US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: FY 1993 Foreign Assistance Request--
Partnership for Peace
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Feb, 24 19922/24/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
Subject: Democratization, Development/Relief Aid,
State Department, Arms Control, POW/MIA Issues, Narcotics,
United Nations, Security Assistance and Sales, Refugees
[TEXT]
Over the last 3 months, I have visited 11 of the 12 new states of the former
Soviet Union. I have met leaders everywhere, explained our policies to
them, and listened to their hopes and concerns. Last week, I completed a
trip to Russia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
and Moldova. For many Americans, several of these states were just
obscure names on a map just a year ago; now they stand in the front ranks of
our efforts to enlarge the world's community of stable, democratic nations.
This was my first-ever visit to several of these states. I return convinced
that we face a once-in-a- century opportunity to shape the course of history
and to define a new age for our children and grandchildren.
And, I am convinced that it is an opportunity that we, in concert with our
allies, must seize. The promises and risks are great.
The Promises
Those promises would have been unimaginable even a few years ago:
-- The prospect of close to 300 million people emerging from 70 years of
totalitarian rule and charting their own democratic destiny;
-- The possibility of 12 new countries beginning the difficult process of
converting from a crippling command economy to vibrant free markets; and
-- Perhaps most importantly, the real prospect of putting the nightmare of
great power nuclear confrontation behind us.
The Risks
But, we should not forget that there are also risks. Most of the states of
the former Soviet Union are struggling bravely to create new societies
based upon representative and accountable government, the rule of law, and
the free market. But they do so burdened by over 70 years of political and
economic misrule. The temptations of ethnic conflict and authoritarianism
remain strong. And, despite dramatic progress on arms control, nearly
30,000 nuclear weapons remain in the states of the former Soviet Union.
Engaging the New Independent States
I addressed both promises and risks during my trip to the former Soviet
Union. My trip had three purposes: to see off Operation Provide Hope; to
meet face-to-face with the leaders of Moldova, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and to visit Armenia; and to meet with the
Russian leadership to discuss security, economic, and political issues.
In Frankfurt, I joined [German] Foreign Minister Genscher as Operation
Provide Hope began at Rhein Main Air Base. I was pleased to see that over
10 countries participated directly in this American initiative--especially
Turkey and Japan, whose participation made it far easier and economical to
reach cities in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Russian far east. We
expanded the number of US sorties from 54 to 64 and were able to send
shipments to 24 different cities across the former Soviet Union during
Operation Provide Hope's 2 weeks of operation.
The Russian leadership was particularly pleased that we were able to get
food and medicine to hard-to-reach cities in Siberia, the Urals, and the far
north. All reports from the other independent states were very positive,
with many saying that these American assistance flights were the first
humanitarian shipments they had received.
We understood from the beginning that these flights were substance and
symbolism. The power of both should not be underestimated. Our message
of hope was heard clearly across the former Soviet Union. For those whose
lives were eased--perhaps even preserved--by the timely arrival of
medicine and foodstuffs, these flights were substantive, indeed.
We are assessing the results of Operation Provide Hope and, with our allies,
looking for ways to accelerate and expand our emergency assistance
programs.
From Frankfurt, I traveled to Kishinev, Baku, Ashkhabad, Dushanbe, and
Tashkent to discuss with the leaders of these new states the question of
diplomatic relations. At each stop, I outlined the various principles the
United States expects these new states to adhere to in terms of democratic
political practices, responsible security policies, and free market
economics.
At each stop, the Presidents of these new states gave me the assurances we
need to move ahead with diplomatic relations. We have no illusions. We
realize that the quality of these commitments will vary from state to state
and leader to leader. That's why, at each stop, I made it clear, that even as
we moved ahead with diplomatic relations, the nature and depth of those
relations would depend upon continuing adherence to our principles and the
fulfillment of the assurances given us.
We also felt it important to move ahead with diplomatic relations so we
could have a permanent American presence in these new states. At each
stop, I found a large degree of goodwill toward America with people lining
the streets to greet my delegation; in each of these states, a unique window
of opportunity exists where both governments and publics are hungry for our
help and advice.
To take advantage of this opportunity, it is important to have Americans on
the ground in each of these states during a difficult time of transition. We
also feel this is the way to help American business assist in developing
those sectors that clearly hunger for American know-how, investment, and
goods. There are clear opportunities for American business, especially as
markets develop and expand. And there are clear political opportunities as
well to see the seeds of democracy planted in a region long thought
inhospitable to political and economic freedom. Accordingly, I have set a
goal of establishing embassies by March 15 in each of the states I visited.
I also went to Armenia to lend our support to Armenia's fledgling
democracy. In both Yerevan and Baku, I discussed Nagorno-Karabakh and told
both the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis that they had their hands full with
building their own independent states and that they needed to resolve
Nagorno-Karabakh peacefully. I made it clear we supported Russian and
Kazakh efforts to mediate the conflict, as well as the CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe] rapporteur mission.
I began my trip to Russia at the Institute for Technical Physics at
Chelyabinsk-70 in the Urals. At this top secret facility in what was a
closed city until a few weeks ago, I was welcomed by workers who came out
to greet me and my delegation warmly and openly. With the scientists of
this facility--which is comparable to our Los Alamos or Livermore labs--I
discussed how we might come up with "brain gain" solutions to the "brain
drain" problem. This helped us further refine the joint proposal that we
have subsequently announced with Germany and Russia to set up an
international scientific center to help Soviet weapons scientists. We are
pleased with the positive and wide-ranging international response to this
initiative which will help designers of weapons of mass destruction in all
the new independent states shift their work to civilian purposes.
In Moscow, I met with President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev for
two productive days of talks. In terms of security issues, I think we've
begun to define what you might call a new security partnership between
Russia and America. We made real progress on a range of issues,
particularly nuclear safety, security, and dismantlement.
First, the United States will provide Russia with 25 safe, secure rail cars
designed to transport nuclear weapons.
Second, we have offered Russia 250 large specialized containers for
transportation of nuclear weapons.
Third, we have offered safe and secure containers for nuclear weapons
components, and, if these containers meet their needs well, the United
States has committed to producing them in quantity.
Fourth, our experts will meet next week to discuss alternative ways to
address Russian needs to store plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
Fifth, we will cooperate with Russia in helping improve the Russian
accounting system for nuclear material, including providing computers and
software.
Sixth, we will establish a technical working group to discuss the ultimate
disposition of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in ways that would be
beneficial to both countries.
Finally, our experts will meet to discuss how we can cooperate to ensure a
swift and appropriate response to any nuclear accident or incident.
In terms of arms control, we made progress in combining elements of our
two Presidents' proposals in a way
that will enhance stability for both sides. We also discussed START
[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] and CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe] ratification. We agreed that Russia will be the party to ratify
START and that Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine should provide us a
written commitment expressing their legal intention to observe and
implement START.
Most importantly, we've begun to leave the era of competition decisively
behind as we've taken steps toward defense cooperation between our
countries. In Moscow, we agreed to accelerate our discussions on strategic
defenses. As a first step, we will consider setting up a Joint Ballistic
Missile Early Warning Center that would display warning information from
the United States, Russia, and other participating nations.
We also agreed to expand our space cooperation efforts. We will cooperate
in environmental monitoring from space, in flights of each other's
astronauts, in talks on civil space issues, and in possibly using Soyuz crew
recovery vehicles.
Reflecting the spirit of Camp David, we also made progress in political and
economic issues. We agreed to set up a US-Russian POW/MIA [prisoner of
war/missing-in-action] commission that would be a joint body led by the
executive branches but including representatives from our legislatures. We
will also participate with Russian experts in an archival search to find
whether there is additional information that might shed light on missing
servicemen.
On economics, we discussed our overall approach to emergency humanitarian
assistance, technical assistance, and macroeconomic reform. President
Yeltsin requested $600 million in additional grain credit guarantees. We
are considering this request and looking at creative ways we might target
our food assistance in a way that would promote the growth of free
markets. I made it clear that we want to see Russia--and the other new
independent states--become members in the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and [the] World Bank as soon as possible and to have the IMF work with
Russia and the other states as they continue to develop their economic
reform plans. Early membership in international financial institutions will
make these states eligible for funds and support their efforts to build
market democracy.
Challenges Remain
My visit to the new independent states brought home to me the
extraordinary opportunities presented by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
But we can't neglect the other challenges confronting us today.
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a deadly menace to
international peace. Revelations about Iraq's advanced nuclear program and
the specter of a buyer's market in Soviet nuclear know-how drive home a
clear lesson: Only by constant, concerted vigilance--the sort of vigilance
that brought us victory in the Cold War --can we ensure our national and
international security.
In this regard, we welcome China's written commitment of February 1,
confirmed publicly on Saturday [February 22], to abide by the Missile
Technology Control Regime guidelines and parameters as agreed by Foreign
Minister Qian and myself in Beijing last November. This important step, like
China's agreement to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, constitutes
real progress--but progress we must monitor very closely in the months and
years ahead.
We also welcome President Yeltsin's announced intention to adopt
legislation regulating dual-use technology and the decision of Brazil and
Argentina to adopt full scope safeguards under the IAEA [International
Atomic Energy Agency].
Regional conflicts have abated--but not everywhere and not at the same
pace. Old adversaries in Central America, Southeast Asia, and Southern
Africa have started bridging decades of distrust. Even the Middle East--
scene of generations of war, bitterness, and hate--saw ancient enemies sit
down to talk, a first but necessary step on the road to peace.
Over the last year, we have, indeed, seen a remarkable expansion of
multilateral peace-making and peace-keeping initiatives. Less than a month
ago, the President joined 13 world leaders at the [UN] Security Council in a
demonstration of support for the UN's revived importance to international
peace and security.
But peace-making remains painfully protracted. India and Pakistan, for
example, have just begun the daunting process of reconciliation. Peace-
keeping in El Salvador, Cambodia, and elsewhere will be expensive. We and
the world community must be persistent in our support of both. It is the
price of success.
Opening markets to American goods and services presents a particularly
complex challenge. Bilaterally, we must negotiate to ensure that our goods
and services are not shut out of individual foreign markets. Globally, we
must take the lead to ensure that the Uruguay Round [of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] succeeds and trade barriers come down
worldwide. This is vitally important not only to the United States but also
to developing countries and the emerging democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
We must maintain momentum toward a North American Free Trade
Agreement that will eventually create the world's largest market with
annual production of $6 trillion and a population of more than 360 million
people.
Finally, let us not forget the task of consolidating democratic values. The
victory of democracy has not been universal. It is certainly not inevitable.
In much of the world, representative government and the rule of law remain
fragile or even a distant dream. The example of Haiti is a tragic case in
point.
We must remember that the United States is more than our military might
and economic power: We are the spokesman for democratic values
everywhere.
I believe we can meet these and other challenges. I believe we can forge an
effective policy in pursuit of our interest in a free, prosperous, and peaceful
world. I believe this budget will bring us closer to that goal.
Overview of Our Funding Request
In FY [fiscal year] 1993, we seek $22.1 billion in discretionary budget
authority for international affairs programs and $20.6 billion in outlays.
This compares to FY 1992 figures of $22.2 billion in requested or enacted
budget authority and $20.1 billion in outlays. Our request is within the
limits on budget authority and outlays set by the Budget Enforcement Act of
1990.
For accounts under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, we request $15.1
billion in FY 1993 discretionary budget authority and $13.7 billion in
outlays.
As Secretary of State, I am daily faced by the challenges confronting the
United States around the world. But I am also a public servant acutely
aware of my duty to husband the taxpayer's dollars during a period of
economic hardship here at home. This budget reflects both these facts. It
is a lean budget for lean times.
But it is also a flexible budget, one that reflects the changed international
environment in which we live. I would like to highlight two initiatives--our
aid package for the former Soviet Union and support for international peace-
keeping--before moving on to a general overview.
Partnership for Peace
Just over a month ago here in Washington, the United States joined over 50
other nations and international organizations in a coordinating conference
to help the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. Our
objectives were twofold: first, to plan emergency measures to stem the
short-term rise of human misery; and, second, to chart longer term
strategies to bring the new independent states more fully into the
community of prosperous, peaceful, and democratic nations. We compared
notes, developed joint action plans, and discussed ways to divide our labors.
For we all realized that a truly global problem called for nothing less than a
global solution.
In short, we forged a new coalition here in Washington--a coalition no less
important than the one that freed Kuwait. Our aid to the new independent
states must, therefore, be considered in the context of this broad coalition
effort: It is our part in an international partnership for peace.
We seek $620 million in new appropriations for aid to the former Soviet
Union in fiscal years 1992 and 1993; most of this funding would be provided
by this subcommittee:
-- $500 million for a special humanitarian and technical assistance
account to meet emerging humanitarian and special assistance needs ($150
million in FY 1992 and $350 million in FY 1993);
-- $100 million in Economic Support Funds to promote democratic reforms,
economic restructuring, and defense conversion;
-- $10 million in development assistance targeted at the poorer republics;
and
-- $10 million in PL 480 Food for Peace for a "Farmer to Farmer" technical
assistance program.
The funds you appropriate will augment $860 million in funds available
under existing legislation, including:
-- $210 million in food assistance ($165 million in food aid and $45 million
in surplus Department of Defense stocks);
-- $100 million from Defense for transportation of humanitarian relief;
-- $400 million from Defense to help states of the former Soviet Union
eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons;
-- $30 million from [the] US Agency for International Development (USAID)
for emergency medical supplies; and
-- $120 million from USAID and the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
for technical assistance programs in priority sectors, such as democratic
and economic institution-building.
Finally, the CCC has announced $3.75 billion in food credit guarantees for
the former Soviet Union. About $3.1 billion is already being used to buy and
ship more than 20.2 million tons of US commodities.
US assistance and credit guarantees to the new independent states will
total more than $5 billion. Our success in actually delivering food and
assistance to the former Soviet Union is second to none.
Paying for Peace-Keeping
In peace-keeping, as with our help for the new states of the former Soviet
Union, we intend to seize the opportunities offered by changing
international circumstances. We seek to reinforce the new solidarity of the
United Nations that was first displayed during the Gulf crisis and to support
its key role in defusing regional conflicts.
We, therefore, propose $350 million as an amendment to the FY 1992 budget
and $350 million in the FY 1993 budget to support our fair share of new and
expected peace-keeping activities in Cambodia, El Salvador, Africa, the
Middle East, and, perhaps, Yugoslavia. Although peace-keeping falls within
the jurisdiction of the Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations
Subcommittee, I ask for your support in obtaining funding in FY 1992
through the peace-keeping operations account. We consider these funds
nothing less than an investment in peace.
We also request $257 million in voluntary contributions to international
organizations, such as the UN Development Program ($124 million) and the
UN Children's Fund ($60 million) during FY 1993.
Foreign Assistance
Foreign assistance remains an essential tool in advancing US interests in
the 1990s. It permits timely, flexible support for our interests in political
pluralism, free market economic development, peace-making, strong
alliances, and the war on drugs. About 30% of all foreign assistance will go
to Israel and Egypt, reflecting our commitment to peace in a volatile region.
Salient features of our bilateral assistance program for FY 1993 include:
Military Assistance. Our proposal will decrease military assistance by 11%
from $4.7 billion to $4.2 billion. This decline reflects lessening
international tensions. Israel ($1.8 billion) and Egypt ($1.3 billion) will
receive about 70% of all military assistance; the balance will go to other
friends and allies, including Turkey ($547 million), Greece ($345 million),
the Andean countries ($142 million), and Portugal ($101 million).
Economic Support Funds. Our program will cut Economic Support Funds from
$3.2 to $3.1 billion. Israel ($1.2 billion) and Egypt ($815 million) will
receive about 65% of all funds under this program. Other major recipients
include the Andean coun-tries ($250 million), El Salvador ($160 million),
Nicaragua ($125 million), and the states of the former Soviet Union ($100
million).
Eastern Europe. Our plan will increase assistance to Eastern Europe by $50
million from $400 million to $450 million, with a focus on strengthening
democratic institutions and the free market.
Development Assistance. Our proposal will keep development assistance
roughly constant at $2.5 billion, including the Development Fund for Africa
($776 million). We expect to provide assistance to 70 countries with
programs emphasizing sustainable, broad-based economic growth.
Capital Projects Fund. Our program includes a special $100 million Capital
Projects Fund to help recipient countries invest in the infrastructure
critical to development.
Asian Environmental Initiative. Our plan also includes a $25-million Asian
Environmental Initiative to address the serious environmental problems that
constrain Asian economic growth. We will implement the initiative in
concert with 16 other US Government agencies, the US private sector, and
Asian countries.
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI). Our plan asks for $286 million
under the second year of the EAI to reduce debt owed the United States by
countries undertaking economic liberalization. The United States has
increased its exports to Latin America and the Caribbean by nearly 30% over
the last 2 years. We consider the EAI an investment in our own economic
recovery.
Multilateral Development Institutions
For FY 1993, we seek $1.8 billion for multilateral development institutions
that foster economic reform and growth in developing countries. This
includes $100 million for the EAI Multilateral Investment Fund to be
administered by the Inter-American Development Bank; the fund will offer
technical advice and financial support to countries liberalizing their
investment regimes. Japan, Canada, Spain, and Portugal have also pledged to
help the fund. We also propose a new 4-year replenishment for the Asian
Development Fund, with an initial installment of $170 million in 1993, to
provide concessionary loans to the smaller, poorer countries of Asia.
Finally, we believe it critical that the United States meet our commitment
to an IMF quot increase. This increase is urgently required if the IMF is [to]
take a leading role in fostering economic reform in Russia and the other new
states of the former Soviet Union.
Refugee Programs
The United States has long played an important, even critical role in
addressing the plight of the world's refugees-- nowhere more evident in
1991 than in our timely assistance to the Kurds. We estimate that more
than 16 million refugees will require some sort of international help in FY
1993. Our request includes $550 million for Migration and Refugee
Assistance and $20 million to replenish the Emergency Refugee and
Migration Assistance Fund.
For our refugee programs overseas, we seek $265 million to assist
international efforts providing protection, care, resettlement, and
repatriation assistance to refugees. To finance our refugee admission and
resettlement program, we seek $208 million. This will cover the expenses
of an estimated 122,000 refugees planned for admission into the United
States. Finally, continuing a program begun in 1973, we propose $50 million
to support refugee resettlement in Israel.
The War on Drugs
In FY 1993, we request approximately $580 million for international
counter-narcotics programs to combat the flow of illegal drugs into the
United States. The war on drugs remains a top national priority, as
reflected by President Bush's upcoming participation in the San Antonio
summit with the Presidents of the Andean nations and Mexico. One hundred
seventy-three million dollars will fund activities of the Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters. These include demand- reduction programs
in Latin America and Asia, the Department's counter-narcotics air-wing, and
improving the coordination of international efforts to combat drug
trafficking. Economic Support Fund assistance of $250 million will help
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia revitalize their legal economies and create
alternatives to coca cultivation. FMF [foreign military financing], USAID,
and USIA [US Information Agency] programs round out the international
affairs counter-narcotics package.
Peace Corps
In FY 1993, we request $218 million for the Peace Corps. This will support
high-priority activities in Central and Eastern Europe and up to 500
volunteers in the republics of the former Soviet Union without lessening our
efforts elsewhere, especially in the developing world.
Conclusion
After this quick tour of our foreign assistance budget, I would like to
conclude with a personal note.
On my way to Moscow 2 weeks ago, I stopped in Frankfurt to help inaugurate
Operation Provide Hope, our military airlift of emergency food and medical
supplies to the states of the former Soviet Union. As always, I was
impressed by the professionalism of the young men and women of our
military services. I was impressed, too, by the enthusiasm with which they
embarked on this mission of mercy.
But, most of all, I was struck by the powerful symbolism of the moment:
For 40 long years, the men and women of our military services had served as
the foot soldiers of the Cold War. For 40 years, they had fought and died in
places like Korea and Vietnam. For 40 years, they had readied themselves
for the moment when they would be called upon to halt the Soviet war
machine.
Yet, there in Frankfurt were young men and women of our military services
preparing to take off for Moscow and Minsk, Baku and Bishkek, Kiev and
Kishinev, not with a cargo of destruction but with a message of peace. They
understand that it is not enough for us to win the Cold War. We must also
win the peace. That is their--and our--challenge. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Diplomatic Relations With New Independent
States
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin
Fitzwater, Washington
Date: Feb, 19 19922/19/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, State Department
[TEXT]
The President has decided that the United States will take immediate steps
to establish diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The United States had recognized their
independence on December 25, 1991. Following Secretary Baker's recent
visit to these countries, the President believes US interests will be best
served by having diplomatic ties to their governments. Secretary Baker
conducted detailed discussions with the leaders of the four countries on the
political, economic, and security principles of most importance to the
United States. The depth, extent, and richness of United States relations
with each of these countries will depend on their commitment to these
principles.
With this step and yesterday's establishment of diplomatic relations with
Moldova, the United States now has diplomatic relations with 11 of the 12
former Soviet republics. The United States does not intend or seek to
isolate the people of Georgia, as Secretary Baker said in Moscow. But, at
this time, the United States is not in a position to establish diplomatic
relations with Georgia.
The United States will open embassies in these countries by March 15. In
addition, the United States will support their membership in relevant
international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Diplomatic Relations With New Independent
States
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks by Secretary Baker prior to meeting with
Georgian Prime Minister Sigua, Moscow
Date: Feb, 19 19922/19/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Georgia
Subject: State Department, Democratization, CSCE
[TEXT]
Q: Mr. Secretary, what must Georgia do before the United States will extend
diplomatic recognition? Does President Gamsakhurdia have to be
reinstated?
Secretary Baker: I just completed about a 40-minute press conference at
which I was asked the question: Why am I seeing Prime Minister [Sigua]? I
said that I thought it was important that the people of Georgia know that
the United States has no desire or intention of isolating them. Georgia is
the only state which I have not visited--the only state that was a republic
of the former Soviet Union that I have not yet visited.
The purpose of this meeting is simply to let the people of Georgia know that
the United States has no desire to ignore or isolate them. It does not
represent an implicit extension of diplomatic recognition. I will say that
the United States has recognized the independence of Georgia. The meeting
today is for the purpose that I've just expressed and not as an endorsement
of a particular government in Georgia.
I will tell the Prime Minister that we have concern about the violent manner
in which a democratically elected leader was overthrown by force. But I
will also tell him, as we have made very clear to the world, that we have
great concern about actions that that democratically elected leader took
after becoming President, actions that--in our view--do not comport with
the principles of CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe],
with respect for human rights, [or] with respect for minority rights. I will
want to hear the Prime Minister on his view of CSCE principles, the five
principles which the United States had articulated back in September. So
we're looking forward to having that discussion. . . .(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Supporting Scientists of the Former Soviet
Union
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks before the Institute for Technical Physics,
Chelyabinsk-70, Chelyabinsk, Russia
Date: Feb, 14 19922/14/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), Russia
Subject: Science/Technology, Democratization
[TEXT]
When this facility was built decades ago, no one could have envisioned the
meeting we are having today: An American Secretary of State sitting down
with the very Russian physicists and technicians who built weapons of the
Cold War to discuss ways we can work together to destroy those weapons of
war and build instead a lasting peace.
I come here today primarily to listen to you. I want to hear your views on
the challenges you face as Russia undertakes its courageous effort to
develop democracy and free markets. Two weeks ago at Camp David,
President Yeltsin explained with eloquence and passion your situation to
President Bush. Now, President Bush has asked me to come here to discuss
ways the international community can work with you to build a partnership
for peace.
Let me begin by being very clear about America's position: We fully and
completely back President Yeltsin and his effort to build democracy and free
markets in Russia. We know that this transition is difficult. We are
working closely with other nations and the international financial
institutions to help political and economic freedom succeed in Russia and
the other new independent states. And, we will continue to accelerate and
expand our efforts.
We do so because we value and cherish freedom everywhere. But we do so,
too, because your success will also be our success: The more democracy
succeeds here, the less America will have to spend to defend itself in the
decades ahead and the more resources we'll have to educate our children,
improve our highways, clean our environment, and build a more prosperous
future for the American people for decades to come.
You can play a key role in seeing reform succeed. You are among the most
talented and educated scientists of your generation. You have much to offer.
The transition to democracy and free markets will not be easy, and Russia
and the other new independent states very much need your talents and
expertise to make freedom succeed here.
We know you are patriots and professionals who want to serve your country
and help build a better society. We know you want to stay and use your
expertise to build the new Russia and in doing so, to create a democratic
peace between our two countries. Yet, you need to be able to put your
talents to good use, doing interesting and intellectually rewarding work, and
making a decent living to care for your families. We know you need to
convert your defense skills to civilian applications.
But we know, too, that right now your options at home are limited, and
outlaw regimes and terrorists may try to exploit your situation and
influence you to build new weapons of war.
It's the highest priority of the United States and our allies, as well as the
Russian Government, to help you overcome your hardships and avoid that
terrible choice. The entire world has an interest in preventing aggressive,
outlaw regimes and terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. To
understand the danger, just think what would happen if Saddam Hussein had
a nuclear bomb. That would be a grave danger--not just to the Middle East,
but to America, Russia, and to the entire world.
Some talk about the "brain drain" problem. But I think we should talk about
the "brain gain" solution: putting your talents to the work of peace to
accelerate reform and build democracy here, to help your people live better
lives for decades to come.
We want to help you do just that. We want to help you find new projects
that will allow you to remain in your country and earn a decent living,
applying your skills to advancing the cause of science and peace, rather than
forging weapons of war.
We've been discussing with both the German Government and your
government the possibility of setting up an international scientific center
here in Russia, with perhaps some additional branches in other new states.
This center would play a clearinghouse or facilitating role. It would
receive, review, generate, and fund proposals for projects. It would help
match projects with qualified scientists and individuals, and monitor
projects to ensure proper use of funds. Actual projects themselves could be
carried out by top scientists throughout the new independent states. It
would be open to scientists from all of the new independent states.
I will be discussing this further with President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister
Kozyrev in Moscow in a few days. But in the meantime, I'd like to hear your
response to this concept, as well as your thoughts about the current
situation and any other ideas we might pursue together. I'd like to hear
about the problems you face and the projects you are working on now. And,
I'd like to know what kind of new, non-military projects you think would be
most interesting to you and would make best use of your talents. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Tripartite Statement on Proposed International
Science and Technology Center
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Date: Feb, 17 19922/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), Russia, Germany
Subject: Science/Technology
[TEXT]
Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany, Foreign
Minister Kozyrev of the Russian Federation, and Secretary of State Baker of
the United States have agreed to call for the creation in Russia of an
international science and technology center that would support scientists
and engineers of the former Soviet Union during the present critical period,
which includes the transition to a market economy, the developing process
of disarmament, and the conversion of industrial-technical potential from
military to peaceful endeavors.
The center would be a clearinghouse for developing, selecting, funding, and
monitoring projects that would be carried out primarily at institutions and
facilities located in the Russian Federation and other interested
Commonwealth states.
An important focus of projects supported by the center would be to give
weapons scientists and engineers opportunities to redirect their talents to
non-military endeavors and, in particular, to minimize any incentives to
engage in activities that would result in proliferation of nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems. Through these projects,
scientists and engineers also would contribute to ongoing efforts to reduce
and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, including the development of
technologies that could assist in those efforts. The center also would serve
the wider goals of supporting the transition to market-based economies
responsive to civilian needs, as well as supporting basic and applied
research and technology development.
The success of this initiative will require strong international support,
including funding from foundations, academic and scientific institutions,
and other non-governmental bodies. The private sector will be encouraged to
play an important role that would include identifying and funding
commercially promising research and applications. The United States will
seek to provide $25 milIion to help establish the center and fund its
projects and will seek support from other interested members of the
international community. Germany will advocate support for the initiative
by the European Community and its member states.
In order to establish the center as soon as possible, the three ministers
agreed that a meeting should be held at the earliest possible time with the
participation of interested states, including Russia and other
Commonwealth states. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Arms Control in the Commonwealth States
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpt from news conference by Secretary Baker and
Uzbekistan President Karimov, Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Date: Feb, 16 19922/16/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
Q: . . . What is your attitude toward this decision concerning armies of the
Commonwealth of Independent States and the republics?
Secretary Baker:
The United States takes the position that what
the
Commonwealth states decide with respect to conventional forces is really a
matter for those independent nations of the Commonwealth to themselves
determine. However, we expect that whatever decisions are taken will be
consistent with the arms control agreements and other international
agreements entered into by the former Soviet Union, agreements such as the
conventional forces agreement.
With respect to the question of nuclear weapons or strategic arms, it has
been the consistent and very firm position of the United States that we
expect to see a unified command and control of nuclear weapons maintained.
We have been assured that that will be the case, and so far we are satisfied
with respect to those assurances.
I might just add here, that in all of the new nations that I visited, I've made
it very clear that we also seek assurances that the countries involved with
[this] accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear nations
and that they will join us and other nations of the international community
in creating and maintaining a system of control of the export of technology
and materials that could be used in the manufacture of weapons of mass
destruction. These are some of the nuclear safety assurances and
representations that we have asked for as we made our rounds through the
Commonwealth states.
If I may just add one last thing, and then I suppose we may have to go--
although I think we should hear from President [Karimov of Uzbekistan]--but
one last thing. We have made it clear at each of our stops that support--
rhetorical support--for the principles that I referred to earlier, the five
principles of nuclear safety considerations, is readily accepted by us. But
what is really important is that there be implementation as well and that
the extent and depth and richness of the relations between the United States
and the new nations or particular nation will depend upon follow-through
with respect to those
principles. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Nuclear Safety and Disarmament
Baker
Yeltsin
Source: Secretary Baker, President Yeltsin
Description: Excerpts from a press conference following their
meeting, Moscow
Date: Feb, 17 19922/17/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: Russia
Subject: Arms Control, Trade/Economics,
Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
Secretary Baker:
Ladies and gentlemen, we have just concluded
what I would characterize as a very, very good meeting that lasted
approximately 3 hours, during the course of which we talked about the
status
of the reform efforts here in Russia. I was able to tell President Yeltsin
about our trip to other republics, as well as our trip to Yekaterinburg and
Chelyabinsk.
We talked, in quite a bit of detail, about a number of the nuclear safety and
disarmament subjects and proposals that had been discussed by President
Yeltsin and President Bush at Camp David.
We agreed that there would be a more detailed discussion of these proposals
tomorrow during the course of a meeting that I will have with the Foreign
Minister. And I want to thank President Yeltsin for receiving our delegation
today in the aftermath of his return from Minsk and at a time that I know is
a very, very busy time for him.
President Yeltsin:
[as translated] I am very satisfied with my
meeting with the Secretary of State, which has been a continuation of our
talks held last month, and also of the discussions held at Camp David with
President Bush of the United States. Today, we have covered a wide area of
issues following the Camp David discussions. I understand that those
understandings will be then recorded in writing . . . before my July official
visit to the United States at the invitation of President Bush.
We also agreed that the United States would consider some steps to support
our economic reforms--in addition to what was agreed at Camp David. And
we also discussed some measures of nuclear disarmament in continuation of
what we had discussed at Camp David with President Bush, particularly
with regard to the safety of nuclear arms.
It was also agreed between us that a research center to support science in
Russia will be set up with the participation of the United States, Germany,
and Russia. And a major initiative was also discussed in terms of space
research, as well as other issues. And I am ready to field your questions.
Q: Mr. Baker, can you detail for us exactly what you and President Yeltsin
have agreed on in this meeting and what remains to be discussed--both in
the arms control field and in the economic field? A lot of ideas have been
kind of put out here, but we can't really tell what's been agreed on and what
hasn't here.
Secretary Baker:
Quite a bit has been agreed upon, specifically
with
respect to the questions of nuclear safety, the disarming and destruction of
nuclear weapons, and the United States has furnished Russia with specific
detail covering questions of storage of plutonium and uranium, the safe
transport of nuclear weapons and the component parts of nuclear weapons.
The United States will be furnishing rail cars and security blankets--Kevlar
blankets--and a whole host of other things.
And I think the best way, rather than my trying to summarize all of that
detail here, is to give it to the press--perhaps in the aftermath of our more
detailed meeting tomorrow with the Foreign Minister--if that's acceptable,
Mr. President, to you.
We further explored some of the very specific proposals that President
Yeltsin himself had made at Camp David. For instance, the suggestion that
we cooperate in the sharing of technologies relating to defenses. For
instance, the suggestion that there be an international center for scientists
established to serve as a clearinghouse for projects and the funding thereof
for some of the scientists of the former Soviet Union who have been engaged
in making weapons of war.
And President Yeltsin has just told you that that center will be established
as a cooperative venture, by the United States, Russia, and Germany, and,
hopefully, other countries will want to parti-cipate. The United States will
provide initially $25 million to assist in the establishment of this center in
Russia.
So there were a whole host of things that we discussed in detail and agreed
upon. There are other things that we will discuss in more detail tomorrow
with the Foreign Minister. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Deputy Secretary's Meeting With President Of
Bosnia-Hercegovina
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Feb, 19 19922/19/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, EC
[TEXT]
Deputy Secretary Eagleburger met today with Alija Izetbegovic, President of
Bosnia-Hercegovina.
The Deputy Secretary expressed to President Izetbegovic the high regard of
the United States for the consistent efforts of the leadership of Bosnia to
promote a peaceful political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis and the
interest of the United States in developing closer ties with this republic.
The Deputy Secretary also expressed the support of the United States for
the ongoing efforts, under the auspices of the EC [European Community]
Conference, to foster dialogue among all parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and
the opposition of the United States to any attempt to disrupt the upcoming
referendum on the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
The Deputy Secretary assured President Izetbegovic that the United States
would strongly condemn any attempt by any side to use force or intimidation
to threaten the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The United
States does not accept the use of force or intimidation to change the
borders of Yugoslav Republics. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: US-Swedish Relations
Bush
Bildt
Source: President Bush, Swedish Prime Minister Bildt
Description: Remarks upon Prime Minister Bildt's departure
Date: Feb, 20 19922/20/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Sweden
Subject: History, State Department
[TEXT]
President Bush:
Mr. Prime Minister, I am delighted to have
welcomed you on your first official visit to Washington and to have shared
very profitable, congenial talks.
Prime Minister Bildt comes here at a time when Europe is being transformed
and when Sweden itself is beginning a new chapter in its history. As the
Prime Minister remarked on his election night last September, the winds of
political change blowing through Europe have finally reached Sweden.
He understands well his nation's past. Just more than 100 year ago, his
great-great-grandfather was Prime Minister. But even more, Prime Minister
Bildt represents a rising generation of leadership for a people seeking a new
role in Europe and a new birth of freedom and initiative in Swedish domestic
policy.
We welcome Sweden's desire to play a more active part in the emerging
global community. The Prime Minister is committed to democracy, to free
markets. I know that as active partners in the common endeavor to create a
free, open, and prosperous world, the United States and Sweden will make a
real difference.
Sweden and the United States share a deep and unswerving commitment to
peace, and Sweden is a vital partner in our global non-proliferation efforts.
A model peace-keeper, Sweden has shown its commitment to this function
of collective security many times with distinction in the UN system.
Sweden has taken a firm stand against terrorism, supporting our efforts to
bring to justice those who sabotaged Pan Am Flight 103. And during the
Gulf war, Sweden provided humanitarian and economic assistance.
Our partnership in the service of freedom and democracy is not a new one.
Americans and Swedes share more than 350 years of friendship, dating back
to 1638 when the kingdom of Sweden established a colony along the
Christina River in Delaware. American patriots of Swedish origin fought in
our Revolutionary War and signed the Declaration of Independence. Sweden
was one of the first nations to sign a treaty of friendship and commerce
with a newly independent United States.
That legacy of partnership continues today on contemporary issues--for
example, through the new investor visa arrangements our governments
agreed upon today. After today's talks, I am confident that this friendship
will continue to flourish.
Mr. Prime Minister, let me explain to you our sincere thanks for this new
spirit of cooperation and friendship. It strengthens our relations. Your visit
has clearly helped build the basis for a solid partnership as we face
together the challenges that lie ahead.
Prime Minister Bildt:
Thank you, Mr. President, for your very
warm
words. They certainly show the degree of understanding between the two of
us and between our two countries on the crucial issues of our time. Indeed,
I
am convinced that this meeting of ours, today, will be seen as the starting
point for a closer relationship between Sweden and the United States.
We share the ideals of democracy, of freedom, of the rule of law, and of a
free market economy. But, while the Cold War has certainly been warmed,
we have yet to secure the new peace. To secure that new peace will be the
great challenge for both of our nations during the 1990s.
If there is one single message that I would like to bring to you--we've been
discussing this--in your country, it is that the active involvement of the
United States will be as indispensable in the 1990s, when it comes to the
solution of all of these issues, as it has been in the past. We need the
vision, the determination, and the strength of the United Nations when it
comes to securing this new peace.
Sweden is changing its policies to make our country a more active partner in
the building of the new European future. We are entering the European union
in order to be part of the core and the engine of the emerging new Europe.
We are extending cooperation across the Baltic Sea to the newly independent
nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as to the democratic
Russia. And we are energizing our own economy and our own society by the
new policies demanded by the new times.
Together we must do whatever we can to assist the transformation of the
new states and democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. It is by doing
this that we can secure the new peace and prevent a return not only to the
confrontation of the past half century but also to the devastating disorders
of the centuries before. That must not be allowed to happen.
But the cooperation between us stretches further than the building of the
new system of cooperation in Europe. Let me just mention the efforts to
secure a lasting peace in [the] Middle East; the intercession of South Africa;
the new role to be played by [the] United Nations; the new global
environment challenges to be discussed in Rio de Janeiro in June; the work
to stop and punish terrorists and to hold the proliferations of weapons of
mass destruction; and not the least, the vital efforts now underway to
secure free trade through a successful completion of the Uruguay Round [of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. On these and many other
issues, Sweden and the United States have every reason to increase contact
and cooperation.
I well remember when first as a young student I stood by the Lincoln
Memorial down there and read those so rightly famous lines of Lincoln of the
Gettysburg Address: "that government of the people, by the people, for the
people, shall not perish from the earth." And to secure just that:
"government of the people, by the people, and for the people" through the
world is to secure the new peace that the dramatic changes of the last few
years have finally made possible.
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: US-Swedish Relations
Niles
Source: US Ambassador Thomas Niles
Description: Remarks upon Prime Minister Bildt's departure
Date: Feb, 20 19922/20/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Sweden
Subject: History, State Department
[TEXT]
Excerpt from news conference
.
The President and the Prime Minister met privately in the Oval Office for
about 15 minutes, joined the other members of the two groups for about 45
minutes in the Cabinet Room, went on for a working lunch, which concluded
around 1:15 pm and then, of course, met with the press on the South Lawn.
The emphasis during the discussions--all three of the discussions-- was on
cooperation between the United States and Sweden. The Prime Minister said
that his objective as Prime Minister was to make a good relationship with
the United States better, and the President said that was certainly one that
he shared--an objective that he shared.
There was a good deal of discussion on how we can work together with other
countries in assistance to the new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe and the emerging democracies in the former Soviet Union.
Prime Minister Bildt expressed interest--concern about the problem of
safety of the various nuclear reactors of Soviet design that have been built
in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There was some discussion
about how we could work to ensure safety of those reactors, perhaps linking
that with the new scientific center, which may be established in Russia to
deal with the problems of the proliferation of scientific knowledge
connected with nuclear weapons design.
There was a broad discussion of issues outside Europe, the Middle East,
Central America, and other areas; in all cases, there seemed to be quite a
coincidence of views between the Swedish and the US perspectives.
On Europe, the Prime Minister described for the President Sweden's
intention and hope to begin negotiations on entering into the [Western]
European Union during 1993--early in 1993--about a year from now. The
Prime Minister said that Sweden intends to be a member of the European
Union by 1995--expects to be joining the union together with several other
countries currently members of the European Free Trade Association, and
the President welcomed that development.
Finally, there was some considerable discussion of the Uruguay Round [of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations. Both leaders
agreed that bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion this year
was a very high-priority objective of Sweden and the United States. . .
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Country Profile: Sweden
Niles
Source: US Ambassador Thomas Niles
Description: Remarks upon Prime Minister Bildt's departure
Date: Feb, 20 19922/20/92
Category: Country Data
Region: Europe
Country: Sweden
Subject: History, State Department
[TEXT]
Official Name: Kingdom of Sweden
Geography
Area: 449,964 sq, km. (173,731 sq. mi.); about the size of California.
Cities: Capital--Stockholm (pop. 1.5 million. Other cities--Goteborg
720,000, Malmo 467,000.
Terrain: Generally flat or rolling.
Climate: Northern temperate.
People
Nationality: Noun--Swede(s). Adjective--Swedish.
Population: (1989): 8 million.
Annual growth rate (1988): 0.6%.
Ethnic groups: Swedes, ethnic Finns, and Lapps.
Religions: Evangelical Lutheran 94%, Roman Catholic, Pentecostal, Mission
Covenant, Baptists, Jews.
Education: Years compulsory--12. Attendance--100%. Literacy--99%.
Health: Infant mortality rate (1987)--
6/1,000. Life expectancy--men 74 yrs., women 80 yrs.
Work force (4 million): Community, social, personal services--37%.
Mining and manufacturing--24%. Commerce, hotels, restaurants--14%.
Banking and insurance--7%. Communications--7%. Construction--6%.
Agriculture, fishing, forestry--5%.
Government
Type: Constitutional monarchy.
Constitution: A new constitution was adopted in 1975, replacing the acts of
1809, 1866, and 1949.
Branches: Executive--cabinet, responsible to parliament. Legislative--
unicameral parliament (Riksdag). Judicial--Supreme Court, 6 superior
courts, 108 lower courts.
Subdivisions: 24 counties, 278 municipalities (townships).
Political parties: Moderate (conservative), Liberal, Center, Social
Democratic, Left Party--communist (VPK), Environment (Greens).
Suffrage: Universal at 18.
Central government budget (1989): Revenues--$60 billion. Expenditures--
$58 billion. Surplus--$2 billion.
Defense: 8% of government budget.
Flag: Yellow cross laid horizontally on medium blue field.
Economy
GDP: (1990) $138 billion.
Annual growth rate (1991): -1%.
Per capita income: (1990) $16,200.
Avg. inflation rate (1991): 11%.
Natural resources: Forests, iron ore, hydroelectric power.
Agriculture (3% of GNP): Products--dairy products, grains, sugar beets,
potatoes, wood. Arable land--3 million hectares.
Industry (22% of GNP): Types--machinery.
Trade: Exports--$57.5 billion: machinery, paper and pulp, minerals,
chemicals, foodstuffs. Major markets--Germany, UK, US, Norway, Denmark.
Imports--$41 billion: non-electric machinery, petroleum, chemicals,
electric machinery, foodstuffs. Major suppliers--Germany, UK, US, Finland,
Japan.
Fiscal year: July 1-June 30.
Principal Government Officials
Head of State--King Carl Gustaf XVI
Prime Minister--Carl Bildt
Foreign Minister--Margaretha af Ugglas
Ambassador to the United States--Anders Thunborg
Ambassador to the United Nations--Jan Eliasson (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Restoring Democracy in Haiti: Persistence and
Patience
Hrinak
Source: Donna Hrinak, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the
Caribbean and Mexican Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington,
DC
Date: Feb, 19 19922/19/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Refugees,
OAS, Immigration
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, it is my intention in these opening comments to explain
briefly the underlying rationale for our policy toward Haiti, trace how we
got to where we are now, and touch on where we want to go from here.
At the outset let me make one basic observation: The situation in Haiti
presents no easy answers or quick solutions. Rather, it faces us with some
very tough choices and requires of us persistence and patience if we hope to
see democracy restored to Haiti.
US Concerns About Haiti
As I said, I want to turn first to the rationale behind our Haiti policy--the
reasons why we care what happens there and try to influence these events.
Our concerns lie on two levels. First, there is our humanitarian obligation
to the people of Haiti and our desire to see them enjoy decent standards of
economic well-being, social justice, respect for human rights, and political
freedoms. These objectives spring from the most fundamental tenets of the
Administration's foreign policy and, in this sense, are no different when
applied to Haiti than to any other country.
Yet, in these human terms, Haiti is a special case. No close neighbor of
ours--in fact no nation in the Hemisphere and few in the world--has
experienced a history of economic misery and authoritarian brutality to
match Haiti's. This history is an affront to our most cherished values and
one we must try to reverse.
The second level of our concern is a more pragmatic one. It stems from the
fact that what happens in Haiti has a direct, material impact on other areas
of interest to us. Recent developments in Haiti illustrate this phenomenon
as never before. The most dramatic such illustration is the boat people,
about which I will say more in a moment. Another dimension, less visible
but potentially more worrisome, is the danger that Haiti's current crisis
will open the country to expanded influence of drug traffickers. There are
signs already of drug involvement by army officers. We must anticipate
that this situation will worsen as long as the current illegitimate regime
remains in place and keeps Haiti economically and politically isolated.
Finally, there is the fact that overthrow of Haiti's freely elected
government is a setback to the consolidation of democracy throughout the
hemisphere. Let me stress that I am not talking here in abstract or
philosophical terms but rather of the contagious effect of both dictatorship
and democracy. It is no coincidence that, in the 1960s and 1970s, one Latin
American nation after another suffered military coups. The disquieting
reality is that the military in the various victim nations were emboldened
by the success of their counterparts elsewhere. Similarly, the return of
these Latin nations to democracy in the following decade did not occur in
isolation but rather as part of an unmistakable trend that has brought this
hemisphere as a whole to an unprecedented level of political freedom and
respect for human rights.
It is for these reasons that the ouster of an elected government in Haiti, or
in any nation of the hemisphere, has a political significance well beyond the
borders of the country directly involved. It is likewise for these reasons
that the Organization of American States [OAS] reacted quickly and firmly
to the coup in Haiti and why we have supported, and continue to support, the
efforts of the OAS and its Secretary General to restore constitutional order
in Haiti.
US Efforts in Haiti
This discussion of Haiti's importance to us brings me logically to a brief
outline of how this Administration tried--before our efforts were
interrupted by the coup--to help move Haiti in the direction of economic
health and democratic freedoms. Our efforts can be divided into two phases.
First was the support we provided to Haiti's latest electoral process which
culminated with the first genuinely free and fair vote in the country's
history in December 1990 and the inauguration 2 months later of Jean-
Bertrand Aristide as President.
Our role in this process is a matter of record and has been outlined before to
this committee which, I should add, was very supportive of our efforts, as
was the entire Congress. Suffice it here to say that, working both
independently and in conjunction with the OAS, the United Nations, and other
interested governments, we devoted significant material and political
resources to help ensure that the campaign, the election itself, and the
transition were carried out in accord with accepted democratic principles
and in a climate free of fear and intimidation. We are proud of the role we
played. We shared with the people of Haiti the joy they felt at the
inauguration of a president whom they themselves had chosen and who
represented to them such great promise.
With the successful completion of the electoral process, we moved into the
second phase of our effort, characterized primarily by the implementation
of a major bilateral assistance program that included, in FY 1991, $12.5
million in Economic Support Funds [ESF], $38.3 million in Development
Assistance [DA], and $29.1 million in PL 480. In FY 1992, the allocated
totals were $24 million ESF, $39 million DA, and $20.6 million PL 480.
I want to stress, moreover, that our bilateral programs in Haiti, as
projected, went well beyond provision of material assistance. At the time
of the coup, we were preparing to implement programs in the areas of
strengthening democratic institutions, administration of justice,
improvements in law-enforcement procedures, and reform of the military.
In short, we contemplated a comprehensive approach to helping Haiti
address the full range of problems that have plagued the country for
generations.
I can't say how long this effort might have taken or even whether it would,
in the end, have produced the results desired. I can say that the programs I
outlined reflected a strong commitment of the United States to the
betterment of conditions in Haiti, particularly in the areas of economic
well-being and political rights and freedoms. This commitment remains,
today, the underpinning of our policy toward Haiti.
In this context, and specifically to reject some allegations that have been
made since the coup, I want to reassert that we remain committed to the
restoration of democracy to Haiti and to our recognition of Jean-Bertrand
Aristide as Haiti's legitimately elected President. By the same token, I
want to stress that we do not recognize the military-installed regime now
in power in Haiti, nor will we deal with it except on matters we deem in our
own clear interest. I want to use this opportunity to call on the military
regime to restore Haiti to constitutional order under terms that provide for
President Aristide's return to his legitimate authority and that guarantee
full rights and freedoms for all Haitians.
Haiti: OAS Concern and Efforts
Mr. Chairman, our concern for Haiti's return to democratic rule is shared by
countries throughout this hemisphere. That is why the member countries of
the OAS have been engaged from the day of the coup in efforts to help
restore democracy in Haiti. That is why the United States has acted in
solidarity with other member countries of the OAS.
Within 48 hours of the September 30 coup, OAS member foreign ministers,
including Secretary of State Baker, met and unanimously adopted tough
measures--diplomatic isolation and suspension of aid, economic,
commercial, and financial ties--to press the illegal regime to return to
democratic rule. The OAS member state foreign ministers followed these
measures by urging an embargo and freeze of official assets on October 8.
In the week after the coup, active OAS diplomatic efforts began with an
eight-country mission to Haiti, including US Assistant Secretary [for Inter-
American Affairs Bernard] Aronson. He, seven foreign ministers, and the
Secretary General met with individuals across a spectrum of Haitian society
to press for return to democratic rule.
OAS Secretary General Baena Soares--through his representative, Augusto
Ramirez Ocampo, the former foreign minister of Colombia--has carried on
OAS diplomacy in Haiti, Caracas (where President Aristide is temporarily
living), Cartagena, and Washington. The OAS has facilitated repeated
meetings among Haiti's political leaders and maintains pressure to keep the
dialogue going. The OAS has brokered talks that have resulted in President
Aristide's nomination of a Prime Minister, Rene Theodore, who must now
win the approval of Parliament to begin serving as the head of government.
The OAS is preparing to field a civilian presence throughout Haiti--OEA-
DEMOC [OAS-democracy]--to monitor human rights, help strengthen judicial
and other democratic institutions, and help professionalize the military.
The aim of OEA-DEMOC is to foster conditions for the return of democratic
rule and Haiti's freely elected president. Fielding OEA-DEMOC will
complement progress on the diplomatic-political front. Timing of
deployment is part of the negotiation process.
Such a country-wide OAS presence in Haiti would be no stranger to the
Haitian people. On December 16, 1990, the day Haitians elected Jean-
Bertrand Aristide as their president, the OAS electoral observation team in
Haiti stood at 202 members from 25 countries. Team members were located
throughout Haiti and monitored balloting at some 1,000 polling stations.
Their presence in the 1990-91 elections, along with the United Nations and
other interested bodies, is credited with a major role in ensuring a free,
fair, and peaceful process. The value of a country-wide OAS presence is
shown also by the successful work of the OAS Commission on Verification
and Support in helping resettle former resistance members in Nicaragua.
The United States fully supports OAS diplomatic and other measures to
resolve the crisis brought on by the coup of September 30. We have pledged
$2 million to carry out OEA-DEMOC and coordinated our humanitarian
relief program for Haiti's neediest with the OAS.
Hemispheric solidarity on Haiti is unprecedented. The United States and the
33 other member countries of the OAS are united in the determination to see
constitutional democracy restored in Haiti. We are united in our resolve
that Haiti's freely elected President resume exercise of his legitimate
authority. We are united in the approach laid out in the foreign ministers'
resolutions of October 3 and October 8.
Efforts to date have kept open channels of communication and dialogue and
helped bring Haiti to the threshold of selecting a prime minister, in spite of
attempts by a violent fringe to intimidate Mr. Theodore and derail the
efforts to settle on a prime minister.
Much more needs to be done, but mechanisms are in place, a process has been
set in motion, and the political support needed to bring the crisis to a
conclusion remains as firm as in the days following the coup when 34
countries--including the United States--rallied to the cause of democracy
in Haiti.
Retargeting the Embargo Against Haiti
The primary instrument we have used to bring pressure on the illegal regime
in Haiti, and thereby facilitate return to constitutional government, has
been the economic and financial embargo and diplomatic isolation adopted
by member states as urged by the OAS in its resolutions of October. I want
to stress that we believe the embargo remains an essential element in
pressuring the regime to negotiate restoration of democracy.
As I mentioned, however, the crisis in Haiti is characterized by tough
choices. In this regard, there are some aspects of the embargo that I want
to discuss in more detail.
We have heard criticism that the embargo against Haiti has affected the
wrong people--that it has hurt the poor and left the regime and its
supporters unscathed. More recently, we have heard accusations that the
Administration bowed to pressure from the American business community in
deciding to ease the embargo.
Starting with the latter claim, let me be clear about what we did on
February 4. We retargeted the embargo. We did not lift it. We will now
permit, on a case-by-case basis, companies in the offshore assembly sector
(the so-called 807 companies) to ship components to Haiti for assembly and
to bring finished products back to the United States. These components and
products do not enter Haitian commerce--Haiti simply provides the labor to
assemble them. Our action does not open or resume general commerce with
Haiti.
I want to stress that we took this action precisely out of concern for the
effect the embargo was having on poor Haitian workers employed by these
companies--or not employed, which was increasingly the case--and on the
families that depend on their wages. We, likewise, acted to prevent what
we concluded would have been disastrous and lasting damage to the Haitian
economy through the bankruptcy of the 807 companies or their shift to third
countries.
At the time we imposed the embargo, we weighed very carefully the impact
it would have on the 807 sector. From firsthand experience, I can assure the
committee that we agonized for days, knowing the harm that could come to
the 40,000 employees and up to 250,000 dependents and to the future of one
of the few really bright spots in the Haitian economy. To lessen the impact,
we granted that sector a 30-day grace period during which companies could
continue to ship materials and assembled goods to and from Haiti.
The crisis has gone on longer than we had hoped, and it became apparent a
few weeks ago that we would have to act to relieve the hardship that this
was causing to Haitian workers and to the long-term economic prospects of
the country.
Mindful of the embargo's potential impact on the poor, we were careful to
exempt food staples--including rice, wheat, and cooking oil--from our
sanctions. Reporting from our Embassy indicates that food stocks remain
adequate. We also put in place a special humanitarian assistance program,
operating through private voluntary agencies that work with the US Agency
for International Development [USAID], to provide food and nutrition
assistance to vulnerable groups. That program is now providing
supplemental feeding for 50,000 persons and is expected to extend to an
additional 200,000 by the end of March. Finally, for humanitarian reasons
we have also continued to permit exports of medicines to Haiti as well as
shipments of humanitarian donations and supplies for private voluntary
organizations providing health care and hospital services in Haiti.
We believe the embargo has had a very marked effect on Haiti. Millions of
dollars of official Haitian assets in the United States remain frozen.
Government revenues are dramatically down. The 1992 budget introduced by
the de facto regime last month is almost 25% lower than in 1991. The
regime has had to purchase oil on the spot market at premium prices when it
could get it. The criticism the embargo has received both publicly and in
private from regime officials makes clear that it is having a major
economic--and psychological--impact. For all its imperfections, it remains
our and our allies' most powerful lever on the regime.
Haitian Migration
Finally, I want to touch on the issue of Haitian migration. First, I should
point out that, contrary to some allegations that Haitians are not welcome
here, there is a large and steady legal flow of Haitians to the United States-
-more than 140,000 persons in the last decade, fifth among all nations in
the world. Estimates of the total Haitian community in the United States
run as high as 1 million--one-sixth of Haiti's population. Nonetheless, we
recognize that persistent, abject poverty and recurring violence have, for
many years, motivated large numbers of Haitians to put to sea to attempt
the 600-mile voyage to the United States. Usually the attempt is made in
dangerously overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels. Often the voyages end in
tragedy, the vessels sinking with a loss of life which cannot be estimated.
This loss of life and our obligation to try to curb the wave of illegal
migrants prompted the US and Haitian Governments to implement the Alien
Migration Interdiction Operation (AMIO) in 1981. Under this agreement, US
Coast Guard cutters are positioned just outside Haiti's 12-mile limit of
territorial waters. To the extent possible, vessels with intending migrants
are interdicted before they can sail into the dangerous waters of the high
seas. Interviews are conducted on board by USINS [US Immigration and
Naturalization Service] agents, and those with plausible claims to asylum
are brought to the United States to pursue their claims.
During the 10 years preceding the September 1991 coup, more than 22,000
Haitians were interdicted under AMIO, including 1,351 during the 7 months
of the Aristide Administration. While the coup and its volatile aftermath
certainly influenced some of the approximately 15,000 interdicted since
September to make the attempt, the greater immediate inducement was the
court injunction barring repatriation. This injunction made the odds of
gaining admission to the United States greater than they had ever been
before, and made the Coast Guard cutters magnets rather than deterrents.
This is borne out by the drastic decline in new interdictions since the court
ban was overturned.
I want to stress our conviction that if we were impeded from repatriation
by a new court decision or by legislation, the inevitable result would be a
new magnet effect. We are concerned, for example, that granting temporary
protected status to Haitians interdicted by the Coast Guard--as has been
suggested by some--would constitute an open invitation that would
encourage a massive outpouring of boat people.
On a related aspect, Mr. Chairman, the Administration has been accused of
arbitrarily categorizing boat people as "economic migrants" and denying
them entry on these grounds while ignoring the unstable and possibly violent
conditions that they fled. This is an inaccurate and misleading description
of the process. While it is true that we find most Haitian migrants are
motivated presumably by economic considerations, we do not deny them
entry expressly on these grounds, nor do we ignore the other conditions in
Haiti that may have induced them to leave.
However, US law, as written by Congress, does not say that any citizen of
any country in the world who experiences instability or violence can be
automatically admitted into the United States as a refugee. Rather, an
individual must present a credible claim of persecution or well-founded
fear of persecution on account of his or her race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. USINS, through
its interviewing process, has thus far determined that over 4,100 Haitians
of the 11,000 interviewed since the coup had plausible enough claims to
pursue their claims further in the United States.
However, it is our intention to repatriate those who do not. Despite widely
reported claims by individuals seeking entry to the United States that
repatriates face retaliation in Haiti, we have no credible evidence that this
is the case. In fact, in those cases which we have investigated, evidence
has directly contradicted the claims. We will continue to monitor the
situation of the returnees.
Lessons Learned
Mr. Chairman, in closing I want to note that, while there are few easy
answers to the current problems of Haiti, there are some lessons to be
learned or reinforced.
One relates to the fragility of democratic government, especially in a
country that lacks the cultural and institutional foundations to make it
work. Hindsight suggests that had the international community continued
after the inauguration the ambitious effort to monitor Haiti's presidential
campaign and election, it might have mitigated the mutual fear and
suspicion that grew up between the Aristide Administration and other
elements of society and ultimately led to the coup. It is, in part, this
recognition that led to the creation of OEA-DEMOC and our determination to
work actively with all Haitians of goodwill in restoring and strengthening
democracy in their country.
Another lesson stems from our experience with the embargo. Although, as I
have noted, we consider the embargo on balance to be an effective
instrument of pressure against the illegal regime, it is clear that it has not
forced the solution we sought and that, inevitably, it brought hardships on
innocent Haitians, US businessmen and their employees, and other
unintended victims. There may be no sure remedy for these kinds of flaws,
but they will have to be considered closely in a future situation of this kind.
Meanwhile, as I have discussed, we have fine-tuned our economic sanctions
against Haiti in trying to produce the desired overall effects.
Mr. Chairman, there is a theme running through my comments that I would
like to make very explicit in conclusion. This Administration, consistent
with our nation's deepest values, strongly supports genuine democracy and
respect for human rights in Haiti. Similarly, we are committed to improving
the well-being of all Haitians and will continue working to do so within the
limits of our resources and our law. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Lifting US Sanctions Against South Africa
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Feb, 20 19922/20/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: South Africa
Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
On July 10, [1991], the President announced that South Africa had met the
conditions for lifting the trade and economic sanctions contained in the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA). Since that time, the
political process in South Africa has continued forward toward non-racial
democracy. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa, which held its
first session December 20-21, 1991, is another definitive step toward
abolishing apartheid and establishing a non-racial, multi-party democracy
in South Africa. The United States will continue to assist this process.
Pursuant to Section 2(B) (9) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as
amended (the Evans amendment), the President has determined that South
Africa has made "significant progress toward the elimination of apartheid."
This will permit the Export-Import Bank to insure or provide credits for US
exports to the South African Government. We are also encouraging US
exports to non-governmental South African importers who have endorsed
and proceeded toward the implementation of fair labor standards. If the
Secretary of State certifies that a South African firm meets these
standards, US exporters to such a firm would also be eligible for Exim [Bank]
support. Firms that are majority owned by non-white South Africans are
exempt from this requirement.
South Africa's economic conditions will have a direct and decisive impact
on the success of the new democracy which emerges from the current
negotiations. In recent weeks, President Bush and Secretary Baker met with
African National Congress President Nelson Mandela and have spoken with
South African President F.W. de Klerk. Both men indicated their concern
with South Africa's economic future.
Assisting US exports to South Africa will help create jobs in the United
States and will demonstrate our commitment to the agreement reached at
the Economic Summit this past July that the industrialized nations find
ways to assist South Africa in those areas where the majority have long
suffered deprivation: education, health, housing, and social welfare.
It is important that we help in this effort. South Africa's considerable
needs cannot be met by domestic resources alone. The legacy of apartheid is
so great that South Africa will need a variety of resources to provide the
necessary capital. A healthy economic situation in South Africa is of
critical importance as a new non-racial constitution is being negotiated. In
this regard, we want to be as helpful as possible. We would, therefore, be
prepared to consider a proposal for an IMF [International Monetary Fund]
facility for South Africa subject to the terms of the Gramm amendment.
(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Zaire Demonstrations
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Feb, 16 19922/16/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Zaire
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
On February 16, peaceful demonstrations organized city-wide in Kinshasa,
Zaire, by the members of all major Christian churches were attacked by
military units intent on breaking up and suppressing this evidence of
support for the reconvocation of the National Conference.
By all reports, the demonstrators were in the thousands and were entirely
peaceful, beginning their marches as they emerged from Sunday services in
churches all over Kinshasa. Nevertheless, we understand that they were
attacked by soldiers using rifles, tear gas, hot water cannons, and metal-
tipped whips. Initial reports are that at least 13 demonstrators were
killed.
We consider the military reaction to the peaceful demonstrations to be
entirely without justification. We renew our call on the authorities to
reconvene the National Conference and to conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with their protestations of democratic values. The National
Conference represents the best hope for a peaceful transition to democracy.
We believe that those responsible for this violent response to a peaceful
demonstration should be brought promptly to justice. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Dr. King's Message to the World: Make Real the
Promise of Democracy
Eagleburger
Baker
Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Remarks at the State Department's Martin Luther King
Reception, Washington, DC
Date: Jan, 16 19921/16/92
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: United States
Subject: Cultural Exchange, Democratization
[TEXT]
With Secretary Baker in El Salvador, I feel greatly honored to have this
opportunity to welcome you on his behalf to the State Department as we pay
tribute today to the life and legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Dr. King's
birthday is a holiday which we celebrate here in the United States, but his
message is one which belongs not to one country, or to one people, or to one
race. It is a universal message--a message which the world as a whole
urgently needs to hear, perhaps more today than ever before. Thus, it is
good to see so many representatives of the world community gathered here
this evening to help us commemorate the life of a great American hero.
It may seem a bit odd to say that the world needs to hear Dr. King's message
at a time when much of the planet has been made over in his image. It is
certainly true that we have witnessed a remarkable series of victories for
human dignity and a remarkable demonstration of the power of nonviolence
in the democratic revolutions of our times.
But it has become increasingly clear that the new world order rests on
fragile foundations. It is unfortunate, but nevertheless a reality, that the
new democracies are forced to build on the ruins left by their totalitarian
predecessors. They confront overwhelming social and economic challenges.
They confront, above all, the raw emotions of their untranscended history--
a history of crimes unavenged, of grievances unforgiven, of hatreds
unappeased.
Dr. King used to say that injustice and economic privation provided fertile
ground for the growth of communism. Today, however, the persistence of
those ills risks stimulating not the cold enmity of ideological conflict but
the passionate outburst of uncontrollable racial and ethnic animosities. We
have only to look at Yugoslavia, at the republics of the former Soviet Union,
at Sudan and Somalia, at the West Bank, and at our very own cities to
understand that hatred of and an inclination to scapegoat "the other"--that
is, those who are different in racial, ethnic, or religious terms--is the
challenge of our times.
There is no question that we must address the underlying problems which
afflict much of humanity today: the problems of poverty, population, and
underdevelopment. Dr. King believed in an interdependent world and the
responsibility of all men for each other. He called on the United States to
"make real the promises of democracy," and he would have urged the same on
a democratizing world today.
But in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, Dr. King also spoke of "the need for
man to overcome oppression without resorting to violence," and herein lies
his special claim on the attention of the world today. Dr. King taught that
meeting violence with violence and hatred with hatred would only
perpetuate the tragic cycle of history and of man's inhumanity to man. In
this dangerous era of political disintegration and the spread of weapons of
mass destruction, different peoples must somehow learn to cooperate and to
live together. As Dr. King said the day before he died, "It is no longer a
choice between violence and nonviolence in this world, it's nonviolence or
nonexistence."
In these circumstances, the world can only profit from the example of Dr.
King and from the tragic history of race relations in the United States. As a
people, we are no better or worse than others, no more or less racist. Two
things set us apart. First, we have been involved in a unique experiment
which has brought together disparate groups whose fundamental beliefs are
as contrasting as the colors of their skin. Second, we are part of a nation
founded upon ideas and ideals--especially the ideal of democracy--and not
blood ties or race.
It is undeniable that reality has often mocked those ideals throughout the
course of our history. But the struggle between our baser human instincts
and our higher ideals has been the glory of this country. That struggle
produced a Martin Luther King, Jr., and, through his doctrine of brotherhood
and nonviolence, it has given us--and now given the world--the opportunity
to transcend our history. If Dr. King could struggle against the legacy of
slavery without hatred, then there is hope for a world otherwise enslaved to
history's legacy today.
It goes without saying that the struggle Dr. King led is not over--not in this
country and not anywhere else in the world. The struggle goes on in the
hearts and minds of each of us. If there is one thing that Dr. King taught us,
it is the danger of complacency. We cannot be satisfied merely with the
idea of brotherhood or the ideal of democracy. Black Americans, especially,
know what the world is discovering today--that democracy is no sure
safeguard against our worst instincts or against the tyranny of the
majority.
The celebration of Dr. King's birthday is all about the struggle against
complacency. It is quite unlike all of our other national holidays, which
tend to make us look back in commemoration of some event or figure in the
past. The legacy
of Dr. King makes us look inward to examine our shortcomings and to look
forward to the path we need to travel in order to become worthy of our
nation's ideals--in order to become the people we would like ourselves to
be. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Feature: The United States and Ethiopia,
1903
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jan, 16 19921/16/92
Category: Features
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Ethiopia
Subject: History, Cultural Exchange, Democratization
[TEXT]
At the turn of the century, the US Consul in Marseilles, Robert P. Skinner,
proposed to his superiors in Washington that the United States undertake a
diplomatic mission to the only independent state in Sub-Saharan Africa--
the Kingdom of Ethiopia.
In Marseilles, Skinner heard talk in Marseilles of Ethiopia and its Emperor,
Menelik II, known as the "Conquering Lion of Judah." Four years earlier, in
1896, Menelik successfully had defended his country from Italian
aggression, and, as a result, was the only black African leader to be
accepted as an equal by the European powers. His success at Adowa was
called the greatest victory of Africans over Europeans since Hannibal
defeated the Roman army in 217 BC.
Skinner also was well aware that Ethiopian trade could be lucrative for
American business, which felt excluded from the riches of Africa. For the
past 25 years, the great European powers had carved the continent into
exclusive "spheres of influence." Independent Ethiopia, Skinner felt, was a
ready-made point of entry for enterprising Americans.
Yet the Administration of his friend, President William McKinley, was
preoccupied with the aftermath of the Spanish-American war and took no
action. Skinner complained that, "The only really satisfactory report on
Ethiopia [known by US citizens] was contained in the 10th chapter of the
First Book of Kings," which told the story of Solomon and an early ruler of
the land which became Ethiopia--the Queen of Sheba.
In 1903, with the adventurous Teddy Roosevelt in the White House, Skinner
tried again. This time, Acting Secretary of State Francis Loomis called
Skinner to Washington and named him commissioner of the first US trade
mission to the Ethiopian Empire. The President himself took an interest in
the mission and called Skinner to the White House, where the new
commissioner found the conversation "electrifying". Although the President
knew little about Ethiopian society, he spoke excitedly of the exotic
wildlife of the African highlands.
Like other Americans, President Roosevelt's exposure to Ethiopia and its
culture was limited to a few newspaper articles and the reports of intrepid
American explorers. He speculated about a mysterious land, filled with
people living in a " a primitive society which was much like society in the
time of Christ." But the American visitors were to find Ethiopia to be far
different from what they expected.
In the Land of the Neguse Negast
According to tradition, the first Ethiopian king, Menelik I, was the son of
King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. The Ethiopians believed that Menelik
was raised by Solomon and then, in 1000 BC founded a dynasty of 225
emperors and 1 empress. As a parting gift, according to legend, Solomon
prepared a copy of the Tables of the Law for Menelik. Because of an error,
Menelik took the original tablets back instead and buried them in the holy
city of Axum. In 1903, priests showed the shrine to Consul Skinner,
although the tablets were not visible.
By the 4th century AD, the Ethiopian court accepted Christianity, had a
written language, and extensive trading contacts with Byzantium, Egypt, and
India. But the rise of Islam in the 7th century cut those sea ties and turned
the kingdom into an isolated state, which stubbornly retained both its
Christianity and its identity as a nation. Throughout the centuries, despite
the rivalry of regional chieftains, the Ethiopians had remained strong and
were continuing to expand and consolidate their power.
Menelik II was perhaps the greatest of the Emperors: the Neguse Negast, the
"King of Kings." With his brilliant and powerful empress, Taytu, at his side,
Menelik thwarted an Italian challenge to his sovereignty and expanded
Ethiopia's boundaries to their greatest extent ever.
A Man of the 20th Century
Menelik was heir to a monarchy with a long and distinguished history, but he
also was a man of the future. Under his guidance, the Ethiopians built a
fully equipped, modern, 700,000-man army--one of the strongest on the
continent. His court officials were literate, and French, German, and
English-speaking interpreters were always at hand. Menelik was fascinated
with technological innovation, and, during his reign, the first modern
bridges and roads eased transportation difficulties.
In the decade before the arrival of the American delegation, Menelik had
issued postage stamps and a national currency, established a post office
system, and initiated telegraph services to the coast.
Menelik's goal, according to his Italian physician de Castro, was to use
Western technology to benefit his people without falling prey to Western
political control. The Emperor believed that he and his advisers were best
suited to chart Ethiopia's course: "We know how to profit from whatever
aspects of their civilization are most helpful to us." The problem, for
Menelik, was that the European powers had a different sense of priorities.
In 1892, the Emperor's most powerful vassal, Ras Mekonnen, wrote to the
Czar of Russia:
We have not found among the Europeans who have become our neighbors any
who desire our welfare and independence, but those who [want to] deprive us
[of them].
The Americans recognized Menelik's difficult position "balancing influence
against influence," and believed that he would welcome a purely commercial
mission. In October 1903, Commissioner Skinner and his contingent of
Marine guards set sail for Africa.
Lions and Typewriters: The US Delegation Arrives
The Americans were dazzled by the sights they saw on their 22-day
journey--in part, by camel caravan--from Djibouti to Menelik's new capital,
Addis Ababa--the "New Flower." Upon their arrival in December 1903, the
delegation was greeted by a 5,000-man guard of honor, including a cavalry
wearing mantles of lion and leopard skin. Skinner described the scene as
"bewilderingly beautiful" and was equally impressed by his first glimpse of
the emperor, seated on a carpeted throne under a silken canopy.
Menelik confounded American expectations. He was anything but an isolated,
provincial leader. Skinner was immediately struck by the Emperor's
kindness, intelligence, and wit--and skill at diplomacy. When presented
with a typewriter by the US delegation, he immediately asked how it could
be adapted to Amharic.
Menelik was impressed that the Americans had written their treaty proposal
in Amharic and immediately began to negotiate a new document that was
satisfactory to both sides. According to Skinner, Menelik was "rapid in
seizing a point and determining his own line of action." Although European
diplomats had warned the Americans to be prepared to spend months in
Ethiopia, the treaty was rewritten in 9 days.
Skinner believed that the warm reception accorded to the Americans
stemmed from the fact that no foreign mission had ever visited the country
on a peaceful mission, "neither asking nor granting anything to which both
sides could not gladly accede."
Throughout the visit, the Americans were impressed by the Emperor's
interest in them and their country. Menelik demonstrated wide knowledge of
world affairs and quizzed Commissioner Skinner closely about the exploits
of Teddy Roosevelt at San Juan Hill. Hearing that the American President
was interested in a project to use zebras in the southwestern United States,
the Emperor presented a breeding pair to the delegation, in addition to two
lion cubs. In turn, the Americans presented the Emperor with seeds--he
personally distributed them to local farmers, taking great interest in their
progress and potential.
The Americans had, seemingly, uncovered a new world filled with business
opportunities. But they were not the first to recognize Ethiopia's potential.
When Commissioner Skinner's advance party entered Addis Ababa, they
were greeted by William H. Ellis--a black American businessman.
Black Americans and the Ethiopian Dream
In 1903, W.H. Ellis arrived in Addis Ababa with Haitian Benito Sylvain on a
two-fold mission--to provide an Ethiopian refuge for black Americans along
with business and development plans.
Ellis was born in Texas in 1864 and worked as a cowboy in Texas and
Mexico, before attending college in Tennessee. He entered the business
world as a hide and wool merchant in San Antonio in 1886.
In 1889, Ellis announced plans to colonize black Americans in Mexico and
founded a colony near Mapimi in 1894-95, which failed. Ellis moved to New
York in 1897 and became a Wall Street stockbroker.
Ellis was well aware of Menlik's reputation and the business opportunities
to be found in Ethiopia. As a hide and wool merchant, he knew that Ethiopia
sent virtually its entire production of hides to the United States.
Menelik, who knew Ellis' companion Benito Sylvain well, received the
American cordially. Although Ellis left before Commissioner Skinner
arrived in December 1903, he played a role in the negotiations, returning in
1904 with the signed treaty. At that time, Menelik granted Ellis
concessions for land to grow cotton. However, Ellis's dreams did not come
to fruition. In 1906, the Emperor suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and
became an invalid, dying in 1913.
But Menelik's reputation and achievements lived on. As the only African
leader to be treated as an equal by the 19th century Western powers,
Menelik's example was of major importance to other black Africans--and
black Americans. --Susan Holly, Office of Public Communication (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Focus on the Enterprise For the Americas
Initiative
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Jan, 24 19921/24/92
Category: Features
Region: Caribbean, Central America, North America,
South America
Country: Bolivia, Mexico, Chile, Jamaica
Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid,
Environment, Science/Technology
[TEXT]
The Initiative In Brief
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is an innovative proposal which
rests on three pillars--trade, investment, and debt.
-- To expand trade, the President has proposed a hemisphere-wide free
trade zone. The proposed North American Free Trade Agreement and
bilateral framework agreements are the first steps in the process.
-- To expand investment, the United States has proposed measures,
including an investment sector loan program, to create a new flow of
capital into the region.
-- To further reduce the debt burden, EAI offers new approaches to debt
relief--including an innovative program which uses debt reduction to
provide funds for the environment.
Debt Reduction and the Environment for the Americas
US concessional debt--monies owed on US Agency for International
Development (USAID) and PL 480 (food financing) loans--owed by Caribbean
and Latin American countries currently totals $6.9 billion. Under the US
proposal, this debt could be exchanged for new, reduced obligations. Dollar
payments would be made on the principal, but interest would be paid--in
local currency--into an environmental fund, controlled by a local
environmental board. The EAI program also makes provisions for reducing
nonconcessional debt owed by countries to the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) and the US Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) through debt
for equity and other debt swaps.
Spending authority to fund the reduction of PL 480 debt for countries
undertaking serious economic and investment reforms was included in the
FY 1991 budget. So far, Chile, Jamaica, and Bolivia have qualified for the PL
480 reduction program. The Administration currently is seeking
congressional authority to reduce other official debt, including USAID loans.
As the first step in the environmental funding process, President Bush
appointed nine prominent Americans from both the public and private
sectors to sit on the Environment for the Americas board (see below). The
Environment for the Americas board approved draft framework agreements
with Bolivia and Jamaica, which were signed in late November 1991.
Negotiations are currently underway with Chile, and agreement is expected
before the end of February 1992.
Bolivia and Jamaica Take First Steps
In August 1991, Bolivia's PL 480 debt was reduced by 80%, from $38 million
to $7.7 million.
For Bolivia, interest payments on the reduced PL 480 debt will amount to
the local currency equivalent of $1.8 million over 15 years, most of which
will be received during the first 10 years. In addition, on the occasion of
the forgiveness in August of Bolivian debt owed to USAID--under a different
debt reduction authority--the Bolivian Government voluntarily pledged to
provide a bond which will produce $20 million in local currency over 10
years. All of this money will be placed in the EAI environmental account at
the National Fund for the Environment in Bolivia.
An administrative council, consisting of two representatives appointed by
the Bolivian Government, one US Government appointee, and four
representatives from Bolivian environmental, scientific, and local
development non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is currently being
formed.
The administrative council will propose an interim annual program by May
1, 1992, for the remainder of the year. According to the terms of the
agreement, priority will be given to projects managed by NGOs which
involve local communities in their planning and execution.
Jamaica's experience is similar to that of Bolivia. In August 1991,
Jamaica's food assistance debt to the United States was reduced by 80%
from $271 million to $54.2 million. It is estimated that the new
environmental agreement will generate $9.2 million over the next decade to
fund grass-roots environmental projects.
Jamaica's environmental foundation board will have one representative
appointed by the Government of Jamaica, one US Government representative,
one representative from the University of the West Indies, and four local
community and environmental group leaders.
The environmental foundation board will present its first annual program by
June 1, 1992.
EAI News in Brief
Administration Budgets EAI Funds. The Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative Act of 1991 was submitted to Congress on February 26, 1991. In
addition, the Administration is seeking appropriations for funding debt
reduction and $100 million per year, for 5 years, to fund the Inter-American
Development Bank [IDB] Multilateral Investment Fund. This fund, which will
be administered by the IDB, will provide technical advice and financial
support to help countries liberalize their investment regimes. Japan,
Canada, several European countries, and at least 13 Latin American
countries also will contribute to the fund, bringing its total capitalization
near the $1.5-billion target.
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. To date, the United States has
signed 16 bilateral/multilateral agreements with 31 Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Each agreement stresses the need for intellectual
property rights protection and the importance of observing and promoting
internationally recognized worker rights. Local councils monitor trade and
investment relations and work to reduce impediments to growth.
Consultations are scheduled with Colombia (March); Honduras, El Salvador,
CARICOM (Caribbean Community, and the MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common
Market) countries--Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay (April); Chile
(June); and Costa Rica (July).
IDB Negotiates Loan. The Inter-American Development Bank signed its first
loan agreement under EAI in June 1991 with the Chilean Government. Chile
will receive $150 million to open its copper and transport sectors to
foreign investment, sign inheritance tax and investment agreements, and
pass legislation allowing international dispute settlement mechanisms to
arbitrate foreigners' investment disputes with Chile.
Since then, loans for Jamaica and Bolivia have been approved for $75 and
$60 million, respectively. In October, IDB approved a $200-million loan for
Colombia. Loans to Uruguay, Costa Rica, Argentina, Honduras, Guatemala,
Trinidad and Tobago, El Salvador, Bahamas, Barbados, and Paraguay are under
active consideration.
These countries are desperately in need of expert assistance--particularly
in the fields of intellectual property rights, energy, and pension
privatization. US firms definitely have an edge in the region; anyone who
would like more information may call the IDB at 202-623-1128.
Latin American Energy Conference. The Institute of the Americas will
present its 1992 conference on new opportunities in the Latin American
energy industry from March 8-10 in La Jolla, California. According to
Institute President, Ambassador Paul H. Boeker, "Latin America's energy
industry is moving away from exclusive state ownership and operation
toward new arrangements with local and international business.
Opportunities created by these moves are no longer confined to one or two
countries but are becoming truly region-wide."
The conference is designed to provide a forum for business to obtain
information directly from ministerial-level officials and energy sector
executives. In addition, speakers will include top officials of the IDB and
the World Bank, as well as Senator J. Bennett Johnston (Chairman, Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources) and Adm. James Watkins
(Secretary of Energy).
For additional information, contact Dawn Morgenstern, Associate Director of
Programs, at 619-453-5560.
EAI March Calendar. The Trade Development Program will sponsor a Brazil
Reverse Retail Mission to Miami, Akron, Louisville, Dallas, Chicago, and
Paramus, NJ, from March 8 to 14.
The Department of Commerce will hold EAI Venezuela/Chile Business
Development Seminars in New Orleans, Houston, and St. Louis, from March 18
to 20. From March 30 to April 7, the Department will send a
telecommunications trade mission to Argentina, Chile, and Colombia. The
Commerce Department also will sponsor a Tourism Seminar on Honduras.
--Susan Holly, Office of Public Communication(###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: No Country Will be Able to Enjoy Economic
Prosperity Without Protecting the Environment
That All Countries Share
Gelbard
Source: Robert S. Gelbard, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Description: Excerpts from remarks to Globescope Amercas Conference,
Miami, FLA
Date: Oct, 31 199110/31/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean, Central America, North America,
South America
Country: Bolivia, Mexico, Chile, Jamaica
Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid,
Environment, Science/Technology
[TEXT]
[Robert S. Gelbard, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs, discussed the Environment for the Americas component of EAI with
delegates to the Globescope Americas Conference in Miami on October 31,
1991. Following are excerpts from his remarks:]
No country will be able to enjoy economic prosperity without protecting the
environment that all countries share. The President's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative recognizes that sound environmental practices and
sustainable economic progress go hand in hand. . . .
During my time as Ambassador to Bolivia, we forgave 80% of Bolivia's PL
480 debt, reducing this burden from $38 million to $7.7 million. In addition,
the Government of Bolivia pledged to provide $20 million over 10 years to
support environmental activities. We are now negotiating environmental
agreements with Bolivia, Chile, and Jamaica--all beneficiaries of EAI debt
reduction.
Multilateral Lenders Change Focus
To reinforce these EAI environmental initiatives, the United States has
encouraged multilateral lenders to increase their focus on the environment.
New environmental impact assessment procedures are about to begin at the
World Bank and the IDB [Inter-American Development Bank] The World Bank
is reassessing its forest policy and taking a new look at energy efficiency
and conservation. The IMF [International Monetary Fund] is seriously
discussing establishing a group of economists to advise it on environmental
concerns. We are looking for new opportunities to influence energy policy,
promote energy efficiency and conservation programs, and secure greater
protection for tropical forests.
But neither the United States nor international lenders can single-handedly
bring about greater concern for the environment in Latin America. This is
why achieving the ultimate goal of EAI--a prosperous, democratic
hemisphere, each country trading freely with its neighbors--is so important
to the future of our environment.
The experience of the world has shown that prosperous countries pay more
attention to the environment than countries where people are more
concerned about their next meal. And nations that must worry about where
to get resources to pay their international debt will worry less about
protecting environmental resources. . . .
Mexico's Innovative Environmental Progress
Indeed, Mexico, one of the hemisphere's leaders in economic reform and
economic growth, is also showing the way with innovative approaches to
protect the environment. On October 23, the Mexican Government announced
that an Integrated Border Environmental Plan, which Presidents Bush and
Salinas set in motion during their November 1990 meeting in Monterrey,
Mexico, would be ready by January. Independently, President Salinas pledged
$460 million for environmental projects in the border area between 1992
and 1994. These projects would concentrate on water treatment, solid and
hazardous wastes, and vehicle pollution. By the end of the year, 200 trained
inspectors will monitor the environment along the border. And by 1992,
computerized systems will keep strict tabs on border crossings of
hazardous wastes.
Mexico has also been active in arranging private debt-for-environment
swaps. Last February, the group Conservation International purchased $4
million in Mexican debt in exchange for an increase in the Mexican
Government's spending on the environment.
The economic reforms that provide the basis for greater concern for the
environment do not come easily. Many countries must pass through difficult
periods of adjustment before recovering their economic footing. But the
success stories show that countries that want to reform can weather the
changes.
Bolivia suffered through years of massive inflation. With the help of the
IMF and other multilateral lenders, it undertook sweeping economic reforms.
Now, Bolivia has substantially reduced its debt burden through rescheduling,
buybacks, and swaps, and is well on the way to economic health. Not
surprisingly, Bolivia was one of the first countries to show interest in
debt-for-environment swaps.
Venezuela also faced hard times while economic reforms took hold. Today,
it enjoys perhaps the highest rate of economic growth in the region: 4.4% in
1990 and an expected 5-7% in 1991.
The lesson couldn't be clearer. There can be no economic growth or new
investment without economic reform. And without economic growth and
new investment, the environment will suffer. . . .
Improving Living Standards, Protecting the Environment
To sum up, the hemisphere that the President's Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative envisions is a hemisphere where the air and water are clean, one
where the forests and animals thrive, as well as one where people enjoy the
fruits of growing, outward-looking economies. Indeed, the goals of
improved living standards and improved environmental protection go hand in
hand. For only when people are not overwhelmed by the problems of their
own survival can they spare the resources to ensure the survival of the
environment. . . . (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Environmental Assistance Under EAI
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Feb, 24 19922/24/92
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Caribbean, Central America, North America,
South America
Country: Bolivia, Mexico, Chile, Jamaica
Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid,
Environment, Science/Technology
[TEXT]
Activities which may be funded under the "Environment for the Americas"
portion of the EAI, include:
-- Restoration, protection, or sustainable use of the world's oceans and
atmosphere;
-- Restoration, protection, or sustainable use of diverse animal and plant
species;
-- Establishment, restoration, protection, and maintenance of parks and
reserves;
-- Development and implementation of sound systems of natural resource
management;
-- Development and support of local conservation programs;
-- Training programs to strengthen conservation institutions and increase
scientific, technical, and managerial capabilities of individuals and
organizations involved in conservation efforts;
-- Efforts to generate knowledge, increase understanding, and enhance
public commitment to conservation;
-- Design and implementation of sound programs of land and ecosystem
management;
-- Agriculture-related activities, including those that provide for the
biological prevention and control of animal and plant pests and diseases, to
benefit the environment; and
-- Local community initiatives that promote conservation and sustainable
use of the environment. (###)
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Treaty Actions: Multilateral
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Feb, 24 19922/24/92
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Subject: Trade/Economics, Science/Technology,
Development/Relief Aid, Security Assistance and Sales,
Environment
[TEXT]
Multilateral
Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor
Organization. Dated at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20,
1948. TIAS 1868.
Acceptances deposited: Korea, Dec. 9, 1991; Latvia, Dec. 3, 1991.
Prisoner Transfer
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. Done at
Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 10824.
Ratification deposited: Germany, Oct. 31, 1991.1- 2
Accession deposited: The Bahamas, Nov. 12, 1991.1
Dispatch, Vol 3, No 8, February 24, 1992
Title: Treaty Actions: Bilateral
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Feb, 24 19922/24/92
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Region: South America, E/C Europe, Europe, Caribbean,
Southeast Asia, Central America
Country: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Brazil, Barbados,
Czechoslovakia (former), Poland, Spain, Turkey, Singapore,
South Korea, France, Hungary, Indonesia
[TEXT]
Bilateral
Barbados
Protocol amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1984 (TIAS 11090)
for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion
with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington Dec. 18, 1991.
Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Brazil
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Brasilia Dec. 20, 1991. Enters into
force following signature and receipt by Brazil of written notice from the
US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Czechoslovakia
Basic exchange and cooperative agreement for topographic
mapping, nautical and aeronautical charting, geodesy and geophysics, digital
data, and related MC ∧ G materials. Signed at Prague Dec. 10, 1991. Entered
into force Dec. 10, 1991.
France
Agreement amending and extending the interim agreement of Feb. 24, 1987
relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees.
Effected by exchange of notes at Paris Dec. 31, 1991. Entered into force
Dec. 31, 1991.
Hungary
Exchange and cooperative agreement for military, topographic mapping,
aeronautical charting, digital data, and related MC ∧ G materials. Signed at
Budapest Dec. 9, 1991. Entered into force Dec. 9, 1991.
Indonesia
Agreement for cooperation in scientific research and technological
development. Signed at Jakarta Jan. 15, 1992. Enters into force upon an
exchange of notes confirming that all constitutional and other legal
requirements have been fulfilled.
Jamaica
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or
refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kingston Jan. 14,
1992. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Jamaica of
written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements
have been fulfilled.
Korea
Agreement relating to scientific and technical cooperation,
with annexes. Signed at Seoul Jan. 6, 1992. Enters into force upon an
exchange of notes confirming that all requirements have been fulfilled.
Nicaragua
Aviation security agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at
Managua Dec. 4 and 12, 1991. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1991.
Agreement of friendship and cooperation. Signed at Managua
Jan. 6, 1992. Entered into force Jan. 6, 1992.
Poland
Agreement amending and extending the memorandum of
understanding to the agreement of Dec. 29, 1989, concerning the
contribution by the US to the Polish Stabilization Fund. Effected by
exchange of letters at Washington and Warsaw Dec. 6 and 18, 1991. Entered
into force Dec. 30, 1991.
Singapore
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Mar. 31,
1978, as amended (TIAS 9001, 9654), with annex. Effected by exchange of
notes at Singapore Nov. 21 and Dec. 3, 1991. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1991.
Spain
Agreement on cooperation to reduce the demand for narcotic
drugs. Signed at Madrid Nov. 25, 1991. Entered into force Nov. 25, 1991
provisionally; definitively, 60 days following an exchange of notes in which
the parties inform each other of the fulfillment of requirements of their
respective national legislation.
Turkey
Memorandum of understanding concerning technical cooperation in the field
of environmental protection. Signed at Ankara Dec. 10, 1991. Entered into
force Dec. 10, 1991.
Venezuela
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical
cooperation in the earth and mapping sciences. Signed at Caracas Jan. 15,
1992. Entered into force Jan. 15, 1992.
1 Declarations.
2 Reservations. (###) (