US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992


Aid to the New Independent States: A Peace We Must Not Lose

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 9 19924/9/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: USSR (former), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] Today, I want to share some serious observations with you on events around the world. Look around the world today. Think of the page one stories of the past few years and our victory in the Cold War, the collapse of imperial communism, the liberation of Kuwait. Think of the great revolutions of 1989 that brought down the Berlin Wall and broke the chains of communism and brought a new world of freedom to Eastern Europe. And think of the role this nation played in every one of these great triumphs--the sacrifices we made, the sense of mission that carried us through. Each day brings new changes; new realities; new hopes; new horizons. In the past 6 months alone, we've recognized 18--in 6 months--18 brand new nations. The bulk of those nations, of course, are born of one momentous event: the collapse of Soviet communism. Today, I want to talk to you all about the most important foreign policy opportunity of our time--an opportunity that will affect the security and the future of every American, young and old, throughout this entire decade. The democratic revolutions underway in Russia, in Armenia, Ukraine, and the other new nations of the old Soviet empire represent the best hope for real peace in my lifetime. Shortly after taking office, I outlined a new American strategy in response to the changes underway in the Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe: It was to move beyond containment, to encourage reform, to always support freedom for the captive nations of the East. Now, after dramatic revolutions in Poland and Hungary and Czechoslovakia, revolutions that spread then to Romania and Bulgaria and even Albania; after the unification of Germany in NATO; after the demise of the one power--the USSR--that threatened our way of life, that mission has been fulfilled. The Cold War is over. The specter of nuclear Armageddon has receded, and Soviet communism has collapsed. In its wake, we find ourselves on the threshold of a new world of opportunity and peace. But with the passing of the Cold War, a new order has yet to take its place. The opportunities [are] tremendous. They're great, but so, too, are the dangers. And so we stand at history's hinge point--a new world beckons, while the ghost of history stands in the shadows. I want to outline today a new mission for American policy toward Russia and the other new nations of the old USSR. It is a mission that can advance our economic and security interests while upholding the primacy of American values--values which, as Lincoln said, are the "last, best hope of earth."
A New Mission for America
Americans have always responded best when a new frontier beckoned. I believe that the next frontier for us and for the generation that follows is to secure a democratic peace in Europe and the former USSR that will ensure a lasting peace for the United States of America. The democratic peace must be founded on the twin pillars of political and economic freedom. The success of reform in Russia and Ukraine, Armenia and Kazakhstan, Byelarus and the Baltics will be the single best guarantee of our security, our prosperity, and our values. After the long Cold War, this much is clear: Democrats in the Kremlin can assure our security in a way nuclear missiles never could. Much of my Administration's foreign policy has been dedicated to winning the Cold War peacefully. The next 4 years must be dedicated to building a democratic peace--not simply for those of us who lived through the Cold War and won it but for generations to come. From the first moments of the Cold War, our mission was containment--to use the combined resources of the West to check the expansion, the expansionist aims, of the Soviet empire. It has been my policy as President to move beyond containment to use the power of America and the West to end the Cold War with freedom's victory. Today, we have reached a turning point. We have defeated imperial communism. We've not yet won the victory for democracy, though. This democratic peace will not be easily won. The weight of history--74 years of communist misrule in the former USSR--tells us that democracy and economic freedom will be years in the building. America must, therefore, resolve that our commitment be equally firm and lasting. With this commitment, we have the chance to build a very different world-- a world built on the common values of political and economic freedom between Russia and America, between East and West, and, at long last, a peace built on mutual trust, not on mutual terror. Today, we find ourselves in an almost unimaginable world where democrats not communists, hold power in Moscow and Kiev and Yerevan; a new world where a new breed of leaders--Boris Yeltsin, Levon Ter-Petrosian, Leonid Kravchuk, Askar Akyev, among others--are pushing forward to reform. They seek to replace the rule of force with the rule of law. And they seek, for the first time in their countries' histories, not to impose rule in the name of the people but to build governments of, by, and for the people. They seek a future of free and open markets where economic rights rest in the hands of individuals, not on the whims of the central planners. They seek partnerships. They seek alliances with us. And they also seek an end to competition and conflict. Our values are their values. In this time of transition, they are reaching out to us. They seek our help. If we are to act, we must see clearly what is at stake.
Dividends for America
Forty years ago, Americans had the vision and the good sense to help defeated enemies back to their feet--as democracies. Well, what a wise investment that proved to be. Those we helped became close allies and major trading partners. Our choice today, just as clear: With our help, Russia, Ukraine, [and] other new states, can become democratic friends and partners. Let me say here, they will have our help. What difference can this make for America, you might ask? We can put behind us for good the nuclear confrontation that has held our very civilization hostage for over 4 decades; the threat of a major ground war in Western Europe has disappeared with the demise of the Warsaw Pact. A democratic Russia is the best guarantee against a renewed danger of competition and the threat of nuclear rivalry. The failure of the democratic experiment could bring a dark future, the return to authoritarianism or a descent into anarchy. In either case, the outcome would threaten our peace, our prosperity, and our security for years to come. We should focus not on the dangers of failure but on the dividends of success. First, we can reap a genuine peace dividend this year and then year after year in the form of permanently reduced defense budgets. Already, we've proposed $50 billion of defense spending reductions between now and 1997. Now that cut comes on top of savings totaling $267 billion--more than a quarter of a trillion dollars in projected defense expenditures--since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Make no mistake: I am not going to make reckless defense cuts that impair our own fundamental national security. Second, working with our Russian partners and our allies, we can create a new international landscape--a land-scape where emerging threats are contained and undone, where we work in concert to confront common threats to our environment, where terrorists find no safe haven, and where genuine coalitions of like-minded countries respond to dangers and opportunities together. Finally, third, the triumph of free governments and free markets in the old Soviet Union will mean extensive opportunities for global trade and economic growth. A democratic Russia, one dedicated to free-market economies, will provide an impetus for a major increase in global trade and investment. The people of the former Soviet Union are well-schooled and highly skilled. They seek for their families the same better future each of us wishes for our own. Together, they form a potentially vast market that crosses 11 time zones and comprises nearly 300 million people. No economist can pinpoint the value of trade opportunities we hope to have. It's impossible to compute, but the potential for prosperity is great. Increased trade means vast new markets for American goods, new opportunities for American entrepreneurs, new jobs for American workers. I'm committed to giving American business every possible opportunity to compete fairly and equally in these new markets. For example, last week I asked the Congress to repeal the Stevenson and Byrd amendments that limit [the] Exim [US Export-Import Bank] bank's ability to help promote American exports to the former USSR. I'm pleased that Congress has acted. I'm also seeking to conclude trade, bilateral investment, and tax treaties with each of the new Commonwealth states. The first agreement between the United States and Armenia was signed last week, and we expect a lot more to follow. Russian democracy is in America's interest. It's also in keeping with this nation's guiding ideals. Across the boundaries of language and culture, across the Cold War chasm of mistrust, we feel the pull of common values. In the ordeal of long-suffering peoples of the Soviet empire, we seek glimpses of this nation's past. In their hopes and dreams we see our own. This is an article of the American creed: Freedom is not the special preserve of one nation, it is the birthright of men and women everywhere. We have always dreamed of the day [when] democracy and freedom will triumph in every corner of the world, in every captive nation and closed society. This may never happen in our lifetime, but it can happen now for the millions of people who for so long suffered under that totalitarian Soviet rule. Some may say this view of the future is a little unrealistic. Let me remind you that three of our leading partners in helping democracy succeed in Russia are none other than Germany, Japan, and Italy. If we can now bring Russia into the community of free nations who share American ideals, we will have redeemed hope in a century that has known so much suffering. It is not inevitable, as de Tocqueville wrote, that America and Russia were destined to struggle for global supremacy. De Tocqueville only knew a despotic Russia, but we see and can help secure a democratic Russia. One of America's greatest achievements in this century has been our leadership of a remarkable community of nations: the free world. This community is democratic; it is stable; it is prosperous; it is cooperative; and it is independent. America, all of us, are the better for that. We have strong allies; we have enormous trade; and we are safer as a result of our commitment to this free world. And now we must expand this most successful of communities to include our former adversaries. Now, this is good for America. A world that trades with us brings greater prosperity. A world that shares our values, strengthens the peace. This is the world that lies out there before us. This is the world that can be achieved if we have the vision to reach for it, and this is the peace that we must not lose.
Winning the Peace
This is what we're doing right now to win this peace. Strategically, we're moving with the Russians to reach historic nuclear reductions. We've urged speedy ratification of START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] and CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]. We're working with all the new states to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We are offering our help in safety--in nuclear weapons safety--and security and, yes, in the dismantlement. We're engaged in an intensive program of military-to-military exchanges to strengthen the ties between our two militaries; indeed, to build unprecedented defense cooperation--cooperation that would have simply been unthinkable a few short months ago. Politically, we're reaching out so America and American values will be well represented in these new lands. We are the only country with embassies in all of the former republics. We're planning to bring "America Houses" and American expertise to the former USSR; to send hundreds of Peace Corps volunteers to help create small businesses; to launch major exchanges of students, professionals, and scientists so that our people can establish the bonds so important to permanent peace. Economically, working with the European Community and many other countries, we organized a global coalition to provide urgently needed emergency food and medical supplies this past winter. Now, we will send Americans to help promote improvements in food distribution, energy, defense conversion, and democratization. I have sent Congress the FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and East European Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act, a comprehensive and integrated legislative package that will provide new opportunities to support freedom and repeal all Cold War legislation. In its key features, this bill asks Congress to meet my request for $620 million to fund technical assistance projects in the former USSR. It urges Congress to increase the US quota in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] by $12 billion. I pledge to work with the Congress on a bipartisan basis to pass this act, and I want to sign this bill into law before my June summit with President Yeltsin here in Washington, DC. Just as the rewards of this new world will belong to no one nation, so, too, the burden does not fall to America alone. Together with our allies, we've developed a $24-billion package of financial assistance. Its aim: to provide urgently needed support for President Yeltsin's reforms. Ours is a policy of collective engagement and shared responsibility. Working with the G-7 [seven leading industrialized nations], the IMF and the World Bank, we are seeking to help promote the economic transformation so central to an enduring democratic peace. Forty-five years after their founding, the Bretton Woods institutions we created after World War II are now serving their original purpose. By working with others, we're sharing the burden responsibly and acting in the best interests of the American taxpayer.
The Need for Public Support
I know that broad public support will be critical to our effort to get this program passed, so let me say something to those who say: "Yes, the people of Russia and all across the old Soviet empire are struggling; yes, we want to see them succeed, to join the democratic community. But what about us? What about the challenges and demands we must meet right here in America? Isn't it time we took care of our own?" And to them, I would say this: Peace and prosperity are in the interest of every American, each one of us alive today, and all the generations that will follow. As a nation, we spent more than $4 trillion to wage and win the Cold War. Compared to such monumental sacrifice, the costs of promoting democracy will be a fraction, and the consequences for our peace and prosperity beyond measure. America must take the lead in creating this new world of peace. Three times this century, America has been called on to help construct a lasting peace in Europe. Seventy-five years ago this month, the United States entered World War I to tip the balance against aggression. And yet, with the battle won, America withdrew across the ocean, and the "war to end all wars" produced a peace that did not last even a generation. Indeed, by the time I was born in 1924, the peace was already unraveling. Germany's economic chaos soon led to what? To fascist dictatorship. The seeds of another, more terrible war were sown. And still, the isolationist impulse remained strong. Years later, as the Nazis began their march across the continent, I can still remember the editorials here in the United States talking about "Europe's war," as if America could close itself off, as if we could isolate ourselves from the world beyond our shores. As a consequence, you know the answer: We fought the most costly war in the history of man, a war that claimed the lives of countless millions. At war's end, once again, we saw the prospect of a new world on the horizon. But the great victory over fascism quickly gave way to the grim reality of a new communist threat. We are fortunate that our post-war leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, did not forget the lessons of the past in building the peace of the next 4 decades. They shaped a coalition that kept America engaged, that kept the peace through the long twilight struggle against Soviet communism. They taught the lesson that we simply must heed today: That the noblest mission of the victor is to turn an enemy into a friend. Now America faces a third opportunity to provide the kind of lasting peace that for so long eluded us. At this defining moment, I know where I stand. I stand for American engagement in support of a democratic peace, a peace that can secure for the next generation a world free from war, free from conflict. After a half-century of fear and mistrust, America, Russia, and the new nations of the former USSR must become partners in peace. After a half- century of Cold War and harsh words, we must speak and act on common values. After a half-century of armed and uneasy peace, we must move forward toward a new world of freedom, cooperation, reconciliation, and hope. Thank you all very much for inviting me here today. May God bless the free peoples of the former Soviet empire, and may God bless the United States of America. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

Securing a Democratic Peace

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 9 19924/9/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: USSR (former), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] In the middle of the last century, Alexis de Tocqueville prophesied that America and Russia were destined to hold in each of their hands half the world. Throughout this century, de Tocqueville's words have been invoked time and time again as a prophesy of the superpower rivalry that has dominated and divided world politics since World War II. Today, we meet to discuss an issue --the democratic revolutions in Russia and Eurasia--that will weigh heavily on America's future peace and prosperity well into the next century. With our hopes for the 21st century firmly in mind, I come here today to advance our work toward one overriding goal: to overcome history's rivalry and to build instead a democratic peace with the peoples of Russia and Eurasia, an enduring peace that can help unite the world well into the next century. With you today, I want to explain our vision of a democratic peace that can lift forever the old Iron Curtain and unite the lands of Russia and Eurasia-- and of Central and Eastern Europe-- with the democratic community of nations. I also want to explain what's at stake in this historic transformation, how we're going about supporting democracy and free markets in Russia and Eurasia, and what we need the Congress to do. Before I go any further, let me give you our bottom line: The President and I ask the Congress to pass the FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act by the time President Yeltsin arrives here in June. With passage of the act, we will be poised to use the June summit as a springboard to Russian-American partnership and broader support for democracy across Russia and Eurasia. Without the FREEDOM Support Act, not only will Russian-American relations suffer but so, too, will our relations with Ukraine and Armenia; Kazakhstan and Byelarus; and our position in the world more generally.
A Democratic Peace
Let me begin with our vision for the future--a vision and approach that the President will present this afternoon when he speaks before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. As you'll see, the President's vision is a straightforward and compelling one--a view of America's relations with Russia and Eurasia that we believe all Americans can support. Until very recently, de Tocque-ville's prophesy has for the most part been borne out by events. America and czarist Russia were never close partners, and, with the Bolshevik accession to power in 1917, the new Soviet Union and the United States very quickly became rivals. With the exception of World War II and the last years under President Gorbachev, we remained rivals and competitors with the Soviet Union. While some would argue that the Cold War was primarily a geopolitical rivalry driven by competing interests, the real fuel for the fire of confrontation came from a more fundamental source: a marked and irreconcilable conflict over basic values. At its core, the Cold War was a titanic struggle between freedom and totalitarianism. Our solution to this uneasy and uncomfortable state of affairs was containment. While containment was a successful policy, it was never a truly satisfying one for it was, at heart, a policy with a negative goal: to deter the Stalinists from going any further while avoiding nuclear war at the same time. Consequently, the peace of the Cold War was not a genuine peace at all but really a series of episodic accommodations punctuated by frequent super- power crises. Peace was simply the avoidance of war, not the reconciliation of peoples. And the avoidance of war was achieved only through confrontation, tension, and the haunting shadow and threat of nuclear holocaust. Today, we face a wholly different and novel situation--a chance to build a genuine peace based on common, democratic values. Today, we live in a world where freely elected leaders govern in Moscow and Kiev; Yerevan and Bishkek; Chisinau and Alma-Ata. Our aspirations--the desire to choose one's own destiny in political and economic freedom--are their aspirations. Our foundations--the rights of the individual, the rule of law, free elections-- are becoming their foundations. Today, we have the opportunity to break radically with the past. We can shift our eyes far beyond the negative goal of containment because now a positive purpose beckons: to support political and economic freedom and to build a democratic peace with Russia and Eurasia. A democratic peace would be a genuine peace, not just the absence of war. Starting from what the President calls the twin pillars of political and economic freedom, the ground would be sown for cooperation and common work, not conflict and military competition. With such a foundation for our relations, the peace we would share with Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states would be a peace founded on shared values--the enduring peace we share with Great Britain or France. It would be the peace we share with old adversaries, like Germany, Italy, and Japan, who now share our democratic values. No one envisions a war now with these countries, and the reason is simple: Following World War II, we supported political and economic freedom in these nations and by doing so, as one analyst has put it, built a zone of peace. Now, by reaching out to the Rus-sians and Kazkahs, Uzbeks and Azeris, we can extend this zone of peace. By cultivating common values now, we can avoid dangerous conflicts for generations to come. That's a purpose worthy of the American people. And that's a purpose we believe all Americans will be willing to support.
What's At Stake
Here's why. A democratic government in Russia will no longer pose a clear and present threat to the United States. Real democracies do not go to war with one another. Arms control dealt with the symptom--nuclear weapons- -while democracy's success in Russia will deal with the cause: totalitarianism. Democracy in Russia will bolster democracy's chances in Byelarus and Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. That will be all to the good, not only for our allies in Western Europe but for the prospects of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Middle East and South Asia as well. In this way, we hope the community of democratic nations will soon stretch across the Eurasian landmass from Japan to Europe, as today it extends from Europe across the Western Hemisphere to Japan. This would make more effective our collective work to meet growing new challenges: proliferation, terrorism, drugs, environmental degradation. Such a state of affairs is not only in America's strategic interest but in the interest of every American. For decades now, we've spent trillions of dollars to defend against the communist threat. By investing in a democratic peace now, we can leave a wealthy inheritance to our children and grandchildren--an inheritance of enduring peace, an inheritance of enduring opportunities to make of America a better country. The growth of democracy and free markets in Russia and Eurasia can be a new source of trade and investment for American businesses and companies. These lands are rich in natural resources and educated, talented peoples. They want us to trade with them and invest in their ventures and their futures. This is something that is in our mutual benefit. While helping them build a free market society, we can improve our competitiveness and utilize our resources to meet the needs of these new markets. This will strengthen our economy as we support their efforts to build free markets. Moreover, we know that our democracy--and our people--thrive best in a democratic world. The more democratic the lands of Russia and Eurasia become, the greater the opportunities for peace and friendship between our peoples. That's something that is in everyone's interest. Above all, this is a purpose worthy of the American character. In the past, we have often mobilized the American people to war to defend our way of life. Now, we seek to mobilize them to build a democratic peace to extend our way of life and our values to new frontiers.
Collective Engagement
Mr. Chairman, let me turn now from what's at stake to what we need to do to support democracy in Russia and the other new independent states. While the Soviet Union was in the stage of final collapse last December, I called in a speech at Princeton University [Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 50, December 16, 1991] for the West to pursue a diplomacy of collective engagement with the former Soviet Union. I said we should work with our allies and organize our efforts around three tasks: First, helping destroy and control the military remnants of the Cold War; Second, helping our former adversaries build democracy and political legitimacy out of the wreckage of totalitarianism; and Third, helping free market forces stimulate economic stabilization and recovery in the lands of the former Soviet Union. By working across this agenda, we address the myriad military, political, and economic problems the new states must overcome to build democracy and free markets. And, since December, we've moved forward in each, working in concert with our allies. In the military sphere, we've moved forward with new proposals by President Bush and President Yeltsin for nuclear arms control; with new practical steps to help Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan disable and dismantle nuclear weapons; and with the creation of an international science center in Russia and in Ukraine to cope with the brain drain problem. In the political realm, we've established diplomatic relations with and are opening embassies in all the new independent states, and we've welcomed them into the United Nations, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We've also had the historic Camp David declaration between President Bush and President Yeltsin--a clear sign of the new era Russia and America are entering together. In economics, we pushed for special associate status for the Soviet Union with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and World Bank and now have pushed hard for Russia and the new independent states to become full members. We've accelerated, through Operation Provide Hope, a massive effort to meet emergency humanitarian needs. We've expanded our technical assistance programs. And at the Washington Coordinating Conference, we and our allies began an extensive and productive effort to coordinate assistance.
FREEDOM Support Act
Now, the FREEDOM Support Act can give us greater abilities and more impetus as we move to the next stage of support for democracy and free markets. It represents a comprehensive, integrated framework for addressing the military, political, and economic problems of Russia and Eurasia. It supports our policy of collective engagement and our efforts to coordinate and share responsibilities with our allies. The FREEDOM Support Act purges Cold War restrictions, but more importantly, it supports our efforts to build a democratic peace. In this regard, it is as much a policy statement as a legislative package. But as a legislative vehicle for which we request your support, we are attempting to unite the executive and legislative branches around a bipartisan program that can mobilize the American people. Let me briefly explain how the act supports the three-part agenda I have outlined. First, the act supports our efforts at threat reduction, demilitarization, and nuclear safety. It authorizes funds to be used for demilitarization, defense conversion, non-proliferation, withdrawal and relocation of former Soviet military forces, and reduction of the nuclear threat. It will broaden the allowable uses of Nunn-Lugar [nuclear risk reduction legislation] funds--as well as foreign military financing (FMF) funds--for these purposes as well. It also expresses support for an International Science and Technology Center in Ukraine similar to the one we've agreed to for Russia. Second, the act supports our democratization programs in Russia and the other new independent states. It will support our efforts to build "America Houses"--centers where local citizens in the new states can go to learn about America and learn from American resident advisers. It will reinforce our commitment to the President's Citizens Democracy Corps as well as our ability to support a Eurasia Foundation. Both of these organizations will be better able to catalyze the involvement of our private sector in this effort. The act will also authorize funding for new diplomatic posts to expand an effective diplomatic presence across the former Soviet Union. In addition, the act supports an International Military Education and Training (IMET) program with Russia and the other new independent states aimed at promoting the democratic principle of civilian control in these new states. Third, the FREEDOM Support Act supports free and open markets through technical assistance, trade and investment promotion, and macro-economic stabilization. Let me deal with each separately. With regard to technical assistance, the act authorizes agencies involved in the SEED [Support for East European Democracies] program for Central and Eastern Europe to conduct comparable activities in Russia and the other new independent states. This will allow us to draw on the expertise from a wide range of US Government agencies in providing technical assistance in the former Soviet Union. The act also provides for greater flexibility in Department of Agriculture programs. What these new independent states need more than anything else--that for which they truly hunger--is knowledge: how to build democratic institutions, how to operate in a free market economy. These states do not require old-style "foreign aid" as much as they need something different: the knowledge that can be passed along by the active involvement of an energized private sector acting in partnership with the US Government. Our technical assistance program is focused on facilitating such a partnership. With regard to business, trade, and investment promotion, the act will make it easier for our companies to get involved in trade and investment opportunities in Russia and the other new independent states. Notably, the act lifts otherwise applicable ceilings on OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] and Export-Import Bank programs and will allow us to use funds to cover subsidy portions of guarantee programs. In this way, we can leverage US Government funds to catalyze private sector trade and investment. That's good for our business and our economy--as well as for the development of markets and democracy in the new states. The act will allow the President to waive many statutory provisions which now hamstring normal economic relations and hinder American business, including Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) eligibility restrictions and Johnson Debt Default Act restrictions on private lending. The act also makes clear our intention to lift even further COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control] restrictions. The former Soviet republics are new countries. They should begin their new histories with a clean bill of health, not be unduly burdened by restrictions aimed at Stalinists. With regard to macroeconomic stabilization, the act will provide a framework of support to continue our important role in the multilateral stabilization program we're working out with the IMF, World Bank, and G-7 [seven leading industrialized nations]. Most importantly, the act authorizes the IMF quota increase--a step the Congress absolutely must take to support this multilateral effort. Let me note, Mr. Chairman, when I was up here 2 months ago, members of the committee made it a point to tell me that the Congress would not act on this until the President weighed in. Mr. Chairman, the President has now weighed in--publicly and unequivocally--and now we look to Congress to act. Not only do we need Congress to authorize the quota increase through the FREEDOM Support Act, we also request that the Congress act concurrently to pass the necessary appropriations legislation. The act further supports our efforts to play a leading role in supporting a macroeconomic stabilization program by providing an expression of congressional support for US participation of up to $3 billion for a currency stabilization fund or funds. The act also makes clear that the Congress supports the Adminis-tration's approach of working multilaterally through the IMF and World Bank in support of macroeconomic stabilization.
Macroeconomic Stabilization Program
Before I conclude, let me say a few words about the macroeconomic stabilization program and our role in it. The $24 billion in G-7 macro-economic support for Russia's ambitious economic reform plan that the President announced will provide essential help in Russia's transition to market economics. Russia is a country rich in resources and talented people. Market economics are key to tapping those resources and talents; markets will unlock the door to economic growth and development. But while markets develop, Russia needs help in meeting its liquidity problem. We don't see this as an endless cycle of billions of dollars going to prop up the Russian economy. The sound, IMF-backed economic program President Yeltsin has embarked upon will, we believe, promote growth and development. And that economic growth will further support the democratic peace we seek to build. Balance-of-payments support will come in the form of lending from the IMF and the other international financial institutions in the context of a negotiated standby arrangement and in bilateral assistance from the G-7 countries themselves. Further debt deferral, if necessary, could add interest payments to the already existing agreement on deferral of pre- 1991 principal payments. The details are being worked out with a view to having a complete agreement by the end of April. Much will depend on Russia reaching agreement with the IMF on a standby program. Details of a larger debt deferral would have to be worked out among the creditor countries. In addition, the G-7 have decided to make available a currency stabilization fund for Russia. The precise nature and purposes of this fund are being worked out. We will want to proceed carefully so that the fund is properly put together and supports sound economic policies; the currency stabilization fund cannot be a substitute for such policies. But, as in Poland, a currency stabilization fund could provide crucial backing for Russia's efforts to make the ruble an effective means of exchange. The funding for the currency stabilization fund will be financed entirely from the General Arrangements To Borrow, a borrowing authority the IMF created in the 1960s to enable it to augment its resources in time of critical need. We need it now. The US share of the General Arrangements To Borrow is 25%, so we, in effect, would provide $1.5 billion of the $6-billion currency stabilization fund. But there would be no net budget outlay required. In principle, we would be prepared to support creation of a fund or funds for other former Soviet republics, depending on reform plans and needs. But, frankly, none of the other republics has gotten as far as Russia in developing a comprehensive economic reform program in conjunction with the IMF. And many of them probably will be included in a ruble zone rather than have separate currencies. However, should a clear need arise, we will be prepared to find ways to address their needs, too. Progress on microeconomic and structural issues is no less essential than macroeconomic stabilization. Stabilization policies create the climate for markets, but Russia and other republics also need vigorous policies to promote competition, genuine property and contract rights, de- monopolization and privatization, and sectoral reform. Our technical assistance will be targeted in part in these areas. We look also to the World Bank to play a key role in this.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, let me conclude by saying this: As the President has made clear, we stand at a defining moment for America and for the world. With the end of the Cold War, history has granted us a unique opportunity. The task is daunting and success cannot be guaranteed. But the choices we make now will have consequences for decades to come, and, therefore, I am convinced that we must seize this present opportunity to work toward a democratic peace and a better future. It is true that Americans are a prudent, pragmatic people with little taste for foreign adventures. But we are also a courageous people. In these revolutionary times, we must draw on that courage. We must dare. We have shown that courage before. And we have dared before. During the long, dark years of the Cold War, we dared to believe that the nightmare of communism would pass. We dared to believe that we could create a better world--a world no longer divided into armed camps, a world freed from the bonds of oppression. We're well on our way to that world. It is time to dare again and complete our work. We must dare to believe that America is great enough--that America is good enough--to lead the way into a more peaceful, free, and prosperous world. We must dare to believe that we can prosper at home even as we thrive abroad. We must dare to believe that our businesses can compete, that our children can sleep without fear of war, that our values can flourish in a new century. We must dare to believe that as we help create a new world abroad, we can build a new America here at home and that we can--and must--do both together. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

US Recognition of Former Yugoslav Republics

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 7 19924/7/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia Subject: Democratization, State Department, EC [TEXT] The United States recognizes Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia as sovereign and independent states and will begin immediately consultations to establish full diplomatic relations. The United States accepts the pre- crisis republic borders as the legitimate international borders of Bosnia- Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. We take this step because we are satisfied that these states meet the requisite criteria for recognition. We acknowledge the peaceful and democratic expression of the will of citizens of these states for sovereignty. We will continue to work intensively with the European Community [EC] and its member states to resolve expeditiously the outstanding issues between Greece and the republic of Macedonia, thus enabling the United States to recognize formally the independence of that republic as well. The United States will also discuss with the governments of Serbia and Montenegro their interest in remaining in a common state known as Yugoslavia. In light of our decisions on recognition, the United States will lift economic sanctions from Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. Sanctions were applied to Yugoslavia on December 6, 1991. We will lift sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro contingent on Belgrade's lifting the economic blockades directed against Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. The UN arms embargo remains in effect. It has been US policy throughout the Yugoslav crisis to accept any resolution arrived at peacefully, democratically, and by negotiation. The United States strongly supports the UN peace-keeping plan as worked out by Cyrus Vance and the full deployment of the UN peace-keeping force. We continue to support the EC peace conference as the indispensable forum for the parties to reach a peaceful settlement of their dispute and to establish the basis for future relations. US recognition is without prejudice to any future association Yugoslav successor states might agree to establish. The United States views the demonstrated commitment of the emerging states to respect borders and to protect all Yugoslav nationalities as an essential element in establishing full diplomatic relations. Equally, we view such a commitment by Serbia and Montenegro as essential to proceed in discussions on their future status. The deployment of the UN peace-keeping force, the continuation of the EC peace conference, and the process of international recognition offer all of the former Yugoslav republics a historic opportunity to reject decisively the tragic violence which has marked this crisis. Continued commitment to peaceful dialogue should lead toward reconciliation, toward integration within Europe, and toward cordial and productive relations with the United States. The United States will continue to work to achieve these goals. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

The United States and Israel: An Unshakable Alliance

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Remarks before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Washington, DC Date: Apr, 7 19924/7/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, United States Subject: Democratization, Refugees, State Department [TEXT] It is great to be back with my friends at AIPAC. Two years have passed since I last spoke with you here in Washington. Since then, some new doors have been opened, and some old wrongs have been righted. Last week, I had breakfast with Spain's Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. He told me how moved he was to have the President of Israel in Spain as a guest of King Juan Carlos--500 years after Spain expelled the Jews. I remember the wise words of President [Chaim] Herzog at Beth Yacov Synagogue in Madrid. He said: "We cannot change the past. But we can learn its lessons and thus assure a better future for ourselves and humanity." Some recent events do point to a better future. Justice has finally prevailed with regard to Soviet and Ethiopian Jewry, and we remain committed to the human rights of the Jews of Syria and elsewhere, particularly their right to migrate. Morality and decency have prevailed in a war against aggression in the Persian Gulf. Hope has prevailed with the beginning of the Middle East peace talks. And, at long last, reason and truth have prevailed at the United Nations: The disgraceful resolution equating Zionism with racism is dead and buried. The days before Passover should be especially joyous ones this year for the Jewish people and their friends, not just in America but around the world. But instead, one detects a feeling of uncertainty, reservation, doubt--even foreboding. Part of the uncertainty and foreboding is due to disagreements between the Governments of the United States and Israel on specific policies. Some of the "experts" are telling us the American-Israeli relationship has reached a "turning point." From time to time, it's put even more strongly. I noticed a recent cover story in the Washington Jewish Week entitled, "US/Israel Relations: Coming Apart at the Seams." I am here to tell you that is not the case. Israel and the United States need each other. We benefit from each other. Our alliance is unshakable because it rests on two firm pillars: strategic interests and common values. Difficulties aside, Israel and the United States remain friends and allies today, and we shall be friends and allies forever. Think for a moment about our strategic relationship. It is in America's interest to have a strong Israel that works closely with the United States on behalf of peace and stability in the region. A strong Israel and a strong America stand together in opposition to the threat posed by various forms of radicalism in the Middle East. There are those in that area of the world who pursue policies that are fundamentally hostile to our most basic values. There are also those who employ or protect terrorists. Israel is our partner--indeed, a heroic partner--in the battle against international terrorism and its agents. All this highlights a basic point: Since the US-Israeli relationship was not a product of the Cold War, it won't be diminished by the end of the Cold War. Over the last 3 years, I have begun each working day with an intelligence briefing at the White House. Every morning I hear what's going on, what's changing, what needs to be watched. Believe me: The world in still a dangerous place--in some respects, even more dangerous than it used to be. Our relationship is absolutely critical in this new world. In fact, because of the unchanging principles on which it is based, the US-Israeli alliance is one of the very few permanent strategic alliances we have. Cold War or no Cold War, Israel remains our closest and most reliable ally in the Middle East. Nothing will change our commitment to maintaining Israel's qualitative edge against any likely combination of aggressors. This is not just rhetoric. Our commitment is real, and it is deep. Some of you may know that 2 weeks ago, the Administration sent Army Secretary Mike Stone and Hank Cooper, the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative, to Israel for a series of meetings. They were joined by my own military adviser. They went there to sit down with Israeli officials and plan for joint efforts to meet the challenges of the coming years. There will be many such joint efforts. Indeed, US-Israeli military-to-military contacts and cooperation are now wider in scope than ever before. That leads me to the second pillar that sustains our alliance: common values, embodied both in the Judeo-Christian tradition on which our societies rest and in the democratic values we share. Israel is a vibrant democracy in a part of the world where democratic institutions have not, as yet, taken hold. It faces daily challenges of a kind that other democracies, surrounded by peaceful neighbors, simply don't have to face. Yet, Israel's democracy holds firm--indeed, it flourishes. No wonder that among the first steps taken by the fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe was the re- establishment of formal ties with Israel. She is, indeed, a light to the nations. And that, my friends is a tribute to the courage and determination of the people of Israel. Not long ago, I was disturbed to open the newspaper and read an article that said it is "very hard for some Americans to feel the sense of shared values with Israel that they once did." The article went on to report the belief of some that "(t)he case for Israel has increasingly become the almost exclusive preserve of American Jews." I, for one, do not believe either of those statements to be true. To imply that Americans--Jews and non-Jews alike--no longer share basic values with a democratic Israel is just plain wrong. And, speaking as a non-Jew, let me say this: As long as I am in public life, the case for Israel will not become the "exclusive preserve of American Jews." It's been said nations do not have "friends" but only "interests." But with Israel, the United States has both. We are young nations; both of us built on freedom, and in resistance to oppression and intolerance; both of us founded by people who had the courage to stand up and speak the truth--against the odds, and on behalf of faith and hope. America's founders lived 2 centuries ago; many of Israel's founders are still with us. And when I think of them and of all the brave pioneers who built the state of Israel upon the ashes of the Holocaust, I cannot help but recall one who left us only last month: the late Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Menachem Begin did many remarkable things in his life. Perhaps his most acclaimed achievement was as a peace-maker--as the late President Sadat's partner in making a historic peace between Israel and Egypt. Then, as now, Israel faced hard choices. Menachem Begin seized the opportunity and made choices that broke once and for all the ring of rejection around Israel. The peace process now underway builds on Menachem Begin's vision- -a vision of "real peace" between Israel and her neighbors. But during the Gulf war last year, who among us did not think back to another event associated with Menachem Begin as well--to that day in 1981 when Israel's air force knocked out Iraq's nuclear reactor in Osiraq? We now know that had Israel not acted in 1981, Saddam Hussein might well have had the nuclear bomb by the time he invaded Kuwait and attacked Israel. He did not, thank God, and thanks to Menachem Begin. It is good that Menachem Begin lived to see the victory against Saddam Hussein. It is good that he lived to see the historic emigration of Soviet Jews. And it is right that we acknowledge today the enormous debt the entire world owes to Israel in general, and to one Israeli leader in particular: Menachem Begin. Let me turn now to the current state of US-Israeli relations. As I need hardly tell this audience, differences over settlements, over the meaning of UN Security Council Resolution 242, and over loan guarantees have strained the relationship. But let's keep our disagreements in perspective. Let's remember that were it not for the statesmanship of Ronald Reagan and George Bush: -- The great Soviet emigration would not have occurred; -- The rescue of Ethiopian Jewry would not have happened; -- Zionism-is-racism would still stand; -- Direct peace talks, on terms that Israel has rightly sought for 43 years, would not be a reality; and -- Iraq might be threatening Israel's very survival today. When you take all these things into account, I think you'll agree: Ronald Reagan's presidency and George Bush's presidency have been good for Israel. I am here as George Bush's Vice President to underscore his commitment to Israel. The bumps in the road trouble him and all of us deeply, but they do not change or threaten the basic principles behind our relationship. I think the President stated it best 2 weeks ago in a letter to a friend: "Our fundamental commitment to Israel is just that--fundamental. Please know this, for it comes from the heart as well as the head." To the President's observation, I would like to add one of my own. I come from the town of Huntington, Indiana--a small, decent, quiet American town, where life was safe and secure. That was my world. As with many Americans, it was only as I grew up that I learned some ugly realities--like the Gulag, like Auschwitz and Treblinka. Later, in public life, I would meet people like the refusenik Vladmir Raiz, Elie Wiesel, Natan Shcharansky, and, of course, Menachem Begin--a man who would tell you how his father "went to his death at Nazi hands voicing his faith to God and singing 'Hatikvah.'" I learned that the safety and security I took for granted as a boy were not part of the inevitable order of things. You have to work at it; you have to fight for it; and sometimes you have to sacrifice for it. I am committed to working for human rights, for the security of Israel, and against anti- Semitism. That is a commitment I know I share with all of you. And together we know this: America and Israel have proven to the entire world our commitment to work--and, when necessary, to fight and to sacrifice-- for what we believe. Let me conclude with this thought. As Americans, you have every right to voice your support for the state of Israel. You have every right to remind your fellow Americans of the value of the American-Israeli relationship. After all, like freedom of religion, access to the political process is not a privilege. It is a right. Indeed, it is one we have a duty to exercise. And in doing so, my friends, you are performing a valuable service. We must defend the right of all Americans to advocate their views and speak out for the causes they support. One of those causes--one of my causes--is the security and well-being of the people of Israel. We who live in this blessed land, at this historic hour, owe it to our children, and to our children's children, to preserve and strengthen the friendship of these great and noble democracies--the United States of America and Israel--now and forever. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

The North American FTA: The New World Order Takes Shape in the Western Hemisphere

Zoellick Source: Robert B. Zoellick, Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs and Counselor of the Department of State Description: Address before the Columbia Institute's conference on "NAFTA: Impacts of a Borderless Economy on North American Regional Competitiveness," Tucson, Arizona Date: Apr, 3 19924/3/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, Central America Country: United States, Mexico, Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics [TEXT] What do Switzerland, the Cold War, and NAFTA have in common? This is not a riddle, but a serious question. According to the story, President Salinas was attending a meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in early 1990 when he came to a realization about the end of the Cold War. President Salinas reportedly observed that the post-Cold War world would pose new economic challenges for Mexico and North America. On the one hand, many developed nations, especially those of Western Europe, would probably be preoccupied with the demands for investment, trade, and development of the world that was frozen behind the Iron Curtain for over 4 decades. On the other hand, developing countries would have to compete even more vigorously than before for capital, to create jobs, and to expand trade. So, the story goes, NAFTA was born. I start with this perspective because it is important to recognize that we are in fact creating a post-Cold War order, and NAFTA is part of it. Indeed, I believe that NAFTA could be a practical expression of the way that the United States can address a number of the changing challenges of a new era. Of course, this is still a period of transition. This new era is so fresh that we still don't even have a proper name for it, other than to refer to these times as after what came before: a post-Cold War era. Yet to me, this flux represents dynamism, and dynamism means opportunity for those who are ready to leave old assumptions behind and be guided by a vision of the future. One feature of the United States' foreign policy strategy in this post-Cold War world is that our economic policy must become an increasingly critical component of our planning and action. The United States must be economically strong at home and abroad. One or the other won't do. That is why NAFTA is so important. It is a rare strategic opportunity to secure, strengthen, and develop our continental base, economically and politically, in a way that will promote America's foreign policy agenda, our economic strength and leadership, and US global influence. The United States is the only nation in the world today that ranks at the top of the scales of political, military, and economic power. Over the course of the past few years--in Europe, the Gulf, and elsewhere--we have once again demonstrated our political and military leadership. But it is also vital that we remain in the forefront of international economic policy. We've taken important steps in this direction. The US is the largest exporter in the world. Nearly one-third of our growth in GDP from 1986 to 1991 is due to our increased exports. The US worker is the most productive in the world, 31% above Japan, 26% above the western states of Germany. During the 1980s, the productivity of our manufacturing workers grew an average of 3.6% per year. Taken together, exports and productivity produce jobs: Our growth in merchandise exports accounted for about 25% of the total growth in private industry jobs between 1986 and 1990. But no one ever got ahead just by touting accomplishments. We need to develop political and economic structures that enable us to grow stronger, and in doing so, to expand prosperity and opportunity for others around the globe. The NAFTA would be a key component of a network of global, regional, and bilateral arrangements that promote American interests. It can strengthen the capabilities of North America, enhancing our ability to compete globally. Attention to the challenges of regional integration is definitely not the same as the promotion of regional blocs. The signal the United States wants to send the world is that we're committed to opening markets and that we will extend a hand to others who share that commitment. NAFTA is a commitment by the United States, Mexico, and Canada to be outward- looking, promoting liberalization of trade and capital flows in our hemisphere as a step toward promoting them globally. In particular, we want to support the efforts of Mexico, and then the rest of Latin America, to leave behind the illogic of economic autarky. The new leaders building competitive market economies in Latin America want to do business with Asia and Europe as well as North America. It is in our interest to support their transition to the global marketplace. Indeed, this generation of political and business leaders has the opportunity to fulfill a lost promise of America's revolutionary generation. Our revolution won more than our independence; it was viewed at the time as a practical experiment emanating from the Age of Reason, the Spirit of the Enlightenment. That's why in 1782 the new Congress of the United States selected the motto "Novus Ordo Seclorum," New Order of Ages, for the Great Seal of the new nation. Our experiment inspired others, inspired the causes of Bolivar and San Martin. While the revolutions against Spanish colonial authority in Latin America were victorious on the field of battle, their hopes were not fulfilled. Indeed, a traveler to Washington, DC, today can see the special place accorded statues of Latin American liberators--not European, not Asian--among the Capital's memorials to our American heroes; mute statements of a dream not yet realized. For 2 centuries, the United States' hemispheric relations, starting at our Latin border with Mexico, were marked by disappointments and conflicts on both sides. But the original vision still survived, preserved by leaders with imagination on both sides of the border, people who understood the importance of US- Mexican relations. In the 1860s, during the Civil War that almost destroyed our American experiment, President Lincoln still took time to support President Juarez in his struggle against French efforts to install a European Emperor in Mexico. In 1933, shortly after assuming office, FDR rose above preoccupation with a deep depression at home to chart a new course with Mexico and the rest of Latin America. FDR called it the "Good Neighbor Policy." And he dismissed the special interests who argued that Latin America was "different" and not ready for such a special relationship. Almost 30 years later, in 1961, another new President, John F. Kennedy, called for an Alliance for Progress with Latin America. He asked us to reach out to our hemispheric neighbors, to rise above those who lament about what we cannot do, saying the Latins are poor--or "different." Now, after another 30 years, we have the opportunity to sustain and invigorate that vision. After 200 years, history is coming full circle. This generation, on both sides of the border, has the opportunity to integrate North America in a way that will build the foundation for stronger cohesion, growth, and cooperation. The people of the United States may take for granted our geopolitical good fortune. Unlike most of the rest of the world, our land borders, extending about 7,500 miles, are marked by the absence of military threat. But the challenges of the 21st Century will be of economics, environment, narcotics, and migration, as well as military. The security of our citizens will encompass this broader set of challenges. So we need to complete the North American reconciliation in a way that strengthens our ability to handle these challenges cooperatively. The North American Free Trade Agreement can be the cornerstone of this structure. NAFTA will give important economic and political impetus for our current efforts to address the range of pressing North American problems. By dismantling the economic barriers among the United States, Mexico, and Canada that create inefficiencies and higher costs, NAFTA will generate economic growth, enhancing our ability to take on new challenges, economic and otherwise. A failure to complete and approve NAFTA, on the other hand, would be seen as a rebuff of the Mexican political leaders and people who have sought to reorient their country as part of North America. The United States would be trying to isolate itself from its neighbors, something it cannot, in fact, do. We would do irreparable harm to our ability to work together, with mutual respect, on the numerous issues--migration, narcotics, environment, and others--that do not recognize borders. We would repeat mistakes of the past. We would fail to answer the call for leadership. NAFTA will send strong encouraging signals throughout all of Latin America. A new cadre of leaders throughout the hemisphere is struggling to transform our region into one pledged to democracy, market economics, and growth. These men and women are taking a totally new attitude towards the United States. They reject the excuses of "dependency theory." But the process of progress is still fragile; tremendous barriers must still be overcome. The governments of Latin America and, even more important, the people of Latin America, are trusting that the people of the United States will continue to stand for the ideals that we have espoused for so long. They know that they must perform the tasks of reform--but they also know that their prospects for success depend on the willingness of the United States to preserve and promote international systems based on the free flow of capital, trade, and ideas. If there is to be a New World Order that unites security and economic policies, certainly these must be our objectives. But Latins are troubled by the new echoes of the old nay-sayers in the United States who grumble that Latin America is in some way "different," or even a threat. The United States cannot promote the same vision that Lincoln and FDR and JFK acted on, if we follow the voices that have abandoned America's faith in bettering itself--and others. Now I understand that Americans are practical people as well as idealists. Any New World Order for the United States must also be based on common sense. That's good news for NAFTA, because the nuts and bolts of this agreement can fit together very well. The North America Free Trade Agreement will create the largest market in the world: 360 million consumers with a total output of $6 trillion. The agreement will eliminate economic barriers and inefficiencies with our first and third largest trading partners. In 1991, our three-way trade amounted to $243 billion. NAFTA will increase sales opportunities for US firms, improve their operating efficiency, increase real income for workers in the United States, create jobs, and spur growth in all three nations. Our neighbors' growth multiplies benefits for the United States. For each dollar of growth in Mexico, about 15 cents is spent on US goods. As Mexico grows more, it will import more. Seventy cents of each Mexican import dollar is spent on goods from the United States. This is an important point: Trade is not a "you win, I lose" proposition. By generating growth, trade multiplies the purchasing power of our trading partners. Of course, Mexico's economy is relatively small compared to that of the United States. Its GDP, approximately $280 billion, is about the same as that of Illinois. Because Mexico's economy is only about one-twentieth the size of the US economy and its exports only amount to about 6% of US imports, scare stories of mass dislocations from reducing barriers simply are not credible. Moreover, the factual record since 1986, when Mexico began a major opening of its economy, tells a very encouraging story. US exports to Mexico have increased from $12.4 bil-lion to $33.3 billion in 1991, making Mexico our third largest export market. This growth of 169% is almost twice the rate of overall US export growth in this period. By way of example, our exports to Western Europe increased 93%, a hefty amount but still significantly less. US manufacturing exports to Mexico increased from $10.4 to $26.7 billion during this period, almost twice the rate of our overall growth in manufacturing exports. Agricultural exports jumped from $1.1 to $2.8 bil- lion, making Mexico our third largest customer in 1991. Consumer goods exports tripled from $1 to $3 billion in 1990. Exports of telecommunications equipment doubled. Exports of autos and auto parts more than doubled. In fact, two highly sensitive sectors--steel and textiles--were in surplus with Mexico in both 1990 and 1991. If you forget all the rest of these numbers, just remember this fact: We have swung from a bilateral trade deficit with Mexico in 1986 of $4.9 billion to a surplus of $2.1 billion in 1991. If one excludes our petroleum imports, the surplus shoots up to $6.6 billion. The United States has even more to gain because our economy is already relatively open. Right now Mexico has relatively good access to our market; NAFTA will help us secure reciprocal access to Mexico's. To take just one example, our already sizable agricultural exports to Mexico are still less than they could be because restrictive Mexican import licenses still apply to about 30% of the value of the US agricultural exports. I also think it is a serious miscalculation to assume that the alternative to NAFTA is Mexican barriers as they exist today. Those lower barriers and the growth that is stimulating more Mexican purchases of US goods are a recent phenomenon, reflecting a shift by Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas away from the historical Mexican reliance on protectionism and economic autarky. At the end of 1985, Mexican tariffs ranged up to 100%, the average tariff was about 30%, and licenses for imports protected 47% of domestic output (down from 92% earlier in the year); today, Mexico's maximum tariff is 20%, its average trade-weighted tariff is about 10%, and many more licensing restrictions have been removed. If the United States sends a signal to the Mexican people that we intend to reject this historic opening, I could easily see a return to the old ways. Politics and economics are dynamic, not static, systems. There are political forces in Mexico, as in the United States, that are afraid of competition. In Mexico, these forces usually are strongly associated with antipathy toward the United States. A failure to complete NAFTA would fuel their animosity for decades and give these negative protectionists the upper hand. That's why NAFTA is an excellent example of the serious choices we have to make as we define this New World Order. I understand that some people will snipe that all these statistics may sound good for American business, but what about the American worker. Speaking frankly, that sort of logic will trip up the United States as we cross the threshold into the 21st Century. It certainly will leave America ill- prepared to play a strong leadership role in the post-Cold War world. Because the fact is that successful American businesses are going to help create US jobs. The Commerce Department estimates that our current trade with Canada and Mexico supports jobs for well over 2 million US workers, about 538,000 of whom are linked to our exports to Mexico. That's just the start of what we can do. As a rough rule of thumb, every extra billion dollars of US merchandise exports creates about 20,000 new jobs; so consider the benefits we've already achieved because trade liberalization and faster growth in Mexico has produced a swing of our trade balance of over $7 billion. Various studies suggest that NAFTA will create between 64,000 and 150,000 new US jobs. My personal view is that these estimates are on the low side, because most are based on so-called "equilibrium," or "static," models that, in effect, measure the impact of reduced barriers in an economy at rest. They do not generally capture the dynamic effects of higher growth, which I suspect will be the real generator of jobs. The claims about overall job loss just don't stand up to scrutiny. Jobs don't flee to places just because wages are lower. If they did, I imagine that Puerto Rico, which enjoys duty free entry into the US as well as tax incentives, would be the manufacturing center of the hemisphere. In fact, firms' decisions on locations of investments and their ability to pay higher wages depend significantly on the productivity of the labor force. Productivity, in turn, depends on the education, skills, capital, technology, management, and overall infrastructure (including financial, communications, and transportation systems) that can be brought to bear. Moreover, the US market is already relatively open to Mexico. Our trade- weighted tariff for Mexican goods is only about 3-4%, with 45% of Mexico's goods coming in duty free; so we can use NAFTA to slash Mexico's higher barriers and lock in new market openings. It's also useful to observe that past dire warnings about job losses from reducing US barriers turned out flat wrong: For example, after the Caribbean Basin Initiative opened our markets, we turned a $200 million deficit with those nations in 1986 into a $2.1 billion surplus in 1991. Consider the real competition. Japanese firms have grown stronger by sourcing components in Asia. EC firms are doing the same with inputs from southern Europe. Integrated operations that produce or assemble parts in Mexico can help make our higher wage workers more competitively globally. We even could expect a bonus because Mexican workers will buy more from us, too. Nevertheless, the reduction of remaining US barriers to competition will require adjustment by some US firms and individual workers. But it is important not to overstate the scope of these changes. Since Mexico's economy is about 5% the size of ours, it is not likely to overwhelm us. In addition, I would expect that NAFTA will incorporate long transition periods. It will also probably include safeguards that ease the transition if the import flows become too disruptive. To place this adjustment in context, recall that about 10% of the US labor force changes jobs annually (87% of them voluntarily). Finally, these changes are necessary if the US is to remain a dynamic economy that is always striving to produce goods and services in which we have a comparative advantage. Job changes can also be expedited and eased through the financial assistance of programs such as the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act, or EDWAA. EDWAA is a flexible, comprehensive program that Congress created in 1988 with broad bipartisan and Administration support. Funded at $540 million in 1992, EDWAA will have served approximately 750,000-800,000 workers in its first 3 years, achieving a placement rate of about 66%. President Bush recently reaffirmed the importance of these programs as part of an overall strategy to make America stronger. On March 20th, the President said, "We must prepare our work force to compete, through better education, better training." His set of education reforms, called America 2000, and our new approach to job training, Job Training 2000, are natural complements to the NAFTA. The United States didn't get where it is today by shrinking from challenges. With good education, good training, and a fair opportunity to sell our goods abroad to countries whose growing economies draw more US goods, we can help the American worker and American business lead the way in the New World Order. In addition to benefiting the United States, Mexico, and Canada economically, NAFTA is likely to lead to a pattern of cooperation that will be important for other challenges we face after the Cold War. The publics in all our countries have expressed an increasing interest in the so-called transnational problems: These are issues that cross national borders, but which tend to be generated by the actions of private individuals and groups, not governments. Topics like narcotics, the environment, migration, and health are examples of trans-national problems. The traditional foreign policy machinery is only beginning to figure out how to cope with such issues; we need to integrate them more effectively within our statecraft. I strongly believe that a new and strengthened North American relationship, founded on NAFTA and economic integration, could be extended to address a series of such transnational problems that neighboring states will have to face together in the 21st Century. Just take one example--the environment. The United States and Mexico know that sustainable economic development and environmental safeguards need to be mutually supportive. Indeed, the Salinas Administration has made significant strides in recent years to orient environmental policies, as well as economic policies, towards the standards set by the United States and other developed nations. President Salinas has made clear that Mexico is taking these steps because it recognizes they are in its own interest, not because we and other developed nations require them as an "entry ticket" to the club of developed nations. Without underestimating the tasks it faces, Mexico could become a model for nations that believe economic growth and protection of the environment are complements, not alternatives. Of course there is a relationship between economic prosperity and the ability to devote resources to environmental protection. Mexico has about one-third the population of the United States with only one-twentieth of our economic resources. Our task, then, is to build on the program of environmental cooperation that we have already begun with Mexico, and to negotiate a trade agreement that will help Mexico grow so it will have new resources to fulfill its environmental goals. Mexico took a major step towards environmental protection in 1988 through enactment of its General Law for Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection. Much of this statute is based on US law and experience. It covers air, water, and soil pollution; contamination by hazardous materials and waste; pesticides and toxic substances; the conservation of ecosystems; ecology reserves; and the rational use of natural resources. A central element of the 1988 law is the requirement of environmental impact assessments for all new investment projects in both the public and private sectors. The law also establishes administrative sanctions and criminal penalties for non-compliance. The Salinas Administration recognizes that laws on the books will not be effective unless they're backed by proper enforcement. So the Mexican government is acting to remedy its past problem of inadequate enforcement. It sent a strong signal over the past 2 years by temporarily closing some 1,000 industrial enterprises for non-compliance. The budget of SEDUE, Mexico's environmental agency, increased almost eightfold between 1989 and 1991; a large part of this increase will go to develop regulations and enhance enforcement. SEDUE recently announced a commitment of 50 new environmental inspector positions for Mexico City and a total of 200 for the US-Mexican border. Mexico is also turning to international sources to expand its environmental resources. The World Bank has extended loans worth $345 million to support projects in forestry development, water supply, and sanitation, and it is currently considering lending to support projects worth $226 million in environmental and resource management and air pollution. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank is currently working on loans for water projects in Guadalajara, ecology conservation in Mexico City, and forestry. The United States and Mexico already cooperate extensively in a number of environmental areas. Not surprisingly, these joint efforts have intensified along with our economic integration. Let me refer to just a few examples. The United States is providing technical support for Mexico's efforts to reduce Mexico City's air pollution. In the areas of wildlife and parks, we have around 100 joint projects, ranging from conservation and management of migratory bird habitats, to protecting endangered species such as the jaguar, to research on tropical birds. Mexico's extensive domestic wildlife conservation programs include the establishment of 44 national parks, 8 reserves, and 14 biosphere reserves. Mexico has joined CITES, the International Convention for the Protection of Endangered Species. The US Forest Service and the Agency for International Development have developed a cooperative program with the Mexican government for the sustainable management of tropical forests. Joint projects include, for example, cooperative research on insects and pest control, protecting migratory bird habitats, and remote sensing inventories of Mexico's forests. In the area of marine resources, we're working together to place stringent restrictions on waste generated from ships in the Gulf of Mexico, to protect endangered sea turtles, and, most recently, Mexico proposed a number of far reaching moves to protect dolphins. To help include business in our efforts, we established a joint business committee to provide advice and training in compliance with environmental laws and regulations for businesses in Mexico. In November 1991, we set up a Technical Information Clearinghouse in Mexico City that offers businesses access to information on advanced environmental technologies to meet standards more effectively. I know that the border environment is particularly important for many of you. Our initial efforts built on programs of the 100-year-old International Boundary and Water Commission. In 1983, Mexico and the United States established a new framework for cooperation on border and environmental pollution, supplementing the IBWC by tackling a broader range of pollution problems. Then this year, the two Presidents announced a much more comprehensive and in-depth plan for addressing environmental concerns in the border region. This border plan focuses on problems in the areas of air pollution, water pollution, hazardous waste, chemical emergencies, enforcement, and pollution prevention. Recognizing the need to adjust to changing circumstances, our border plan includes programs that will be implemented during the period 1992-94. The plan will then be reviewed every 2 years, with further initiatives added or expanded as needed. As part of the development of the border plan, US and Mexican officials held a series of public hearings in cities along the border. This was the first time the government of Mexico had ever conducted such public hearings. To ensure ongoing input from the public, EPA and SEDUE are establishing advisory committees. This new border plan is backed by money. The Mexicans have committed $460 million over 3 years. And the United States proposed $241 million for next year alone. Both Mexico and the United States recognize that these moves, substantial though they might be, are just a start of a much larger effort. Both of us intend to do more in the future--to address problems and opportunities that are unconstrained by borders. I believe all of us want to do more to improve environmental conditions in Mexico and the United States. I also firmly believe that economic growth is the essential ingredient in helping us to do so. So I hope you appreciate that I am deeply disturbed by the statements of some who seem willing to sacrifice the free trade agreement to make a point. I would hope people would answer this question honestly: Do you really believe killing NAFTA would improve Mexico's efforts to clean up the environment? The answer must be no. First, it is a practical fact of life that the Salinas Administration's innovative efforts to improve the environment are far less likely to win popular support if the Mexican people are struggling to find jobs or eking out an elementary existence. Second, rejection of NAFTA on environmental grounds will lend great support to those in Mexico who argue that the United States and other developed nations are only pressing the environmental topic so as to perpetuate the developing world's dependency. Third, our joint efforts with Mexico on environment and conservation issues have been based on a spirit of cooperation, reciprocity, and respect. We have avoided self-defeating actions that might appear to Mexicans like the hectoring commands of gringos who have in the past inserted themselves into Mexican sovereignty and decisionmaking. The Mexican people, who today want to clean up their own environment because they recognize it is in their own interest, will resent environmental dictates that they may perceive as an insult to their own commitment and as a new form of eco- protectionism. There is a great deal that the US, Mexico, and Canada can and must accomplish together. To do it, the parties on each side of the border need to work together on the same side of the issue. In conclusion, a successful North American Free Trade Agreement can be part of a new paradigm for the United States in the post-Cold War era. This agreement can stand for US leadership in opening markets abroad. It can stand as a building block in a strategy to produce growth, jobs, higher incomes, competitiveness, and economic strength for America. It can stand as a practical commitment by the United States to help support nations, in Latin America and elsewhere, that are struggling to adopt outward-looking market economies and democratic political systems. It can stand as a model of effective integration that will enhance our cooperation on other mutual challenges--such as the environment, narcotics, migration, and health. And at a time when, elsewhere in the world, the fervors of nationalism are fragmenting countries and regions, NAFTA can stand out and move the world ahead by showing the benefits of enhanced integration based on mutual respect and working from shared principles. That is my vision of a New World Order for the post-Cold War world. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

Democracy in Latin America

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 8 19924/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America, South America Country: El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics [TEXT] When this Administration took office, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Chile were dictatorships. All have successfully moved toward democracy. The war in El Salvador has been ended through negotiations, as has the war in Nicaragua. For the first time in a decade, Latin America, as a whole, is growing economically. Net capital flows to the region are positive. Under the Brady plan and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, commercial or bilateral debt has been reduced or forgiven in Mexico, Venezuela, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guyana, and Chile. We think the Administration's record is a very good one. Having said that, it is also true that democracy remains fragile and threatened in many parts of the hemisphere. That is why, in our view, it is very important for the United States to remain engaged in the hemisphere. Frankly, we are disappointed that Congress has been unable to be more supportive. We asked for $246 million in authority to forgive over $1 billion in debt in the hemisphere in the continuing resolution that just passed. Unfortunately, not a penny was provided. The President remains committed to a North American Free Trade Agreement; negotiations continue. But, again, unfortunately, some in Congress do not support this effort. As for levels of aid, we would obviously like to do more in many parts of the world, including Latin America. Nevertheless, despite budget limits, we had allocated, as I stated yesterday, $275 million in aid for Peru for Fiscal Year 1992. The United States is feeding one out of every seven Peruvians today. We proposed, and the Congress passed, the Andean Trade Preference Initiative which would provide duty-free access for 15% of Peru's products. We still are optimistic about democracy in this hemisphere, but recent events in Peru, as well as those in Haiti and Venezuela, demonstrate that democracy remains embattled. We must remain engaged, and we must work through the Organization of American States and other means to defend democracy when it is threatened. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

Geneva Meeting On Liberia

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 8 19924/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Liberia Subject: Democratization [TEXT] The United States commends the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Committee of Five for its firm and clear reaffirmation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accords on Liberia, which was formulated during informal consultations April 6-7 in Geneva. The final communique calls for effective implementation without any further delay of the primary objectives of Yamoussoukro IV, including encampment, disarmament, and the conduct of democratic elections. The parties also clarified arrangements for the planned buffer zone along the border with Sierra Leone and directed that it be established without further delay. The United States fully supports the ECOWAS directive. We expect all Liberian parties to honor it scrupulously and to respect fully the sense of urgency ECOWAS has attached to implementation. We call on all armed factions to disarm and encamp and give ECOWAS their utmost cooperation. The United States will condemn any action which interferes with peaceful establishment of the buffer zone as an urgent priority. ECOWAS has once more demonstrated its resolve to bring about a peaceful solution in Liberia. It is time for the Liberian people to get on with the process of healing, reconciliation, and reunification. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

One Year After the Gulf War: Prospects for Peace

Haass Source: Richard N. Haass, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs of the National Security Council Description: Address before the Faculty Club, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida Date: Apr, 2 19924/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Mideast Peace Process, United Nations, Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] My subject tonight concerns the Gulf--I suppose in Florida one needs to make clear which Gulf one is talking about--and the Middle East. I want to talk about what we accomplished by the Gulf War and the President's Middle East peace initiative and also about what remains to be done. It was just over a year ago that the guns fell silent. But in just 6 weeks of war, the United States and its coalition partners had accomplished a great deal. Saddam Hussein and the world's fourth largest military were forced out of Kuwait. Kuwait's sovereignty and independence were restored. By defeating Iraq, we ensured that oil, which remains the key to the economic performance of the industrialized world, would continue to flow in adequate quantities at reasonable prices that would not be manipulated for political purposes. It is important to remember that Iraq has 10% of the world's oil reserves. With Kuwait, it had 20%. Even without invading Saudi Arabia, Iraq would have been able to control a majority of the world's oil reserves. Just remember that the next time someone argues that foreign policy doesn't affect the quality of life here at home. As a direct result of the war, we dramatically reduced the military strength of Iraq and its ability to project power, whether through conventional or unconventional means. Chemical and biological capabilities certainly did exist. We have learned just how close Iraq was to obtaining a functioning nuclear weapon. With ballistic missiles, they clearly had the means to threaten the entire region. As a result of what we did, our friends in the Middle East, from the Arab oil producers to Israel, no longer live in the shadow of a significant Iraqi military threat. We set the stage for the release of the American hostages. It is hard to point to any event that explains why the hostages were released this past year--that is, other than what happened during the crisis in the Gulf. It was not because diplomats suddenly got a lot more clever or because diplomats increased their efforts. No, the hostages were freed because of what we accomplished in the war and the resulting new respect for American power in places ranging from Tehran to the slums of Beirut. We also did some good beyond the immediate region. This crisis came about as the Cold War was coming to an end. There was a sense that by what we did and how we did it we would be setting precedents for the post-Cold War era. There was a strong concern that if we allowed this wanton aggression and brutality to stand, a lot of would-be Saddams would draw the obvious lesson, and we would soon be living in a world where restraint, collective security, and the rule of law were no longer to be found. So we acted to send a message to friend and foe alike. Similarly, the crisis may have proved a turning point for the United Nations. For the first time, the institution began to resemble the dreams of its founders. It proved to be a united nations, and the United Nations did act on behalf of the common security and legal principle. Since, the United Nations has continued to show it is much improved, requiring full Iraqi compliance with its resolutions, repealing the resolution that equated Zionism with racism, and isolating Libya for its role in the destruction of Pan Am [Flight] 103. I'm not going to argue that we have solved everything or that challenges don't remain. Obviously, there are things we did not accomplish. Just as obviously, significant challenges remain. We still face the challenge of bringing about full Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, including both those mandating that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them be destroyed and those dealing with the safety and human rights of the Iraqi people. We also have the related challenge of seeing Iraq's current leadership replaced by one representative of the Iraqi people, one willing to live in peace with its own people and its neighbors. We still have the problem of consolidating viable security arrangements in the region, arrangements that are militarily significant and politically sustainable for those we seek to help. There is, as well, the growing threat of proliferation, be it of conventional or nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. There are the familiar but no less deadly menaces of terrorism and narcotics. Iran's leaders must be persuaded to moderate their behavior at home and abroad. Lebanon's Government has not yet extended its sovereignty over all its territory. Virtually all of the countries of the region would benefit from an increase in popular political participation and a liberalization of economic policies. We are seeing some signs of both, but they need to be nurtured and supported. The agenda is long and difficult. This is in itself nothing new. The Gulf region has posed major dilemmas for American foreign policy for half a century. Unlike Europe and Asia, where we have had very strong allies, a large military presence, and states we had a lot in common with-- culturally, historically, and linguistically--this part of the world is more difficult for us. It is a place where we have allies who may be economically strong but who are militarily weak. There are many threats to them. It is a place where we have very important interests--oil among them--but where our ability to safeguard these interests never has been what we would want it to be. There has always been something of a gap between the importance of this part of the world and our ability to safeguard it. It is a fact of life that this gap remains. I see no way to close it completely, but like most problems, it is one that can be worked out with concerted effort. This is no time for pulling back, no time for isolationism, be it here or anywhere else. Yet despite all these challenges, the Gulf remains a far better place for what we did. I am aware that this view is not universally shared. There has been a wave of revisionism and criticism disparaging what was accomplished. Some argue that the war could have been avoided had we done more to prevent Iraq's build-up. But this ignores the context. Although we never sold arms to Iraq, we had worked with Iraq to prevent Iran's victory in their 8-year war; had we not, the Persian Gulf today could well be Persian in more than name. In that war's aftermath, we sought to forge a working relationship with Iraq, then the region's most powerful state. This proved impossible, owing to Saddam's ambitions. But the fact that we tried made it that much easier to forge the successful coalition against Saddam. Moreover, it was impossible to build such a coalition against Saddam prior to his invasion of Iraq; it took a graphic demonstration of brutality and aggression to convince his Arab neighbors as well as our allies in Europe to stand up to him. Still others argue that we stopped the war too soon and that we should have gone on into Baghdad to force Saddam out of power. Yet this view, too, is flawed. Our mandate--as voted by the UN Security Council and supported by the Congress--was to seek Kuwait's liberation, not remake Iraq. Our coalition would not have survived the more ambitious undertaking. Moreover, getting into Baghdad likely would have proved easier than leaving it. There is no guarantee we would have located Saddam quickly, and there is even less assurance we could have extricated ourselves from Iraq confident that what we had left behind was stable. The bottom line is that the revisionists need to revise their thinking. No, we did not transform the region. We did not end history. We did not solve all the problems of this part of the world. But you have to set standards that are realistic. And by realistic standards, the Gulf region, and the broader Middle East, is a much better place compared to 2 years ago. It is an infinitely better place than would have been the case had we not reversed Saddam's brutal aggression. One reason I feel as comfortable as I do in asserting this point is one other dividend of the war: peace. Call it ironic, but the fact is that it was the successful conclusion of two wars--the Cold War and the Gulf war--that created new opportunities for peace in the Middle East. Our leadership helped to create a political environment in which there was a lot more confidence in the United States. Radical forces in the Middle East--both Iraq and those who sided with Iraq--that historically had looked to the Soviet Union were dealt a severe setback. Those countries who historically had worked with the United States and made peace, namely Egypt and Israel, emerged from the conflict substantially better off. At the same time, this most recent war was something of a warning. People realized what another war in the Middle East might mean that population centers could become battlefields, that civilians could become combatants, that the horror of weapons of mass destruction could be unleashed. The peoples of a region that had known war in 1948, in 1956, in 1967, and in 1973, as well as in Lebanon, between Iran and Iraq, and now with Iraq were at long last realizing that, in the modern age war, was increasingly becoming a loser's game. The current phase of US policy toward the Middle East goes back more than a year to March 6, 1991. Speaking before a joint session of the Congress, President Bush outlined the key principles of the emerging US approach. Pointing out that, in the modern age, geography cannot guarantee security and that security cannot come from military might alone, the President announced that the United States would work for a comprehensive peace grounded in UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. He went on to say that this principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Security and fairness became the watchwords of what would follow. Less than 8 months later, and thanks in large part to the eight missions undertaken by Secretary Baker, the parties central to the Arab-Israeli conflict were gathered for the first time around the same table to talk peace. We had brokered approaches to the questions of the participation of both Palestinians and the United Nations that all parties could accept. Similarly, we had gained agreement on just what the conference could and could not do. More than 4 decades after Israel's birth, more than a decade after Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, real negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors--all her Arab neighbors--became a reality, as did the promise of a comprehensive peace. In the 5 months since Madrid, we have seen four rounds of bilateral negotiations--between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Again, there have been frustrations. But again, there is progress to point to. Israelis and Palestinians have both tabled their ideas about how to structure interim or transitional arrangements that would govern the situation in the occupied territories until final status terms were agreed upon and implemented. Syria and Israel have had exhaustive, substantive talks on UN Security Council Resolution 242 and its requirements. Lebanon and Israel have established that their main problem is not borders, which are commonly accepted, but how to ensure security and peace to both southern Lebanon and northern Israel. Meanwhile, Jordanians and Israelis are exploring practical ways to address the relatively limited issues on which they disagree. We have also begun a set of talks involving a much broader membership, including many of the countries of the region and beyond. The intent here is to address those regional issues--water, environment, economic development, refugees, arms control, and security--that can only be addressed on a regional or multilateral basis. These are the problems--and the opportunities--that affect peoples. In Moscow, 36 countries met to organize these talks. Follow-on working groups are slated to meet later this spring. The goal is to make this part of the world a region in more than the narrow geographical sense. In short, over the last few months we have come a long way. We finally have a Middle East peace process that provides a mechanism by which the basic political questions key to the region's stability can be addressed. We are moving past procedure and getting into substance. While no one should underestimate all the differences--they are clearly great--or all the pitfalls, what has been accomplished is considerable. For the first time, we have a comprehensive process where ideas can be constructively addressed. The participation of the United States remains central to the process. Yet we have been careful not to make it too central. We are described as an "honest broker" or "catalyst" for peace, but there are also limits to what we can and should do. We cannot and will not deliver any party. We can propose but not impose our preferences. In the end, we are not of or in the Middle East. It is for those who are to negotiate their own future and to learn to talk and ultimately live with one another. Where will this process take us? It is always risky if not downright foolish to predict. Let me put it this way. In my last incarnation, I was a professor and wrote a good deal about negotiations and why some succeed and others do not. I came to the conclusion that a conflict would be ripe for resolution when four factors came into being. First, leaders of the key parties had to be committed to finding a realistic compromise. Second, these leaders had to be strong enough to bring their people and governments along. Third, it was necessary to have the outlines of a compromise on the table. Fourth, it was necessary to have a table where all the key players would be prepared to sit. As things now stand in the Middle East, it is not clear that all four prerequisites exist. In some cases, what is in question is the commitment of leaders to compromise; in others, it is their ability. We have pieces of a formula that are acceptable but not a complete package. The one thing we do have going for us is a process that all are participating in. Successful peace-making will take real discipline. The road to peace is certain to be rough. All parties should avoid those statements and actions that will only make things that much more difficult. At the same time, this being the Middle East, there will be acts of violence and other provocations that will cause one or more of the key parties to want to pull back. But these are temptations that must be overcome if progress is to happen. Peace-making will also require compromise. Any compromise will bring with it certain costs and risks. And these must be carefully examined, for there are proposals real or imagined that are ill-advised and simply not worth it. When the issues are war and peace and security, too much is at stake to act recklessly. But if it is important to examine the costs and risks of possible agreements, it is no less important to assess the costs and risks of rejecting compromise, of sticking with the status quo. Here, I would argue that the current situation in the Middle East is both costly and dangerous. The resources devoted to preparing for war--the billions of dollars in budget outlays, the billions of man-hours lost to military service--are enormous. Countries pay, too, by lost trade and investment, by businesses that choose to place their money in an environment less prone to conflict. And above all, there is the human cost of war itself--the physical destruction, the wounded, the dead. For Palestinians, there is the additional cost of living under occupation, of not being able to exercise their legitimate political rights. But for Israel, too, there are costs of occupation. These are measured not only in incidents of violence or the costs of policing but also in the realm of politics and demographics. Israel was created not just to be a state but to be a Jewish state, a functioning democracy, and a successful society. Israel needs to make peace, not as a favor to the Arabs, but to keep its commitment to itself. If it is necessary to examine the very real costs and risks of the status quo, it is also necessary to look at the possible benefits of peace. Here, I mean the benefits that go beyond the obvious ones of avoiding war. If I may quote from what President Bush had to say at the Madrid Conference in October [1991], "Our objective. . . is not simply to end the state of war in the Middle East and replace it with a state of non-belligerency. This is not enough; this would not last. Rather, we seek peace--real peace--and by real peace I mean treaties, security, diplomatic relations, economic relations, trade, investment, cultural exchange, even tourism. . . a Middle East where normal men and women lead normal lives." I expect for some--if not most of you--this all sounds utopian. You may be right. But then again, who would have predicted during World War II that Germany and Japan would one day be two of our closest allies and partners? And who, just 5 years ago, would have predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany's unification, or the demise of the Cold War? Who among you foresaw the progress we are today witnessing in Cambodia or South Africa? Peace and reconciliation are possible, even in the Middle East. Right now, the Middle East stands apart from this trend, but not in a way that should give anyone satisfaction. Saying all this does not argue for any particular set of transitional or final status arrangements. To paraphrase what President Bush said in Madrid, we come with no maps saying where final borders are to be drawn. This is the stuff, this is the purpose of negotiations. These are questions for the peoples of the region to decide. They are the ones who must live with the consequences of negotiations, of success or failure. But we do have a role, and an important one. There is simply too much suspicion, too much residue of war, for the peoples of the Middle East to make peace by themselves. It is our role to support their efforts. At this stage of the process, we can help--with our ideas, our suggestions, our good offices. Later, if it is desired and if Congress agrees, we can provide security guarantees and additional financial aid. But we can only be effective, we can only be a force for peace and an honest broker, if we are seen to be consistent. We are doing our utmost to be fair and consistent. Let me explain how. We are firmly committed to Israel's security and welfare. While we support legitimate political rights for the Palestinian people, we do not support a Palestinian state, which we believe would be a source for instability and a potential threat to Israel. We believe Jerusalem should remain united, its final status determined by negotiations. We will proceed on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. I want to say something about another of our principles. We oppose settlements, which we believe constitute an obstacle to peace. This is not an invention of the Bush Administration; to the contrary, it has been a principle of every administration, Democratic and Republican, since 1967. The reasoning is simple: settlements constitute a unilateral action by Israel that prejudice the outcome of negotiations and, quite frankly, weaken the prospects for peace. To those who argue that we ought not link settlements to loan guarantees, I would say that peace, too, is a humanitarian aim, and that peace is a must if new immigrants and all Israelis are to enjoy the quality of life they deserve. Let me also make clear what our policy is not about. We are not challenging the right of Jews or anyone else to live where they choose. We are not using loan guarantees to determine the ultimate borders of Israel. We are not setting a precedent in which aid critical for Israel's security is denied. And we are not seeking to substitute ourselves for the Arab negotiating teams. What we are doing--no more and no less--is giving the first comprehensive peace talks ever to be held in the Middle East every chance of succeeding. I know that disagreement over this issue has introduced great strain into our relationship with Israel. I am aware of the anguish many of you feel; trust me when I say it is shared. I hope the differences with Israel can be bridged. We, in the Administration, are committed to making a good faith effort to do so. But even if we cannot find a formula that both governments can accept, this question must not be allowed to weaken US-Israeli ties or create any questions about US support for Israel's security. Here, too, I can do no better than quote President Bush, who recently wrote that the "measure of a good relationship is not the ability to agree, but rather the ability to disagree on specifics without placing fundamentals at risk. We do this all the time with Britain; we should manage with Israel." This, then, is where things stand. Just 1 year after the end of the Gulf war, we are working to bring peace and stability to a part of the world where our interests are important and enduring and where the threats to our interests will not go away. The United States has a critical role to play, in deterring war, in promoting peace. Any temptation to evade this role, to evade this responsibility, will come to haunt us if we give in to it. In the end, when history is written, the final judgment on wars is often the peace that follows. What we have accomplished in winning the Cold War, what we have accomplished in winning the Gulf war, will depend in large part upon what comes next. If we consolidate the opportunities before us and help create conditions of lasting peace, our sacrifices and all our efforts will have been worthwhile. If we are not willing to see through what we have begun, we will have squandered our investments and will one day find ourselves being asked once more to sacrifice a great deal. This would be reckless folly. Fortunately, it can be avoided. What is required is that we stay the course, that we lead in peace as we did in war. If we do, we shall succeed in winning the peace, just as we won the war. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

Curbing Destabilizing Arms Transfers

Bartholomew Source: Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary for International Security Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 8 19924/8/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: South Africa, South Korea, India, Argentina, Brazil, USSR (former), Russia Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] This Administration has assigned a very high priority to preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles that can deliver them. We have been at work over the past 3 years developing and implementing new initiatives in all these areas. We have strengthened and expanded the international control regimes. We have increased the equipment and technology subject to export controls, both in the United States and multilaterally. We have undertaken regional initiatives to stop proliferation in volatile areas of the world. And we have inaugurated a process for dealing with conventional arms transfers. Let me first discuss some of these achievements and then recount the problem areas which are our current focus.
International Institutions
The international institutions dealing with nuclear proliferation have been greatly strengthened under American leadership. Membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has expanded. Long-time powerful holdouts such as China and South Africa have joined, and France is about to join. In addition, many countries have adopted stricter conditions on their nuclear-related exports. Twenty-seven countries--the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group--have agreed to the long-standing US position on "full-scope safeguards"--that a country receiving any significant new nuclear-related supplies must have safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. The international lists of items controlled for nuclear proliferation reasons have been updated and expanded. At US initiative, the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed on April 3 to control a substantial list of dual-use, nuclear- related equipment and technology. In sum, these advances mean a substantially stronger institutional framework for nuclear non-proliferation. They heighten the barriers to obtaining nuclear technology by countries seeking nuclear weapons capabilities.
Regional Gains
We have also made gains on some pressing regional nuclear problems. Argentina and Brazil have both renounced nuclear weapons ambitions. If things continue to go well, they may soon be taken entirely off the map of nuclear proliferation concerns. Our long-time concerns about South African nuclear weapons ambitions have been alleviated. That country has now acceded to the NPT and promptly completed its NPT safeguards agreement. We have set back Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs were heavily damaged during the Gulf war, and those that remain are subject to destruction under international supervision. Long-term international monitoring will be conducted to assure these programs are not rebuilt. We have made an important start on the North Korean nuclear problem by strongly encouraging the North-South dialogue and nuclear inspection agreement and pressing North Korea fully to implement its nuclear obligations under the NPT.
Multilateral Controls
There have been major positive developments to strengthen multilateral controls of missile technology. Key supplier countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, have toughened their national export controls. Institutional membership has expanded dramatically. The Missile Technology Control Regime--MTCR --responsible for combating missile proliferation has grown from 7 to 18 member nations, and at least two more will join this year. The list of controlled items has been revised and updated. The MTCR has extended the scope of its efforts to include missiles capable of delivering all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons. The United States has persuaded key supplier countries to apply strict MTCR missile export control standards. These include Russia and China. Argentina now observes MTCR-equivalent controls, as does Israel. Several East European countries are in the process of doing likewise. Beyond this, the MTCR is conducting an active outreach program to non- member countries to help them assure effective missile export controls. On March 30, [1992], the United States--with contributions by other MTCR partners--hosted a seminar for nations of Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and the former Soviet Union.
US Controls
The United States has tightened its own controls on missile technology. Under our Enhanced Proliferation Controls Initiative, licenses will soon be required for any exports to missile projects in the Middle East and in certain other countries of proliferation concern. Under a US law enacted in 1990, we have imposed missile trade sanctions on foreign entities in several nations, including China, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea, and Iran. This means that almost all sources of missile technology have now been closed off to proliferant countries. Only North Korea is still exporting complete MTCR-class missile systems. We have gotten a number of countries out of the missile business. Argentina, last year, announced the termination of its Condor Ballistic Missile Program. Iraqi missile programs are subject to UN efforts to dismantle them.
Chemical, Biological Weapons (CBW) Controls
Important steps have also been taken against the spread of chemical and biological weapons. The international institution dealing with CBW proliferation--the "Australia Group"--has become stronger and larger. Membership has expanded from 20 to 22 members, including newest members Finland and Sweden. The list of internationally controlled CBW-related goods has jumped dramatically under US prodding. In 1990-91, the United States greatly expanded its own list of controlled chemical weapons precursors--from 11 to 50 worldwide--and introduced controls on chemical and biological weapons-related, dual-use equipment and whole chemical plants. Now, all Australia Group members are adopting these same strict controls. There have been regional achievements as well. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile last year agreed to a chemical and biological weapons-free zone. East European CBW export controls have multiplied. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania are meeting the high Australia Group export control standards. Other countries are joining the trend to better controls. Israel, China, and, to some extent, India have adopted export controls in this field as well. The net result of these persistent efforts has been to choke off most of the traditional sources of supply for chemical and biological weapons programs.
Conventional Arms Transfers
The five major conventional arms suppliers have begun moving toward responsibility, transparency, and consultation on conventional arms transfers. Concerning responsibility, the five have acknowledged their special obligation for insuring that their arms transfers do not undermine stability. Regarding transparency, they have also agreed that we must exchange information about arms sales in order to identify and avert destabilizing arms transfers. In the way of consultation, the five have agreed, for the first time, to make their arms transfers subject to debate and criticism and to abide by common guidelines concerning arms transfers. In short, the five have agreed to apply the collective reason of the five to decisions they--except for the United States--do not share with their own parliaments. This is not business as usual. It is both new and important.
Present Focus
Institutionally, our top priority is to get a chemical weapons convention completed this year as a basic framework for dealing with chemical weapons. There are several regional problems that warrant our continuing attention. -- On North Korea, we need to assure that the North carries out fully its nuclear commitments. These include nuclear inspections under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and its bilateral agreement with the South. We need to continue pressure on North Korea to stop its uncontrolled missile technology transfers. -- We are making a start on South Asian non-proliferation. Our proposal for a five-power conference is an important step in the right direction, and our bilateral discussions are continuing. Four of five participants have agreed to the conference, and we continue to engage India with a view toward obtaining its participation as well. -- In the Middle East, we will continue to insist on Iraqi compliance with its obligations to destroy and not rebuild its weapons of mass destruction. Iran has increased its efforts to obtain missiles and weapons of mass destruction and expanded its conventional weapons capability. We will keep Iran under very close scrutiny. -- We will need to assure that Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union do not become new sources of supply or brain power for countries seeking weapons of mass destruction. Initiatives are underway to help strengthen export controls, improve nuclear material accountancy and control and physical protection, and to redirect scientists in meaningful non-military endeavors. Our contacts with the newly independent states have been encouraging. On conventional weapons transfers, we intend to move the process forward by holding a plenary meeting this spring.
Review of Proliferation Developments
Nuclear Controls:
Cooperating Countries Increase, Controls Are Tightened. Several important steps to further nuclear non-proliferation have been taken in the last 3 years. Important new members have been added to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT]. China has acceded to the NPT, and France is expected to do so soon. South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have also adhered to the NPT since the beginning of 1991. Russia has assumed the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the NPT, and prospects are favorable for the other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Other important nuclear-related agreements have been completed. Argentina and Brazil are removing themselves from the area of nuclear proliferation concerns. They entered into a agreement with the IAEA accepting full-scope nuclear [inspections] at all their facilities. Other countries have taken important steps. South Africa promptly completed its NPT safeguards agreement. Algeria has placed its Chinese- origin research reactor under safeguards, and Syria has recently completed an NPT full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. While North Korea has signed its IAEA safeguards agreement, it has still failed to ratify and fully implement it as required by the NPT, and we are greatly concerned about its continued stalling. Prompt and full implementation remains crucial. North and South Korea have agreed to a joint declaration to establish a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, with a mutual inspection regime. Here, again, the key will be effective implementation. There has been significant progress over the past couple of years on a key nuclear export policy long supported by the United States, i.e. requiring full- scope IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear-weapons states as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment. All 27 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Agreement issued a statement calling for full-scope safeguards as a condition of significant nuclear supply. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is upgrading its trigger list and agreed upon a list of dual-use nuclear related equipment and technology for common controls at its meeting in Warsaw last week. This is a major step forward in impeding access by proliferant countries to technology potentially relevant to nuclear weapons. The NPT Exporters or Zangger Committee recently clarified its controls on heavy water production plants by itemizing equipment and components of such a facility which should not be exported in the absence of a commitment to apply IAEA safeguards. The IAEA Board of Governors, spurred by the example of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program, confirmed the agency's authority to carry out "special inspections," whereby it can inspect nuclear activities at any place in a country, not just at declared nuclear facilities.
Chemical and Biological Weapons:
US Controls Strengthened. The United States has taken the lead in strengthening its own controls and creating a stronger international institution to deal with chemical and biological weapons. In 1991, the Administration introduced regulations under the Enhanced Proliferation Controls Initiative (EPCI), which expanded US export controls related to chemical and biological weapons. These controls include chemical weapons precursors, chemical and biological equipment, and certain whole chemical plants. Under EPCI, we also now have authority to require a license and, where necessary, to stop the export of any item or any US citizen assistance where this may materially contribute to the proliferation of chemical or biological weapons or missile programs.
Multilateral Chemical and Biological Efforts:
International Regime Enlarged, Controls Expanded. The international chemical and biological weapons control regime--the Australia Group--has been enlarged and strengthened. -- Sweden and Finland have now joined the Australia Group, bringing membership to 22 countries, and all Australia Group members now control all 50 chemical weapons precursors. Just over half did so before EPCI. -- We are now nailing down agreement on chemical equipment controls. -- For the first time, we now have a multilateral list of organisms, toxins, and equipment for adoption by the Australia Group at its June 1992 plenary. Regional Successes: Eastern Europe and Others Adopt Export Controls. The extension of CBW export controls outside the Australia Group in the past 12 months has been encouraging. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria are in the process of applying controls comparable to those of the Australia Group. Israel has adopted controls on all 50 chemical weapons precursors. China has also adopted some precursor controls, as, to a lesser extent, has India. In September 1991, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil took the major step of establishing a chemical and biological weapons-free zone among themselves.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Seeking a Treaty This Year
. The long-term solution to the problem of chemical weapons [CW] is a global, verifiable CW ban. We are seeking a treaty this year. Last May [1991], President Bush called for accelerating the pace of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, the United States made substantial concessions on major issues which had been sticking points in the talks. Subsequently, the Conference on Disarmament set a 1992 target date for completion of the convention and has redoubled work on the convention. The United States is working vigorously to solve the relatively few major outstanding issues, notably on verification, with the aim of getting a treaty finished as soon as possible this year. In March [1992], Australia tabled a new draft treaty text at the Geneva Chemical Weapons negotiation. We welcome this initiative. With some changes that are important to us, we believe this text can serve as the basis for concluding a convention. We are strongly urging the countries participating in the convention negotiations, and the chairman of the negotiations, to use the Australian text as a basis to finish a broadly acceptable treaty we can sign this year.
Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference: Measures Adopted at US Behest.
The Third Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference (RevCon), which met September 9-27 [1991] in Geneva, produced positive results. It largely adopted US proposals for strengthening the implementation of the convention. The RevCon adopted eight new or revised confidence-building measures designed to enhance openness about biological research activities. Perhaps the most interesting confidence-building measures are those requiring the declaration of past offensive biological weapons programs and of past and present biological defense research programs. The RevCon also agreed on measures designed to improve adherence and compliance and endorsed the principle of biological export controls to help prevent proliferation. It also urged all parties to adopt penal legislation against illegal biological weapons activities, to apply to a country's citizens wherever they might be. The RevCon elaborated the procedures for raising compliance concerns and obligated a party to provide a specific and timely response to concerns raised. As agreed by the RevCon, a governmental experts meeting began on March 30 with a mandate to identify and examine potential Biological Weapons Convention verification measures from a technical and scientific standpoint. Although the United States has not been able to identify any verification measures we believe would be effective, we think the verification issue deserves a fair and open-minded technical review. So far, this experts meeting has gone well, with a frank and fruitful discussion of the problems associated with verification.
In the last year, the MTCR has added two more members- -Finland and Sweden, bringing membership to 18. This is a dramatic increase from the original seven partners in 1987. Two other countries will soon become members, and others have expressed interest in joining. Various non-member countries have recently taken steps to bring their practices into conformity with the [MTCR] guidelines and the annex, which lists sensitive missile-related equipment and technology. In 1991, Argentina announced the termination of its ballistic missile program and an intention to adopt the guidelines, and Israel announced and took steps to implement its adherence to the guidelines. In keeping with an agreement reached during Secretary Baker's November visit to Beijing, China, on February 22 [1992], announced that it would observe the MTCR guidelines and parameters in return for the lifting of US missile sanctions imposed on China in June 1991. At the MTCR's Fifth Plenary Meeting, held in Washington last November, the partners approved a revised Equipment and Technology Annex of controlled items and agreed on the desirability of extending the scope of the MTCR guidelines to missiles capable of delivering any weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological as well as nuclear warheads. Technical experts from the partner nations are meeting this week to work out how to implement this extension of the guidelines. Several other partner countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland, have tightened their controls on exports of sensitive missile technology. Regulations pursuant to the EPCI, published in August 1991, require licenses for all exports that a US exporter "knows or is informed" are destined for MTCR-covered missile projects in the Middle East and certain other countries. A list to implement this part of the regulation will be published soon. Sanctions can be unwieldy and difficult, even painful, to apply. Still, used judiciously, they have proved a useful way of securing cooperation on non- proliferation. After the Congress passed missile and chemical/biological sanctions legislation, the United States provided detailed information on the new laws to all foreign countries. This in itself caused some countries to review their export control systems. The actual application of sanctions spurred other countries to get their exports under effective control. Among the countries where missile trade sanctions have been imposed are China, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea, and Iran.
Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been the subject of intensified non-proliferation efforts because of the collapse of central controls and the temptations inherent in difficult economic circumstances. A major objective has been to sensitize these countries to the importance of non-proliferation and to get them to adopt appropriate export control and enforcement mechanisms. We and partner countries have been engaged in a long series of contacts. In July 1990, the United States conducted a special visit to Eastern Europe focused on the need to establish responsible and effective non-proliferation and defense trade controls. A follow-up visit to the region was made in October 1991. In December 1990 and again in December 1991, the Australia Group held seminars on CBW for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A multilateral group of MTCR partners visited Moscow in October 1991 to discuss missile proliferation. In February of this year, an inter-agency team visited Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to discuss the need for effective export controls and to stress the importance of participating in the non- proliferation regimes. The MTCR hosted a seminar for East European, Baltic, and former Soviet Union states on March 30, and a third Australia Group seminar will be conducted in Budapest in December. The results in Eastern Europe have been highly encouraging. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria have already adopted, or are in the process of adopting, controls comparable to those of the Australia Group and MTCR. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, we launched a fresh series of initiatives to meet the changed situation there. In January 1992, I visited four states--Russia, Byelarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan--and brought along a special team to brief on non-proliferation and defense trade controls and to encourage the new states to impose effective control systems. Although these states' degree of organization varies greatly, all have been receptive to the US approach. Russia, which benefits from the expertise and resources of the former Soviet Union, is the farthest along in having an effective control system. We will be following up in various ways. In the near future, teams will be visiting the former Soviet Union to help the newly independent states to establish effective non-proliferation regimes. We expect several of our allies to participate in these teams. The President has named a senior coordinator with responsibility for coordinating cooperation with the states of the former Soviet Union on brain drain matters. The United States, Russia, Japan, and the European Community have agreed to create science and technology centers in Russia and Ukraine to provide peaceful civilian work for weapons scientists from the former Soviet Union. The center will function as a clearinghouse for developing, selecting, funding, and monitoring projects that would be carried out mainly at institutions and facilities located in Russia and other CIS [Commonwealth] States. The intention is to help weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to non-military endeavors and thus minimize the temptation to use these skills in proliferation projects. In addition, we will provide concrete assistance to Russia to help disable and dismantle nuclear weapons. We have also offered assistance to Russia to help it begin the process of destroying its chemical weapons.
Other Problem Areas
. Proliferation concerns have decreased markedly in some areas, such as Argentina and Brazil and Eastern Europe. In other areas, a difficult situation remains. North Korea is a top concern for nuclear and missile proliferation. We are using all available channels to exert pressure on North Korea to halt its proliferation efforts. We have held direct discussions with North Korea. Other countries have engaged the North Koreans as well. In the context of international pressures, we hope that the North-South dialogue, and, in particular, the declaration on establishing a non-nuclear Korea, will yield results. It will be essential to have a credible and effective mutual nuclear inspection regime. North Korea must also ratify and fully and promptly implement its IAEA safeguards agreement. Ultimately, however, the question remains North Korean intentions. We need to keep the pressure up. Aside from our nuclear concerns, North Korea's irresponsible proliferation behavior is most egregious in the case of missiles. In fact, North Korea is now the only country selling complete missile systems that exceed MTCR parameters to the Third World--a dubious distinction that threatens international security. North Korea has learned to produce Scud missiles indigenously, and to extend the range of its Scuds. It is prone to selling these missiles to countries in volatile regions such as the Middle East. North Korea may even be going beyond this. First, the North appears willing to sell not only complete missile systems but also the equipment and technology to permit other countries to build their own missiles. Providing a production capability makes it more difficult for the world community to stop missile programs in the recipient countries, and can, in effect, "clone" still more irresponsible suppliers hungry for hard currency to keep their indigenous missile efforts going. Second, North Korea is working on a still longer range system in the 1,000- kilometer class. This system will let North Korea target all of South Korea and most of Japan. There is a more ominous possibility. Given North Korea's past record, it is highly likely that this system--and the technology to produce it--will become available on the international market. Such a system is inherently so inaccurate that its only use will be as a terror weapon against cities. It will be most effective when tipped with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction. These North Korean actions regarding missiles and missile technology represent a threat to the security of Northeast Asia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and anywhere else such missiles are procured. We are working intensively with other countries to deal with this serious problem. Various Middle East countries remain worrisome. Although Iraq's capabilities have been substantially reduced by the Gulf war and ensuing embargo and inspection regime, it remains poised to resume these activities when and if current strictures are removed. Meanwhile, Iran is energetically seeking to develop its conventional and non-conventional weapons capabilities. South Asia is a concern primarily for nuclear proliferation reasons, but our concerns extend to the danger that India and Pakistan will also compete in missile, chemical, and biological weapons. We have proposed a five-nation conference as a way to reduce tensions and deal with regional proliferation problems, among other subjects. All states but India have accepted the idea. India continues to have the idea under consideration. We are pleased with the ongoing foreign secretary level talks between India and Pakistan. These have already resulted in useful confidence-building measures and, we expect, will result in more. Meanwhile, our bilateral efforts with India and Pakistan continue. We held intensive discussions with Indian Foreign Secretary Dixit on his recent visit to Washington. Strengthening Non-Proliferation Efforts. While we can be proud of our non- proliferation achievements, the problem is a big one, and our efforts are never-ending. I wish there were a single, easy way to deal with the problem, but there isn't. Rather, we need a full array of techniques and must be ready to shift our strategy and tactics constantly to meet constantly changing situations.
Arms Control in the Middle East
The Administration has been pursuing a formal program of arms restraint among suppliers and recipients since the President announced his post-Gulf war Middle East arms control initiative in May. The Administration has sent the Congress a report on the progress we have made in this initiative, but let me review for a moment before I discuss where we are headed.
President's Initiative.
The President launched the Middle East Arms Control Initiative on May 29, 1991. The initiative included proposals: -- To establish supplier guidelines for restraint on destabilizing transfers of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction and associated technology; -- To freeze and eventually eliminate holdings of surface-to-surface missiles in the region; -- To implement a verifiable ban on the production of nuclear weapons- usable material in the region and call on the states of the region to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and place all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; -- Calling for states in the region to become original parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and implement CWC confidence-building measures; and -- Calling for strengthening of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and urging regional states to adopt biological weapons confidence-building measures. The President's initiative called for the five major suppliers of conventional arms to the Middle East to meet to discuss guidelines for restraining destabilizing transfers of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction and WMD-related equipment and technology.
Five-Power Meetings.
Following the President's announcement, senior representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, China, France, and United Kingdom met in Paris on July 8-9 [1991]. At this Paris plenary, the five countries issued a communique supporting the President's proposal and agreed to meet again to develop their work further. On September 26-27, the five governments sent experts to London to draft guidelines on the responsible transfer of conventional arms, a mechanism for exchanging information on arms transfers, and harmonization of WMD export controls--including the development of common guidelines governing transfers of WMD-related equipment and technology. The work of these experts paved the way for a second plenary meeting in London, on October 16-17. At the October meeting, the five governments adopted common guidelines for the export of conventional arms. These guidelines are a matter of public record. The five countries agreed to inform each other about transfers to the region of the Middle East for seven types of weapons, including tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, military aircraft and helicopters, naval vessels, and certain missile systems. They agreed to make arrangements to permit meaningful consultation about such transfers. Getting this far has not been easy, but we are moving ahead and making steady progress. One encouraging sign of our efforts was the resounding adoption, on December 9, of a UN Transparency in Armaments Resolution in the UN General Assembly. The United States co-sponsored this resolution and has worked through the Middle East arms control process and at the United Nations to build support for its adoption. Another good example is the progress made at the last meeting of the five, with Russia sitting in the place of the [former] Soviet Union. On February 20-21 [1992], the United States chaired the fourth meeting of the five on arms transfer restraint. The meeting prepared the way for a plenary meeting in Washington at the Under Secretary level. The timing for this meeting has not been finalized. As a result of the efforts made at the February meeting, the plenary will address concrete proposals for exchanging information on arms transfers and guidelines for transfers of weapons of mass destruction-related equipment and technology. Discussion of specific proposals for sharing information on arms transfers is a first for this process and for these five countries. The arrangements for consultation we envision will give us the opportunity to influence arms transfers which we find destabilizing before they occur--to act instead of react. I hope to chair this next meeting in May.
Middle East Arms Control--Regional Security and Arms Control Group.
In Moscow last January, the United States and the Russian Federation hosted the organizational meeting for the multilateral phase of the Middle East peace process, which included establishment of an arms control and regional security working group. The process will not be easy; from our own history, we know that arms control is always hardest when the threat of armed conflict looms large. But we have made an important start. The regional participants in the Moscow arms control working group meeting demonstrated an earnest interest in getting down to business. The first substantive meeting of the groups is scheduled for Washington in mid-May, and we look forward to continued support from the regional players.
It is true we have made substantial progress in all areas. We and our non- proliferation partners have done a lot. The last year or so have been models of cooperative effort. But it is also true that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons represents a continuing threat. This is a time for stronger efforts, not for complacency. We need to do more nationally and internationally. The collapse of the Soviet Union has given us a chance to redirect some of our energies. The proliferation problem needs to be among the highest priorities. There is no single magic bullet that will stop proliferation. Rather, there are actions we need to take along a broad front. Only with concentrated effort will we be able to reduce and eventually eliminate the dangers of conventional and non-conventional weapons proliferation. We want to work closely with Congress in this important task. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Commodities

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 3 19924/3/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: Subject: Arms Control, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] The United States is pleased to announce that the 27 member-states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group have agreed on common export controls of nuclear- related dual-use items that could make a major contribution to the development of nuclear weapons. At a meeting in Warsaw on March 31-April 3, the Nuclear Suppliers Group approved a comprehensive arrangement to prohibit exports of some 65 key items of equipment and materials to unsafeguarded activities and nuclear explosives programs. This effort, which began a year ago under US chairmanship, is the most important export-control initiative of recent years. It will fill a crucial gap in existing controls and will greatly assist in our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States is grateful to all of the participants for their cooperation in bringing about this important step in strengthening the global non- proliferation regime. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

US Policy Toward Burma

EAP Description: Statement released by the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 6 19924/6/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Burma Subject: Human Rights, Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Our policy is to encourage political and economic reform and improvement in human rights practices. The United States has been in the forefront of international efforts to convince the Burmese military regime to transfer power to a civilian government and release political prisoners. We are seeking to send an ambassador to Burma to ensure that this message is delivered most effectively to the Burmese regime. We have terminated all forms of non-humanitarian assistance to Burma. We actively urge other countries to do the same and have established a consensus among the EC [European Community] countries, the Nordics, Australia, New Zealand, and others to withhold bilateral aid. We have suspended Burma's GSP [Generalized System of Preferences] privileges--the only country to do so, as far as we are aware. We have not certified Burma as cooperating fully on narcotics. This means that we will oppose loans to Burma by the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank, and other international financial organizations. Since 1988, we have maintained an embargo on the export of arms to Burma from the United States. We monitor arms sales to Burma by other countries and try to discourage such sales. We have worked to establish an international arms embargo on Burma, with considerable success. Following our lead, the EC last summer established an arms embargo as well. We last year declined to renew the bilateral textile agreement between the United States and Burma. In addition, we have often strongly urged, publicly and privately, that the Burmese Government immediately transfer power to a civilian government and release all political prisoners, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. We have worked with other interested countries to develop multilateral initiatives in the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission. The UN General Assembly in November passed a resolution, which the United States co-sponsored, critical of Burmese human rights practices, an important step in solidifying international opposition to the regime. We co-sponsored a resolution at the February meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission which was extremely critical of Burma. The resolution, which passed by consensus, called for the naming of a public rapporteur to investigate the human rights situation in Burma. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 15, April 13, 1992 Title:

Pre-transition Council For Afghanistan

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Apr, 10 19924/10/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South Asia Country: Afghanistan Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations, Democratization [TEXT] The UN Secretary General [Boutros Boutros-Ghali] announced today an agreement in principle among the Afghan parties to form a Pre-transitional Council in Afghanistan to take power in Kabul and oversee the next steps in a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. He has announced that the understanding also calls for a cessation of hostilities, a declaration of general amnesty, and guarantees of safety and security for all Afghans. The United States warmly welcomes this accomplishment. It is a major step toward self-determination for the Afghan people and ending over a decade of bloody war. During that period, the United States has consistently supported Afghan self-determination through a political settlement and safe return for millions of Afghan refugees. US support for the UN Secretary General's initiative to help bring about a settlement has been the centerpiece of our policy on Afghanistan. The UN Secretary General and his special representative for Afghanistan, Mr. Benon Sevan, have labored tirelessly to bring closure to the Afghan conflict during the 4 years since the signing of the Geneva accords. The Afghan parties and the international community are also to be congratulated for taking the steps necessary to initiate this process. The formation of a Pre- transition Council can be the first step toward political settlement and reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan. But, it is only a beginning and much hard work remains to be done. The United States calls upon all the Afghan sides to work for the good of their country and cooperate with the UN Secretary General and his special representative in following through on creation of the council and in the further steps required. We urge all parties to honor the call for a cessation of hostilities and guarantees of safety for all Afghans. We also call upon members of the international community to give strong backing to this process. The United States pledges continued strong support for the UN Secretary General's initiative and the right of the Afghan people to self- determination and peace. (###)