US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 16, April 20, 1992


The Need to Restore Democracy in Peru

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address before the Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, DC Date: Apr, 13 19924/13/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Peru Subject: Democratization, OAS [TEXT] Mr. President: We meet today, Mr. President, at a moment of historic opportunity but also of risk for our hemisphere. If we had convened a meeting of Foreign Ministers of this Organization just 3 years ago--in my first months as Secretary of State of the United States--there would not have been seated at this table, Mr. President, as there are today, the Foreign Ministers of a democratic Paraguay, a democratic Chile, a democratic Nicaragua, or a democratic Panama. There would not, as well, have been seated at this table the Foreign Minister of an El Salvador at peace. Three years ago, we could not have said, as we can today, that the economies of the hemisphere are beginning to grow again or that, for the first time in more than a decade, more capital is flowing into the hemisphere from renewed investment and lending than is flowing out of the hemisphere in order to pay old debts. Three years ago, we could not have envisioned that, from the Southern Cone to North America, this hemisphere would be moving steadily toward a new vision of economic cooperation, of free trade, and of shared prosperity. Nor could we have known, 3 years ago, that this proud organization, the OAS, would have resumed its regional leadership with new energy and new dedication to defend democracy, to combat narco-trafficking, and to promote economic integration and regional arms control. Mr. President, I have said before, and I still believe, that we are building here in the Americas something mankind has never seen before--the first truly, completely democratic hemisphere in this world. But each of us knows that this process is not going to be easy. There are dangers on the way to the future we seek. Democracy has returned to our hemisphere. But democracy remains fragile, and it remains threatened by deep social and economic problems and by ever-present temptations to seek a different, supposedly more efficient, anti-democratic course. In Santiago, less than 1 year ago, our member states unanimously committed ourselves to join together, through the OAS, in solidarity with democracy anywhere in this hemisphere where it is threatened or overturned. To the credit of the OAS, when the democratically elected President of Haiti was violently and illegally forced from office, we demonstrated our solidarity in deed, as well as word, with the suffering of the Haitian people. That solidarity continues, I would submit to you, and we will not relent until repression ends and democracy returns to Haiti. Since the Santiago declaration, we have also seen a violent assault upon one of the oldest continuing democracies in Latin America, our friend and ally Venezuela. We are heartened that those who sought to overturn constitutional democracy were not successful. But let those who might still consider that same dangerous and illegal path have no doubt about the consequences, because this body and my country, I do not think, would ever accept business as usual with an undemocratic Venezuela. There will be a secure place in this new hemisphere of political freedom and free trade for every democratic nation which seeks membership. But, Mr. President, there will be no place for those who isolate themselves through the overthrow of democracy. Today, of course, we meet because of the recent, tragic events in a great and proud member of this organization, Peru. I use the word tragic because every Foreign Minister and every Ambassador seated at this table recognizes that no nation and no people face a more daunting, dangerous, or terrible set of crises than those inherited by the new democratic Government of Peru less than 2 years ago. No nation and no people need and deserve international solidarity and support more than the Peruvian nation and the Peruvian people. They confront the deepest economic crisis of their history, the violence and corruption of narco-trafficking, and the most murderous and dangerous terrorist movement that has ever appeared in Latin America. The United States and the international community have tried to offer their solidarity and support to the new democratic Government of Peru and to its people as they confront these challenges. Mr. President, I would like to say that, to its immense credit, Peru has carried out a difficult but courageous process of economic reform that has begun to reopen long-closed avenues to new lending and resources from the international financial community. When the events that brought us here occurred, a representative of my government was in Peru to discuss with President Fujimori's Government new initiatives for alternative economic development and new joint efforts to combat narco-trafficking. Unfortunately, those discussions could not and did not take place because of the extraordinary actions taken by President Fujimori on April 5. Let me repeat before this distinguished meeting of Foreign Ministers what my government has already said: The actions taken by President Fujimori, whatever the justification given, are unjustified. They represent an assault on democracy that cannot and will not be supported by the United States of America, and, therefore, we have suspended all new assistance to the Government of Peru. We will continue to do so until constitutional democracy is restored. No nation in Latin America, Mr. President, in our view needs and deserves support and assistance any more than Peru. The deepest wish of the President and people of the United States is that the Peruvian Government and people succeed in restoring economic growth and opportunity, in defeating terrorism and narco-trafficking, and consolidating their democracy. Nevertheless, there can be no illusions. The course that President Fujimori has taken, if it is not altered, will affect Peru's relations with democratic states at the very moment when Peru, with great sacrifice and with great effort, has reintegrated itself into the international and democratic community. The actions taken since April 5 will deprive Peru of the support that it desperately needs and deserves if it is going to successfully meet the terrible crises it confronts. All of us recognize that democracy can be inefficient, all of us recognize that democracy can be slow, and all of us recognize that democracy can be frustrating. But, Mr. President, there is no alternative. You cannot destroy democracy in order to save it. Peru has started down a slippery slope which, whatever its government's intentions, will only lead to repression and to radicalization if it is not changed. The only long-term beneficiaries of this assault on democracy in Peru will be those very terrorists and guerrillas who falsely argue that violence is the solution to the problems of the Peruvian people. Mr. President, I strongly support a high-level mission from this body which would go to Peru to speak for this organization. I think that the message we should deliver is clear. First, this democratic hemisphere cannot and will not accept the undemocratic assault on constitutional processes that we have witnessed in Peru, for there can be no business as usual with a Peru that isolates itself from the democratic community. Second, our message must also be that this hemisphere and the international community seek nothing more than an opportunity to reestablish their solidarity with the Peruvian nation and with the Peruvian people to help them confront the terrible crises they face. We urge Peru to release those in detention, fully restore freedom of the press and all other constitutional liberties, initiate a national dialogue involving all Peruvian democratic forces and groups, and re-establish immediately constitutional democracy. We should offer the good offices of the OAS mission to help Peru, if it seeks our help, to start down that road. This is the 500th anniversary of the voyage to the New World. Ours is a world today of enormous hope and possibilities, but, above all, ours is a world of growing interdependence. Our freedom, our security, our prosperity, and our environment depend on each other. That interdependence and hope for a better, common future has brought us here in solidarity with the people of Peru. If Peru changes course, if constitutional democracy is restored, we can re- embrace the Peruvian nation and the Peruvian people and work together in partnership to help Peru overcome its difficult problems. If Peru decides to pursue the lonely and unacceptable path of authoritarianism, our solidarity, and our cooperation, and our help will be impossible. Mr. Minister, it is not too late. It is never too late for reason and dialogue and good will to prevail. So I hope that our colleague, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Peru, will carry our message back to President Fujimori's Government, for the last thing that Peru needs today is a constitutional crisis that puts it at odds with the inter-American community. Let me say to our distinguished colleague, the Foreign Minister of Peru, we welcome the initial steps that you have mentioned in your presentation today which have been taken toward the restoration of democracy. We hope your government will accept the mission that we propose and recognize that its good offices offer a chance to reunite the Peruvian people and return quickly and fully to constitutional and democratic legitimacy. This Organization of American States is founded on one unswerving principle: Representative democracy is the key to peace, it is the key to economic opportunity, and it is the key to legitimacy in this hemisphere. With democracy comes the solidarity of the inter-American community. Without it, the support that comes from that solidarity will be missing because, let me say one more time, Mr. President, you cannot destroy democracy in order to save it. So that is our message to Peru. We hope and pray that it will be heard. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 16, April 20, 1992 Title:

Secretary Baker Meets With Foreign Minister Of Bosnia-Hercegovina

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 14 19924/14/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] The Secretary met today with Haris Siladzic, Foreign Minister of Bosnia- Hercegovina. The Secretary advised Mr. Siladzic that the United States has high regard for the Bosnian Government, which has sought to promote and defend CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] principles throughout the Yugoslav crisis, to chart a peaceful transition to independence, and to respond constructively to the legitimate concerns of all national groups in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Secretary also made the following points. The United States strongly supports the territorial integrity of Bosnia- Hercegovina, a state which we recognized on April 7. The United States also strongly supports the EC [European Community]-sponsored intra-Bosnian negotiations. All the participants in these talks should respect the commitments they have undertaken to engage in constructive dialogue on the future constitutional structure of Bosnia-Hercegovina and to renounce the use of force. The United States condemns the use of force, intimidation, and provocation to nationalist violence by militant nationalist Serbian and, to a lesser extent, Croatian leaders in Bosnia. Their strategy and tactics are clearly aimed at promoting the forcible disintegration of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The United States also condemns the clear pattern of support for the destabilization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, primarily on the part of the "Yugoslav" military and Serbian President Milosevic. The international community should hold the Serbian and "Yugoslav" military leadership accountable for acts of aggression and destabilization aimed against Bosnia-Hercegovina. These leaders stand at a crossroads. If they continue on their present course of destabilization, they will only ensure their international political and economic isolation. They should, instead, take clear and concrete steps to demonstrate their respect for the independence, borders, territorial integrity, and legitimate Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina and their cooperation with the UN peace- keeping plan and the EC conference.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 16, April 20, 1992 Title:

Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 13 19924/13/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Albania, Serbia-Montenegro Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights [TEXT] The United States remains deeply concerned about the situation of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In our estimation, the Serbian Government's actions in Kosovo represent one of the worst human rights problems in Europe. That government continues to engage in repressive activities which include widescale arbitrary arrests, politically motivated job dismissals, and the routine, excessive use of force against ethnic Albanians. Discrimination against Albanians extends to every area of life, including the provision of medical care and services. We have made our concerns very clear to all levels of the Serbian Government, including to President Milosevic himself. In the context of the CSCE, we have insisted that the Serbian Government take real steps to respect fully the human rights of all people living in Kosovo. In the context of the EC conference, we believe it should fully commit to accepting Chapter II of the draft agreement, including its "special status" provisions for the rights of members of minorities. The US Government notes the contradiction of Serbian demands for extensive rights and autonomy on behalf of Serbs living outside Serbia, while the Serbian Government remains unwilling to extend basic human rights to non-Serbs in Serbia. The situation in Kosovo will be a major factor to be considered as we approach the future status of Serbia and Montenegro and our relations with Belgrade.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 16, April 20, 1992 Title:

US Policy Toward Cuba

Gelbard Source: Robert S. Gelbard, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Description: Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 8 19924/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Cuba Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights, Democratization [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the situation in Cuba, US policy toward that country, and the legislation pending before you, HR 4168. Cuba's Government is isolated today as never before because of three factors: first, the collapse of the Soviet bloc; second, Cuba's own policies, which resist reform, violate human rights, and drive away new sources of support; and, third, a consistent, 30-year US policy of diplomatic and economic isolation. While Cuba's Government is isolated, the Cuban people are not. They know that democratic change has swept through Latin America and the former Soviet bloc. Although their own media contain many distortions, they are aware of world events through international broadcasts. They know relations with Cuba's former allies have changed dramatically. They have witnessed the departure from Cuba of technicians from once friendly nations and the return to Cuba of workers and students who were residents in the former East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the former Soviet Union. One day the Cuban people--and they alone--will bring change to Cuba. No outsider can predict or determine when or how this will happen, but the depth of Cuba's crisis and the Cuban people's pent-up desire to improve their lives make it certain that change will come. Many Cubans who work inside the system have done so because it is the only way to obtain education and advancement, not because they believe passionately in communism. But others have rejected the easy way out. More and more Cubans are standing up to the regime. Teachers, trade unionists, and human rights activists are bravely calling for democratic reform. We are deeply concerned about the question of when and how the change comes. Our hope for a free Cuba is not just an aspiration for a better future for Cuba based on our humanitarian values. US policy has consistently sought this end through a tough program of diplomatic and economic isolation of the Castro regime. Failure to continue this policy of isolation would only prolong the regime and delay the day when Cubans can decide their own future. We take no pleasure in the suffering of the Cuban people, and we hope change comes soon. We hope it brings a genuine opening to democracy. Above all, we hope for peaceful, democratic change. Violence would do more than take innocent human lives--it could set off a cycle of revenge and recrimination, thereby preventing Cuba from turning promptly to the massive tasks of building new political institutions, freeing the economy, and fostering national reconciliation. Let me turn now to a discussion of the conditions in Cuba and the policy issues we face.
The Economic Situation in Cuba
The year 1991 was when Cuba's economic benefits from the former Soviet bloc dropped precipitously. One top Cuban official, party ideology chief Carlos Aldana, referred to the end of Soviet and East European support as "the second blockade," which has caused an economic crisis that "has not bottomed out." In 1991, economic aid from the former Soviet Union to Cuba totaled about $1 billion, compared to $4 billion the year before. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, [Russian] President Yeltsin announced an end to all economic assistance to Cuba. In 1992, little, if any, aid remains. Many Russian civilian advisers have departed. Those that remain will have to be paid in hard currency by the Cuban Government. While there may be some residual aid remaining--for example, in the form of technicians--it is clear that Russian aid to Cuba is coming to an end. Reduced fuel supplies are causing dislocations throughout the Cuban economy, most importantly in the key export crop--sugar--but also in transportation and in reduced activity throughout the economy. This year's sugar harvest is expected to drop to about 5.8 million tons, 24% less than last year. That, in turn, will further reduce Cuba's capacity to import oil. Public transportation has been cut by more than a third in Havana and drastically between Cuban cities. Many factories have reduced their work forces due to lack of inputs, spare parts, and fuel. Unemployment and underemployment are rapidly growing. The economic crisis affects all aspects of daily life. Rationing continues on bread, meat, sugar, eggs, milk, basic staples, tobacco, and fuel. Even in areas such as the health sector, where the government has long allocated substantial resources, hospitals have experienced shortages of medicine. On January 3, additional transportation cutbacks were announced in Havana, where 48 of 162 bus lines were eliminated. More fuel conservation measures were announced on February 3. These include a nationwide program of job-swapping, where workers trade their current jobs for ones closer to their homes. Windmills, beasts of burden, and bicycles are being used in increasing numbers to cut fuel consumption. Office workers are going to the countryside in large numbers to work 2- to 4-week stints on farms. Cuban officials and media reports are indicating that the government is encouraging some permanent resettlement of urban residents in rural areas to increase farm production. Military exercises are fewer, and military units are raising poultry, pigs, dairy herds, and crops for their own consumption. Both Cuban and foreign press reports are describing a rising wave of so-called economic crimes, such as illegal sales of goods at illegal prices, which are the result of Cubans trying to create sources of income, employment, and supply where the state-planned economy is not functioning. Absent a political decision to reduce the state's role in the economy and allow private initiative, the outlook for the Cuban economy is grim. In 1992, Russia and Kazakhstan have contracted to sell 1 million metric tons (mt) and 200,000 mt of oil, respectively, to Cuba, compared to 13 million mt that went to Cuba from the Soviet Union in 1989. Now that Cuba must pay world prices for oil, it will be able to buy only half of the amount it imported in 1989. Moreover, Cuba's total two-way trade, which in 1989 was $13.5 billion, is expected to be $4.8 billion in 1992. Cuba is desperately seeking foreign investment and new trading partners. On the whole, it has been unsuccessful. Cuba has found few new trading partners and has been completely unable to find sources for the products once supplied by the Soviet Union. Cuba is not receiving concessional assistance or favorable aid terms for its oil imports, despite Castro's personal request to Latin leaders. Cuba's total imports have fallen more than 50%. On the assistance side, no government has been willing to replace the former Soviet Union. Most governments have ended aid programs which were maintained during the 1980s.
The Political Situation
If 1991 answered a basic question about Cuba's prospects for continued subsidies from abroad, it also answered a key political question. Last year, the regime relied increasingly upon repression and ideological discipline, not reform, to deal with its internal critics. In the months preceding last October's Fourth Party Congress, the Cuban public hoped that the congress would bring some important reforms. In the political sphere, direct elections to the National Assembly were mentioned; in the economic, the reopening of free farmers markets. These reforms, while far from revolutionary, would have represented an admission that a measure of economic and political freedom is needed to alleviate Cuba's crisis. When the congress did take place, few reforms were adopted. Finally, in March, the leadership announced that direct elections to the National Assembly would be carried out next October but made it clear that the single-party system would remain unaltered. The idea of reestablishing farmers' markets was derided at the congress as an ideological error, even though, until their abolition in 1986, they contributed substantially to food supplies and to the 6% annual growth that the Cuban economy experienced in the early 1980s. Since the farmers' markets were abolished in 1985, there has been no growth in the Cuban economy. The National Assembly's December debate, rather than following up on the minor reforms proposed by the party congress, focused on revolutionary discipline: The interior minister warned about the threat of crime; party ideology chief Carlos Aldana called human rights activists "traitors to the nation" who will be summarily punished; and Castro himself extolled the creation of "rapid action brigades"--mobs that suppress dissent. Two months earlier, Archbishop Jaime Ortega of Havana had opposed the participation of Catholics in these brigades as activity contrary to Christian values. "Our Christian conscience," Ortega said, "not only says 'no' to participation in those actions; it also feels concern and suffers whenever those actions occur."
Human Rights
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson testified before this committee last July about Cuba's human rights record. Since then, the repression has worsened, and the international community has seen and condemned it. Cuba's human rights activists are people of extraordinary courage. They deserve even wider attention from the democratic community. The protest last September of the Cuban Democratic Coalition in front of the Villa Marista, the state security headquarters in Havana, brought world attention to the Cuban regime's failure to allow peaceful transition. Coalition leaders Daniel and Tomas Aspillaga received sentences of up to 2 years for disorderly conduct and incitement to crime. On October 7, the 11 groups making up the Cuban Democratic Convergence held a press conference 3 days before the Fourth Party Congress. They called on the congress to make bold democratic reforms including formation of a provisional government, an elected constituent assembly, and amnesty for political prisoners. Eighteen Democratic Convergence members were arrested; three got 3-year prison terms for "clandestine publishing" and "incitement to crime." One Convergence leader, Luis Pita Santos, was arrested and sent to a mental hospital after he called for peaceful demonstrations against the regime. He was held without charge until late last month, when he was suddenly put on trial for "illicit association," "clandestine printing," and "contempt." Recently, the Cuban Government has used supposedly spontaneous demonstrations, called "acts of repudiation," to intimidate human rights activists. One of these occurred last November 19, when a mob of 200 ransacked Alternative Criterion leader Maria Elena Cruz Varela's house, dragged her down four flights of stairs, and forced papers she had written into her mouth. Filmmaker Marco Antonio Abad was arrested as he tried to videotape this attack. No one was punished for the attack; instead, a Cuban court sentenced the victim, Cruz Varela, to 2 years for "felonious association and slander." Six other Alternative Criterion members who faced mob violence were similarly treated in the courts. They are now serving 1- to 2-year sentences. The Cuban Government also took advantage of the capture of three Cuban exiles in December to impugn the motives of peaceful human rights activists. A regime-sponsored television program about the exiles alleged that they had a list of names, including those of human rights leaders who had called for peaceful change. Shortly thereafter, Gustavo and Sebastian Arcos of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights were assaulted by a mob and arrested; Sebastian Arcos and Harmony Movement leader Yndamiro Restano, who has been detained since December, now face trial for "rebellion." The United States supports the brave people who are peacefully demanding greater respect for human rights and democracy in Cuba. Our Interests Section maintains contacts with these individuals, since do other diplomatic missions. We do not provide assistance to any group, as to do so would compromise their position as independent voices calling for reform. In our diplomatic contacts with other nations, we constantly return to the subject of the Cuban regime's deplorable treatment of those who dissent from its rule. These discussions are bearing fruit. In recent years, the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) has been much more willing than in the past to call Cuba to account for its violations of fundamental human rights. It voted in 1991 to create, for the first time, a Special Representative for Cuba. The Special Representative, though prohibited by Castro from visiting the island, compiled a report containing nearly 150 instances of human rights violations. That report concludes that repression against those seeking "non-violent changes in circumstances which they find intolerable" has increased and that "the rights of free expression, political participation and free association have been seriously curtailed." On March 3, at the annual meeting of the UNHRC in Geneva, the international community responded to Cuba's most recent wave of attacks by deploring that country's human rights record and its failure to abide by the UNHRC's resolution and by upgrading the Special Representative to a Special Rapporteur. Incidentally, Russia voted with the United States in favor of this upgrade. Despite its membership on the Commission, Cuba, which had defied the earlier resolution and refused to allow the Special Representative to visit Cuba, denounced what it called UN "interference" and announced its intention to likewise refuse to admit the UN Special Rapporteur. In this hemisphere as well, more attention is being given to Cuba's human rights record. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) recently expressed its "deep concern over the mounting restrictions" on dissidents in Cuba. The commission noted that the regime had "hardened its attitude" toward dissent after it "failed to respond to repeated requests" from other nations in the hemisphere to relax its restrictions and open its political system.
Cuba in the International Community
The UNHRC is but one measure of Cuba's growing international isolation. Last November, at the UN General Assembly, Cuba offered a resolution condemning the US trade embargo. As the day of debate approached, only North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam had shown interest. Ultimately, the resolution was withdrawn for lack of support. In 1989, Cuba succeeded in passing a general anti-embargo resolution through the General Assembly. We succeeded in defeating the 1991 effort because we convincingly argued that the embargo was justified because each country should be able to determine its own commercial relations. Had the embargo applied to US companies in third countries, Cuba would likely have won the UN debate. At the July summit at Guadalajara, Cuba was the sole dictatorship represented. President Lacalle of Uruguay described Castro's presentation as. . . a speech from the trenches about a state of siege, [about] the closing of doors, and about staying entrenched in his old positions. . . . We know the consequences of the preachings of a man like him who made an entire generation believe that their country could be fixed with bullets and bombs. At Guadalajara, President Perez of Venezuela called on Cuba to make democratic reforms. At a later summit in October on the Mexican island of Cozumel, he and Presidents Salinas of Mexico and Gaviria of Colombia renewed a call for democratic reform. Furthermore, none of these Latin oil producers has stepped in to provide oil at concessional prices to replace the old Soviet subsidy. Just last month, the Rio Group called on Cuba to begin a "definitive democratization process."
US Policy Toward Cuba
The United States has followed a policy of isolating Cuba diplomatically and economically for 3 decades. We continue that policy today, in an effort to encourage a change to a democratic government in Cuba. To do otherwise would only bolster the regime's repression at home and delay democratic reform. Thoughtful, respected analysts in the exile community and the academic world argue that the goal of peaceful change in Cuba would be better served by easing or ending the embargo. We respect their views, but we disagree. If the US ended the embargo leaving the Castro dictatorship in place, we would have no leverage for reform in Cuba. We would leave the Cuban people without hope of a better future. Most seriously, US trade and investment could strengthen communism in Cuba rather than helping to bring it to an end. Those who argue to drop the embargo have the burden of demonstrating how new travel and investment would support independent Cubans rather than strengthen the state and how it would create greater pressure for change than that which now exists due to the economic crisis. In our view, the Cuban Government tightly controls foreign investment and the areas in which these investments may occur. This does not help the average Cuban, nor does it foster change. Most new foreign investment in Cuba is in tourism. But this effort more and more reminds the Cuban people of the type of society they were seeking to end when they rejected the Batista dictatorship. The regime's system of "tourist apartheid" is designed to keep Cubans away from foreigners who might bring ideas of freedom and free choice. Our Cuba policy has responded to the collapse in the communist world not by changing basic principles but by taking new measures tailored to the possibilities of a new era. Cuba has isolated itself through its own behavior, but US policy has also played a significant part in increasing Cuba's isolation. From the beginning of this Administration, we put Cuba at the center of the US-Soviet agenda. In the March 1989 Bipartisan Accord, the Administration and Congress called on the Soviet Union and Cuba to stop their aid for subversion in Central America. In announcing that accord, President Bush pressed Cuba and the Soviets to live up to their pledge to support the Esquipulas treaty. We have also consistently urged the Soviets, and now the independent states, not to aid the Cuban Government. We have pointed out that Soviet subsidies were inconsistent with the Gorbachev "new thinking" and even less so with the Yeltsin reform program. As Secretary Baker has noted, "We raise this issue every time we sit down with the Soviets." The fact that subsidies are disappearing reflects more than the movement to reform--it is a result of persistent US diplomacy. We also argue in regular, worldwide diplomatic contacts that the best way for democracies to promote change in Cuba is to press for democratic change and to back that up with reduced economic ties. Expanded trade or economic benefits only strengthen the Cuban Government and delay inevitable reform. More and more, we find that Cuba's economic policies and the extreme climate of uncertainty are persuading people not to put money into Cuba. We regularly review the effectiveness of the embargo and make changes when needed. Last year, in response to the Cuban Government's charging exorbitant processing fees--in dollars--for its citizens to be approved for tourist travel to the United States, we changed our procedure. We sharply limited the amount that may be transferred to Cuba for travel to the United States. In the past, Cuban fees averaged $700-$1,000 per person above the cost of airfare. In addition, we continually encourage our allies not to aid the Cuban regime until it initiates democratic reform. Increasingly, they are following this advice. We urge them to review investment and trade with Cuba in light of the Cuban Govern-ment's inability and unwillingness to pay its debt and its arbitrary treatment of foreign investment. We are particularly concerned about the property of US citizens which was expropriated by the Cuban Government without compensation. To this end, we have urged foreign governments to ensure that potential investors in Cuba are not becoming entwined in deals involving properties which do not have clear title.
Contingency Plans
We have analyzed a number of possible courses of events in Cuba and formulated some possible US responses. I cannot discuss these in detail, but I can offer some general comments. In the interest of encouraging peaceful change, we have worked to dispel the Cuban Government's argument that the United States is poised to attack Cuba. In the past year, the President, the Secretary of State, and Assistant Secretary Aronson have publicly reiterated that we pose no threat and have no aggressive intentions toward Cuba. We hope for democratic change but claim no right to order the affairs of Cuba. The future of Cuba depends on the Cuban people. If there is violence in Cuba, we will seek the mediation of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations. We will work with these organizations to end violence, to promote stability, and to secure a democratic transition. We will not permit a mass migration to the United States. The laws of the United States will be enforced. We expect all US citizens and residents to obey the laws of this land. We seek to continue the current migration accord between the United States and Cuba in order to ensure orderly and normal migration. Under this accord, over 23,000 Cubans have come to live in this country. Make no mistake, we do not intend to permit another Mariel boatlift. No one knows how change will come to Cuba. However, people in Cuba and in the democratic community should know that we are serious in our desire to see peaceful democratic change come to Cuba--a change that is free of bloodshed and revenge, that opens the way to a genuine democratic system. When that change becomes possible, we will be prepared to help bring it about, and we will urge international support. That could include support for a democratic transition and elections. The possibilities will depend on decisions and actions taken by people in Cuba and on whether those decisions represent a genuine effort to build democracy. The important point is that we are prepared to help. Like the rest of the democratic community, we are eager to build good relations with a democratic Cuba.
The Road Ahead
Mr. Chairman, we will continue to press for peaceful democratic change in Cuba, we will continue the embargo, we will continue to reiterate that we have no hostile intentions toward Cuba, and we will continue to inform the Cuban people--through Radio and TV Marti and other means--of world events in the hope that Cuba will also share in the return to democracy. I would like to state here one basic principle that should guide our discussions. Today, Cuba stands isolated because the world community--the United Nations, the European Community, Latin America, human rights monitors, even Russia--clearly recognizes that the Cuban Government is denying freedom to its people. Cuba's Government is violating the basic, minimal standards of this hemisphere's democratic community. That is where the focus should remain: on the conflict between Cuba's repressive government and the Cuban people's aspirations for freedom. We commend the Cuban Democracy Act [HR 4168] for its goal of bringing about peaceful democratic change in Cuba. We are impressed by its vision of future close and friendly relations between the United States and a democratic Cuba. We share this vision with the sponsors of the Cuban Democracy Act. Where we differ is not in the goal but in aspects of the strategy. Where the Cuban Democracy Act would demand adherence by our allies to a policy similar to ours, we would respect their sovereignty and ask their cooperation. Where the proposed legislation would remove the focus on Cuba and shift the burden of action to the United States, we would return the focus to Cuba and the failure of the Castro regime to implement change. One provision in the Cuban Democracy Act, for example, instructs the United States to negotiate, with governments which trade with Cuba, agreements to restrict their trade in a manner consistent with US policy. In short, we would be told to open talks to secure their agreement to an embargo on Cuba. In our view, this provision would infringe severely on the President's foreign policy powers. Second, our attempts would be rejected. While many governments agree that Cuba should not receive aid, few want to impose an embargo against it. Third, such a provision diminishes support for our Cuba policy. We believe we have had excellent results in persuading countries around the world to refrain from closer economic ties with Cuba. We have been successful because we are trying to convince, not demand cooperation from, sovereign nations and because Cuba's economy offers so little objective incentive to investment. It would do the democratic cause little good to give the Cuban Government a new excuse to claim it is a victim of US policy. It would shift the spotlight away from the Cuban Government's refusal to permit democracy, and it would separate us from democracies whose cooperation we need to have to promote a peaceful transition in Cuba. Another provision of the proposed legislation would deny US aid and other benefits to any country which aids Cuba or provides favorable terms of trade. Although the independent states of the former Soviet Union have cut aid dramatically and significantly reduced trade to Cuba, this act's definition of assistance is so broad that even a residual amount of trade or aid could disqualify these states from receiving badly needed assistance from the United States--assistance that President Bush has pledged to give these new republics at a time of great opportunity and uncertainty. These results are clearly not the intended outcome of the sponsors, but it would be an unfortunate consequence. It would be doubly unfortunate at a time when world events are combining with US policy to isolate Cuba and to place Havana under more pressure than it has ever faced before to abandon communism and give the Cuban people their freedom. We share Congress's goal of a speedy transition to a peaceful and democratic Cuba. We agree that this goal may be best achieved through the economic and political isolation of Cuba. We have been successful in gaining the cooperation of our friends because they are equally concerned about the bitter future Cubans face if there is no change in government. But measures that command their cooperation or demand their imposition of a policy similar to our own will only diminish their commitment to withhold aid from Cuba and will result in their governments taking actions harmful to US trade and investment. The record shows that we will be successful if we work with the world community. There is very little aid going to Cuba. Since 1989, trade has fallen by over 50%. Cuba faces its most severe crisis in 33 years. The Cuban Government's refusal to adopt economic and political reforms only deepens the crisis and hastens the day of change. If we stay the course and work together, we can with the help of our friends--particularly those in Latin America, the OAS, and the United Nations--bring about a stable, prosperous, democratic Cuba. We hope we can work with the Congress to resolve differences in approach. My colleagues and I are prepared to answer your questions about specific parts of the bill. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 16, April 20, 1992 Title:

Telecommunication Links to Vietnam

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 13 19924/13/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Vietnam Subject: Media/Telecommunications [TEXT] The United States will grant an exception to the US economic embargo with Vietnam to allow US telecommunication links with Vietnam to be established. Payments to Vietnam will go into blocked accounts pending full lifting of the embargo. This action will facilitate humanitarian contact between the American/Vietnamese community and their family members still in Vietnam. Our decision to lift the telecommunications ban is in response to positive steps by Vietnam on POW/MIA [prisoner of war/missing in action] issues, as well as Vietnam's continued support of the Cambodia peace settlement. Our step demonstrates US intent to fulfill our commitments as Vietnam fulfills its commitments. It is in keeping with the established US policy for a step- by-step process of normalization of relations with Vietnam. We expect the Vietnamese to respond with continued and intensified efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting for all our missing Americans. Over the coming weeks and months, we will consider additional confidence- building steps as Vietnam fully implements the agreements reached between Foreign Minister Cam and Assistant Secretary Solomon in Hanoi on March 5, 1992. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 16, April 20, 1992 Title:

US Implements UN Sanctions on Libya

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 15 19924/15/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Libya Subject: Trade/Economics, United Nations [TEXT] The President has signed an executive order taking effect at 11:59 pm today to implement UN Security Council Resolution 748 by imposing additional sanctions on Libya. The executive order bars any aircraft from landing in, taking off from, or overflying the United States as part of or a continuation of a flight to or from Libya. This prohibition covers legs or continuations of flights as well as direct flights. The Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and other Cabinet and senior Administration officials has primary responsibility for implementing this new ban. This prohibition is in addition to the comprehensive embargo on US exports to, and imports from, Libya adopted pursuant to Executive Order No. 12543, January 7, 1986. Taken together with the pre-existing embargo, today's executive order puts the United States in full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 748. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 16, April 20, 1992 Title:

US-Polish Relations

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 7 19924/7/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Poland Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] The President met for approximately 45 minutes this afternoon with Prime Minister Jan Olszewski of Poland, who is in the United States on a private visit. The President reaffirmed his strong support for the pioneering transformation to democracy and a free market economy in Poland, whose success is all the more important in light of the revolutionary changes farther east. The two leaders discussed economic and political developments in Poland as well as the larger European security situation. Prime Minister Olszewski outlined his government's economic policies and its commitment to working with the International Monetary Fund on an agreed reform program. He thanked the President for US support and discussed ways the United States could be helpful during the present difficult economic situation in Poland, particularly through encouraging greater trade and investment. In that context, the Prime Minister welcomed the President's offer, made in a recent letter to President Walesa, to send a mission of US business leaders to Poland with the aim of facilitating some of the many US private investment projects now under negotiation. The President has asked former Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead to lead the mission and to select a long-term US adviser, who would remain in Warsaw to follow up on the mission's recommendations and assist US enterprises in their efforts to find joint venture partners and other investment opportunities. (###)

Feature: US Consular Service Celebrates 200th Anniverary

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Apr, 20 19924/20/92 Category: Features Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department, Travel, History [TEXT] When their boat broke down in shark-infested waters off the coast of Indonesia, two American women traveling to a remote nature reserve wondered if they would ever be found. After a US consular officer in Jakarta heard that the women were reported missing, she pursued leads constantly with Indonesian authorities to find them. Her perseverance paid off when, 21 days later, the two women were found, sunburned and dehydrated but otherwise unhurt. The dramatic episode was well-documented in the media, as was the work of consular officials who helped the hundreds of Americans stranded in the Persian Gulf after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Officers from the US Consular Service relayed messages from the Americans to their families and friends and arranged for their safe departure. Consuls have performed similar duties more recently during the turmoil in the former Yugo-slav republics and Zaire. Other, more ordinary stories, though unreported in newspapers or television, also demonstrate the dedication that consular officers display--and the results they achieve: -- An American woman traveling in Ecuador with her child became ill and required emergency surgery. A consular officer in Guayaquil arranged for a local hospital to admit her and perform the necessary operation. The officer watched over the woman's child and found an English-speaking nurse to care for the woman until family members arrived from the United States. -- When an American traveler was robbed on a weekend in Belgium, a consular officer from the Embassy in Brussels cashed a check from his own account and issued a replacement passport to the traveler, enabling him to continue his trip and save a substantial amount of money. -- After a Polish airliner crashed in 1987, consular officers from the US Embassy in Warsaw rushed to the site to provide assistance. Working with agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the consular officers helped identify the bodies of Americans who were killed in the crash. Other officers established a task force to coordinate information between the Embassy, the airline, and Polish authorities. Working around the clock, consular officers notified next of kin, ensured that the most current information was available to the families of victims, and helped facilitate the travel of family members to Poland for memorial services. These are but a few of countless examples from around the world. Since 1792, the US Consular Service and its responsibilities have grown, but its purpose has remained the same: providing the best service possible to Americans traveling or living overseas. Today, the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs oversees the work of about 800 employees in the United States and 2,500 consular personnel at 260 embassies and consu-lates worldwide. Because consular officers are often the only contact that Americans and foreigners have with the Department, the Consular Bureau is often called the Department's "human face." The bureau consists of Passport Services, Overseas Citizens Services, and Visa Services. Consuls are located in US embassies and consulates around the world. In a crisis, the US consul becomes the focal point for maintaining contact between Americans and their families in the United States. The consul's first responsibility is to help Americans who have been hurt, are in trouble, or who face immediate danger. -- About 3,000 Americans are arrested abroad every year. Consuls visit them in prison, provide a list of local lawyers, call their family and friends if they wish, and ensure that they are held under humane circumstances. Consular officers also transfer money, food, and clothing to detained Americans from relatives or friends. -- When Americans are injured or become sick while abroad, consuls help them get medical assistance by providing lists of local doctors, dentists, and other medical specialists. Consuls also assist Americans who become destitute while abroad by helping them notify friends or family members who can assist them and arranging for the transfer of money. -- About 6,000 Americans die abroad each year, many of whom are long- term overseas residents. After learning of a death, the consul notifies the next of kin and provides information about burial abroad or return of remains to the United States. For example, a young student on a school trip to Moscow died from alcohol poisoning. A consular officer from the US Embassy arrived at the group's hotel even before local authorities did. The officer remained present at all times when other group members were questioned and worked closely with forensic authorities to ensure that the family's wishes were respected regarding the handling of the body. The officer supervised all arrangements for returning the remains. In another case, the child of an American couple was killed in an accident in the United States while they were vacationing in Europe. Working with a minimal itinerary, consular officers in Paris and London checked ferry ports, car rental agencies, and local police to find the couple. One officer learned that the couple had corresponded with a Renault car rental agency and immediately called its agencies in New York to find the license number of the rental car. A Renault agent in France thought they might be in an area of northern France. The consular officer enlisted the aid of local police in the area, asking them to post signs requesting the couple to call home. The couple eventually saw one of the signs, called police and, within 3 days, learned of the accident. -- During natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, or floods, a political crisis, or any civil disturbance overseas, Americans can call a consulate to request assistance in notifying relatives or friends of their condition and location. -- Consular officers spend a great deal of time locating lost or missing Americans. Consuls are involved in more than 200,000 "welfare and whereabouts" cases each year. Traveling Americans should register at the nearest embassy or consulate upon arrival. If an emergency occurs in the United States, consuls will know where they are and how to reach them. Information is released only by permission through a signed Privacy Act waiver.
Travel Advisories
In addition to assisting Americans in emergencies abroad, the Emergency Center administers the State Department's travel advisory program. Travel advisories describe unusual or dangerous conditions in specific countries that could present problems for travelers. Advisories fall into three classifications: -- Warning. Issued for, but not limited to, situations in which deferral of non-essential travel is recommended for all or some part of a country. -- Caution. Issued to advise of unusual security situations or travel conditions, including the potential for unexpected detention, unstable political conditions, or serious health problems. -- Notice. Issued to provide information about conditions that could result in inconvenience or difficulty for travelers, such as unusual custom or entry requirements or a pattern of crime, but that presents no broad-scale risk. Advisories are provided 24 hours a day by the Emergency Center at (202) 647-5225. They are posted at each of the 13 regional passport agencies across the United States, are available at US embassies and consulates abroad, and can be obtained through most travel agents' airline reservation systems. The Department's Computer Information Delivery Service (CIDS), a bulletin board for a wide range of foreign policy information, also makes travel advisories available. For subscription information, call 703-802- 5700. The LEXIS-NEXIS services of Mead Data Central provide these advisories, along with other Department information, such as Dispatch, in their DSTATE file. DSTATE is found in the EXEC political library as well as the WORLD, ASIAPC, MDEAFR, NSAMER, and EUROPE international libraries. Consuls also provide non-emergency services, particularly for the 3 million Americans living overseas. These include preparing 4,500 reports of birth for American citizen children born abroad each year, renewing 18,000 expired passports, notarizing 400,000 documents, helping to distribute 2.8 million federal benefits payments, advising on 25,000 property claims, assisting with 3,000 US citizenship claims, helping with absentee voting and Selective Service registration, assisting in child custody disputes (see Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 3, January 21, 1991), providing US tax forms, and assisting with the taking of legal evidence abroad. Each year, consuls at American embassies and consulates issue millions of visas to foreigners wishing to visit or reside in the United States. This exchange of information is often the first contact a foreign national has with an American official.
Domestically, the Consular Bureau is responsible through its passport agencies for issuing Americans about 3.5 million US passports each year. To assist American travelers abroad, the bureau provides information on currency regulations, customs, dual nationality, entry requirements and other tips for specific areas through its many travel brochures. Travelers are encouraged to provide their passport number, which makes securing a replacement easier. Each year, 30,000 passports are lost or stolen. US consuls are restricted by law from acting as travel agents, bankers, or lawyers. Consular officers are prohibited from finding employment for Americans, obtaining residence or driving permits or licenses, accepting mail, serving as interpreters, searching for missing luggage, or settling private disputes with employers or businesses. Consular officers often can advise where to get help with these matters.
In 1792, the US Government, recognizing a need to protect the welfare of American citizens overseas, established the Consular Service. Two distinct branches of service developed, the Diplomatic Service and the Consular Service. In 1924, the Rogers Act combined them. The Consular Service has played an important part in the country's development. Indeed, the first two military conflicts after independence, the Barbary Wars (1805-18) and the War of 1812, were motivated, in part, by the priority the US Government assigned to protecting American travelers on the high seas and abroad. During the 19th century, the number of diplomats and consuls serving overseas grew along with America's interests and the increasing number of US travelers. Today, in an increasingly interdependent world linked by instant communication and rapid transportation, the role of the Consular Service has never been more prominent or essential. Despite new technology and other changes, the human element remains. Recently, an American doctor asked the US Embassy in Liberia to issue a visa to her mother so she could visit her daughter in the United States. When the elderly Liberian woman applied for a visa, the consular officer recognized that she was mentally ill and, therefore, ineligible by law to enter the United States. The officer called the woman's family in the United States to explain his decision and offer an alternative. Working through the Department of State, the officer convinced the Immigration and Naturalization Service that the woman was suffering from inadequate food, medical services, and family support, while her family in the United States wanted to provide her medical and psychiatric care. As a result, the woman received humanitarian parole into the country and has been receiving proper care. She also spent Christmas with her daughter, a gift made possible by the patience and diligence of one of America's front-line overseas representatives, a consular services officer. [--Jim Pinkelman Dispatch Staff]
Information About Consular Services - Important Telephone Numbers:
Citizens Emergency Center (emergencies and travel advisories) 202-647-5225 Citizens Consular Services (non-emergency services) 202-647-3444 Passport Services 202-647-0518 Visa Services (for foreign visitors) 202-663-1225
Available for $1 from the Government Printing Office, Tel. 202-783-3228. Your Trip Abroad: Tips on preparing for your trip overseas. A Safe Trip Abroad: Helpful hints on precautions you can take to minimize your chances of becoming a victim of terrorism and other safety tips. Tips for Americans Residing Abroad: Information for US citizens living abroad on dual citizenship, tax regulations, voting, and overseas consular services. For currency, customs, and dual nationality regulations and other travel tips for specific areas of the world: Tips for Travelers to Caribbean Middle East and North Africa Central and South America People's Republic of China Eastern Europe South Asia Mexico Sub-Saharan Africa Foreign Entry Requirements contains information on visa/entry requirements of other countries for American citizens and is available from the Consumer Information Center, Pueblo, CO 81009 for 50.
Other information:
Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts: Provides names of key officers and addresses for all US embassies, consulates, and missions abroad. It is updated three times yearly and is available from the Government Printing Office. Single copy purchase price is $1.75. Subscriptions are $5/year. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 16, April 20, 1992 Title:

New Ambassadors: January-March 1992

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Apr, 20 19924/20/92 Category: Ambassadorial Appointments Region: East Asia, MidEast/North Africa, E/C Europe Country: Israel, Cambodia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania Subject: State Department [TEXT]
New Ambassadors
: January-March 1992 Cambodia--Charles H. Twining, Jr. (assigned Chief of Mission, January 1992) Estonia--Robert C. Frasure, March 26, 1992 Israel--William Caldwell Harrop, January 2, 1992 Latvia--Ints M. Silins, March 27, 1992 Lithuania--Darryl Norman Johnson, March 30, 1992 Romania--John R. Davis, Jr., February 18, 1992 (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 16, April 20, 1992 Title:

1992 Foreign Service Examination

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington DC Date: Apr, 10 19924/10/92 Category: Features Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department [TEXT] The 1992 Foreign Service Written Examination is scheduled this year on November 7. The yearly examination is the first step leading to appointment as a Foreign Service officer with the Department of State, the US Information Agency, or the US and Foreign Commercial Service of the Department of Commerce. The examination will be offered in approximately 200 locations nationwide and at all US diplomatic and consular posts abroad. In order to be eligible to take the examination, registrants must be US citizens and at least 20 years old. This year's examination, administered worldwide by The Psychological Corporation, will require a half-day and consist of three parts. The first is a test of job-related knowledge, including US and world history, American and foreign systems of government, and basic principles of economics. There will also be a test of English grammar and usage as well as a biographic information questionnaire. Further information on the content of the examination and sample questions will be provided in the application booklet which will be available after June 1. Application materials can be obtained by sending a postcard to: Foreign Service Written Examination PO Box 12226 Arlington, VA 22219 Supplies of application materials will be sent to many college placement offices, Office of Personnel Management Job Information Centers, and all US Foreign Service posts. Individuals who live outside the United States should write or visit the nearest American embassy or consulate for application materials after June 1. Applications must be received at The Psychological Corporation in San Antonio, Texas, by September 11 for overseas test centers and October 2 for domestic test centers. The Educational Testing Service is preparing a State Department-sanctioned study guide for the examination which will be available in bookstores in August.(###)