move toward a more open and democratic society and could revive relations with the international community. Finally, I want to take this opportunity to commend the Government of Malawi on the agreement it recently concluded with the International Committee of the Red Cross to permit access to Malawi's prisons. This is an important step, and we trust that action will be taken to implement it in the near future. I hope it presages a broader effort to respond to the legitimate demands of Malawians for a society in which political participation and open political discussion is allowed.
Somalia remains a difficult and tragic situation. Experienced humanitarian workers say they have never seen worse conditions. Although food deliveries are now getting through to Mogadishu--a ship with 7,000 tons of UN World Food Program food was successfully unloaded [during] the week of June 7, following the delivery of 21,000 tons of food aid in April and May-- many vulnerable people have already died or suffered irreversibly from malnutrition. This is a horrendous human tragedy which is of the utmost concern to the US Government and me, personally. Somalia's estimated food needs are 30,000 metric tons per month. Security for food deliveries has been hit or miss; it needs to be ensured. With our active support, the Security Council recently adopted Resolutions 733, 746, and 751. These resolutions: -- Authorized immediate dispatch of UN cease-fire observers to Mogadishu and approved, in principle, a UN security force to protect humanitarian operations; -- Declared an international arms embargo; and -- Welcomed the Secretary General's intention to appoint a special representative for Somalia. That special representative, Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria, has our full support. He has made repeated trips to Mogadishu and to other areas of the country. He is working hard to find common ground among the Somali factions. We are impressed by his skills and rapid mastery of the complex Somali situation. Special Representative Sahnoun has worked hard to win approval for deployment of a UN protective force, but, thus far, Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed, whose faction holds the southern half of Mogadishu, has rejected deployment. This is unacceptable; one man's recalcitrance cannot be allowed to hold up urgent humanitarian operations in support of a severely stressed population. We are urgently consulting with the United Nations to devise a means of breaking the logjam. At the head of our political agenda is an immediate countrywide cease-fire. A viable long-term political settlement, we believe, will require regional reconciliation agreements before any attempt at a national reconciliation conference. We will be working closely with Ambassador Sahnoun to flesh out these ideas and to gain wider diplomatic support for urgent action. Thank you for this opportunity to present a brief outline of our policy--and our humanitarian--concerns regarding these three African nations. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

The Organization of American States: Democracy's Greatest Resource

Eagleburger Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger Description: Statement to the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly, Nassau, The Bahamas Date: May, 19 19925/19/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, South America, Caribbean, Central America Subject: OAS, Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] (as delivered by Luigi R. Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to the OAS) We meet today, as we have for the past 2 years, in a period of ongoing revolutionary change around the world. Whether we consider this to be a curse or a privilege, it cannot be denied that we live in interesting times-- times in which the only thing which remains fixed and immutable is the fact of change itself. Two years ago, in Asuncion [Paraguay], we met in the afterglow of the global democratic revolution and amidst hopes that we could begin to revitalize our hemispheric forum, the Organization of American States, on the 100th anniversary of the inter-American system. Last year, we met in Santiago [Chile] to make good on those hopes and witnessed the emergence of a new OAS, one ever more capable of action. Such an OAS emerged, in part, because almost all of us had become democratic and transcended the quarrels which had paralyzed us for so long. But such an OAS also emerged because, as a united hemisphere, we suddenly had need of an instrument to exercise our newly found collective will. Today, it is more than fitting that we meet in the Caribbean, here in The Bahamas, where Columbus made his landing exactly 5 centuries ago. The place of the New World's beginning remains its geographic center, its commercial crossroads, and the meeting ground for all the peoples of the Americas--native, African, Hispanic, and European. And now that Guyana and Belize have joined this organization, the OAS has the full benefit of the Caribbean perspective--a perspective which reflects the longest adherence to democratic principle and practice in this hemisphere. However, it must be acknowledged that, in a psychological sense at least, the circumstances surrounding this General Assembly are different from those which obtained in Asuncion and Santiago. The fact of the matter is that we are no longer riding the crest of euphoria atop the wave of democratization which swept the world. Whereas before we celebrated the defeat of democracy's enemies and the end of the Cold War, today we have, in effect, entered a new historical era defined by the challenge of making democracy work. In other words, we are no longer looking backward or patting ourselves on the back; we are instead looking into an unknowable future through the prism of some rather bracing present challenges and realities. Those realities reared their ugly heads this year on the streets of Caracas [Venezuela] and south central Los Angeles, and they helped to interrupt democratic processes in Haiti and Peru. Behind those realities lies the challenge of our times: the challenge of matching fairness at the ballot box with fairness in the marketplace and before the law; the challenge, that is, of defeating democracy's remaining enemies--poverty, injustice, racism, ignorance, and corruption in all its forms. As formidable as that challenge may be, pessimism is no more warranted today than was our euphoria of the past few years. The fact is that we are not alone; the entire world is going through the same wrenching transformations. We may, for example, be disappointed to discover that the OAS cannot simply wave a magic wand and produce instant solutions in Haiti, Peru, or elsewhere; but neither can the United Nations or the European Community. And our disappointment, itself, is an unconscious compliment we pay to the OAS and to its vastly expanded potential for good. More fundamentally, we must draw strength from the conviction that we will succeed over time. We know that there is no other road to prosperity than the free market and that there is no other road to freedom than democracy. All rival systems and ideologies are now discredited. The question is not whether democracy will succeed but rather what we have to do to make it succeed. And finally, we in the Americas have a special reason to be optimistic about the future, because our unique consensus on values and commonality of purpose are both embodied in this hemispheric organization. Let us not, therefore, underestimate the importance of what we in this body have accomplished over the past year and over the past 24 hours. We have refused to recognize assaults on democracy or to legitimize them with our silence. We have asserted that they will not stand, and, if we stay united and strong, it will eventually be said that they did not stand. At the same time, we have made considerable progress over the past year in attacking the root causes of political instability--namely, the economic backwardness which threatens democratic institutions and the inter-state rivalries which threaten our hemispheric peace. For example, new economic growth has lifted per capita income for the first time in 4 years; $36 billion in capital flowed into this region in 1991-- nearly quadruple the 1989 amount. Debt burdens are easing--Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, and, most recently, Argentina have reached agreements to ease their commercial bank debt, and we hope to see Brazil conclude an agreement soon. Official obligations to the United States have also been reduced for seven countries. The United States is pleased to have made a contribution to these successes through the Brady Plan and the EAI [Enterprise for the Americas Initiative], but the real credit--and the vote of confidence these successes represent-- belongs to these countries and their bold economic reformers. There are other reasons for satisfaction with our record. Brazil and Argentina brought their nuclear activities under full scope safeguards. With Chile, they issued the Mendoza declaration forswearing development of chemical and biological weapons. Argentina and Chile settled 21 land border disputes and sent the remaining one to arbitration. And, finally, this region has taken a leading role in addressing global environmental problems, and Brazil will host the UN's conference on the environment and development [in June 1992]. Thus, the record of the past year is one of real achievement on our hemispheric agenda of peace and security, economic growth, and environmental protection. Now, as we look to this agenda in the year ahead, we must build on the hemisphere's three collective pillars of strength: democracy, free enterprise, and the OAS. First, in spite of the temporary setbacks in Haiti and Peru, democracy has proven its resilience and capacity for reform. In Colombia, President Gaviria led a peaceful, democratic movement to rewrite and modernize the constitution. In Canada, Prime Minister Mulroney has successfully maintained national unity, also through constitutional reform. In El Salvador, President Cristiani courageously opened the political system to those who for so long had sought to overthrow it and ended, through negotiations, a long and bitter civil conflict. And, in Guatemala, President Serrano is leading efforts to negotiate an end to that country's civil strife. In fact, democracy's enemies are becoming fewer and fewer. The collapse of communism has demoralized and bankrupted guerrilla groups throughout the region. Some are negotiating for peace; in Uruguay and Argentina, armed irregulars have retired from the field. Others in Peru and Colombia fight on, shamelessly financing themselves not through the auspices of international communism but from the proceeds of narco-trafficking. These groups-- especially the unspeakably brutal Sendero Luminoso [Shining Path] in Peru-- are animated less by ideology than they are by nihilistic blood lust. Democracy is also taking root throughout this hemisphere's civil societies; it is emerging from the bottom up as well as from the top. Throughout the region, the press has become freer and stronger as have other institutions which give citizens greater voice and power. According to one source, non- governmental organizations--for example, municipal development councils, health cooperatives, and civic education foundations--have grown from fewer than 1,000 to over 11,000 in the past 2 decades. Second, this region's economy is turning the corner back to sustained growth. For example, the global business and financial communities have taken notice of the new economic policies; the capital flowing into the region is their vote of confidence. Official reserves grew 38% in 1991. In the Caribbean, the Andes, the Southern Cone, and Central America, the movement to trade liberalization is well underway, making those economies more competitive and preparing the region as a whole for free trade. This is not just a matter of statistics. Democracy is proving that it can deliver a better life. The difference is everywhere. Today, a family starting a new business in Nicaragua can go to a private bank for a loan, knowing that creditworthiness, not politics, will decide the outcome. Workers in Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico can save for their future, knowing that hyperinflation and devaluations will no longer confiscate their earnings. Farmers in El Salvador have been freed of the state-controlled commodity export system, so that the world price alone will determine what they earn. Still, hopes are high, and expectations are growing. Economic reform must mean greater upward mobility and new opportunities for workers, farmers, and entrepreneurs to participate in economic recovery. Third, a revitalized OAS is helping define and advance a new hemispheric agenda, for example: -- We established a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy--the only such body in an international organization. This unit has observed elections in six countries and is now under study by the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. -- We adopted in [the] General Assembly the world's toughest standards on precursor chemicals used to produce illicit drugs; and, now, 14 member countries in our region have implemented or begun to implement those standards. -- The United States and the Andean nations have embraced the tough money-laundering standards we called for last year in Santiago--standards we look for this General Assembly to adopt. -- The OAS has expressed our collective desire for an open world trading system before the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and before the European Community. -- We have produced a resolution for decision by this assembly which makes it possible for the Americas to speak with a single voice in support of global and regional initiatives, from expansion of investment to non- proliferation of weapons--initiatives such as those Argentina and Brazil have made under the courageous leadership of Presidents Menem and Collor. -- We have adopted a plan of action on the environment which presents the specific measures we are committed to implement in order to preserve, manage, and utilize our natural assets. -- Finally, I am pleased to say [that] just last week, the United States signed a headquarters agreement with the OAS Secretariat, resolving once and for all the legal status of the OAS headquarters and OAS employees. This is the record of progress upon which we must build to further our hemisphere's development. First, we must strengthen our collective mechanism to defend democracy. With the adoption of the Santiago mechanism and with its use in the cases of Haiti and Peru, a line has been drawn. We have made it clear that those who subvert democracy will be isolated--they will go without normal diplomatic contacts, without financial support, and without participating in those cooperative activities central to the EAI. And that situation will not change until there has been--in the case of [Haitian] President Aristide--a return to office and--in the case of Haiti and Peru--a return to democracy. The United States strongly supports the Santiago mechanism. We do not seek a mechanism which would deny governments and this body the opportunity to make considered responses to future challenges to democracy. But we do seek increased leverage for the OAS and increased risk for those who would lead a coup anywhere in this region. Second, the political and economic opening that has already brought profound change to the Americas must continue. This is essential if we are to face squarely an internal threat to democratic government--corruption-- which is as much a menace as the external threats we faced in previous decades. No society is immune from corruption, and no government is exempt from the obligation to fight it. People throughout this hemisphere increasingly are aware of the rights and privileges they have as citizens of democracies. A basic sense of fairness tells them that many old practices are not consistent with the contract that governs a true democratic society. They know the democratic contract means that all must pay their taxes. They know it means that elected leaders govern with strong popular authority but with limited power. They know that the state's security services are not to be instruments of political parties, social classes, or particular ethnic groups. They know that, in a democracy, economic policy is not a set of rules to preserve a status quo in which a few are comfortable and safe from competition. And they know that the administration of justice must be based on the rule of law and not the influence of the powerful. Under these circumstances, each of us has a continuing obligation to do all we can to root out and eliminate corruption whenever and wherever it occurs. Economic reform itself--by limiting the power of the state to make economic decisions--reduces the opportunities for corruption, and that is why reform must continue and accelerate. Moreover, we must also promote sound and stable currencies which deny insiders the opportunity for profit-making. When foreign exchange is freely traded, the government is no longer a gatekeeper determining which citizens will have the opportunity to participate in the international economy. When state monopolies give way to competition under the law, arbitrary practices and sinecures disappear. Third, we must continue to strengthen the institutional foundations of democracy. This means further international cooperation to build fair and modern electoral and judicial systems. It means continuing to support the free flow of information. It means ensuring that the state's necessary retreat from economic control not give way to a tyranny of special interests or the law of the jungle. In other words, a market economy requires competent and accountable government able to ensure public order, the protection of individual rights, and access to basic health and education services. Finally, we must also foster a long overdue dialogue between civilians and the military establishments in all our countries. In the United States, we are only now coming to terms with the need to reshape our military to fit a world where there is no Soviet Union. Many difficult questions involving security, foreign policy, the budget, and our career military must be faced. And like many other countries in this region, the United States is still debating the extent to which the military should be involved in the war on drugs. In too many cases throughout this region, there is a gulf between elected civilians and the military. Nothing could be more dangerous to democracy, to national security, or to the long-term health of the military institutions themselves. Before closing, I would like to reflect briefly on my own country's view of itself and its role in this hemisphere. There have been suggestions in recent years that the end of the Cold War would find the United States returning to the isolationism of its past, and commentary to this effect has increased in the wake of the Los Angeles riots. It is certainly true that winning the Cold War came at immense cost to American society and immense sacrifice to the American people. We are, as a consequence, going to do what it takes to address our domestic challenges and rightfully so. However, it would be very mistaken to conclude that the American people want to retreat from global engagement. On the contrary, they recognize that we are part of an interdependent world [and] that our own security and well-being are directly affected by developments beyond our shores. The United States will, of course, have to adjust its foreign policy to the vastly changed circumstances of the post-Cold War era, but, far from coming at the expense of our hemispheric relationships, this adjustment actually means for us an acceleration in the process of inter-American integration. Just last week, for example, President Bush announced that negotiations for a free trade agreement with Chile will follow the conclusion of a North American Free Trade Agreement. However, nothing better demonstrates my government's commitment to Latin America and the Caribbean than the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative--a blueprint for economic growth in equal partnership with all the nations of this hemisphere. EAI envisions relations characterized not by might or dependency but instead by mutual interests, mutual benefits and responsibilities, and mutual respect. Thanks to EAI, trade and investment councils are already meeting under framework agreements in force with 31 countries, including two regional groups. The Inter-American Development Bank made four investment sector loans in 1991 totaling almost $500 million, and work is proceeding on at least seven more for 1992. Agreement has been reached on the establishment of the Multilateral Investment Fund, with pledges of support approximating $1.3 billion. We have reduced the official bilateral debt of Chile, Jamaica, and Bolivia, and we have established mechanisms to finance environmental protection in those countries. Surely, these are only the first steps toward the lofty goals of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Much remains to be done by all of us, including--in the case of the United States--the completion by our Congress of the necessary legislation. But the accomplishments to date are significant, and they chart an ambitious course for future inter-American cooperation. Finally, we have heard a lot of talk in recent weeks that the United States after Los Angeles has lost the right to preach at other nations--that we have forfeited our purported role as the world's moral policeman. To the extent that we ever played that role, it is one we should be thankful to relinquish. We do have a store of experience in democracy which we should be willing to share with the world's nascent democracies. We do have a moral voice--as opposed to a moralizing voice--which we should not stifle. But henceforth in this revolutionary new world, in this new democratic era, we and our partners alike need to understand that the values in which we believe are not American at all--they are universal values which all of us strive to achieve. The goal of democracy, unlike communism, is not to engineer a new man but instead to make imperfect men and imperfect societies fit to govern themselves. Democracy assumes a constant struggle against our darker selves--against the greed, the hatred, and the prejudices which make us unworthy of freedom. And so we must be humble, all of us, for with the end of the Cold War, this much at least is clear--that the enemies of democracy come from within. But we must also be hopeful and optimistic, because it is equally clear, especially in this hemisphere today, that the friends of democracy are all around us. They are a constant and powerful resource against democracy's enemies, wherever they may be. We have now, for perhaps the first time in history, a consensus of principle, and, to the extent that we embody that consensus in our instrument of collective action--in this Organization of American States--then we have perhaps democracy's greatest resource of all. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

OAS Resolutions: Restoration of Democracy in Haiti

OAS Source: Organization of American States Date: May, 17 19925/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, Human Rights, OAS [TEXT] Resolution MRE/RES. 3/92 on Restoration of Democracy in Haiti (May 17, 1992) The Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Having seen resolutions MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES. 2/91, of October 3 and 8, 1991, of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Foreign Ministers and the reports of the Secretary General on the situation in Haiti; Considering: That the Organization of American States has made efforts to restore the democratic system in Haiti and has maintained an ongoing presence in that country through various missions; and That as a result of those efforts President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Presiding Officers of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies of Haiti decided freely to sign, on February 23, 1992, the Protocol of Washington; Bearing in mind that, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention, the OAS has made and is sustaining extraordinary efforts to promote a Haitian solution for the reinstatement of the democratic system, Resolves: 1. To reaffirm in their entirety resolutions MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES. 2/91, of October 3 and 8, 1991, which condemn the disruption of the democratic system in Haiti and recommend the isolation of the de facto regime that arose with the coup d'etat of September 30, 1991. 2. To reiterate its full support for the Protocol of Washington, of February 23, 1992, solemnly signed under the auspices of the OAS, which constitutes the Haitian people's solution to the institutional crisis in that country. 3. To repudiate the dilatory and intimidating maneuvers of the sectors that have benefited from the disruption of democracy, aimed at preventing ratification of the Protocol of Washington, and to reject any document that disregards it. 4. To urge the member states to adopt whatever actions may be necessary for the greater effectiveness of the measures referred to in resolutions MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES. 2/91, particularly those in operative paragraphs 5, 6, 8, and 9 of resolution 1/91, and in operative paragraph 4 of section I of resolution 2/91. 5. To adopt the following additional measures: a. To expand and intensify the monitoring of the trade embargo on Haiti through the Special Committee of the Permanent Council by measures such as a periodical publication on violations of the embargo as they occur. To urge the member states to increase their cooperation and provide the necessary information. b. To acknowledge the support provided by the member countries of the European Economic Community and other countries with economic and commercial ties to Haiti that have suspended their economic and technical cooperation, and to coordinate with them on the enforcement of other measures to make the embargo more effective. c. To instruct the Special Committee of the Permanent Council to meet with representatives of the member states involved in any way in actions contravening the embargo, with a view to promoting unity of purpose and action in strengthening its implementation. d. To instruct the Secretary General to convoke a technical meeting of member states and observers at Headquarters to be held in June to coordinate strategies for the implementation of the embargo. e. To urge the member states to deny access to port facilities to any vessel that does not abide by the embargo and to ensure that air transport is not used to carry goods in violation thereof. f. To urge the member states to refrain from granting or to cancel, as appropriate, entry visas issued to the perpetrators and supporters of the coup d'etat, and to freeze their assets. g. To urge the member states to increase humanitarian aid to the poorest sectors of the Haitian people. h. To instruct the Secretary General to maintain coordination with the member states, the observer countries and the inter-American and international organizations for the design and development of a comprehensive program for the economic recovery of Haiti, with a comprehensive program for the economic recovery of Haiti, with a view of its implementation in consultation with Haiti's constitutional authorities as soon as the country's democratic institutions have been reinstated. i. To urge the member states, observers, and international organizations, and private voluntary organizations to assist in relieving humanitarian problems involving emigres from Haiti. j. To suggest that the member states consider the usefulness of reducing their diplomatic missions in Haiti until democratic institutions have been restored in Haiti. 6. To reiterate its serious concern over the continual violations of human rights and to again request the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to continue its ongoing close monitoring of the situation in Haiti, and to keep this ad hoc Meeting informed through the Permanent Council. 7. To request the OAS member and observer states to instruct their representatives to the multilateral financial institutions and to the United Nations to cooperate within those institutions toward enforcement of the measures provided in this resolution. Also, to request the cooperation of the multilateral financial institutions and the United Nations in implementing the measures referred to in operative paragraphs 4 and 5. 8. To urge the observer countries and the international community to support the decisions contained in this resolution and to cooperate in their effective implementation. 9. To emphasize that the OAS and its member states remain fully prepared to facilitate the reestablishment and strengthening of the democratic institutions in Haiti, and resolved to contribute to the economic and social recovery and development of that country and to collaborate in the implementation of the Protocol of Washington, including, in the pertinent content, paragraph 7 thereof. 10. To keep open the Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

OAS Resolutions: Restoration of Democracy in Peru

OAS Source: Organization of American States Date: May, 18 19925/18/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Peru Subject: OAS, Democratization, Human Rights [TEXT] Resolution MRE/RES. 2/92 on Restoration of Democracy in Peru (May 18, 1992) The Ministers of Foreign Affairs at an Ad Hoc Meeting, Having Seen: The Permanent Council resolution of April 6, 1992, convoking an ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in accordance with the provisions of resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), and resolution MRE/RES. 1/92 "Support for the Restoration of Democracy in Peru", adopted by the ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Peru) on April 13, 1992; Having Heard the report presented by the Mission established in accordance with operative paragraph 6 of the aforementioned resolution MRE/RES. 1/92, and the statements by the President of Peru, Mr. Alberto Fujimori; the Chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR); a representative of the Peruvian political parties, and a representative of the Latin American Parliament; and Considering: That representative democracy can be promoted and defended only by democratic means, any other course being rejected as contrary to the fundamental principles established in the Charter of the OAS, and The measures taken and recommendations made by the OAS Mission as set forth in its report, as well as President Fujimori's commitment to his people made at today's session, Resolves: 1. To reaffirm the provisions of resolution MRE/RES. 1/92, and to take note of the commitment made by the President of Peru to call immediate elections for a Constitutional Congress, in an electoral process fully guaranteeing free expression of the will of the people, in such a way as to restore representative democracy in his country. 2. To urge the Peruvian authorities to effect the return to the system of representative democracy at the earliest possible opportunity, with full respect for the principle of separation of powers and the rule of law, thereby facilitating complete restoration of international aid and assistance. 3. To recommend to the Secretary General of the OAS that, subject to prior consideration by the Permanent Council and in light of developments in the political situation in Peru and in particular, the timely compliance with President Fujimori's commitment, he provide such assistance as may be formally requested of him, including observation of the elections for a prompt return to the system of representative democratic government. 4. To request the Mission to continue its representations in accordance with operative paragraph 6 of resolution MRE/RES. 1/92, and also to provide its assistance to ensure more effective fulfillment of the provisions of operative paragraph 3 of that resolution and contribute to effective progress in the restoration of democracy. 5. To urge the Government of Peru to ensure full respect for human rights and the guarantees thereof, and to request the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to continue to observe the human rights situation and to report thereon to the Permanent Council. 6. To keep open the ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, there to receive, through the Permanent Council, information on the progress of the situation in Peru and, in particular, on compliance with the commitment to democratization made in the context of the dialogue called for in operative paragraph 6 of resolution MRE/RES. 1/92.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

OAS Resolutions: Support for the Democratic Government of the Republic of Venezuela

OAS Source: Organization of American States Date: May, 18 19925/18/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Venezuela Subject: OAS, Democratization, Human Rights [TEXT] Resolution AG/doc. 2906/92 on Support for the Democratic Government of the Republic of Venezuela (May 22, 1992) The General Assembly, Considering that one of the essential purposes of the Organization of American States is to "promote and consolidate representative democracy with due respect for the principle of non-intervention"; Reaffirming the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty- first regular session, and In view of the lamentable events that occurred in Venezuela, February 4, 1992, designed to overthrow the Government democratically elected by the popular and sovereign will of its people, Resolves: 1. To confirm, in all its parts, resolution CP/RES. 576 (887/92) "Support for the Democratic Government of Venezuela," adopted by the Permanent Council on February 4, 1992. 2. To reaffirm confidence in democracy, as the political system of American nations and the institutional system capable of confronting in our hemisphere, in an effective way, different political, economic, social and ethical situations with a view to continue to impel the process of integral development of member States. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

OAS Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Promotes Economic Growth

Aronson Source: Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Date: Jun, 17 19926/17/92 Description: Statement before the House Agriculture Committee, Washington, DC Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America, Central America, Caribbean Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] Thank you for this opportunity to join you for a discussion of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI). We in the Administration appreciate the invaluable support you have given this initiative at crucial times in the legislative process. We also appreciate your effort to advance the process of debt reduction through your legislation, HR 4059, and I join [Treasury] Under Secretary [David] Mulford in encouraging you to include authority for third-party sales to facilitate debt swaps as part of your legislation. What is at stake in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is maintaining momentum in one of the best performing areas of the US economy today.
The US Export Boom
US exports to Latin America and the Caribbean have doubled in the past 5 years, from $31 billion in 1987 to $62 billion last year. That created about 620,000 new jobs in the United States. It has also nearly wiped out a trade deficit with that region that stood at about $11 billion in 1987. Your state of Texas is in the lead, but this new export business is building in all states and reaching all the important sectors of our economy. Between 1987 and 1990, US exports to the region grew by nearly $19 bil- lion or 55%. Over $7 billion of that new business was in Texas; California and Florida each captured over $2.5 billion in new export sales; and New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, and New Jersey are among the 20 states which added $100 million or more. Nationwide, exports of foodstuffs to this hemisphere grew 47% (up $1.2 billion); raw materials 30% (up $427 million); cars, trucks, and parts 84% (up $1.9 bil-lion); machinery 46% (up $4.9 billion); and consumer goods, ranging from radios and televisions to clothing, furniture, and sporting goods, 120% (up $2.6 billion).
The New Economic Model
This export boom did not happen by accident. It happened because our neighbors--first Chile and Mexico, now nearly every country in the hemisphere--decided to undertake revolutionary economic change. A new generation of leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean has made the politi-cal decision to replace longstanding protectionist and statist policies with a new model that relies on economic freedom and openness to international trade and competition. This is not like other regions of the world, where the United States faces tough, often intractable negotiations to cut tariffs, remove non-tariff barriers, and dismantle subsidy schemes which price our exports out of the market. In this hemisphere, countries are cutting tariffs unilaterally. They are removing barriers to foreign investment unconditionally. They are waiting in line to enter talks with us to liberalize trade. They stand shoulder to shoulder with us in calling for Europe to cooperate in liberalizing world trade through the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade].
Consider these examples:
Sound Money. Lack of stable currencies has long blocked investment and growth throughout the hemisphere. But today, many countries have taken the strong fiscal and monetary policy measures needed to stabilize their currencies. Hyperinflation has been contained in Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Peru. Argentina's success has been particularly dramatic. Under President Menem's leadership, the Argentine peso is maintaining rough parity with the dollar as a result of fiscal discipline and a transparent monetary policy where the movement of key money supply indices is published daily in the newspapers. Cutting Barriers to Trade. Chile, long a leader in tariff reduction, now maintains an across-the-board 11% tariff on imports. Since 1986, Mexico cut its maximum tariff from 100% to 20%. Average tariffs are one-half of what they were 6 years ago, and there are virtually no non-tariff barriers. In 1989, Argentina's tariffs ranged from 15% to 53%; 62% of the industrial output of the country was protected by trade restrictions. Today, many tariffs have been eliminated, the top tariff is 22%, and import quotas have been eliminated on all products except automobiles. Three years ago, the top issue in our relationship with Brazil was "informatics" laws, which blocked imports of computers and related technology in order to protect Brazil's computer manufacturers. Those restrictions have been cut substantially, and they will end in October. Most of Brazil's other non-tariff barriers have also been eliminated by President Collor. El Salvador reduced its tariff rate ceiling from 250% to 35% in 1989. As late as 1990, Ecuador's maximum tariff was 290%. Today, it is 40%. Last December, the presidents of the Andean nations meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, approved more trade liberalization in 2 days than they had in the past 22 years of economic integration efforts. They seek a common market by the end of this year, and Ecuador just announced its decision to meet that schedule. That work is being repeated throughout the hemisphere, as sub- regional trade agreements are being negotiated in preparation for hemisphere-wide free trade. The Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are working to build a common market by 1995. The Central American nations are aiming to put a common external tariff in place by the end of this year, and negotiations to liberalize the region's trade with Mexico are underway. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras signed a separate trade liberalization agreement last month. Opening to Foreign Investment. The most important change affecting foreign investment has been one of attitude: The countries of this hemisphere are aggressively seeking it, and they are competing with each other to create the conditions that will best attract new capital. New laws are being passed--Honduras approved one 2 weeks ago--to give foreign investors equitable treatment in the legal system and to allow repatriation of profits. Bolivia and Colombia also have enacted far-reaching reforms. Last year, Argentina effectively abandoned the Calvo doctrine, which foreclosed the option of binding arbitration to resolve international investment disputes. This has given investors new confidence that they will be treated fairly. Creation of sound currencies, convertible at market rates, is another key factor attracting capital from new investors and from nationals who had taken their funds to safe havens overseas. These reforms have reaped impressive rewards. Latin America had a $40-billion capital inflow in 1991, three times as much as the year before, and a positive financial resource transfer--$6.72 billion--for the first time in 10 years. Much of this capital is financing trade, including our increased exports to the region. The Inter-American Development Bank's estimates show Latin America receiving 80% of all foreign direct investment in less developed countries. Five of the world's six top-performing stock markets are in Latin America. Reducing the State's Economic Role. One of the most visible results of this region's new economic thinking is the reduction in the size of the state sector. Large state enterprises, once seen as an economic necessity, are now viewed as a drain on the government's revenues and the nation's capital. Often, privatization is a double benefit for government, removing the burden of running enterprises that are more efficient in private hands and bringing in funds that can be used to address pressing social needs--a few examples: -- In November 1990, Argentina sold both its state-owned telephone company and 85% of its national airline to private consortia. Most of Argen- tina's remaining state enterprises are expected to be sold by mid-1993. -- Brazil sold state-owned steel company USIMINAS for $1.17 billion last October. -- Also that month, Mexico sold its share of [the] state-owned bank, Bancomer, for $2.54 billion. Mexico had 1,155 state enterprises a decade ago; only 200 remain to be sold, and the privatizations continue. -- And last November, Venezuela sold 40% of state-owned telephone company CANTV to an ATT/GTE [American Telephone ∧ Telegraph/General Telephone and Electronics] consortium for $1.8 billion.
The Role of EAI
President Bush launched the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 2 years ago to respond to these dramatic changes. His vision--free trade throughout the hemisphere, greater investment, debt relief, and increased environmental cooperation--has been well received. It fits the vision President Salinas has for Mexico: "We think not about a walled market, but an open market to the rest of the world." And because it is based on trade, not aid, it is an initiative, in the words of President [Patricio] Aylwin of Chile, "better than any of those from the past because it is free of a paternalistic and protective flavor." The progress made to date has been significant. Trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] negotiations, now in the final stages, will create a single market of 370 million consumers and a combined GDP [gross domestic product] of over $6 trillion. Last month, President Bush announced that free trade talks with Chile will follow completion of the NAFTA. We have signed trade and investment framework agreements with 31 countries in this region. These agreements are vehicles for discussions about liberalizing trade and investment regimes in preparation for hemisphere-wide free trade. For many countries, these discussions identify the policy measures they need to take to ensure that their economies will be competitive under a freer trade regime. They also identify measures needed to improve investment climate, such as passing laws that protect intellectual property rights. Investment. A $1.3 billion multilateral investment fund, established last February under EAI, will help countries identify the measures they need to take to attract investment; develop privatization plans; target special loans to smaller enterprises; and provide grants to help train workers, managers, and environmental protection professionals. Japan has pledged to match the US contribution of $500 million to this fund, and 19 other nations from Europe and this hemisphere have pledged to contribute. These countries have responded to President Bush's proposal to create this facility. We urge Congress to approve the full US share of the multilateral investment fund. The Inter-American Development Bank responded to President Bush's call for a new, fast-disbursing loan facility to promote investment reform. Chile received the first loan last June; since then, Bolivia, Jamaica, and Colombia have received loans, and El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Honduras, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Paraguay are under consideration. These loans support a wide variety of measures to improve the climate for private investment and to ensure that all sectors of society can participate in renewed economic growth. We have signed bilateral investment treaties with three countries, and discussions are underway with seven others. These treaties make invaluable contributions to attracting foreign investment by providing protection against unwarranted expropriations and discriminatory treatment of foreign investors, by establishing clear and transparent rules for settling disputes, and by codifying rules for capital repatriation. Debt. As Latin American nations move toward a future of more open economies, many face a daunting legacy of the past--debt. Though economic growth helps to reduce debt, debt service costs often soak up the resources needed to make economies grow. Under EAI, countries that receive investment sector loans from the Inter- American Development bank or make other significant investment reforms become eligible for debt reduction. So far, we have reduced the official debt of Bolivia, Chile, and Jamaica to the United States by over $260 million. (Under other authority outside EAI, we also reduced $1.28 billion in bilateral debt with Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua.) These reductions can have substantial impact in countries which owe much of their debt to the United States--in El Salva-dor's case, over $650 million; in Costa Rica, $458 million. Congress did not appropriate any funds for debt reduction in this fiscal year. EAI debt reduction will be one of our top priorities in fiscal year 1993, and we urge your approval. It can bring enormous benefits in encouraging economic reform and freeing scarce central government resources for programs that address pressing social needs. Environment. When Bolivia, Chile, and Jamaica reduced their debt, they also signed environmental framework agreements. These agreements set up jointly administered environmental funds; the capital for these funds comes from local currency contributions equal to the interest payments on the debt and from other donations. The three countries are in the process of establishing the commissions that will administer the funds, which should total $32 million over the life of the debt-reduction agreements. By the end of the year, these commissions should be in a position to begin funding environmental projects.
EAI's Place In Hemispheric Relations
Continued support for the EAI is vitally necessary if we are to continue encouraging the bold reforms of leaders throughout the hemisphere, such as President Collor of Brazil, who is facing the difficult challenges of fiscal and constitutional reform; President Cristiani of El Salvador, who is turning to the economic tasks of reconstruction; President Gaviria of Colombia, who is opening his economy at the same time he is combatting guerrillas and the drug cartels; and the leaders of the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), who are beginning to confront the complexities of real economic integration. In many cases, these reforms carry short-term political costs, while the benefits of growth come later. Now that these countries are adopting the kind of policies the United States has long urged under administrations of both parties, our continued support is essential. But EAI's importance is more than economic. It fits into a larger context of a new partnership President Bush is building with Latin America and the Caribbean in an era where democracy is the norm. This economic partnership could not exist without the foundation of shared democratic values. In building that partnership, the Administration has worked hard to craft a policy that is sustainable over the long term because it rests on a bipartisan consensus. We believe we have met key congressional concerns. Central America is fully democratic, and the wars have ended in Nicaragua and El Salvador. More than ever before, we are working through the OAS [Organization of American States], and we took a leading role in revitalizing that organization to deal with issues from drugs and money- laundering to monitoring elections and defending democracy. Our aid is being used as a strong lever to create freer markets, not to perpetuate dependency. EAI is strengthening our political relations, treating our neighbors as equals, and helping to renew economic growth. It is often said that the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is disappearing. Nowhere is that more true than in this hemisphere, and it's true beyond the area of economic policy. When we deal with democracies, we make more progress on a wide range of issues, from fighting drug traffic in the Andes and the Caribbean to protecting the environment along our southern border, to ending conflicts in Central America, to controlling the regional balance of conventional weapons, to stopping the development of weapons of mass destruction begun under military governments in Brazil and Argentina. What we see as separate developments--economic reform and the spread of democracy--our neighbors see as a single process of modernization. They are strongly committed to their new course, because they have paid the price of the old ways, in terms of lost political freedoms and foregone economic progress. And they welcome our partnership. What is required of us is to avoid our frequent mistake of on-again, off-again engagement in this hemisphere. Now that we and our neighbors have more in common and more of a common agenda than ever before, we need to remain engaged. With your leadership, I am confident that Congress will join the President in building the hemispheric partnership that will make the Americas prosper. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

Claims Against Iraq

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 22 19926/22/92 Description: Statement before the House Agriculture Committee, Washington, DC Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations [TEXT] The UN Compensation Commission, established pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), is developing procedures to provide compensation for losses that were sustained as a result of Iraq's illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait. To that end, it has adopted criteria for the processing of all individual, corporate, and government claims. Its claim forms for individuals with claims for amounts up to $100,000 were distributed in December 1991 by the Department, and the commission will begin to process those claims later this year. On June 15, 1992, the commission circulated "Form D" to be used in filing claims of individuals that could not be filed on forms previously released by the commission. This form should be used by those whose losses exceed $100,000 and who have not yet filed a claim with the commission, or have filed a claim for the first $100,000 and want to file for any additional losses not previously claimed. It should also be used by those who have made payments or provided relief for other eligible individuals. (A separate form will be circulated in several months for claims of corporations and other legal entities.) To make a claim, a claimant must fill out Form D and return it to the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and Investment Disputes in the State Department. The Assistant Legal Adviser's office will consolidate the claims and submit them to the commission. The Department will submit the claims of US citizens and is considering submitting the claims of residents of the United States who are not citizens. Claimants who are not US citizens should include a statement with their claim form indicating whether, at the time of the invasion, any members of their immediate family (spouse, parent, child) were citizens or permanent residents of the United States and describe the losses sustained by those family members. They also should include documentation of their residency status or citizenship. If no member of their family was a citizen or permanent resident at the time of the invasion, claimants should describe how they came to the United States and provide documentation as to their residency status here. This information will help the Department establish a basis on which to consider submitting their claim. As of December 15, 1992, the commission will begin processing claims submitted by governments on Form D up to that date. The final deadline for the submission of these claims by governments is July 1, 1993, but it is in a claimant's interest that his or her claim be submitted as soon as possible. The Department will need time to review the forms and documentation received, to follow up with claimants where necessary, and to prepare a consolidated statement summarizing the claims. Therefore, claimants wishing to ensure that their claim is considered as soon as possible should return a completed form by September 15, 1992. The Department urges claimants to file by this date, but in any event no later than January 15, 1993. For more information and to obtain claim forms, individuals should contact the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and Investment Disputes, 2100 K Street, NW, Suite 402, Washington DC 20037- 7180. Telephone: (202) 653-2412. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Europe's Multilateral Organizations

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jun, 29 19926/29/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe Subject: International Organizations, CSCE, NATO [TEXT] From World War II to the present, a number of multilateral organizations have contributed to European stability and evolving economic and political integration. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the European Community (EC) are the most prominent. NATO originally was created to bind Western Europe and North America in a mutual defense commitment. It now is achieving its objective of a Europe "whole and free" through expanded cooperation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The CSCE has provided a platform for East- West dialogue and pressed for an improvement in human rights in the former Eastern bloc. It continues such efforts to secure peace and freedom. The EC was created to remove economic barriers and to move the member states toward increased economic and political integration. It will consider new membership applications from Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden in the near future. Other multilateral organizations affecting European economic and political policy include: the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Council of Europe, the Nordic Council, and the Western European Union (WEU). The Council of Europe was established to promote European unity and cooperation as well as consolidate democratic reforms. EFTA was created to form a free trade area for industrial products without the political implications of a customs union. The Nordic Council works toward creating harmonious laws and cooperative efforts in cultural fields in Scandinavia. The WEU comprises most members of the European Community and coordinates planning for defense matters. Its role may expand when EC members develop their defense component.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, NATO was established in 1949 to deter potential Soviet aggression in Europe and to provide for the collective self- defense of the alliance. Its signing represented the first peace-time alliance with US participation. With the end of the Cold War, NATO began a major transformation to adapt to the new realities in Europe. In the July 1990 London "Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," the leaders called for enhancing the political character of the alliance by transforming NATO's relationship with its former adversaries. Recognizing the growing importance of related regional organizations, the London declaration recommended that NATO liaison activities complement the activities of the EC, the CSCE, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the WEU. While NATO's new security policy reflects a greater reliance on the elements of dialogue and cooperation, the London declaration also transformed the character of NATO's conventional defenses. NATO moved away from its strategy of forward defense to a reduced forward presence. Reliance on nuclear weapons was reduced; nuclear forces became weapons of last resort. The November 1991 Rome "Declaration on Peace and Cooperation" signaled a growing shift to a broad approach to security based on dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability. To achieve these goals, NATO called for further reduction in conventional and nuclear forces. The North Atlantic Council is NATO's chief policy-making body and provides for intergovernmental consultation. It is the highest political and military authority in the alliance. The Council meets twice yearly in ministerial session and occasionally in a heads-of-state session. The Secretary General chairs the Council and heads an international staff. Participating countries provide a permanent representative of ambassadorial rank to the Council. When defense matters are discussed, the permanent representatives meet as the Defense Planning Committee.
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
In order to enhance liaison with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the NACC was established at the Rome NATO summit in November 1991. Secretary Baker and German Foreign Minister Genscher originated the idea to create the NACC in a government statement issued on October 2, 1991. The NACC includes former Warsaw Pact countries and other newly independent states in Eurasia and was established as an inclusive forum for discussing security, disarmament, and political issues. NACC provides an opportunity to eliminate what were once two opposing blocs and allow them to join together in a common circle built on shared universal and domestic values. Through NACC, NATO members can share their unique expertise in security cooperation in ways that will help the new independent states address problems critical to the transformation of their societies. The allies are prepared to offer their expertise in defense planning, democratic concepts of civil-military relations and coordination of air-traffic management, and the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes. The first NACC ministerial meeting in December 1991 signaled the intention of the participants to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation on political and security issues. Regular meetings will be held at the ambassadorial and ministerial level.
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSCE was established in 1975 (with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act) to press for human rights and to provide a forum for East-West dialogue. The heart of CSCE is the set of norms and principles in the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents which established important standards of state behavior, particularly in human rights, economic cooperation, military openness, and peaceful, democratic change. The dramatic changes in Europe are, in part, a consequence of the CSCE process, which established [the] standards of state behavior, built mutual confidence, encouraged openness to change, and demanded respect for human rights. CSCE's membership includes the United States, Canada, and all European countries-- including the new states arising from the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. At the November 1990 CSCE Paris summit, leaders publicly recognized the end of the Cold War and, for the first time, created CSCE institutions: a small CSCE Secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections--later replaced by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw. The CSCE Council of Ministers, created at the Paris summit, is the highest decision-making body in the organization. Mandated to meet at least annually, it has so far met in Berlin in June 1991, in Prague in January 1992, and in Helsinki (to open the follow-up meeting) in March 1992. The fourth CSCE follow-up meeting convened in Helsinki in March 1992. It is reviewing all CSCE procedures and institutions and will make recommendations for any needed changes. It also will review the implementation of CSCE commitments and explore cooperative ways to improve the implementation by all CSCE members. The Paris summit mandated the Committee of Senior Officials to prepare Council meetings, act as the Council's agent between its meetings, review current issues, and consider future CSCE work. Over the first year of its existence, the Committee developed into the central decision-making and administrative body of CSCE, meeting almost monthly to deal with a range of issues including the situation in Yugoslavia and membership for newly recognized states.
European Community
The European Community is comprised of three European communities set up in the 1950s--the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community-- that have functioned with common institutions since 1967. Major institutions are the EC Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament, and Court of Justice. The EC has the authority to conclude binding agreements with non- member countries and international organizations. Today, a major goal of the Community is to complete, by the end of 1992, a unified economic area or "single market," with free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital. In December 1991, EC members agreed to amendments of the EC treaties which will move the Community in the direction of greater economic, monetary, and political union, including more unified foreign and security policies. The EC's current aim is increased integration of member countries. It is expected to establish a single European Central Bank and a single currency by the end of 1992. However, all 12 member states may not enter the new arrangements at once. Meeting in Maastricht, Netherlands, in 1991, members set a deadline of no later than January 1999 for the inception of a common currency. The European Parliament is the only multinational European institution directly elected by the people of Europe. Elections are held every 5 years. The Parliament has 518 members from the EC's 12 member states. Currently, there are nine political groups, embracing a range of European political ideologies. It is run by a bureau consisting of the president and 12 vice presidents. The various parliamentary committees issue reports on proposals of the EC Commission--the executive body of the European Community charged with initiating action--and on other important matters. The European Parliament's main role is consultative, because the EC's chief legislative powers remain with the EC Council of Ministers--the intergovernmental group that is the EC's highest decision-making body--and the EC Commission. The Parliament has been granted the following rights: to reject a draft budget, to force the EC Commission to resign as a body (this right has never been exercised), to respond to the written and oral questions it directs to the EC Commission and the Council of Ministers on their activities, and to approve or disapprove applications of non-member countries to join the Community and new association agreements. The Council can overrule the Parliament by a unanimous vote only. The Parliament has taken a leading role in pressing for closer European integration, including a more substantive role for itself. The Maastricht Treaty, approved by the European Council in December 1991 (but not yet ratified), strengthens the Parliament's assent-cooperation role and synchronizes the terms of Parliament members and the EC commissioners. Parliamentary business is conducted in Strasbourg (plenary sessions), Brussels (committee meetings), and Luxembourg (secretariat).
Council of Europe
The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 to foster Europe's common heritage and to promote human rights and social progress. It was based on Sir Winston Churchill's 1946 proposal for a "United States of Europe." The Council is headquartered in Stras-bourg, France. Since 1989, when East and Central European countries began to re-establish democratic institutions and to apply for membership, the Council has boosted its role in Europe's political integration. The Council's two main bodies are the Parliamentary Assembly, composed of 170 representatives chosen by the national parliaments, and the Committee of Ministers, consisting of the foreign ministers of member nations and their deputies. The Assembly holds four plenary sessions each year. Although the Assembly has no major decision-making power, it is a significant voice within Europe on matters such as relations with newly independent states and human rights issues. Among the most important of the Council's other organs are the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (supported by a 900-member secretariat), which investigate and rule on alleged violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.
European Free Trade Association
EFTA, headquartered in Geneva, was created in 1960 to promote free trade among its seven original members in Western Europe--Austria, Denmark, UK, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. EFTA was conceived as an organization similar to the European Economic Community. The founders hoped that the two organizations might eventually be merged. EFTA members agreed to remove all tariffs on industrial products imported from each other over a 10-year period but, unlike the EEC, to maintain their existing national tariffs on certain imports. On May 2, 1992, foreign ministers of both EFTA and the EC signed a treaty in Portugal (to take effect on January 1, 1993) uniting the two groups into a new European Economic Area. The 1,000- page treaty stipulates free movement of goods, labor, services, and capital among member states.
Nordic Council
The Nordic Council is a Scandinavian advisory body established in 1952 to provide for synchronized laws and cultural cooperation among five member nations. With headquarters in Stockholm, the Council has worked to standardize legal, economic, and social arrangements among its members. As a result of cooperation within the Council, citizens of one Nordic country visiting or working in another share many of the rights of the country's nationals. Each member sends representatives to an annual meeting to formulate policy.
Western European Union
Based on the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the WEU was established in 1955 as an alliance concerned with European cooperation in the field of security. Its structure consists of the Secretariat (London), Parliamentary Assembly (Paris), and Institute for Security Studies (Paris). In addition, meetings of experts and political directors are held regularly, and foreign and defense ministers meet at least twice a year. Moribund for nearly 3 decades, the WEU was revitalized in 1986, coincidental with European efforts to deal with conflicts in the Persian Gulf. In 1987, WEU states dispatched mine-sweeping units to the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. More recently, WEU states contributed to the Gulf coalition forces efforts by coordinating the European component of an international naval blockade and, later, coordinating humanitarian assistance to Kurdish refugees. At the EC summit talks in Maastricht in December 1991, the 12 EC nations agreed on a new mandate for the WEU: The WEU will serve as the defense component of the European Union and as the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance. In addition, to better coordinate with NATO and EC, the WEU Secretariat will be moved to Brussels by the end of 1992. Membership in the WEU will be opened up; EC member states are invited to join the WEU either as full members or as observers. European members of NATO are invited to participate as associate members. (###)
Who Belongs to What
The 52 members are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Byelarus, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia.
The 12 members are Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom.
The 16 members are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
The 36 members are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelarus, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Uzbekistan.
Council of Europe
The 27 members are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom.
The 6 members are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Nordic Council
The 5 members are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
The 9 members are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom. (###)
EC at a Glance
-- The total population of the 12 EC member states is about 345 million. It is world's largest trading bloc and America's largest trading partner. -- In 1990, the EC had a GDP of $6 trillion and an average per capita GDP of $17,400. Total US-EC trade was $189 billion in 1991: US imports from the European Community amounted to $86 billion; US exports to the EC were $103 billion. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992 Title:

Points of Contact For US Firms Seeking Business Opportunities in The New Independent States

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jun, 29 19926/29/92 Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies Region: Eurasia Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Subject: Trade/Economics, State Department [TEXT] Focus on the Emerging Democracies A Periodic Update The President has designated Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger as Coordinator of US Assistance Policy for the New Republics of the Former Soviet Union. Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Dr. Michael Boskin, Deputy Treasury Secretary John Robson, and US Agency for International Development Administrator Ronald W. Roskens, have been designated as Deputy Coordinators. In addition, each US Government agency listed below has identified key individuals as points of contact.
Department of State
The Office of the Deputy to the Coordinator is headed by Ambassador Richard L. Armitage, who reports to the Deputy Secretary of State. Ambassador Armitage is responsible for overall coordination of US assistance policy and technical assistance programs (ongoing or planned) for the new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. This office is the initial point of contact for US firms interested in business and investment opportunities. Priscilla Rabb-Ayres Senior Adviser, Private Sector Programs D/CISA, Rm. 1004 US Department of State 2201 C Street, NW Washington, DC 20520 Tel: 202-647-2626 Fax: 202-647-2636
US Agency For International Development (USAID)
The Center for Trade and Investment Services provides specific information about USAID programs and activities. Mr. Caesar Gonzmart USAID, SA-2 Washington, DC 20523-0029 Tel: 202-663-2660 or 1-800-USAID-4-U Fax: 202-663-2149.
Department of Commerce
The Business Information Service for the New Independent States (BISNIS) provides information on business opportunities, foreign trade legislation, and sources of financing, as well as contact information. It will publish a monthly BISNIS Bulletin on trade-related US Government programs and trade promotional events. BISNIS will have a match-making service and also publish a "Search for Partners" newsletter. Linda Nemec Director, Business Information Service US Department of Commerce Rm. 7413 Herbert C. Hoover Building Washington, DC 20230 Tel: 202-377-4655 Fax: 202-377-4473
US Trade and Development Program (TDP)
TDP promotes US exports for major development projects in the NIS. It funds feasibility studies, consultancies, training programs, and other project planning services related to major projects. Daniel Stein US Trade and Development Program SA-16, Rm. 309 Washington, DC 20523-1602 Tel: 703-875-4357 Fax: 703-875-4009
Export/Import Bank (Eximbank)
The Eximbank and its insurance contractor, the Foreign Credit Insurance Association (FCIA), provide insurance, guarantees, and loans to US exporters and commercial banks to facilitate financing for the export of goods and services from the United States to many of the NIS emerging markets.
FCIA Insurance:
Mitchell McCauley Loan Officer Eximbank of the US 811 Vermont Ave., NW Washington, DC 20571 Tel: 202-566-8190 Fax: 202-566-7524
Guarantees and Loans, including Oil and Gas Sector:
John Lentz (same address as above) Tel: 202-566-8208 Fax: 202-566-7524
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
OPIC promotes economic growth in more than 125 developing nations and emerging economies (including at this time Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia) by encouraging US private investment in those nations. OPIC assists American investors through three principal programs: -- Financing investment projects through direct loans and loan guarantees; -- Insuring investment projects against a broad range of political risks; and -- Providing a variety of investor services including advisory services, project development funding, investment missions, computer-assisted joint venture partner matching, and country and regional information kits.
1100 New York Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20527
OPIC NIS contacts:
Dave Cahn, Legal Affairs Tel: 202-336-8423 Fax: 202-408-0297 Michael Oxman, Insurance Tel: 202-336-8589 Fax: 202-408-5142 Burton Bostwick, Finance Tel: 202-336-8475 Fax: 202-408-9866 Dan Riordan, Investor Services Tel: 202-336-8620 Fax: 202-408-5145 Brenda Brereton, Investor Services Tel: 202-336-8617 Fax: 202-408-5145
US Department of Agriculture (USDA)
USDA is responsible for commercial export programs and several food aid programs including concessional loans, Food for Peace Programs, and com- modity grants. A wide array of US agricultural food commodities are eligible for export under these different programs. USDA also sponsors technical assistance programs for the NIS that support the transition to a private agriculture system. Mary Chambliss USDA, Rm. 4079 SUSDA/FAS/EC Washington, DC 20250-1000 Tel: 202-720-3573 Fax: 202-690-0727
US Information Agency (USIA)
USIA is responsible for educational and cultural exchanges, information programs, internships, and training activities that support US policy goals in the new countries. USIA programs aim to assist democratic and economic reform in the new states. In addition to USIA Foreign Service officers posted in NIS Embassies, USIA Washington headquarters works through a number of private sector exchange organizations in the United States. Rosemary DiCarlo USIA, Rm. 868 301 4th Street, SW Washington, DC 20547 Tel: 202-619-5057 Fax: 202-619-6821
Department of the Treasury
The Treasury Department provides technical assistance in macroeconomic policy, government financial operations, and financial sector reform to support development and operation of central and commercial banking institutions. Alexis Rieffel Office of Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union Policy 1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Rm. 4138 Main Treasury Department Washington, DC 20220 Tel: 202-622-2130 Fax: 202-622-2308 (###)