US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 11, March 16, 1992
Title: NACC Intervention
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Intervention at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) ministerial meeting, Brussels
Date: Mar, 10 19923/10/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, Eurasia, E/C Europe
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: CSCE, NATO
[TEXT]
Only 6 months ago, when the establishment of this Council was first
proposed, none of us suspected we would be sitting today in a group of 35
nations, determined to heal the divisions of yesterday and build a new
future. Today we welcome the new states of the former Soviet Union into
the NACC. Their presence expands our horizons. But our objectives remain
the same: to build confidence and concrete cooperation among us that will
help ensure the full realization of a Euro-Atlantic community of democratic
values and institutions.
For generations, indeed for centuries, some of the 16 NATO allies waged a
perpetual competition that slid into conflict, wars, and devastation. NATO
ended that. Now we need to turn to that model of cooperation to quiet both
ancient and new conflicts among neighbors to the east.
The needs of the emerging democracies are numerous and varied. There is
scope for complementary actions by a variety of organizations and all our
governments. Through the NACC, NATO members will share their unique and
successful expertise in security cooperation in ways that will help our
liaison partners address problems critical to the transformation of their
societies and fulfillment of their CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] commitments.
Indeed, the NACC should have a mutually reinforcing relationship with CSCE.
Rather than engage in theological debates about predestined institutional
roles, we should take a pragmatic approach to solving problems at hand. For
example, the NACC's security dialogue, together with cooperation on arms
control verification and implementation, will enhance the effectiveness of
the post-Helsinki CSCE security forum. The NACC could also support CSCE
efforts to avoid and manage conflicts.
The modest work plan we approve today is only a start. We need to retain
the dynamism to respond to evolving needs. In the months ahead, we should
invigorate our work. We encourage the governments of our new partners as
well as our NATO allies to develop additional projects.
As we move forward, NATO's response to individual liaison partners should
be commensurate with the pace and extent of democratization, economic
reform, demilitarization, and the fulfillment of commitments made
regarding nuclear weapons and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their technologies. Progress toward the implementation of
democratic ideals should be a key yardstick by which we measure our
response.
Recent events underscore the need for NATO and the NACC members to
consider how these institutions can more effectively address new
challenges. Let me review a few of these.
First, regular consultations can build confidence and security throughout
Europe. Our experience here at NATO over many years has proven that. More
recently, the work of our High-Level Working Group on CFE [Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe] has produced specific, Euro-Atlantic-wide
agreements on the ratification of the treaty that will be the security
foundation of a new Europe. Now we must go the rest of the way--from
political commitment to practical reality--so that the CFE Treaty is in
force by the Helsinki summit in July.
In the nuclear area, we have made much progress since President Bush's
initiative last September. Now it is critical that all the new members of
this Council move quickly to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-
nuclear states and adhere unequivocally to its provisions.
Second, we must address the urgent problems of defense conversion. On my
recent visit to Chelyabinsk [Russia], I saw how immense and immediate a
task defense conversion is, not just in physical but in human terms. NATO
can provide unique expertise in the multifaceted problem of defense
conversion. We ought to reconsider whether the NACC can better assist in
this task by creating a Defense Conversion Working Group to focus the
specific programs that may emerge following the seminar now being
planned.
I want to note, in this regard, the forthcoming establishment of the
International Science and Technology Center. The center will give weapons
scientists and engineers opportunities to redirect their talents to non-
military endeavors and minimize any incentives to engage in activities that
could result in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other
advanced military technologies. Although not an initiative of this body, the
center is an example of the benefits of united action in addressing difficult
issues.
Third, we must explore all means to halt the outbreak of ethnic and regional
violence. Even before the first spring grasses have had an opportunity to
take root on fresh graves in Croatia, we hear that blood feuds are rising in
Bosnia. But we have an opportunity to break the cycle if we use our
diplomatic and other resources in unison. NATO has fully supported the
efforts of the CSCE rapporteur mission and of the United Nations to deploy
peace-keeping troops. The alliance has urged all parties to work within the
framework of the EC [European Community]-sponsored Carrington
Commission to find a political resolution to the conflict. Alliance members
will continue to consult closely in NATO on the Yugoslav crises.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, the United States has encouraged the continuing
Russian and Kazakh effort, supported by the CSCE, to mediate this dispute.
With continued violence, there will be no victors--not in Armenia,
Azerbaijan, nor anywhere else. There is no glory in leaving widows and
orphans to build the democratic, free market societies that should be the
paramount priority. Now the parties need to redouble their efforts to
implement the provisions of the February 20 Russian-Armenian-Azerbaijan
communique and the February 28 decisions of the CSCE Committee of Senior
Officials. Additional steps by all of us and the international community may
be needed to respond to the violence and to bring it to an end.
These two conflicts underscore the need for NATO and NACC members to
consider how these bodies can help prevent and reduce the risks of future
conflicts in Europe. We need to pursue the very constructive ideas offered
by our Dutch colleagues with regard to the division of labor among
institutions on peace-keeping. We agree that NATO's infrastructure,
resources, and operational experience are well suited to support peace-
keeping efforts that may be sanctioned by CSCE or the United Nations in the
future. Moreover, the practical forms of cooperation that NATO is
developing with our NACC partners, including military-to-military
exchanges and the meeting of defense ministers on April 1, could facilitate
a highly desirable broader participation in such operations.
NATO, through the NACC, can concretely provide expertise and operational
experience in defense and security affairs that will help our liaison
partners make the transition to durable democratic systems. Working
together with our new partners, we can implement a successful NACC
program that will contribute to security and stability throughout the Euro-
Atlantic community. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 11, March 16, 1992
Title: Support for International Science and Technology
Center
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks at the Centre Borschette, Brussels, Belgium
Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Science/Technology
[TEXT]
Just 3 weeks ago, I had the unprecedented opportunity to visit Chelyabinsk-
70--one of the premier nuclear weapons laboratories of the former Soviet
Union. It is a place where some of the finest minds of an entire generation
devoted their creative energies to designing the weapons that gave the Cold
War its most terrifying dimension.
There I found that the upheaval that had profoundly transformed the former
Soviet society outside the heavily secured gates of this closed and isolated
Urals mountain community was also turning upside down the lives of the
specialists within. I met with a group of senior staff and scientists and
listened to what the end of the Cold War--and the resulting sharp decline in
demand for their old talents--meant to them.
What I heard was deep uncertainty on the part of the scientists about what
the future held in store and anxiety about the impact the anticipated
hardships might have on their families. I saw discouragement on their faces
about what top-notch scientists may fear most--the absence of
intellectually challenging work. And I heard concern that economic and
professional conditions could deteriorate to the point where even highly
patriotic and responsible specialists might be tempted to market their
skills to unscrupulous regimes.
But I also heard some very encouraging things from the scientists of
Chelyabinsk. I heard their readiness--indeed, their eagerness--to adapt
their old skills in weapons development to non-military purposes. I heard
their strong desire after decades of physical and intellectual isolation to
enter the mainstream of international scientific life and to tackle urgent
technical problems common to society as a whole--not just to a narrow
segment of the military-industrial complex.
What I found at Chelyabinsk-70, in other words, was a realistic appreciation
of the difficult challenges ahead, along with a strong desire to meet those
challenges head on. What was missing was material support and the
institutional framework to channel that support where it is needed.
That is why our meeting today is crucial. By establishing a well-funded
International Science and Technology Center, we can provide weapons
scientists and engineers of the former Soviet Union [with] technically
interesting and professionally rewarding opportunities to put their talents
to productive use in non-military areas. In so doing, we can minimize any
incentives that may exist for those highly skilled personnel to engage in
activities that could assist the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons, missile delivery systems, or other advanced military
technologies.
Combating proliferation--the most pressing security challenge of the 1990s
and beyond--should thus be a central objective of projects funded by the
center. Yet by sering this vital goal, the center's projects can promote
wider goals as well. They can contribute to ongoing efforts to reduce and
eliminate weapons of mass destruction. They can contribute to efforts by
the states of the former Soviet Union to make the difficult conversion from
heavily militarized command economies to market-based systems
responsive to civilian needs, and they can help achieve solutions to critical
national and international problems, such as those involving the
environment, health, and energy.
Our task is urgent. We must translate the idea of an International Science
and Technology Center into a working reality as expeditiously as possible.
For this reason, we are pleased that representatives from the European
Community, Japan, and the United States--three parties we expect will be
major financial contributors to the center--have joined with Russia in
preparing an international agreement that would formally establish the
center. We should make every effort to ensure signature and entry into
force of this agreement before the end of March. We should then proceed
with concrete steps necessary to get the center up and running--with
projects approved and funded--by early summer. The joint statement we
have issued today outlines a variety of actions over the next months to get
the center operational by the summer.
Success of the center will require broad international support by
governments, by the private sector, and by the international non-
governmental scientific community as well. We welcome the attendance
here today of states of the former Soviet Union and look forward to
exchanging views with you on how best to structure and operate the center.
We also welcome participation today by prospective donor parties, including
the senior-level representatives of the major donors who will take their
place as initial members of the center's governing board. We hope to
increase the number of states who will make substantial contributions to
the center and will join us on the governing board. In this connection, I
would like to confirm today that the United States is now actively taking
the steps necessary to provide the $25 million we earlier pledged to help
get the center started and fund its projects.
The problem we are here to address is sometimes referred to as "brain
drain"--the leakage of specialized talent, especially to locations where that
talent could be put to undesirable ends. The International Science and
Technology Center we are about to launch can help plug this brain drain.
But it can do more. It can help put some of the best brains available
anywhere today to work solving mankind's most vexing problems. It can play
a role in reallocating the productive resources of the former Soviet Union to
better serve the welfare of the people, and the cooperative scientific
endeavors fostered by the center will not only expand the frontiers of
science--they will strengthen the bonds of friendship among our countries.
This is what we call the "brain gain" solution. It is a solution worth
investing in.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992
Title: Support for International Science and Technology
Center: Joint Statement
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Department Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), Japan, United States
Subject: Science/Technology, EC
[TEXT]
Messrs. Joao de Deus Pinheiro, President of the Council of the European
Communities, Frans Andriessen, Vice President of the European Commission,
Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, of the United States, Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev of the Russian Federation, and Koichiro Matsuura,
Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, met in Brussels at a
conference of interested states on 11 March 1992 to promote the
establishment and early operation, in the Russian Federation, of an
International Science and Technology Centre.
The four parties--the European Community, the United States of America,
the Russian Federation and Japan--agreed that a primary focus of the Centre
would be to provide weapons scientists and engineers of the former Soviet
Union, particularly those who possess the skills and knowledge related to
weapons of mass destruction, with opportunities to redirect their talents to
peaceful activities. It would, thereby, minimise any incentive to engage in
activities that could result in the proliferation of nuclear, biological or
chemical weapons, or missile delivery systems. The four parties also
agreed that, through its projects, the Centre would contribute to ongoing
efforts to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, and to the
wider goals of reinforcing the transition to market-based economies
responsive to civil needs and of supporting basic and applied research and
technology development, for example, in the field of environmental
protection, energy production and nuclear safety.
The four parties agreed that the Centre would be a clearinghouse for
developing, selecting, financing and monitoring science and technology
projects that would be carried out primarily at institutions and facilities
located in the Russian Federation and, if interested, in other States of the
CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and Georgia.
The four parties confirmed their intention to provide significant material
support for the Centre and its activities. Secretary Baker confirmed that
the US administration is now actively taking the steps necessary to provide
$25 million to support the Centre and fund its projects. President of the
Council of European Communities, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, and Vice-President
of the European Commission, Frans Andriessen, confirmed that the European
Community envisages an equivalent contribution to the Centre. Deputy
Foreign Minister, Koichiro Matsuura, announced that Japan is prepared to
make substantial contributions to the Centre, taking into account such
factors as the future steps to be taken with regard to this Centre. Foreign
Minister Kozyrev confirmed the readiness of the Russian Federation to
provide the Centre, at the expense of the Russian side, with the necessary
premises and services.
The parties stressed the importance of wide international support for the
Centre. In this connection they noted that Canada has already expressed an
interest in participating in the Centre's activities and is currently
examining the possibility of doing so. The parties agreed to encourage other
governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations to
participate in the Centre's activities and to finance them.
The four parties expressed satisfaction with the preparation this week of
an international agreement, under which the European Community, Japan,
Russia, and the United States, as original parties and major contributors,
would formally establish the Centre, specify its basic legal framework,
outline certain key elements of its structure and operation, and become
initial members of its governing board. The four stated their intention to
sign an agreement by the end of March and to bring it into force without
delay. They noted that accession by other governments is foreseen and they
expressed their hope that other interested governments, inter-governmental
and non-governmental organisations would soon demonstrate their strong
support for the Centre and its projects.
The four parties further noted that the agreement in preparation envisages
the creation of a governing board and of executive and advisory structures,
as necessary, for the implementation of the Centre's activities. They hope
that the governing board will meet soon after entry into force to develop
and adopt a statute for implementing the agreement.
The four parties emphasised the urgency of making the Centre operational at
the earliest possible date. Accordingly, they agreed that a joint team would
be sent to Russia by the end of March to survey possible sites for the Centre
nominated by the Russian Federation, and to consider infrastructure
requirements and other steps necessary to get the Centre underway. They
further agreed that the governing board would meet soon thereafter in order
to take decisions on management and to appoint the Centre's senior staff.
They expressed their determination to see the Centre operational by early
summer, and their expectation that projects would begin to be financed by
the Centre in that timeframe. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992
Title: Extending Assistance to Newly Emerging
Democracies
Eagleburger
Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Statement before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
We have witnessed, over the last few years, breathtaking changes in Central
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For over 4 centuries,
Russia had been an imperial, authoritarian state, dominating its neighbors
and threatening stability in both Europe and Asia. But, now, the collapse of
the Soviet empire and the discrediting of communism have provided new
hope for freedom and prosperity for over 400 million people in the region.
As a consequence, we enjoy the prospect of a democratic Russia which has
dismantled its empire and is turning its energies inward toward reform
rather than outward toward expansion. This is a prospect which bears
directly on the national security of the United States, and it is, therefore,
something which is in our national interest to support.
But it is also a prospect which is as yet fragile, one which could easily give
way to a more historically familiar state of affairs. There is no guarantee
that the new states of Central and Eastern Europe or those of the former
Soviet Union will evolve into friendly, prosperous democracies. They face
formidable obstacles along the path of reform, as communism has driven
these countries and their economies to the brink of ruin. In the final
analysis, success will depend on the will and determination of the
governments and peoples of the region. But Western assistance can make a
difference, and we have an obligation before history and to future
generations to do our part in helping to make their democratic experiment a
success. What is at stake for us is whether the recent transformation of
dangerous adversaries into friends and partners is a permanent or a passing
phenomenon.
Clearly, the United States does not possess limitless resources, especially
in a time of serious economic difficulty at home. But the American people,
who spent trillions of dollars to wage and to win the Cold War, hopefully are
willing to allocate comparatively modest sums today in order to ensure that
we do not face, once again, an old threat under a new guise. If we do the
right thing today, we will have done what we could to spare our children
from the specter of nuclear war and from the colossal expenditures on
national defense which our generation has had to live with since World War
II.
Our economic well-being is also at stake. The peoples of Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union present an enormous new market
for Western trade and investment. We must actively seek to involve the
American private sector in the rebuilding of this region. Not only will such
involvement provide new economic opportunities for America, but it will
help enhance the presence and influence of the United States in these newly
emerging democracies. We certainly do not want to see the old COMECON
[Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] bloc closed to US trade and
investment by activities and agreements struck with other trading partners.
Our private sector can provide positive examples of the free market values
which are the foundation of economic prosperity both here and abroad. Our
assistance program itself, by utilizing US goods and services rather than
writing checks to foreign governments, creates jobs at home as well as
overseas.
US Programs in Central and Eastern Europe
As we begin to implement our assistance program in the new independent
states, we can benefit from our experience to date in Central and Eastern
Europe. When we started our assistance program with the SEED [Support for
Eastern European Democracies] Act of 1989, only Poland and Hungary were
involved in major reform efforts. Now we have programs in 10 countries in
Central and Eastern Europe. During the past 2 1/2 years, we have worked
with the Congress to develop a creative assistance program, combining
traditional activities with innovative approaches, such as the Enterprise
Funds now operating in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. We
and the East Europeans have learned what works quickly and what does not,
and we remain committed to adapting our programs as needed to promote
our goals.
The flexibility we have built into our programs has been critical in allowing
us to shift resources as necessary to respond to sudden changes in
individual recipient countries--changes which are inevitable given the
unprecedented reforms being implemented and the resulting dislocations
that are occurring. If we had, for example, allocated funds to each country
for each fiscal year, we would not have been able to shift resources to
respond to the dramatic developments last year in Bulgaria, Albania, and the
Baltic states.
In my view, we have also been correct in focusing the majority of our
assistance directly on the private sector. The overthrow of communism was
a rejection of state interference in daily life. We want to strengthen
nascent private institutions in these countries rather than perpetuate
bureaucracies. Moreover, we believe that the primary reason why the United
States has been able to disburse our assistance commitments at over twice
the rate of the European Community has been because we work directly with
the private and non-governmental sector rather than through host
government institutions.
We have also sought to combine our assistance tools with new initiatives
designed to enhance US trade opportunities and promote US investments. In
the long run, the impact of US private sector capital, goods, and services
will be much greater on the development of free markets abroad than any
government assistance that we can offer.
The Administration's FY 1993 Program for Central and Eastern
Europe
As we proceed with humanitarian and technical assistance for the
independent states of the former Soviet Union, it is essential that we not
divert resources from our programs designed for Central and Eastern Europe.
The success or failure of the political and economic transition underway
from the Baltics to the Black Sea will have a decisive effect on the
prospects for a successful transformation in Russia and the other
independent states.
We are, therefore, keeping funding for our East European program strictly
separate from our CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] program. We
are also asking for a $50-million increase in funding for Central and Eastern
Europe in FY 1993--$450 million as opposed to the $400 million we asked
for in FY 1992. The increase in our request reflects the fact that we are
now providing assistance to more countries. At the time we submitted the
President's budget for FY 1992, we had assistance programs for six
countries. Since then, we have added Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Albania
to the list, and the latecomers have some of the most urgent and long-term
needs in the region.
As the number of recipients has changed, so have the needs we are trying to
fill. While we continue to place emphasis on the transitional nature of our
East European assistance program and look to "graduate" countries as
quickly as possible, we recognize that we will be providing assistance to
some parts of the region for much longer than we had originally anticipated.
Albania, for example, is similar to a traditional developing country, where
the United States and other donors will probably be involved in institution-
building for many years.
In program terms, we want to build on our successes. Here is what we are
planning for FY 1993:
-- Poland will continue to be the largest single recipient of assistance in
the region, consistent with its size and importance.
-- As in the past, we will divide our program budget into democratic
initiatives (approximately 7.5% of the total), quality of life activities
(17.5%), and economic restructuring projects (75%).
-- The Enterprise Funds will receive the largest single portion of the 1993
budget, as they have been quite successful in responding quickly to the
needs of the new private sector. We believe that the funds will be able to
attract other donor and private sector support, as the Polish and Hungarian
funds are already demonstrating.
-- Another key program is the American Business Initiative, which is
designed to promote US trade and investment in Eastern Europe. This helps
US business while also providing new job opportunities for East Europeans.
-- The promotion of private agriculture and agribusiness also will remain a
top priority.
-- We will continue encouraging all the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe to move ahead with privatization. Our programs in this area will
represent a significant share of our assistance effort in FY 1993.
The Administration's FY 1993 Program for the New Independent States
We will build on our experience in Central and Eastern Europe in developing
activities for the former Soviet Union. But we must not exaggerate the
parallels. We are looking at 12 entirely new countries, which are likely to
proceed with reforms at different speeds and in different ways.
The challenges we face in the former Soviet Union are more extensive than
those we faced in Central and Eastern Europe. The region is much larger, the
number of people greater, and the problems more profound. The immediate
humanitarian needs are widespread, and the risks of political instability in
certain areas are high. Private enterprise and societal connections with the
West are much less developed compared to most of Eastern Europe 3 years
ago. New government structures are just being established, with laws being
written. And, of course, there is the enormous defense industry, including
its nuclear component, which is a subject of special attention under our
assistance
program.
In short, the challenges we face are unprecedented. Simply throwing money
at the situation--especially money that in these times we can ill afford to
waste--will not solve these problems. Indeed, money indiscriminately
pumped into the region could hinder reform and promote the very
dependencies that have, for too long, existed in these countries. We must
remain prudent, using the combined resources of various US Government
agencies and an engaged private sector to overcome immediate humanitarian
crises and help prevent political instability. We must also help create
market mechanisms needed to promote self-sustaining economic reforms.
Critical to this effort will be encouraging the participation of US and
Western companies in trade and investment.
To achieve these simultaneous goals, the President has asked for $620
million in FY 1992 and FY 1993 in new appropriations for the former Soviet
Union. These funds would be used to deliver emergency humanitarian relief
and provide technical assistance to support democratic reform and promote
economic restructuring:
-- Of this, $500 million would go toward special humanitarian and
technical assistance to meet emerging needs as they arise. The technical
assistance is intended to provide the necessary bridge between short-term
humanitarian aid to cope with immediate shortages and medium-term
development to promote the successful transition to a democratic society
and a market economy.
-- $100 million in FY 1993 Economic Support Funds would go toward
technical assistance activities to promote democratic reforms and
economic restructuring.
-- $10 million in FY 1993 Development Assistance funds would be targeted
at development activities in the poorest states, and $10 million in FY 1993
PL 480 [Food for Peace] funds will be used to send US farmers and
agribusiness experts to provide training and advice to counterparts in the
new independent states.
These funds will be combined with $860 million in resources available
under existing legislation, including:
-- About $210 million in food assistance ($165 million in food aid and $45
million in surplus Department of Defense stocks);
-- $100 million in Department of Defense money for transportation of
humanitarian relief;
-- $400 million in Defense funds for assistance in eliminating nuclear arms
and chemical weapons;
-- $30 million in funds to provide urgently needed medical supplies; and
-- $120 million in USAID [US Agency for International Development] and US
Commodity Credit Corporation funds for technical assistance activities.
In addition, the Peace Corps hopes to support up to 500 volunteers in the
new independent states by the end of FY 1993, and we will rely on the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Eximbank [Export Import
Bank] to encourage US investment in and exports to the region.
For our technical assistance activities, we are planning programs in the
following areas:
-- Programs to privatize and restructure the militarized economies of the
new independent states through conversion of defense industries and
resources to consumer-oriented production;
-- Activities to promote a market economy, both on the macro- and the
microeconomic side;
-- Improvements in food distribution, transportation, and humanitarian
service systems;
-- Promotion of investment in and increased efficiency of the energy
sector;
-- Promotion of bilateral trade and investment to encourage the US private
sector to become involved in the new independent states; and
-- Initiatives to encourage the development of a democratic society,
including rule of law, educational reform, public administration, and media
programs.
As in Eastern Europe, we do not plan to set specific levels for assistance to
individual states, as we will need to shift resources to address changing
needs and to encourage the varying levels of reform efforts. We estimate,
however, that roughly half of the US assistance will be directed to Russia,
given its size and importance. Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan are also important priorities and will be treated accordingly.
In general, we want to direct assistance at whatever level--national or
local--is most appropriate and effective, working with both governmental
and non-governmental entities. We will be proposing new mechanisms,
including the Eurasia Foundation, which will be a private organization
designed to provide fast-disbursing grants for technical assistance,
management training, and democratic institution building.
While much needs to be done, the United States has been a leader in
responding to the urgent needs. We have delivered over 21 million metric
tons of grain and other foodstuffs and over $35 million in pharmaceuticals
and medical supplies. We have disbursed almost 70% of our commitments to
date (including agricultural credits), a much higher rate than other donors.
We have already opened, or are in the process of opening, embassies in 11 of
the new states. We are working to establish an USAID presence on the
ground. And, as you may know, last week the Secretary named Rich
Armitage, who successfully organized Operation Provide Hope, to manage
the operations of our entire assistance program to the new independent
states.
Considering the importance of the challenge we face, it is also significant
to note that US assistance is only part of a global response, with over 50
nations and multilateral institutions committed to providing over $27
billion to the new independent states. The Washington Coordinating
Conference held in January brought together 54 delegations to develop
specific plans of action in the areas of food, medicine, shelter, energy, and
technical assistance. We have also met bilaterally and multilaterally with
representatives of the new independent states to discuss and implement
these initiatives. We are taking a lead role in supporting memberships for
the new states in the international financial institutions as soon as
practicable in order to promote the macroeconomic stabilization and
structural changes that are needed.
Conclusion
In sum, let us remember that the Western community worked together under
US leadership to protect democracy and free enterprise during the dark
years of the Cold War. We provided inspiration and hope for the peoples
living under the weight of totalitarianism. It is now up to all of us to see
that the promise of a more secure, prosperous world is realized. Under US
leadership, the Western democracies have again forged a partnership, this
time with our former adversaries, in order to build a more stable future for
our children. We look forward to working with the Congress in extending the
assistance that is so much in our national interest. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992
Title: The Future of Democracy and Economic Transition
in Bulgaria
Eagleburger
Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Remarks before the Bulgarian-US Trade and Economic
Council's Conference on the Future of Democracy and Economic
Transition in Bulgaria, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 4 19923/4/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Bulgaria
Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Today, if all of us do our jobs well, we are going to bring to the attention of
this conference one of the great but largely unsung success stories in post-
communist Europe and, in so doing, etch the promise of a free and
democratic Bulgaria into the consciousness of the American business and
political communities.
Until recently, Bulgaria has conjured in the American mind the image of a
proud people in a land of great natural plentitude but one which historically
has known misrule at home and vulnerability at its borders. We do, of
course, count Bulgarian sons and daughters as citizens in this land of
immigrants, and we have sent idealists to Bulgaria as elsewhere--the
journalist Januarius MacGahan, who championed Bulgarian independence, and
the Americans who founded schools in Samokov and Lovech [in the] last
century. But the tragic history of the Balkans and the insane ideological
struggles of this century have also placed our two countries--but never our
two peoples--at loggerheads for the better part of the past 75 years.
Yet, in a mere 2 years, amazing changes have produced a Bulgaria which
bears little resemblance to the country in our mind's eye. Americans are
unfamiliar with but not indifferent to this new Bulgaria. They have only to
learn about the great opportunity
for democracy which now exists there in order to do whatever they can to
help. That is why this conference is so important: It will, I hope, awaken
the American business community to the economic potential of a
modernizing Bulgaria and rekindle the spirit of idealism which informed
American efforts in Bulgaria at an earlier moment in our history.
When Americans think of the revolutionary changes in Europe over the past
several years, they tend to remember the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
heroic struggles of Lech Walesa in Poland and Vaclav Havel in
Czechoslovakia. What until now they perhaps have not sufficiently
appreciated is the fact that the Bulgarian revolution has traveled the
furthest distance of any throughout the region; it has struggled against the
greatest odds; and, against all odds, it has remained peaceful and
democratic.
It was only a little more than 2 years ago that Todor Zhivkov headed one of
the most repressive and unreconstructed Stalinist regimes in the entire
world. It was only 3 years ago that more than 300,000 ethnic Turks fled
Zhivkov's forced assimilation campaign within the country. As recently as
November 1989, the Communist Party's monopoly of political and economic
power was so complete that, unlike elsewhere in the region, there appeared
to be no democratic forces ready to fill the vacuum when the revolution
suddenly came. Given these circumstances, and given the country's and its
neighbors history of violence and intrigue, there was every reason to believe
that post-communist Bulgaria would be anything but peaceful and
democratic.
What observers failed to anticipate, however, was the political maturity of
the Bulgarian people and the emergence of truly enlightened political
leadership--two factors without which democracy cannot succeed. The
result has been generally responsible behavior by all parties despite their
rivalries and deep-seated grievances, and thus a remarkably peaceful
transition to democracy. Perhaps most important of all, Bulgaria has
deliberately eschewed the example of Yugoslavia by promoting inter-ethnic
reconciliation. Not only does the Turkish minority enjoy full voting rights
but their constituency has become the third party in parliament and is
providing support to the government headed by Prime Minister Dimitrov.
It is no exaggeration to say that Bulgaria under democracy has not only
overcome the legacy of communism, it is in the process of overcoming the
legacy of history--and this may have positive and far-reaching
consequences both within Bulgaria and beyond its borders. All of us are
familiar with history's noxious hold over the people of the Balkans, the
seemingly endless and self-sustaining cycle of violence and revenge. By
reaching out to their country's ethnic minority, President Zhelev and Prime
Minister Dimitrov are transcending that history and establishing the
foundations of a democracy which can last and which merits full
membership in the wider community of Western democratic nations.
Similarly, by reaching out to Bulgaria's neighbors and historic enemies--
witness the improvement in relations with both Greece and Turkey. The
democratic government has again broken with history and embarked on the
only path to peace and prosperity for the Bulgarian people, and for all the
people of the Balkans.
As a result, and against all historical precedent, Bulgaria today has become
a virtual "island of stability" in the Balkans. It is, for example, a bulwark
against the spread of Yugoslavia's tragic civil war throughout the region. In
fact, the contrast between the two countries could not be greater--that is,
between a Yugoslavia mired in the hatreds of the past and sliding further
into the past, and a Bulgaria which, like the nations of Western Europe
following World War II, is transcending those hatreds and is thus poised to
move forward into a totally different and a far better kind
of future.
Yet, we know that that future is not necessarily assured. We know that the
destructive hatreds of the past lie not far from the surface and that the
enemies of democracy within Bulgaria may try to exploit those emotions to
thwart economic change which threatens their interests. Until now,
fortunately, a majority of the Bulgarian people have not heeded their siren
song, but it is a fact that the whole country is going to be tested by
economic hardship in the years to come. In those circumstances, the
temptation will be great to listen to those who urge a return to the policies
and even to the hate-mongering of a bygone era. Let it be understood,
however, that to live in the past is to be condemned to relive the past.
However painful market reforms may be, however frustrating parliamentary
politics may be, however long the path to prosperity may be, there is simply
no alternative to capitalism, to democracy, and to respect for human rights
for any nation which truly wants to join the ranks of the Western
democracies.
In the case of Bulgaria, there is every reason to be optimistic. Already,
Bulgaria has joined Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in terms of
political progress and commitment to economic reform, and it deserves the
fullest support from the international financial institutions and integration
into the Western family of nations. The United States, for example, believes
Bulgaria's progress is sufficient now to merit inclusion with the three other
countries in our assistance programs and initiatives.
At the same time, however, we would like to see Bulgaria accelerate the
pace of economic reforms. Much still needs to be done to complete the
transition to an authentic free market economy. We realize that this
transition will mean a very difficult period of adjustment as unprofitable
enterprises fold, layoffs increase, and the cost of living for all Bulgarians
rises. But only by fully implementing land reform, banking reform, and the
privatization of enterprises can Bulgaria compete on the world market and
create genuine prosperity for its people. Clinging to remnants of the old
system, on the other hand--however comforting they may seem--is a recipe
for permanent economic decline.
Fundamentally, what is required is that the Bulgarian people believe in
themselves and fully embrace a system --the free enterprise system--
which will give maximum scope to their creative energies and help them
realize their true economic potential. As for the role of outsiders, the kind
of assistance Bulgaria needs more than anything else is investment to make
up for the current shortage of domestic capital. The Bulgarian Government
recently improved legislation passed last year to create an attractive
climate for such investment, and I would urge them to implement this law
as flexibly as possible. Ultimately, the job of "selling" outsiders on the
benefits of investing and doing business in Bulgaria is one for the
Bulgarians themselves. Outsiders cannot do this in their place; it is they
who will have to be convinced that Bulgaria competes favorably with other
rivals for their investment.
Bulgaria has enormous potential and should not in the least be shy in
advertising itself to the world. The country boasts a highly educated and
motivated work force, and the cost of doing business there is bound to be
attractive. There are promising investment opportunities in the fields of
agribusiness, light manufacturing, and tourism. Bulgaria's location offers
export opportunities to a wide variety of markets not sufficiently covered
by US firms. I, therefore, have no reticence in urging US investors to take a
serious look at Bulgaria. They will find that it is a market which has not
been cornered by the West Europeans and one which is warmly hospitable to
Americans and to American business.
Finally, let me say that I hope that at the conclusion of this conference, the
best-kept secret in Central and Eastern Europe will be a secret no more. If
this is the case, as I expect it will be, we will owe a debt of gratitude to
the US-Chamber of Commerce and to the Bulgaria-US Trade and Economic
Council for having educated Americans about the exciting emergence of a
democratic Bulgaria and about the exciting prospects for economic
cooperation between our two countries. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992
Title: US-Bulgarian Relations
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Date: Mar, 3 19923/3/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Bulgaria
Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The President met for approximately 30 minutes this afternoon with
Bulgarian Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov. He welcomed the Prime Minister as
the first popularly elected Bulgarian leader ever to visit the United States
and congratulated him on Bulgaria's National Day of Independence,
celebrated today.
The President expressed admiration for the determination shown by
President Zhelev and Prime Minister Dimitrov in advancing democracy and
human rights, including minority rights, in Bulgaria and in pursuing a bold
program of market economic reform. He expressed America's firm support
for Bulgaria as it undertakes this difficult transformation and proposed that
both countries work to promote foreign trade and investment, which can
bring the capital, know-how, and new jobs Bulgaria needs.
The two leaders also discussed the situation in the Balkans. They
reaffirmed their strong support for UN peace-keeping efforts in Yugoslavia
and agreed that all countries should act with restraint so as to promote
confidence and stability in the region. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992
Title: Department Statement on Romania
Boucher
Source: Statement by Deputy Department Spokesman Richard
Boucher, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Romania
Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The United States welcomes the progress made by the people of Romania
toward a market economy and democratic pluralism. There have been
significant advances in meeting CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] criteria and generally accepted international
standards for free and fair elections.
We commend all those in Romania--Prime Minister Stolojan and members of
his government, political and civic leaders, domestic election observers,
and others--who are working to achieve these goals. The US is especially
encouraged by the widespread participation by political parties, civic
organizations, and candidates in the electoral process throughout Romania.
In light of Romania's progress in reform and its desire for closer relations
with the United States, we have informed Romania that the US is prepared
to sign a new bilateral trade agreement with Romania.
The new trade agreement would have to be approved by Congress. The
agreement would then provide for most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff
treatment on a reciprocal basis and promote closer ties between the people
of the US and Romania by encouraging trade and business contacts.
MFN trade status would not take effect until the agreement wins
congressional approval. We anticipate that the Administration and Congress
will continue to discuss respect for human rights and the conduct of free
and fair national elections in Romania this spring as they consider MFN.
The US looks for further improvement in Romania's electoral system as it
prepares for national elections. We encourage all citizens of Romania to
continue to strive for a democratic society which fully respects human
rights and the rule of law.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992
Title: Department Statement Nagorno-
Karabakh
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater,
Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 12 19923/12/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, CSCE
[TEXT]
The President spoke with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey today on the
escalating crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The President is
concerned about the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and calls on the parties
to declare an immediate cease-fire, so that they can attempt to resolve
their differences peacefully.
The involvement of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe] in the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh reflects the deep concern of the
international community about the violence that threatens to scar this
region for generations to come. The parties must not seek to gain a
temporary military advantage during a time of great uncertainty and
heightened tensions. We call on them to exercise restraint even in the face
of apparent provocation. The bloodshed must end.
The United States joins Turkey, Russia, and other countries in calling for an
immediate cease-fire and for Armenia and Azerbaijan to cooperate with the
CSCE to put a peaceful end to this growing tragedy. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992
Title: US-EC Declaration on the Yugoslav Republics
EC
Source: Declaration by the United States and the European
Community on the recognition of the Yugoslav republics,
Brussels, Belgium
Date: Mar, 10 19923/10/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: USSR (former), Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia-Montenegro,
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Subject: EC, Democratization, United Nations
[TEXT]
The Community and its member States and the United States reiterate their
strong support for the UN Peacekeeping Plan, for the EC Peace Conference
chaired by Lord Carrington and for the key principles underlying the search
for a political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis at the EC Conference: no
changes in the borders of the Yugoslav republics by force or absent mutual
consent, strong protection for human rights and the rights of all national
and ethnic groups in all republics.
The Community and its member States and the United States have agreed to
coordinate their approaches to completing the process of recognizing those
Yugoslav republics that seek independence.
The Community and its member States, bearing in mind its declaration on 16
December 1991, and the United States are agreed:
(i) that the United States will, in this context, give rapid and positive
consideration to the requests for recognition by Croatia and Slovenia in such
a way as to support the dual-track approach based on the deployment of the
UN peacekeeping force and the European Community Peace Conference
chaired by Lord Carrington.
(ii) that the Community and its member States and the United States will
also coordinate their approach to Serbia and Montenegro, which have
expressed the wish to form a common state, and lay particular emphasis on
their demonstrable respect for the territorial integrity of the other
republics and for the rights of minorities on their territory as well as their
willingness to negotiate Yugoslav state succession issues at the EC
Conference on the basis on mutual agreement with the other four republics;
and
(iii) that positive consideration should be given to the requests for
recognition of the other two republics, contingent on the resolution of the
remaining European Community questions relating to those two republics. In
this context, they strongly urge all parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina to adopt
without delay constitutional arrangements that will provide for a peaceful
and harmonious development of this republic within its existing borders.
The Community and its member States and the United States also agreed
strongly to oppose any effort to undermine the stability and territorial
integrity of those two republics. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992
Title: The Need for an Active Foreign Policy
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpts from remarks at the Nixon Library dinner,
Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 11 19923/11/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Whole World
Country: United States
Subject: State Department
[TEXT]
Today's challenge is fundamentally different. . . . What we must do is find a
way to maintain popular support for an active foreign policy and a strong
defense in the absence of an overriding single external threat to our nation's
security and in the face of severe budgetary problems. In this post-Cold
War world, ours is the wonderful, yet no less real or difficult, challenge,
really, of coping with success.
This challenge is by no means unprecedented. Think back to the era after
World War I or the years in the immediate wake of World War II. In both
instances, the American people were anxious to bring their victorious
troops home [and] to focus their energies on making the American dream a
reality.
Perhaps more instructive, though, are the differences between our reactions
following this century's two great wars. After World War I, the United
States retreated behind its oceans. We refused to support the League of
Nations. We allowed our military forces to shrink and grow obsolete. We
helped international trade plummet, the victim of beggar-thy-neighbor
protectionism. We stood by and watched as Germany's struggling
democracy, the Weimar Republic, failed under the weight of reparations,
protectionism, and depression and gave way to the horror that we all know
as the Third Reich.
Likewise, our initial reaction to victory after World War II showed little
learning. But, galvanized by an emerging communist threat spearheaded by
an imperialist Soviet Union, the United States acted. NATO, the IMF
[International Monetary Fund], the World Bank, the Marshall Plan--these and
other institutions prove that Americans grasped the nature of the challenge
and the need to respond. Our military was modernized, free trade nourished,
[and] US support for former adversaries Germany and Japan made generous.
It was fitting that Dean Acheson titled his memoirs Present at the Creation,
for these years were truly creative.
The result, as they say, is history. We kept the peace. We won the Cold War.
Democracy is on the march. Now, for the third time this century, we've
emerged on the winning side of a war--the Cold War--involving the great
powers. So the question before us is the same: We have won the war, but
are we prepared to secure the peace? . . .
Yesterday, we saw conflict, and, today--yes--the world is a safer place.
Yes, the Soviet Union--aggressive, looking outward--that we feared is no
longer. But the successor republics are still struggling to establish
themselves as democracies, still struggling to make the transition to
capitalism. We invested so much to win the Cold War; we must invest what
is necessary to win the peace. If we fail, we will create new and profound
problems for our security and that of Europe and Asia. If we succeed, we
strengthen democracy, we build new market economies, and, in the process,
we create huge new markets for America. We must support reform, not only
in Russia but throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. . . .
Those who would have us do less ignore the intimate interrelationship
between overseas developments and those here at home. If we had not
resisted aggression in the Gulf a year ago, if we had not liberated Kuwait
and defeated Iraq's invading army, we would now be facing the economic
consequences not of a mild recession but of a deep depression brought on by
Saddam Hussein's control over the majority of the world's oil. I am
absolutely certain--I expect we could get a good lively debate in this room
of enormously intellectual people--but I am absolutely certain in my mind
that if we had not moved against Saddam, he would be in Saudi Arabia today.
The coalition would have fallen apart, he would be in Saudi Arabia, and we
would be facing agony like we've never faced before in the history of our
country.
It is a pipedream to believe that we can somehow insulate our society or our
economy or our lives from the world beyond our borders. This is not meant
to suggest that we should not do more here at home. Of course, we should.
But foreign policy, too, is a powerful determinant of the quality of life here
at home.
Isolationism is not the only temptation we need to avoid. Protectionism is
another siren song which will be difficult to resist. There are, indeed, many
examples of unfair trade practices where US firms get shut out of foreign
government markets owing to trade barriers of one sort or another or owing
to foreign government subsidies. But the way to bring down barriers abroad
is not to raise them at home. In trade wars, there are no winners, only
losers.
Export growth is a proven economic engine. Every billion dollars--we
estimate every billion dollars--in manufactured exports creates 20,000
jobs for Americans. We should have no doubts about the ability of our
workers and farmers to thrive in a competitive world. Our goal must be to
increase, not restrict, trade. Opting out, be it under the banner of
protection or isolation, is nothing more than a recipe for weakness and,
ultimately, for disaster. That's why I'm so determined to do all I can to
bring to--to successfully conclude the Uruguay Round of GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and to get a fair trade agreement with
Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada.
It is important to us; it creates jobs in the United States.
Now, if I can choose a theme for you to take away from what I have to say
tonight, it is this: There is no distinction between how we fare abroad and
how we live at home. Foreign and domestic policy are but two sides of the
same coin. True, we will not be able to lead abroad if we are not united and
strong at home. But it is no less true that we will be unable to build the
society we seek here at home in a world where military and economic
warfare is the norm. . . .(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992
Title: President Bush Meets With King Hussein
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater,
Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 12 19923/12/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Jordan, Iraq
Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The President and [Jordanian] King Hussein met for approximately 1 hour in
the Oval Office. Also attending the meeting were Secretary Baker, General
Scowcroft, and Jordanian Prime Minister Bin Shaker. Following the meeting,
the President and the King and their respective staffs had a working lunch in
the residence.
There was considerable discussion of the peace process. The President
stressed the importance of all parties continuing to participate in the
Madrid process. The two agreed to continue to consult closely, both about
ways to solve remaining procedural issues affecting both the bilateral and
multilateral talks and on how best to advance the peace process more
generally.
On the question of Iraq, the two leaders agreed on the importance of full
Iraqi compliance with all [UN] Security Council resolutions. King Hussein
said that Jordan would continue to do its part. President Bush and King
Hussein also agreed that the United States and Jordan would continue to
consult closely on questions relating to Iraq and the Gulf war aftermath.
King Hussein also raised the matter of Jordan's economic situation, which
has been made more difficult by the more than 300,000 men, women, and
children who have entered Jordan from the Gulf. The President told the King
that the United States would continue to do what it could to help Jordan,
both directly and via international financial institutions. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992
Title: East Timor, Indonesia, and US Policy
Quinn
Source: Kenneth M. Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Mar, 6 19923/6/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Indonesia, Portugal
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization,
Human Rights, History
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to
present our views on the situation in East Timor and US policy regarding the
Indonesian Government's handling of the violent incident in Dili last
November.
The Dili Affair
We are here today principally out of concern over the tragic event in Dili
last November 12. On that day, Indonesian army and police units fired on
unarmed civilians engaged in a political demonstration, killing and wounding
scores of people.
The US Government has long been concerned about the human rights situation
in East Timor. Officers from our Embassy in Jakarta have gone there
frequently over the years. Both Ambassador Monjo and former Ambassador
Wolfowitz have visited East Timor. Four embassy teams have been there
since November 12; the most recent visitation was in mid- February.
Our dialogue with the Indonesian Government about East Timor is long-
standing and has frequently been at the highest levels. Shortly after the
November 12 incident, both Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas and
Secretary Baker were in Seoul attending an APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation] ministerial meeting. Both the Secretary and Assistant
Secretary Solomon immediately discussed preliminary reports of the
incident directly with the Minister, and Secretary Baker sent Minister
Alatas a letter of concern shortly thereafter.
The United States has publicly condemned the Dili incident. No provocation
could have warranted such a wanton military reaction; the excessive use of
force was unjustified and reprehensible. We immediately called for a
complete and credible investigation leading to appropriate punishments for
those who resorted to or condoned such deadly use of force. We clearly
conveyed our views at high levels in both Jakarta and Washington.
Mr. Chairman, we share the Congress' deep concern and disapproval of the
violence of November 12, as well as the desire to see that those accountable
for the massacre are punished, that justice is done, and that steps are taken
to ensure that no such incident recurs.
The issues now requiring US policy judgments are these: How can the United
States best help to ensure that our goals of accountability and a just
resolution of the incident are realized and that the well-being of the people
of East Timor is improved?
We have been encouraged by the fact that the Indonesian Government has
also characterized the incident as a tragedy. Senior leaders are well aware
that the world is watching. They understand that their positive
international reputation, of which they are proud, is on the line. Our hope
and expectation has been that Indonesia would move vigorously to find the
facts, assess responsibility, appropriately punish those responsible, and
take steps to prevent such an event from occurring again.
As of today, our expectations have been partially fulfilled. President
Suharto promptly formed a national investigatory commission which
delivered a preliminary report on December 26. The report clearly answered
two key questions in the affirmative: Was excessive force used and should
the military personnel involved be punished? While we look forward to the
final report to provide additional detail, we and most other concerned
foreign observers--including Australia, Japan, and the European Community
(EC)--have judged the preliminary report to be a serious and responsible
effort by the Government of Indonesia. The report confronts the toughest
issues and directly refutes many of the initial assertions about the event
put forward by the Indonesian armed forces:
-- It raises the official casualty totals to realistic levels, flatly
contradicting figures announced earlier by the Indonesian armed forces.
-- It makes the key determination that excessive force was used and that
some troops were clearly "out of control."
-- It also finds that this incident was not the result of government policy.
-- It asserts that those who violated the law must be prosecuted.
We have also been encouraged by President Suharto's follow-up actions:
-- On receiving the preliminary findings which were critical of his army,
the President immediately made the report public and extended his deep
apology to the families of innocent victims. He has publicly apologized on
three occasions.
-- The President relieved of their duties two general officers--the regional
and provincial military commanders. Lower-level officers in the chain of
command have also been replaced.
-- He ordered formation of a military "Council of Honor" to recommend army
punishments and reforms, with the intention that such an incident must
never happen again in Indonesia. On February 27, the Indonesian army
announced that six senior officers will be disciplined, with three of them
dismissed from the service; eight other officers and enlisted men will be
court-martialed; and five more remain under investigation.
-- President Suharto ordered Armed Forces Commander Gen. Try Sutrisno to
account for missing persons.
-- He ordered increased efforts to improve the well-being of the Timorese
people.
We have monitored the situation in East Timor closely since November 12.
Four teams from Embassy Jakarta have visited the province since the
incident. The most recent visit, in mid- February, reaffirmed the findings
of earlier teams that there is no evidence to substantiate allegations of
additional killings since November 12. The team also confirmed earlier
reports that, while tensions in Dili continue, they have eased from
November. Economic and social life has returned to normal; however,
security is tight, reportedly because of concerns that a group of political
activists is en route [to] Dili on a Portuguese ship.
As of mid-February, 14 civilians remained hospitalized as a result of
wounds received; 77 others had recovered sufficiently to be released.
Twenty-four civilians who were in detention in Dili in mid-February on
charges related to the demonstration have reportedly been released in
recent days. Eight others remain in detention in Dili and will be tried on
criminal charges. Some detainees were abused in the days immediately
after November 12. We understand that such mistreatment has ceased.
Some have criticized the government preliminary report over the matter of
provocation. Eyewitnesses differed greatly on this issue. The report says
that some witnesses denied there was any provocation; others allege that
significant provocations of the military did occur. The report concludes
that provocation did occur, but it does make the critical point that,
regardless, the response of the military was excessive and unjustifiable.
We have been appalled at callous and inappropriate "blame the victim"
comments by some in the Indonesian military. But I should say again that,
like the incident itself, such comments--in our estimation--do not reflect
the policy or approach of the senior leaders of the Indonesian Government.
The punishment phase is now beginning. We will closely monitor the
Indonesian Government's efforts to follow through on the national
commission's judgments of responsibility, and we will continue to watch
the human rights situation in East Timor with care. I must add that, in our
view, the interest of truth and of amelioration of the situation in East
Timor is best served by a policy of more, not less, access.
East Timor: Human Rights
Human rights issues have been, and will remain, an important element of our
continuing dialogue and good working relations with the Indonesian
Government. As our annual human rights report makes clear, Indonesia's
record is mixed; but, prior to last fall, the trend in East Timor in recent
years had been positive.[1]
[1-Copies of Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991 are
available for sale from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, tel. 202-783-3238; GPO stock no.
952-070-06790-0.]
Looking back, the first years immediately after Portugal's 1974 decision to
decolonize East Timor were traumatic. A bloody civil war erupted as
several Timorese factions competed to gain control of the area. When the
Marxist FRETILIN (East Timor National Liberation Front) faction gained the
ascendancy, Indonesia invaded to keep East Timor out of Marxist hands.
Many innocent civilians were undoubtedly caught in the crossfire during the
civil war and later, as the Indonesian army attempted to crush the well-
armed and well-organized FRETILIN insurgents. As the insurgency continued
into the 1980s, so did human rights violations, although at a reduced rate.
We have received no reports in recent years, however, of incidents on the
scale of what took place on November 12.
One of the real tragedies of last fall's events is the setback they gave to
recent progress. Fortunately, the Indonesian Government appears set to
resume a positive course. As already noted, President Suharto has publicly
apologized to the families of innocent victims. He has instructed that civic
action or "territorial operations" and other efforts to improve the well-
being of the East Timorese people be stepped up. He has ordered the army to
punish those at fault and to institute reforms so that such a tragedy can not
happen again. The punishments have already begun.
Following the arrival in late 1989 of a new military commander for East
Timor, General Warouw, we noticed a marked decline in human rights abuses.
General Warouw developed a cooperative relationship with East Timor
Governor Carrascalao and with Bishop Belo of the Catholic Church. He began
to emphasize territorial operations--that is, civic action efforts in the
villages--rather than combat operations. At about the same time, East
Timor was opened to outside visitors.
The improving atmosphere changed last fall, however, when discussions
between Indonesia and Portugal under the UN Secretary General's auspices
brought tentative agreement for a visit to East Timor by a Portuguese
parliamentary delegation. That news raised the hopes of anti-integrationist
elements. It also led to increased Indonesian security operations. That
combination of factors heightened tensions. When Portugal canceled the
visit at the last minute because of a dispute over the credentials of a
foreign journalist, frustrations among anti-integrationists in East Timor
heightened.
Those frustrations found expression on November 12 during the visit of a UN
official to Dili, which coincided with a commemoration service for the
death 2 weeks earlier of an anti-integrationist who died as a result of a
confrontation with pro-integrationist forces. During a march through city
streets, anti-Indonesia demonstrators were vocal, and a few were violent.
An army major was stabbed. It appears that local military units then took
revenge. The Indonesian Government commission has judged that the
reaction of some troops "exceeded acceptable norms," and their actions have
been widely condemned--by ourselves and by the international community.
More recently, we, Japan, Australia, and many other governments have been
encouraged by the Indonesian efforts to directly address this situation. The
EC, currently under the leadership of Portugal, stated on February 13 that it
is encouraged by the preliminary report and the actions taken by Jakarta.
These efforts are clearly those of a government that is seeking to be
responsive to human rights concerns. Those few nations which suspended
aid programs have either lifted the suspensions or are considering doing so.
I recognize that some people believe Jakarta's response to these events has
been inadequate and that diplomatic suasion is insufficient. They urge that
we cut US security or economic assistance to Indonesia. Such a course, in
our view, would not produce the desired results which we all seek and could
have negative consequences: for US-Indonesia relations; for our limited
influence in Indonesia; and, most importantly, for the people of East Timor.
It is important to encourage, not discourage, constructive trends in the
human rights situation in Indonesia. Some elements within the Indonesian
Government initially resisted President Suharto's response to November 12.
They wanted to confront international opinion by whitewashing the Dili
episode. Those recalcitrant forces would likely be reinforced by a response
on our part which denigrated President Suharto's efforts.
Also, to cut off programs such as IMET [International Military Education and
Training], which help to promote democratic values and respect for human
rights, would not foster such goals but rather would markedly reduce our
influence and role as an interlocutor.
Our welcome access to senior officials in Jakarta is particularly important
when it comes to lobbying effectively on important human rights issues
such as East Timor. More broadly, our engagement with Indonesia needs to
be sustained, not hindered. Indonesia is the world's fourth-largest nation; it
is the world's largest Islamic community. I would note that at a time of
resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism--which seeks to exclude Western
influence from the Middle East--the Indonesian Government, in dramatic
contrast, is firmly committed to religious tolerance for the country's
Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian minorities.
An Indonesian Government that we have been able to work with productively
on a broad range of issues is now assuming chairmanship of the Non-Aligned
Movement, and Indonesia is a leading member of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indonesia is an important regional power.
Jakarta's activism and cooperation were essential in our efforts to resolve
the conflict in Cambodia, and its support for UN resolutions and sanctions
against Iraq during Desert Storm were significant--especially in view of
Iraq's efforts to gain support in Indonesia from Muslim fundamentalists.
Our economic relations with Indonesia are important and growing;
Indonesia's progress in deregulating its economy and sustaining growth have
facilitated expanded two-way trade (now $6 billion) and US investment
($2.5 billion). Our trade with Indonesia is now greater than that with all of
Eastern Europe.
Such political and economic interests notwithstanding, if Indonesia were a
human rights pariah which had ordered a massacre and disregarded world
opinion, I could better understand an argument for demonstrating our
opprobrium by cutting off security and economic assistance. But the
Government of Indonesia has accepted that the November incident was a
tragedy, has taken responsibility for the actions of its troops, has already
announced punishments for some senior military officers, is preparing to
bring other wrongdoers to trial, and is working to ensure that such violent
use of force by its troops does not recur. It seems evident that continuing
cooperative engagement, not retribution, best serves the human rights goals
we all seek.
One way we can help in this process is through our IMET program, the only
security assistance we plan to provide Indonesia in FY 1992. Among IMET's
goals are to increase military professionalism and to expose students to
universal standards of human rights. I should note that a recent GAO [US
Government Accounting Office] investigation of the events of last November
found that no IMET trainees were involved in the incident, while several
have been prominent in the ongoing corrective efforts. The UN Human Rights
Commission Special Rapporteur who was in Dili at the time of the November
12 tragedy later highlighted to us the importance of international training
for increasing human rights sensitivity among the Indonesian military. Yet
some would cut our IMET program. Our expressions of grave concern were
appropriate in November and were not ignored. What is needed now is
encouragement for further reform.
East Timor: History and Status
The underlying issue in the November 12 incident is the status of East
Timor, a Christian enclave of 750,000. As this hearing is intended to deal
with all aspects of East Timor, including the US response to Indonesia's
invasion in 1975 and incorporation of the province in 1976, let me mention a
few relevant aspects of the historical record.
After the April 1974 leftist coup in Portugal, Lisbon decided to rapidly
decolonize its overseas empire. This resulted in widespread chaos, civil
conflict, and foreign intervention in Portugal's former colonies. Angola and
Mozambique endured 17 years of Marxist rule and brutal civil war that has
only ended within the past year.
East Timor could have suffered a similar fate. When the new Portuguese
Government in 1974 decided to decolonize, East Timor was completely
unprepared for self-governance. Four centuries of colonialism had left East
Timor with one high school, fewer than 10 college graduates, and a literacy
rate under 10%. Portugal and Indonesia held discussions about the colony's
future, but a civil war erupted there before any agreement was reached. The
combatants were: FRETILIN, which sought immediate creation of an
independent Marxist state; another group that advocated immediate
integration into Indonesia; and a third, which preferred a gradual
decolonization process.
Portugal's leftist government abruptly withdrew in August 1975, handing
over to FRETILIN weapons which were then used to gain the upper hand. In
the face of a FRETILIN military victory and the declaration of an independent
Marxist state, Indonesia invaded in December of 1975--and indicated it did
so at the request of the East Timorese factions opposed to FRETILIN.
When the world turned its attention to East Timor in the mid-1970s, self-
determination was not a realistic option. The choice was Marxist rule by
FRETILIN or action by Indonesia. Neither had a mandate from the ballot box.
It is important to recall that, since President Suharto rose to power in the
mid-1960s, Indonesia has not had an expansionist agenda; East Timor is the
only addition to what was once Dutch colonial territory. Indonesia
considers that its takeover of East Timor was forced on it by the threat of a
Marxist insurgency. The political context here is significant: The
annexation of East Timor occurred amidst active communist insurgencies in
much of Southeast Asia as the United States departed from Vietnam and
with memories of an attempted 1965 communist takeover in Indonesia still
fresh.
In the minds of Indonesian leaders--whose bedrock principle is the unity of
their archipelagic country--once East Timor had been incorporated, its
standing became a symbol of the integrity of the nation. Those leaders look
at the hundreds of distinct ethnic groups and languages within Indonesia and
at the presence of several major religions. They recall regional rebellions
from the 1950s, and they fear that loosening even one thread of the national
fabric could stimulate other successionist threats.
Even before independence, Indonesian leaders had begun weaving that
unifying fabric. They chose Malay, a minor trading language, rather than
majority Javanese to be the national language. They promoted religious
freedom for Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist populations scattered throughout
the archipelago, despite a Muslim majority. To this day, Indonesian leaders
strongly resist any advocacy of an Islamic state. A number of radical
Muslims have been prosecuted over the years for promoting such a course.
Indonesia's leaders have stressed unity because of their nation's immense
diversity. They continue to insist on it today.
In 1976, US policy-makers decided to accept Indonesia's incorporation of
East Timor as an accomplished fact. They judged that nothing the United
States or the world was prepared to do could change that fact. Thus, to
oppose Indonesia's incorporation would have had little impact on the
situation.
With such reality in mind, previous Administrations fashioned a policy
which has been followed consistently on a bipartisan basis: We accept
Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor without maintaining that a valid act
of self-determination has taken place.
Clearly, a democratic process of self-determination would have been more
consistent with our values, but the realities of 1975 did not include that
alternative. Accepting the absorption of East Timor into Indonesia was the
only realistic option.
Since then, we have maintained a constructive dialogue with the Indonesian
Government designed to promote the well-being of the people of East Timor.
Included in this has been an ongoing human rights dialogue. That dialogue is
generally private and is conducted at high levels; it is those characteristics
that have made it effective.
Politically, we support discussions between Indonesia and Portugal under
the auspices of the UN Secretary General, as were mandated by the UN
General Assembly in 1982. We believe such a dialogue continues to be the
most promising avenue for resolving the East Timor issue. We are pleased
that such a dialogue between Indonesia and Portugal at the UN Human Rights
Commission meetings, which just concluded in Geneva, led to a constructive
and balanced chairman's statement concerning human rights in East Timor.
Economically, our constructive relationship with Indonesia has allowed us
to extend assistance to all Indonesians, which especially benefits the East
Timorese. On a per capita basis, we have provided more than twice as many
USAID [US Agency for International Development] project dollars to East
Timor since 1988 as to the rest of Indonesia.
Additionally, Indonesia has, on a per capita basis, funneled over six times as
much of its own economic development budget into East Timor as to any
other province. In 1991, East Timor received about $170 million in
Indonesian Government grants. The $170 million, one might note, is, in
nominal terms, almost exactly 100 times the average yearly development
expenditure for East Timor in the last days of colonial rule, all of which
was in the form of repayable loans.
The results of such recent investment are striking:
-- In 1974, after 4 centuries of colonial rule, East Timor had 47 elementary
schools, 2 middle schools, 1 high school, and no colleges. Now it has 574
elementary schools, 99 middle schools, 14 high schools, and 3 colleges.
-- In 1974, East Timor had 2 hospitals and 14 health clinics. Now it has 10
hospitals and 197 village health centers.
-- In 1974, East Timor had 100 churches. Today it has 518.
-- In 1974, East Timor had 20 kilometers of surfaced roads, all within Dili.
Now it has 428 kilometers throughout the province.
-- In 1974, East Timor was plagued with endemic poverty. Today, poverty
remains a problem, as it does elsewhere in that part of Indonesia, but
starvation is extremely rare.
The missing economic element is sufficient employment to fulfill rising
expectations of newly educated youth. But new business investors insist on
a peaceful environment, and that remains problematic until the East Timor
issue is fully resolved.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate our major policies for dealing
with the situation in East Timor:
-- We intend to work cooperatively with the Indonesian Government to
promote development and respect for human rights in the province; and
-- We support the 1982 UN decision to promote an Indonesian-Portuguese
dialogue under the auspices of the UN Secretary General to resolve the East
Timor issue. (###)