US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992

Title:

A Democratic Partnership For the Post-Cold War Era

Eagleburger Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger Description: Address before the Trade and Economic Council's annual meeting, the Kremlin, Moscow, Russia Date: May, 27 19925/27/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former), Russia Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] It is an honor for me to be with you this evening in this most historic of places. In fact, as someone who spent the better part of 4 decades in the service of an American diplomacy driven and defined by the Cold War, this is one of the most gratifying moments of my career. Never could I have foreseen myself addressing the Trade and Economic Council here in a democratic Moscow, here in what was for my country the very symbol of our former hostility. And yet, the past 24 hours here in Moscow have left me with a sense of astonishment that we ever were antagonists. I cannot but feel a deep sense of regret that our hostility lasted as long as it did, depriving our peoples of the fruits of cooperation and peaceful development. The irony, of course, is that the American and Soviet peoples never truly considered themselves as enemies. On the contrary, we have, on both sides, always felt the most natural affinity toward each other--an affinity based on history, on a sense of mutual identification, and also on a keen and healthy sense of mutual competition. We are in so many ways the mirror image of each other: continent-sized, multi-ethnic nations and peoples with a singular sense of their unique destiny and historic mission in the world. Even as competitors, our efforts to outdo each other implicitly bespoke mutual respect and admiration. In fact, in some ways our competition brought out the best in us, forcing us, as it did, to strive for excellence in everything from space exploration to Olympic sporting events. But, still, by any measure the Cold War was a great tragedy for us both. The indisputable fact is that we both sacrificed dearly and suffered greatly during a period in which our considerable energies could better have gone to create a stable, peaceful, and prosperous world order following our common victory in World War II. Instead, we squandered those energies and wasted precious resources in the colossal folly which was the Cold War. And we are paying the price for this today--most recently on the streets of Los Angeles. And so, I would like to make it clear that we in the United States consider ourselves, too, as victims of the same totalitarian system which oppressed the peoples of the former Soviet Union. Deliverance, when it came, was the work of all who faced down that system in the West, in Eastern Europe, and right here in the streets of Moscow just 9 months ago. Now you are engaged in the monumental task of consolidating your experiment in democracy and the free market economy. I say "experiment" deliberately, because democracy is a form of government which can never be considered permanently secure. It presupposes the ability of the people to govern themselves, and it requires a greater degree of economic and social justice than do most political systems. In short, as much as democracy rewards the best in us, it requires the best in us as well, and for that reason it is an eternally experimental form of government--what Winston Churchill called "the worst form of government except for all the others." The task of making democracy work is a never-ending struggle. Ours began in the revolution of 1776, continued on through the terrible crisis of our Civil War, and goes on today. Your task, meanwhile, is a formidable one: to endure enormous human and economic costs while overcoming the damage of over 70 years of misrule. But at least you will do so, finally, in accordance not with a blueprint of commissars or a blueprint imported from the West, but in accordance with your peoples' own values, traditions, and genius. And you will do so, finally, in the invigorating air of democracy and with your peoples' energies at last unleashed to reach their maximum potential. All of this is to say that the work of recovery is the business of the peoples of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and theirs alone. We in the United States have no magic formula to offer, since neither we nor anyone else has ever attempted such a transition from a command to a free market system. Yet I am here today to do what I can to assure you that the American people will be there with you in time of emergency--as we were in the 1920s, as we were in World War II, and as we were this past winter. I can also assure you that what we desire most is to join with you in a historic partnership to help you launch this great experiment in democracy. What I am talking about is not some abstract kind of partnership, a politician's slogan, but a real partnership between the two groups assembled in this hall tonight: the business communities of the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States. This is not philanthropy, nor is it exploitation. It is called commerce--economic activity for the good of both partners and for the benefit of all. It is an endeavor in which there should only be winners and no losers. It was, in fact, through this same kind of engagement--investment and trade--that the United States helped its allies and former enemies in World War II to achieve prosperity and become stable democracies and, in so doing, built a lasting partnership. This is precisely what we want to accomplish together with our former adversaries of the Cold War. We look upon the new nations of the former Soviet Union as representing one of the greatest potential markets in the world today. We see jobs for your people and ours alike. We see mutually prosperous and peaceful relations between us. But if we contemplate the possible failure of your experiment in democracy and the free market, we see none of these advantages. And so, we need you to succeed; we want you to prosper. We believe that in addition to the know-how and macroeconomic stabilization assistance which the US Government will provide, what you are most going to need from us--the capital, the advanced technology, and the human expertise--can only be provided in sufficient amounts by our private sector. This is a lesson we have learned from 2 years of experience in assisting the new democracies of Eastern Europe. But this is even more true for the Commonwealth of Independent States, where the key to resuming quick economic growth lies in the stimulation of the hard- currency earning sectors such as agriculture, energy, and mining. In order to launch this partnership between our respective private sectors, there is a host of facilitative actions which your governments and my own must now undertake. I will describe the contemplated and ongoing activities of the US Government first. First, to begin with, I am pleased to report that we are making rapid progress in concluding trade, investment, and tax agreements with most of the nations of the former Soviet Union, and that we are making important strides in expanding Exim [Export-Import Bank] and OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] coverage. Second, the Administration is also working closely with Congress in seeking the early enactment of the FREEDOM [Freedom for East European Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act. Let me make one thing crystal clear: We are deadly serious about this act and about doing everything we can to assist the economic reforms of our new democratic friends. Third, the same act also authorizes our government to provide technical assistance in the form of people-to-people know-how, including: -- Training for government officials at all levels and for economists, businessmen, and scientists; -- Assistance in the fields of energy, housing, agriculture, and transport designed to remove some of the bottlenecks to development; -- Support to your governments in their efforts to rebuild infrastructure in the form of feasibility studies and technical assistance in cooperation with the World Bank and EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development]; -- Help for US business in guiding them through the unfamiliar paths of finding partners here, supporting their proposals, and providing funding for certain kinds of post-feasibility studies and tenders as we do in Central and Eastern Europe; [and] -- Providing advisers who will help create the financial institutions, laws, and regulations which will make a market economy work. Meanwhile, our Department of Commerce has a number of novel programs which will directly support American firms seeking to do business in the former Soviet Union. First, [the Department of] Commerce is extending to the CIS nations a data base program, which will deliver detailed information on potential opportunities and local partners directly into the hands of firms across the United States. Second, Commerce is working with US firms to provide internships in the United States for managers of CIS enterprises through the Special American Business Internship Training Program (SABIT). And third, Commerce is establishing Business Development Committees (BDCs) with the new independent states which will focus on removing general obstacles to trade and investment, as well as serving, in effect, as ombudsmen on specific projects which are slowed by government action or inaction. Finally, with us here this evening is the first team of US defense conversion advisers who have recently taken up residence in Nizhny Novgorod. They are already looking for ways to join Russian defense firms with US partners to create new, private, joint ventures which will produce exclusively civilian goods. These, then, are the measures which the US Government has implemented to assist the private sectors in your countries and my own. But there also are actions which the governments of the new independent states need to undertake to make the trading and investment climate here as attractive as it can possibly be. It is a fact that the countries which have overthrown communism have embraced the free enterprise system at a very specific stage in its historical development. They have done so at the very moment when the global market has emerged as the preeminent factor affecting the decision- making of firms and national governments alike. The reality now is that capital, in particular, will go where it wants to go, regardless of its origins and regardless of the intentions of those governments. Even within the United States, we have discovered that enterprises will leave states in which they have been established for generations when they find, for example, that the tax environment in another state has become more favorable to them. And of course, they take their jobs and local tax contributions with them when they go. We may bemoan the loss of governmental control, but for the firms themselves, the competition for economic survival is usually so intense as to leave them no choice. This is the reality with which every government in the world, without exception, must now deal. In the case of the governments of the former Soviet republics, we understand there will be confusion as markets are born, and that Western enterprises will be looked on as ideal sources of revenue. However, in the short time I have been in Moscow, I must say that virtually all the American businessmen I have seen have told me that their ability to contribute as partners to economic recovery here is severely, if not fatally, hampered by regulatory and fiscal practices they are encountering at all levels of government. I will not bore you with all the changes which American businessmen would like to see implemented. Briefly, the following are the most oft-cited impediments: 1. Constant changes and lack of transparency of laws and regulations; 2. Constant changes and prohibitive increases in taxation; 3. Uncertain ownership, particularly of natural resources, and overlapping jurisdiction among various levels of government; and 4. Payment arrears of more than $190 million owed to American companies by the former Soviet Union. Let me assure you that American companies which want to do business in the former Soviet Union are responsible firms; the US Government neither tolerates nor supports the "robber barons" of an earlier era. We have firms that can make the difference in vital areas such as food distribution, transportation, communications, health care, energy, and defense conversion. They can create jobs in your country, and they can help generate the hard currency you need. But they will be unable to do any of these things if the environment is not favorable. They cannot do business when, for example, a sudden tax increase wipes out the anticipated profit on a previously negotiated project. They cannot do business when they are faced with a bureaucracy as yet unable to deal expeditiously and authoritatively with them at working levels. They will, in fact, go elsewhere, if they must, to find a favorable environment among the oldest or the newest of the world's many free-market democracies. My friends, it is easy to dwell on the difficulties we face in this time of transition--transition to the free market, to democracy, and to a new world order. For the present, all we can see are the obstacles in our path and the sacrifices to be endured. We hear voices who say that the two superpowers of the Cold War are not going to flourish in the revolutionary new era which is upon us. I say, however, that those voices are wrong, and that anyone who doubts the capacities of the American people and the peoples of the former Soviet Union will be in for a rude surprise. Yes, we were victims of the Cold War; others advanced economically while we dissipated our energies in a senseless military rivalry. But look what power and creativity we demonstrated even while handicapped by that rivalry and imagine what we can accomplish now that our energies can be unleashed in the single-minded pursuit of economic rebirth and recovery. Imagine, especially, what we can accomplish not at loggerheads, but instead in intimate and mutually beneficial partnership. Once upon a time we were, in fact, allies, but we were allied against something external to us--against a threat we faced in common. Today, we have the opportunity for alliance in favor of something--in favor of the democratic way of life and values we now hold in common. We recognize that the opportunities for partnership are wide and varied in this democratic age, and that the new independent states will forge mutually fruitful relationships with their European neighbors and others. However, I would like to make one point clear: the United States is not just any partner, nor do we consider you to be just any partner. We are both peoples of destiny, peoples who have yet to make their greatest contributions to history and to our times. We have both been counted out by history before, yet on each occasion we have risen to the challenge--as we surely will today. Between us, we have the world's largest preponderance of power. Between us, there has been no history of armed conflict, no matter how intense our differences happened to be during the Cold War. Between us, therefore, there can be a partnership of greater trust and potential for mutual advancement than that between any other peoples in the world today. I know that when the peoples of the Commonwealth of Independent States look at the United States of America, they see the one nation most committed to the democratic free market system and to a just, stable, and peaceful world order. I can assure you that when we look at you, we see the nations who can and will flourish the most under that system and that order. In other words, history has decreed that we will be partners. Once before, we resisted that judgment, and we and the entire world paid a terrible price. But, thank God, we are determined to resist our common destiny no more. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

The US and the Middle East In a Changing World

Djerejian Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Description: Address at Meridian House International, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 2 19926/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Israel, Iran Subject: Democratization, Mideast Peace Process, Arms Control [TEXT] For over 4 decades, the central characteristic of international relations was the dichotomy between the Soviet empire of dictatorial regimes and centrally planned economies and the free world of democratic governments and market economies. Thus, the Cold War reverberated around the globe, affecting virtually everyone everywhere. Much of America's foreign policy and that of many other free nations was either driven by or [was] a derivative of our collective efforts to contain Soviet aggression and expansion. Today, East-West competition and conflict over the future of Europe and the Third World has been transformed. In the former Soviet Union, new leaders are striving for peaceful, democratic change as the only effective road to sustainable economic and social progress. Partnership has replaced conflict. A new mode of international cooperation, which Secretary Baker has called "collective engagement," is replacing the acrimonious competition of the Cold War. This sea change in world politics has had a profound effect in the Near East. An early example of the new "collective engagement" was the response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. A historically unprecedented coalition responded forcefully and successfully in reversing that aggression and in preventing Iraq from threatening or coercing its neighbors. In partnership with Russia, we have been able to bring Israel and all her immediate Arab neighbors--Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestinians-- together for the first time ever in a historic peace process to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of their long-standing disputes in direct, face- to-face negotiations based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Further, the United Nations has taken an increasingly active and positive role in enforcing the principles of its charter. Just this weekend, we have seen the UN Security Council enact Chapter Seven sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro following--in Secretary Baker's words--the "humanitarian nightmare" in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where many people, including Muslims, have been brutally victimized by the continued warfare. Besides its many resolutions on Iraq, the Security Council has shown it will not tolerate Libya's use of terrorism. In the Near East and Maghreb, the UN's activities extend from Iraq and the Iraq-Kuwait border to the Western Sahara. Within the ancient lands of the Near East, the rapid and fundamental change evident elsewhere is also pressing people to see their own futures in a new light and to reevaluate their relationships with other nations, with their neighbors, and with each other in a particularly challenging manner.
US Goals in the Near East
Amidst these changes, basic US foreign policy objectives remain consistent and clear. Two major goals stand out: First, we seek a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Israel and all her neighbors, including the Palestinians; and Second, we seek viable security arrangements which will assure stability and unimpeded commercial access to the vast oil reserves of the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf. These are not new goals, of course. We have striven toward both for decades. What is new is the opportunity afforded us by recent global and regional events to make real progress toward achieving them.
Arab-Israeli Peace Process
The first of these goals--the search for peace between Arabs and Israelis-- has challenged every US Administration in the last 4 decades. In the Middle East, where war has at times seemed endemic, the road to achieving lasting peace through negotiation now stretches before us. The first historic steps forward have been taken. We knew last autumn, before the first negotiations began in Madrid, that the path we had embarked on would not be an easy one. Fundamental and bitterly contested differences separate the parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, there have now been five rounds of direct, bilateral talks between Israelis and Arabs, and a sixth round is being planned for a venue closer to the region--namely, Rome. In addition, we have worked closely with our Russian partners in this endeavor to launch the multilateral phase of the peace process. Let me comment briefly on where we stand in this process. In the bilateral negotiations, the parties have resolved many procedural questions and have begun to put substantive issues on the table. Israel and the Arabs, including the Palestinians, are all engaging on the basic issues of land, peace, and security which form the nexus of these negotiations. Israel and the Palestinians are focusing directly on the central issue of interim self-government arrangements for the Occupied Territories as a first, transitional step along the path to a permanent settlement of their dispute, which will be resolved in final status negotiations. While major gaps remain between the respective positions of the parties, the bilaterals between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan have begun down the path of serious negotiations aimed at defining possible areas of agreement and at narrowing differences through compromise where disagreement persists. This is the essence of the art of negotiation, and it is the essence of the negotiating process upon which the parties first embarked, 7 months ago in Madrid. Another major accomplishment has been the beginning of the multilateral phase of the peace process. As a result of closely coordinated planning by the United States and Russia, 36 countries, including 11 Arab states, gathered in Moscow in January to organize working groups on issues of regional concern, such as economic development, the environment, refugees, water resources, and arms control and regional security. In mid-May, these working groups held their initial meetings in various capitals around the world. Follow-on meetings will convene later this year. I just returned from Lisbon, where the multilateral steering committee met on May 27 to coordinate the work of these working groups. I can report that we had a successful and productive meeting. The reports from the five working groups demonstrated again that all parties are approaching the issues seriously and pragmatically, and we achieved agreement on the venues and timeframe for the next round of working group meetings to be held in the fall. These multilateral talks support rather than substitute for the bilateral negotiations, and we hope that those bilateral parties who have so far refrained from participating will join all these important talks as soon as possible. President Bush and Secretary Baker have committed the United States to play the role of an honest broker, a catalyst, and a driving force to assure the continued progress of the peace process in all its dimensions. We look forward with real hope to the continued dedication and commitment to peace evinced thus far by the regional parties and the international community.
Gulf Security and Stability
A second major aspect of our Middle East policy is our shared interest in the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. We all know that the countries of the Arabian Peninsula are located in a dangerous neighborhood and confront risks to their sovereignty and independence. Stability in the Gulf is vital, not only to our own national interest but also to the economic security of the whole world.
Arabian Peninsula.
In February, I visited the countries which are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]. In all my conversations with their leaders and government officials, I stressed the need for individual self-defense and for collective defense planning and arrangements among the six GCC states--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman--with the goal of strengthening their ability to defend themselves against external aggression. I also encouraged security cooperation between the Gulf states and their friends in the region. Much work needs to be done in attaining this goal. At the same time, I assured the GCC leaders that the United States will cooperate closely with them to meet their legitimate defense needs. This includes both the sales of weapons within the context of the President's Middle East arms control initiative and bilateral security arrangements such as the periodic conduct of joint military exercises, the maintenance of an enhanced naval presence in the Gulf, and arrangements for the access and pre-positioning of critical military materiel and equipment. I emphasized that these bilateral efforts would complement but not supersede the Gulf states' collective security efforts. I reiterated that we do not intend to station ground troops permanently anywhere in the region. The purposes of both arms sales and collective security measures are to deter threats to our shared interests and to raise the threshold of future requirements for direct US military action.
Iraq.
The most drastic threat to the security of the Gulf, and indeed of the whole region, has been Saddam Hussein's aggression against his neighbors and against the people of Iraq. Here, the collective engagement of the international community and our coalition partners has been noteworthy in carrying out UN Security Council resolutions. Saddam continues to refuse to comply fully with these resolutions, which were passed by the Security Council to ensure peace and security in the region. Using "cheat and retreat" tactics, he has resisted dismantling his weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles and the means to produce them, as mandated by Resolution 687. He refuses to end his repression of the Iraqi people or to respect their human rights as mandated by Resolution 688, and he is intentionally and systematically depriving large populations in the north and south of Iraq of the basic necessities of life for the sake of hanging on to his own personal power. Clearly, he hopes to frustrate and outlast the will of the Security Council. We will enforce the UN sanctions fully. Saddam Hussein's regime has become more brittle, and he is preoccupied by his quest for survival. Clearly, the Iraqi people deserve new leadership which will be representative of the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society and ready to live at peace with Iraq's neighbors.
Iran.
Across the Gulf from our friends and allies lies the Islamic Republic of Iran, an important country that can contribute to regional security if it chooses a constructive path. Iran knows what it has to do to be accepted by the international community. Many hope that the recent Majlis [parliament] election will lead to moderate policies. We share this hope, but actions must be the litmus test. From our view, the normalization of relations with Iran depends on several factors, particularly an end to support for terrorism. Iran's role in the freeing of American hostages held in Lebanon was an important step. We hope this will lead to the release of all those being held outside the judicial process, regardless of nationality, and that this signals the permanent cessation of hostage-taking. However, Iran's role in sponsoring terrorism continues in other ways that are deeply disturbing. Iran's human rights practices and its apparent pursuit of a destabilizing arms build-up, including everything from submarines to weapons of mass destruction, also remain matters of serious concern. Further, Iran's policies toward its neighbors in the Gulf, where we have vital interests, and in Central Asia need to be watched closely. Another serious problem is Iran's categoric opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and its support for those, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, who violently oppose it. We have made clear from the outset that we are prepared to engage in a dialogue with authorized representatives of the Iranian Government to discuss these issues and US-Iranian relations. To date, the Iranian leadership has declined to engage us in this dialogue.
Fundamental Values
Reviewing the main thrusts of our policy in the Middle East reminds us that, even in the 1990s, our national security interests in the region continue to exert a powerful claim on our attention. But there is more to our policy agenda than protection of vital resources and conflict resolution. Another pillar of US policy is our support for human rights, pluralism, women's and minority rights, and popular participation in government and our rejection of extremism, oppression, and terrorism. These worldwide issues constitute an essential part of the foundation for America's engagement with the countries of the Near East--from the Maghreb to Iran and beyond. In this context, there are certain factors which we should underscore in discussing US relations with these countries. The first is diversity. Not only is this area diverse within itself, so are our relations with the countries that make it up. This diversity requires not only that a clear sense of our own values and interests guide our policy but also that understanding and tolerance be key factors in our dealings with other political cultures. The second point is interaction. US relations with this part of the world are just the latest chapter in a history of interaction between the West and the Middle East that is thousands of years old. Our interaction spans political, economic, social, cultural, and military fields. We should not ignore this totality. The third point is common aspirations. Despite obvious differences, we and the peoples of the Near East share important aspirations, which I will touch on later. These common aspirations provide a promising foundation for future cooperation.
Islam and the West
Politics in the region has increasingly focused on the issues of change, openness, and economic and social inequities. As part of a trend that predates the events I have recounted, the role of religion has become more manifest, and much attention is being paid to a phenomenon variously labeled political Islam, the Islamic revival, or Islamic fundamentalism. Uncertainty regarding this renewed Islamic emphasis abounds. Some say that it is causing a widening gap between Western values and those of the Muslim world. It is important to assess this phenomenon carefully so that we do not fall victim to misplaced fears or faulty perceptions. A cover of a recent issue of The Economist magazine headlined its main story, "Living With Islam," and portrayed a man in traditional dress, standing in front of a mosque and holding a gun. Inside the magazine, we are told that "Islam Resumes its March!" and that "one anti-western 'ism' is growing stronger." If there is one thought I can leave with you tonight, it is that the US Government does not view Islam as the next "ism" confronting the West or threatening world peace. That is an overly simplistic response to a complex reality. The Cold War is not being replaced with a new competition between Islam and the West. It is evident that the Crusades have been over for a long time. Indeed, the ecumenical movement is the contemporary trend. Americans recognize Islam as one of the world's great faiths. It is practiced on every continent. It counts among its adherents millions of citizens of the United States. As Westerners, we acknowledge Islam as a historic civilizing force among the many that have influenced and enriched our culture. The legacy of the Muslim culture, which reached the Iberian Peninsula in the 8th century, is a rich one in the sciences, arts, and culture and in tolerance of Judaism and Christianity. Islam acknowledges the major figures of the Judeo- Christian heritage: Abraham, Moses, and Christ. In countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa, we thus see groups or movements seeking to reform their societies in keeping with Islamic ideals. There is considerable diversity in how these ideals are expressed. We detect no monolithic or coordinated international effort behind these movements. What we do see are believers living in different countries placing renewed emphasis on Islamic principles and governments accommodating Islamist political activity to varying degrees and in different ways.
Political Participation
For our part as Americans, we are proud of the principles on which our country is founded. They have withstood many severe challenges over more than 2 centuries. We know they work. We, therefore, are committed to encouraging greater openness and responsiveness of political systems throughout the world. I am not talking here about trying to impose an American model on others. Each country must work out, in accordance with its own traditions, history, and particular circumstances, how and at what pace to broaden political participation. In this respect, it is essential that there be real political dialogue between government on the one hand and the people and parties and other institutions on the other. Those who are prepared to take specific steps toward free elections, creating independent judiciaries, promoting the rule of law, reducing restrictions on the press, respecting the rights of minorities, and guaranteeing individual rights will find us ready to recognize and support their efforts, just as those moving in the opposite direction will find us ready to speak candidly and act accordingly. As Secretary Baker has said: We best can have truly close and enduring relations with those countries with which we share fundamental values. Those who seek to broaden political participation in the Middle East will, therefore, find us supportive, as we have been elsewhere in the world. At the same time, we are suspect of those who would use the democratic process to come to power, only to destroy that very process in order to retain power and political dominance. While we believe in the principle of "one person, one vote," we do not support "one person, one vote, one time." Let me make it very clear with whom we differ. We differ: -- With those, regardless of their religion, who practice terrorism, oppress minorities, preach intolerance, or violate internationally accepted standards of conduct regarding human rights; -- With those who are insensitive to the need for political pluralism; -- With those who cloak their message in another brand of authoritarianism; -- With those who substitute religious and political confrontation for constructive engagement with the rest of the world; -- With those who do not share our commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict; and -- With those who would pursue their goals through repression or violence. It is for just these reasons that we have such basic differences with the avowedly secular governments in Iraq and Libya. To the extent that other governments pursue or adopt similar practices, we will distance ourselves from them, regardless of whether they describe their approach in secular, religious, or any other terms. Simply stated, religion is not a determinant-- positive or negative--in the nature or quality of our relations with other countries. Our quarrel is with extremism and the violence, denial, intolerance, intimidation, coercion, and terror which too often accompany it. The facts bear that out. The United States has good, productive relations with countries and peoples of all religions throughout the world, including many whose systems of government are firmly grounded in Islamic principles. Religious freedom and tolerance are integral elements of our American national character and constitutional system. Indeed, as much as any society, the American people understand the meaning of diversity and the virtues of tolerance.
Conclusion
The broad policy goals of the United States in the Near East region have been laid down by President Bush and Secretary Baker: Genuine peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, enhancing security and deterring or defeating aggression, helping to protect the world's economic security, promoting economic and social justice, and promoting the values in which we believe. I believe these are aspirations in which the peoples of the region--whether Muslim, Jewish, Christian, or otherwise--can realistically share. Like us, they seek a peaceful, better future. They aspire to work productively in peace and safety [in which] to feed, house, and clothe their families; in which their children can be educated and find avenues to success; in which they can have a say and can be consulted in how they will be governed; and in which they can find personal fulfillment and justice. In this respect, the pursuit of viable economic and social development programs, privatization, and adequate educational and vocational training opportunities are key to responding to the basic material needs of the region's people. Working with an international community of unprecedented solidarity, we have come a long way in the past few years in repelling aggression and in promoting a negotiated peace to a seemingly intractable conflict in the region. We still have a long way to go before these worthy efforts will have achieved success and before the other aspirations we share are realized. We can get there through close engagement and constructive interaction between the United States and all the countries of the Near East region at all levels--government-to-government, group-to-group, person-to-person, and faith-to-faith. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

Aggression by the Serbian Regime

Perkins Source: Ambassador Perkins, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, New York City Date: May, 30 19925/30/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations, CSCE, EC [TEXT] Mr. President, the aggression of the Serbian regime and the armed forces it has unleashed against Bosnia and Hercegovina represent a clear threat to international peace and security--and a grave challenge to the values and principles which underlie the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the UN Charter. The United States, the European Community [EC], the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] community, and the UN Security Council, by the action it is taking today, are sending a clear message to the Serbian regime and to the forces it sponsors in Bosnia and Hercegovina and Croatia. We hope they will fully understand that message. The international community will not tolerate the use of force and terror to settle political or territorial disputes. By its aggression against Bosnia and Hercegovina and Croatia and by its repression within Serbia, the Serbian regime can only condemn itself to increasingly severe treatment by a world united in its opposition to Serbian aggression. My government has already informed both the Security Council and the General Assembly that it does not believe that the authorities in Belgrade represent the continuation of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I note that many other countries have reserved their position on the continuity issue and quite a few have adopted the same view as we have on this matter. It is, further, my government's strong belief that the Security Council and then the General Assembly should act in the near future to confirm this position. The Chapter Seven measures we are undertaking today are serious and comprehensive. The United States is determined to see them through and, if necessary, to seek further measures until the Serbian regime changes course. It must reverse its brutal aggression. It must cease and desist from the campaign of terror it is conducting against the civilian populations of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Croatia. The Serbian and Montenegrin leadership must disband, disarm, and withdraw the former units of the Yugoslav National Army and armed militias from Bosnia and Hercegovina and from Croatia immediately. The Serbian regime and its armed surrogates must cease inflicting suffering on the civilian populations of those two states, creating a humanitarian crisis of nightmare proportions, and applying force to block international humanitarian relief to its victims. Belgrade and Serbian hardline leaders in Bosnia must instead cooperate in good faith with international humanitarian relief to those two states. Belgrade must clearly and unequivocally demonstrate respect for the independence, borders, territorial integrity, and legitimate sovereign Governments of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, and other former Yugoslav republics. Belgrade must fulfill its solemn commitments to cooperate with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force]. It must join with all of the parties concerned in continuing negotiations to achieve a political settlement. The United States will not have normal relations with Belgrade until it ends its occupation of neighboring states and implements guarantees of rights for members of all national minorities within Serbia and Montenegro, as stipulated by the EC conference on Yugoslavia. We regret the inevitable impact that the measures we are taking today will have on the people of Serbia and Montenegro. The American and Serbian peoples have a long tradition of friendship. The Serbian people have a long and proud history as fighters for freedom--not as aggressors. We doubt very much that the Serbian people, whether in Serbia or in Bosnia- Hercegovina or Croatia, favor the brutally aggressive and repressive policies of the Serbian regime and the Serbian leaders it has sponsored in Bosnia and Croatia. We further doubt that they want to shoulder the increasing economic and political costs of this brutal aggression or of the increasing international isolation that it brings. This is not simply because these policies so clearly run counter to legitimate Serbian interests but also because they run counter to the historical character of the Serbian people. Down the road of continued conflict lies ruin. The people of the former Yugoslavia have suffered enough. We look forward to the restoration of peace and stability and reason and to the time when peoples who had lived together peacefully in the past do so again. Reason, compromise, and respect for international principles embodied in the CSCE accords and the UN Charter must supplant aggression, hatred, and intolerance. We in this Council, and many others, will work hard to that end. Thank you, Mr. President.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

UN Security Council Resolution 757 on Sanctions Against the Former Yugoslavia

UN Source: UN Security Council Description: Resolution adopted by the UN Security Council, New York City Date: May, 30 19925/30/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations [TEXT] The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991, 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, 727 (1992) of 8 January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992 and 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, Noting that in the very complex context of events in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia all parties bear some responsibility for the situation, Reaffirming its support for the Conference on Yugoslavia, including the efforts undertaken by the European Community in the framework of the discussions on constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and recalling that no territorial gains or changes brought about by violence are acceptable and that the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina are inviolable, Deploring the fact that the demands in resolution 752 (1992) have not been complied with, including its demands: -- that all parties and others concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the fighting immediately, -- that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina cease immediately, -- that Bosnia and Herzegovina's neighbours take swift action to end all interference and respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, -- that action be taken as regards units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the disbanding and disarming with weapons placed under effective international monitoring of any units that are neither withdrawn nor placed under the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, -- that all irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina be disbanded and disarmed, Deploring further that its call for the immediate cessation of forcible expulsions and attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population has not been heeded, and reaffirming in this context the need for the effective protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those of ethnic minorities, Dismayed that conditions have not yet been established for the effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, including safe and secure access to and from Sarajevo and other airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Deeply concerned that those United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel remaining in Sarajevo have been subjected to deliberate mortar and small-arms fire, and that the United Nations Military Observers deployed in the Mostar region have had to be withdrawn, Deeply concerned also at developments in Croatia, including persistent cease-fire violations and the continued expulsion of non-Serb civilians, and at the obstruction of and lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR in other parts of Croatia, Deploring the tragic incident on 18 May 1992 which caused the death of a member of the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] team in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Noting that the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted, Expressing its appreciation for the report of the Secretary-General of 26 May 1992 (S/24000) pursuant to resolution 752 (1992), Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, and the continuing role that the European Community is playing in working for a peaceful solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in other republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Recalling its decision in resolution 752 (1992) to consider further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Council, and affirming its determination to take measures against any party or parties which fail to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992) and its other relevant resolutions, Determined in this context to adopt certain measures with the sole objective of achieving a peaceful solution and encouraging the efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, Recalling the right of States, under Article 50 of the Charter, to consult the Security Council where they find themselves confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures, Determining that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other parts of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Condemns the failure of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), to take effective measures to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992); 2. Demands that any elements of the Croatian Army still present in Bosnia and Herzegovina act in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 752 (1992) without further delay; 3. Decides that all States shall adopt the measures set out below, which shall apply until the Security Council decides that the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), have taken effective measures to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992); 4. Decides that all States shall prevent: (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution; (b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or aircraft or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for the purposes of such activities or dealings; (c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any commodities or products, whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs notified to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991), to any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products; 5. Decides that all States shall not make available to the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to those authorities or to any such undertaking of any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs; 6. Decides that the prohibitions in paragraphs 4 and 5 above shall not apply to the trans-shipment through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of commodities and products originating outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and temporarily present in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) only for the purpose of such trans-shipment, in accordance with guidelines approved by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991); 7. Decides that all States shall: (a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), unless the particular flight has been approved, for humanitarian or other purposes consistent with the relevant resolutions of the Council, by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991); (b) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the provision of engineering and maintenance servicing of aircraft registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or operated by or on behalf of entities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or components for such aircraft, the certification of airworthiness for such aircraft, and the payment of new claims against existing insurance contracts and the provision of new direct insurance for such aircraft; 8. Decides that all States shall: (a) Reduce the level of the staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); (b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting events on their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); (c) Suspend scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges and visits involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); 9. Decides that all States, and the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or of any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution and related resolutions; 10. Decides that the measures imposed by this resolution shall not apply to activities related to UNPROFOR, to the Conference on Yugoslavia or to the European Community Monitor Mission, and that States, parties and others concerned shall cooperate fully with UNPRO-FOR, the Conference on Yugoslavia and the European Community Monitor Mission and respect fully their freedom of movement and the safety of their personnel; 11. Calls upon all States, including States not members of the United Nations, and all international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of the present resolution; 12. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 22 June 1992 on the measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations set out in paragraphs 4 to 9 above; 13. Decides that the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) shall undertake the following tasks additional to those in respect of the arms embargo established by resolutions 713 (1991) and 727 (1992): (a) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 above; (b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 4 to 9 above; (c) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 4 to 9 above and, in that context, to make recommendations to the Council on ways to increase their effectiveness; (d) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 4 to 9 above and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States; (e) To consider and approve the guidelines referred to in paragraph 6 above; (f) To consider and decide upon expeditiously any applications for the approval of flights for humanitarian or other purposes consistent with the relevant resolutions of the Council in accordance with paragraph 7 above; 14. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee in the fulfillment of its tasks, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution; 15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council, not later than 15 June 1992 and earlier if he considers it appropriate, on the implementation of resolution 752 (1992) by all parties and others concerned; 16. Decides to keep under continuous review the measures imposed by paragraphs 4 to 9 above with a view to considering whether such measures might be suspended or terminated following compliance with the requirements of resolution 752 (1992); 17. Demands that all parties and others concerned create immediately the necessary conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport and respecting the agreements signed in Geneva on 22 May 1992; 18. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to use his good offices in order to achieve the objectives contained in paragraph 17 above, and invites him to keep under continuous review any further measures that may become necessary to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies; 19. Urges all States to respond to the Revised Joint Appeal for humanitarian assistance of early May 1992 issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF [UN Children's Fund] and the World Health Organization; 20. Reiterates the call in paragraph 2 of resolution 752 (1992) that all parties continue their efforts in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia and that the three communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina resume their discussions on constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina; 21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider immediately, whenever necessary, further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Council. VOTE: 13-0-2 (China and Zimbabwe abstaining) (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

US Extends Most-Favored-Nation Status to China

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: White House Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 2 19926/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights [TEXT] The President informed the Congress today that he plans to extend China's most-favored-nation (MFN) status for another year. In making this important decision, the President stressed that it is wrong to isolate China if we hope to influence China. Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 explicitly links eligibility for MFN to the important human rights issue of free emigration. Continuation of the current Jackson-Vanik waiver (and, thus, MFN trade status) will substantially promote freedom of emigration from China, as it has since 1979. China continues to permit the departure of citizens who qualify for a US immigrant visa. Although we have seen positive, if limited, developments in our human rights dialogue, the President has made clear to the Chinese that their respect for internationally recognized human rights is insufficient. We are deeply disappointed in China's limited actions with regard to internationally recognized human rights and cannot describe our relations as fully normal until the Chinese Government effectively addresses these concerns. We want to elicit a faster pace and a broader scope for human rights improvements in China. Withdrawal of MFN would achieve neither of these objectives. Short of fully normal relations, maintaining a constructive policy of engagement with China has served US interests. In our bilateral relationship, we have used the tools available to achieve the foreign policy goals shared by the Administration and the Congress. This has been true of our targeted use of 301 and Special 301 trade investigations and our vigorous enforcement of the law against prison labor imports and textile fraud. Our non-proliferation dialogue also has been successful: China has acknowledged international non-proliferation standards by acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and declaring adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines. We are monitoring these commitments closely. We have generated positive results without withdrawing MFN from China. Withdrawal of MFN would inflict severe costs on American business people, investors, and consumers. It would mean lost jobs and failed businesses in the United States and a multi-billion dollar surcharge on American consumers' imports. Our direct engagement with the Chinese is, on the whole, a successful policy. We intend to maintain it in order vigorously to protect American interests while we promote positive change in China.
Title:

Letter: US Extends Most-Favored-Nation Status to China

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Letter to Congress from President Bush released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 2 19926/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights [TEXT] To the Congress of the United States: I hereby transmit a document referred to in section 402 (d) (1) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 2432 (d) (1) ("the Act"), with respect to the continuation of a waiver of application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Act to the People's Republic of China. The document includes my reasons for determining that continuation of the waiver currently in effect for the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402, and my determination to that effect. Documents concerning the extension of the authority to waive subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Act, including a determination with respect to other countries and the reasons therefore, are transmitted separately. George Bush
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

Report: US Extends Most-Favored-Nation Status to China

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Report to Congress from President Bush released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 2 19926/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights [TEXT] Pursuant to subsection 402(d) (1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "the Act"), having determined that further extension of the waiver authority granted by subsection 402(c) of the Act for twelve months will substantially promote the objectives of section 402, I have today determined that continuation of the waiver currently applicable to China will also substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act. My determination is attached and is incorporated herein. Freedom of Emigration Determination. China's relatively free emigration policies have continued during the past twelve months. In FY 1991, 18,051 U.S. immigrant visas were issued in China, a 7.8 percent increase over the previous year. The U.S. numerical limitation for immigrants from China was fully met. Early figures indicate that the Immigration Act of 1990 will lead to an additional 15-20 percent increase in immigrant visas issued in China this fiscal year. The principal restraint on increased emigration continues to be the capacity and willingness of other nations to absorb Chinese immigrants, not Chinese policy. I have concluded that continuing the MFN waiver will preserve the gains already achieved on freedom of emigration and encourage further progress. Chinese Foreign Travel Policies. China continues to adhere to a relatively open foreign travel policy. According to Chinese officials, issuance of passports for private travel increased more than threefold between 1986 and 1990. US diplomatic posts in China issued 77,615 nonimmigrant visas in FY 1991, a 28 percent increase from the previous year. In FY 1991, 39,465 visas were issued worldwide to students and tourists from China, a 17 percent increase over FY 1990 and a 114 percent increase over FY 1988. Chinese officials report that several thousand students returned from overseas for visits after June 1989 and have been allowed to depart again under expedited procedures. We cannot verify these figures, but we are not aware of any case in which Chinese living in the U.S. who returned to China for visits after June 1989 were prevented from leaving again. Foreign travel by Chinese-government sponsored businessmen rebounded sharply in FY 1991, reflecting an easing of economic austerity measures imposed in 1988. The number of officially-sponsored students declined slightly because of PRC authorities' concern about extended delays in the students' return to China. In February 1990, China issued a new directive requiring most recent college graduates and fourth-year undergraduates educated at state expense to work for five years before applying for privately-funded overseas study. The directive most likely has forced some students to defer their plans for overseas study, but student visa applications and issuances have increased at all China posts except Beijing. In Beijing, issuances declined slightly from the previous year's record level, but remained above 1989, the year before the directive was promulgated. Human Rights Issues. Our serious and continuing concerns about Chinese abuses of human rights are detailed in the State Department's annual human rights report. That report makes clear that China's human rights practices remain repressive, falling far short of internationally-accepted norms; freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and religion are sharply restricted. We have raised and continue to raise these serious concerns with China. The President and Secretary Baker told the Chinese that concern for human rights is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. The President has stressed to Premier Li Peng that China's record on human rights remains in need of significant improvement. More than half of Secretary Baker's discussions during his visit to Beijing in November 1991 were devoted to human rights. We press our concerns about abuses in the area of political and religious freedom at every opportunity. China has responded to our inquiries with information on prisoners of human rights concern. We do not consider these responses wholly satisfactory and have requested additional information, but the Chinese responses contain useful information about the status of many political and religious dissidents. We have stressed the need for further responsiveness on Beijing's part. The Chinese also recently provided additional details on the whereabouts of prominent dissidents from the Tiananmen demonstrations and the 1979 Democracy Wall movement. In May, Under Secretary Kanter told senior Chinese officials that progress in human rights is essential if we are to improve bilateral relations. The Chinese reiterated to Under Secretary Kanter their earlier pledge to Secretary Baker that China would provide exit permits to all those who had no criminal charges pending. Those who have left China or received exit permission over the past year include the spouses of prominent dissidents at Princeton University, journalist Dai Qing, intellectual Li Zehou, labor leader Han Dongfang, and Democracy Wall activist Liu Qing. Others continue to face difficulties in obtaining exit permission. We are pressing Beijing to allow their departure. We share with Congress the goal of release of all those held solely for the peaceful expression of their political and religious views. We continue to share data on the human rights situation with both the Congress and concerned non-governmental organizations. In November 1991, the Chinese confirmed to Secretary Baker the release of 133 prisoners on our June 1991 list. Since then, the Chinese have announced the release of additional political prisoners, including, Han Dongfang, Wang Youcai, Luo Haixing, Xiong Yan, Yang Wei, Bao Zunxin, Wang Zhixin, and Zhang Weiguo and a number of Catholic clergy and activists. We are seeking a general amnesty and permission for the international humanitarian organizations to have access to Chinese prisons. Short of these goals, we have urged amelioration of the conditions of those in Chinese prisons. As a result, treatment and medical care for Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming has improved. China has acknowledged the West's unyielding principle that domestic human rights policies are a legitimate topic of international discussion. China hosted human rights delegations from France, Australia, and Japan, and sent several delegations to the U.S. and Europe to study Western human rights practices. Beijing issued a "white paper" maintaining that basic human rights are observed in China and arguing that a country's human rights record should be viewed in light of its own history and culture. We have publicly rejected this contention, but are pleased to engage China in discussion of appropriate human rights standards throughout the country, including in Tibet where beatings and detentions of Buddhist monks and nuns by the security forces were reported. We have voiced our hopes for the release of those incarcerated in Tibet for nonviolent expression of political views, both bilaterally and at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. China has admitted US and other foreign observers to Tibet and to the main Lhasa prison. Non-Proliferation Issues. China's support for global nonproliferation initiatives increased significantly in the last year. China acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and adhered to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines and parameters. We are monitoring closely to ensure that China follows through with full implementation of these important commitments. Beijing endorsed the imposition of safeguards on the Ain Oussera nuclear reactor it sold to Algeria, and has explicitly pledged not to export M-9 and M-11 missiles (which are captured by MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] guidelines). China is also participating in the Middle East Arms Control negotiations and discussions in Geneva aimed at establishing a Chemical Weapons Convention. Impact of MFN on Other US Interests--Bilateral Trade. The granting of MFN tariff status provided a framework for major expansion of our economic and commercial relations with China. Continuation of non-discriminatory tariff status is fundamental if we are to maintain trade relations with China. In 1991, bilateral trade topped $25 billion, with Chinese exports of $19 billion and U.S. exports of $6.3 billion. China was our fastest growing export market in Asia in 1991 as U.S. exports to China rose by 30 percent, after a 16 percent decline in 1990. In turn, the United States remains China's largest export market, absorbing about a quarter of its total exports. If MFN were withdrawn, we anticipate that China would reciprocate by applying its own higher non-MFN tariffs to U.S. products and erecting other trade barriers. U.S. companies, disadvantaged by higher tariff rates, would lose business to their competitors from Japan and Europe, who would quickly move to replace U.S. exports of aircraft and aerospace equipment, grain, industrial machinery, steel products, chemicals, fertilizers and computers. Americans employed by these industries would lose their jobs. U.S. joint ventures would pay higher duties on imported components from the United States, and their exports to the U.S. would be subject to non-MFN tariffs, jeopardizing continued operations. Without MFN, United States consumers would pay higher prices for Chinese-made products, including appliances, toys, apparel and footwear. Withdrawal of MFN would also undercut our current market access 301 investigation as well as implementation of the hard-won agreement on protection of intellectual property rights produced by our Special 301 investigation. We have advanced our bilateral agenda without resorting to the blunt instrument of MFN withdrawal. The Administration's vigorous use of available policy tools included criminal indictments for Chinese textile transshipments and quota charges in excess of $100 million. As proof of the Administration's intent to deal severely with charges that China is exporting goods produced by prison labor, we have obtained one criminal conviction and a score of detention orders have blocked entry into the United States of suspected prison products. Although we have made significant progress toward our objective of resolving favorably issues relating to Taiwan's accession to the GATT, China's intransigence has prevented conclusion of ongoing negotiations. We remain firmly committed to Taiwan's accession. Economic Reform in the PRC. Maintaining MFN is essential to promote reform in China. No one has found a way to import our goods without importing our ideas. The opening of China and expansion of bilateral commercial relations made possible by MFN has contributed significantly to improved living standards, the introduction of progressive economic thinking, and further integration of China into the world community. Withdrawing MFN would most hurt the dynamic coastal provinces in China which are the heartland of market-oriented economic reform. It would further isolate those in China who look to the United States for support in their effort to liberalize Chinese society. MFN withdrawal would also have a substantial negative effect on Hong Kong's free enterprise economy, where more than 900 U.S. firms have invested roughly $7 billion. Hong Kong's economy depends heavily on U.S.- China trade and the health of export industries in South China. The economic disruption caused by MFN withdrawal would undermine confidence in Hong Kong's future in the critical period leading up to its reversion to PRC sovereignty in 1997. Regional and Multilateral Cooperation. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China's cooperation on multilateral efforts concerning Iraq and Libya was indispensable. The Chinese support efforts to find a comprehensive political solution in Cambodia, facilitated entry of North and South Korea into the United Nations, and oppose North Korea's effort to develop nuclear weapons. In summary, maintaining non-discriminatory trade status gives China an incentive to stay engaged on issues of vital concern to the United States. Without MFN--and conditioning its renewal is simply withdrawal with a time delay--we cannot pursue effectively our interests with respect to these critical areas of concern. Moreover, if MFN were withdrawn, the brunt of the economic costs would be borne not by policymakers in Beijing, but by American businessmen, American consumers, and the people of Hong Kong and progressive areas of China. China's opening to the outside world has accelerated growth in the non-state sector of the PRC economy and has deepened China's links to the global economy. For this process to continue, China's most-favored-nation status in the United States is essential. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

Gist: Cambodia Settlement Agreement

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Description: Date: Jun, 8 19926/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Cambodia, Vietnam Subject: Democratization, United Nations [TEXT] In November 1991, the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) arrived in Cambodia to begin preparations for the implementation of the Comprehensive Settlement signed in Paris on October 23, 1991, by the Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC) and foreign ministers from 18 other countries, including the United States. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), headed by Special Representative Yasushi Akashi, began the UN's largest peace-keeping operation on March 15. It envisions a peak deployment of 16,000 military personnel and several thousand civilian personnel to organize and conduct free elections by the spring of 1993. The United States opened its diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh, accredited to the SNC, in November 1991. It looks forward to the restoration of full diplomatic relations once a government is elected to represent the will of the Cambodian people. Several political parties have begun to organize in anticipation of fielding candidates for the constituent assembly, the intermediate stage in the return to self-government.
Background
Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Kampuchea) in December 1978 and did not substantially withdraw its troops until 1989. Although the Vietnamese threw out the Khmer Rouge regime, a continued Vietnamese presence in Cambodia was not acceptable to the world community. Four principal Cambodian factions were involved in the struggle for a solution. -- The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), loyal to former monarch and head of state Prince Sihanouk and now led by his son, Prince Ranariddh. -- The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), headed by former Prime Minister Son Sann. The forces of Prince Sihanouk and the KPNLF together formed the non-communist resistance. -- The Khmer Rouge, a Marxist-Leninist group headed by Pol Pot that took power in 1975 and established one of the most brutal regimes in modern world history. -- The Phnom Penh regime (also known as the State of Cambodia), led by Chea Sim and Hun Sen, includes former Khmer Rouge officials who broke with Pol Pot. It was installed and sustained by the Vietnamese in the wake of their invasion.
Road to Agreement
Following the suspension of the Paris Conference on Cambodia in August 1989, the United States proposed that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Permanent Five) seek to bridge the differences among the Cambodian factions by introducing an enhanced UN role. During these negotiations, the five (US, China, France, UK, and USSR), worked with others chairing the Paris Conference, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), Australia, Japan, and other nations in pursuit of three objectives: -- Preventing a Khmer Rouge return to power; -- Ensuring self-determination for the Cambodian people through free and fair elections; and -- Verifying the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. On August 28, 1990, after 8 months of negotiation, they agreed on a framework for a comprehensive political settlement. All Cambodian factions accepted the framework, which called for establishing a Supreme National Council and included a UN peace-keeping role as the basis for resolving their differences. The August framework agreement was endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council in Resolution 668 in September and by acclamation by the General Assembly in October 1990. The Permanent Five subsequently agreed in November on a detailed draft settlement agreement. This document became the basis for the final agreement.
Development of the SNC
The Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC) was formed in September 1990. On May 1, 1991, the four factions announced a voluntary cease-fire and arms moratorium. Since then, under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk, the SNC moved forward rapidly to reach consensus on a final comprehensive settlement based on the Permanent Five framework. It met five times--in Jakarta; Pattaya, Thailand (twice); Beijing; and New York--to work out differences over the draft agreements. The SNC members agreed to elect Prince Sihanouk as President of the SNC and to designate him the final arbiter in the absence of a consensus. They then decided on at least 70% demobilization of all factional forces during the transitional period, with the rest to be demobilized or merged into a new national army after elections. They agreed that the first election will be conducted through a proportional representation system along provincial lines. Finally, they delegated to the UN the last word on all matters relating to the organization and conduct of the elections during the transitional period. There is a consensus among the four Cambodian factions and interested countries that representatives of a Supreme National Council should be seated in the UN General Assembly as the Cambodian delegation. Prince Sihanouk and the SNC returned to Phnom Penh in mid-November to establish the SNC headquarters.
US Relations
Following UNAMIC's deployment in Cambodia, the President announced the lifting of the US embargo on January 3, 1992, thus normalizing economic relations with Cambodia. The United States also removed blanket opposition to lending by international financial institutions (e.g., the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) to Cambodia. The United States plans to maintain an active presence through its mission in Phnom Penh during the transition to elections to ensure that the settlement is effectively implemented, providing full support--financial and personnel--to UNTAC as well as economic assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia.
UN Role in Settlement
The US worked hard to achieve a comprehensive Cambodian settlement with an enhanced role for the UN. With the signing of the agreement, the UN will take on a great challenge. It is the only international body with the experience and capabilities necessary to implement the settlement, including the ability to achieve a neutral environment in which to organize and conduct free and fair elections for the Cambodian people. A sizeable UN presence and substantial resources will be required to put into effect the military arrangements of the agreement, to resettle nearly 500,000 displaced persons in safety and dignity, to carry out the administrative responsibilities of the plan, and to prepare Cambodia for free and fair elections. In addition, strong and effective measures, supported by the major powers, will be required to ensure that the Khmer Rouge abide fully by the agreement.
International Assistance
More than 2 decades of violence and aggression have taken a terrible toll on the people of Cambodia. The world is still shocked at the horrors of Khmer Rouge annihilation that left more than 1 million Cambodians dead. The infra-structure is in ruins. The country is strewn with millions of land mines. More than 350,000 displaced persons in camps along the Thai- Cambodian border and another 150,000 inside the country await repatriation and resettlement. Cambodia will not be able to recover from these multiple disasters without sustained international involvement and relief. More than 40 donor countries (including the United States) and international organizations will meet in Tokyo in June 1992 to coordinate economic assistance to Cambodia.
Six Key Points of Agreement
-- UNTAC will include a large military and civilian force to disarm the combatants, administer the country, and organize elections. -- SNC is made up of all four Cambodian factions and headed by Prince Sihanouk. It will represent Cambodia internationally and advise UNTAC. -- Agencies, such as finance, foreign affairs, interior, and the police, that could directly influence the outcome of elections, will be placed "under direct UN supervision or control." -- UNTAC will verify a cease-fire. The Cambodian combatants must give the UN the numbers of their forces, their location, and a list of their equipment. Before elections, all forces are to report to cantonments in stages with their weapons, after which at least 70% are to be demobilized. -- The UN will educate voters and organize all aspects of free elections for a 120-member constituent assembly based on proportional representation within each province. The assembly will draft and approve a constitution and then transform itself into a working legislature. -- Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, estimated at more than 350,000, have the right to return to a destination of choice and to move about freely in the country. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

US Action Against Violators Of Haitian Trade Embargo

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: May, 28 19925/28/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Trade/Economics, Refugees, Immigration [TEXT] I have today directed the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Transportation to deny the use of American ports to ships that violate the trade embargo against Haiti. This action is being taken in support of the resolution adopted by the Organization of American States [OAS] on May 17, which calls on OAS member states to deny port facilities to vessels trading with Haiti in disregard of the OAS embargo. The United States remains committed unequivocally to the restoration of democratic government in Haiti. We will continue working in close concert with our OAS allies toward a negotiated settlement of the political crisis that began with the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide last September 30. In addition to today's action and in accordance with the recent OAS resolution, we are examining other steps to tighten sanctions against the illegal regime in Port au Prince. Our actions are directed at those in Haiti who are opposing a return to democracy, not at the Haitian poor. We are continuing to provide substantial, direct humanitarian assistance to the people of Haiti and are working to intensify those efforts. Our current programs total $47 million and provide food for over 600,000 Haitians and health care services that reach nearly 2 million. While tightening the embargo, we will continue to encourage others to ship food staples and other humanitarian items to those in need. The action that I have directed will not affect vessels carrying permitted items. We are expanding opportunities for Haitians who fear persecution in their homeland to apply for admission to the United States as refugees with our Embassy in Port au Prince. The Embassy has been receiving such applications since early February, and all persons who believe they may be qualified are urged to avail themselves of our expanded refugee operation in Haiti. I have asked the Department of State to ensure that Embassy personnel will also be available outside Port au Prince to assist applicants in other parts of the country in pursuing their claims. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

US Ratifies UN Convenant

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 5 19926/5/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: United Nations [TEXT] The President has signed the US instrument of ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A UN treaty, the covenant articulates the principles inherent in a democracy--including freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, equal protection under the law, and the right to liberty and security. By ratifying the covenant, the United States is underscoring its commitment to these principles at home and abroad. We hope that our ratification of the covenant will contribute to the fostering of democracy and human rights throughout the world. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

Department Statements On COCOM

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 2 19926/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States Subject: Media/Telecommunications, Science/Technology, Trade/Economics [TEXT] The United States is pleased that yesterday in Paris the 17 partners of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls--better known as COCOM--made major progress in transforming COCOM to reflect the new strategic environment. COCOM's high-level meeting in Paris made two key decisions: -- Establishing a COCOM Cooperation Forum on Export Controls that reflects the new East-West relationships; and -- Liberalizing significantly telecommunications export controls that will go into effect July 1, 1992. The republics of the former Soviet Union are on a path toward democratic reform and economic integration with the West. In light of this welcome change, Secretary Baker recently sent a letter to the foreign ministers of our COCOM counterparts proposing the establishment of an informal COCOM Cooperation Forum on Export Controls. COCOM has now agreed to invite the republics of the former Soviet Union to join this forum. The goals of the new COCOM forum reflect new strategic relationships, particularly with Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. These goals include: -- Significantly wider access by those countries to advanced Western goods and technology; -- Procedures for ensuring against diversion of these sensitive items to military or other unauthorized users; -- Assistance to the new states to develop their own systems of export controls; and -- Further cooperation on matters of common concern on export controls. The COCOM partners also agreed to an immediate improvement in the availability of advanced telecommunications equipment to the republics of the former Soviet Union. As these emerging democracies seek to reform and establish closer ties to the economies of the West, better telephone, fax, and other data networks are clearly needed. This very positive COCOM decision will provide: -- Rapid and reliable telecommunications between the newly independent states and the West; and -- Modern cost-effective domestic telecommunications systems. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

CSCE Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Jun, 8 19926/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States Subject: CSCE [TEXT]
CSCE Implementation Report
The Secretary transmitted on June 3 the 30th report on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to the Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The report covers the period April 1, 1991, to March 31, 1992, and focuses on certain CSCE member countries where further progress in meeting CSCE standards appears necessary or where remarkable progress recently has been made. Because the USSR and Yugoslavia were intact for much of the reporting period, they are dealt with in single reports followed by overviews of new states. Each country report contains an assessment of CSCE implementation overall and specific assessments of the three traditional CSCE areas: security (including confidence- and security- building measures), economics (including science and technology and the environment), and the human dimension. This 30th CSCE implementation report is a central part of the continuing assessment by the United States of progress toward realization of CSCE goals--building democracy, promoting free markets, protecting human rights, and strengthening security. It should also enhance US efforts to foster compliance by CSCE member states with CSCE principles and commitments. Copies of the report will be available as Dispatch Supplement, Vol. 3, No. 5, "President's 30th Report, Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, April 1, 1991, to March 31, 1992." (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

Status Report on Washington Coordinating Conference Initiatives

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jun, 8 19926/8/92 Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies Region: Eurasia Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT]
Department of Defense Medical Supplies.
The United States continues to assess its inventory of excess medical supplies and has shipped such excess (non-war reserve stocks) to regions in critical need and provided distribution through the assistance of private voluntary agencies. The Department of Defense: -- Has made available excess Desert Storm stocks including the equivalent of 3 C-5 and 21 C-141 aircraft-loads of medical supplies (gauze, syringes, catheters, etc.) from stocks located in Oakland, California; -- Has supplied about $8.7 million of Desert Storm stocks of multi-purpose oral antibiotics (Ciprofloxacin) which represent more than 1 million doses and a sixth C-5 load of medical supplies stored in Pirmasens, Germany; and -- Is shipping 58 sea containers of excess medical consumables stored in California to ports in the Russian Far East (Magadan and Vladivostok).
Emergency Medical Program.
The United States is implementing Phase I of this $20-million program, designed to help alleviate critical shortages of essential medicines and medical supplies, including antibiotics for the treatment of respiratory and other infectious diseases, vaccines to immunize children and the elderly against life threatening diseases, drugs to treat cardiovascular diseases and cancers, and disposable gloves and syringes to prevent the spread of infections. -- Under a $6-million component of this program, the US will more than meet its goal of vaccinating 50,000 children this year. Last week, Phase I of the US vaccination initiative began, with the first deliveries of medicines and inoculation supplies for a measles, diphtheria, polio, tetanus, and whooping cough (DPT) vaccination program. This $2- million phase will reach some 520,000 children throughout Central Asia over the course of this summer. By September, the US will begin Phase II of the US vaccination program to inoculate children in other new independent states. Phase II will be funded at $4 million and will use vaccines purchased from American manufacturers. -- Under a $14-million program with the American Red Cross designed to leverage private contributions, the American Hospital Association has begun a solicitation for essential medicines and medical consumables to more than 5,300 member hospitals. The first shipment was delivered to Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on May 14, 1992.
Medical Airlift.
The United States provided logistics support (air crews and planes) for shipment of medicines and medical supplies donated by governments and private sector groups. -- The United States delivered humanitarian assistance donated by the city of Berlin, Turkey, Japan, and other governments participating in the coordinating conference. -- The United States has transported some 455 tons of medicines collected through private voluntary organizations in America. Nations in Hospital Partnerships. With other conference participants, the United States committed to support the establishment of "health care partnerships" with comparable facilities in the new independent states to improve sanitation, surgery, administration, and equipment. -- The first hospital partnership program was established in May between Norfolk Medical Center and the Children's Hospital #1 in Moscow to help improve the quality of care offered in childhood infectious diseases and hematology. -- The United States has expanded its initial goal of establishing seven health partnerships by the end of 1992 to ten partnerships by August 1992. -- The Medical Working Group has adopted the US program as a model for other conference participants' efforts in this area.
Promoting US Trade and Investment in the Medical Sector.
The system for producing and delivering medicines, vaccines, and medical supplies in the new independent states has deteriorated dramatically. In partnership with American business, the United States aims to help the new independent states move from dependency on donated medicines and supplies to the development of their own productive capacities. The United States has: -- Fielded audit teams with representatives from Merck and Lederle to identify "quick fixes" to problems limiting production at 12 vaccine production facilities. The team identified commodity, equipment, and technical assistance needed for the new independent states to meet most of their needs for DPT vaccines within 12-18 months after production resumes. The first shipment of commodities will arrive this summer. -- Supported a business round-table, which was hosted by the World Health Organization and attended by 30-50 pharmaceutical companies in Geneva on May 7, 1992; and -- Developed a program to support US private investment in the health sector through funding for trade and investment missions, pre-investment services, and business development.
American Food for Freedom Partnerships.
The US Government has provided logistical support, transportation, and expertise to support private sector and non-governmental organization efforts to donate 4,405 tons of food and low-cost agribusiness equipment to the new independent states. Some examples include: -- Department of Defense airlift of 100,000 pounds of soybean seed and inoculant from Des Moines, Iowa, to Stavropol, Russia, in order to establish an agribusiness center; -- Transport of some 500 tons of food and clothing collected by private voluntary organizations throughout America since February 10, 1992; and -- Transport of the 274 sea containers of bulk food commodities (flour, rice, legumes, etc.) and some clothing collected by the Fund for Democracy; 88 sea containers already have been delivered.
Farmer-to-Farmer Program.
Over the next 3 years, the US will provide 1,500-1,800 farm and agribusiness volunteers, for periods of 30-90 days, to work directly with private farmers and agribusiness in the independent states to help them increase farm production and income. The first group of agri-business experts arrived in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in April 1992.
Low-Cost Food Storage.
To help alleviate one of the most serious problems in the food production chain, the United States is developing an agribusiness project that will address pre- and post-harvest needs. The US is sending two teams of experts to Russia and Ukraine in July to identify food storage constraints, short-term training and technical assistance needs, and potential marketing and investment opportunities for US manufacturers and suppliers of storage facilities and equipment. The teams will make recommendations on an action plan to address these needs prior to the fall harvest.
US Agriculture Extension Services.
A US Department of Agriculture extension service team visited Armenia in March to design an extension service program to teach basic skills to private farmers and improve food distribution and market information. A long-term extension service adviser will be in place by late June 1992.
Food Aid.
The United States is working with more than eight private voluntary organizations to deliver $165 million of grant food aid to locations throughout the new independent states. Approximately $21 million of this will be sold with proceeds used to support pension funds in Russia. To date, the United States has: -- Delivered more than 21,000 tons of grant food aid to cities throughout the new independent states, including St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kaliningrad, Chelyabinsk, Yekaterinburg, Ufa, Khabarovsk, Birobidzhan, Vladivostok, Yerevan, Alma-Ata, and Ashgabat; -- Arranged to ship 55,000 tons of agricultural commodities by surface vessel to the new independent states; -- Transported another 15,000 tons of grant food aid to US ports for shipment; and -- Procured about 105,450 tons of agricultural commodities for shipment to locations throughout the new independent states.
Energy Efficiency Project.
US experts conducted energy audits in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Byelarus, and Armenia and identified opportunities to improve the efficiency of district heating systems that serve industrial, commercial, and residential users. By September 1992, equipment will be in place to demonstrate improved energy efficiency.
Coal Mine Safety Project.
This program continues to be developed in support of an expanded "Partners in Economic Reform" program, an initiative of the US coal industry, several US railroads, and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. This program will help relieve logistical bottlenecks in coal production and delivery systems and provide training in mine safety.
International Resident Adviser Program.
Three teams of US Government and private sector experts visited a total of nine cities in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Armenia in March 1992 to determine where housing advisers should be placed. Agreements were reached with each of these states on the placement of advisers and the scope of work. -- Interim housing advisers have been placed in Moscow, Russia; Kharkov, Ukraine; Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan; and Yerevan, Armenia. -- Full-time, permanent resident housing advisers will be put in place by the end of August 1992. -- The Shelter Working Group has adopted the US program as a model for other participants' efforts in this area.
Democracy-in-Practice Training Program.
The United States has developed a program to offer technical assistance in public policy and training at all levels of government based on firsthand experience in the United States. -- The US Information Agency (USIA) initiated training programs this week for the Chief of Staff and the Foreign Policy Adviser to the President of Kazakhstan. Similar programs are currently planned for Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in June and September 1992. USIA also is developing additional programs, including a program on the establishment of an executive office, which will be offered to the advisers to the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia this summer. -- Sister Cities International was given a grant to provide municipal training programs to the more than 30 sister cities which have been established between the United States and the new independent states.
Eurasia Foundation for Democracy, Free Enterprise, and Training in Leadership and Management.
The Eurasia Foundation will make grants to institutions and individuals in the United States and the new independent states to promote market economies and strengthen representative governments. Foundation funding requires congressional approval. The foundation is designed to be a rapid-response, flexible mechanism for assistance. Its early emphasis will be on management training and private sector development. It will work largely with private institutions. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 23, June 8, 1992 Title:

Treaty Actions

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Jun, 8 19926/8/92 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: Eurasia, South America, Pacific, Subsaharan Africa Country: Australia, Chile, Armenia, Colombia, Mongolia, Tunisia, Russia, Zambia Subject: International Law, State Department, Cultural Exchange, Environment [TEXT]
Multilateral
Conservation
Convention on wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat. Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into force Dec. 21, 1975; for the US Dec. 18, 1986. TIAS 11084. Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Dec. 27, 1991. Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249; 27 UST 1087. Accessions deposited: Czechoslovakia, Feb. 28, 1992; Djibouti, Feb. 7, 1992.
Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the United States Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820; 21 UST 77. Accession deposited: Lithuania, Jan. 15, 1992.
Cultural Property
Statutes of the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. Done at New Delhi Nov.-Dec. 1956, and revised Apr. 24, 1963 and Apr. 14-17, 1969. Entered into force May 10, 1958; for the US Jan. 20, 1971. TIAS 7038; 22 UST 19. Accession deposited: Lithuania, Oct. 21, 1991.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the US Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502; 23 UST 3227. Accession deposited: Lithuania, Jan. 15, 1992.
Privileges and Immunities
Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at New York Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1946; for the US Apr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900; 21 UST 1418. Accession deposited: Korea, Apr. 9, 1992.
Publications
Statutes of the International Center for the Registration of Serial Publications. Done at Paris Nov. 14, 1974, and amended Oct. 11 and 12, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 21, 1976; provisionally for the US Mar. 31, 1978. Accession deposited: Turkey, Jan. 10, 1992.
Seals
Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex. Done at London June 1, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1978. TIAS 8826; 29 UST 441. Accession deposited: Italy, Apr. 2, 1992.
Taxation
Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters. Signed at Strasbourg Jan. 25, 1988.1 Signature: Belgium, Feb. 7, 1992.2 Agreement on state and local taxation of foreign employees of public international organizations. Done at Washington Apr. 21, 1992.1 Signatories: United States, European Space Agency, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, Organization of American States and Pan American Health Organization.
World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226; 27 UST 37. Acceptance deposited: Cambodia, Nov. 28, 1991.
Bilateral
Armenia
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Washington Apr. 2, 1992. Entered into force Apr. 2, 1992.
Australia
Agreement concerning cooperation in radar activities, with project arrangements. Signed at Salisbury Mar. 3, 1992. Entered into force Mar. 3, 1992.
Chile
Memorandum of understanding on the exchange of staff noncommissioned officers between the US Marine Corps and the Chilean Navy's Marine Corps. Signed at Washington and Santiago Feb. 7 and 26, 1992. Entered into force Feb. 26, 1992.
Colombia
Mutual cooperation agreement to combat, prevent and control money laundering arising from illicit activities. Signed at San Antonio Feb. 27, 1992. Entered into force Feb. 27, 1992.
Mongolia
Memorandum of understanding concerning facilitation of the work of diplomatic missions, with attachments. Signed at Washington Mar. 27, 1992. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1992.
Russian Federation
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Washington Apr. 3, 1992. Enters into force on date on which Russian Federation notifies the US that all necessary legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Tunisia
Memorandum of understanding on the exchange of officers. Signed at Tunis and Washington Feb. 14 and Mar. 12, 1992. Entered into force Mar. 12, 1992.
Zambia
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Lusaka Mar. 9, 1992. Entered into force Mar. 9, 1992. 1 Not in force. 2 With reservations and declarations. (###)