US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: From Cold War to Democratic Peace
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Address before the World Affairs Council of Boston,
Boston, Massachusetts
Date: Jun, 25 19926/25/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
I am pleased and honored to be here today to receive the Christian A. Herter
Memorial Award.
Twice in his lifetime, Christian Herter saw the world utterly transformed.
First as a young man, then in full maturity, he watched great wars sweep
away old orders, raising nations to greatness, reducing others, redrawing
borders, and revising the very terms by which we defined the world and
America's place in it.
Today we stand at a similar moment of change--a moment symbolized by
last week's Washington summit between President Bush and President
Yeltsin. In 2 days, the leaders of the United States and the Russian
Federation began to close one historic chapter and to open another:
-- Russia and the United States agreed to slash our nuclear arsenals,
reversing what once seemed to be an irreversible nuclear arms competition,
and leaving far, far behind the time when schoolchildren knelt beneath their
desks and prepared for nuclear Armageddon;
-- We concluded treaties to accelerate trade and investment between our
two countries, opening up vast economic opportunities for the Russian and
American peoples;
-- We forged an unprecedented partnership in fields as broad as defense
conversion, space, science and technology, and in regions as diverse as the
Balkans and the Korean Peninsula; and
-- We issued the Washington charter on partnership and friendship,
committing our two countries to uphold the principles of democracy,
economic freedom, and peaceful settlement of disputes.
The progress achieved by President Bush and President Yeltsin at the
Washington summit was, indeed, a cause for celebration--for Americans,
for Russians, and for the world. But it is also a call to action. Because the
summit marked not just an end but a beginning.
Disarming Fear
Nothing so defined the Cold War--or so revealed its terror--as the nuclear
arms competition. Future generations will find it difficult to understand
how pervasive the threat of nuclear war was, not only in our foreign policy
but in our daily lives. There was always the fear--not on the surface,
perhaps, but always just beneath it--that the next crisis might be the
terrifying last. For my generation, that fear was there at night when we put
our children to bed, and there in the morning when we read about the latest
flare-up over Cuba, Berlin, or the Middle East. Americans lived at Ground
Zero.
There were those who told us that we would have to accept the threat of
nuclear war as a horrifying but inevitable fact of life. They said that
agreements could only slow the arms race, never halt or reverse it.
But President Bush made his first priority as Commander in Chief to reduce
the threat to America and the danger to Americans. Working with a
democratic Russia and the other new states of the former Soviet Union, we
have pursued a comprehensive and integrated approach that in less than 10
months has radically reduced the nuclear danger:
-- All tactical nuclear weapons have been consolidated in Russia;
-- By 2003 and, hopefully, by the year 2000, Russia and the United States
will cut our strategic nuclear weapons by two-thirds, reducing our
inventories to no more than 3,500 warheads each;
-- Russia and the United States will eliminate all multiple warhead land-
based missiles, the most destructive and destabilizing weapons in the
history of humanity;
-- Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--still host to a fourth of Soviet
strategic forces--will responsibly forswear the nuclear option and become
parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
-- Finally, we will put in place the most intensive and extensive
verification regimes ever developed.
We have gone far in putting 40 years of fear behind us. We have moved far
from Ground Zero and nuclear confrontation.
But another task has just begun: We must create a real, enduring peace with
Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.
A Spirit of Change
Because, just as important as the weapons limits and the timetables and
the verification regimes is the spirit that made these changes possible: The
spirit of historic change that last week moved even world-weary
Washington.
That spirit was embodied in Boris Yeltsin. President Yeltsin came to
Washington as the leader of a reborn Russia. He came as a freely elected
president, fully committed to democracy and private enterprise. He came, in
short, as a partner: a partner ready to transcend both his nation's tragic
history and the legacy of the Cold War; a partner prepared to work with us
to build a democratic peace, a peace grounded in political and economic
freedom.
A Democratic Peace
A democratic peace is a real and enduring peace: a peace rooted in a shared
commitment to democratic government; a peace nurtured by the prosperity
that only the free market can provide.
It is a peace based on the same values upon which our own great nation is
founded: responsible representative government, respect for human rights,
the rule of law, and private property.
The peace we hope to build with Russia and the other new and independent
states is the peace that we enjoy today with Western Europe and Japan--a
peace that has let us flourish as no other nations in history, attaining
unprecedented peace and prosperity. It's a peace that makes even the idea of
war between the United States and its allies the stuff of fantasy.
Building a democratic peace with Russia and the other new and independent
states will not occur overnight. Neither did the peace we enjoy today with
old enemies like Germany and Japan.
And building a democratic peace will not be easy. But neither was re-
creating a world from the ruins of World War II.
Our task today--to extend democracy to Russia and the other new and
independent states--is no less daunting. Our success will depend on
developments there--above all, on the political and economic
transformation of the states of the former Soviet Union. Only then can
these nations become full members in the world's democratic community.
And only then can they successfully integrate into the world economy and
share in--and add to--its abundance.
President Yeltsin and other brave democrats have put their political lives--
and more--on the line to achieve that transformation. They've asked not for
charity but for our partnership.
The FREEDOM Support Act
The FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and
Open Markets] Support Act, proposed by President Bush on April 1, is our
answer. The act directly addresses the military, political, and economic
transformation of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Byelarus, and the other new
states. It supports threat reduction, defense conversion, non-proliferation,
and nuclear safety. It strengthens democratization and people-to-people
programs. And it encourages free markets through technical assistance,
trade and investment promotion, and macroeconomic stabilization.
Let me explain the act--what it is and what it's supposed to do:
First, the FREEDOM Support Act supports freedom by bolstering reform.
With the International Monetary Fund, Russia has embarked on a broad, bold
program to free prices, privatize property, and create a convertible
currency. President Yeltsin and other reformers are attempting to build
modern, free-market economies from the ground up. Their efforts are
hampered by political turmoil, economic hardship, and the simple fact that
no one has ever done what they are trying to do.
Our help is no hand-out. The reformers must take the hard decisions. They
must do the hard work. But we, and all who want to see this courageous
experiment in freedom prevail, can help them succeed.
Second, the act will underpin America's share in an international effort--
our fair share. The problems of the former Soviet Union are too huge for any
one country to tackle. Last January, President Bush convened a coordinating
conference in Washington to forge a broad coalition of more than 50 nations
and international institutions to support reform in Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Armenia, and the other new and independent states. That
coalition is at work today.
And this is only right. Both we and our partners will all benefit from a
democratic peace. And together we must share the responsibility of helping
make it a reality.
Third, the act creates economic opportunity--there and here. The current
hardship in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and the other new states of the former
Soviet Union obscures their great economic potential. These nations
straddle two continents and stretch across 11 time zones. They possess
vast material and human resources, much of it still untapped. Russia and
the other new states comprise one of the world's largest markets--one that
today cries out for American goods, American services, American
technology. Visionary American investors and traders are already on the
scene doing business.
By catalyzing the private sector, the FREEDOM Support Act will help create
opportunities for Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Byelarussians, for all the
peoples of the former Soviet Union--and for Americans and American
business.
Fourth, and most importantly, the act is an investment in America's
security, now and in the future. There are two peace dividends. The first
is financial and important. The second is human, and it is critical: The
freedom from fear that we wish for all Americans.
Let there be no doubt: If Russia and the other new democracies fail, if
democracy collapses and authoritarianism returns, we stand to lose both
dividends. Defense budgets could rise again, and the fear we knew during
the Cold War could return. We could find ourselves setting back the clock
and putting forward the time when we can consign the nuclear nightmare to
a memory.
In sum, the FREEDOM Support Act represents our part in a partnership for a
democratic peace--and a chance to seize a historic opportunity.
A Moment of Opportunity
For decades, Soviet communism not only enslaved peoples but kept change
itself captive. In the Soviet Empire and the petty tyrannies it spawned in
Eastern Europe, communism froze economic and political development.
Abroad, it locked the world into a dangerous contest known as the Cold War.
Now Soviet communism is gone. Change, suddenly, is everywhere we look,
sweeping empires and ideologies before it, shaping a new era even as we
watch.
Such moments are rare. They have occurred only twice before in this
century, and they are precious. Because such moments offer us a unique
opportunity to create a better world. But they do not last.
Today, we stand at such a moment. President Bush and the Administration
have acted. With the START Treaty [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] and
last week's agreement, we can begin to close forever the tragic chapter of
the arms fear. But, no less importantly, we can press forward with the
FREEDOM Support Act to build a democratic peace. By doing so we begin to
open a new chapter--a chapter of hope.
Both the START Treaty and the FREEDOM Support Act are before the
Congress. Congress may hesitate, but history will not. It is time for the
Senate and the House to act and act now.
Times here at home have been tough. The budget is tight, and it is an
election year. There should be no wonder, then, when we hear arguments
against support for Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.
But all these arguments reduce to one excuse: America can't afford it.
To which I say: We can. Because we, as a people, are rich in the best sense
of the word:
-- Rich in the courage it takes to put partisanship aside to do what is right
for our country;
-- Rich in the common sense it requires to see that an investment in
democracy in Russia today is better than paying trillions later for defense
against her;
-- Rich in the generosity it takes to foster abroad the very values upon
which our own great nation was founded; and
-- Above all, rich in the imagination it requires to seize a once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity to ensure that our children and grandchildren will
never know the uncertainty and fear of another Cold War.
Conclusion
Ladies and gentlemen: Christian A. Herter would not hesitate. Whether as
congressman, governor of this great state, or secretary of state, he believed
that history is not something that happens to men and women, but something
that men and women make happen.
Like others of his generation who came of age during World War I, Christian
Herter fostered high hopes that the end of that bloody conflict would usher
in a new era of peace. But the historic moment passed: America turned
inward and Europe plunged again into discord and, in time, into another
horrifying war.
After World War II, Herter and the other statesman of his era made sure that
America wouldn't make the same mistake twice: This time, we seized the
historic opportunity and forged the great alliance that would fight the Cold
War and finally prevail.
Today, we face a similar challenge, a similar choice. Like Herter, we must
act and, by acting, leave to future generations of Americans an inheritance
of hope, not a legacy of "what ifs." If we fail, history will judge us harshly:
not just the history of textbooks, but the human history that will be read in
the lives of our children and grandchildren--a history that we today, by our
decisions, have already begun to write. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: The START Treaty: Foundation of a Safer World
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jun, 23 19926/23/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
One week ago today, President Bush and President Yeltsin revolutionized the
nuclear age. In the Rose Garden of the White House, they announced that
over the course of the next 10 years Russia and the United States will
dramatically slash nuclear weapons levels to previously unthinkable levels.
By this agreement, MIRVed [multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle] ICBMs--the hydra-headed monsters that threatened to destabilize
our strategic relationship--will be eliminated. While we reduce nuclear
weapons to the minimum levels necessary for ensuring our security, Russia
and America--working with our allies and friends--will also engage in what
we hope will be a productive dialogue to develop a concept for the
deployment of a global protection system against limited ballistic missile
attacks on both our peoples and our friends and allies.
Historians may well mark last Tuesday as the end of the Cold War nuclear
arms competition. But the history of the end of the arms competition will
only be complete when you finish one of the most important last chapters:
when you exercise your constitutional duty and give your advice and consent
to the ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
For, as I believe you'll agree, START is critical to the end of the nuclear
arms competition. For the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, we
have agreed to real reductions in our nuclear weapons levels, rather than
simply setting limits on their rate of increase. In a very real sense,
START is the means by which we will begin to turn back the nuclear clock,
advancing both strategic stability and predictability.
And while nailing down the end of the Cold War, START also addresses what
is perhaps the most important security challenge of our time--nuclear non-
proliferation--through its legally binding protocol.
Moreover, it locks in these achievements through the most extensive and
intrusive verification regime ever, institutionalizing a safer world with its
legally binding provisions.
With START ratification, the foundation of a safer world will be set in place
and the prospect of nuclear Armageddon safely locked away. But if START
were not to be ratified, last Tuesday's historic agreement would be
meaningless, our security less sure, and the prospect for a renewed nuclear
arms competition and increased nuclear proliferation more possible. For as
President Bush and President Yeltsin made clear, the new agreement for
further reductions assumes that the START Treaty--with its effective
verification regime--will be ratified and implemented. And, of course, we
will be proceeding as quickly as possible with codifying last week's
agreement into a treaty.
With you today, Mr. Chairman, I would like to review briefly the essential
provisions of the treaty, discuss the importance of its protocol, and show
how START ratification is an essential step in building the democratic
peace we seek with Russia and the other new independent states.
START: Locking in Stability and Predictability
One of START's fundamental goals is to reduce the risk of nuclear war by
enhancing strategic stability and predictability, especially in times of
crisis.
First and foremost, START will reduce the risk of nuclear war by reducing
levels of strategic forces in a stabilizing manner. To put START's
reductions into perspective, consider this: In order to meet START's limits,
on average, an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] launcher, an SLBM
[sea-launched ballistic missile] launcher, or a heavy bomber from the
former Soviet inventory must be destroyed every 68 hours throughout the
first 7 years of implementation.
Last week's agreement to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs is the logical
culmination of a process begun in START to eliminate those weapons whose
combination of vulnerability and effectiveness risked pushing both sides
into a hair-trigger posture. Eliminating these "use 'em, or lose 'em
weapons," eliminates almost any rationale for launching first in a crisis.
Heavy MIRVed ICBMs became a prime symbol of the Soviet threat. Now
democratic Russia has agreed to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs by no later than
2003--and, hopefully, by the year 2000 if that can be worked out
technically and, with US help, financially.
Strategic stability will be buttressed by the predictability START mandates
through its openness and transparency provisions. START institutionalizes
the most extensive notification, inspection, monitoring, and data exchange
regimes ever negotiated. Implementation of these regimes will create
military transparency and openness heretofore unthinkable. Those regimes
are also a critical prerequisite for last week's agreement.
Let me emphasize that such transparency and openness is ensured by the
treaty requirements. For example, with ratification of START, there will be
an end to the historic Soviet penchant for secrecy of ballistic missile
telemetry data, as START dictates the cessation of the encryption of such
data. A major accomplishment of the treaty--once considered unattainable-
-is that it gives the sides complete access to one another's missile
telemetry, with only a few minor exceptions. This access will allow us to
monitor missile tests more carefully than ever and will help us verify the
treaty's limits on missile warheads and throw-weight, its ban on new types
of heavy ICBMs, and other provisions. In addition, every year we will
receive plans for the elimination of strategic offensive arms on the
territory of the former Soviet Union, and we will be continually notified of
the movements and disposition of these strategic offensive arms.
Mr. Chairman, by implementing the START Treaty, we ensure the right to
basic equality in forces. START's overall ceilings apply equally to the
United States and to the forces of the former Soviet Union while preserving
each side's flexibility in the make-up of its forces. At the same time, the
treaty does not inhibit the development and deployment of non-nuclear
military technologies such as conventional cruise missiles, whose
effectiveness and value to our armed forces was underscored during the Gulf
war.
START Protocol
Let me turn to the protocol to the START Treaty that we signed in Lisbon.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, this committee recognized that the
question of exactly who would be our treaty partner was a critical issue for
START.
Through our many exchanges, I assured you that the President and I strongly
believed that the four new states with strategic offensive arms and
declared treaty-related facilities on their territories--Byelarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine--must be legally obligated to observe and
implement START. At the same time, we wanted to ensure the safe
command and control of former Soviet nuclear forces and to ensure that the
proliferation of new states in Eurasia did not also lead to a proliferation of
new nuclear powers. The protocol does all these things and more.
The protocol legally obligates Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to
observe and implement START as parties to the treaty.
By the protocol, ratification and implementation of the START Treaty now
furthers our most fundamental non-proliferation objectives. It ensures
that, despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, the number of nuclear-weapon
states shall not increase.
The protocol thus expands the treaty's role by obligating Byelarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to become parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. Combined with the legally
binding obligations in the associated letters from the heads of state of each
of these countries, implementation of START means that 7 years after entry
into force there will no longer be any nuclear weapons or deployed strategic
offensive arms in Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Those forces currently
amount to over one-quarter of the declared strategic nuclear warheads of
the former Soviet military.
Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have viewed START as a means to
establish non-nuclear weapon zones on their territories, to enhance their
standing as sovereign, independent states, and to show the world that they
can act responsibly, thus deserving full inclusion in the family of nations.
In this regard, I hope the committee will join with the President in saluting
the Governments of Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine for the important
commitments they have made in the interests of international peace and
security. Through their renunciation of nuclear weapons, they have set an
example other states need to follow.
In this, START serves as a concrete example of our determination to
fulfill our commitments under Article VI of the NPT. This article calls for
each of the parties to the treaty to pursue negotiations on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear
disarmament.
START and a Democratic Peace
Mr. Chairman, the START Treaty is a product of the Cold War, but it is by no
means a relic. Instead, START is the gateway to this new era of cooperation
that will help control and destroy the military remnants of the Cold War.
This effort complements the efforts underway to build democracy and free
market systems in the new independent states and to build a democratic
peace with them.
Having the START Treaty in force also complements our new, practical steps
to help Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine disable and dismantle
nuclear weapons. It is consistent with our efforts to create international
science centers in Russia and Ukraine that will encourage weapons
scientists in the former Soviet Union to turn their talents to peaceful
purposes, rather than auctioning their deadly skills off to the highest
foreign bidder. Collectively, these efforts will show practical benefits not
only in eliminating the effects of the Cold War but in helping us address
some of the most pressing challenges arising out of the Cold War's demise.
And while it serves as a framework for next steps on deeper reductions, the
treaty also ensures that significant reductions will begin now, even as
Russia and the United States pursue the codification of the agreement
reached last week. I would hope you would resist any temptation to delay
START ratification until the de-MIRVing treaty is codified. We need to put
START into place now.
Finally, let me add one additional aspect of START implementation that
relates to our four treaty partners. Although there is continued, significant
progress toward building democratic governments in Byelarus, Kazakhstan,
Russia, and Ukraine and establishing stable relationships between them,
there is uncertainty about the future due to the enormous economic strains
these states and societies are experiencing.
If you are concerned about uncertainty, ratify START. START provides a
legally binding basis that locks in stabilizing changes. With START in place,
we have a powerful instrument at our disposal to manage change safely and
surely under almost any political circumstances, ensuring that our interests
are protected. Without START, however, we will simply have added
strategic uncertainty to the considerable economic and political uncertainty
that already exists, doing a disservice not only to the states of the former
Soviet Union, but, worst of all, to the American people as well.
Conclusion
In short, Mr. Chairman, START is a good agreement--indeed, a historic one.
But, just as important as the limits and the timetables and the verification
regimes is the spirit that moves our relations with the new independent
states of the former Soviet Union.
You saw that spirit last week embodied in President Boris Yeltsin: It is the
spirit of the new and democratic Russia. It is a spirit that brings the hope
of freedom and prosperity to millions enslaved and impoverished by
communism. And it is the spirit that gives us hope that we can build a true
democratic peace--based on shared values, not the balance of terror--for
ourselves and for generations of Americans to come. Because, as President
Bush so eloquently put it, "Democrats in the Kremlin can assure our security
in a way nuclear missiles never could."
Through START and the FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging European
Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act, we help assure that security--
and help foster that spirit.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: We stand at history's hingepoint.
With the START Treaty, we begin to close a tragic 40-year chapter of
nuclear competition. With the FREEDOM Support Act, we can begin to open
another chapter--one of partnership and friendship with Russia and the
independent states.
I ask the Senate to fulfill its solemn responsibility and move history
forward by prompt approval of both. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: START Treaty Protocol Sent to the Senate
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of transmittal letter released by the White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Newport Beach, California
Date: Jun, 19 19926/19/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
To the Senate of the United States:
I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Protocol) signed at Lisbon,
Portugal, on May 23, 1992. The Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the
START Treaty), which I transmitted for the advice and consent of the Senate
to ratification on November 25, 1991. The Protocol is designed to enable
implementation of the START Treaty in the new international situation
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Protocol constitutes an
amendment to the START Treaty, and I therefore request that it be
considered along with the START Treaty for advice and consent to
ratification.
I also transmit for the information of the Senate documents that are
associated with, but not integral parts of, the Protocol or the START Treaty.
These documents are letters containing legally binding commitments from
the heads of state of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan,
and Ukraine concerning the removal of nuclear weapons and strategic
offensive arms from their territories. Although not submitted for the
advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, these documents are
relevant to the consideration of the START Treaty by the Senate. No new US
security assurances or guarantees--beyond the assurances previously
extended to all nonnuclear-weapon States Parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty--are associated with any of these letters.
The START Treaty represents a nearly decade-long effort by the United
States and the former Soviet Union to address the nature and magnitude of
the threat that strategic nuclear weapons pose to both countries and to the
world in general. As I indicated in transmitting that Treaty to the Senate,
the United States had several objectives in the START negotiations. First,
we consistently held the view that the START Treaty must enhance stability
in times of crisis. Second, we sought an agreement that did not simply
limit strategic arms, but that reduced them significantly below current
levels. Third, we sought a treaty that would allow equality of US strategic
forces relative to those of the former Soviet Union. Fourth, we sought an
agreement that would be effectively verifiable. And, finally, the United
States placed great emphasis during the negotiations in seeking an
agreement that would be supported by the American and allied publics.
I was fully convinced in 1991 and I remain fully convinced that the START
Treaty achieves these objectives. In addition, the Protocol transmitted
herewith has allowed us to achieve another important objective: ensuring
that only one state emerging from the former Soviet Union will have nuclear
weapons. To gain the benefits of START in the new international situation
following the demise of the Soviet Union, it is necessary that Byelarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine--the four former Soviet republics within
whose territory all strategic offensive arms are based and all declared
START-related facilities are located--be legally bound by the START Treaty.
The Protocol accomplishes this, while recognizing the sovereign and
independent status of each of these four states.
Of equal importance, the Protocol obligates Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-
weapon States Parties in the shortest possible time. In addition, the
letters transmitted with the Protocol legally obligate these three states to
eliminate all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive arms located on
their territories within 7 years following the date of entry into force of the
START Treaty. The Protocol and the associated letters thus further one of
our most fundamental non-proliferation objectives--that the number of
nuclear-weapon states shall not be increased. Together with the START
Treaty, the Protocol helps ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used in
the future.
The START Treaty serves the interest of the United States and represents an
important step in the stabilization of the strategic nuclear balance. With
the addition of the Protocol, the START Treaty can be implemented in a
manner consistent with the changed political circumstances following the
demise of the Soviet Union and in a manner that achieves important non-
proliferation goals. I therefore urge the Senate to give prompt and
favorable consideration to the START Treaty, including its Annexes,
Protocols, Memorandum of Understanding, and this new Protocol, and to give
advice and consent to its ratification.
George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: US-Moldova Trade Relations
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jun, 19 19926/19/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia
Country: Moldova
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment
The trade agreement between the United States and Moldova provides for
reciprocal most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment to the products of
each country. A trade agreement was originally concluded with the Soviet
Union in June 1990 and approved by the Congress in November 1991. The
United States and Moldova recently reached agreement on technical
adjustments to that agreement to reflect the establishment of an
independent Moldova. US congressional reapproval is not required.
The agreement will permit Moldovans to export goods to the United States
while receiving non-discriminatory treatment of their goods. The United
States expects that this agreement will create commercial opportunities
for emerging Moldovan enterprises and promote the development of a
market-based economy in Moldova. At the same time, it will lay the
groundwork for enhanced opportunities for US business.
In addition to providing MFN for both parties, the agreement:
-- Provides improved market access and non-discriminatory treatment for
US goods and services in Moldova and also calls for step-by-step provision
of national treatment for US products and services;
-- Facilitates business by allowing free operation of commercial
representations in each country and by permitting companies to engage and
serve as agents and consultants and to conduct market studies; and
-- Offers strong intellectual property rights protection by reaffirming
commitments to the Paris Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention; obligating adherence to the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works; providing copyright protection for computer
programs and data bases and protection for sound recordings; giving product
and process patent protection for virtually all areas of technology; and
providing comprehensive coverage of trade secrets.
OPIC Agreement
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) President and Chief
Executive Officer Fred M. Zeder and Moldovan Minister of Economic Relations
Andrei Chaptine signed a bilateral OPIC agreement this morning at the State
Department. The US-Moldovan OPIC agreement will enable OPIC to provide
investment insurance, project financing, and investor services for US
private investors in the Republic of Moldova. Signature of this agreement
demonstrates US commitment to help the private sector in Moldova develop
and assist US companies seeking to invest there. OPIC is a US Government
agency that provides assistance to American investors in more than 120
developing countries and emerging economies throughout the world.
Projects supported by OPIC also create US jobs and exports and strengthen
America's international competitiveness. OPIC already has signed
agreements with five other new independent states: Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: US-Albania Trade Relations
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate released by
the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington,
DC
Date: Jun, 15 19926/15/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Albania
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Dear Mr. Speaker:
(Dear Mr. President:)
In accordance with section 407 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-
618, January 3, 1975; 88 Stat. 1978), as amended (the "Trade Act"), I am
transmitting a copy of a proclamation that extends nondiscriminatory
treatment to the products of Albania. I also enclose the text of the
"Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and
the Republic of Albania," including exchanges of letters that form an
integral part of the Agreement, which was signed on May 14, 1992, and
which is included as an annex to the proclamation.
The Agreement will provide a nondiscriminatory framework for our bilateral
trade relations and thus strengthen both economic and political relations
between the United States and Albania. Conclusion of this Agreement is an
important step we can take to provide greater economic benefits to both
countries. It will also give further impetus to the progress we have made in
our overall diplomatic relations since last year and help to reinforce
political and economic reform in Albania. In that context, the United States
is encouraging Albania to continue to strive for a democratic, pluralistic
society.
I believe that the Agreement is consistent with both the letter and the
spirit of the Trade Act. It provides for mutual extension of
nondiscriminatory tariff treatment while seeking to ensure overall
reciprocity of economic benefits. It includes safeguard arrangements to
ensure that our trade with Albania will grow without causing disruption to
the U.S. market and consequent injury to domestic firms or loss of jobs for
American workers.
The Agreement also confirms and expands for American businesses certain
basic rights in conducting commercial transactions both within
Albania and with Albanian nationals and business entities. Other provisions
include those dealing with settlement of commercial disputes, financial
transactions, and government commercial offices. Through this Agreement,
Albania also undertakes obligations to modernize and upgrade very
substantially its protection of intellectual property rights. Once fully
implemented, the Albanian intellectual property regime will be on a par
with that of our principal industrialized trading partners. This Agreement
will not alter U.S. law or practice with respect to the protection of
intellectual property.
On May 20, 1992, I waived application of subsections (a) and (b) of section
402 of the Trade Act to Albania. I determined that this waiver will
substantially promote the objectives of section 402, and, pursuant to
section 402 (c) (2) of the Trade Act, notified the Congress that I have
received assurances that the emigration practices of Albania will
henceforth lead substantially to achievement of those objectives.
I urge that the Congress act as soon as possible to approve the "Agreement
on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the Republic
of Albania" and the proclamation extending nondiscriminatory treatment to
products of Albania by enactment of a joint resolution referred to in section
151 of the Trade Act.
Sincerely,
George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: US-Romania Trade Relations
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate released by
the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington,
DC
Date: Jun, 22 19926/22/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Romania
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Dear Mr. Speaker:
(Dear Mr. President:)
In accordance with section 407 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-
618, January 3, 1975; 88 Stat. 1978), as amended (the "Trade Act"), I am
transmitting a copy of a proclamation that extends nondiscriminatory
treatment to the products of Romania. I also enclose the text of the
"Agreement on Trade Relations Between the Government of United States of
America and the Government of Romania," including exchanges of letters
that form an integral part of the Agreement, which was signed on April 3,
1992, and which is included as an annex to the proclamation.
The Agreement will provide a nondiscriminatory framework for our bilateral
trade relations and thus strengthen both economic and political relations
between the United States and Romania. Conclusion of this Agreement is an
important step we can take to provide greater economic benefits to both
countries. It will also give further impetus to the progress we have made in
our overall diplomatic relations since last year and help to reinforce
political and economic reform in Romania. In that context, the United
States is encouraging Romania to continue to strive for a democratic,
pluralistic society, particularly through the conduct of early, free, and fair
national elections.
I believe that the Agreement is consistent with both the letter and the
spirit of the Trade Act. It provides for mutual extension of
nondiscriminatory tariff treatment while seeking to ensure overall
reciprocity of economic benefits. It includes safeguard arrangements to
ensure that our trade with Romania will grow without causing disruption to
the U.S. market and consequent injury to domestic firms or loss of jobs for
American workers.
The Agreement also confirms and expands for American businesses certain
basic rights in conducting commercial transactions both within
Romania and with Romanian nationals and business entities. Other
provisions include those dealing with settlement of commercial disputes,
financial transactions, and government commercial offices. Through this
Agreement, Romania also undertakes obligations to modernize and upgrade
very substantially its protection of intellectual property rights. Once fully
implemented, the Romanian intellectual property regime will be on a par
with that of our principal industrialized trading partners. This Agreement
will not alter U.S. law or practice with respect to the protection of
intellectual property.
On August 17, 1991, I waived application of subsections (a) and (b) of
section 402 of the Trade Act to Romania. I determined that this waiver will
substantially promote the objectives of section 402, and, pursuant to
section 402 (c) (2) of the Trade Act, notified the Congress that I have
received assurances that the emigration practices of Romania will
henceforth lead substantially to achievement of those objectives.
I urge that the Congress act as soon as possible to approve the "Agreement
on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
Government of Romania" and the proclamation extending nondiscriminatory
treatment to products of Romania by enactment of a joint resolution
referred to in section 151 of the Trade Act.
Sincerely,
George Bush (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: US Condemns Nagorno-Karabakh Fighting
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Statement by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler,
Washington, DC
Date: Jun, 18 19926/18/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, CSCE
[TEXT]
The US Government strongly condemns the recent fighting in the Nagorno-
Karabakh crisis. The military actions now underway threaten to undermine
the prospects for good-faith negotiations to resolve the conflict.
The US Government has consistently stated that a lasting solution to this
conflict cannot be achieved through violence. Rather, the only path toward a
peaceful settlement is through good-faith negotiation based on CSCE
[Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] principles.
We call upon all sides to end the violence immediately, recommit
themselves to the CSCE mediation effort, and take steps to de-escalate the
conflict and create an environment in which good-faith negotiations can
succeed.
The CSCE mediation effort is the best opportunity for resolving this tragic
conflict. The US Government calls upon all parties to the conflict to honor
CSCE commitments that require disputants to refrain from any action which
may aggravate a dispute and make it more difficult or impossible to settle.
We urge all parties in the region to act with restraint and to cooperate with
the ongoing CSCE mediation effort. We call upon the representatives of the
Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh to attend the preliminary
meeting, now underway in Rome, of the participants in the CSCE conference
on Nagorno-Karabakh.
The US Government has repeatedly stated that the quality and character of
its relationship with both Armenia and Azerbaijan will depend on their
demonstrated commitment to CSCE principles, including the peaceful
settlement of disputes. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: New Policy on Federal Defense Procurement
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Newport Beach, California
Date: Jun, 19 19926/19/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia
Country: United States, Russia
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, State Department,
International Law
[TEXT]
As part of his regulatory reform initiative, President Bush announced on
June 19 an important change in federal defense procurement policy that will
ease the transition by American businesses and workers to the post-Cold
War era. When fully implemented, the policy will enable American firms to
compete more effectively for billions of dollars [of] additional business and
preserve tens of thousands of American jobs.
The end of the Cold War and the accompanying reduction of the US military
have created dislocations in the American economy. To excel in this new
environment and avoid significant layoffs, many defense-oriented
companies have tried to redirect their efforts toward commercial products
by, for example, adapting military technologies to commercial use.
One obstacle to a successful transition is the Defense Department's
"recoupment of non-recurring costs" rule, adopted in the early 1960s as a
way of sharing weapons development costs with US allies. It requires
contractors to pay fees to the government on non-government sales of
products and technologies developed under government contracts, as well as
commercial spinoffs of those technologies.
In today's environment, the rule operates as a sales tax imposed only on US
companies. It hurts American workers by limiting the ability of their
employers to compete for business in the United States and abroad. This
burden is no longer justified in light of the historic political changes in the
last 3 years. Accordingly, the President has announced a policy that will
eliminate all recoupment fees as expeditiously as possible.
How the New Policy Works
The Department of Defense and Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the
Office of Management and Budget developed the policy in consultation with
the Council on Competitiveness, the President's Export Council, and the
Department of State.
By administrative action, the Department of Defense will immediately
abolish recoupment fees on all products other than "major defense
equipment" (MDE) exported for military uses. This action eliminates
recoupment fees on all non-military products, including spinoffs and
derivatives of military products. Recoupment no longer would be required
if, for example, a company decided to use aircraft cockpit display
technology in making dashboard displays for automobiles.
The policy eliminates recoupment on military products that are unclassified
as MDE or exported for non-military uses. Thus, recoupment no longer will
be required on the sale of aircraft engines for use on commercial airliners.
The Department's action will eliminate recoupment under new non-MDE
contracts and, to the extent permitted by law, existing non-MDE contracts
as well.
In addition, the Administration will work with Congress to eliminate
recoupment fees on MDE exported for military uses. The Arms Export
Control Act requires the Department of Defense to collect recoupment fees
on MDE sales through the Foreign Military Sales program, which accounts for
most MDE sales. The Administration will work with Congress to lift this
requirement and find budget offsets.
Benefits
The new policy will produce several important benefits:
-- It will make US companies more competitive against foreign suppliers,
which typically are not subject to recoupment requirements. The policy
will enhance the capability of American firms to compete for billions of
dollars of business that they might otherwise lose. It also will eliminate
administrative costs associated with the present policy, which, according
to industry estimates, exceed $40 million each year.
-- It will facilitate efforts by defense-oriented companies to shift to
commercial activities. It will give defense contractors an incentive to
develop products and technologies with larger markets. The policy also will
eliminate costly tracking requirements that otherwise would discourage
contractors from consolidating military and commercial operations. This
will facilitate the transfer of technology and ideas within companies and
allow enhanced economies of scale and scope.
-- It will contribute to US national security by strengthening defense-
oriented US companies. The new policy also will reduce defense costs by
encouraging defense contractors to incorporate commercial technologies
into military products. Eliminating recoupment will have no effect on
national security controls such as export licensing requirements, which will
continue to ensure that sophisticated US technology never falls into the
wrong hands.
-- It will preserve thousands of American jobs in high-technology firms
throughout the country. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: Review of US Efforts To Achieve Near East
Policy Goals
Djerejian
Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Jun, 24 19926/24/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
RRegion: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon,
Kuwait
Subject: Democratization, Terrorism, International Law,
United Nations
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you and the
distinguished members of the subcommittee again. It has been 3 months
since we last met, and I would like, today, to review our efforts to achieve
the broad policy goals of the United States in the Near East.
Let me discuss some of the steps we have taken to achieve these goals since
I last spoke with you.
Middle East Peace Process
The Arab-Israeli peace process is on a firm footing, and progress is being
made. Away from the glare of publicity, negotiations involving Israel, Arab
states, and Palestinians have become an established fact in the region. Five
rounds of direct, bilateral negotiations have taken place. Five multilateral
working groups met during May to discuss regional cooperative activities in
such areas as water, the environment, arms control and regional security,
refugees, and economic development. The multilateral steering committee
convened to ensure that the multilateral track fulfilled its promise of
complementing in a pragmatic manner--but not substituting for--the direct
bilateral negotiations. Throughout this whole process, we are working
closely with our co-sponsor, Russia.
Bilateral Negotiations
In the bilateral negotiations, the parties have taken tentative steps toward
serious engagement on the core issues. Israel and the Palestinians have
tabled proposals containing models or outlines for interim self-government
arrangements. During the last round of talks in Washington, the two sides
engaged more intensively on several aspects of these models. As would be
expected, each party also sought to modify the positions of the other side.
Israel asserted that the Palestinian model was too much like a Palestinian
state rather than an interim self-government. The Palestinians countered
that the Israeli outline minimized the scope of powers and authorities to be
transferred and did not include some key elements from the Camp David
accords, such as elections. Palestinians have also used the negotiations to
focus attention on Israeli occupation practices, settlements, and the human
rights situation. Israel has called for an end of intifada [uprising] violence
and the economic boycott.
In the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations, the two sides have engaged in
practical discussions on several key issues, such as water, energy, and
security.
In the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, the security situation on the
ground continues to be of serious concern. Differences between the parties
focus on two main points. Israel seeks a full peace treaty and normalization
with Lebanon. Lebanon seeks immediate implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 425. Notwithstanding this difference of view, the parties
are engaged in serious discussions, particularly in the area of security. It
is helpful that Israel has made it clear that it makes no claim to Lebanese
territory or resources.
In the Israeli-Syrian talks, the two sides continue to focus on the meaning
of a peace settlement under UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Each side has presented its views and has been testing and probing the
position of the other side. There have been serious exchanges on the issue
of mutual security.
All of the parties have now agreed to conduct the next round of bilateral
negotiations in Rome, at a time to be determined. As a co-sponsor of the
peace process, we are working closely with the Italian Government to
ensure that the upcoming negotiations proceed smoothly.
With their basic positions now on the table, we believe the parties can
usefully begin defining possible areas of agreement and narrowing the gaps.
This will require hard work, careful listening, hard-nosed realism, and some
calculated risk-taking. At the same time, the parties need to focus on the
issues being negotiated and not be distracted by events away from the table.
We hope all sides will undertake measures designed to assure that the
negotiations take place in a political environment conducive to making
progress and instilling confidence in the peace process.
Multilateral Negotiations
Mr. Chairman, even as the bilateral negotiating process was underway, the
Administration worked with our co-sponsor, Russia, the parties in the
region, and many of our friends and allies around the world to structure
multilateral negotiations on issues of regional concern. These negotiations
hold promise of allowing the parties to deal with issues that have been
neglected for too long. The multilateral negotiations were conceived as a
means of complementing the bilateral negotiations, not substituting for
them. These forums help bring into the process additional parties from the
region as well as extra-regional parties who can contribute expertise,
experience, and resources.
In May, the multilateral working groups held their initial meetings in
capitals around the world. In all cases, the results were encouraging, as all
parties engaged seriously and pragmatically on a range of issues.
In the environment working group in Tokyo, a number of practical measures
were identified that hold the potential for resolving some festering
environmental problems in the Gulf of Aqaba and in refugee camps in the
occupied territories. In Vienna, the water working group agreed to study
ways to enhance the supply of water and the availability of data on water
resources.
The Canadians hosted the refugee working group. In Ottawa, the parties
identified a range of possible practical steps that could be taken to
alleviate the plight of refugees and displaced persons without prejudice to
the ultimate political settlement. In the economic development working
group, which met in Brussels, the parties agreed to compile an inventory of
priority areas for cooperation. Here in Washington, the arms control and
regional security working group convened and began the important process
of familiarization with each other and with the concepts, methods, and
history of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures.
We were heartened by the participation of so many parties from inside and
outside the region. Most Arab states participated in all of the working
groups, including Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Yemen.
Palestinians also participated in four of the working groups. The
contributions of these Arab delegations to the launching of the multilateral
process with Israel were significant.
Also in May, I co-chaired the multilateral steering committee in Lisbon.
This committee coordinates the efforts of the working groups. This first
meeting after the Moscow organizational session was successful and
productive. The reports from the five working groups demonstrated that all
parties are approaching the issues seriously and pragmatically. The
committee agreed on venues and timeframes for the next round of working
group meetings to be held in the fall.
Clearly, we were disappointed that Syria and Lebanon decided not to attend
the multilateral negotiations. We were equally disappointed that Israel
decided not to attend the working groups on economic development and
refugees. We intend to keep these parties fully briefed in the hope that they
will decide to attend future meetings of the working groups and the steering
committee.
Bilateral Relations
Mr. Chairman, let me also add a word, in the context of the peace process,
about our bilateral relations with the parties most directly concerned. In so
doing, I want to deal with the reality of the relationship and not the
mythology and misperceptions that crop up from time to time. Let me start
with Israel.
Israel
The US-Israel relationship remains rock solid. It is based on the firmest of
foundations, as Secretary Baker has made clear: shared democratic ideals
and values, profound and extensive ties from the grassroots to the official
level, and an unshakable US commitment to Israel's security. US-Israel
relations in every sphere remain active and vibrant.
This has been fully reflected in this Administration's approach to a range of
issues of great importance to Israel.
-- We succeeded in overturning the Zionism/racism equation in the UN
General Assembly.
-- We helped Israel achieve the recognition it deserves, with the
establishment or upgrading of Israel's diplomatic ties with Russia, Turkey,
India, China, and other countries.
-- We were proud to play a key role in the exodus of Ethiopian Jews and
Jews from the former Soviet Union.
-- We helped Israel defend itself against Saddam Hussein's aggression and
eliminated Iraq's ability to project significant force against Israel.
-- We played a key role with Syria on the travel status of Syrian Jews.
-- Most importantly, we successfully brought about a negotiating process
on terms long sought by Israel--namely, direct negotiations between Israel
and each of its
neighbors.
This does not mean--and has never meant--that the United States and Israel
see eye to eye on every issue. Our differences on such substantial questions
as settlements are a matter of record. We have had discussions over
technology transfer concerns. We have tried, and will continue to try, to
deal with such matters in a businesslike fashion and on a basis of mutual
respect, as befits close friends. We hope we will be able to arrive at
mutually acceptable terms that would allow us to extend loan guarantees to
facilitate immigration absorption in a manner compatible with US policies.
Our differences should not obscure--as they have threatened to recently--
the fact that the United States and Israel share fundamental values and that
we remain unshakably committed to Israel's security and to preserving
Israel's qualitative edge over any likely combination of aggressors.
Syria
The Administration has maintained a broad-based dialogue with the Syrian
leadership on a wide range of issues. This policy of engagement has yielded
results which serve important US interests. Syria joined the US-led
coalition to reverse Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. President
Assad's affirmative response to President Bush's letter inviting Syria to
participate in the peace negotiations with Israel was one of the major
breakthroughs which allowed Secretary Baker to proceed with constructing
a peace process which engages Israel with bilateral negotiations with all
its immediate Arab neighbors. Most recently, we have welcomed the Syrian
Government's decision to lift discriminatory restrictions on travel and the
disposition of property by the Syrian Jewish community. We are in close
contact with the Syrian Government concerning the implementation of this
policy.
Our engagement with Syria does not mean that we overlook real differences
on outstanding issues such as human rights, narcotics, and terrorism. Syria
remains on the list of state sponsors of terrorism as it continues to support
and provide safehaven for terrorist groups. We are engaged in a continuous
and direct dialogue with the Syrian Government in an effort to resolve these
issues and will work to try to achieve positive results, as we have on other
issues.
Lebanon
In Lebanon, US policy remains firm and consistent. We believe that the Taif
agreement continues to offer the best chance of regaining the unity,
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon.
Implementation of this agreement helped bring to an end the turbulent era of
civil war in Lebanon. Under the terms of the Taif accords, the Lebanese and
Syrian Governments should decide on the redeployment of Syrian troops to
the western end of the Bekaa Valley no later than September 1992--which
is 2 years from the ratification of the constitutional reforms in Lebanon.
Syria has pledged to abide by the letter and the spirit of the Taif agreement.
It will be of great importance that that commitment be honored in all its
aspects.
The Government of Lebanon has made important progress in re-constituting
the institutions of the state. The United States hopes to see free and fair
parliamentary elections held there when adequate preparations can assure
their reliability. It is important that the elections be held in an
environment free of intimidation and coercion. Accordingly, it is up to the
Lebanese Government to determine when such free and fair elections can be
held. We have encouraged the new government to tackle the country's
serious economic problems as its first priority. Recent events underscore
the urgency of restoring the Lebanese economy and beginning the task of
reconstruction. We, along with other countries and international financial
institutions, are considering ways in which we can help.
We continue to support the extension of central government authority
throughout all of Lebanon, the disarming of all militias, and the withdrawal
of all non-Lebanese forces. We have also discussed our serious concern over
the situation in South Lebanon with key governments in the region, asking
all to exercise maximum restraint lest the continuing violence lead to even
more serious consequences for all concerned.
Jordan
Jordan is playing a very constructive role in the peace process at both the
bilateral and multilateral levels. This role has helped us make moderate
progress toward the gradual restoration of a bilateral relationship that was
severely strained by the Gulf war.
When King Hussein visited the United States last March, he pledged to the
President Jordan's continued commitment to the peace process and to abide
by the UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq. We have since been working
closely with the Government of Jordan to establish an effective and credible
sanctions enforcement regime there. Unfortunately, I cannot yet report to
you that we have accomplished this task. Establishment of such a regime is
particularly important, because reports continue of contraband entering Iraq
via Jordan. We have informed the Jordanians that further progress in our
bilateral relationship and our ability to provide assistance to Jordan depend
not only on the peace process but also on effective Jordanian cooperation
and measures to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq.
Egypt
Egypt continues to play an active role in the peace process, participating in
each of the five multilateral working groups, working closely with the
United States in urging the parties to the bilateral process to focus on
issues on the table rather than events in the region, and helping to dampen
unrealistic expectations by preparing the parties for a long-term process.
Internally, the government continues its efforts to reform an economy
crippled by decades of socialist policy. While much remains to be done, the
Government of President Mubarak is making tough decisions and taking steps
necessary to privatize and rationalize a massive public sector. Our
bilateral relationship remains vigorous and healthy.
Libya
In the context of this review of our policy, I would like to briefly mention
Libya. We are cooperating closely with the United Nations and a coalition of
allies to end Libyan-sponsored terrorism. The United States is playing a
leading role in the international effort to ensure that the Libyan Government
complies with all aspects of UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748,
including bringing the perpetrators of the Pan Am [flight] 103 and UTA
[flight] 772 bombings to justice and ceasing its support for terrorism and
pursuit of non-conventional weapons.
Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula
Along with the Middle East peace process, the Persian Gulf has remained a
focus of US policy.
Iraq
In Iraq, we continue our leading role in the international effort to maintain
sanctions and pressure on Saddam Hussein. Iraq has failed to comply with
Security Council requirements in many areas. In light of this clear record of
non-compliance, we joined in the Security Council vote last month to
maintain economic sanctions against Iraq. As President Bush has made
clear, we favor the continuation of sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein
continues to hold on to power.
Because of the Iraqi Government's threats to its own people, we have asked
Turkey for further extension of Operation Provide Comfort. This presence,
particularly low-level aircraft flights, was significant in keeping recent
Kurdish elections free of Iraqi interference. We welcomed those elections
in the context of Kurdish statements that they did not challenge Iraqi
territorial unity. Let me make it clear that Iraq's territorial integrity
remains an important part of US policy and a vital element of regional
stability. We look forward one day to elections throughout Iraq so that the
Iraqi people can freely choose their representatives and a government that
reflects the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society. Currently, we are closely
monitoring Saddam Hussein's actions throughout the country and will not
tolerate violations of the UN resolutions, including UN Council Resolution
688, which demands an end to acts of repression.
Overall, our policy toward Iraq is on track, and international support for and
compliance with UN sanctions remains strong, albeit not perfect. The UN
Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have made
substantial progress toward eliminating Iraq's programs in weapons of mass
destruction and offensive missiles. We will continue to provide support to
this process, which is vital to regional security and to curbing Iraq's ability
to again threaten its neighbors, including Saudi Arabia and Israel. The UN
Boundary Commission has made good progress on its mission of demarcating
the Iraq-Kuwait border. Hundreds of international relief workers are acting
to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.
Clearly, Saddam hopes to frustrate and outlast the will of the Security
Council. However, he should have no illusion that the international
community will forget his record of lawless brutality or accept anything
less than full compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions. He is
simply, in our view, unredeemable. We will enforce the UN sanctions fully.
The Iraqi people deserve new leadership which will not only be
representative of the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society but ready to live a
peace with Iraq's neighbors. To that end, we applaud the Iraqi opposition for
their courage in standing up to a ruthless regime by meeting last week in
Vienna. We hope this is a step toward greater unity under freely chosen
leaders and toward a future in which all Iraqis can enjoy the freedoms so
long denied them by Saddam Hussein.
Iran
In Iran, we would like to see a return to the international community and
constructive participation in regional stability. Many hope that the recent
Majlis [parliament] election will lead to moderate policies. We share this
hope, but actions must be the litmus test.
Our normalization of relations with Iran depends on several factors,
particularly an end to support for terrorism. We recognized Iran's role in
the release of American hostages in Lebanon, but that was only a subset of
the overall problem of terrorism where Iranian performance remains
unacceptable. Iran's human rights practices and its apparent pursuit of a
destabilizing arms buildup also remain matters of serious concern. Further,
Iran's policies toward its neighbors in the Gulf, where we have vital
interests, and in Central Asia and Afghanistan need to be watched closely.
Another serious problem is Iran's categoric opposition to the Arab-Israeli
peace process and its support for those, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, who
violently oppose it.
Iran has not taken up our offer to hold a direct dialogue through authorized
representatives. The offer remains, as does our desire for a more normal
relationship if Iranian behavior comes to reflect international norms.
Arabian Peninsula
On the Arabian Peninsula, there are signs of increasing willingness on the
part of governments to expand political participation, and we have made
progress toward our goal of increased security for the area.
Security cooperation between the United States and the six members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] includes military and political consultations,
joint exercises and planning for multilateral exercises, and agreements
with GCC governments to provide a basis for responding rapidly to future
security contingencies. Thus far, we have updated an agreement with Oman
and concluded new agreements with Kuwait and Bahrain and, just yesterday,
with Qatar. We are continuing discussions with the UAE [United Arab
Emirates] and Saudi Arabia and hope to make progress on these agreements
as soon as possible.
As for steps toward broader political participation, which we urge, Kuwait
is preparing for parliamentary elections and resumption of constitutional
rule in October. In Saudi Arabia, King Fahd has announced that he will
appoint a consultative council. A similar structure of consultative councils
was established in Oman last December. In Yemen, multiparty elections are
scheduled to be held in November, and many restrictions on the press have
been removed. We welcome these developments and will continue to
monitor the progress of the Gulf countries as they take steps to permit
fuller political participation and increased civil liberties.
Fundamental Values
We are encouraged by these developments. The fundamental values which
inspire US foreign policy globally--support for human rights, for popular
participation in government, for pluralism, and for the rights of women and
minorities--also find reflection in our approach to the countries of the Near
East.
This reality is the point of departure for our attitude toward an increasingly
important factor in the region--a phenomenon variously described as
political Islam, the Islamic revival, or Islamic fundamentalism. I addressed
this issue in some detail in remarks I gave at Meridian House June 2, the
text of which I can leave with you today [see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 23, p.
444]. But let me just note a few key points.
-- First, we do not view Islam as the next "ism" confronting the West or
threatening world peace. That is an overly simplistic reaction to a complex
reality. It is evident the Crusades have been over for a long time.
-- Second, while we have no desire to impose a "made in the USA" model on
other societies, we are proud of our values and traditions and will support
those in the region who seek to broaden political participation and respect
for basic human values.
-- We part company in the Middle East, as elsewhere, with those--whether
they cloak their message in religious or other terms--who practice
terrorism, oppress minorities, preach intolerance, violate human rights, or
pursue their goals through violent means.
-- Those who seek to broaden political participation in the Middle East will
find us supportive, as we have been elsewhere in the world. At the same
time, we are suspect of those who would use the democratic process to
come to power only to destroy that very process in order to retain power
and political dominance. While we believe in the principle "one person, one
vote," we do not support "one person, one vote, one time."
-- In sum, religion is not a determinant of the nature or quality of our
relations with the countries of the Middle East. Our quarrel is with
extremism and the violence, denial, intolerance, intimidation, coercion, and
terror which too often accompany it.
Support to American Business
Finally, I would like to say a few words about our efforts toward a more
immediate and material goal and one in which I know you, Mr. Chairman, have
expressed a special interest--namely, the promotion of American business
and economic interests in the Middle East. There are two important aspects
to the work of the State Department and our Embassies toward this
objective.
First, we strive in each country to assure that American companies are
afforded every opportunity to compete energetically and equally with
foreign contenders. Our promotion of fair, free, and open markets is aimed
at opening foreign doors and keeping them open for American businesses and
their products.
Second, we in the Department of State, along with our colleagues at
Commerce and our Embassy staffs, work actively with American companies
to promote their products and services. That these efforts are paying off
can be illustrated by a few examples.
-- Our Embassies in the GCC countries are assisting American
manufacturers to sell passenger aircraft to the region's airlines in the face
of fierce international competition.
-- The largest proportion of contracts for expansion and modernization of
Saudi oil facilities has been awarded to American firms. Embassy Riyadh
has played an active role in these and other commercial matters. Total US
exports to Saudi Arabia were $6.6 bil-lion in 1991 and, for the first quarter
of 1992, are 26% ahead of last year's pace. We are actively working with
the Saudi Government to resolve some longstanding commercial disputes and
to establish a dispute resolution mechanism.
-- Kuwait, with a population of around 1 million, purchased $1.2 billion of
US goods and services during war-ravaged 1991 and has increased its
imports of American products this year. In fact, US exports to Kuwait alone
provided jobs for 23,000 Americans in 1991, according to Department of
Commerce figures.
These are just a few examples. The [State] Department is active, in Wash-
ington and at our Embassies, on a daily basis to assist and promote US
business throughout the Middle East, the Maghreb, and South Asia. We know
from experience that sound economic and business ties between the United
States and our friends and allies create a broader, more stable community
of interests as well as directly benefiting the American worker and
economy.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the principled but pragmatic view I have outlined is reflected
in the excellent relations we enjoy with so many of the countries of the
region--from Israel to countries whose systems of government are based on
Islamic principles. It is an integral part of a realistic approach to achieving
the US policy goals I mentioned at the beginning of my statement. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: US Policy and Current Events In Kenya, Malawi,
and Somalia
Cohen
Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jun, 23 19926/23/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Kenya, Malawi, Syria
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest,
Development/Relief Aid, Human Rights
[TEXT]
I am pleased to be here to review US policies and current events in Kenya,
Malawi, and Somalia. US policy in Africa is designed to promote maximum
African participation in the political and economic lives of their countries.
We support fair, equitable, and open systems as we, like Africans, believe
that these are the keys to sustainable democracy, development, and
progress.
We are responding to African demands for better and fairer political and
economic programs--multiple centers of power, open participation,
transparency in government, structures which allow free and fair elections,
freedom of the press, and respect for civil and political rights. Today,
three-quarters of Sub-Saharan countries are in some phase of
democratization. Eighteen African countries have scheduled democratic
elections within the next 18 months. Throughout Africa there is interest in
economic, as well as political, liberalization. Economic reform is urgently
needed to alleviate the harsh poverty which afflicts the continent. Growth
has been constrained by natural disaster and political instability. In spite
of these problems, Africa has reached a turning point in its economic
history. Almost 30 African governments have launched economic reform
programs supported by the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and World Bank.
The United States strongly supports this fundamental shift and believes it
is fully compatible with and complementary to moves toward political
reform.
With this framework in mind, I turn to the specific--and very different and
difficult--cases of Kenya, Malawi, and Somalia.
Kenya
On December 8, 1991, the Government of Kenya authorized multiple parties.
Some 6 months into this new era of multipartyism, Kenya's record on human
rights and democracy remains mixed. There have been genuine advances but
also serious setbacks. I will review both in turn.
The first key advance was the government decision, after lengthy
opposition, to authorize multiple parties. Eight opposition parties have been
registered, and the opposition has held numerous mass rallies. Equally
positive is the government's stated commitment to hold free and fair
elections within the constitutional timeframe. The constitution requires
the government to hold elections no later than February 1993, although it
may call early elections before then. In June, the government began
registering new voters, traditionally the prelude to general elections.
Moreover, the government has agreed that Commonwealth observers can
monitor the elections. And, in recent months, it has released key opponents
from jail.
Simultaneously, however, negative developments have been undermining the
progress achieved. Harassment of the opposition is an ongoing problem.
Several opposition politicians have been charged by the government with
rumor-mongering for their public comments. The government is preventing
opposition parties from opening local offices and creating obstacles to the
holding of public rallies. It is also harassing the press. Six editors and
journalists currently face sedition charges. And last March, the police
brutally clubbed and teargassed peaceful protestors in Nairobi, including
mothers protesting the detentions of their sons. Also worrisome are
attacks by unidentified thugs against opposition leaders. Several leaders
have been assaulted and injured. The authorities have made no apparent
effort to identify and arrest the perpetrators.
The most disquieting development, however, has been the recent ethnic
violence in western Kenya. It has claimed hundreds of lives, left thousands
homeless, and displaced over 100,000 persons. Many observers, including
church leaders, believe the government is behind these attacks. While this
cannot be confirmed, it does appear that, at first, security forces did little
to stop the violence.
In the past few weeks, there appears to be a change in the government's
attitude--security forces have begun responding more effectively to the
communal violence, which has decreased. The Attorney General and the
opposition have begun to meet. Hopefully, a broader government-opposition
dialogue on the election process and procedures will ensue.
Despite the setbacks, Kenya is more democratic today than 6 months ago
under one-party rule. But more progress is needed for democracy and
respect for human rights to take root firmly. US policy toward Kenya is to
urge it to follow the path to a fully democratic and open society. The key to
this is free and fair elections. We are urging the government to hold such
elections soon and to accept widespread monitoring by international and
domestic election observers. This can best ensure the election outcome is
fully democratic and credible.
In November 1991, to underscore our concern about the need for political
and economic reform in Kenya, we decided, with other donors, to withhold
fast-disbursing assistance to Kenya. The United States withheld $28 million
of its planned fiscal year 1992 economic development to Kenya. Progress
remains too modest, and the setbacks too profound, to warrant releasing
these funds at this time. Significant additional progress is required. We
are, however, prepared to provide, in concert with the other donors, election
assistance to help Kenya hold genuinely free and fair elections.
We are urging the government to create a climate conducive to truly free
and fair elections. This includes announcing a firm election date, thus
eliminating a key element of uncertainty. It also means creating a level
playing field by stopping harassment of the opposition and ending the ethnic
violence. The government should also move to ensure that the election
commission has the confidence of a broad spectrum of Kenyan society. The
recent appointment of new commission members who enjoy widespread
respect is a step in the right direction, which should be continued. We are
also urging the government and opposition alike to move beyond the rhetoric
of confrontation to embrace dialogue, thus ensuring a successful
substantive transition to democracy.
In this regard, we believe the opposition call to boycott voter registration
is ill advised. There are irregularities in the registration, and the
government should extend the registration period beyond 1 month, which is
insufficient to get the job done. But it is still unclear whether the
irregularities are a deliberate attempt at fraud or the result of poor
organization. Unless there is widespread registration, many abuses will go
undocumented, making it difficult to determine whether there is truly a
systematic attempt at fraud. And Kenyans who fail to register will lose any
say in the choice of Kenya's leaders in the event of free and fair elections.
The government, for its part, should move promptly to address effectively
the complaints about the fairness of the registration process and the
composition of the election commission.
Besides these political issues, I must mention two other matters that
demand attention. One is the drought that is afflicting Kenya. The United
Nations estimates that almost 1 million Kenyans will require food
assistance due to drought. In the worst hit areas of the northeast,
malnutrition rates among children under five are as high as 72%--with 28%
of those categorized as acutely malnourished. These shocking statistics
parallel conditions
in some parts of war-torn Somalia. The international community is now
mo-bilizing assistance. The US Government has committed $700,000 in
disaster assistance funds to move food by air and road. We are working on
providing 6,000 metric tons of blended foods, worth over $3.4 million, as
soon as possible. We will continue to work with other donors and seek
additional resources for food and non-food relief for those suffering from
the drought.
Before ending my comments on Kenya, I must underscore our concern about
the influx of refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. In less than a
year, the number of refugees in Kenya has soared from under 50,000 to over
300,000. To its great credit, Kenya, previously a reluctant host of refugees,
has generously accepted the recent inflows and is cooperating well with
international relief organizations. But it cannot cope by itself with the
burden. In response to the crisis, we have given $8.5 million to the UNHCR's
[UN High Commissioner for Refugees] emergency appeal for Kenya. We have
also provided funds to NGOs [non-governmental organizations] such as CARE
and the International Rescue Committee to work with the UNHCR in
assisting refugees in Kenya.
Malawi
The United States and Malawi historically have enjoyed cordial relations.
However, we remain concerned about the Government of Malawi's lack of
respect for fundamental human rights and the absence of progress toward a
more open political environment in Malawi.
We appreciate that despite enormous financial costs and severe social
dislocation, Malawi has been an exceedingly hospitable host to a Mozambican
refugee population that totals 10% of its own population (over 950,000
refugees in a country of 10 million people). The burden is compounded by
the worst drought in living memory now afflicting all of Southern Africa.
Our commitment to assist all victims of the drought remains as strong as
ever. We are working to provide substantial emergency food and other
humanitarian assistance to all people at risk in Malawi.
In addition to welcoming the overwhelming influx of refugees, Malawi has
contributed to the Mozambican peace process by committing its army to
securing the Nacala line in Mozambique and cooperating with efforts to
promote negotiations between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO
[Mozambique National Resistance]. We have encouraged the government to do
all it can to promote the peace process in Mozambique.
Malawi's otherwise positive record as a responsible, stable, strongly pro-
Western government is marred by a human rights performance which
includes political detentions, a controlled press, harsh laws curbing speech
and expression, and a single-party political system. The United States, as a
long-time friend, has raised its concerns about the lack of basic freedoms
in high-level contacts with Malawian authorities, including during a visit by
Vice President Quayle in September 1991. Despite occasional positive
developments--for example, the release of some 90 political detainees in
January 1991 and eight more last week--there have been no fundamental
changes.
In December 1991, the United States joined with members of the European
Community to urge the Malawi Government to take certain steps prior to the
consultative group donor meeting in May, including the charging or release
of all detainees, the external inspection of prisons, and respect for the right
of free speech. We had hoped they would do so, but they did not.
The lack of basic freedoms was dramatically evident in the Malawi
Government's harsh reaction to the March 1992 Malawi Catholic bishops'
pastoral letter: It declared the letter seditious and banned its possession
and circulation. We found the letter to be a measured and conciliatory
effort by religious leaders to work for the betterment of the country.
Our Ambassador strongly protested the government's response and did so
again when one of its authors, Monsignor Roche, was expelled. We pointed
out that such actions indicated a lack of commitment by the Government of
Malawi to constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, particularly of speech,
association, and religion.
More recently, we expressed our disappointment at the arrest of pro-
democracy advocate and labor leader Chakufwa Chihana. Chihana was
arrested when he returned to Malawi after visiting Zambia and South Africa
where he spoke in support of democratic change in Malawi. We called for his
immediate release and urged the government to allow him to freely express
his political views. We have continued to closely monitor the proceedings
against him and his treatment while in custody.
In May 1992, in direct response to the Malawi Government's intransigence
and to underscore our concern about the need for democratic reforms, we
decided, together with other Western donors, to reduce non-humanitarian
assistance to Malawi. Our reduction was 33%--from $34 million to $22
million. We also withheld an additional $15 million in quick-disbursing
balance-of-payments support. At the same time, we made clear that we
remain committed to providing humanitarian assistance for the Mozambican
refugees and to the drought-stricken people of Malawi.
We hope that, over the next 6 months, Malawi will take steps to institute
the basic freedoms of speech, expression, and association, including the
abolition of preventive detention legislation and the reintroduction of
habeas corpus legislation. We do not seek to prescribe to Malawians (or
anyone else) the specific form of government that is most appropriate to
their circumstances, but we do believe that it is fundamental that the
Government of Malawi recognize that its citizens should be permitted to
criticize their government and to change it, if they wish, through peaceful,
democratic means. By doing all these things, Malawi will move toward a
more open and democratic society and could revive relations with the
international community.
Finally, I want to take this opportunity to commend the Government of
Malawi on the agreement it recently concluded with the International
Committee of the Red Cross to permit access to Malawi's prisons. This is an
important step, and we trust that action will be taken to implement it in
the near future. I hope it presages a broader effort to respond to the
legitimate demands of Malawians for a society in which political
participation and open political discussion is allowed.
Somalia
Somalia remains a difficult and tragic situation. Experienced humanitarian
workers say they have never seen worse conditions. Although food
deliveries are now getting through to Mogadishu--a ship with 7,000 tons of
UN World Food Program food was successfully unloaded [during] the week of
June 7, following the delivery of 21,000 tons of food aid in April and May--
many vulnerable people have already died or suffered irreversibly from
malnutrition. This is a horrendous human tragedy which is of the utmost
concern to the US Government and me, personally.
Somalia's estimated food needs are 30,000 metric tons per month. Security
for food deliveries has been hit or miss; it needs to be ensured.
With our active support, the Security Council recently adopted Resolutions
733, 746, and 751. These resolutions:
-- Authorized immediate dispatch of UN cease-fire observers to Mogadishu
and approved, in principle, a UN security force to protect humanitarian
operations;
-- Declared an international arms embargo; and
-- Welcomed the Secretary General's intention to appoint a special
representative for Somalia.
That special representative, Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria, has our full
support. He has made repeated trips to Mogadishu and to other areas of the
country. He is working hard to find common ground among the Somali
factions. We are impressed by his skills and rapid mastery of the complex
Somali situation.
Special Representative Sahnoun has worked hard to win approval for
deployment of a UN protective force, but, thus far, Gen. Mohamed Farah
Aideed, whose faction holds the southern half of Mogadishu, has rejected
deployment. This is unacceptable; one man's recalcitrance cannot be
allowed to hold up urgent humanitarian operations in support of a severely
stressed population. We are urgently consulting with the United Nations to
devise a means of breaking the logjam.
At the head of our political agenda is an immediate countrywide cease-fire.
A viable long-term political settlement, we believe, will require regional
reconciliation agreements before any attempt at a national reconciliation
conference. We will be working closely with Ambassador Sahnoun to flesh
out these ideas and to gain wider diplomatic support for urgent action.
Thank you for this opportunity to present a brief outline of our policy--and
our humanitarian--concerns regarding these three African nations. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: The Organization of American States:
Democracy's Greatest Resource
Eagleburger
Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Statement to the Organization of American States (OAS)
General Assembly, Nassau, The Bahamas
Date: May, 19 19925/19/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America, South America, Caribbean,
Central America
Subject: OAS, Democratization, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
(as delivered by Luigi R. Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to the OAS)
We meet today, as we have for the past 2 years, in a period of ongoing
revolutionary change around the world. Whether we consider this to be a
curse or a privilege, it cannot be denied that we live in interesting times--
times in which the only thing which remains fixed and immutable is the fact
of change itself.
Two years ago, in Asuncion [Paraguay], we met in the afterglow of the global
democratic revolution and amidst hopes that we could begin to revitalize
our hemispheric forum, the Organization of American States, on the 100th
anniversary of the inter-American system.
Last year, we met in Santiago [Chile] to make good on those hopes and
witnessed the emergence of a new OAS, one ever more capable of action.
Such an OAS emerged, in part, because almost all of us had become
democratic and transcended the quarrels which had paralyzed us for so long.
But such an OAS also emerged because, as a united hemisphere, we suddenly
had need of an instrument to exercise our newly found collective will.
Today, it is more than fitting that we meet in the Caribbean, here in The
Bahamas, where Columbus made his landing exactly 5 centuries ago. The
place of the New World's beginning remains its geographic center, its
commercial crossroads, and the meeting ground for all the peoples of the
Americas--native, African, Hispanic, and European. And now that Guyana
and Belize have joined this organization, the OAS has the full benefit of the
Caribbean perspective--a perspective which reflects the longest adherence
to democratic principle and practice in this hemisphere.
However, it must be acknowledged that, in a psychological sense at least,
the circumstances surrounding this General Assembly are different from
those which obtained in Asuncion and Santiago. The fact of the matter is
that we are no longer riding the crest of euphoria atop the wave of
democratization which swept the world. Whereas before we celebrated the
defeat of democracy's enemies and the end of the Cold War, today we have,
in effect, entered a new historical era defined by the challenge of making
democracy work. In other words, we are no longer looking backward or
patting ourselves on the back; we are instead looking into an unknowable
future through the prism of some rather bracing present challenges and
realities.
Those realities reared their ugly heads this year on the streets of Caracas
[Venezuela] and south central Los Angeles, and they helped to interrupt
democratic processes in Haiti and Peru. Behind those realities lies the
challenge of our times: the challenge of matching fairness at the ballot box
with fairness in the marketplace and before the law; the challenge, that is,
of defeating democracy's remaining enemies--poverty, injustice, racism,
ignorance, and corruption in all its forms.
As formidable as that challenge may be, pessimism is no more warranted
today than was our euphoria of the past few years. The fact is that we are
not alone; the entire world is going through the same wrenching
transformations. We may, for example, be disappointed to discover that the
OAS cannot simply wave a magic wand and produce instant solutions in
Haiti, Peru, or elsewhere; but neither can the United Nations or the European
Community. And our disappointment, itself, is an unconscious compliment
we pay to the OAS and to its vastly expanded potential for good.
More fundamentally, we must draw strength from the conviction that we
will succeed over time. We know that there is no other road to prosperity
than the free market and that there is no other road to freedom than
democracy. All rival systems and ideologies are now discredited. The
question is not whether democracy will succeed but rather what we have to
do to make it succeed.
And finally, we in the Americas have a special reason to be optimistic about
the future, because our unique consensus on values and commonality of
purpose are both embodied in this hemispheric organization. Let us not,
therefore, underestimate the importance of what we in this body have
accomplished over the past year and over the past 24 hours. We have
refused to recognize assaults on democracy or to legitimize them with our
silence. We have asserted that they will not stand, and, if we stay united
and strong, it will eventually be said that they did not stand.
At the same time, we have made considerable progress over the past year in
attacking the root causes of political instability--namely, the economic
backwardness which threatens democratic institutions and the inter-state
rivalries which threaten our hemispheric peace.
For example, new economic growth has lifted per capita income for the first
time in 4 years; $36 billion in capital flowed into this region in 1991--
nearly quadruple the 1989 amount. Debt burdens are easing--Mexico, Costa
Rica, Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, and, most recently, Argentina have
reached agreements to ease their commercial bank debt, and we hope to see
Brazil conclude an agreement soon. Official obligations to the United States
have also been reduced for seven countries.
The United States is pleased to have made a contribution to these successes
through the Brady Plan and the EAI [Enterprise for the Americas Initiative],
but the real credit--and the vote of confidence these successes represent--
belongs to these countries and their bold economic reformers.
There are other reasons for satisfaction with our record. Brazil and
Argentina brought their nuclear activities under full scope safeguards. With
Chile, they issued the Mendoza declaration forswearing development of
chemical and biological weapons. Argentina and Chile settled 21 land border
disputes and sent the remaining one to arbitration. And, finally, this region
has taken a leading role in addressing global environmental problems, and
Brazil will host the UN's conference on the environment and development [in
June 1992].
Thus, the record of the past year is one of real achievement on our
hemispheric agenda of peace and security, economic growth, and
environmental protection. Now, as we look to this agenda in the year ahead,
we must build on the hemisphere's three collective pillars of strength:
democracy, free enterprise, and the OAS.
First, in spite of the temporary setbacks in Haiti and Peru, democracy has
proven its resilience and capacity for reform. In Colombia, President
Gaviria led a peaceful, democratic movement to rewrite and modernize the
constitution. In Canada, Prime Minister Mulroney has successfully
maintained national unity, also through constitutional reform. In El
Salvador, President Cristiani courageously opened the political system to
those who for so long had sought to overthrow it and ended, through
negotiations, a long and bitter civil conflict. And, in Guatemala, President
Serrano is leading efforts to negotiate an end to that country's civil strife.
In fact, democracy's enemies are becoming fewer and fewer. The collapse of
communism has demoralized and bankrupted guerrilla groups throughout the
region. Some are negotiating for peace; in Uruguay and Argentina, armed
irregulars have retired from the field. Others in Peru and Colombia fight on,
shamelessly financing themselves not through the auspices of international
communism but from the proceeds of narco-trafficking. These groups--
especially the unspeakably brutal Sendero Luminoso [Shining Path] in Peru--
are animated less by ideology than they are by nihilistic blood lust.
Democracy is also taking root throughout this hemisphere's civil societies;
it is emerging from the bottom up as well as from the top. Throughout the
region, the press has become freer and stronger as have other institutions
which give citizens greater voice and power. According to one source, non-
governmental organizations--for example, municipal development councils,
health cooperatives, and civic education foundations--have grown from
fewer than 1,000 to over 11,000 in the past 2 decades.
Second, this region's economy is turning the corner back to sustained
growth. For example, the global business and financial communities have
taken notice of the new economic policies; the capital flowing into the
region is their vote of confidence. Official reserves grew 38% in 1991. In
the Caribbean, the Andes, the Southern Cone, and Central America, the
movement to trade liberalization is well underway, making those economies
more competitive and preparing the region as a whole for free trade.
This is not just a matter of statistics. Democracy is proving that it can
deliver a better life. The difference is everywhere.
Today, a family starting a new business in Nicaragua can go to a private
bank for a loan, knowing that creditworthiness, not politics, will decide the
outcome. Workers in Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico can save for their
future, knowing that hyperinflation and devaluations will no longer
confiscate their earnings. Farmers in El Salvador have been freed of the
state-controlled commodity export system, so that the world price alone
will determine what they earn.
Still, hopes are high, and expectations are growing. Economic reform must
mean greater upward mobility and new opportunities for workers, farmers,
and entrepreneurs to participate in economic recovery.
Third, a revitalized OAS is helping define and advance a new hemispheric
agenda, for example:
-- We established a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy--the only such
body in an international organization. This unit has observed elections in
six countries and is now under study by the CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe].
-- We adopted in [the] General Assembly the world's toughest standards on
precursor chemicals used to produce illicit drugs; and, now, 14 member
countries in our region have implemented or begun to implement those
standards.
-- The United States and the Andean nations have embraced the tough
money-laundering standards we called for last year in Santiago--standards
we look for this General Assembly to adopt.
-- The OAS has expressed our collective desire for an open world trading
system before the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and before
the European Community.
-- We have produced a resolution for decision by this assembly which
makes it possible for the Americas to speak with a single voice in support
of global and regional initiatives, from expansion of investment to non-
proliferation of weapons--initiatives such as those Argentina and Brazil
have made under the courageous leadership of Presidents Menem and Collor.
-- We have adopted a plan of action on the environment which presents the
specific measures we are committed to implement in order to preserve,
manage, and utilize our natural assets.
-- Finally, I am pleased to say [that] just last week, the United States
signed a headquarters agreement with the OAS Secretariat, resolving once
and for all the legal status of the OAS headquarters and OAS employees.
This is the record of progress upon which we must build to further our
hemisphere's development.
First, we must strengthen our collective mechanism to defend democracy.
With the adoption of the Santiago mechanism and with its use in the cases
of Haiti and Peru, a line has been drawn. We have made it clear that those
who subvert democracy will be isolated--they will go without normal
diplomatic contacts, without financial support, and without participating in
those cooperative activities central to the EAI. And that situation will not
change until there has been--in the case of [Haitian] President Aristide--a
return to office and--in the case of Haiti and Peru--a return to democracy.
The United States strongly supports the Santiago mechanism. We do not
seek a mechanism which would deny governments and this body the
opportunity to make considered responses to future challenges to
democracy. But we do seek increased leverage for the OAS and increased
risk for those who would lead a coup anywhere in this region.
Second, the political and economic opening that has already brought
profound change to the Americas must continue. This is essential if we are
to face squarely an internal threat to democratic government--corruption--
which is as much a menace as the external threats we faced in previous
decades. No society is immune from corruption, and no government is
exempt from the obligation to fight it.
People throughout this hemisphere increasingly are aware of the rights and
privileges they have as citizens of democracies. A basic sense of fairness
tells them that many old practices are not consistent with the contract that
governs a true democratic society.
They know the democratic contract means that all must pay their taxes.
They know it means that elected leaders govern with strong popular
authority but with limited power. They know that the state's security
services are not to be instruments of political parties, social classes, or
particular ethnic groups. They know that, in a democracy, economic policy
is not a set of rules to preserve a status quo in which a few are comfortable
and safe from competition. And they know that the administration of
justice must be based on the rule of law and not the influence of the
powerful.
Under these circumstances, each of us has a continuing obligation to do all
we can to root out and eliminate corruption whenever and wherever it
occurs. Economic reform itself--by limiting the power of the state to make
economic decisions--reduces the opportunities for corruption, and that is
why reform must continue and accelerate.
Moreover, we must also promote sound and stable currencies which deny
insiders the opportunity for profit-making. When foreign exchange is freely
traded, the government is no longer a gatekeeper determining which citizens
will have the opportunity to participate in the international economy. When
state monopolies give way to competition under the law, arbitrary practices
and sinecures disappear.
Third, we must continue to strengthen the institutional foundations of
democracy.
This means further international cooperation to build fair and modern
electoral and judicial systems. It means continuing to support the free flow
of information. It means ensuring that the state's necessary retreat from
economic control not give way to a tyranny of special interests or the law
of the jungle. In other words, a market economy requires competent and
accountable government able to ensure public order, the protection of
individual rights, and access to basic health and education services.
Finally, we must also foster a long overdue dialogue between civilians and
the military establishments in all our countries. In the United States, we
are only now coming to terms with the need to reshape our military to fit a
world where there is no Soviet Union. Many difficult questions involving
security, foreign policy, the budget, and our career military must be faced.
And like many other countries in this region, the United States is still
debating the extent to which the military should be involved in the war on
drugs.
In too many cases throughout this region, there is a gulf between elected
civilians and the military. Nothing could be more dangerous to democracy,
to national security, or to the long-term health of the military institutions
themselves.
Before closing, I would like to reflect briefly on my own country's view of
itself and its role in this hemisphere.
There have been suggestions in recent years that the end of the Cold War
would find the United States returning to the isolationism of its past, and
commentary to this effect has increased in the wake of the Los Angeles
riots. It is certainly true that winning the Cold War came at immense cost
to American society and immense sacrifice to the American people. We are,
as a consequence, going to do what it takes to address our domestic
challenges and rightfully so.
However, it would be very mistaken to conclude that the American people
want to retreat from global engagement. On the contrary, they recognize
that we are part of an interdependent world [and] that our own security and
well-being are directly affected by developments beyond our shores.
The United States will, of course, have to adjust its foreign policy to the
vastly changed circumstances of the post-Cold War era, but, far from
coming at the expense of our hemispheric relationships, this adjustment
actually means for us an acceleration in the process of inter-American
integration. Just last week, for example, President Bush announced that
negotiations for a free trade agreement with Chile will follow the
conclusion of a North American Free Trade Agreement.
However, nothing better demonstrates my government's commitment to
Latin America and the Caribbean than the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative--a blueprint for economic growth in equal partnership with all
the nations of this hemisphere. EAI envisions relations characterized not by
might or dependency but instead by mutual interests, mutual benefits and
responsibilities, and mutual respect.
Thanks to EAI, trade and investment councils are already meeting under
framework agreements in force with 31 countries, including two regional
groups. The Inter-American Development Bank made four investment sector
loans in 1991 totaling almost $500 million, and work is proceeding on at
least seven more for 1992. Agreement has been reached on the
establishment of the Multilateral Investment Fund, with pledges of support
approximating $1.3 billion. We have reduced the official bilateral debt of
Chile, Jamaica, and Bolivia, and we have established mechanisms to finance
environmental protection in those countries.
Surely, these are only the first steps toward the lofty goals of the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Much remains to be done by all of us,
including--in the case of the United States--the completion by our Congress
of the necessary legislation. But the accomplishments to date are
significant, and they chart an ambitious course for future inter-American
cooperation.
Finally, we have heard a lot of talk in recent weeks that the United States
after Los Angeles has lost the right to preach at other nations--that we
have forfeited our purported role as the world's moral policeman.
To the extent that we ever played that role, it is one we should be thankful
to relinquish. We do have a store of experience in democracy which we
should be willing to share with the world's nascent democracies. We do
have a moral voice--as opposed to a moralizing voice--which we should not
stifle. But henceforth in this revolutionary new world, in this new
democratic era, we and our partners alike need to understand that the values
in which we believe are not American at all--they are universal values
which all of us strive to achieve.
The goal of democracy, unlike communism, is not to engineer a new man but
instead to make imperfect men and imperfect societies fit to govern
themselves. Democracy assumes a constant struggle against our darker
selves--against the greed, the hatred, and the prejudices which make us
unworthy of freedom.
And so we must be humble, all of us, for with the end of the Cold War, this
much at least is clear--that the enemies of democracy come from within.
But we must also be hopeful and optimistic, because it is equally clear,
especially in this hemisphere today, that the friends of democracy are all
around us. They are a constant and powerful resource against democracy's
enemies, wherever they may be. We have now, for perhaps the first time in
history, a consensus of principle, and, to the extent that we embody that
consensus in our instrument of collective action--in this Organization of
American States--then we have perhaps democracy's greatest resource of
all. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: OAS Resolutions: Restoration of Democracy in
Haiti
OAS
Source: Organization of American States
Date: May, 17 19925/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Democratization, Human Rights, OAS
[TEXT]
Resolution MRE/RES. 3/92 on Restoration of Democracy in Haiti (May 17,
1992)
The Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Having seen resolutions MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES. 2/91, of October 3 and
8, 1991, of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Foreign Ministers and the reports of the
Secretary General on the situation in Haiti;
Considering:
That the Organization of American States has made efforts to restore the
democratic system in Haiti and has maintained an ongoing presence in that
country through various missions; and
That as a result of those efforts President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the
Presiding Officers of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies of Haiti
decided freely to sign, on February 23, 1992, the Protocol of Washington;
Bearing in mind that, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention,
the OAS has made and is sustaining extraordinary efforts to promote a
Haitian solution for the reinstatement of the democratic system,
Resolves:
1. To reaffirm in their entirety resolutions MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES.
2/91, of October 3 and 8, 1991, which condemn the disruption of the
democratic system in Haiti and recommend the isolation of the de facto
regime that arose with the coup d'etat of September 30, 1991.
2. To reiterate its full support for the Protocol of Washington, of February
23, 1992, solemnly signed under the auspices of the OAS, which constitutes
the Haitian people's solution to the institutional crisis in that country.
3. To repudiate the dilatory and intimidating maneuvers of the sectors that
have benefited from the disruption of democracy, aimed at preventing
ratification of the Protocol of Washington, and to reject any document that
disregards it.
4. To urge the member states to adopt whatever actions may be necessary
for the greater effectiveness of the measures referred to in resolutions
MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES. 2/91, particularly those in operative
paragraphs 5, 6, 8, and 9 of resolution 1/91, and in operative paragraph 4 of
section I of resolution 2/91.
5. To adopt the following additional measures:
a. To expand and intensify the monitoring of the trade embargo on Haiti
through the Special Committee of the Permanent Council by measures such
as a periodical publication on violations of the embargo as they occur. To
urge the member states to increase their cooperation and provide the
necessary information.
b. To acknowledge the support provided by the member countries of the
European Economic Community and other countries with economic and
commercial ties to Haiti that have suspended their economic and technical
cooperation, and to coordinate with them on the enforcement of other
measures to make the embargo more effective.
c. To instruct the Special Committee of the Permanent Council to meet
with representatives of the member states involved in any way in actions
contravening the embargo, with a view to promoting unity of purpose and
action in strengthening its implementation.
d. To instruct the Secretary General to convoke a technical meeting of
member states and observers at Headquarters to be held in June to
coordinate strategies for the implementation of the embargo.
e. To urge the member states to deny access to port facilities to any
vessel that does not abide by the embargo and to ensure that air transport is
not used to carry goods in violation thereof.
f. To urge the member states to refrain from granting or to cancel, as
appropriate, entry visas issued to the perpetrators and supporters of the
coup d'etat, and to freeze their assets.
g. To urge the member states to increase humanitarian aid to the poorest
sectors of the Haitian people.
h. To instruct the Secretary General to maintain coordination with the
member states, the observer countries and the inter-American and
international organizations for the design and development of a
comprehensive program for the economic recovery of Haiti, with a
comprehensive program for the economic recovery of Haiti, with a view of
its implementation in consultation with Haiti's constitutional authorities
as soon as the country's democratic institutions have been reinstated.
i. To urge the member states, observers, and international organizations,
and private voluntary organizations to assist in relieving humanitarian
problems involving emigres from Haiti.
j. To suggest that the member states consider the usefulness of reducing
their diplomatic missions in Haiti until democratic institutions have been
restored in Haiti.
6. To reiterate its serious concern over the continual violations of human
rights and to again request the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
to continue its ongoing close monitoring of the situation in Haiti, and to
keep this ad hoc Meeting informed through the Permanent Council.
7. To request the OAS member and observer states to instruct their
representatives to the multilateral financial institutions and to the United
Nations to cooperate within those institutions toward enforcement of the
measures provided in this resolution. Also, to request the cooperation of
the multilateral financial institutions and the United Nations in
implementing the measures referred to in operative paragraphs 4 and 5.
8. To urge the observer countries and the international community to
support the decisions contained in this resolution and to cooperate in their
effective implementation.
9. To emphasize that the OAS and its member states remain fully prepared
to facilitate the reestablishment and strengthening of the democratic
institutions in Haiti, and resolved to contribute to the economic and social
recovery and development of that country and to collaborate in the
implementation of the Protocol of Washington, including, in the pertinent
content, paragraph 7 thereof.
10. To keep open the Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: OAS Resolutions: Restoration of Democracy in
Peru
OAS
Source: Organization of American States
Date: May, 18 19925/18/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Peru
Subject: OAS, Democratization, Human Rights
[TEXT]
Resolution MRE/RES. 2/92 on Restoration of Democracy in Peru (May 18,
1992)
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs at an Ad Hoc Meeting,
Having Seen: The Permanent Council resolution of April 6, 1992, convoking
an ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in accordance with the
provisions of resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), and resolution MRE/RES.
1/92 "Support for the Restoration of Democracy in Peru", adopted by the ad
hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Peru) on April 13, 1992;
Having Heard the report presented by the Mission established in accordance
with operative paragraph 6 of the aforementioned resolution MRE/RES. 1/92,
and the statements by the President of Peru, Mr. Alberto Fujimori; the
Chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR); a
representative of the Peruvian political parties, and a representative of the
Latin American Parliament; and
Considering:
That representative democracy can be promoted and defended only by
democratic means, any other course being rejected as contrary to the
fundamental principles established in the Charter of the OAS, and
The measures taken and recommendations made by the OAS Mission as set
forth in its report, as well as President Fujimori's commitment to his
people made at today's session,
Resolves:
1. To reaffirm the provisions of resolution MRE/RES. 1/92, and to take note
of the commitment made by the President of Peru to call immediate
elections for a Constitutional Congress, in an electoral process fully
guaranteeing free expression of the will of the people, in such a way as to
restore representative democracy in his country.
2. To urge the Peruvian authorities to effect the return to the system of
representative democracy at the earliest possible opportunity, with full
respect for the principle of separation of powers and the rule of law,
thereby facilitating complete restoration of international aid and
assistance.
3. To recommend to the Secretary General of the OAS that, subject to prior
consideration by the Permanent Council and in light of developments in the
political situation in Peru and in particular, the timely compliance with
President Fujimori's commitment, he provide such assistance as may be
formally requested of him, including observation of the elections for a
prompt return to the system of representative democratic government.
4. To request the Mission to continue its representations in accordance
with operative paragraph 6 of resolution MRE/RES. 1/92, and also to provide
its assistance to ensure more effective fulfillment of the provisions of
operative paragraph 3 of that resolution and contribute to effective
progress in the restoration of democracy.
5. To urge the Government of Peru to ensure full respect for human rights
and the guarantees thereof, and to request the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights to continue to observe the human rights situation and to
report thereon to the Permanent Council.
6. To keep open the ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, there to
receive, through the Permanent Council, information on the progress of the
situation in Peru and, in particular, on compliance with the commitment to
democratization made in the context of the dialogue called for in operative
paragraph 6 of resolution MRE/RES. 1/92.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: OAS Resolutions: Support for the Democratic
Government of the Republic of Venezuela
OAS
Source: Organization of American States
Date: May, 18 19925/18/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Venezuela
Subject: OAS, Democratization, Human Rights
[TEXT]
Resolution AG/doc. 2906/92 on Support for the Democratic Government of
the Republic of Venezuela (May 22, 1992)
The General Assembly,
Considering that one of the essential purposes of the Organization of
American States is to "promote and consolidate representative democracy
with due respect for the principle of non-intervention";
Reaffirming the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the
Inter-American System, adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-
first regular session, and
In view of the lamentable events that occurred in Venezuela, February 4,
1992, designed to overthrow the Government democratically elected by the
popular and sovereign will of its people,
Resolves:
1. To confirm, in all its parts, resolution CP/RES. 576 (887/92) "Support
for the Democratic Government of Venezuela," adopted by the Permanent
Council on February 4, 1992.
2. To reaffirm confidence in democracy, as the political system of
American nations and the institutional system capable of confronting in our
hemisphere, in an effective way, different political, economic, social and
ethical situations with a view to continue to impel the process of integral
development of member States. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: OAS Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
Promotes Economic Growth
Aronson
Source: Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
Date: Jun, 17 19926/17/92
Description: Statement before the House Agriculture Committee,
Washington, DC
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America, Central America, Caribbean
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Thank you for this opportunity to join you for a discussion of the Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative (EAI).
We in the Administration appreciate the invaluable support you have given
this initiative at crucial times in the legislative process. We also
appreciate your effort to advance the process of debt reduction through your
legislation, HR 4059, and I join [Treasury] Under Secretary [David] Mulford in
encouraging you to include authority for third-party sales to facilitate debt
swaps as part of your legislation.
What is at stake in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is maintaining
momentum in one of the best performing areas of the US economy today.
The US Export Boom
US exports to Latin America and the Caribbean have doubled in the past 5
years, from $31 billion in 1987 to $62 billion last year. That created about
620,000 new jobs in the United States. It has also nearly wiped out a trade
deficit with that region that stood at about $11 billion in 1987.
Your state of Texas is in the lead, but this new export business is building
in all states and reaching all the important sectors of our economy.
Between 1987 and 1990, US exports to the region grew by nearly $19 bil-
lion or 55%. Over $7 billion of that new business was in Texas; California
and Florida each captured over $2.5 billion in new export sales; and New
York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, and New Jersey are among the 20 states
which added $100 million or more. Nationwide, exports of foodstuffs to
this hemisphere grew 47% (up $1.2 billion); raw materials 30% (up $427
million); cars, trucks, and parts 84% (up $1.9 bil-lion); machinery 46% (up
$4.9 billion); and consumer goods, ranging from radios and televisions to
clothing, furniture, and sporting goods, 120%
(up $2.6 billion).
The New Economic Model
This export boom did not happen by accident. It happened because our
neighbors--first Chile and Mexico, now nearly every country in the
hemisphere--decided to undertake revolutionary economic change. A new
generation of leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean has made the
politi-cal decision to replace longstanding protectionist and statist
policies with a new model that relies on economic freedom and openness to
international trade and competition.
This is not like other regions of the world, where the United States faces
tough, often intractable negotiations to cut tariffs, remove non-tariff
barriers, and dismantle subsidy schemes which price our exports out of the
market.
In this hemisphere, countries are cutting tariffs unilaterally. They are
removing barriers to foreign investment unconditionally. They are waiting
in line to enter talks with us to liberalize trade. They stand shoulder to
shoulder with us in calling for Europe to cooperate in liberalizing world
trade through the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade].
Consider these examples:
Sound Money. Lack of stable currencies has long blocked investment and
growth throughout the hemisphere. But today, many countries have taken
the strong fiscal and monetary policy measures needed to stabilize their
currencies.
Hyperinflation has been contained in Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Peru.
Argentina's success has been particularly dramatic. Under President
Menem's leadership, the Argentine peso is maintaining rough parity with the
dollar as a result of fiscal discipline and a transparent monetary policy
where the movement of key money supply indices is published daily in the
newspapers.
Cutting Barriers to Trade. Chile, long a leader in tariff reduction, now
maintains an across-the-board 11% tariff on imports. Since 1986, Mexico
cut its maximum tariff from 100% to 20%. Average tariffs are one-half of
what they were 6 years ago, and there are virtually no non-tariff barriers.
In 1989, Argentina's tariffs ranged from 15% to 53%; 62% of the industrial
output of the country was protected by trade restrictions. Today, many
tariffs have been eliminated, the top tariff is 22%, and import quotas have
been eliminated on all products except automobiles. Three years ago, the
top issue in our relationship with Brazil was "informatics" laws, which
blocked imports of computers and related technology in order to protect
Brazil's computer manufacturers. Those restrictions have been cut
substantially, and they will end in October. Most of Brazil's other non-tariff
barriers have also been eliminated by President Collor. El Salvador reduced
its tariff rate ceiling from 250% to 35% in 1989. As late as 1990, Ecuador's
maximum tariff was 290%. Today, it is 40%.
Last December, the presidents of the Andean nations meeting in Cartagena,
Colombia, approved more trade liberalization in 2 days than they had in the
past 22 years of economic integration efforts. They seek a common market
by the end of this year, and Ecuador just announced its decision to meet that
schedule. That work is being repeated throughout the hemisphere, as sub-
regional trade agreements are being negotiated in preparation for
hemisphere-wide free trade.
The Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are
working to build a common market by 1995. The Central American nations
are aiming to put a common external tariff in place by the end of this year,
and negotiations to liberalize the region's trade with Mexico are underway.
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras signed a separate trade liberalization
agreement last month.
Opening to Foreign Investment. The most important change affecting foreign
investment has been one of attitude: The countries of this hemisphere are
aggressively seeking it, and they are competing with each other to create
the conditions that will best attract new capital. New laws are being
passed--Honduras approved one 2 weeks ago--to give foreign investors
equitable treatment in the legal system and to allow repatriation of profits.
Bolivia and Colombia also have enacted far-reaching reforms. Last year,
Argentina effectively abandoned the Calvo doctrine, which foreclosed the
option of binding arbitration to resolve international investment disputes.
This has given investors new confidence that they will be treated fairly.
Creation of sound currencies, convertible at market rates, is another key
factor attracting capital from new investors and from nationals who had
taken their funds to safe havens overseas.
These reforms have reaped impressive rewards. Latin America had a
$40-billion capital inflow in 1991, three times as much as the year before,
and a positive financial resource transfer--$6.72 billion--for the first time
in 10 years. Much of this capital is financing trade, including our increased
exports to the region. The Inter-American Development Bank's estimates
show Latin America receiving 80% of all foreign direct investment in less
developed countries. Five of the world's six top-performing stock markets
are in Latin America.
Reducing the State's Economic Role. One of the most visible results of this
region's new economic thinking is the reduction in the size of the state
sector. Large state enterprises, once seen as an economic necessity, are
now viewed as a drain on the government's revenues and the nation's capital.
Often, privatization is a double benefit for government, removing the burden
of running enterprises that are more efficient in private hands and bringing
in funds that can be used to address pressing social needs--a few examples:
-- In November 1990, Argentina sold both its state-owned telephone
company and 85% of its national airline to private consortia. Most of Argen-
tina's remaining state enterprises are expected to be sold by mid-1993.
-- Brazil sold state-owned steel company USIMINAS for $1.17 billion last
October.
-- Also that month, Mexico sold its share of [the] state-owned bank,
Bancomer, for $2.54 billion. Mexico had 1,155 state enterprises a decade
ago; only 200 remain to be sold, and the privatizations continue.
-- And last November, Venezuela sold 40% of state-owned telephone
company CANTV to an ATT/GTE [American Telephone ∧ Telegraph/General
Telephone and Electronics] consortium for $1.8 billion.
The Role of EAI
President Bush launched the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
2 years ago to respond to these dramatic changes. His vision--free trade
throughout the hemisphere, greater investment, debt relief, and increased
environmental cooperation--has been well received. It fits the vision
President Salinas has for Mexico: "We think not about a walled market, but
an open market to the rest of the world." And because it is based on trade,
not aid, it is an initiative, in the words of President [Patricio] Aylwin of
Chile, "better than any of those from the past because it is free of a
paternalistic and protective flavor."
The progress made to date has been significant.
Trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] negotiations, now
in the final stages, will create a single market of 370 million consumers
and a combined GDP [gross domestic product] of over $6 trillion. Last
month, President Bush announced that free trade talks with Chile will
follow completion of the NAFTA.
We have signed trade and investment framework agreements with 31
countries in this region. These agreements are vehicles for discussions
about liberalizing trade and investment regimes in preparation for
hemisphere-wide free trade. For many countries, these discussions identify
the policy measures they need to take to ensure that their economies will be
competitive under a freer trade regime. They also identify measures needed
to improve investment climate, such as passing laws that protect
intellectual property rights.
Investment. A $1.3 billion multilateral investment fund, established last
February under EAI, will help countries identify the measures they need to
take to attract investment; develop privatization plans; target special loans
to smaller enterprises; and provide grants to help train workers, managers,
and environmental protection professionals. Japan has pledged to match the
US contribution of $500 million to this fund, and 19 other nations from
Europe and this hemisphere have pledged to contribute. These countries
have responded to President Bush's proposal to create this facility. We urge
Congress to approve the full US share of the multilateral investment fund.
The Inter-American Development Bank responded to President Bush's call
for a new, fast-disbursing loan facility to promote investment reform.
Chile received the first loan last June; since then, Bolivia, Jamaica, and
Colombia have received loans, and El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica,
Uruguay, Honduras, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Paraguay
are under consideration. These loans support a wide variety of measures to
improve the climate for private investment and to ensure that all sectors of
society can participate in renewed economic growth.
We have signed bilateral investment treaties with three countries, and
discussions are underway with seven others. These treaties make
invaluable contributions to attracting foreign investment by providing
protection against unwarranted expropriations and discriminatory
treatment of foreign investors, by establishing clear and transparent rules
for settling disputes, and by codifying rules for capital repatriation.
Debt. As Latin American nations move toward a future of more open
economies, many face a daunting legacy of the past--debt. Though economic
growth helps to reduce debt, debt service costs often soak up the resources
needed to make economies grow.
Under EAI, countries that receive investment sector loans from the Inter-
American Development bank or make other significant investment reforms
become eligible for debt reduction. So far, we have reduced the official
debt of Bolivia, Chile, and Jamaica to the United States by over $260
million. (Under other authority outside EAI, we also reduced $1.28 billion in
bilateral debt with Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua.) These
reductions can have substantial impact in countries which owe much of
their debt to the United States--in El Salva-dor's case, over $650 million; in
Costa Rica, $458 million.
Congress did not appropriate any funds for debt reduction in this fiscal year.
EAI debt reduction will be one of our top priorities in fiscal year 1993, and
we urge your approval. It can bring enormous benefits in encouraging
economic reform and freeing scarce central government resources for
programs that address pressing social needs.
Environment. When Bolivia, Chile, and Jamaica reduced their debt, they also
signed environmental framework agreements. These agreements set up
jointly administered environmental funds; the capital for these funds comes
from local currency contributions equal to the interest payments on the debt
and from other donations. The three countries are in the process of
establishing the commissions that will administer the funds, which should
total $32 million over the life of the debt-reduction agreements. By the end
of the year, these commissions should be in a position to begin funding
environmental projects.
EAI's Place In Hemispheric Relations
Continued support for the EAI is vitally necessary if we are to continue
encouraging the bold reforms of leaders throughout the hemisphere, such as
President Collor of Brazil, who is facing the difficult challenges of fiscal
and constitutional reform; President Cristiani of El Salvador, who is turning
to the economic tasks of reconstruction; President Gaviria of Colombia, who
is opening his economy at the same time he is combatting guerrillas and the
drug cartels; and the leaders of the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM),
who are beginning to confront the complexities of real economic integration.
In many cases, these reforms carry short-term political costs, while the
benefits of growth come later. Now that these countries are adopting the
kind of policies the United States has long urged under administrations of
both parties, our continued support is essential.
But EAI's importance is more than economic. It fits into a larger context of
a new partnership President Bush is building with Latin America and the
Caribbean in an era where democracy is the norm. This economic
partnership could not exist without the foundation of shared democratic
values.
In building that partnership, the Administration has worked hard to craft a
policy that is sustainable over the long term because it rests on a
bipartisan consensus. We believe we have met key congressional concerns.
Central America is fully democratic, and the wars have ended in Nicaragua
and El Salvador. More than ever before, we are working through the OAS
[Organization of American States], and we took a leading role in revitalizing
that organization to deal with issues from drugs and money- laundering to
monitoring elections and defending democracy. Our aid is being used as a
strong lever to create freer markets, not to perpetuate dependency. EAI is
strengthening our political relations, treating our neighbors as equals, and
helping to renew economic growth.
It is often said that the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is
disappearing. Nowhere is that more true than in this hemisphere, and it's
true beyond the area of economic policy. When we deal with democracies,
we make more progress on a wide range of issues, from fighting drug traffic
in the Andes and the Caribbean to protecting the environment along our
southern border, to ending conflicts in Central America, to controlling the
regional balance of conventional weapons, to stopping the development of
weapons of mass destruction begun under military governments in Brazil
and Argentina.
What we see as separate developments--economic reform and the spread of
democracy--our neighbors see as a single process of modernization. They
are strongly committed to their new course, because they have paid the
price of the old ways, in terms of lost political freedoms and foregone
economic progress. And they welcome our partnership. What is required of
us is to avoid our frequent mistake of on-again, off-again engagement in
this hemisphere. Now that we and our neighbors have more in common and
more of a common agenda than ever before, we need to remain engaged.
With your leadership, I am confident that Congress will join the President in
building the hemispheric partnership that will make the Americas prosper.
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: Claims Against Iraq
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Jun, 22 19926/22/92
Description: Statement before the House Agriculture Committee,
Washington, DC
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations
[TEXT]
The UN Compensation Commission, established pursuant to UN Security
Council Resolution 687 (1991), is developing procedures to provide
compensation for losses that were sustained as a result of Iraq's illegal
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. To that end, it has adopted criteria for
the processing of all individual, corporate, and government claims. Its claim
forms for individuals with claims for amounts up to $100,000 were
distributed in December 1991 by the Department, and the commission will
begin to process those claims later this year.
On June 15, 1992, the commission circulated "Form D" to be used in filing
claims of individuals that could not be filed on forms previously released by
the commission. This form should be used by those whose losses exceed
$100,000 and who have not yet filed a claim with the commission, or have
filed a claim for the first $100,000 and want to file for any additional
losses not previously claimed. It should also be used by those who have
made payments or provided relief for other eligible individuals. (A separate
form will be circulated in several months for claims of corporations and
other legal entities.)
To make a claim, a claimant must fill out Form D and return it to the Office
of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and Investment
Disputes in the State Department. The Assistant Legal Adviser's office will
consolidate the claims and submit them to the commission. The Department
will submit the claims of US citizens and is considering submitting the
claims of residents of the United States who are not citizens. Claimants
who are not US citizens should include a statement with their claim form
indicating whether, at the time of the invasion, any members of their
immediate family (spouse, parent, child) were citizens or permanent
residents of the United States and describe the losses sustained by those
family members. They also should include documentation of their residency
status or citizenship. If no member of their family was a citizen or
permanent resident at the time of the invasion, claimants should describe
how they came to the United States and provide documentation as to their
residency status here. This information will help the Department establish a
basis on which to consider submitting their claim.
As of December 15, 1992, the commission will begin processing claims
submitted by governments on Form D up to that date. The final deadline for
the submission of these claims by governments is July 1, 1993, but it is in a
claimant's interest that his or her claim be submitted as soon as possible.
The Department will need time to review the forms and documentation
received, to follow up with claimants where necessary, and to prepare a
consolidated statement summarizing the claims. Therefore, claimants
wishing to ensure that their claim is considered as soon as possible should
return a completed form by September 15, 1992. The Department urges
claimants to file by this date, but in any event no later than January 15,
1993.
For more information and to obtain claim forms, individuals should contact
the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and
Investment Disputes, 2100 K Street, NW, Suite 402, Washington DC 20037-
7180. Telephone: (202) 653-2412. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: Europe's Multilateral Organizations
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jun, 29 19926/29/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe
Subject: International Organizations, CSCE, NATO
[TEXT]
From World War II to the present, a number of multilateral organizations
have contributed to European stability and evolving economic and political
integration. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the European Community
(EC) are the most prominent.
NATO originally was created to bind Western Europe and North America in a
mutual defense commitment. It now is achieving its objective of a Europe
"whole and free" through expanded cooperation in the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC). The CSCE has provided a platform for East-
West dialogue and pressed for an improvement in human rights in the former
Eastern bloc. It continues such efforts to secure peace and freedom.
The EC was created to remove economic barriers and to move the member
states toward increased economic and political integration. It will consider
new membership applications from Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden in the
near future.
Other multilateral organizations affecting European economic and political
policy include: the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Council of
Europe, the Nordic Council, and the Western European Union (WEU). The
Council of Europe was established to promote European unity and
cooperation as well as consolidate democratic reforms. EFTA was created
to form a free trade area for industrial products without the political
implications of a customs union. The Nordic Council works toward creating
harmonious laws and cooperative efforts in cultural fields in Scandinavia.
The WEU comprises most members of the European Community and
coordinates planning for defense matters. Its role may expand when EC
members develop their defense component.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, NATO was established in 1949 to deter
potential Soviet aggression in Europe and to provide for the collective self-
defense of the alliance. Its signing represented the first peace-time
alliance with US participation.
With the end of the Cold War, NATO began a major transformation to adapt
to the new realities in Europe. In the July 1990 London "Declaration on a
Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," the leaders called for enhancing the
political character of the alliance by transforming NATO's relationship with
its former adversaries. Recognizing the growing importance of related
regional organizations, the London declaration recommended that NATO
liaison activities complement the activities of the EC, the CSCE, the Council
of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), and the WEU.
While NATO's new security policy reflects a greater reliance on the
elements of dialogue and cooperation, the London declaration also
transformed the character of NATO's conventional defenses. NATO moved
away from its strategy of forward defense to a reduced forward presence.
Reliance on nuclear weapons was reduced; nuclear forces became weapons
of last resort.
The November 1991 Rome "Declaration on Peace and Cooperation" signaled a
growing shift to a broad approach to security based on dialogue,
cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability. To
achieve these goals, NATO called for further reduction in conventional and
nuclear forces.
The North Atlantic Council is NATO's chief policy-making body and provides
for intergovernmental consultation. It is the highest political and military
authority in the alliance. The Council meets twice yearly in ministerial
session and occasionally in a heads-of-state session. The Secretary General
chairs the Council and heads an international staff. Participating countries
provide a permanent representative of ambassadorial rank to the Council.
When defense matters are discussed, the permanent representatives meet as
the Defense Planning Committee.
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
In order to enhance liaison with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, the NACC was established at the Rome NATO
summit in November 1991. Secretary Baker and German Foreign Minister
Genscher originated the idea to create the NACC in a government statement
issued on October 2, 1991. The NACC includes former Warsaw Pact
countries and other newly independent states in Eurasia and was established
as an inclusive forum for discussing security, disarmament, and political
issues.
NACC provides an opportunity to eliminate what were once two opposing
blocs and allow them to join together in a common circle built on shared
universal and domestic values.
Through NACC, NATO members can share their unique expertise in security
cooperation in ways that will help the new independent states address
problems critical to the transformation of their societies. The allies are
prepared to offer their expertise in defense planning, democratic concepts
of civil-military relations and coordination of air-traffic management, and
the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes.
The first NACC ministerial meeting in December 1991 signaled the
intention of the participants to develop a more institutional relationship of
consultation on political and security issues. Regular meetings will be held
at the ambassadorial and ministerial level.
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSCE was established in 1975 (with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act) to
press for human rights and to provide a forum for East-West dialogue. The
heart of CSCE is the set of norms and principles in the Helsinki Final Act
and other CSCE documents which established important standards of state
behavior, particularly in human rights, economic cooperation, military
openness, and peaceful, democratic change. The dramatic changes in Europe
are, in part, a consequence of the CSCE process, which established [the]
standards of state behavior, built mutual confidence, encouraged openness
to change, and demanded respect for human rights. CSCE's membership
includes the United States, Canada, and all European countries-- including
the new states arising from the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
At the November 1990 CSCE Paris summit, leaders publicly recognized the
end of the Cold War and, for the first time, created CSCE institutions: a
small CSCE Secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna,
and an Office for Free Elections--later replaced by the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw. The CSCE Council of
Ministers, created at the Paris summit, is the highest decision-making body
in the organization. Mandated to meet at least annually, it has so far met in
Berlin in June 1991, in Prague in January 1992, and in Helsinki (to open the
follow-up meeting) in March 1992.
The fourth CSCE follow-up meeting convened in Helsinki in March 1992. It
is reviewing all CSCE procedures and institutions and will make
recommendations for any needed changes. It also will review the
implementation of CSCE commitments and explore cooperative ways to
improve the implementation by all CSCE members.
The Paris summit mandated the Committee of Senior Officials to prepare
Council meetings, act as the Council's agent between its meetings, review
current issues, and consider future CSCE work. Over the first year of its
existence, the Committee developed into the central decision-making and
administrative body of CSCE, meeting almost monthly to deal with a range
of issues including the situation in Yugoslavia and membership for newly
recognized states.
European Community
The European Community is comprised of three European communities set up
in the 1950s--the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic
Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community-- that have
functioned with common institutions since 1967. Major institutions are the
EC Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament, and Court of
Justice. The EC has the authority to conclude binding agreements with non-
member countries and international organizations.
Today, a major goal of the Community is to complete, by the end of 1992, a
unified economic area or "single market," with free movement of persons,
goods, services, and capital. In December 1991, EC members agreed to
amendments of the EC treaties which will move the Community in the
direction of greater economic, monetary, and political union, including more
unified foreign and security policies.
The EC's current aim is increased integration of member countries. It is
expected to establish a single European Central Bank and a single currency
by the end of 1992. However, all 12 member states may not enter the new
arrangements at once. Meeting in Maastricht, Netherlands, in 1991,
members set a deadline of no later than January 1999 for the inception of a
common currency.
The European Parliament is the only multinational European institution
directly elected by the people of Europe. Elections are held every 5 years.
The Parliament has 518 members from the EC's 12 member states.
Currently, there are nine political groups, embracing a range of European
political ideologies. It is run by a bureau consisting of the president and 12
vice presidents. The various parliamentary committees issue reports on
proposals of the EC Commission--the executive body of the European
Community charged with initiating action--and on other important matters.
The European Parliament's main role is consultative, because the EC's chief
legislative powers remain with the EC Council of Ministers--the
intergovernmental group that is the EC's highest decision-making body--and
the EC Commission. The Parliament has been granted the following rights:
to reject a draft budget, to force the EC Commission to resign as a body
(this right has never been exercised), to respond to the written and oral
questions it directs to the EC Commission and the Council of Ministers on
their activities, and to approve or disapprove applications of non-member
countries to join the Community and new association agreements. The
Council can overrule the Parliament by a unanimous vote only. The
Parliament has taken a leading role in pressing for closer European
integration, including a more substantive role for itself. The Maastricht
Treaty, approved by the European Council in December 1991 (but not yet
ratified), strengthens the Parliament's assent-cooperation role and
synchronizes the terms of Parliament members and the EC commissioners.
Parliamentary business is conducted in Strasbourg (plenary sessions),
Brussels (committee meetings), and Luxembourg (secretariat).
Council of Europe
The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 to foster Europe's common
heritage and to promote human rights and social progress. It was based on
Sir Winston Churchill's 1946 proposal for a "United States of Europe." The
Council is headquartered in Stras-bourg, France.
Since 1989, when East and Central European countries began to re-establish
democratic institutions and to apply for membership, the Council has
boosted its role in Europe's political integration.
The Council's two main bodies are the Parliamentary Assembly, composed of
170 representatives chosen by the national parliaments, and the Committee
of Ministers, consisting of the foreign ministers of member nations and
their deputies. The Assembly holds four plenary sessions each year.
Although the Assembly has no major decision-making power, it is a
significant voice within Europe on matters such as relations with newly
independent states and human rights issues.
Among the most important of the Council's other organs are the European
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights
(supported by a 900-member secretariat), which investigate and rule on
alleged violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.
European Free Trade Association
EFTA, headquartered in Geneva, was created in 1960 to promote free trade
among its seven original members in Western Europe--Austria, Denmark, UK,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. EFTA was conceived as an
organization similar to the European Economic Community. The founders
hoped that the two organizations might eventually be merged. EFTA
members agreed to remove all tariffs on industrial products imported from
each other over a 10-year period but, unlike the EEC, to maintain their
existing national tariffs on certain imports.
On May 2, 1992, foreign ministers of both EFTA and the EC signed a treaty in
Portugal (to take effect on January 1, 1993) uniting the two groups into a
new European Economic Area. The 1,000- page treaty stipulates free
movement of goods, labor, services, and capital among member states.
Nordic Council
The Nordic Council is a Scandinavian advisory body established in 1952 to
provide for synchronized laws and cultural cooperation among five member
nations. With headquarters in Stockholm, the Council has worked to
standardize legal, economic, and social arrangements among its members.
As a result of cooperation within the Council, citizens of one Nordic country
visiting or working in another share many of the rights of the country's
nationals. Each member sends representatives to an annual meeting to
formulate policy.
Western European Union
Based on the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the WEU was established in 1955 as
an alliance concerned with European cooperation in the field of security. Its
structure consists of the Secretariat (London), Parliamentary Assembly
(Paris), and Institute for Security Studies (Paris). In addition, meetings of
experts and political directors are held regularly, and foreign and defense
ministers meet at least twice a year.
Moribund for nearly 3 decades, the WEU was revitalized in 1986,
coincidental with European efforts to deal with conflicts in the Persian
Gulf. In 1987, WEU states dispatched mine-sweeping units to the Gulf
during the Iran-Iraq war. More recently, WEU states contributed to the Gulf
coalition forces efforts by coordinating the European component of an
international naval blockade and, later, coordinating humanitarian
assistance to Kurdish refugees.
At the EC summit talks in Maastricht in December 1991, the
12 EC nations agreed on a new mandate for the WEU: The WEU will serve as
the defense component of the European Union and as the European pillar of
the Atlantic alliance. In addition, to better coordinate with NATO and EC,
the WEU Secretariat will be moved to Brussels by the end of 1992.
Membership in the WEU will be opened up; EC member states are invited to
join the WEU either as full members or as observers. European members of
NATO are invited to participate as associate members. (###)
Who Belongs to What
CSCE
The 52 members are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Byelarus, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia.
EC
The 12 members are Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom.
NATO
The 16 members are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and United States.
NACC
The 36 members are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelarus,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom,
United States, and Uzbekistan.
Council of Europe
The 27 members are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark,
Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United
Kingdom.
EFTA
The 6 members are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland.
Nordic Council
The 5 members are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
WEU
The 9 members are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom. (###)
EC at a Glance
-- The total population of the 12 EC member states is about 345 million. It
is world's largest trading bloc and America's largest trading partner.
-- In 1990, the EC had a GDP of $6 trillion and an average per capita GDP of
$17,400. Total US-EC trade was $189 billion in 1991: US imports from the
European Community amounted to $86 billion; US exports to the EC were
$103 billion. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 26, June 29, 1992
Title: Points of Contact For US Firms Seeking Business
Opportunities in The New Independent States
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jun, 29 19926/29/92
Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies
Region: Eurasia
Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
Subject: Trade/Economics, State Department
[TEXT]
Focus on the Emerging Democracies
A Periodic Update
The President has designated Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S.
Eagleburger as Coordinator of US Assistance Policy for the New Republics of
the Former Soviet Union. Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Dr. Michael
Boskin, Deputy Treasury Secretary John Robson, and US Agency for
International Development Administrator Ronald W. Roskens, have been
designated as Deputy Coordinators. In addition, each US Government agency
listed below has identified key individuals as points of contact.
Department of State
The Office of the Deputy to the Coordinator is headed by Ambassador Richard
L. Armitage, who reports to the Deputy Secretary of State. Ambassador
Armitage is responsible for overall coordination of US assistance policy and
technical assistance programs (ongoing or planned) for the new independent
states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. This office is the initial point of
contact for US firms interested in business and investment opportunities.
Priscilla Rabb-Ayres
Senior Adviser, Private Sector Programs
D/CISA, Rm. 1004
US Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520
Tel: 202-647-2626
Fax: 202-647-2636
US Agency For International Development (USAID)
The Center for Trade and Investment Services provides specific information
about USAID programs and activities.
Mr. Caesar Gonzmart
USAID, SA-2
Washington, DC 20523-0029
Tel: 202-663-2660 or 1-800-USAID-4-U
Fax: 202-663-2149.
Department of Commerce
The Business Information Service for the New Independent States (BISNIS)
provides information on business opportunities, foreign trade legislation,
and sources of financing, as well as contact information. It will publish a
monthly BISNIS Bulletin on trade-related US Government programs and trade
promotional events. BISNIS will have a match-making service and also
publish a "Search for Partners" newsletter.
Linda Nemec
Director, Business Information Service
US Department of Commerce
Rm. 7413
Herbert C. Hoover Building
Washington, DC 20230
Tel: 202-377-4655
Fax: 202-377-4473
US Trade and Development Program (TDP)
TDP promotes US exports for major development projects in the NIS. It
funds feasibility studies, consultancies, training programs, and other
project planning services related to major projects.
Daniel Stein
US Trade and Development Program
SA-16, Rm. 309
Washington, DC 20523-1602
Tel: 703-875-4357
Fax: 703-875-4009
Export/Import Bank (Eximbank)
The Eximbank and its insurance contractor, the Foreign Credit Insurance
Association (FCIA), provide insurance, guarantees, and loans to US exporters
and commercial banks to facilitate financing for the export of goods and
services from the United States to many of the NIS emerging markets.
FCIA Insurance:
Mitchell McCauley
Loan Officer
Eximbank of the US
811 Vermont Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20571
Tel: 202-566-8190
Fax:
202-566-7524
Guarantees and Loans, including Oil and Gas Sector:
John Lentz
(same address as above)
Tel: 202-566-8208
Fax: 202-566-7524
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
OPIC promotes economic growth in more than 125 developing nations and
emerging economies (including at this time Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia) by encouraging US private investment in those
nations. OPIC assists American investors through three principal programs:
-- Financing investment projects through direct loans and loan guarantees;
-- Insuring investment projects against a broad range of political risks;
and
-- Providing a variety of investor services including advisory services,
project development funding, investment missions, computer-assisted joint
venture partner matching, and country and regional information kits.
OPIC
1100 New York Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20527
OPIC NIS contacts:
Dave Cahn, Legal Affairs
Tel: 202-336-8423
Fax: 202-408-0297
Michael Oxman, Insurance
Tel: 202-336-8589
Fax: 202-408-5142
Burton Bostwick, Finance
Tel: 202-336-8475
Fax: 202-408-9866
Dan Riordan, Investor Services
Tel: 202-336-8620
Fax: 202-408-5145
Brenda Brereton, Investor Services
Tel: 202-336-8617
Fax: 202-408-5145
US Department of Agriculture (USDA)
USDA is responsible for commercial export programs and several food aid
programs including concessional loans, Food for Peace Programs, and com-
modity grants. A wide array of US agricultural food commodities are
eligible for export under these different programs.
USDA also sponsors technical assistance programs for the NIS that support
the transition to a private agriculture system.
Mary Chambliss
USDA, Rm. 4079
SUSDA/FAS/EC
Washington, DC 20250-1000
Tel: 202-720-3573
Fax: 202-690-0727
US Information Agency (USIA)
USIA is responsible for educational and cultural exchanges, information
programs, internships, and training activities that support US policy goals
in the new countries. USIA programs aim to assist democratic and economic
reform in the new states. In addition to USIA Foreign Service officers
posted in NIS Embassies, USIA Washington headquarters works through a
number of private sector exchange organizations in the United States.
Rosemary DiCarlo
USIA, Rm. 868
301 4th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20547
Tel: 202-619-5057
Fax: 202-619-6821
Department of the Treasury
The Treasury Department provides technical assistance in macroeconomic
policy, government financial operations, and financial sector reform to
support development and operation of central and commercial banking
institutions.
Alexis Rieffel
Office of Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union Policy
1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Rm. 4138
Main Treasury Department
Washington, DC 20220
Tel: 202-622-2130
Fax: 202-622-2308 (###)