US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 11, March 16, 1992


NACC Intervention

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Intervention at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) ministerial meeting, Brussels Date: Mar, 10 19923/10/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, Eurasia, E/C Europe Country: USSR (former) Subject: CSCE, NATO [TEXT] Only 6 months ago, when the establishment of this Council was first proposed, none of us suspected we would be sitting today in a group of 35 nations, determined to heal the divisions of yesterday and build a new future. Today we welcome the new states of the former Soviet Union into the NACC. Their presence expands our horizons. But our objectives remain the same: to build confidence and concrete cooperation among us that will help ensure the full realization of a Euro-Atlantic community of democratic values and institutions. For generations, indeed for centuries, some of the 16 NATO allies waged a perpetual competition that slid into conflict, wars, and devastation. NATO ended that. Now we need to turn to that model of cooperation to quiet both ancient and new conflicts among neighbors to the east. The needs of the emerging democracies are numerous and varied. There is scope for complementary actions by a variety of organizations and all our governments. Through the NACC, NATO members will share their unique and successful expertise in security cooperation in ways that will help our liaison partners address problems critical to the transformation of their societies and fulfillment of their CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] commitments. Indeed, the NACC should have a mutually reinforcing relationship with CSCE. Rather than engage in theological debates about predestined institutional roles, we should take a pragmatic approach to solving problems at hand. For example, the NACC's security dialogue, together with cooperation on arms control verification and implementation, will enhance the effectiveness of the post-Helsinki CSCE security forum. The NACC could also support CSCE efforts to avoid and manage conflicts. The modest work plan we approve today is only a start. We need to retain the dynamism to respond to evolving needs. In the months ahead, we should invigorate our work. We encourage the governments of our new partners as well as our NATO allies to develop additional projects. As we move forward, NATO's response to individual liaison partners should be commensurate with the pace and extent of democratization, economic reform, demilitarization, and the fulfillment of commitments made regarding nuclear weapons and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their technologies. Progress toward the implementation of democratic ideals should be a key yardstick by which we measure our response. Recent events underscore the need for NATO and the NACC members to consider how these institutions can more effectively address new challenges. Let me review a few of these. First, regular consultations can build confidence and security throughout Europe. Our experience here at NATO over many years has proven that. More recently, the work of our High-Level Working Group on CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] has produced specific, Euro-Atlantic-wide agreements on the ratification of the treaty that will be the security foundation of a new Europe. Now we must go the rest of the way--from political commitment to practical reality--so that the CFE Treaty is in force by the Helsinki summit in July. In the nuclear area, we have made much progress since President Bush's initiative last September. Now it is critical that all the new members of this Council move quickly to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non- nuclear states and adhere unequivocally to its provisions. Second, we must address the urgent problems of defense conversion. On my recent visit to Chelyabinsk [Russia], I saw how immense and immediate a task defense conversion is, not just in physical but in human terms. NATO can provide unique expertise in the multifaceted problem of defense conversion. We ought to reconsider whether the NACC can better assist in this task by creating a Defense Conversion Working Group to focus the specific programs that may emerge following the seminar now being planned. I want to note, in this regard, the forthcoming establishment of the International Science and Technology Center. The center will give weapons scientists and engineers opportunities to redirect their talents to non- military endeavors and minimize any incentives to engage in activities that could result in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other advanced military technologies. Although not an initiative of this body, the center is an example of the benefits of united action in addressing difficult issues. Third, we must explore all means to halt the outbreak of ethnic and regional violence. Even before the first spring grasses have had an opportunity to take root on fresh graves in Croatia, we hear that blood feuds are rising in Bosnia. But we have an opportunity to break the cycle if we use our diplomatic and other resources in unison. NATO has fully supported the efforts of the CSCE rapporteur mission and of the United Nations to deploy peace-keeping troops. The alliance has urged all parties to work within the framework of the EC [European Community]-sponsored Carrington Commission to find a political resolution to the conflict. Alliance members will continue to consult closely in NATO on the Yugoslav crises. In Nagorno-Karabakh, the United States has encouraged the continuing Russian and Kazakh effort, supported by the CSCE, to mediate this dispute. With continued violence, there will be no victors--not in Armenia, Azerbaijan, nor anywhere else. There is no glory in leaving widows and orphans to build the democratic, free market societies that should be the paramount priority. Now the parties need to redouble their efforts to implement the provisions of the February 20 Russian-Armenian-Azerbaijan communique and the February 28 decisions of the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials. Additional steps by all of us and the international community may be needed to respond to the violence and to bring it to an end. These two conflicts underscore the need for NATO and NACC members to consider how these bodies can help prevent and reduce the risks of future conflicts in Europe. We need to pursue the very constructive ideas offered by our Dutch colleagues with regard to the division of labor among institutions on peace-keeping. We agree that NATO's infrastructure, resources, and operational experience are well suited to support peace- keeping efforts that may be sanctioned by CSCE or the United Nations in the future. Moreover, the practical forms of cooperation that NATO is developing with our NACC partners, including military-to-military exchanges and the meeting of defense ministers on April 1, could facilitate a highly desirable broader participation in such operations. NATO, through the NACC, can concretely provide expertise and operational experience in defense and security affairs that will help our liaison partners make the transition to durable democratic systems. Working together with our new partners, we can implement a successful NACC program that will contribute to security and stability throughout the Euro- Atlantic community. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 11, March 16, 1992 Title:

Support for International Science and Technology Center

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks at the Centre Borschette, Brussels, Belgium Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Science/Technology [TEXT] Just 3 weeks ago, I had the unprecedented opportunity to visit Chelyabinsk- 70--one of the premier nuclear weapons laboratories of the former Soviet Union. It is a place where some of the finest minds of an entire generation devoted their creative energies to designing the weapons that gave the Cold War its most terrifying dimension. There I found that the upheaval that had profoundly transformed the former Soviet society outside the heavily secured gates of this closed and isolated Urals mountain community was also turning upside down the lives of the specialists within. I met with a group of senior staff and scientists and listened to what the end of the Cold War--and the resulting sharp decline in demand for their old talents--meant to them. What I heard was deep uncertainty on the part of the scientists about what the future held in store and anxiety about the impact the anticipated hardships might have on their families. I saw discouragement on their faces about what top-notch scientists may fear most--the absence of intellectually challenging work. And I heard concern that economic and professional conditions could deteriorate to the point where even highly patriotic and responsible specialists might be tempted to market their skills to unscrupulous regimes. But I also heard some very encouraging things from the scientists of Chelyabinsk. I heard their readiness--indeed, their eagerness--to adapt their old skills in weapons development to non-military purposes. I heard their strong desire after decades of physical and intellectual isolation to enter the mainstream of international scientific life and to tackle urgent technical problems common to society as a whole--not just to a narrow segment of the military-industrial complex. What I found at Chelyabinsk-70, in other words, was a realistic appreciation of the difficult challenges ahead, along with a strong desire to meet those challenges head on. What was missing was material support and the institutional framework to channel that support where it is needed. That is why our meeting today is crucial. By establishing a well-funded International Science and Technology Center, we can provide weapons scientists and engineers of the former Soviet Union [with] technically interesting and professionally rewarding opportunities to put their talents to productive use in non-military areas. In so doing, we can minimize any incentives that may exist for those highly skilled personnel to engage in activities that could assist the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, missile delivery systems, or other advanced military technologies. Combating proliferation--the most pressing security challenge of the 1990s and beyond--should thus be a central objective of projects funded by the center. Yet by sering this vital goal, the center's projects can promote wider goals as well. They can contribute to ongoing efforts to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. They can contribute to efforts by the states of the former Soviet Union to make the difficult conversion from heavily militarized command economies to market-based systems responsive to civilian needs, and they can help achieve solutions to critical national and international problems, such as those involving the environment, health, and energy. Our task is urgent. We must translate the idea of an International Science and Technology Center into a working reality as expeditiously as possible. For this reason, we are pleased that representatives from the European Community, Japan, and the United States--three parties we expect will be major financial contributors to the center--have joined with Russia in preparing an international agreement that would formally establish the center. We should make every effort to ensure signature and entry into force of this agreement before the end of March. We should then proceed with concrete steps necessary to get the center up and running--with projects approved and funded--by early summer. The joint statement we have issued today outlines a variety of actions over the next months to get the center operational by the summer. Success of the center will require broad international support by governments, by the private sector, and by the international non- governmental scientific community as well. We welcome the attendance here today of states of the former Soviet Union and look forward to exchanging views with you on how best to structure and operate the center. We also welcome participation today by prospective donor parties, including the senior-level representatives of the major donors who will take their place as initial members of the center's governing board. We hope to increase the number of states who will make substantial contributions to the center and will join us on the governing board. In this connection, I would like to confirm today that the United States is now actively taking the steps necessary to provide the $25 million we earlier pledged to help get the center started and fund its projects. The problem we are here to address is sometimes referred to as "brain drain"--the leakage of specialized talent, especially to locations where that talent could be put to undesirable ends. The International Science and Technology Center we are about to launch can help plug this brain drain. But it can do more. It can help put some of the best brains available anywhere today to work solving mankind's most vexing problems. It can play a role in reallocating the productive resources of the former Soviet Union to better serve the welfare of the people, and the cooperative scientific endeavors fostered by the center will not only expand the frontiers of science--they will strengthen the bonds of friendship among our countries. This is what we call the "brain gain" solution. It is a solution worth investing in.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

Support for International Science and Technology Center: Joint Statement

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Department Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former), Japan, United States Subject: Science/Technology, EC [TEXT] Messrs. Joao de Deus Pinheiro, President of the Council of the European Communities, Frans Andriessen, Vice President of the European Commission, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, of the United States, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of the Russian Federation, and Koichiro Matsuura, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, met in Brussels at a conference of interested states on 11 March 1992 to promote the establishment and early operation, in the Russian Federation, of an International Science and Technology Centre. The four parties--the European Community, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and Japan--agreed that a primary focus of the Centre would be to provide weapons scientists and engineers of the former Soviet Union, particularly those who possess the skills and knowledge related to weapons of mass destruction, with opportunities to redirect their talents to peaceful activities. It would, thereby, minimise any incentive to engage in activities that could result in the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, or missile delivery systems. The four parties also agreed that, through its projects, the Centre would contribute to ongoing efforts to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, and to the wider goals of reinforcing the transition to market-based economies responsive to civil needs and of supporting basic and applied research and technology development, for example, in the field of environmental protection, energy production and nuclear safety. The four parties agreed that the Centre would be a clearinghouse for developing, selecting, financing and monitoring science and technology projects that would be carried out primarily at institutions and facilities located in the Russian Federation and, if interested, in other States of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and Georgia. The four parties confirmed their intention to provide significant material support for the Centre and its activities. Secretary Baker confirmed that the US administration is now actively taking the steps necessary to provide $25 million to support the Centre and fund its projects. President of the Council of European Communities, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, and Vice-President of the European Commission, Frans Andriessen, confirmed that the European Community envisages an equivalent contribution to the Centre. Deputy Foreign Minister, Koichiro Matsuura, announced that Japan is prepared to make substantial contributions to the Centre, taking into account such factors as the future steps to be taken with regard to this Centre. Foreign Minister Kozyrev confirmed the readiness of the Russian Federation to provide the Centre, at the expense of the Russian side, with the necessary premises and services. The parties stressed the importance of wide international support for the Centre. In this connection they noted that Canada has already expressed an interest in participating in the Centre's activities and is currently examining the possibility of doing so. The parties agreed to encourage other governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations to participate in the Centre's activities and to finance them. The four parties expressed satisfaction with the preparation this week of an international agreement, under which the European Community, Japan, Russia, and the United States, as original parties and major contributors, would formally establish the Centre, specify its basic legal framework, outline certain key elements of its structure and operation, and become initial members of its governing board. The four stated their intention to sign an agreement by the end of March and to bring it into force without delay. They noted that accession by other governments is foreseen and they expressed their hope that other interested governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations would soon demonstrate their strong support for the Centre and its projects. The four parties further noted that the agreement in preparation envisages the creation of a governing board and of executive and advisory structures, as necessary, for the implementation of the Centre's activities. They hope that the governing board will meet soon after entry into force to develop and adopt a statute for implementing the agreement. The four parties emphasised the urgency of making the Centre operational at the earliest possible date. Accordingly, they agreed that a joint team would be sent to Russia by the end of March to survey possible sites for the Centre nominated by the Russian Federation, and to consider infrastructure requirements and other steps necessary to get the Centre underway. They further agreed that the governing board would meet soon thereafter in order to take decisions on management and to appoint the Centre's senior staff. They expressed their determination to see the Centre operational by early summer, and their expectation that projects would begin to be financed by the Centre in that timeframe. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

Extending Assistance to Newly Emerging Democracies

Eagleburger Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger Description: Statement before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics [TEXT] We have witnessed, over the last few years, breathtaking changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For over 4 centuries, Russia had been an imperial, authoritarian state, dominating its neighbors and threatening stability in both Europe and Asia. But, now, the collapse of the Soviet empire and the discrediting of communism have provided new hope for freedom and prosperity for over 400 million people in the region. As a consequence, we enjoy the prospect of a democratic Russia which has dismantled its empire and is turning its energies inward toward reform rather than outward toward expansion. This is a prospect which bears directly on the national security of the United States, and it is, therefore, something which is in our national interest to support. But it is also a prospect which is as yet fragile, one which could easily give way to a more historically familiar state of affairs. There is no guarantee that the new states of Central and Eastern Europe or those of the former Soviet Union will evolve into friendly, prosperous democracies. They face formidable obstacles along the path of reform, as communism has driven these countries and their economies to the brink of ruin. In the final analysis, success will depend on the will and determination of the governments and peoples of the region. But Western assistance can make a difference, and we have an obligation before history and to future generations to do our part in helping to make their democratic experiment a success. What is at stake for us is whether the recent transformation of dangerous adversaries into friends and partners is a permanent or a passing phenomenon. Clearly, the United States does not possess limitless resources, especially in a time of serious economic difficulty at home. But the American people, who spent trillions of dollars to wage and to win the Cold War, hopefully are willing to allocate comparatively modest sums today in order to ensure that we do not face, once again, an old threat under a new guise. If we do the right thing today, we will have done what we could to spare our children from the specter of nuclear war and from the colossal expenditures on national defense which our generation has had to live with since World War II. Our economic well-being is also at stake. The peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union present an enormous new market for Western trade and investment. We must actively seek to involve the American private sector in the rebuilding of this region. Not only will such involvement provide new economic opportunities for America, but it will help enhance the presence and influence of the United States in these newly emerging democracies. We certainly do not want to see the old COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] bloc closed to US trade and investment by activities and agreements struck with other trading partners. Our private sector can provide positive examples of the free market values which are the foundation of economic prosperity both here and abroad. Our assistance program itself, by utilizing US goods and services rather than writing checks to foreign governments, creates jobs at home as well as overseas.
US Programs in Central and Eastern Europe
As we begin to implement our assistance program in the new independent states, we can benefit from our experience to date in Central and Eastern Europe. When we started our assistance program with the SEED [Support for Eastern European Democracies] Act of 1989, only Poland and Hungary were involved in major reform efforts. Now we have programs in 10 countries in Central and Eastern Europe. During the past 2 1/2 years, we have worked with the Congress to develop a creative assistance program, combining traditional activities with innovative approaches, such as the Enterprise Funds now operating in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. We and the East Europeans have learned what works quickly and what does not, and we remain committed to adapting our programs as needed to promote our goals. The flexibility we have built into our programs has been critical in allowing us to shift resources as necessary to respond to sudden changes in individual recipient countries--changes which are inevitable given the unprecedented reforms being implemented and the resulting dislocations that are occurring. If we had, for example, allocated funds to each country for each fiscal year, we would not have been able to shift resources to respond to the dramatic developments last year in Bulgaria, Albania, and the Baltic states. In my view, we have also been correct in focusing the majority of our assistance directly on the private sector. The overthrow of communism was a rejection of state interference in daily life. We want to strengthen nascent private institutions in these countries rather than perpetuate bureaucracies. Moreover, we believe that the primary reason why the United States has been able to disburse our assistance commitments at over twice the rate of the European Community has been because we work directly with the private and non-governmental sector rather than through host government institutions. We have also sought to combine our assistance tools with new initiatives designed to enhance US trade opportunities and promote US investments. In the long run, the impact of US private sector capital, goods, and services will be much greater on the development of free markets abroad than any government assistance that we can offer.
The Administration's FY 1993 Program for Central and Eastern Europe
As we proceed with humanitarian and technical assistance for the independent states of the former Soviet Union, it is essential that we not divert resources from our programs designed for Central and Eastern Europe. The success or failure of the political and economic transition underway from the Baltics to the Black Sea will have a decisive effect on the prospects for a successful transformation in Russia and the other independent states. We are, therefore, keeping funding for our East European program strictly separate from our CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] program. We are also asking for a $50-million increase in funding for Central and Eastern Europe in FY 1993--$450 million as opposed to the $400 million we asked for in FY 1992. The increase in our request reflects the fact that we are now providing assistance to more countries. At the time we submitted the President's budget for FY 1992, we had assistance programs for six countries. Since then, we have added Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Albania to the list, and the latecomers have some of the most urgent and long-term needs in the region. As the number of recipients has changed, so have the needs we are trying to fill. While we continue to place emphasis on the transitional nature of our East European assistance program and look to "graduate" countries as quickly as possible, we recognize that we will be providing assistance to some parts of the region for much longer than we had originally anticipated. Albania, for example, is similar to a traditional developing country, where the United States and other donors will probably be involved in institution- building for many years. In program terms, we want to build on our successes. Here is what we are planning for FY 1993: -- Poland will continue to be the largest single recipient of assistance in the region, consistent with its size and importance. -- As in the past, we will divide our program budget into democratic initiatives (approximately 7.5% of the total), quality of life activities (17.5%), and economic restructuring projects (75%). -- The Enterprise Funds will receive the largest single portion of the 1993 budget, as they have been quite successful in responding quickly to the needs of the new private sector. We believe that the funds will be able to attract other donor and private sector support, as the Polish and Hungarian funds are already demonstrating. -- Another key program is the American Business Initiative, which is designed to promote US trade and investment in Eastern Europe. This helps US business while also providing new job opportunities for East Europeans. -- The promotion of private agriculture and agribusiness also will remain a top priority. -- We will continue encouraging all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to move ahead with privatization. Our programs in this area will represent a significant share of our assistance effort in FY 1993. The Administration's FY 1993 Program for the New Independent States We will build on our experience in Central and Eastern Europe in developing activities for the former Soviet Union. But we must not exaggerate the parallels. We are looking at 12 entirely new countries, which are likely to proceed with reforms at different speeds and in different ways. The challenges we face in the former Soviet Union are more extensive than those we faced in Central and Eastern Europe. The region is much larger, the number of people greater, and the problems more profound. The immediate humanitarian needs are widespread, and the risks of political instability in certain areas are high. Private enterprise and societal connections with the West are much less developed compared to most of Eastern Europe 3 years ago. New government structures are just being established, with laws being written. And, of course, there is the enormous defense industry, including its nuclear component, which is a subject of special attention under our assistance program. In short, the challenges we face are unprecedented. Simply throwing money at the situation--especially money that in these times we can ill afford to waste--will not solve these problems. Indeed, money indiscriminately pumped into the region could hinder reform and promote the very dependencies that have, for too long, existed in these countries. We must remain prudent, using the combined resources of various US Government agencies and an engaged private sector to overcome immediate humanitarian crises and help prevent political instability. We must also help create market mechanisms needed to promote self-sustaining economic reforms. Critical to this effort will be encouraging the participation of US and Western companies in trade and investment. To achieve these simultaneous goals, the President has asked for $620 million in FY 1992 and FY 1993 in new appropriations for the former Soviet Union. These funds would be used to deliver emergency humanitarian relief and provide technical assistance to support democratic reform and promote economic restructuring: -- Of this, $500 million would go toward special humanitarian and technical assistance to meet emerging needs as they arise. The technical assistance is intended to provide the necessary bridge between short-term humanitarian aid to cope with immediate shortages and medium-term development to promote the successful transition to a democratic society and a market economy. -- $100 million in FY 1993 Economic Support Funds would go toward technical assistance activities to promote democratic reforms and economic restructuring. -- $10 million in FY 1993 Development Assistance funds would be targeted at development activities in the poorest states, and $10 million in FY 1993 PL 480 [Food for Peace] funds will be used to send US farmers and agribusiness experts to provide training and advice to counterparts in the new independent states. These funds will be combined with $860 million in resources available under existing legislation, including: -- About $210 million in food assistance ($165 million in food aid and $45 million in surplus Department of Defense stocks); -- $100 million in Department of Defense money for transportation of humanitarian relief; -- $400 million in Defense funds for assistance in eliminating nuclear arms and chemical weapons; -- $30 million in funds to provide urgently needed medical supplies; and -- $120 million in USAID [US Agency for International Development] and US Commodity Credit Corporation funds for technical assistance activities. In addition, the Peace Corps hopes to support up to 500 volunteers in the new independent states by the end of FY 1993, and we will rely on the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Eximbank [Export Import Bank] to encourage US investment in and exports to the region. For our technical assistance activities, we are planning programs in the following areas: -- Programs to privatize and restructure the militarized economies of the new independent states through conversion of defense industries and resources to consumer-oriented production; -- Activities to promote a market economy, both on the macro- and the microeconomic side; -- Improvements in food distribution, transportation, and humanitarian service systems; -- Promotion of investment in and increased efficiency of the energy sector; -- Promotion of bilateral trade and investment to encourage the US private sector to become involved in the new independent states; and -- Initiatives to encourage the development of a democratic society, including rule of law, educational reform, public administration, and media programs. As in Eastern Europe, we do not plan to set specific levels for assistance to individual states, as we will need to shift resources to address changing needs and to encourage the varying levels of reform efforts. We estimate, however, that roughly half of the US assistance will be directed to Russia, given its size and importance. Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are also important priorities and will be treated accordingly. In general, we want to direct assistance at whatever level--national or local--is most appropriate and effective, working with both governmental and non-governmental entities. We will be proposing new mechanisms, including the Eurasia Foundation, which will be a private organization designed to provide fast-disbursing grants for technical assistance, management training, and democratic institution building. While much needs to be done, the United States has been a leader in responding to the urgent needs. We have delivered over 21 million metric tons of grain and other foodstuffs and over $35 million in pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. We have disbursed almost 70% of our commitments to date (including agricultural credits), a much higher rate than other donors. We have already opened, or are in the process of opening, embassies in 11 of the new states. We are working to establish an USAID presence on the ground. And, as you may know, last week the Secretary named Rich Armitage, who successfully organized Operation Provide Hope, to manage the operations of our entire assistance program to the new independent states. Considering the importance of the challenge we face, it is also significant to note that US assistance is only part of a global response, with over 50 nations and multilateral institutions committed to providing over $27 billion to the new independent states. The Washington Coordinating Conference held in January brought together 54 delegations to develop specific plans of action in the areas of food, medicine, shelter, energy, and technical assistance. We have also met bilaterally and multilaterally with representatives of the new independent states to discuss and implement these initiatives. We are taking a lead role in supporting memberships for the new states in the international financial institutions as soon as practicable in order to promote the macroeconomic stabilization and structural changes that are needed.
In sum, let us remember that the Western community worked together under US leadership to protect democracy and free enterprise during the dark years of the Cold War. We provided inspiration and hope for the peoples living under the weight of totalitarianism. It is now up to all of us to see that the promise of a more secure, prosperous world is realized. Under US leadership, the Western democracies have again forged a partnership, this time with our former adversaries, in order to build a more stable future for our children. We look forward to working with the Congress in extending the assistance that is so much in our national interest. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

The Future of Democracy and Economic Transition in Bulgaria

Eagleburger Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger Description: Remarks before the Bulgarian-US Trade and Economic Council's Conference on the Future of Democracy and Economic Transition in Bulgaria, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 4 19923/4/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Bulgaria Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Today, if all of us do our jobs well, we are going to bring to the attention of this conference one of the great but largely unsung success stories in post- communist Europe and, in so doing, etch the promise of a free and democratic Bulgaria into the consciousness of the American business and political communities. Until recently, Bulgaria has conjured in the American mind the image of a proud people in a land of great natural plentitude but one which historically has known misrule at home and vulnerability at its borders. We do, of course, count Bulgarian sons and daughters as citizens in this land of immigrants, and we have sent idealists to Bulgaria as elsewhere--the journalist Januarius MacGahan, who championed Bulgarian independence, and the Americans who founded schools in Samokov and Lovech [in the] last century. But the tragic history of the Balkans and the insane ideological struggles of this century have also placed our two countries--but never our two peoples--at loggerheads for the better part of the past 75 years. Yet, in a mere 2 years, amazing changes have produced a Bulgaria which bears little resemblance to the country in our mind's eye. Americans are unfamiliar with but not indifferent to this new Bulgaria. They have only to learn about the great opportunity for democracy which now exists there in order to do whatever they can to help. That is why this conference is so important: It will, I hope, awaken the American business community to the economic potential of a modernizing Bulgaria and rekindle the spirit of idealism which informed American efforts in Bulgaria at an earlier moment in our history. When Americans think of the revolutionary changes in Europe over the past several years, they tend to remember the fall of the Berlin Wall and the heroic struggles of Lech Walesa in Poland and Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia. What until now they perhaps have not sufficiently appreciated is the fact that the Bulgarian revolution has traveled the furthest distance of any throughout the region; it has struggled against the greatest odds; and, against all odds, it has remained peaceful and democratic. It was only a little more than 2 years ago that Todor Zhivkov headed one of the most repressive and unreconstructed Stalinist regimes in the entire world. It was only 3 years ago that more than 300,000 ethnic Turks fled Zhivkov's forced assimilation campaign within the country. As recently as November 1989, the Communist Party's monopoly of political and economic power was so complete that, unlike elsewhere in the region, there appeared to be no democratic forces ready to fill the vacuum when the revolution suddenly came. Given these circumstances, and given the country's and its neighbors history of violence and intrigue, there was every reason to believe that post-communist Bulgaria would be anything but peaceful and democratic. What observers failed to anticipate, however, was the political maturity of the Bulgarian people and the emergence of truly enlightened political leadership--two factors without which democracy cannot succeed. The result has been generally responsible behavior by all parties despite their rivalries and deep-seated grievances, and thus a remarkably peaceful transition to democracy. Perhaps most important of all, Bulgaria has deliberately eschewed the example of Yugoslavia by promoting inter-ethnic reconciliation. Not only does the Turkish minority enjoy full voting rights but their constituency has become the third party in parliament and is providing support to the government headed by Prime Minister Dimitrov. It is no exaggeration to say that Bulgaria under democracy has not only overcome the legacy of communism, it is in the process of overcoming the legacy of history--and this may have positive and far-reaching consequences both within Bulgaria and beyond its borders. All of us are familiar with history's noxious hold over the people of the Balkans, the seemingly endless and self-sustaining cycle of violence and revenge. By reaching out to their country's ethnic minority, President Zhelev and Prime Minister Dimitrov are transcending that history and establishing the foundations of a democracy which can last and which merits full membership in the wider community of Western democratic nations. Similarly, by reaching out to Bulgaria's neighbors and historic enemies-- witness the improvement in relations with both Greece and Turkey. The democratic government has again broken with history and embarked on the only path to peace and prosperity for the Bulgarian people, and for all the people of the Balkans. As a result, and against all historical precedent, Bulgaria today has become a virtual "island of stability" in the Balkans. It is, for example, a bulwark against the spread of Yugoslavia's tragic civil war throughout the region. In fact, the contrast between the two countries could not be greater--that is, between a Yugoslavia mired in the hatreds of the past and sliding further into the past, and a Bulgaria which, like the nations of Western Europe following World War II, is transcending those hatreds and is thus poised to move forward into a totally different and a far better kind of future. Yet, we know that that future is not necessarily assured. We know that the destructive hatreds of the past lie not far from the surface and that the enemies of democracy within Bulgaria may try to exploit those emotions to thwart economic change which threatens their interests. Until now, fortunately, a majority of the Bulgarian people have not heeded their siren song, but it is a fact that the whole country is going to be tested by economic hardship in the years to come. In those circumstances, the temptation will be great to listen to those who urge a return to the policies and even to the hate-mongering of a bygone era. Let it be understood, however, that to live in the past is to be condemned to relive the past. However painful market reforms may be, however frustrating parliamentary politics may be, however long the path to prosperity may be, there is simply no alternative to capitalism, to democracy, and to respect for human rights for any nation which truly wants to join the ranks of the Western democracies. In the case of Bulgaria, there is every reason to be optimistic. Already, Bulgaria has joined Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in terms of political progress and commitment to economic reform, and it deserves the fullest support from the international financial institutions and integration into the Western family of nations. The United States, for example, believes Bulgaria's progress is sufficient now to merit inclusion with the three other countries in our assistance programs and initiatives. At the same time, however, we would like to see Bulgaria accelerate the pace of economic reforms. Much still needs to be done to complete the transition to an authentic free market economy. We realize that this transition will mean a very difficult period of adjustment as unprofitable enterprises fold, layoffs increase, and the cost of living for all Bulgarians rises. But only by fully implementing land reform, banking reform, and the privatization of enterprises can Bulgaria compete on the world market and create genuine prosperity for its people. Clinging to remnants of the old system, on the other hand--however comforting they may seem--is a recipe for permanent economic decline. Fundamentally, what is required is that the Bulgarian people believe in themselves and fully embrace a system --the free enterprise system-- which will give maximum scope to their creative energies and help them realize their true economic potential. As for the role of outsiders, the kind of assistance Bulgaria needs more than anything else is investment to make up for the current shortage of domestic capital. The Bulgarian Government recently improved legislation passed last year to create an attractive climate for such investment, and I would urge them to implement this law as flexibly as possible. Ultimately, the job of "selling" outsiders on the benefits of investing and doing business in Bulgaria is one for the Bulgarians themselves. Outsiders cannot do this in their place; it is they who will have to be convinced that Bulgaria competes favorably with other rivals for their investment. Bulgaria has enormous potential and should not in the least be shy in advertising itself to the world. The country boasts a highly educated and motivated work force, and the cost of doing business there is bound to be attractive. There are promising investment opportunities in the fields of agribusiness, light manufacturing, and tourism. Bulgaria's location offers export opportunities to a wide variety of markets not sufficiently covered by US firms. I, therefore, have no reticence in urging US investors to take a serious look at Bulgaria. They will find that it is a market which has not been cornered by the West Europeans and one which is warmly hospitable to Americans and to American business. Finally, let me say that I hope that at the conclusion of this conference, the best-kept secret in Central and Eastern Europe will be a secret no more. If this is the case, as I expect it will be, we will owe a debt of gratitude to the US-Chamber of Commerce and to the Bulgaria-US Trade and Economic Council for having educated Americans about the exciting emergence of a democratic Bulgaria and about the exciting prospects for economic cooperation between our two countries. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

US-Bulgarian Relations

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Date: Mar, 3 19923/3/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Bulgaria Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] The President met for approximately 30 minutes this afternoon with Bulgarian Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov. He welcomed the Prime Minister as the first popularly elected Bulgarian leader ever to visit the United States and congratulated him on Bulgaria's National Day of Independence, celebrated today. The President expressed admiration for the determination shown by President Zhelev and Prime Minister Dimitrov in advancing democracy and human rights, including minority rights, in Bulgaria and in pursuing a bold program of market economic reform. He expressed America's firm support for Bulgaria as it undertakes this difficult transformation and proposed that both countries work to promote foreign trade and investment, which can bring the capital, know-how, and new jobs Bulgaria needs. The two leaders also discussed the situation in the Balkans. They reaffirmed their strong support for UN peace-keeping efforts in Yugoslavia and agreed that all countries should act with restraint so as to promote confidence and stability in the region. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

Department Statement on Romania

Boucher Source: Statement by Deputy Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Romania Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] The United States welcomes the progress made by the people of Romania toward a market economy and democratic pluralism. There have been significant advances in meeting CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] criteria and generally accepted international standards for free and fair elections. We commend all those in Romania--Prime Minister Stolojan and members of his government, political and civic leaders, domestic election observers, and others--who are working to achieve these goals. The US is especially encouraged by the widespread participation by political parties, civic organizations, and candidates in the electoral process throughout Romania. In light of Romania's progress in reform and its desire for closer relations with the United States, we have informed Romania that the US is prepared to sign a new bilateral trade agreement with Romania. The new trade agreement would have to be approved by Congress. The agreement would then provide for most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment on a reciprocal basis and promote closer ties between the people of the US and Romania by encouraging trade and business contacts. MFN trade status would not take effect until the agreement wins congressional approval. We anticipate that the Administration and Congress will continue to discuss respect for human rights and the conduct of free and fair national elections in Romania this spring as they consider MFN. The US looks for further improvement in Romania's electoral system as it prepares for national elections. We encourage all citizens of Romania to continue to strive for a democratic society which fully respects human rights and the rule of law.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

Department Statement Nagorno- Karabakh

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 12 19923/12/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, CSCE [TEXT] The President spoke with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey today on the escalating crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The President is concerned about the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and calls on the parties to declare an immediate cease-fire, so that they can attempt to resolve their differences peacefully. The involvement of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] in the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh reflects the deep concern of the international community about the violence that threatens to scar this region for generations to come. The parties must not seek to gain a temporary military advantage during a time of great uncertainty and heightened tensions. We call on them to exercise restraint even in the face of apparent provocation. The bloodshed must end. The United States joins Turkey, Russia, and other countries in calling for an immediate cease-fire and for Armenia and Azerbaijan to cooperate with the CSCE to put a peaceful end to this growing tragedy. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

US-EC Declaration on the Yugoslav Republics

EC Source: Declaration by the United States and the European Community on the recognition of the Yugoslav republics, Brussels, Belgium Date: Mar, 10 19923/10/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: USSR (former), Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: EC, Democratization, United Nations [TEXT] The Community and its member States and the United States reiterate their strong support for the UN Peacekeeping Plan, for the EC Peace Conference chaired by Lord Carrington and for the key principles underlying the search for a political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis at the EC Conference: no changes in the borders of the Yugoslav republics by force or absent mutual consent, strong protection for human rights and the rights of all national and ethnic groups in all republics. The Community and its member States and the United States have agreed to coordinate their approaches to completing the process of recognizing those Yugoslav republics that seek independence. The Community and its member States, bearing in mind its declaration on 16 December 1991, and the United States are agreed: (i) that the United States will, in this context, give rapid and positive consideration to the requests for recognition by Croatia and Slovenia in such a way as to support the dual-track approach based on the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force and the European Community Peace Conference chaired by Lord Carrington. (ii) that the Community and its member States and the United States will also coordinate their approach to Serbia and Montenegro, which have expressed the wish to form a common state, and lay particular emphasis on their demonstrable respect for the territorial integrity of the other republics and for the rights of minorities on their territory as well as their willingness to negotiate Yugoslav state succession issues at the EC Conference on the basis on mutual agreement with the other four republics; and (iii) that positive consideration should be given to the requests for recognition of the other two republics, contingent on the resolution of the remaining European Community questions relating to those two republics. In this context, they strongly urge all parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina to adopt without delay constitutional arrangements that will provide for a peaceful and harmonious development of this republic within its existing borders. The Community and its member States and the United States also agreed strongly to oppose any effort to undermine the stability and territorial integrity of those two republics. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

The Need for an Active Foreign Policy

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from remarks at the Nixon Library dinner, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: United States Subject: State Department [TEXT] Today's challenge is fundamentally different. . . . What we must do is find a way to maintain popular support for an active foreign policy and a strong defense in the absence of an overriding single external threat to our nation's security and in the face of severe budgetary problems. In this post-Cold War world, ours is the wonderful, yet no less real or difficult, challenge, really, of coping with success. This challenge is by no means unprecedented. Think back to the era after World War I or the years in the immediate wake of World War II. In both instances, the American people were anxious to bring their victorious troops home [and] to focus their energies on making the American dream a reality. Perhaps more instructive, though, are the differences between our reactions following this century's two great wars. After World War I, the United States retreated behind its oceans. We refused to support the League of Nations. We allowed our military forces to shrink and grow obsolete. We helped international trade plummet, the victim of beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism. We stood by and watched as Germany's struggling democracy, the Weimar Republic, failed under the weight of reparations, protectionism, and depression and gave way to the horror that we all know as the Third Reich. Likewise, our initial reaction to victory after World War II showed little learning. But, galvanized by an emerging communist threat spearheaded by an imperialist Soviet Union, the United States acted. NATO, the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the World Bank, the Marshall Plan--these and other institutions prove that Americans grasped the nature of the challenge and the need to respond. Our military was modernized, free trade nourished, [and] US support for former adversaries Germany and Japan made generous. It was fitting that Dean Acheson titled his memoirs Present at the Creation, for these years were truly creative. The result, as they say, is history. We kept the peace. We won the Cold War. Democracy is on the march. Now, for the third time this century, we've emerged on the winning side of a war--the Cold War--involving the great powers. So the question before us is the same: We have won the war, but are we prepared to secure the peace? . . . Yesterday, we saw conflict, and, today--yes--the world is a safer place. Yes, the Soviet Union--aggressive, looking outward--that we feared is no longer. But the successor republics are still struggling to establish themselves as democracies, still struggling to make the transition to capitalism. We invested so much to win the Cold War; we must invest what is necessary to win the peace. If we fail, we will create new and profound problems for our security and that of Europe and Asia. If we succeed, we strengthen democracy, we build new market economies, and, in the process, we create huge new markets for America. We must support reform, not only in Russia but throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. . . . Those who would have us do less ignore the intimate interrelationship between overseas developments and those here at home. If we had not resisted aggression in the Gulf a year ago, if we had not liberated Kuwait and defeated Iraq's invading army, we would now be facing the economic consequences not of a mild recession but of a deep depression brought on by Saddam Hussein's control over the majority of the world's oil. I am absolutely certain--I expect we could get a good lively debate in this room of enormously intellectual people--but I am absolutely certain in my mind that if we had not moved against Saddam, he would be in Saudi Arabia today. The coalition would have fallen apart, he would be in Saudi Arabia, and we would be facing agony like we've never faced before in the history of our country. It is a pipedream to believe that we can somehow insulate our society or our economy or our lives from the world beyond our borders. This is not meant to suggest that we should not do more here at home. Of course, we should. But foreign policy, too, is a powerful determinant of the quality of life here at home. Isolationism is not the only temptation we need to avoid. Protectionism is another siren song which will be difficult to resist. There are, indeed, many examples of unfair trade practices where US firms get shut out of foreign government markets owing to trade barriers of one sort or another or owing to foreign government subsidies. But the way to bring down barriers abroad is not to raise them at home. In trade wars, there are no winners, only losers. Export growth is a proven economic engine. Every billion dollars--we estimate every billion dollars--in manufactured exports creates 20,000 jobs for Americans. We should have no doubts about the ability of our workers and farmers to thrive in a competitive world. Our goal must be to increase, not restrict, trade. Opting out, be it under the banner of protection or isolation, is nothing more than a recipe for weakness and, ultimately, for disaster. That's why I'm so determined to do all I can to bring to--to successfully conclude the Uruguay Round of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and to get a fair trade agreement with Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada. It is important to us; it creates jobs in the United States. Now, if I can choose a theme for you to take away from what I have to say tonight, it is this: There is no distinction between how we fare abroad and how we live at home. Foreign and domestic policy are but two sides of the same coin. True, we will not be able to lead abroad if we are not united and strong at home. But it is no less true that we will be unable to build the society we seek here at home in a world where military and economic warfare is the norm. . . .(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

President Bush Meets With King Hussein

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 12 19923/12/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Jordan, Iraq Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Trade/Economics [TEXT] The President and [Jordanian] King Hussein met for approximately 1 hour in the Oval Office. Also attending the meeting were Secretary Baker, General Scowcroft, and Jordanian Prime Minister Bin Shaker. Following the meeting, the President and the King and their respective staffs had a working lunch in the residence. There was considerable discussion of the peace process. The President stressed the importance of all parties continuing to participate in the Madrid process. The two agreed to continue to consult closely, both about ways to solve remaining procedural issues affecting both the bilateral and multilateral talks and on how best to advance the peace process more generally. On the question of Iraq, the two leaders agreed on the importance of full Iraqi compliance with all [UN] Security Council resolutions. King Hussein said that Jordan would continue to do its part. President Bush and King Hussein also agreed that the United States and Jordan would continue to consult closely on questions relating to Iraq and the Gulf war aftermath. King Hussein also raised the matter of Jordan's economic situation, which has been made more difficult by the more than 300,000 men, women, and children who have entered Jordan from the Gulf. The President told the King that the United States would continue to do what it could to help Jordan, both directly and via international financial institutions. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

East Timor, Indonesia, and US Policy

Quinn Source: Kenneth M. Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 6 19923/6/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Indonesia, Portugal Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, Human Rights, History [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to present our views on the situation in East Timor and US policy regarding the Indonesian Government's handling of the violent incident in Dili last November.
The Dili Affair
We are here today principally out of concern over the tragic event in Dili last November 12. On that day, Indonesian army and police units fired on unarmed civilians engaged in a political demonstration, killing and wounding scores of people. The US Government has long been concerned about the human rights situation in East Timor. Officers from our Embassy in Jakarta have gone there frequently over the years. Both Ambassador Monjo and former Ambassador Wolfowitz have visited East Timor. Four embassy teams have been there since November 12; the most recent visitation was in mid- February. Our dialogue with the Indonesian Government about East Timor is long- standing and has frequently been at the highest levels. Shortly after the November 12 incident, both Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas and Secretary Baker were in Seoul attending an APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] ministerial meeting. Both the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Solomon immediately discussed preliminary reports of the incident directly with the Minister, and Secretary Baker sent Minister Alatas a letter of concern shortly thereafter. The United States has publicly condemned the Dili incident. No provocation could have warranted such a wanton military reaction; the excessive use of force was unjustified and reprehensible. We immediately called for a complete and credible investigation leading to appropriate punishments for those who resorted to or condoned such deadly use of force. We clearly conveyed our views at high levels in both Jakarta and Washington. Mr. Chairman, we share the Congress' deep concern and disapproval of the violence of November 12, as well as the desire to see that those accountable for the massacre are punished, that justice is done, and that steps are taken to ensure that no such incident recurs. The issues now requiring US policy judgments are these: How can the United States best help to ensure that our goals of accountability and a just resolution of the incident are realized and that the well-being of the people of East Timor is improved? We have been encouraged by the fact that the Indonesian Government has also characterized the incident as a tragedy. Senior leaders are well aware that the world is watching. They understand that their positive international reputation, of which they are proud, is on the line. Our hope and expectation has been that Indonesia would move vigorously to find the facts, assess responsibility, appropriately punish those responsible, and take steps to prevent such an event from occurring again. As of today, our expectations have been partially fulfilled. President Suharto promptly formed a national investigatory commission which delivered a preliminary report on December 26. The report clearly answered two key questions in the affirmative: Was excessive force used and should the military personnel involved be punished? While we look forward to the final report to provide additional detail, we and most other concerned foreign observers--including Australia, Japan, and the European Community (EC)--have judged the preliminary report to be a serious and responsible effort by the Government of Indonesia. The report confronts the toughest issues and directly refutes many of the initial assertions about the event put forward by the Indonesian armed forces: -- It raises the official casualty totals to realistic levels, flatly contradicting figures announced earlier by the Indonesian armed forces. -- It makes the key determination that excessive force was used and that some troops were clearly "out of control." -- It also finds that this incident was not the result of government policy. -- It asserts that those who violated the law must be prosecuted. We have also been encouraged by President Suharto's follow-up actions: -- On receiving the preliminary findings which were critical of his army, the President immediately made the report public and extended his deep apology to the families of innocent victims. He has publicly apologized on three occasions. -- The President relieved of their duties two general officers--the regional and provincial military commanders. Lower-level officers in the chain of command have also been replaced. -- He ordered formation of a military "Council of Honor" to recommend army punishments and reforms, with the intention that such an incident must never happen again in Indonesia. On February 27, the Indonesian army announced that six senior officers will be disciplined, with three of them dismissed from the service; eight other officers and enlisted men will be court-martialed; and five more remain under investigation. -- President Suharto ordered Armed Forces Commander Gen. Try Sutrisno to account for missing persons. -- He ordered increased efforts to improve the well-being of the Timorese people. We have monitored the situation in East Timor closely since November 12. Four teams from Embassy Jakarta have visited the province since the incident. The most recent visit, in mid- February, reaffirmed the findings of earlier teams that there is no evidence to substantiate allegations of additional killings since November 12. The team also confirmed earlier reports that, while tensions in Dili continue, they have eased from November. Economic and social life has returned to normal; however, security is tight, reportedly because of concerns that a group of political activists is en route [to] Dili on a Portuguese ship. As of mid-February, 14 civilians remained hospitalized as a result of wounds received; 77 others had recovered sufficiently to be released. Twenty-four civilians who were in detention in Dili in mid-February on charges related to the demonstration have reportedly been released in recent days. Eight others remain in detention in Dili and will be tried on criminal charges. Some detainees were abused in the days immediately after November 12. We understand that such mistreatment has ceased. Some have criticized the government preliminary report over the matter of provocation. Eyewitnesses differed greatly on this issue. The report says that some witnesses denied there was any provocation; others allege that significant provocations of the military did occur. The report concludes that provocation did occur, but it does make the critical point that, regardless, the response of the military was excessive and unjustifiable. We have been appalled at callous and inappropriate "blame the victim" comments by some in the Indonesian military. But I should say again that, like the incident itself, such comments--in our estimation--do not reflect the policy or approach of the senior leaders of the Indonesian Government. The punishment phase is now beginning. We will closely monitor the Indonesian Government's efforts to follow through on the national commission's judgments of responsibility, and we will continue to watch the human rights situation in East Timor with care. I must add that, in our view, the interest of truth and of amelioration of the situation in East Timor is best served by a policy of more, not less, access.
East Timor: Human Rights
Human rights issues have been, and will remain, an important element of our continuing dialogue and good working relations with the Indonesian Government. As our annual human rights report makes clear, Indonesia's record is mixed; but, prior to last fall, the trend in East Timor in recent years had been positive.[1] [1-Copies of Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991 are available for sale from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, tel. 202-783-3238; GPO stock no. 952-070-06790-0.] Looking back, the first years immediately after Portugal's 1974 decision to decolonize East Timor were traumatic. A bloody civil war erupted as several Timorese factions competed to gain control of the area. When the Marxist FRETILIN (East Timor National Liberation Front) faction gained the ascendancy, Indonesia invaded to keep East Timor out of Marxist hands. Many innocent civilians were undoubtedly caught in the crossfire during the civil war and later, as the Indonesian army attempted to crush the well- armed and well-organized FRETILIN insurgents. As the insurgency continued into the 1980s, so did human rights violations, although at a reduced rate. We have received no reports in recent years, however, of incidents on the scale of what took place on November 12. One of the real tragedies of last fall's events is the setback they gave to recent progress. Fortunately, the Indonesian Government appears set to resume a positive course. As already noted, President Suharto has publicly apologized to the families of innocent victims. He has instructed that civic action or "territorial operations" and other efforts to improve the well- being of the East Timorese people be stepped up. He has ordered the army to punish those at fault and to institute reforms so that such a tragedy can not happen again. The punishments have already begun. Following the arrival in late 1989 of a new military commander for East Timor, General Warouw, we noticed a marked decline in human rights abuses. General Warouw developed a cooperative relationship with East Timor Governor Carrascalao and with Bishop Belo of the Catholic Church. He began to emphasize territorial operations--that is, civic action efforts in the villages--rather than combat operations. At about the same time, East Timor was opened to outside visitors. The improving atmosphere changed last fall, however, when discussions between Indonesia and Portugal under the UN Secretary General's auspices brought tentative agreement for a visit to East Timor by a Portuguese parliamentary delegation. That news raised the hopes of anti-integrationist elements. It also led to increased Indonesian security operations. That combination of factors heightened tensions. When Portugal canceled the visit at the last minute because of a dispute over the credentials of a foreign journalist, frustrations among anti-integrationists in East Timor heightened. Those frustrations found expression on November 12 during the visit of a UN official to Dili, which coincided with a commemoration service for the death 2 weeks earlier of an anti-integrationist who died as a result of a confrontation with pro-integrationist forces. During a march through city streets, anti-Indonesia demonstrators were vocal, and a few were violent. An army major was stabbed. It appears that local military units then took revenge. The Indonesian Government commission has judged that the reaction of some troops "exceeded acceptable norms," and their actions have been widely condemned--by ourselves and by the international community. More recently, we, Japan, Australia, and many other governments have been encouraged by the Indonesian efforts to directly address this situation. The EC, currently under the leadership of Portugal, stated on February 13 that it is encouraged by the preliminary report and the actions taken by Jakarta. These efforts are clearly those of a government that is seeking to be responsive to human rights concerns. Those few nations which suspended aid programs have either lifted the suspensions or are considering doing so. I recognize that some people believe Jakarta's response to these events has been inadequate and that diplomatic suasion is insufficient. They urge that we cut US security or economic assistance to Indonesia. Such a course, in our view, would not produce the desired results which we all seek and could have negative consequences: for US-Indonesia relations; for our limited influence in Indonesia; and, most importantly, for the people of East Timor. It is important to encourage, not discourage, constructive trends in the human rights situation in Indonesia. Some elements within the Indonesian Government initially resisted President Suharto's response to November 12. They wanted to confront international opinion by whitewashing the Dili episode. Those recalcitrant forces would likely be reinforced by a response on our part which denigrated President Suharto's efforts. Also, to cut off programs such as IMET [International Military Education and Training], which help to promote democratic values and respect for human rights, would not foster such goals but rather would markedly reduce our influence and role as an interlocutor. Our welcome access to senior officials in Jakarta is particularly important when it comes to lobbying effectively on important human rights issues such as East Timor. More broadly, our engagement with Indonesia needs to be sustained, not hindered. Indonesia is the world's fourth-largest nation; it is the world's largest Islamic community. I would note that at a time of resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism--which seeks to exclude Western influence from the Middle East--the Indonesian Government, in dramatic contrast, is firmly committed to religious tolerance for the country's Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian minorities. An Indonesian Government that we have been able to work with productively on a broad range of issues is now assuming chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement, and Indonesia is a leading member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indonesia is an important regional power. Jakarta's activism and cooperation were essential in our efforts to resolve the conflict in Cambodia, and its support for UN resolutions and sanctions against Iraq during Desert Storm were significant--especially in view of Iraq's efforts to gain support in Indonesia from Muslim fundamentalists. Our economic relations with Indonesia are important and growing; Indonesia's progress in deregulating its economy and sustaining growth have facilitated expanded two-way trade (now $6 billion) and US investment ($2.5 billion). Our trade with Indonesia is now greater than that with all of Eastern Europe. Such political and economic interests notwithstanding, if Indonesia were a human rights pariah which had ordered a massacre and disregarded world opinion, I could better understand an argument for demonstrating our opprobrium by cutting off security and economic assistance. But the Government of Indonesia has accepted that the November incident was a tragedy, has taken responsibility for the actions of its troops, has already announced punishments for some senior military officers, is preparing to bring other wrongdoers to trial, and is working to ensure that such violent use of force by its troops does not recur. It seems evident that continuing cooperative engagement, not retribution, best serves the human rights goals we all seek. One way we can help in this process is through our IMET program, the only security assistance we plan to provide Indonesia in FY 1992. Among IMET's goals are to increase military professionalism and to expose students to universal standards of human rights. I should note that a recent GAO [US Government Accounting Office] investigation of the events of last November found that no IMET trainees were involved in the incident, while several have been prominent in the ongoing corrective efforts. The UN Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur who was in Dili at the time of the November 12 tragedy later highlighted to us the importance of international training for increasing human rights sensitivity among the Indonesian military. Yet some would cut our IMET program. Our expressions of grave concern were appropriate in November and were not ignored. What is needed now is encouragement for further reform.
East Timor: History and Status
The underlying issue in the November 12 incident is the status of East Timor, a Christian enclave of 750,000. As this hearing is intended to deal with all aspects of East Timor, including the US response to Indonesia's invasion in 1975 and incorporation of the province in 1976, let me mention a few relevant aspects of the historical record. After the April 1974 leftist coup in Portugal, Lisbon decided to rapidly decolonize its overseas empire. This resulted in widespread chaos, civil conflict, and foreign intervention in Portugal's former colonies. Angola and Mozambique endured 17 years of Marxist rule and brutal civil war that has only ended within the past year. East Timor could have suffered a similar fate. When the new Portuguese Government in 1974 decided to decolonize, East Timor was completely unprepared for self-governance. Four centuries of colonialism had left East Timor with one high school, fewer than 10 college graduates, and a literacy rate under 10%. Portugal and Indonesia held discussions about the colony's future, but a civil war erupted there before any agreement was reached. The combatants were: FRETILIN, which sought immediate creation of an independent Marxist state; another group that advocated immediate integration into Indonesia; and a third, which preferred a gradual decolonization process. Portugal's leftist government abruptly withdrew in August 1975, handing over to FRETILIN weapons which were then used to gain the upper hand. In the face of a FRETILIN military victory and the declaration of an independent Marxist state, Indonesia invaded in December of 1975--and indicated it did so at the request of the East Timorese factions opposed to FRETILIN. When the world turned its attention to East Timor in the mid-1970s, self- determination was not a realistic option. The choice was Marxist rule by FRETILIN or action by Indonesia. Neither had a mandate from the ballot box. It is important to recall that, since President Suharto rose to power in the mid-1960s, Indonesia has not had an expansionist agenda; East Timor is the only addition to what was once Dutch colonial territory. Indonesia considers that its takeover of East Timor was forced on it by the threat of a Marxist insurgency. The political context here is significant: The annexation of East Timor occurred amidst active communist insurgencies in much of Southeast Asia as the United States departed from Vietnam and with memories of an attempted 1965 communist takeover in Indonesia still fresh. In the minds of Indonesian leaders--whose bedrock principle is the unity of their archipelagic country--once East Timor had been incorporated, its standing became a symbol of the integrity of the nation. Those leaders look at the hundreds of distinct ethnic groups and languages within Indonesia and at the presence of several major religions. They recall regional rebellions from the 1950s, and they fear that loosening even one thread of the national fabric could stimulate other successionist threats. Even before independence, Indonesian leaders had begun weaving that unifying fabric. They chose Malay, a minor trading language, rather than majority Javanese to be the national language. They promoted religious freedom for Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist populations scattered throughout the archipelago, despite a Muslim majority. To this day, Indonesian leaders strongly resist any advocacy of an Islamic state. A number of radical Muslims have been prosecuted over the years for promoting such a course. Indonesia's leaders have stressed unity because of their nation's immense diversity. They continue to insist on it today. In 1976, US policy-makers decided to accept Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor as an accomplished fact. They judged that nothing the United States or the world was prepared to do could change that fact. Thus, to oppose Indonesia's incorporation would have had little impact on the situation. With such reality in mind, previous Administrations fashioned a policy which has been followed consistently on a bipartisan basis: We accept Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor without maintaining that a valid act of self-determination has taken place. Clearly, a democratic process of self-determination would have been more consistent with our values, but the realities of 1975 did not include that alternative. Accepting the absorption of East Timor into Indonesia was the only realistic option. Since then, we have maintained a constructive dialogue with the Indonesian Government designed to promote the well-being of the people of East Timor. Included in this has been an ongoing human rights dialogue. That dialogue is generally private and is conducted at high levels; it is those characteristics that have made it effective. Politically, we support discussions between Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, as were mandated by the UN General Assembly in 1982. We believe such a dialogue continues to be the most promising avenue for resolving the East Timor issue. We are pleased that such a dialogue between Indonesia and Portugal at the UN Human Rights Commission meetings, which just concluded in Geneva, led to a constructive and balanced chairman's statement concerning human rights in East Timor. Economically, our constructive relationship with Indonesia has allowed us to extend assistance to all Indonesians, which especially benefits the East Timorese. On a per capita basis, we have provided more than twice as many USAID [US Agency for International Development] project dollars to East Timor since 1988 as to the rest of Indonesia. Additionally, Indonesia has, on a per capita basis, funneled over six times as much of its own economic development budget into East Timor as to any other province. In 1991, East Timor received about $170 million in Indonesian Government grants. The $170 million, one might note, is, in nominal terms, almost exactly 100 times the average yearly development expenditure for East Timor in the last days of colonial rule, all of which was in the form of repayable loans. The results of such recent investment are striking: -- In 1974, after 4 centuries of colonial rule, East Timor had 47 elementary schools, 2 middle schools, 1 high school, and no colleges. Now it has 574 elementary schools, 99 middle schools, 14 high schools, and 3 colleges. -- In 1974, East Timor had 2 hospitals and 14 health clinics. Now it has 10 hospitals and 197 village health centers. -- In 1974, East Timor had 100 churches. Today it has 518. -- In 1974, East Timor had 20 kilometers of surfaced roads, all within Dili. Now it has 428 kilometers throughout the province. -- In 1974, East Timor was plagued with endemic poverty. Today, poverty remains a problem, as it does elsewhere in that part of Indonesia, but starvation is extremely rare. The missing economic element is sufficient employment to fulfill rising expectations of newly educated youth. But new business investors insist on a peaceful environment, and that remains problematic until the East Timor issue is fully resolved. Conclusion In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate our major policies for dealing with the situation in East Timor: -- We intend to work cooperatively with the Indonesian Government to promote development and respect for human rights in the province; and -- We support the 1982 UN decision to promote an Indonesian-Portuguese dialogue under the auspices of the UN Secretary General to resolve the East Timor issue. (###)