US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992

Title:

International Cooperation on Environment and Development

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address to the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Date: Jun, 12 19926/12/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States, Brazil Subject: Environment, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] President Collor, Mr. Secretary General, Heads of Delegation. May I first express my admiration to Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and my gratitude to Secretary General Maurice Strong for his tireless work in bringing this "Earth Summit" together. This is truly a historic gathering. The Chinese have a proverb: If a man cheats the earth, the earth will cheat man. The idea of sustaining the planet so that it may sustain us is as old as life itself. We must leave this earth in better condition than we found it. Today, this old truth must be applied to new threats facing the resources which sustain us all--the atmosphere and the ocean; the stratosphere and the biosphere. Our village is truly global. Some find the challenges ahead overwhelming. I believe that their pessimism is unfounded. Twenty years ago, at the Stockholm conference, a chief concern of our predecessors was the horrible threat of nuclear war--the ultimate pollutant. No more; upon my return from Rio, I will meet with Russian President Yeltsin in Washington, and the subject we will discuss is cooperation--not confrontation. Twenty years ago, some spoke of the limits to growth. Today, we realize that growth is the engine of change and the friend of the environment. Today, an unprecedented era of peace, freedom, and stability makes concerted action on the environment possible as never before. This summit is but one key step in the process of international cooperation on environment and development. The United States will work to carry forward the promise of Rio. Because as important as the road to Rio has been, what matters more is the road from Rio. There are those who say that cooperation between developed and developing countries is impossible. Let them come to Latin America, where debt-for- nature swaps are protecting forests in Costa Rica and funding pollution control in Chile. There are those who say that it takes state control to protect the environment. Let them go to Eastern Europe, where the poisoned bodies of children now pay for the sins of fallen dictators, and only the new breeze of freedom is allowing for cleanup. There are those who say that change can never come because the interests of the status quo are too powerful. Let them come right here to Brazil, where President Collor is forging a new approach that recognizes the economic value of sustaining the rain forest. There are those who say that economic growth and environmental protection cannot be compatible. Let them come to the United States--where, in the 20 years since Stockholm, our economy has grown by 57%, yet, we have cut the lead going into the air by 97%, the carbon monoxide by 41%, the particulates by 59%. We've cleaned up our water and preserved our parks, wilderness, and wildlife. There are those who say that the leaders of the world do not care about the earth and the environment. Let them all come to Rio. We have come to Rio. We've not only seen the concern; we share it. We not only care; we're taking action. We come to Rio with an action plan on climate change. It stresses energy efficiency, cleaner air, reforestation, [and] new technology. And I am happy to report that I have just signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Today, I invite my colleagues from the industrialized world to join in a prompt start on the convention's implementation. I propose that our countries meet by January 1 [1993] to lay out our national plans for meeting the specific commitments in the framework convention. Let us join in translating the words spoken here into concrete action to protect the planet. We come to Rio with a proposal to double global forest assistance. We stand ready to work together, respecting national sovereignty on new strategies for forests for the future. As a down payment, we will double US forest bilateral assistance next year. We will reform at home, phasing out clear- cutting as a standard practice on US national forests and working to plant 1 billion trees a year. We come to Rio with an extensive program of technology cooperation. We stand ready, government and private sector, to help spread green technology and launch a new generation of clean growth. We come to Rio recognizing that the developing countries must play a role in protecting the global environment but will need assistance in pursuing these cleaner growths. So, we stand ready to increase US international environmental aid by 66% above the 1990 levels, on top of the more than $2.5 billion that we provide through the world's development banks for Agenda 21 projects. We come to Rio with more scientific knowledge about the environment than ever before and with the wisdom that there is much we do that's not yet known. We stand ready to share our science and to lead the world in a program of continued research. We come to Rio prepared to continue America's unparalleled efforts to preserve species and habitat. Let me be clear. Our efforts to protect biodiversity itself will exceed the requirements of the treaty. But that proposed agreement threatens to retard biotechnology and undermine the protection of ideas. Unlike the climate agreement, its financing scheme will not work. It is never easy to stand alone on principle, but sometimes leadership requires that you do. Now is such a time. Let's face it, there has been some criticism of the United States. But I must tell you, we come to Rio proud of what we have accomplished and committed to extending the record on American leadership on the environment. In the United States, we have the world's tightest air-quality standards on cars and factories, the most advanced laws for protecting lands and waters, and the most open processes for public participation. And now for a simple truth. America's record on environmental protection is second to none. So, I did not come here to apologize; we come to press on with deliberate purpose and forceful action. Such action will demonstrate our continuing commitment to leadership and to international cooperation on the environment. We believe that the road to Rio must point toward both environmental protection and economic growth--environment and development. By now, it's clear, to sustain development we must protect the environment, and to protect the environment, we must sustain development. It's been said that we don't inherit the earth from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children. When our children look back on this time and this place, they will be grateful that we met at Rio. They will certainly be pleased with the intentions stated and the commitments made. But they will judge us by the actions we take from this day forward. Let us not disappoint them. (###) Other materials relating to the UN Conference on Environment and Development will be printed in Dispatch Supplement No. 4. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

Framework Convention on Climate Change Signed

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Date: Jun, 12 19926/12/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States, Brazil Subject: Environment, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] I have today signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change on behalf of the United States of America. This landmark agreement is a major step forward by the international community in taking action to address global climate change. It requires countries to formulate, implement, and publish national programs for mitigating climate change by limiting net emissions of greenhouse gases. The framework convention is comprehensive, covering all sources and sinks of greenhouse gases. It provides the flexibility for national programs to be reviewed and updated as new scientific information becomes available. These are important and desirable features. The United States already has been working to develop plans that are responsive to the requirements of the convention. In February 1991, and again in the spring of this year, my Administration published a detailed program of specific measures that the United States was prepared to undertake to address climate change. The Administration also provided detailed estimates of the emissions effects of these measures. The US plan stresses energy efficiency, cleaner air, new technology, and reforestation. It is estimated that our plan will reduce annual net greenhouse gas emissions by 125 to 200 million tons below projected levels in the year 2000. Many of the items contained in the US action agenda are already being implemented. Some were contained in the Clean Air Act of 1990. Some energy efficiency measures, such as EPA's [Environmental Protection Agency] Green Lights program, are being pursued under existing authority. Others, such as elements of the National Energy Strategy, have been proposed by the Administration and are awaiting final action by the US Congress. No effort to address climate change can be successful without the participation of the developing countries. We have pledged support for "country studies," for the Global Environmental Facility, and for various other programs to help these countries begin the process of developing action programs. I have, today, invited the other industrialized nations who have signed the framework convention to join me in a prompt start on its implementation. I have proposed that our countries meet by January 1 [1993] to present and review our national action plans. We look forward to cooperating with the other developed nations in this regard and to seeing what specific measures they propose to undertake. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

US-Panamanian Friendship

Bush Endara Source: President Bush, Panamanian President Endara Description: Exchange of toasts between Presidents Bush and Endara, Panama City, Panama Date: Jun, 11 19926/11/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: Panama Subject: Democratization, International Law [TEXT]
President Endara:
I wish to toast in honor of the United States, our friends and our partners in Panama. And I want to make a toast to this excellent friend of Panama, Mr. George Bush; to his wife, Barbara Bush; and wish them the best of luck, the best of health, and the best of happiness. So I want to raise my cup and say, "Salud."
President Bush:
Mr. President and Mr. Vice President, members of the cabinet, Barbara and I are just delighted to be with you to witness firsthand the great progress that Panama has made since its liberation from that dictatorship and tyranny back in December 1989. Panama is once again free, democracy [is] restored, and the rule of law prevails. With your nation's return to democracy, Panama resumes its place in the world community. This country's path toward economic reform and liberalization has rekindled economic enterprise. And maybe some don't realize it, but last year your nation's economic growth was the highest in the whole hemisphere. And I salute your success and your efforts, which bring the prospect of a better future for all Panamanians. Our countries have enjoyed a unique partnership since Panama gained its independence nearly 90 years ago. That partnership is embodied today in the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties. Mr. President, let me just assure you the United States keeps its word; those treaties will be fully implemented on schedule. But what I really wanted to do was to salute those of you in this room who stood up to the tyranny of [General Manuel] Noriega and who dared to oppose him in the 1989 elections and who now have the responsibility for strengthening your democracy for future generations. As we were riding in the car, I sensed a little nervousness on the part of my friend, President Endara. I think he was worried that I might be offended by some show of protest. But what I saw and felt was that overwhelming welcome from the people along the streets. It expressed, I think, a genuine friendship between Panama and the United States. And for the tiny, tiny handful of people that are protesting, I said they ought to go up to San Francisco and get an idea what a real protest is like. So we've been here, and we are very grateful to you. And we salute you. And I would like to just propose a toast to the health of President and Mrs. Endara, and to that lasting, strengthening friendship between Panama and the United States of America. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

US-Russian Negotiations on Nuclear Weapons Reduction

Baker Kozyrev Source: Secretary Baker, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev Description: Remarks at the White House, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 9 19926/9/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Russia Subject: Arms Control, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT]
Secretary Baker:
We do not have closure on the question of further reductions in nuclear weapons, although we continue to work on the issue and discuss the various different formulations. We will continue these discussions, hopefully over the course of the next several days. I should say that with respect to the other elements of the proposed visit of President Yeltsin to the United States, I think we have achieved a very good agreement on a whole host of agreements and understandings that will be entered into when the two Presidents meet.
Foreign Minister Kozyrev:
I was particularly impressed by the meeting that we just had with President Bush, where he reaffirmed the support of the United States for political and economic reform in Russia, and where he said that this is in our mutual interest. With regard to further reductions in strategic offensive arms, I want to make one thing absolutely clear: We do not need those arms, and we are not going to use them against the United States. The real challenge here is finding out just how we dismantle this war machine that has been created over the past 40 years. It's basically the same problem that we run into in terms of our economic reform--that is, trying to overcome the communist inheritance that we somehow have to get over in order to move forward. Therefore, the real challenge of these negotiations here is not to strike the right balance of mutual threats, but rather to find a technically and economically feasible way of destroying the arsenals that we already have. Q: Mr. Secretary, do you expect closure, as you put it, by--during next week's summit, by then? Secretary Baker: I don't know. I think both sides would like very much to reach an agreement that would result in further reductions from the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] level. As I've said over the course of the past month or two as we have met on this issue, it's a question, not just of numbers, but of the mix of weapons. We will continue to discuss that, and I hope that we can find some common ground. We are also discussing, of course, cooperation with respect to questions of missile defense and that sort of thing. Those discussions will continue as well in the hopes that the two Presidents can reach an agreement on that subject when they can get together. Q: Was there agreement, Mr. Secretary, on the ballistic early warning center that you had discussed earlier? Secretary Baker: I think there's genuinely--there's substantial common ground on the concept of participation in a ballistic missile early warning center, jointly, not just with Russia and the United States but with other allies as well. Foreign Minister Kozyrev: The question was whether another meeting between the two ministers might be called for before the summit. We will now check on the material that we have; we will analyze the things that we have discussed. We have a much better understanding of each other's positions now, and we're sure that we will be able to arrive at closure on this. The question is not really in terms of discussing which option is best, because we have quite a few good options, but the real question here is not to turn the better into the enemy of the good. Q: Minister Kozyrev on a couple of points mentioned the financial aspects of this. Is there any dispute, difference, as to who is going to pay for the cost of dismantling? Secretary Baker: We are already committed to pay some costs of collection, storage, disassembling, and dismantling of nuclear weapons. We have not agreed to pick up all of the costs of dismantling all of the strategic nuclear weapons that the former Soviet Union and the now new states are obligated to dismantle under START. Q: Are you being asked to? Secretary Baker: No. We have actually said to the Russians that if some of the problems we face are technical problems dealing with the mechanics of dismantling nuclear weapons or the cost of dismantling those weapons, let us know what those are, and we will consult with the Congress to see the degree to which we might be able to help. We're still in--those are some of the things, Charles, that we're still discussing. Q: Is there agreement to reduce to 4,700? Secretary Baker: No. I just said that we have not reached an agreement to go--as we stand here today, we have not reached an agreement to go, indeed, below the START levels. So, that report is an erroneous report. Q: Will you summarize what the stumbling points are? Secretary Baker: As I just said earlier, the--I think that there's a genuine recognition on the part of both countries that we ought to reduce the levels of these weapons in the light of the new political environment as substantially and quickly as possible. The timing of these reductions and the mix of the reductions are the main elements where there continue to be differences. It's not enough simply to say reduce weapons; you have to talk about what kinds should be reduced, and you have to consider the reductions of those weapons that are of the most destabilizing nature. Q: Who wants to do it quicker? Secretary Baker: It's not that simple. I think that we might be out in front on doing it quicker with respect to some weapons, and they might be out front doing it quicker with respect to others. It's not a simple matter at all; it's a very complex subject. We will continue to work on it and see if we can bring it to closure. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

UN Security Council Resolution 758 On Bosnia-Hercegovina

UN Source: UN Security Council Resolution, New York Date: Jun, 8 19926/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations [TEXT] UN Security Council Resolution 758 On Bosnia-Hercegovina Resolution 758 (June 8, 1992) The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991, 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of15 December 1991, 727 (1992) of 8 January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992, 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992 and 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, Noting that the Secretary-General has secured the evacuation of the Marshal Tito Barracks in Sarajevo, Noting also the agreement of all the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes, under the exclusive authority of the United Nations, and with the assistance of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Noting further that the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes would constitute a first step in establishing a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport, Deploring the continuation of the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is rendering impossible the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo and its environs, Stressing the imperative need to find an urgent negotiated political solution for the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 6 June 1992 (S/24075) submitted in accordance with paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolu-tion 757 (1992); 2. Decides to enlarge the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR, established under resolution 743 (1992), in accordance with the Secretary-General's report; 3. Authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy, when he judges it appropriate, the military observers and related personnel and equipment required for the activities referred to in paragraph 5 of his report; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to seek Security Council authorization for the deployment of the additional elements of UNPROFOR, after he has reported to the Council that all the conditions necessary for them to carry out the mandate approved by the Security Council, including an effective and durable cease-fire, have been fulfilled; 5. Strongly condemns all those parties and others concerned that are responsible for the violations of the cease-fire reaffirmed in paragraph 1 of the agreement of 5 June 1992 annexed to the Secretary-General's report; 6. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to comply fully with the above-mentioned agreement and in particular to respect strictly the cease- fire reaffirmed in paragraph 1 thereof; 7. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and international humanitarian agencies and take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of their personnel; 8. Demands that all parties and others concerned create immediately the necessary conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport and respecting the agreements signed in Geneva on 22 May 1992; 9. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to use his good offices in order to achieve the objectives contained in paragraph 8 above and invites him to keep under continuous review any further measures that may become necessary to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies; 10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on his efforts no later than seven days after the adoption of this resolution; 11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0). (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

EC 1992 and US Business

McAllister Source: Eugene J. McAllister, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 9 19926/9/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Subject: EC, Trade/Economics [TEXT] I am pleased to have the opportunity to continue the discussions about EC [European Community] 1992 begun by these subcommittees in 1989. I would like to offer three general points: 1. As a whole, EC 1992 is good for US business. In general, the directives have not discriminated against US business and have contributed to a more efficient European market. The Community has approached the effort in a manner designed to increase trade and investment flows with the rest of the world. Let me qualify this observation by noting that the 1992 process is not yet complete: There are important directives yet to be approved in areas such as data privacy. In addition, the EC has taken actions in particular areas that we believe are discriminatory. The US Government is concentrating our efforts to ensure that these EC actions are reversed. 2. The EC does not appear to be using the 1992 process to pursue unearned strategic advantages through discrimination. The United States was concerned about the potential abuse of trade measures by the EC to distort US business decisions. In its 1989 report, the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade pointed out an example of such a potential abuse of the rule of origin for semiconductors to force investment in Europe. We have not seen further examples of potential uses of such a strategy. 3. [The EC] 1992 [process] is generally open because the EC is approaching the endeavor with the intent of creating economic opportunities within Europe; they recognize the importance of an open European economy in creating these opportunities. [It] is open also because the US Government has been aggressive in protecting our interests and has adopted a broad strategy for influencing 1992 and other critical EC trade decisions. For instance: -- We are using Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--GATT] negotiations to address directly EC 1992 related problems such as standards, sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, quotas on films and broadcasting, government procurement, and rules of origin. -- At a time when 25% of the US embassies and many consulates in Western Europe have experienced cutbacks in staffing, the US Mission to the EC has received a 35% increase in professional staff, with seven agencies now represented (State, Commerce, Agriculture, USTR [US Trade Representative], Treasury, Customs, and USIA [US Information Agency]).
1992: Generally Open
A good place to start in considering the effects of [EC] 1992 is what has actually occurred since the 1992 process began: -- US exports to the EC have nearly doubled since 1986, when plans for the single market were initiated. -- The United States moved from a $22.5-billion trade deficit with the EC in 1986 to a $16.7-billion surplus last year. Our trade performance with key countries in the EC was equally impressive over the same period: Our exports to Germany doubled from $10.6 billion to $21.3 billion while our bilateral trade deficit shrank by two-thirds. US exports to the UK rose 94%, and we moved from a $4-billion bilateral deficit to a $3.6-billion surplus with the UK. US shipments to France increased 114% (from $7.2 billion to $15.4 billion), and our bilateral balance shifted from a deficit of $2.9 billion to a $2-billion surplus. -- US export performance to the EC was strong across a broad range of sectors, with noteworthy growth in shipments to the EC being in categories, including general transportation equipment, telecommunications equip- ment, electrical machinery, and road vehicles. In the high-technology area, our exports to the EC of semiconductors increased by 165% between 1986 and 1991. Exports of computers to the EC increased by 79% during the period. We feel fairly confident making general observations about the trend of [EC] 1992 based on two considerations. -- 233 of the 275 necessary directives have been adopted by the Council and are thus final. (I must note that the member countries have varied in how rapidly they are making the neces-sary statutory changes in national legislation.) -- To date, the EC has adopted 11 of the 21 "new approach" directives on standards, which set general guidelines and leave the development of specific standards to standard-setting bodies. In particular, the United States has been very pleased with the outcome on several critical directives.
Computer Software.
The EC's software directive will provide new copyright protection for computer software programs, directly benefiting the US software industry by cutting the costs incurred from unprosecutable pirating. Industry estimates that US companies suffered over $1 billion in lost sales due to software piracy in EC member states in 1991. The largest loss was in Germany. We have reviewed the draft amendment to the German copyright law, which would implement the provisions of the EC directive, and it appears to resolve points of concern we had in the past.
Banking.
Thanks in large part to strong US intervention, the EC backed away from its plan to institute mandatory mirror-image reciprocity, which would have severely discriminated against US banks. Instead, under the national treatment provisions now in force, US banks incorporated in one of the EC countries enjoy the full benefits of the liberalized banking system and, most importantly, the ability to conduct operations throughout Europe.
Autos.
The EC is moving from a system where some member states restricted auto imports by quotas to a completely liberalized auto market by 1999. Transition measures essentially hold exports from Japan at current market share but do not affect exports of Japanese nameplate cars manufactured in the United States. We had been concerned that US- manufactured cars might be harmed, and we made clear to both the EC and Japan that this would not be an acceptable outcome.
Telecommunications Services.
With the liberalization of the EC's telecommunications market, US firms have secured major contracts to provide cellular communications services. They will soon have non- discriminatory access to leased lines over which they can provide intra- corporate communications and value- added services.
Problems
I don't mean to suggest that EC 1992 is without problems. We are very concerned about several issues in the 1992 process. -- The data privacy directive is a pending proposal (an amended version will be issued by the Commission in July) with important implications. While we support the EC's goal of protecting individual privacy, we are concerned that the directive as currently drafted would impede normal business activity and increase costs of US businesses, such as credit, banking, insurance, and direct marketing industries. -- We seek rollback of the broadcast directive's quotas on non-European entertainment programming. After extensive bilateral consultations failed to yield fruit, we placed the EC on a special [Section] 301 [of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act] "priority watch list" in April 1991. We continue to seek quota rollback in the context of the Uruguay Round services negotiations. We are also evaluating the possibility of pursuing a GATT remedy. -- The EC's utilities directive, currently scheduled to enter into force on January 1, 1993, would allow EC procuring entities to discriminate against products containing less than 50% EC origin. -- Residual IPR [intellectual property rights] problems--our film and computer companies have some concerns about a draft EC proposal on rental rights, which would give exclusive right for a rightholder to authorize or prohibit the rental and lending of copyright works. US companies are concerned about the effect of the proposal on existing contractual rights. -- We are also concerned about the final shape of the EC banana import regime. In April, the EC Commission adopted a policy favoring a unified banana quota system but has not yet issued a detailed proposal. The United States opposes a quota regime, which will set a precedent for exceptions to the Uruguay Round principle of tariffication. We believe the EC can find a solution which allows increased access while protecting the interest of Lome [Convention] beneficiaries.
US Government Actions
The US Government is actively pursuing all of our interests in the EC 1992 process through a variety of channels. Since the last set of hearings by this committee, the government has embarked on a number of new efforts. These include:
Joint Declaration.
We signed a joint declaration on US-EC relations on November 23, 1990, establishing a framework for consultation on political and economic issues. The agreement provides for greater consultations on economic and political issues through biannual summits and ministerial meetings, ad hoc consultations between the EC Presidency Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State, and biannual consultations between the Commission and the US cabinet.
Mission in Brussels
. We have increased staffing in the US Mission to the European Community by 35% since May 1989, while at the same time we faced urgent staffing requirements in Eastern Europe and the need to open 15 new embassies in the Baltics and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. The new professional positions include two in the economic section, one new science and technology position, three new commerce positions, and a financial attache staffed by Treasury.
CEN/CENELEC
. While there is still room for improvement, US access to CEN/CENELEC [European standards-setting bodies] has increased in recent years, due in part to the open dialogue on standards-related issues between the United States and the EC as well as to the efforts of the US private sector. We continue to encourage the EC to rely on international standards to the extent possible. ANSI [American National Standards Institute] has an office in Brussels and has played an important role in promoting international standards and maintaining a dialogue with the EC on its plans for an EC-wide product testing and certification regime.
Procurement.
In order to ensure non-discriminatory access for US firms to key EC markets, the Office of the US Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce have been working together to ensure that those European countries with which we have reciprocal memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on defense procurement are also members of the GATT Government Procurement Code. The Administration is also working with our allies to establish, within NATO, a code of conduct on defense trade. We intend that the code of conduct will address many of the issues that have proved troublesome to the US industry, including disciplines on offset requirements that foreign governments often use in evaluating bids and in making procurement awards. In addition, the Departments of Defense and Commerce have incorporated annexes on procurement procedures in several MOUs to provide US industry greater transparency and visibility into allied requirements.
Justice Competition Policy.
In September 1991, the US and EC signed a bilateral agreement on anti-trust cooperation. Like our prior agreements with Germany, Australia, and Canada, the US-EC agreement provides for notification and consultation on anti-trust matters that may affect important interests of the other party.
Use of Uruguay Round.
The Administration has aggressively raised all significant EC 1992-related problems in the Uruguay Round and in bilateral negotiations. We remain committed to achieving a successful conclusion of the round. In the round, the Administration seeks to mitigate the utility directive's discrimination against US products by negotiating an expansion of coverage of the GATT Government Procurement Code to services contracts, telecommunications and heavy electrical equipment, and procurement by sub-central governments. We seek rollback of the broadcast directive's quotas on non-European entertainment programming. We continue to discuss an agreement on rules of origin within the Uruguay Round, which should mitigate future problems with the EC. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

Assessing the Current Trends in Opium Production and Heroin Trafficking

Levitsky Source: Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters Description: Statement before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 9 19926/9/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central America, Caribbean, MidEast/North Africa Country: Burma, Thailand, Laos, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Lebanon, China Subject: Narcotics [TEXT] I am pleased to meet with you and the committee today to discuss current trends in opium production and heroin trafficking. We last discussed this topic in May 1991, when I laid out our heroin strategy and plans for the coming year. I return today to give you my assessment of the current situation and detail the course we have plotted for continuing the fight against every link in the heroin-trafficking chain. I believe we have made progress in addressing the concerns that you and this committee outlined at last year's hearing. The alarm which Congress and others in the Administration sounded about the resurgence of heroin as a drug of choice has resonated through the many different organizations responsible for waging the war on drugs, and action is being taken across many fronts to meet this threat. Without prejudging the committee, I would venture to say that your investigations probably parallel mine on the state of the international opium/heroin problem. I know the committee as a whole has traveled to South Asia and the Middle East and that the chairman individually has traveled to additional countries with narcotics issues. I am interested in hearing your views and your observations.
Production Trends
The opium/heroin situation, from the international perspective, is just as grim as at this time last year. We have actually seen an increase in the amount of hectarage given over to opium cultivation. There were over 226,000 hectares devoted to cultivation in all the traditional countries compared to just over 214,000 hectares in the 1990 growing season. That number excludes the 15,000 to 20,000 hectares now in opium cultivation in Colombia, according to unconfirmed reports. Even without the Colombia production included, the worldwide potential production of opium is about 3,486 metric tons. We are all aware that not all of that production is turned into heroin, but if it were, there would be about 304 metric tons of heroin produced. If we add the Colombian production to that figure, we would get even more. The biggest producers, as in past years, are Burma, Laos, and Afghanistan. Pakistan, Iran, Mexico, Thailand, Lebanon, Guatemala, and Colombia also produce substantial amounts. The total tonnage produced is more than 1,000 metric tons greater than our estimate for 1987. This is not a pretty statistic, and I get no joy in reporting it to you. The reasons behind the huge amount of production are similar to those in past years. The cultivation in Burma is in areas largely off limits to the central government and in the control of insurgent armies with which the Rangoon government has reached accommodations. These groups use the drug trade to finance their activities. They have done so for many years and, absent any serious effort by the central government to come to terms with these insurgent armies and devote developmental resources to the border areas, the narcotics trade will continue. Of course, we cannot overlook the lack of law enforcement effort from the central government. Although there have been some reports of eradication and a few arrests for possession, there have been no sustained major efforts to stop the trafficking commensurate with the problem. Indeed, as we have noted for the last 3 years, the central government, [it] appears, has reached accommodations with certain insurgent groups that allow continued trafficking in return for peaceful co-existence with the center. Afghanistan has only recently emerged from many years of turmoil. A tenuous central government is in place with which we would like to work, but it is still too early to know how committed the government will be to counter-narcotics efforts. The long years of war were hardly conducive to any sustained effort to control poppy cultivation. Given the feudal nature of Afghan society with control of large areas in the hands of regional commanders and no effective central government as yet, a variety of groups and individuals will have to be engaged in order to implement any program. With a devastated economy and a large refugee population, it will not be easy to staunch cultivation. Laos showed a small decline in cultivation this past year after a substantial (27%) decline from the year before. This country, too, is a traditional producer of opium with a difficult geography, an impecunious central government that has delegated fiscal responsibility to regional entities and thus lost some measure of control, and a dependency on international institutions for external financing. The central government says all the right things, and we are working with them on alternative cropping, but it will probably be some time before we see any more major reductions. I am concerned about the possibility of expanded cultivation in China. The Chinese themselves have acknowledged the seriousness of their addiction and trafficking problems, and press reports indicate cultivation in diverse parts of China. Another formerly off-limits part of the world--the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union--also hold the potential for expanded production. Given the ethnic kinship with growers in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the subsistence economies of the many countries, and the new "openness," it would not surprise me if production spurted in these areas. The one bright spot in the production picture is Mexico where we estimate there was a 20-metric-ton drop from 1990. This decrease, which is small in the overall picture but more significant on the US scene, derives from a determined and effective eradication effort by the government. What concerns me most is the trend in Colombia, the center of the cocaine trade. From a few scattered experimental fields as recently as 1 year ago, we now have unconfirmed reports that there is cultivation on 15,000- 20,000 hectares. Yields appear to be low by Asian standards, but even small yields of 8-10 kilograms per hectare could put Colombia on the production map. The Government of Colombia's response has been aggressive--5,000 hectares manually eradicated or fumigated since last November. The Colombian opium explosion takes on an additional dimension of concern due to recent reports that cultivation may be spreading to Peru and Ecuador. This South American production phenomenon is clearly market oriented. The cartels have decided that there is money to be made in heroin and so have turned their organizational talents to a new enterprise. It is yet another challenge in the ever-changing world of trafficking and production. Where does all this production go? We believe that much of it is consumed in producer nations and their neighbors. The growth of consumption in the United States over the last few years has been relatively small. The explosive increases have been in countries like India, Pakistan, and China. It is difficult to put numbers on local usage, but we believe there are over 1 million users in Pakistan alone. We have seen disturbing trends in a number of South Asian countries, and the growth of abuse--and AIDS from intravenous injection--is a primary factor in the heightened attention in China. There are reports of Thai hill tribe villages with large numbers of heroin--not opium--addicts. This is where the largest increases in consumption are. Just to remind the committee--America's biggest consumption problem is with cocaine. We may use about 70% of the world's production. Our use of heroin is small by comparison--probably less than 10% of the world's potential production. That does not mean we can ignore the problem. Heroin remains an important area of concern.
Trafficking Trends
During my testimony last year, I noted that trafficking patterns had not shown any substantial changes from previous years. That remains true today with perhaps heightened volume in certain areas. For example, the amount of opium and heroin leaving the Golden Triangle through the People's Republic of China appears to have increased substantially. As you know, we added China to the list of those countries subject to certification in 1992 because of the growth of trafficking. I have been to China since I last met with the committee, and I can assure you that the Chinese take narcotics seriously. As I recently told Senator [Joseph R.] Biden, they have mounted a major public education campaign to address the narcotics problem and have gone so far as to execute traffickers under their strict drug laws. This trafficking trend is a difficult one to address as the border between Burma and China is an almost totally open one. When I was on the border, I saw a young boy guarding a bridge that spanned the river. When he waved his rifle menacingly at potential bridge- crossers, they simply moved away from the bridge and took ferries across the river. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that illicit goods of all kinds--including narcotics--make their way into China. I most recently was in India and Pakistan, and there, too, I noted what will undoubtedly be a new and disturbing trafficking trend. I referred earlier to the potential growth of production in Afghanistan. As that country gradually returns to a peace-time footing, I expect borders to open and the flow of narcotics to increase. The area along the Pakistan-Afghan border is wild country where there is little law enforcement, making trafficking rather easy. Of equal concern is the diversion of opium from the licit crop produced in India. In my discussions with Indian officials, I repeatedly made the point that the international community would not stand for such activity. Indian officials admit there is some diversion to illicit markets although, again, it is difficult to say how much. This is not surprising given the large number of farmers involved in production and the rather limited security features of the Indian production stream. I fear that the potential for increased trafficking from the sub-continent is substantial. One of the most frustrating and difficult heroin-smuggling routes is the network constructed by criminal organizations in West Africa. Controlled principally by Nigerians and Ghanaians, these networks have refined the techniques used by individual couriers to a new level of sophistication. Whereas West African citizens were previously used almost exclusively to smuggle drugs, in recent months, the people planning smuggling operations have been recruiting couriers of other nationalities, including young Americans, in cities throughout the United States. While the West African organizations gained worldwide notoriety for couriers who carried drugs by swallowing heroin-filled condoms, a mix of traditional methods, such as body carries and false compartment luggage, is also used. The huge seizure in Hayward, California, last May as well as the two large seizures in Thailand in 1991 indicate that East Asian trafficking organizations are sending larger shipments to the United States. No longer will small shipments suffice. The world's third largest container port in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, has recently emerged as a transit point for heroin shipments. Containers shipped through ports in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore also have been found to contain heroin. We believe similar size loads are destined for Europe as well. The long-awaited dismantlement of the Soviet Union and establishment of independent states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have resulted in the development of new drug routes into Europe. We could very well see the emergence of a "Baltic route" through northern Europe in addition to the well-known Balkan route through southern Europe. Unlike the cocaine cartels of South America, heroin is generally transported by a wide assortment of ethnically homogeneous organizations which specialize in a particular segment of the transit route between the producer and the consumer. The ethnic, cultural, and linguistic exclusivity of a particular network makes it difficult for law enforcement personnel to penetrate the operation.
Responses and Results
The production and trafficking trends I have outlined above are, indeed, troubling. However, I would like to outline for the committee how we have responded to the heroin problem and list some of the results we have achieved. Our response is framed by the President's national drug control strategy, the inter-agency heroin strategy and action plan, and individual operational plans of all the counter-narcotics agencies. These documents attempt to integrate the efforts of all the bureaucratic actors and, based on the results thus far, appear to be working as planned. Without question, the heroin issue is receiving higher level US Government policy attention than ever before. More fiscal and research and intelligence resources are devoted to the issue than when I testified last year. Without getting into classified details, the intelligence and enforcement communities have focused their resources on the organizations which run smuggling operations. We are developing an integrated approach that seeks to identify key individuals, disrupt money laundering channels, and restrict the supply of essential chemicals. We have raised our concern about opium and heroin production and trafficking in numerous high-level meetings. Secretary Baker and Under Secretary Kanter have raised heroin-related issues on their visits to Asia-- specifically at meetings of the Association of South East Asian Nations, in China, and in Thailand. I have had extensive discussions with officials in China, Malaysia, Singapore, India, and Pakistan. In addition, I have talked to Benon Sevan, the UN representative for Afghanistan, about the importance of narcotics control in that country. We have had extensive discussions with leaders of the UN Drug Control Program, which plays an important role in areas where US influence on governments is not high. ONDCP [Office of National Drug Control Policy] Director [Robert] Martinez met with high-level European political leaders and his narcotics counterparts to address mutual heroin and cocaine concerns. Gen. Colin Powell was very persuasive in conveying our concerns about drugs during his discussions with senior military leaders in Nigeria this spring. Administrator [Robert] Bonner of the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] has also visited several Asian countries and has worked to develop innovative enforcement operations. Without speaking for him, I know that he has delivered his message to decisionmakers in many of the important production and transit countries, e.g., Thailand, Laos, and China. In Southeast Asia, Thailand took the lead in organizing a tripartite conference with Burma and Laos to discuss ways of combating narcotics. The Thais did this on their own, and it is the first instance of which I am aware that producer/transit countries organized themselves to start a dialogue on a regional basis. We are pleased with this development. The committee is well aware of our INM [Bureau of International Narcotics Matters] bilateral programs in Thailand, Laos, and Pakistan. -- In Thailand, we are improving the capabilities of the police and supporting the ongoing eradication campaign. Production there is now about one-quarter of what it was just 10 years ago and, indeed, Thailand is a net importer of opiates. -- In Laos, we are providing alternative crops for traditional opium producers in a northern province. Production countrywide is down over 25% in the last 3 years. -- In Pakistan, we are building roads into previously inaccessible areas and providing support to law enforcement organizations. Effective poppy bans have been maintained in areas where cultivation had been widespread because of the access our roads have provided. In those countries where for a variety of reasons we cannot work, we are encouraging the United Nations to take the lead. The United Nations has prepared innovative programs--pairing Burma with China and with Thailand- -that are in the initial stages. I also look to the United Nations to take the lead in Afghanistan should the opportunity present itself. I would also like to highlight some legislative achievements. Thailand has finally passed an asset forfeiture and conspiracy law, and we are actively working with them to craft implementing regulations and provide training. This law holds the promise of getting at drug kingpins and money-launderers who, heretofore, have been exempt from prosecution. Also, Singapore appears finally ready to move on a money-laundering law. This, too, has been a long-sought goal of ours in the region. In addition, US urgings encouraged Pakistan to draft and request passage of legislation to establish anti-narcotics task forces, strengthen asset-seizure and conspiracy laws, to regulate the sale and distribution of acetic anhydride, and to permit the pre-trial destruction of seized narcotics and chemicals. Although diversion is a problem, I can report that the Government of India is beginning to focus more on the narcotics issue. They have pledged to tighten up on their licit opium industry and to beef up enforcement. We have delivered a strong message to them of the importance of this issue to us. We have not been idle on other international fronts as well. We have taken the initiative to ensure that all UN development programs include "poppy clauses" in their agreements. This initiative has elicited a positive reaction from UN officials. Last year, I mentioned our initiation and original leadership of the Dublin Group.1 We have now succeeded in devolving leadership to the Japanese, Germans, and Portuguese for various sub-regional groups. And, for the first time, we are having "pure narcotics" bilaterals with European nations such as Germany and Spain. I think this is a direct outgrowth of our Dublin Group work. At international meetings and on a bilateral basis, we have continually urged signatories to ratify the 1988 UN convention [on trafficking]. We have seen some movement on this issue in the recent past, with Thailand and Japan passing legislation in the past year that is in conformance with tenets of the treaty. We have sent formal demarches to both Syria and Lebanon asking them for more action and cooperation on narcotics matters. The committee's visit to Syria may have had a positive impact on the attitude of that country toward narcotics. We concluded a formal bilateral agreement with Israel pledging greater cooperation and resource sharing on narcotics matters. Our Embassy in Bogota, spearheaded by the INM program, is actively engaged in supporting the Colombian forces in their opium eradication and enforcement campaigns. The Colombian National Police have committed eight aircraft to the effort, expending over 200 blade hours per month. I might add that this effort is drastically diverting resources from cocaine interdiction operations. There are numerous examples of lost targets due to lack of helicopter support in this phase of the war on drugs. We are loaning additional aircraft to Colombia to help in its two-front war. Mexico eradicated 64% of its poppy crop in 1991, which is a significant increase over 1990. Authorities eradicated some 6,500 hectares of poppies through a combination of aerial and manual eradication. To date in 1992, they have reported eradicating 2,500 hectares of opium poppy. The Chemical Action Task Force organized a meeting in Kuala Lumpur for Asian nations to discuss ways and means of controlling essential and precursor chemicals. Again, in an encouraging development, it was the United Kingdom that took the organizational lead. We were able to bring the message of the importance of chemical controls to nations which had previously paid little heed to it. And our preaching may well have paid off. In April, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs voted to add 10 additional chemicals to the tables of the 1988 UN convention on trafficking. Signatory nations should now devise control regimes for these chemicals. I am under no illusion that such controls will come quickly or even be very effective, but I think we have taken an important step. On the money-laundering front, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was also focused mainly on heroin-related issues. The task force made presentations to nine central banks of Southeast Asia regarding implementation of the FATF recommendations and is working with East European countries regarding implementation of regulations to prevent money laundering. We are supporting demand reduction training in China, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, and India. On the international law enforcement front, US agencies facilitated the Pakistan authorities' seizure of19 tons of acetic anhydride and its subsequent safekeeping. We also played a role in the seizure of about 3,000 kgs. of semi-refined opium derivative in Baluchistan. But large seizures do not tell the whole story. Total heroin seizures in Thailand in 1991 were 31% higher than the year before, and total narcotics arrests were 34% greater. We are working with several countries--among them Hong Kong, Nigeria, Malaysia, and Pakistan--to complete extraditions of key traffickers to the United States. Our so-called designation agreement has been critical in restraining millions of dollars in narcotics-related assets in both the United States and Hong Kong. This sends a clear message to traffickers that ill-gotten gains are not immune from seizure.
Decisiveness and Dollars
I would like to say a word about the intangible known as "political will" on the part of heroin production and transit countries. Some countries, such as Colombia, have demonstrated tremendous amounts of it against huge odds. Others have shown lesser amounts of this unquantifiable commodity, but we are working to bolster it wherever we can. The fact that certain Southeast Asian countries and China have taken strong counter-narcotics stances shows me that our efforts have not been in vain. We have sought to enlist every country as a foot soldier in the war on drugs, and I believe we are making progress. In contrast to the ephemeral nature of the political will issue, I would like to conclude with some observations on that most tangible of things--money. As you know, INM's budget was reduced by 1.5% this year from the FY 1991 level. Under budget constraints, existing commitments we have against the cocaine threat from Latin America absorb most of our resources. We will continue to fund our bilateral programs at more or less the same modest levels. Even so, we have increased our Asia/Africa/Europe regional fund by 50% from $800,000 to $1.2 million for use in small grants to those non- program countries who have shown the will to take action against heroin traffickers who threaten their own societies and our security. If we receive our FY 1993 request, we will be able to do more. I have presented this list to the committee to indicate that we are actively working on the heroin issue. Against an immense production problem and in difficult political circumstances, we have produced some results. It is not enough. It is never enough. But, with the support of this committee, we will increase our efforts and continue to make progress against a difficult enemy. 1 The Dublin Group was created in June 1990, in Dublin, Ireland, and stemmed from a US proposal to the EC and other developed countries to establish an informal consultative mechanism on narcotics issues. Members include the European Community, US, Canada, Sweden, Australia, Japan, European Commission, and the UN International Drug Control Program. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

US Policy on Haitian Refugees

McKinley Source: Brunson McKinley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugee Programs Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on Western Hemisphere Affairs and on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 11 19926/11/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean, Southeast Asia Country: Haiti, Vietnam Subject: Refugees, Immigration [TEXT] On May 24, 1992, President Bush issued an executive order which permits the US Coast Guard to return Haitians picked up at sea directly to Haiti. Since that date, we have picked up and returned to Haiti 2,887 Haitians. In the past week, once information on the new policy became widespread, we have interdicted only about a dozen Haitians. There have been no reports of mistreatment of returnees. This was a difficult decision, taken only in the face of rising and increasingly unmanageable outflows and after 7 months of exploring all possible alternative means of addressing the outflow of Haitians in unseaworthy boats. For as long as we could, we used the base at Guantanamo [Cuba] as a humanitarian sanctuary and a location for interviewing Haitian boat people to allow those with credible claims to be identified and brought to the United States to apply for asylum status. In May, however, when more than 13,000 Haitians were picked up, we were overwhelmed by the numbers. Moreover, we became convinced that the Guantanamo operation and the presence of US Coast Guard cutters offshore had become a magnet-- causing more and more Haitians to take to the boats. In this circumstance, we were compelled to act to end or to reduce greatly the boat exodus. One essential element of our policy is to safeguard human life. When the numbers of boat people began to exceed the capacity of our Coast Guard cutters to pick them up, we were forced to implement a practice of selectivity-- asking the cutter captains to decide which boats were sufficiently seaworthy to let sail on. Sooner or later, a Haitian boat would go down and lives would be lost. Similarly, at some point the overcrowding at Guantanamo would pose serious risks to human health. These risks were clearly intolerable and unsustainable, and, on May 24, the President determined that the point of maximum capacity had been reached. We faced an excruciating dilemma. Haitians want to come to Miami. To save lives, we pick people up at sea. By doing so, we strengthen the pull of the magnet for the United States. The magnet goes well beyond political refugees; most are people seeking better economic opportunity. The dilemma is magnified by the need to employ an embargo in our efforts to restore democracy, which adds to the economic pressures. In these circumstances, recognizing all the down sides, we believe that it is imperative to end the magnet effect by returning all Haitians directly to Haiti. We will be able to continue to save lives by picking up those at sea. We will be able to process any Haitians who fear persecution at our Embassy in Port-au-Prince, and we have spread this word widely. The Embassy has been processing refugee applications since February with no interference from the Haitian authorities. The cumulative total of applications received by the Embassy is over 1,400, and more than 1,000 others have expressed interest in the program. We are also monitoring returnees and working with both the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] to expand their presence in Haiti for this purpose. This monitoring, plus our refugee processing, provides an expanding means of protection within Haiti. We are hoping that the OAS-DEMOC [Organization of American States-Democracy--a joint venture between the OAS and member states to promote democracy in and give humanitarian aid to Haiti] observers will soon be able to arrive to expand such protection further. This, of course, is not all we are doing for Haiti, nor is it the most important aspect of our overall Haiti policy. The only good answer to the dilemma of the Haitian boat people is to address the fundamental problem facing the entire Haitian population--the need to restore democratic legitimacy. When that happens, Haitians can have hope for a better life without leaving their country. We and the OAS are doing what we can. In the meanwhile, we are endeavoring to address the basic needs of the people. We have increased our humanitarian assistance programs, which total $47 million and will provide food for over 600,000 Haitians and health care services to nearly 2 million. We have called on other nations to increase their humanitarian efforts. Fundamentally, however, the answer to Haiti's problem and the desire of its people for a better life can be found only in the political realm, through the restoration of constitutional government.
Other Policy Options
The central fact about boat people is that they are on the high seas. They must be brought safely to shore. There must be a place on land to receive them. A second fact about asylum seekers and migration phenomena generally is offering resettlement or asylum to any large group will cause even greater numbers to seek the same benefit. Any policy we pursue must be considered in terms of this potential magnet effect. Taking these two criteria together, the need for a place on land and the avoidance of a magnet effect, the options available to the United States for Haitian boat people are extremely limited: We could bring them to the United States, we could return them to Haiti, or we could find a third country which would allow the use of its territory for safehaven or, at least, for processing. We have ruled out bringing any or all boat persons to the United States, for our territory is the supreme magnet. It is precisely for the purpose of reaching the United States that most Haitians have gone out in the boats. When Haitians arrived spontaneously in Cuba, Jamaica, or The Bahamas rather than reaching Guantanamo, they voluntarily returned to Haiti. So, too, have the great majority of those offered safehaven in Venezuela and Honduras. We are convinced that a program of large-scale entry into the United States, under any current or conceivable legal framework, would only ensure that thousands, tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of additional Haitians would follow. Over the past 7 months, we have strenuously pursued the third country option. Initially, when the numbers were small, several countries in the region offered to help (including Honduras, Venezuela, Suriname, Guyana, Jamaica, Belize, and Guatemala), but in no case did a country agree to accept more than 250 Haitians. Clearly, this is no answer when the pick-up rate is in the thousands per month. Hence, the problem we face in responding to the outflow of Haitians is quite different from the situation in Southeast Asia or Africa, where there is an acceptance of shared responsibility for a regional problem. We have also sought a solution through multilateral institutions, and we have strongly supported the diplomatic efforts of the OAS and UNHCR to orchestrate a regional plan. The United States and UNHCR are continuing to seek a regional solution. To date, however, there has been no success.
The UN Refugee Convention
Our policy decision to return Haitians picked up on the high seas without screening has raised concern about the consistency of our policy with the legal obligations of the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees. Let me assure you that the Department of State has approached this question with the greatest seriousness. Not only do we respect such treaty obligations as a matter of law and policy, we are the acknowledged world leader in refugee affairs. Both in support of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and bilaterally, as necessary, we are constantly working with other governments in the cause of first-asylum practice and refugee protection. We have not violated the convention, and we have no intention of lessening our advocacy of its principles around the world. Our position, simply put, is that the UN refugee convention does not impose an obligation on a state with respect to refugees outside its own territory. This is not a new interpretation to fit the present circumstance. The negotiating record shows that this was the understanding of the convention at the time it was negotiated. I will not attempt in this testimony to iterate the full legal reasoning of the US Government; it is on the public record in the several court proceedings of the past half-year. And the courts have sustained our position.
Asylum Seekers From Other Countries
The new policy is working. New boat departures have dropped to nearly zero in the past week. Since May 24, 2,887 persons who have not been screened have been returned directly to Haiti. We have checked and monitored, and no incidents of mistreatment have come to light. All returnees are being met at the dock by embassy officers. All receive a briefing in Creole and a handout which explains how to apply at the Embassy for the US refugee admis-sions program. I think our critics are attacking us not so much because of what we are doing but because of the perception that we are treating Haitians differently from asylum seekers from other nations. The first line of attack is to charge that our policy is racist. This is not true. In fact, we are admitting to the United States large numbers of Haitian asylum seeker--over 10,000 persons have been approved for entry from Guantanamo under a more generous standard than is applied for refugee admissions or asylum processing in the United States. Moreover, in the category of legal immigration, some 140,000 Haitians have been given legal status in the past 10 years, which is the fifth highest nationality in the world. Only four countries sent more of their citizens here than Haiti in that period--one of them [is] Jamaica. The second argument is that we treat Haitians differently from Cubans. This is decidedly true, but the anomaly lies in the preferential status accorded Cubans not in discrimination against Haitians. Cuban asylum seekers picked up by the Coast Guard are brought to the United States because they are fleeing a repressive, totalitarian regime. This is longstanding US policy for which we believe there is bipartisan congressional support. Otherwise, our policy of interdicting intending illegal immigrants is not discriminatory; it applies to other Caribbean nationalities besides Haitians. Currently, we are picking up and returning small numbers of boat people from the Dominican Republic. Finally, and here the argument is particularly pointed within the fraternity of experts on refugee affairs, there is the contention that we are less concerned for the fate of the Haitian boat people than for the fate of Vietnamese boat people. Before reaching a conclusion, let us work through these two quite different cases. In both situations, safe landing of boat people to safeguard human life is the overriding element. For Vietnamese boat people, safe landing has required a commitment by the United States and other nations that the boat people would be resettled or would eventually return to their country of origin. For Haitian boat people, safe landing is entirely dependent on the capacity of the US Coast Guard to rescue people in unseaworthy craft and take them to land. For Vietnamese boat people, each of the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] countries, plus Hong Kong, has agreed to the use of its territory for, at least, temporary asylum facilities. As stated earlier, this question of land to house boat people is a critical element. For Haitian boat people, no other country has been willing to offer its territory for a significant number. For Vietnamese boat people there is a multilateral agreement among over 50 nations--the comprehensive plan of action (usually called the CPA). For Haitian boat people, there is almost no multilateral support, despite 7 months of effort. For Vietnamese boat people, there are specific precepts on screening to determine who is a refugee. For Haitian boat people, the United States instituted thorough screening procedures at Guantanamo. We applied more generous standards than the refugee test used in Southeast Asia; on the other side, there is not an appeals process. As stated earlier, we had to cease screening of new pick-ups when the numbers overwhelmed our facilities. We have maintained our commitment to consider the claims of persons alleging a fear of persecution. We will do so at our Embassy in Port-au-Prince, and we have endeavored to facilitate access to this process. For Vietnamese boat people, the United States has opposed involuntary repatriation to Vietnam, even of [those] screened out. US policy on Vietnamese boat people has been in place for over 10 years and is well known to Congress. In capsule form, we continue to oppose involuntary repatriation to Vietnam until conditions change in that country. In addition, the CPA agreement states that voluntary repatriation is the appropriate solution. Since over 22,000 persons have returned voluntarily and thousands more are in the queue, we believe involuntary repatriation is unnecessary. US policy on Haitian boat people also has been in place for over 10 years. This policy recognizes that most Haitians are intending illegal immigration to the United States and allows for their interdiction and return to Haiti. We have done so for over 10 years with no evidence that returnees are persecuted. Since the coup in October 1991, we have returned some 22,000 Haitians. We are monitoring all over the country, tracking down specific allega-tions that are reported to us, and we have found no credible evidence that returnees are targeted for persecution.
Conclusion
This is what we are doing. In the cases of both Vietnamese and Haitian boat people, we have put first and foremost the safety of people on the high seas. In both cases, we have sought multilateral solutions. In both cases, we have supported screening procedures. This was our policy on Haitians for 7 months, but it could not be sustained. The unilateral US program to offer safe landing and screening at Guantanamo became its own undoing. It became a magnet, drawing out more and more Haitians until eventually our first priority--the safeguarding of lives at sea--could no longer be assured. We were forced to change our policy. We are returning Haitians directly to their country of origin without screening. We recognize that our decision might be misconstrued and used to weaken international resolve to protect asylum seekers in other circumstances. We will work to counter that, carefully explaining the special circumstances of this case and the efforts we are undertaking within Haiti both to monitor returnees and process refugees. In these ways, we believe we can sustain our support on behalf of refugees worldwide. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

US-Russian Joint Commission On POW/MIAs

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington DC Date: Jun, 11 19926/11/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, East Asia Country: Russia, Vietnam, North Korea Subject: POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] At the conclusion of working-level meetings of the US-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs [prisoners of war/missing in action] in Moscow, the US Embassy and the Russian Foreign Ministry released the following joint statement in Moscow on Friday, June 5. In Moscow, May 28-June 3, a meeting was held of the working-level group of the Russian and American sides of the Commission on the Clarification of the Fate of Prisoners-of-War and Missing-in-Action during and after World War II. The Russian side of the working group was headed by presidential adviser D.A. Volkogonov; the American side was headed by the Director of POW/MIA Affairs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Edward Ross. In the course of the working-level meeting, the commission heard a report by Volkogonov concerning the results of the work by the Russian side on carrying out the missions laid out at the March meeting. During the meeting it was acknowledged that in spite of the assurance of all Soviet leaders from Khrushchev to Gorbachev that there were no Americans on the territory of the USSR, a preliminary study of documents attests to the fact that Americans were present on Soviet territory and that the remains of Americans may still be present. Documents and materials of a number of state and leadership archives were analyzed which established that during and after World War II there turned out to be about 3.5 million foreign citizens who were prisoners-of-war and interned prisoners on the territory of the USSR, of whom more than 23,000 were US citizens. The Russian side was successful in establishing that basically these were American citizens liberated from German captivity by Soviet Army forces. Most of them were repatriated to their homeland in 1945-46. The fate of the remaining is being clarified presently. With respect to the fate of the American citizens missing in action in Korea, the Russian side was able to establish that they were mainly crews of aircraft shot down over North Korean territory and taken prisoner by Korean and Chinese military personnel. The Russian side discovered materials in their archives on some of them. Up to this point, the Russian side has found no documents regarding Americans currently present on the territory of the former USSR. With respect to US citizens who participated in the war in Vietnam, the Russian side was able to establish that some American servicemen who were avoiding service in Vietnam were present for a short period of time on the territory of the former USSR. These individuals were exploited actively in the propaganda campaign against the war in Vietnam. According to the data the Russian side has, these American citizens departed to various European countries. In addition, it was established that in the period 1950- 60, several American planes were shot down over the territory or territorial waters of the former USSR. In the conclusion of his report, D.A. Volkogonov expressed his assurance that future joint work will proceed constructively in the spirit of mutual understanding. The American side was asked to provide information concerning contacts with the countries of Indochina and to report on work accomplished with respect to the clarification of information concerning Soviet citizens missing-in-action and prisoners-of-war in Afghanistan and in other countries. Mr. Ross presented a brief statement about the recent trip to Southeast Asia by Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Solomon, including the results of the discussions with officials of the Vietnamese Government. The American delegation proposed a three-level approach for the organization and accomplishment of the work of the joint commission and agreed on the provision of technical support for the work of the joint commission in Moscow. Mr. Ross discussed the anticipated visit to Moscow of Mr. Peter Tomsen, US special envoy to Afghanistan. The Russians assisted the American side in arranging meetings and interviews with former Soviet military officers with possible knowledge of American servicemen or their remains on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The Russian side arranged for American members to visit the archives of the ministries of internal affairs and defense and the archives of the Russian archival committee. Representatives of various Russian archives presented short informational briefs on problems of research related to the responsibilities of the commission. The joint commission discussed the issue of the creation of a fifth working group to clarify the fate of Soviet POWs and MIAs in Afghanistan, as was agreed upon in the March meeting. The next working group meeting will be planned following the summit meeting between President Yeltsin and President Bush. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

Seizure of US Petroleum Companies in Zaire

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington DC Date: Jun, 8 19926/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Zaire Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] We are seriously concerned about the seizure more than 1 week ago of the assets of American petroleum companies in Zaire. There is a bilateral investment treaty currently in force between Zaire and the United States; it is incumbent on the Government of Zaire to ensure that its actions conform to that treaty. Ambassador Wells has been instructed to approach the Prime Minister to register our deep concern and to determine how the Government of Zaire intends to fulfill its international legal obligations under the bilateral investment treaty. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Computer Information Delivery Service

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jun, 15 19926/15/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Whole World Country: United States Subject: Science/Technology [TEXT] The US Department of State joined the Computer Information Delivery Service (CIDS) in February 1991. This was the first time that the Department of State widely disseminated foreign policy information to the general public in electronic form. This federal bulletin board network provides accelerated access to time-sensitive US Government information for subscribers around the world. CIDS is accessed by private information companies--news services, research companies, and database services--who retrieve data on an hourly, daily, or weekly basis and redistribute it to their customers around the world. The service also is accessed by numerous federal, state, and local government offices, libraries, and academic institutions. State Department contributors to CIDS are the Offices of Public Communication and Press Relations in the Bureau of Public Affairs and the Bureau of Consular Affairs. Other State Department offices have accessed CIDS to load special material--such as the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and the International Narcotics Control Strategy report-- as it is released to Congress. The unparalleled speed in delivery offered by CIDS has made it possible for critical foreign policy information to reach the American public in a more timely manner. The system also is available to other foreign affairs agencies.
How CIDS Works
CIDS is a delivery service. Information is offered in chronological order by category and organized by menu. Users can retrieve data automatically by pre-defined user profiles or selectively by browsing the menu by title and date. Users may review current or past issues of the US Department of State Dispatch, for instance, in their entirety or select individual stories by title. Other retrieval options, such as the ability to search by key word, may be added later by commercial services, such as Lexis-Nexis, which subscribe to CIDS. Users also may directly download CIDS data to privately owned software programs. Most commercial users--who value the accelerated access to foreign policy information in electronic form--establish a CIDS profile to automatically capture information pertinent to their needs. The public may use one of these services at home or at a local library to have the same information at their fingertips.
Access
CIDS is available daily and on public holidays according to the following schedule: -- Monday-Friday: 6 am-4 am -- Saturdays: 6 am-midnight -- Sundays: 7 am-2 am Calling CIDS CIDS information resides on a mainframe computer system with Martin Marietta Corporation. Through competitive bidding, the contractor is the wholesale distributor for the information--charging only for the accelerated access, not information. For subscription information to CIDS, contact the CIDS Message Center at (703) 802-5070 (specify State Department) or write: CIDS-State Department, Martin Marietta Corporation, 4795 Meadow Wood Lane, Chantilly, Virginia 22021. Questions concerning content should be addressed to the Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, Room 6805, Washington, DC, 20520-6810. If you wish to access information on CIDS through other subscribers, contact your local library or systems operator for database resources.
Highlights of What's Available on CIDS
Secretary of State File: Transcripts of speeches, remarks, interviews, press conferences, and congressional testimonies by the Secretary of State. US Department of State Dispatch: Weekly record of US foreign affairs. Travel Advisories: Travel updates for countries worldwide. Country Profiles/Background Notes: Overviews of the politics, economics, history, and travel notes for some 190 countries and international organizations. Foreign Policy Summaries: Full texts from the Gist series, plus Fact Sheets and Chronologies. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 24, June 15, 1992 Title:

Treaty Actions: Multilateral and Bilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jun, 15 19926/15/92 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Caribbean, Pacific, South America, E/C Europe, Europe, East Asia Country: Algeria, Australia, Bahamas, Chile, Germany, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Russia, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela Subject: International Law, OAS, Trade/Economics, Human Rights, Environment, Science/Technology [TEXT]
Multilateral
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. Adherence deposited: Slovenia, May 13, 1992.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. Signatures and acceptances: Armenia, May 28, 1992; Estonia, May 26, 1992; Georgia, May 5, 1992; Kyrgyzstan, May 8, 1992; Latvia, May 19, 1992; Lithuania, Apr. 29, 1992; Marshall Islands, May 21, 1992; Switzerland, May 29, 1992. Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. Signatures and acceptances: Marshall Islands, May 21, 1992; Switzerland, May 29, 1992.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the US Feb. 23, 1989. Accession deposited: Seychelles, May 5, 1992.
Human Rights
International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.1 Accession deposited: Seychelles, May 5, 1992. International covenant on civil and political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.1 Accession deposited: Seychelles, May 5, 1992.
International Labor Organization
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Dated at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948. TIAS 1868. Acceptance deposited: Kyrgyzstan, Mar. 31, 1992.
Organization of American States
Headquarters agreement, with annexes. Signed at Washington May 14, 1992. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes confirming that all necessary requirements have been fulfilled.2
Pollution
Amendments to the Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer of Sept. 16, 1987. Adopted at London June 29, 1990. Acceptance deposited: South Africa, May 12, 1992. Enters into force: Aug. 10, 1992.
Slavery
Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 25, 1926. Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for the US Mar. 21, 1929. TS 778. Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for the US Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.Accession deposited: Seychelles, May 5, 1992.
Taxation-International Organizations
Agreement on state and local taxation of foreign employees of public international organizations. Done at Washington Apr. 21, 1992.2 Signatures: Inter-American Defense Board, May 1, 1992; International Cotton Advisory Committee, May 7, 1992; Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture, May 13, 1992.
Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987.1 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20. Accession deposited: Seychelles, May 5, 1992.
UNESCO
Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials, with protocol. Done at Lake Success Nov. 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952. TIAS 6129. Protocol to the agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials of Nov. 22, 1950. Done at Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 2, 1982; for the US Nov. 15, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 97-2. Accessions deposited: Cuba (Protocol only) May 15, 1992; Venezuela, May 1, 1992 .
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Done at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.1 Accession deposited: Seychelles, May 5, 1992.
Bilateral
Algeria
Consular convention. Signed at Washington Jan. 12, 1989.2 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-13. Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 13, 1992.
Australia
Protocol amending the treaty on extradition of May 14, 1974 (TIAS 8234). Signed at Seoul Sept. 4, 1990.2 Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 13, 1992.
Bahamas
Extradition treaty. Signed at Nassau Mar. 9, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102- 17.2 Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 13, 1992.
Chile
Basic agreement relating to scientific and technological cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Washington May 14, 1992. Enters into force on the date of notification by the Parties that agreement has been approved in accordance with applicable constitutional procedures.
Czechoslovakia
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical cooperation in the earth sciences, with annex. Signed at Prague Apr. 10, 1992. Entered into force Apr. 10, 1992.
Germany
Supplementary treaty to the treaty concerning extradition of June 20, 1978 (TIAS 9785). Signed at Washington Oct. 21, 1986. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-6.2Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 13, 1992. Agreement concerning the settlement of certain property claims, with annex. Signed at Bonn May 13, 1992. Enters into force on date on which the Parties have notified each other that the necessary domestic requirements have been fulfilled.
Israel
Memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the field of labor. Signed at Washington and Jerusalem Nov. 6, 1986. Entered into force Nov. 6, 1986. Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of Nov. 6, 1986, for cooperation in the field of labor. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington and Jerusalem Feb. 7 and Mar. 3, 1992. Entered into force Mar. 3, 1992, effective Nov. 6, 1991.
Japan
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 28, 1984, as amended, concerning acquisition and production in Japan of F-15 aircraft and related equipment and materials. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Mar. 31, 1992. Entered into force Mar. 31, 1992. Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 29, 1988, concerning the acquisition and production in Japan of the EP-3 and UP-3C aircraft and related equipment and materials. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Mar. 31, 1992. Entered into force Mar. 31, 1992.
Kazakhstan
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Washington May 19, 1992. Entered into force May 19, 1992. Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of assistance. Signed at Washington May 20, 1992. Entered into force May 20, 1992.
Kyrgyzstan
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Washington May 8, 1992. Entered into force May 8, 1992.
Latvia
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Washington Apr. 17, 1992. Entered into force Apr. 17, 1992. Postal money order agreement. Signed at Washington Apr. 17, 1992. Entered into force July 1, 1992.
Luxembourg
Agreement on inspection procedures for the implementation in Luxembourg of the Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE). Effected by exchange of notes at Luxembourg Sept. 18, 1991 and Apr. 28, 1992. Enters into force on the date of entry into force of the CFE Treaty.2
Mongolia
Consular convention. Done at Ulaanbaatar Aug. 2, 1990.2 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-14. Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 13, 1992.
Morocco
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Exchange of notes at Rabat Feb. 27 and Apr. 2, 1992. Entered into force Apr. 2, 1992.
Russia
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of assistance. Signed at Moscow Apr. 4, 1992. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1992.
Spain
Second supplementary treaty on extradition. Signed at Madrid Feb. 9, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-24.2 Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 13, 1992.
Tunisia
Consular convention. Signed at Tunis May 12, 1988.2 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-12. Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 13, 1992.
Ukraine
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Washington May 6, 1992. Entered into force May 6, 1992. Agreement regarding humanitarian and technical economic cooperation. Signed at Washington May 7, 1992. Entered into force May 7, 1992. Agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection. Signed at Washington May 7, 1992. Entered into force May 7, 1992.
Venezuela
Agreement supplementing the investment incentive agreement of June 22, 1990, relating to the Export-Import Bank. Signed at Washington Apr. 22, 1992. Entered into force Apr. 22, 1992. Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technological cooperation in chemistry, physics and engineering measurement sciences, with appendix. Signed at Washington and Caracas Feb. 25 and Mar. 6, 1992. Entered into force Mar. 6, 1992. 1 Not in force for the US. 2 Not in force.(###)