US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 17, April 27, 1992

Title:

A Summons to Leadership

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois Date: Apr, 21 19924/21/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, Eurasia Country: United States, USSR (former), Russia Subject: Democratization [TEXT] Not long ago, I stood at Rhein-Main Airfield in Germany. Pilots moved their planes into line for takeoff. Crewmen strained to hoist final loads. And jets roared as I watched US Air Force planes taking off for Moscow and 19 other cities in the former Soviet Union. At that very base and others like it, young Americans had stood guard for two generations, ready to launch planes to repel a Soviet attack. But now, instead of missiles and bombs, American planes were taking off with food and medicine, a cargo of hope--not the freight of destruction. The flight of those planes was also a measure of a larger journey--the distance the world has come after so many years of Cold War and the distance we have come as Americans in the course of this century. Twice before America has been summoned to leadership to build a new peace. Now the call has come again.
An American Journey
The first steps on this American journey were taken 75 years ago this month. We joined what was called the "Great War," the "War to End All Wars," but which became simply the First World War. That terrible slaughter of men and nations destroyed the old order but put nothing in its place. When it ended, the hope of humanity was centered on the United States, which alone had the strength and the moral force to assure a lasting peace. America was summoned to leadership. But America was not ready. Our leaders were bitterly divided. Our people only sought to resume a normal life. So we decided to "stay out" of other nations' troubles and hoped by doing so to stay out of trouble ourselves. Before we are too harsh on the Americans of 1919, we should remember that, at first, isolationism seemed to work. It took the enemies of democracy more than a decade and the Great Depression before they could mount the next great assault. But make no mistake about it. The disasters of the 1930s grew from the mistakes of the 1920s: the illusion of isolationism and the delusion of protectionism. When, at last, Americans understood that a protectionist America could never be a prosperous America, and that an isolationist America could never be a secure America, we had to redeem those mistakes with a depression and with a war. When the Second World War was over, we wanted to get back to our own business. Yet we faced a second summons to international leadership: the Cold War against Soviet aggression. We resolved not to repeat the mistakes of an earlier generation. This time we rose to the challenge. We led a 40- year struggle that ended finally with the collapse of Soviet communism. Now that the Cold War is history, it would be tempting to depict this great engagement of America with the world--the America of the Marshall Plan and of NATO and of the support for democracy in Japan--as an obvious and popular commitment from the start. But it was not. The American people were skeptical, at first, of what their leaders were telling them. When New York Times columnist James Reston revealed the details and likely cost of the Marshall Plan, he got a call from Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican leader of the Senate. Vandenberg told him that Congress would never spend that kind of money to save anybody. But when the facts were put before the American people, when they understood the stakes and what had to be done, minds were changed. Senator Vandenberg changed his mind, too, and General Marshall--with Vandenberg's help and public support--got the money. Neither the Marshall Plan nor any of the great bipartisan achievements of those times came about because foreign aid was popular. The American people supported the Marshall Plan and the NATO alliance and efforts to foster democracy and reconstruction not because those causes were popular but because Americans knew what had to be done. Americans understood it was not enough just to contain the Soviet Union. For the sake of enduring peace and freedom, we had to transform our World War II adversaries into friends and allies. And through our support for political and economic freedom in those countries, we did it. The results are clear for all to see: what I would call a "zone of peace and prosperity" that has opened new horizons for so many nations in Europe and Asia and, not the least, for the United States of America.
The Third Summons: Leading Collective Engagement
Today, in the post-Cold War era, we face a third summons to leadership. This time it is not about winning a war--hot or cold--but about winning a democratic peace. This time it is not about winning a peace for half a world--the free half--but for the whole world. The choice for America is this: We can either try to win this peace through a deliberate policy of working with others to shape our times, or we can stand aside and drift, either out of conviction or neglect, while the times shape us. The President has made our choice clear. Our idea is to replace the dangerous period of the Cold War with a democratic peace--a peace built on the twin pillars of political and economic freedom. Much as we helped democracy flourish in Germany, Italy, and Japan after World War II, we can now foster democratic values in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and the other new states of Eurasia. Shared democratic values can ensure an enduring and stable peace in a way the balance of terror never could. Real democracies do not go to war with each other. And while democracy will support our security, the free markets that go along with it will support global--and American-- prosperity. In short, by supporting democracy and free markets in Russia and Eurasia, we can extend the "zone of peace and prosperity" further east across Russia and Eurasia and bring these new states into the democratic community of nations, much as we've worked since 1989 to bring the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into this zone of peace and prosperity. That's good for American interests and values not only in Russia and Eurasia but also in Western and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia as well. The work of freedom will be difficult. The lands of Russia and Eurasia, in contrast to Western Europe after World War II, have little experience with either democracy or capitalism. The dangers of ethnic conflict and political fragmentation as well as the pain and sacrifices of market reform are stark. Yet the community of democratic nations is larger and more vigorous than at the end of World War II. That's why we plan to build a democratic peace by pursuing a straight- forward policy of American leadership called "collective engagement." Collective engagement builds on our success in enlarging the democratic community of nations after World War II. Germany, Italy, and Japan are now strong and prosperous allies. By working with our other allies and the international institutions we created in the aftermath of World War II--the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund--we need not go it alone. Instead, we can build a democratic peace together. The moving force of collective engagement is American leadership, drawing on the common values and common interests shared by the democratic community of nations. As the most powerful democracy on earth, we must act as the catalyst, driving forward where we can. But there is also something more. It is called trust. As President Bush has said, "the world trusts us with power. . . they trust us to do what's right." Because of this American record, we are able today--if we will--to work with our partners to share responsibilities and costs and to advance together on common problems. That's American leadership through collective engagement.
How It Has Worked
Over the course of the Bush Administration, the policy of collective engagement has worked--and worked well. Indeed, it has produced achievements beyond what many not only thought possible but what many told us at the time simply could not be done: -- Many said that Germany could not be united peacefully, democratically, and kept in NATO. Yet, together, the United States and its allies, negotiating with the former Soviet Union, did it. -- Many said the Soviet Union would never free Eastern Europe and never let the Baltic states go, but the United States and our European allies skillfully pressed the USSR to release its grip when captive peoples stirred for freedom. -- Many said NATO could not be transformed. But, working with a newly unified Germany, the United States and its allies did it, devising new strategies and forces for new times and creating a new North Atlantic Cooperation Council that reaches out to former adversaries to make new friends and help with new and different challenges. -- Many said that we could not safely negotiate radical cuts in nuclear and conventional arsenals, yet the United States and its allies, negotiating first with the Soviet Union and now with Russia and the other new independent states, is doing it. -- Many said that Iraqi aggression against Kuwait would not be reversed, that the fourth largest army in the world could not be beaten except at enormous cost, yet the United States, leading an unprecedented international coalition, did it. -- Many said that Arabs and Israelis would never sit down together at a peace conference and that they definitely would never follow such a meeting with direct bilateral and multilateral negotiations, yet, working with the parties, the United States, Russia, and other partners were the catalysts that got it done. -- Many said that democracy could not triumph over violence in Central America, but the United States, working with partners in Latin Ame-rica and other continents, helped make it happen in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Now the United States is helping overcome the past in Latin America and supporting democracy and econo-mic reform through the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. -- Many said that Cambodia would never escape its anguish, that Vietnamese troops would maintain their hold, that peaceful change would be impossible. But now the United States, working with the UN Security Council and Asian friends, is moving to assist free elections and reconstruction in Cambodia. In each case, the pattern was clear: American leadership and engagement made collective action possible. We did not have to do it alone, but without us it could not have been done successfully. Despite the doubts and the doubters, the verdict is in. Collective engagement works. To put it simply: We led, we had partners, and together we succeeded. US leadership of collective engagement avoids the dangerous extremes of fallacious omnipotence or misplaced multilateralism. The United States is not the world's policeman. Yet we are not bystanders to our own fate. What happens beyond our shores has very real consequences here at home. Collective engagement allows the United States to rally like-minded nations on behalf of peace and to draw on international institutions where they can play a constructive part. The nature of the problem, the interests and values we have at stake, the capacity of our friends to act, and the relevance of available multilateral mechanisms will shape our role. Obviously, we can hardly entrust the future of democracy or American interests exclusively to multilateral institutions, nor should we. Of course, the United States reserves the right to act alone, which at times may be the only way to truly lead or serve our national interests. Ours is a pragmatic approach, a realistic approach, but also a principled approach--for it promotes those common values that are essential for a democratic peace. It is in this way that we build a new and better world order: US leadership catalyzing collective action to protect and promote our core security, political, and economic values.
The Test of Russia and Eurasia
American leadership of collective engagement now faces another great test: the test of Russia and the other independent states emerging from the former Soviet Union. Freed from the dual burdens of communism and empire, the Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, and the other peoples of the former Soviet Union are trying to reclaim their national identities--their rich cultures, religions, and histories, their constructive places in the world. All of the once-captive nations have emerged, at last, from the shadows into the light. In varying degrees, they are beginning to seek democracy and the economic benefits of free markets. Over the last 4 months, I have visited all of the new states of the former Soviet Union except Georgia. I have met their leaders and explained our policies. They have told me of their aspirations and their problems. Together we shared an experience that only a short time ago seemed but a distant dream: an American Secretary of State meeting with the President of an independent Ukraine, an independent Byelarus, an independent Armenia, and an independent Uzbekistan. Like the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians and the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Romanians, Albanians, and others before them, I found only the highest regard and the warmest affection for America and for our people. I have returned from my travels absolutely convinced of this: We have a once-in-a-century opportunity to shape the course of history and to define a new age of peace. I'm not talking about the 20th century but the 21st century. And I'm not talking about only our generation but generations to come. The stakes are truly historic: Strategically, the United States, Russia, and the other countries of the former Soviet Union can move to enduring friendship, partnership, and even alliance. This is the true peace dividend--the lifting of the psychological burden of fear and hostility, the release of both the moral and material resources consumed by the nuclear and conventional arms competitions. As President Bush has said, "Democrats in the Kremlin can assure our security in a way nuclear missiles never could." Politically, democracy can flourish where it has never flourished before. De Tocqueville's famous prophecy that the American republic and the Russian empire were destined to oppose each other--democracy versus autocracy-- has run its course. There can be a new burst of freedom for those who have longed to share its blessings. Economically, Russia and the other new states can join the global economy at last. Their natural riches and the abundant skills of their peoples can benefit the welfare of their peoples, not the Communist Party, and their integration into the global economy can expand opportunities for our traders and investors. The United States has been working for some time now preparing for just these opportunities, not only with Russia but with all the new states. As they have moved forward, we and our allies have moved with them. We have calibrated our approach to reflect not only our assessment of what we should do but also how far they themselves were prepared to go--because, in the end, we cannot help those who will not help themselves.
Next Steps
We have sought in particular to pursue a new vision with Russia, the largest of the independent nations emerging from the Soviet collapse--a Russia that could become a strategic partner of America, working not against us but with us to promote peace and democracy throughout all of Eurasia; a Russia that could become a new democratic society built on free elections, multiparty democracy, and the rule of law; a Russia that could be integrated into the global economy, open to outside trade and investment, and made prosperous by free markets and individual initiative. Russia's potential is part and parcel of a broader vision for all the lands of the former Soviet Union and the Eurasian continent. We can extend the zone of peace and prosperity eastward until we achieve the President's goal of a Europe truly whole and free: a continent of free, independent, and sovereign nations working to build democracy and free markets, cooperating with one another to resolve disputes peacefully, and integrating themselves fully into the democratic community of nations and the global economy. This is a revolutionary vision, but then we are living in revolutionary times. At Princeton University in December, just as the Soviet Union was finally disappearing, I outlined three areas--military, political, and economic-- where we could work with Russia and the other new independent states to realize the vision. Since then, we've made progress in the military sphere with new proposals by President Bush and President Yeltsin for nuclear arms control; with new practical steps to help Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan disable and dismantle nuclear weapons; and with the creation of international science centers to cope with the brain drain problem. In the political realm, we've established diplomatic relations with all the new states, and we're the only country to have an embassy in each and every one of the new states. We are also welcoming them into the United Nations, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In economics, we have accelerated a massive humanitarian effort to meet emergency food and medical needs. We've expanded our technical assistance programs, and, at the Washington Coordinating Conference in January, a new international coalition of 54 nations and institutions began an extensive and productive effort to coordinate assistance. The last piece of the puzzle has been a comprehensive, credible economic reform plan. In December, while the Soviet Union was still collapsing, there was no such plan. But since January, President Yeltsin has taken one courageous decision after another, lifting most price controls, reducing government spending, and cutting defense drastically. Russia has engaged in serious, fruitful discussions with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. A reform program has been put into place that is both credible and comprehensive, and President Yeltsin's commitment to it remains steadfast. Clearly, the Russians are committed, and they cannot afford to stop now. The legacy of the past is a vast inflation ravaging the ruble that threatens not only the economic reform effort but the future of democracy in Russia and its neighbors as well. If democracy fails in Russia, it will make the work of freedom far more difficult in Ukraine, Armenia, Byelarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and all the rest. Those are the reasons why, on April 1, the President announced our support for a multilateral macro-economic support package. This $24-billion support package will help Russia stabilize its economy, bring inflation under control, and set the stage for growth and development. As a broad- based multilateral effort aimed at supporting democracy and free markets, this plan is a prime example of collective engagement at work. As part of this multilateral effort, the President has proposed the FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act. While this act supports our involvement in the multilateral macroeconomic support package, it also supports democracy and free markets in Russia and Eurasia across the full range of military, political, and economic issues. It represents a comprehensive and integrated approach to the transformation of the former Soviet Union. First, the act supports our efforts at reducing the threat to our security through weapons dismantlement, demilitarization, and nuclear safety. It will allow us to expand our efforts to help Russia, Ukraine, and the other new independent states shift away from militarized economies. Second, the act supports our democratization programs in Russia and the other new independent states. It will support our efforts to bring Russians, Ukrainians, Central Asians, and others here for internships and to send American resident advisers to teach the ways of democracy and free markets. Third, the act supports free and open markets through technical assistance, trade and investment promotion, and macroeconomic stabilization. The act will make it easier for our companies to get involved in trade and investment opportunities in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the other new independent states. The act will help expand the programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Export-Import Bank. This will allow us to use government funds to catalyze private sector trade and investment. That's good for our business and our economy and good for the development of markets and democracy in Eurasia and Russia. I urge you to support this proposed legislation, just as the President and I have urged the Congress to pass it without delay and without attaching "killer" amendments to meet some domestic imperative. I am sure that you will ask me, as some in the Congress have already asked me, whether this is just more foreign aid. I will answer that it is not just more foreign aid. You will ask me whether this is just more charity. I will answer that it is not just more charity. It is, instead, a hard-headed investment in our security, a hard-headed investment in our future. Simply put, the FREEDOM Support Act is in America's national interest--indeed, in our national security interest.
The Challenge of Our Times
I recognize that asking for a further investment in collective engagement at this point is neither easy nor popular. It costs money, and there are risks. Some people do not want to take these risks or to make investments in a democratic peace for the future. The so-called America Firsters prefer to avoid the challenges of our times by pretending they do not exist. But that is the greatest risk of all. Others are still caught up in mistakes of past decades: They doubt America's capacity to do good; they distrust America's ability to compete; and they claim that domestic pressures preclude international leadership. Whatever their reasons, I say to them what George Kennan said to a Chicago audience in 1950: "History does not forgive us our national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our domestic politics." To these defeatists and retreatists, I say the real choice is this: Either we answer the summons of leadership or we do not. Either we take hold of history, or history will take hold of us. The alternative to American leadership and collective engagement is not more security for Americans but less; not higher wages but lower; not a more competitive economy but less; not the success of democracy but its failure. It means to lose the peace after winning the war, to forfeit the peace dividend after having earned it. It could mean that we would have to once again spend the trillions of dollars required to win another Cold War. Above all, we shall have lost the opportunity for a better America in a better world. The alternative to skillful American leadership abroad is the contraction, not the expansion, of opportunity at home. And if you doubt that, look again at how our lives, our safety, our ideals, and our work are tied up with the world beyond our borders. For isolationism does not travel alone. Intolerance and division at home are its companions. The American spirit and American ideals have no place in that society. I spoke earlier of the opportunity of the century, the next century. How different life would be for the coming generations if we make the right choice now--if we answer the summons to leadership by leading through collective engagement; if we help turn Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union into a source of promise, not threat; in short, if we win a democratic peace. Together we share with other democracies in this century a record of having won great world wars, of having paid dearly in lives and treasure because we had no choice. But, after the wars, we still had to win the peace. Now we face the challenge once more. America in her youth sought to stay clear of the "Old World" of conflict. America grown up is a citizen of a world now made new for everyone. The challenge of our times is to answer the summons to leadership. We must live up to the greatness of our ideals--to win a democratic peace. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 17, April 27, 1992 Title:

Private Sector Role Critical In Helping Former Soviet Union

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks in a meeting with US business executives, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 21 19924/21/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, Eurasia Country: USSR (former), Russia Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] I am very pleased to welcome to the White House this morning 16 senior American business leaders to discuss how the American private sector can help to meet the most important foreign policy challenge that faces us--the transformation of the new states and the former USSR from command to market economies and from authoritarian to democratic governments. We are determined to expand the volume of our trade and investment with them. I would like to announce today a series of measures to meet these important objectives. First, I have asked that current negotiations with all the new states on trade, bilateral investment, and tax treaties be expedited and completed as soon as possible. These agreements will provide greater access for our companies, and they will lay a new foundation for our future commercial relationships. Second, I have also asked OPIC--the Overseas Private Investment Corporation--and Eximbank--the Export-Import Bank--to negotiate new agreements and expand their operations in the former USSR, another critical step so that American firms can compete equally and fairly for a share of the new markets there. Third, I would like to reiterate my call to the Congress in a spirit of bipartisanship to pass, in time for my summit meeting with [Russian] President Yeltsin in June, the FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act, the landmark legislation that I announced on April 1. We hope the business leaders here today and the larger American business community will support this bill which will lift Cold War restrictions on trade and investment. Finally, I have requested that our Secretary of Commerce, Barbara Franklin, create new business development committees with Russia, Ukraine, and other countries to eliminate the barriers that currently discourage trade with them. All these issues will be high on my agenda when I meet with Presidents Kravchuk [of Ukraine] and Yeltsin. I'm absolutely committed to giving American companies every opportunity to compete in these markets. The American private sector should seize this opportunity to do business with these countries. It's a vast and rich market, and expanding our business ties will benefit the American people. Increased trade means new markets for American goods, greater opportunities for American investors, and more jobs for American workers. The United States increased its exports of manufactured goods to the USSR by nearly 40% in 1991. We should aim to do even better this year and the next. This is a defining moment in this century. Indeed, the private sector's role is absolutely critical. The need for capital, advanced technology, and human expertise in these countries during this decade and into the next century will be far too great for governments alone to meet. A great economic transformation to liberate the peoples of the former Soviet Union and benefit our own people will only occur if our private firms invest and trade to show them the way. I thank those business leaders that are with us here today, many of them already involved in trying to do business in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries. I pledge my commitment to this partnership with the American private sector. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 17, April 27, 1992 Title:

Commitment to Cuban Freedom

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Kennebunkport, Maine Date: Apr, 18 19924/18/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Cuba, Russia Subject: Democratization [TEXT] I am strongly committed to actions that will bring rapid, peaceful, democratic change to Cuba. My Administration has pursued an effective policy of economic and political isolation of the Castro regime. We urge all democratic governments to join us. No nation should help bankroll the dictatorship. Aid to the Castro regime will prolong Castro's hold on Cuba and prolong the misery and suffering of the Cuban people. Today, we are closer than ever to our goal of returning freedom to Cuba. The Russian Government has announced that economic relations with Cuba will be on a hard currency basis. Also, Russia is withdrawing the former Soviet brigade and announced that, as of January 1, 1992, it was ending all subsidies to Cuba. Castro is on his own. Cuba has lost a source of economic and military aid that has totaled as much as $5 billion annually in some years. Cuban trade with the new independent states amounts to a mere fraction of its trade with the former Soviet Union. For the first time, the Russian Republic voted with countries from Latin America, Africa, and Asia to condemn Cuba's human rights abuses at the UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva. Our Latin American allies rejected Cuban requests to purchase oil at less than fair market prices and have called for a democratic opening in Cuba. My Administration will support free trade arrangements that benefit our sister democracies but will not accept loopholes that aid the Castro regime. The benefits of these agreements are for governments committed to freedom and democracy. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 seeks to build on the strong pro- democracy policy of my Administration. I applaud such efforts and endorse the objectives of this legislation to isolate Cuba until democratic change comes to that embattled island. I believe in and I am committed to work with the Congress this session to pass a stronger, more effective Cuban Democracy Act which tightens the embargo and closes any unintentional loopholes that could benefit the Castro regime, while preserving the proper constitutional prerogatives of the Congress and the President. However, as currently written, the Cuban Democracy Act could, without intending to do so, weaken the embargo. It could result in the transfer of millions of dollars to the Castro regime from earnings on telecommunication services between the United States and Cuba. Current regulations allow balanced, and even improved, phone service but restrict hard currency transfers to Cuba. Additionally, we should continue to license donations of food and medicines to non-governmental organizations in Cuba for the benefit of the Cuban people. But we cannot permit either the sale of medicines or the donation of food to the Castro regime itself. To do so, as the bill proposes, could directly aid the security forces of the Castro dictatorship and could contribute to the building of a biotechnology industry. Finally, consistent with my proposal of 3 years ago, the legislation should strengthen the provision providing for civil penalty authority for the Department of the Treasury as a weapon against embargo violators. With the appropriate changes, I expect to be able to sign this legislation. I intend to work with the Congress to pass a strong Cuban Democracy Act this year. In this spirit, I am today instructing the Treasury Department to restrict further shipping to Cuba by issuing regulations that will prohibit entry into US ports of vessels that are engaged in trade with Cuba. Additionally, I am instructing Treasury to begin the process of issuing licenses to permit shipment of humanitarian package mail on the Miami/Havana air charter services. This measure will further limit Cuba's hard currency earnings. My Administration will continue to press governments around the world on the need to isolate economically the Castro regime. Together we will bring to Cuba a new era of freedom and democracy. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 17, April 27, 1992 Title:

US-Portuguese Relations

Bush Silva Source: President Bush, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva Description: Excerpts from remarks by President Bush and Portuguese Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 22 19924/22/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: Portugal Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT]
President Bush:
Mr. Prime Minister, this year my country celebrates the Iberian spirit of discovery. Half a millennium ago, Portugal and Spain helped chart a course toward a new world. Five hundred years later, European unity guides the way toward a new world order. Those early pioneers believed their mission was to probe the secrets of the world. Now we must explore the frontiers of common interest and common ground. The next horizon: a strengthened partnership between the United States and the European Community. Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, EC President [Jacques] Delors, and I and our top officials have discussed areas where we may deepen cooperation: peace efforts in the Middle East, coordination of aid to Central and Eastern Europe, the struggle of the emergent CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and international assistance--the agenda of next month's EC conference in Lisbon. We also talked about Yugoslavia, where, tragically, old hatreds are opening new wounds. The US-EC partnership is working tirelessly to create conditions for a lasting democratic peace. No topic on our agenda is more crucial than the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. We are committed to achieving an early agreement--one that will spur economic growth, not just in America, but in Europe and all around the world. It will create jobs--not just for our generation but for generations to come. For Americans, agreement will mean more than free trade abroad; it will mean for Americans good jobs here at home and a better standard of living at home. We had an extensive exchange of views on the outstanding issues and some new ideas on how to conclude this Uruguay Round were advanced by both sides. We are convinced, absolutely convinced, that the EC leaders are committed to an early agreement. And I hope they know that I am committed to such an early conclusion. We agreed to continue this process. We had some serious discussions, and the process will go on. Forty-one years ago almost to the day, the countries of Europe began their quest for unity. Over the ruins of war they laid a blueprint for peace and began building the foundations for economic and political cooperation. They sought unity not out of convenience but out of conviction: a vision of economic interdependence that would inflate the costs of war and expand the dividends of peace. The wisdom of their actions has brought us today to a new Europe--where peace has paid off. Now, this new Europe has now joined its strength with the United States to support the spread of political and economic freedom in the lands only recently liberated from Soviet communism. Those who helped four decades ago are now able to shoulder--those that we helped four decades ago are now able to shoulder a larger part of these new challenges. Jean Monnet, the grandfather of European unity, once asked: "If you are in a dark tunnel and see a small light at the end, should you turn your back on that light and go back into darkness, or should you continue walking toward it even though you know it's far away?" Five hundred years ago, a European mariner followed the light of his imagination to illuminate a new world. For almost 50 years, the West carried freedom's torch to protect the free world. Today, we stand at the shores of a new world order--where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom and prosperity. A strong and united Europe offers the best hope for this united purpose, and the best alliance for the United States. I salute our two distinguished guests today, and now would like to ask Prime Minister Cavaco Silva to say a word.
Prime Minister Silva:
It was extremely gratifying for President Delors and myself to have the opportunity to meet with President Bush. It was a meeting among friends that we found very constructive and fruitful. In November 1990 in the declaration on the United States and the European Community relations, we defined the guidelines on which our future cooperation should be based. We are glad to conclude today that our cooperation has been both substantial and effective. We very much value our partnership with the United States. We believe that the continued presence and involvement of the United States in Europe is fundamental to maintain peace and stability in our continent. Human rights, democratic values, and free market economy are the foundations of our Euro-Atlantic partnership. In the past, we have come together to defend them. Now we see these ideals gaining ground everywhere. It's of the most fundamental importance that we join our efforts to ensure that these gains will be durable. Our cooperation and leadership are also crucial to ensure sustained economic goals worldwide. We have reaffirmed our commitment to the multilateral trade system. We are determined to bring the Uruguay Round to a positive conclusion. We discussed also the situation in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the preparation of the coming Lisbon conference on coordination of aid to the region. We believe it is fundamental that we continue working together to bring stability to the region, thus creating conditions for the consolidation of democracy and the market economy. We talked about the present situation in Yugoslavia and the prospects for peace there. Coordination between Europe and the United States has been, and will be, of the utmost importance to help reach a negotiated settlement. We reviewed the situation in the Middle East and the prospects for the region within the framework of the current peace process. The Community is deeply committed to the peace process. The European Community and the United States share the same outlook on this issue, and we are well aware of the fact that there is no viable alternative to the present peace talks. We also reviewed the situation in the Magreb. The threat posed by the spread of fundamentalism in that region is a matter of concern for us. We believe that promotion of economic development and free markets and a respect of human rights are the best means to deal with this problem. We agreed that respect for international law and the rejection of terrorism are also essential, particularly where it concerns Libya. This was the first meeting between the European Community and the United States since the decisions of last week, which are now in the process of ratification in the 12 EC member states. We are convinced that the establishment of a new European union will create possibilities for further enlargement of the scope of fellow cooperation. We discussed new ideas where we could work together. We will be exploring these opportunities in the months ahead. Thank you, Mr. President. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 17, April 27, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Portugal

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Apr, 22 19924/22/92 Category: Fact Sheets Category: Country Data Region: Europe Country: Portugal Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] On April 21-22, 1992, Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva, in his capacity as President of the European Council of the European Communities (EC), was in Washington, DC, for an official working visit. Portugal has served in the EC presidency since January 1992 and will continue to serve through June. Prime Minister Cavaco Silva has been to the United States three times since 1988 on official and private visits. The Prime Minister met with President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, EC Commission President Jacques Delors, and others to discuss a range of issues of interest to the United States and the EC.
US-Portuguese Relations
The United States has encouraged a stable and democratic Portugal that is closely associated with the industrial democracies of Western Europe and NATO and has supported Portugal's entry into the West European economic and defense mainstream. US-Portuguese defense cooperation traditionally has been excellent. US armed forces have access to the Portu-guese air base at Lajes in the Azores. The United States, along with other NATO allies, provides security assistance to Portugal. This includes modern equipment and training to support Portuguese participation in NATO. Since 1975, US economic assistance to Portugal has included programs for refugee and disaster assistance, agriculture, schools and rural education, health, low income housing and housing guarantees, sanitation, consultants and training, balance-of-payments loans, PL 480 (Food for Peace) loans, and Economic Support Fund (ESF) cash transfers. ESF has been used in large part to assist the Azores and fund the Luso-American Development Foundation. Portugal and the United States also have cooperated on assistance projects for some African countries. Portugal's remarkable economic growth in recent years and its entry into the EC have steadily lessened the need for direct US assistance.
Political Conditions
On April 25, 1974, a largely bloodless military coup toppled Portugal's authoritarian regime. A new constitution took effect April 25, 1976, providing for a president, prime minister, council of ministers, and parliament. The 1982 constitutional revision placed the military under strict civilian control and trimmed the powers of the president. In the July 1987 parliamentary elections, Social Democratic Party leader Cavaco Silva led his party to the first absolute majority for a single party. President Mario Soares, elected in February 1986, invited Cavaco Silva to form a government as Prime Minister. The Cavaco Silva Administration has implemented economic and social reforms meant to make Portugal more competitive with its European partners. In 1989, the government and the Socialist Party cooperated in the parliament to eliminate Marxist rhetoric from the constitution and to pave the way for full privatization of public sector enterprises. The governing Social Democrats and Cavaco Silva's Administration were again chosen to lead Portugal in the October 6, 1991, legislative election.
Economic Conditions
Portugal's economy has made gains since the 1974 revolution. Finance and commercial relations with the former colonies are less important, and the large industrial-financial groups that once dominated the economy have been dismantled. The majority government has pursued a comprehensive plan of structural economic reform to promote investment-led growth, modernize industry and agriculture, privatize most state-owned enterprises, reduce the public sector deficit, and hold down inflation; the most ambitious element has been to privatize firms that were nationalized earlier. Agricultural production has diminished as a percentage of GDP, and industry and tourism have expanded. Inflation was 11.4% in 1991, and the public sector deficit was 6.5% of GDP. The government continues to pare employment rolls and streamline programs. Labor unions--before the revolution mainly instruments of government policy--have become active, independent agents. Two major labor confederations have emerged. The oldest, the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGPT-Intersindical), is communist controlled. In January 1979, the General Union of Workers (UGT) was formed as a democratic alternative. The UGT has become a major force in the Portuguese labor movement and has gained international respect. Foreign trade has increased, with West European countries and the United States becoming Portugal's largest partners. Portugal's January 1986 entry into the EC and the concomitant obligations to open its markets and compete freely with its EC partners by the planned 1992 single market have been the main stimulus for many of the recent reforms and have influenced much of the country's economic policy and business strategy. Transition periods to bring Portuguese agricultural prices and tariffs in line with other EC countries and to liberalize capital movements will continue through the mid-1990s. EC structural adjustment assistance aims to help the government modernize its industry and agriculture.
Foreign Relations
Portugal's foreign policy reflects the country's geographic, cultural, and historic roots in the Western community and the determination of governments elected after 1974 to reinforce those bonds and the democratic values they help sustain. The government took a major step in that direction when it formally entered the EC in January 1986. Portugal is a charter member of NATO and a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It also is one of the 24 countries of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact that negotiated the Open Skies Treaty signed in Helsinki on March 24, 1992. Portugal retains ties with many of its former colonies. Since granting independence to the former overseas territories of Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome and Principe, the Portuguese Government has made efforts to maintain and strengthen diplomatic, economic, and assistance relations with them. Portugal also has sought to broaden diplomatic contacts with moderate Arab states to promote expanded economic and commercial ties. It maintains relations with Israel at the ambassadorial level. Portugal and Indonesia broke relations in 1975 in a dispute over the status of East Timor, which Indonesia then annexed in 1976; Portugal contested the action. The overseas territory of Macau still is administered by Portugal, although Portugal and China have concluded an agreement to return the territory to Chinese rule in 1999. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 17, April 27, 1992 Title:

Country Profile: Portugal

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Apr, 22 19924/22/92 Category: Country Data Region: Europe Country: Portugal Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT]
Official Name: Republic of Portugal
Geography
Area: 94,276 sq. km. (36,390 sq. mi.), including the Azores and Madeira Islands; about the size of Indiana. Cities: Capital--Lisbon (pop. 2 million in the metropolitan district). Other cities--Oporto (2 million in the metropolitan district). Terrain: Mountainous in the north; rolling in central south. Climate: Maritime temperate.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Portuguese (sing. and pl.). Population (est.): 10 million. Population density: 106/sq. km. (274/sq. mi.) Annual growth rate (est.): 0.3%. Ethnic groups: Homogeneous, Mediterranean stock with small black African minority. Religion: Roman Catholic 97%. Language: Portuguese. Education: Years compulsory--6. Attendance--60%. Literacy (1985)--83%. Health: Infant mortality rate (1987)--14/1,000. Life expectancy (1985)-- 73 yrs. Work force: (5 million, 1989) Government, commerce, and services--46%. Industry--35%. Agriculture--19%.
Government
Type: Parliamentary democracy. Constitution: Entered into effect April 25, 1976; revised October 30, 1982, and June 1, 1989. Branches: Executive--president (chief of state), Council of State (presidential advisory body), prime minister (head of government), council of ministers (cabinet). Legislative--unicameral Assembly of the Republic (between 230 and 235 deputies). Judicial--Supreme Court, district courts, appeals courts, Constitutional Tribunal. Major political parties: Social Democratic Party (PSD), Socialist Party (PS), Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), Center Social Democratic Party (CDS), Democratic Renewal Party (PRD), Popular Monarchist Party (PPM). Suffrage: Universal at 18. Subdivisions: 18 districts, 2 autonomous regions, and 1 dependency. Central government budget (1990): $23 billion (expenditures). Defense (1990): 2% of GDP. Flag: A vertically divided field--one-third green along the staff, two-thirds red; centered on the dividing line is the Portuguese coat of arms encircled in gold.
Economy
GDP (1991 est.): $69 billion. Annual growth rate (1990): 4.5%. Per capita GDP (1991 est.): $6,680. Avg. inflation rate (1991 est.): 13%. Natural resources: Fish, cork, tungsten, iron, copper, tin, and uranium ores. Industry (44% of GDP): Types--textiles, clothing, footwear (9%); construction (7%); food, beverages, tobacco (6%). Trade (1989): Exports--$13 billion: clothing, footwear, electrical machinery and appliances, automobiles. Imports--$19 billion: electrical and non-electrical machinery, automobiles, fuel, appliances. Partners--European Community, US, European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
Principal Government Officials
President--Mario Soares Prime Minister--Anibal Cavaco Silva Foreign Minister--Joao De Deus Pinheiro Ambassador to the United States--Francisco Jose Laco Treichler Knopfli Ambassador to the United Nations--Fernando Reino (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 17, April 27, 1992 Title:

Cancellation of Passports Valid Only to Israel

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 17 19924/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel Subject: Travel [TEXT] On April 25, 1992, legislation prohibiting the State Department from issuing second passports valid for travel only to Israel becomes effective. This legislation was enacted on October 28, 1991, and was published in the Federal Register on January 29, 1992. US citizens who have passports valid for travel only to Israel may at their convenience contact the nearest passport agency in the United States or American embassies and consulates abroad for assistance. Upon presentation of a passport valid for travel only to Israel and two identical passport photographs, a US passport agency, embassy, or consulate will cancel the passport and issue a replacement valid for 2 years that will bear no geographic limitations. There will be no charge for the issuance of a replacement passport for this purpose. In cases where cancellation of a current passport valid for travel only to Israel causes unnecessary hardship, the passport agencies, embassies, and consulates may instead cancel the current endorsement stating that the passport is valid only for travel to Israel. The existing passport will then be endorsed as valid for a period of 2 years. Hardship cases would be situations in which the cancellation of the passport would require the passport bearer to obtain new visas in the replacement passport. US passport agencies, embassies, and consulates will also assist Americans who are planning to travel to the Middle East and require two passports to obtain visas. In such cases, the State Department may issue a second passport with a validity of 2 years. To obtain a limited-duration second passport, US citizens must submit the following to a passport agency, embassy, or consulate: 1. A valid passport; 2. A completed passport application; 3. Two passport photographs; 4. The appropriate passport fee; 5. A written request for a second passport to facilitate obtaining visas for travel to Israel and Arab countries; and 6. A statement that if either passport is lost, the loss will be reported to the nearest US embassy or consulate or passport agency. Passport agencies are located in the following cities: Boston, Chicago, Honolulu, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Seattle, Stamford, and Washington, DC. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 17, April 27, 1992 Title:

New Assistance Package for the Former Soviet Union

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Apr, 27 19924/27/92 Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies Region: E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: USSR (former), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid, Arms Control [TEXT] Secretary Baker has told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the growth of democracy and free markets in Russia and Eurasia can be a source of new trade and investment opportunities for American companies. In testimony supporting new legislation proposed by the Bush Administration on April 1, 1992, Secretary Baker said, "These lands are rich in natural resources and educated, talented peoples." The proposed legislation, known as the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM), marks the second stage of US support for democracy and free markets in the former Soviet Union. It aims to spur reform in three broad areas: military, political, and economic. In the military sphere, the United States and Russia have agreed to sweeping arms control and disarmament plans and to the creation of a science center in Russia to stop the "brain drain" of nuclear scientists. The act provides money to implement those agreements, including the conversion of defense industries to civilian use, the withdrawal and relocation of former Soviet forces, and the establishment of a science center in Ukraine, similar to the one proposed for Russia. The political component of the act would build upon new diplomatic relations with the former Soviet republics by establishing democratization programs, including efforts to build "America Houses"--centers where local citizens can go to learn about America and the ways in which Americans practice democracy. The act provides long-term follow-up to the technical assistance programs and humanitarian aid efforts that immediately followed the dissolution of the USSR last December. This economic component of the act has several key provisions: -- Technical assistance will be channeled through a partnership between an energized US private sector and the government; more than traditional foreign aid, the former Soviet republics need the knowledge necessary to build a viable free market system. -- US regulations will be lifted so that American companies can more easily get involved in business, trade, and investment opportunities. In particular, money provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the US Export-Import Bank will be able to cover subsidies--in effect, using US Government money to catalyze private sector trade and development. -- Macroeconomic stabilization centers around a $24-billion program, to be administered by the Group of 7, which is aimed at supporting Russia's transition to a market economy. In addition, the Administration proposes a $3-billion US contribution to help stabilize the ruble. Secretary Baker urged the Senate to approve the legislation before Russian President Boris Yeltsin arrives in June for a summit with President Bush. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 17, April 27, 1992 Title:

US Recognizes Former Yugoslav Republics

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Apr, 7 19924/7/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia Subject: State Department, Democratization [TEXT] On April 7, the United States recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia as sovereign and independent states. The White House added that, once differences are resolved between Macedonia and Greece, the US will recognize that republic as well. The US also is discussing with Serbia and Montenegro their interest in remaining part of a common state known as Yugoslavia. These developments resulted in the lifting of the US economic sanctions against Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia that were imposed last December. Sanctions against Serbia and Montnegro will be lifted once Belgrade lifts its economic blockades directed against Bosnia- Hercegovina and Macedonia. The UN arms embargo remains in effect.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 17, April 27, 1992 Title:

Treaty Actions: Multilateral and Bilateral

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Apr, 27 19924/27/92 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: E/C Europe, Europe, Pacific, Central America, South America, Caribbean Country: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica, Spain, Czechoslovakia (former), Philippines Subject: International Law, Cultural Exchange, Environment, State Department, Resource Management [TEXT]
Multilateral
Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the United States Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. Accessions deposited: Latvia, Feb. 13, 1992; Uzbekistan, Mar. 2, 1992.
Cultural Relations
Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials, with protocol. Done at Lake Success Nov. 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952; for the United States Nov. 2, 1966. TIAS 6129. Protocol to the agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials of Nov. 22, 1950 (TIAS 6129; 17 UST 1835). Done at Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 2, 1982; for the United States Nov. 15, 1989. Accession deposited: Australia, Mar. 5, 1992.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the United States Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502. Accessions deposited: Latvia, Feb. 13, 1992; Uzbekistan, Mar. 2, 1992.
Fisheries
International convention for the high seas fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, with annex, as amended, with Protocol of Apr. 25, 1978 (TIAS 9242). Signed at Tokyo May 9, 1952. Entered into force June 12, 1953. TIAS 2786. Notice of termination: Presented by the US Feb. 21, 1992; effective Feb. 21, 1993.
Pollution
Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22, 1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988. TIAS 11097. Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1989. Accession deposited: Korea, Feb. 27, 1992.
Bilateral
Australia
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 28, 1964, as amended, for the financing of certain educational and cultural exchange programs. Exchange of notes at Canberra Feb. 20 and 21, 1992. Entered into force Feb. 21, 1992.
Austria
Agreement concerning the American International School in Vienna. Signed at Vienna Sept. 13, 1989. Enters into force on the first day of the second month that follows the month in which the Parties have notified each other of the fulfillment of constitutional requirements for effectiveness.
Brazil
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Brasilia Dec. 20, 1991. Entered into force: Mar. 9, 1992.
Costa Rica
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at San Jose Feb. 19, 1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Costa Rica of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement for the protection and preservation of cultural properties, with annex. Signed at Washington Mar. 17, 1992. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1992.
Honduras
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 20, 1990, regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa Feb. 25 and 28, 1992. Entered into force Feb. 28, 1992.
Jamaica
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kingston Jan. 14, 1992. Entered into force: Mar. 2, 1992.
Philippines
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Dec. 11, 1991. Entered into force: Mar. 2, 1992. Agreement regarding the relinquishment of the US Facility at Wallace Air Station, the Crow Valley Weapons Range and the US Air Force Transmitter site at O'Donnell. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Sept. 11 and 16, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 16, 1991.
Spain
Memorandum of understanding on the exchange of service personnel between the United States Navy and the Spanish Air Force and on the general conditions which will apply to the exchange of such personnel. Signed at Washington and Madrid July 20 and Aug. 13, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 13, 1991. Memorandum of understanding on the exchange of service personnel between the United States Navy and the Spanish Navy and on the general conditions which will apply to the exchange of such personnel. Signed at Washington and Madrid Aug. 5 and Sept. 5, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1991.
Uruguay
Cooperative mapping, charting and geodesy agreement. Signed at Montevideo and Fairfax Aug. 27 and Oct. 25, 1991. Entered into force Oct. 25, 1991. (###)