US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992


China's MFN Status

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Letter from President Bush to the House of Representatives dated March 2, 1992, released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control [TEXT] To the House of Representatives: I am returning herewith without my approval HR 2212, the "United States- China Act of 1991," which places additional conditions on renewal of China's most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status. The sponsors of HR 2212 believe they can promote broad economic and foreign policy objectives in China by placing conditions on the renewal of China's MFN status. They expect that the Chinese will improve respect for human rights, cooperate in arms control, and drop barriers to trade, given a choice between losing MFN and addressing these concerns. Let me state at the outset that my Administration shares the goals and objectives of HR 2212. Upholding the sanctity of human rights, controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and free and fair trade are issues of vital concern. My objection lies strictly with the methods proposed to achieve these aims. There is no doubt in my mind that if we present China's leaders with an ultimatum on MFN, the result will be weakened ties to the West and further repression. The end result will not be progress on human rights, arms control, or trade. Anyone familiar with recent Chinese history can attest that the most brutal and protracted periods of repression took place precisely when China turned inward, against the world. Recent agreements by the Chinese to protect US intellectual property rights, to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines, to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by April, and to discuss our human rights concerns--after years of stonewalling--are the clear achievements of my Administration's policy of comprehensive engagement. We have the policy tools at hand to deal with our concerns effectively and with realistic chances for success. The Administration's comprehensive policy of engagement on several separate fronts invites China's leadership to act responsibly without leaving any doubts about the consequences of Chinese misdeeds. Our approach is one of targeting specific areas of concern with the appropriate policy instruments to produce the required results. HR 2212 would severely handicap US business in China, penalizing American workers and eliminating jobs in this country. Conditional MFN status would severely damage the Western-oriented, modernizing elements in China, weaken Hong Kong, and strengthen opposition to democracy and economic reform. We are making a difference in China by remaining engaged. Because the Congress has attached conditions to China's MFN renewal that will jeopardize this policy, I am returning HR 2212 to the House of Representatives without my approval. Such action is needed to protect the economic and foreign policy interests of the United States. GEORGE BUSH (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

China's Adherence to Missile Control Guidelines

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 21 19922/21/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Human Rights, Trade/Economics [TEXT] The US Administration intends to lift specific sanctions imposed on China last June because of transactions by two Chinese companies involving missile technology covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines. As a result, we expect China to announce its adherence to the guidelines and parameters of the MTCR. Our action comes following receipt of a letter on February 1 from PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in response to a letter from Secretary Baker. This letter confirmed that China will abide by the MTCR guidelines and parameters, as agreed in Beijing last November during the Secretary's trip. China's written commitment to abide by the MTCR guidelines and parameters is an important step forward in securing Chinese support for ballistic missile non-proliferation. The MTCR guidelines are the key multi-national effort to limit ballistic missile proliferation. This in no way means we will slacken our efforts to monitor either missile transfers worldwide, or Chinese missile and missile technology export practices. Transfers of missile technology covered by the MTCR guidelines will continue to be subject to sanction in accordance with US law. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

FY 1993 Budget: Meeting New Foreign Policy Challenges

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 3 19923/3/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Subject: State Department [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, as Secretary of State, I must deal daily with the challenges confronting the United States around the world. Seizing the historic opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union stands at the forefront of those challenges. But, there are others. And they are important. Nonproliferation, ending regional conflicts, opening markets to Americans goods and services, and strengthening democratic values worldwide--are crucial today to American interests and will remain vital to our foreign policy through the end of the century and beyond. But, Mr. Chairman, I am also a public servant. And as such, I am acutely aware of the need to husband the taxpayers' money during a period of hardship here at home. This is a lean budget, but it is also a flexible budget--one that lets us seize the opportunities of a new era. We believe that the future will be marked by the decline of ideological confrontation and the rise of collective engagement based on shared values. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that decline in ideological conflict has decisively begun. We now look to Russia as a partner, not an adversary. And collective engagement has proven, again and again--during the Gulf crisis, in Southeast Asia, Southern Africa, and Central America--that common problems demand a collective security response from the international community. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the two most important initiatives in our broad budget request--aid to the former Soviet Union and support for international peace-keeping efforts--conform to this vision of a future characterized by a growing democratic community and the rising use of collective engagement as an instrument of foreign policy. Mr. Chairman, we also recognize that in a new world we must look at new ways to conduct our foreign policy. The American people cannot afford business as usual. We therefore will undertake a wide-ranging examination of our current structures and processes, looking at ways we might better meet our new foreign policy challenges. Let me highlight just three areas where we need to re-think old ways: -- First, we must consider how we can more effectively use foreign assistance to support the development of free markets while promoting American business interests. We have long known that economic development helps American business in the long-run by creating new and stronger markets for US exports. But now we want to consider innovative ways we can facilitate public-private cooperation in the short and medium- term to further strengthen America's competitiveness. As we help others, we must help American business--and foreign assistance must become part of this equation. -- Second, we must also better coordinate our efforts to deal with the multi-faceted aspects of the proliferation challenge. Non-proliferation is far more than arms control; it crosses over into political questions involving regional conflicts, technology questions involving weapons dismantlement and technology transfer, and political-military questions involving security assistance. If we are to meet these challenges effectively, we must do so with a comprehensive policy implemented by a consolidated bureaucracy. -- Third, we must look at new ways we can promote American values and interests through mass media and the global communications network. As we saw in last August's coup in the Soviet Union, mass media and the worldwide information network can play critical roles in our foreign policy; on my recent trip to the new states of Central Asia, the leaders asked me how they could tie into this information network. These are just three examples of areas where new approaches may help us better meet new challenges. But we will, of course, be looking at the full range of ways by which we can make our foreign policy apparatus more efficient, responsive, and flexible. Let me now turn to a brief budget overview.
Budget Overview
For FY 1993, we seek $4.4 billion for the State Department and $1.5 billion for related international agencies falling under the jurisdiction of this Subcommittee. I would like to touch briefly on key elements of our proposal: Peace-keeping. We request a total of $460 million for peace-keeping in FY 1993, up from $107 million appropriated in FY 1992. We seek $350 million to support UN peace-keeping efforts in Cambodia, El Salvador, and Yugoslavia. This amount supplements another $350 million requested for FY 1992--a request currently before the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee. Over the last year, we have seen and encouraged regional settlements in Southeast Asia, Central America, and Southern Africa. But, Mr. Chairman, it is not enough to help make peace. We must also help keep it. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War and the scaling back of our own defense forces, UN peace-keeping will play a pivotal role in resolving regional conflicts. I consider American support for peace-keeping one of our top foreign policy priorities, a true investment in peace. I ask for your support on this vital issue. International Organizations. In FY 1993, we seek $913 million for international organizations, compared to $842 million appropriated in FY 1992. This increase reflects higher FY 1993 assessments by the UN and other institutions and ongoing payment of arrears. Our contribution delivers an American vote of confidence in the new maturity of the UN system--a maturity clearly demonstrated during the Gulf crisis--and in the new Secretary General's commitment to clean the UN's financial and administrative house. Foreign Buildings Program. We propose $600 million for our Foreign Buildings Office (FBO) in FY 1993, in contrast to $545 million appropriated in FY 1992; $140 million will complete construction of modern and secure facilities in Moscow. It is time we put this contentious issue behind us and complete a facility commensurate with our vital interests in Russia. Other FBO funds will sustain our ongoing program to rehabilitate properties worldwide. Salaries and Expenses. In FY 1993, we request $2.13 billion for State Department Salaries and Expenses (S∧E), our base operating account. This compares to $2.02 billion appropriated in FY 1992. This sum will support the extraordinary array of tasks the Department is called on to perform. The Department of State executes our foreign policy, conducting delicate negotiations with foreign governments. It also serves as our eyes and ears abroad, reporting on local developments in every corner of the globe. And, working with the US Information Agency, it represents the United States to the world at large, promoting not just American interests, but American values. But, Mr. Chairman, the Department of State performs much, much more than this. In FY 1993, we estimate that we will issue over 5 mil- lion passports, adjudicate over 7 million visas, help tens of thousands of Americans, many of them in distress, and assist thousands of US businessmen abroad. Our Operations and Citizens Emergency Centers--the heart of our government's crisis management system--provide critical support as we grapple with events as diverse as an aircraft hijacking in Southeast Asia or the ongoing violence in Yugoslavia. Merely managing our information is a remarkable feat. Our office of communications monthly handles well over 150,000 cables relating to everything from major developments in international affairs to the welfare of individual Americans travelling abroad. It is in terms of this remarkable range of functions that I would like you to consider our FY 1993 S∧E request, as well as the number of initiatives that it contains: -- New Posts. We propose a $26-million increase in FY 1993 to underwrite the annualized cost of opening posts in the Baltics, the former Soviet Union, and Cambodia. A year ago we had one embassy in the former Soviet Union. Within weeks, that number will reach 11, plus our 3 embassies in the Baltics. Opening new posts is expensive--but vital if we are to help shape local developments, serve our citizens, and promote American business in these new states. -- Investing in Diplomacy. In FY 1993, we also seek $12 million to complete our National Foreign Affairs Training Center. This marks a $5 mil- lion increase over FY 1992. The State Department's most valuable resource remains its personnel, both Civil and Foreign Service. Our new Training Center, which we hope to occupy in FY 1993, will help train the generation of foreign affairs specialists that will carry American foreign policy into the 21st century. -- Regional Passport Processing Center. In addition, we request $2.8 million in FY 1993 to establish a regional Passport Processing Center. The Center will eventually issue 1.5 million passport renewals annually as part of our effort to serve the growing ranks of travelling Americans. -- Modernizing Financial Management. Finally, our FY 1993 proposal includes a $4-million increase to modernize our financial management system, much of which is woefully out-of-date. Our object is to create and maintain the tight financial management that the Congress--and the American people--rightfully expect. Public Diplomacy. In FY 1993, we seek $1.14 billion for the US Information Agency, compared to $1.08 billion appropriated in FY 1992. USIA has long been at the cutting edge of our diplomacy, playing a significant role in the dramatic transformation of Eastern and Central Europe. It has recently opened new posts in the former Soviet Union and plans to expand its presence there, as well as in Angola, Laos, and Cambodia. We also request $220 mil-lion in FY 1993 for the Board for International Broadcasting, up from $207 million in FY 1992.
Mr. Chairman, after this quick tour of our budget, I would like to conclude with a brief general observation: With the end of the Cold War, we have the opportunity to shape our future for decades to come--a real chance to create a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic world. As we look for ways to win the peace, I believe we should recall how the Cold War was won. The West's military might, the economic prowess of free markets, the universal appeal of ideas like freedom and democracy--all were crucial to our ultimate success. But it took American leadership to harness them together. It took our leadership to forge durable alliances. It took our leadership to lay the foundation of a truly global economic system. And it took our leadership to give voice to the cause of freedom even in its darkest hours. And, Mr. Chairman, it will again take American leadership--and a vigorous foreign policy led by a strong Department of State--to seize this historic moment and win a lasting peace. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

New US Embassies in the Former Soviet Union

Rogers Source: John F.W. Rogers, Under Secretary for Management Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on International Operations and on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 25 19922/25/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Subject: State Department, Democratization [TEXT] Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the opening of new US Embassies in the former Soviet Union. The disappearance of the US-USSR superpower confrontation has already changed the way we think about our nation's security and our children's future. The success of the political and economic reforms underway in this region is of vital concern to all Americans. But the success of these reforms is not assured. There are many pitfalls to be avoided if the new countries which are now being born are to develop into stable societies based on the democratic principles which we consider the only effective guarantee of a peaceful world. Secretary Baker recently told your full committee that one of our greatest challenges is to help the new states of the former Soviet Union find their place as peaceful, democratic, and prosperous members of the world community. We are committed to being fully engaged in this process. We want to ensure that our nation's influence is put to its full use in encouraging and assisting the transition to free, democratic societies. This is the reason Secretary Baker also told your committee that top priority would be given to opening new embassies in the former Soviet Union. To put this policy into action, the Department of State has already initiated an aggressive program of placing representatives of our government in the new states of the former Soviet Union. I would like to give you a short description of the measures we have underway, and then I will be happy to take your questions. Our policy on opening embassies follows two recent presidential decisions. On Christmas Day, the President recognized the independence of all 12 former republics and sought to conduct diplomatic relations with 6 of the republics--Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Following Secretary Baker's recent trip to the former Soviet Union, the President decided last week to establish relations with five more republics--Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Although the Secretary met with Georgian leaders in Moscow, we are not yet prepared to conduct full diplomatic relations with Georgia. We believe that Georgia must first have a legitimate government that expresses its commitment to a number of principles important to us and the international community. These are the same principles we have used as guidelines for establishing relations with the other former republics: -- Support for CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] principles; -- Respect for boundaries and commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes; -- Respect for the rights of opposition political forces to organize and have free access to the media; -- Respect for human rights and the rights of minorities; -- Freedom of emigration; -- Adherence to the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] either as a nuclear or non-nuclear weapon state; -- Adherence to international arms control conventions such as the BWC [Biological Weapons Convention] and a prospective CW [chemical weapons] agreement; -- Establishment of an effective export control system to prevent the export of technology used in the production of weapons of mass destruction; -- Responsible security policies; -- Movement toward a free market system; and -- Respect for international law and obligations, including the assumption, as appropriate, of the obligations and debts of the former Soviet Union. Secretary Baker has made it clear to all former republics that the depth, extent, and richness of our relations will depend upon their commitment to these principles. I am pleased to say that, within 5 weeks of the President's Christmas Day announcement, we had functioning embassies in the capitals of each of the six states with whom we had established diplomatic relations. We were the first country to open an embassy in Minsk, Yerevan, Alma-Ata, and Bishkek, and this fact has been noted and commented on very positively by the governments and people in each of the countries. Despite decades of relative isolation within the Soviet Union, we have found that the people of these new states retain a clearly positive image of the United States as a "can-do" nation, and their first contact with real Americans has confirmed what they had always thought. We also will be moving quickly in the wake of the President's most recent announcement and will open embassies in the next five capitals by March 15. Well before the President decided to recognize the former republics, we took several steps to expand our presence in what was then the Soviet Union. We opened a consulate general in Kiev in March 1991 and set up a "circuit rider" program at Embassy Moscow later that year. The circuit riders have traveled to the republics on a regular basis, met with a variety of contacts, and filed reports on their trips upon return to Moscow. Indeed, many of the contacts they established proved valuable in setting up our new posts. In July 1991, we began negotiations with the Soviet Foreign Ministry to open a consulate general in Khabarovsk in the Russian far east. Following the August coup, we tried to push these negotiations forward and also sought to open a number of additional consulates. It soon became clear, however, that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was inevitable and [that] we should wait to open embassies, rather than consulates, in the republic capitals. Following the President's Christmas Day announcement, Secretary Baker tasked me with opening the new embassies. We accredited our diplomats in Moscow to the Russian Federation, moved to open new embassies in Minsk, Byelarus; Yerevan, Armenia; Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan; and Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; and changed our former consulate general in Kiev to embassy status. Our experience in opening new embassies in Albania and the Baltics and our planning for the Soviet consulates helped us to respond quickly to the President's decision. Our major objective was to get our people on the ground and provide them with the tools and support they would need to establish small but functional embassies. We focused on three areas-- identifying and assigning qualified officers, putting together comprehensive supply and equipment kits, and doing as much advance work as possible to ease the officers' transition once they arrived in the capitals. With the exception of Embassy Kiev, we chose to staff these posts with seven State Department officers, with five of the officers to be assigned immediately and the remaining two officers to be assigned in FY 1993. Embassies of this size would be large enough to support our interests in these capitals but lean enough to reduce startup and operating costs. We also knew that these posts would be at the end of a long supply line and that it would be difficult to support a large initial presence. Ukraine is a special case--its large size and strategic and economic importance require a larger American presence, and we decided on an initial staff of 13 State officers. Russian remains the common language of these former republics, so virtually all of the officers we have identified are Russian speakers. We have been aggressive in breaking previous assignments to get the necessary officers in the Foreign Service to these new posts at this critical time. We also have sought volunteers from the Russian-speaking corps of our Civil Service. To give you an idea of the talent we have drawn upon, our Embassy in Minsk will be staffed by one native Russian speaker who tested at the 5/5 level, two 4/4 speakers, and two officers at the 3+/3+ level. In addition to having impressive Russian language skills, these and other officers have served, studied, or traveled extensively in the former Soviet Union and have well-developed area skills. A number of our officers are former USIA [US Information Agency] tour guides who lived and traveled extensively in the Trans-caucasus and Central Asia. We have several experts on nationalities questions and some officers who have Russian and the local language. Our Embassy in Kiev, for example, will have at least four Ukrainian speakers. We also have identified several Romanian speakers (which is the same as Moldovan) for Kishinev [Chisinau], two Azeri speakers for Baku, one Uzbek speaker for Tashkent, and one Dari speaker (which is similar to Tajik) for Dushanbe. In other cases, officers will have the opportunity to study the local language independently while at post. While this is a good start, it is obvious we will need much more expertise in these local languages in the near future, and we have tasked our Foreign Service Institute with preparing training programs in several local languages. Our talented officers are the key to these operations, but we wanted to make sure they had everything they needed to set up full, functioning embassies upon arrival in these cities. Because many of these capitals are in remote locations cut off from normal transportation lines, we decided the initial supplies should be sent in by special cargo flights. We put together complete embassy startup kits that could be loaded on pallets and airlifted into each city. This included communications equipment, faxes, office supplies, photocopiers, bottled water, MREs [meals ready to eat] for emergencies, parkas, etc. In order to communicate with the Department, each team traveled to post with a satellite phone system, and the support flights brought in additional communications equipment, allowing us to bypass primitive local phone lines and ensure that the teams were in touch with Washington from the moment they hit the ground. We also wanted to ease the teams' transition by doing as much advance work as possible. We sent Embassy Moscow's circuit riders to the capitals about a week before the teams arrived to take care of advance details--renting hotel rooms and vehicles, making initial contacts with the host government, and hiring a small number of local employees to provide essential services. They also made arrangements for the arrival of the support flights. As I mentioned at the outset, we were the first country to open embassies in these capitals and received a very warm welcome. Our flag-raising ceremonies were major events that received extensive press coverage by local, national, and, in some cases, international media. The ceremony in Bishkek was attended by the Kyrgyz President, and, as you may have read in The Washington Post, the Alma-Ata opening was attended by over 70 Americans who live in Kazakhstan, including an American choir which performed the "Star Spangled Banner" and "God Bless America." The governments were amazed and pleased by the rapidity with which we opened our embassies and have provided excellent support services, including additional phone lines, fuel, and other hard-to-acquire items. We hope to take advantage of this goodwill by working with these governments to acquire suitable office space and housing. We focused on property early in the post-opening process and Ambassador [Nicholas] Salgo, our Special Property Negotiator, has visited all the capitals where we have embassies and several of the cities where we will open in March. We are seeking suitable properties that will serve both short-term and long-term interests and are evaluating both purchase arrangements and long-term leases. We are not, however, planning to build any new chanceries. In addition, many of these countries wish to open missions in the United States, and we are willing to consider the type of successful property swap agreements we negotiated with China. Although suitable real estate is difficult to find in these cities, we have identified and moved into interim properties in Minsk, Bishkek, and Alma- Ata and are making good progress in Yerevan. We have had less success with housing, however, and we are looking at creative solutions, including setting up modular housing on purchased or leased land. We have been on the ground in these capitals for only 3 weeks, but our presence has already begun producing policy dividends. The reporting is off to a good start; our officers have begun providing excellent information on a wide variety of subjects, including local economic reform efforts, local views on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and first-hand readouts of the recent commonwealth meeting in Minsk. In addition, our embassies are in regular contact with senior government officials on important topics, including Operation Provide Hope assistance flights, GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations, and MFN [most-favored- nation] status. In the past, messages of this nature had to be passed through the republics' Moscow-based representatives, who had trouble getting through to their governments because of communications problems and were seldom able to give us any prompt feedback. We want to follow the President's latest announcement on diplomatic relations by opening embassies in Baku, Dushanbe, Ashkhabad, Kishinev [Chisinau], and Tashkent. We will have advance officers on the ground in these cities soon, and the embassies will open for business on March 15. We will draw on our outstanding corps of Russian-speaking officers, add a few officers who speak local languages, and go in with the same level of support we have provided the first posts. I am extremely pleased with our work so far--our embassies were the first to open in these new countries--we have staffed the posts with talented, language-qualified officers, and we have prepared a post-opening budget that makes efficient use of the Department's resources. As a result of these openings, we now have fully functioning embassies reporting on local conditions, dealing directly with the host government at the highest levels, helping with Western assistance and promoting stronger political, economic, and commercial ties. In addition to the new embassies, Vladivostok in the Russian far east recently was declared an open city, and we want to establish a small consulate general there rather than Khabarovsk, which we had considered earlier. This post will allow us to assist US investment in this region and track Russia's relations with its Asian neighbors. The consulate also will provide consular services for the growing number of American tourists and businessmen who are traveling to the Russian far east as well as visa services for Russians who want to visit the United States. The budget impact of opening these new missions goes well beyond anything we could have imagined before the August coup. The Department's FY 1992 budget assumed that we would maintain our presence in Moscow, Kiev, and St. Petersburg and open no new posts. Instead, following the Soviet breakup, we have upgraded Kiev to an embassy and moved to open nine new embassies in the former republics. We also are making plans to open a consulate general in Vladivostok and may open an embassy in Tbilisi once the President determines Georgia has met our criteria for diplomatic relations. This post opening program is one of our highest priorities, but the unanticipated costs have been a tremendous burden on our budget. We have met this gap by reprogramming and cutting funding from other budget priorities, including our deteriorating overseas equipment base. We estimate that the FY 1992 [salaries and expenses] costs to open and operate these new embassies will be about $28 million. We estimate that FY 1993 operating costs will reach $48.7 million. Last month, we submitted a reprogramming letter which identified $8.3 million for the first round of post openings. This week, we will submit a second reprogramming request for $2.8 million. We have offset our total costs by reassigning officers within the system, delaying funding for major equipment purchases, and using off-the-shelf equipment for the new posts. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

US Support for Mediation Between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 26 19922/26/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: Azerbaijan, Armenia Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] The US Government strongly supports Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's constructive efforts to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We call upon both the Armenian and Azerbaijani Governments to implement the communique issued on February 20 by Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers. Implementing this communique would be a significant step toward ending the violence in Nagorno-Karabakh and beginning the process of resolving the conflict through good faith negotiation. The US Government has consistently stated that a lasting solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute can only be achieved through good faith negotiations between the parties themselves. The Russian-Kazakh mediation effort, renewed by Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev last week, offers the best hope for beginning such good faith negotiations. The US Government also welcomes the recent CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] rapporteur mission to the region and CSCE support for Foreign Minister Kozyrev's mediation effort. At the same time, the US Government is deeply concerned by reports of escalating fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh and continuing blockades throughout the region. This escalation of fighting only increases human suffering and further complicates efforts to achieve a lasting resolution to the conflict. The blockades must end, particularly at a time when the rest of the world community is coming together to relieve humanitarian need in Azerbaijan and Armenia. We urge all sides to end the fighting and lift blockades in the region. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

US Prepares for UN Conference on Environment and Development

Bohlen Source: Curtis Bohlen, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Description: Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 26 19922/26/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: Azerbaijan, Armenia Subject: Science/Technology, United Nations, Environment, Resource Management [TEXT] I appreciate the opportunity to discuss US preparations for the UN Conference on Environment and Development and what this conference means for the United States and its citizens. The conference, commonly referred to as UNCED, will take place June 1-12, 1992, in Rio de Janeiro. Next week, on March 2, the fourth and final meeting of the Preparatory Committee [PrepCom] for the conference will begin at UN Headquarters in New York. We face a formidable task in New York. The committee must complete work on all of the documents being proposed for adoption in Rio. These include an action program, called "Agenda 21," that will guide national and international environmental and developmental efforts into the 21st century; a declaration of general principles; and a statement of forest principles. These are to be negotiated by some 160 governments. Progress so far has been understandably slow, since such documents normally require unanimous approval. Until now, most of the drafting work has been done by the secretariat, not governments. In addition, global conventions on climate and on the conservation of biological diversity are currently being negotiated in separate UN committees, with the goal of having them ready for signature at the Rio conference.
Significance of UNCED
What UNCED achieves can make a great difference. Despite increasing efforts in the United States and abroad to be mindful of the environment, and despite decades of attention to the needs of developing nations, the global problems of poverty and environmental degradation have never been more pressing. The essential purpose of UNCED is to adopt or encourage the development of global, regional, and national strategies that address both environment and development simultaneously. By working in concert, the world's nations can make greater strides toward achieving environmentally sound development than by separately pursuing fragmented programs. This tenet--that all nations, rich and poor, should pursue sustainable development--promises multiple benefits: more efficient use of nature's resources, including energy; rising living standards and the prospect that this trend would be sustained; improvements in health; and abatement of environmental degradation. The United States is positioned to benefit commercially as well. Environmentally sound products, services, and technology will make up a large and growing segment of world trade in the coming century. We have a great deal to offer in this regard and should take advantage of the commercial opportunities presented by the transition to environmentally sound development.
Sustainable Development
Let me say a few words about what we mean by sustainable development. It is not another foreign aid concept nor just a new twist in the way rich countries deal with developing nations. Ideally, it would influence the planning of investors of all sizes and nationalities, from the individual farmer to the multi-national corporation, as well as the way governments at all levels reach decisions and spend their money. Sustainable development requires a long-term perspective: Where will Los Angeles get its fresh water 20 or 50 years from now? How will the world get past current dependence on oil and meet the energy needs of a burgeoning and wealthier population in the next century? How will the people of Bangladesh feed themselves, not through handouts but by earning their own way? These problems cannot be solved by the city of Los Angeles alone, or by the petroleum industry alone, or by the people of Bangladesh alone. They require strategic thinking, purposeful investment, and coordinated effort on a local, national, and international scale. Sustainable development involves providing for the future so that our children and grandchildren will have opportunities equal to, or greater than, our own. But that is only part of the concept. It implies judicious use of resources, in the sense both of economic efficiency and of husbanding resources to serve future needs as well as present needs. It requires the accumulation and diffusion of scientific knowledge and of environmentally sound technologies. Equally fundamental, the process of making developmental or economic policy decisions must fully integrate environmental concerns. How will UNCED bring this about? Not in a day, by government fiat, as a result of one meeting of high officials in Rio de Janeiro. UNCED can profoundly influence our world for the better, but this depends on what is decided there and on the dedication of governments and international agencies to implement the principles and programs that may emerge from Rio. Although the final UNCED documents will be non-binding, they should represent a strong statement of political will. Agenda 21 will contain a lengthy menu of recommended actions. We, and many other countries, believe that priorities for this action program must be set at the national level. Successful implementation of Agenda 21, we believe, will require a democratic process, involving public participation policymaking. Similarly, sustainable development cannot be achieved without the conviction and adherence of the private sector and reliance on market mechanisms. We are working to ensure that these principles shape the UNCED documents throughout.
US Priorities
The United States has taken the lead in developing realistic and achievable programs to address high-priority environmental and development issues. No other country has submitted as many constructive proposals. Global forest convention. Negotiation of a global forest convention has been a top US priority. At the beginning of the UNCED process, we had hoped that a framework convention could be concluded in time for signature at the Rio conference, but June 1992 was too tight a deadline, given that limited staffs in many countries were already hard pressed to negotiate conventions on climate change and bio-diversity during the same time frame. We have successfully gained widespread support for negotiation of a non-binding statement of principles on forest conservation and management. Our goal is to have the forest principles adopted at Rio to serve as the basis for international negotiations on a forest convention soon after. Prior to PrepCom III last August, the United States circulated a proposal on forest principles that might comprise the basic elements of a global forest convention. This included principles on sustainable management, conservation, reforestation, indigenous peoples, fuel wood, research, education, training, international cooperation, and curbing the effects of pollution and climate change. PrepCom III produced a draft text that incorporated many of the US proposals, but it also contained problematic language on such issues as financial assistance, technology transfer, and trade. In New York, we need to iron out these differences. Technology cooperation. Technology cooperation is an area in which UNCED can be of particular benefit to developing countries. Unfortunately, however, the discussion in UNCED has tended to focus on intellectual property rights and the perceived needs of developing countries to obtain technology on concessional terms. Most environmentally sound, appropriate technology is in the public domain. But we believe that the protection of intellectual property rights is actually in the interest of developing countries in order to make privately held technology more widely available. The real necessity, in our view, is to help developing countries build internal capacity to identify their needs for technology, to keep abreast of what technology is available, and to utilize it effectively. The United States has proposed a program to facilitate developing country access to technology. Among other features, it would provide measures to improve national capacity to adapt and use environmentally sound technologies; to make it easier for developing countries to search for information on needed technology; and to assist developing countries to assess their resources, constraints, and options. We recognize that even the best program will fall short without an adequate government policy framework and are prepared to assist in this area as well. Effective implementation of Agenda 21 will depend on having the right institutional frameworks. A major point to emphasize is that many actions in the Agenda 21 program will need to be implemented by national or local governments; each government must establish its own priorities. This does not obviate a need to strengthen institutions and cooperation among UN agencies on environment and development. The United States has submitted a six-point proposal to this end, which has substantial support in at least some of its features. Protection of marine environment. We are also taking the lead in identifying concrete measures related to protection of the marine environment. The United States has tabled four detailed papers on oceans issues, which formed the basis for the oceans text in Agenda 21. We are seeking adoption of conservation principles to control human activities that threaten survivability of marine species, to protect endangered species, and to promote sustainable fishing practices on the high seas. We have placed high priority on an action plan to address land-based sources of marine pollution, which constitute the major threat to the health of the oceans. Other proposals include greater emphasis on collecting ocean data, environmental monitoring, and more effective coastal zone management. Man-made pollution. Addressing the problem of man-made pollution, the United States has proposed new international approaches to problems of toxic chemicals, solid waste, and hazardous waste. We have led efforts at UNCED to promote the harmonization of chemical classification and labeling systems. This will convey better health safety information to the public and lead toward freer trade. The United States has also promoted community right-to-know programs, concerning chemical risks to communities. This program and a system of toxic release inventories have encouraged voluntary reductions of chemical emissions in the United States. Biological diversity. Finally, the US delegation has emphasized a viable approach in Agenda 21 to the conservation of biological diversity. Our approach emphasizes eco-system management and the essential role of scientific research. In addition, the United States successfully lobbied for separate program areas on population problems and the role of women and indigenous peoples. We have actively participated in the debate on development issues such as poverty and human settlements.
Developing Country Priorities
The policy differences that divide industrialized countries from developing countries reflect a difference of outlook and philosophy, as well as the reality of the gap in levels of development. Developing nations are, understandably, concerned with overcoming their economic disadvantage. Many are still unconvinced when we tell them that development and environmental objectives are compatible. The success of PrepCom IV in completing Agenda 21 will depend heavily on the ability of delegations to deal effectively with the question of how to finance new approaches to sustainable development. The United States believes that UNCED should forge an international partnership to promote sustainable development. This includes reviewing how all governments and international institutions have been promoting development and re-orienting financial assistance toward sustainable programs. The result of lasting importance will be the commitment to share in a global effort. Over the medium to long term, sustainable investment strategies will yield faster economic growth and greater financial capabilities in developing countries than ad hoc development that degrades the environment and wastes resources. Thus, the most valuable consensus UNCED could form with respect to financial resources, in our view, would be to call for a re- orientation of investment decision-making toward sustainable development objectives.
The Conventions
In parallel with the UNCED preparatory process, many of the same countries are engaged in negotiating binding conventions on climate change and biological diversity. The US goal is to complete each of these in time for signature at Rio. The climate change negotiations are entering their second year. The fifth session is currently in progress in New York, and the last will be held in April or May. Several concepts introduced or supported by the United States are now widely accepted by most countries, namely to: -- Take into account all greenhouse gases; -- Calculate current emissions by individual countries; -- Prepare national response strategies and reports; and -- Promote technology cooperation in helping developing countries prepare their national strategies. Other issues are still being negotiated, including the extent of commitments to reduce emissions and the nature of financial mechanisms for assisting developing countries. In 1989, at the initiative of the United States, the UN Environment Program called for negotiation of a framework convention for the conservation of biological diversity. This concept received G-7 [Group of Seven] endorsement at the Houston and London economic summits. An international negotiating committee has now held four sessions. The United States has emphasized the importance of conserving biological diversity, subject to national law, within and beyond national jurisdiction; expanded cooperation in data acquisition and research on species and habitat; and access to biological resources on a non-discriminatory basis. Progress has been made on scientific and technical issues related to conservation. The negotiators are still searching for means to bridge large gaps between North and South on funding and financial mechanisms. Some countries are seeking to use the convention to regulate biotechnology, a position the United States cannot accept. The last negotiating session prior to Rio will be convened in Nairobi next May.
Once again, I am grateful for the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss US objectives for UNCED and some of the issues that remain to be decided. We welcome your advice on any aspect of US preparations for PrepCom IV and the Rio conference to help achieve US objectives. We look forward to the full participation of congressional advisers from both the House and the Senate in Rio early next June. An effective partnership between the Administration and the Congress will make an important contribution to a successful outcome to what may prove to be the most important international meeting of this decade. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

El Salvador: FMLN Delays Peace Commitment

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Statement, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 4 19923/4/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Whole World Country: El Salvador Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] We are disappointed with the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] leadership's decision not to comply with the peace accords signed last month in Mexico City by delaying their entry into designated cease-fire zones. This is the first serious infraction of the accords. The failure to comply with the agreement to move into cease-fire zones by March 2 contrasts sharply with the positive record of both sides in meeting most other commitments of the peace accords. In the past month, the Salvadoran Government abolished the Treasury Police and the National Guard; the Salvadoran Assembly named a human rights ombudsman and a new electoral commission and passed constitutional amendments reforming the armed forces. We hope the United Nations and the Salvadoran National Peace Commission, which have been instrumental to the peace process, will be able to resolve this situation. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

Potential for US Private Sector Activity in Angola

Davidow Source: Jeffrey Davidow, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Mar, 3 19923/3/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] (introductory remarks deleted) I have recently returned from Angola and would like to share my impressions of that country with you. I believe that the peace process is working, though not without difficulties; that there will be internationally monitored elections in September of this year; and that, once the people of Angola have chosen their government, the United States will establish full and, I hope, productive relations with it. Our commitment is to make the peace process work and to give the people of Angola their first real opportunity to select their governors. The signing of the Angola peace accords on May 31, 1991, provided that country's first real hope of peace in nearly 30 years. A Joint Political Military Commission (JPMC), composed of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the government, oversees implementation of the accords. Along with Portugal and Russia, we participate in the JPMC as observers. Accomplishments have been significant. The cease-fire has been honored. Formation of the new national army has begun successfully. Extension of civilian administration throughout the national territory is proceeding. Under Red Cross auspices, over 900 political prisoners have been released by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola (GPRA) and more than 3,000 by UNITA. Major roads have been reopened and the free circulation of people and goods is expanding. UNAVEM II, the UN Angola Verification Mission, has established an effective and respected national presence to monitor the cease-fire. The United Nations is also preparing to assist in elections, and the Secretary General has appointed a special representative to oversee all UN activities in Angola. Political reform has advanced in preparation for the holding of free and fair multiparty elections as required by the accords. At last count, 27 new political parties had announced their formation; political rallies were occurring without interference. Regretably, the GPRA, which is responsible for setting an official election date, has not yet done so, causing unnecessary uncertainty in the process. But I believe that this will soon be rectified. Our liaison office in Luanda, which opened 10 days after the signing of the accords, has worked tirelessly to ensure the effective implementation of the accords. We have sought to draw attention to the need for an active UN presence in the military, political, and humanitarian spheres. We have also personally engaged [Angolan] President Dos Santos and UNITA President Savimbi in the peace process, both in our meetings with them in Luanda and in their respective visits to Washington in the fall of 1991. But we have not limited our participation to observing and dispensing advice. We recognize that the two parties must have not only the will but also the means to move from cease-fire to elections. Working with the United Nations and the donor community, the United States has sought to ensure that appropriate resources were available. When serious food shortages developed early in the cantonment process, we persuaded the United Nations to mount an emergency program for demobilizing soldiers in assembly areas. We also were the major contributor to that emergency program, providing 7,300 metric tons of grain, money for airlifts, and thousands of tents and excess military rations. We are continuing to provide significant humanitarian assistance for the many thousands of war- affected civilians under the UN special relief program. We have also been working to make resources available for a transitional aid program in Angola. On February 19, the President signed a determination waiving the prohibition on direct assistance to Angola. This will allow us to use at least $3 million for technical assistance, materials, and commodities for elections, in cooperation with the United Nations, and non- partisan training for political parties through US party institutes. Another $10 million will fund social and economic reintegration programs for former combatants, resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, [and] humanitarian and other programs necessary to implement the peace accords. These will be implemented through US private voluntary organizations. Despite major progress to date, no one would claim that the process of transition in Angola has been without problems--far from it. Serious delays have plagued implementation almost from the beginning. The cantonment of troops, scheduled to begin in July, only started gaining momentum in October and slowed considerably at the beginning of 1992. Similar delays have affected the release of prisoners, the extension of central administration, the integration of the police, and political consultations. Some of these are attributable to logistical or organizational problems. Others can be traced to lack of resources, to lack of know-how, or, in some cases, [to] lack of trust. All of them require energy and determination from all parties to resolve. We realize that the observers have played, and will continue to play, a key role in focusing the parties' attention on resolving remaining issues. With that in mind, I visited Luanda at the beginning of February to assess personally the status of implementation. In meetings with President Dos Santos and President Savimbi, I underscored our concerns on these two issues. I urged them to come to agreement quickly on a plan for completing the troop assembly process and beginning demobilization. I also encouraged President Dos Santos to move as quickly as possible on approving an electoral law and to work closely with the United Nations to begin concrete preparations for elections. At the same time, I encouraged Savimbi's cooperation with the GPRA in placing civilian government personnel throughout the country so that free elections can be held and verified. During these meetings, I was impressed by the continued personal commitment of both leaders to the peace process. Since that time, there has been a burst of energy on both political and military fronts. The JPMC has approved a military demobilization plan and set guidelines for the insertion of civilian administrators in areas under UNITA's control. Joint police monitoring teams are operating under new reporting guidelines. Agreement has also been reached on the composition of a national electoral commission and on related electoral issues. In cooperation with the United Nations, the GPRA is completing an electoral budget and has held a donors conference to garner support for the electoral process. US trade and economic relations with Angola are evolving in light of the new realities. Angola is potentially one of the richest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with extensive petroleum reserves, rich agricultural land, and valuable mineral resources. The US private sector has long recognized this potential, especially in the petroleum area. There has never been a prohibition on US companies operating in Angola; many of them have done so. Indeed, in 1991, the United States was Angola's largest trading partner: Imports from Angola, mainly oil, totaled nearly $1.8 billion; US exports to Angola totaled $188 million. The Angolan economy remains in a distressing state, but some progress has been made. There are signs that the economy is turning from a centralized, command-style past toward a free market future. Economic reforms designed to pave the way for a market-based economy were instituted last year. These included devaluations of the currency, decontrol of prices on most commodities, and an end to the special and complementary supply system. Legislation to enact further reforms, such as a reduction in the size of the public sector and reform of the investment code, is under consideration. Over the years, Congress has enacted various legislation constraining US assistance, investment, and trade with respect to Angola. In 1989, for example, Congress prohibited US support for loans to Angola in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, unless the President certified that progress was being made toward national reconciliation. The President did so on June 19, 1991. Our policy toward Angola in international financial institutions is now guided by the same economic and technical criteria that govern our decisions with respect to other countries. This is as it should be and is the model of progressive normalization that we should implement in other areas as Angola moves toward free and fair elections. Action will be required on a number of fronts. For a number of years, direct assistance to Angola has been prohibited by a provision in the annual foreign assistance appropriations act. As I noted earlier, the President signed a determination on February 19, 1992, waiving that prohibition to the extent necessary to provide up to $14.5 million in US aid to the process of democratization and the implementation of the peace accords in FY 1992 only. Apart from this limited waiver, however, the prohibition on direct assistance remains in force. If reenacted for future fiscal years, it would bar a normal and much needed development assistance program. At present, under Section 901(j) of the Internal Revenue Code, US firms are not allowed foreign tax credits with respect to income earned in Angola. The resulting double taxation places the American private sector at a competitive disadvantage and discourages further US investment. Section 901(j) does not refer expressly to Angola but rather to countries whose governments we do not recognize and with respect to which we do not maintain diplomatic relations. After free and fair elections are held in Angola, we plan to recognize the government that is elected and will establish diplomatic relations. Once that is done, foreign tax credits will be permitted. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) assistance for US exports to Angola is currently the subject of four separate statutory provisions: 1. The ban on direct assistance mentioned earlier which expressly applies to Exim[bank] support; 2. The Marxist-Leninist list in the Eximbank act, which includes Angola; 3. A requirement in the Eximbank act that the President certify not only that all Cuban troops have left Angola but also that all military advisors of Marxist-Leninist countries depart; and 4. A further provision in the Eximbank act that calls for a presidential certification that free and fair elections have been held and certain other conditions have been met, although this provision does not apply if it imposes, as it now does, more restrictive requirements on Angola than generally on all other countries. Another statutory provision bans the Department of Defense from procuring Angolan petroleum products. Clearly, as further progress is made in the Angolan peace process, we will want to work in close cooperation with Congress to surmount these legislative hurdles to normal trade relations. In both political and economic terms, the current climate in Angola is a hopeful one but not a perfect one by any means. It would be foolish to underestimate the obstacles ahead. We believe that the recent sense of urgency evident in Luanda must continue to spur all parties to action. The past 9 months have demonstrated the capacity of Angolans and the international community to work together effectively to establish peace. The next 9 months will test the ability of the same parties to consolidate those gains and ensure that the peace accords achieve their ultimate goal-- a free and democratic Angola on the road to economic development and prosperity. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

Department Statements on Africa: Southern Africa: Drought and Food Crisis

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola, Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Zambia, Malawi Subject: Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] A severe drought with resultant food shortage is developing in Southern Africa. Affected areas include all or parts of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In some areas, the drought is the worst seen this century. It comes at a time when food reserves are already low, due to poor harvests last year. In response to the impending crisis, the US Agency for International Development is sending teams to the region to assess the magnitude of the drought, the extent of the food shortage, and the potential impact on the region's population. Preliminary estimates from our missions in the region and from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization indicate that food imports to the region could top 7 million metric tons from August 1992 to May 1993, compared to normal importation requirements of 2 million metric tons. More than half of that total food demand will be met through commercial purchases, primarily by South Africa. However, considerable donor assistance will be needed to avert a major humanitarian crisis in the region. We have begun intensive consultations with other potential donors to develop a coordinated response.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

Department Statements on Africa: Developments in Kenya

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: Mar, 3 19923/3/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Kenya Subject: Democratization [TEXT] In a welcome development, in December 1991, the Government of Kenya authorized multiple parties. Genuine multipartyism, however, can only exist with the respect of basic freedoms, including freedom of speech and assembly, freedom for political parties to organize, and freedom from intimidation. The government is responsible for ensuring that these freedoms are enforced. The US Government is deeply concerned that, after Kenya's multi-party democracy's promising start, these freedoms are being violated. Opposition parties face growing obstacles to organizing and holding rallies. Their members are physically attacked with disturbing frequency. In an incident today, the police forcibly dispersed peaceful demonstrators in Nairobi who were calling for the release of political prisoners. We urge the government to take all appropriate actions to ensure the respect of key freedoms by preventing further violence and intimidation and promoting dialogue over confrontation. Failure to do so would jeopardize Kenya's commitment to multi-party democracy and to the democratization process.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:

Department Statements on Africa: Human Rights Situation in Chad

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: Mar, 4 19923/4/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Chad Subject: Democratization, Human Rights [TEXT] The US Government supports the program of democratization and economic and military reform undertaken by the Government of Chad. During the past year, the Government of Chad has permitted press freedom and the formation of political parties. It is now in the process of organizing a national conference to take place in May. We are, however, concerned about the reports of rising violence in N'Djamena and the involvement of security forces in attacks on private citizens. Of particular concern are the murder of human rights activist Joseph Behidi on February 16 and reports of the use of excessive force by government troops following the violent incidents at the Chagoua Bridge in N'Djamena on February 21. Our Ambassador in N'Djamena has expressed our concerns to the highest levels of the Government of Chad. He has also advised the Government of Chad of the continuing interest and concern within the international community regarding the human rights situation in Chad. We urge the Government of Chad to conduct a full and impartial investigation of the murder of Joseph Behidi and to bring the perpetrators to justice. We urge the Chadian people to resolve their differences through peaceful dialogue and legitimate political means. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 10, March 9, 1992 Title:


PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 16 19923/16/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Subject: State Department [TEXT] Correction In Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 10, page 190, the attribution sentence following the title should read, "Statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Washington, DC, March 3, 1992." (###)