US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992


Two Years After Cartagena: Assessing Accomplishments and Plans

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpt from prepared statement at the Opening Plenary Session of the San Antonio Drug Summit Date: Feb, 27 19922/27/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: United States, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru Subject: Narcotics [TEXT] It is a great honor and pleasure to call to order a historic meeting, in a historic city, in a historic state--my home state of Texas. We are all here to make this San Antonio Drug Summit as successful as the first summit called by [Colombian] President Barco 2 years ago in beautiful, "heroic" Cartagena. It is fitting to begin this meeting with a warm tribute to the great, visionary man who first brought us together on this issue, Virgilio Barco. In Cartagena, as [Bolivian] President Paz Zamora, who is also here today, will recall, we faced a daunting, unprecedented--some thought, hopeless-- challenge: How to unite against the scourge of drugs, violence, and corruption that was undermining our democratic societies, our institutions, our economies, and our environment. That meeting gave birth to a new alliance to strengthen our democracies by attacking the drug trafficking and consumption with greater resolve than ever before. Cartagena was when we stopped the finger-pointing and committed ourselves to cooperation, when we recognized that drugs are an international plague caused by both consumer and supplier. Two years later, the situation has markedly improved. We are facing the challenge; we are united; we are resolute; we are prevailing. We are now seven, not four. We welcome to this group Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador, all of whom have shown firm leadership and courage in this struggle. Others in the Americas and Europe are with us, seeing the threat more clearly. Progress is being made. We have courageously faced those who would subvert our societies, break our laws, and kill thousands of innocents. Top traffickers are dead or jailed; record levels of cocaine and other drugs have been seized; cultivation has leveled off; interdiction is up worldwide; we have cracked down on drug users; consumption is declining as our people increasingly reject drugs, especially our youth; our judicial institutions are stronger, better able to meet the challenge; our efforts against money- laundering, chemical diversion, and illegal arms exports are improving. We are here today because the job is not yet done. We have not yet won this fight. It is time to assess our accomplishments and our plans--to learn from the past and look to the future. Let me mention what seems to me to be some priority areas. First and foremost, we must reduce demand. All else will fail if we do not do that. I know that task falls heaviest on the United States, and we have made a good beginning. Since I came to office, there has been a 35% decrease in current cocaine users, and 27% fewer young people are using drugs. Second, we must continue the economic reform, economic assistance, debt, trade, and investment measures which are so important to our anti- narcotics programs. The United States wants alternative development to succeed. I am sure Peruvian and Bolivian peasants will stop growing illegal coca if there is an alternative besides starvation. The stick of law enforcement must have a carrot--an offer of viable economic alternatives for poor peasants. Third, we must continue and enhance our effectiveness in eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement that have been so critical to our success thus far. Just as demand reduction will lower supply, so supply reduction will lessen demand. We have laid this out in the "strategy for action" that is part of our declaration. We must make it happen. Fourth, we must look carefully and imaginatively at what might be called non-violent law-enforcement measures. We must strengthen and harmonize our laws on money-laundering, arms, exports, chemical controls, asset seizure, and in other areas. It is here that the long arm of the law can fracture the power of the traffickers. The anti-racketeering laws in the United States have proven to be one of the strongest measures we have developed in recent years. Fifth, our judicial systems need our attention. Many of us have underway legal reforms so that we can handle criminal cases faster, more securely, and more effectively. These are important and should proceed. We must also cooperate by sharing information about traffickers and their crimes so they can be brought to justice. Sixth, our cooperation has developed in the past 2 years, and I welcome that. We need to keep in close touch so that we can coordinate strategy and understand each others' perspectives and needs. That makes the high-level follow-on meeting very important. It will be the first review of how our "strategies for action" are progressing. We also must enlist the cooperation of the Europeans and Asians. To do that, we should send a delegation to those countries to talk to their leaders. Seventh, heroin production is a worrisome problem which Mexico and Colombia are moving against with some success. This is a sign the traffickers believe the cocaine trade is declining. We cannot ignore this new threat, or we risk a surprise in the future. Eighth, we must do a better job educating our press and our publics about our progress. In the United States, for example, we are seeing a downturn in demand that was purchased at great cost in money and effort. Another example is the story of the drop in cultivation in the Chapare in Bolivia. Ninth, as we up the struggle within our own countries with renewed vigor, we must bear in mind that our efforts transcend borders. We must respect sovereignty, or our cooperation will not be sustained. But, as sovereign states, we can agree to cooperate against the traffickers who trample on sovereignty. If we do not work together, the traffickers will destroy us separately. Finally, one more note of great importance. Everything we do must conform to our democratic principles. None of us wants a drug-free dictatorship. We must protect the human and civil rights of our citizens. We are all committed to defending democracy and its principles as we defeat the scourge of drugs.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Declaration of San Antonio

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of joint declaration Date: Feb, 27 19922/27/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: United States, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] We, the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and the United States of America, and the Minister of Foreign Relations of Venezuela, met in San Antonio, Texas, on the 26th and 27th of February, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-two and issued the following Declaration of San Antonio: We recognize that the Cartagena Declaration, issued on February 15, 1990, by the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and the United States of America, laid the foundation for the development of a comprehensive and multilateral strategy to address the problem of illegal drugs. Those of us who represent the countries that met in Cartagena strongly reaffirm the commitments assumed at that time. Meeting now as representatives of seven governments, we express our determination to move beyond the achievements of Cartagena, build upon the progress attained, and adapt international cooperation to the new challenges arising from worldwide changes in the drug problem. We recognize that the overall problem of illegal drugs and related crimes represents a direct threat to the health and well-being of our peoples, to their economies, to the national security of our countries, and to harmony in international relations. Drugs lead to violence and addiction, threaten democratic institutions, and waste economic and human resources that could be used for the benefit of our societies. We applaud the progress achieved over the past two years in reducing cocaine production, in lowering demand, in reducing cultivation for illicit purposes, in carrying out alternative development programs, and in dismantling and disrupting transnational drug trafficking organizations and their financial support networks. The close cooperation among our governments and their political will have led to an encouraging increase in drug seizures and in the effectiveness of law enforcement actions. Also as a result of this cooperation and political will, a number of the principal drug lords who were actively engaged in the drug trade two years ago are in prison in several countries. Alternative development programs have proven to be an effective strategy for replacing coca cultivation in producer countries. Although we are encouraged by these achievements, we recognize that mutual cooperative efforts must be expanded and strengthened in all areas. We call on all sectors of society, notably the media, to increase their efforts in the anti-drug struggle. The role of the media is very important, and we urge them to intensify their valuable efforts. We undertake to promote, through the media, the values essential to a healthy society. In addition to the cocaine problem, we recognize the need to remain alert to the expansion of the production, trafficking, and consumption of heroin, marijuana, and other drugs. We emphasize the need to exert greater control over substances used in the production of these drugs, and to broaden consultations on the eradication of these illegal crops. We are convinced that our anti-drug efforts must be conducted on the basis of the principle of shared responsibility and in a balanced manner. It is essential to confront the drug problem through an integrated approach, addressing demand, cultivation for illicit purposes, production, trafficking, and illegal distribution networks, as well as related crimes, such as traffic in firearms and in essential and precursor chemicals, and money laundering. In addition, our governments will continue to perfect strategies that include alternative development, eradication, control and interdiction, the strengthening of judicial systems, and the prevention of illicit drug use. We recognize the fundamental importance of strengthening judicial systems to ensure that effective institutions exist to bring criminals to justice. We assume responsibility for strengthening judicial cooperation among our countries to attain these objectives. We reaffirm our intention to carry out these efforts in full compliance with the international legal framework for the protection of human rights. We reaffirm that cooperation among us must be carried out in accordance with our national laws, with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our nations, and in strict observance of international law. We recognize that the problem of illicit drugs is international. All countries directly or indirectly affected by the drug problem should take upon themselves clear responsibilities and actions in the anti-drug effort. We call on the countries of the region to strengthen national and international cooperative efforts and to participate actively in regional programs. We recognize that in the case of Peru, complicity between narco- trafficking and terrorism greatly complicates the anti-drug effort, threatens democratic institutions, and undermines the viability of the Peruvian economy. We express our support for the anti-drug struggle being carried out by our sister nations of the Western Hemisphere, we call on them to increase their efforts, and we offer to strengthen our governments' cooperation with them through specific agreements they may wish to sign. We value and encourage regional unity in this effort. We note with concern the opening and expansion of markets for illicit drugs, particularly cocaine, in Europe and Asia. We call upon the nations of those continents and on other member countries of the international community to strengthen, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, cooperation in the anti-drug effort in which the nations of the Western Hemisphere are engaged. To this end, we have agreed to form a high-level group with representatives designated by the signatory countries of this Declaration, to visit other countries of this Hemisphere, Europe, and Japan, with the purpose of inviting them to participate actively in the efforts and cooperative strategies described in this Declaration. We reaffirm our solid commitment to the anti-drug efforts of international organizations, notably the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Inspired by the mandate of the Inter-American Commission on the Control of Drug Abuse, we express our full support for this programs. We recognize the fundamental importance of strong economies and innovative economic initiatives to the successful conduct of the anti-drug effort. Further progress in the areas of trade and investment will be essential. We support the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative as a means of improving economic conditions in the Hemisphere, and we are encouraged by the progress the countries of the region have made in restructuring their economies. We reaffirm the importance of alternative development in the anti-drug effort. We note that the victims of narco-trafficking in the region include those sectors of society that live in extreme poverty and that are attracted to illicit drug production and trafficking as a means of livelihood. We consider that if our efforts to reduce illegal drug trafficking are to be successful, it will be essential to offer legitimate options that generate employment and income. We propose to achieve the objectives and goals defined above in this Declaration and in its attached Strategies for Action. Recognizing the need to ensure cohesion and progress in our anti-drug efforts, our governments intend to hold a high-level meeting on an annual basis. In order to broaden international anti-drug efforts still further, we invite additional countries or representatives of groups of countries to associate themselves with this Declaration. Done at San Antonio, Texas, on this, the 27th day of February, 1992, in the English and Spanish languages. For Bolivia - President Jaime Paz Zamora For Colombia - President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo For Ecuador - President Rodrigo Borja Cevallos For Mexico - President Carlos Salinas de Gortari For Peru - President Alberto Fujimori For the United States of America - President George Bush For Venezuela - Foreign Minister Armando Duran
Strategies for Drug Control and the Strengthening of the Administration of Justice
The Countries intend to strengthen unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral enforcement efforts and strengthen judicial systems to attack illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursor and essential chemicals. The Countries are determined to combat drug trafficking organizations through the arrests, prosecution, sentencing, and imprisonment of their leaders, lieutenants, members, accomplices, and accessories through the seizure and forfeiture of their assets, pursuant to the Countries' respective domestic legal systems and laws in force. To attain these objectives, the Countries intend to carry out coordinated cooperative actions through their national institutions. Enforcement efforts cannot be carried out without economic programs such as alternative development. The Countries request financial support from the international community in order to obtain funds for alternative development programs in nations that require assistance.
(1) Training Centers
The Countries intend to provide training for the personnel who are responsible for or support the counter-drug battle in the signatory Countries at national training centers already in existence in the region. Emphasis will be given to the specialties of each of these centers in which personnel from governments of the other Countries may be enrolled as appropriate, in accordance with their respective legal systems. The signatory Countries, other governments, and international organizations are encouraged to provide financial and technical support for this training.
(2) Regional Information Sharing
The Countries intend to expand reciprocal information sharing concerning the activities of organizations, groups, and persons engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The Countries will establish channels of communication to ensure the rapid dissemination of information for purposes of effective enforcement. This information sharing will be consistent with the security procedures, laws, and regulations of each country.
(3) Control of Sovereign Air Space
The Countries recognize that drug traffickers move illicit drugs via identified air corridors and without regard to international borders or national airspace. The Countries also recognize that monitoring of airspace is an important factor in the apprehension of aircraft and crews involved in illicit drug traffic. The Countries recognize that there is a need to exchange timely information on potential drug traffickers in and around each country's sovereign air space. The Countries also agree to exchange information on their experiences and to provide one another with technical assistance in detecting, monitoring, and controlling aerial drug trafficking, when such assistance is required in accordance with the domestic laws of each country and international laws in force.
(4) Aircraft, Airfield and Landing Strip Control
The Countries, recognizing that private and commercial aircraft are being utilized with increasing frequency in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, intend to establish and increase the necessary enforcement actions to prevent the utilization of such aircraft, pursuant to the domestic laws of each country and international regulations in force. The Countries also intend, if necessary, to examine their domestic regulations pertaining to civil aviation in order to prevent the illicit use of aircraft and airports. They will also take the enforcement measures necessary to prevent the establishment of clandestine landing strips and eliminate those already in existence. The Countries will cooperate closely with each other in providing mutual assistance when requested in order to investigate aircraft suspected of illicit drug trafficking. The Countries, pursuant to their domestic legal systems, also intend to seize and confiscate private aircraft when it has been proven that they have been used in the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
(5) Maritime Control Actions;
As called for in Article 17 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the Countries intend to strengthen cooperation to eliminate to the extent possible illicit trafficking by sea. To this end, they will endeavor to establish mechanisms to determine the most expeditious means to verify the registry and ownership of vessels suspected of illicit trafficking that are operating seaward of the territorial sea of any nation. The Countries further intend to punish illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances by sea under their national laws.
(6) Chemical Control Regimes
The Countries recognize that progress has been made in international efforts to eliminate the diversion of chemicals used in the illicit production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. They specifically support the "Model Regulations to Control Chemical Precursors and Chemical Substances, Machines and Materials" of the Organization of American States, the chemical control measures adopted at the April 1991 International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) meeting, and the recommendations in the Final Report of the Group of Seven Chemical Action Task Force, published in June 1991. The Countries call on all nations, and in particular, chemical exporting countries, to adopt the recommendations of the Group of Seven Chemical Action Task Force. They welcome the work of the above- mentioned Task Force and await with interest its report to the 1992 Economic Summit, in which it will make recommendations for the proper organization of worldwide control of those chemical products. The Countries express their support for including ten additional chemicals in the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, as proposed by the United States on behalf of the Chemical Action Task Force in the US notification to the Secretary General. The Countries call on the International Narcotics Control Board to strengthen its actions aimed at controlling essential and precursor chemicals. The Countries intend to investigate, in their respective countries, the legitimacy of significant commercial transactions in controlled chemical products. The Countries call on the chemical producing nations to establish an effective system for certification of end uses and end users. The Countries will take appropriate legal action against companies violating chemical control regulations. Studies will be conducted in the countries where narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances are produced in order to quantify the demand for chemicals for legitimate purposes in order to assist in the control of these products. The United States intends to provide financial and technical assistance for conducting the aforementioned studies and for setting up national data banks. The Countries urge all nations and international organizations to cooperate effectively with programs aimed at strengthening border control in order to prevent the illegal entry of chemicals.
(7) Port and Free Trade Zone Control
The Countries intend to implement measures to suppress illicit drug trafficking in free trade zones and ports, as called for in Article 18 of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and in accordance with the recommendations of the Ninth International Drug Enforcement Conference. A group of experts may be required to conduct a specialized study in order to identify the ports and free trade zones in the region that could be utilized for illicit traffic in drugs and chemicals. This study and subsequent reviews will serve as the basis for adopting measures to prevent illicit traffic in drugs and controlled substances in ports and free trade zones.
(8) Carrier Cooperation Agreement
The Countries are concerned about the difficulties inherent in the identification of suspicious shipments included in the great volume of legitimate commerce. In order to improve the effectiveness of border controls and also facilitate the transit of legitimate merchandise, the Countries intend to enlist the cooperation of air, land, and maritime transport companies. The Countries agree, in principle, to implement common standards and practices in order to include carriers in measures to improve anti-drug security.
(9) Money Laundering
The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances establishes a series of measures related to the control of financial assets to which the Countries intend to conform their domestic laws. The Countries support full implementation of this Convention, which requires, inter alia, the criminalization of all money laundering operations related to illicit drug traffic. The Countries recognize and support the efforts of the Group of Seven Financial Action Task Force. The Countries call upon the Eleventh Meeting of senior-level OAS/CICAD officials to approve the Model Regulations on Money Laundering related to illicit drug traffic. The Countries intend to make recommendations regarding the following: -- The elements of a comprehensive financial enforcement and money laundering control program; -- Exchange of financial information among governments in accordance with bilateral understandings.
(10) Strengthening the Administration of Justice
The Countries recognize and support efforts designed to improve their judicial systems, in those cases in which this may be necessary, in order to ensure the effectiveness of those systems in establishing the culpability and penalties applicable to traffickers in illicit drugs. They recognize the need for adequate protection for the persons responsible for administering justice in this area inasmuch as effective legal systems are essential for democracy and economic progress. The Countries call on all nations to strengthen the United Nations Drug Control Program.
(11) Strengthening Judicial Cooperation
The Countries support the provisions of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances related to increased cooperation and mutual legal assistance in the battle against illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, and investigations and proceedings involving seizure and forfeiture. The Countries must consider approval of the projects of the OAS Inter-American Judicial Committee on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and on precautionary measures. The Countries will encourage the expeditious exchange of information and evidence needed for legal proceedings involving illicit drug trafficking, pursuant to their domestic laws and bilateral and multilateral agreements.
(12) Sharing of Assets and Property
The Countries shall seek to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on the sharing of property seized and forfeited in the struggle against drug trafficking in accordance with the laws in force and the practices in each country. The Countries also consider that asset sharing would encourage international cooperation among law enforcement officials, and that confiscated property would be a valuable source of funds and equipment for combating drug production and trafficking and for preventing drug consumption and treating addicts.
(13) Firearms Control
The Countries recommend that measures to control firearms, ammunition, and explosives be strengthened in order to avoid their diversion to drug traffickers. The Countries also call for an enhanced exchange of detailed and complete information regarding seized weapons in order to facilitate the identification and determination of origin of such weapons, as well as the prosecution of those responsible for their illegal export. To this end, the United States intends to tighten its export controls and to cooperate with the Governments of the other Countries to verify the legitimacy of end users. The Countries consider that close cooperation with the OAS/CICAD is essential in such firearms, ammunition, and explosives control efforts.
(14) Other Cooperative Arrangements
The Countries recognize that cooperative operations have been a useful tool in the war against drug traffickers in the past. The Countries intend to continue and expand such cooperative measures through their national organizations responsible for the struggle against illegal drug trafficking.
Strategies in the Economic and Financial Areas
The Countries propose to strengthen unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral efforts aimed at improving economic conditions in the countries involved in the cycle of illegal drug production and trafficking. Extreme poverty and the growth of the drug problem are the main reasons that peasants become involved in illegal coca leaf production. The Countries reaffirm the principles in the Declaration of Cartagena, which accept that alternative economic development is an essential part of the comprehensive plan to reduce illegal trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Alternative development cannot succeed in the absence of enforcement and interdiction efforts that effectively reduce this illegal drug trafficking. The Countries recognize and approve of the structural changes that have taken place in the economies of the Andean countries and Mexico. These changes strengthen stability and increase prospects for economic growth. The Countries recognize that these reforms merit full support. Efforts to attract an increased flow of private investment will provide opportunities for sustained economic growth.
(1) Economic Issues
The Countries recognize that the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) with its three pillars--investment, trade, and debt--offers important means of improving economic conditions in the Hemisphere. All of the Countries have signed bilateral trade and investment framework agreements with the United States. The Countries recognize that these agreements are important to encourage investment and trade liberalization, and they intend to move ahead with the three pillars of the EAI as follows: (a) Investment The Countries recognize the critical importance of enacting laws and taking steps that encourage private investment and economic development. In this regard, the Countries have expressed their willingness to negotiate parallel bilateral agreements to protect intellectual property rights, as well as bilateral investment agreements, and others that promote trade liberalization. For this purpose, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative includes trade and investment framework agreements. The Countries express their satisfaction with the establishment of the Multilateral Investment Fund under the aegis of the Inter-American Development Bank [IDB]. The Countries consider this Fund important to provide technical assistance and to encourage private investment. The Countries note that the move towards a market economy in Latin America is a good vehicle for generating sustained economic growth, with benefits throughout society. They therefore view with interest experiences in privatizing services and industries that can serve to attract a significant flow of direct foreign investment. The initiation of operations by the Multilateral Investment Fund and technical assistance in support of privatization efforts will aid in the development of market economies. Some Andean countries plan to proceed with privatization programs and reforms of financial systems to the degree and depth possible in each country. The Andean countries state that facilitating access to the 936 funds would have a catalytic effect in attracting private investment to that subregion. The profound structural changes in the region make the active participation of financial entities in funding private projects more important than ever before. The Countries urge entities such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) to continue working with the Andean region. The countries of the Andean region are pleased by Mexico's participation as a stockholder in the Andean Development Corporation (ADC), which is a suitable channel for development activity in the subregion, particularly for the private sector, within a framework of productive integration. These countries express their interest in also being able to count on active participation by the United States Government in the ADC. The United States takes note of that interest. (b) Trade The Countries express their satisfaction regarding enactment of the Andean Trade Preference Act which allows the countries of the Andean region to export a wide variety of products to the United States for a ten-year period without paying duties. Those eligible countries that wish to benefit from this law will take the required steps. The United States, furthermore, plans to implement the provisions of this law as rapidly as possible in order to extend its benefits to the countries determined to fulfill the criteria in the law. The Andean countries also express their interest in having these preferences extended to Venezuela. The countries recognize that the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement will be an important step in the process of creating a hemispheric free trade agreement in accordance with the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. The Countries stress the importance of continued economic integration and trade liberalization efforts. (c) Debt The Countries express their satisfaction with the progress achieved by some Andean countries and Mexico in renegotiating their debt with the private international banking system and intend, when appropriate, to continue to support reduction of this debt. The Countries point out that the economic reforms implemented by Bolivia have already made it possible for that country to benefit from the reduction of a large part of its bilateral debt with the United States under the auspices and in the spirit of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which will make it possible to implement environmental projects in Bolivia. The Government of the United States will continue to take the necessary steps to obtain the legislative approval required for the debt categories that still do not have this authorization.
(2) Alternative Development
The Countries acknowledge that the goals of the Cartagena Declaration regarding the substitution of other agricultural products for coca and other plants that feed the drug cycle, and the creation of new sources of licit income, have not yet been fully achieved. The Countries note that in a major new initiative, the United States--in consultation with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru--is engaged in a program to provide training and technical assistance in agricultural marketing that will stress participation by the private sector as well as assistance for animal and plant health. The Countries applaud this program and intend to facilitate its implementation to the maximum extent possible. Notwithstanding assistance already pledged by the United States and the United Nations, the Countries recognize the need to establish a broad basis of funding for alternative development. For this reason, and given the worldwide range of illicit narcotics, the Countries intend to strive for increased participation of countries such as Japan and others as well as international financial agencies and institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Community, the OAS, the OECD, and others. The Andean nations believe, and the United States takes note, that such actions should also include the establishment of a facility for alternative development in an international financial institution. The Countries are determined to enlist the support of the international community in their fight against drugs. The Countries support the work of the OAS/CICAD Group of Experts charged with reviewing the alternative development approach and recommending ways to enhance it. Under the alternative development program, the Countries recognize the importance of implementing short-term projects such as emergency food programs, food for work, and income and employment generation. The Countries recognize that these efforts must simultaneously accompany eradication efforts in order to reduce the economic impact on coca leaf producers. These short-term actions must be aimed at producing jobs and temporary income until such time as the alternative development projects are fully developed. The Countries underscore the need for alternative development programs to be strengthened in coca leaf producing countries, or in those countries with areas that have potential for producing plants from which elements utilizable in the production of narcotics and psychotropic drugs can be extracted, so as to reduce the supply of raw material that feeds the narco- trafficking cycle. These programs will help farmers have different economic alternatives, which will allow them to move away from illegal coca production. The Countries acknowledge the progress achieved in alternative development in Bolivia and the beginning of alternative development activities in Peru. In this context, the Countries note the bilateral agreements with the United States signed by Peru and by Bolivia to implement alternative economic development and drug control programs, as useful experiences applicable to other countries. These two most salient examples are summarized as follows. Bolivia In Bolivia, with the firm support of the United States, efforts undertaken to develop other crops in coca producing zones, as well as in those areas from which people have been expelled, are having some success, starting with the production of genetic material with a proven biological viability, acceptable rate of return, and a potential for export. Technical assistance and credit, as well as continued training of farmers, permit the achievement of a good level of technology transfer. Actions taken in the infrastructure area have made it possible to improve the means of transporting agricultural products to consumer markets and processing them. Aggressive marketing is slowly allowing the opening of internal markets to the first items of this production, in accordance with phytosanitary and quality control requirements. The support being given to the social dimension by providing infrastructure in the health and education sectors is making it possible to improve the quality of life of the rural population. A new five-year project, which will start in early June of 1992, will provide continuity and strengthen key activities, such as marketing and private investment. Multilateral cooperation through the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) has also assisted in the alternative development process, especially in basic sanitation, roads, energy, and agroindustry. Nevertheless, based on the above-mentioned Bolivian experiences, it is recommended that: 1. Recognition be given to the fact that implementation of coca reduction policy has to be adapted to the pace of alternative development in order to reduce the gap between the loss of income and its replacement. It is evident that the success in alternative development will discourage farmers from growing coca. 2. Recognition be given to the importance of full and active participation by the farmers in alternative development processes. 3. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in alternative development be considered with regard to its specificity. It should include comprehensive, multisectoral, and long-term program guidance and should also be sufficiently flexible, broad, and timely to be able to promote qualitative changes beyond the short term. Peru In the case of Peru, progress can be summarized by the following points: -- The participation of the United States Government and Japan in the support group for the reentry of Peru into the international financial community. This allows the IDB and other bilateral donors to provide funds. -- The carrying out of massive food aid programs, promotion of a favorable economic policy framework for the development of the private sector, and the liberalization of two-way trade. -- The existence of projects, especially in the Upper Huallaga Valley where 14,000 farmers have received technical assistance in seed research, production, and marketing. The project provided credit and land titles and made it possible to resurface 1,200 kilometers of roads and to set up potable water systems, health posts, and latrines. -- The massive support received by President Fujimori from the rural population in the coca producing areas. -- Plans for 1992 that call for the resurfacing of the road linking the Upper Huallaga Valley to the coast, a program for recognizing and awarding property rights, and the participation of multinational firms interested in investing in alternative development projects. -- All this has been achieved in spite of insidious narco-trafficking, terrorism, and the alliance between the two. Under the Agreement on Narcotics Control and Alternative Development signed on May 14, 1991, which includes aspects relating to interdiction and security, an autonomous Peruvian institution will be responsible for distributing the necessary resources. This institution and its US counterpart will hold meetings to implement the shared strategy, immediately after the Presidential Summit in San Antonio. -- With respect to respect to human rights, the importance of conducting the anti-drug struggle within the framework of international standards is stressed. -- With respect to the citizens' commitment to the anti-drug effort, emphasis is placed on the need for them to have access to information and for efficient legal and administrative systems to exist. -- In order to have adequate farmer participation, consideration should be given, among other requirements, to: (a) Creating the democratic tools that make it possible to involve the people directly in the decision-making process; (b) Recognizing, awarding, and registering property rights; (c) Concluding crop substitution agreements with farmers; (d) Ensuring that eradication programs take into account the safeguarding of human health and preservation of the ecosystem; (e) Fostering new economic opportunities, such as alternative development and crop substitution programs, that will help to dissuade growers from initiating or expanding illegal cultivation; (f) Implementing reforestation programs in those areas where coca has been eradicated but where the land is not suitable for farming; (g) Substantially facilitating access to business activity and to credit; (h) Abolishing bureaucratic obstacles and mechanisms, particularly those that limit the production, marketing, and exportation of alternative goods; [and] (i) Promoting the participation of all countries interested in providing technical solutions and conducting specific alternative development projects with the peasants and/or their organizations.
(3) The Environment
The Countries express their concern regarding the severe damage that coca cultivation and illegal processing of coca derivatives are causing to the environment of the Andean region. The slash-and-burn method employed by coca and opium poppy growers causes severe erosion of the soil, and indiscriminate disposal of the toxic chemicals used to produce coca derivatives is poisoning the rivers and the water table. These activities enrich a small group of traffickers and cause harm to thousands of people. The United States Government notes that it is helping the Andean governments address the serious environmental problems caused by illegal coca and opium production. The United States is providing technical assistance and training under comprehensive environmental management programs that are important components of alternative development projects. The United States is providing assistance for watershed management, farm-level and community forestry, reforestation and environmental restoration, education on environmental problems, and environmental monitoring programs. These efforts are designed to prevent damage to--and to restore--the soil, water, and forest resources, thereby improving the quality of life and expanding opportunities for those who abandon, or never initiate, coca production in favor of alternative crops. The Countries agree that such technical assistance and training services must be designed to strengthen the capacity of Andean governments to protect their countries' natural environment. The Countries agree to design and implement suitable programs to reduce the negative ecological impact of coca production and ensure that security, interdiction, and substitution activities take the protection of the ecosystem into account.
Strategies for Prevention and Demand Reduction
The Countries recognize that consumption of, and illicit traffic in, drugs and psychotropic substances are a comprehensive problem, and that it can therefore be resolved only if control, interdiction, and supply reduction measures are accompanied by vigorous and effective action in demand reduction. It is also necessary for society, including its members who consume illegal drugs and those who are involved in illicit drug traffic or the cultivation of plants intended for conversion into illicit drugs, to be made aware of the harmful consequences of the production, traffic, and consumption of illicit drugs. It is imperative to provide warnings about the dangers of violence, crime, corruption, environmental damage, addiction, and the dissolution of society and the family resulting from the drug problem. The Countries are convinced that raising awareness regarding the harmful impact of drug-related offenses will motivate society to develop a culture that rejects drug use and to support vigorously efforts to combat supply and demand. In order to support this awareness campaign, the Countries agree to assume the responsibility, either individually or jointly, to conduct long- term programs to inform the public through the appropriate mass media and other information resources. The Countries also call on their respective private sectors to combine efforts to create a culture that rejects drugs. In this regard, the Countries are aware that demand can be controlled and reduced and that the basis can be laid for increasing awareness by means of continuous, systematic actions that include:
(1) Prevention
The Countries consider that prevention must be a priority aspect of national strategies to reduce the demand for drugs. In order to prevent consumption of drugs and dissuade occasional users, the Countries must include in their national and drug control strategies comprehensive prevention programs that include, among other things: (a) Education The Countries recognize that education is fundamental in the upbringing of the individual and the creation of positive values and attitudes toward life, and that the educational system at all levels and in all its forms is a suitable tool to reach most of the people. Consequently, the Countries undertake to engage in additional educational efforts for comprehensive prevention of drug use from pre-school through higher education, by means of scientific research, in order to create an attitude and a culture that rejects drugs and in which the family and the community play a fundamental role. (b) Community Mobilization The Countries wish to emphasize the importance of mobilizing all sectors of society against drugs as a fundamental part of national prevention efforts. This mobilization includes carrying out actions at the individual, family, and social levels by means of activities that include recreation, sports, and cultural events that make it possible to achieve a total rejection of drug consumption.
(2)Treatment and Rehabilitation
In order for drug addicts to receive suitable assistance, the Countries consider that it is necessary to increase their capacity with regard to treatment and rehabilitation, in addition to improving the quality of services. The Countries consider that these programs must be designed not only to rehabilitate drug addicts but also to help them reenter society. The Countries believe that treatment and rehabilitation are basic in reducing the consequences arising from drug use, including AIDS transmission, societal violence, and the destruction of the family and social structure.
(3)Scientific Research
The Countries recognize that it is necessary to establish programs for basic and social research, including epidemiology, in their national strategies. Epidemiological programs must be conducted using a methodology that makes it possible to compare findings at the regional and international levels. These findings will also be useful in evaluating prevention programs. The Countries undertake to exchange information on drug abuse through a regional information network and to support initiatives to establish a data bank on this subject, especially within the framework of CICAD.
The Countries undertake to cooperate by providing appropriate technical assistance for the education and training of human resources in these areas. The Countries will also endeavor to consult with one another and exchange information on the prevention of illicit drug use, treatment, rehabilitation, and scientific research. In this regard, they agree to cooperate in order to determine the most effective ways to utilize the research findings in implementing the various programs.
(5)National Councils
The Countries are convinced that the creation of national councils to coordinate efforts to develop strategies against illicit drugs has made an important contribution to the development of prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation programs in all the countries.
The Countries undertake to engage in ongoing follow-up of the actions described above. To that end, they will assign responsibility to their national councils in line with OAS/CICAD programs. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

US Assistance to El Salvador

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 24 19922/24/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: El Salvador Subject: Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] President Bush held a half-hour private meeting today with President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador. President Bush congratulated President Cristiani for his great personal leadership and courage in bringing peace to his country. He also praised the progress President Cristiani has made toward implementing the peace agreements signed earlier this month in Mexico City and achieving true national reconciliation. The President gave his assurance that the United States would do everything possible to support full implementation of the peace accord and to help El Salvador consolidate democracy and peace and expand economic opportunity. In this regard, the President mentioned that the US Government was working with other governments to assure international support for the national reconstruction of El Salvador. The President also promised to work with Congress on a bipartisan basis for continued US assistance to El Salvador in the future through both direct aid programs and debt reduction under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. US assistance and international support will be vital to the continued success of the peace process and national reconciliation in El Salvador. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Building International Cooperation To Fight Illicit Drug Trafficking

Aronson Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Description: Excerpts from press briefing at San Antonio Drug Summit, San Antonio, Texas Date: Feb, 27 19922/27/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America, North America Country: United States, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] What I will do is try to just give a context for this final day of the summit and then describe what I think was accomplished and then take questions. I would just make one large point, which is that if you look at the new challenges of the post-Cold War era, increasingly they are what is called "transnational problems," or "global problems"--controlling weapons of mass destruction, global environmental issues, and narcotics trafficking. What the democratic community has learned over recent years is that these new global challenges cannot be confronted by any one country alone; they cross borders, they require a new degree of regional cooperation and multilateral cooperation. I think that the summit declaration said it very well; it said that the Cartagena Declaration laid the foundation for the development of a comprehensive and multilateral strategy to address the problem of illegal drugs, and that here in San Antonio we've moved beyond the achievements of Cartagena to adapt international cooperation to the new challenges arising from worldwide changes in the drug problem. I'm going to go through briefly the conversation--just a few highlights of the discussion among the heads of state to give you a sense of it. And then I would like to say what I think was accomplished here. One of the problems in the drug fight is that countries waited too long. One of the positive results of the new regional cooperation is that countries have learned that lesson. So, for instance, President [Rodrigo] Borja made the point in the morning's discussion that he saw a growing transit problem across Ecuador and he intended to commit his government to stamp it out before it was too late. He called drugs a transnational problem that requires joint action, and he said that just in the last few weeks Ecuador had seized the largest cocaine seizure in its history--about 3.1 tons of cocaine hydrochloride. President [Carlos] Salinas made the same point. He said the power wielded by the drug traffickers makes them a threat to all our governments. He said that Mexico was dramatically increasing its budget. He said that more than 25,000 soldiers, several thousand police are committed to the drug fight, and over 56,000 hectares of drug production have been destroyed; 1,500 tons seized--these are over the last 2 years. He said the last 2 years they've seized drugs valued at more than twice their external debt. He said they've made 16,000 arrests, they've seized 20,000 weapons and 140 airplanes from the drug traffickers. He said Mexico probably has the largest air force in Latin America today because of the planes they've seized from the traffickers. The President of Bolivia [Jaime Paz Zamora] noted his very strong sense that, since Cartagena, enormous progress has been made on all areas--trade, interdiction, and eradication. He pointed to new investment by American companies as being helpful. He said, "If not us, who; if not now, when?" in the drug fight. And the reason I'm citing these quotes is, if you remember back to Cartagena, the issues then were: Is there a will to fight? Will they cooperate? The whole spirit and tone and nature of these conversations is really a quantum advance. Nobody's questioned whether we need to fight this effort. Nobody's questioned whether we need to cooperate. Nobody's fighting between producers and consumers. Countries are learning the lessons as Ecuador clearly has done by getting into this drug fight before it grows beyond dimensions that they can't cope with. [Colombian] President [Cesar] Gaviria went through the progress since Cartagena. He said: "Two years have passed; we've gone beyond headlines to commitment. Two years ago, the cartels looked invincible; they threatened our democracies; now their leaders are dead and in jail." He said, "We're no longer pointing fingers of guilt at the producers or the consumers." He says, "There's been a dramatic change in the position of international financial and banking circles. It used to be that the dirty capital of the drug traffickers was just accepted without question; now there's a new multilateral commitment to stop it." But he said, "Drug traffickers find it easy to adapt, and therefore we need to strengthen this hemispheric effort to confront them." [Peruvian] President [Alberto] Fujimori thanked President Bush for the US effort that helped in what he said, "reinserting Peru into financial relations with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and World Bank and Inter- American Development Bank and helping it carry out a stabilization program." He said that drugs are destroying the Amazon rain forest. He talked strongly about the need to build a regional effort to interdict trafficker aircraft. President Gaviria also, later in the conversation, talked about the changes in the Colombian judicial system. He said that they fundamentally have reformed their judicial system and moved to a prosecutorial system. For those of you familiar with Latin American judicial systems, they usually have the judge in the case do the investigation and prosecution, which is a very weak system. They've now gone to a system of prosecutors. He said they now have a 60% conviction rate. He said, "Today we feel capable of trying the criminals who 2 years ago terrorized Colombia." He thanked the United States for complying with the agreements on controlling precursor chemicals. We said other countries are not complying, and we need to do more. President Salinas stressed the need to involve Central America where transiting is going through. I think those are the highlights. Now, what was done in San Antonio I think was the following: First, this alliance was broadened and strengthened by including three additional countries, including very important countries like Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Second, it was broadened internationally. This summit is sending a delegation to Europe and Japan to enlist the support and assistance of our allies in this new effort. And, finally, I think if you look at the annexes of the agreement, you will see that there are strategies for drug control and strengthening of administration of justice. We agreed to set up regional training centers for police and administration of justice training, strengthen intelligence- sharing. There was a major focus on a regional effort, starting in the Andes but going all the way down through Mexico, to control the airspace and deny airspace to trafficker aircraft. And that means intelligence-sharing, sharing of the monitoring of trafficker aircraft; it means a greater effort on all the countries to have standardized markings and the like so it will be known which aircraft are legitimate and which are not. There was a similar effort to do more to control so-called "free trade zones" and ports where drugs go out and chemicals go in; a much greater strengthening of legal regimes to control precursor chemicals. The countries committed to take appropriate legal action against companies violating chemical control regulations. There is going to be a follow-up effort to strengthen intelligence-sharing, evidence-sharing, and technical information to control money-laundering. And I would note, for instance, that the raid Colombia just made on the Cali cartel led to the seizure of 150 bank accounts in five different countries. That kind of an international effort wasn't possible a couple of years ago. There's a much greater effort, in part because of the great success of Colombia, which is in part financed with about a $25 million, 5-year program through USAID [US Agency for International Development], to strengthen judicial systems. President Gaviria really felt that one of the key accomplishments was creating a system of special courts where judges have anonymity; you can get evidence without revealing the sources; jurors have anonymity and safety; and they can try drug-trafficking kingpins without fear. Last year, for the first time, I think, no judge in Colombia was assassinated. They've lost in recent years over 200 judicial personnel, judges, and others. On the economic area, there was a lot of support and appreciation for the Andean trade preference legislation, which already has passed. There was a commitment to go to the multilateral lending institutions--the World Bank, the IMF, the Inter-American Development Bank--and urge lending that was counter-narcotics-related to the producing countries. And, in addition, Secretary Baker signed some bilateral agreements: One was on money-laundering with Colombia, and the second was a memorandum of understanding on public education on drugs with Ecuador. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Progress in the International War Against Illicit Drugs

Levitsky Source: Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 20 19922/20/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America, North America Country: United States, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru Subject: Narcotics [TEXT] I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the status of our efforts to counter the threat to our interests and those of our friends and allies from the illegal trade in narcotics. Over the past few years, my colleagues and I have briefed numerous committees, Members, and staff of the Congress on the nature of the problem that we face, on the approach that we have been taking, and the progress that we have made--progress that would not have been possible without the broad support of the Congress and the American people. The story I have to tell of our progress to date is a good one. I can report to you today that cocaine seizures in this hemisphere and worldwide have increased significantly, as have other operations and pressure against drug traffickers; law enforcement actions and coca eradication have contributed to a stabilization of cultivation; and international efforts against illegal money-laundering and diversion of essential chemicals are beginning to pay dividends. Two years have passed since President Bush and his counterparts from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru met on February 15, 1990, at Cartagena, Colombia, to address the shared problem of drug use and trafficking in this hemisphere. That summit laid down a strong concept for concerted action against the drug barons and their cartels. Now, a new drug summit is set for next week in San Antonio that will allow us to review our progress since Cartagena and renew the collective effort begun there but strengthened with the welcome addition of Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela. Taken together, the summits represent the commitment and the meeting of minds that is essential to the complex and difficult process of bringing diverse nations together for combined actions in a common effort. In themselves, they represent the evolution of that international coalition of nations that is crucial if we are to address the transnational threat of drug trafficking and abuse. You will recall that one of the basic principles of the strategy that the President outlined to the American people for combating the drug threat was the need to build a regional consensus and capability to support sustained cooperative action against a shared danger. The summits are manifest proof of the success of that effort, but there is more to the story. The scoreboard of accomplishments for the first 2 years of the Andean strategy is extremely positive. I am not going to minimize either the inherent difficulties in trying to deal with an underground, illicit, violent, and economically powerful adversary which preys on human frailties, or on the barriers that must be overcome in assisting the governments of the region--many of which face multiple problems of economic recession, underdevelopment, indigenous guerrilla subversion of democratic institutions, internal corruption, and weak judicial and penal institutions-- in order to respond to this threat. We have, however, made real progress, and this needs to be acknowledged. At Cartagena, we agreed that both demand and supply reduction of cocaine were important, and we committed ourselves not only to enhanced levels of law enforcement, military, and economic assistance to the Andean countries to support their anti-narcotics efforts; we also pledged to increase the effort within the United States. We are living up to our part of the commitments made at Cartagena. The Administration increased domestic spending on drug law enforcement and treatment over 65% in the last 2 years and committed itself to the long-term problems of changing attitudes that made drug abuse a "victimless" crime. Although everyone recognized that such an undertaking would take time, we are already seeing results. US demand for cocaine has been decreasing, especially among our youth: -- Past-month cocaine use in 1991 was 35% below the 1988 level, with 1.3 million fewer users. Despite an unsettling increase in 1991 over 1990, the overall trend is down. -- Occasional use of cocaine since 1988 dropped 22%, and adolescent use dropped 63%. -- Current cocaine use among high school seniors is down from 1.9% in 1990 to 1.4% in 1991. -- Student approval ratings of occasional cocaine use dropped by 47% since 1988. To put this into some perspective, it has taken a generation to achieve sustained reductions among smokers, despite intensive information campaigns and scientific evidence of the inherent dangers. In this light, the drops in just the last few years in drug abuse, then, are even more encouraging and underscore not only the commitment of the Administration to reduce long-term abuse but to the changing attitudes that must go along with increased enforcement and treatment efforts. As impressive as these have been, my focus is on the international effort to address drug abuse and trafficking, particularly of cocaine, in this hemisphere. Here, too, the results have been impressive, from the unprecedented degree of international cooperation and coordination that we have seen to the increased effectiveness of US efforts. The strategy for tackling the cocaine threat that my colleagues and I have presented to the Congress in detail over the past 2 years contains four major objectives: -- Strengthening the political commitment and institutional capability of the Andean governments to enable them to take the necessary steps to disrupt narcotics trafficking activities; -- Increasing the effectiveness of military and law enforcement activities against the cocaine industry in the Andes; -- Inflicting significant damage on the trafficking organizations that operate within the three source countries by apprehending the trafficker leadership and disrupting or dismantling their operations; and -- Strengthening and diversifying the legitimate economies of the Andean nations to enable them to overcome the destabilizing effects of eliminating cocaine, a major source of income. Our cocaine strategy translates these goals into action by focusing on working with the producer and transit countries to attack drug trafficking from its point of origin--beginning with coca and coca seedbed eradication and alternative development programs for farmers--and throughout its production and trafficking life cycles. The strategy uses security and economic assistance as well as trade incentives and the employment of sophisticated intelligence technology to deal with the problem in a comprehensive manner. We believe in attacking every link of the drug chain, from leaf to street. These efforts are beginning to pay dividends. I have already noted the role that the summits play in giving visible confirmation to enhanced international cooperation, but progress goes beyond these very public events. There have been unprecedented levels of cooperation among the governments of the region. Continuous consultations and communication take place from the highest political levels to the lowest technical levels. There have been, for example, numerous regional meetings on demand reduction issues. The governments of the region have participated in a series of joint anti- narcotics operations, known as "Support Justice," involving US and local government detection and monitoring assets and Andean government air interdiction assets which have had considerable success in disrupting the flow of cocaine products moving north from the Andean region. There are regular meetings of established inter-American forums on drugs, such as IDEC [International Drug Enforcement Conference], CICAD [Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Commission], and HONLEA [Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies]. This cooperation extends to efforts to control the flow of chemicals and money-laundering, in the Andean region and more broadly. Chemicals are necessary for the production of cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs. Using as a foundation the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the Chemical Diversion Trafficking Act which the Congress passed in 1988, the Administration's efforts to internationalize this effort are yielding results. The United States chairs the G-7 [Group of Seven] Chemical Action Task Force, which includes 26 other major chemical manufacturing countries. A series of extensive discussions between 1990 and 1991 resulted in a series of recommendations that include five basic chemical control procedures to be adopted at the national level to prevent illegal chemical diversion, and the expansion of the 1988 UN convention to include 10 additional chemicals. The Administration has also signed major chemical control agreements with Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru to facilitate the exchange of information that will allow law enforcement officials to check the legitimacy of chemical shipments. Profits from the sale of illegal drugs generate hundreds of billions of dollars each year. Somewhere, somehow, this money must be "laundered" or "cleaned" in the world financial system so that it can be made to look as though it were legitimate proceeds from legal transactions. The Administration has cast a wide net in enlisting countries throughout the world to attack this critical link in the drug chain. The tip of this spear is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an ad-hoc group of 26 countries that constitute the major financial centers of the world. This group has endorsed 40 measures to combat money-laundering which it has recommended other countries adopt. These recommendations call for the criminalization of money-laundering, cooperating in financial investigations, reporting suspicious transactions, and regulating non-bank as well as banking institutions. The FATF's plan is to adopt these measures and, through an outreach program that already involves governments in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, to persuade governments whose financial centers are vulnerable to laundering activity to adopt the FATF's recommendations. The governments of the Andes, particularly Colombia, have assisted in the effort to control money-laundering. Colombia has provided assistance to international efforts against a number of money laundering operations, [and] has raided key trafficker financial centers, arrested many financial managers, and seized numerous documents. Colombia also signed an asset sharing agreement with the United States. These numerous and varied efforts represent more than just mere activity. They are part not only of a growing cooperative effort but contribute to an overall strategic approach that focuses the efforts of many governments toward a common purpose. One of the most encouraging aspects of recent actions is the multilateralization of these efforts as more countries recognize the threat to their security from unrestrained illegal drug trafficking. The cumulative effect of this growing environment of cooperation and common action helped to increase the variety, number, and effectiveness of operations throughout the region. As a result, we have seen significant results from the Andean strategy: -- Andean coca cultivation has leveled off, and there has been a net reduction of over 4% in the past 2 years instead of the 10% or more annual increases of the early 1980s. In 1991, reductions took place in all three Andean coca producing countries. -- At Cartagena, we signed six bilateral agreements. Recently, we have signed agreements with Colombia on essential chemicals and asset sharing and a declaration of intent on evidence sharing; with Peru on drug control and alternative development and on money-laundering; and with Venezuela on a reciprocal shipboarding agreement. -- Drug kingpins of the Medellin cartel are either in jail (Pablo Escobar, the three Ochoas) or dead (Rodriguez Gacha). Twenty-six major Colombian traffickers were extradited between 1989 and 1991, when extradition was made unconstitutional in Colombia. Twenty-one traffickers have turned themselves in under a presidential plea-bargaining decree. Thousands of other drug-related arrests have been made each year in Colombia. -- In 1991, Colombia and Mexico together seized about 140 tons of coca products--40 tons more than in 1990 and 65 tons more than in 1989. -- In other significant transit countries, large amounts of cocaine were also seized last year: almost 9 metric tons in Venezuela, 17.5 in Guatemala, and 5.3 in the Bahamas. These facts directly reflect the increased operational capability of local security forces, aided to a considerable degree by the flow of pledged US assistance. We have seen increased coordination and effectiveness from our own effort as well. The cumulative effect of this is an overall increase in operational effectiveness, as clearly indicated by seizure numbers. Although we cannot give a precise figure to the amount of cocaine produced, it is reasonable to assume around 700 metric tons after inefficiencies are factored in. Worldwide seizures in 1991 were about 300 metric tons. This means, conservatively, that we and our allies seized over 30% of total production. While the remainder can still meet US demand, that demand is dwindling, and we are making significant inroads into the market. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the proper measure of our success should be the above "body count" type data on arrests, labs destroyed, and cocaine seized. These are indicative only of the qualitative improvements that must ultimately result for our programs, such as the degree to which we are encouraging host country political will to arrest, try, and imprison drug kingpins, to eradicate illicit coca crops, to disrupt the trafficking organizations, and to work cooperatively with us and their neighbors. Our efforts must go, however, to the development of host country judicial institutions capable of operating securely to resist the threats, bribes, and other instruments of the enormously powerful and wealthy traffickers. We are increasingly seeing evidence that the Andean governments are moving positively in these directions with our assistance. Let's look at the record of accomplishments.
The seizure of almost 90 tons of refined and semi-refined cocaine in Colombia last year demonstrates the will of the Colombian Government, along with INM [Bureau for International Narcotics Matters] training, helicopter and modernized communications support given to the National Police, to carry out actions against the cartels. -- During the past 2 years, the Colombians have attacked over 500 laboratories, including two operations against major processing and transshipment hubs where they seized a total of nearly 40 tons of coca products; -- Colombian police credit a 3-ton cocaine seizure in 1991 to a newly installed secure communications system funded by INM. INM and USAID [US Agency for International Development] programs are supporting President Gaviria's judicial reforms which are aimed at bringing major traffickers to trial and undercutting their ability to corrupt and intimidate the system: -- Colombia has been more successful than ever in prosecuting traffickers under its new public order courts which have a 60% conviction rate, compared with 12% in the regular courts. -- Colombia's efforts have led to the incarceration of the top Medellin traffickers, including Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers, whose fates are now in the hands of the courts. -- Colombian authorities recently opened an offensive against Cali traffickers, raiding their offices and seizing thousands of documents containing money-laundering and other evidence. This has led to the freezing of over 150 bank accounts in 5 countries. These operations are ongoing. Having successfully destroyed 38,000 hectares of marijuana between 1984 and 1989 with INM-supplied aircraft and chemicals, Colombia is moving quickly to stop the rapid increase in opium production; authorities have manually destroyed some 1,500 hectares of poppies and plan to begin an aerially applied herbicide campaign against opium poppy crops this month. In 1991, the Colombian National Police seized nearly 74 metric tons of cocaine (total government seizures were a record-breaking 87 tons) and continued to pursue the leadership of the Medellin cartel along with the Cali cartel's infrastructure. National Police sources claim that over half of the cocaine seizures belong to the Cali cartel. National Police units have also destroyed 75 cocaine laboratories and 65 clandestine airstrips. This is not all. -- So far this year, Colombian National Police have seized over 2,000 kilos of cocaine, manually eradicated over 1,000 hectares of opium poppy, and are gearing up for an aerial herbicidal campaign against the newly expanding crop. Plans are also underway for spraying marijuana crops, which were nearly eliminated between 1984 and 1990. -- This progress has not come cheaply, with over 400 policemen and 700 civilians, officials, judges, and others killed by traffickers in the past 2 years. The Colombian military began to get involved in counter-narcotics operations toward the latter part of 1991, and, this year, the Colombian army, supported by US FMF [Foreign Military Financing] funds, is again expected to engage the traffickers after concentrating efforts against subversives. -- In 1991, the Colombian army conducted the first airborne operation against traffickers in Latin America. Although the operation did not result in major seizures, the operation demonstrated the Colombian Government's ability to coordinate complex, multi- service operations in remote areas. -- Two military operations late last year resulted in 12 tons in cocaine seizures. Both operations involved coordination with national police units. Cali kingpins, who once operated openly in Cali, have been forced underground since the Colombian Government overturned their acquittals in local courts. In line with the strategy, Colombian efforts have severely damaged the Medellin cartel's leadership and infrastructure, keeping the pressure up. Although the circumstances may be controversial, Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, and many of their key lieutenants took advantage of President Gaviria's plea bargaining decree and are now in custody. As a result, incidents of narco-terrorism have decreased dramatically, a simple fact that should poignantly illustrate who in Colombia has been responsible for the majority of the violence and human rights abuses. Increased Colombia national police pressure and interdiction of major air corridors has led to major shifts in trafficking patterns. Indications are that traffickers are currently exploiting maritime smuggling routes rather than many of the traditional air routes. Coca cultivation is declining in response to increased police pressure and alternative development projects, especially in the San Jose Guaviare area. Some cultivators are switching from coca to opium poppy cultivation. Prompt government action on the opium crop will thwart these efforts. Judicial reforms have increased convictions of narcotics-related crimes. Judicial protection programs have enhanced the security of the new judicial system, with only one unsuccessful attack against new special order court judges.
Peru still accounts for over 60% of the world's coca leaf production, and cooperation with the Peruvian Government is critical to any effort to halt the flow of cocaine to the United States. In contrast to the Garcia Administration, the Fujimori Administration has expressed support for anti-narcotics cooperation. President Fujimori signed a historic umbrella agreement on counter-narcotics in May of last year. Since the signing of that agreement: -- Police operations have become larger in scope and more effective. Several major operations were launched in 1991 in the Upper Huallaga Valley [UHV] and other cocaine production areas. -- The Peruvian air force has intercepted over 55 unscheduled aircraft in the UHV and, since late last year, forced down 6 trafficker aircraft enroute to Colombia. After these operations began, the purchase price of coca derivatives at the farmgate fell, indicating that the air operations were having an effect. -- Especially noteworthy is that the Peruvian air force used its own scarce resources and assets to implement its air intercept program and is once again operating Tucano aircraft from the Santa Lucia base. -- Coca cultivation is down by roughly 500 hectares from estimates developed 2 years ago. While the reduction results from a number of factors, including insurgent-generated violence, Peruvian interdiction activities and coca seedbed eradication operations operating out of the US- supported police base at Santa Lucia also contributed to the reduction and the stabilization of cultivation. -- The armed forces recognize their responsibility to support narcotics enforcement, as it has become apparent that narcotics-supported internal subversion and the incursions of Colombian trafficking aircraft into Peruvian air space have become serious threats. -- The army logistically supported two major police counter-narcotics operations and provided security and a liaison officer to coordinate narcotics efforts for the Santa Lucia police base in 1991. Unfortunately, our assistance to Peru, where such aid was urgently needed, has been subject to a number of conditions that delayed implementation of the program. The Government of Peru agreed as a condition for receiving economic and military assistance to improve military and police human rights performance as well as to intensify counter-narcotics actions. Progress in both of these areas during 1991, after extended consultations with several congressional committees, led the Administration to provide a portion of the economic assistance (ESF-Economic Support Fund) in December 1991 and a portion of the military assistance (FMF) in January 1992. Although we were able to reach consensus with the Congress, it is unfortunate that providing even initial FY 1991 assistance was delayed well into the current fiscal year and that critical aid for the security of the counter-narcotics effort was eliminated. As we approach the San Antonio summit, the Peruvian Government has demonstrated its desire to press forward with its commitments under our agreement. It is our desire to be responsive, but we will need the understanding and support of the Congress.
Narcotics control assistance to the Government of Bolivia includes assignment of 28 US-titled aircraft to Bolivia. The Rural Mobile Patrol Units (UMOPAR), Bolivia's leading anti-drug law enforcement unit, expanded its authorized strength to 640. US narcotics control assistance programs fund training, food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and other equipment necessary to keep UMOPAR operating in the field. As we have helped to increase the training and professionalism of the UMOPAR, we have seen a corresponding increase in their effectiveness and ability to sustain operations. This has produced results. -- Large-scale joint counter-narcotics police-military actions resulted in the disruption of major trafficking organizations, returned a trafficker- controlled town to government authority, seized 69 aircraft, and resulted in the arrest or surrender of 30 major traffickers. -- The combination of effective law enforcement and a coca eradication program helped to reduce coca cultivation in Bolivia by 10% since 1989, from 52,900 to 47,900 hectares. There has been a net reduction in coca cultivation for the past 2 consecutive years. -- The Government of Bolivia is demonstrating an increasing institutional capacity to mount large-scale counter-narcotics operations. In 1991, the government conducted the largest joint Bolivian law enforcement and military counter-narcotics operation against the trafficker-controlled town of Santa Ana. -- The Government of Bolivia reacted to charges that top officials were believed to be involved in corruption by removing the Minister of Interior, chief of the national police, and head of the special narcotics force. Subsequent to this, another head of the special force was removed as well as a number of corrupt police and the ineffective director of the coca reduction agency (DIRECO). -- Two Bolivian army battalions received training in counter-narcotics operations. In the fall of 1991, the Bolivian army conducted the first joint army-UMOPAR operation. -- The government signed a project agreement involving US support to the National Directorate of Precursor and Chemical Substance Control. The agreement expands the precursor chemical program and establishes two special investigation teams to address interdiction and illegal diversion of precursor chemicals. -- The government re-established the regulatory agency to control the transport and marketing of legal coca (coca legal). -- The Bolivian air force helicopter unit dedicated to supporting counter- narcotics operations (Red Devils) flew more than 17,000 accident-free hours. -- Eight major traffickers surrendered to law enforcement authorities under a government 120-day "repentance" decree. Terms of the decree included amnesty from extradition to the United States and requirements to cooperate with law enforcement authorities. The fact of their surrender indicates the increased effectiveness of Bolivian operations. US counter-narcotics assistance to Bolivia is critical to building effective narcotics law enforcement institutional capabilities. Over the past 5 years, the capacity of the government to conduct large-scale, joint police-military law enforcement operations has been growing. President Jaime Paz Zamora and leading members of his cabinet have demonstrated a concern for the success of counter-narcotics programs, and we have seen close coordination and cooperation between our two governments.
Myths about the "Drug War" In the Andes
Mr. Chairman, I believe that, following this review, it would be appropriate to anticipate and address a fair question about our Andean strategy: If things are going so well, why do we hear so much criticism of the programs? I believe that criticisms of the Andean strategy are based on misconceptions or myths about what we are really trying to accomplish there. Many of these grow out of a desire to see quick results on an issue affecting the health and welfare of this country. I believe we all want to see results, but, in order to be effective, we must be prepared to sustain our engagement with the problem in all its complexity and not be diverted by simplistic panaceas or criticisms from solving a difficult long-term problem. As one observer put it, for every problem there is a solution that is simple, straightforward, and wrong. Let me outline, then, what I believe are some of the notions about the nature of the problem that we face that mislead many people.
Myth No. 1: The "drug war" is a war like other wars.
The "war on drugs" is a metaphor, and, while there are battles and casualties, the nature of the conflict is not a straightforward, stand-up fight like Desert Storm. There are no frontiers and no fronts in this war. The "enemy" is not in uniform, and he does not fight in formations. The nature of the threat is indirect and underground. The trafficker fights his battles with subversion, terror, bribery, intimidation, and subterfuge. This type of attack, nevertheless, poses an immediate threat to the sovereignty and stability of the nations it puts at risk, for it undermines the very institutions upon which a free and open society is based, and it attacks the health and welfare of the people themselves. The nature of the response must take these facts into consideration.
Myth No. 2: We are not up against a traditional threat.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that much of the confusion that we see about the nature of our effort stems from a lack of understanding of the type of threat we are dealing with. In our counter-narcotics efforts, we are not seeking to invent a surrogate for the Cold War. We are not looking backward at guerrilla wars in Central America. We are seeking to look forward. There is nothing ideological, or even partisan, in this effort. Drugs are a new, emerging, transnational concern, similar to nuclear proliferation, environmental devastation, AIDS, and disaster relief. These are all issues which, if not addressed adequately, have long-term consequences that affect our future. We must make the decade of the 1990s one in which we obliterate narcotics as a threat to our societies and our democratic values.
Myth Number 3: "Militarization" of the drug war
Use of the metaphor of war has raised the question of an alleged desire by the US Government to "militarize" the counter-drug effort. This is also a myth. Most of our "military assistance" for counter-narcotics is, in fact, going to Andean police organizations. Dealing with drug trafficking organizations is primarily and essentially a civilian law enforcement problem requiring that police be on the front lines. Our goal is not "search and destroy." We wish to indict, arrest, try, convict, and incarcerate criminals either in the United States or in their own countries--respecting their rights and those of ordinary citizens. This requires better equipped, more professional police and more streamlined judicial organs. We have involved the US military in supporting roles to provide sophisticated assets for detection and monitoring, transport, training, and delivery of military assistance hardware and in providing communications, logistical, and intelligence expertise to US missions abroad. Host government militaries provide air intercept, transport, and airlift capabilities to their own police; security for law enforcement personnel; [and] riverine capabilities; and [these] are sometimes used directly for operations against large, outlying drug production complexes. Recall, also, that, in Colombia and Peru, violent insurgent organizations that are waging illegitimate war on democratically elected governments are engaged in narco-trafficking themselves, and it is their considerable firepower in difficult, semi-jungle terrain that overmatches the police. Part of the myth of militarization ignores this fact and the responsibility for sustaining domestic violence and the drug trade.
Myth No. 4: Counter-narcotics assistance serves to violate human rights.
We have little choice but to engage ourselves in combating the vicious organized criminal gangs which seek to penetrate our country with and, ultimately, all of us. Some people seem to believe, however, that any assistance to Andean governments for anti-narcotics will result in or associate the United States with violations of human rights. Our counter-narcotics programs include human rights training for both police and military, include efforts to professionalize and institutionalize police and the organs of justice which are the safeguard for human rights observance, and include conditions for human rights observance. Furthermore, we monitor our assistance to assure it is not used for other than counter-narcotics purposes. We believe that the more closely we work with host government institutions, the less likely they are to engage in violations of human rights. We must recognize that we have a responsibility to prevent the abuse of human rights from drugs and those that push them; we must recognize the key role that drug traffickers and their allies play in promoting the atmosphere of violence that produces the majority of abuses; [and] we must see that our goal of supporting democracy does not become a victim of ignorance of the threat posed by traffickers and their insurgent allies.
Myth No. 5: We have failed in our objective of stopping the flow of cocaine to the United States.
We are dealing in an ambiguous environment in which it is difficult to know anything with absolute certainty. Drug trafficking occurs in the shadows, and traffickers take infinite pains to obscure the workings of their business. Progress, moreover, takes time, especially against a well-entrenched, ruthless foe who possesses incredible wealth. Nevertheless, we are making impressive gains in efforts to deal with the illicit flow of cocaine to the United States. While it is difficult to know exactly how much is being produced, we know that, in a brief 2-year period, the Andean countries have staunched the rising levels of coca cultivation, [have] cut back on new cultivation through seedbed eradication, and have had increasing success in arresting major traffickers, breaking up narcotics networks, and seizing cocaine shipments. These reflect the increased commitment of the producing and transiting countries with the support of the United States. The pressure is up, but we view this effort as a long-term one, and there will be no instant success against a deeply rooted problem. Increased assistance to the Andean governments was only approved in 1990 and was received only last year. In Peru, our enhanced assistance only started arriving over the past 2 months. If we do not have the patience and the stamina to persevere, we will not only lose the ground that we have gained, we will fail in the goal of reducing the threat to this country and to our friends and allies from drugs. We have by no means won the "war," but we have made substantial progress. It remains for us to sustain those gains.(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Combating Drug Money-Laundering

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: South America, North America Country: United States, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru Subject: Narcotics [TEXT]
The Problem
In 1990, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an ad hoc organization of 26 countries that have significant financial centers, estimated worldwide proceeds from the production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs at more than $300 billion.
The Response
In recent years, it became clear that campaigns against money-laundering are an important tool to destabilize drug-trafficking organizations. In 1988, nearly 100 governments approved the UN Convention Against Trafficking in Illicit Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which requires signatories to criminalize money- laundering and remove bank secrecy barriers that inhibit criminal investigations. The 1989 economic summit, held in Paris, established the FATF to develop recommendations for action. In 1990, the FATF endorsed 40 countermeasures, which it recommended to governments throughout the world, calling for: -- The criminalization of money- laundering; -- Removal of legislative barriers to investigations; -- Reporting suspicious transactions; -- Regulating non-bank as well as banking institutions; and -- Rendering assistance to other governments on financial investigations. FATF recommends that each of the 26 participating governments adopt and implement legislation to enforce these countermeasures. They further recommend that, through an outreach program already involving governments in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, participating governments seek concurring legislation among all possible governments whose financial systems are considered vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers. To bolster this effort, the 26 FATF members have agreed to mutual evaluation, in which teams comprised of experts from other member countries will assess each government on progress. This commitment to examination, in addition to submitting annual self-evaluations, has given the FATF greater political credibility. The organization has established a secretariat through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris. The European Community (EC) adopted a policy directive to guide its 12 members in the implementation of the UN convention, going beyond the convention in some key aspects--notably the requirement for mandatory reporting by banks of suspicious transactions. The EC is one of two regional members of FATF and works closely with that body. A new convention, drafted by the Council of Europe, addresses the critical issue of cooperation on asset forfeiture, which is essential given the multiplicity of financial transactions that today's traffickers are initiating through professional money managers across the globe.
The Future
Money-launderers are using increasingly complex schemes to avoid detection, such as employing a wide variety of monetary instruments, non- bank financial institutions, and corporate shells for placing money. The United States and other financial center countries have changed strategies to counter these innovations. The United States supports Colombian Government efforts to target money managers. Raids on the Cali cocaine organization, for example, resulted in the arrests of six leading managers and seizures of millions in assets. These raids also yielded 300,000 documents, which provide important new insights into how and where money is laundered. The United States plans similar cooperation with other governments in South America and Asia, the results of which should force traffickers to increasingly expose their assets by constant movements that should result in more seizures and arrests. In 1992, FATF is focusing on non-bank institutions, while also targeting corporate criminal liability and strengthening asset forfeiture and seizure provisions. The Caribbean Group is expected to adopt more than 60 measures unique to its region, and governments in Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to take the first steps to implement model legislation recommended by the Organization of American States. Similar efforts will begin in other regions.
Financial Action Task Force
Austria Japan Australia Luxembourg Belgium Netherlands Canada New Zealand Denmark Norway Finland Portugal France Singapore Germany Spain Greece Sweden Hong Kong Switzerland Iceland Turkey Ireland United Kingdom Italy United States(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Controlling Chemicals Used in Drug Trafficking

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Whole World Subject: Narcotics, Environment [TEXT] Chemicals are necessary for the production of cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs. In order to curb drug production, the United States is working to deny traffickers access to these chemicals. The extensive and competitive international commerce in chemicals, however, complicates the design and adoption of effective regulations to prevent diversion. Such regulations must control the entire chain of a chemical transaction, from chemical manufacturers through intermediaries to ultimate users, while not unduly burdening legitimate commerce. They must be adopted by all major chemical manufacturing and trading countries, in addition to drug producing countries, to prevent traffickers from switching to unregulated sources of supply. The 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances outlines procedures for controlling 12 of the most important drug-related chemicals. The United States, other Western Hemisphere countries, and the European Community (EC) have been leaders in adopting laws and regulations incorporating them. The 1988 US Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act placed 20 chemicals under government control. In 1990, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted "Model Regulations to Control Precursor Chemicals and Chemical Substances, Machines and Materials" which are forming the basis for chemical control regulations in many OAS countries. They call for the regulation of 36 chemicals. The EC has adopted community-wide chemical control regulations based on the 1988 UN convention to control chemical trade with non-EC countries. Nevertheless, chemicals essential to the production of illicit drugs are getting through for two basic reasons: the absence of universal, uniform regulations; and the inability of many countries to effectively implement their chemical control laws because they do not have the regulatory infrastructure and trained personnel to do so. We are attacking the problem on two fronts. Experience demonstrates that the most effective chemical control action is that taken by the exporting country prior to the exportation of regulated chemicals. The United States chairs the G-7 Chemical Action Task Force (CATF) which includes 26 other major chemical manufacturing countries, drug manufacturing countries, and concerned international organizations; the CATF has developed comprehensive recommendations for chemical control, building on procedures in the 1988 UN convention. The extensive discussion in five meetings during 1990-91 on these recommendations demonstrated to the CATF members that chemical control is not only desirable but feasible and provided uniform procedures to be incorporated in a chemical control regime. The recommendations include five basic chemical control procedures to be adopted at the national level to prevent diversion and the addition of 10 chemicals to the 12 in the 1988 UN convention. These multilateral initiatives are being supplemented by US Government bilateral initiatives targeted at the major cocaine producing countries. We have chemical control agreements with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru to facilitate the exchange of information to determine the legitimacy of chemical sales between our countries. The United States is funding chemical control training through the UN Drug Control Program and the OAS for the chemical and drug producing countries of Latin America. In 1991, national training workshops were conducted in Bogota, Mexico City, Quito, and Santiago. The US Drug Enforcement Administration conducts much of the training. The model regulatory regimes and chemical control training are providing the foundation for enhanced international cooperation between enforcement agencies of major chemical and drug producing countries. Our chemical control objective is to extend adoption of compatible chemical control regimes through the CATF to those countries that do not have them, while enforcement agencies work to improve cooperation within existing regulatory frameworks. The ultimate objective is to make diversion control a standard part of any transaction involving a drug-related chemical. (###) Chemical Action Task Force Members Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, UN International Narcotics Control Board, Organization of American States, Commission of the European Communities. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Coca Production And the Environment

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Whole World Subject: Narcotics, Environment [TEXT]
The Problem
Cocaine production causes serious--often irreparable--damage, since coca is grown and processed in some of the world's most fragile ecological zones. Coca farmers and the so-called chemists who process the raw product for export irreversibly damage jungle forests, soils, and waterways. The populations of the primary Andean coca regions in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia--largely migrants who have come specifically to grow coca--have almost no regard for the "eyebrow of the jungle" region where the tributaries of the Amazon begin. Although the US drug war seeks mainly to halt the devastation caused by drugs to citizens and communities, the United States also wants to stop environmental destruction. American drug users help finance the environmental degradation, and the increasing number of drug users in Europe, in neighboring Latin American countries that serve as narcotics pipelines, and in the producer countries themselves add to the market. Coca growers and processors damage the environment in three ways:
Deforestation increases erosion and soil runoff, depletes soil nutrients, and decreases biological diversity. As heavy rains erode the thin topsoil of the fields, growers often must abandon their parcels to prepare new plots. Traffickers also destroy jungle forests to build landing strips and laboratories. A smoky haze covers much of the Huallaga Valley throughout August and September as farmers slash and burn forests to create new fields for coca production; much of the coca-producing land is cut out of nature preserves and national forests. Scientists in Peru report the irretrievable loss of plant and animal species due to clearance of large areas of the country's most biologically diverse region. Besides the 171,000 hectares of coca cultivated in Bolivia and Peru, producers of illicit drugs have deforested as much as 1 million hectares of fragile jungle forest lands in the Amazon region.
Use of Herbicides, Pesticides, and Fertilizers in Coca Growing
Seeking to maximize their incomes and largely ignorant about chemicals, coca growers dump great quantities of strong pesticides, weedkillers, and fertilizers on their crops. Peruvian environmentalists estimate that coca growers use 1.5 million liters of paraquat each year in the Upper Huallaga Valley alone. These chemicals saturate the soil and contaminate waterways, poisoning the water system and destroying the species that depend upon it. Although the extent of damage is still unknown, Latin American environmentalists believe that the contamination is spreading into adjacent ecological zones.
Toxic Chemicals From Cocaine Processing.
Cocaine processing laboratories disposing of huge amounts of toxic chemicals into nearby streams and rivers have killed several fish species in Peru. Scientists estimate that pollution in Peru's Amazon feeder rivers from Peruvian processing included, in 1 year, the discharge of: -- 57 million liters of kerosene--the equivalent of one supertanker; -- 22 million liters of sulfuric acid; -- 16,000 metric tons of lime; -- 3,000 metric tons of carbide; -- 6 million liters of acetone; -- 6 million liters of toluene; and -- 10,000 tons of toilet paper.
US Strategy
Successful drug control strategies must weigh environmental as well as social and economic effects. Since manual eradication of coca bushes is very difficult, dangerous work and because of environmental concerns about chemical eradication, the United States--in consultation with Andean nations--is pursuing a three-fold strategy. 1. In Peru and Colombia--limit forced eradication to coca seedbeds to reduce the spread of cultivation, while working with local authorities and grower organizations to promote voluntary eradication. (Some forced eradication of mature coca plants continues in Bolivia, primarily in public areas such as national parks.) 2. Support alternative economic opportunities, crop substitution, and other programs to provide growers with another way to earn a living and escape from dependence on criminal organizations. 3. Attack the trafficker organizations by intercepting their aircraft, seizing their assets, destroying their drug production facilities, and reducing their supplies of chemical inputs to stem their earnings. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Gist: Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: Whole World Subject: Narcotics, Environment [TEXT]
In September 1989, President Bush approved an Andean counter-drug initiative that expanded narcotics-related military, economic, law enforcement, and intelligence cooperation for selected Andean countries for the purpose of strengthening their counter-narcotics efforts. At the Cartagena summit in February 1990, President Bush joined Andean presidents from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in a commitment to fight drug trafficking through a strategy of mutually reinforcing actions to cut demand and supply. At that summit, the Andean presidents appealed to President Bush to provide new trade opportunities to create legal sources of employment to displace permanently the cocaine economy in their countries. Later, in July 1990, President Bush announced that he was sending to the US Congress the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), designed to fulfill his commitment at the Cartagena summit with Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, as well as Ecuador.
Key Provisions of the ATPA
This proposal, which was signed into law on December 4, 1991, is designed to expand economic alternatives for those countries that have been fighting to eliminate the production, processing, and shipment of illegal drugs. It provides the basic authority for the President to grant duty-free treatment to imports of eligible articles from countries designated as beneficiaries according to criteria set forth in the act. The proposal is patterned after the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990, which implemented the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).
Key provisions of the proposal are:
-- The President is authorized to designate Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru as beneficiary countries, based upon certain criteria specified in the act. -- Articles are eligible for duty-free entry if they are imported directly from a beneficiary country, consist of at least 35% value-added in a beneficiary country or countries (including CBI countries), and are made of components originating in the beneficiary countries or (if of foreign origin) have been substantially transformed in the beneficiary country or countries into new and different articles of commerce. -- Articles exempt from duty-free treatment include: textiles and apparel, footwear, canned tuna, petroleum and petroleum products, watches and watch parts, and rum. Handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and leather wearing apparel are subject to duty reduction over a 5-year period. Duty-free entry of sugar, syrups, and molasses is provided consistent with the tariff-rate quotas on these products. -- The proposal establishes import relief and emergency provisions in order to safeguard US domestic industries, including those producing perishable products (i.e., live plants and fresh cut flowers, certain fresh or chilled vegetables, certain fresh fruit, and concentrated citrus fruit juice). -- The US International Trade Commission and the Department of Labor are required to monitor and report annually on the impact of the act on the US economy and US labor, respectively. The program will remain in effect for 10 years. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: US Economic, Military, and Counter-Narcotics Program

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: Whole World Country: Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT]
(All figures $ million) FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 actual actual actual request
Economic ESF 2.9 2.10 50.0 50.0 a Development Assistance 0.0 7.50 b 4.1 b 3.8 b PL 480 0.0 0.20 0.0 0.0 Subtotal 2.9 9.80 54.1 53.8 Military FMF credit 0.0 0.0 19.5 0.0 FMF 7.1 71.7 27.1 58.0 IMET 1.0 1.50 2.5 2.3 Narcotics Control c 65.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 Excess Defense Articles 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 Subtotal 73.1 93.2 51.5 60.3 INM Interdiction 9.4 18.9 18.5 18.3 Drug Prevention and Education 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 Program Development and Support 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.4 Subtotal 10.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 Total d 86.0 123.0 125.6 134.1
Economic ESF 11.8 33.4 76.8 25.0 100.0 a Development Assistance 24.6 24.2 23.8 22.5 PL 480 33.3 33.8 36.7 33.3 Subtotal 69.7 91.4 137.3 180.8 FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 actual actual actual request Military FMF 5.0 39.2 35.0 40.0 IMET 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9 Narcotics Control c 0.0 7.8 0.0 0.0 Subtotal 5.4 47.5 35.9 40.9 INM Interdiction 6.5 10.9 11.5 12.2 Crop Production Control 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.1 Drug Prevention and Education 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 Program Development and Support 0.9 1.7 2.2 1.5 Subtotal 10.0 15.7 15.7 15.7 Total d 85.1 154.6 188.9 237.4
Economic ESF 2.0 3.3 59.1 100.0 a Development Assistance 17.7 16.0 9.7 15.7 PL 480 30.0 50.8 70.9 72.0 PL 480, Section 416 e 0.0 0.0 17.5 0.0 Subtotal 49.70 70.1 157.2 187.7 Military FMF 2.5 1.0 24.0 39.0 IMET 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 Subtotal 3.0 1.5 24.5 39.9 INM Interdiction 7.7 6.9 13.6 13.6 Crop Production Control 2.0 2.2 4.2 4.3 Drug Prevention and Education 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 Program Development and Support 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 Subtotal 10.5 10.0 19.0 19.0 f Total d 63.2 81.6 200.7 246.6 FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 actual actual actual request
Economic ESF 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Development Assistance 17.2 16.3 15.6 15.0 PL 480 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.0 PL 480, Section 416 e 0.0 2.9 4.5 0.0 Subtotal 26.9 19.5 20.7 15.0 Military FMF 4.0 0.5 2.0 5.0 IMET 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 Narcotics Control c 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 Subtotal 4.7 4.2 2.8 5.8 INM Interdiction 0.8 1.2 1.3 2.6 Crop Production Control 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 Program Development and Support 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 Subtotal 1.0 1.4 1.5 3.0 Total d 32.6 25.1 25.0 23.8
Economic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Military FMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 IMET 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 Subtotal 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 INM Interdiction 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.7 Drug Prevention and Education 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 Program Development and Support 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 Subtotal 0.7 1.0 1.0 2.0 Total 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.2
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 actual actual actual request Economic ESF 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 Development Assistance g 11.4 9.5 14.0 16.1 (anti-narcotics portion) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) PL 480 h 4.3 2.8 0.50 0.0 PL 480, Section 416 e 22.2 22.8 22.7 23.1 Subtotal 37.9 35.1 37.3 39.2 Military FMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 IMET 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 Subtotal 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 INM Interdiction and Eradication 14.4 14.4 18.6 24.8 Drug Prevention and Education 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 Program Development and Support 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 Subtotal 15.0 15.0 19.3 26.0 Total 53.1 50.3 57.0 65.6
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 actual actual actual request
Economic 2.9 9.8 54.1 53.8 i Military 73.1 93.2 51.5 60.3 INM d 10.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 Total 86.0 123.0 125.6 134.1 Bolivia Economic 69.7 91.4 137.3 180.8 i Military 5.4 47.5 35.9 40.9 INM d 10.0 15.7 15.7 15.7 Total 85.1 154.6 188.9 237.4
Economic 49.7 70.1 157.2 187.7 i Military 3.0 1.5 24.5 39.9 INM d 10.5 10.0 19.0 19.0 Total 63.2 81.6 200.7 246.6
Economic 26.9 19.5 20.7 15.0 Military 4.7 4.2 2.8 5.8 INM d 1.0 1.4 1.5 3.0 Total 32.6 25.1 25.0 23.8
Economic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Military 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 INM 0.7 1.0 1.0 2.0 Total 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.2
Economic 37.9 35.1 37.3 39.2 Military 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 INM 15.0 15.0 19.3 26.0 Total 53.1 50.3 57.0 65.6 Grand Total 320.8 435.7 598.6 709.7
a $250 million in Economic Support Funds from the Andean Counter- narcotics Initiative will be allocated among Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, contingent upon each country's counter-narcotics efforts and sound economic policies. b From centrally funded Development Assistance programs. c Section 506A of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. d Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador receive additional support through the Department of State's centrally funded International Narcotics Matters air wing, which also supplements narcotics control programs in Central America and the Caribbean. e Surplus agricultural commodities from US Department of Agriculture (USDA). f From regional anti-narcotics program funds. g Development Assistance in Mexico is managed through the US Agency for International Development's central and regional programs. Priorities include training and technical assistance for public and private sector personnel involved in the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement and Trade Development, Global Climate Change, and Voluntary Population Planning. Other areas of emphasis are in AIDS prevention and anti-narcotics public awareness. h PL 480 (Food for Peace) Title II and the Section 416 (surplus USDA agricultural commodities) programs are being phased out in FY 1992 and FY 1993. In the past, those programs have provided grants or donated food to private voluntary organizations for community self-help projects. i Includes projected allocation of $250 million in Economic Support Funds from the Andean Counter-narcotics Initiative, which is allocated among Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, contingent upon each country's counter- narcotics efforts and sound economic policies.
ESF--Economic Support Fund FMF--Foreign Military Financing IMET--International Military Education and Training INM--Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Matters PL 480--Food for Peace (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: US-Bolivian Relations

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Category: Fact Sheets Region: Whole World Country: Bolivia Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT] Traditionally, the United States and Bolivia have enjoyed good, friendly relations. Our goals in Bolivia are similar to those that the current government has set for itself: to strengthen democracy, institutionalize economic reforms, and eliminate narcotics trafficking. The United States has a longstanding aid relationship with Bolivia. Between 1945 and 1991, US economic assistance totaled more than $1.6 billion. Bolivia is an active participant in regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Rio Group. The country has a good human rights record and has created a legal framework to encourage foreign private investment. The United States has modest trade with Bolivia and is negotiating a bilateral investment treaty. Since taking office in August 1989, President Jaime Paz Zamora has met twice with President Bush. Vice President Quayle visited the Bolivian capital, La Paz, in the fall of 1989.
Political Conditions
Bolivia is close to completing a decade of democratic government. Since 1982, it has had two peaceful democratic transitions. The Administration of President Paz Zamora is now in its third year of its 4-year term. He has been a moderate, pragmatic president. The coalition of his center-left Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the center-right Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN) probably will maintain its cohesion until the next national elections in 1993. However, corruption, domestic opposition to certain counter-narcotics activities, and continuing political scandals have undermined government effectiveness. The December 1991 municipal elections set a new standard of propriety and transparency. The governing coalition MIR/ADN won nationwide by a slight margin over the principal opposition party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Two populist parties, the Civic Solidarity Union (UCS) and Conscience of the Fatherland (CONDEPA), and various leftist parties also participated. With no candidate or party emerging as a clear leader, the parties probably will form various alliances for victory in the 1993 elections.
Economic and Trade Issues
President Paz Zamora inherited--and maintained--sound economic policies from his predecessor. He has concentrated on changing economic stability into growth and upon creating a climate favorable to foreign investment. During his administration, economic growth has equaled population growth. The GDP growth rate of 4.1% in 1991 shows acceleration for the first time in more than a decade. In 1990-91, Bolivia created a legal framework to facilitate foreign investments by approving a new investment code and laws on mining and hydrocarbons, the two sectors of the Bolivian economy that offer the best investment opportunities. Inflation remains low, but unemployment and underemployment continue to plague the economy.
Counter-Narcotics Strategy
Bolivian counter-narcotics performance has been mixed. Over the last year, there have been several major interdiction operations, including Operation Safehaven, which resulted in the arrest of top narco-traffickers and seizure of their assets. In July 1991, the Government of Bolivia issued a plea- bargaining decree offering a promise of no extradition to the United States to those narco-traffickers who surrendered to Bolivian authorities, declared their assets, incriminated their accomplices, and confessed to their crimes. Although eight traffickers are in jail, they have not complied with all requirements of the decree. The Bolivians have been able to achieve net coca eradication for the second year in a row (reducing total hectarage from 50,300 in 1990 to 47,900 in 1991) but have been hesitant to carry out involuntary/uncompensated coca eradication. Successes on alternative development include exports to other Latin American countries of licit products from the Chapare coca growing region, such as pineapples, passion fruit, and bananas. Although the United States negotiated a modern extradition treaty with Bolivia in April 1990, it has not been signed. Instead, the two governments are using the 1900 (Butch Cassidy) Extradition Treaty as modified by the 1988 Vienna Convention on narcotics as a basis for extraditions. Two extradition cases are pending before the Bolivian Supreme Court. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Country Profile: Bolivia

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Region: Whole World Country: Bolivia Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics [TEXT]
Official Name: Republic of Bolivia
Area: 1 million sq. km. (approximately 425,000 sq. mi.); about the size of Texas and California combined. Cities: Capital--La Paz (administrative) 976,000 (1989 est.); Sucre (judicial) 105,000 est. Other major cities--Santa Cruz (529,000 est.), Cochabamba (403,000 est.). Terrain: Three major geographic zones: the high plateau (altiplano), temperate and semitropical valleys, and the tropical lowlands. Climate: Varies with altitude from humid and tropical to semi-arid and cold.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Bolivian(s). Population: (1991 est.) 7 million. Annual growth rate: 2.2%. Ethnic groups: 65% are Quechua and Aymara Indians, 20-30% are Mestizo (mixed European and Indian ancestry), and the remainder are European. Religion: Predominantly Roman Catholic. Many Protestant denominations are also well represented. Languages: Spanish is the official language, but there are rural areas in which Quechua or Aymara is the principal language. Education: 90% of the relevant age group attends primary school. Health: Life expectancy (1989)--54 yrs. Infant mortality rate is high (118 deaths per 1,000 live births). There is 1 doctor for every 4,800 inhabitants. Work force: 2 million.
Type: Republic. Independence: August 6, 1825. Constitution: 1967. Branches: Executive--president and cabinet. Legislative--bicameral congress. Judicial--five levels of jurisdiction, headed by Supreme Court. Principal subdivisions: Nine departments. Major political parties: Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN), Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Conscience of the Fatherland (CONDEPA). Suffrage: Universal adult. Central government budget: Receipts were 33% of 1991 GDP. National holidays: New Year's Day, Carnival, Good Friday, Labor Day (May 1), Corpus Christi Day, La Paz Day (La Paz only, July 16), Independence Day (August 6), All Saints Day (November 1), and Christmas Day. Flag: Red, yellow, and green horizontal bands from top to bottom; the coat of arms is centered on the yellow band.
Economy (1991 est.)
Nominal GDP: $6 billion. Real GDP growth rate: 4.1%. GDP per capita: $897. Inflation rate: 14.5%. Trade: Exports--$927 million. Imports--$942 million. Principal exports are natural gas and minerals such as tin and silver. Fiscal year: Calendar year. US assistance (FY 1991): Economic--$137 million. Military--$35.9 million. Narcotics--$15.7 million Principal Government Officials President--Jaime Paz Zamora Vice President--Luis Ossio Sanjines Foreign Minister--Carlos Iturralde Ballivian Ambassador to the United States--Jorge Crespo Velasco Ambassador to the United Nations--Hugo Navajas Mogro Ambassador to the OAS--Mario Rolon Anaya (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Colombia

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Category: Fact Sheets Region: Whole World Country: Colombia Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT] Colombia has struggled for years with narco-trafficking, narco-terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. Now, there is hope for successful peace talks; gains have been made in the war against drugs and the country's economy is being liberalized further to encourage growth and foreign investment. President Gaviria took office in 1990 and has continued his predecessor's commitment to fighting drugs, strengthening judicial and economic institutions, and opening the economy.
Political Conditions
The Liberal and Conservative Parties lead a strong, decades-old democratic system. The Liberal Party, headed by President Gaviria, now dominates. The Alianza Democratica/M-19, a party based on disarmed former guerrillas, entered politics in 1990 and has shown potential as a significant third party. Three other guerrilla groups disarmed in 1991: the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), and Quintin Lame, an indigenous rights group. The two largest guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), have had peace talks with the Government of Colombia since the fall of 1991. In parts of Colombia, guerrilla groups are allied with narco-traffickers who pay them to guard their laboratories. Elsewhere, particularly where narco- traffickers have bought large estates, the two groups oppose each other. In areas such as the fertile Magdalena River Valley, narco-traffickers have armed paramilitary groups to protect their property against the guerrillas, who maintain they are fighting for land reform to benefit poor peasants. The result is a high level of violence. Colombia's leading cause of death in 1990 was murder. But progress is being made. The peace talks offer hope of a government cease-fire with the guerrillas. The surrender of major narco-traffickers-- including the Ochoa brothers and Pablo Escobar--and their expected trials have led to a decline in violence and terrorism against individuals and government institutions by traffickers. The government has made major reforms in its judicial system, establishing public order courts and a new criminal code; it now can deal more effectively with criminals. In 1991, a constituent assembly met for 5 months and rewrote the Colombian constitution, decentralizing some government functions, modifying the congressional structure, and reforming the judicial system. The congress elected in October 1991 is working on legislation to put the constitution into effect.
The Economy
Since assuming office, President Gaviria has been pursuing a program of apertura, or economic opening. It has led to many changes which the government hopes will bring local capital back to Colombia from banks abroad and encourage foreign investment. The country is a growing trade partner of the United States and its status will improve under the Andean Trade Initiative. Colombia has a mixed economy; private enterprise is dominant. The coffee industry makes up 20-25% of legal export earnings and is mainly private- sector, as is most manufacturing, agriculture, and services. State enterprises control participation in the oil and coal industries and play an important role in the electric and telecommunication utilities. Ports and railroads are being privatized. Colombia excels in agriculture. Second in world coffee exports, Colombia also is the world's largest exporter of cut flowers. Another major export is bananas, and other crops include cotton, sugarcane, coconuts, cacao, rice, citrus fruits, mangoes, wheat, barley, and potatoes. Colombia's population of 33 million is changing fast from rural to urban. Eighty percent used to live in small towns and rural areas; 80% now reside in large cities. One of every six Colombians lives in Santa Fe de Bogota, the capital. Education is compulsory for 5 years; 80% of Colombians are literate. Colombia's per capita income is $1,300. (###)
Counter-Narcotics Strategy
Mutual anti-narcotics efforts greatly influence US-Colombian relations. Since former President Barco declared war in 1989 against narco- traffickers in Colombia, the level of US-Colombian cooperation has grown. Colombia is the strongest US ally in the war against drugs. Although narco- traffickers control vast illicit enterprises, they face increasing pressure from internationally coordinated asset forfeiture and money-laundering and conspiracy investigations; drug organizations do not pose a threat to the Colombian Government's sovereignty as they did a few years ago. The Colombian National Police have been effective in seizing tons of cocaine--a record 90 tons in 1991--as well as destroying laboratories and seizing precursor chemicals. The United States has supported these efforts by providing training, equipment such as helicopters, and modern communications equipment. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Country Profile: Colombia

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Region: Whole World Country: Colombia Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT]
Official Name: Republic of Colombia
Area: 1 million sq. km. (440,000 sq. mi.); about the size of Texas, New Mexico, and Arkansas combined. Cities: Capital--Bogota (pop. about 5 million). Other major cities-- Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena. Terrain: Flat coastal areas, central highlands, mountains, and eastern plains. Climate: Tropical on coast and eastern plains, cooler in highlands.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Colombian(s). Population (1991): 33 million. Annual growth rate: 1.8%. Ethnic groups: Mestizo (mixed European and Indian ancestry) 58%, white 20%, mulatto 14%, black 4%, mixed black-Indian 3%, Indian 1%. Religion: Roman Catholic 95%. Language: Spanish. Education: Years compulsory--5 (primary school). Attendance--77% of children enter, but only one-half of the schools offer the full 5-year cycle. Only 28% finish primary school. Literacy--80%. Health: Infant mortality rate-- 39/1,000. Life expectancy (1989)--69 yrs. Work force : 14 million.
Type: Republic. Constitution: Became effective July 5, 1991; replacing the 1886 constitution. Independence: July 20, 1810. Branches: Executive--president (chief of state and head of government). Legislative--bicameral congress. Judicial--Supreme Court. Administrative divisions: 25 departments, 4 intendencias, 4 comisarias, Santa Fe de Bogota special district. Major political parties: Liberal Party; Social Conservative Party; National Salvation Movement and New Democratic Force (Conservative offshoots); AD/M-19 (Democratic Alliance), based on the former guerrilla group which became a political party December 1989. Suffrage: Universal over 18. Central government budget (1989): 25% of GDP. Defense (1989): 2% of GDP. Flag: Top half yellow, bottom half blue, with red stripes of equal width.
Nominal GDP (1991 est.): $43.5 billion. Real GDP growth (1991 est.): 2%. Per capita GDP (1991 est.): $1,300. Average inflation rate (1991 est.): 27%. Unemployment (1991 est.): 10%. Natural resources: Coal, petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, nickel, gold, copper, emeralds. Agriculture (21% of GDP): Products--coffee, bananas, cut flowers, cotton, sugarcane, livestock, rice, corn, tobacco, potatoes, soybeans, sorghum. Cultivated land--5% of total land area. Industry (21% of GDP): Types--textiles and garments, chemicals, metal products, cement, cardboard containers, plastic resins and manufactures, beverages, tourism. Trade (1991): Exports--total $7.5 billion; to US $3 billion: coffee, petroleum, gold, bananas, flowers, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, ferronickel, textiles and garments, coal and coke, sugar, cardboard containers, printed matter, cement, plastic resins and manufactures, emeralds. Major markets--US, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan. Imports-- total $6 billion; from US $2.2 billion: machinery/equipment, grains, chemicals, transportation equipment, mineral products, consumer products, metals/metal products, plastic/rubber, paper products. Major suppliers-- US, Venezuela, Japan, Germany, France. Fiscal year: Calendar year. US assistance (FY 91): Economic--$50 million. Military--$51.5 million. Narcotics--$20 million.
Principal Government Officials
President--Cesar Gaviria Trujillo Minister of Foreign Relations--Noemi Sanin Ambassador to the United States--Jaime Garcia-Parra Ambassador to the United Nations--Luis Jaramillo Ambassador to the OAS--Julio Londono Paredes (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Ecuador

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Category: Fact Sheets Region: Whole World Country: Ecuador Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT] The United States and Ecuador have close ties based on mutual interests in maintaining democratic institutions and fighting narcotics trafficking. The United States assists Ecuador's economic development through US Agency for International Development programs and through multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. In addition, the US Peace Corps operates a sizable program in Ecuador.
Political Conditions
Ecuadorian politics are characterized by populist leadership, a large number of political parties (17), and fluid party distinctions. Until recently, changes in government were often effected by bloodless coups. Since the return to civilian rule in 1979, free elections for the presidency, vice presidency, and the congress have taken place, and power has been transferred peacefully. Congress has the power to question and censure ministers. Censure results in automatic dismissal. The Ecuadorian military has significant autonomy. It has access to revenue from oil exports, civil aviation, shipping, and other economic activities. It has maintained a low profile in domestic politics since the return to constitutional rule in 1979. After unsuccessful campaigns in 1979 and 1984, Rodrigo Borja of the center-left Izquierda Democratica (ID) became president in a run-off election in 1988. His often acrimonious relations with the congress after his party's heavy losses in the June 1990 mid-term elections resulted in the impeachment of six government ministers. Relations improved somewhat with the formation in October 1991 of a new but tenuous political alliance comprised of six parties covering a broad spectrum of interests. Borja's term ends in August 1992.
Economic Conditions
A member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Ecuador depends on petroleum to produce 10-15% of GDP and 35-65% of its exports, depending mainly on the world price. The agricultural sector in recent years has provided about 17% of GDP, with cultivated shrimp, bananas, coffee, and cocoa accounting for all of Ecuador's non-petroleum exports. The manufacturing sector makes up about 16% of GDP, mostly from textiles and food processing. The economy is based on private enterprise, although there is heavy government involvement in such key sectors as petroleum, utilities, and aviation. Inflation is high, at about 49% in 1991, and overall economic conditions are difficult for most Ecuadorians. The Borja Administration managed to push through the congress modest economic reforms, trade liberalization, and an agreement to join the Andean Pact Free Trade Zone in July 1992. However, the pace of economic reform in Ecuador has lagged behind that of other Latin American countries in key areas such as trimming back the state sector through privatization and attracting foreign investment.
Foreign Policy
Ecuador is an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement and regional organizations such as the Andean Pact and the Rio Group. Since beginning its 2-year term on the UN Security Council in January 1991, it has supported key US-sponsored resolutions. Ecuador's long-simmering border dispute with Peru flared up in August 1991, when both countries claimed troops were on the wrong side of an undemarcated section of the border. In January 1992, President Alberto Fujimori traveled to Ecuador to present a proposal which could lead to a permanent settlement. President Borja plans to return the visit, but the proposal will require further negotiation. (###)
Counter-Narcotics Strategy
Ecuador has no tradition of coca cultivation and processing. However, it is a transit country for large quantities of precursor chemicals used to refine cocaine. It also is a money-laundering center and a potential source of illegal weapons for Colombian guerrillas. The Government of Ecuador has cooperated with our anti-narcotics efforts. In 1991, it signed a chemical control agreement and initialed a money-laundering agreement with the United States. Ecuador was one of the first South American countries to ratify the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. In September 1991, it passed comprehensive anti-narcotics legislation based on the UN convention and Organization of American States (OAS) model regulations. The government signed anti-drug cooperation agreements with other South and Central American governments and initialed anti-drug cooperation and asset sharing agreements with the United Kingdom. Ecuador participates in regional and multilateral anti-drug forums, including the Chemical Action Task Force and the OAS Chemicals Control Working Group. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Country Profile: Ecuador

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Region: Whole World Country: Colombia Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT]
Official Name: Republic of Ecuador
Area: 3 million sq. km. (109,483 sq. mi.); about the size of Colorado. Cities: Capital--Quito (pop. 2 million). Other major cities--Guayaquil (2 million). Terrain: Mountains to coastal plain. Climate: Varied.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Ecuadorian(s). Population (1991 est.): 11 million. Annual growth rate: 2%. Ethnic groups: Indian 25%, Mestizo (mixed European and Indian ancestry) 65%, Caucasian and others, 7%, African 3%. Religion: Predominantly Roman Catholic. Languages: Spanish (official), Indian languages, especially Quechua. Education: Years compulsory--ages 6-12, but enforcement varies. Literacy- -88%. Health: Infant mortality rate--51/1,000. Life expectancy--66 yrs. Work force: About 3.6 million.
Type: Republic. Constitution: 1979. Independence: August 10, 1809. Branches: Executive--president, vice president, and 12 cabinet ministers. Legislative--unicameral congress. Judicial--Supreme Court, provincial courts, and ordinary civil and penal judges. Administrative subdivisions: 21 provinces. Political parties: 17 legal political parties (1992) represent a wide variety of views; none predominates. Suffrage: Obligatory for literate citizens 18-65 yrs. of age; optional for other eligible voters (active duty military personnel do not vote). Central government budget (1990 est.): $1.4 billion. Defense (1990): $154 million.
GDP (1991 est.): $11.5 billion. Real GDP growth rate (1991): 2.5%. GDP per capita income (1991 est.): $1,025. Average inflation rate (1991): 49%. Natural resources: Petroleum, fish, shrimp, timber, gold, limestone. Agriculture (about 17% of GDP): Products--bananas, seafood, coffee, cacao, seafood, sugar, rice, corn, and livestock. Industry (about 16% of GDP): Types--food processing, wood products, textiles, chemicals (pharmaceuticals). Trade (1991 est.): Exports--$3 billion; to US $1.5 billion: petroleum and petroleum products, shrimp, bananas, coffee, cocoa. Major markets--US , Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), EC. Imports--$2 billion; from US $0.8 billion. US assistance (FY 1991): Economic--$20.7 million. Military (IMET and FMF)--$2.8 million. Narcotics- -$1.5 million. Fiscal year: Calendar year.
Principal Government Officials
President--Rodrigo Borja Cevallos Vice President--Luis Parodi Valverde Foreign Minister--Diego Cordovez Zegers Ambassador to the US--Jaime Moncayo Garcia Ambassador to the UN--Jose Ayala-Lasso Ambassador to the OAS--Miguel Antonio Vasco (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Mexico

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Category: Fact Sheets Region: South America Country: Mexico Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT]
US-Mexico Relations
Since Presidents Bush and Salinas were elected in 1988, US-Mexican relations have been marked by an extraordinarily high level of cooperation and understanding. This spirit of cooperation characterizes all levels of government and is demonstrated by the intensive efforts underway on such issues as the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), environmental and labor cooperation, educational and cultural exchange, and the war on drugs.
Political Conditions
For more than 60 years, the Mexican Government has been controlled by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has won every presidential and most gubernatorial races. In the 1988 federal elections, six other parties gained representation in the Chamber of Deputies, and two in the Senate, with the combined opposition winning 237 out of 500 seats in the lower chamber. In the 1991 mid-term elections, the PRI bounced back with a major victory by increasing its representation to 320 in the Chamber of Deputies and by winning numerous local municipal and gubernatorial elections. Since assuming office, President Salinas has pursued a program of bold economic and political reforms that feature the goal of completing a North American free trade agreement with the United States and Canada. The Salinas Administration's economic recovery program has reduced inflation from 170% in 1989 to 19% in 1991, and raised the real gross domestic product growth rate from 2% in 1987 to 4% in 1991. Bolstering Mexican efforts to protect the environment is another major area of intense cooperation with the United States. There are bilateral agreements on border environment, Mexico City pollution, maritime pollution, and projects of the International Boundary and Water Commission to resolve border sanitation problems.
Economic Conditions
The Mexican Government has taken dramatic steps to restructure the economy through privatization and de-regulation of state-owned companies, eliminating subsidies to inefficient industries, and dramatically reducing tariff rates. To date, Mexico has privatized almost 800 public companies; billions of dollars invested in other countries have returned to Mexico. Mexico works diligently with the United States and Canada in negotiations to conclude a North American free trade agreement. Foreign Policy While remaining true to its traditional doctrine of non-intervention, Mexico, along with Spain, Colombia, and Venezuela, played a key role in the successful peace talks between the Government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. Mexico also has been an important supporter of Organization of American States [OAS] actions to reverse the September 30, 1991 coup in Haiti. President Salinas has made clear that a main feature of his foreign policy is to increase access to world markets. For example, last January, Mexico and five countries in Central America established the goal of creating a Central American free trade agreement by 1996, and President Salinas signed a free trade agreement with Chile during his visit to Santiago in September 1991.
Counter-Narcotics Strategy
Mexico and the United States view the narcotics problem in both regional and global terms, and both countries seek regional solutions to the problems of narcotics trafficking and drug dependency. Domestically, President Salinas continues his aggressive campaign against drugs and related corruption. This effort has resulted in progressively higher cocaine interdiction and opium and marijuana eradication over the past 3 years. Mexico's 1991 anti-drug effort paralleled its impressive 1990 success; arrests and drug seizures were up. On a national basis, Mexico seized a record 50.2 metric tons of cocaine in 1991 (up from 48.5 in 1990), second only to Colombia in the international arena. The Salinas Administration expanded upon systemic improvements in the judicial area. The Northern Border Response Force (NBRF) has become a significant deterrent to cocaine smugglers, denying them easy access to Mexican territory as a trans-shipment point. Since April 1990, the NBRF has seized about 70 tons of cocaine worth billions of dollars on US streets, thus accounting for about 70% of all Mexican cocaine seizures in the 2-year period. The US-Mexican Mixed Permanent Commission, established under a 1989 bilateral anti-narcotics agreement, met for the first time on September 7, 1991. A mutual legal assistance treaty is now in force, which enhances both countries' abilities to prosecute criminals operating on both sides of the border. Mexico has a keen interest in regional anti-narcotics cooperation. The government works bilaterally with the Central American nations, particularly neighboring Guatemala and Belize. Mexico also has played a key role in the OAS counter-narcotics efforts. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Country Profile: Mexico

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Region: South America Country: Mexico Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT]
Official Name: United Mexican States
Area: 2 million sq. km. (764,000 sq. mi.); about three times the size of Texas. Cities: Capital--Mexico City (pop. 20 million; 1990 est.). Other major cities--Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla de Zaragoza, Leon. Terrain: Varied. Climate: Tropical to desert.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Mexican(s). Population (1990): 86 million. Annual growth rate (1991 est.): 2%. Ethnic groups: Mestizo (mixed European and Indian ancestry) 60%, American Indian 30%, Caucasian 9%, other 1%. Religions: Roman Catholic 97%, Protestant 3%. Language: Spanish. Education: Years compulsory--10. Literacy--88%. Health (1991): Infant mortality rate--32/1,000. Life expectancy--72 yrs. Work force: 26 million.
Type: Federal Republic. Independence: First proclaimed Sept. 16, 1810; republic established 1822. Constitution: Feb. 5, 1917. Branches: Executive--president (chief of state and head of government). Legislative--bicameral. Judicial-- Supreme Court, local and federal systems. Political parties: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (ruling), National Action Party (PAN), Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), Popular Socialist Party (PPS), Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), Party of the Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction (PFCRN), Mexican Democratic Party (PDM), Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), Mexican Ecology Party (PEM). Suffrage: Universal over 18. Administrative subdivisions: 31 states and a Federal District. Flag: Green, white, and red vertical bands. Centered is an eagle holding a snake in its beak and perching on a cactus.
(1991 est.) Nominal GDP: $280 billion. Real GDP growth rate: 4.5%. Per capita GDP: $3,400. Avg. inflation rate: 18.8%. Natural resources: Petroleum, silver, copper, gold, zinc, lead, natural gas, timber. Agriculture: Products--corn, beans, oilseeds, feedgrains, fruit, cotton, coffee, sugarcane, winter vegetables. Industry: Types--manufacturing, services, commerce, transportation and communications, petroleum, and mining. Trade: Exports--$30 billion; to US $23 billion: manufacturing 52%, petroleum and derivatives 38%, agriculture 8%, other 2%. Imports--$38 billion; from US $26.5 billion: intermediate goods 60%, capital goods 23%, consumer goods 17%. Major trading partners--US, EC, Japan. US exports-- $28 billion. US imports--$30 billion (data includes trade with maquiladoras). US assistance (FY 1991): Economic--$37 million. Military (IMET)--$43,000. Narcotics-- $19 million.
Principal Government Officials
President--Carlos Salinas de Gortari Foreign Minister--Fernando Solana Morales Ambassador to the US--Gustavo Petricioli Iturbide Ambassador to the UN--Jorge Montano Martinez Ambassador to the OAS--Santiago Onate Laborde (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact sheet: Peru

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Category: Fact Sheets Region: Whole World Country: Peru Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT] The United States and Peru share common goals of supporting democracy, stemming the illegal drug trade, and promoting respect for human rights. US relations with Peru are excellent, and the two countries have a good working relationship. In September 1991, President Fujimori traveled to Washington on an official working visit--the first such visit of a Peruvian head of state in 50 years. The United States has welcomed President's Fujimori's drive to re-establish Peru in the international financial community, and has assisted him in this effort. The United States, along with Japan, co-chaired a support group of bilateral donors, which raised about $1.1 billion to fill Peru's 1991-92 external financing gap. The US Agency for International Development's program in Peru is the largest in South America. It provides assistance in agriculture, health, private enterprise promotion, and institutional development.
Political Conditions
Peru has a freely elected democratic government, with an executive branch, bicameral legislature, and judiciary. Alberto Fujimori, leader of the reform party Cambio 90, was inaugurated President on July 28, 1990, replacing Alan Garcia. He defeated Mario Vargas Llosa with 57% of the vote. Recent polls show continued domestic support for his Administration. During the past year, Fujimori has instituted a number of reforms in order to improve Peru's human rights record. On September 28, 1991, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was given permission to visit all military detention facilities. Since then, the ICRC has been visiting military and police facilities throughout Peru on a regular basis. On September 3, 1991 civilian prosecutors were accorded, by law, access to military facilities in the emergency zones. Two active insurgent groups, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), seek to bring about a loss of faith in government institutions and overthrow the government. The chief causes of human rights violations in Peru remain the terrorist activities of the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas and the government's difficulty in mounting a disciplined response.
Economic Conditions
Peru has a mixed economy that combines elements of domestic market capitalism with state ownership of major industries. Minerals extraction and processing account for the bulk of foreign exchange earnings. During the previous government's tenure, Peru's gross domestic product plummeted more than 22% from 1988 to 1990. President Fujimori's Administration has pursued a rigorous economic stabilization and adjustment program. He also has instituted a number of market-oriented reforms--slashing government subsidies, cutting import tariffs, liberalizing restrictions on foreign exchange, and settling three multimillion dollar investment disputes with US firms. During his tenure, Peru also has resumed payment on the country's international financial institutions arrears. Inflation has declined from 62% a month--when Fujimori took office--to 3.5% a month in January 1992. The Government of Peru is now embarking upon an ambitious program to privatize state enterprises. Nonetheless, despite this progress, unemployment and underemployment remain high.
Foreign Policy
Since President Fujimori's September visit to the United States, he has traveled to Ecuador and Bolivia in an attempt to improve relations. He has proposed that Ecuador and Peru both reduce their arms purchases by 50%, and he has offered Bolivia special access to the Pacific through the Peruvian port of Ilo.
Counter-Narcotics Strategy
The US and Peruvian Governments came to a consensus in 1991 for implementing a comprehensive counter-narcotics strategy. President Fujimori signed an agreement on drug control and alternative development with the United States in May. Provision of economic and military assistance began in late 1991. Terrorism, lack of resources, economic depression, the government's implementation of a drastic economic reform/stabilization program, the debilitation of governmental institutions, and widespread corruption limited the government's ability to control coca cultivation, processing, and export in 1991. At year's end, there were encouraging signs of more effective efforts by Peruvian security forces and of their willingness to undertake actions to disrupt Peru's illegal narcotics industry. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Country Profile: Peru

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Region: Whole World Country: Peru Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT]
Official Name: Republic of Peru
Area: 1 million sq. km. (496,222 sq. mi.); three times larger than California. Cities: Capital--Lima (pop. 6 million, 1989 est.). Other cities--Arequipa, Trujillo, Chiclayo, Piura, Chimbote, Cuzco, Huancayo, Iquitos, Tacna. Terrain: Western coastal plains, central rugged mountains (Andes), eastern lowlands with tropical jungle forests (the Amazon headwaters). Climate: Coastal area, arid and mild; Andes, temperate to frigid; eastern lowlands, warm and humid.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Peruvian(s). Population (1991 est.): 23 million (69% urban). Annual growth rate (1990 est.): 2.5%. Ethnic groups: Indian 45%, Mestizo (mixed European and Indian ancestry) 37%, white 15%, black, Asian, and other 3%. Religion: Roman Catholic. Official languages: Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara. Education: Years compulsory--11. Literacy--88%. Health: Infant mortality rate-- 83/1,000. Life expectancy--61 yrs. Work force: 7 million.
Type: Constitutional republic. Independence: July 28, 1821. Constitution: Took effect July 28, 1980, but often referred to as the 1979 constitution because constituent assembly met to write it that year. Branches: Executive--president, two vice presidents, council of ministers. Legislative--Senate and Chamber of Deputies. Judicial--Supreme Court and lower courts, Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees. Administrative subdivisions: Historically divided into 24 departments and 1 constitutional province; currently being reorganized into 12 regions (under the 1979 constitution). Political parties: Popular Action (AP), American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), Cambio '90, Popular Christian Party (PPC), Liberty Movement (LIBERTAD), plus United Left (IU) and Socialist Left (IS) coalitions. Suffrage: Universal and mandatory, ages 18 to 70 (members of the military and police may not vote). Central government budget (1991): $5 billion. Defense (1990): $506 million. Flag: Three vertical stripes--red, white, red--with coat of arms on center stripe.
GDP (1991 est.): $20 billion. Real GDP growth rate (1991 est.): 2.8%. Per capita GDP (1991 est.): $885. Inflation rate (1991): 139%. Natural resources: Minerals, metals, petroleum, forests, fish. Agriculture (11% of GDP): Products--coffee, cotton, sugar, rice, corn, potatoes. Industry (25% of GDP): Types--mineral processing, oil refining, fishmeal, textile, food processing, light manufacturing, automobile assembly. Trade (1991): Exports--$3 billion: petroleum, copper, fishmeal, zinc, lead, coffee, silver, cotton, textiles. Major markets--US (25%), European Community, Japan. Imports--$3 billion: cereals, machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, petroleum and mining equipment. Major suppliers--US (24%), Andean Pact countries, EC, Argentina, Brazil, Japan. Fiscal year: Calendar year. US assistance (FY 1991): Economic--$157 million. Military--$24.5 million. Narcotics--$19 million.
Principal Government Officials
President--Alberto Fujimori Prime Minister--Alfonso de los Heros Perez Abela Foreign Minister--Augusto Blacker Miller Ambassador to the US--Roberto MacLean Ambassador to the UN--Ricardo V. Luna Ambassador to the OAS--Luis Marchand Stens (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Venezuela

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Category: Fact Sheets Region: Whole World Country: Venezuela Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT]
US-Venezuelan Relations
The United States and Venezuela share some fundamental views. Both countries believe in accelerating sound economic and social development through orderly and progressive change within the framework of a free society. Both countries are cooperating in the defense and security of the Western Hemisphere. The United States and Venezuela support democracy and human rights throughout the hemisphere. After an unsuccessful military coup attempt in Venezuela, President Bush on Febru-ary 4, 1992 called President Carlos Andres Perez "one of the great democratic leaders in our hemisphere," and added, "this outrageous, illegal military coup should be condemned by all countries, not just in our hemisphere." Venezuela has adopted the American Convention on Human Rights and supports the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Along with the United States, Venezuela supports nuclear non-proliferation in the hemisphere, conventional arms restraint, anti-terrorism, and hemispheric economic development. Venezuela and the United States have similar views on the importance of democratization as a key element in a solution to the long-term problems of Central America and the Caribbean. Presidents Perez and Bush have met several times and communicate by telephone on a broad range of issues.
Political Conditions
Venezuela's history since 1958 has been marked by periodic competition for political power based on free and open national elections. In December 1989, governors in 20 states and mayors in 269 municipalities were elected for the first time in Venezuelan history. Opposition parties won nine gubernatorial contests. State and local elections are scheduled for late 1992 and presidential and congressional elections for December 1993. Perez was president from 1974-79 but was constitutionally barred from succeeding himself. He began his unprecedented second 5-year term on February 2, 1989, with a series of radical reforms designed to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of Venezuelan enterprises, reduce Venezuela's dependence on oil exports, and enhance its image among domestic and foreign investors. To prepare Venezuela for the 21st century, his economic team seeks to reduce the state's role in the economy and scrap protectionist policies. Perez's reforms have begun to bear fruit. Economic growth in 1991 was 9.2%, the highest in Latin America. However, benefits have been slow to reach the middle class and the poor.
Economic Conditions
About the size of Oklahoma and Texas combined, Venezuela is rich in oil and other mineral resources. The economy is dominated by the petroleum industry, which accounts for about 80% of exports and more than 50% of government resources. Agriculture accounts for only about 6% of GDP. Venezuela manufactures and exports petrochemicals, steel, aluminum, textiles, apparel, beverages, and foodstuffs. The United States is Venezuela's most important trading partner, representing more than 60% of its international trade. The United States exports machinery, transportation equipment, agricultural commodities, and automobile parts in exchange for Venezuelan oil and other products. In April 1991, Venezuela and the United States signed a trade and investment framework agreement to expand commercial relations.
Foreign Policy Issues
Venezuela has a land border dispute with Guyana and a maritime boundary dispute with Colombia. It is working to resolve these conflicts peacefully. President Perez has been active on the international scene. Venezuela helped monitor preparations for elections in Nicaragua and Haiti, and provided some aid to countries trying to consolidate democratic institutions. President Perez played an important role in bringing peace to El Salvador and is working to restore democracy in Haiti. In January 1992, Venezuela began a 2-year term on the UN Security Council.
Counter-Narcotics Strategy
Venezuela is a transit country for drugs coming from Colombia and for chemicals diverted to Colombia for use in cocaine processing. Venezuela is also a major producer of marijuana. This was a benchmark year in the Venezuelan Government's public policy toward drug control. Faced with tangible evidence of increased trafficker use of Venezuela and greater public awareness of drug abuse, Perez announced new anti-drug measures. He said Venezuela would use the recently ratified UN convention on illicit drugs to strengthen domestic law enforcement and take steps to reduce demand and control money-laundering. A unified drug command was created under the Minister of Interior to provide drug policy direction. Recently, the Venezuelan Government collaborated with the Government of Colombia in establishing a joint drug control commission. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Country Profile: Venezuela

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Country Data Region: Whole World Country: Venezuela Subject: Narcotics, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, History [TEXT]
Area: 9 million sq. km. (352,143 sq. mi.); about the size of Texas and Oklahoma combined. Cities: Capital--Caracas (metropolitan area pop. est. 4 million). Other major cities--Maracaibo, Valencia. Terrain: Varied. Climate: Varies from tropical to temperate, depending on elevation.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Venezuelan(s). Population (1991 est.): 20 million. Annual growth rate: 2.4%. Ethnic groups: Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Arab, German, Amerindian, African. Religions: Roman Catholic 96%, Protestant 2%. Languages: Spanish (official), Indian dialects spoken by some of the 200,000 Amerindians. Education: Years compulsory--9.Literacy--87%. Health: Infant mortality rate-- 36/1,000. Life expectancy--70 yrs. Work force: About 7.5 million.
Type: Republic. Independence: July 5, 1821. Constitution: January 23, 1961. Branches: Executive--president (head of government and chief of state) and Council of Ministers (cabinet). Legislative--bicameral congress (201-member Chamber of Deputies, 49-member Senate). Judicial--18-member Supreme Court. Subdivisions: 20 states, 2 federal territories, 1 federal district, and a federal dependence (72 islands). Political parties: Democratic Action (Accion Democratica--AD), Social Christian (Comite Organizador Politico pro Elecciones Independientes-- COPEI), and the Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo--MAS) are the major parties in the Venezuelan congress. A number of smaller parties also are represented in the legislature. Flag: Three horizontal bands--yellow, blue, and red, with semicircle of seven stars in the middle of the blue band.
GDP (1991 est.): $53.9 billion. Real GDP growth rate (1991 est.): 9.2%. GDP per capita (1991 est.): $2,700. Avg. inflation rate (1991 est., Caracas metropolitan area): 35%. Unemployment (1991): 9.3%. Natural resources: Petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, gold, other minerals, hydroelectric power, bauxite. Agriculture (about 6% of GDP): Products--rice, coffee, corn, sugar, bananas, and dairy, meat, and poultry products. Industry (about 17% of GDP): Types--petrochemicals, oil refining, iron and steel, paper products, aluminum, textiles, transport equipment, consumer products. Trade (1991 est.): Exports--$15.7 billion ($10 billion to the US): petroleum ($12.7 billion), iron ore, coffee, steel, aluminum, cocoa. Major markets--US, Germany, Brazil, Japan, Canada, Sweden. Imports--$10.5 billion (about $4.5 billion from the US): machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, chemicals, foodstuffs. Major suppliers--US, Germany, Japan, France, Canada, Italy, Brazil. Fiscal year: Calendar year. US assistance (1991 est.): International Military Education and Training-- $389,000. Narcotics-- $1 million.
Principal Government Officials
President--Carlos Andres Perez Foreign Minister--Armando Duran Ambassador to the United States--Simon Alberto Consalvi Ambassador to the United Nations--Diego Arria Alicetti Ambassador to the OAS--Guido Grooscors (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

The Environment and Free Trade With Mexico

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks at US-Mexico Environmental Border Plan Meeting, Los Angeles Date: Feb, 25 19922/25/92 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Mexico Subject: Trade/Economics, Environment [TEXT] (introductory remarks deleted). We're here today because today marks another step to a better future for all of the people of the United States and Mexico. Ambassador Carla Hills' [US Trade Representative] new report--and I have it here; it will be available-- shows that higher standards of living for both our nations will help people keep the air and water cleaner on both sides of the border. The engine for higher living standards is the North American Free Trade Agreement. That agreement will link the United States, Canada, and Mexico in one of the world's largest open markets, with 360 million people and more than $6 trillion in output. EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] Administrator Bill Reilly and his counterpart from Mexico today have issued a comprehensive new plan--and I have it here--for cleaning up pollution along the US-Mexico border. They've worked hard on this, and--thanks to our trade representatives, to our environmental officials, and to their partners in private industry, many of whom are here today--we now have a better understanding of the environmental problems along our border. We have a joint plan of action to correct these problems, and we've made the financial commitment to get this job done. I've said many times before: Environmental destruction knows no borders. That is why, today, we're reaching hands across the border to improve our environment on both sides and improve our economies as well. My fiscal 1993 budget--FY 1993--requests almost a quarter of a billion dollars for the border environment. This includes $125 million for wastewater treatment projects in three major border communities-- including San Diego-Tijuana and the Imperial Valley-Mexicali--and we're seeking $75 million for improved drinking water and sewage improvements in low-income housing areas on the US side of the border. We're also expanding our successful air quality monitoring programs to the San Diego-Tijuana and Imperial Valley-Mexicali areas. We're deepening the involvement of California universities in our overall research and training efforts. Our new plan will include San Diego State University and the think tank for studying environmental problems along the border, and it will help UCLA [University of California, Los Angeles] and the state of California improve training for Baja, California's health and environment inspectors. My good friend--and I use that term advisedly--President Carlos Salinas is announcing the Mexican participation in this joint effort today. When I meet him tomorrow in San Antonio, I'll tell him that the free trade agreement can be a bright green light for both our countries. We need that agreement sooner, not later. We need the new jobs that open trade will create. We need the environmental benefits of higher living standards for both our nations. Mexico has reduced its tariffs dramatically over the past 4 years, allowing us to more than double our exports to a level of $33 billion. But even after so much progress, their trade barriers are still 150% higher than ours. There's much more we can, and must, do. Remember: The reward for each billion dollars of manufactured exports-- each billion--averages nearly 20,000 new jobs in the United States of America. For every billion dollars in agricultural exports, the figure is 27,000 new jobs. More open Mexican markets will mean tremendous opportunities for Californians. Mexico needs machinery and equipment of all kinds. Mexico is a net importer of food; California industry and California agriculture are better positioned than anyone to fill those needs. I am delighted that our outstanding Governor [of California, Pete Wilson] is pushing so hard for this fair trade agreement. Already, California is reaping rewards from Mexico's partial trade liberalization. From 1987 to 1989, California's exports to Mexico increased by 107%. That's 39% higher than California's increased exports to the rest of the world. Four weeks ago, in my State of the Union message, I spoke of urgent actions that we must take to get our economy moving. I spoke, too, of the long- range vision that we need to stay strong far into the future. Our best interests for both the near and long term require vigorous trade relations with the rest of the world. We must not hide behind protectionist walls. We must let open commerce flourish--in commodities, in manufactured goods, in services, and in ideas. Let me be very clear, as I will assure President Salinas tomorrow. I want to wrap up a sound new North American Free Trade Agreement. I believe economic growth and a clean environment go hand in hand. I want to move forward with new opportunities and a better quality of life for everyone from the Yukon to the Yucatan. We're here to celebrate these two important areas of agreement. I might just say, in conclusion, one of the joys I have is working with the President of Mexico. It gives me a great sense of personal pride. I'm sure I speak for Ambassador Hills and for Administrator Reilly [in saying] that relations with the United States and Mexico have never, ever been better. We're going to make them even stronger, and the way to do that is to get a successful conclusion of this very, very important free trade agreement. Thank you all for what you're doing. Thanks for your interest in the border. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Review of US-Mexico Enrionmental Issues

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 25 19922/25/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: South America Country: Mexico Subject: Trade/Economics, Environment [TEXT] In a letter to the congressional leadership dated May 1, 1991, the President called for extending the fast track procedures to permit negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada. Responding to concerns about the environmental effects of free trade, the President indicated that the Administration would conduct a thorough and detailed review of US-Mexico environmental issues. This review was coordinated by the Office of the US Trade Representative with the assistance of other federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Council on Environmental Quality, and the Departments of State, Agriculture, and the Interior. As part of the review, hearings were held in six cities, and public comments were sought.
Key Conclusions
In Los Angeles today, after briefing President Bush on their findings, US Trade Representative Carla A. Hills and EPA Administrator William Reilly announced the results of the Admin-istration's review. The review produced the following conclusions: -- The United States and Mexico have a strong record of bilateral cooperation on the environment. -- Completing and implementing NAFTA will enhance cross-border environmental cooperation and provide Mexico with resources and revenues to fund environmental protection and infrastructure development initiatives. -- It is reasonable to expect that a NAFTA would encourage industry to shift away from the maquiladora sector--that is, assembly plants benefiting from Mexican Government incentives for firms that export most or all of their production. This would reduce environmental stress on the US-Mexico border. Conversely, without NAFTA, Mexico's industrial resources will continue to flow into the maquiladoras, leading to further, uncontrolled development along the border and increased pollution. -- NAFTA will not turn Mexico into a pollution haven for firms seeking to escape US environmental standards. -- Consistent with the President's May 1 letter, the NAFTA negotiators should take steps to ensure that NAFTA is consistent with strong environmental protection policies and does not weaken US environmental, food safety, and pesticide laws and regulations.
An Intensified Cooperative Relationship for Environmental Protection
The United States and Mexico have worked together for many years on environmental problems, particularly those affecting the US-Mexico border region. As momentum has built behind NAFTA, such cooperation has expanded and intensified. The United States and Mexico have entered into formal, bilateral agreements covering the border environment, boundary and water issues, the conservation of natural resources, and Mexico City air pollution. In addition, both the United States and Mexico are parties to the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, and the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. Finally, bilateral cooperation has benefited from extensive technical and scientific exchanges covering a broad range of environmental standards and enforcement issues. By fostering economic growth and expanded bilateral trade, a NAFTA will enhance cooperation on economic and environmental issues and provide Mexico with resources and tax revenues to fund environmental and infrastructure development initiatives.
Environmental Effects of NAFTA on the US-Mexico Border
The US-Mexico border region is under environmental stress, in part due to Mexico's maquiladora sector. The situation is similar to that of an expanding urban area unable to keep pace with essential infrastructure and environmental enforcement. The review found that, without NAFTA, the border area will likely continue its rapid economic development. With NAFTA, border growth may actually slow, as industry shifts into Mexico's interior. Air Quality. Without NAFTA, the review found that emissions could increase between 40% and 225% over 10 years. With a NAFTA and increased governmental cooperation, emissions growth could range from 20% to 85% over 10 years. Water Quality. Growth in the border area will present the greatest obstacle to achieving and maintaining clean water. Increased demand for water may also lead to enhanced water treatment in order to make wastewater available for other uses. Hazardous and Municipal Waste. Mexican law currently requires return-ing to the United States hazardous wastes generated at maquiladora industries from US raw materials. The current compliance rate is estimated at 31%. Both governments are committed to improving compliance and assuring proper handling of hazardous wastes.
NAFTA Will Not Create a Pollution Haven in Mexico
Some have expressed concern that NAFTA might turn Mexico into a pollution haven for US firms seeking to take advantage of lower environmental requirements or weaker enforcement. The review concludes that NAFTA will not cause Mexico to become a pollution haven. -- Pollution abatement represents a small share of total costs for most industries. Thus, 86% of industries have abatement costs of 2% or less. Compliance costs tend to play a minimal role in decisions on plant location. -- Most US industries with high pollution abatement costs already have low tariffs, so that decisions on locating production would not change under NAFTA. -- The 11 US industries that have both high pollution abatement costs and high tariffs also tend to be capital-intensive. Consequently, the high cost of closing a US plant and building a new plant in Mexico is likely to overwhelm any compliance cost savings. -- Such schemes would involve a highly questionable assumption as to future compliance costs, given that Mexico's regulatory requirements are similar to those in the United States, and new investment projects are subjected to special environmental reviews by the Mexican Government.
Recommendations for Improving the Environment
The review produced a detailed list of policy and program options for US- Mexico environmental cooperation that are proceeding in parallel with the NAFTA talks. The review also contains a detailed set of recommendations for NAFTA negotiators to reinforce the positive environmental benefits of NAFTA and mitigate potential adverse effects. These include: -- NAFTA should aim to expand trade and investment in environmental services and environmental and energy technology to encourage the availability of state-of-the-art expertise and technology. -- NAFTA should seek to reduce Mexico's incentives for export-only maquiladora plants, which tend to be concentrated along the US-Mexico border. -- NAFTA should maintain US rights to prohibit entry of goods that do not meet US health, safety, food and drug, and environmental regulations, so long as such regulations are based on sound science and do not discriminate against imports or constitute a "disguised" trade barrier. -- NAFTA should maintain the right, consistent with other international obligations, to limit trade in items or products controlled by international environmental treaties to which the United States is a party. -- NAFTA should contain dispute resolution mechanisms that are sensitive to environmental and health programs and considerations.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Fact Sheet: Envionmental Program

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Feb, 25 19922/25/92 Category: Fact Sheets Region: South America Country: Mexico Subject: Trade/Economics, Environment [TEXT] During their meeting on November 27, 1990, President Bush and President Salinas directed their respective environmental authorities to develop a comprehensive environmental plan to address air, soil, water, and hazardous wastes in the border area. The United States and Mexico have reached agreement on the first stage of the plan, covering the period 1992 through 1994. The plan represents a firm commitment by both governments to protect the environment along the 2,000-mile US-Mexico border, while sustaining economic development.
The 1983 Agreement
The new plan builds on the 1983 US-Mexico Border Environmental Agreement, which for the first time defined the main objectives of border environmental cooperation and established a mechanism for action. The primary binational mechanism will continue to be working groups led by officials of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its Mexican counterpart, SEDUE. These working groups address concerns relating to water, hazardous wastes, air, contingency planning, enforcement, and pollution prevention. Another key mechanism is the International Boundary and Water Commission, which since the mid-1940s has fostered cooperation on issues related to water resources and water sanitation.
Preparation of the Plan
The plan was prepared with participation by national, state, and local governments; businesses; labor groups; academic institutions; and environmental organizations. The public and private sectors participated in 17 hearings in both countries and submitted written comments. This pattern of open participation will continue during the implementation process, as well as in preparing for the next stage of the plan.
Scope of the Plan
The Border Environmental Plan represents a commitment by the United States and Mexico to a substantially increased effort to speed environmental improvements along the border. The main objectives of the plan, which will require at least a decade to implement, are to protect the environment in the border area through: -- Strengthened enforcement of existing laws; -- Increased cooperative planning, training, and education; and -- Improved understanding of the border environment. The plan describes in detail the joint environmental initiatives to be undertaken by the United States and Mexico in the border area between 1992 and 1994. The following is an illustrative list of actions included in the plan. -- Border Advisory Committees will be created in Mexico and the United States to provide advice to EPA and SEDUE on key environmental border issues. Membership will include leaders from environmental, business, government, academic, civic, and other organizations with expertise on border area issues. -- Air pollution monitoring programs will be established for the San Diego- Tijuana and Imperial Valley-Mexicali areas. Already, such monitoring is occurring in the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez area. -- Mexico will substantially increase the number of Mexican border environmental inspectors. -- Enforcement authorities will develop a computerized database on the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. -- A wastewater treatment initiative will clean up the New River, which runs north through Mexicali, Mexico, into California. The New River is one of the most polluted rivers in the world. -- Drinking water and wastewater treatment systems will be constructed in the US colonias [border town neighborhoods]. -- Voluntary compliance programs will be established for US industry operating along the Mexican border. The main objectives are waste reduction, waste recycling, and other forms of pollution prevention. -- To improve air quality, a $120-million investment program is being launched to improve roads, bridges, and traffic along the Mexican border. -- Government officials will develop procedures for the prompt return of illegal hazardous waste exports to the country of origin. -- An inventory of legal and illegal waste disposal sites will be developed. Future needs for legal disposal will also be projected and developed.
Funding for specific actions in the first stage of the plan (1992-94) will come from a variety of sources, including the Mexican and US Governments, state and local governments, and the private sector. The total financing planned by the US Government for environmental protection along the border is $143 million in FY 1992 and will increase by 69%, to $241 million, in FY 1993. This includes $75 million for US border area colonias and over $80 million for wastewater treatment projects along the border (in San Diego- Tijuana, Imperial Valley-Mexicali, Nogales-Nogales, and Laredo-Nuevo Laredo). Other programs receiving funding include enforcement, transboundary air pollution monitoring and mitigation, environmental health, and emergency planning and response. The Mexican Government has allocated $460 million during the 1992-94 phase of the plan. In 1992, Mexico committed $147 million for an array of environmental infrastructure projects in the border region, including wastewater treatment, solid waste management, transportation infrastructure, and dedicated land areas for low-income housing. SEDUE's resources are expected to be supplemented by a $50 million loan from the World Bank.
Relationship to NAFTA
Mexico, the United States, and Canada are now negotiating a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) intended to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade among the three countries, thereby creating an open trading market of over 360 million people. The United States and Mexico are committed to reducing or avoiding potential adverse environmental impacts of the NAFTA. The Border Environmental Plan is a central vehicle for fulfilling that commitment. However, the plan itself will be implemented on the agreed schedule and is not dependent on NAFTA or its pace of implementation. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

NEW AMBASSADORS: July-December 1991

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Feb, 25 19922/25/92 Category: Features Region: Whole World Subject: State Department [TEXT] Albania--William Edwin Ryerson, December 16, 1991 Algeria--Mary Ann Casey, July 25, 1991 Bolivia--Charles R. Bowers, August 8, 1991 Chile--Curtis Warren Kamman, December 17, 1991 China--J. Stapleton Roy, July 29, 1991 Colombia--Morris D. Busby, August 26, 1991 Costa Rica--Luis Guinot, Jr., August 15, 1991 Denmark--Richard B. Stone, December 20, 1991 Dominican Republic--Robert Stephen Pastorino, December 23, 1991 Egypt--Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., July 31, 1991 Equatorial Guinea--John E. Bennett, July 31, 1991 Ethiopia--Marc Baas (assigned Chief of Mission June 1991) Finland--John Hubert Kelly, December 9, 1991 Germany--Robert Michael Kimmitt, August 23, 1991 Guyana--George Fleming Jones, December 18, 1991 Mauritania--Gordon S. Brown, July 29, 1991 Morocco--Frederick Vreeland, December 11, 1991 Pakistan--Nicholas Platt, September 25, 1991 Paraguay--Jon David Glassman, July 8, 1991 Philippines--Frank Wisner, August 6, 1991 Russia--Robert S. Strauss, August 20, 1991 Seychelles--Richard W. Carlson, July 30, 1991 Syria--Christopher W. S. Ross, August 29, 1991 Thailand--David Floyd Lambertson, August 16, 1991 Trinidad and Tobago--Sally G. Cowal, August 15, 1991 Tunisia--John Thomas McCarthy, July 22, 1991 Turkey--Richard Clark Barkley, October 16, 1991 Uganda--Johnnie Carson, July 17, 1991 Yemen--Arthur Hayden Hughes, August 12, 1991 Zimbabwe--Edward Gibson Lanpher, November 8, 1991 US Mission to the Vienna Office of the UN--Jane E. Becker, August 19, 1991 US Mission to the EC--James F. Dobbins, October 15, 1991 (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 9, March 2, 1992 Title:

Focus on the Emerging Democracies: A Periodic Update

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Mar, 2 19923/2/92 Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies Region: E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Subject: State Department, Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid, Cultural Exchange [TEXT]
A Periodic Update
Focus on Central and Eastern Europe has a new title which reflects a broader area of interest. In addition to information concerning the former Eastern bloc, it now includes initiatives for the 12 independent states which formerly constituted the Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Although the overall goal of assistance to these countries is to support political and economic reform, the immediate objective is to help people survive the shock of change and stave off shortages of basic necessities. Because of the enormous needs of these newly independent states, assistance requires global cooperation and support.
Operation Provide Hope
Twelve flights on Monday, February 10, inaugurated a 17-day airlift by the US European Command to relieve the most critical needs of cities in the 11 new democracies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A total of 2,200 tons of supplies was delivered, including 395 tons of medicines and medical consumables. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, was on hand in Frankfurt, Germany, for the departure of the first US Air Force C-141 and C-5A cargo planes destined for Moscow and St. Petersburg, Russia; Kiev, Ukraine; Minsk, Byelarus; and Chisinau, Moldova. He said that American flights could not hope to "stock all the emergency pharmacies of Ukraine, Uzbekistan, or Azerbaijan. But these flights will provide emergency food and medical supplies. And, above all, they will carry a dramatic message of hope to the peoples of the new independent states." Besides the five flights from Frankfurt, seven flights departed from two airfields in Turkey for destinations in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. During the following 16 days, the US Air Force repeated the same-day, round-trip flights until the cargo assembled from US military depots in Europe and the United States reached 24 destinations in the CIS. The United States thereby fulfilled its offer to finance the transport of humanitarian goods donated by other governments. Several nations in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America also contributed to the international effort. Quick-reaction teams were deployed to 24 recipient sites to make contact and coordinate with local government officials, airport managers, and members of the press in order to determine needs. They also selected recipient institutions and supervised cargo offloading from flights. Personnel from the On Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), and from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) comprised on-site support teams for the operation. A Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) under contract to OFDA had been operating inside the Commonwealth for three weeks prior to the operation, relaying information to Operation Provide Hope planners. The teams, including the DART team, were responsible for monitoring the distribution of aid to all 24 locations. In Russia, food and medical supplies were delivered to Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ulan Ude, Novokuznetsk, Perm, Chelya-binsk, Irkutsk, Chita, Yekaterinberg, Arkhangelsk, and Kemerovo. In Ukraine, they went to Kiev, Kharkov, and L'vov. Elsewhere, they were delivered to Minsk, Byelarus; Chisinau, Moldova; Yerevan, Armenia; Baku, Azerbaijan; Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; and Alma-Ata and Semipalitinsk in Kazakhstan. Department of Defense (DoD) excess pharmaceuticals, medicines, and consumable medical supplies were moved from US Army Medical Material Center Europe (USAMMCE), a tri-service medical support activity located in Pirmasens, Germany, and shipped to the CIS republics. Included were antibiotics, surgical gloves, sutures, survival dressings, blood recipient sets, and patient comfort items such as blankets, pajamas, and slippers. DoD food rations included packaged meals, some requiring the addition of water and many virtually identical to commercially available foodstuffs. They contained a meat serving, fruits, vegetables, and rice, pasta, potatoes, or bread. The rations reached hospitals, clinics, and other institutions with special needs. Funding for Operation Provide Hope was part of a $100-million supplemental appropriation by Congress under the Dire Emergency statute. The On-site Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to the Commonwealth States is Ambassador Richard Armitage, who said that assistance will continue through varied means of transportation during the coming months.
Coordinating Conference
Operation Provide Hope was an outgrowth of the Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States meeting held in Washington, DC, on January 22-23, 1992, and attended by foreign ministers and representatives of 47 nations and 7 international organizations. Opening the conference, President Bush said that, although the ultimate responsibility for "unraveling economic dislocations resulting from over 70 years of communist economics" cannot be shifted from the peoples of the republics, neither can they accomplish this without help. He warned, "These 12 new countries will need the hard work, creativity, and good will of all of our countries from every continent . . . . If we do not, we risk the reversal of the historic leap to freedom made by the Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian and other peoples during these last months." Coordinating Conference participants prepared action plans to ensure that food, medicine, energy, shelter, and technical assistance would reach those in need. Five working groups identified ways to deliver supplies directly to targeted groups and locations, including orphanages and hospitals. To avoid delays caused by disrupted distribution systems, supplies were being routed through bordering countries.
Working Group Reports
Food. The food assistance working group organized delivery of about $500 million in food. It also identified about $5 billion in available credits. Wheat, dairy products, baby food, cooking oil, meat, and other foods were to be delivered to pensioners, schools, orphanages, and hospitals. Reforms were urged in the food production and distribution systems of the new independent states to avoid a repeat of the current crisis. They included improving productivity, processing, transport, and marketing, which the assistance coalition will address through technical programs such as model farms, farmer-to-farmer initiatives, extension services, and new markets. Where feasible, the new states will be encouraged to use food credits and credit guarantees to build trade relationships and free markets. Medical. The medical assistance working group developed a four-point program to deal with disease and high death rates, shortages of critical medicines, vaccines and supplies, and a pharmaceutical industry with low productivity. Medical supplies have been sent to meet acute humanitarian needs while hospitals and health care institutions were urged to participate in the "Nations in Partnership" program. Pharmaceutical and medical supply companies were encouraged to consider joint ventures in the new states and to provide technical assistance for the establishment of quality controls and monitoring systems. Shelter. Solutions to the housing problems of the new independent states will require long-term efforts and fundamental economic transformation. The shelter working group called for the immediate development of contingency plans for temporary shelters. As the housing industry begins to develop, permanent buildings will replace the "shelter units" envisioned for the emergency period. Energy. The energy working group has been consulting with industry experts and the new independent states to establish priorities. A critical concern is the availability of fuel supplies to transport food and medical assistance from ports of entry. The coalition will also help improve working conditions and productivity of coal miners, increase the energy efficiency of heating systems in large cities, ensure adequate energy supplies for the 1992 planting and harvesting seasons, upgrade equipment, and reduce waste. Technical Assistance. Technical assistance is aimed at supporting sustained, comprehensive political and economic reform. The technical assistance working group proposed that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) serve as clearinghouse for technical assistance to avoid duplication of effort. Several members of the US delegation to the Coordinating Conference traveled to Minsk to meet on January 31 with counterparts from Canada, the European Community, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the UK, and Venezuela. These constituted the "contact group" that presented the action plans to representatives of the states slated to receive assistance. A follow-on conference is scheduled for April or May in Lisbon to assess the accomplishments that will have been completed by then. Japan has offered to host a possible third conference.
Private Sector Assistance Conference
The importance of the private sector in the delivery of humanitarian aid and in the provision of technical assistance highlighted a separate, concurrent conference on January 22-23, when 200 representatives of US nonprofit organizations and a number of international non-governmental umbrella organizations met in Washington under the auspices of the Citizens Democracy Corps (CDC). The Conference on Private Sector Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States reviewed the role the private sector has already played in the delivery of humanitarian aid and the ways in which organizations can better collaborate on plans for the future. The private sector conference explored steps that can be taken to augment the amount of aid being delivered to the Commonwealth states. It featured such topics as the appropriate role of government in support of private sector aid, the part nonprofit organizations play in the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the function of the private sector in the provision of technical assistance. Two task forces focused on food aid and on the delivery of medical supplies; two concentrated on technical assistance in democratic institution-building and in building free-market economies. In their remarks to the CDC-sponsored conference, both President Bush and Secretary Baker praised the private sector for its efforts. A high priority of private voluntary organizations (and the US Agricultural Extension Service) is the improvement of food processing, marketing, and distribution systems so that food produced in the 12 republics can be taken to viable markets and stored until needed. The goal is to build an agricultural infrastructure in regions that depend upon imported food. Achieving this objective will demonstrate the value of technical assistance to provide lasting, rather than temporary, solutions. Participants at both conferences expressed confidence that their action plans would simplify and speed efforts to meet the needs they had catalogued. Proposals for assistance geared to identified needs came from Latin America, the Persian Gulf, Asia, and all of Europe, including the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were, only 2 years ago, the first to reject communist governments and embrace a market economy.
US Aid Commitments
The President's budget requests $620 million in new appropriations for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 for assistance to the republics of the former Soviet Union. Funding will be used to deliver emergency humanitarian relief and provide technical assistance to support democratic reform and promote economic restructuring. The request includes: -- $500 million for a special humanitarian and technical assistance account to meet humanitarian and other contingencies; -- $100 million in Economic Support Funds for technical assistance activities to promote democratic reforms and economic restructuring; -- $10 million in Development Assistance funds targeted at development activities in republics with lower per capita incomes; and -- $10 million in PL 480 "Food for Peace" money for the "Farmer-to- Farmer" program to send US farmers and agribusiness experts to train and advise counterparts in the new independent states. These funds will be combined with $860 million in resources available under existing legislation, including: -- About $210 million in food assistance ($165 million in food aid and $45 million in surplus DoD stocks); -- $100 million in DoD money for transportation of humanitarian relief; -- $400 million in DoD funds for assistance in eliminating nuclear arms and chemical weapons; -- $30 million in USAID funds to provide urgently needed medical supplies; and -- $120 million in USAID and US Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds for technical assistance.* The United States also has announced $3.75 billion in CCC export guarantees for the purchase of food. Over $3 billion has already been used to buy and ship more than 20 million tons of commodities. Taking into account the $1.5 billion in existing and proposed grant assistance described above, President Bush has proposed more than $5 billion in assistance to republics of the former Soviet Union. However, US assistance is only part of the global response, with over 50 nations and multilateral institutions committed to providing more than $27 billion to the new independent states. The $450-million FY 1993 request for Central and Eastern Europe represents an increase of $50 million, or 13%, over the level proposed for FY 1992 in the President's budget. The program funded by these resources has three objectives. The first is to advance democratic reforms that will form the foundation for enduring political freedom and encourage broad-based participation in civic and economic affairs. The second is to support the efforts of the Central and East European countries to restructure their economies by establishing market-based systems to replace central planning. The third is to improve the quality of life of a population enduring the legacy of an old order--inefficient agriculture and lack of housing, along with hardships associated with the dramatic structural changes now underway. In addition, the budget: -- Requests a third annual contribution of $70 million to capitalize the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which makes loans in support of market-oriented reforms in the region; -- Supports activities of the Peace Corps in six Central and East European countries and up to 500 volunteers in the former Soviet republics; -- Continues post openings, initiated in FY 1992, in the Baltics and former Soviet republics in FY 1993; and -- Proposes the issuance of insurance and up to $125 million in loan guarantees to the former republics of the Soviet Union by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The President's proposals for assistance to the republics of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe will benefit not only the citizens of these regions but also those of the United States. By promoting trade, developing private markets, supporting freedom, and reducing the nuclear threat, the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe will benefit not only the citizens of those regions but also those of the United States. By promoting trade, developing private markets, supporting freedom, and reducing the nuclear threat, US assistance will bring direct economic and security benefits to the American people.
Vice President Quayle's Visit to Baltics
During his February 6-7 visit to the capital cities of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Vice President Quayle signed agreements to provide Peace Corps volunteers for English language instruction, small business development, and technical assistance on environmental issues. The Peace Corps hopes to have 60 volunteers in the Baltics by mid-summer, even though formal requests for assistance were received only 4 months ago. While the Vice President visited Talinn, Estonia, medical aid from Project Hope and surplus US military medical supplies arrived. Medical assistance for the three countries amounted to about $8 million. In Vilnius, Lithuania, and Riga, Latvia, medical aid was supplemented by DoD surplus food supplies. The Baltic nations also will be receiving $36 million of feed grain from the United States. (###)
Assistance Hot Line
Individuals or groups wishing to offer monetary or material assistance to the new independent states may call (703) 276-1914. This is a 24-hour phone line established by USAID and the US Department of Agriculture. Operators answer between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST Monday-Friday, and electronic answering devices accept messages during other hours. (###)