US Department of State Dispatch Supplement
VOL. 3, NO 7
Title: Material Relating to the London
Conference (August 26-27, 1992) and the Crisis in
the Former Yugoslavia.
Eagleburger
Perkins
Baker
Bolton
Niles
Bush
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Sep, 15 19929/15/92
Category: Chronologies
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Category: Fact sheets
Category: Resolutions
Category: Reports
Region: Whole World
Country: Yugoslavia (former), United States, United Kingdom,
Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia,
Croatia
Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest,
State Department, Resource Management, Immigration,
Military Affairs, Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid,
United Nations, International Organizations, Refugees,
International Law, Cultural Exchange
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Intervention at the London
Conference On the Former Yugoslavia
[Intervention on August 26, during the conference held August 26-27,
1992, London, United Kingdom]
We have gathered here today because, as members of the family of
nations--East and West, Muslim, Christian or Jew--we are
compelled to help the peoples of the former Yugoslavia in their hour
of suffering and need. But the decisions we make in London on their
behalf will have consequences beyond the crisis at hand. For what
we accomplish--or fail to accomplish--cannot help but influence the
future of Europe and the shape of the post-Cold War international
system.
Just 3 years ago, mankind began anew its long-interrupted march
toward freedom, enlightenment, and the rule of law. We had every
reason then to hope that all nations liberated from communism
would join not only the Western circle of democracy, but also the
circle of peace created by the reconciliation of historical enemies.
We envisaged, in short, an enlarged commonwealth of democracies
poised to enter the 21st century, having transcended the hatreds and
rivalries which had so blighted the century we were about to leave.
Those hopes remain undiminished, but, in the meantime, events in
the former Yugoslavia have confronted us with the specter there of
history not transcended but relived and of the vision of that land's
future as a re-enactment of its tragic past.
Indeed, there is a chilling echo today in the former Yugoslavia of
some of Europe's darkest moments--of previous examples of racially
inspired repression, aggression, and territorial expansion. However,
history teaches that the conquests of past ethnic cleansers have
tended to be short-lived and that peoples in whose name their
crimes were committed have tended to enjoy an unhappy fate.
True friends of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia must
acknowledge that history did not begin there yester-day, and that
the tragedy now unfolding has ancient and complicated roots. They
are aware, in particular, that the people of Serbia were one of World
War II's principal victims, and they sympathize with their suffering
which is still fresh in the minds of many.
I represent a government, in fact, which historically has enjoyed a
special relationship with the people of Serbia. And I recognize that
in the ongoing Yugoslav turmoil, crimes have been committed on all
sides. But it is Serbs, alas, who are most guilty today of crimes
which mimic those of their former tormentors, and which violate
the sacred memory of ancestors who suffered at their hands. And it
is the Serbs who face a spectacularly bleak future unless they
manage to change the reckless course their leaders chose for the
new nation.
I make this prediction without satisfaction, but I make it because
we must be absolutely clear: The civilized world simply cannot
afford to allow this cancer in the heart of Europe to flourish, much
less spread. We must wrest control of the future from those who
would drag us back into the past, and demonstrate to the world--
especially to the world's 1 billion Muslims--that the Western
democracies will oppose aggression under all circumstances, not
oppose it in one region and appease it in another.
To be sure, we will not settle this conflict here today in London. But
neither will we acquiesce in the de facto constitution of a greater
Serbia. What we will do, I hope, is to establish a coordinated,
integrated, and ongoing process of negotiations which will
culminate in a reversal of Serb aggression and the integration of the
former Yugoslav republics into the wider framework of a democratic
Europe. Here at this conference, we should offer leaders throughout
the former Yugoslavia the choice of cooperating with the
international community or paying what we will ensure is an
unacceptable price for aggression. And we should, here at this
conference, place squarely before the people of Serbia the choice
they must make between joining a democratic and prosperous Europe
or joining their leaders in the opprobrium, isolation, and defeat
which will be theirs if they continue on their present march of folly.
In brief, the United States expects this conference to undertake the
following specific tasks.
Humanitarian Relief
First, the delivery of humanitarian relief to the victims of this
conflict, and the granting of immediate, complete, and unimpeded
access to all detention camps.
With winter approaching, our immediate priority is to address
urgently the task of housing and feeding the hundreds of thousands
who have been left homeless in Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, and
Macedonia. We must also funnel humanitarian assistance to
hundreds of thousands more who are besieged inside Bosnia, so that
they do not become the next wave of refugees. It will require the
opening of safe corridors to accomplish this goal. The international
community must have unimpeded access by ground and air to deliver
humanitarian relief. And while we seek to cooperate peacefully
with all sides, we must be prepared to use all means necessary to
ensure that help reaches its destination.
To date, the United Nations and the ICRC [International Committee of
the Red Cross] have helped deliver some $500-million worth of
assistance to the war zone. But the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner
for Refugees] has now called concerned governments to meet again
on September 4 [1992] to implement a concrete plan for expanding
convoys into Bosnia and meeting the winter shelter needs of
refugees everywhere in the former Yugoslavia. The United States
will make an initial contribution of more than $40 million and an
additional contribution after October. Beyond direct financial
assistance, our support will include food, medicine, shelter
materials, transportation, and technical assistance.
Let me say, parenthetically, that we are aware of the risk that
humanitarian assistance could, if we are not careful, help
consolidate the land-grab in Bosnia and the political cantonization
which the United States categorically opposes. Therefore, we
believe it is not too soon for the international community to begin
addressing the issue of how we will assist refugees to return to--
and to rebuild--what is left of their homes and villages. This is an
issue which will have to be part of any political settlement of the
present crisis which obtains the support of the United States, and it
will require another substantial infusion of international
assistance.
Finally, we must insist upon an end to the abuses being committed in
detention camps throughout Bosnia, and the disbandment of those
camps. The international community must receive full access to all
such camps at once and on a continuing basis. The ICRC should do all
it can to accelerate its ongoing inspections and be joined in its
efforts by rapporteurs from the UNHRC [UN Human Rights
Commission] and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe].
A Negotiating Process
Our second task here is to seek a definitive halt to the violence
inflicted day after day on the people of Bosnia. As a first step, I
call upon the Serbian forces to lift the sieges of Sarajevo, Gorazde,
Tuzla, Bihac, Mostar, and other Bosnian cities--a step which must be
part of a larger diplomatic process. Toward this end, we must
create a durable international negotiating mechanism, one that will
operate permanently with all the relevant parties present to achieve
a just and lasting settlement.
I emphasize the words "just and lasting." The Government of Serbia
has stated its willingness in London to negotiate peace. But we
must make certain that in agreeing to a negotiating mechanism, all
parties agree as well to negotiate on the basis of principles
enshrined in the UN Charter and CSCE--namely, a commitment to the
peaceful resolution of disputes; respect for the territorial integrity
of other states; rejection of efforts to change borders by force;
guarantee of fundamental human rights, including the rights of
minorities; safe return to their homes of populations victimized by
"ethnic cleansing;" and mandatory compliance with efforts to deliver
humanitarian assistance. Only by agreeing to a peace process based
on these principles can we ensure that negotiations do not become a
vehicle for consolidating the fruits of aggression.
Punishing and Quarantining Aggression
But successful negotiations will require us, above all, to raise the
costs now for those who perpetuate the violence and continue to
hold territory acquired by force. Thus, we believe the third task of
this conference is to reaffirm the international community's resolve
to tighten comprehensive economic sanctions against Serbia-
Montenegro and to maintain its political isolation until all relevant
[UN] Security Council resolutions are complied with. At the same
time, we should make all other parties to the conflict aware that we
will impose sanctions against them, too, if they act with similar
viciousness.
We understand that tightening sanctions will impose hardships on
the traditional trading partners of Serbia-Montenegro, and we
encourage efforts to help compensate those states whose strict
compliance with the sanctions is causing them undue pain. But we
must resolve no longer to tolerate continuing and flagrant violations
of the sanctions regime.
Several steps are necessary. One, the UN Sanctions Committee
transshipment guidelines must be strengthened to include strict
documentation and inspection procedures. Two, in agreement with
the Government of Romania, we will move quickly to place
multinational sanctions monitors in Romania. The United States is
ready to contribute experts and equipment to this operation. Similar
arrangements should also be established in other areas bordering
Serbia-Montenegro, including Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and
Macedonia. Three, we must implement new measures to eliminate
violations occurring via the Danube River.
Preventive Diplomacy
The fourth task for this conference must be in the realm of
preventive diplomacy--namely, to ensure the conflict does not
expand into areas and countries not yet directly affected by the
fighting.
The immediate step must be to implement decisions taken 2 weeks
ago by the CSCE to insert continuous human rights monitors into
those areas of Serbia--Kosovo, Vojvodina, and the Sandzak--that
could become the next targets of aggression. Further, Serbian
leaders have expressed their readiness to permit international
observers on their territory, including along the Bosnian-Serbian
border, and at airbases in Serbia and Montenegro. Now is the time
to turn these words into effective action by deciding, here today, to
place observers along that border and at those airbases.
These monitors must be complemented by others in the states and
regions bordering Serbia. Their function would be to serve both as a
deterrent to an expansion of the fighting and as an "early warning" of
its imminent occurrence.
The European Community (EC) is actively working with Albania,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece to put into place such
monitoring teams. We applaud these efforts, urge that they be
completed as soon as possible, and stand ready to help as we can. At
the same time, the United States is making efforts to put monitors
on the ground in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, and we
will cooperate with the EC to provide the residents of this region
with economic help as well.
Conclusion
I began by describing the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia in terms
of the seemingly endless cycle of violence and vengeance which has
characterized that region for so many centuries. But in truth, there
is nothing fatalistic about what is going on in those lands. The fact
of the matter is that the conflict was willed by men seeking to
perpetuate Europe's last communist regime by manipulating age-old
hatreds and fears. The fact of the matter is that the peoples of the
former Yugoslavia can still refuse to drink the lethal brew which
their leaders have put before them.
If they should so refuse, they will be able to join a democratic
Europe in a process of integration which is rendering obsolete
traditional notions of sovereignty, and which is enhancing the
interests of minorities across the continent. The world's
democracies--most certainly including the United States--will
welcome the Serbs to their midst, and offer them greater security
than they could ever hope to enjoy under the law of the jungle now
prevailing.
But those peoples who choose the irrational path of hatred and
aggression cannot expect membership in the newly enlarged
community of democratic nations. We will simply not allow them to
make a mockery of the more humane and rational future that the
collapse of communism and the end of the threat of nuclear
holocaust promise.
London Conference Documents
[Texts of statements approved August 26-27, 1992, at the London
Conference on Yugoslavia, London, United Kingdom. The Conference
was co-chaired by UK Prime Minister Major as the Head of
State/Government of the Presidency of the European Community and
by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali.]
Statement of Principles
The London Conference has endorsed the following principles as the
basis for a negotiated settlement of the problems of former
Yugoslavia:
(i) the imperative need that all parties and others concerned should
cease fighting and the use of force, should respect agreed ceasefires
and restrain those who commit or seek to provoke breaches of them;
(ii) non-recognition of all advantages gained by force or fait
accompli or of any legal consequences thereof;
(iii) the need for all parties concerned to engage actively, directly
or through intermediaries, in negotiations on the basis of these
principles;
(iv) respect for the highest standards of individual rights and
fundamental freedoms in a democratic society, as embodied in the
International Covenants of the United Nations on Human Rights, the
European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols and other
instruments of the United Nations, the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] and the Council of Europe;
(v) implementation of constitutional guarantees of the human rights
and fundamental freedoms of persons belonging to ethnic and
national communities and minorities, the promotion of tolerance and
the right to self determination in accordance with the commitments
entered into under the CSCE and in the EC [European Community]
Conference on Yugoslavia;
(vi) total condemnation of forcible expulsions, illegal detentions
and attempts to change the ethnic composition of populations, and
effective promotion of the closure of detention camps, and of the
safe return to their homes of all persons displaced by the hostilities
who wish this;
(vii) compliance by all persons with their obligations under
international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and the personal responsibility of
those who commit or order grave breaches of the Conventions;
(viii) the fundamental obligation to respect the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region; and
to respect the inviolability of all frontiers in accordance with the
UN Charter, the CSCE Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Rejection
of all efforts to acquire territory and change borders by force;
(ix) the requirement that a final settlement of all questions of
succession to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
[SFRY] must be reached by consensus or by arbitration and the
commitment of all parties to recognise each other mutually, to
respect each others' status and rights under any such settlement and
to share the duties and responsibilities of successor states;
(x) the obligations on all states and parties concerned to comply in
full with all UN Security Council Resolutions [UNSCR] on the crisis in
the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to do their
utmost to secure their implementation;
(xi) the vital need for humanitarian aid to be provided and, under
appropriate protection and with the full cooperation of the local
authorities, to reach the populations in need, with special
consideration for the needs of children;
(xii) the obligation on all parties to cooperate wholeheartedly in the
international monitoring, peacekeeping and arms control operations
in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and to contribute constructively to the suppression of
violence throughout the area;
(xiii) the need to provide international guarantees to ensure the full
implementation of all agreements reached within the framework of
the International Conference.
Specific Decisions by the London Conference
1. Acting under the principles set out in the relevant Conference
documents, all parties at the Conference formally accept and agree
to cooperate in a number of actions.
Cessation of Violence
2. The overall aim is an effective and durable cessation of
hostilities in the whole of the former SFRY and in particular in
Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to facilitate the negotiation of a
lasting political settlement. This requires urgent action including:
--early lifting of the sieges of towns and cities
--international supervision of heavy weapons
--bringing all forces, including irregulars, under central control
--withholding of direct or indirect military assistance to self-
proclaimed governments and the internal components of neighbouring
states
--the progressive reduction of weapons in the region under
international supervision.
3. Participants agreed confidence-building measures including:
--the notification of all mortars and heavy weapons to the UN within
96 hours as a prelude to their disengagement from the conflict,
which will be the first item in negotiations
--a ban on military flights
--early setting up of hot lines between local commanders and HQs
[headquarters]
--improved contact through liaison visits
--the identification of HQs and commanders of all armed units,
including para-militaries
--the posting of observers on the Bosnian/Serbian and
Bosnian/Montenegrin borders
--the deployment of observers in Bosnia to monitor heavy weapons.
4. Further confidence-building measures, covering military
movements, arms limitation and verification will be urgently
examined.
Humanitarian Issues
5. The Co-Chairmen have agreed a programme of action with the
parties to the conflict. This includes:
Effective delivery of humanitarian aid
i) Full collaboration in delivery of humanitarian relief by road
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the following specific steps:
--progressive development of relief missions and road convoys from
Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro into all areas of Bosnia where
relief is required
--priority to repairing the road and railway between Ploce, Mostar
and Sarajevo
--parties to designate local representatives with whom practical
arrangements for relief missions and road convoys can be made
--acceptance of and arrangements for international monitors.
ii) Parties to exercise authority over undisciplined elements in
their areas.
Refugees
iii) Progressive return of refugees to their homes and response to
the needs identified by the UN.
Dismantling detention camps
iv) Unconditional and unilateral release under international
supervision of all civilians detained, and the closure without delay
of the detention camps.
v) Parties to take responsibility for security and protection of
those detained until freed under international supervision.
vi) International community to be given immediate access in order
to monitor the situation of those in detention .
vii) Pending release and return home of those detained, urgent
action by humanitarian organisations to examine temporary options.
Safe areas
viii) Further examination of options including neutral zones for safe
areas.
International Action
6. In order to promote these objectives all governments and
international organisations will:
--collaborate fully with the Secretary General of the United Nations
in providing to him information in implementation of UNSCR 771
--ensure the compliance by all persons with their obligations under
international humanitarian law
--take all possible legal action to bring to account those responsible
for committing or ordering grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
--draw up a register of verified breaches of international
humanitarian law
--set up the monitoring missions called for by the CSCE in the
territories of the former SFRY and in neighbouring countries
--not consider help for the reconstruction of the Serbian economy
before Serbia has complied with the demands of this Conference
--provide the means for:
-- passage and protection of humanitarian convoys at the request of
the United Nations;
-- control and monitoring of heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina
under the auspices of the United Nations.
Sanctions
7. The relevant governments have agreed that they will:
--implement an agreed action plan to ensure the rigorous application
of sanctions
--enforce sanctions on the Danube, consistent with their view that
riparian states have the authority and obligation to do so
--provide practical advice, man-power and equipment to help
neighbouring countries to enforce sanctions rigorously
--contribute experts to advise on the application of sanctions in all
neighbouring countries to take part in the monitoring missions
which will be established in the neighbouring countries to ensure
full implementation of sanctions
--ask the Security Council to:
-- take necessary measures to tighten up the application of
sanctions in the Adriatic;
-- prevent illegal transfers of financial assets to Serbia and
Montenegro; and
-- eliminate diversion of goods in transit.
Conference parties have asked the European Community and the CSCE
to coordinate all necessary practical assistance to all neighbouring
countries.
Violations of International Humanitarian Law
8. The Co-Chairmen have undertaken to carry forward a study of the
creation of an international criminal court.
Statement on Bosnia
The participants in the London Conference on the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia condemn the continuing violence in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the attempts to gain territory by the use
of force. They reject as inhuman and illegal the expulsion of civilian
communities from their homes in order to alter the ethnic character
of any area. They welcome the adoption by the United Nations
Security Council of Resolution 771 and other Security Council
Resolutions, and the Resolution of the UN Commission on Human
Rights on the situation of human rights in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. They undertake to collate substantiated
information on violations of international humanitarian law and to
make this information available to the United Nations. They
reaffirm that persons who commit or order the commission of grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions are individually responsible in
respect of such breaches.
A political settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina must include the
following provisions:
a) a full and permanent cessation of hostilities and an end of all
violence and repression, including the expulsion of populations;
b) recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by all the former Yugoslav
Republics;
c) respect for the integrity of present frontiers, unless changed by
mutual agreement;
d) implementation of guarantees for the rights of persons belonging
to all national communities and minorities in accordance with the
UN Charter and CSCE provisions;
e) just and adequate arrangements for people who have been
forcibly expelled from their homes including the right to return and
compensation for their losses;
f) democratic and legal structures which properly protect the rights
of all in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including national communities and
minorities;
g) assurances of non-intervention by outside military forces
whether formed units or irregulars, except as provided for in
relevant UN Security Council Resolutions;
h) respect for all international Treaties and Agreements;
i) restoration of trade and other links with neighbouring countries.
Further urgent steps are now required to achieve a settlement. The
participants in the London Conference urge all parties immediately
and without preconditions to resume negotiations on future
constitutional arrangements within the framework of the
Conference. All parties involved must participate in these
negotiations with a genuine will to secure peace and a respect for
the interest of the other parties.
The negotiations will also need to cover the following arrangements:
a) a genuine and lasting end to the conflict throughout the Republic,
and return of territory taken by force;
b) the cessation of all outside interference, in terms of personnel
or material support, in the present conflict;
c) the grouping of heavy weaponry under international control;
d) the demilitarisation of major towns and the monitoring of them
by international observers;
e) the establishment of refugee and relief centres for those
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who have lost or been expelled from
their homes, pending their return;
f) the extension of humanitarian relief to all areas of Bosnia-
Herzegovina where supplies are needed, with the cooperation of
local parties;
g) an international peacekeeping force under UN auspices may be
created by the UN Security Council to maintain the ceasefire, control
military movements, and undertake other confidence building
measures.
As and when parties are ready to reach a settlement on the above
basis, the International Community will join with them in a major
reconstruction programme to cope with humanitarian needs and to
restore economic activity.
At a meeting with FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] Minister
of State Douglas Hogg, Drs. Karadzic and Koljevic representing the
Bosnian Serbs signified their agreement to the following:
i) That the Bosnian Serb side would notify to the UN within 96 hours
the positions of all heavy weaponry to be grouped around the 4 towns
of Sarajevo, Bihac, Gorazde and Jajce, this grouping to be completed
within a period of 7 days. The weaponry once grouped would be put
under the continuous supervision of permanent UN observers. The
Bosnian Serb side would expect the Bosnian Government to take
reciprocal action, but would not impose this as a precondition for
their own action, which would be unilateral. The Bosnian Serb side
further undertook with immediate effect not to initiate fire from
any of this heavy weaponry.
ii) That the Bosnian Serb side recognised that in negotiations
between the three Bosnian parties, they would agree to withdraw
from a substantial portion of the territory now under the control of
their forces.
Co-Chairmen's Paper On Serbia and Montenegro
We welcome the fact that all participants in the Conference have
subscribed to the Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. All
participants must fulfil the obligations to which they have agreed.
In particular, Serbia and Montenegro face a clear choice. They have
undertaken to:
--cease intervention across their borders with Bosnia and Croatia;
--to the best of their ability restrain the Bosnian Serbs from taking
territory by force and expelling the local populations;
--restore in full the civil and constitutional rights of the
inhabitants of the Kosovo and Vojvodina and also to ensure the civil
rights of the inhabitants of the Sandjak;
--use their influence with the Bosnian Serbs to obtain the closure of
their detention camps, to comply with their obligations under
international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva
Conventions, and to permit the return of refugees to their homes.
The Bosnian Croats and Muslims have given similar undertakings;
--fully observe the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council;
--declare that they fully respect the integrity of present frontiers;
--guarantee the rights of ethnic and national communities and
minorities within the borders of Serbia and Montenegro in
accordance with the UN Charter, the CSCE and the draft convention
of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia;
--work for the normalisation of the situation in Croatia, for
implementation of the Vance Plan and for acceptance by the Serbs in
the Krajina of special status as foreseen in the draft convention of
the EC Conference on Yugoslavia;
--respect all relevant international treaties and agreements.
If, as suggested by Mr. Panic's recent letter to the President of the
Security Council of the UN, Serbia and Montenegro do intend to fulfil
these obligations in deed as well as word they will resume a
respected position in the international community. They will be
enabled to trade, to receive assistance and to enjoy the full
cooperation of all members of the international community. If they
do not comply the Security Council will be invited to apply stringent
sanctions leading to their total international isolation.
Work Programme Of the Conference
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
1. The International Conference on the former Yugoslavia will
remain in being until a final settlement of the problems of the
former Yugoslavia has been reached. It will build on the work
already done by the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, especially the
documents already produced, and will be guided by the provisions of
the statement of principles agreed today. The Permanent Co-
Chairmen will be the Head of State/Government of the Presidency of
the European Community and the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. The Conference will be re-convened in plenary session by
the Permanent Co-Chairmen on the recommendation of the Co-
Chairmen of the Steering Committee.
Steering Committee
2. A high-level Steering Committee will be set up. The Co-Chairmen
will be a representative of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations and a representative of the Presidency of the European
Community. It will include representatives of the Troika of the
European Community, the Troika of the CSCE, the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council, and one representative from the
OIC [Organization of the Islamic Conference], two representatives
from the neighbouring States and Lord Carrington [EC special
mediator on the Balkan crisis]. It will meet at the request of the
Co-Chairmen to guide the work of the Conference and to coordinate
its work with related work in other organizations.
The Office of the Co-Chairmen
3. The Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee will be assisted by
the Chairmen of the Working Groups (on which see below). They will
work in continuous session at the Office of the United Nations in
Geneva. The Co-Chairmen will direct the Working Groups and prepare
the basis for a general settlement and associated measures. They
will also meet as necessary with representatives from the former
Yugoslavia, who will attend meetings without preconditions.
4. There will be six Working Groups in continuous session at the
Office of the United Nations in Geneva:
(a) Bosnia-Herzegovina Working Group. The Group's task is to
promote a cessation of hostilities and a constitutional settlement in
Bosnia-Herzegovina;
(b) Humanitarian Issues Working Group. The Group's task is to
promote humanitarian relief in all its aspects, including refugees;
(c) Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities Working Group.
The Group's task is to recommend initiatives for resolving ethnic
questions in the former Yugoslavia. A special group on the former
autonomous province of Kosovo will be set up;
(d) Succession Issues Working Group. The Group's task is to resolve
succession issues arising from the emergence of new states on the
territory of the former Yugoslavia;
(e) Economic Issues Working Group. The Group's task is to address
the economic issues arising from the emergence of new states in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia;
(f) Confidence and Security-building and Verification Measures
Working Group. The Group's tasks are to develop confidence-building
measures covering military movements, arms control and arms
transfers and limitations, and measures for their monitoring and
verification.
Arbitration Commission
5. The Conference will seek the continued assistance of the
Arbitration Commission.
Secretariat
6. A small Secretariat will be established at the Office of the
United Nations in Geneva. It will be headed by an Executive
Director. It will be staffed by personnel from the United Nations and
from the European Community.
Costs
7. Participants in the Conference agree to bear the costs related to
the administrative implementation of this Work Programme and the
provision of the Secretariat, with a scale of contributions to be
approved by the Steering Committee.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: London Conference To Galvanize
International Action
[Excerpts from news conference following the London Conference on
Yugoslavia, London, United Kingdom, August 27, 1992]
As I said yesterday, this conflict is truly a cancer in the heart of
Europe. Its causes and consequences are complex. It will not be
cured overnight. And it must be addressed in all its dimensions if
we are to defuse it, contain it, and, in the end, bring it to an end.
So we wanted to use the conference to galvanize international
action across all of those dimensions: to alleviate the humanitarian
nightmare in Bosnia; to support the negotiating process; to punish
the aggressors and tighten the economic and political isolation of
Serbia and Montenegro; to quarantine and contain the conflict and
prevent its widening; and, ultimately, to bring peace to the peoples
of the former Yugoslavia. We come out of this conference, I believe,
with a strong consensus and a concrete plan of action in each of
these areas.
First, we wanted this conference to support the territorial integrity
of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the legitimate Government of Bosnia-
Hercegovina and to ensure that the conference did not become a
forum for endorsing partition or cantonization. The conference has
sent a clear political signal that the international community will
not reward aggression; that Bosnia's sovereignty, independence, and
integrity will be upheld; and that negotiations must proceed in line
with fundamental CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe] principles.
Second, we wanted to create a permanent negotiating forum that
could work full time to defuse the crisis and manage the process
toward a political settlement. We believe the process we've
created--co-chaired by the UN and the EC [European Community],
based in Geneva and guided by strong principles--will provide the
forum to bring the parties together to help defuse the current
conflict; end the bloodshed; and, ultimately, to craft a negotiated
settlement. To facilitate this negotiating process, the United
States has offered $3 million to help with start-up costs.
Third, we wanted to move beyond agreement on principles and a
negotiating structure to develop an international plan of action to
deal with this crisis. As I think you've seen in the Co-Chairmen's
[UK Prime Minister Major and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali]
statement on specific decisions taken at the conference [see p. 4],
we have outlined a number of concrete actions the international
community is taking to provide humanitarian relief, increase
pressure on the aggressors, and contain the conflict. Let me
highlight several of them.
We've launched a massive humanitarian relief effort for this winter,
including pledges for the September 4 UNHCR [UN High Commissioner
for Refugees] meeting. Let me add here, as I mentioned in my
statement to the conference yesterday, that we will begin now to
plan with others in the international community to assist refugees
to return to--and to rebuild--what is left of their houses and their
villages.
As [UK] Prime Minister Major has indicated, we have agreement to
expand and strengthen UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in support of
UN humanitarian operations in Bosnia.
We're strengthening the sanctions regime by introducing
international monitors in neighboring states, stopping sanction
leakage via the Danube, and helping compensate neighbors hardest
hit by strict sanctions compliance.
And we are engaging in preventive diplomacy. We are placing
continuous human rights monitors in the Kosovo, Vojvodina, and
Sandzak [areas] and "early warning" monitors in neighboring states
and regions, including Albania, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, and
Hungary.
Another area where we've made progress is with the parties
themselves. As you may know by now, the leader of the Bosnian
Serbs--Mr. Karadzic--has agreed to consolidate heavy weapons under
international monitors. We expect him to follow through on this
agreement. We believe consolidation and control of heavy weaponry
has the potential to do much to reduce the level of bloodshed. In
addition, the Government of Bosnia has agreed to rejoin the
negotiating process.
We also have pushed the parties hard to take other concrete steps,
many of which are also included in the Co-Chairmen's statement. In
particular, we've stressed the need to do several things.
-- Lift the sieges and withdraw forces from chokepoints around
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac, and Mostar, and other Bosnian
cities.
-- Accept international monitors on Bosnia's borders with all its
neighbors to prevent military supply of ethnic forces in Bosnia. We
expect UN agreement to supply these monitors by sometime next
week.
-- Respect the lives and safety of UN forces and ensure safe
passage for humanitarian assistance to all areas of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, including unimpeded access by ground and air for
humanitarian relief.
-- And, finally, to allow continuous international access to all
detention camps and their quick dissolution.
I know it is customary to be polite--to say nice things about the
host. I am not just being polite. Let me say, with absolute
sincerity, that Mr. Major and Her Majesty's Government have done, I
think, a real thing in the cause of peace for what was Yugoslavia.
This conference, I think, has set us on a new course. We will not
solve this problem overnight, but I think we have established a
substantial process. We have put in place, I think, a number of
important steps, and they could not have happened without the
organizing genius and the really superb management that the Prime
Minister demonstrated at this conference in the last 2 days. I'll be
glad to try to answer your questions.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you said that the conference had reached
agreement to prevent the partition or cantonization of Bosnia, but
the last item in the statement on Bosnia--the one that was signed--
says the Bosnian-Serb side recognized that in negotiations between
the three Bosnian parties, they would agree to withdraw from a
substantial portion of the territory under the control of their
forces. This seems to imply that they're going to get to keep some
of what they have obtained by force. Is that correct?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: No, not at all. What that says is that
the Bosnian-Serb side said that they are prepared to withdraw from
substantial portions but not all. But the conference has made it
clear that that is not sufficient, and, certainly, in our statement, I
made it clear that the United States will accept no settlement that
does not return to the previous owners, if you will, the lands that
have been taken. So Mr. Karadzic and the Bosnian-Serbs may have
agreed to go a certain distance, but that is not adequate, in our
judgment, and, in the end, as I indicated, we won't accept anything
other than a return to the status quo ante.
Q: My question relates to the same issue. If the idea is to return to
the status quo ante, it would seem that the issue of refugees--
which is the fundamental political issue here and related to any
future constitutional settlement--has been not only separated from
the discussions in the working group with constitutional issues but
also has been downgraded from an individual issue on its own to one
of humanitarian aid. This again raises--would raise, seemed to
raise--very grave doubts about the ability to reverse cantonization
and division.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: I'm not sure I understand how you've
come to that conclusion. But, look, what we've said in the
conference and what has been agreed and certainly what I said in my
statement yesterday is [that] we have an immediate problem of
hundreds of thousands of refugees and a winter coming. Some of
those are in Bosnia. Many of them are outside Bosnia in other parts
of what was Yugoslavia. We [are] going to have to--and the UNHCR
will have a pledging conference in early September to try to raise
money to deal precisely with that question of what you do to try to
help these refugees in the shorter term, and the United States has
pledged the equivalent of $40 million of assistance to that
particular effort and more after October.
But as I had said in my statement yesterday--I said again here
today, that what the international community is also going to have
to do is examine and, in the end, come up with money to assist these
refugees to return to their homes--or what is left of their homes--
and to provide adequate assistance to rebuild those homes and to
provide them shelter. The fundamental point here is [that] we have
to deal with the immediate issue of refugees and their getting
through a winter.
But it is clearly our intention--when I say "our," I mean the United
States, and I think we have agreement from the others--that the
principle must be that they will then be returned to their homes. We
are not about to create refugee camps that 20 years from now are
still refugee camps. These people must be returned to their homes,
but, in the meantime, we have the immediate problem of taking care
of people who have been driven from their homes and are, at this
point, refugees.
Q: I have two questions. One comes immediately based on that. Is it
realistic to expect people to return to villages where the neighbors
have raped your wife or killed your father or massacred your
children? And the second question is that the specific decision said
"the notification of all mortars and heavy weapons to the UN within
96 hours." The question is: 96 hours from when?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Let me take--with regard to the first
question, you know, it may not be realistic to expect that all people
will return to their homes. But, you know, the only alternative is to,
in effect, say that they cannot return to their homes, and then we
are precisely in the problem that the gentleman just raised, which
is, under those circumstances, dealing with the refugees that way,
we have, in fact, acquiesced in ethnic cleansing and the
cantonization.
The point must be that the international community is prepared to
assure that these people can return to their homes with some
assistance if they wish to return. We can't make them go back if
they don't want to. And the 96 hours from when? I would be--I'm
reluctant to try to give you a specific answer to that. I would rather
leave that--it's not immediate. It's 96 hours from when the process
begins, and I don't know when that is. So I can't answer that
question.
Q: Mr. Secretary, both you and the Prime Minister said that the
detention camps would be closed, hopefully soon. But in the paper on
Serbia, they said only that they would use their influence with the
Bosnian-Serbs to obtain the closure of these detention camps. Do
you have any idea when they will be closed, and did they give you any
stronger commitment to that?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: The Serbs, you mean?
Q: Yes.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: No, other than that they would use
their influence. Again, please, let's try to make one thing clear here.
What the Serbs may have agreed to, or what the Bosnian Serbs may
have agreed to, is a start in the right direction, perhaps. But this
conference and the members of the conference decided on some
things that were more explicit than that. It is the same issue,
fundamentally, as the question of whether the Bosnian Serbs are
prepared to withdraw from all of the territory that they have taken
in Bosnia.
We have a commitment from the Serbs that they will use their
influence. We have the conference itself saying [that] these camps
must be open and open fast--and, indeed, I must say, on the basis of
the report from the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross],
they are getting access to the camps on a fairly quick basis, but
there is still much left to do--but that the camps must be open, and,
indeed, they must be disbanded as soon as possible. I can't give you
a specific timeframe.
I can only tell you again that one of the points of the conference is
that there are now some benchmarks, and we will, in fact, judge
their performance--Serb and Bosnian Serb, Muslim and Croatian--on
the basis of how fast they meet the demands of the conference.
Q: I want to stick to the case of Kosovo. What was done inside in
this conference to stop a possible bloodshed in Kosovo when
everyone there fears that a possible conflict is quite near with
armed Serbs and Serbia ready to use military force against them?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: What was decided at this conference
was to put monitors into Albania and as soon as possible. You have a
perfectly legitimate issue, and one of the issues that has concerned
me, for some time, and a number of us is the dangers with regard to
the Kosovo. By moving the monitors in, we are at least beginning a
process, I hope, of assuring that, in fact, outside forces will not be
able to intervene in the Kosovo. We have warned not only in this
conference, but the United States, certainly, and others, I am sure,
as well, have made it very clear to the government in Belgrade that
they must be very cautious with regard to the Kosovo.
Q: Again about Kosovo--journalist from Kosovo Pristina--you know,
in Kosovo, 2 million Albanians, and you have [a] Serbian minority
with heavy guns and heavy artillery and Albanians without any guns.
Do you--is it a possibility to keep peace in his area?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Well, you know, with all respect,
there is peace in the Kosovo at this point. It may not be the peace
that the Albanian majority particularly enjoys, but it is,
nevertheless, peace, and the fundamental point now is that this must
not become another area of conflict in what was Yugoslavia. The
Serbs are under no doubt whatsoever of the view of the US
Government with regard to that. My profound hope is that the
monitors that we are putting in will assist in assuring that it
remains peaceful, and it is the view of the US Government and has
been for some time that it is incumbent on the government in
Belgrade to return Kosovo to its previous status within the
federation.
Q: Precisely how you can realize this?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: There are lots of things that I can't
tell you how we can realize at this point. We are engaged in a
process, and one of the fundamental points at this stage is how do
we realize bringing peace to Bosnia-Hercegovina and establishing a
process that brings peace and security to all of what was
Yugoslavia. I cannot give you a specific answer other than to say I
think we are well down a new road which I think and devoutly hope
will, in fact, produce that result over time.
Q: Mr. Secretary, what kind of pressure can be brought on Mr.
Karadzic, considering that he doesn't control institutions,
governments--the kinds of things that you can put sanctions on and
that sort of thing?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Well, the question was asked a little
bit differently to the Prime Minister, and I wouldn't want to try to
go beyond him. But let me make a couple of points that I think
indicate that there are some means of pressure.
First of all, I believe, and I think with substantial reason, that while
Karadzic can be a semi-independent actor given the weapons and so
forth he now has, he cannot be a completely independent actor, and I
do not believe he is. Supply of petroleum products and so forth is
essential to his ability to continue to conduct his operations, in my
judgment. By putting the monitors that have been agreed by both
sides now along the Bosnian-Serbian border and, indeed, along the
Croatian-Bosnian border, we have introduced into the process a
means of checking on what supplies, if any, are going from Serbia
into Bosnia. That's one of the things that I think can apply some
pressure.
The second point is that, to the degree you believe, as I do, that he
continues to receive support from Serbia, one of the factors [that] I
think is most critically important out of this whole conference is
the fact that we have together agreed that the sanctions are going to
be tightened. I believe that there have been too many weak spots in
those sanctions--not the least of which is the Danube River--and
the sanctions, as they are tightened and squeeze the Serbian
economy, I think, at the same time, have an effect on Serbia's ability
to support Mr. Karadzic. So, those are just two additional items. . . .
Q: Mr. Secretary, question from the Sunday Times newspaper in
London. It just touches on this last point that you've made. The
Prime Minister [UK Prime Minister Major] did describe some of the
pressure that was put on Mr. Karadzic to reach the agreements that
we have seen today. Can you shed any light on that process? What
were the mechanics of this? What was said to him?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Well, again, you've put me in an
awkward spot, because the Prime Minister was fairly careful how he
answered the question. I can only tell you that there were clearly
some discussions with Mr. Karadzic. There were some discussions
with Mr. Izetbegovic [Bosnian President] and Mr. Silajdzic [Bosnian
Foreign Minister]--not together, I emphasize. And, in fact, British
representatives were involved in both of those and were, I think,
quite successful in reaching this agreement, and I would prefer to
leave it, therefore, to Her Majesty's Government to be specific about
what went on.
Q: Mr. Eagleburger, what do you think the reaction tomorrow morning
is going to be in Sarajevo to the results of this conference,
especially when allied aircraft are flying down to south Iraq to
protect the Shiites?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Well, I don't know what aircraft
flying in Iraq will do to attitudes in Sarajevo, but let me tell you
what I think the attitude in Sarajevo ought to be. But I preface this
by saying I understand the agony that is going on in Sarajevo, and I
understand that since it has--this conference will not have stopped
every evil thing that is going on in Sarajevo; people are not going to
view this conference as immediately having solved their problem.
But I think there are a couple of points to make, the first of which is
if Mr. Karadzic--your and my close friend--does, in fact, perform on
his commitment on heavy weapons and mortars, we will see fairly
quickly, I believe, a substantial diminution in the shelling with
regard to Sarajevo. I think that, in a period of not too much time,
ought to provide some solace to the people of Sarajevo.
Secondly, it would seem to me that, so long as the assistance flights
can continue to come in, and, indeed--hopefully as a result of the
agreements in this conference--be increased, that should provide
some additional support to their view that this conference has begun
to change things. And, fundamentally and not overnight, but I deeply
believe that what we have begun today here with a new process that
is in place 24 hours a day in Geneva headed by [co-chairmen of the
steering committee] Cyrus Vance [representative of the UN
Secretary General] and Dr. [David] Owen [representative of the
presidency of the European Community]--and I can assure you [that]
Cyrus Vance will be deeply engaged in this on a day-to-day basis,
based on the additional measures that have been taken here,
including tightened sanctions on Serbia, the monitors that are going
to be put in place, and so forth, the long list of things that have been
agreed--I think we will begin to see a change in the situation in
Sarajevo and not just in Sarajevo. I mentioned the other cities in
Bosnia that are also under severe pressure. I think we will see, over
time and not tomorrow morning, a substantial change in their
situation. That may not be enough to meet all of the demands--
legitimate demands--of the people of Sarajevo, but it is more than a
beginning, I think.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you said that we--you--are helping the refugees.
As a friend of Macedonia and called--so-called--Lawrence of
Macedonia in 1977 Time magazine, could you help Macedonia in
supplying help for 40,000 refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina to
Macedonia, because we are under pressure of the embargo, [and]
because we are complying [with] the embargo sanctions against
Serbia?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Let me make a couple of points here
with regard to that general question. First of all, the UNHCR refugee
pledging sessions in early September, including the $40 million we
have already promised we will provide at that session, is not
exclusively for refugees in one particular place--Bosnia, or Croatia,
or wherever. It will be in order to assist Macedonia in its refugee
problem as well. So, what I am saying is [that] the international
community is going to be providing assistance to Macedonia.
I want to make another point to you, which is that while issues of
recognition and UN membership are yet outstanding issues, the
United States has before and will continue to provide technical and
other kinds of assistance to Macedonia. We have sent in fairly large
quantities of medicine and food. We will continue to do that and,
indeed, as I informed people here yesterday, the President of the
United States has decided to grant GSP--and I'll explain that in a
second--to Macedonia as well as to Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina,
and Croatia. What that means is a Generalized System of
Preferences. Let me simply say to you that what that means is that
exports from Macedonia to the United States, under certain
circumstances, will have preferential treatment. We understand the
problems in Macedonia. We are trying to do what we can to help.
Q: Based on past experience, what gives you confidence that Mr.
Milosevic will live up to his end of the bargain?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: I don't have any particular confidence
that he will live up to his end of the bargain based on his
philanthropic attitudes, but what I am trying to say is what we have
here--it may not be perfect--but what we have here is a substantial
change from the past. We have a permanent negotiating process
headed by two distinguished people that will be located in Geneva
and bringing these parties together day after day to deal with these
questions.
Mr. Vance has assured me, in addition, that he will be actively
engaged in making sure that the sanctions-tightening is proceeding
and rattling cages as necessary, if, in fact, those sanctions are not-
-the tightening is not proceeding as it should. So that we have their
process of squeezing the Serbian economy, and I think it will make a
substantial difference if we can close down the Danube which is
particularly a problem in terms of petroleum supplies to Serbia. We
have monitors that we didn't have before on the Serbian-Bosnian
border [and] the Croatian-Bosnian border. We have monitors in
Romania to help assure that the sanctions are being complied with.
We want to put them in other neighboring countries. I can't say to
you that we have solved the problem overnight, but what I am saying
is [that] I think we have created a structure which provides
substantially enhanced ability to force, over time, Mr. Milosevic, if
he doesn't want to cooperate, into cooperating. This is not
something that is--this conference did not come out with an
outcome that is solely based on his good will. We knew better than
to rest on that.
Results of the London Conference
[Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater,
Washington, DC, August 28, 1992.]
The President met this morning with Acting Secretary of State
Lawrence Eagleburger to discuss the results of the London
Conference on the former Yugoslavia.
The conference has given us a better foundation to defuse, contain,
and bring to an end the conflict in former Yugoslavia. It has
established a new, permanent negotiating forum, co-chaired by the
United Nations and the European Community, in Geneva. The United
States has offered $3 million to help with start-up costs of the
conference.
The conference developed an international plan of action to deal
with this crisis. As a result, the international community is taking
a number of concrete actions to provide humanitarian relief,
increase pressure on the aggressors, and contain the conflict. These
include a massive humanitarian relief effort for this winter, a
strengthening of the sanctions regime by introducing international
monitors in neighboring states, and the placing of human rights
monitors as well as "early warning" monitors in neighboring states
and regions.
The conference also made progress with the parties themselves. The
leader of the Bosnian Serbs has agreed to consolidate heavy weapons
under international control and the Government of Bosnia has agreed
to rejoin the negotiating process.
The causes of this conflict are complex; it will not be ended
overnight. We thank [UK] Prime Minister Major and [UN] Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali for organizing and running this conference,
which has succeeded in galvanizing international action to alleviate
the humanitarian nightmare in Bosnia, to support the negotiating
process, to punish the aggressors, and to quarantine the conflict.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Agreements Reached At the
London Conference
[Remarks on the "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour," Washington, DC, August
28, 1992]
Q: Is it disheartening to come back to Washington and realize that
just a few hours after the big meeting in London, they were killing
people again in Bosnia? Ten people have died; the fighting is as
severe as it's ever been.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: It's disheartening, because people are
being killed. But I must say to you, I did not expect when we went to
that conference or when it finished that at that point the killing
would stop. I am not surprised that the fighting continues, and I
don't think that the fundamental points of the conference were
aimed at trying to bring a direct end to the fighting the day after the
conference was over, despite the fact that we would certainly hope
that this would have been the consequence.
Q: Well, then, let's go through, what was agreed to around that big,
square table in London?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Lots of things were agreed to. But let
me start with the things that I think the United States went there
trying to get, that we got, and that I think are important.
We got agreement, first of all, that the sanctions must be
stringently enforced. There is no question that--
Q: This is against Serbia?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Against Serbia. There is no question,
for example, that there's great leakage through the Danube River. A
number of things, particularly petroleum, are getting into Serbia.
The sanctions have not been tightly enforced. I think there is clear
agreement that they now will be, and we're going to take steps to
make sure that they are. That's the first point.
Secondly, what we got was agreement on the establishment of a
permanent process aiming toward peace. We have [co-chairmen of
the steering committee] Cy Vance [representative of the UN
Secretary General] and David Owen [representative of the presidency
of the European Community] permanently located in Geneva [and]
working groups on each of the issues involved with the Yugoslav
crisis able to bring the parties together there to negotiate to try to
deal with each of the specific issues. That's a permanent process
now. We've had episodic efforts at it but never permanent.
We got agreement on monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian border, the
Croatian-Bosnian border to make sure that we can now see and
hopefully stop whatever leaks in to the Bosnian Serbs from Serbia.
We've got monitors agreed in all of the neighboring countries, in the
Kosovo, which is one of the areas where we're worried that things
may blow up.
So we have a number of those things agreed on. I think they are all
important over the longer term to bring this thing to an end.
Sanctions are critical in that regard.
In addition, we got, for example--the Bosnian Serbs said they would
collect their heavy arms and turn them over to supervision by the
United Nations within 96 hours--a number of those kinds of
agreements, a number of agreements from the Serbs in Bosnia as the
Bosnians agreed to go back to the negotiating table. There is a
whole list of these; all of which will be nice if, in fact, the parties
perform on them. But we have a long history of earlier agreements
where the parties were supposed to perform, and they didn't.
For example, I did not believe--still don't believe--it was useful to
try to go to that conference and get an immediate agreement on a
cease-fire. We would have walked out of the conference, and on the
basis of past history, within a day or two, the cease-fire would have
been broken.
What we have established now, that I think is critical, is a longer
term process to try to force the parties, and particularly the Serbs,
to the negotiating table and to some conclusions.
Q: I'm sure you saw, or were told if you did not see the headlines in
the papers back here, that all that came out of this conference was
talk and nothing with any bite, nothing with any meat.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Well, I don't happen to think that's
true, and as I say, I think the things that I described that we got
agreement on--from 40 different countries, not the warring parties,
but from the rest of the civilized world, as to what they're going to
do to try to squeeze these people--are, in fact, important. We also
got some agreements, as I say, from the warring parties.
But there's a point I need to make here. Unless you start from an
assumption that this is a conflict that can be ended one way or
another by some application of outside force--and I'll be glad to talk
to you about that--I think it's wrong as an assumption. But, unless
you start with that assumption, then what you have to be looking
for, to try to deal with what all of us will admit is a terrible,
horrible human tragedy is the kind of structure that will force these
contending parties over time, to end this war.
I am, in fact, horrified by what I see in the press in the United
States and in Britain. I must say, these day[s], about all of these
arm-chair strategists and generals who are prepared to say we must
use some form of force, [that] they aren't the ones that have to
worry about the Americans getting killed if we get into a situation
in that part of the world from which we cannot easily extract
ourselves.
Q: Well, George Kenney who worked for you--Yugoslav desk of the
State Department--resigned in the last 48 hours because he thought
US policy was wrong. And he wasn't suggesting use of US force; he
was saying why don't we arm the Bosnians so they can defend
themselves against the Serbs.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Well, in the first place, there is, in my
judgment, from what we can tell, substantial evidence that the
Bosnian Muslims are, in fact, being armed from outside. They do
have substantial arms.
Is the purpose to this thing to add more weapons to an already
overburdened area of the world as far as weapons are concerned? I
don't believe that that's the way you're going to solve the problem,
by giving arms to the Bosnian Muslims, aside from the fact I think
they already have an adequate quantity.
The thing with Kenney, if I could talk about it for a second.
Q: Sure, sure.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: To me, this is a classic case, and it's
a tough one to deal with. Here is a young man in the Foreign Service
who saw this horror going on [and who] did not think we were doing
the right things with it. And I must say, having been a Foreign
Service officer, having lived through that kind of situation myself,
[he] showed remarkable courage in, at least, saying, "I don't like it,
I'm going to quit, and I'm going to talk about it." Too many don't like
it, don't quit, and talk about it. So I--
Q: Did he talk to you about it before?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: No, no. I don't think I've ever met
him, but I certainly didn't talk to him about that.
Q: Okay.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: But having said that, here again, he
sees one piece of this. He sees the human tragedy; he sees the US
Government not acting in what he would consider to be an
appropriate way to bring it to an end, not being actively enough
engaged.
I disagree with that, but I come back to saying again--to be seeing it
from that perspective as against a perspective that George Bush,
Jim Baker, and, indeed, I have to worry about, and certainly Dick
Cheney [Secretary of Defense] and General Powell [Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff] have to worry about, which is the degree to
which the United States involves itself militarily in a process for
which there is no clear purpose and no clear end. Because, you see,
in my judgment, Kenney is also saying military involvement on our
part was, in the end, essential.
That process leads you into the kind of situation that got us into
Vietnam. And I'm not prepared to accept arguments that there must
be something between the kind of involvement of Vietnam and doing
nothing, that the New York Times and the Washington Post keep
blabbing about, that there must be some form in the middle. That's,
again, what got us into Vietnam--do a little bit, and it doesn't work.
What do you do next?
Q: But they also say--the New
York Times and the Washington Post and others say, and you sat right
here for the news summary just now: We showed film of US
airplanes taking off from an aircraft carrier to fly air cover for the
Shiites in Iraq--why can't we do that for the Bosnians?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Fly air cover against what? The war
in Bosnia, while there is some air activity, the war is not being
fought fundamentally in the air; it's being fought on the ground.
The comparisons between Iraq and Bosnia, it seems to me, are
totally incorrect. The proper comparison with regard to Iraq, as far
as I'm concerned, is the fact that the President stopped at a point.
He didn't go chasing after Saddam Hussein through all of Iraq and
getting us tied down; that there is a fundamental difference between
the kind of activity that went on in Iraq, including the Iraqi invasion
of another country. And what I continue to say is, in a sense, a civil
war--not that these aren't different republics and different
countries now, but it is inter-ethnic conflict; it is massively mixed
up; it is in territory that is extremely difficult to fight in.
And the one thing we have decided clearly [that] we were going to do
is [that] we will use all necessary force to get humanitarian
supplies in to these people, and that is critically important. What
we have also said is [that] we are not going to involve ourselves
militarily in trying to make peace and force this conflict to an end.
And I understand Mr. Kenney's concerns. He doesn't have to make the
kind of tough decisions in the last analysis that others have to make.
And, again, I'm not attacking the young man, but he never set foot in
Yugoslavia as far as I can understand it. And until you've been there,
until you've seen what kind of country it is, until you understand the
terribly complex relationships between people in Yugoslavia, it is
very dangerous to look for simplistic solutions.
Q: Okay. Let's go back to the solution that you outlined at the very
beginning, that was agreed to in London. Let's say that everything
that you all put in place works.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: There's no time, and it will take time.
Q: Okay, okay. There's no precedent for that, but let's say it does
this time. How long will it take before the killing stops?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Let me remind you, there is also no
precedent for the kind of situation we see in Yugoslavia right now.
Q: Okay, right.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: And I don't know how long it will
take. I will say this.
Q: Excuse me. What I meant was, you said it yourself; there has
been deal after deal after deal, and nothing happens.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Yes, and it's also quite clear that very
often sanctions as an instrument of bringing somebody to change his
policy--you cannot guarantee they're going to work.
The fact of the matter is that imperfect as the sanctions have been
against the Serbs so far, it is clear they have made some real impact
on the Serbian economy.
The Serbs are looking at a winter that's going to be tough. If, in
fact, those sanctions are really clamped down, there is, at least,
some, I think, substantial reason to believe that that's going to force
real change in the attitudes of the Serbian Government and,
hopefully, the Serbian people. And there is no question.
Q: By when?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: I don't know. I can't tell you how
long.
Q: Okay.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: This is not an issue that's going to be
settled next week or next month. It's going to take time. And that's
tragic, and it's terrible. It's better than having 100,000 troops in
there and not knowing how to get them out again.
Q: Well, you have been to Yugoslavia before. You were the US
ambassador to Yugoslavia. It's a country you've always cared about.
You're now the number one man at the State Department, the number
one man in this government on foreign affairs below the President.
Were you able to, in a private way in London, to look any Serbian
leader in the eye and say, "Hey, fellows, this is for real, we're going
to get you eventually if you don't stop this?"
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: We have to do it privately. We had
this table, and the Serbs were sitting over there. And I think I gave
the toughest speech of anybody at the conference. And I said to them,
and they sat there, and they heard it, and hopefully, we're going to
get the same thing into Serbia itself: You people need to understand
that the choices you make and have made determine whether you're
going to be accepted into the civilized world for years to come. You
are isolating yourselves from the rest of the world. We're not going
to forget what you're doing, and you're going to pay a price for many,
many years into the future, if this doesn't all stop.
And my point again is, I think they understand that at one level. It is
difficult to explain, but this war is not rational. There is no
rationality at all about ethnic conflict. It is gut; it is hatred; it's
not for any common set of values or purposes; it just goes on. And
that kind of warfare is most difficult to bring to a halt. I am more
than inclined to--I strongly believe that, without Serbian support
from Belgrade to the Bosnian Serbs, over time, it withers.
But I keep coming back to saying, it's over time. I hate that. People
are dying every day; I understand that. It is the alternatives that
have to be looked at. And from my point of view--and I think from
the President's, since he supported me in all of this--the fact of the
matter is, the only way to deal with this issue is, one, over time,
squeezing down as we can, making it clear that we are going to get
humanitarian supplies in to starving people; that we're going to
break up those detention camps; we're going to get people out of
them; we're going to take care of the refugees.
And also one other thing that's critically important is I said the
United States will never accept a peace settlement in that part of
the world with Bosnia that, in fact, recognizes ethnic cleansing,
that is, having driven Muslims out of areas taken over by Serbs; that
those people are going to have [to] be permitted to go back to their
homes; that there will be no cantonization, that is, against
separating people out; and that the refugees have to be permitted to
go back where they are.
So one of the things that is also clear is, there isn't anybody on the
Yugoslav side who doesn't understand that the United States will not
accept a conclusion to this mess that doesn't permit the Bosnian
Muslims, for example, to go back to their homes, to provide some
support rebuilding their homes. It may take a long time, but I
personally don't see any other solution to it. And I'm not alone in
that--Dick Cheney doesn't; the generals don't; the President doesn't.
Massive use of force to try to bring about a peace settlement here is
just far too dangerous, and a lot of people who loosely write about
using force had better think about the fact that they don't have to
worry about the young Americans that may or may not come back
from something like that.
US Coordinator Named for Geneva Conference on Former
Yugoslavia
[Statement by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington,
DC, September 1, 1992.]
In order to follow up quickly on the results of the London Conference
on former Yugoslavia and to participate actively in the Geneva talks
beginning September 3, Acting Secretary Eagleburger has appointed
Ambassador Warren Zimmermann as US coordinator and US
representative on the steering committee of the conference.
Ambassador Zimmermann's new designation underlines the
importance the United States attributes to the obligations of the
London Conference on all participants and the active role the United
States will continue to play to encourage a just and peaceful
outcome to the Yugoslav crisis.
Ambassador Zimmermann, who has extensive experience both with
Yugoslavia and the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe], will be devoting his full-time efforts to ensuring the
follow-up to the London conference. He will retain his position as
Director of the Bureau of Refugee Programs; however, during his
tenure as coordinator, Priscilla Clapp, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, will be in charge of the day-to-day activities of the
bureau.
Chronology: Developments Related to the Crisis in Bosnia, March
10-September 22, 1992
March 10, 1992
The United States and the European Community (EC) issue a joint
declaration in support of ongoing efforts by the United Nations and
the EC to achieve a political settlement to the crisis among the
republics of Yugoslavia.
April 7
The United States recognizes the independence of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia.
April 27
Serbia and Montenegro proclaim the dissolution of the Socialist
Federated Republic of Yugoslavia and the establishment of a new
state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The United States does
not recognize this new state.
May 6
At a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
meeting in Helsinki, the United States condemns perpetrators of
violence in Bosnia-Hercegovina and urges that Serbian
representatives be excluded from all CSCE activities.
May 12
After delivering a strong warning, the US Ambassador in Belgrade is
recalled to Washington, DC, for consultations.
May 14
The State Department Spokesman expresses concern about
allegations of "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
May 20
The United States suspends landing rights for Yugoslav National
Airlines.
A CSCE Committee of Senior Officials calls for urgent action to
provide humanitarian relief in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
May 22
Secretary Baker, in London, announces diplomatic sanctions against
Serbia-Montenegro because of the "humanitarian nightmare." With
US support, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia become
members of the United Nations.
May 24
Secretary Baker, in Lisbon, announces that the United States has
initiated discussions at the United Nations on Chapter VII sanctions.
He states that "before we consider force, we ought to exhaust all of
the political, diplomatic, and economic remedies that might be at
hand."
May 28
The White House announces a $9-million contribution to assist
refugees in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
May 30
The United Nations adopts Resolution 757, co-sponsored by the
United States, imposing immediate sanctions against Serbia-
Montenegro, including a trade embargo, the freezing of assets
abroad, the prohibition of services related to aircraft and weapons,
the prohibition of air traffic, the reduction of diplomatic staff, a
ban on participation in official cultural and sporting events, and
suspension of scientific and technical cooperation.
President Bush freezes Yugoslav assets in the US.
June 1
A UN-mediated cease-fire in Sarajevo takes effect. It lasts only 2
hours.
June 4
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) condemns continuing
violence in Yugoslavia, criticizing Serbia and Montenegro.
June 5
President Bush issues an executive order imposing a trade embargo
on Serbia-Montenegro.
June 8
The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopts Resolution 758 authorizing
60 observers to secure Sarajevo's airport for the delivery of
humanitarian relief once a cease-fire is in place.
June 10
The CSCE establishes an 11-nation task force on Yugoslavia.
June 23
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Secretary Baker announces that he will recommend that the
President refuse ambassadorial recognition from Belgrade, close the
Yugoslav consulate in Chicago, and support suspension of Serbia-
Montenegro as participants in international organizations.
June 26
The UN Secretary General tells the Security Council that a new Serb
military offensive threatens the feasibility of UN forces
successfully reopening Sarajevo airport. He suggests the Council
consider alternative means of aiding Sarajevo.
June 27
An EC declaration refuses to recognize Serbia-Montenegro as the
successor state to Yugoslavia. The declaration does not exclude
support for military action by the United Nations to achieve
humanitarian objectives.
June 29
The UNSC adopts Resolution 761 authorizing deployment of
additional forces to ensure functioning of the Sarajevo airport and
delivery of humanitarian aid. Thirty-four UN peacekeepers officially
assume control of the airport from Serbian forces.
June 30
The UNSC unanimously adopts a resolution establishing a joint
commission to monitor restoration of Croatian authority in zones
outside UN-protected areas. The resolution urges Croatia to
withdraw to positions held prior to its June 21 offensive and urges
the Serb territorial defense forces in Croatia to withdraw and
disarm.
Department of Defense Secretary Richard Cheney says the United
States is prepared to provide air and naval escort protection to
humanitarian relief convoys en route to Sarajevo if explicitly
authorized by the UNSC.
July 1
In a meeting with the leader of the Serbian Democratic Party, Mr.
Micunovic, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger emphasizes that Serbia can
only end its international isolation by complying with all relevant
UNSC resolutions and CSCE principles.
July 3
The UN begins coordinating an airlift of relief supplies to Sarajevo.
July 7
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) re-establishes
its presence in Bosnia-Hercegovina and renews its efforts to visit
detention centers.
July 8
The CSCE Committee of Senior Officials decides not to allow
attendance by Serbia or Montenegro at the CSCE summit meeting in
Helsinki or at future meetings.
July 9
A CSCE summit declaration condemns Serbian aggression and calls
for an end to violence.
July 10
Secretary Baker meets with Serbian Prime Minister-designate Milan
Panic in Helsinki and spells out the steps needed for compliance by
Serbia-Montenegro with UNSC resolutions.
NATO, in coordination with the Western European Union, agrees on a
maritime operation to monitor enforcement of sanctions against
Serbia-Montenegro.
July 13
The UNSC authorizes an increase in UN personnel in Sarajevo from
1,100 to 1,600.
July 16
In the Adriatic Sea, NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean
begins monitoring of compliance by Serbia-Montenegro with UN
sanctions.
July 19
A cease-fire negotiated at meetings in London on July 17 is broken.
July 27
EC-sponsored peace talks resume in London.
July 28
The United States grants 1-year temporary protection to residents
of Bosnia-Hercegovina already in the United States.
July 29
Participants in EC-mediated peace talks agree to establish a
coordinating committee to discuss cease-fire arrangements,
refugees, and humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
August 4
Acting Secretary Eagleburger instructs US missions to press for
immediate ICRC access to any places of detention.
The UNSC President demands unimpeded access to detention centers
in Bosnia-Hercegovina by international organizations, including the
ICRC.
August 5
Acting Secretary Eagleburger announces additional US actions,
including a request for an emergency meeting of the UN Human
Rights Commission (UNHRC) to examine reports of alleged abuses in
detention centers in Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and a request
that the CSCE investigate these allegations. He also indicates that
the United States is sending monitors to Romania to evaluate the
effects of UN sanctions and is developing a resolution that would
call on states to collect substantiated information on "war crimes"
and transmit such information to the UNSC.
August 6
President Bush outlines further US efforts to contain the crisis.
These include:
-- Support for passage by the UNSC of a resolution authorizing the
use of all necessary measures to facilitate delivery of humanitarian
assistance;
-- Establishment of diplomatic relations with Slovenia, Croatia,
and Bosnia-Hercegovina;
-- Enhanced enforcement of sanctions against Serbia;
-- Stationing of monitors to prevent the conflict from widening;
and
-- Intensified consultation with NATO on measures to assist the
United Nations.
August 7
The United States formally requests an emergency meeting of the
CSCE Committee of Senior Officials to discuss further steps to
address humanitarian problems in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
August 8
UNHRC assessment teams depart for Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia, and Slovenia to review the status of food, nutrition, shelter,
and health programs.
August 10
Thirty-five UNHRC members support the US proposal for a special
session on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.
August 11
Croatia and Slovenia accept the US proposal to establish full
diplomatic relations.
August 13
Based on US initiative, UNSC Resolution 770 authorizes "all
measures necessary" to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to Bosnia-Hercegovina.
US-sponsored UNSC Resolution 771 demands immediate access to
detention centers by the ICRC and asks countries to provide
information on possible violations of humanitarian law.
A UNHRC special session on human rights abuses in the former
Yugoslavia opens in Geneva.
The CSCE Committee of Senior Officials begins its meeting.
August 14
The UNHRC appoints a special rapporteur, Tadeusc Mazowiecki, to
investigate violations of human rights abuses and report to the
Secretary General by August 28, 1992.
A UNHRC resolution calls for the ICRC to have unimpeded access to
all detention facilities in the region.
The North Atlantic Council, meeting to discuss preliminary plans
drawn up by NATO's military authorities, requests a more detailed
report by August 24.
The Western European Union meets in Rome and directs its planning
committee to examine military options by August 24.
Bosnia-Hercegovina accepts the US proposal to establish full
diplomatic relations.
August 15
The CSCE appoints a rapporteur mission to inspect places of
detention and report on alleged human rights abuses by September
16, 1992. It also confirms to the UN Secretary General its
commitment to assist the UN in peace-keeping activities in Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
August 18
The UN Economic and Social Council endorses the UNHRC resolution
on human rights abuses and confirms the appointment of the special
rapporteur.
August 19
At a Brussels meeting of NATO allies, some North Atlantic
Cooperation Council partners, and Austria, the United States offers
personnel and logistical support for a Romanian in-country mission
to monitor sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.
August 19-23
CSCE Chairman-in-Office, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Moravic,
visits Belgrade, Skopje, Sarajevo, and Zagreb to pass on the CSCE's
strong message denouncing human rights violations and calling for
access to detention centers, to secure early deployment of
rapporteur and monitor missions, and to review the situation on the
ground.
August 20
The CSCE Steering Committee names Sir John Thompson head of the
CSCE rapporteur mission on detention camps.
The US Mission in Geneva offers to support the efforts of the special
CSCE rapporteur by providing a US officer to accompany him to
Zagreb.
The CSCE Steering Committee accepts a US offer of an official to
head a mission to Skopje to help prevent spillover of the violence.
August 21
UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Mazowiecki departs with a
team to the former Yugoslavia to inspect detention camps and
examine the human rights situation.
August 24
The UN General Assembly begins debate on the situation in Bosnia.
Acting US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Watson
reiterates US refusal to recognize the claim by Serbia and
Montenegro to the rights and privileges of the former Yugoslavia at
the United Nations.
August 25
The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution calling on the Security
Council to take "further appropriate measures" to end the war in
Bosnia, including direct military action if necessary.
President Bush authorizes $12 million from the US Emergency
Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to respond to the needs of
displaced persons in the former Yugoslavia. He also signs a
proclamation restoring Generalized System of Preferences benefits
for all former Yugoslav republics, except Serbia and Montenegro.
The United States opens embassies in Zagreb and Ljubljana and
announces plans to open an embassy in Sarajevo when the security
situation permits.
NATO ambassadors review a contingency plan for use of 6,000 NATO
troops to protect humanitarian convoys in Bosnia.
Lord Carrington, the EC's special mediator in the Balkan crisis,
announces he will no longer continue in that role.
August 26
An international conference, co-sponsored by the United Nations and
the European Community to develop an effective response to the
continued violence in the former Yugoslavia, opens in London.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger urges the conference to:
-- Address urgently the delivery of humanitarian relief to the
victims of the conflict and the granting of immediate access to all
detention camps;
-- Create a durable international negotiating mechanism, based on
UN and CSCE principles, to achieve a just and lasting settlement;
-- Tighten comprehensive economic sanctions against Serbia-
Montenegro and to maintain its political isolation until it complies
with all relevant Security Council resolutions; and
-- Deter the expansion of the conflict by positioning human rights
monitors in Serbia and the states and regions bordering Serbia.
August 27
Decisions at the London conference lead to:
-- Creation of a permanent negotiating forum to manage a political
settlement of the crisis;
-- Support for the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina and
recognition by the international community that territorial gains
made by force will not be honored;
-- A call for "full collaboration" by all parties to permit safe
delivery of relief supplies to Bosnia-Hercegovina and long-term
assistance for displaced persons;
-- A call for "unconditional and unilateral release under
international supervision of all civilians detained, and the closure
without delay of the detention camps;"
-- Agreement to expand the operations of the UN Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in support of UN humanitarian operations in Bosnia-
Hercegovina;
-- Commitment to place human rights monitors in the territories of
the former Yugoslavia and in neighboring states and regions; and
-- Agreement on an action plan to ensure rigorous application of
sanctions against Serbia.
Serbia and Montenegro undertake to cease intervention across their
borders with Bosnia and Croatia; to the best of their ability restrain
the Bosnian Serbs from taking territory by force and expelling local
populations; and to fully observe the relevant resolutions of the UN
Security Council.
Participants agree to resume negotiations in Geneva on September 3,
1992.
August 28
In a report presented to the UNHRC, Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki
makes the following recommendations:
-- Extending UNPROFOR's mandate to protect populations against
human rights violations;
-- Creating an information agency to combat racial hatred;
-- Establishing a commission to investigate possible criminal acts;
-- Basing human rights monitors on such threatened areas as
Kosovo; and
-- Setting up a commission on disappeared persons.
September 2
The North Atlantic Council agrees to support UN efforts to deliver
humanitarian assistance and to monitor heavy weapons in Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
September 3
The Steering Committee of the International Conference on the
former Yugoslavia, co-chaired by Cyrus Vance, representing the UN,
and Lord Owen, representing the EC, begins meeting in Geneva. It
establishes six working groups and a permanent executive
secretariat.
An Italian cargo plane carrying relief supplies destined for Sarajevo
crashes. The UN suspends flights into Sarajevo pending an
investigation into the crash.
September 4
An Iranian aircraft supposedly carrying humanitarian relief for
Bosnia lands in Zagreb with a substantial quantity of arms and
ammunition. Croatian authorities take control of the shipment.
September 8
Two French members of UNPROFOR are killed and five wounded near
Sarajevo.
September 9
The President of the UN Security Council asks the Secretary General
for a speedy report on the results of the UN inquiry into the deaths
of the French troops. He emphasizes the urgent need for reinforcing
the security and protection of UNPROFOR personnel in Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
Sir John Thomson, head of the CSCE humanitarian mission to
detention camps in the former Yugoslavia, meets with the CSCE
Chairman-in Office, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Moravcik, to
discuss his findings.
September 10
The Secretary General recommends to the UN Security Council that
the mandate of UNPROFOR be expanded to ensure delivery of
humanitarian assistance.
Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen travel to Sarajevo to meet with
Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic.
September 14
The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 776, which authorizes
the use of armed escorts as necessary to enable the delivery of
relief supplies, allows UNPROFOR to protect detainees released
from detention camps, andÊprovides for the expansion of UNPROFOR
to enable it to carry out its enhanced role.
September 16
Ambassador Kenneth Blackwell, US Representative to the UN Human
Rights Commission and leader of one of the two CSCE missions
inspecting detention camps, presents the mission report to the CSCE
Committee of Senior Officials meeting in Prague. The report
maintains that thousands are being held against their will, although
it does not confirm the existence of alleged "death camps." It
recommends that all prisoners be released immediately and that all
CSCE members take a strong stance against "ethnic cleansing."
September 17
The CSCE plenary meeting endorses proposals for monitoring
missions in Macedonia, Kosovo, the Sandjak, and Vojvodina. It also
approves US and EC sanctions monitoring plans for Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria.
September 18
The International Conference working group on Bosnia-Hercegovina
begins its meetings in Geneva. It includes the Bosnian Foreign
Minister, the leader of the Croatian Serbs, and the leader of the
Bosnian Serbs.
President Bush announces his intention to nominate Allan Wendt as
Ambassador to Slovenia, Mara Letica as Ambassador to Croatia, and
Victor Jackovich as Ambassador to Bosnia-Hercegovina.
September 22
The UN General Assembly votes to adopt UNSC Resolution 777
denying the claim of Serbia-Montenegro to the UN seat held by the
former Yugoslavia.
US Recognition of Former Yugoslav Republics
[Statement released by the White House Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC, April 7, 1992.]
The United States recognizes Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and
Slovenia as sovereign and independent states and will begin
immediately consultations to establish full diplomatic relations.
The United States accepts the pre-crisis republic borders as the
legitimate international borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and
Slovenia.
We take this step because we are satisfied that these states meet
the requisite criteria for recognition. We acknowledge the peaceful
and democratic expression of the will of citizens of these states for
sovereignty.
We will continue to work intensively with the European Community
[EC] and its member states to resolve expeditiously the outstanding
issues between Greece and the republic of Macedonia, thus enabling
the United States to recognize formally the independence of that
republic as well. The United States will also discuss with the
governments of Serbia and Montenegro their interest in remaining in
a common state known as Yugoslavia.
In light of our decisions on recognition, the United States will lift
economic sanctions from Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
and Slovenia. Sanctions were applied to Yugoslavia on December 6,
1991. We will lift sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro
contingent on Belgrade's lifting the economic blockades directed
against Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. The UN arms embargo
remains in effect.
It has been US policy throughout the Yugoslav crisis to accept any
resolution arrived at peacefully, democratically, and by negotiation.
The United States strongly supports the UN peace-keeping plan as
worked out by Cyrus Vance and the full deployment of the UN peace-
keeping force. We continue to support the EC peace conference as
the indispensable forum for the parties to reach a peaceful
settlement of their dispute and to establish the basis for future
relations. US recognition is without prejudice to any future
association Yugoslav successor states might agree to establish.
The United States views the demonstrated commitment of the
emerging states to respect borders and to protect all Yugoslav
nationalities as an essential element in establishing full diplomatic
relations. Equally, we view such a commitment by Serbia and
Montenegro as essential to proceed in discussions on their future
status.
The deployment of the UN peace-keeping force, the continuation of
the EC peace conference, and the process of international
recognition offer all of the former Yugoslav republics a historic
opportunity to reject decisively the tragic violence which has
marked this crisis. Continued commitment to peaceful dialogue
should lead toward reconciliation, toward integration within Europe,
and toward cordial and productive relations with the United States.
The United States will continue to work to achieve these goals.
Department Statements
Secretary Baker Meets With Foreign Minister of Bosnia-
Hercegovina
[Statement by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler,
Washington, DC, April 14, 1992.]
The Secretary met today with Haris Silajdzic, Foreign Minister of
Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Secretary advised Mr. Silajdzic that the
United States has high regard for the Bosnian Government, which has
sought to promote and defend CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] principles throughout the Yugoslav crisis, to
chart a peaceful transition to independence, and to respond
constructively to the legitimate concerns of all national groups in
Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Secretary also made the following points.
The United States strongly supports the territorial integrity of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, a state which we recognized on April 7. The
United States also strongly supports the EC [European Community]-
sponsored intra-Bosnian negotiations. All the participants in these
talks should respect the commitments they have undertaken to
engage in constructive dialogue on the future constitutional
structure of Bosnia-Hercegovina and to renounce the use of force.
The United States condemns the use of force, intimidation, and
provocation to nationalist violence by militant nationalist Serbian
and, to a lesser extent, Croatian leaders in Bosnia. Their strategy
and tactics are clearly aimed at promoting the forcible
disintegration of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
The United States also condemns the clear pattern of support for the
destabilization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, primarily on the part of the
"Yugoslav" military and Serbian President Milosevic. The
international community should hold the Serbian and "Yugoslav"
military leadership accountable for acts of aggression and
destabilization aimed against Bosnia-Hercegovina.
These leaders stand at a crossroads. If they continue on their
present course of destabilization, they will only ensure their
international political and economic isolation.
They should, instead, take clear and concrete steps to demonstrate
their respect for the independence, borders, territorial integrity,
and legitimate Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina and their
cooperation with the UN peace-keeping plan and the EC conference.
Situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina
[Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, May 4, 1992.]
The United States is deeply concerned about the continued fighting
in Bosnia, including in Sarajevo. Destruction to the city is enormous
both in human and material terms. The United States condemns
perpetrators of violence in Bosnia on all sides, including the Serbian
side and the "Yugoslav" army, which clearly bear the heaviest blame
for continued fighting in Bosnia and have the greatest responsibility
for working to obtain a cease-fire. We call on the JNA [Yugoslav
National Army] and the Governments of Serbia-Montenegro to fully
respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
The US condemns the JNA's seizure of Bosnian President [Alija]
Izetbegovic against his will on Saturday. We note that active
efforts by the United Nations and the European Community, as well
as by our Ambassador in Belgrade, played a significant role in
arranging his release.
The United States is also dismayed that Bosnian armed forces
engaged in actions in Sarajevo over the weekend which are not
conducive to dialogue or negotiation. We especially condemn the
attack on a JNA column departing Sarajevo on Sunday under a safe
conduct agreement negotiated by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force].
We strongly urge the Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina to exercise
restraint and to abide by its agreements with UNPROFOR. We also
strongly urge the Yugoslav military command to exercise restraint
and avoid further actions contributing to a spiral of violence.
We will continue to work closely with the European Community in
sup- port of its efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement in
Bosnia-Hercegovina.
US Ambassador Recalled From Yugoslavia
[Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, May 12, 1992.]
Ambassador [Warren] Zimmermann is being recalled from Belgrade
for consultations. During these consultations, the US Embassy will
be headed by the Deputy Chief of Mission.
The US is taking this action in coordination with the European
Community [EC] and in light of the aggression carried out against
Bosnia-Hercegovina by Serbian civilian and military leaders in clear
and continuing violation of all CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] principles.
The United States will continue to work closely with the European
Community to seek strong collective action against Belgrade's
aggression against Bosnia-Hercegovina.
The United States strongly endorses the EC Foreign Ministers' May 11
declaration on Bosnia-Hercegovina, including the demand for the full
withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army from Bosnia-Hercegovina
and the reopening of Sarajevo airport under safe conditions.
Serbia: Suspension of JAT Landing Rights in US
[Statement by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler,
Washington, DC, May 20, 1992.]
On May 16, on instruction from Secretary Baker, Ambassador
Zimmermann sought assurances from Serbia that relief convoys
would be allowed free passage into Sarajevo and that the Sarajevo
airport would be reopened immediately for humanitarian flights.
Ambassador Zimmermann informed Serbia that failure to take these
steps would result in immediate termination of JAT landing rights
in the United States. That is the Yugoslav airline.
On May 18, Serbia made clear its response when Serbian forces
attacked a Red Cross relief convoy heading into Sarajevo, destroying
desperately needed humanitarian supplies and killing an ICRC
[International Committee of the Red Cross] delegate. And yesterday,
as further evidence of their intransigence and brutality, Serbian
forces took hostage a convoy of women and children fleeing
Sarajevo. We have various reports of that number of hostages being
anywhere from 1,000 individuals to 7,000.
Effective today, we have asked the Department of Transportation to
terminate the authority of the Serbian national carrier, Yugoslav
Airlines, to fly to and from the United States. This means that their
three weekly flights from Belgrade to New York City and on to
Chicago will end immediately.
We are also considering a series of further measures in response to
continued Serbian aggression which we will be discussing with our
allies and friends over the next day or two.
Secretary Baker: Sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro
[Excerpts of Secretary Baker's remarks at concluding news
conference of the Lisbon Conference on Assistance to the New
Independent States, Lisbon, Portugal, May 24, 1992 ]
I was very pleased to hear the remarks of my colleague, [Portuguese
Foreign] Minister Deus Pinheiro, with respect to the issue of what
used to be Yugoslavia, because we feel rather strongly about this. It
seems to me that the world community is appalled at the atrocities
that are taking place in Bosnia-Hercegovina. That is becoming more
and more evident and more and more obvious. Clearly, none of us
should try to find reasons for not forcefully and specifically
condemning what has happened. None of us should try to find reasons
for not taking some sort of action to try and end what truly is a
humanitarian nightmare in the heart of Europe.
Q. A question, if I may, to [Foreign Minister] Pinheiro and Secretary
of State Baker: Both of you have laid emphasis on the crisis in
Yugoslavia. Can I ask you both, when do you expect firm, concrete
sanctions to be enacted (a) by the community and (b) perhaps by the
United Nations? Can we look forward to a definite decision by next
Tuesday at the meeting you referred to, or will it take longer?
Secondly, if I may, have you ruled out the need for some military
action to assure the availability of Sarajevo airport for
humanitarian assistance if the present situation continues?
Secretary Baker: I think your question was, when do--quite apart
from the use of force question--your question was when we might
anticipate sanctions. Let me speak for the United States and say
that I guess that the first ones were undertaken months ago--with
respect to the question of arms embargo--and undertaken in
cooperation with our European colleagues. In addition to that, the
United States has already instituted a number of sanctions,
cancelling the landing rights of the Yugoslav airline in the United
States. That action was taken several days ago.
We do not have major assistance programs to Yugoslavia, but the
ones we do have have been put on hold quite some time ago. We have
taken diplomatic action over the course of the last 48 hours by
making it clear that we will not be sending our Ambassador back to
Belgrade. We will be closing two of the three consulates that
Yugoslavia has in the United States. We, for our part, will not
accept Yugoslavia--I am sorry, Serbia-Montenegro--as the
continuation state of Yugoslavia in multilateral institutions. We are
breaking contacts that we have had in the past with the Yugoslav
military, and we are also drawing down the size of our embassy in
Belgrade. So these are actions that the United States has already
taken.
We are also having discussions with others at the United Nations in
New York about the possibility of some Chapter VII action. I can't
predict for you when that might or might not be possible, but I can
predict for you that we intend to continue those discussions and to
push them as forcefully as we know how because of what's taking
place in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
I want to elaborate on that a little bit more, too, because I think it's
all too easy to sit back and talk about this tragedy in a vacuum. I
think it is important for everyone to understand what's happening
here, because we are appalled by it. There are 35,000 diabetics who
have no insulin. There are 6,000 women and babies who have no
medicine, baby formula, or milk. There are reports, in the last 48
hours, of hunger-related deaths, because food and humanitarian
assistance cannot get through. There have been attacks, as you
know, on Red Cross convoys. There have been killings of Red Cross
personnel. Twelve UN trucks have been hijacked at gunpoint. The
so-called cleansing operations that are taking place--the ethnic
purification of certain portions of Bosnia-Hercegovina--are all too
reminiscent of something that we sat back and witnessed a number
of years ago.
The Bosnian Government reports--and I don't know; I can't vouch for
the accuracy of these reports--but their reports are that, over the
last month, 2,225 people have been killed, 7,600 have been injured,
and over 2,500 people are missing.
So I think that the message should be to the world community:
Anyone who is looking for reasons not to act or arguing somehow
that action in the face of this kind of a nightmare is not warranted
at this time--I think that in the view of all of us in the civilized
world at least--is on the wrong wavelength.
Now, you asked me about the use of force, and I think that is,
obviously, a very hypothetical question at this point. We had to face
hypothetical questions like that leading up to the events in the Gulf
over a long period of time. I will say this, because we made it very
clear: There will be no unilateral use--no unilateral use--of US
force. As we have said before, we are not and we cannot be the
world's policeman. Before we consider force, it seems to me, we
ought to exhaust all of the political, diplomatic, and economic
remedies that might be at hand. That's why I am encouraged to hear
what my colleague here has said, and I would be even more
encouraged if, coming out of the meeting on Tuesday, there were a
willingness on the part of our European colleagues to act. . . .
Edward J. Perkins, US Permanent Representative to the United
Nations: Aggression by the Serbian Regime
[Statement before the UN Security Council, New York City, May 30,
1992]
Mr. President, the aggression of the Serbian regime and the armed
forces it has unleashed against Bosnia and Hercegovina represent a
clear threat to international peace and security--and a grave
challenge to the values and principles which underlie the Helsinki
Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the UN Charter.
The United States, the European Community [EC], the CSCE
[Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] community, and
the UN Security Council, by the action it is taking today, are sending
a clear message to the Serbian regime and to the forces it sponsors
in Bosnia and Hercegovina and Croatia.
We hope they will fully understand that message. The international
community will not tolerate the use of force and terror to settle
political or territorial disputes. By its aggression against Bosnia
and Hercegovina and Croatia and by its repression within Serbia, the
Serbian regime can only condemn itself to increasingly severe
treatment by a world united in its opposition to Serbian aggression.
My government has already informed both the Security Council and
the General Assembly that it does not believe that the authorities in
Belgrade represent the continuation of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. I note that many other countries have
reserved their position on the continuity issue and quite a few have
adopted the same view as we have on this matter. It is, further, my
government's strong belief that the Security Council and then the
General Assembly should act in the near future to confirm this
position.
The Chapter VII measures we are undertaking today are serious and
comprehensive. The United States is determined to see them through
and, if necessary, to seek further measures until the Serbian regime
changes course. It must reverse its brutal aggression. It must
cease and desist from the campaign of terror it is conducting
against the civilian populations of Bosnia and Hercegovina and
Croatia. The Serbian and Montenegrin leadership must disband,
disarm, and withdraw the former units of the Yugoslav National
Army and armed militias from Bosnia and Hercegovina and from
Croatia immediately. The Serbian regime and its armed surrogates
must cease inflicting suffering on the civilian populations of those
two states, creating a humanitarian crisis of nightmare proportions,
and applying force to block international humanitarian relief to its
victims.
Belgrade and Serbian hard-line leaders in Bosnia must instead
cooperate in good faith with international humanitarian relief to
those two states. Belgrade must clearly and unequivocally
demonstrate respect for the independence, borders, territorial
integrity, and legitimate sovereign Governments of Bosnia and
Hercegovina, Croatia, and other former Yugoslav republics. Belgrade
must fulfill its solemn commitments to cooperate with UNPROFOR
[UN Protection Force]. It must join with all of the parties concerned
in continuing negotiations to achieve a political settlement.
The United States will not have normal relations with Belgrade until
it ends its occupation of neighboring states and implements
guarantees of rights for members of all national minorities within
Serbia and Montenegro, as stipulated by the EC conference on
Yugoslavia.
We regret the inevitable impact that the measures we are taking
today will have on the people of Serbia and Montenegro. The
American and Serbian peoples have a long tradition of friendship.
The Serbian people have a long and proud history as fighters for
freedom--not as aggressors. We doubt very much that the Serbian
people, whether in Serbia or in Bosnia-Hercegovina or Croatia, favor
the brutally aggressive and repressive policies of the Serbian
regime and the Serbian leaders it has sponsored in Bosnia and
Croatia. We further doubt that they want to shoulder the increasing
economic and political costs of this brutal aggression or of the
increasing international isolation that it brings. This is not simply
because these policies so clearly run counter to legitimate Serbian
interests but also because they run counter to the historical
character of the Serbian people.
Down the road of continued conflict lies ruin. The people of the
former Yugoslavia have suffered enough. We look forward to the
restoration of peace and stability and reason and to the time when
peoples who had lived together peacefully in the past do so again.
Reason, compromise, and respect for international principles
embodied in the CSCE accords and the UN Charter must supplant
aggression, hatred, and intolerance. We in this Council, and many
others, will work hard to that end. Thank you, Mr. President.
Secretary Baker: Meeting With Milan Panic
[Excerpt from a news conference at the Helsinki CSCE summit,
Helsinki, Finland, July 8, 1992]
Secretary Baker: First of all, Mr. Panic requested this meeting. I
met with him in his capacity as Prime Minister-designate [of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which consists of the republics of
Serbia and Montenegro]. I agreed to meet with him in the interest of
making sure, absolutely sure, that no one in Serbia or Montenegro
misunderstands America's position.
The message that I gave him is very clear, and that is that the
growing humanitarian nightmare in the former Yugoslavia, for which
we think Serbian authorities and military are overwhelmingly
responsible, must end, and Serbia-Montenegro must abide by the UN
Security Council resolutions.
Those requirements include the need to allow the unhindered
delivery of humanitarian assistance to all who need it; to end
interference in Bosnia-Hercegovina and respect the territorial
integrity and legitimate government of that state; to withdraw,
disband, and disarm all Serbian forces in Bosnia and place their
weapons under effective international monitoring; and to cease
immediately all forcible expulsions and any attempts to change the
ethnic composition of the population.
I told Mr. Panic quite bluntly that we do not question in any way his
motives or aims, which I think are noble--he expressed them as a
desire to act in the best interest of his country of origin [Serbia] and
of his adopted country [the United States], both, and to bring peace
to that region--but that the world would now demand deeds from
Yugoslavia, not just words. We've heard words before.
I concluded the meeting by noting the historic friendship of the
Serbian and American people and expressed our regrets that the
policies of the Belgrade leadership have come between our two
countries. I made it clear to him that America supports a free and
democratic Serbia that lives in peace with its neighbors and its own
people.
Q: What did he tell you, Mr. Baker?
Secretary Baker: He told me with respect to each of the items that I
mentioned as things that we thought had to be done that he agreed
with that. He said his only aim in taking the job was to see what
could be done to bring peace and to help the people of this country at
large. He said that he felt it was a very difficult job, that he would
need a lot of help from a lot of different sources and a lot of
different people.
We made it very clear at the outset that he is not a representative
of the US Government. He is not going there somehow as a special
emissary from us. There are no special deals or arrangements that
we have made with him. He is an American citizen, and we have
given him a 30-day exemption from the sanctions under our law in
order to travel to Belgrade. . . .
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Detention Centers In Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Serbia
[Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, August 5, 1992]
Over the past week, we have seen an increasing number of reports
about detention centers in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia, including
reports that indicate the possibility of executions, torture, and
other gross human rights abuses. These reports have included press
interviews, charges and counter-charges by the parties, and reports
from others in the area. The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) has visited nine facilities where they registered 4,300
prisoners. At this point, they have reported on very difficult
conditions of detention but have not found any evidence of death
camps. Nonetheless, there are many reports of other detention
centers which the Red Cross has not been able to visit, and it is at
some of these that atrocities have been reported.
These reports, although unconfirmed, are profoundly disturbing. It is
vital that any and all prisons and detention centers be opened to the
Red Cross and other neutral parties. Urgent action is required to
reveal the truth and to prevent any abuses which may be occurring.
Yesterday morning, we began a series of steps to support such
access.
-- We instructed our diplomatic personnel immediately to contact
senior Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian officials to insist that the
ICRC be granted immediate, unimpeded, and continuing access to any
places of detention.
-- We have asked the United Kingdom, the presidency country of the
European Community (EC), and, through them, the other members of
the EC to make similar approaches.
-- We have asked the Russians to use their influence with the Serbs
to this same end.
-- We proposed and obtained a statement by the [UN] Security
Council yesterday evening which endorsed this demand and reminded
those involved in any abuses that they can be held individually
responsible for breaches of the Geneva conventions.
Today, we have called for an emergency, extraordinary meeting of
the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva to examine this situation
in more detail, to discuss gross human rights violations, and [to]
press for full access to detention camps. We look to the Human
Rights Commission to forcefully exercise its mandate in this regard
by appointing a special representative who should be granted access
to investigate these charges and report back to the members of the
United Nations with his recommendations. This will be the first-
ever such meeting by the UN Human Rights Commission. We have
been urging governments throughout the world to support this call
immediately, even before the formal proposal was circulated, so
that the meeting could take place as soon as possible. It has now
been circulated in Geneva, asking the 53 members for their views by
1 pm eastern daylight time on Monday, August 10. We hope to see
the necessary endorsement from at least 27 members even before
that, if possible. In addition, we are undertaking other steps
immediately.
-- We are calling on the CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] to invoke the appropriate measure of the CSCE
Human Dimension Mechanism in order to telescope the process of
choosing a rapporteur to look into the allegations.
-- We are undertaking renewed efforts to tighten sanctions
enforcement in addition to efforts we made earlier this month which
have met with some success. We will facilitate the deployment of
monitors to Romania to ensure that the effect of the UN sanctions on
the Serbian economy is as devastating as possible. We are
developing a Security Council resolution which would call on states
and organizations to collect substantiated information concerning
"war crimes" and make that information available to the Security
Council.
There are indications today that our urgings are being heard.
-- In Belgrade, [Yugoslav Prime Minister] Mr. [Milan] Panic promised
our charge [d'affaires] to invite international observers to sites of
alleged camps in Serbia and Montenegro. Mr. Panic also pledged his
support to the UN presidency statement demanding the opening of
camps run by Serbians in Bosnia.
-- Press reports indicate leaders of the so-called Serbian Republic
of Bosnia have said they are ready to open all facilities to
international inspection.
-- Bosnian President [Alija] Izetbegovic told our charge [d'affaires]
in Belgrade that he has offered access to international observers to
all facilities within Bosnia.
-- [Croatian] President [Franjo] Tudjman told our consul general in
Zagreb yesterday that he would contact Croatian leaders in Bosnia to
request their complete cooperation with the ICRC.
These promises are welcome, but what is important is real action.
We cannot allow excuses--such as those used in the past that the
safety of ICRC delegates could not be ensured--to block their
important mission. We will press to see that real action is achieved.
President Bush: Containing the Crisis in Bosnia and the Former
Yugoslavia
[Opening remarks from news conference, Colorado Springs, Colorado,
August 6, 1992]
A few remarks on the situation in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia
and what the United States--working with the international
community--is doing to contain and defuse this escalating crisis.
Like all Americans, I am outraged and horrified at the terrible
violence shattering the lives of innocent men, women, and children
in Bosnia. The aggressors and extremists pursue a policy--a vile
policy--of ethnic cleansing, deliberately murdering innocent
civilians [and] driving others from their homes. And already the war
has created over 2.2 million refugees, roughly the population of
greater Pittsburgh and Baltimore. This is, without a doubt, a true
humanitarian nightmare.
Now, the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia is a complex,
convoluted conflict that grows out [of] age-old animosities. The
blood of innocents is being spilled over century-old feuds. The lines
between enemies and even friends are jumbled and fragmented. Let
no one think there is an easy or a simple solution to this tragedy.
The violence will not end overnight, whatever pressure and means
the international community brings to bear. Blood feuds are very
difficult to resolve. Any lasting solution will only be found with the
active cooperation and participation of the parties themselves.
Those who understand the nature of this conflict understand that an
enduring solution cannot be imposed by force from outside on
unwilling participants.
Defusing this crisis and preventing its spread will require patience
and persistence by all members of the democratic community of
nations and key international organizations. Bringing peace again to
the Balkans will literally take years of work.
For months now, we've been working with other members of the
international community in pursuing a multifaceted and integrated
strategy for defusing and containing the [Balkan] conflict. Let me
explain the critical steps that we already have underway to help
defuse and to contain this crisis.
First, we must continue to work to see that food and medicine get to
the people of Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia, no matter what it
takes. To this end, I have directed the Secretary of State to press
hard for quick passage of [a] UN Security Council resolution
authorizing the use of all necessary measures to establish
conditions necessary for, and to facilitate the delivery of,
humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Hercegovina. This resolution is
critical--it is absolutely critical to our efforts to bring food and
medicine to the people of Bosnia.
This resolution will authorize the international community to use
force, if necessary, to deliver humanitarian relief supplies. My
heartfelt hope is that that will not prove necessary. But the
international community cannot stand by and allow innocent
children, women, and men to be starved to death. You can be assured
that should force prove necessary, I will do everything in my power
to protect the lives of any American servicemen or women involved
in this international mission of mercy.
To truly end the humanitarian nightmare, we must stop ethnic
cleansing and open any and all detention camps to international
inspection. We will not rest until the international community has
gained access to any and all detention camps.
Second, we must support the legitimate governments of Slovenia,
Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. To this end, I have decided that the
United States will move now to establish full diplomatic relations
with those governments. I will shortly submit to the Senate my
nominations for ambassadors to these posts.
Third, we must continue to isolate Serbia economically and
politically until all the UN Security Council resolutions are fully
implemented. We must continue to tighten economic sanctions on
Serbia so that all understand that there is a real price to be paid for
the Serbian Government's continued aggression. And the United
States proposes that the international community place monitors in
neighboring states to facilitate the work of those governments to
ensure strict compliance with the sanctions.
Fourth, we must engage in preventive diplomacy to preclude a
widening of the conflict into Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak, or
Macedonia. And, therefore, the United States is proposing that the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--CSCE--place
continuous monitoring missions in these locations to provide an
international presence and inhibit human rights abuses and violence.
Fifth, we must contain the conflict and prevent its spilling over into
neighboring states like Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and
Greece. And, to this end, the United States proposes that the
international community again place civilian monitors, thereby
reassuring these governments of our concern for their welfare and
inhibiting any aggression against them.
And sixth, we are consulting with our allies in NATO on all aspects
of this crisis and how the alliance--how the NATO alliance--might
be of assistance to the United Nations.
Now, these steps represent an integrated strategy for defusing and
containing this conflict. We've been working with the international
community to advance our work on each of these and will continue to
do so in the weeks ahead. It is through international cooperation--
through the UN, NATO, the EC [European Community], CSCE, [and] other
institutions--that we will be able to help bring peace to that
troubled region.
Thomas M.T. Niles, Assistant Secretary for European and
Canadian Affairs: US Position and Proposed Actions Concerning the
Yugoslav Crisis
[Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Washington, DC, August 11, 1992]
Mr. Chairman, now more than 1 year old, the Yugoslav crisis has
come to dominate foreign policy news. The images and the reporting
from that unhappy land remind us of past tragedies in Europe and
pose serious questions about the nature of post-Cold War Europe.
From the outset of the crisis, in June 1991, the United States has
taken a leading role in seeking to find a peaceful solution while
deterring Serbian aggression and providing urgently needed
humanitarian relief. Today, I would like briefly to review our
position and outline the actions we propose to take, particularly as
regards the humanitarian nightmare in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
In his August 6 statement, the President laid out a six-point
program which we are following.
-- We are working, through a new UNSC [UN Security Council]
resolution, to ensure, through the use of all necessary means, the
delivery of humanitarian aid and the opening of any and all detention
centers to international inspection and the guarantee of proper
treatment, medical care, and nourishment of those detained.
-- We are establishing immediately full diplomatic relations with
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia, further to support their
governments.
-- We are working with the international community to place
monitors in neighboring states to help assure strict compliance with
the UN sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.
-- We are engaging in preventative diplomacy to preclude the
conflict from spreading into