US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: Two Years After Cartagena: Assessing
Accomplishments and Plans
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpt from prepared statement at the Opening Plenary
Session of the San Antonio Drug Summit
Date: Feb, 27 19922/27/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: United States, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru
Subject: Narcotics
[TEXT]
It is a great honor and pleasure to call to order a historic meeting, in a
historic city, in a historic state--my home state of Texas. We are all here
to make this San Antonio Drug Summit as successful as the first summit
called by [Colombian] President Barco 2 years ago in beautiful, "heroic"
Cartagena. It is fitting to begin this meeting with a warm tribute to the
great, visionary man who first brought us together on this issue, Virgilio
Barco.
In Cartagena, as [Bolivian] President Paz Zamora, who is also here today,
will recall, we faced a daunting, unprecedented--some thought, hopeless--
challenge: How to unite against the scourge of drugs, violence, and
corruption that was undermining our democratic societies, our institutions,
our economies, and our environment.
That meeting gave birth to a new alliance to strengthen our democracies by
attacking the drug trafficking and consumption with greater resolve than
ever before. Cartagena was when we stopped the finger-pointing and
committed ourselves to cooperation, when we recognized that drugs are an
international plague caused by both consumer and supplier.
Two years later, the situation has markedly improved. We are facing the
challenge; we are united; we are resolute; we are prevailing. We are now
seven, not four. We welcome to this group Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador,
all of whom have shown firm leadership and courage in this struggle. Others
in the Americas and Europe are with us, seeing the threat more clearly.
Progress is being made. We have courageously faced those who would
subvert our societies, break our laws, and kill thousands of innocents. Top
traffickers are dead or jailed; record levels of cocaine and other drugs have
been seized; cultivation has leveled off; interdiction is up worldwide; we
have cracked down on drug users; consumption is declining as our people
increasingly reject drugs, especially our youth; our judicial institutions are
stronger, better able to meet the challenge; our efforts against money-
laundering, chemical diversion, and illegal arms exports are improving.
We are here today because the job is not yet done. We have not yet won this
fight. It is time to assess our accomplishments and our plans--to learn
from the past and look to the future. Let me mention what seems to me to
be some priority areas.
First and foremost, we must reduce demand. All else will fail if we do not
do that. I know that task falls heaviest on the United States, and we have
made a good beginning. Since I came to office, there has been a 35%
decrease in current cocaine users, and 27% fewer young people are using
drugs.
Second, we must continue the economic reform, economic assistance, debt,
trade, and investment measures which are so important to our anti-
narcotics programs. The United States wants alternative development to
succeed.
I am sure Peruvian and Bolivian peasants will stop growing illegal coca if
there is an alternative besides starvation. The stick of law enforcement
must have a carrot--an offer of viable economic alternatives for poor
peasants.
Third, we must continue and enhance our effectiveness in eradication,
interdiction, and law enforcement that have been so critical to our success
thus far. Just as demand reduction will lower supply, so supply reduction
will lessen demand. We have laid this out in the "strategy for action" that
is part of our declaration. We must make it happen.
Fourth, we must look carefully and imaginatively at what might be called
non-violent law-enforcement measures. We must strengthen and harmonize
our laws on money-laundering, arms, exports, chemical controls, asset
seizure, and in other areas. It is here that the long arm of the law can
fracture the power of the traffickers. The anti-racketeering laws in the
United States have proven to be one of the strongest measures we have
developed in recent years.
Fifth, our judicial systems need our attention. Many of us have underway
legal reforms so that we can handle criminal cases faster, more securely,
and more effectively. These are important and should proceed. We must
also cooperate by sharing information about traffickers and their crimes so
they can be brought to justice.
Sixth, our cooperation has developed in the past 2 years, and I welcome that.
We need to keep in close touch so that we can coordinate strategy and
understand each others' perspectives and needs. That makes the high-level
follow-on meeting very important. It will be the first review of how our
"strategies for action" are progressing. We also must enlist the cooperation
of the Europeans and Asians. To do that, we should send a delegation to
those countries to talk to their leaders.
Seventh, heroin production is a worrisome problem which Mexico and
Colombia are moving against with some success. This is a sign the
traffickers believe the cocaine trade is declining. We cannot ignore this
new threat, or we risk a surprise in the future.
Eighth, we must do a better job educating our press and our publics about
our progress. In the United States, for example, we are seeing a downturn in
demand that was purchased at great cost in money and effort. Another
example is the story of the drop in cultivation in the Chapare in Bolivia.
Ninth, as we up the struggle within our own countries with renewed vigor,
we must bear in mind that our efforts transcend borders. We must respect
sovereignty, or our cooperation will not be sustained. But, as sovereign
states, we can agree to cooperate against the traffickers who trample on
sovereignty. If we do not work together, the traffickers will destroy us
separately.
Finally, one more note of great importance. Everything we do must conform
to our democratic principles. None of us wants a drug-free dictatorship. We
must protect the human and civil rights of our citizens. We are all
committed to defending democracy and its principles as we defeat the
scourge of drugs.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: Declaration of San Antonio
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of joint declaration
Date: Feb, 27 19922/27/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: United States, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru
Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
We, the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and the
United States of America, and the Minister of Foreign Relations of
Venezuela, met in San Antonio, Texas, on the 26th and 27th of February, one
thousand nine hundred and ninety-two and issued the following Declaration
of San Antonio:
We recognize that the Cartagena Declaration, issued on February 15, 1990,
by the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and the United States of
America, laid the foundation for the development of a comprehensive and
multilateral strategy to address the problem of illegal drugs. Those of us
who represent the countries that met in Cartagena strongly reaffirm the
commitments assumed at that time. Meeting now as representatives of
seven governments, we express our determination to move beyond the
achievements of Cartagena, build upon the progress attained, and adapt
international cooperation to the new challenges arising from worldwide
changes in the drug problem.
We recognize that the overall problem of illegal drugs and related crimes
represents a direct threat to the health and well-being of our peoples, to
their economies, to the national security of our countries, and to harmony in
international relations. Drugs lead to violence and addiction, threaten
democratic institutions, and waste economic and human resources that
could be used for the benefit of our societies.
We applaud the progress achieved over the past two years in reducing
cocaine production, in lowering demand, in reducing cultivation for illicit
purposes, in carrying out alternative development programs, and in
dismantling and disrupting transnational drug trafficking organizations and
their financial support networks. The close cooperation among our
governments and their political will have led to an encouraging increase in
drug seizures and in the effectiveness of law enforcement actions. Also as
a result of this cooperation and political will, a number of the principal
drug lords who were actively engaged in the drug trade two years ago are in
prison in several countries. Alternative development programs have proven
to be an effective strategy for replacing coca cultivation in producer
countries.
Although we are encouraged by these achievements, we recognize that
mutual cooperative efforts must be expanded and strengthened in all areas.
We call on all sectors of society, notably the media, to increase their
efforts in the anti-drug struggle. The role of the media is very important,
and we urge them to intensify their valuable efforts. We undertake to
promote, through the media, the values essential to a healthy society.
In addition to the cocaine problem, we recognize the need to remain alert to
the expansion of the production, trafficking, and consumption of heroin,
marijuana, and other drugs. We emphasize the need to exert greater control
over substances used in the production of these drugs, and to broaden
consultations on the eradication of these illegal crops.
We are convinced that our anti-drug efforts must be conducted on the basis
of the principle of shared responsibility and in a balanced manner. It is
essential to confront the drug problem through an integrated approach,
addressing demand, cultivation for illicit purposes, production, trafficking,
and illegal distribution networks, as well as related crimes, such as traffic
in firearms and in essential and precursor chemicals, and money laundering.
In addition, our governments will continue to perfect strategies that include
alternative development, eradication, control and interdiction, the
strengthening of judicial systems, and the prevention of illicit drug use.
We recognize the fundamental importance of strengthening judicial systems
to ensure that effective institutions exist to bring criminals to justice. We
assume responsibility for strengthening judicial cooperation among our
countries to attain these objectives. We reaffirm our intention to carry out
these efforts in full compliance with the international legal framework for
the protection of human rights.
We reaffirm that cooperation among us must be carried out in accordance
with our national laws, with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of our nations, and in strict observance of international law.
We recognize that the problem of illicit drugs is international. All
countries directly or indirectly affected by the drug problem should take
upon themselves clear responsibilities and actions in the anti-drug effort.
We call on the countries of the region to strengthen national and
international cooperative efforts and to participate actively in regional
programs. We recognize that in the case of Peru, complicity between narco-
trafficking and terrorism greatly complicates the anti-drug effort,
threatens democratic institutions, and undermines the viability of the
Peruvian economy.
We express our support for the anti-drug struggle being carried out by our
sister nations of the Western Hemisphere, we call on them to increase their
efforts, and we offer to strengthen our governments' cooperation with them
through specific agreements they may wish to sign. We value and encourage
regional unity in this effort.
We note with concern the opening and expansion of markets for illicit drugs,
particularly cocaine, in Europe and Asia. We call upon the nations of those
continents and on other member countries of the international community to
strengthen, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, cooperation in the
anti-drug effort in which the nations of the Western Hemisphere are
engaged. To this end, we have agreed to form a high-level group with
representatives designated by the signatory countries of this Declaration,
to visit other countries of this Hemisphere, Europe, and Japan, with the
purpose of inviting them to participate actively in the efforts and
cooperative strategies described in this Declaration.
We reaffirm our solid commitment to the anti-drug efforts of international
organizations, notably the United Nations and the Organization of American
States. Inspired by the mandate of the Inter-American Commission on the
Control of Drug Abuse, we express our full support for this programs.
We recognize the fundamental importance of strong economies and
innovative economic initiatives to the successful conduct of the anti-drug
effort. Further progress in the areas of trade and investment will be
essential. We support the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative as a means
of improving economic conditions in the Hemisphere, and we are encouraged
by the progress the countries of the region have made in restructuring their
economies.
We reaffirm the importance of alternative development in the anti-drug
effort. We note that the victims of narco-trafficking in the region include
those sectors of society that live in extreme poverty and that are attracted
to illicit drug production and trafficking as a means of livelihood. We
consider that if our efforts to reduce illegal drug trafficking are to be
successful, it will be essential to offer legitimate options that generate
employment and income.
We propose to achieve the objectives and goals defined above in this
Declaration and in its attached Strategies for Action.
Recognizing the need to ensure cohesion and progress in our anti-drug
efforts, our governments intend to hold a high-level meeting on an annual
basis.
In order to broaden international anti-drug efforts still further, we invite
additional countries or representatives of groups of countries to associate
themselves with this Declaration.
Done at San Antonio, Texas, on this, the 27th day of February, 1992, in the
English and Spanish languages.
For Bolivia - President Jaime Paz Zamora
For Colombia - President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo
For Ecuador - President Rodrigo Borja Cevallos
For Mexico - President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
For Peru - President Alberto Fujimori
For the United States of America - President George Bush
For Venezuela - Foreign Minister Armando Duran
Strategies for Drug Control and the Strengthening of the
Administration of Justice
The Countries intend to strengthen unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral
enforcement efforts and strengthen judicial systems to attack illicit
trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursor and
essential chemicals. The Countries are determined to combat drug
trafficking organizations through the arrests, prosecution, sentencing, and
imprisonment of their leaders, lieutenants, members, accomplices, and
accessories through the seizure and forfeiture of their assets, pursuant to
the Countries' respective domestic legal systems and laws in force. To
attain these objectives, the Countries intend to carry out coordinated
cooperative actions through their national institutions.
Enforcement efforts cannot be carried out without economic programs such
as alternative development.
The Countries request financial support from the international community in
order to obtain funds for alternative development programs in nations that
require assistance.
(1) Training Centers
The Countries intend to provide training for the personnel who are
responsible for or support the counter-drug battle in the signatory
Countries at national training centers already in existence in the region.
Emphasis will be given to the specialties of each of these centers in which
personnel from governments of the other Countries may be enrolled as
appropriate, in accordance with their respective legal systems. The
signatory Countries, other governments, and international organizations are
encouraged to provide financial and technical support for this training.
(2) Regional Information Sharing
The Countries intend to expand reciprocal information sharing concerning
the activities of organizations, groups, and persons engaged in illicit drug
trafficking. The Countries will establish channels of communication to
ensure the rapid dissemination of information for purposes of effective
enforcement. This information sharing will be consistent with the security
procedures, laws, and regulations of each country.
(3) Control of Sovereign Air Space
The Countries recognize that drug traffickers move illicit drugs via
identified air corridors and without regard to international borders or
national airspace. The Countries also recognize that monitoring of airspace
is an important factor in the apprehension of aircraft and crews involved in
illicit drug traffic.
The Countries recognize that there is a need to exchange timely information
on potential drug traffickers in and around each country's sovereign air
space.
The Countries also agree to exchange information on their experiences and
to provide one another with technical assistance in detecting, monitoring,
and controlling aerial drug trafficking, when such assistance is required in
accordance with the domestic laws of each country and international laws
in force.
(4) Aircraft, Airfield and Landing Strip Control
The Countries, recognizing that private and commercial aircraft are being
utilized with increasing frequency in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances, intend to establish and increase the necessary
enforcement actions to prevent the utilization of such aircraft, pursuant to
the domestic laws of each country and international regulations in force.
The Countries also intend, if necessary, to examine their domestic
regulations pertaining to civil aviation in order to prevent the illicit use of
aircraft and airports. They will also take the enforcement measures
necessary to prevent the establishment of clandestine landing strips and
eliminate those already in existence.
The Countries will cooperate closely with each other in providing mutual
assistance when requested in order to investigate aircraft suspected of
illicit drug trafficking. The Countries, pursuant to their domestic legal
systems, also intend to seize and confiscate private aircraft when it has
been proven that they have been used in the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances.
(5) Maritime Control Actions;
As called for in Article 17 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the Countries
intend to strengthen cooperation to eliminate to the extent possible illicit
trafficking by sea. To this end, they will endeavor to establish mechanisms
to determine the most expeditious means to verify the registry and
ownership of vessels suspected of illicit trafficking that are operating
seaward of the territorial sea of any nation. The Countries further intend to
punish illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances by sea
under their national laws.
(6) Chemical Control Regimes
The Countries recognize that progress has been made in international
efforts to eliminate the diversion of chemicals used in the illicit production
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. They specifically support
the "Model Regulations to Control Chemical Precursors and Chemical
Substances, Machines and Materials" of the Organization of American States,
the chemical control measures adopted at the April 1991 International Drug
Enforcement Conference (IDEC) meeting, and the recommendations in the
Final Report of the Group of Seven Chemical Action Task Force, published in
June 1991. The Countries call on all nations, and in particular, chemical
exporting countries, to adopt the recommendations of the Group of Seven
Chemical Action Task Force. They welcome the work of the above-
mentioned Task Force and await with interest its report to the 1992
Economic Summit, in which it will make recommendations for the proper
organization of worldwide control of those chemical products.
The Countries express their support for including ten additional chemicals
in the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, as proposed by the United States on behalf of
the Chemical Action Task Force in the US notification to the Secretary
General.
The Countries call on the International Narcotics Control Board to
strengthen its actions aimed at controlling essential and precursor
chemicals.
The Countries intend to investigate, in their respective countries, the
legitimacy of significant commercial transactions in controlled chemical
products. The Countries call on the chemical producing nations to establish
an effective system for certification of end uses and end users.
The Countries will take appropriate legal action against companies violating
chemical control regulations.
Studies will be conducted in the countries where narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances are produced in order to quantify the demand for
chemicals for legitimate purposes in order to assist in the control of these
products. The United States intends to provide financial and technical
assistance for conducting the aforementioned studies and for setting up
national data banks.
The Countries urge all nations and international organizations to cooperate
effectively with programs aimed at strengthening border control in order to
prevent the illegal entry of chemicals.
(7) Port and Free Trade Zone Control
The Countries intend to implement measures to suppress illicit drug
trafficking in free trade zones and ports, as called for in Article 18 of the
1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances and in accordance with the recommendations of
the Ninth International Drug Enforcement Conference. A group of experts
may be required to conduct a specialized study in order to identify the ports
and free trade zones in the region that could be utilized for illicit traffic in
drugs and chemicals. This study and subsequent reviews will serve as the
basis for adopting measures to prevent illicit traffic in drugs and controlled
substances in ports and free trade zones.
(8) Carrier Cooperation Agreement
The Countries are concerned about the difficulties inherent in the
identification of suspicious shipments included in the great volume of
legitimate commerce. In order to improve the effectiveness of border
controls and also facilitate the transit of legitimate merchandise, the
Countries intend to enlist the cooperation of air, land, and maritime
transport companies. The Countries agree, in principle, to implement
common standards and practices in order to include carriers in measures to
improve anti-drug security.
(9) Money Laundering
The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances establishes a series of measures related to the
control of financial assets to which the Countries intend to conform their
domestic laws. The Countries support full implementation of this
Convention, which requires, inter alia, the criminalization of all money
laundering operations related to illicit drug traffic.
The Countries recognize and support the efforts of the Group of Seven
Financial Action Task Force. The Countries call upon the Eleventh Meeting of
senior-level OAS/CICAD officials to approve the Model Regulations on Money
Laundering related to illicit drug traffic.
The Countries intend to make recommendations regarding the following:
-- The elements of a comprehensive financial enforcement and money
laundering control program;
-- Exchange of financial information among governments in accordance
with bilateral understandings.
(10) Strengthening the Administration of Justice
The Countries recognize and support efforts designed to improve their
judicial systems, in those cases in which this may be necessary, in order to
ensure the effectiveness of those systems in establishing the culpability
and penalties applicable to traffickers in illicit drugs. They recognize the
need for adequate protection for the persons responsible for administering
justice in this area inasmuch as effective legal systems are essential for
democracy and economic progress.
The Countries call on all nations to strengthen the United Nations Drug
Control Program.
(11) Strengthening Judicial Cooperation
The Countries support the provisions of the 1988 United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
related to increased cooperation and mutual legal assistance in the battle
against illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, and investigations and
proceedings involving seizure and forfeiture. The Countries must consider
approval of the projects of the OAS Inter-American Judicial Committee on
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and on precautionary measures.
The Countries will encourage the expeditious exchange of information and
evidence needed for legal proceedings involving illicit drug trafficking,
pursuant to their domestic laws and bilateral and multilateral agreements.
(12) Sharing of Assets and Property
The Countries shall seek to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on
the sharing of property seized and forfeited in the struggle against drug
trafficking in accordance with the laws in force and the practices in each
country. The Countries also consider that asset sharing would encourage
international cooperation among law enforcement officials, and that
confiscated property would be a valuable source of funds and equipment for
combating drug production and trafficking and for preventing drug
consumption and treating addicts.
(13) Firearms Control
The Countries recommend that measures to control firearms, ammunition,
and explosives be strengthened in order to avoid their diversion to drug
traffickers. The Countries also call for an enhanced exchange of detailed
and complete information regarding seized weapons in order to facilitate
the identification and determination of origin of such weapons, as well as
the prosecution of those responsible for their illegal export.
To this end, the United States intends to tighten its export controls and to
cooperate with the Governments of the other Countries to verify the
legitimacy of end users.
The Countries consider that close cooperation with the OAS/CICAD is
essential in such firearms, ammunition, and explosives control efforts.
(14) Other Cooperative Arrangements
The Countries recognize that cooperative operations have been a useful tool
in the war against drug traffickers in the past. The Countries intend to
continue and expand such cooperative measures through their national
organizations responsible for the struggle against illegal drug trafficking.
Strategies in the Economic and Financial Areas
The Countries propose to strengthen unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral
efforts aimed at improving economic conditions in the countries involved in
the cycle of illegal drug production and trafficking. Extreme poverty and the
growth of the drug problem are the main reasons that peasants become
involved in illegal coca leaf production. The Countries reaffirm the
principles in the Declaration of Cartagena, which accept that alternative
economic development is an essential part of the comprehensive plan to
reduce illegal trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
Alternative development cannot succeed in the absence of enforcement and
interdiction efforts that effectively reduce this illegal drug trafficking.
The Countries recognize and approve of the structural changes that have
taken place in the economies of the Andean countries and Mexico. These
changes strengthen stability and increase prospects for economic growth.
The Countries recognize that these reforms merit full support. Efforts to
attract an increased flow of private investment will provide opportunities
for sustained economic growth.
(1) Economic Issues
The Countries recognize that the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
(EAI) with its three pillars--investment, trade, and debt--offers important
means of improving economic conditions in the Hemisphere.
All of the Countries have signed bilateral trade and investment framework
agreements with the United States. The Countries recognize that these
agreements are important to encourage investment and trade liberalization,
and they intend to move ahead with the three pillars of the EAI as follows:
(a) Investment
The Countries recognize the critical importance of enacting laws and taking
steps that encourage private investment and economic development. In this
regard, the Countries have expressed their willingness to negotiate parallel
bilateral agreements to protect intellectual property rights, as well as
bilateral investment agreements, and others that promote trade
liberalization. For this purpose, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
includes trade and investment framework agreements.
The Countries express their satisfaction with the establishment of the
Multilateral Investment Fund under the aegis of the Inter-American
Development Bank [IDB]. The Countries consider this Fund important to
provide technical assistance and to encourage private investment.
The Countries note that the move towards a market economy in Latin
America is a good vehicle for generating sustained economic growth, with
benefits throughout society. They therefore view with interest experiences
in privatizing services and industries that can serve to attract a significant
flow of direct foreign investment. The initiation of operations by the
Multilateral Investment Fund and technical assistance in support of
privatization efforts will aid in the development of market economies.
Some Andean countries plan to proceed with privatization programs and
reforms of financial systems to the degree and depth possible in each
country.
The Andean countries state that facilitating access to the 936 funds would
have a catalytic effect in attracting private investment to that subregion.
The profound structural changes in the region make the active participation
of financial entities in funding private projects more important than ever
before. The Countries urge entities such as the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) to
continue working with the Andean region. The countries of the Andean
region are pleased by Mexico's participation as a stockholder in the Andean
Development Corporation (ADC), which is a suitable channel
for development activity in the subregion, particularly for the private
sector, within a framework of productive integration. These countries
express their interest in also being able to count on active participation by
the United States Government in the ADC. The United States takes note of
that interest.
(b) Trade
The Countries express their satisfaction regarding enactment of the Andean
Trade Preference Act which allows the countries of the Andean region to
export a wide variety of products to the United States for a ten-year period
without paying duties. Those eligible countries that wish to benefit from
this law will take the required steps. The United States, furthermore, plans
to implement the provisions of this law as rapidly as possible in order to
extend its benefits to the countries determined to fulfill the criteria in the
law. The Andean countries also express their interest in having these
preferences extended to Venezuela.
The countries recognize that the proposed North American Free Trade
Agreement will be an important step in the process of creating a
hemispheric free trade agreement in accordance with the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative. The Countries stress the importance of continued
economic integration and trade liberalization efforts.
(c) Debt
The Countries express their satisfaction with the progress achieved by
some Andean countries and Mexico in renegotiating their debt with the
private international banking system and intend, when appropriate, to
continue to support reduction of this debt. The Countries point out that the
economic reforms implemented by Bolivia have already made it possible for
that country to benefit from the reduction of a large part of its bilateral
debt with the United States under the auspices and in the spirit of the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which will make it possible to
implement environmental projects in Bolivia. The Government of the United
States will continue to take the necessary steps to obtain the legislative
approval required for the debt categories that still do not have this
authorization.
(2) Alternative Development
The Countries acknowledge that the goals of the Cartagena Declaration
regarding the substitution of other agricultural products for coca and other
plants that feed the drug cycle, and the creation of new sources of licit
income, have not yet been fully achieved. The Countries note that in a major
new initiative, the United States--in consultation with Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru--is engaged in a program to provide training and technical
assistance in agricultural marketing that will stress participation by the
private sector as well as assistance for animal and plant health. The
Countries applaud this program and intend to facilitate its implementation
to the maximum extent possible.
Notwithstanding assistance already pledged by the United States and the
United Nations, the Countries recognize the need to establish a broad basis
of funding for alternative development. For this reason, and given the
worldwide range of illicit narcotics, the Countries intend to strive for
increased participation of countries such as Japan and others as well as
international financial agencies and institutions such as the World Bank, the
Inter-American Development Bank, the European Community, the OAS, the
OECD, and others. The Andean nations believe, and the United States takes
note, that such actions should also include the establishment of a facility
for alternative development in an international financial institution. The
Countries are determined to enlist the support of the international
community in their fight against drugs.
The Countries support the work of the OAS/CICAD Group of Experts charged
with reviewing the alternative development approach and recommending
ways to enhance it.
Under the alternative development program, the Countries recognize the
importance of implementing short-term projects such as emergency food
programs, food for work, and income and employment generation. The
Countries recognize that these efforts must simultaneously accompany
eradication efforts in order to reduce the economic impact on coca leaf
producers. These short-term actions must be aimed at producing jobs and
temporary income until such time as the alternative development projects
are fully developed.
The Countries underscore the need for alternative development programs to
be strengthened in coca leaf producing countries, or in those countries with
areas that have potential for producing plants from which elements
utilizable in the production of narcotics and psychotropic drugs can be
extracted, so as to reduce the supply of raw material that feeds the narco-
trafficking cycle. These programs will help farmers have different
economic alternatives, which will allow them to move away from illegal
coca production.
The Countries acknowledge the progress achieved in alternative
development in Bolivia and the beginning of alternative development
activities in Peru. In this context, the Countries note the bilateral
agreements with the United States signed by Peru and by Bolivia to
implement alternative economic development and drug control programs, as
useful experiences applicable to other countries. These two most salient
examples are summarized as follows.
Bolivia
In Bolivia, with the firm support of the United States, efforts undertaken to
develop other crops in coca producing zones, as well as in those areas from
which people have been expelled, are having some success, starting with the
production of genetic material with a proven biological viability, acceptable
rate of return, and a potential for export. Technical assistance and credit,
as well as continued training of farmers, permit the achievement of a good
level of technology transfer.
Actions taken in the infrastructure area have made it possible to improve
the means of transporting agricultural products to consumer markets and
processing them.
Aggressive marketing is slowly allowing the opening of internal markets to
the first items of this production, in accordance with phytosanitary and
quality control requirements. The support being given to the social
dimension by providing infrastructure in the health and education sectors is
making it possible to improve the quality of life of the rural population.
A new five-year project, which will start in early June of 1992, will
provide continuity and strengthen key activities, such as marketing and
private investment.
Multilateral cooperation through the United Nations Drug Control Program
(UNDCP) has also assisted in the alternative development process,
especially in basic sanitation, roads, energy, and agroindustry.
Nevertheless, based on the above-mentioned Bolivian experiences, it is
recommended that:
1.
Recognition be given to the fact that implementation of coca reduction
policy has to be adapted to the pace of alternative development in order to
reduce the gap between the loss of income and its replacement. It is
evident that the success in alternative development will discourage
farmers from growing coca.
2.
Recognition be given to the importance of full and active participation by
the farmers in alternative development processes.
3.
Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in alternative development be
considered with regard to its specificity. It should include comprehensive,
multisectoral, and long-term program guidance and should also be
sufficiently flexible, broad, and timely to be able to promote qualitative
changes beyond the short term.
Peru
In the case of Peru, progress can be summarized by the following points:
-- The participation of the United States Government and Japan in the
support group for the reentry of Peru into the international financial
community. This allows the IDB and other bilateral donors to provide funds.
-- The carrying out of massive food aid programs, promotion of a favorable
economic policy framework for the development of the private sector, and
the liberalization of two-way trade.
-- The existence of projects, especially in the Upper Huallaga Valley where
14,000 farmers have received technical assistance in seed research,
production, and marketing. The project provided credit and land titles and
made it possible to resurface 1,200 kilometers of roads and to set up
potable water systems, health posts, and latrines.
-- The massive support received by President Fujimori from the rural
population in the coca producing areas.
-- Plans for 1992 that call for the resurfacing of the road linking the Upper
Huallaga Valley to the coast, a program for recognizing and awarding
property rights, and the participation of multinational firms interested in
investing in alternative development projects.
-- All this has been achieved in spite of insidious narco-trafficking,
terrorism, and the alliance between the two. Under the Agreement on
Narcotics Control and Alternative Development signed on May 14, 1991,
which includes aspects relating to interdiction and security, an autonomous
Peruvian institution will be responsible for distributing the necessary
resources. This institution and its US counterpart will hold meetings to
implement the shared strategy, immediately after the Presidential Summit
in San Antonio.
-- With respect to respect to human rights, the importance of conducting
the anti-drug struggle within the framework of international standards is
stressed.
-- With respect to the citizens' commitment to the anti-drug effort,
emphasis is placed on the need for them to have access to information and
for efficient legal and administrative systems to exist.
-- In order to have adequate farmer participation, consideration should be
given, among other requirements, to:
(a) Creating the democratic tools that make it possible to involve the
people directly in the decision-making process;
(b) Recognizing, awarding, and registering property rights;
(c) Concluding crop substitution agreements with farmers;
(d) Ensuring that eradication programs take into account the safeguarding
of human health and preservation of the ecosystem;
(e) Fostering new economic opportunities, such as alternative development
and crop substitution programs, that will help to dissuade growers from
initiating or expanding illegal cultivation;
(f) Implementing reforestation programs in those areas where coca has
been eradicated but where the land is not suitable for farming;
(g) Substantially facilitating access to business activity and to credit;
(h) Abolishing bureaucratic obstacles and mechanisms, particularly those
that limit the production, marketing, and exportation of alternative goods;
[and]
(i) Promoting the participation of all countries interested in providing
technical solutions and conducting specific alternative development
projects with the peasants and/or their organizations.
(3) The Environment
The Countries express their concern regarding the severe damage that coca
cultivation and illegal processing of coca derivatives are causing to the
environment of the Andean region. The slash-and-burn method employed by
coca and opium poppy growers causes severe erosion of the soil, and
indiscriminate disposal of the toxic chemicals used to produce coca
derivatives is poisoning the rivers and the water table. These activities
enrich a small group of traffickers and cause harm to thousands of people.
The United States Government notes that it is helping the Andean
governments address the serious environmental problems caused by illegal
coca and opium production. The United States is providing technical
assistance and training under comprehensive environmental management
programs that are important components of alternative development
projects. The United States is providing assistance for watershed
management, farm-level and community forestry, reforestation and
environmental restoration, education on environmental problems, and
environmental monitoring programs. These efforts are designed to prevent
damage to--and to restore--the soil, water, and forest resources, thereby
improving the quality of life and expanding opportunities for those who
abandon, or never initiate, coca production in favor of alternative crops.
The Countries agree that such technical assistance and training services
must be designed to strengthen the capacity of Andean governments to
protect their countries' natural environment.
The Countries agree to design and implement suitable programs to reduce
the negative ecological impact of coca production and ensure that security,
interdiction, and substitution activities take the protection of the
ecosystem into account.
Strategies for Prevention and Demand Reduction
The Countries recognize that consumption of, and illicit traffic in, drugs and
psychotropic substances are a comprehensive problem, and that it can
therefore be resolved only if control, interdiction, and supply reduction
measures are accompanied by vigorous and effective action in demand
reduction.
It is also necessary for society, including its members who consume illegal
drugs and those who are involved in illicit drug traffic or the cultivation of
plants intended for conversion into illicit drugs, to be made aware of the
harmful consequences of the production, traffic, and consumption of illicit
drugs. It is imperative to provide warnings about the dangers of violence,
crime, corruption, environmental damage, addiction, and the dissolution of
society and the family resulting from the drug problem.
The Countries are convinced that raising awareness regarding the harmful
impact of drug-related offenses will motivate society to develop a culture
that rejects drug use and to support vigorously efforts to combat supply and
demand. In order to support this awareness campaign, the Countries agree
to assume the responsibility, either individually or jointly, to conduct long-
term programs to inform the public through the appropriate mass media and
other information resources.
The Countries also call on their respective private sectors to combine
efforts to create a culture that rejects drugs.
In this regard, the Countries are aware that demand can be controlled and
reduced and that the basis can be laid for increasing awareness by means of
continuous, systematic actions that include:
(1) Prevention
The Countries consider that prevention must be a priority aspect of national
strategies to reduce the demand for drugs.
In order to prevent consumption of drugs and dissuade occasional users, the
Countries must include in their national and drug control strategies
comprehensive prevention programs that include, among other things:
(a) Education
The Countries recognize that education is fundamental in the upbringing of
the individual and the creation of positive values and attitudes toward life,
and that the educational system at all levels and in all its forms is a
suitable tool to reach most of the people. Consequently, the Countries
undertake to engage in additional educational efforts for comprehensive
prevention of drug use from pre-school through higher education, by means
of scientific research, in order to create an attitude and a culture that
rejects drugs and in which the family and the community play a fundamental
role.
(b) Community Mobilization
The Countries wish to emphasize the importance of mobilizing all sectors of
society against drugs as a fundamental part of national prevention efforts.
This mobilization includes carrying out actions at the individual, family,
and social levels by means of activities that include recreation, sports, and
cultural events that make it possible to achieve a total rejection of drug
consumption.
(2)Treatment and Rehabilitation
In order for drug addicts to receive suitable assistance, the Countries
consider that it is necessary to increase their capacity with regard to
treatment and rehabilitation, in addition to improving the quality of
services. The Countries consider that these programs must be designed not
only to rehabilitate drug addicts but also to help them reenter society.
The Countries believe that treatment and rehabilitation are basic in
reducing the consequences arising from drug use, including AIDS
transmission, societal violence, and the destruction of the family and social
structure.
(3)Scientific Research
The Countries recognize that it is necessary to establish programs for basic
and social research, including epidemiology, in their national strategies.
Epidemiological programs must be conducted using a methodology that
makes it possible to compare findings at the regional and international
levels. These findings will also be useful in evaluating prevention
programs. The Countries undertake to exchange information on drug abuse
through a regional information network and to support initiatives to
establish a data bank on this subject, especially within the framework of
CICAD.
(4)Training
The Countries undertake to cooperate by providing appropriate technical
assistance for the education and training of human resources in these areas.
The Countries will also endeavor to consult with one another and exchange
information on the prevention of illicit drug use, treatment, rehabilitation,
and scientific research. In this regard, they agree to cooperate in order to
determine the most effective ways to utilize the research findings in
implementing the various programs.
(5)National Councils
The Countries are convinced that the creation of national councils to
coordinate efforts to develop strategies against illicit drugs has made an
important contribution to the development of prevention, treatment, and
rehabilitation programs in all the countries.
(6)Follow-Up
The Countries undertake to engage in ongoing follow-up of the actions
described above. To that end, they will assign responsibility to their
national councils in line with OAS/CICAD programs. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: US Assistance to El Salvador
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Feb, 24 19922/24/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: El Salvador
Subject: Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
President Bush held a half-hour private meeting today with President
Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador. President Bush congratulated President
Cristiani for his great personal leadership and courage in bringing peace to
his country. He also praised the progress President Cristiani has made
toward implementing the peace agreements signed earlier this month in
Mexico City and achieving true national reconciliation.
The President gave his assurance that the United States would do everything
possible to support full implementation of the peace accord and to help El
Salvador consolidate democracy and peace and expand economic opportunity.
In this regard, the President mentioned that the US Government was working
with other governments to assure international support for the national
reconstruction of El Salvador.
The President also promised to work with Congress on a bipartisan basis for
continued US assistance to El Salvador in the future through both direct aid
programs and debt reduction under the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative. US assistance and international support will be vital to the
continued success of the peace process and national reconciliation in El
Salvador. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: Building International Cooperation To Fight
Illicit Drug Trafficking
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
Description: Excerpts from press briefing at San Antonio Drug
Summit, San Antonio, Texas
Date: Feb, 27 19922/27/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America, North America
Country: United States, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru
Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
What I will do is try to just give a context for this final day of the summit
and then describe what I think was accomplished and then take questions.
I would just make one large point, which is that if you look at the new
challenges of the post-Cold War era, increasingly they are what is called
"transnational problems," or "global problems"--controlling weapons of
mass destruction, global environmental issues, and narcotics trafficking.
What the democratic community has learned over recent years is that these
new global challenges cannot be confronted by any one country alone; they
cross borders, they require a new degree of regional cooperation and
multilateral cooperation.
I think that the summit declaration said it very well; it said that the
Cartagena Declaration laid the foundation for the development of a
comprehensive and multilateral strategy to address the problem of illegal
drugs, and that here in San Antonio we've moved beyond the achievements of
Cartagena to adapt international cooperation to the new challenges arising
from worldwide changes in the drug problem.
I'm going to go through briefly the conversation--just a few highlights of
the discussion among the heads of state to give you a sense of it. And then I
would like to say what I think was accomplished here.
One of the problems in the drug fight is that countries waited too long. One
of the positive results of the new regional cooperation is that countries
have learned that lesson. So, for instance, President [Rodrigo] Borja made
the point in the morning's discussion that he saw a growing transit problem
across Ecuador and he intended to commit his government to stamp it out
before it was too late. He called drugs a transnational problem that
requires joint action, and he said that just in the last few weeks Ecuador
had seized the largest cocaine seizure in its history--about 3.1 tons of
cocaine hydrochloride.
President [Carlos] Salinas made the same point. He said the power wielded
by the drug traffickers makes them a threat to all our governments. He said
that Mexico was dramatically increasing its budget. He said that more than
25,000 soldiers, several thousand police are committed to the drug fight,
and over 56,000 hectares of drug production have been destroyed; 1,500 tons
seized--these are over the last 2 years. He said the last 2 years they've
seized drugs valued at more than twice their external debt. He said they've
made 16,000 arrests, they've seized 20,000 weapons and 140 airplanes from
the drug traffickers. He said Mexico probably has the largest air force in
Latin America today because of the planes they've seized from the
traffickers.
The President of Bolivia [Jaime Paz Zamora] noted his very strong sense
that, since Cartagena, enormous progress has been made on all areas--trade,
interdiction, and eradication. He pointed to new investment by American
companies as being helpful. He said, "If not us, who; if not now, when?" in
the drug fight.
And the reason I'm citing these quotes is, if you remember back to
Cartagena, the issues then were: Is there a will to fight? Will they
cooperate? The whole spirit and tone and nature of these conversations is
really a quantum advance. Nobody's questioned whether we need to fight
this effort. Nobody's questioned whether we need to cooperate. Nobody's
fighting between producers and consumers.
Countries are learning the lessons as Ecuador clearly has done by getting
into this drug fight before it grows beyond dimensions that they can't cope
with.
[Colombian] President [Cesar] Gaviria went through the progress since
Cartagena. He said: "Two years have passed; we've gone beyond headlines to
commitment. Two years ago, the cartels looked invincible; they threatened
our democracies; now their leaders are dead and in jail." He said, "We're no
longer pointing fingers of guilt at the producers or the consumers." He says,
"There's been a dramatic change in the position of international financial
and banking circles. It used to be that the dirty capital of the drug
traffickers was just accepted without question; now there's a new
multilateral commitment to stop it." But he said, "Drug traffickers find it
easy to adapt, and therefore we need to strengthen this hemispheric effort
to confront them."
[Peruvian] President [Alberto] Fujimori thanked President Bush for the US
effort that helped in what he said, "reinserting Peru into financial relations
with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank and helping it carry out a stabilization
program." He said that drugs are destroying the Amazon rain forest. He
talked strongly about the need to build a regional effort to interdict
trafficker aircraft.
President Gaviria also, later in the conversation, talked about the changes in
the Colombian judicial system. He said that they fundamentally have
reformed their judicial system and moved to a prosecutorial system. For
those of you familiar with Latin American judicial systems, they usually
have the judge in the case do the investigation and prosecution, which is a
very weak system. They've now gone to a system of prosecutors. He said
they now have a 60% conviction rate. He said, "Today we feel capable of
trying the criminals who 2 years ago terrorized Colombia."
He thanked the United States for complying with the agreements on
controlling precursor chemicals. We said other countries are not complying,
and we need to do more. President Salinas stressed the need to involve
Central America where transiting is going through.
I think those are the highlights. Now, what was done in San Antonio I think
was the following: First, this alliance was broadened and strengthened by
including three additional countries, including very important countries like
Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Second, it was broadened internationally.
This summit is sending a delegation to Europe and Japan to enlist the
support and assistance of our allies in this new effort.
And, finally, I think if you look at the annexes of the agreement, you will see
that there are strategies for drug control and strengthening of
administration of justice. We agreed to set up regional training centers for
police and administration of justice training, strengthen intelligence-
sharing. There was a major focus on a regional effort, starting in the Andes
but going all the way down through Mexico, to control the airspace and deny
airspace to trafficker aircraft. And that means intelligence-sharing,
sharing of the monitoring of trafficker aircraft; it means a greater effort on
all the countries to have standardized markings and the like so it will be
known which aircraft are legitimate and which are not.
There was a similar effort to do more to control so-called "free trade
zones" and ports where drugs go out and chemicals go in; a much greater
strengthening of legal regimes to control precursor chemicals. The
countries committed to take appropriate legal action against companies
violating chemical control regulations. There is going to be a follow-up
effort to strengthen intelligence-sharing, evidence-sharing, and technical
information to control money-laundering. And I would note, for instance,
that the raid Colombia just made on the Cali cartel led to the seizure of 150
bank accounts in five different countries. That kind of an international
effort wasn't possible a couple of years ago.
There's a much greater effort, in part because of the great success of
Colombia, which is in part financed with about a $25 million, 5-year
program through USAID [US Agency for International Development], to
strengthen judicial systems. President Gaviria really felt that one of the
key accomplishments was creating a system of special courts where judges
have anonymity; you can get evidence without revealing the sources; jurors
have anonymity and safety; and they can try drug-trafficking kingpins
without fear.
Last year, for the first time, I think, no judge in Colombia was
assassinated. They've lost in recent years over 200 judicial personnel,
judges, and others.
On the economic area, there was a lot of support and appreciation for the
Andean trade preference legislation, which already has passed. There was a
commitment to go to the multilateral lending institutions--the World Bank,
the IMF, the Inter-American Development Bank--and urge lending that was
counter-narcotics-related to the producing countries.
And, in addition, Secretary Baker signed some bilateral agreements: One
was on money-laundering with Colombia, and the second was a memorandum
of understanding on public education on drugs with Ecuador. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: Progress in the International War Against Illicit
Drugs
Levitsky
Source: Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for
International Narcotics Matters
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Narcotics, and International Operations of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Feb, 20 19922/20/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America, North America
Country: United States, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru
Subject: Narcotics
[TEXT]
I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the status
of our efforts to counter the threat to our interests and those of our friends
and allies from the illegal trade in narcotics. Over the past few years, my
colleagues and I have briefed numerous committees, Members, and staff of
the Congress on the nature of the problem that we face, on the approach that
we have been taking, and the progress that we have made--progress that
would not have been possible without the broad support of the Congress and
the American people. The story I have to tell of our progress to date is a
good one.
I can report to you today that cocaine seizures in this hemisphere and
worldwide have increased significantly, as have other operations and
pressure against drug traffickers; law enforcement actions and coca
eradication have contributed to a stabilization of cultivation; and
international efforts against illegal money-laundering and diversion of
essential chemicals are beginning to pay dividends.
Two years have passed since President Bush and his counterparts from
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru met on February 15, 1990, at Cartagena,
Colombia, to address the shared problem of drug use and trafficking in this
hemisphere. That summit laid down a strong concept for concerted action
against the drug barons and their cartels. Now, a new drug summit is set
for next week in San Antonio that will allow us to review our progress since
Cartagena and renew the collective effort begun there but strengthened with
the welcome addition of Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela.
Taken together, the summits represent the commitment and the meeting of
minds that is essential to the complex and difficult process of bringing
diverse nations together for combined actions in a common effort. In
themselves, they represent the evolution of that international coalition of
nations that is crucial if we are to address the transnational threat of drug
trafficking and abuse.
You will recall that one of the basic principles of the strategy that the
President outlined to the American people for combating the drug threat
was the need to build a regional consensus and capability to support
sustained cooperative action against a shared danger. The summits are
manifest proof of the success of that effort, but there is more to the story.
The scoreboard of accomplishments for the first 2 years of the Andean
strategy is extremely positive. I am not going to minimize either the
inherent difficulties in trying to deal with an underground, illicit, violent,
and economically powerful adversary which preys on human frailties, or on
the barriers that must be overcome in assisting the governments of the
region--many of which face multiple problems of economic recession,
underdevelopment, indigenous guerrilla subversion of democratic
institutions, internal corruption, and weak judicial and penal institutions--
in order to respond to this threat. We have, however, made real progress,
and this needs to be acknowledged.
At Cartagena, we agreed that both demand and supply reduction of cocaine
were important, and we committed ourselves not only to enhanced levels of
law enforcement, military, and economic assistance to the Andean countries
to support their anti-narcotics efforts; we also pledged to increase the
effort within the United States. We are living up to our part of the
commitments made at Cartagena.
The Administration increased domestic spending on drug law enforcement
and treatment over 65% in the last 2 years and committed itself to the
long-term problems of changing attitudes that made drug abuse a
"victimless" crime. Although everyone recognized that such an undertaking
would take time, we are already seeing results. US demand for cocaine has
been decreasing, especially among our youth:
-- Past-month cocaine use in 1991 was 35% below the 1988 level, with
1.3 million fewer users. Despite an unsettling increase in 1991 over 1990,
the overall trend is down.
-- Occasional use of cocaine since 1988 dropped 22%, and adolescent use
dropped 63%.
-- Current cocaine use among high school seniors is down from 1.9% in
1990 to 1.4% in 1991.
-- Student approval ratings of occasional cocaine use dropped by 47% since
1988.
To put this into some perspective, it has taken a generation to achieve
sustained reductions among smokers, despite intensive information
campaigns and scientific evidence of the inherent dangers. In this light, the
drops in just the last few years in drug abuse, then, are even more
encouraging and underscore not only the commitment of the Administration
to reduce long-term abuse but to the changing attitudes that must go along
with increased enforcement and treatment efforts.
As impressive as these have been, my focus is on the international effort to
address drug abuse and trafficking, particularly of cocaine, in this
hemisphere. Here, too, the results have been impressive, from the
unprecedented degree of international cooperation and coordination that we
have seen to the increased effectiveness of US efforts.
The strategy for tackling the cocaine threat that my colleagues and
I have presented to the Congress in detail over the past 2 years contains
four major objectives:
-- Strengthening the political commitment and institutional capability of
the Andean governments to enable them to take the necessary steps to
disrupt narcotics trafficking activities;
-- Increasing the effectiveness of military and law enforcement activities
against the cocaine industry in the Andes;
-- Inflicting significant damage on the trafficking organizations that
operate within the three source countries by apprehending the trafficker
leadership and disrupting or dismantling their operations; and
-- Strengthening and diversifying the legitimate economies of the Andean
nations to enable them to overcome the destabilizing effects of eliminating
cocaine, a major source of income.
Our cocaine strategy translates these goals into action by focusing on
working with the producer and transit countries to attack drug trafficking
from its point of origin--beginning with coca and coca seedbed eradication
and alternative development programs for farmers--and throughout its
production and trafficking life cycles. The strategy uses security and
economic assistance as well as trade incentives and the employment of
sophisticated intelligence technology to deal with the problem in a
comprehensive manner. We believe in attacking every link of the drug chain,
from leaf to street.
These efforts are beginning to pay dividends. I have already noted the role
that the summits play in giving visible confirmation to enhanced
international cooperation, but progress goes beyond these very public
events.
There have been unprecedented levels of cooperation among the governments
of the region. Continuous consultations and communication take place from
the highest political levels to the lowest technical levels. There have been,
for example, numerous regional meetings on demand reduction issues. The
governments of the region have participated in a series of joint anti-
narcotics operations, known as "Support Justice," involving US and local
government detection and monitoring assets and Andean government air
interdiction assets which have had considerable success in disrupting the
flow of cocaine products moving north from the Andean region. There are
regular meetings of established inter-American forums on drugs, such as
IDEC [International Drug Enforcement Conference], CICAD [Inter- American
Drug Abuse Control Commission], and HONLEA [Heads of National Drug Law
Enforcement Agencies].
This cooperation extends to efforts to control the flow of chemicals and
money-laundering, in the Andean region and more broadly. Chemicals are
necessary for the production of cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs. Using
as a foundation the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the Chemical Diversion Trafficking
Act which the Congress passed in 1988, the Administration's efforts to
internationalize this effort are yielding results.
The United States chairs the G-7 [Group of Seven] Chemical Action Task
Force, which includes 26 other major chemical manufacturing countries. A
series of extensive discussions between 1990 and 1991 resulted in a series
of recommendations that include five basic chemical control procedures to
be adopted at the national level to prevent illegal chemical diversion, and
the expansion of the 1988 UN convention to include 10 additional chemicals.
The Administration has also signed major chemical control agreements with
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru to facilitate the exchange of information that
will allow law enforcement officials to check the legitimacy of chemical
shipments.
Profits from the sale of illegal drugs generate hundreds of billions of
dollars each year. Somewhere, somehow, this money must be "laundered" or
"cleaned" in the world financial system so that it can be made to look as
though it were legitimate proceeds from legal transactions. The
Administration has cast a wide net in enlisting countries throughout the
world to attack this critical link in the drug chain.
The tip of this spear is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an ad-hoc
group of 26 countries that constitute the major financial centers of the
world. This group has endorsed 40 measures to combat money-laundering
which it has recommended other countries adopt. These recommendations
call for the criminalization of money-laundering, cooperating in financial
investigations, reporting suspicious transactions, and regulating non-bank
as well as banking institutions.
The FATF's plan is to adopt these measures and, through an outreach program
that already involves governments in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa,
the Middle East, and Asia, to persuade governments whose financial centers
are vulnerable to laundering activity to adopt the FATF's recommendations.
The governments of the Andes, particularly Colombia, have assisted in the
effort to control money-laundering. Colombia has provided assistance to
international efforts against a number of money laundering operations, [and]
has raided key trafficker financial centers, arrested many financial
managers, and seized numerous documents. Colombia also signed an asset
sharing agreement with the United States.
These numerous and varied efforts represent more than just mere activity.
They are part not only of a growing cooperative effort but contribute to an
overall strategic approach that focuses the efforts of many governments
toward a common purpose. One of the most encouraging aspects of recent
actions is the multilateralization of these efforts as more countries
recognize the threat to their security from unrestrained illegal drug
trafficking. The cumulative effect of this growing environment of
cooperation and common action helped to increase the variety, number, and
effectiveness of operations throughout the region.
As a result, we have seen significant results from the Andean strategy:
-- Andean coca cultivation has leveled off, and there has been a net
reduction of over 4% in the past 2 years instead of the 10% or more annual
increases of the early 1980s. In 1991, reductions took place in all three
Andean coca producing countries.
-- At Cartagena, we signed six bilateral agreements. Recently, we have
signed agreements with Colombia on essential chemicals and asset sharing
and a declaration of intent on evidence sharing; with Peru on drug control
and alternative development and on money-laundering; and with Venezuela
on a reciprocal shipboarding agreement.
-- Drug kingpins of the Medellin cartel are either in jail (Pablo Escobar, the
three Ochoas) or dead (Rodriguez Gacha). Twenty-six major Colombian
traffickers were extradited between 1989 and 1991, when extradition was
made unconstitutional in Colombia. Twenty-one traffickers have turned
themselves in under a presidential plea-bargaining decree. Thousands of
other drug-related arrests have been made each year in Colombia.
-- In 1991, Colombia and Mexico together seized about 140 tons of coca
products--40 tons more than in 1990 and 65 tons more than in 1989.
-- In other significant transit countries, large amounts of cocaine were
also seized last year: almost 9 metric tons in Venezuela, 17.5 in Guatemala,
and 5.3 in the Bahamas.
These facts directly reflect the increased operational capability of local
security forces, aided to a considerable degree by the flow of pledged US
assistance. We have seen increased coordination and effectiveness from our
own effort as well. The cumulative effect of this is an overall increase in
operational effectiveness, as clearly indicated by seizure numbers.
Although we cannot give a precise figure to the amount of cocaine produced,
it is reasonable to assume around 700 metric tons after inefficiencies are
factored in. Worldwide seizures in 1991 were about 300 metric tons. This
means, conservatively, that we and our allies seized over 30% of total
production. While the remainder can still meet US demand, that demand is
dwindling, and we are making significant inroads into the market.
Nevertheless, we do not believe that the proper measure of our success
should be the above "body count" type data on arrests, labs destroyed, and
cocaine seized. These are indicative only of the qualitative improvements
that must ultimately result for our programs, such as the degree to which
we are encouraging host country political will to arrest, try, and imprison
drug kingpins, to eradicate illicit coca crops, to disrupt the trafficking
organizations, and to work cooperatively with us and their neighbors.
Our efforts must go, however, to the development of host country judicial
institutions capable of operating securely to resist the threats, bribes, and
other instruments of the enormously powerful and wealthy traffickers. We
are increasingly seeing evidence that the Andean governments are moving
positively in these directions with our assistance. Let's look at the record
of accomplishments.
Colombia
The seizure of almost 90 tons of refined and semi-refined cocaine in
Colombia last year demonstrates the will of the Colombian Government,
along with INM [Bureau for International Narcotics Matters] training,
helicopter and modernized communications support given to the National
Police, to carry out actions against the cartels.
-- During the past 2 years, the Colombians have attacked over 500
laboratories, including two operations against major processing and
transshipment hubs where they seized a total of nearly 40 tons of coca
products;
-- Colombian police credit a 3-ton cocaine seizure in 1991 to a newly
installed secure communications system funded by INM.
INM and USAID [US Agency for International Development] programs are
supporting President Gaviria's judicial reforms which are aimed at bringing
major traffickers to trial and undercutting their ability to corrupt and
intimidate the system:
-- Colombia has been more successful than ever in prosecuting traffickers
under its new public order courts which have a 60% conviction rate,
compared with 12% in the regular courts.
-- Colombia's efforts have led to the incarceration of the top Medellin
traffickers, including Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers, whose fates are
now in the hands of the courts.
-- Colombian authorities recently opened an offensive against Cali
traffickers, raiding their offices and seizing thousands of documents
containing money-laundering and other evidence. This has led to the
freezing of over 150 bank accounts in 5 countries. These operations are
ongoing.
Having successfully destroyed 38,000 hectares of marijuana between 1984
and 1989 with INM-supplied aircraft and chemicals, Colombia is moving
quickly to stop the rapid increase in opium production; authorities have
manually destroyed some 1,500 hectares of poppies and plan to begin an
aerially applied herbicide campaign against opium poppy crops this month.
In 1991, the Colombian National Police seized nearly 74 metric tons of
cocaine (total government seizures were a record-breaking 87 tons) and
continued to pursue the leadership of the Medellin cartel along with the Cali
cartel's infrastructure. National Police sources claim that over half of the
cocaine seizures belong to the Cali cartel. National Police units have also
destroyed 75 cocaine laboratories and 65 clandestine airstrips. This is not
all.
-- So far this year, Colombian National Police have seized over 2,000 kilos
of cocaine, manually eradicated over 1,000 hectares of opium poppy, and are
gearing up for an aerial herbicidal campaign against the newly expanding
crop. Plans are also underway for spraying marijuana crops, which were
nearly eliminated between 1984 and 1990.
-- This progress has not come cheaply, with over 400 policemen and 700
civilians, officials, judges, and others killed by traffickers in the past 2
years.
The Colombian military began to get involved in counter-narcotics
operations toward the latter part of 1991, and, this year, the Colombian
army, supported by US FMF [Foreign Military Financing] funds, is again
expected to engage the traffickers after concentrating efforts against
subversives.
-- In 1991, the Colombian army conducted the first airborne operation
against traffickers in Latin America. Although the operation did not result
in major seizures, the operation demonstrated the Colombian Government's
ability to coordinate complex, multi- service operations in remote areas.
-- Two military operations late last year resulted in 12 tons in cocaine
seizures. Both operations involved coordination with national police units.
Cali kingpins, who once operated openly in Cali, have been forced
underground since the Colombian Government overturned their acquittals in
local courts.
In line with the strategy, Colombian efforts have severely damaged the
Medellin cartel's leadership and infrastructure, keeping the pressure up.
Although the circumstances may be controversial, Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa
brothers, and many of their key lieutenants took advantage of President
Gaviria's plea bargaining decree and are now in custody. As a result,
incidents of narco-terrorism have decreased dramatically, a simple fact
that should poignantly illustrate who in Colombia has been responsible for
the majority of the violence and human rights abuses.
Increased Colombia national police pressure and interdiction of major air
corridors has led to major shifts in trafficking patterns. Indications are
that traffickers are currently exploiting maritime smuggling routes rather
than many of the traditional air routes.
Coca cultivation is declining in response to increased police pressure and
alternative development projects, especially in the San Jose Guaviare area.
Some cultivators are switching from coca to opium poppy cultivation.
Prompt government action on the opium crop will thwart these efforts.
Judicial reforms have increased convictions of narcotics-related crimes.
Judicial protection programs have enhanced the security of the new judicial
system, with only one unsuccessful attack against new special order court
judges.
Peru
Peru still accounts for over 60% of the world's coca leaf production, and
cooperation with the Peruvian Government is critical to any effort to halt
the flow of cocaine to the United States. In contrast to the Garcia
Administration, the Fujimori Administration has expressed support for
anti-narcotics cooperation. President Fujimori signed a historic umbrella
agreement on counter-narcotics in May of last year.
Since the signing of that agreement:
-- Police operations have become larger in scope and more effective.
Several major operations were launched in 1991 in the Upper Huallaga
Valley [UHV] and other cocaine production areas.
-- The Peruvian air force has intercepted over 55 unscheduled aircraft in
the UHV and, since late last year, forced down 6 trafficker aircraft enroute
to Colombia. After these operations began, the purchase price of coca
derivatives at the farmgate fell, indicating that the air operations were
having an effect.
-- Especially noteworthy is that the Peruvian air force used its own scarce
resources and assets to implement its air intercept program and is once
again operating Tucano aircraft from the Santa Lucia base.
-- Coca cultivation is down by roughly 500 hectares from estimates
developed 2 years ago. While the reduction results from a number of
factors, including insurgent-generated violence, Peruvian interdiction
activities and coca seedbed eradication operations operating out of the US-
supported police base at Santa Lucia also contributed to the reduction and
the stabilization of cultivation.
-- The armed forces recognize their responsibility to support narcotics
enforcement, as it has become apparent that narcotics-supported internal
subversion and the incursions of Colombian trafficking aircraft into
Peruvian air space have become serious threats.
-- The army logistically supported two major police counter-narcotics
operations and provided security and a liaison officer to coordinate
narcotics efforts for the Santa Lucia police base in 1991.
Unfortunately, our assistance to Peru, where such aid was urgently needed,
has been subject to a number of conditions that delayed implementation of
the program. The Government of Peru agreed as a condition for receiving
economic and military assistance to improve military and police human
rights performance as well as to intensify counter-narcotics actions.
Progress in both of these areas during 1991, after extended consultations
with several congressional committees, led the Administration to provide a
portion of the economic assistance (ESF-Economic Support Fund) in
December 1991 and a portion of the military assistance (FMF) in January
1992.
Although we were able to reach consensus with the Congress, it is
unfortunate that providing even initial FY 1991 assistance was delayed
well into the current fiscal year and that critical aid for the security of
the counter-narcotics effort was eliminated.
As we approach the San Antonio summit, the Peruvian Government has
demonstrated its desire to press forward with its commitments under our
agreement. It is our desire to be responsive, but we will need the
understanding and support of the Congress.
Bolivia
Narcotics control assistance to the Government of Bolivia includes
assignment of 28 US-titled aircraft to Bolivia. The Rural Mobile Patrol
Units (UMOPAR), Bolivia's leading anti-drug law enforcement unit, expanded
its authorized strength to 640. US narcotics control assistance programs
fund training, food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and other equipment
necessary to keep UMOPAR operating in the field. As we have helped to
increase the training and professionalism of the UMOPAR, we have seen a
corresponding increase in their effectiveness and ability to sustain
operations. This has produced results.
-- Large-scale joint counter-narcotics police-military actions resulted in
the disruption of major trafficking organizations, returned a trafficker-
controlled town to government authority, seized 69 aircraft, and resulted in
the arrest or surrender of 30 major traffickers.
-- The combination of effective law enforcement and a coca eradication
program helped to reduce coca cultivation in Bolivia by 10% since 1989,
from 52,900 to 47,900 hectares. There has been a net reduction in coca
cultivation for the past 2 consecutive years.
-- The Government of Bolivia is demonstrating an increasing institutional
capacity to mount large-scale counter-narcotics operations. In 1991, the
government conducted the largest joint Bolivian law enforcement and
military counter-narcotics operation against the trafficker-controlled town
of Santa Ana.
-- The Government of Bolivia reacted to charges that top officials were
believed to be involved in corruption by removing the Minister of Interior,
chief of the national police, and head of the special narcotics force.
Subsequent to this, another head of the special force was removed as well
as a number of corrupt police and the ineffective director of the coca
reduction agency (DIRECO).
-- Two Bolivian army battalions received training in counter-narcotics
operations. In the fall of 1991, the Bolivian army conducted the first joint
army-UMOPAR operation.
-- The government signed a project agreement involving US support to the
National Directorate of Precursor and Chemical Substance Control. The
agreement expands the precursor chemical program and establishes two
special investigation teams to address interdiction and illegal diversion of
precursor chemicals.
-- The government re-established the regulatory agency to control the
transport and marketing of legal coca (coca legal).
-- The Bolivian air force helicopter unit dedicated to supporting counter-
narcotics operations (Red Devils) flew more than 17,000 accident-free
hours.
-- Eight major traffickers surrendered to law enforcement authorities
under a government 120-day "repentance" decree. Terms of the decree
included amnesty from extradition to the United States and requirements to
cooperate with law enforcement authorities. The fact of their surrender
indicates the increased effectiveness of Bolivian operations.
US counter-narcotics assistance to Bolivia is critical to building effective
narcotics law enforcement institutional capabilities. Over the past 5 years,
the capacity of the government to conduct large-scale, joint police-military
law enforcement operations has been growing. President Jaime Paz Zamora
and leading members of his cabinet have demonstrated a concern for the
success of counter-narcotics programs, and we have seen close coordination
and cooperation between our two governments.
Myths about the "Drug War" In the Andes
Mr. Chairman, I believe that, following this review, it would be appropriate
to anticipate and address a fair question about our Andean strategy: If
things are going so well, why do we hear so much criticism of the
programs?
I believe that criticisms of the Andean strategy are based on
misconceptions or myths about what we are really trying to accomplish
there. Many of these grow out of a desire to see quick results on an issue
affecting the health and welfare of this country. I believe we all want to
see results, but, in order to be effective, we must be prepared to sustain our
engagement with the problem in all its complexity and not be diverted by
simplistic panaceas or criticisms from solving a difficult long-term
problem. As one observer put it, for every problem there is a solution that
is simple, straightforward, and wrong. Let me outline, then, what I believe
are some of the notions about the nature of the problem that we face that
mislead many people.
Myth No. 1: The "drug war" is a war like other wars.
The "war on drugs" is a metaphor, and, while there are battles and
casualties, the nature of the conflict is not a straightforward, stand-up
fight like Desert Storm. There are no frontiers and no fronts in this war.
The "enemy" is not in uniform, and he does not fight in formations. The
nature of the threat is indirect and underground. The trafficker fights his
battles with subversion, terror, bribery, intimidation, and subterfuge. This
type of attack, nevertheless, poses an immediate threat to the sovereignty
and stability of the nations it puts at risk, for it undermines the very
institutions upon which a free and open society is based, and it attacks the
health and welfare of the people themselves. The nature of the response
must take these facts into consideration.
Myth No. 2: We are not up against a traditional threat.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that much of the confusion that we see about the
nature of our effort stems from a lack of understanding of the type of threat
we are dealing with. In our counter-narcotics efforts, we are not seeking to
invent a surrogate for the Cold War. We are not looking backward at
guerrilla wars in Central America. We are seeking to look forward. There is
nothing ideological, or even partisan, in this effort. Drugs are a new,
emerging, transnational concern, similar to nuclear proliferation,
environmental devastation, AIDS, and disaster relief. These are all issues
which, if not addressed adequately, have long-term consequences that
affect our future. We must make the decade of the 1990s one in which we
obliterate narcotics as a threat to our societies and our democratic values.
Myth Number 3: "Militarization" of the drug war
Use of the metaphor of war has raised the question of an alleged desire by
the US Government to "militarize" the counter-drug effort. This is also a
myth. Most of our "military assistance" for counter-narcotics is, in fact,
going to Andean police organizations. Dealing with drug trafficking
organizations is primarily and essentially a civilian law enforcement
problem requiring that police be on the front lines. Our goal is not "search
and destroy." We wish to indict, arrest, try, convict, and incarcerate
criminals either in the United States or in their own countries--respecting
their rights and those of ordinary citizens. This requires better equipped,
more professional police and more streamlined judicial organs.
We have involved the US military in supporting roles to provide
sophisticated assets for detection and monitoring, transport, training, and
delivery of military assistance hardware and in providing communications,
logistical, and intelligence expertise to US missions abroad. Host
government militaries provide air intercept, transport, and airlift
capabilities to their own police; security for law enforcement personnel;
[and] riverine capabilities; and [these] are sometimes used directly for
operations against large, outlying drug production complexes.
Recall, also, that, in Colombia and Peru, violent insurgent organizations that
are waging illegitimate war on democratically elected governments are
engaged in narco-trafficking themselves, and it is their considerable
firepower in difficult, semi-jungle terrain that overmatches the police.
Part of the myth of militarization ignores this fact and the responsibility
for sustaining domestic violence and the drug trade.
Myth No. 4: Counter-narcotics assistance serves to violate human
rights.
We have little choice but to engage ourselves in combating the
vicious organized criminal gangs which seek to penetrate our country with
and, ultimately, all of us. Some people seem to believe, however, that any
assistance to Andean governments for anti-narcotics will result in or
associate the United States with violations of human rights.
Our counter-narcotics programs include human rights training for both
police and military, include efforts to professionalize and institutionalize
police and the organs of justice which are the safeguard for human rights
observance, and include conditions for human rights observance.
Furthermore, we monitor our assistance to assure it is not used for other
than counter-narcotics purposes. We believe that the more closely we work
with host government institutions, the less likely they are to engage in
violations of human rights.
We must recognize that we have a responsibility to prevent the abuse of
human rights from drugs and those that push them; we must recognize the
key role that drug traffickers and their allies play in promoting the
atmosphere of violence that produces the majority of abuses; [and] we must
see that our goal of supporting democracy does not become a victim of
ignorance of the threat posed by traffickers and their insurgent allies.
Myth No. 5: We have failed in our objective of stopping the flow of
cocaine to the United States.
We are dealing in an ambiguous
environment in which it is difficult to know anything with absolute
certainty. Drug trafficking occurs in the shadows, and traffickers take
infinite pains to obscure the workings of their business. Progress,
moreover, takes time, especially against a well-entrenched, ruthless foe
who possesses incredible wealth. Nevertheless, we are making impressive
gains in efforts to deal with the illicit flow of cocaine to the United States.
While it is difficult to know exactly how much is being produced, we know
that, in a brief 2-year period, the Andean countries have staunched the
rising levels of coca cultivation, [have] cut back on new cultivation through
seedbed eradication, and have had increasing success in arresting major
traffickers, breaking up narcotics networks, and seizing cocaine shipments.
These reflect the increased commitment of the producing and transiting
countries with the support of the United States.
The pressure is up, but we view this effort as a long-term one, and there
will be no instant success against a deeply rooted problem. Increased
assistance to the Andean governments was only approved in 1990 and was
received only last year. In Peru, our enhanced assistance only started
arriving over the past 2 months. If we do not have the patience and the
stamina to persevere, we will not only lose the ground that we have gained,
we will fail in the goal of reducing the threat to this country and to our
friends and allies from drugs.
We have by no means won the "war," but we have made substantial progress.
It remains for us to sustain those gains.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: Combating Drug Money-Laundering
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: South America, North America
Country: United States, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru
Subject: Narcotics
[TEXT]
The Problem
In 1990, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an ad hoc organization of
26 countries that have significant financial centers, estimated worldwide
proceeds from the production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs
at more than $300 billion.
The Response
In recent years, it became clear that campaigns against money-laundering
are an important tool to destabilize drug-trafficking organizations.
In 1988, nearly 100 governments approved the UN Convention Against
Trafficking in Illicit Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which requires
signatories to criminalize money- laundering and remove bank secrecy
barriers that inhibit criminal investigations. The 1989 economic summit,
held in Paris, established the FATF to develop recommendations for action.
In 1990, the FATF endorsed 40 countermeasures, which it recommended to
governments throughout the world, calling for:
-- The criminalization of money- laundering;
-- Removal of legislative barriers to investigations;
-- Reporting suspicious transactions;
-- Regulating non-bank as well as banking institutions; and
-- Rendering assistance to other governments on financial investigations.
FATF recommends that each of the 26 participating governments adopt and
implement legislation to enforce these countermeasures. They further
recommend that, through an outreach program already involving governments
in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia,
participating governments seek concurring legislation among all possible
governments whose financial systems are considered vulnerable to
exploitation by traffickers.
To bolster this effort, the 26 FATF members have agreed to mutual
evaluation, in which teams comprised of experts from other member
countries will assess each government on progress. This commitment to
examination, in addition to submitting annual self-evaluations, has given
the FATF greater political credibility. The organization has established a
secretariat through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development in Paris.
The European Community (EC) adopted a policy directive to guide its 12
members in the implementation of the UN convention, going beyond the
convention in some key aspects--notably the requirement for mandatory
reporting by banks of suspicious transactions. The EC is one of two regional
members of FATF and works closely with that body. A new convention,
drafted by the Council of Europe, addresses the critical issue of cooperation
on asset forfeiture, which is essential given the multiplicity of financial
transactions that today's traffickers are initiating through professional
money managers across the globe.
The Future
Money-launderers are using increasingly complex schemes to avoid
detection, such as employing a wide variety of monetary instruments, non-
bank financial institutions, and corporate shells for placing money. The
United States and other financial center countries have changed strategies
to counter these innovations.
The United States supports Colombian Government efforts to target money
managers. Raids on the Cali cocaine organization, for example, resulted in
the arrests of six leading managers and seizures of millions in assets.
These raids also yielded 300,000 documents, which provide important new
insights into how and where money is laundered. The United States plans
similar cooperation with other governments in South America and Asia, the
results of which should force traffickers to increasingly expose their
assets by constant movements that should result in more seizures and
arrests.
In 1992, FATF is focusing on non-bank institutions, while also targeting
corporate criminal liability and strengthening asset forfeiture and seizure
provisions.
The Caribbean Group is expected to adopt more than 60 measures unique to
its region, and governments in Latin America and the Caribbean are expected
to take the first steps to implement model legislation recommended by the
Organization of American States. Similar efforts will begin in other regions.
Financial Action Task Force
Austria Japan
Australia Luxembourg
Belgium Netherlands
Canada New Zealand
Denmark Norway
Finland Portugal
France Singapore
Germany Spain
Greece Sweden
Hong Kong Switzerland
Iceland Turkey
Ireland United Kingdom
Italy United States(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: Controlling Chemicals Used in Drug
Trafficking
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Whole World
Subject: Narcotics, Environment
[TEXT]
Chemicals are necessary for the production of cocaine, heroin, and synthetic
drugs. In order to curb drug production, the United States is working to deny
traffickers access to these chemicals.
The extensive and competitive international commerce in chemicals,
however, complicates the design and adoption of effective regulations to
prevent diversion. Such regulations must control the entire chain of a
chemical transaction, from chemical manufacturers through intermediaries
to ultimate users, while not unduly burdening legitimate commerce. They
must be adopted by all major chemical manufacturing and trading countries,
in addition to drug producing countries, to prevent traffickers from
switching to unregulated sources of supply.
The 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances outlines procedures for controlling 12 of the most
important drug-related chemicals. The United States, other Western
Hemisphere countries, and the European Community (EC) have been leaders in
adopting laws and regulations incorporating them.
The 1988 US Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act placed 20 chemicals
under government control. In 1990, the Organization of American States
(OAS) adopted "Model Regulations to Control Precursor Chemicals and
Chemical Substances, Machines and Materials" which are forming the basis
for chemical control regulations in many OAS countries. They call for the
regulation of 36 chemicals. The EC has adopted community-wide chemical
control regulations based on the 1988 UN convention to control chemical
trade with non-EC countries.
Nevertheless, chemicals essential to the production of illicit drugs are
getting through for two basic reasons: the absence of universal, uniform
regulations; and the inability of many countries to effectively implement
their chemical control laws because they do not have the regulatory
infrastructure and trained personnel to do so.
We are attacking the problem on two fronts. Experience demonstrates that
the most effective chemical control action is that taken by the exporting
country prior to the exportation of regulated chemicals. The United States
chairs the G-7 Chemical Action Task Force (CATF) which includes 26 other
major chemical manufacturing countries, drug manufacturing countries, and
concerned international organizations; the CATF has developed
comprehensive recommendations for chemical control, building on
procedures in the 1988 UN convention.
The extensive discussion in five meetings during 1990-91 on these
recommendations demonstrated to the CATF members that chemical control
is not only desirable but feasible and provided uniform procedures to be
incorporated in a chemical control regime. The recommendations include
five basic chemical control procedures to be adopted at the national level to
prevent diversion and the addition of 10 chemicals to the 12 in the 1988 UN
convention.
These multilateral initiatives are being supplemented by US Government
bilateral initiatives targeted at the major cocaine producing countries. We
have chemical control agreements with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama,
and Peru to facilitate the exchange of information to determine the
legitimacy of chemical sales between our countries. The United States is
funding chemical control training through the UN Drug Control Program and
the OAS for the chemical and drug producing countries of Latin America. In
1991, national training workshops were conducted in Bogota, Mexico City,
Quito, and Santiago. The US Drug Enforcement Administration conducts much
of the training.
The model regulatory regimes and chemical control training are providing
the foundation for enhanced international cooperation between enforcement
agencies of major chemical and drug producing countries. Our chemical
control objective is to extend adoption of compatible chemical control
regimes through the CATF to those countries that do not have them, while
enforcement agencies work to improve cooperation within existing
regulatory frameworks. The ultimate objective is to make diversion control
a standard part of any transaction involving a drug-related chemical. (###)
Chemical Action Task Force Members
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia,
Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Pakistan, Peru, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom,
United States, UN International Narcotics Control Board, Organization of
American States, Commission of the European Communities. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: Coca Production And the
Environment
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Whole World
Subject: Narcotics, Environment
[TEXT]
The Problem
Cocaine production causes serious--often irreparable--damage, since coca
is grown and processed in some of the world's most fragile ecological zones.
Coca farmers and the so-called chemists who process the raw product for
export irreversibly damage jungle forests, soils, and waterways. The
populations of the primary Andean coca regions in Peru, Bolivia, and
Colombia--largely migrants who have come specifically to grow coca--have
almost no regard for the "eyebrow of the jungle" region where the
tributaries of the Amazon begin.
Although the US drug war seeks mainly to halt the devastation caused by
drugs to citizens and communities, the United States also wants to stop
environmental destruction. American drug users help finance the
environmental degradation, and the increasing number of drug users in
Europe, in neighboring Latin American countries that serve as narcotics
pipelines, and in the producer countries themselves add to the market.
Coca growers and processors damage the environment in three ways:
Deforestation.
Deforestation increases erosion and soil runoff, depletes soil nutrients, and
decreases biological diversity. As heavy rains erode the thin topsoil of the
fields, growers often must abandon their parcels to prepare new plots.
Traffickers also destroy jungle forests to build landing strips and
laboratories. A smoky haze covers much of the Huallaga Valley throughout
August and September as farmers slash and burn forests to create new
fields for coca production; much of the coca-producing land is cut out of
nature preserves and national forests.
Scientists in Peru report the irretrievable loss of plant and animal species
due to clearance of large areas of the country's most biologically diverse
region. Besides the 171,000 hectares of coca cultivated in Bolivia and Peru,
producers of illicit drugs have deforested as much as 1 million hectares of
fragile jungle forest lands in the Amazon region.
Use of Herbicides, Pesticides, and Fertilizers in Coca Growing
Seeking to maximize their incomes and largely ignorant about chemicals,
coca growers dump great quantities of strong pesticides, weedkillers, and
fertilizers on their crops. Peruvian environmentalists estimate that coca
growers use 1.5 million liters of paraquat each year in the Upper Huallaga
Valley alone. These chemicals saturate the soil and contaminate
waterways, poisoning the water system and destroying the species that
depend upon it. Although the extent of damage is still unknown, Latin
American environmentalists believe that the contamination is spreading
into adjacent ecological zones.
Toxic Chemicals From Cocaine Processing.
Cocaine processing laboratories disposing of huge amounts of toxic
chemicals into nearby streams and rivers have killed several fish species in
Peru. Scientists estimate that pollution in Peru's Amazon feeder rivers
from Peruvian processing included, in 1 year, the discharge of:
-- 57 million liters of kerosene--the equivalent of one supertanker;
-- 22 million liters of sulfuric acid;
-- 16,000 metric tons of lime;
-- 3,000 metric tons of carbide;
-- 6 million liters of acetone;
-- 6 million liters of toluene; and
-- 10,000 tons of toilet paper.
US Strategy
Successful drug control strategies must weigh environmental as well as
social and economic effects. Since manual eradication of coca bushes is
very difficult, dangerous work and because of environmental concerns about
chemical eradication, the United States--in consultation with Andean
nations--is pursuing a three-fold strategy.
1. In Peru and Colombia--limit forced eradication to coca seedbeds to
reduce the spread of cultivation, while working with local authorities and
grower organizations to promote voluntary eradication. (Some forced
eradication of mature coca plants continues in Bolivia, primarily in public
areas such as national parks.)
2. Support alternative economic opportunities, crop substitution, and other
programs to provide growers with another way to earn a living and escape
from dependence on criminal organizations.
3. Attack the trafficker organizations by intercepting their aircraft,
seizing their assets, destroying their drug production facilities, and
reducing their supplies of chemical inputs to stem their earnings. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: Gist: Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: Whole World
Subject: Narcotics, Environment
[TEXT]
Background
In September 1989, President Bush approved an Andean counter-drug
initiative that expanded narcotics-related military, economic, law
enforcement, and intelligence cooperation for selected Andean countries for
the purpose of strengthening their counter-narcotics efforts. At the
Cartagena summit in February 1990, President Bush joined Andean
presidents from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in a commitment to fight drug
trafficking through a strategy of mutually reinforcing actions to cut demand
and supply. At that summit, the Andean presidents appealed to President
Bush to provide new trade opportunities to create legal sources of
employment to displace permanently the cocaine economy in their countries.
Later, in July 1990, President Bush announced that he was sending to the US
Congress the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), designed to fulfill his
commitment at the Cartagena summit with Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, as
well as Ecuador.
Key Provisions of the ATPA
This proposal, which was signed into law on December 4, 1991, is designed
to expand economic alternatives for those countries that have been fighting
to eliminate the production, processing, and shipment of illegal drugs. It
provides the basic authority for the President to grant duty-free treatment
to imports of eligible articles from countries designated as beneficiaries
according to criteria set forth in the act. The proposal is patterned after
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990, which
implemented the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).
Key provisions of the proposal are:
-- The President is authorized to designate Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru as beneficiary countries, based upon certain criteria specified in the
act.
-- Articles are eligible for duty-free entry if they are imported directly
from a beneficiary country, consist of at least 35% value-added in a
beneficiary country or countries (including CBI countries), and are made of
components originating in the beneficiary countries or (if of foreign origin)
have been substantially transformed in the beneficiary country or countries
into new and different articles of commerce.
-- Articles exempt from duty-free treatment include: textiles and apparel,
footwear, canned tuna, petroleum and petroleum products, watches and
watch parts, and rum. Handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and
leather wearing apparel are subject to duty reduction over a 5-year period.
Duty-free entry of sugar, syrups, and molasses is provided consistent with
the tariff-rate quotas on these products.
-- The proposal establishes import relief and emergency provisions in order
to safeguard US domestic industries, including those producing perishable
products (i.e., live plants and fresh cut flowers, certain fresh or chilled
vegetables, certain fresh fruit, and concentrated citrus fruit juice).
-- The US International Trade Commission and the Department of Labor are
required to monitor and report annually on the impact of the act on the US
economy and US labor, respectively.
The program will remain in effect for 10 years. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: US Economic, Military, and
Counter-Narcotics Program
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: Whole World
Country: Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico
Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid,
Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
Assistance
(All figures $ million)
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY
92
actual actual actual
request
Colombia
Economic
ESF 2.9 2.10 50.0 50.0
a
Development
Assistance 0.0 7.50 b 4.1 b 3.8
b
PL 480 0.0 0.20 0.0 0.0
Subtotal 2.9 9.80 54.1 53.8
Military
FMF credit 0.0 0.0 19.5 0.0
FMF 7.1 71.7 27.1 58.0
IMET 1.0 1.50 2.5 2.3
Narcotics
Control c 65.0 20.0 0.0 0.0
Excess Defense
Articles 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0
Subtotal 73.1 93.2 51.5 60.3
INM
Interdiction 9.4 18.9 18.5 18.3
Drug Prevention
and Education 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3
Program
Development
and Support 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.4
Subtotal 10.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Total d 86.0 123.0 125.6 134.1
Bolivia
Economic
ESF 11.8 33.4 76.8 25.0
100.0 a
Development
Assistance 24.6 24.2 23.8 22.5
PL 480 33.3 33.8 36.7 33.3
Subtotal 69.7 91.4 137.3 180.8
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY
92
actual actual actual
request
Military
FMF 5.0 39.2 35.0 40.0
IMET 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9
Narcotics
Control c 0.0 7.8 0.0 0.0
Subtotal 5.4 47.5 35.9 40.9
INM
Interdiction 6.5 10.9 11.5 12.2
Crop Production
Control 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.1
Drug Prevention
and Education 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0
Program
Development
and Support 0.9 1.7 2.2 1.5
Subtotal 10.0 15.7 15.7 15.7
Total d 85.1 154.6 188.9 237.4
Peru
Economic
ESF 2.0 3.3 59.1 100.0
a
Development
Assistance 17.7 16.0 9.7 15.7
PL 480 30.0 50.8 70.9 72.0
PL 480,
Section 416 e 0.0 0.0 17.5 0.0
Subtotal 49.70 70.1 157.2 187.7
Military
FMF 2.5 1.0 24.0 39.0
IMET 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9
Subtotal 3.0 1.5 24.5 39.9
INM
Interdiction 7.7 6.9 13.6 13.6
Crop Production
Control 2.0 2.2 4.2 4.3
Drug Prevention
and Education 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Program
Development
and Support 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0
Subtotal 10.5 10.0 19.0 19.0
f
Total d 63.2 81.6 200.7 246.6
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY
92
actual actual actual
request
Ecuador
Economic
ESF 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Development
Assistance 17.2 16.3 15.6 15.0
PL 480 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.0
PL 480,
Section 416 e 0.0 2.9 4.5 0.0
Subtotal 26.9 19.5 20.7 15.0
Military
FMF 4.0 0.5 2.0 5.0
IMET 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
Narcotics
Control c 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0
Subtotal 4.7 4.2 2.8 5.8
INM
Interdiction 0.8 1.2 1.3 2.6
Crop Production
Control 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Program
Development
and Support 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Subtotal 1.0 1.4 1.5 3.0
Total d 32.6 25.1 25.0 23.8
Venezuela
Economic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Military
FMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IMET 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2
Subtotal 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2
INM
Interdiction 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.7
Drug Prevention
and Education 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Program
Development
and Support 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Subtotal 0.7 1.0 1.0 2.0
Total 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.2
Mexico
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92
actual actual actual request
Economic
ESF 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Development
Assistance g 11.4 9.5 14.0 16.1
(anti-narcotics
portion) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2)
(0.3)
PL 480 h 4.3 2.8 0.50 0.0
PL 480,
Section 416 e 22.2 22.8 22.7 23.1
Subtotal 37.9 35.1 37.3 39.2
Military
FMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IMET 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
Subtotal 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
INM
Interdiction and
Eradication 14.4 14.4 18.6 24.8
Drug Prevention
and Education 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Program
Development
and Support 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0
Subtotal 15.0 15.0 19.3 26.0
Total 53.1 50.3 57.0 65.6
Summary
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92
actual actual actual request
Colombia
Economic 2.9 9.8 54.1 53.8 i
Military 73.1 93.2 51.5 60.3
INM d 10.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Total 86.0 123.0 125.6 134.1
Bolivia
Economic 69.7 91.4 137.3 180.8 i
Military 5.4 47.5 35.9 40.9
INM d 10.0 15.7 15.7 15.7
Total 85.1 154.6 188.9 237.4
Peru
Economic 49.7 70.1 157.2 187.7 i
Military 3.0 1.5 24.5 39.9
INM d 10.5 10.0 19.0 19.0
Total 63.2 81.6 200.7 246.6
Ecuador
Economic 26.9 19.5 20.7 15.0
Military 4.7 4.2 2.8 5.8
INM d 1.0 1.4 1.5 3.0
Total 32.6 25.1 25.0 23.8
Venezuela
Economic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Military 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2
INM 0.7 1.0 1.0 2.0
Total 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.2
Mexico
Economic 37.9 35.1 37.3 39.2
Military 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
INM 15.0 15.0 19.3 26.0
Total 53.1 50.3 57.0 65.6
Grand Total 320.8 435.7 598.6 709.7
Footnotes
a $250 million in Economic Support Funds from the Andean Counter-
narcotics Initiative will be allocated among Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru,
contingent upon each country's counter-narcotics efforts and sound
economic policies.
b From centrally funded Development Assistance programs.
c Section 506A of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act.
d Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador receive additional support through
the Department of State's centrally funded International Narcotics Matters
air wing, which also supplements narcotics control programs in Central
America and the Caribbean.
e Surplus agricultural commodities from US Department of Agriculture
(USDA).
f From regional anti-narcotics program funds.
g Development Assistance in Mexico is managed through the US Agency for
International Development's central and regional programs. Priorities
include training and technical assistance for public and private sector
personnel involved in the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement
and Trade Development, Global Climate Change, and Voluntary Population
Planning. Other areas of emphasis are in AIDS prevention and anti-narcotics
public awareness.
h PL 480 (Food for Peace) Title II and the Section 416 (surplus USDA
agricultural commodities) programs are being phased out in FY 1992 and FY
1993. In the past, those programs have provided grants or donated food to
private voluntary organizations for community self-help projects.
i Includes projected allocation of $250 million in Economic Support Funds
from the Andean Counter-narcotics Initiative, which is allocated among
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, contingent upon each country's counter-
narcotics efforts and sound economic policies.
Acronyms
ESF--Economic Support Fund
FMF--Foreign Military Financing
IMET--International Military Education and Training
INM--Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Matters
PL 480--Food for Peace (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992
Title: Fact Sheet: US-Bolivian Relations
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public