US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992


US-German Friendship Strengthens Atlantic Partnership

Bush Kohl Source: President Bush, German Chancellor Kohl Description: Introductory remarks at a White House news conference, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 22 19923/22/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: Germany Subject: History, NATO, Trade/Economics, Democratization [TEXT]
President Bush:
Chancellor Kohl and I had a very productive discussion on a wide range of the issues that face us in the new era. Among them: the Amer-ican role in Europe, support for the democratic revolutions in Russia and Eastern Europe, and world trade talks. We agreed that NATO remains the bedrock of European peace and there is no substitute for our Atlantic link, anchored by a strong American military presence in Europe--which the Chancellor and I both agreed must be maintained. In our review of the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--GATT] negotiations, the Chancellor and I reaffirmed our determination to reach an early agreement that expands the world trading system. This would be a victory for US-European partnership in promoting free trade, spurring economic growth, and creating jobs in the United States, Germany, and all developing countries. We also discussed how we can best support democracy in the East. We agreed that as Russia and other new democracies adopt reform programs, we and the rest of the G-7 countries should take the lead in expanding financial support through the international financial institutions. Our talks have shown that the Atlantic partnership is as vital and healthy as ever. I'm especially pleased to see the United States and Germany are working as closely now as we did during the period of German unification. And finally on a very personal side, Barbara and I were just delighted to have this time together with Chancellor Kohl, with his wife, and it was also a great pleasure to have their son up there at Camp David. It was a good visit. Mr. Chancellor, the floor is yours, sir.
Chancellor Kohl:
Mr. President, Mrs. Bush, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to take up where you left off, Mr. President, and thank you and Mrs. Bush for the very warm hospitality with which you received my wife, my son, and the members of my delegation at Camp David. It was a very, very friendly meeting, a very personal meeting, a very nice [meeting]--for these discussions on problems of interest to both of us which will be of interest for the very near future. One of these issues--which we consider to be a very important one--was the issue of GATT. Obviously, I did not come here as an official negotiator but as a member--or as a representative--of an EC [European Community] member country. I explained our position on this question once again. The negotiations obviously are being weighed by the EC Commission, and the EC Commission enjoys the full confidence of the EC member countries. President Bush and I are in agreement that it is of paramount importance for [the] world economy to come to a successful conclusion of the GATT negotiations now, and we are in agreement that we have to prevent--at all costs--a fallback into a policy of protectionism. We know that it is, particularly at this juncture, a very important thing that we maintain free world trade; that this is very important for a good development of the world economy. This is, indeed, one of the main reasons why we intend to strengthen GATT. We are also, both of us, very well aware of the fact that the successful conclusion of the GATT round is also of paramount importance for the countries of the Third World. This is why we want to put all our efforts into these negotiations in the coming weeks, and why we want to come to a successful conclusion of the GATT round at the very latest by the end of April. In our talks, we talked, obviously, also about the preparations leading up to the world economic summit meeting in Munich in July. The President supported me in the endeavor that these talks should focus more intensively on informal talks, and that we should give room to the discussions on global issues that are of interest to all of us. Very important issues for the summit meeting in Munich will be, first of all, world economic developments. We want this summit to strengthen the trust and confidence in all countries in the world economy. Another important subject for Munich will be the situation in the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We will talk in Munich particularly about an overall package of so-called "help for self-help" where we want to draw up a sort of framework for cooperation of the West with the CIS. And a third very important subject which we talked about is the improvement of cooperation of Western industrialized countries with the countries of the Third World now after the end of the Cold War. Another important subject we talked about--in view of the very dramatic changes is the success of republics of the former Soviet Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States--was the overall situation there but also the relief activities that our two countries have already initiated. We just initiated the second of these assistance activities, and it is the second of the kind. But, obviously, we cannot go on doing this kind of thing indefinitely. What is important now is to give them sort of a solid program of help or self-help where we focus on individual areas; where we focus, for example, on agriculture, on improvement of infrastructure, on the improvement of transport and communication links, and where we also concentrate on improving, for example, the safety standards of nuclear power plants in the former Soviet Union. These were just some of the subjects that we dealt with during our very long and intensive discussions during these past 2 days. But I would like to mention the most important subject at the end of my remarks here: That once again, during these 2 days it became apparent that the United States of America and reunified Germany are linked by very strong bonds of friendship and partnership. No matter what will happen in the world, this friendship, this partnership is of existential importance for us Germans. In [the] future, too, [the] freedom and security of Europe and also, therefore, of Germany can be safeguarded by this transatlantic alliance, which is why I would like to underline here in Washington, in the White House, that for us, it is a matter of course that this includes also a substantial presence of American troops in Europe. But it is our joint desire that our relationship will be deepened and widened beyond the mere scope of security and military issues; that we come to even closer relations in the cultural field, in the scientific field, in research and development, which is why I'm very pleased to be able to announce--and we have agreed on this--that this year we will inaugurate a German-American Academy of Sciences. This has never existed, to my knowledge, in the United States of America, and we have never had this sort of link with the United States before, or with any other country across the Atlantic, for that matter. I think that an instrument such as this one is of utmost importance, particularly for the young generation, for fostering a mutual understanding of each other. I would now like to issue an invitation to all our American friends to participate as guests in the German cultural festival that will take place here soon and to understand this as a sign of sympathy and friendship with the American people. Mr. President, allow me to thank you once again for these days where you once again demonstrated your friendship to us, which made it possible to meet in this very warm and hospitable atmosphere. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

The Middle East: US Interests And Challenges Ahead

Djerejian Source: Edward P. Djerejian , Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 17 19923/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Trade/Economics, Arms Control, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you and the distinguished members of the subcommittee again. When Secretary Baker appeared before the House Foreign affairs Committee a short while ago, he said that 1991 marked the end of one era and the dramatic birth of another. This is certainly true in the Middle East, where in 1991 we fought and won the Gulf war by reversing Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, launched the Middle East peace process, and began to see the implications of the end of the Cold War in the region. I would like to bring you up to date on where we are now and the challenges that we face ahead.
Arab-Israeli Peace Process
When I met with you in November, the peace process had just begun in Madrid. We have now had four rounds of direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors, and we launched the multilateral process in Moscow in January. I pointed out in November that the road ahead would not be an easy one because of the fundamental differences that separated the parties. This has certainly proven to be the case. Nonetheless, real progress has been made. The parties have resolved many procedural questions and have moved into substantive negotiations. Israel, the Arabs, and the Palestinians are engaging on the basic issues of land, peace, and security, which are fundamental for the peace process. Israel and the Palestinians are engaging directly on the key issue of interim self-government arrangements as a first, transitional step along the path to a permanent settlement. In the most recent round, there were real, substantive issues on the table, and the parties explored ways to negotiate about these issues. Now that all sides have laid out their positions, it is time for them to engage in serious negotiations aimed at defining possible areas of agreement and working toward narrowing the gaps where disagreements exist in order to make real progress as soon as possible. This is the essence of negotiating and of this negotiating process which the parties embarked on at Madrid. Another accomplishment has been the initiation of the multilateral negotiations on regional issues. Thirty-six states gathered in Moscow in January to launch working groups on issues of regional concern. In spite of the absence of Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians, 11 Arab countries participated in this forum with Israel. In serious, cordial, business-like organizational meetings, broad consensus was reached to establish working groups on water, economic development, refugees, the environment, and regional security and arms control and to hold initial meetings this spring in various capitals around the world. We hope that those who were absent in Moscow will join the multilateral talks as soon as possible. As we look ahead, we are fully convinced that the process begun in Madrid offers the best prospect to fulfill our longstanding goals of a comprehensive and lasting peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. A meaningful peace must provide for both the recognition and security of Israel and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. While no date or venue has yet been set for future meetings, all sides have reiterated their commitment to the process, and we are in contact directly with the parties to establish the time and venue for the next round. It is important that the momentum of the process be maintained. For our part, the US role in the peace process continues to be that of a catalyst, a driving force, and an "honest broker." The President and the Secretary of State have made clear that we will remain fully engaged in this role.
US-Israeli Relations
For the past 42 years, the United States has maintained a close relationship with the state of Israel and has worked hard to bring about the peace and security that the Israeli people richly deserve. As Secretary Baker has said, our commitment to Israel's security and well-being remains unshakeable. We have had and do have differences, to be sure. But what has distinguished our relationship over the years is what has brought us together. As democracies, the United States and Israel share similar values and common traditions, and these have provided a strong foundation for cooperation. It is in this spirit that we will work to maintain a strong and healthy relationship in the future.
Gulf Security and Stability
I would like next to report on my trip in February to the Gulf states. I went there to confer with the leaders of the governments and with our Ambassadors to get their first-hand assessments as we pursue our goal of helping to strengthen stability and security in this vital part of the world. At every stop, I also sought to convey the strategic context in which we view this important region and to reiterate the high priority this Administration attaches to progress on human rights and participatory government. A starting point in my conversations was the changed situation in the former Soviet Union and especially in Central Asia, a close neighbor of the Middle East. Gulf states have allocated $3.5 billion in grants, loans, and credits to the former Soviet Union and have sent fact-finding missions to Central Asia. They are concerned about the possibility of instability, transfers of dangerous weapons technology, and economic collapse. I assured them that a top priority of the United States is to mobilize resources to assure the success of the new states' moves toward democracy, privatization, and market economies. Middle East countries which share common cultural and religious ties with the Islamic states of Central Asia can play an important role in this transition, and I got the clear impression they were prepared to be supportive. A second point I made was our shared interest in the security and stability of the Gulf. We all recognize that the Gulf still is a dangerous neighborhood and one of the world's most strategically important locations. In every conversation, I stressed the need for individual self defense and collective security arrangements among the six GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states, with the goal of strengthening their ability to defend themselves from external aggression. I also encouraged security cooperation between the Gulf states and their regional friends. At the same time, I assured them that the United States was determined, while preserving Israel's qualitative edge over any likely combination of aggressors, to meet the legitimate defense needs of our friends in the Gulf. This includes sales of weapons and bilateral security arrangements, such as the periodic conduct of joint military exercises, the maintenance of an enhanced naval presence in the Gulf, and access and prepositioning arrangements. I emphasized that these bilateral arrangements could complement but not supersede the Gulf states' collective security agreements. The third major point we addressed was the peace process. All of the GCC states attended the multilateral talks in Moscow, and all have committed themselves to participation in the working groups created there. We welcome this participation and believe that they have an important role to play. Further, we discussed the bilateral negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors and the Palestinians. The GCC leaders voiced their strong support of President Bush and Secretary Baker's efforts in the peace process. I also stopped in Turkey. I emphasized there our interest in an enhanced relationship, following up on Prime Minister Demirel's meeting with President Bush in Washington, involving a closer dialogue on such issues as the situation in Central Asia, the peace process, and the situation in the northern Gulf a year after the reversal of Saddam's aggression. These talks were extensive and productive in terms of exchanging our respective assessments and outlining possible courses of action and cooperation. At every stop in the Gulf, I also underscored our strong interest in ensuring that US exporters, contractors, and investors were given a fair chance to compete for business. In several capitals, I took up specific commercial problems, as well as the Arab boycott. Further, and very importantly, I raised the US Government's strong interest in the promotion of participatory government and human rights. In this respect, we note and are encouraged by heightened sensitivity to and signs of the expansion of political participation. We welcome King Fahd's decision to establish a consultative council in Saudi Arabia and his reaffirmation of limits on governmental interference in citizens' private lives, in accordance with Saudi Arabia's religion and tradition. It is a very important step forward. In Kuwait, we look forward to the parliamentary elections which the Amir has slated for October of this year.
Across the Gulf from our friends lies Iran, which the Untied States recognizes as an important geopolitical entity in the region. With this importance comes correspondingly important responsibilities. We encourage Iran to develop stable, peaceful relations with all its neighbors in the Gulf on the basis of noninterference and mutual respect. We will continue working with other countries to encourage Iranian adherence to acceptable standards of international behavior. Iran knows what it has to do to re-enter the international community as a constructive participant. As for our own relations with Iran, normal ties depend on several factors, particularly an end to support for terrorism and a permanent cessation of hostage taking. Iran's role in helping to bring about the release of American hostages in Lebanon was an important step. Regrettably, however, the hostage situation has not been completely resolved. There are still others held outside the judicial process. Moreover, Iran's role in sponsoring terrorism continues in other ways that are deeply disturbing. Iran's human rights practices and its apparent quest for weapons of mass destruction will also affect the potential relationship. Another cause of concern is Iran's categoric opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and its support for those who are prepared to oppose the peace process, even by violent means. We have offered to hold direct talks with Iran's authorized representatives. The Iranians have not accepted this offer. The ball is in their court if they wish to pursue this matter seriously.
In Iraq, Saddam Hussein continues to refuse to comply with resolutions passed by the UN Security Council. He has refused to dismantle weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and the means to produce them. He refuses to end repression and respect human rights. He has rejected the UN Special Rapporteur's recent report which concludes that the violations of human rights in Iraq are so grave that few parallels can be found since the Second World War. Saddam Hussein has rejected UN resolutions that would relieve the suffering of his own people. He is intentionally depriving millions of Iraqi civilians of food, fuel, and medicine permitted by UN sanctions. Tariq Aziz' performance before the UN Security Council last week was sadly predictable. He ostensibly exuded goodwill and good intentions--while failing utterly to respond to the very specific, and very serious, concerns raised by the council. His responses fell far short of complete and unconditional compliance with all the resolutions. We do not aim, as Tariq Aziz alleged, at the destruction of Iraq's industrial base. But we strongly support the determination of the UN Security Council that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and the facilities used to produce them, will be destroyed. We also share the international community's resolve to continue programs of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein should not again mistake the seriousness of purpose of the international community. Clearly, he hopes to frustrate and outlast the will of the Security Council. He will not succeed.
Turning to the Levant, the United States was deeply concerned about the renewal of violence in February, and we have urged maximum restraint on all parties. US policy on Lebanon remains firm and consistent. We have long recognized that the security and safety of all the people of southern Lebanon and northern Israel can best be assured by a strong and effective central government in Beirut, a strong Lebanese army, and the extension of the Lebanese Government's authority throughout the country. We believe that the Taif agreement must be carried out in letter and in spirit and offers the best chance of regaining the unity, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Further, we continue to support the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon. When King Hussein [of Jordan] visited Washington last week, President Bush, Secretary Baker, and he discussed Iraq and agreed on the importance of full Iraqi compliance with all Security Council resolutions. King Hussein said that Jordan would do its part, and, I believe, we had serious and constructive discussions in this respect. King Hussein reiterated his strong commitment to the Arab-Israeli peace process as demonstrated by Jordan's active participation in both the bilateral and multilateral negotiations and discussions. We welcome Jordan's key, constructive, and positive role in the search for peace. The King also raised the dire economic straits in which Jordan finds itself. The disruption of the Gulf war and the influx of Palestinians from the Gulf countries--up to 300,000 of them--have raised Jordan's unemployment rate to about 40%. There is a clear need to alleviate Jordan's economic situation, and support by Jordan's neighbors in the region and the international community is needed now. With Syria, we continue to pursue a broad dialogue on issues of mutual interest, and we remain engaged on the issues where we need to narrow the gaps between us, such as terrorism, human rights, and narcotics. Despite these differences, the United States and Syria consulted productively on the effort leading to the Taif accords on Lebanon and cooperated in opposing Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait. Last fall, after eight trips by Secretary Baker to the Middle East, President Assad responded positively to President Bush's invitation to participate in direct bilateral negotiations with Israel.
Arms Control
Finally, arms control remains a high priority in our efforts to bring stability to the Middle East. Pursuant to the President's arms control initiative for the Middle East, negotiations continue among the five major arms suppliers- -the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China--aimed at controlling destabilizing transfers of conventional weapons and of weapons of mass destruction-related equipment and technology. We will pursue these efforts with vigor.
Foreign Assistance
I would like to close by noting that foreign assistance remains a vital tool for advancing American interests and values in the Middle East and worldwide. As the Secretary said in his recent appearances here, the funds that we have requested are "an investment in peace," an investment which permits "timely, flexible support for our interests in political pluralism, free market economic development, peacemaking, and strong alliances." Foreign assistance is a crucial element of our Middle East policy and will continue to be in the upcoming era. We are ready to work closely with Congress to assure that our foreign policy interests in the Middle East are met. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

Iraqi Non-Compliance With UN Security Council Resolutions

Pickering Source: Thomas R. Pickering, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, New York Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: United Nations, Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Human Rights [TEXT] Mr. President, to say we are disappointed in what we heard from [Iraqi] Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz this morning would be a serious understatement. The approach which he made to the Council did not, in our view, address the issues nor did it advance the process. Let me cite a few examples. [Firstly], the statement itself appears to be directed toward destroying the confidence of the Security Council, the Special Commission, and the International Atomic Energy Agency and their work. In several areas, it suggests the Council put itself into the process of actually implementing its own resolutions. Even worse, it suggests that the Security Council enter into a negotiating process with Iraq for the implementation of what we all know to be mandatory resolutions. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of Iraq about mandatory resolutions and a complete miscalculation of the intention and purpose of the Council in dealing with Iraq's programs of weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, the Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister suggests that with respect to the declarations required of Iraq under Resolution 687, Iraq would be ready to sit down with the Council and the Special Commission and apparently negotiate out what it is that Iraq will declare. This is not the approach of the Council nor, obviously, the purpose of its resolutions. Secondly, with respect to the issue of the destruction of its weapons of mass destruction and the programs in Iraq for the production of those weapons, it seeks a similar negotiating-oriented approach. It suggests there is confusion about what the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] have asked to be destroyed. It suggests that the Council put itself into the middle of this process to decide what elements must be destroyed. It ignores the firm position on the part of the Council that the Special Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency will be the technical mechanism for the designation of what should be destroyed or rendered harmless or removed in the Iraqi program and in the production base which supports that program. We understand the Special Commission and the IAEA conducted several rounds of conversations with Iraqi technical experts and has come up with final lists on certain ballistic missile and related production items which Iraq now refuses to destroy. We fail to see how further conversations and negotiations are a real answer to the problem. The problem is really full compliance with the resolution as it stands and the designations made carefully by the Special Commission. Finally, we appear to have roughly the same proposal coming out of the statement this morning with respect to the issue of long-term monitoring. Again, long-term monitoring plans presented by the Council to Iraq and approved in resolutions which are mandatory are clearly not subject to negotiation. Such efforts are not in keeping with mandatory resolutions. We expect a full and clear Iraqi commitment to comply. A drawn-out discussion and negotiation of Iraqi compliance with resolutions is not in the interest of regional peace and stability, and it is not the intention of the members of the Council, nor is it provided for in the resolutions with which Iraq must comply. It is also disappointing that the Iraqi statement made no serious effort to address the numerous outstanding questions in the minds of the members of the Council. The Deputy Foreign Minister at the end of his statement clearly must have understood this, and we, on our part, welcome his commitment to address these questions with his answers tomorrow morning. We look forward to hearing what he has to say in this regard. Other portions of the statement merely repeat the old and tired arguments of the past. In that respect, there was very little new which we saw in the statement itself, and it did not serve to advance the process of Iraqi compliance which is, again, deeply disappointing. We are also disappointed, as others are, that nowhere in the Iraqi statement this morning did we see a reference to Resolution 688, to the UN's important role in providing humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Iraq, or a discussion of what Iraq will do to alleviate the plight of the Kurds and the Shi'a. This only serves to lend greater credence to our fears about Iraq's refusal to observe universal standards of human rights and its oppression of the Kurds and the Shi'a--its own citizens--in its own country. On the other hand, we react positively to one small portion of the statement in which the Deputy Foreign Minister seemed to break new ground by promising, starting today, to publish the names of missing persons in several Iraqi newspapers once a week for a period of several weeks. We could only hope that Iraq would comply rapidly with the rest of its obligations with the same degree of directness--this especially includes providing unrestricted access to the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] to all Iraqi prisons and places of detention. Iraq has made frequent references to its sovereignty and its internal affairs. However, Iraq knows as well as all of us that the Council is operating with regard to its resolutions on Iraq under Chapter 7. Such resolutions are mandatory and fall under the last portion of Article II, Paragraph 7 of the Charter which makes it clear that the principle of non- intervention "shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 7." The measures that Iraq complains of are clearly "enforcement measures under Chapter 7." It is clear that the author of all of this destruction and difficulty is Iraq itself. Iraq was frequently warned by the Council to cease its aggression and to abandon its illegal occupation of Kuwait. Iraq brought these measures upon itself. Iraq now holds the key to their relaxation. It is clear that Iraq must comply with the Security Council resolutions. Attacks on the views of the members of the Security Council and attacks on the cohesion of the Security Council and the independence of its individual members is not the way to achieve a change in the present situation. Similarly, attacks on the Special Commission and the IAEA do not help. As I said this morning, Iraq should begin by committing itself to full compliance and then to immediately taking on the follow-up actions rapidly and expediently to carry out that compliance. Unfortunately, nothing we have heard here today so far suggests that Iraq understands this need. It is clear that Iraq has not yet fully complied with the resolutions of this Council, but, again, we hope to hear tomorrow--as we did not today--that Iraq intends to do so.
Weapons Destruction
Now I would like to turn, Mr. President, in light of our session planned for tomorrow morning to a few questions which we believe clearly need answers: First, on weapons of mass destruction. Is Iraq ready to make full final and complete disclosure of its programs of weapons of mass destruction and when will it do so? Second, is Iraq prepared to commence destruction of its ballistic missile production and repair facilities, as requested by the Special Commission's letter of February 14 under UN supervision and will it do so immediately? Third, will Iraq return to the IAEA the nuclear documents seized from and never returned to the sixth IAEA inspection team in September 1991 and will it do so immediately? Fourth, will Iraq today provide unconditional acceptance of the long-term monitoring and verification plans laid out in Resolution 715 and make the required declarations of its equipment and facilities? When will Iraq begin to observe the full range of privileges and immunities to be accorded to the Special Commission and to the IAEA?
Boundary Demarcation
With respect to the boundary demarcation and border posts, does Iraq now recognize its obligations to accept the work of the Boundary Commission to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait border? Will Iraq remove immediately its border police posts from the Kuwaiti side of the border on the map used by UNIKOM [UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission]?
Humanitarian Issues
With respect to detainees, refugees, and humanitarian interests, will Iraq resolve, as soon as possible, the matter of missing Kuwaitis, Saudis, and missing third country nationals from the Gulf war by: -- Conducting detailed, documented searches for those still missing and sharing the full results of those searches with the ICRC? -- Providing to the ICRC information on Kuwaitis and third country nationals who died while in custody? -- Granting the ICRC unrestricted access to all Iraqi places of detention in its effort to trace the missing? When will Iraq meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people by implementing Resolutions 706 and 712? When will Iraq permit the establishment of UN humanitarian centers throughout Iraq, including Kirkuk and Mosul? When will Iraq guarantee the UN humanitarian program unrestricted access to vulnerable groups throughout Iraq? When will Iraq dismantle the checkpoints blocking roads into northern Iraq and lift the blockade of northern Iraq? When will Iraq allow Iraqi citizens formerly resident in the Kirkuk area to return to their homes and businesses? Will Iraq cease attacks on civilians, including artillery bombardment of urban areas? When will the Iraqi military end its encirclement of the southern marsh area--a de facto blockade confining up to half a million persons--and permit the UN to visit?
Return of Property
Concerning the return of property: When will Iraq make a final accounting of and return all of both the military and non-military property taken from Kuwait? Finally, when will Iraq begin providing the Secretary-General and appropriate international organizations a monthly statement of Iraq's gold and foreign currency reserves as required by Resolution 706? Thank you, Mr. President. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

Humanitarian Situation in Iraq

Kimble Source: Melinda L. Kimble, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Development and Technical Specialized Ageny Affairs Description: Statement before the International Task Force of the House Select Committee on Hunger, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 18 19923/18/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: United Nations, Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your invitation to appear today to update you and the members of the select committee on conditions in Iraq. First, I would like to detail what the international community is providing in the way of humanitarian assistance to needy Iraqi civilians. Approximately 375 UN humanitarian personnel, 500 UN guards, 300 Red Cross workers, and 192 employees of private organizations are stationed throughout Iraq. The United Nations and its agencies have provided nearly $300 million in humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people in the past year; the Red Cross, another $100 million. US contributions include $94 million to the United Nations, over 63,000 metric tons (mt) of food, and $6.9 mil-lion to private agencies for programs in Iraq. These amounts, together with the cost of Operation Provide Comfort, bring the total US expenditure for the people of Iraq to over $600 million in the past year.
Iraq Sanctions
In discussing the issues of sanctions and the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, let me begin by making three points: First, the sanctions imposed against Iraq by the United Nations in Security Council Resolutions 661 and 687 are designed to ensure that the Iraqi leadership lives up to obligations clearly spelled out in various UN resolutions. Resolution 687 makes no provision for any easing of sanctions before Iraq fully complies. Second, these sanctions were never intended to punish innocent Iraqi civilians. For this reason, medicine was excluded from the trade sanctions imposed before the war, [and] food and medicine have been excluded from those imposed following the cease-fire. Finally, the international community will continue to battle the suffering which the repressive policies of the Government of Saddam Hussein have brought to the Iraqi people. It will not, however, trust this government with unmonitored supervision of humanitarian assistance. This government's record of massive human rights violations more than justifies this distrust. Many, led by Iraqi Government officials, have overstated the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi economy. UN officials have assured us that there are adequate stocks of food in Iraq and that massive malnutrition is not a serious problem in any region. Reports from Jordan provide evidence which backs this up: Walks through markets in Amman reveal undisguised supplies of black market Iraqi food exports, including high-caloric dates. We have also received numerous reliable reports of Iraqi dates being exported via the Jordanian port of Aqaba. In the last 10 months of 1991, the UN Sanctions Committee was informed of plans to export 5.4 million mt of food to Iraq--we estimate that figure to represent about 75% of Iraq's annual pre-war food imports. Just in the past few days, we understand that Iraq has sent payment to Australia for a massive 900,000-ton shipment of wheat. Between December 15 and February 21, 22,259 trucks carried 605,895 mt of fruit and vegetables, wheat, sugar, rice, medicine, and other products into Iraq from Jordan. On the average, that is 327 trucks, each carrying nearly 30 tons every single day. Transport from Turkey was disrupted during this period by a strike of truck drivers. But tens of thousands of tons of flour, sugar, peas and beans, potatoes, onions, and other products were brought into Iraq from Turkey. This brisk, legal trade continues as we meet here today. UN sanctions do not block--and, since March 22, 1991, have not blocked--the export of essential civilian items to Iraq. I have with me the current list of exports approved by the UN Sanctions Committee. The list shows hundreds of exports of essential civilian items. It shows clothing and shoes, soap, and detergent sold commercially and donated by relief organizations. It shows hundreds of agricultural tractors and harvesting combines, pesticides, vegetable seeds, veterinary vaccines, and breeding stock. It shows parts and equipment to maintain and repair water and sewage systems, including whole water treatment plants. It shows school supplies, bakery equipment, food packaging materials, and much more. Trade with no direct humanitarian rationale remains tightly embargoed. The Multinational Interception Force is on station in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Ships of the United States, France, and Australia, to be joined soon by Canada, continue to enforce the sanctions and deter violations. Though a share of Iraq's imports of medicine, food, and essential civilian items is being provided by relief agencies, the overwhelming majority is being purchased commercially by government and private buyers. We know that Iraq's finances are tight. Foreign exchange is in short supply, and the value of the Iraqi dinar is collapsing. Yet Iraqis continue to finance imports, evidently drawing on personal accounts or hidden reserves held outside Iraq and probably by smuggling out Iraqi objects of value. Iraq reportedly used its gold reserves to make payment for the large shipment of Australian wheat.
UNHRC Report: Saddam's Disregard for His People
The February 18 report on the situation of human rights in Iraq, prepared by Mr. Max van der Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission [UNHRC], provides essential background information for any discussion on the current situation in Iraq. The report provides a chilling account of the brutal way in which the Iraqi Government has abused its citizens in recent years. Here are just three of the findings it makes: -- Arbitrary executions have been carried out on thousands, including women and children, characterized as "saboteurs." -- Hardly a family in Iraq has not been touched by a "systematic policy of enforced disappearances." -- Methods of torture, including electric shocks, burning with hot irons, extraction of the fingernails, gouging of the eyes, beating of the genitals, and rape, have become "a systematic practice conforming to government directives." Knowing this barbaric record, I have to wince when I hear Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister [Tariq Aziz] blame trade sanctions for the deaths of innocent civilians. For 11 months now, Saddam has found a new motive for torturing his people: He is attempting to use their suffering to protect his position, his military apparatus, and his nuclear weapons program. By trying to pass the results of his policies off as the result of trade sanctions, he hopes to get off the hook. As if his human rights record was not horrible enough, there is more evidence of his indifference toward his people. Look at his refusal to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712, which would allow Iraq to pump oil to generate resources for humanitarian assistance.
Blockade of the North
If that's not enough, we can dwell on the hypocrisy of his complaints. While attacking internationally imposed trade sanctions, he himself restricts food, medicine, and fuel reaching minority groups in northern and southern Iraq. Representatives of private voluntary organizations who have traveled to the region have told us about some elements of the Iraqi blockade of the north. -- Pensions of about 50,000 retired civil servants in the Kurdish- controlled area of the north have not been paid since last October. -- Since October 1991, salaries of civil servants in the north, with some exceptions such as Health Ministry employees, have also not been paid. -- Health Ministry officials and other exceptions to the rule have not been paid at all in 1992--they are not included in Iraq's 1992 budget. The Kurdish Front has raised enough to pay some salaries and maintain some semblance of a social services network. -- Government food rations provided to Kurds are reduced to approximately half the amount provided to other Iraqis. -- Fuel deliveries from the state oil company are just a quarter the amount sent to the north prior to October 1991. The blockade is enforced by a series of military checkpoints. Reports indicate cars with more than half a tank of gas have the extra fuel siphoned off. Overhead flights confirm reports that bags of groceries are taken from private vehicles crossing the checkpoints. Repression in the South Because the Iraqi Government has severely restricted access by foreigners to southern Iraq, we do not have a clear picture of the situation in this Shi'a-dominated region. We know enough to say that the Shi'a population is also suffering under the brutal policies of the Iraqi Government. Mr. van der Stoel's report documents allegations of the desecration of Shi'ite shrines, the closing of Shi'ite universities, the persecution of Shi'ite clergy, and the censorship of Shi'ite publications. Mr. van der Stoel also cites information that the Iraqi army surrounds the region of southern marshes, home to the so-called "marsh" Arabs. According to van der Stoel, alleged actions taken by the army against those in the marshes include: -- Tightening of control over food destined for the area; -- Evacuation of all areas within 3 kilometers of the marshes; -- Killing of large numbers of animal and bird life in the marshes; -- Dumping of toxic chemicals into the marsh waters; and -- Military attacks which have resulted in hundreds of deaths. These repressive policies toward Iraqis living in the north and south and the array of human rights violations listed by Mr. van der Stoel, not to mention the repression shown during Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, make the truth inescapable. The biggest problem confronting the Iraqi people is not the sanctions imposed by the United Nations. It is the policies imposed by the Government of Saddam Hussein.
International Humanitarian Relief
Action must, clearly, be taken to alleviate the suffering of vulnerable groups inside Iraq. After the Iraqi army chased thousands of refugees into the mountains along the border with Turkey and Iran, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688. This resolution told Iraq to allow humanitarian organizations immediate access to those in need of assistance and requested UN agencies to meet the critical needs of Iraqi refugees and displaced persons. Since last April, the United Nations has been helping refugees and the displaced, along with the most needy in vulnerable groups throughout Iraq. Between March and December 1991, donors provided almost $322 million to fund UN relief efforts in the Gulf region. In January, the United Nations requested $120 million more to fund operations through June 1992. The United States responded with a pledge of $36 million. Other donors have so far given about $20 million--we expect further pledges at a meeting the British are trying to schedule later this month. The United Nations has accomplished a great deal with this money. More than 1.8 million refugees were repatriated from Turkey and Iran to Iraq last year. Materials to build winter shelters were provided to about 74,000 families. More than 87,000 mt of food were provided, with three-quarters of it going to displaced persons concentrated in northern Iraq. Just as important as the emergency supplies has been the maintenance of a 500-man UN guard contingent operating across northern Iraq and in the southern town of Basrah. The guards are charged with providing security to UN personnel and equipment. They serve as de facto monitors whose presence deters violence on the part of both the Iraqi army and the Kurdish peshmerga.
Resolutions 706 and 712
Still, no one disagrees that much more needs to be done, particularly in the Kurdish regions of the north and in the Shi'a areas of the south. Here, the economic blockade mounted by the Government of Iraq has broadened the crisis beyond the needs of refugees and displaced. Last August, the Security Council created the ideal mechanism to provide this support in its Resolutions 706 and 712. You are familiar by now with the framework of this mechanism. -- The UN Sanctions Committee would monitor production and export of $1.6 billion worth of oil by the Iraqi state oil company. -- Funds would go into a UN escrow account, which, after deducting money for the UN Compensation Fund and the Special Commission overseeing destruction of Iraqi weapons, would provide about a billion dollars to fund humanitarian assistance to Iraq. -- The purchase and distribution of humanitarian supplies purchased with this money would be carefully monitored by the United Nations. As you all know, Iraq has refused to implement these resolutions. As Mr. van der Stoel noted in his report, the Iraqi Government has evidently decided that "its notions of 'sovereignty' are more important than its obligations to respect human rights." Just as it has in other areas covered by UN resolutions--weapons destruction and tracing of missing Kuwaitis to name but two--Iraq complains that the measures advocated by the United Nations violate Iraq's sovereignty. It demands that the terms governing the sale of oil and the disbursement of oil revenues be worked out to its liking. Following up on the meetings in New York last week, Iraqi and UN Secretariat representatives will soon meet again in Vienna to discuss implementation of Resolutions 706 and 712. We welcome Iraq's decision to resume these discussions. We believe the Security Council has made it unmistakably clear that until Iraq complies with pertinent UN resolutions, any oil exported from Iraq must be pumped under the mechanisms established by Resolutions 706 and 712. The international community has also made it clear to Iraq that, given Iraq's record, there must be international supervision of both the export of oil and the distribution of humanitarian relief. Resolutions 706 and 712 provided Iraq with 6 months to pump the necessary oil. Those 6 months expire tomorrow. Our discussions with Security Council partners indicate that once Iraq agrees to implement these resolutions, a 6-month time frame will again be established.
Future Plans
Until funds come in from oil pumped under Resolutions 706 and 712 or from some alternate source, the United Nations will continue to operate under its January 6-month plan of action. Because the scope of the work that needs to be done is changing and because of the recent appointment of a new UN Under Secretary General for Emergency Assistance, some changes are being made in the UN operations. At the top, Under Secretary General Jan Eliasson, who was recently appointed to fill the newly created position of humanitarian aid coordinator at the United Nations, is still considering the manner in which he will administer the UN program. We anticipate that he will appoint a new Executive Delegate for Humanitarian Programs in Iraq, who will be stationed in Baghdad. That position has been vacant since Prince Saddrudin Aga Khan resigned last December. On the ground, the United Nations will continue to help refugees and displaced persons. It also aims to meet the most basic needs of at-risk populations, focusing particularly on support for essential sanitation, medical, and agricultural services. While the focus will remain on northern Iraq, the United Nations is also working to expand operations in the south. Up until last month, Iraq had barred the United Nations from establishing offices in Nasiriyah and Al Hammar, two strategic locations adjacent to the southern marshes. The United Nations has now been allowed to open an office in these towns, but we fear this might have been a temporary concession timed to coincide with the arrival of Mr. Tariq Aziz in New York. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has had the lead until now in the UN operation. With the reduction in the number of displaced, it is anticipated that another agency will now come to the forefront. UNICEF [UN Children' Fund] and UNDP [UN Development Program] are the leading candidates, but neither has stepped forward to date. We have emphasized our position that there should be no decrease in the UN presence--such a drop could be misinterpreted by the Iraqi Government and by the Kurdish minority and thus lead to another flow of refugees. We recognize that UN agencies must, of necessity, work with authorities in Baghdad. However, we have continuously emphasized that they must monitor every aspect of their in-country programs to ensure that the Iraqi Government does not misdirect relief supplies.
A year after Saddam Hussein's armies were expelled from Kuwait, the humanitarian situation in Iraq is still unsettled. Saddam Hussein continues to repress his people, [and] the international community continues to respond compassionately to the suffering of the Iraqi people. In our urge to do all we can to end this suffering, we must not lose sight of its root cause: the disdain for the rule of law and the inhumane policies of the Government of Saddam Hussein. The framework established by Security Council resolutions provides the best means for meeting the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians and for compelling the Iraqi Government to return to the community of nations which respect international law. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

FY 1993 Budget Request For Migration and Refugee Assistance

Lyman Source: Princeton N. Lyman, Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 17 19923/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia, North America, South America, Central America, Caribbean, MidEast/North Africa Country: Afghanistan, South Africa, Angola, Cambodia, Vietnam, Iraq, Somalia, Ethiopia Subject: Immigration, Refugees, United Nations [TEXT] Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's discussion of the demographic realities of the world and how the FY 1993 budget for Migration and Refugee Assistance [MRA] begins to address some of these changes in the post-Cold War environment. In reference specifically to refugees and displaced persons, we see before us a very mixed scene. Resolution of conflicts that were fed in part by the Cold War--Cambodia, Angola, El Salvador--and of the civil war in Ethiopia, plus growing prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan, offer us the prospect of enabling 3 million of the world's refugees to go home over the next 2 years and as many as 7 million once the Afghan war is truly over. Repatriation of refugees to homes and farmlands, often devastated by war, and to countries where the internally displaced are also in need is costly and time-consuming. But the prospect of ending the plight of nearly half the world's refugees--after a decade of seeing those numbers rise--should motivate us not to shrink from this great humanitarian opportunity. It will also, once completed, remove a heavy burden from the international community, especially the United States, that has been the leading contributor to refugee assistance for the last 20 years. Another part of the scene is less encouraging. New conflicts, often brutal, are producing new refugee emergencies. In just the time between your setting this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and today, over 100,000 new refugees have fled into Bangladesh from depredations of the Burmese army, and as many as 150,000 Somali refugees have fled civil war, arriving in Kenya nearly dead from starvation and exposure. Over the last 2 years, the Liberian civil war has added 600,000 persons to the world's refugee total. Yugoslavia's fighting produced 40,000 refugees and nearly a half million internally displaced, and we are waiting upon ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] reports on the human costs of the clashes in Nagorno- Karabakh [Azerbaijan], where as many as 500,000 people have been forced from their homes. We must meet these emergencies not only with humanitarian assistance but with renewed and refined efforts at conflict resolution so that they do not breed yet another new generation of long- term refugees. Finally, we are witnessing greater and more complex pressures upon both the asylum and immigration systems of Western Europe and North America. Some of this has demographic roots, some is rooted in conflict, repression, and poverty. Unfortunately, we have seen instances where these pressures are producing [a] negative, even ugly, backlash against refugees themselves. More broadly, they pose a challenge to our ability to work cooperatively on both refugee and migration matters so that new walls are not erected and burden-sharing is maintained. Through our programs and through several other fora, we are seeking to address these concerns as well in the post- Cold War era.
FY 1993 MRA Budget Request
The world's refugees, which still number some 16 million--13 million of whom need assistance--fall into four main concentrations: 5 million Afghans in Pakistan and Iran; nearly 5 million African refugees, mostly the victims of civil wars; 2.5 million Palestinians; and 720,000 in Asia, nearly half from Cambodia. The numbers, which alone are staggering, do not give adequate expression to the human reality. Behind the numbers are men, women, and children fleeing soldiers as they cross the Naf river into Bangladesh. The numbers blur the starkness of women and children, separated from the men in their family, seeking shelter under plastic sheeting in northern Iraq or Kenya. They do not convey the desperation of people cut off from home and services, often for years at a time, trying to put together makeshift schools for their children and to retain their dignity in a situation of total dependence. Refugee programs go beyond the provision of assistance to those fleeing persecution and conflict, as critical and important as that is. They go beyond finding new homes for those needing resettlement in the West. They encompass difficult decisions by governments, by international organizations, and by private agencies to determine: -- Who are the people of concern; -- How to provide protection and adequate longer-term assistance to those people in a wide variety of situations; -- How to bring about solutions to the underlying causes of their flight and to enable refugees to return to their homes in countries often devastated by war; and -- How to forestall future refugee populations. The Department's FY 1993 budget request includes $550 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and $20 million for the US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund. Close to 60% of the MRA request, $315.3 million, will support international efforts to provide protection and assistance to refugees and conflict victims worldwide. A regional breakout of this assistance is provided below.
International Refugee Assistance (in millions $US)
East Asia 48.8 Africa 104.0 Near East/South Asia 106.0 Israel 50.0 Western Hemisphere 4.5 Europe 2.0 Subtotal, Assistance 315.3
Africa continues to be the most troubling and difficult continent in which to provide adequate protection and assistance. In addition to refugees, there are as many as 10 million persons displaced by conflict and conflict- induced famine within their own countries. In Sudan, government limitations on the international assistance agencies and continued civil war have left us almost helpless in the face of enormous human need. In the south alone, we have tried air, sea, and land bridges to assist those who first fled into Ethiopia, then back to Sudan, and who are now fleeing south to escape renewed fighting. Among these are 10,000 unaccompanied minors, shuttled around like pieces on a chess board--but they are just children, and they are victims. Fighting in Somalia has frustrated literally dozens of attempts to address the appalling conditions there. Now as many as 250,000 Somalis can be ex- pected to cross into northern Kenya--into a region devoid of shade, shelter, or water. There is another major problem looming this year. Southern Africa is experiencing a devastating drought, perhaps the worst in this century. The implications are enormous for millions of persons. For the refugees, it creates special problems; UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] and WFP [World Food Program] have traditionally purchased most food for refugees in this part of Africa from Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. None of those sources will be available this year. The costs of refugee assistance will thus go up dramatically as will refugee food needs, added to the emergency food requirements needed for this region and the many demands elsewhere in the world. There are also in Africa, however, islands of hope. The end of almost 30 years of civil war in Ethiopia means the hope for repatriation of 250,000 Eritreans in Sudan, of 50,000 Tigreans, and the return and reintegration of perhaps 300,000 Ogadenis. Local insecurity must be overcome in Ethiopia, and rehabilitation assistance is badly needed if these persons are to return home productively, not just to new feeding camps or as restless sources of banditry and instability in an impoverished countryside. In Angola and South Africa, there is also hope. Some 400,000 Angolan refugees are poised to return home and over 10,000 South African exiles are coming home under UNHCR protection. We need to make these returns work. We have had to rely heavily on the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to respond to the rapidly changing circumstances and increased needs of refugees and conflict victims in Africa. Last year alone, $48.4 million from the fund was used to meet urgent needs throughout Africa, and an additional $10 million was reprogrammed from other MRA programs to address urgent unforeseen needs in the Horn of Africa.
As I indicated, the largest single group of refugees are Afghans. We are hopeful that with the agreement on an arms cutoff since January this year and a reinvigorated UN conciliation effort, a solution can soon be found to this long, costly war. Already, tens of thousands of refugees are, with international assistance, going home to areas that have become peaceful, and perhaps several hundred thousand may choose to do so as the negotiations proceed. But we do not expect a massive repatriation until there is a political settlement. Thus we must plan to continue assistance to the Afghans throughout FY 1993. We will endeavor to emphasize through several private voluntary organization projects the development of skills that will be needed back in Afghanistan.
The most dramatic recent event in Asia is the agreement to end the war in Cambodia. For 330,000 Cambodians who have been living on the Thai border for 12 years, it means, at last, the opportunity to go home. I will return to the costs and complexities of this repatriation. But I am happy to report to you that the preparatory phase of the UNHCR's Cambodia repatriation program was fully funded from voluntary donor contributions, and we have budgeted sufficient funds to provide our share of the full program in FY 1992 and 1993. While Cambodia has captured the most attention lately, there is another example in Asia of what international support and cooperation can achieve. Almost 3 years after the Comprehensive Plan of Action was adopted in June 1989 to address the needs of Vietnamese and Lao asylum seekers, it has been successful in many important respects. The practice of first asylum has been preserved in all countries of the East Asia region, with the regrettable exceptions of Malaysia and Singapore. Meanwhile, direct processing from Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Program [ODP] has expanded dramatically: Over 100,000 persons will be resettled this coming year under ODP, offering a much safer alternative to departure by boat. Arrivals by boat have dropped 98% to about 230 a month. Screening procedures have been established in all the first asylum countries, and all those determined to have a well-founded fear of persecution--almost 16,000 so far--are being resettled. For those not found to be refugees, one of the most elaborate monitored and assisted return programs in the world has been instituted. Voluntary repatriation has increased 70% and now averages more than 1,700 a month. In all, more than 20,000 boat people have returned safely to Vietnam. Monitoring of the returnees in Vietnam is carried out by UNHCR, and there has been no evidence that any have been persecuted. The European Community has begun direct assistance to the returnees and the impoverished areas from which they come to help their rein-tegration. Problems remain, however. We are working with UNHCR to improve further the efficiency and fairness of the national screening processes. The special procedures for unaccompanied minors are still not working adequately, and many minors remain far too long in the camps.
The Middle East
The Middle East is the site of another very successful effort. A little under a year ago, over 1 million Kurds and other people fled Saddam Hussein's regime seeking sanctuary in neighboring countries. Under the umbrella of Operation Provide Comfort, the United States and many other countries, working together and through the UN system, averted what would have been a human tragedy of massive proportions by providing immediate assistance to those new refugees. Since last May-June, well over 90% have returned to their homes in northern Iraq, repatriation made possible only by creating conditions of security and by providing critical inputs of food and shelter in Iraq. While some still remain, prompt action forestalled the creation of a large, semi-permanent refugee population living in camps in Turkey and Iran and requiring international support for the foreseeable future. This committee was instrumental in recognizing the need for continued US leadership and in enacting the Administration's request for supplemental appropriations. To date, of the $75 million appropriated for Migration and Refugee Assistance, $47.7 million has been used to assist refugees and displaced persons in and around Iraq. Unfortunately, we also know that repatriation has not ended the plight of the Kurds and others affected by Saddam Hussein's deliberate repression of his own people. The United States and the international community continue to provide important humanitarian assistance in northern Iraq. Iraq's refusal to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712--which would finance humanitarian assistance from Iraqi oil sales--its blockade against the north, and its harassment in the south, all reveal Saddam's cruelty toward his own people and create a continuing humanitarian demand upon the outside world. I would like to address some generic problems which cut across all regions of the world.
Refugee Women and Children
Within the UN system, we have worked with UNHCR to focus greater programming emphasis on the special needs of women and children. Together, women and children account for 70% to 80% of the world's refugees; children alone account for half of the refugee population in most camps. All refugee women share a common need for special protective and assistance measures. Many refugee women find themselves heading a household for the first time, a status which makes them and their accompanying children particularly vulnerable. Single women in a refugee population share that vulnerability. All too often, these needs have been overlooked. Women have been subject to sexual abuse, often [are] not interviewed by relief organizers, and [are] not accommodated in the design assistance program. This past year, with strong support from the United States, UNHCR issued sweeping new "Guidelines for the Protection of Refugee Women" which are designed to protect women from abuse and help those women who already have been abused. We are asking that implementation of these guidelines be closely monitored. Refugee women worldwide also share in their need for protection and assistance for their children. Of particular concern to the United States, however, is protection for those children who have been separated from their parents. With the support of Norway, UNHCR has established a position for a senior adviser to the High Commissioner to coordinate UNHCR policy on children. In addition, the Department and US Embassies throughout the world evaluated UNHCR implementation of its 1988 "Guidelines on Refugee Children." Our conclusions and recommendations have been sent by UNHCR headquarters to every field office. With the establishment of senior advisers on refugee women and on children and with proactive US leadership, we believe UNHCR programs are being increasingly designed to fit the needs of the beneficiaries, who are women and children. US contributions in support of these objectives are well used. In special situations, however, we have made decisions to fund private voluntary organization projects to meet certain needs directly. For example, we support several projects in Pakistan designed specifically for Afghan women and children. Among these are health, education, and income- generating activities which are critical for the well-being of refugees in long-term asylum situations. For Palestinian refugees, we support UNRWA [UN Relief and Works Agency] programs which are designed with women and children as the primary beneficiaries: 60% of the UNRWA budget is for education, 25% for medical programs--the majority of which are maternal- child health--and 15% for relief assistance.
As I noted earlier, repatriation possibilities have opened up--for example, in South Africa, northern Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Chad--providing opportunities for the return of as many as 3 million of the world's refugees between 1992 and 1993. The past year's experience with repatriation provides important evidence of how complicated and difficult such programs are and the degree of international cooperation and support that is needed if these opportunities are not to be lost. Successes in returning people to Vietnam and Iraq have shown that close attention to the needs of returnees once they have returned is essential. It is, if anything, more complicated in countries like Cambodia and even Ethiopia. Mines cover the roads and fields in Cambodia and Somalia; irrigation systems are clogged and overgrown in Afghanistan; poverty and insecurity reign in the areas to which people are returning in Ethiopia. Thus, we need more than a few months of food aid and some tools for refugees to return. We need demining, which is extraordinarily time consuming and dangerous, rehabilitation of local infrastructure, and the building of new understandings among returnees and those who were displaced or deprived inside the country. This requires close cooperation between refugee agencies such as UNHCR and development agencies such as UNDP [UN Development Program], the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], and bilateral aid agencies. A gap often exists here, however. The lines of responsibility between repatriation assistance and development are ill-defined. UNHCR has little capability [n]or the mandate to manage rehabilitation for combined populations of refugees and internally disadvantaged, while aid agencies are often focused on more macroeconomic objectives. In Central America, through CIREFCA (International Conference on Refugees in Central America), a model was created to address these needs, and we can see the results in Nicaragua where well-designed, quick-impact projects were developed at a time when over 50,000 refugees and former contras were returning home. The same model of cooperation between refugee repatriation efforts and development reconstruction assistance will be needed elsewhere. UNHCR and UNDP, for example, are working on such a plan for Cambodia. But funding will be a factor. Repatriation is thus costly--as an example, it will require roughly $350 per refugee or $116 million for 330,000 Cambodians, and that does not count the CIREFCA-type projects. It is, therefore, an understandable fact of multilateral organization efforts that their ability to undertake initiatives is strongly affected by the likelihood of funding. The international community must be ready to respond to these efforts with the resources to support programs to provide for the safe return of refugees to their homes. We have sought to build more of such funding into the MRA budget in order to give impetus to repatriation opportunities and reintegration programs.
Emergency Response Capabilities
High Commissioner Ogata took office just over a year ago and had 3 weeks on the job when Kurds began fleeing from northern Iraq. Her trial by fire included trying to determine the proper role for UNHCR in an internal crisis and then, once involved, trying to mobilize personnel and resources to care for the hundreds of thousands of refugees stranded in mountains along the Turkish border and the million-plus who fled to Iran. Despite the success of the international response to the Kurdish emergency, the UN drew criticism for the time it took to organize and deploy its assistance. The lessons learned were numerous and specific enough for Mrs. Ogata that she launched an initiative by the fall to overhaul UNHCR's emergency response capabilities. Her plan has included actions: -- To make UNHCR personnel more readily available for assignment to an emergency; -- To create teams of sectoral experts for each geographic region who are ready to assess needs at the onset of an emergency; -- To have ready draft agreements for non-governmental organizations to become operating partners of UNHCR in specific sectors (health, sanitation, food, etc.); and -- To establish a small stockpile of items commonly needed but often unavailable in sufficient quantity on immediate notice. We can see the fruits of these steps already in the effective UNHCR response to the influx of Somalis into Kenya and of Burmese into Bangladesh. Emergencies such as that which occurred in northern Iraq also convinced the UN member governments that the emergency response capability of the United Nations as a whole needed significant improvement. In too many cases, lines of responsibility have not been clear at the beginning, mobilization of experienced staff has taken too long, and management with non-governmental organizations and other implementing partners has developed ad hoc after considerable trial and error. In late 1991, in the context of US and other members' efforts at UN reform, a new position was established, an Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance, plus a $50-million central emergency revolving fund (of which over $40 million is already subscribed)--two measures which should lead to more timely responses to save human lives. The United States has pledged $5 million in support of this fund. We believe that the establishment of the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance will relieve many of the problems of coordination which plagued the UN system during the Gulf crisis.
Admissions Program
The Department's budget request for Migration and Refugee Assistance includes $208 million for refugee admissions programs in FY 1993. These funds are estimated to support the admission and initial resettlement of about 122,000 refugees from all regions of the world. While a specific number has been used to calculate an estimated budget requirement, the final number of admissions and regional allocations will be determined by the President following the annual consultations process with the Congress. This process will begin in June. This year, the President has authorized the admission of up to 142,000 refugees in this country. Within this total, 10,000 numbers are only available for private sector funding. The established ceilings for the federally funded program [follow].
Federal Funding Ceilings By Geographic Region
Geographic Region FY 1992 Ceiling East Asia 52,000 Eastern Europe 3,000 Former Soviet Union/ Commonwealth of Independent States 61,000 Near East/South Asia 6,000 Latin America/Caribbean 3,000 Africa 6,000 Unallocated Reserve 1,000 Total 132,000 Admissions from East Asia first asylum continue as an essential element of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). The population of Vietnamese which existed in the region at the start of the CPA in 1989 has now been almost entirely resettled. With effective screening in place and with declining rates of new arrivals of Vietnamese boat people, this element of our program is diminishing. However, in light of the unpredictability of resettlement needs for Lao refugees and the rapid expansion of the Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam, the East Asia admissions numbers will continue at about current levels in FY 1993. We expect that Amerasian departures from Vietnam will begin to decline during FY 1993. Although approximately 40,000 former detainees and their family members have resettled in the United States since the Reeducation Center Detainees Program was agreed to by the United States and Vietnam in 1989, we expect that the interviewing of eligible former detainees will continue through at least FY 1994. Our other largest admissions program region is the former Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has brought increased freedom in many areas, and new applications from nationals of the former Soviet Union have slowed considerably. Nevertheless, there remains a substantial pipeline of current applications to be processed representing persons qualified under US law and for whom the specter, particularly of religious persecution, remains. We will continue to interview individuals who meet our eligibility criteria and expect to continue the Soviet refugee admissions program at about the recent annual average level of 50,000 in FY 1993. During FY 1991, the United States began a limited resettlement program for the Kurds forced out of Iraq by the chemical war of 1988, and, this year, we have begun processing Iraqi refugees from the 1990-91 Gulf war out of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This will be a multilateral effort. Last month, the United States began an in-country processing program in Haiti. This program is intended to reach individuals who fear persecution because of their political opinion[s]. Examples of Haitian nationals who may be eligible for this program include those who fear persecution because they hold or held leadership positions in political or religious organizations at the national or local level, have held sensitive positions in the Aristide Government, or are prominent in fields that may be targets of pressure.
Other Activities
The MRA budget is the channel for US assistance to the ICRC, one of the most important instruments in the world for aiding the victims of conflict. In 1991, armed conflicts ranged from declared war in the Gulf to resistance movements within dozens of countries. The application of the Geneva Convention and the role of the ICRC are triggered regardless of whether the combat is between a domestic resistance movement and the regime in power or between governments. The ICRC performs the essential humanitarian role on the battlefield, delegates care for war-wounded, registers and protects prisoners of war, facilitates tracing and communication among separated families, and protects civilians in combat areas. The United States, as a party to the Geneva Convention, has an obligation to fund the basic structure of the ICRC as well as to support its specific relief activities. When sufficient appropriations are available, it is our policy to provide 10% of the budget for ICRC's core functions and to contribute an appropriate share to its individual emergency program appeals. Another most effective international organization with which we cooperate is the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which has assisted millions of refugees to resettle in the United States in its 40-year existence. Although associated primarily with resettlement programs, IOM displayed its logistical expertise in emergency situations by helping thousands of displaced and refugee Kurds in their movements out of harm's way and then in returning to their homes in northern Iraq. It is helping South African exiles return home in conjunction with UNHCR and is working on a new information program in Albania to help people there understand what opportunities do and do not exist for migration. The United States funds IOM in three ways: through a reimbursement agreement for its resettlement program services, through an assessed contribution to its administrative budget, and through unearmarked voluntary contributions to support IOM's other migration programs. Since 1973, the United States has provided grants to the United Israel Appeal to help resettle refugees in Israel. Although Israel does not use the term "refugee," persons assisted by the grant come from parts of the former Soviet Union, Ethiopia, the Middle East, and elsewhere where the Jewish population feels threatened. To help with the absorption of the new immigrants into Israeli society, the Administration is requesting $50 mil-lion for FY 1993. These funds represent only a small supplement to funds raised by the United Israel Appeal from the American Jewish community for refugee resettlement in Israel.
International Migration
Before concluding, I would like to address a broader issue which ties in with the demographic theme of today's hearing--the overall context of world migration in which we are working. In the 1990s, we face the paradox that there are at once historic opportunities to resolve some of the major refugee issues from the Cold War era and increasing pressures on the international system as a whole to address new, mixed populations of asylum seekers and other migrants.
East-West Pressures
The political asylum systems of Western Europe (and North America) were established during the Cold War era on the basis of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. When Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were under communist control, people fleeing those regimes were treated as refugees and offered generous opportunities for permanent resettlement by the West. With the advent of democratic governments and the removal of restrictions on travel, movements from East to West have taken on a new character, and European governments increasingly focus on the question of economic rather than political migration. In 1989, the year of the Eastern European revolutions, 1.2 million people-- after a lifetime of imprisonment behind armed borders--left the Warsaw Pact states, seeking permanent resettlement in the West. The following year, some 9 million Soviet people traveled abroad, of whom 450,000 were emigrating through established channels. A sense of panic began to spread around Europe concerning the prospect of a massive wave of migration. A more salient factor in European concern about East-West migration, however, has been the crisis in asylum. During the past decade, and particularly the past 5 years, the number of people applying for asylum in Western Europe annually has increased. Whereas, in 1983, some 75,000 asylum applications were lodged in Europe, by 1991, the figure was nearly 600,000. European countries have thus begun a searching analysis of how to curb this phenomenon. The European Community has been working to harmonize its asylum practices and responsibilities as prelude to permitting unrestricted internal travel by 1993; a corollary has been to try to tighten border controls and means of returning migrants home or to other safe countries.
South-North Pressures
For many European governments, however, the more serious long-term problem is not the migration pressures from the East but rather the rapid rise in asylum seekers from the developing world. These individuals have, in many cases, created serious new social pressures and often cannot safely be returned home. Owing to projected population increases in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, migration pressures from the South would appear more difficult to manage than those from the East. Africa's population is expected to grow from 642 million in 1990 to nearly 1.6 billion in the year 2025. By that time, the population in South Asia will exceed 2 billion, and Latin America's will reach 750 million. South-North migration trends are not only the result of demographic pressure but opportunity and, in some cases, political and cultural ties. In some cases, it is not without value to the longer-term stabilization of economic relations between North and South. The use of remittances sent home by migrant workers to finance investments in housing, businesses, and farm improvement as well as consumer goods serves as an example of this. In such cases, worker remittances may actually serve as important [a role] as foreign aid as a source of capital transfer. Shorter-term strains upon the asylum and/or immigration systems of Europe and North America may arise more from instability and turmoil than from poverty and population growth. It is instructive that asylum pressure is currently strongest from Somalia and Sri Lanka. The former is one of the poorest countries of the Third World; the latter is one of the better developed ones. But both are in the midst of civil war. One implication of this is that attention to conflict resolution may be as important as development and trade as ways to address South-North pressure.
Technical Cooperation in Migration
Although modest in budgetary terms, the work of the Bureau for Refugee Programs is expanding markedly in addressing these future global migration issues. The United States has serious concerns that reactions to these pressures in Western Europe do not result in erecting a new "wall" which forces the new democracies of Eastern Europe to face alone any major problems from the former Soviet Union. Nor will it help, in the long run, simply to shift asylum pressures from Europe elsewhere. We need to work on constructive responses, including opportunities for orderly migration, and to maintain an appropriate sharing of responsibilities in addressing these growing demands. The United States is working closely with our European and North American partners and with relevant international bodies to pursue such objectives. In particular, we seek to develop national and international mechanisms to ensure the identification and protection of refugees, while at the same time allowing for the orderly control of movements of people across international borders for immigration or commercial purposes. These are complicated questions, and considerable work will be required to achieve a proper balance between the rights of individual asylum seekers and other migrants and the rights of sovereign states to control immigration. At the initiative of the United States, CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] has made the migration issue a prominent subject for this year. We also have exchanged technical missions on these subjects by senior officials with Russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, and we are supporting cooperation between the Commonwealth of Independent States, the UNHCR and the ICRC. We are pleased that the IOM concluded on March 13 an agreement with Russia to operate orderly migration programs in Moscow and provide technical assistance. The response to East-West migration pressures affects both US foreign (international burden-sharing and refugee protection) and domestic (asylum and immigration) policy interests. The Department's FY 1993 budget request for Migration and Refugee Assistance, therefore, includes funds not only to help address refugee and conflict victim emergencies in Europe but also to provide technical assistance and enhanced cooperation to deal with the inevitability of large migration flows. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

Funds for Cambodian And Burmese Refugees

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 19 19923/19/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Burma, Cambodia Subject: Immigration, Refugees [TEXT] On March 16, the President authorized the release of $18 million from the US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to meet urgent refugee and migration needs of Cambodians and Burmese. Of this amount, $15 million will be used to address the needs of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons who will be returning to Cambodia as an essential part of the Cambodian political settlement. The UN Cambodian repatriation operation intends to repatriate approximately 330,000 Cambodian refugees and displaced persons within a 9-month period beginning in March-April. It is essential that the repatriation begin soon since elections--the capstone of the Cambodian resettlement--are to take place in the spring of 1993. These funds may be used for US contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other international organizations and private voluntary agencies, as required. The United States has already contributed $5 million to the United Nations for the pre-operational phase of the program. With these additional funds, the total US contribution for Cambodian repatriation will increase to $20 million. As announced at the White House earlier this afternoon, $3 million from the emergency fund drawdown will be used to respond to the urgent needs of Burmese Muslim refugees (Rohingyas) who have been forced to flee to Bangladesh from Burma's Arakan state to escape a continuing Burmese Government military action against them. There are now over 130,000 refugees in Bangladesh and several thousand people continue to cross the border each day. In view of the magnitude of this flow, the Government of Bangladesh has asked UNHCR to coordinate relief efforts for the Rohingyas. The US contribution will be used for relief assistance to the Rohingyas through UNHCR and non-governmental organizations as appropriate. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

US, Bangladesh Sign PL 480 Agreement

Eagleburger Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger Description: Remarks at the signature of Bangladesh-United States PL 480 (Food for Peace) agreement, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 18 19923/18/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South Asia Country: Bangladesh Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Bangladesh is an overwhelmingly agricultural country, one that is fertile and productive. Yet it takes more than soil, sunlight, and water to grow enough food for an entire population--it takes investment in improved technology as well. The steps Bangladesh has taken to expand the private sector's role in the marketing of fertilizer and small-scale irrigation equipment have helped produce record-breaking harvests of irrigated rice in the past 4 years, without increasing the fixed costs of government. Bangladesh has come a long way toward self-sufficiency since its independence and, in fact, is nearly self-sufficient in rice production. We look forward to similar positive results from the development expenditures provided for, in part, by the multi-year agreement we are about to sign. This agreement contains a 4-year program for up to $268 million of food aid to Bangladesh. The assistance will be used not only to meet Bangladesh's food security needs, it will also generate local currency to finance the annual development investment program, much of which focuses upon agricultural development. The program places highest priority on development investment policy reform. Greater investments in agricultural technology will engender, in turn, more employment, higher household income, and self-sustaining agricultural development. Our countries' friendship is of long standing, but the return of democracy in Bangladesh has carried the bilateral relationship to new levels. In the past year, we have cooperated closely on important international issues, and the United States has manifested its support through debt relief and disaster assistance efforts. Today's agreement formalizes and continues our joint commitment to food security and development investment reform. I am pleased to be witness to the signing of an agreement which I am certain will be of great benefit to the people of Bangladesh. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

US-Russian Commission on POW/MIAs Established

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 20 19923/20/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Russia Subject: POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] The United States and Russia have established a joint commission to investigate unresolved cases of prisoners of war and missing in action dating from the Second World War, including the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. The creation of this commission underscores the commitment of both the United States and Russia to work together in a spirit of friendship to uncover the fate of missing servicemen on both sides. This effort symbolizes the determination of the Administration to resolve outstanding issues from the Cold War period and is another step in developing our new, cooperative relationship with Russia. Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Malcolm Toon has been designated [as] the President's representative and chairman of the US delegation to this commission. The commission also will include Senators John Kerry and Robert Smith and Congressmen Pete Peterson and John Miller. The Russian delegation will be chaired by Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, a senior adviser to President Yeltsin. The first meeting of the joint commission will be held March 26-28 in Moscow. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

The Horn of Africa: Country Updates

Cohen Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 19 19923/19/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights, Democratization, Refugees [TEXT] Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting me to speak with you about the developments in the countries of the Horn of Africa. The range of issues to be dealt with in the Horn run the gamut from drought, famine, and civil war to political reform, development, and democracy. In Ethiopia, the focus on war has changed to nation building and development. Leaders there are taking steps to open the system to greater participation by the people; the first local elections are to be held soon. We, for our part, are looking for ways to begin our assistance to that country. It will, however, be dependent on continued progress in human rights and democracy. As for Sudan, I wish I were the bearer of good news. Unfortunately, the regime in Khartoum appears bent on ignoring basic human rights and pursuing the military option in the south. One particularly egregious manifestation of the uncaring attitude of the government in Khartoum is its treatment of the hundreds of thousands of displaced in the capital. Sudanese authorities have been deaf to our entreaties to allow humanitarian relief to reach these people. In Somalia, the extent of the tragedy there grows daily. Perhaps 30,000 people have now been killed or wounded. Despite the obstacles, we continue to look for ways to stop the bloodshed and bring desperately needed humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia. The United Nations continues its efforts to achieve a cease-fire and arrange for the secure delivery of food and medicine. The Secretary General has the support of the OAU [Organization for African Unity], the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC]. The next step is to arrange for a UN technical team to work with all factions on the further mechanics of food distribution as well as a process leading to a durable cease-fire and an eventual political settlement. We have told the representatives of [opposing factions leaders] General Aideed and Ali Mahdi in blunt terms that they must stop the fighting and allow humanitarian relief to go forward. Let me address, in turn, the countries of the Horn in greater detail.
The transitional government of Ethiopia in Addas Ababa is making headway confronting the challenge of constructing a new government from representatives of a number of wary political, ethnic, and regional groups. Based on the July 1991 charter, it is well into the process of restructuring a post-Marxist government administration, taking initial steps to rebuild the shattered economy and moving toward regional and national elections. Regional elections are currently planned for May. These elections will be the first free elections in Ethiopia's history. In the economic sphere, the council of representatives adopted an economic policy at the end of 1991 which goes a long way toward reducing the role of government and increasing the role of the private sector in the Ethiopian economy. The transitional government is now taking steps toward privatizing the transport sector and the 110 state-owned industries. However, revitalizing an economy devastated by 17 years of war and a socialist dictatorship will require substantial financial and technical support from the international community. The Ethiopian Government recently concluded negotiations with the World Bank on a $630-million emergency recovery and reconstruction project, which the Bank board of executive directors is expected to approve in March. Negotiations with the World Bank and IMF [International Monetary Fund] have begun for structural adjustment support. Other potential donors are waiting to see what assistance the United States provides. Two legislative restrictions--[the] Brooke [amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act] and Section 812 of the International Cooperation and Development Act--prohibit us from providing bilateral development assistance to Ethiopia. If legislative restrictions are surmounted, any development assistance we provide will be dependent on continued progress in human rights and democracy. We are planning to direct our assistance to rebuilding infrastructure, restoring public services, reintegrating demobilized soldiers, and revitalizing the economy. The rapid restarting of economic activity, particularly agriculture, is essential to help the country move toward self- sufficiency and engage its long-suffering and displaced population in productive enterprises. Funds from the development fund for Africa would also be directed to assist the establishment of solid processes of democracy and governance, both regionally and nationally. American relief contributions for Ethiopia in food, disaster assistance, and refugee aid totaled nearly $183 mil-lion in FY 1991. Although the rains this year were good, we anticipate that humanitarian relief efforts will be needed for the next several years.
Sudan suffers famine, massive displacements of people, a devastated economy, and serious human rights abuses. Many of these difficulties can be traced to the ongoing civil war which seems no closer to solution than ever. Neither side appears serious about negotiating, at least until the current dry season fighting is over. Nevertheless, we continue to support the OAU's effort to bring both sides to the negotiating table and are open to suggestions if both sides want us to help. The situation has recently become more complicated due to the split within the SPLA [Sudanese People's Liberation Army], which is largely along tribal lines. It is complicating relief efforts, presenting Khartoum with a pretext for not negotiating, and has caused terrible bloodshed and uprooting of peoples in the south. Human rights abuses in Sudan are a major concern for us. Since the middle of last year, the Sudanese Government has been forcibly relocating people who had settled in the Khartoum area after fleeing war and drought elsewhere in the country. They are being moved to inhospitable areas in the desert outside the city. To date, approximately 500,000 people have been forcibly relocated, sometimes at gunpoint. Essential services at the new sites are minimal to non-existent. We and the rest of the international community have strongly protested these forced relocations and asked the Sudanese Government to at least suspend these movements of people until sites can be better prepared.
Somalia is the most acute humanitarian tragedy in the world today. The fighting in Mogadishu--and deliberate targeting of ships trying to come into port--has thwarted efforts to deliver relief supplies to Somalia's capital. Hundreds of thousands of people have fled the fighting. Five hundred or more Somali refugees cross the Kenyan border every day. Thousands of Somalis have died already of starvation. Estimates of the numbers killed and wounded in the Mogadishu war are now pushing 30,000. No one really knows the extent of the casualties; many of the most seriously wounded never reached hospitals. Some estimates are that 90% of casualties are non- combatants and that, of these, 75% are children. Despite both sides' public adherence to a cease-fire, the fighting continues, varying in intensity from day to day. Mogadishu's population is at the mercy of hungry young men--some not yet teenagers--who take orders from no one and live by the gun. The international community, in trying to provide emergency relief, has not yet found a way to get around or neutralize these bandits. The United Nations continues its efforts to achieve a cease-fire in Mogadishu and arrange secure means of delivering food, medicine, and medical care. Secretary General Boutros Ghali has given the Somalia situation a high priority and considerable personal energy and attention. He has met in New York with delegations from the warring factions and searched for mechanisms that will work in an unprecedented situation of conflict and humanitarian disaster. He has enlisted the support of the OAU, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in an innovative joint effort for peace in Somalia. These are the regional organizations which ideally should be involved in settlement of conflicts such as Somalia's but which, unfortunately, have too often been missing. Based on the results of the joint UN-OAU-Arab League-OIC delegation's visit to Mogadishu at the beginning of March, Boutros Ghali has recommended the dispatch of a technical team to work out the mechanics of a cease-fire and provision of humanitarian relief. The next steps depend a great deal on what the technical team recommends. Throughout the crisis, we have urged the factions to stop fighting and permit international relief operations to go forward. I made these points as bluntly as I could to the leaders of the factional delegations when they visited Washington after the UN meetings. We continue to consult with UN Security Council members; influential countries such as Italy, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia; [and] the OAU and others about actions the international community can usefully take to promote peace and prevent famine. If there are insurmountable obstacles, then ways will have to be found to go around them. To be specific, there is a growing consensus that the United Nations and other international efforts should not be held hostage to the political squabbling and fighting in Mogadishu, which has ceased to be a capital city. If the parties are unwilling to accept help from the international community in resolving their disputes, then we will concentrate on humanitarian relief. We will not ignore the people even if their self-proclaimed leaders do.
For several months, we have been following the insurgency in Djibouti with concern. This small country, seriously affected by years of war in Ethiopia and the disasters in Somalia, has experienced enough suffering without a civil war of its own. We are heartened by the progress that my French counterpart, Mr. Paul Dijoud, has made in his repeated efforts to mediate the Djiboutian dispute. We hope that the cease-fire continues in effect and that by fulfilling pledges for greater democracy, the Djiboutian Government will satisfy demands for a wider participation of all segments of society. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

US Welcomes South African Referendum Results

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 18 19923/18/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: South Africa Subject: Democratization [TEXT] Yesterday, white South Africans voted overwhelmingly for a just and democratic future and expressed confidence in their place in that future. They said no to apartheid and yes to reconciliation. We welcome their decision. In voting yes, white voters affirmed that negotiations offer the only path to a secure future for all South Africans. South Africans have already begun to enjoy the benefits of this path. Internationally, they have seen the lifting of sanctions, an end to cultural and athletic isolation, and South Africa's ongoing reintegration into the world community. This vote sends a message of reconciliation to black South Africans who have demonstrated a remarkable willingness to put the past behind them. Yesterday, white South Africans made their preference crystal clear. They rejected a no option that would have led to a return of international isolation and domestic discord. All South Africans have a stake in their country's future and a right to make their views known. The way forward to a negotiated settlement is now more open than ever. We urge those who so far have chosen to remain outside the negotiating process to join the vast majority of their countrymen and bring their aspirations into the convention for a democratic South Africa forum. Perhaps the best summary of the importance of this event is what is being said today in South Africa itself. President De Klerk has said that "Today we have closed the book on apartheid." Nelson Mandela said that "An overwhelming yes vote means the process [of democracy] is definitely on course." We certainly agree with them and look forward to further and rapid progress in building a new, democratic South Africa. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

Gist: Western Sahara

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 23 19923/23/92 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: Subsaharan Africa, MidEast/North Africa Country: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria Subject: Democratization, United Nations, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT]
From 1884 to 1975, the territory now known as the Western Sahara was controlled by Spain and called Spanish Sahara. In 1975, under the terms of the Treaty of Madrid, Spain gave up its claims, ceding the territory to Mauritania and Morocco. Mauritania was to occupy the southern third, and Morocco, the remaining portion. Meanwhile, in 1973, a group known by the acronym POLISARIO (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saquia el Hamra and the Rio de Oro) and consisting of the population indigenous to the area and a few foreign advisers and supporters, had formed a union to call for self-determination and independence for the whole area. In 1979, Mauritania, unwilling to continue facing opposition from within the Western Sahara, signed an accord with the POLISARIO, surrendering control of its southern section. That left Morocco and the POLISARIO in a struggle for the area. Morocco, lying northeast of the region, bases its claim to the territory on the Treaty of Madrid and, historically, on contacts dating back to the Almoravid Empire of the 11th century. The Western Sahara plays an integral part in the Moroccan concept of a "Greater Morocco." Because it contains some of the world's largest reserves of phosphates, the area also has economic importance.
Current Situation
The POLISARIO is opposed to Morocco's efforts to control the area. The POLISARIO force, estimated at no more than 20,000 troops is made up of local Berbers and Arabs, called Sahrawis (or Sahraouis). In the past, the POLISARIO has received assistance from Mali, Libya, Cuba, and Algeria. Algeria remains as the POLISARIO's most significant supporter. Algeria's announcement of recognition and support for the POLISARIO in 1976 led to a rift in Algerian/Moroccan relations that was not reconciled until 1988. At its peak, the POLISARIO, and its governmental arm, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), had the support of 28 of 50 members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and a number of other Third World countries. The conflict between the Government of Morocco and the POLISARIO has plagued the Western Sahara region for more than 16 years. In 1975, King Hassan II of Morocco led thousands of his supporters in the famous "Green March" into the Western Sahara region, reinforcing Moroccan claims to the territory by relocating thousands of Moroccans in the area. The Moroccan Government has made heavy investments in the infrastructure of the Western Sahara in hopes of bolstering its claim as rightful controller of the region. During the past decade, alternating periods of conflict and cease-fire have characterized the situation in the Western Sahara. Several proposals for a referendum to settle the dispute were suggested throughout this time by both the UN and the OAU. In August 1988, the Moroccan Government and the POLISARIO accepted in principle an OAU proposal aimed at the settlement of the question of the Western Sahara. Subsequently, the UN Security Council accepted responsibility to organize and oversee a referendum to determine the future of the Western Sahara.
UN Role
The UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 690 in April 1991. The Secretary General's plan calls for about 2,900 military and civilian personnel to observe a cease-fire between Morocco and the POLISARIO and to conduct a referendum to determine whether the Western Sahara will become independent or integrate with Morocco. A UN monitored cease-fire went into effect on September 6, 1991. Thirty US military personnel were part of the first deployment of 185 MINURSO cease-fire observers. The original schedule envisioned the referendum taking place in early 1992, but full deployment of MINURSO and progress toward the holding of the referendum have been delayed pending final agreement between the parties on guidelines for voter participation. The UN General Assembly approved $181 million for MINURSO, of which the UN assessed member states $143 million for the first 6 months. The US assessment for this period was $43.3 million. The United States also pledged a voluntary contribution to the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of $8.5 million to assist it in repatriating to the Western Sahara an expected 65,000 Sahrawis, now in Algeria, so they can vote in the referendum. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

Peru's Brutal Insurgency: Sendero Luminoso

Aronson Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Date: Mar, 12 19923/12/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Peru, Ecuador Subject: Terrorism, Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, Narcotics [TEXT] I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the Communist Party of Peru-- usually known as Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path--with you. I want to begin by commending you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this subcommittee for devoting your attention to one of the most important, and least discussed, issues in this hemisphere. A little over a half century ago, Nazi Germany exterminated one-third of the Jewish population in the world--mothers, fathers, and children--while the world stood by and failed to stop it. After the Holocaust, the world community vowed "Never again." But in the 1970s, in Cambodia under Pol Pot, we saw genocide repeated. We need to learn that lesson and never repeat it again. We welcome these hearings and asked that you hold them to stimulate public discussion about an important policy issue. The congressional foreign affairs committees have a long tradition of fostering public discussion of difficult foreign policy questions. Under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, this subcommittee has focused public attention on key questions concerning US interests in this hemisphere. It is in that spirit that I asked the opportunity to testify. What I would like to do is begin a dialogue with the Congress about what needs to be done in Peru. I hope this hearing generates wider public debate here and abroad on what can be done to strengthen a democratic government that is confronting this hemisphere's most brutal insurgency.
Sendero Luminoso's Aims and Activities
Sendero Luminoso is unlike any other insurgent or terrorist group that has ever operated in Latin America. Put out of your mind the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] of El Salvador which just signed a peace agreement, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua who allowed themselves to be voted out of office, the M-19 of Colombia, and other South American insurgencies that have ended their violent struggle to take advantage of the political space open to the peaceful, democratic left. Sendero Luminoso is in a category by itself. There are other communist insurgencies, but only Sendero saw the fall of Eastern European communist governments as a positive step where the people overthrew decadent, bourgeois communism to make way for pure communism; Sendero bombed the North Korean commercial office in Lima and believes Fidel Castro is a US lackey. Latin America has seen violence and terror but none like Sendero's, where children are forced to commit acts of brutality as part of their indoctrination [and] where entire towns are forced to witness the so-called trial, torture, and killing of nuns or municipal leaders. Latin America has seen many variations of the Marxist vision but none so sweeping as Sendero's war against "Western culture." A Sendero victory would compare not to Cuba under Castro or Nicaragua under the Sandinistas but to Cambodia under Pol Pot. In the words of [Sendero's leader] Abimael Guzman, "We start from a principle established by Chairman Mao: Violence is a universal law with no exception. . . . without revolutionary violence we cannot replace one class for another. . . ." The revolution will triumph, according to Guzman, after the Peruvian people "cross over the river of blood" to the other side. Make no mistake: If Sendero were to take power, we would see this century's third genocide. Luis Arce Borja, Sendero's representative in Europe, told a Lima newspaper last November that the current stage of the war--"strategic equilibrium"--will cost 1 million Peruvian lives. Sendero began its armed campaign in 1981 just as Peru returned to democratic government. It is a movement of the "unreconstructed" Peruvian left born in protest against Peru's return to democracy. When most of Peru's left decided to re-enter the democratic process, a small, fringe, university- based Marxist elite cried "treason" and evolved into Sendero Luminoso. Its founders, especially the undisputed leader Abimael Guzman, the so- called Presidente Gonzalo, were deeply influenced by Chinese communism during the Cultural Revolution and brought a strong Maoist orientation to Sendero, hence the strategy of a rural, peasant-based movement that hopes to capture the cities as its final objective. Sendero takes advantage of two factors unique to Peru. In its ideology, it plays on the sharp division of Peruvian society between white descendants of the Spaniards, the mestizos, and the rural indigenous Indian population, much of which speaks only Quechua, the language of the Incas. In its finances, it profits from Peru's key role in cocaine production. We do not believe that Sendero receives significant material or financial support from foreign governments or revolutionary movements, but it does raise funds from gullible publics in Europe. Roughly estimated, we believe Sendero has 3,000-5,000 full-time armed fighters and up to twice that many part-time militia. Including political cadre of various types, Sendero may be able to count on as many as 25,000 supporters. In addition, 15%-20% of Peru's population lives in "pink" or "red" zones under significant or predominant Sendero influence. Some of these citizens provide support out of intimidation and fear. In response to the combined threat of Sendero and the Tupac Amaru (MRTA) guerrillas, about one-third of Peru's 183 provinces and nearly half of its people have been placed under "emergency zones" where civilian rule is suspended and the local military commander is effectively in charge of government and security. Sendero knows that in the past 2 decades, the expansion of participatory democracy in Latin America has delegitimized revolutionary movements. From El Salvador to Chile, violent revolutionaries lost their raison d'etre as democracy grew and citizens gained a real role in governing their own affairs. Sendero's strategy, then, is to use violence to destroy democratic institutions, to stop citizens from participating in local government, to destroy the functioning economy, and to cripple programs which provide aid and services to the population. This form of terror often succeeds. Mayors and municipal leaders refuse to run--or take office--because not only will they be targeted by Sendero, but their families and the entire community will be subject to Sendero's terror. Sendero's intimidation caused a round of municipal elections scheduled for 1989 to be delayed until 1991. When the balloting was held last August, guerrilla intimidation prevented candidates from running in 104 towns. Overall, elections had to be annulled in 220 out of 498 jurisdictions because either no candidate ran, the winner resigned after being elected, or too few people cast ballots. In Sendero's mind, any Peruvian or any foreigner who takes up the democratic cause, tries to ease human suffering, or resists terrorist threats is hampering the development of revolutionary consciousness and delaying the day when the people will turn to armed revolt. That makes them targets for terror: -- Last May 18, Sendero terrorists publicly shot to death [an] Australian nun, Sister Irene McCormick, of the Catholic relief organization Caritas, who worked to help the poorest of Peru's poor in Junin department. Her body was left lying where it fell for 24 hours on orders from Sendero. -- Sendero has bombed Catholic and Baptist churches and murdered religious workers. On August 22, 1990, Sendero killed two young Baptist missionaries in Junin, one with a knife thrust through his neck. -- Norman Tattersall, a Canadian working in Lima with the Protestant social services organization World Vision, lost his life in a Sendero attack last May 17, as did his Colombian associate Jose Chuquin. -- In January 1990, a Sendero group, mostly of children under 16, shot two French tourists they took off a bus passing through a rural area. The youngest member of the group was made to beat one of the victims' skulls with a large rock until it was completely crushed. -- Two other tourists were taken off a bus, tortured, and shot in November 1989. In this killing, Sendero slashed a young woman's chest and stomach so badly that it had to be bound to hold in its internal organs before it could be moved. -- Sendero killed two Polish and one Italian priest who worked with poor children in Ancash department last August. -- Last July 12, Sendero murdered three Japanese development workers near Huaral. The Japanese have withdrawn most of their aid workers in response to this and other attacks. -- On February 15, Maria Elena Moyano, Vice Mayor of Lima's largest shanty town of Villa El Salvador, was leaving a neighborhood barbecue party with her family. She had met Senator [Mark] Hatfield and Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Richard Shifter in Lima last fall. She bravely, vocally, and actively resisted Sendero terror, even after they bombed the local community food warehouse. Sendero assassins shot her point-blank then threw a dynamite charge that scattered pieces of her body over 100 yards away. -- Juana Lopez directed the Glass of Milk feeding program in Callao, north of Lima. Sendero killed her and others last fall in attacks against food distribution and emergency aid projects. -- Andres Davila Arnao organized a local self-defense force to protect his neighborhood against Sendero brutality. He was killed February 17 just outside of Lima. -- A Catholic priest from the Ayacucho area told of ritual murders of peasants who refused to cooperate with or tried to escape from Sendero during its early years of terror. After a so-called people's trial, victims were stripped and tied to a post in the town square. Every person in the town--men, women, and children--was forced to cut a piece of flesh from the living body. The Sendero torture went on for as long as an hour before victims died from shock and loss of blood. -- Peruvian police found the body of a fellow officer in the summer of 1989, completely eviscerated and filled with human feces--Sendero's work. -- Sendero assassins machine-gunned the mayor of one small town, then set off a dynamite charge in his lap, while they forced his wife and four children to watch. -- Sendero's campaign against Peru's Ashaninka Indians in 1990 and 1991 was terrifying in its brutality: A 14-year-old struck in the head with a machete, shot, stabbed, and dumped in a river; victims doused in gasoline and set afire; children forced to eat their parents' tongues. -- A November 1991 Sendero attack on a village near Ayacucho left 37 dead, including 9 children. -- Since 1980, Sendero has killed 42 Peruvians working with US Government development projects. On February 14, Sendero climaxed a bombing campaign against government offices, banks, diplomatic missions--including US Ambassador Quainton's residence, where a bomb killed three Peruvian policemen and severely damaged a security wall--and other targets with an "armed strike" in Lima. Armed strikes are a long-standing Sendero tactic in which the guerrillas seek to enforce compliance with the strike through waves of killings against those who dare to go to work. Despite numerous bombings in last month's strike, Lima citizens tried bravely to go about their business. This past decade of violence has cost Peru 24,000 lives and about $20 billion in economic damage--about 1 year's GNP.
What Can Be Done About Sendero Luminoso
The crucial question is what can be done about the threat of Sendero. There are no easy answers. But I agree wholeheartedly with statements members of the subcommittee made yesterday: Sendero confronts us not only with a question of geopolitical interest but also with the defense of fundamental moral values. Sendero will only be defeated by Peruvians. There is no US solution to this threat. Still, the United States can and must help and so must the democratic community worldwide. Scott Palmer, who testified yesterday, posed the problem well. He said revolutions don't succeed; governments fail. Therefore, our challenge is to help the Peruvian Government succeed in its expressed agenda of strengthening democratic institutions, reviving the Peruvian economy, meeting long neglected social needs, strengthening the capacity of peasant farmers to develop alternatives to coca leaf production, and defending human rights. First, the international community and respected human rights organizations must focus the spotlight of world attention on the threat which Sendero poses. I am not suggesting that the Peruvian Government get a pass on human rights. They should not, and they will not. But if the world had held tribunals, issued reports, and alerted governments and multilateral institutions to the threat that the Khmer Rouge posed to Cambodia early in the 1970s, perhaps the horrors of its rule might have been averted in time. Second, Sendero does not operate in a vacuum. Two-thirds of Peruvians live in poverty today; that human misery offers fertile breeding grounds for a messianic group like Sendero. The guerrillas take advantage of Peru's profound economic crisis, and the international community must help the Peruvian Government to overcome that crisis. When President Fujimori took office 20 months ago, Peru's 1990 GDP was down 22% from only 2 years before. It would take Peru 12 straight years of 5% growth to get per capita income back to 1987 levels. Inflation ran at a staggering 7,650%. The previous government's suspension of external debt payments cut off Peru from any resources of the international financial institutions--the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the IDB [Inter-American Development Bank], [and] the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]. Peru's debts totaled $22 billion; fully two-thirds of Peru's external debt was in arrears. President Fujimori has proven one of the boldest, most far-reaching reformers in today's generation of Latin American leaders. He slashed inflation to 220% in 1990; in December 1991, inflation was only 3.7%-- under 55% annually. He balanced Peru's budget, ended longstanding price controls and subsidies, and reduced the government payroll by 50,000 employees. Peru's average tariff, 80% in August 1990, is down to 17% today. Almost all barriers to foreign investment are gone. Last fall, Peru settled three multi-million-dollar investment disputes with US companies. President Fujimori's currency exchange, interest rate, and labor reforms have made Peru's economy more competitive. Peru has resumed debt payments to international financial institutions. As a result of these policies, the Peruvian economy grew 2.8% last year after contracting 4.6% in 1990 and 11.9% the year before. The United States has done much to support President Fujimori's economic policies, and I hope we can do more. We took the lead in forming a support group of donors that pledged $1.1 billion--$416 million of that from the United States--in new money over 2 years. With this help and that of other international donor countries and institutions, Peru has begun to pay off its arrears so it can receive fresh capital inflows. The IDB has already resumed new lending. We are providing Peru $200.7 mil-lion in direct assistance this year, $157.2 million of it [in] economic aid. The Andean Trade Preference Initiative passed by Congress and signed into law by the President last December will expand Peru's trade access to the United States. We have requested $286 million in budget authority for official debt reduction under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative in FY 1993, and we hope to include reduction of Peru's official debt in this year's program. Full funding of this initiative by the Congress would permit us to provide significant relief to Peru. Our aid has helped Peru in other key areas. US assistance feeds one in seven Peruvians. When the cholera epidemic struck in January 1991, afflicting about 300,000 Peruvians, programs we had in place for a decade were key to containing the disease and keeping the fatality rate low--1.3%. We have continued and expanded our infant mortality program--training health care personnel and providing oral rehydration salts--with $5 million in extra aid last year and $5 million more to be spent this year. Third, the Peruvian Government must develop a comprehensive political, economic, and social strategy to confront Sendero. The military component of that strategy must support and be subsumed by the larger political, economic, and social goals. A fundamental part of that strategy must be to extend the government's presence and services to the marginalized rural areas and to the new urban [areas]--pueblos jovenes--where Sendero has sunk its roots, in part, because there is no government presence. The United States can help as well by supporting economic development projects that emphasize grassroots participation by local communities in developing project goals, overseeing their implementation, and providing volunteer efforts to carry them out. Security is also necessary for such projects to be effective. So far this year, eight foreign development workers and six foreign nationals involved in religious and humanitarian organizations have been assassinated by Sendero. The Peruvian armed forces and police must be assisted in professionalizing themselves with training, equipment, technical assistance, and human rights standards. Fourth, Peru must fundamentally reform and strengthen its system for administering justice. Peru must ensure swift, efficient due process that protects the innocent but also a system of justice that prosecutes terrorists effectively while safeguarding judges and jurors and police officials. Today the conviction rate for accused terrorists is less than 10%. Prosecutors and police are underpaid and ill-equipped. They lack law books, typewriters, and even buses to transport prisoners. Corruption must be rooted out of judicial systems as well. We are now in the third year of a $3.4-million US Agency for International Development (USAID) administration of justice program. That program supports Peruvian efforts to establish a national register of detainees; increase cooperation between prosecutors, judges, and police; and improve access to legal services. USAID is developing new programs to help improve court information systems, implement the new procedural code, establish legal aid offices, and provide technical support and equipment. Peru has asked for our help to consolidate its three existing police organizations into a single national police force, determine future training needs, and recommend needed legal reforms. Our USAID program foresees the creation of a nonpartisan, public-private sector institution to develop a national consensus on--and national support for--judicial reform. The $5 million we plan to request for this 3- to 5-year program will be money well spent. Our $500,000 ICITAP [US Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program] has trained 120 Peruvian judges, prosecutors, and police officers in proper police and investigative techniques. We turned over the materials used in these programs to the Peruvians so they can train additional personnel. We plan a pilot human rights training course for police officers next year. Fifth, we and the international community must go forward with our commitments made at Cartagena and, now, San Antonio. Contrary to conventional myth, this does not mean militarization of the drug war. It requires, first and foremost--by the United States and, hopefully, by the European democracies as well--continued, steady, sustained effort to reduce the demand for drugs, and here the United States has a record that shows progress. It involves sustained, multilateral efforts to attack the drug trafficking cartels in every area: the chemicals they transport and ship, the money they launder, the aircraft and ships that move their product, and the corruption they breed. I understand why Peru places Sendero higher on their list of priorities than coca leaf. I also understand why the United States, when it thinks about Peru, thinks about cocaine. But that does not mean we cannot cooperate in ways that strengthen the ability of both governments to deal with their relative priorities. The problem of cocaine production is related to the problem of insurgency. Sendero earns money from the drug traffickers by having its units protect coca processing labs. But Sendero's role is often more direct. In large parts of the Huallaga Valley, Sendero is the drug business: It allocates land [and] dictates prices paid to coca farmers then negotiates and sells directly to the Colombian cartels. The Upper Huallaga Valley is Sendero's chief logistical base; Sendero controls about 30,000 hectares there, amounting to over half the valley's coca leaf cultivation. The guerrillas "tax" narcotics flights, earning $5,000-$15,000 for each use of an airport they control. These funds give Sendero access to weapons they otherwise wouldn't get. Captured documents show that in 1989, for example, Sendero was able to buy some Belgian-made assault rifles from drug traffickers. Both we and the Peruvian Government are working to create alternative economic development to replace coca cultivation. However, that work won't succeed in Peru unless we drive the price of coca leaf down and provide security to allow alternative development to go forward. Sendero has destroyed roads and bridges linking the Huallaga Valley to Lima and killed development workers as part of a strategy to isolate the coca farmers and make them dependent on Sendero. Adequate security for development efforts will require assistance to the police, and, in some instances, the military is needed. I believe we made a mistake in depriving the army of these funds in this year's aid package. We fully share the Congress' concerns about human rights in Peru. We also believe that our engagement will do more than get better results in the drug war--it will further the progress President Fujimori is already making in advancing the cause of human rights. Alternative economic development for coca farmers is a fundamental goal of both Peru and the United States in its counter-narcotics strategy. Despite the difficulties, through our aid in the Upper Huallaga project, more than 14,000 farmers have received technical assistance and planted more than 1,700 demonstration plots. More than 2,100 agricultural loans and 4,700 land titles have been provided to farmers. A total of 1,256 kilometers of road and 12 bridges have been rehabilitated, thereby reducing travel time by 60% along a key section of the coastal road from the valley to the coast. The project has provided 38 potable water systems, 16 medical posts, and 88 water pumps as well as scores of community vegetable gardens. Still, serious alternative economic development programs cannot go forward without providing security. [Sixth], the international community should also support the efforts of Peru and Ecuador to finally resolve their longstanding border dispute stemming from the conflict fought between them in 1942. President Fujimori courageously was the first Peruvian President to visit Quito last January, and President Borja has agreed to make a return visit. President Bush praised these efforts at the San Antonio drug summit. As a guarantor of the 1942 Rio Protocols, the United States has a role to play in supporting this diplomacy. For, despite the fundamental threat which Sendero poses, the bulk of Peru's army is still organized, mobilized, and stationed to deal with the threat of conflict with neighbors like Ecuador and Chile. Final settlement of this border conflict would allow Peru to concentrate its security forces on the real enemy of the Peruvian people--Sendero Luminoso.
Mr. Chairman, the programs we support in Peru today are not counterinsurgency programs. They each have specific, limited objectives. But they also contribute to strengthening the government's economic, administrative, and military capacity to confront and defeat Sendero. Economic development and administration of justice programs strengthen Peru's democracy and give the lie to the guerrillas' argument that the state cannot serve justice or human needs. Our counter-narcotics programs impart basic security skills and an understanding of human rights--that makes Peru's security forces more effective in any mission they undertake. As the drug trade is disrupted, Sendero loses a source of financing. Certainly, there is a convincing case against US involvement in a counterinsurgency program in Peru. The Administration has no such plans, nor would we propose them without close consultation with the Peruvian Government and the Congress and only after careful consideration and debate. Yet there is a case for closer engagement with Peru. The plain fact is that while drug trafficking is our top interest in Peru, the Sendero Luminoso is a direct threat to the government's survival. Peru's insurgencies threaten more than democracy and prosperity--they pose serious obstacles to all aspects of an effective counter-narcotics strategy, from interdicting coca shipments to economic development to enforcing the law against captured traffickers. They threaten democracy in Latin America and the prospects for regional economic integration and trade. I look forward to the debate these hearings will generate, and I look forward to continuing our work with Congress on a policy toward Peru that serves US interests of stopping drug trafficking, strengthening democracy, and defending human rights. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

El Salvador: Pickett-Dawson Murders

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 14 19923/14/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: El Salvador Subject: Terrorism, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] The FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] has announced that the suspects in the January 1991 murders of US citizens David Pickett and Earnest Dawson will be turned over to Salvadoran authorities. This step will not, in itself, ensure that those responsible for this crime will face the bar of justice. The US Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of these murders and has obtained an indictment against one defendant in the United States. The United States continues to believe that those responsible for this case should answer to the US justice system for violations of US law. The FMLN is aware of our position on this matter. The FMLN's announcement in no way relieves it of the obligation to provide all the evidence in its possession, including the results of its internal investigation, testimony from witnesses, the witnesses themselves, prior statements by the accused, and physical evidence. We call upon the FMLN to go beyond their announcement and to cooperate immediately and fully with US and Salvadoran authorities in order to make the legal case against all those who were involved in these murders. For its part, the United States will continue its full cooperation with Salvadoran investigative authorities. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 12, March 23, 1992 Title:

New US Embassies Open

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Notice to the press, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 17 19923/17/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Azerbaijan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan Subject: State Department [TEXT] Embassies of the United States of America are staffed and functioning in the following countries:
The Embassy is located at 103 Ulitsa Alexei Matoovich in Chisinau. There currently is no phone hookup to the Embassy building, but the staff can be reached at the Seabaco Hotel, phone number 0422-23-28- 94. Pending the designation of an ambassador, Howard Steers has been appointed as Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
The Embassy is located at 55 Chelendarskaya in Tashkent. There currently is no phone hookup to the Embassy building, but the staff can be reached at the Hotel Uzbekistan, phone number 7-3630-24- 49-08. Pending the designation of an ambassador, Michael Mozur has been appointed as Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
The Embassy is located in the Intourist Hotel in Baku, phone number 8922-91-79-56. Pending the designation of an ambassador, Robert Finn has been appointed as Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
The Embassy is located in the Yuvelinaya Hotel in Ashkhabad, phone number 3630-24-49-08. Pending the designation of an ambassador, Jeffrey White has been appointed as Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
The Embassy is located in the Oktyabrskaya Hotel in Dushanbe, phone number 3772-24-32-23. Pending the designation of an ambassador, Edmund McWilliams has been appointed as Charge d'Affaires ad interim. The Embassies currently are providing limited consular services to American citizens. Americans in need of emergency services may contact the local Embassy. All Americans residing or traveling in these countries are urged to register with the US Embassy. Routine visa services will be provided at the new Embassies as soon as the offices are readied and appropriate staff assigned. In the meantime, citizens of Moldova, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan will continue to apply for US visas at other US embassies or consulates. (###)