US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Progress in Middle East Arms Control
Bartholomew
Source: Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary for
International Security Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Arms Control,
International Organizations, and Science of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 24 19923/24/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Country: China, France, United Kingdom, USSR (former)
Subject: Arms Control, Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, I am happy to have the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee to present an update on our discussions with the other four
major suppliers [China, France, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet
Union] on arms transfers and non-proliferation. We have made good progress
in the difficult negotiations among the five, and I will discuss that in some
detail.
It is important to note at the outset that in the short time since the
President announced his Middle East arms control initiative--less than a
year ago--we have seen the major suppliers take some hard decisions. We
have begun moving in a new direction toward responsibility, transparency,
and consultation.
What we have accomplished so far represents a convergence among the five,
for the first time, regarding the needs of this critical part of the world.
There are many more tough decisions that need to be made before we can
claim success. It is important, however, to outline some key elements of
this new direction.
First, responsibility. The five have acknowledged that, as major suppliers
of arms, they bear a special obligation for ensuring that their arms
transfers do not undermine stability. This requires that they work together.
Second, transparency. The five have agreed that we must exchange
information about arms sales in order to identify and avert destabilizing
arms transfers.
Third, consultation. The five have agreed, for the first time, to make their
arms transfer decisions subject to debate and criticism and to abide by
common guidelines governing arms transfers.
This may not seem remarkable or challenging until you consider that the
United States is the only member of the five that shares the responsibility,
information, and decision-making about arms transfers with its legislative
body. What our partners have agreed, in effect, is to apply the collective
reason of the five to decisions they do not share with their own
parliaments.
This is not business as usual. I would submit to you that this is something
quite new.
At a minimum, what we are seeking in this process is to elevate the level of
transparency among the five to that of the United States. The agreement by
the five to share information about arms transfers in this way is a major
step in that direction.
I would like [to] take a moment to review how we got here and bring the
[sub]committee up to date on remaining issues among the five.
Five Power Talks
The President launched the Middle East arms control initiative on May 29,
1991. As you know, the President called for the five major suppliers of
conventional arms to the Middle East--the United States, USSR, France,
Great Britain, and China--to establish guidelines for restraining
destabilizing transfers of conventional arms and weapons of mass
destruction-related equipment and technology. The initiative also included
proposals:
-- To freeze and eventually eliminate holdings of surface-to-surface
missiles in the Middle East;
-- To implement a verifiable ban on the production and importation of
nuclear weapons-usable material in the region and call on the states of the
region to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and place all nuclear
facilities under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards;
-- To call for states in the region to become original parties to the
Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] and to implement CWC confidence-
building measures; and
-- To call for strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention and
urging regional states to adopt biological weapons confidence-building
measures.
Following the President's announcement, I led a delegation that met with
senior representatives from the Soviet Union, China, France, and [the] United
Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union] in Paris on July 8-9. In Paris, the
five issued a communique supporting the elements of the Prresident' s
proposal.
At that meeting, we agreed to work toward a US proposal to adopt
guidelines on responsible arms transfers. We did not envision these
guidelines as a means of establishing a cartel of weapons exporters; rather,
they were intended to set a common standard by which we could judge arms
transfers.
On September 26-27, the five governments sent experts to London to begin
drafting these guidelines and a mechanism for exchanging information on
arms transfers. They also began work on guidelines governing transfers of
weapons of mass destruction-related equipment and technology. The work
of these experts paved the way for a second senior-level meeting in London
on October 16-17.
At the close of the October meeting, the five governments adopted common
guidelines for the export of conventional arms. They agreed to inform each
other about transfers to the region of the Middle East for seven types of
weapons; namely:
-- Tanks;
-- Armored combat vehicles;
-- Artillery;
-- Military aircraft and helicopters;
-- Naval vessels, and
-- Certain missile systems.
They also agreed to make arrangements to permit meaningful consultation
about such transfers.
The agreement on guidelines implements the commitment made by the five
governments in Paris on
July 8-9 to observe rules of restraint. More importantly, it provided the
basis for debating the issue of arms transfers among the five. Without this
reference point, it would not be possible to apply "collective reason" to the
question of arms transfers.
The guidelines themselves are not a formula for determining who gets what.
Again, we are not trying to create an international arms cartel. Rather, the
guidelines give us wide berth to question and be questioned on such matters.
This is exactly what we intended when we proposed the guidelines.
However promising these guidelines are, the key to evaluating transfers--to
effecting decisions about arms transfers--is the consultative process.
Immediately following the completion of the guidelines, we gave top
priority to creating a mechanism to insure that the consultations of the five
have the ability to avert destabilizing transfers.
On February 20-21, the five met again in Washington at the expert level to
pave the way for a plenary meeting later this spring. The recommendations
of the experts on information sharing, weapons of mass destruction
guidelines, and weapons to be covered by the information exchange have
been compiled and will be forwarded to the next plenary meeting.
This was not easy to achieve, and several important issues and many details
must still be resolved. However, we are beginning to see a convergence
among the five on
the need for timely, meaningful consultations.
Before moving on to some of the remaining issues among the five, I would
like to draw attention to international efforts to bring greater transparency
to the arms trade. In December, the United Nations voted overwhelmingly to
implement a global conventional arms register to include data on
international arms transfers; the United States co-sponsored this
resolution. A panel of government experts set up by the United Nations is
now meeting to elaborate the technical procedures and other details
necessary for effective operation of the register. We are encouraged by the
broad support for the resolution and the movement toward greater
transparency. I think that the leadership by the five powers, who are also
represented on the UN Security Council, played a critical role in building
support for the resolution. There is ample evidence that the direction
charted by the five toward greater transparency and responsible arms
transfers has taken root in the UN arms register initiative.
Outstanding Issues
Without getting into the details of the negotiations or the positions held by
individual participants, I would like to describe the major outstanding
issues as we see them. I will be very careful not to discuss the positions of
other governments for reasons that, I'm sure, you understand.
First, there is not 100% agreement on our proposal to ban all surface-to-
surface missile transfers to the Middle East. This has been the policy of the
United States for many years. We have, for a long time, argued that these
weapons are qualitatively different from other conventional weapons
systems--that they are best suited in the Middle East to serve as terror
weapons capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. In our view,
these missiles do not serve a defensive or deterrent purpose in the region.
As you know, all five countries have now agreed to limit transfers of
missiles and missile technology defined by the Missile Technology Control
Regime [MTCR] which includes missiles capable of delivering a 500-
kilogram payload to a minimum distance of 300 kilometers. However, given
the danger posed by surface-to-surface missiles and the history of their use
in the Middle East, we believe that it is necessary to exercise even greater
restraint than that called for by the MTCR. The plain fact is that missiles
below MTCR range/payload capabilities can have a very destabilizing effect
in a region with strategic distances as small as those in the Middle East.
The President has called on the countries of the Middle East to freeze and,
ultimately, eliminate surface-to-surface missiles from the region through
arms control. The five supported this proposal in Paris, and we feel that it
would be inconsistent to endorse such a proposal and then continue to
transfer surface-to-surface missiles.
The second area with remaining differences involves the sharing of
information about arms transfers to the Middle East. This is very, very
important.
In our view, real transparency requires that we share information on arms
transfers before they occur. Of course, we would like this exchange to
occur as early as possible.
As you know, in our system, we consult with and formally notify the
Congress before final government approval of major defense equipment--
like tanks and aircraft--and services over $14 million dollars. However, the
arms transfer systems of the five are all different, and finding a common
point among them for information exchange to take place has been very
difficult.
Our top concern is that information should be exchanged in time to permit
serious consultation about whether a transfer should go forward. This
process must have the ability to affect decisions about arms transfers.
It is true that we can stop US arms transfers at any point before a recipient
takes possession of the goods. We can cancel export licenses and even turn
ships around on the high seas if we determine that [it] is necessary. We
expect that this is the case with all of the suppliers, but early consultation
is still important to us. We will continue to argue vigorously, as we have
from the outset, for early information exchange about Middle East arms
transfers.
There are also a number of important technical issues to be resolved.
Questions like:
-- What types and tonnages of naval vessels should we tell each other
about before transferring?
-- Should we exchange information on defensive anti-aircraft systems?
-- Should we exchange information on transfers of all combat aircraft or
only those with long ranges?
Our approach to these questions is, to be on the safe side, to call for more
rather than less.
But those of you familiar with the problems associated with questions like
"What is a tank," know how complicated and time consuming these technical
discussions can be.
These are not simple matters to resolve. In one case, we are asking states
to completely ban transfers of a whole category of weapons systems; in the
other, we are asking states to share privileged information about arms
transfers. Finally, we have a host of definitional questions that still need
to be resolved. Again, we are seeing a convergence, and many issues as
difficult as these have already been resolved. This is encouraging.
Arms Sales
In my previous testimony on the President's initiative, I commented that the
arms sales policy of the United States is aimed at supporting our strategic
objective in the region--stability. This is still the case,
Mr. Chairman.
Lest there be any misunderstanding about our arms transfer policy and our
objective of limiting destabilizing transfers to the Middle East through the
five power process, I would like to underscore some of the basic
assumptions underlying our policy.
First, arms transfers are an instrument of US policy and not an end in
themselves. US arms transfers worldwide, including those to the Middle
East, promote stability in a number of ways:
-- They help to deter aggression against friends and allies.
-- They promote regional cooperation and credible deterrence, e.g., through
the integration of small military forces.
-- They reduce the likelihood that US forces will have to be employed by
increasing the deterrent capability of regional forces and by allowing them
to deal with smaller contingencies on their own.
-- In cases where it is necessary for US forces to be introduced, they
increase the ability to operate jointly with regional forces and to use their
infrastructure.
-- Finally, the enhancement of US influence among key regional decision-
makers, the creation of confidence in their defensive capabilities, and their
cooperation with the United States make those key regional decision-
makers willing to take risks for peace and willing, potentially, to engage in
arms control.
Second, it has been our policy only to only make arms transfers to the
Middle East that are consistent with maintaining stability. We do not
transfer arms without careful consideration of the military threat and the
potential effect on regional security and stability.
We do transfer arms when it means supplying friends and allies with the
means to defend against and deter aggression. These transfers are fully
consistent with our policy of promoting stability.
The Administration would not and could not support any policy that would
prohibit sales that are necessary for the security of our friends and our own
national interests. A policy that seeks to regulate arms transfers without
case-by-case consideration of the current and future security requirements
of the Middle East would seriously undermine our influence in a region that
this nation thought critical enough to send a half a million Americans into a
war 1 year ago.
Let me state, once again, that our effort to promote restraint among
suppliers is intended to eliminate destabilizing, irresponsible arms
transfers and prevent another aggressor state like Iraq from acquiring
weapons far beyond its legitimate defensive needs.
This effort by the five will not solve the political and security problems of
the region. Ultimately, such a solution must come from the region itself.
Nonetheless, the President's initiative can make a considerable contribution
to creating the conditions in which such a solution will be possible. We are
heading, therefore, in an important and positive direction. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: UN Peace-keeping Efforts To Promote Security
and Stability
Bolton
Source: John R., Assistant Secretary for International
Organization Affairs
Description: Excerpts from a statement before the Subcommittees on
International Operations and on Human Rights and
International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 25 19923/25/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Caribbean, Eurasia, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Cambodia, USSR (former), El Salvador, Somalia,
Morocco
Subject: United Nations
[TEXT]
I look forward to discussing with you a topic which I consider of great
importance to the United States' national security, namely UN peace-
keeping. To start, however, I would like to make a few brief remarks on
three topics: the rapid expansion of UN peace-keeping, our attempts to
control the costs of UN peace-keeping, and the outlook for the future.
Expansion of UN Peace-keeping
The last 2 years have seen an explosion in UN peace-keeping and peace-
making activities. Since last April alone, the Security Council has created
new peace-keeping missions in the Persian Gulf, the Western Sahara, El
Salvador, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia. Indeed, the last 4 years have seen the
creation of more new UN peace-keeping operations than had been undertaken
in the previous 43 years of the organization's history.
Why has UN involvement in peace-keeping expanded so rapidly? The
simplest answer is because the world has changed so much. The collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union has led to
breathtaking changes in the relations among countries and among peoples,
most of which have been for the good. They have not only brought freedom
to millions of individuals who lived under the yoke of tyranny but will also
lead to greater global prosperity and stability. Some changes have,
however, been pernicious and have led to the open expression of long pent-up
hatreds. In varying degrees, these regional conflicts damage US interests
and impact on our national security.
Overall, these changes in the world order have tremendously increased the
importance of the UN's peace-keeping role. With the end of the Cold War, the
Security Council is finally able to carry out the chief duty entrusted to it by
the founders of the United Nations--the preservation of international peace
and security. No longer do animosities between the Soviet Union and the
Western members prevent the council from taking action to resolve threats
to the global peace.
Now, the members of the council work together effectively to address
international problems which would have been allowed to fester a few short
years ago. In case after case, the
Security Council finds solutions to problems which once seemed intractable.
Those solutions are frequently imperfect, and they always cost money. They
do, however, usually prevent the expansion of conflict, have saved countless
thousands of lives, and cost much less than direct US involvement.
The end of the Cold War has not only made the Security Council a more
effective institution for addressing threats to international peace, it has
also meant that regional conflicts which were fueled by superpower rivalry
are now ripe for resolution. In countries as diverse as Angola, El Salvador,
and Cambodia, communist governments and guerrilla movements have
realized that they can no longer count on outside support and must make
peace. Given the long history of animosity, people in such countries
naturally look for an impartial arbiter as they try to make the transition to
a system incorporating all sectors of society. In many cases, the United
Nations becomes that arbiter.
As I have mentioned above, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and
in the Soviet Union, coupled with rapid democratization throughout the Third
World, has had some undesirable side effects. Religious and ethnic
animosities long crushed under the dictator's boot heel are now coming to
the fore. Yugoslavia has already fallen apart because of such tensions;
unrest is also palpable in various portions of the former Soviet Union. In
some cases, the world community will be forced to turn to the United
Nations to try to help cool things down.
New UN peace-keeping activities confront daunting obstacles to fulfilling
their mandates. Each individual case presents unique logistical, financial,
and underlying political problems. For example:
Cambodia.
In Cambodia, the United Nations is beginning to implement its most
ambitious peace-keeping effort to date--UNTAC [UN Transitional Authority
in Cambodia]. Issues of immediate importance include estab-lishing as soon
as possible a viable, nationwide UN presence; initiating priority de-mining
and infrastructural improvements essential for timely repatriation;
preparing to demobilize as many of the factional forces [as] possible (at
least 70%); and, finally, creating the conditions for free and fair elections.
No less important is identifying sources to fund UN activities, especially an
urgent need for accommodation, transportation, communication, and other
support equipment and services.
Yugoslavia.
On February 21, 1992, the Security Council established a UN Protection
Force for Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). UN estimates project a force of around
14,000 at a cost of close to $640 million [for] the first year. Security
Council members have expressed concern over the high costs of UNPROFOR
and authorized the dispatch to Yugoslavia of an advance mission to, inter
alia, look at ways of reducing costs and creating the conditions necessary
for UNPRO-FOR's full deployment. UNPROFOR will be charged with
demilitarizing the three UN-protected areas within Croatia and overseeing
the civil and police administration of those areas.
El Salvador
The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was created May 20, 1991.
ONUSAL's original mandate was to verify compliance with the San Jose
agreement on human rights. The Security Council expanded ONUSAL January
14, 1992, to include separate peace-keeping (military) and police
contingents. There have been accusations on the part of the Government of
El Salvador that the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] has
violated provisions of the peace agreement on declaring its arms
inventories, land seizures, and prompt entry into the zones of concentration.
On the other hand, FMLN charges the government with trying to retain former
paramilitary police units that it had promised to disband. We are looking
into allegations by both parties and are working closely with ONUSAL to
ensure that the process not lose momentum.
ONUSAL was able to deploy rapidly because its human rights unit had been in
El Salvador since mid-1991 and because it inherited all resources, including
military officers and equipment, belonging to the UN Observer Mission in
Central America (ONUCA), which was dissolved shortly after ONUSAL/PK's
[Peace-keeping] creation. ONUSAL has had problems, however, in recruiting
sufficient numbers of qualified police officers.
Western Sahara
Although 185 UN cease-fire monitors deployed in the Western Sahara
September 6, 1991, to observe the cease-fire between Morocco and the
POLISARIO [Popular Liberation Front for Rio de Oro and Saguia El Hamra], the
formal deployment of the full MINURSO [UN Mission in Western Sahara]
peace-keeping contingent to conduct a referendum has been delayed because
of the inability of the two parties to agree on the criteria to be used in
selecting voters. The Secretary General has asked that the Security Council
grant him until the end of May to resolve all outstanding impediments to the
deployment of MINURSO.
Somalia
The Security Council approved last week the dispatch of a technical team to
Somalia to discuss with all the warring factions the modalities of providing
UN cease-fire observers and the effective distribution of humanitarian
relief. The technical team must deal with the fact that there are many more
opposing factions in Somalia than the two Mogadishu-based ones with which
the United Nations has heretofore dealt. The team must also confront the
fact that there has not yet been a respected cease-fire despite numerous
agreements brokered either through regional or UN efforts. To be effective,
UN peace-keepers in Somalia will have to oversee a continuing political
process whose goal will be not only a cease-fire but a resolution of the
fundamental political differences among the warring factions that will
allow, in the first instance, the successful distribution of badly needed
relief assistance.
Peace-keeping Costs
Strong support of UN peace-keeping activities has long been a basic tenet of
US foreign policy. We must ensure the United Nations has the wherewithal
to accomplish its very important mandate. The lack of adequate and timely
financing for new and existing peace-keeping operations will pose serious
problems for the United Nations and for the US leadership and influence in
the United Nations.
We have requested an FY 1992 budget amendment totalling
$350 million in the foreign assistance bill to meet FY 1991 and 1992
unfunded requirements for the UN Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM),
the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), the UN Mission in Western
Sahara, and the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). Also included in
this request is the initial funding for the UN Observer Mission in El
Salvador, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, and the UN Protection
Force in Yugoslavia.
For FY 1993, the Administration has asked for $350 million to meet new and
anticipated peace-keeping requirements. This money will be used to fund UN
peace-keeping missions in Cambodia and Yugoslavia, as well as continue the
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador.
Benefits to the United States
We are keenly aware that our current appropriations request for US
contributions for international peace-keeping activities represents a very
large increase over our previous years' requests. However, while the costs
are expanding rapidly, UN peace-keeping remains one of the best bargains
there is with respect to the maintenance of world peace. Obviously, the
amounts which the world spends on UN peace-keeping are only the minutest
fraction of what the world spends on armaments.
UN peace-keeping serves US national security interests. Peace-keeping
helps prevent regional conflicts from expanding and directly threatening US
interests.
Admittedly, not all of those trouble spots would appear to be of direct
interest to the United States. Many, however, are areas where US lives,
money, and prestige have been on the line for years. In those instances, we
appear to be making the last payment on investments which have succeeded
brilliantly; failure to pay that last installment could, however, jeopardize
the entire investment.
For example, our $20-million bill for UN peace-keeping in El Salvador looks
high at first--until one compares it with the billions of dollars we have
spent ensuring that that nation got to the point where UN peace-keeping
could succeed. Similarly, the scores of millions of dollars we spent to
ensure that a Marxist government did not stifle the will of the people of
Angola more than offset the money we are asked to spend to ensure that the
United Nations can help demobilize the rival armies and hold fair elections.
Finally, who in good conscience could walk away from the last, best chance
to resolve the tragedy of Cambodia, a tragedy with which the American
people have been linked for years. The United Nations is the best insurance
against a return to power by the Khmer Rouge.
Even those UN peace-keeping missions with which our ties are less obvious
usually directly benefit US interests. For example, in many fields--
investment, trade, strategic interests--our links to Yugoslavia are tenuous.
Continuation of the war there, however, would have had a direct, negative
effect on many important US interests in the area. To take one obvious
example, the flow of large numbers of refugees could well have undermined
the new, fragile democracies on Yugoslavia's northern and eastern borders.
Keeping Costs Down
While I continue to believe UN peace-keeping is a tremendous bargain, I am
also painfully aware of the need to keep costs down. Our own domestic
concerns demand it; so does the credibility of the United Nations.
How can we keep the cost of UN peace-keeping down? One way is to create
as few new missions as absolutely necessary. The UN Charter makes it
clear that regional organizations should take the lead in trying to resolve
regional problems; we fully support this approach.
Let me assure you that we do not view UN peace-keeping as the savior of
lost causes, to be thrown into a crisis willy-nilly when all else fails. If
new peace-keeping missions must be created, they must have as clearly
defined a mandate as possible. Preferably, the duration of a new mission
should be set in concrete and tied to a process which will clearly lead to a
resolution of the underlying problem. The current UN peace-keeping
missions in Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia and the one successfully
concluded in Namibia all share these characteristics.
Even if the duration of a peace-keeping mission cannot be so sharply
defined, we must make it clear to all parties that UN peace-keeping is not
an end in itself; UN peace-keepers will not serve as the perpetual
guarantors of an armed truce. For example, the Security Council resolution
authorizing peace-keeping in Yugoslavia specifically tied the deployment of
UN peace-keepers to the attempts to negotiate a resolution to the crisis at
the EC [European Community]-sponsored conference on Yugoslavia. We
expect those talks to succeed; if they do not, however, and if the parties
abandon good faith efforts to resolve their differences, the Security Council
will have to re-examine the mandate of that mission.
Another way to keep costs down is to ensure that each individual mission is
as lean and efficient as possible. We are in constant communication with
the UN Secretariat to make certain that the number of peace-keepers
deployed in each mission is the absolute minimum need to implement that
mission's mandate. We also press the Secretariat to maximize voluntary
contributions from the countries hosting peace-keeping missions and from
countries with particular interests in the success of a given mission. These
approaches have resulted in the savings of hundreds of millions dollars from
the estimates initially advanced by the United Nations for peace-keeping
missions in Namibia and Angola. We expect that they will lead to even
greater savings with respect to the upcoming missions in Cambodia and
Yugoslavia.
Finally, let me assure you that we are examining the question of whether
there is any honorable and equitable way to adjust the percentage that we
pay of UN peace-keeping costs. We cannot escape the fact that our economy
is more than twice as large as that of any other nation. We cannot deny that
we are the world's only remaining superpower. We cannot escape the reality
that our overseas interests are broader and more compelling than those of
any other country. Still, within those parameters, we will fight to ensure
that the US share of UN peace-keeping is kept to an absolute minimum. To
me, for the United States to continue to pay 30.4% of the total cost of UN
peace-keeping does seem excessive.
The Future
We have reached one of the three great junctions of 20th century history.
We have won the Cold War, just as we won the First and Second World Wars.
Our prestige and influence in the world are at an apogee, but, in some ways,
we are tired from the struggle and want to turn inward. Our domestic
problems are myriad and cry out for attention. We want somebody--anybody-
-to take over the load overseas.
Over the long term, however, to turn our backs on the world we must live in
would be disastrous. We all remember the isolationism of the 1920s and its
evil twin, economic protectionism, just as we remember the chaos they
helped create on the world stage. We must never let that happen again.
We have an opportunity to do great things:
-- Help stabilize fledgling democracies in countries that have known only
tyranny for decades;
-- Promote human rights on a global scale; [and]
-- Use the United Nations and the relevant regional organizations to help
create greater international peace and stability than the world has ever
known.
The "good guys" are clearly winning right now; if we, the United States,
abandon the fight, however, the outcome will become much murkier. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Securing Nuclear Weapons In the Former Soviet
Union
Burns
Source: William F. Burns, Head of the US Delegation on
Safety, Security, and Dismantlement
Description: Statement before the House Armed Services Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 26 19923/26/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before this committee today to
discuss the Administration's efforts to facilitate the safe, secure
dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.
As you are well aware, the breakup of the Soviet Union has posed new
challenges and opportunities in the area of national security. President
Bush responded to these challenges and opportunities beginning with his
September 27 initiative. As part of that initiative, the President proposed
discussions to explore cooperation on the safety and security of nuclear
weapons and on their safe and environmentally responsible storage,
transportation, and destruction.
Our objective is to enhance the security of nuclear weapons in the former
Soviet Union, particularly those tactical nuclear weapons slated for
elimination under commitments made by [former Soviet President]
Gorbachev and [Russian President] Yeltsin. These weapons, in particular,
because of their relatively small size and transportability, pose the
greatest risk of loss of control or seizure by third parties. We wanted to
take steps to ensure that these weapons were quickly disabled and
consolidated at sites where they could be securely controlled. In addition,
we wanted to put into motion a process for quickly dismantling them.
I agreed to come out of retirement to lead the US delegation on Safety,
Security, and Dismantlement (SSD) because these goals and objectives are
extremely important ones. As you know, we have been engaged with
officials of the Russian Government since last November in an attempt to
formulate a specific package of assistance. This effort has been aided by
the Congress, which provided the President discretionary authority to spend
up to $400 million for this purpose.
Let me bring you up to date on the current status of our talks with the
Russians. Following discussions between the US and Russian SSD
delegations in Moscow in January, Secretary Baker, on February 18,
presented [Russian] Foreign Minister Kozyrev with papers on seven topics
that appeared to be promising areas where assistance could accelerate the
process of dismantling nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union and
enhance their safety and security. These papers summed up our views on the
current state of play and made specific proposals for discussion at a next
round of SSD meetings in Moscow. In a number of areas, we proposed
meetings of technical experts to try to reach closure on specific areas of
assistance.
These meetings took place in Moscow over the period of March 5-13, during
which each of the seven topics proposed by the United States was discussed.
I am pleased with the overall progress we made. Let me review each of the
specific areas we discussed:
Fissile Material Containers. The Russians have stated a requirement for
45,000 containers for the transportation/storage of fissile material and
weapons components from dismantled nuclear weapons. Based on our
previous discussions, we believed that US-designed containers could meet
this requirement. After discussions between US and Russian experts,
however, we have now concluded that production of Russian-designed
containers would be optimal for their requirements.
This conclusion is based, inter alia, on the smaller size of Russian
containers, which minimizes required storage space, their belief that their
containers will meet all IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] test
standards, and the presence of ballistic protection and other additional
security features in their design. A decision is still required on where such
containers will be produced. Three options are under consideration:
production in the United States, production in Russia with US financial
assistance, or assembly of the container in Russia using at least some
components or materials that have been manufactured in the United States.
The Russians have committed to providing us detailed production drawings
for their container by March 31. Based on this information, a decision on
assistance can be made.
Weapons Supercontainers/Kevlar Blankets. The Russians have stated a
requirement for 250 supercontainers for the transportation of nuclear
weapons and fissile material. Because the United Kingdom has publicly
stated its intention to fulfill this requirement, it was not a focus of our
discussions.
The Russians, however, would like 250 Kevlar blankets to protect their
existing nuclear weapons containers until more capable supercontainers can
be constructed. Our discussions in this area proved to be very promising.
We have agreed to provide several prototype Kevlar blankets by May 1 and to
test them jointly with the Russian side. Based on this information, a
decision on the form of assistance to provide can be made.
Safe, Secure Railcars. The Russians have stated a requirement for 100
railcars to provide for the safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons.
Going into our recent discussions with the Russians, we felt that the
provision of 25 existing US railcars that we had previously used for the
transport of nuclear weapons was a promising area of assistance. As is so
often the case, however, the "devil was in the detail." Based on information
provided to us by the Russian side, US and Russian experts concluded that
the modification and testing of US railcars to make them compatible with
the Russian rail system would take an extended period of time, thus
minimizing their value in the current Russian weapon-dismantlement
process.
We have agreed to consider a Russian request for technical assistance in the
modification of existing Russian railcars to include additional safety and
security features. They are to provide us with specific proposals by March
31.
Nuclear Materials Storage Facility. The Russians have indicated that the
lack of a long-term storage facility for the fissile material removed from
dismantled weapons is a significant bottleneck in their dismantlement
process. We are committed to effective assistance to Russia that would
provide for safe and secure storage of uranium and plutonium from
dismantled weapons. However, assistance in the construction of a new,
long-term storage facility will have to be resolved in the context of
decisions on the ultimate disposition of fissile material removed from
nuclear weapons, i.e., whether it should be placed in long-term storage or
possibly converted for peaceful purposes and sold in the relatively near
future.
As a next step, the Russians are to provide us with the feasibility study for
their planned long-term storage facility by the end of this month. This
study should allow us to assess, in detail, all major aspects of their
proposed design including cost, physical structures, and security.
Accident Response. In January, the Russians indicated a strong interest in
discussing nuclear weapon accident response, particularly incidents which
could result in the release of significant radiation. In our latest round of
meetings, we provided detailed briefings by our experts. The Russians
indicated a strong interest in acquiring US equipment, e.g., diagnostic
equipment to assess the condition of weapons involved in an accident and in
training in its use.
We agreed that further meetings on accident response would be necessary.
As a next step, we will invite Russian experts to the United States next
month to witness the demonstration of US accident response equipment and
to determine the utility of such equipment for use in Russia.
State System of Accounting and Control for Nuclear Material. It is clear
that the dismantlement of nuclear weapons will present new challenges for
Russia. In the past, they have been concerned largely with item, i.e.,
weapon, inventory. Now they are faced with the prospect of controlling bulk
nuclear material. We provided a briefing on the US national system for
accounting and control of fissile material, but we still need a better grasp
of Russian facilities and systems in order to understand their problems and
assess potential areas of specific US assistance.
We left the Russians with a series of proposals for next steps including a
follow-up briefing on physical protection of nuclear material and reciprocal
visits to US and Russian fuel fabrication facilities, which we believe can be
accomplished over the next several months. Following these steps, we hope
to schedule follow-up discussion on possible cooperative arrangements.
The Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium. In early February
at Camp David, President Yeltsin proposed discussions on the conversion of
excess fissile material from dismantled weapons of the former Soviet Union
into fuel for power reactors. This issue raises important economic and non-
proliferation issues, and our preliminary discussions in Moscow only
scratch the surface on these questions. In addition, this issue is connected
to the question of the requirement for a long-term storage facility for
fissile material. We left the Russians with a series of questions on their
approach to the disposition of highly enriched uranium and plutonium and a
proposed agenda for follow-on discussions.
We are not yet in a position to make specific decisions committing part of
the $400 million appropriated by the Congress. Our recent discussions in
Moscow, however, have moved the ball forward to a significant degree. As I
have noted, we have also agreed with the Russians on specific next steps
with short-fuse timelines, particularly with regard to potential areas of
assistance in the safety, security, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
Despite some fits and starts at the working level, I believe we have high-
level Russian commitment to moving the SSD process forward expeditiously.
Their ability to meet their self-imposed deadlines, however, will be an
important test of their resolve in this regard.
As a final point, I would also note that NATO has now established an ad hoc
group to discuss assistance in the safety, security, and dismantlement of
nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. This group will help to ensure
that our efforts in this area do not conflict or overlap. We had a successful
first meeting of this group on March 18. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Trade and Cooperation In Space Technology
Between The US and the Former Soviet
Union
Duelfer
Source: Charles A. Duelfer, Director, Center for Defense
Trade, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Space of the House
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 25 19923/25/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Subject: Science/Technology, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
Today, I plan to discuss the Department of State's regulatory and policy
responsibilities in the defense trade area. As you may know, my division is
responsible for the licensing of commercial munitions sales.
Specifically, I would like to focus on trade and cooperation in space
hardware and technology between the United States and the former Soviet
Union. We are at a crossroads of sorts. As I review our regulatory
responsibilities, I will be discussing some important changes that we plan
to make over the coming months.
First, let's deal with:
-- Why we license defense exports;
-- How we determine what is a defense item; and
-- How we license them.
Simply put, our ability to influence events around the globe can hinge on our
ability to stem the flow of weapons. Defense sales have long been a
recognized building block of our foreign policy.
Legislation and Regulation
Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) authorizes the President
to control the export and import of defense articles and services. Primary
responsibility for exercise of this authority is delegated to the Secretary of
State. Under that authority, the Secretary promulgated the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations [ITAR] (22 CFR Parts 120-130), which detail
the requirements for export and temporary import of defense articles and
services.
The Department of State determines whether a particular item should be
covered by the USML [US Munitions List] or more appropriately covered by
the "dual-use" Commerce Control List (CCL)--basing its decision, in part,
upon the findings of an interagency panel. Removing an item, entire
category, or sub-category from the USML requires, by law, the concurrence
of the Department of Defense.
The AECA establishes the principle that munitions licensing decisions are to
be made "in furtherance of world peace and security and foreign policy of
the United States." The implications of this requirement are that licensing
decisions are not [to] be based solely upon commercial considerations but on
fundamental national security and foreign policy concerns.
Changes to the ITAR
The inclusion of an item on the USML is based, primarily, upon whether it is
deemed to be inherently military in character or has a predominantly
military application. Whether an item may be used for both military and
civilian purposes does not in and of itself determine whether it is subject
to ITAR control. Nor is the intended use of the item after its export--i.e.,
whether for a military or civilian purpose--relevant in determining whether
the item is subject to ITAR control.
We are in the process of publishing a new version of the ITAR which would
change our criteria for determining defense articles. The new guidelines
are intended to assure that decisions regarding items reviewed for inclusion
or retention in the USML take into account civil applications and
performance capabilities.
The Licensing Process
When a US company wishes to export an item controlled by the ITAR, it must
apply to the Office of Defense Trade Controls for an export license. Seventy
percent of the licenses we receive can be approved or disapproved without
further staffing or interagency consultation.
However, some 30% of license applications require additional review from
other offices in the Department of State or a national security or technical
assessment from the Department of Defense, NASA, or other agencies. After
receiving recommendations from those offices and agencies consulted, the
Office of Defense Trade Controls either approves or denies the request,
taking into account any congressional reporting requirements or
international agreements such as COCOM [Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls] or the MTCR [Missile Technology Control
Regime].
Among the factors we consider in approving or denying a license are:
-- US foreign policy and national security interests;
-- Regional stability;
-- Technology transfer issues;
-- Human rights;
-- Missile or nuclear proliferation; and
-- The end-user's identity and the declared end-use.
US Policy on Space Technology Transfers
I'd like to turn now to the subject of how space commodities and
technologies are handled in the ITAR. Today, the ITAR contains five
categories containing space-related commodities and technologies:
1. Launch vehicles, guided missiles, ballistic missiles, rockets, missile and
space vehicle powerplants, associated equipment and propellants for these
vehicles. (USML Categories IV and V)
2. Manned or unmanned spacecraft and satellites--without exception,
regardless of type, end-use, or end-user; power supplies for spacecraft and
all "components, parts, accessories, attachments, and associated equipment
specifically designed or modified for spacecraft." (USML Category VIII)
3. All electronic equipment specifically designed or modified for
spacecraft and all specifically designed or modified components of such
electronic equipment. (USML Category XI)
4. All spacecraft guidance, control and stabilization systems, astro-
compasses, and star trackers. (USML Category XII)
5. All cameras designed for use in spacecraft, including encryption
equipment used aboard spacecraft. (USML Category XIII)
The Administration's policy on the transfer of space technology and
hardware is:
-- US launch assistance will be available to interested countries,
international organizations, or foreign business entities for those
spacecraft projects which are for peaceful purposes and are consistent with
US laws and obligations under relevant international agreements and
arrangements--such as INTELSAT [International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization]--as determined by the US Government.
-- Sales of unclassified US space hardware, software, and related
technologies for use in foreign space projects will:
--Be for peaceful purposes;
--Be consistent with relevant international and bilateral agreements and
arrangements;
--Serve our objectives for international cooperation in space activities;
--Restrict third country transfers;
--Favor transfers of hardware over transfers of technology;
--Not adversely affect US national security, foreign policy, or trade
interests through diffusion of technology in which the United States has
international leadership; and,
--Continue to be subject to the export control process.
USML Rationalization and Space Commodities and Technology
On November 16, 1990, the President signed Executive Order 12735 on
chemical and biological weapons proliferation and directed additional
export control measures. These measures include removal from the USML of
all items included by COCOM on its dual-use industrial list (the core list)
unless significant US national security interests would be jeopardized.
To implement the President's directive, the State Department established
the Space Technical Working Group which includes the Departments of
Commerce and Defense and other national security agencies. This working
group identifies spacecraft and related articles on the COCOM industrial
list. Our goal is to move all space items, which are primarily commercial in
nature, off the USML to Commerce's dual-use list. The new ITAR definition
of defense items and services, [which] I mentioned earlier, further
expresses our intent to achieve this goal.
The space working group is now working out the details for moving
commercial satellites from the USML to the Commerce Department's
Commerce Control List where such a move would not jeopardize US national
security interests. The space working group has already published proposed
language defining military GPS [Geo-Positioning Station] receivers for the
USML in the Federal Register, which has been well received by US industry
and will be added to the USML shortly.
In several weeks, the space working group expects to publish, in the Federal
Register, language which will identify those commercial communications
satellites whose capabilities require that they remain on the USML in the
interest of US national security. This language has been developed with the
cooperation of US industry.
The space working group is also working to move all other commercial
communications satellites to the Commerce Control List. Hopefully, this
can be completed soon. The group then expects to conclude its review of all
satellite components and remote-sensing satellites and to move as many of
these as possible to the CCL.
Non-Proliferation Concerns
The task of the space working group has not been easy, due to the nature of
the commodities and technologies involved. The same rocket launcher that
puts a communications satellite into orbit can be used to carry a nuclear
warhead. The same weather satellite that predicts an oncoming storm
headed for Washington can be used to provide essential weather information
to battlefield commanders.
Development of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction
is possible through a dedicated military program or an ostensibly civil
space launch vehicle program. Recognizing the resulting threat to regional
stability and to the United States and its friends and allies, it is our policy
to hinder the proliferation of systems capable of delivering nuclear
weapons.
The United States encourages other nations which supply space hardware
and technology to establish comparable national controls and to adhere to
the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Therefore, the
United States:
-- Prohibits export of equipment and/or technology that would make a
contribution to a foreign country's strategic military missile program.
-- Exempts, on a case-by-case basis, certain US friends and allies subject
to appropriate non-transfer assurances and a presidential approval that
such transfers promote US foreign policy and national security objectives.
-- Controls dual-use items and technology when considered likely to
contribute to an unidentified nuclear-capable missile program in a non-
exempt country.
-- Seeks cooperation with supplier nations in limiting the export of
strategic missile-related hardware and technology by consulting with them
on the range of commodities and technology to be restricted, with special
attention to their re-transfer, modification, and control.
All executive branch agencies having responsibilities for export controls
have adopted stringent export controls on technology and equipment which
could make a direct or significant contribution to the design, development,
production, inspection, testing, or use of nuclear-capable missile delivery
systems and related components. At a minimum, this includes guidance sub-
systems and related software, propellants, propulsion systems, rocket
nozzles and related control systems, re-entry sub-systems, missile
structure, and unique support equipment.
International Non-Proliferation Efforts
The Missile Technology Control Regime is a partnership of 18 nations
committed to preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering
nuclear weapons. The MTCR partners' control the export of an agreed list of
missile-related hardware and technology designated in the MTCR Equipment
and Technology Annex. The annex was revised in November 1991, after a
thorough review based on 4 previous years of implementation experience.
Harmonization of these controls is discussed regularly.
"Missiles", as defined under the regime, includes any unmanned vehicle
capable of delivering a 500 kilogram [kg] payload to a range of 300
kilometers [km], including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles,
sounding rockets, cruise missiles, and drones. The MTCR explicitly calls for
controls on the export of space launch vehicles or any other annex items
that could contribute to the design, development, manufacture, or use of
missile systems capable of surpassing the 500 kg/300 km threshold.
In addition to complete systems, this could include, for example:
-- Inertial navigation systems;
-- Certain navigation, guidance, and control components;
-- Individual rocket motor stages;
-- Payload kick motors;
-- Propellants;
-- Composite materials;
-- Radiation-hardened components; and
-- Electrical components.
The annex items controlled by the United States include both munitions
items found both on the USML and dual-use items found on the Commerce
Control List. Any application to export an MTCR-annex item, regardless of
whether it is USML- or Commerce Control List-controlled, is referred to one
of two State Department-chaired interagency missile non-proliferation
working groups for review. These working groups review the export request
for missile proliferation concerns and make a recommendation to the
appropriate department on whether or not to approve or deny the export
license request.
The Commonwealth of Independent States
Thus far, I have reviewed the licensing process and our work to re-evaluate
those space items which can be moved off the munitions list. Lastly, I
would like to turn to our policy with respect to the trade of space items
with the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS].
It has been the policy of the United States to deny import and export
licenses for defense articles and services coming from or going to
proscribed destinations. This policy applies to Albania, Bulgaria, Cambodia,
Cuba, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Korea, Mongolia, Romania, Vietnam,
and to the now-independent states that made up the former Soviet Union. A
similar policy of denial is also applied to countries that have repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism, identified as Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea. The basis for this policy of denial,
in general terms, is simply that we do not wish to support the military
infrastructure of a potential adversary.
At this point, in view of the remarkable events in the CIS countries in the
past year, our policy is evolving. We are exercising our authority to make
exceptions to this policy of denial when it is in the interests of the United
States.
For example, with respect to the import of space technology from the new
republics of the Soviet Union, we have begun to make exceptions when
appropriate. We have just approved the temporary import of Soviet satellite
propulsion technology by a US firm interested in evaluating its potential for
application to Western systems.
In 1988, the State Department approved a NASA high-technology instrument
to be flown on a Soviet spacecraft under the US-Soviet Space Agreement.
Through the interagency process, the way was also cleared for NASA and
SDIO [Strategic Defense Initiative Organization] to visit the former Soviet
Union to evaluate the space technology there, including the recent NASA
evaluation of the Soyuz transport module (used with the Mir space station)
as a possible rescue vehicle for space station Freedom.
There is also US private sector interest in commercial space activities, and
we see opportunities to engage Russia and the other republics in trade in
space technology, goods, and services in ways that can encourage market
reforms and assist their defense conversion efforts in what has been a
military-dominated sector.
There have, however, also been several widely publicized cases in which the
circumstances did not support or permit the granting of an exceptional
approval. But, I want to state very clearly, there is no policy of blocking
any and all such transactions.
However, there are a number of important political, strategic, and
technology transfer issues still to be resolved. The Administration has
placed a high priority on sorting out the complex issues and competing
interests inherent in discussion of space trade with the former Soviet
Union.
For example, we must carefully consider the effect of possible entry of CIS
launch services on our own economic interests that include satellite
operators and users as well as our launch companies. There are several
points we must keep in mind when considering this question.
-- We cannot ignore the past role of the Soviet military in Soviet space
activities.
-- Prices at the low level being offered by the Russians do not represent
their real cost in a true free market economy.
-- Important technology transfer considerations would weigh heavily in any
decision to allow the Russian launch of a US satellite.
Earlier in my statement, I described the process by which we are moving
certain commercial satellites to the Commerce list. I would like to tell you
that this will solve the question of the export of commercial satellites to
the CIS. However, these same issues will be relevant when these
commercial satellites are on the Commerce list. Therefore, we have placed
a high priority on a review of this issue within the Administration. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Nuclear Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet
Union
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 24 19923/24/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
The United States has recognized the severity of nuclear reactor safety
problems in the former Soviet Union and has been cooperating both
bilaterally and through international organizations in an effort to help
reduce those problems and avoid future Chernobyls.
There are four areas where we are working on this:
1. Since 1988 the United States has participated in an extensive joint
program on nuclear reactor safety with the former Soviet Union. The US
side, led by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and supported by the
Department of Energy, has pursued such goals as improving operator-
training, modernizing aging facilities, and strengthening safety regulations.
2. We have supported the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA]
safety evaluation of nuclear reactors in the former Soviet Union. We have
participated in IAEA safety review missions to two Russian reactors (in
Novovoronezh and Dola) and will be sending a representative to meetings in
April on the safety of RBMK reactors.
3. At the recent Washington Coordinating Conference, there was broad
support for providing further assistance to the former Soviet Union in the
area of nuclear reactor safety, and we are following up with other
concerned parties.
4. Finally, the United States recently co-sponsored the creation of an
international science and technology center that will give weapons
scientists in the former Soviet Union opportunities to redirect their efforts
to non-military endeavors. We have held discussions with the center's
founding parties, and there is broad agreement that the first projects
funded by the center will include projects in the area of nuclear reactor
safety. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Trade With the Former Soviet Union Seeking New
Opportunities
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 27 19923/27/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The remarkable changes occurring in Russia and the other new states of the
former Soviet Union offer the United States Government and the private
sector unique opportunities to expand trade with these countries, especially
in high-technology areas that have not before been readily available to us.
The Administration's policy is to actively seek opportunities to acquire
goods, services, and technologies from the new republics that benefit our
economic and other security interests and to encourage private business to
expand their search for new opportunities. We are particularly interested in
access to new technologies that can be acquired economically. To facilitate
this process, we are moving to eliminate restrictions that prevented normal
trade during the Cold War. We are, therefore, announcing today several
steps to promote greater levels of trade with these countries consistent
with our firm support for democratic and market economic reforms.
First, the Administration will promote a greater exchange of technology
between our countries in an area once closed by both sides. Specifically,
-- We will authorize the procurement by the Department of Defense of the
Russian Topaz space power unit that will give us access to new technology
at a significantly lower cost than if we were to try to develop it ourselves.
-- We will also authorize the purchase by the Department of Defense of
four Hall Thrusters which have possible applications for efficient orbital
transfers of satellites, and we have approved a license application for a
private US firm to proceed toward the purchase of these devices.
-- We will authorize a purchase of plutonium-238 from Russia, an isotope
of plutonium not used in nuclear explosives. This purchase will allow us to
meet NASA schedules for needed space power supplies economically and
without the need to restart a nuclear reactor to do so.
Second, we are also working to remove remaining barriers to commercial
imports of non-military items involving the private sector. In those few
instances where import licenses may be required, we will review such
licenses expeditiously.
Third, I would also note that the United States and our allies have reduced
COCOM [Coordinating Committee on Export Controls] controls by over two-
thirds and will continue to work to ensure that we maintain only those
controls on high-technology trade that are needed to protect our most vital
security interests. In that regard, the American business community should
be assured that export licenses for civilian transactions will be processed
expeditiously.
These transactions clearly signal our desire to normalize trade with the
new states. Additional details are available in a separate fact sheet.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Expanding and Normalizing Trade
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 27 19923/27/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Trade/Economics, Science/Technology
[TEXT]
The Press Secretary's announcement today called for expanding and
normalizing trade relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union,
especially in areas of high technology. The following actions demonstrate
the Administration's commitment to foster such trade.
Topaz Space Power Unit. The Administration will approve the purchase by
the Department of Defense of an unfueled Topaz space- nuclear reactor for
experimental use at the University of New Mexico. The reactor, which does
not contain nuclear fuel, is not intended to be launched and will only be used
to understand better its unique technology. This purchase will give us
access to new technology at a significantly lower cost than if we were to
try to develop it ourselves.
Hall Thrusters. The Administration has approved a license application for a
private US firm to proceed toward the purchase of Hall Thrusters, and we
have authorized the Department of Defense to purchase four of these same
devices. These provide a means for using electric current for propelling
objects in space and have broad potential applications in space, including
efficient orbital transfers of satellites.
Plutonium-238. The Department of Energy has been authorized to enter into
discussions with the Russian Federation concerning that govern-ment's
offer to sell plutonium-238 to the United States. Plutonium-238 is used as
the fuel in radio-isotope thermonuclear generators, which supply electricity
on NASA deep-space missions and on certain Department of Defense
terrestrial applications. The material purchased would come either from
existing Russian inventories or from reactors currently in operation. Any
sale would be conditioned on a commitment by Russia not to use the
proceeds to support its nuclear weapons production.
In addition, the Administration has taken several additional steps to expand
trade with the republics in ways consistent with our economic, national
security, and foreign policy interests:
Imports from the Former Soviet Union. Imports by both government and
private entities in the United States are generally not controlled unless
they meet certain criteria related to military systems, including space-
related technologies. For that reason, there are few governmental barriers
to imports into the United States from the republics of the former Soviet
Union.
However, where barriers exist to imports, either by private or governmental
entities, the United States will seek to remove those barriers or
expeditiously review the transactions. Import licenses will be considered
on a case-by-case basis with a presumption of approval unless such
imports--or other activities by the exporting entity--would contribute to
the maintenance of a threatening military capability.
We also are reviewing, on an expedited basis, our policies with respect to
space-related goods and technologies.
Exports to the Former Soviet Union. For over 40 years, the United States and
its allies have controlled the export of goods and technologies to the former
Soviet Union through the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls
(COCOM). Recent actions by COCOM have reduced by over two-thirds items
on the COCOM list, and we will work with our allies to continue adapting the
COCOM controls to the changed strategic situation.
In light of these new circumstances, whenever export licenses are required,
the Administration will:
-- Review license applications promptly;
-- Consider with a presumption of approval all export licenses for dual-use
items to civilian end-users in the republics of the former Soviet Union; and
-- Deny such applications only if the export would jeopardize the security
interests of the United States and its allies.
The Administration will also intensify efforts already underway to improve
the timeliness of export license processing. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: US To Establish Diplomatic Relations With
Georgia
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 24 19923/24/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Georgia
Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization
[TEXT]
The President has decided that the United States will take immediate steps
to establish diplomatic relations with Georgia. The United States had
recognized Georgian independence on December 25, 1991. In recent weeks,
the new Georgian Government has taken steps to restore civilian rule and
begin a dialogue on national reconciliation and [has] committed itself to
holding parliamentary elections this year.
On the basis of these actions and following communications between the
leader of the Georgian State Council, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Secretary of
State James Baker on the political, economic, and security principles of
most importance to the United States, the President believes that US
interests will be best served by having diplomatic ties with the Georgian
Government. The depth, extent, and richness of US relations with Georgia
will depend on the Georgian Government's commitment to these principles.
With this action, the United States now has diplomatic relations with all 12
of the new states of the former Soviet Union.
The United States will open an embassy in Tbilisi as soon as possible. In
addition, the United States will support Georgia's membership in relevant
international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Fact Sheets: CSCE
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Mar, 24 19923/24/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Whole World
Subject: CSCE, History
[TEXT]
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--also known as the
CSCE or the Helsinki process--is an ongoing multilateral forum involving all
the countries of Europe, all former Soviet republics, the United States and
Canada. The CSCE actually began in earnest in the early 1970s, during the
period of "detente" between East and West, culminating in 1975 with the
signing of the Helsinki Final Act.
Helsinki CSCE Meeting
The 1992 Helsinki meeting is the fourth follow-up since the signing of the
CSCE Final Act in Helsinki in 1975. The meeting will review the entire
spectrum of CSCE issues and activities, and set CSCE's course into the mid-
1990s. It will run for 3 months beginning March 24 and culminate in a
summit scheduled to open July 9.
At Helsinki, CSCE states will review progress in implementing CSCE
commitments throughout the CSCE community, particularly in light of the
organization's substantially increased membership.
Currently, 51 states participate in CSCE, including all the former Soviet
republics.
Participating states will consider ways to assist new members in fulfilling
their CSCE commitments.
In the security area, Helsinki will inaugurate formal talks to establish the
post-Helsinki security forum, which will provide a venue for wide-ranging
discussions and negotiations on security in the new Europe and will be open
to all participating states.
In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Helsinki meeting
will look at ways to build and strengthen democratic institutions
throughout Europe. The newly expanded Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights in Warsaw will play a key role in this effort.
In economics, Helsinki will establish the agenda and modalities for the new
CSCE Economic Forum. The forum was established at the Prague Council of
Ministers' meeting in January to strengthen CSCE's dialogue on economic
issues and help address problems relating to the transition to market
economies.
The forum will draw on the expertise of existing economic organizations
such as the European Community, the Economic Council of Europe, and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Issues in CSCE
The Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents are not legally binding
treaties but are considered politically binding on each of the CSCE states,
which, on the basis of the rule of consensus, have agreed to their provi-
sions. These provisions are divided into what are called "baskets."
Basket I: General Principles and Security Issues
The first basket focuses on 10 basic CSCE principles of international
behavior that the CSCE participating states have agreed to observe. These
include respect for territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes,
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights, and self-
determination of peoples.
Basket I is also devoted to security issues. The participants have endorsed
a program of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to remove
some of the secrecy surrounding military activities. Specifically, Basket I
calls for prior notification of military maneuvers and other major military
movements, as well as an exchange of observers. These measures, which
apply to the whole of Europe (as defined in the Helsinki Final Act), are
militarily significant, politically binding, and verifiable. The CSCE member
states also have made general pledges with respect to the importance of
arms control and disarmament.
Basket II: Economics, Science and Technology, the Environment
In Basket II, the CSCE member states placed a wide range of measures
designed to foster free market economies and enhance economic
cooperation, including better economic and commercial information and
improved business contacts and facilities. The members also agreed on
industrial cooperation measures such as harmonization of standards and
arbitration of disputes.
This basket also includes joint efforts in the fields of science (such as
physics, chemistry, meteorology, oceanography, space research) and
technology (e.g., energy, new technologies, computer technology). The
Helsinki Final Act calls for free exchange of information between member
states on these topics and others.
Finally, in Basket II, member states agreed to study bilateral and
multilateral environmental problems and ways to increase the effectiveness
of national and international protection measures. Areas of interest include
air and water pollution, marine protection, and protection of the
Mediterranean environment.
Basket III: Humanitarian Issues
Basket III comprises issues relating to human rights and fundamental
freedoms, humanitarian questions, dissemination of information, and
cultural cooperation. A broad range of principles is encompassed under
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including individual liberty, rule of
law, freedom of expression, and equality of rights. Humanitarian issues
focus on improving human contacts within the member states, setting
standards for the approval of visas or transnational marriages, improving
freedom of travel for business or pleasure, as well as family reunification.
In its information category, the Helsinki Final Act seeks improved access to
all kinds of information--oral, written, film, and broadcast--and to improve
the working conditions of journalists. Cultural cooperation goals include
enhanced relations between the member states, student exchange programs
and visits, and ensuring wider access to printed materials.
CSCE's Role in Europe
With the accession of Albania in June and the Baltic states in September
1991, most former Soviet republics in January, and the Republic of Georgia
as well as Slovenia and Croatia in March 1992, 51 states now participate in
CSCE.
From its inception, CSCE served as the bridge across the East-West divide.
It set important standards of state behavior, particularly in the human
rights area. By holding the East accountable to those standards, the West
used the CSCE process to foster democratic and economic reform.
In signing the Paris Charter1 for a New Europe in November 1990, President
Bush and his counterparts strengthened the CSCE by enhancing its structure
and political consultations so that it can play a more active role in building
a post-Cold War community of stable, prosperous, and democratic states.
The Paris Charter reiterated basic Helsinki commitments and also
established a small CSCE Secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention
Center in Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections--transformed later into
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw. It also
endorsed the concept of greater parliamentary involvement in CSCE. The
first meeting of CSCE's Parliamentary Assembly takes place July 1992 in
Budapest.
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in
Paris on November 1990, following negotiations conducted within the CSCE
framework by the 22 countries of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact.2 The
follow-on negotiations are currently aimed at further strengthening
security and stability, including measures to limit the personnel strength of
conventional forces.
Also at the Paris summit, the CSCE member states agreed to a new set of
confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that build on the
existing regime of notifications and observations of military exercises. In
subsequent negotiations, which ended in March 1992, additional CSBMs
measures were agreed upon.
The 1992 meeting will review the implementation of CSCE commitments by
signatory states, survey the results of inter-sessional and other meetings
since 1989, strengthen and refine CSCE's institutions and procedures, and
set the future course for the CSCE process.
CSCE Institutions
The Charter of Paris signed in November 1990 committed CSCE member
states to a substantial enhancement of CSCE decision-making bodies,
mechanisms, and institutions in order to give permanence and strength to a
16-year-old process of ad hoc political consultations. By the close of the
Berlin Council of Ministers' meeting in June 1991, CSCE had gained three
new institutions and a number of new or expanded consultative mechanisms
geared toward intensifying pan-European dialogue.
Council of Ministers (COM). CSCE members agreed at the Paris summit to
establish a Council of Ministers (COM)--comprised of foreign ministers--as
its highest decision-making body and to have it meet at least annually. The
Charter of Paris set a broad mandate for the COM to deal with any issues
relevant to security and cooperation in Europe. The state hosting a COM
meeting assumes the chairmanship of CSCE and holds the position until the
opening of the next ministerial; Czechoslovakia is the current CSCE
chairman.
Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). The Charter of Paris also established
a subsidiary working group/executive body at the ambassadorial/political
director level. The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), acting as the agent
of the ministers, is charged with preparing for meetings of ministers,
carrying out their decisions, reviewing current issues, and considering
future work of the CSCE, including its relations with other international
organizations. CSO meetings are held at least quarterly. Several additional
meetings have been called to deal with the conflicts in Yugoslavia and
Nagorno-Karabakh. The state chairing the COM also heads CSO meetings.
CSCE Secretariat. The CSCE Secretariat opened in Prague in February 1991.
It is charged with administrative support of the COM and CSO, the
maintenance of archives, and the dissemination of information to the public,
non-CSCE states, and other international organizations.
Parliamentary Assembly. Legislators from CSCE states agreed last April to
meet on an annual basis. The first session will be held in Budapest in July.
The assembly has a consultative role in the CSCE process.
Office for Free Elections (OFE). The Office of Free Elections (OFE) started
operations last April with a general mandate to collect and disseminate
information on elections within CSCE states. The Charter of Paris specially
charges the OFE with fostering regular free and fair elections monitored by
international observers.
CSCE states agreed in January to expand the OFE into an Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. In addition to its original duties,
the office will now serve as a central information source for all aspects of
democratic institution building and will organize seminars on specific
topics in this area. It will be responsible for organizing periodic meetings
to address implementation of CSCE human dimension commitments. It will
also support use of the expanded human dimension mechanism.
Conflict Prevention Center (CPC). The first CSCE institution to open--in
Vienna in January 1991--was the Conflict Prevention Center, which is
charged primarily with overseeing the sharing of data on military forces in
Europe and hosting annual implementation meetings and those called under
the unusual military activities mechanism. The Paris Charter also provides
for CPC involvement in "reducing the risk of conflict" and possibly "broader
tasks relating to dispute settlement." CSCE foreign ministers in Berlin
agreed to put the CPC in charge of supporting implementation of the
peaceful settlement of disputes mechanism.
Conflict Prevention Center Consultative Committee (CPC/CC). The
consultative committee is essentially the steering group and board of
directors for the Vienna-based Conflict Prevention Center. Its primary
functions are to oversee the CPC and its communications network, discuss
information exchanged under agreed confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs), assess the implementation of those CSBMs, and hold
emergency sessions on significant military threats. CSCE states are
generally represented on the committee at ambassadorial level.
CSCE: Major Conferences and Meetings, 1989-92
1989
April-May: London Information Forum
May-June: Paris meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension
October-November: Sofia meeting on the Protection of the Environment
1990
March-April: Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe
June: Copenhagen meeting of Conference on the Human Dimension
September-October: Palma de Mallorca meeting on the Mediterranean
October: New York meeting of CSCE Foreign Ministers
November: Paris CSCE Summit
1991
January-February: Valletta Meeting of Experts on the Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes
May-June: Krakow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage
June: Berlin meeting of the CSCECouncil of Ministers
July: Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities*
September-October: Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension
November: Oslo Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions*
1992
January: Prague meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers
March: Helsinki preparatory meeting
March-June: Helsinki follow-up meeting**
July: Helsinki CSCE Summit
* Meeting added to the CSCE schedule at the November 1990 CSCE Summit.
** Can be extended with the agreement of all CSCE members.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Gist: Open Skies Treaty
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Mar, 24 19923/24/92
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: Eurasia, E/C Europe, Europe, North America
Country: Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelarus, Canada,
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, Georgia, United States
Subject: International Law, CSCE,
Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
The Treaty on Open Skies is the most wide-ranging international effort to
date to promote the openness of military forces and activities. It is
designed to improve mutual understanding and confidence by giving all
participating countries, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering
information about military forces and activities of concern to them. In
Europe, it meets the desire of many countries to build confidence and
enhance stability now that the bipolar division of the continent has ended.
In other regions, this type of openness and the techniques developed in the
treaty could be applied in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflict.
History of Open Skies
Open Skies was first proposed by President Eisenhower at the Geneva
Conference of 1955. The idea was rejected by the Soviet Union.
When President Bush reformulated the Open Skies concept in May 1989, the
world was on the verge of rapid change. Open Skies was proposed as a
means of confidence-building which would promote and consolidate existing
trends toward openness.
Formal negotiations on an Open Skies Treaty began in Ottawa in February
1990 and continued in Budapest in April-May 1990; however, it was
apparent that the Soviet Union was not prepared to open all its territory to
aerial observation.
After the Ottawa and Budapest stalemates, negotiations were on hold for
more than a year, although the United States and other countries kept
pressing the issue bilaterally. Only after the abortive August 1991 Moscow
coup attempt did the former Soviet Union agree to open all its territory to
observation. This cleared the way, and productive negotiations began
November 1991 in Vienna. The treaty was signed in Helsinki on March 24,
1992.
Participation and Implementation
Twenty-four countries participated in the negotiation of the treaty:
Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelarus, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Republic,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey,
Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Other republics on the
territory of the former Soviet Union may, if they choose, also sign the
treaty as initial participants. Georgia did so March 24. Other countries
participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were
invited as observers to the negotiations, and it is expected that many of
them will apply for full participation in the treaty soon after it enters into
force. The treaty is open to accession by any interested country, subject to
the agreement of the other participants. It is not restricted geographically.
The treaty establishes an Open Skies Consultative Commission which will
meet in Vienna to monitor the operation of the treaty and to discuss and
resolve any problems which may arise. The treaty is of unlimited duration
and provides for periodic review conferences.
For the United States, the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) will be
responsible for conducting and receiving Open Skies flights in coordination
with the Department of Defense and other relevant agencies.
Open Skies is not a system for gathering detailed technical intelligence.
But it will enable countries to collect basic information on the military
capabilities and activities of other countries, thereby enhancing mutual
security and confidence. It is explicitly a general purpose observation
system and is not tied to any arms control agreement. Participating
countries may, of course, seek information through Open Skies which would
be relevant to arms control agreements to which they are parties.
Raw data obtained from observation flights--for example, film negatives
and magnetic tapes--will be shared by the observing and observed countries.
Other countries participating in the Open Skies Treaty will be able to
purchase copies of data in which they are interested from the observing
country. Individual countries are responsible for their own analysis of the
raw data.
Principal Elements of Open Skies
The Open Skies Treaty is based on agreements on territorial openness, the
use of observation aircraft, the sensors on board those aircraft, and the
quotas of annual flights which each country in the treaty is willing to
accept.
Territory. The first requirement for a realistic Open Skies system was that
all participants agree to make all of their territory accessible to aerial
observation. This also was the most difficult question to resolve, given the
long tradition of closed areas in the former Soviet Union. It has now been
agreed, and specified in the treaty, that all territory is open to observation
and that countries may not restrict observation flights for national security
reasons. A country may only restrict an observation flight for legitimate
reasons of flight safety.
Aircraft. Observation flights will be conducted on unarmed aircraft
provided either by the observing country or the observed country. The United
States and most other participants would have been prepared to have all
flights conducted on aircraft provided by the observing cÄountry. The option
of using aircraft provided by the observed country was included at the
request of the former Soviet Union, a position maintained by Russia. All
aircraft used in Open Skies will be subjected to rigorous certification and
inspection procedures to ensure that the sensors on board meet the
standards of the treaty, and that sensors which are not permitted are not
installed.
Sensors. Aircraft may be equipped with video cameras, panoramic and
framing cameras for daylight photography, infrared line scanning systems
which also can operate at night, and synthetic aperture radar which can
operate day and night in any weather. The quality of the pictures produced
by the cameras on an observation aircraft is designed to make it possible to
recognize major items of military equipment, for example, to distinguish
between a tank and a truck. A number of other sensors were discussed in
the negotiations, but agreement could not be reached for their inclusion in
the initial regime. There was, for example, considerable interest in the
possibility of installing air sampling equipment. Countries participating in
the treaty will consider the addition of this and other categories of sensors
during periodic meetings of the Open Skies Consultative Commission. To
ensure the fullest possible participation in Open Skies, including by
countries lacking advanced sensor technology, the treaty provides that
sensors which are used shall be commercially available to all participants.
Quotas. Each participating country has agreed to an annual quota of
observation flights which it is willing to accept from other participants.
Quotas are loosely scaled to the size of the country, with the smallest
participants having two or four flights each. The United States and Russia,
as the largest participants, have accepted quotas of 42 annual observation
flights each. The number of flights actually conducted over a country and
which other country conducts them will depend on the particular concerns of
individual countries and on how the international situation develops. There
is now fairly intense interest in observing the area of the former Soviet
Union. However, there is very little interest in observing the United States
and Canada. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Open Skies Treaty Signed
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Date: Mar, 24 19923/24/92
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: Eurasia, Europe, E/C Europe, North America
Country: Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelarus, Canada,
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Georgia
Subject: International Law, CSCE
[TEXT]
Today, the United States, along with Canada and 22 European nations, signed
the Treaty on Open Skies in Helsinki, Finland.
In May 1989, at a time when the immense changes seen in Europe over the
past 3 years were just beginning, President Bush proposed that the nations
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the former Warsaw
Pact agree to open their territories to frequent overflights by observation
aircraft from the other side. The United States believes that the greater
transparency in military activities brought about by such an agreement will
help reduce the chances of military confrontation and build confidence in
the peaceful intentions of the participating states.
The Open Skies Treaty is the most wide-ranging international confidence-
building regime ever developed, covering the entire territory of North
America and nearly all of Europe and the former Soviet Union. Its
arrangements for observation flights using photographic, radar, and infrared
sensors and its provisions for sharing among participants the information
gathered are innovative means to help promote openness and stability in
Europe in these uncertain times. Open Skies could also serve as a basis for
similar arrangements in other regions of the world where there is a need to
build confidence.
The treaty establishes an Open Skies Consultative Commission. In early
April, it will convene in Vienna, Austria, to complete work on outstanding
technical and cost issues regarding treaty implementation. The treaty will
be submitted to the US Senate for its advice and consent to ratification
once this work is finished to the satisfaction of all
participants. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Treaty Actions: Multilateral
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Mar, 24 19923/24/92
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Region: E/C Europe, Eurasia, MidEast/North Africa,
Subsaharan Africa
Country: Estonia, Latvia, France, Angola, Australia,
Lithuania, Chile, Gambia, El Salvador, Argentina
Subject: International Law, Cultural Exchange,
Resource Management, Environment
[TEXT]
Multilateral
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7,1944.
Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Estonia, Jan. 24, 1992; Lithuania, Jan. 8, 1992.
Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving
international civil aviation, supplementary to the convention of Sept. 23,
1971 (TIAS 7570). Done at Montreal Feb. 24, 1988. Entered into force Aug.
6, 1989.1
Ratification deposited: Argentina, Feb. 12, 1992.
Cultural Property
Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import,
export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Done at Paris Nov.
14, 1970. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972. Ratification deposited:
Angola, Nov. 7, 1991.
Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor
Organization. Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20,
1948; reentered into force for the United States Feb. 18, 1980. TIAS 1868.
Acceptance deposited: Estonia. Jan. 13, 1992.
Maritime Matters
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, as amended. Done at
Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17,1958. TIAS 4044, 6285,
6490, 8606, 10374, 11094.
Acceptance deposited: Estonia, Jan. 31, 1992.
Pollution
Basel convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous
wastes and their disposal, with annexes. Done at Basel Mar. 22, 1989.
Accession deposited: Australia, Feb. 5, 1992.
Enters into force: May 5,1992.1
Property, Industrial
Amendments to the Paris Convention of Mar. 29, 1883 as revised at
Stockholm July 14, 1967, for the protection of industrial property. Done at
Geneva Oct. 2,1979. Entered into force June 3,1984. TIAS 6923, 7727.
Accession deposited: Gambia Oct. 21, 1991.
Territorial Sea
Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Done at Geneva
Apr. 29, 1958. Entered into force Sept. 10, 1964. TIAS 5639.
Accession deposited: Lithuania, Jan. 31, 1991.
Whaling
Protocol to the international convention for the regulation of whaling (TIAS
1849). Done at Washington Nov. 19, 1956. Entered into force May 4, 1959.
TIAS 4228.
Adherence deposited: Chile, Feb. 5, 1992.
World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural
heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975.
TIAS 8226.
Acceptance deposited:
El Salvador, Oct. 8,1991.
Ratifications deposited: Angola, Nov. 7, 1991; Saint Lucia, Oct. 14, 1991;
San Marino, Oct. 18, 1991. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: Treaty Actions: Bilateral
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Mar, 24 19923/24/92
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Region: Whole World
Country: Argentina, Cape Verde, China, Djibouti, Estonia,
Germany, Hungary, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Panama, Senegal,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, Venezuela
Subject: International Law
[TEXT]
Bilateral
Argentina
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Dec. 6,
1991. Entered into force: Feb. 10, 1992.
Cape Verde
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at
Praia and Washington Dec. 27,1991 and Feb. 25,1992. Entered into force:
Mar. 7, 1992.
China
Memorandum of understanding on the protection of intellectual property.
Signed at Washington Jan. 17, 1992. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1992.
Djibouti
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government
employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Djibouti Nov. 21 and Dec. 24,
1991. Entered into force Dec. 24, 1991.
Estonia
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at
Tallin and Washington Dec. 31,1991 and Feb. 10, 1992. Entered into force
Mar. 7, 1992.
Germany
Memorandum of understanding for cooperation within the area of short range
air defense (SHORAD) command and control systems for the purpose of
standardization and interoperability. Signed at Alexandria and Bonn June 14
and Dec. 20, 1991. Entered into force Dec. 20, 1991.
Hungary
Agreement relating to employment of dependents of official government
employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Budapest Nov. 18,1991 and
Jan. 16, 1992. Entered into force Jan. 16, 1992.
Japan
Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation in the field of
hydrology, water resources, and global climate change, with addendum.
Signed at Reston and Tsukuba Jan. 3 and Feb. 3, 1992. Entered into force Feb.
3, 1992.
Korea
Agreement for the safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relating to defense
and for which applications for patents have been made. Signed at Seoul Jan.
6, 1992. Enters into force on the 30th day after the day on which the
governments have notified each other that all legal requirements have been
fulfilled.
Mexico
Agreement concerning technical cooperation in chemistry, physics, and
engineering measurement sciences, with annex and appendix. Signed at
Mexico Jan. 29, 1992. Entered into force Jan. 29, 1992.
Panama
Swap agreement among the United States Treasury, the Government of
Panama, and the Banco National de Panama, with letter of understandings.
Signed at Washington and Panama January 29 and 30,1992. Entered into
force Jan. 30, 1992.
Senegal
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Dakar Nov. 26,1991. Entered into force
Feb. 10, 1992.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at
Kingstown and Washington Jan. 27 and Feb. 25, 1992. Entered into force
Mar. 7, 1992.
Tunisia
Memorandum of understanding concerning the operation of the INTELPOST
service, with details of implementation. Signed at Tunis and Washington
December 19, 1989 and Oct. 3, 1991. Enters into force upon date mutually
agreed upon by the administrations.
Venezuela
Agreement to suppress illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances by sea. Signed at Caracas Nov. 9,1991. Entered into force Nov. 9,
1991.
1Not in force for the US. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 13, March 30, 1992
Title: What's In Print: Foreign Relations of the United
States, Volume XII
Historian
Source: Statement released by the Office of the Historian,
Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 18 19923/18/92
Category: Features
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iran, Iraq
Subject: History
[TEXT]
The Department of State today released Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1955-1957, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq.
This volume, one of 27 printed volumes documenting American foreign
affairs from 1955-1957, focuses on US policies toward the Baghdad Pact, a
mutual security organization based on Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Documentation
in this 1,069-page volume was selected from previously classified records
of the White House, the Department of State, and other government agencies.
Copies of Volume XII (Department of State Publication No. 9917; GPO Stock
No. 044-000-02302-4) may be purchased for $39.00 (domestic postpaid) or
$48.75 (foreign postpaid) from the Superintendent of Documents, US
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.
The Office of the Historian has prepared a summary of the volume. For
further information, contact: Glenn LaFantasie (202) 663-1133.