US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: US-German Friendship Strengthens Atlantic
Partnership
Bush
Kohl
Source: President Bush, German Chancellor Kohl
Description: Introductory remarks at a White House news conference,
Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 22 19923/22/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Germany
Subject: History, NATO, Trade/Economics, Democratization
[TEXT]
President Bush:
Chancellor Kohl and I had a very productive
discussion on a wide range of the issues that face us in the new era. Among
them: the Amer-ican role in Europe, support for the democratic revolutions
in Russia and Eastern Europe, and world trade talks.
We agreed that NATO remains the bedrock of European peace and there is no
substitute for our Atlantic link, anchored by a strong American military
presence in Europe--which the Chancellor and I both agreed must be
maintained.
In our review of the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade--GATT] negotiations, the Chancellor and I reaffirmed our
determination to reach an early agreement that expands the world trading
system. This would be a victory for US-European partnership in promoting
free trade, spurring economic growth, and creating jobs in the United
States, Germany, and all developing countries.
We also discussed how we can best support democracy in the East. We
agreed that as Russia and other new democracies adopt reform programs, we
and the rest of the G-7 countries should take the lead in expanding financial
support through the international financial institutions.
Our talks have shown that the Atlantic partnership is as vital and healthy as
ever. I'm especially pleased to see the United States and Germany are
working as closely now as we did during the period of German unification.
And finally on a very personal side, Barbara and I were just delighted to
have this time together with Chancellor Kohl, with his wife, and it was also
a great pleasure to have their son up there at Camp David. It was a good
visit.
Mr. Chancellor, the floor is yours, sir.
Chancellor Kohl:
Mr. President, Mrs. Bush, ladies and gentlemen. I
would like to take up where you left off, Mr. President, and thank you and
Mrs. Bush for the very warm hospitality with which you received my wife,
my son, and the members of my delegation at Camp David. It was a very,
very friendly meeting, a very personal meeting, a very nice [meeting]--for
these discussions on problems of interest to both of us which will be of
interest for the very near future.
One of these issues--which we consider to be a very important one--was
the issue of GATT. Obviously, I did not come here as an official negotiator
but as a member--or as a representative--of an EC [European Community]
member country. I explained our position on this question once again. The
negotiations obviously are being weighed by the EC Commission, and the EC
Commission enjoys the full confidence of the EC member countries.
President Bush and I are in agreement that it is of paramount importance for
[the] world economy to come to a successful conclusion of the GATT
negotiations now, and we are in agreement that we have to prevent--at all
costs--a fallback into a policy of protectionism.
We know that it is, particularly at this juncture, a very important thing that
we maintain free world trade; that this is very important for a good
development of the world economy. This is, indeed, one of the main reasons
why we intend to strengthen GATT.
We are also, both of us, very well aware of the fact that the successful
conclusion of the GATT round is also of paramount importance for the
countries of the Third World. This is why we want to put all our efforts
into these negotiations in the coming weeks, and why we want to come to a
successful conclusion of the GATT round at the very latest by the end of
April.
In our talks, we talked, obviously, also about the preparations leading up to
the world economic summit meeting in Munich in July. The President
supported me in the endeavor that these talks should focus more intensively
on informal talks, and that we should give room to the discussions on global
issues that are of interest to all of us.
Very important issues for the summit meeting in Munich will be, first of
all, world economic developments. We want this summit to strengthen the
trust and confidence in all countries in the world economy.
Another important subject for Munich will be the situation in the
Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and in the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. We will talk in Munich particularly about an overall
package of so-called "help for self-help" where we want to draw up a sort
of framework for cooperation of the West with the CIS.
And a third very important subject which we talked about is the
improvement of cooperation of Western industrialized countries with the
countries of the Third World now after the end of the Cold War.
Another important subject we talked about--in view of the very dramatic
changes is the success of republics of the former Soviet Union and the
Commonwealth of Independent States--was the overall situation there but
also the relief activities that our two countries have already initiated. We
just initiated the second of these assistance activities, and it is the second
of the kind. But, obviously, we cannot go on doing this kind of thing
indefinitely.
What is important now is to give them sort of a solid program of help or
self-help where we focus on individual areas; where we focus, for example,
on agriculture, on improvement of infrastructure, on the improvement of
transport and communication links, and where we also concentrate on
improving, for example, the safety standards of nuclear power plants in the
former Soviet Union.
These were just some of the subjects that we dealt with during our very
long and intensive discussions during these past 2 days. But I would like to
mention the most important subject at the end of my remarks here: That
once again, during these 2 days it became apparent that the United States of
America and reunified Germany are linked by very strong bonds of friendship
and partnership. No matter what will happen in the world, this friendship,
this partnership is of existential importance for us Germans.
In [the] future, too, [the] freedom and security of Europe and also, therefore,
of Germany can be safeguarded by this transatlantic alliance, which is why I
would like to underline here in Washington, in the White House, that for us,
it is a matter of course that this includes also a substantial presence of
American troops in Europe. But it is our joint desire that our relationship
will be deepened and widened beyond the mere scope of security and
military issues; that we come to even closer relations in the cultural field,
in the scientific field, in research and development, which is why I'm very
pleased to be able to announce--and we have agreed on this--that this year
we will inaugurate a German-American Academy of Sciences.
This has never existed, to my knowledge, in the United States of America,
and we have never had this sort of link with the United States before, or
with any other country across the Atlantic, for that matter.
I think that an instrument such as this one is of utmost importance,
particularly for the young generation, for fostering a mutual understanding
of each other. I would now like to issue an invitation to all our American
friends to participate as guests in the German cultural festival that will
take place here soon and to understand this as a sign of sympathy and
friendship with the American people.
Mr. President, allow me to thank you once again for these days where you
once again demonstrated your friendship to us, which made it possible to
meet in this very warm and hospitable atmosphere. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: The Middle East: US Interests And Challenges
Ahead
Djerejian
Source: Edward P. Djerejian , Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 17 19923/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar
Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Trade/Economics,
Arms Control, Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you and the
distinguished members of the subcommittee again. When Secretary Baker
appeared before the House Foreign affairs Committee a short while ago, he
said that 1991 marked the end of one era and the dramatic birth of another.
This is certainly true in the Middle East, where in 1991 we fought and won
the Gulf war by reversing Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, launched the
Middle East peace process, and began to see the implications of the end of
the Cold War in the region. I would like to bring you up to date on where we
are now and the challenges that we face ahead.
Arab-Israeli Peace Process
When I met with you in November, the peace process had just begun in
Madrid. We have now had four rounds of direct, bilateral negotiations
between Israel and her Arab neighbors, and we launched the multilateral
process in Moscow in January.
I pointed out in November that the road ahead would not be an easy one
because of the fundamental differences that separated the parties. This has
certainly proven to be the case. Nonetheless, real progress has been made.
The parties have resolved many procedural questions and have moved into
substantive negotiations. Israel, the Arabs, and the Palestinians are
engaging on the basic issues of land, peace, and security, which are
fundamental for the peace process. Israel and the Palestinians are engaging
directly on the key issue of interim self-government arrangements as a
first, transitional step along the path to a permanent settlement. In the
most recent round, there were real, substantive issues on the table, and the
parties explored ways to negotiate about these issues. Now that all sides
have laid out their positions, it is time for them to engage in serious
negotiations aimed at defining possible areas of agreement and working
toward narrowing the gaps where disagreements exist in order to make real
progress as soon as possible. This is the essence of negotiating and of this
negotiating process which the parties embarked on at Madrid.
Another accomplishment has been the initiation of the multilateral
negotiations on regional issues. Thirty-six states gathered in Moscow in
January to launch working groups on issues of regional concern. In spite of
the absence of Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians, 11 Arab countries
participated in this forum with Israel. In serious, cordial, business-like
organizational meetings, broad consensus was reached to establish working
groups on water, economic development, refugees, the environment, and
regional security and arms control and to hold initial meetings this spring
in various capitals around the world. We hope that those who were absent in
Moscow will join the multilateral talks as soon as possible.
As we look ahead, we are fully convinced that the process begun in Madrid
offers the best prospect to fulfill our longstanding goals of a comprehensive
and lasting peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. A
meaningful peace must provide for both the recognition and security of
Israel and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. While no
date or venue has yet been set for future meetings, all sides have reiterated
their commitment to the process, and we are in contact directly with the
parties to establish the time and venue for the next round. It is important
that the momentum of the process be maintained. For our part, the US role
in the peace process continues to be that of a catalyst, a driving force, and
an "honest broker." The President and the Secretary of State have made
clear that we will remain fully engaged in this role.
US-Israeli Relations
For the past 42 years, the United States has maintained a close relationship
with the state of Israel and has worked hard to bring about the peace and
security that the Israeli people richly deserve. As Secretary Baker has said,
our commitment to Israel's security and well-being remains unshakeable.
We have had and do have differences, to be sure. But what has distinguished
our relationship over the years is what has brought us together. As
democracies, the United States and Israel share similar values and common
traditions, and these have provided a strong foundation for cooperation. It
is in this spirit that we will work to maintain a strong and healthy
relationship in the future.
Gulf Security and Stability
I would like next to report on my trip in February to the Gulf states. I went
there to confer with the leaders of the governments and with our
Ambassadors to get their first-hand assessments as we pursue our goal of
helping to strengthen stability and security in this vital part of the world.
At every stop, I also sought to convey the strategic context in which we
view this important region and to reiterate the high priority this
Administration attaches to progress on human rights and participatory
government.
A starting point in my conversations was the changed situation in the
former Soviet Union and especially in Central Asia, a close neighbor of the
Middle East. Gulf states have allocated $3.5 billion in grants, loans, and
credits to the former Soviet Union and have sent fact-finding missions to
Central Asia. They are concerned about the possibility of instability,
transfers of dangerous weapons technology, and economic collapse. I
assured them that a top priority of the United States is to mobilize
resources to assure the success of the new states' moves toward
democracy, privatization, and market economies. Middle East countries
which share common cultural and religious ties with the Islamic states of
Central Asia can play an important role in this transition, and I got the clear
impression they were prepared to be supportive.
A second point I made was our shared interest in the security and stability
of the Gulf. We all recognize that the Gulf still is a dangerous neighborhood
and one of the world's most strategically important locations. In every
conversation, I stressed the need for individual self defense and collective
security arrangements among the six GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states,
with the goal of strengthening their ability to defend themselves from
external aggression. I also encouraged security cooperation between the
Gulf states and their regional friends.
At the same time, I assured them that the United States was determined,
while preserving Israel's qualitative edge over any likely combination of
aggressors, to meet the legitimate defense needs of our friends in the Gulf.
This includes sales of weapons and bilateral security arrangements, such as
the periodic conduct of joint military exercises, the maintenance of an
enhanced naval presence in the Gulf, and access and prepositioning
arrangements. I emphasized that these bilateral arrangements could
complement but not supersede the Gulf states' collective security
agreements.
The third major point we addressed was the peace process. All of the GCC
states attended the multilateral talks in Moscow, and all have committed
themselves to participation in the working groups created there. We
welcome this participation and believe that they have an important role to
play. Further, we discussed the bilateral negotiations between Israel and
her Arab neighbors and the Palestinians. The GCC leaders voiced their
strong support of President Bush and Secretary Baker's efforts in the peace
process.
I also stopped in Turkey. I emphasized there our interest in an enhanced
relationship, following up on Prime Minister Demirel's meeting with
President Bush in Washington, involving a closer dialogue on such issues as
the situation in Central Asia, the peace process, and the situation in the
northern Gulf a year after the reversal of Saddam's aggression. These talks
were extensive and productive in terms of exchanging our respective
assessments and outlining possible courses of action and cooperation.
At every stop in the Gulf, I also underscored our strong interest in ensuring
that US exporters, contractors, and investors were given a fair chance to
compete for business. In several capitals, I took up specific commercial
problems, as well as the Arab boycott.
Further, and very importantly, I raised the US Government's strong interest
in the promotion of participatory government and human rights. In this
respect, we note and are encouraged by heightened sensitivity to and signs
of the expansion of political participation. We welcome King Fahd's decision
to establish a consultative council in Saudi Arabia and his reaffirmation of
limits on governmental interference in citizens' private lives, in accordance
with Saudi Arabia's religion and tradition. It is a very important step
forward. In Kuwait, we look forward to the parliamentary elections which
the Amir has slated for October of this year.
Iran
Across the Gulf from our friends lies Iran, which the Untied States
recognizes as an important geopolitical entity in the region. With this
importance comes correspondingly important responsibilities. We
encourage Iran to develop stable, peaceful relations with all its neighbors in
the Gulf on the basis of noninterference and mutual respect. We will
continue working with other countries to encourage Iranian adherence to
acceptable standards of international behavior. Iran knows what it has to
do to re-enter the international community as a constructive participant.
As for our own relations with Iran, normal ties depend on several factors,
particularly an end to support for terrorism and a permanent cessation of
hostage taking. Iran's role in helping to bring about the release of American
hostages in Lebanon was an important step. Regrettably, however, the
hostage situation has not been completely resolved. There are still others
held outside the judicial process. Moreover, Iran's role in sponsoring
terrorism continues in other ways that are deeply disturbing. Iran's human
rights practices and its apparent quest for weapons of mass destruction
will also affect the potential relationship. Another cause of concern is
Iran's categoric opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and its support
for those who are prepared to oppose the peace process, even by violent
means.
We have offered to hold direct talks with Iran's authorized representatives.
The Iranians have not accepted this offer. The ball is in their court if they
wish to pursue this matter seriously.
Iraq
In Iraq, Saddam Hussein continues to refuse to comply with resolutions
passed by the UN Security Council. He has refused to dismantle weapons of
mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and the means to produce them. He
refuses to end repression and respect human rights. He has rejected the UN
Special Rapporteur's recent report which concludes that the violations of
human rights in Iraq are so grave that few parallels can be found since the
Second World War. Saddam Hussein has rejected UN resolutions that would
relieve the suffering of his own people. He is intentionally depriving
millions of Iraqi civilians of food, fuel, and medicine permitted by UN
sanctions.
Tariq Aziz' performance before the UN Security Council last week was sadly
predictable. He ostensibly exuded goodwill and good intentions--while
failing utterly to respond to the very specific, and very serious, concerns
raised by the council. His responses fell far short of complete and
unconditional compliance with all the resolutions. We do not aim, as Tariq
Aziz alleged, at the destruction of Iraq's industrial base. But we strongly
support the determination of the UN Security Council that Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction, and the facilities used to produce them, will be
destroyed. We also share the international community's resolve to continue
programs of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein
should not again mistake the seriousness of purpose of the international
community. Clearly, he hopes to frustrate and outlast the will of the
Security Council. He will not succeed.
Levant
Turning to the Levant, the United States was deeply concerned about the
renewal of violence in February, and we have urged maximum restraint on
all parties. US policy on Lebanon remains firm and consistent. We have long
recognized that the security and safety of all the people of southern Lebanon
and northern Israel can best be assured by a strong and effective central
government in Beirut, a strong Lebanese army, and the extension of the
Lebanese Government's authority throughout the country. We believe that
the Taif agreement must be carried out in letter and in spirit and offers the
best chance of regaining the unity, independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity of Lebanon. Further, we continue to support the
withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon.
When King Hussein [of Jordan] visited Washington last week, President Bush,
Secretary Baker, and he discussed Iraq and agreed on the importance of full
Iraqi compliance with all Security Council resolutions. King Hussein said
that Jordan would do its part, and, I believe, we had serious and
constructive discussions in this respect. King Hussein reiterated his strong
commitment to the Arab-Israeli peace process as demonstrated by Jordan's
active participation in both the bilateral and multilateral negotiations and
discussions. We welcome Jordan's key, constructive, and positive role in
the search for peace.
The King also raised the dire economic straits in which Jordan finds itself.
The disruption of the Gulf war and the influx of Palestinians from the Gulf
countries--up to 300,000 of them--have raised Jordan's unemployment rate
to about 40%. There is a clear need to alleviate Jordan's economic situation,
and support by Jordan's neighbors in the region and the international
community is needed now.
With Syria, we continue to pursue a broad dialogue on issues of mutual
interest, and we remain engaged on the issues where we need to narrow the
gaps between us, such as terrorism, human rights, and narcotics. Despite
these differences, the United States and Syria consulted productively on the
effort leading to the Taif accords on Lebanon and cooperated in opposing
Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait. Last fall, after eight trips by
Secretary Baker to the Middle East, President Assad responded positively to
President Bush's invitation to participate in direct bilateral negotiations
with Israel.
Arms Control
Finally, arms control remains a high priority in our efforts to bring stability
to the Middle East. Pursuant to the President's arms control initiative for
the Middle East, negotiations continue among the five major arms suppliers-
-the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China--aimed at
controlling destabilizing transfers of conventional weapons and of weapons
of mass destruction-related equipment and technology. We will pursue
these efforts with vigor.
Foreign Assistance
I would like to close by noting that foreign assistance remains a vital tool
for advancing American interests and values in the Middle East and
worldwide. As the Secretary said in his recent appearances here, the funds
that we have requested are "an investment in peace," an investment which
permits "timely, flexible support for our interests in political pluralism,
free market economic development, peacemaking, and strong alliances."
Foreign assistance is a crucial element of our Middle East policy and will
continue to be in the upcoming era. We are ready to work closely with
Congress to assure that our foreign policy interests in the Middle East are
met. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: Iraqi Non-Compliance With UN Security Council
Resolutions
Pickering
Source: Thomas R. Pickering, US Permanent Representative to
the United Nations
Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, New York
Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: United Nations, Arms Control,
Security Assistance and Sales, Nuclear Nonproliferation,
Human Rights
[TEXT]
Mr. President, to say we are disappointed in what we heard from [Iraqi]
Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz this morning would be a serious
understatement. The approach which he made to the Council did not, in our
view, address the issues nor did it advance the process.
Let me cite a few examples.
[Firstly], the statement itself appears to be directed toward destroying the
confidence of the Security Council, the Special Commission, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency and their work. In several areas, it
suggests the Council put itself into the process of actually implementing
its own resolutions.
Even worse, it suggests that the Security Council enter into a negotiating
process with Iraq for the implementation of what we all know to be
mandatory resolutions. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding on
the part of Iraq about mandatory resolutions and a complete miscalculation
of the intention and purpose of the Council in dealing with Iraq's programs
of weapons of mass destruction.
Specifically, the Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister suggests that with respect to
the declarations required of Iraq under Resolution 687, Iraq would be ready
to sit down with the Council and the Special Commission and apparently
negotiate out what it is that Iraq will declare. This is not the approach of
the Council nor, obviously, the purpose of its resolutions.
Secondly, with respect to the issue of the destruction of its weapons of
mass destruction and the programs in Iraq for the production of those
weapons, it seeks a similar negotiating-oriented approach. It suggests
there is confusion about what the Special Commission and the International
Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] have asked to be destroyed. It suggests that
the Council put itself into the middle of this process to decide what
elements must be destroyed. It ignores the firm position on the part of the
Council that the Special Commission and International Atomic Energy
Agency will be the technical mechanism for the designation of what should
be destroyed or rendered harmless or removed in the Iraqi program and in
the production base which supports that program. We understand the
Special Commission and the IAEA conducted several rounds of conversations
with Iraqi technical experts and has come up with final lists on certain
ballistic missile and related production items which Iraq now refuses to
destroy. We fail to see how further conversations and negotiations are a
real answer to the problem. The problem is really full compliance with the
resolution as it stands and the designations made carefully by the Special
Commission.
Finally, we appear to have roughly the same proposal coming out of the
statement this morning with respect to the issue of long-term monitoring.
Again, long-term monitoring plans presented by the Council to Iraq and
approved in resolutions which are mandatory are clearly not subject to
negotiation. Such efforts are not in keeping with mandatory resolutions.
We expect a full and clear Iraqi commitment to comply.
A drawn-out discussion and negotiation of Iraqi compliance with
resolutions is not in the interest of regional peace and stability, and it is
not the intention of the members of the Council, nor is it provided for in the
resolutions with which Iraq must comply.
It is also disappointing that the Iraqi statement made no serious effort to
address the numerous outstanding questions in the minds of the members of
the Council. The Deputy Foreign Minister at the end of his statement clearly
must have understood this, and we, on our part, welcome his commitment to
address these questions with his answers tomorrow morning. We look
forward to hearing what he has to say in this regard.
Other portions of the statement merely repeat the old and tired arguments
of the past. In that respect, there was very little new which we saw in the
statement itself, and it did not serve to advance the process of Iraqi
compliance which is, again, deeply disappointing.
We are also disappointed, as others are, that nowhere in the Iraqi statement
this morning did we see a reference to Resolution 688, to the UN's important
role in providing humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Iraq, or a
discussion of what Iraq will do to alleviate the plight of the Kurds and the
Shi'a. This only serves to lend greater credence to our fears about Iraq's
refusal to observe universal standards of human rights and its oppression of
the Kurds and the Shi'a--its own citizens--in its own country.
On the other hand, we react positively to one small portion of the statement
in which the Deputy Foreign Minister seemed to break new ground by
promising, starting today, to publish the names of missing persons in
several Iraqi newspapers once a week for a period of several weeks. We
could only hope that Iraq would comply rapidly with the rest of its
obligations with the same degree of directness--this especially includes
providing unrestricted access to the ICRC [International Committee of the
Red Cross] to all Iraqi prisons and places of detention.
Iraq has made frequent references to its sovereignty and its internal
affairs. However, Iraq knows as well as all of us that the Council is
operating with regard to its resolutions on Iraq under Chapter 7. Such
resolutions are mandatory and fall under the last portion of Article II,
Paragraph 7 of the Charter which makes it clear that the principle of non-
intervention "shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter 7."
The measures that Iraq complains of are clearly "enforcement measures
under Chapter 7."
It is clear that the author of all of this destruction and difficulty is Iraq
itself. Iraq was frequently warned by the Council to cease its aggression
and to abandon its illegal occupation of Kuwait. Iraq brought these
measures upon itself. Iraq now holds the key to their relaxation.
It is clear that Iraq must comply with the Security Council resolutions.
Attacks on the views of the members of the Security Council and attacks on
the cohesion of the Security Council and the independence of its individual
members is not the way to achieve a change in the present situation.
Similarly, attacks on the Special Commission and the IAEA do not help.
As I said this morning, Iraq should begin by committing itself to full
compliance and then to immediately taking on the follow-up actions rapidly
and expediently to carry out that compliance.
Unfortunately, nothing we have heard here today so far suggests that Iraq
understands this need. It is clear that Iraq has not yet fully complied with
the resolutions of this Council, but, again, we hope to hear tomorrow--as
we did not today--that Iraq intends to do so.
Weapons Destruction
Now I would like to turn, Mr. President, in light of our session planned for
tomorrow morning to a few questions which we believe clearly need
answers:
First, on weapons of mass destruction. Is Iraq ready to make full final and
complete disclosure of its programs of weapons of mass destruction and
when will it do so?
Second, is Iraq prepared to commence destruction of its ballistic missile
production and repair facilities, as requested by the Special Commission's
letter of February 14 under UN supervision and will it do so immediately?
Third, will Iraq return to the IAEA the nuclear documents seized from and
never returned to the sixth IAEA inspection team in September 1991 and
will it do so immediately?
Fourth, will Iraq today provide unconditional acceptance of the long-term
monitoring and verification plans laid out in Resolution 715 and make the
required declarations of its equipment and facilities?
When will Iraq begin to observe the full range of privileges and immunities
to be accorded to the Special Commission and to the IAEA?
Boundary Demarcation
With respect to the boundary demarcation and border posts, does Iraq now
recognize its obligations to accept the work of the Boundary Commission to
demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait border? Will Iraq remove immediately its
border police posts from the Kuwaiti side of the border on the map used by
UNIKOM [UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission]?
Humanitarian Issues
With respect to detainees, refugees, and humanitarian interests, will Iraq
resolve, as soon as possible, the matter of missing Kuwaitis, Saudis, and
missing third country nationals from the Gulf war by:
-- Conducting detailed, documented searches for those still missing and
sharing the full results of those searches with the ICRC?
-- Providing to the ICRC information on Kuwaitis and third country
nationals who died while in custody?
-- Granting the ICRC unrestricted access to all Iraqi places of detention in
its effort to trace the missing?
When will Iraq meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people by
implementing Resolutions 706 and 712?
When will Iraq permit the establishment of UN humanitarian centers
throughout Iraq, including Kirkuk and Mosul?
When will Iraq guarantee the UN humanitarian program unrestricted access
to vulnerable groups throughout Iraq?
When will Iraq dismantle the checkpoints blocking roads into northern Iraq
and lift the blockade of northern Iraq?
When will Iraq allow Iraqi citizens formerly resident in the Kirkuk area to
return to their homes and businesses?
Will Iraq cease attacks on civilians, including artillery bombardment of
urban areas?
When will the Iraqi military end its encirclement of the southern marsh
area--a de facto blockade confining up to half a million persons--and permit
the UN to visit?
Return of Property
Concerning the return of property: When will Iraq make a final accounting of
and return all of both the military and non-military property taken from
Kuwait?
Finally, when will Iraq begin providing the Secretary-General and
appropriate international organizations a monthly statement of Iraq's gold
and foreign currency reserves as required by Resolution 706?
Thank you, Mr. President. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: Humanitarian Situation in Iraq
Kimble
Source: Melinda L. Kimble, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Development and Technical Specialized Ageny
Affairs
Description: Statement before the International Task Force of the
House Select Committee on Hunger, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 18 19923/18/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: United Nations, Trade/Economics,
Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your invitation to appear today to update you and the members
of the select committee on conditions in Iraq.
First, I would like to detail what the international community is providing
in the way of humanitarian assistance to needy Iraqi civilians.
Approximately 375 UN humanitarian personnel, 500 UN guards, 300 Red
Cross workers, and 192 employees of private organizations are stationed
throughout Iraq. The United Nations and its agencies have provided nearly
$300 million in humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people in the past year;
the Red Cross, another $100 million.
US contributions include $94 million to the United Nations, over 63,000
metric tons (mt) of food, and $6.9 mil-lion to private agencies for programs
in Iraq. These amounts, together with the cost of Operation Provide
Comfort, bring the total US expenditure for the people of Iraq to over $600
million in the past year.
Iraq Sanctions
In discussing the issues of sanctions and the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people, let me begin by making three points:
First, the sanctions imposed against Iraq by the United Nations in Security
Council Resolutions 661 and 687 are designed to ensure that the Iraqi
leadership lives up to obligations clearly spelled out in various UN
resolutions. Resolution 687 makes no provision for any easing of sanctions
before Iraq fully complies.
Second, these sanctions were never intended to punish innocent Iraqi
civilians. For this reason, medicine was excluded from the trade sanctions
imposed before the war, [and] food and medicine have been excluded from
those imposed following the cease-fire.
Finally, the international community will continue to battle the suffering
which the repressive policies of the Government of Saddam Hussein have
brought to the Iraqi people. It will not, however, trust this government with
unmonitored supervision of humanitarian assistance. This government's
record of massive human rights violations more than justifies this distrust.
Many, led by Iraqi Government officials, have overstated the impact of
sanctions on the Iraqi economy. UN officials have assured us that there are
adequate stocks of food in Iraq and that massive malnutrition is not a
serious problem in any region.
Reports from Jordan provide evidence which backs this up: Walks through
markets in Amman reveal undisguised supplies of black market Iraqi food
exports, including high-caloric dates. We have also received numerous
reliable reports of Iraqi dates being exported via the Jordanian port of
Aqaba.
In the last 10 months of 1991, the UN Sanctions Committee was informed of
plans to export 5.4 million mt of food to Iraq--we estimate that figure to
represent about 75% of Iraq's annual pre-war food imports. Just in the past
few days, we understand that Iraq has sent payment to Australia for a
massive 900,000-ton shipment of wheat.
Between December 15 and February 21, 22,259 trucks carried 605,895 mt of
fruit and vegetables, wheat, sugar, rice, medicine, and other products into
Iraq from Jordan. On the average, that is 327 trucks, each carrying nearly
30 tons every single day.
Transport from Turkey was disrupted during this period by a strike of truck
drivers. But tens of thousands of tons of flour, sugar, peas and beans,
potatoes, onions, and other products were brought into Iraq from Turkey.
This brisk, legal trade continues as we meet here today.
UN sanctions do not block--and, since March 22, 1991, have not blocked--the
export of essential civilian items to Iraq.
I have with me the current list of exports approved by the UN Sanctions
Committee. The list shows hundreds of exports of essential civilian items.
It shows clothing and shoes, soap, and detergent sold commercially and
donated by relief organizations. It shows hundreds of agricultural tractors
and harvesting combines, pesticides, vegetable seeds, veterinary vaccines,
and breeding stock. It shows parts and equipment to maintain and repair
water and sewage systems, including whole water treatment plants. It
shows school supplies, bakery equipment, food packaging materials, and
much more.
Trade with no direct humanitarian rationale remains tightly embargoed. The
Multinational Interception Force is on station in the Red Sea and the Persian
Gulf. Ships of the United
States, France, and Australia, to be joined soon by Canada, continue to
enforce the sanctions and deter violations.
Though a share of Iraq's imports of medicine, food, and essential civilian
items is being provided by relief agencies, the overwhelming majority is
being purchased commercially by government and private buyers. We know
that Iraq's finances are tight. Foreign exchange is in short supply, and the
value of the Iraqi dinar is collapsing. Yet Iraqis continue to finance
imports, evidently drawing on personal accounts or hidden reserves held
outside Iraq and probably by smuggling out Iraqi objects of value. Iraq
reportedly used its gold reserves to make payment for the large shipment of
Australian wheat.
UNHRC Report: Saddam's Disregard for His People
The February 18 report on the situation of human rights in Iraq, prepared by
Mr. Max van der Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights
Commission [UNHRC], provides essential background information for any
discussion on the current situation in Iraq.
The report provides a chilling account of the brutal way in which the Iraqi
Government has abused its citizens in recent years. Here are just three of
the findings it makes:
-- Arbitrary executions have been carried out on thousands, including
women and children, characterized as "saboteurs."
-- Hardly a family in Iraq has not been touched by a "systematic policy of
enforced disappearances."
-- Methods of torture, including electric shocks, burning with hot irons,
extraction of the fingernails, gouging of the eyes, beating of the genitals,
and rape, have become "a systematic practice conforming to government
directives."
Knowing this barbaric record, I have to wince when I hear Iraq's Deputy
Prime Minister [Tariq Aziz] blame trade sanctions for the deaths of innocent
civilians.
For 11 months now, Saddam has found a new motive for torturing his people:
He is attempting to use their suffering to protect his position, his military
apparatus, and his nuclear weapons program. By trying to pass the results
of his policies off as the result of trade sanctions, he hopes to get off the
hook.
As if his human rights record was not horrible enough, there is more
evidence of his indifference toward his people. Look at his refusal to
implement UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712, which would allow
Iraq to pump oil to generate resources for humanitarian assistance.
Blockade of the North
If that's not enough, we can dwell on the hypocrisy of his complaints. While
attacking internationally imposed trade sanctions, he himself restricts
food, medicine, and fuel reaching minority groups in northern and southern
Iraq.
Representatives of private voluntary organizations who have traveled to the
region have told us about some elements of the Iraqi blockade of the north.
-- Pensions of about 50,000 retired civil servants in the Kurdish-
controlled area of the north have not been paid since last October.
-- Since October 1991, salaries of civil servants in the north, with some
exceptions such as Health Ministry employees, have also not been paid.
-- Health Ministry officials and other exceptions to the rule have not been
paid at all in 1992--they are not included in Iraq's 1992 budget. The
Kurdish Front has raised enough to pay some salaries and maintain some
semblance of a social services network.
-- Government food rations provided to Kurds are reduced to approximately
half the amount provided to other Iraqis.
-- Fuel deliveries from the state oil company are just a quarter the amount
sent to the north prior to October 1991.
The blockade is enforced by a series of military checkpoints. Reports
indicate cars with more than half a tank of gas have the extra fuel siphoned
off. Overhead flights confirm reports that bags of groceries are taken from
private vehicles crossing the checkpoints.
Repression in the South
Because the Iraqi Government has severely restricted access by foreigners
to southern Iraq, we do not have a clear picture of the situation in this
Shi'a-dominated region. We know enough to say that the Shi'a population is
also suffering under the brutal policies of the Iraqi Government. Mr. van der
Stoel's report documents allegations of the desecration of Shi'ite shrines,
the closing of Shi'ite universities, the persecution of Shi'ite clergy, and the
censorship of Shi'ite publications.
Mr. van der Stoel also cites information that the Iraqi army surrounds the
region of southern marshes, home to the so-called "marsh" Arabs. According
to van der Stoel, alleged actions taken by the army against those in the
marshes include:
-- Tightening of control over food destined for the area;
-- Evacuation of all areas within 3 kilometers of the marshes;
-- Killing of large numbers of animal and bird life in the marshes;
-- Dumping of toxic chemicals into the marsh waters; and
-- Military attacks which have resulted in hundreds of deaths.
These repressive policies toward Iraqis living in the north and south and the
array of human rights violations listed by Mr. van der Stoel, not to mention
the repression shown during Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, make the truth
inescapable. The biggest problem confronting the Iraqi people is not the
sanctions imposed by the United Nations. It is the policies imposed by the
Government of Saddam Hussein.
International Humanitarian Relief
Action must, clearly, be taken to alleviate the suffering of vulnerable
groups inside Iraq. After the Iraqi army chased thousands of refugees into
the mountains along the border with Turkey and Iran, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 688. This resolution told Iraq to allow humanitarian
organizations immediate access to those in need of assistance and
requested UN agencies to meet the critical needs of Iraqi refugees and
displaced persons.
Since last April, the United Nations has been helping refugees and the
displaced, along with the most needy in vulnerable groups throughout Iraq.
Between March and December 1991, donors provided almost $322 million to
fund UN relief efforts in the Gulf region. In January, the United Nations
requested $120 million more to fund operations through June 1992. The
United States responded with a pledge of $36 million. Other donors have so
far given about $20 million--we expect further pledges at a meeting the
British are trying to schedule later this month.
The United Nations has accomplished a great deal with this money. More
than 1.8 million refugees were repatriated from Turkey and Iran to Iraq last
year. Materials to build winter shelters were provided to about 74,000
families. More than 87,000 mt of food were provided, with three-quarters
of it going to displaced persons concentrated in northern Iraq.
Just as important as the emergency supplies has been the maintenance of a
500-man UN guard contingent operating across northern Iraq and in the
southern town of Basrah. The guards are charged with providing security to
UN personnel and equipment. They serve as de facto monitors whose
presence deters violence on the part of both the Iraqi army and the Kurdish
peshmerga.
Resolutions 706 and 712
Still, no one disagrees that much more needs to be done, particularly in the
Kurdish regions of the north and in the
Shi'a areas of the south. Here, the economic blockade mounted by the
Government of Iraq has broadened the crisis beyond the needs of refugees
and displaced.
Last August, the Security Council created the ideal mechanism to provide
this support in its Resolutions 706 and 712. You are familiar by now with
the framework of this mechanism.
-- The UN Sanctions Committee would monitor production and export of
$1.6 billion worth of oil by the Iraqi state oil company.
-- Funds would go into a UN escrow account, which, after deducting money
for the UN Compensation Fund and the Special Commission overseeing
destruction of Iraqi weapons, would provide about a billion dollars to fund
humanitarian assistance to Iraq.
-- The purchase and distribution of humanitarian supplies purchased with
this money would be carefully monitored by the United Nations.
As you all know, Iraq has refused to implement these resolutions. As Mr.
van der Stoel noted in his report, the Iraqi Government has evidently decided
that "its notions of 'sovereignty' are more important than its obligations to
respect human rights." Just as it has in other areas covered by UN
resolutions--weapons destruction and tracing of missing Kuwaitis to name
but two--Iraq complains that the measures advocated by the United Nations
violate Iraq's sovereignty. It demands that the terms governing the sale of
oil and the disbursement of oil revenues be worked out to its liking.
Following up on the meetings in New York last week, Iraqi and UN
Secretariat representatives will soon meet again in Vienna to discuss
implementation of Resolutions 706 and 712.
We welcome Iraq's decision to resume these discussions. We believe the
Security Council has made it unmistakably clear that until Iraq complies
with pertinent UN resolutions, any oil exported from Iraq must be pumped
under the mechanisms established by Resolutions 706 and 712.
The international community has also made it clear to Iraq that, given Iraq's
record, there must be international supervision of both the export of oil and
the distribution of humanitarian relief.
Resolutions 706 and 712 provided Iraq with 6 months to pump the necessary
oil. Those 6 months expire tomorrow. Our discussions with Security
Council partners indicate that once Iraq agrees to implement these
resolutions, a 6-month time frame will again be established.
Future Plans
Until funds come in from oil pumped under Resolutions 706 and 712 or from
some alternate source, the United Nations will continue to operate under its
January 6-month plan of action.
Because the scope of the work that needs to be done is changing and because
of the recent appointment of a new UN Under Secretary General for
Emergency Assistance, some changes are being made in the UN operations.
At the top, Under Secretary General Jan Eliasson, who was recently
appointed to fill the newly created position of humanitarian aid coordinator
at the United Nations, is still considering the manner in which he will
administer the UN program. We anticipate that he will appoint a new
Executive Delegate for Humanitarian Programs in Iraq, who will be stationed
in Baghdad. That position has been vacant since Prince Saddrudin Aga Khan
resigned last December.
On the ground, the United Nations will continue to help refugees and
displaced persons. It also aims to meet the most basic needs of at-risk
populations, focusing particularly on support for essential sanitation,
medical, and agricultural services. While the focus will remain on northern
Iraq, the United Nations is also working to expand operations in the south.
Up until last month, Iraq had barred the United Nations from establishing
offices in Nasiriyah and
Al Hammar, two strategic locations adjacent to the southern marshes. The
United Nations has now been allowed to open an office in these towns, but
we fear this might have been a temporary concession timed to coincide with
the arrival of Mr. Tariq Aziz in New York.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has had the lead until now in the UN
operation. With the reduction in the number of displaced, it is anticipated
that another agency will now come to the forefront. UNICEF [UN Children'
Fund] and UNDP [UN Development Program] are the leading candidates, but
neither has stepped forward to date.
We have emphasized our position that there should be no decrease in the UN
presence--such a drop could be misinterpreted by the Iraqi Government and
by the Kurdish minority and thus lead to another flow of refugees.
We recognize that UN agencies must, of necessity, work with authorities in
Baghdad. However, we have continuously emphasized that they must monitor
every aspect of their in-country programs to ensure that the Iraqi
Government does not misdirect relief supplies.
Conclusion
A year after Saddam Hussein's armies were expelled from Kuwait, the
humanitarian situation in Iraq is still unsettled. Saddam Hussein continues
to repress his people, [and] the international community continues to
respond compassionately to the suffering of the Iraqi people.
In our urge to do all we can to end this suffering, we must not lose sight of
its root cause: the disdain for the rule of law and the inhumane policies of
the Government of Saddam Hussein.
The framework established by Security Council resolutions provides the
best means for meeting the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians and for
compelling the Iraqi Government to return to the community of nations
which respect international law. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: FY 1993 Budget Request For Migration and
Refugee Assistance
Lyman
Source: Princeton N. Lyman, Director, Bureau for Refugee
Programs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs of the
House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 17 19923/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia,
North America, South America, Central America, Caribbean,
MidEast/North Africa
Country: Afghanistan, South Africa, Angola, Cambodia, Vietnam,
Iraq, Somalia, Ethiopia
Subject: Immigration, Refugees, United Nations
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to participate in today's discussion of the demographic realities
of the world and how the FY 1993 budget for Migration and Refugee
Assistance [MRA] begins to address some of these changes in the post-Cold
War environment.
In reference specifically to refugees and displaced persons, we see before
us a very mixed scene. Resolution of conflicts that were fed in part by the
Cold War--Cambodia, Angola, El Salvador--and of the civil war in Ethiopia,
plus growing prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan, offer us the
prospect of enabling 3 million of the world's refugees to go home over the
next 2 years and as many as 7 million once the Afghan war is truly over.
Repatriation of refugees to homes and farmlands, often devastated by war,
and to countries where the internally displaced are also in need is costly
and time-consuming. But the prospect of ending the plight of nearly half the
world's refugees--after a decade of seeing those numbers rise--should
motivate us not to shrink from this great humanitarian opportunity. It will
also, once completed, remove a heavy burden from the international
community, especially the United States, that has been the leading
contributor to refugee assistance for the last 20 years.
Another part of the scene is less encouraging. New conflicts, often brutal,
are producing new refugee emergencies. In just the time between your
setting this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and today, over 100,000 new refugees
have fled into Bangladesh from depredations of the Burmese army, and as
many as 150,000 Somali refugees have fled civil war, arriving in Kenya
nearly dead from starvation and exposure. Over the last 2 years, the
Liberian civil war has added 600,000 persons to the world's refugee total.
Yugoslavia's fighting produced 40,000 refugees and nearly a half million
internally displaced, and we are waiting upon ICRC [International Committee
of the Red Cross] reports on the human costs of the clashes in Nagorno-
Karabakh [Azerbaijan], where as many as 500,000 people have been forced
from their homes. We must meet these emergencies not only with
humanitarian assistance but with renewed and refined efforts at conflict
resolution so that they do not breed yet another new generation of long-
term refugees.
Finally, we are witnessing greater and more complex pressures upon both
the asylum and immigration systems of Western Europe and North America.
Some of this has demographic roots, some is rooted in conflict, repression,
and poverty. Unfortunately, we have seen instances where these pressures
are producing [a] negative, even ugly, backlash against refugees themselves.
More broadly, they pose a challenge to our ability to work cooperatively on
both refugee and migration matters so that new walls are not erected and
burden-sharing is maintained. Through our programs and through several
other fora, we are seeking to address these concerns as well in the post-
Cold War era.
FY 1993 MRA Budget Request
The world's refugees, which still number some 16 million--13 million of
whom need assistance--fall into four main concentrations: 5 million
Afghans in Pakistan and Iran; nearly 5 million African refugees, mostly the
victims of civil wars; 2.5 million Palestinians; and 720,000 in Asia, nearly
half from Cambodia.
The numbers, which alone are staggering, do not give adequate expression to
the human reality. Behind the numbers are men, women, and children fleeing
soldiers as they cross the Naf river into Bangladesh. The numbers blur the
starkness of women and children, separated from the men in their family,
seeking shelter under plastic sheeting in northern Iraq or Kenya. They do not
convey the desperation of people cut off from home and services, often for
years at a time, trying to put together makeshift schools for their children
and to retain their dignity in a situation of total dependence.
Refugee programs go beyond the provision of assistance to those fleeing
persecution and conflict, as critical and important as that is. They go
beyond finding new homes for those needing resettlement in the West. They
encompass difficult decisions by governments, by international
organizations, and by private agencies to determine:
-- Who are the people of concern;
-- How to provide protection and adequate longer-term assistance to those
people in a wide variety of situations;
-- How to bring about solutions to the underlying causes of their flight and
to enable refugees to return to their homes in countries often devastated by
war; and
-- How to forestall future refugee populations.
The Department's FY 1993 budget request includes $550 million for
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and $20 million for the US
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund.
Close to 60% of the MRA request, $315.3 million, will support international
efforts to provide protection and assistance to refugees and conflict
victims worldwide. A regional breakout of this assistance is provided
below.
International Refugee Assistance (in millions $US)
East Asia 48.8
Africa 104.0
Near East/South Asia 106.0
Israel 50.0
Western Hemisphere 4.5
Europe 2.0
Subtotal, Assistance 315.3
Africa
Africa continues to be the most troubling and difficult continent in which to
provide adequate protection and assistance. In addition to refugees, there
are as many as 10 million persons displaced by conflict and conflict-
induced famine within their own countries. In Sudan, government
limitations on the international assistance agencies and continued civil war
have left us almost helpless in the face of enormous human need. In the
south alone, we have tried air, sea, and land bridges to assist those who
first fled into Ethiopia, then back to Sudan, and who are now fleeing south
to escape renewed fighting. Among these are 10,000 unaccompanied minors,
shuttled around like pieces on a chess board--but they are just children, and
they are victims.
Fighting in Somalia has frustrated literally dozens of attempts to address
the appalling conditions there. Now as many as 250,000 Somalis can be ex-
pected to cross into northern Kenya--into a region devoid of shade, shelter,
or water.
There is another major problem looming this year. Southern Africa is
experiencing a devastating drought, perhaps the worst in this century. The
implications are enormous for millions of persons. For the refugees, it
creates special problems; UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] and
WFP [World Food Program] have traditionally purchased most food for
refugees in this part of Africa from Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.
None of those sources will be available this year. The costs of refugee
assistance will thus go up dramatically as will refugee food needs, added to
the emergency food requirements needed for this region and the many
demands elsewhere in the world.
There are also in Africa, however, islands of hope. The end of almost 30
years of civil war in Ethiopia means the hope for repatriation of 250,000
Eritreans in Sudan, of 50,000 Tigreans, and the return and reintegration of
perhaps 300,000 Ogadenis. Local insecurity must be overcome in Ethiopia,
and rehabilitation assistance is badly needed if these persons are to return
home productively, not just to new feeding camps or as restless sources of
banditry and instability in an impoverished countryside.
In Angola and South Africa, there is also hope. Some 400,000 Angolan
refugees are poised to return home and over 10,000 South African exiles are
coming home under UNHCR protection. We need to make these returns work.
We have had to rely heavily on the Emergency Refugee and Migration
Assistance Fund to respond to the rapidly changing circumstances and
increased needs of refugees and conflict victims in Africa. Last year alone,
$48.4 million from the fund was used to meet urgent needs throughout
Africa, and an additional $10 million was reprogrammed from other MRA
programs to address urgent unforeseen needs in the Horn of Africa.
Afghanistan
As I indicated, the largest single group of refugees are Afghans. We are
hopeful that with the agreement on an arms cutoff since January this year
and a reinvigorated UN conciliation effort, a solution can soon be found to
this long, costly war. Already, tens of thousands of refugees are, with
international assistance, going home to areas that have become peaceful,
and perhaps several hundred thousand may choose to do so as the
negotiations proceed. But we do not expect a massive repatriation until
there is a political settlement. Thus we must plan to continue assistance to
the Afghans throughout FY 1993. We will endeavor to emphasize through
several private voluntary organization projects the development of skills
that will be needed back in Afghanistan.
Asia
The most dramatic recent event in Asia is the agreement to end the war in
Cambodia. For 330,000 Cambodians who have been living on the Thai border
for 12 years, it means, at last, the opportunity to go home. I will return to
the costs and complexities of this repatriation. But I am happy to report to
you that the preparatory phase of the UNHCR's Cambodia repatriation
program was fully funded from voluntary donor contributions, and we have
budgeted sufficient funds to provide our share of the full program in FY
1992 and 1993.
While Cambodia has captured the most attention lately, there is another
example in Asia of what international support and cooperation can achieve.
Almost 3 years after the Comprehensive Plan of Action was adopted in June
1989 to address the needs of Vietnamese and Lao asylum seekers, it has
been successful in many important respects. The practice of first asylum
has been preserved in all countries of the East Asia region, with the
regrettable exceptions of Malaysia and Singapore. Meanwhile, direct
processing from Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Program [ODP] has
expanded dramatically: Over 100,000 persons will be resettled this coming
year under ODP, offering a much safer alternative to departure by boat.
Arrivals by boat have dropped 98% to about 230 a month. Screening
procedures have been established in all the first asylum countries, and all
those determined to have a well-founded fear of persecution--almost
16,000 so far--are being resettled. For those not found to be refugees, one
of the most elaborate monitored and assisted return programs in the world
has been instituted. Voluntary repatriation has increased 70% and now
averages more than 1,700 a month. In all, more than 20,000 boat people
have returned safely to Vietnam. Monitoring of the returnees in Vietnam is
carried out by UNHCR, and there has been no evidence that any have been
persecuted. The European Community has begun direct assistance to the
returnees and the impoverished areas from which they come to help their
rein-tegration. Problems remain, however. We are working with UNHCR to
improve further the efficiency and fairness of the national screening
processes. The special procedures for unaccompanied minors are still not
working adequately, and many minors remain far too long in the camps.
The Middle East
The Middle East is the site of another very successful effort. A little under
a year ago, over 1 million Kurds and other people fled Saddam Hussein's
regime seeking sanctuary in neighboring countries. Under the umbrella of
Operation Provide Comfort, the United States and many other countries,
working together and through the UN system, averted what would have been
a human tragedy of massive proportions by providing immediate assistance
to those new refugees. Since last May-June, well over 90% have returned to
their homes in northern Iraq, repatriation made possible only by creating
conditions of security and by providing critical inputs of food and shelter in
Iraq. While some still remain, prompt action forestalled the creation of a
large, semi-permanent refugee population living in camps in Turkey and Iran
and requiring international support for the foreseeable future. This
committee was instrumental in recognizing the need for continued US
leadership and in enacting the Administration's request for supplemental
appropriations. To date, of the $75 million appropriated for Migration and
Refugee Assistance, $47.7 million has been used to assist refugees and
displaced persons in and around Iraq.
Unfortunately, we also know that repatriation has not ended the plight of
the Kurds and others affected by Saddam Hussein's deliberate repression of
his own people. The United States and the international community continue
to provide important humanitarian assistance in northern Iraq. Iraq's
refusal to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712--which
would finance humanitarian assistance from Iraqi oil sales--its blockade
against the north, and its harassment in the south, all reveal Saddam's
cruelty toward his own people and create a continuing humanitarian demand
upon the outside world.
I would like to address some generic problems which cut across all regions
of the world.
Refugee Women and Children
Within the UN system, we have worked with UNHCR to focus greater
programming emphasis on the special needs of women and children.
Together, women and children account for 70% to 80% of the world's
refugees; children alone account for half of the refugee population in most
camps.
All refugee women share a common need for special protective and
assistance measures. Many refugee women find themselves heading a
household for the first time, a status which makes them and their
accompanying children particularly vulnerable. Single women in a refugee
population share that vulnerability. All too often, these needs have been
overlooked. Women have been subject to sexual abuse, often [are] not
interviewed by relief organizers, and [are] not accommodated in the design
assistance program. This past year, with strong support from the United
States, UNHCR issued sweeping new "Guidelines for the Protection of
Refugee Women" which are designed to protect women from abuse and help
those women who already have been abused. We are asking that
implementation of these guidelines be closely monitored.
Refugee women worldwide also share in their need for protection and
assistance for their children. Of particular concern to the United States,
however, is protection for those children who have been separated from
their parents. With the support of Norway, UNHCR has established a position
for a senior adviser to the High Commissioner to coordinate UNHCR policy on
children. In addition, the Department and US Embassies throughout the
world evaluated UNHCR implementation of its 1988 "Guidelines on Refugee
Children." Our conclusions and recommendations have been sent by UNHCR
headquarters to every field office.
With the establishment of senior advisers on refugee women and on children
and with proactive US leadership, we believe UNHCR programs are being
increasingly designed to fit the needs of the beneficiaries, who are women
and children. US contributions in support of these objectives are well used.
In special situations, however, we have made decisions to fund private
voluntary organization projects to meet certain needs directly. For
example, we support several projects in Pakistan designed specifically for
Afghan women and children. Among these are health, education, and income-
generating activities which are critical for the well-being of refugees in
long-term asylum situations. For Palestinian refugees, we support UNRWA
[UN Relief and Works Agency] programs which are designed with women and
children as the primary beneficiaries: 60% of the UNRWA budget is for
education, 25% for medical programs--the majority of which are maternal-
child health--and 15% for relief assistance.
Repatriation
As I noted earlier, repatriation possibilities have opened up--for example,
in South Africa, northern Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia,
and Chad--providing opportunities for the return of as many as 3 million of
the world's refugees between 1992 and 1993.
The past year's experience with repatriation provides important evidence of
how complicated and difficult such programs are and the degree of
international cooperation and support that is needed if these opportunities
are not to be lost. Successes in returning people to Vietnam and Iraq have
shown that close attention to the needs of returnees once they have
returned is essential. It is, if anything, more complicated in countries like
Cambodia and even Ethiopia.
Mines cover the roads and fields in Cambodia and Somalia; irrigation
systems are clogged and overgrown in Afghanistan; poverty and insecurity
reign in the areas to which people are returning in Ethiopia. Thus, we need
more than a few months of food aid and some tools for refugees to return.
We need demining, which is extraordinarily time consuming and dangerous,
rehabilitation of local infrastructure, and the building of new
understandings among returnees and those who were displaced or deprived
inside the country.
This requires close cooperation between refugee agencies such as UNHCR
and development agencies such as UNDP [UN Development Program], the IBRD
[International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], and bilateral aid
agencies. A gap often exists here, however. The lines of responsibility
between repatriation assistance and development are ill-defined. UNHCR
has little capability [n]or the mandate to manage rehabilitation for
combined populations of refugees and internally disadvantaged, while aid
agencies are often focused on more macroeconomic objectives. In Central
America, through CIREFCA (International Conference on Refugees in Central
America), a model was created to address these needs, and we can see the
results in Nicaragua where well-designed, quick-impact projects were
developed at a time when over 50,000 refugees and former contras were
returning home. The same model of cooperation between refugee
repatriation efforts and development reconstruction assistance will be
needed elsewhere. UNHCR and UNDP, for example, are working on such a plan
for Cambodia. But funding will be a factor.
Repatriation is thus costly--as an example, it will require roughly $350 per
refugee or $116 million for 330,000 Cambodians, and that does not count
the CIREFCA-type projects. It is, therefore, an understandable fact of
multilateral organization efforts that their ability to undertake initiatives
is strongly affected by the likelihood of funding. The international
community must be ready to respond to these efforts with the resources to
support programs to provide for the safe return of refugees to their homes.
We have sought to build more of such funding into the MRA budget in order to
give impetus to repatriation opportunities and reintegration programs.
Emergency Response Capabilities
High Commissioner Ogata took office just over a year ago and had 3 weeks
on the job when Kurds began fleeing from northern Iraq. Her trial by fire
included trying to determine the proper role for UNHCR in an internal crisis
and then, once involved, trying to mobilize personnel and resources to care
for the hundreds of thousands of refugees stranded in mountains along the
Turkish border and the million-plus who fled to Iran. Despite the success of
the international response to the Kurdish emergency, the UN drew criticism
for the time it took to organize and deploy its assistance.
The lessons learned were numerous and specific enough for Mrs. Ogata that
she launched an initiative by the fall to overhaul UNHCR's emergency
response capabilities. Her plan has included actions:
-- To make UNHCR personnel more readily available for assignment to an
emergency;
-- To create teams of sectoral experts for each geographic region who are
ready to assess needs at the onset of an emergency;
-- To have ready draft agreements for non-governmental organizations to
become operating partners of UNHCR in specific sectors (health, sanitation,
food, etc.); and
-- To establish a small stockpile of items commonly needed but often
unavailable in sufficient quantity on immediate notice.
We can see the fruits of these steps already in the effective UNHCR
response to the influx of Somalis into Kenya and of Burmese into
Bangladesh.
Emergencies such as that which occurred in northern Iraq also convinced the
UN member governments that the emergency response capability of the
United Nations as a whole needed significant improvement. In too many
cases, lines of responsibility have not been clear at the beginning,
mobilization of experienced staff has taken too long, and management with
non-governmental organizations and other implementing partners has
developed ad hoc after considerable trial and error.
In late 1991, in the context of US and other members' efforts at UN reform,
a new position was established, an Under Secretary General for
Humanitarian Assistance, plus a $50-million central emergency revolving
fund (of which over $40 million is already subscribed)--two measures
which should lead to more timely responses to save human lives. The United
States has pledged $5 million in support of this fund. We believe that the
establishment of the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance
will relieve many of the problems of coordination which plagued the UN
system during the Gulf crisis.
Admissions Program
The Department's budget request for Migration and Refugee Assistance
includes $208 million for refugee admissions programs in FY 1993. These
funds are estimated to support the admission and initial resettlement of
about 122,000 refugees from all regions of the world. While a specific
number has been used to calculate an estimated budget requirement, the
final number of admissions and regional allocations will be determined by
the President following the annual consultations process with the Congress.
This process will begin in June.
This year, the President has authorized the admission of up to 142,000
refugees in this country. Within this total, 10,000 numbers are only
available for private sector funding. The established ceilings for the
federally funded program [follow].
Federal Funding Ceilings By Geographic Region
Geographic Region FY 1992
Ceiling
East Asia 52,000
Eastern Europe 3,000
Former Soviet Union/
Commonwealth of
Independent States 61,000
Near East/South Asia 6,000
Latin America/Caribbean 3,000
Africa 6,000
Unallocated Reserve 1,000
Total 132,000
Admissions from East Asia first asylum continue as an essential element of
the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). The population of Vietnamese
which existed in the region at the start of the CPA in 1989 has now been
almost entirely resettled. With effective screening in place and with
declining rates of new arrivals of Vietnamese boat people, this element of
our program is diminishing. However, in light of the unpredictability of
resettlement needs for Lao refugees and the rapid expansion of the Orderly
Departure Program from Vietnam, the East Asia admissions numbers will
continue at about current levels in
FY 1993. We expect that Amerasian departures from Vietnam will begin to
decline during FY 1993. Although approximately 40,000 former detainees
and their family members have resettled in the United States since the
Reeducation Center Detainees Program was agreed to by the United States
and Vietnam in 1989, we expect that the interviewing of eligible former
detainees will continue through at least FY 1994.
Our other largest admissions program region is the former Soviet Union.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has brought increased freedom in many
areas, and new applications from nationals of the former Soviet Union have
slowed considerably. Nevertheless, there remains a substantial pipeline of
current applications to be processed representing persons qualified under
US law and for whom the specter, particularly of religious persecution,
remains. We will continue to interview individuals who meet our eligibility
criteria and expect to continue the Soviet refugee admissions program at
about the recent annual average level of 50,000 in FY 1993.
During FY 1991, the United States began a limited resettlement program for
the Kurds forced out of Iraq by the chemical war of 1988, and, this year, we
have begun processing Iraqi refugees from the 1990-91 Gulf war out of
Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This will be a multilateral effort.
Last month, the United States began an in-country processing program in
Haiti. This program is intended to reach individuals who fear persecution
because of their political opinion[s]. Examples of Haitian nationals who may
be eligible for this program include those who fear persecution because they
hold or held leadership positions in political or religious organizations at
the national or local level, have held sensitive positions in the Aristide
Government, or are prominent in fields that may be targets of pressure.
Other Activities
The MRA budget is the channel for US assistance to the ICRC, one of the
most important instruments in the world for aiding the victims of conflict.
In 1991, armed conflicts ranged from declared war in the Gulf to resistance
movements within dozens of countries. The application of the Geneva
Convention and the role of the ICRC are triggered regardless of whether the
combat is between a domestic resistance movement and the regime in power
or between governments. The ICRC performs the essential humanitarian role
on the battlefield, delegates care for war-wounded, registers and protects
prisoners of war, facilitates tracing and communication among separated
families, and protects civilians in combat areas. The United States, as a
party to the Geneva Convention, has an obligation to fund the basic structure
of the ICRC as well as to support its specific relief activities. When
sufficient appropriations are available, it is our policy to provide 10% of
the budget for ICRC's core functions and to contribute an appropriate share
to its individual emergency program appeals.
Another most effective international organization with which we cooperate
is the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which has assisted
millions of refugees to resettle in the United States in its 40-year
existence. Although associated primarily with resettlement programs, IOM
displayed its logistical expertise in emergency situations by helping
thousands of displaced and refugee Kurds in their movements out of harm's
way and then in returning to their homes in northern Iraq. It is helping
South African exiles return home in conjunction with UNHCR and is working
on a new information program in Albania to help people there understand
what opportunities do and do not exist for migration. The United States
funds IOM in three ways: through a reimbursement agreement for its
resettlement program services, through an assessed contribution to its
administrative budget, and through unearmarked voluntary contributions to
support IOM's other migration programs.
Since 1973, the United States has provided grants to the United Israel
Appeal to help resettle refugees in Israel. Although Israel does not use the
term "refugee," persons assisted by the grant come from parts of the former
Soviet Union, Ethiopia, the Middle East, and elsewhere where the Jewish
population feels threatened.
To help with the absorption of the new immigrants into Israeli society, the
Administration is requesting $50 mil-lion for FY 1993. These funds
represent only a small supplement to funds raised by the United Israel
Appeal from the American Jewish community for refugee resettlement in
Israel.
International Migration
Before concluding, I would like to address a broader issue which ties in with
the demographic theme of today's hearing--the overall context of world
migration in which we are working. In the 1990s, we face the paradox that
there are at once historic opportunities to resolve some of the major
refugee issues from the Cold War era and increasing pressures on the
international system as a whole to address new, mixed populations of
asylum seekers and other migrants.
East-West Pressures
The political asylum systems of Western Europe (and North America) were
established during the Cold War era on the basis of the 1951 UN Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. When Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union were under communist control, people fleeing those regimes were
treated as refugees and offered generous opportunities for permanent
resettlement by the West. With the advent of democratic governments and
the removal of restrictions on travel, movements from East to West have
taken on a new character, and European governments increasingly focus on
the question of economic rather than political migration.
In 1989, the year of the Eastern European revolutions, 1.2 million people--
after a lifetime of imprisonment behind armed borders--left the Warsaw
Pact states, seeking permanent resettlement in the West. The following
year, some 9 million Soviet people traveled abroad, of whom 450,000 were
emigrating through established channels. A sense of panic began to spread
around Europe concerning the prospect of a massive wave of migration.
A more salient factor in European concern about East-West migration,
however, has been the crisis in asylum. During the past decade, and
particularly the past 5 years, the number of people applying for asylum in
Western Europe annually has increased. Whereas, in 1983, some 75,000
asylum applications were lodged in Europe, by 1991, the figure was nearly
600,000. European countries have thus begun a searching analysis of how to
curb this phenomenon. The European Community has been working to
harmonize its asylum practices and responsibilities as prelude to
permitting unrestricted internal travel by 1993; a corollary has been to try
to tighten border controls and means of returning migrants home or to other
safe countries.
South-North Pressures
For many European governments, however, the more serious long-term
problem is not the migration pressures from the East but rather the rapid
rise in asylum seekers from the developing world. These individuals have,
in many cases, created serious new social pressures and often cannot safely
be returned home. Owing to projected population increases in Africa, South
Asia, and Latin America, migration pressures from the South would appear
more difficult to manage than those from the East. Africa's population is
expected to grow from 642 million in 1990 to nearly 1.6 billion in the year
2025. By that time, the population in South Asia will exceed 2 billion, and
Latin America's will reach 750 million. South-North migration trends are
not only the result of demographic pressure but opportunity and, in some
cases, political and cultural ties. In some cases, it is not without value to
the longer-term stabilization of economic relations between North and
South. The use of remittances sent home by migrant workers to finance
investments in housing, businesses, and farm improvement as well as
consumer goods serves as an example of this. In such cases, worker
remittances may actually serve as important [a role] as foreign aid as a
source of capital transfer.
Shorter-term strains upon the asylum and/or immigration systems of
Europe and North America may arise more from instability and turmoil than
from poverty and population growth. It is instructive that asylum pressure
is currently strongest from Somalia and Sri Lanka. The former is one of the
poorest countries of the Third World; the latter is one of the better
developed ones. But both are in the midst of civil war. One implication of
this is that attention to conflict resolution may be as important as
development and trade as ways to address South-North pressure.
Technical Cooperation in Migration
Although modest in budgetary terms, the work of the Bureau for Refugee
Programs is expanding markedly in addressing these future global migration
issues. The United States has serious concerns that reactions to these
pressures in Western Europe do not result in erecting a new "wall" which
forces the new democracies of Eastern Europe to face alone any major
problems from the former Soviet Union. Nor will it help, in the long run,
simply to shift asylum pressures from Europe elsewhere. We need to work
on constructive responses, including opportunities for orderly migration,
and to maintain an appropriate sharing of responsibilities in addressing
these growing demands. The United States is working closely with our
European and North American partners and with relevant international
bodies to pursue such objectives. In particular, we seek to develop national
and international mechanisms to ensure the identification and protection of
refugees, while at the same time allowing for the orderly control of
movements of people across international borders for immigration or
commercial purposes. These are complicated questions, and considerable
work will be required to achieve a proper balance between the rights of
individual asylum seekers and other migrants and the rights of sovereign
states to control immigration.
At the initiative of the United States, CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] has made the migration issue a prominent subject for
this year. We also have exchanged technical missions on these subjects by
senior officials with Russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, and we
are supporting cooperation between the Commonwealth of Independent
States, the UNHCR and the ICRC.
We are pleased that the IOM concluded on March 13 an agreement with
Russia to operate orderly migration programs in Moscow and provide
technical assistance.
The response to East-West migration pressures affects both US foreign
(international burden-sharing and refugee protection) and domestic (asylum
and immigration) policy interests. The Department's FY 1993 budget request
for Migration and Refugee Assistance, therefore, includes funds not only to
help address refugee and conflict victim emergencies in Europe but also to
provide technical assistance and enhanced cooperation to deal with the
inevitability of large migration flows. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: Funds for Cambodian And Burmese
Refugees
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 19 19923/19/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Burma, Cambodia
Subject: Immigration, Refugees
[TEXT]
On March 16, the President authorized the release of $18 million from the
US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to meet urgent refugee
and migration needs of Cambodians and Burmese.
Of this amount, $15 million will be used to address the needs of Cambodian
refugees and displaced persons who will be returning to Cambodia as an
essential part of the Cambodian political settlement. The UN Cambodian
repatriation operation intends to repatriate approximately 330,000
Cambodian refugees and displaced persons within a 9-month period
beginning in March-April. It is essential that the repatriation begin soon
since elections--the capstone of the Cambodian resettlement--are to take
place in the spring of 1993.
These funds may be used for US contributions to the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
and other international organizations and private voluntary agencies, as
required.
The United States has already contributed $5 million to the United Nations
for the pre-operational phase of the program. With these additional funds,
the total US contribution for Cambodian repatriation will increase to $20
million.
As announced at the White House earlier this afternoon, $3 million from the
emergency fund drawdown will be used to respond to the urgent needs of
Burmese Muslim refugees (Rohingyas) who have been forced to flee to
Bangladesh from Burma's Arakan state to escape a continuing Burmese
Government military action against them.
There are now over 130,000 refugees in Bangladesh and several thousand
people continue to cross the border each day. In view of the magnitude of
this flow, the Government of Bangladesh has asked UNHCR to
coordinate relief efforts for the Rohingyas.
The US contribution will be used for relief assistance to the Rohingyas
through UNHCR and non-governmental organizations as appropriate. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: US, Bangladesh Sign PL 480 Agreement
Eagleburger
Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Remarks at the signature of Bangladesh-United States PL
480 (Food for Peace) agreement, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 18 19923/18/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South Asia
Country: Bangladesh
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Bangladesh is an overwhelmingly agricultural country, one that is fertile
and productive. Yet it takes more than soil, sunlight, and water to grow
enough food for an entire population--it takes investment in improved
technology as well. The steps Bangladesh has taken to expand the private
sector's role in the marketing of fertilizer and small-scale irrigation
equipment have helped produce record-breaking harvests of irrigated rice in
the past 4 years, without increasing the fixed costs of government.
Bangladesh has come a long way toward self-sufficiency since its
independence and, in fact, is nearly self-sufficient in rice production. We
look forward to similar positive results from the development expenditures
provided for, in part, by the multi-year agreement we are about to sign.
This agreement contains a 4-year program for up to $268 million of food aid
to Bangladesh. The assistance will be used not only to meet Bangladesh's
food security needs, it will also generate local currency to finance the
annual development investment program, much of which focuses upon
agricultural development.
The program places highest priority on development investment policy
reform. Greater investments in agricultural technology will engender, in
turn, more employment, higher household income, and self-sustaining
agricultural development.
Our countries' friendship is of long standing, but the return of democracy in
Bangladesh has carried the bilateral relationship to new levels. In the past
year, we have cooperated closely on important international issues, and the
United States has manifested its support through debt relief and disaster
assistance efforts. Today's agreement formalizes and continues our joint
commitment to food security and development investment reform. I am
pleased to be witness to the signing of an agreement which I am certain
will be of great benefit to the people of Bangladesh. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: US-Russian Commission on POW/MIAs
Established
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 20 19923/20/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia
Subject: POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
The United States and Russia have established a joint commission to
investigate unresolved cases of prisoners of war and missing in action
dating from the Second World War, including the Korean and Vietnam
conflicts. The creation of this commission underscores the commitment of
both the United States and Russia to work together in a spirit of friendship
to uncover the fate of missing servicemen on both sides. This effort
symbolizes the determination of the Administration to resolve outstanding
issues from the Cold War period and is another step in developing our new,
cooperative relationship with Russia.
Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Malcolm Toon has been designated
[as] the President's representative and chairman of the US delegation to this
commission. The commission also will include Senators John Kerry and
Robert Smith and Congressmen Pete Peterson and John Miller. The Russian
delegation will be chaired by Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, a senior adviser to
President Yeltsin. The first meeting of the joint commission will be held
March 26-28 in Moscow. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: The Horn of Africa: Country Updates
Cohen
Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 19 19923/19/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest,
Human Rights, Democratization, Refugees
[TEXT]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting me to
speak with you about the developments in the countries of the Horn of
Africa.
The range of issues to be dealt with in the Horn run the gamut from drought,
famine, and civil war to political reform, development, and democracy. In
Ethiopia, the focus on war has changed to nation building and development.
Leaders there are taking steps to open the system to greater participation
by the people; the first local elections are to be held soon. We, for our part,
are looking for ways to begin our assistance to that country. It will,
however, be dependent on continued progress in human rights and democracy.
As for Sudan, I wish I were the bearer of good news. Unfortunately, the
regime in Khartoum appears bent on ignoring basic human rights and
pursuing the military option in the south. One particularly egregious
manifestation of the uncaring attitude of the government in Khartoum is its
treatment of the hundreds of thousands of displaced in the capital.
Sudanese authorities have been deaf to our entreaties to allow humanitarian
relief to reach these people.
In Somalia, the extent of the tragedy there grows daily. Perhaps 30,000
people have now been killed or wounded. Despite the obstacles, we continue
to look for ways to stop the bloodshed and bring desperately needed
humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia. The United Nations continues
its efforts to achieve a cease-fire and arrange for the secure delivery of
food and medicine. The Secretary General has the support of the OAU
[Organization for African Unity], the Arab League, and the Organization of
the Islamic Conference [OIC]. The next step is to arrange for a UN technical
team to work with all factions on the further mechanics of food distribution
as well as a process leading to a durable cease-fire and an eventual
political settlement. We have told the representatives of [opposing factions
leaders] General Aideed and Ali Mahdi in blunt terms that they must stop the
fighting and allow humanitarian relief to go forward.
Let me address, in turn, the countries of the Horn in greater detail.
Ethiopia
The transitional government of Ethiopia in Addas Ababa is making headway
confronting the challenge of constructing a new government from
representatives of a number of wary political, ethnic, and regional groups.
Based on the July 1991 charter, it is well into the process of restructuring
a post-Marxist government administration, taking initial steps to rebuild
the shattered economy and moving toward regional and national elections.
Regional elections are currently planned for May. These elections will be
the first free elections in Ethiopia's history.
In the economic sphere, the council of representatives adopted an economic
policy at the end of 1991 which goes a long way toward reducing the role of
government and increasing the role of the private sector in the Ethiopian
economy. The transitional government is now taking steps toward
privatizing the transport sector and the 110 state-owned industries.
However, revitalizing an economy devastated by 17 years of war and a
socialist dictatorship will require substantial financial and technical
support from the international community. The Ethiopian Government
recently concluded negotiations with the World Bank on a $630-million
emergency recovery and reconstruction project, which the Bank board of
executive directors is expected to approve in March. Negotiations with the
World Bank and IMF [International Monetary Fund] have begun for structural
adjustment support. Other potential donors are waiting to see what
assistance the United States provides.
Two legislative restrictions--[the] Brooke [amendment to the 1961 Foreign
Assistance Act] and Section 812 of the International Cooperation and
Development Act--prohibit us from providing bilateral development
assistance to Ethiopia. If legislative restrictions are surmounted, any
development assistance we provide will be dependent on continued progress
in human rights and democracy.
We are planning to direct our assistance to rebuilding infrastructure,
restoring public services, reintegrating demobilized soldiers, and
revitalizing the economy. The rapid restarting of economic activity,
particularly agriculture, is essential to help the country move toward self-
sufficiency and engage its long-suffering and displaced population in
productive enterprises. Funds from the development fund for Africa would
also be directed to assist the establishment of solid processes of
democracy and governance, both regionally and nationally.
American relief contributions for Ethiopia in food, disaster assistance, and
refugee aid totaled nearly $183 mil-lion in FY 1991. Although the rains this
year were good, we anticipate that humanitarian relief efforts will be
needed for the next several years.
Sudan
Sudan suffers famine, massive displacements of people, a devastated
economy, and serious human rights abuses. Many of these difficulties can be
traced to the ongoing civil war which seems no closer to solution than ever.
Neither side appears serious about negotiating, at least until the current dry
season fighting is over. Nevertheless, we continue to support the OAU's
effort to bring both sides to the negotiating table and are open to
suggestions if both sides want us to help. The situation has recently
become more complicated due to the split within the SPLA [Sudanese
People's Liberation Army], which is largely along tribal lines. It is
complicating relief efforts, presenting Khartoum with a pretext for not
negotiating, and has caused terrible bloodshed and uprooting of peoples in
the south.
Human rights abuses in Sudan are a major concern for us. Since the middle
of last year, the Sudanese Government has been forcibly relocating people
who had settled in the Khartoum area after fleeing war and drought
elsewhere in the country. They are being moved to inhospitable areas in the
desert outside the city. To date, approximately 500,000 people have been
forcibly relocated, sometimes at gunpoint. Essential services at the new
sites are minimal to non-existent. We and the rest of the international
community have strongly protested these forced relocations and asked the
Sudanese Government to at least suspend these movements of people until
sites can be better prepared.
Somalia
Somalia is the most acute humanitarian tragedy in the world today. The
fighting in Mogadishu--and deliberate targeting of ships trying to come into
port--has thwarted efforts to deliver relief supplies to Somalia's capital.
Hundreds of thousands of people have fled the fighting. Five hundred or more
Somali refugees cross the Kenyan border every day. Thousands of Somalis
have died already of starvation. Estimates of the numbers killed and
wounded in the Mogadishu war are now pushing 30,000. No one really knows
the extent of the casualties; many of the most seriously wounded never
reached hospitals. Some estimates are that 90% of casualties are non-
combatants and that, of these, 75% are children. Despite both sides' public
adherence to a cease-fire, the fighting continues, varying in intensity from
day to day.
Mogadishu's population is at the mercy of hungry young men--some not yet
teenagers--who take orders from no one and live by the gun. The
international community, in trying to provide emergency relief, has not yet
found a way to get around or neutralize these bandits.
The United Nations continues its efforts to achieve a cease-fire in
Mogadishu and arrange secure means of delivering food, medicine, and
medical care. Secretary General Boutros Ghali has given the Somalia
situation a high priority and considerable personal energy and attention. He
has met in New York with delegations from the warring factions and
searched for mechanisms that will work in an unprecedented situation of
conflict and humanitarian disaster. He has enlisted the support of the OAU,
the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in an
innovative joint effort for peace in Somalia. These are the regional
organizations which ideally should be involved in settlement of conflicts
such as Somalia's but which, unfortunately, have too often been missing.
Based on the results of the joint UN-OAU-Arab League-OIC delegation's visit
to Mogadishu at the beginning of March, Boutros Ghali has recommended the
dispatch of a technical team to work out the mechanics of a cease-fire and
provision of humanitarian relief. The next steps depend a great deal on what
the technical team recommends.
Throughout the crisis, we have urged the factions to stop fighting and
permit international relief operations to go forward. I made these points as
bluntly as I could to the leaders of the factional delegations when they
visited Washington after the UN meetings. We continue to consult with UN
Security Council members; influential countries such as Italy, Egypt, and
Saudi Arabia; [and] the OAU and others about actions the international
community can usefully take to promote peace and prevent famine.
If there are insurmountable obstacles, then ways will have to be found to go
around them. To be specific, there is a growing consensus that the United
Nations and other international efforts should not be held hostage to the
political squabbling and fighting in Mogadishu, which has ceased to be a
capital city. If the parties are unwilling to accept help from the
international community in resolving their disputes, then we will
concentrate on humanitarian relief. We will not ignore the people even if
their self-proclaimed leaders do.
Djibouti
For several months, we have been following the insurgency in Djibouti with
concern. This small country, seriously affected by years of war in Ethiopia
and the disasters in Somalia, has experienced enough suffering without a
civil war of its own. We are heartened by the progress that my French
counterpart, Mr. Paul Dijoud, has made in his repeated efforts to mediate the
Djiboutian dispute. We hope that the cease-fire continues in effect and that
by fulfilling pledges for greater democracy, the Djiboutian Government will
satisfy demands for a wider participation of all segments of society. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: US Welcomes South African Referendum
Results
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 18 19923/18/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: South Africa
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
Yesterday, white South Africans voted overwhelmingly for a just and
democratic future and expressed confidence in their place in that future.
They said no to apartheid and yes to reconciliation. We welcome their
decision.
In voting yes, white voters affirmed that negotiations offer the only path to
a secure future for all South Africans. South Africans have already begun to
enjoy the benefits of this path. Internationally, they have seen the lifting
of sanctions, an end to cultural and athletic isolation, and South Africa's
ongoing reintegration into the world community. This vote sends a message
of reconciliation to black South Africans who have demonstrated a
remarkable willingness to put the past behind them. Yesterday, white South
Africans made their preference crystal clear. They rejected a no option that
would have led to a return of international isolation and domestic discord.
All South Africans have a stake in their country's future and a right to make
their views known. The way forward to a negotiated settlement is now
more open than ever. We urge those who so far have chosen to remain
outside the negotiating process to join the vast majority of their
countrymen and bring their aspirations into the convention for a democratic
South Africa forum.
Perhaps the best summary of the importance of this event is what is being
said today in South Africa itself.
President De Klerk has said that "Today we have closed the book on
apartheid."
Nelson Mandela said that "An overwhelming yes vote means the process [of
democracy] is definitely on course."
We certainly agree with them and look forward to further and rapid progress
in building a new, democratic South Africa. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: Gist: Western Sahara
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Mar, 23 19923/23/92
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria
Subject: Democratization, United Nations,
Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Background
From 1884 to 1975, the territory now known as the Western Sahara was
controlled by Spain and called Spanish Sahara. In 1975, under the terms of
the Treaty of Madrid, Spain gave up its claims, ceding the territory to
Mauritania and Morocco. Mauritania was to occupy the southern third, and
Morocco, the remaining portion.
Meanwhile, in 1973, a group known by the acronym POLISARIO (Popular Front
for the Liberation of the Saquia el Hamra and the Rio de Oro) and consisting
of the population indigenous to the area and a few foreign advisers and
supporters, had formed a union to call for self-determination and
independence for the whole area. In 1979, Mauritania, unwilling to continue
facing opposition from within the Western Sahara, signed an accord with the
POLISARIO, surrendering control of its southern section. That left Morocco
and the POLISARIO in a struggle for the area.
Morocco, lying northeast of the region, bases its claim to the territory on
the Treaty of Madrid and, historically, on contacts dating back to the
Almoravid Empire of the 11th century. The Western Sahara plays an integral
part in the Moroccan concept of a "Greater Morocco." Because it contains
some of the world's largest reserves of phosphates, the area also has
economic importance.
Current Situation
The POLISARIO is opposed to Morocco's efforts to control the area. The
POLISARIO force, estimated at no more than 20,000 troops is made up of
local Berbers and Arabs, called Sahrawis (or Sahraouis). In the past, the
POLISARIO has received assistance from Mali, Libya, Cuba, and Algeria.
Algeria remains as the POLISARIO's most significant supporter. Algeria's
announcement of recognition and support for the POLISARIO in 1976 led to a
rift in Algerian/Moroccan relations that was not reconciled until 1988. At
its peak, the POLISARIO, and its governmental arm, the Saharan Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR), had the support of 28 of 50 members of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and a number of other Third World
countries.
The conflict between the Government of Morocco and the POLISARIO has
plagued the Western Sahara region for more than 16 years. In 1975, King
Hassan II of Morocco led thousands of his supporters in the famous "Green
March" into the Western Sahara region, reinforcing Moroccan claims to the
territory by relocating thousands of Moroccans in the area. The Moroccan
Government has made heavy investments in the infrastructure of the
Western Sahara in hopes of bolstering its claim as rightful controller of the
region.
During the past decade, alternating periods of conflict and cease-fire have
characterized the situation in the Western Sahara. Several proposals for a
referendum to settle the dispute were suggested throughout this time by
both the UN and the OAU. In August 1988, the Moroccan Government and the
POLISARIO accepted in principle an OAU proposal aimed at the settlement of
the question of the Western Sahara. Subsequently, the UN Security Council
accepted responsibility to organize and oversee a referendum to determine
the future of the Western Sahara.
UN Role
The UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) was
established by UN Security Council Resolution 690 in April 1991. The
Secretary General's plan calls for about 2,900 military and civilian
personnel to observe a cease-fire between Morocco and the POLISARIO and
to conduct a referendum to determine whether the Western Sahara will
become independent or integrate with Morocco. A UN monitored cease-fire
went into effect on September 6, 1991. Thirty US military personnel were
part of the first deployment of 185 MINURSO cease-fire observers.
The original schedule envisioned the referendum taking place in early 1992,
but full deployment of MINURSO and progress toward the holding of the
referendum have been delayed pending final agreement between the parties
on guidelines for voter participation. The UN General Assembly approved
$181 million for MINURSO, of which the UN assessed member states $143
million for the first 6 months. The US assessment for this period was $43.3
million. The United States also pledged a voluntary contribution to the
office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of $8.5 million to
assist it in repatriating to the Western Sahara an expected 65,000
Sahrawis, now in Algeria, so they can vote in the referendum. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: Peru's Brutal Insurgency: Sendero Luminoso
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Date: Mar, 12 19923/12/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Peru, Ecuador
Subject: Terrorism, Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization,
Narcotics
[TEXT]
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the Communist Party of Peru--
usually known as Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path--with you. I want to
begin by commending you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this
subcommittee for devoting your attention to one of the most important, and
least discussed, issues in this hemisphere.
A little over a half century ago, Nazi Germany exterminated one-third of the
Jewish population in the world--mothers, fathers, and children--while the
world stood by and failed to stop it. After the Holocaust, the world
community vowed "Never again." But in the 1970s, in Cambodia under Pol
Pot, we saw genocide repeated. We need to learn that lesson and never
repeat it again.
We welcome these hearings and asked that you hold them to stimulate public
discussion about an important policy issue. The congressional foreign
affairs committees have a long tradition of fostering public discussion of
difficult foreign policy questions. Under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, this
subcommittee has focused public attention on key questions concerning US
interests in this hemisphere. It is in that spirit that I asked the opportunity
to testify.
What I would like to do is begin a dialogue with the Congress about what
needs to be done in Peru. I hope this hearing generates wider public debate
here and abroad on what can be done to strengthen a democratic government
that is confronting this hemisphere's most brutal insurgency.
Sendero Luminoso's Aims and Activities
Sendero Luminoso is unlike any other insurgent or terrorist group that has
ever operated in Latin America. Put out of your mind the FMLN [Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front] of El Salvador which just signed a peace
agreement, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua who allowed themselves to be
voted out of office, the M-19 of Colombia, and other South American
insurgencies that have ended their violent struggle to take advantage of the
political space open to the peaceful, democratic left. Sendero Luminoso is
in a category by itself.
There are other communist insurgencies, but only Sendero saw the fall of
Eastern European communist governments as a positive step where the
people overthrew decadent, bourgeois communism to make way for pure
communism; Sendero bombed the North Korean commercial office in Lima
and believes Fidel Castro is a US lackey. Latin America has seen violence
and terror but none like Sendero's, where children are forced to commit acts
of brutality as part of their indoctrination [and] where entire towns are
forced to witness the so-called trial, torture, and killing of nuns or
municipal leaders. Latin America has seen many variations of the Marxist
vision but none so sweeping as Sendero's war against "Western culture." A
Sendero victory would compare not to Cuba under Castro or Nicaragua under
the Sandinistas but to Cambodia under Pol Pot.
In the words of [Sendero's leader] Abimael Guzman,
"We start from a principle established by Chairman Mao: Violence is a
universal law with no exception. . . . without revolutionary violence we
cannot replace one class for another. . . ."
The revolution will triumph, according to Guzman, after the Peruvian people
"cross over the river of blood" to the other side.
Make no mistake: If Sendero were to take power, we would see this
century's third genocide. Luis Arce Borja, Sendero's representative in
Europe, told a Lima newspaper last November that the current stage of the
war--"strategic equilibrium"--will cost 1 million Peruvian lives.
Sendero began its armed campaign in 1981 just as Peru returned to
democratic government. It is a movement of the "unreconstructed" Peruvian
left born in protest against Peru's return to democracy. When most of Peru's
left decided to re-enter the democratic process, a small, fringe, university-
based Marxist elite cried "treason" and evolved into Sendero Luminoso.
Its founders, especially the undisputed leader Abimael Guzman, the so-
called Presidente Gonzalo, were deeply influenced by Chinese communism
during the Cultural Revolution and brought a strong Maoist orientation to
Sendero, hence the strategy of a rural, peasant-based movement that hopes
to capture the cities as its final objective.
Sendero takes advantage of two factors unique to Peru. In its ideology, it
plays on the sharp division of Peruvian society between white descendants
of the Spaniards, the mestizos, and the rural indigenous Indian population,
much of which speaks only Quechua, the language of the Incas. In its
finances, it profits from Peru's key role in cocaine production. We do not
believe that Sendero receives significant material or financial support from
foreign governments or revolutionary movements, but it does raise funds
from gullible publics in Europe.
Roughly estimated, we believe Sendero has 3,000-5,000 full-time armed
fighters and up to twice that many part-time militia. Including political
cadre of various types, Sendero may be able to count on as many as 25,000
supporters. In addition, 15%-20% of Peru's population lives in "pink" or "red"
zones under significant or predominant Sendero influence. Some of these
citizens provide support out of intimidation and fear.
In response to the combined threat of Sendero and the Tupac Amaru (MRTA)
guerrillas, about one-third of Peru's 183 provinces and nearly half of its
people have been placed under "emergency zones" where civilian rule is
suspended and the local military commander is effectively in charge of
government and security.
Sendero knows that in the past 2 decades, the expansion of participatory
democracy in Latin America has delegitimized revolutionary movements.
From El Salvador to Chile, violent revolutionaries lost their raison d'etre as
democracy grew and citizens gained a real role in governing their own
affairs.
Sendero's strategy, then, is to use violence to destroy democratic
institutions, to stop citizens from participating in local government, to
destroy the functioning economy, and to cripple programs which provide aid
and services to the population. This form of terror often succeeds. Mayors
and municipal leaders refuse to run--or take office--because not only will
they be targeted by Sendero, but their families and the entire community
will be subject to Sendero's terror. Sendero's intimidation caused a round
of municipal elections scheduled for 1989 to be delayed until 1991. When
the balloting was held last August, guerrilla intimidation prevented
candidates from running in 104 towns. Overall, elections had to be annulled
in 220 out of 498 jurisdictions because either no candidate ran, the winner
resigned after being elected, or too few people cast ballots.
In Sendero's mind, any Peruvian or any foreigner who takes up the
democratic cause, tries to ease human suffering, or resists terrorist
threats is hampering the development of revolutionary consciousness and
delaying the day when the people will turn to armed revolt. That makes
them targets for terror:
-- Last May 18, Sendero terrorists publicly shot to death [an] Australian
nun, Sister Irene McCormick, of the Catholic relief organization Caritas,
who worked to help the poorest of Peru's poor in Junin department. Her body
was left lying where it fell for 24 hours on orders from Sendero.
-- Sendero has bombed Catholic and Baptist churches and murdered
religious workers. On August 22, 1990, Sendero killed two young Baptist
missionaries in Junin, one with a knife thrust through his neck.
-- Norman Tattersall, a Canadian working in Lima with the Protestant
social services organization World Vision, lost his life in a Sendero attack
last May 17, as did his Colombian associate Jose Chuquin.
-- In January 1990, a Sendero group, mostly of children under 16, shot two
French tourists they took off a bus passing through a rural area. The
youngest member of the group was made to beat one of the victims' skulls
with a large rock until it was completely crushed.
-- Two other tourists were taken off a bus, tortured, and shot in November
1989. In this killing, Sendero slashed a young woman's chest and stomach
so badly that it had to be bound to hold in its internal organs before it could
be moved.
-- Sendero killed two Polish and one Italian priest who worked with poor
children in Ancash department last August.
-- Last July 12, Sendero murdered three Japanese development workers
near Huaral. The Japanese have withdrawn most of their aid workers in
response to this and other attacks.
-- On February 15, Maria Elena Moyano, Vice Mayor of Lima's largest shanty
town of Villa El Salvador, was leaving a neighborhood barbecue party with
her family. She had met Senator [Mark] Hatfield and Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights Richard Shifter in Lima last fall. She bravely,
vocally, and actively resisted Sendero terror, even after they bombed the
local community food warehouse. Sendero assassins shot her point-blank
then threw a dynamite charge that scattered pieces of her body over 100
yards away.
-- Juana Lopez directed the Glass of Milk feeding program in Callao, north
of Lima. Sendero killed her and others last fall in attacks against food
distribution and emergency aid projects.
-- Andres Davila Arnao organized a local self-defense force to protect his
neighborhood against Sendero brutality. He was killed February 17 just
outside of Lima.
-- A Catholic priest from the Ayacucho area told of ritual murders of
peasants who refused to cooperate with or tried to escape from Sendero
during its early years of terror. After a so-called people's trial, victims
were stripped and tied to a post in the town square. Every person in the
town--men, women, and children--was forced to cut a piece of flesh from
the living body. The Sendero torture went on for as long as an hour before
victims died from shock and loss of blood.
-- Peruvian police found the body of a fellow officer in the summer of
1989, completely eviscerated and filled with human feces--Sendero's work.
-- Sendero assassins machine-gunned the mayor of one small town, then
set off a dynamite charge in his lap, while they forced his wife and four
children to watch.
-- Sendero's campaign against Peru's Ashaninka Indians in 1990 and 1991
was terrifying in its brutality: A 14-year-old struck in the head with a
machete, shot, stabbed, and dumped in a river; victims doused in gasoline
and set afire; children forced to eat their parents' tongues.
-- A November 1991 Sendero attack on a village near Ayacucho left 37
dead, including 9 children.
-- Since 1980, Sendero has killed 42 Peruvians working with US
Government development projects.
On February 14, Sendero climaxed a bombing campaign against government
offices, banks, diplomatic missions--including US Ambassador Quainton's
residence, where a bomb killed three Peruvian policemen and severely
damaged a security wall--and other targets with an "armed strike" in Lima.
Armed strikes are a long-standing Sendero tactic in which the guerrillas
seek to enforce compliance with the strike through waves of killings
against those who dare to go to work. Despite numerous bombings in last
month's strike, Lima citizens tried bravely to go about their business.
This past decade of violence has cost Peru 24,000 lives and about $20
billion in economic damage--about 1 year's GNP.
What Can Be Done About Sendero Luminoso
The crucial question is what can be done about the threat of Sendero. There
are no easy answers. But I agree wholeheartedly with statements members
of the subcommittee made yesterday: Sendero confronts us not only with a
question of geopolitical interest but also with the defense of fundamental
moral values.
Sendero will only be defeated by Peruvians. There is no US solution to this
threat. Still, the United States can and must help and so must the
democratic community worldwide.
Scott Palmer, who testified yesterday, posed the problem well. He said
revolutions don't succeed; governments fail. Therefore, our challenge is to
help the Peruvian Government succeed in its expressed agenda of
strengthening democratic institutions, reviving the Peruvian economy,
meeting long neglected social needs, strengthening the capacity of peasant
farmers to develop alternatives to coca leaf production, and defending
human rights.
First, the international community and respected human rights
organizations must focus the spotlight of world attention on the threat
which Sendero poses. I am not suggesting that the Peruvian Government get
a pass on human rights. They should not, and they will not. But if the world
had held tribunals, issued reports, and alerted governments and multilateral
institutions to the threat that the Khmer Rouge posed to Cambodia early in
the 1970s, perhaps the horrors of its rule might have been averted in time.
Second, Sendero does not operate in a vacuum. Two-thirds of Peruvians live
in poverty today; that human misery offers fertile breeding grounds for a
messianic group like Sendero. The guerrillas take advantage of Peru's
profound economic crisis, and the international community must help the
Peruvian Government to overcome that crisis.
When President Fujimori took office 20 months ago, Peru's 1990 GDP was
down 22% from only 2 years before. It would take Peru 12 straight years of
5% growth to get per capita income back to 1987 levels. Inflation ran at a
staggering 7,650%. The previous government's suspension of external debt
payments cut off Peru from any resources of the international financial
institutions--the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the IDB [Inter-American
Development Bank], [and] the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development]. Peru's debts totaled $22 billion; fully two-thirds of Peru's
external debt was in arrears.
President Fujimori has proven one of the boldest, most far-reaching
reformers in today's generation of Latin American leaders. He slashed
inflation to 220% in 1990; in December 1991, inflation was only 3.7%--
under 55% annually. He balanced Peru's budget, ended longstanding price
controls and subsidies, and reduced the government payroll by 50,000
employees. Peru's average tariff, 80% in August 1990, is down to 17%
today. Almost all barriers to foreign investment are gone. Last fall, Peru
settled three multi-million-dollar investment disputes with US companies.
President Fujimori's currency exchange, interest rate, and labor reforms
have made Peru's economy more competitive. Peru has resumed debt
payments to international financial institutions.
As a result of these policies, the Peruvian economy grew 2.8% last year
after contracting 4.6% in 1990 and 11.9% the year before.
The United States has done much to support President Fujimori's economic
policies, and I hope we can do more. We took the lead in forming a support
group of donors that pledged $1.1 billion--$416 million of that from the
United States--in new money over 2 years. With this help and that of other
international donor countries and institutions, Peru has begun to pay off its
arrears so it can receive fresh capital inflows. The IDB has already resumed
new lending.
We are providing Peru $200.7 mil-lion in direct assistance this year, $157.2
million of it [in] economic aid. The Andean Trade Preference Initiative
passed by Congress and signed into law by the President last December will
expand Peru's trade access to the United States. We have requested $286
million in budget authority for official debt reduction under the Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative in FY 1993, and we hope to include reduction of
Peru's official debt in this year's program. Full funding of this initiative by
the Congress would permit us to provide significant relief to Peru.
Our aid has helped Peru in other key areas. US assistance feeds one in seven
Peruvians. When the cholera epidemic struck in January 1991, afflicting
about 300,000 Peruvians, programs we had in place for a decade were key to
containing the disease and keeping the fatality rate low--1.3%. We have
continued and expanded our infant mortality program--training health care
personnel and providing oral rehydration salts--with $5 million in extra aid
last year and $5 million more to be spent this year.
Third, the Peruvian Government must develop a comprehensive political,
economic, and social strategy to confront Sendero. The military component
of that strategy must support and be subsumed by the larger political,
economic, and social goals. A fundamental part of that strategy must be to
extend the government's presence and services to the marginalized rural
areas and to the new urban [areas]--pueblos jovenes--where Sendero has
sunk its roots, in part, because there is no government presence. The United
States can help as well by supporting economic development projects that
emphasize grassroots participation by local communities in developing
project goals, overseeing their implementation, and providing volunteer
efforts to carry them out. Security is also necessary for such projects to
be effective. So far this year, eight foreign development workers and six
foreign nationals involved in religious and humanitarian organizations have
been assassinated by Sendero. The Peruvian armed forces and police must
be assisted in professionalizing themselves with training, equipment,
technical assistance, and human rights
standards.
Fourth, Peru must fundamentally reform and strengthen its system for
administering justice. Peru must ensure swift, efficient due process that
protects the innocent but also a system of justice that prosecutes
terrorists effectively while safeguarding judges and jurors and police
officials. Today the conviction rate for accused terrorists is less than 10%.
Prosecutors and police are underpaid and ill-equipped. They lack law books,
typewriters, and even buses to transport prisoners. Corruption must be
rooted out of judicial systems as well.
We are now in the third year of a $3.4-million US Agency for International
Development (USAID) administration of justice program. That program
supports Peruvian efforts to establish a national register of detainees;
increase cooperation between prosecutors, judges, and police; and improve
access to legal services. USAID is developing new programs to help improve
court information systems, implement the new procedural code, establish
legal aid offices, and provide technical support and equipment. Peru has
asked for our help to consolidate its three existing police organizations into
a single national police force, determine future training needs, and
recommend needed legal reforms. Our USAID program foresees the creation
of a nonpartisan, public-private sector institution to develop a national
consensus on--and national support for--judicial reform. The $5 million we
plan to request for this 3- to 5-year program will be money well spent.
Our $500,000 ICITAP [US Department of Justice's International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program] has trained 120 Peruvian
judges, prosecutors, and police officers in proper police and investigative
techniques. We turned over the materials used in these programs to the
Peruvians so they can train additional personnel. We plan a pilot human
rights training course for police officers next year.
Fifth, we and the international community must go forward with our
commitments made at Cartagena and, now, San Antonio. Contrary to
conventional myth, this does not mean militarization of the drug war. It
requires, first and foremost--by the United States and, hopefully, by the
European democracies as well--continued, steady, sustained effort to
reduce the demand for drugs, and here the United States has a record that
shows progress. It involves sustained, multilateral efforts to attack the
drug trafficking cartels in every area: the chemicals they transport and
ship, the money they launder, the aircraft and ships that move their product,
and the corruption they breed.
I understand why Peru places Sendero higher on their list of priorities than
coca leaf. I also understand why the United States, when it thinks about
Peru, thinks about cocaine. But that does not mean we cannot cooperate in
ways that strengthen the ability of both governments to deal with their
relative priorities.
The problem of cocaine production is related to the problem of insurgency.
Sendero earns money from the drug traffickers by having its units protect
coca processing labs. But Sendero's role is often more direct. In large parts
of the Huallaga Valley, Sendero is the drug business: It allocates land [and]
dictates prices paid to coca farmers then negotiates and sells directly to
the Colombian cartels.
The Upper Huallaga Valley is Sendero's chief logistical base; Sendero
controls about 30,000 hectares there, amounting to over half the valley's
coca leaf cultivation. The guerrillas "tax" narcotics flights, earning
$5,000-$15,000 for each use of an airport they control. These funds give
Sendero access to weapons they otherwise wouldn't get. Captured
documents show that in 1989, for example, Sendero was able to buy some
Belgian-made assault rifles from drug traffickers.
Both we and the Peruvian Government are working to create alternative
economic development to replace coca cultivation. However, that work
won't succeed in Peru unless we drive the price of coca leaf down and
provide security to allow alternative development to go forward. Sendero
has destroyed roads and bridges linking the Huallaga Valley to Lima and
killed development workers as part of a strategy to isolate the coca
farmers and make them dependent on Sendero. Adequate security for
development efforts will require assistance to the police, and, in some
instances, the military is needed. I believe we made a mistake in depriving
the army of these funds in this year's aid package. We fully share the
Congress' concerns about human rights in Peru. We also believe that our
engagement will do more than get better results in the drug war--it will
further the progress President Fujimori is already making in advancing the
cause of human rights.
Alternative economic development for coca farmers is a fundamental goal of
both Peru and the United States in its counter-narcotics strategy. Despite
the difficulties, through our aid in the Upper Huallaga project, more than
14,000 farmers have received technical assistance and planted more than
1,700 demonstration plots. More than 2,100 agricultural loans and 4,700
land titles have been provided to farmers. A total of 1,256 kilometers of
road and 12 bridges have been rehabilitated, thereby reducing travel time by
60% along a key section of the coastal road from the valley to the coast.
The project has provided 38 potable water systems, 16 medical posts, and
88 water pumps as well as scores of community vegetable gardens. Still,
serious alternative economic development programs cannot go forward
without providing security.
[Sixth], the international community should also support the efforts of Peru
and Ecuador to finally resolve their longstanding border dispute stemming
from the conflict fought between them in 1942. President Fujimori
courageously was the first Peruvian President to visit Quito last January,
and President Borja has agreed to make a return visit. President Bush
praised these efforts at the San Antonio drug summit. As a guarantor of the
1942 Rio Protocols, the United States has a role to play in supporting this
diplomacy. For, despite the fundamental threat which Sendero poses, the
bulk of Peru's army is still organized, mobilized, and stationed to deal with
the threat of conflict with neighbors like Ecuador and Chile. Final
settlement of this border conflict would allow Peru to concentrate its
security forces on the real enemy of the Peruvian people--Sendero
Luminoso.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the programs we support in Peru today are not
counterinsurgency programs. They each have specific, limited objectives.
But they also contribute to strengthening the government's economic,
administrative, and military capacity to confront and defeat Sendero.
Economic development and administration of justice programs strengthen
Peru's democracy and give the lie to the guerrillas' argument that the state
cannot serve justice or human needs. Our counter-narcotics programs
impart basic security skills and an understanding of human rights--that
makes Peru's security forces more effective in any mission they undertake.
As the drug trade is disrupted, Sendero loses a source of financing.
Certainly, there is a convincing case against US involvement in a
counterinsurgency program in Peru. The Administration has no such plans,
nor would we propose them without close consultation with the Peruvian
Government and the Congress and only after careful consideration and
debate.
Yet there is a case for closer engagement with Peru. The plain fact is that
while drug trafficking is our top interest in Peru, the Sendero Luminoso is a
direct threat to the government's survival. Peru's insurgencies threaten
more than democracy and prosperity--they pose serious obstacles to all
aspects of an effective counter-narcotics strategy, from interdicting coca
shipments to economic development to enforcing the law against captured
traffickers. They threaten democracy in Latin America and the prospects
for regional economic integration and trade.
I look forward to the debate these hearings will generate, and I look forward
to continuing our work with Congress on a policy toward Peru that serves US
interests of stopping drug trafficking, strengthening democracy, and
defending human rights. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: El Salvador: Pickett-Dawson Murders
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Statement, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 14 19923/14/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: El Salvador
Subject: Terrorism, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
The FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] has announced that the
suspects in the January 1991 murders of US citizens David Pickett and
Earnest Dawson will be turned over to Salvadoran authorities. This step
will not, in itself, ensure that those responsible for this crime will face the
bar of justice.
The US Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of these murders
and has obtained an indictment against one defendant in the United States.
The United States continues to believe that those responsible for this case
should answer to the US justice system for violations of US law. The FMLN
is aware of our position on this matter.
The FMLN's announcement in no way relieves it of the obligation to provide
all the evidence in its possession, including the results of its internal
investigation, testimony from witnesses, the witnesses themselves, prior
statements by the accused, and physical evidence.
We call upon the FMLN to go beyond their announcement and to cooperate
immediately and fully with US and Salvadoran authorities in order to make
the legal case against all those who were involved in these murders. For its
part, the United States will continue its full cooperation with Salvadoran
investigative authorities. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992
Title: New US Embassies Open
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Notice to the press, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 17 19923/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Azerbaijan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan
Subject: State Department
[TEXT]
Embassies of the United States of America are staffed and functioning in
the following countries:
Moldova:
The Embassy is located at 103 Ulitsa Alexei Matoovich in
Chisinau. There currently is no phone hookup to the Embassy building, but
the staff can be reached at the Seabaco Hotel, phone number 0422-23-28-
94. Pending the designation of an ambassador, Howard Steers has been
appointed as Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
Uzbekistan:
The Embassy is located at 55 Chelendarskaya in
Tashkent. There currently is no phone hookup to the Embassy building, but
the staff can be reached at the Hotel Uzbekistan, phone number 7-3630-24-
49-08. Pending the designation of an ambassador, Michael Mozur has been
appointed as Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
Azerbaijan:
The Embassy is located in the Intourist Hotel in Baku,
phone number 8922-91-79-56. Pending the designation of an ambassador,
Robert Finn has been appointed as Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
Turkmenistan:
The Embassy is located in the Yuvelinaya Hotel in
Ashkhabad, phone number 3630-24-49-08. Pending the designation of an
ambassador, Jeffrey White has been appointed as Charge d'Affaires ad
interim.
Tajikistan:
The Embassy is located in the Oktyabrskaya Hotel in
Dushanbe, phone number 3772-24-32-23. Pending the designation of an
ambassador, Edmund McWilliams has been appointed as Charge d'Affaires ad
interim.
The Embassies currently are providing limited consular services to
American citizens. Americans in need of emergency services may contact
the local Embassy. All Americans residing or traveling in these countries
are urged to register with the US Embassy.
Routine visa services will be provided at the new Embassies as soon as the
offices are readied and appropriate staff assigned. In the meantime,
citizens of Moldova, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan
will continue to apply for US visas at other US embassies or consulates.
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