US Department of State Dispatch Supplement
VOL. 3, NO 6
Title: President's 30th CSCE Report,
Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act,
April 1, 1991-March 31, 1992
PA
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Sep, 15 19929/15/92
Category: Statements
Category: Reports
Region: Whole World
Country: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, USSR (former), Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Yugoslavia (former), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Subject: CSCE, Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid,
Media/Telecommunications
Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act
Text of the President's 30th CSCE Report, "Implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act, April 1, 1991 - March 31, 1992," submitted to
Congress on June 2, 1992
INTRODUCTION
The 30th report to Congress on the implementation of the principles
of the Final Act and other documents of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) appears during a momentous period.
The Fourth CSCE Follow-up Meeting is in session in Helsinki, marking
the great progress made since the Helsinki Final Act was signed in
1975. The report itself covers a period of dramatic change in Europe
which saw the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the
emergence of newly independent states.
In responding to the challenges of these developments, CSCE
experienced great growth and development. During the reporting
period, its membership increased from 35 to 51. It sought new ways
of dealing with the ethnic tension and aggressive nationalism that
have been unleashed by the fall of communism. It affirmed that its
concept of security goes beyond arms control and confidence- and
security-building measures to include political, social, economic,
and environmental factors. Above all, it made remarkable progress
in furthering development of a Euro-Atlantic community of open,
civil societies, with market economies, based on the rule of law.
With the urgent need in this new phase of CSCE to consolidate
progress already made toward democratization and to integrate new
members, implementation review takes on even greater importance.
Active, ongoing implementation review can help all members
establish a baseline of compliance, identify possible areas for
improvement, and find ways cooperatively to help bring about such
improvement. Implementation review can also play a major role in
conflict prevention by identifying and addressing human rights and
military security issues at an early stage before problems escalate
into open conflict. Thus, a key US goal at the Helsinki Follow-up
Meeting is to continue comprehensive implementation review of all
areas of CSCE commitments, emphasizing cooperative problem
solving when deficiencies are pointed out and concerted political
action in cases involving "clear, gross, and uncorrected" violations.
The following Implementation Review reflects some of these new
emphases. As mandated by Public Law 94-304, it focuses on
"actions by the signatories of the Final Act reflecting compliance
with or violation of the provisions of the Final Act." In view of new
developments in CSCE, the report also focuses on the extent of
progress being made by individual countries, especially CSCE's
newest members, in demonstrating commitment to CSCE principles.
OVERVIEW OF CSCE IMPLEMENTATION
At the heart of the CSCE process are the ten principles of the
Helsinki Final Act and additional commitments elaborated over the
years, which define the basic code of conduct that CSCE states have
adopted. The Helsinki principles are listed below:
-- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in
sovereignty;
-- Refraining from the threat of use of force;
-- Inviolability of frontiers;
-- Territorial integrity of states;
-- Peaceful settlement of disputes;
-- Non-intervention in internal affairs;
-- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;
-- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
-- Co-operation among states; and
-- Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.
In the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, these principles were
reaffirmed, launching a new era of hope for realization of a Europe
"whole and free," based on human rights, democracy, and rule of law.
During the reporting period, progress toward this goal, through
improved implementation of CSCE principles, was remarkable. In
Albania, free elections on March 22, 1992, brought to power the
first non-communist government since before WW II. Bulgaria held
free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections, and its new
national assembly adopted a constitution reflecting key CSCE
principles. Romania held its first local elections since the events of
December 1989. Russia and all the new states of the former Soviet
Union pledged to implement CSCE principles. Croatia, Slovenia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia also undertook such a pledge,
although the latter two were not CSCE members during the period
covered by the report.
There were serious problems with compliance as well. Yugoslavia's
dissolution in 1991-1992 was characterized by violence and
massive violations of CSCE principles. Repression of the ethnic
Albanian population of Kosovo and other minority groups in
Yugoslavia worsened. Violence resulting in over a thousand deaths
and major refugee flows continued over the Nagorno-Karabakh
enclave of Azerbaijan. There were continuing problems throughout
the CSCE community with racism, intolerance, anti-Semitism, and
discrimination against individuals belonging to national minorities.
DEVELOPMENTS IN CSCE IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW
The CSCE process, including implementation review, continued its
dynamic development along lines established by the 1990 Charter of
Paris. A new CSBMs [confidence- and security-building measures]
agreement was signed, furthering progress toward openness and
transparency in military security matters and contributing
substantially to confidence-building among the CSCE participating
States. Intersessional meetings on cultural heritage, national
minorities, the human dimension, and democratic institutions were
held. The CSCE Office for Free Elections was transformed into the
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The
political consultative process continued to develop with more
frequent meetings of the CSCE Council of Ministers [COM] and
Committee of Senior Officials [CSO] on an increasing number of
topics, especially the emergency situations in Yugoslavia and
Nagorno-Karabakh. CSCE mechanisms were invoked in response to
concerns about possible threats to security and violations of human
dimension commitments.
CSBMs
In the military security area, the second agreement on Confidence-
and Security Building Measures (CSBM), which supersedes all
previous CSBM agreements, was adopted by CSCE participating
States March 1992 in Vienna. The 1992 Vienna Document, which
expands upon the 1990 Vienna Document and extends the zone of
application to cover the territories of new CSCE members, enters
into force May 1, 1992. It contains a number of improved provisions
and some new CSBMs, including:
-- Annual exchange of data on stationed troops and equipment;
-- Voluntary hosting of visits to verify information exchanged on
stationed troops and equipment;
-- Provision for demonstration of new weapon and equipment types;
-- Lowered military exercise notification thresholds (from 13,000
troops and 300 tanks to 9,000 troops and 250 tanks);
-- Lowered observation thresholds for large-scale military
exercises (from 17,000 troops to 13,000 troops and 300 tanks for
ground force activities and from 5,000 troops to 3,500 troops for
amphibious landings and airborne assaults);
-- Constraints on size, frequency, and scheduling of notifiable
military exercises; [and]
-- The right to include other CSCE states on national CSBM
inspection teams.
The first Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIM),
mandated by the 1990 Vienna Document to review CSBMs
implementation, was held in Vienna, November 11-15, 1991. A
seminar on military doctrine (October 8-18, 1991) and shorter
seminars on defense conversion (February 19-21, 1992) and Western
concepts of civil-military relations (March 4-6, 1992) were held in
Vienna by the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center.
Intersessional Meetings
Although the focus in CSCE during the reporting period was less on
formulation of new commitments than on implementation of existing
ones, intersessional conferences and expert meetings continued to
examine areas of concern in the human dimension. The Krakow
Symposium on Cultural Heritage (May 28-June 7, 1991) focused on
the need for cooperation in preserving cultural heritage. The Geneva
Meeting on National Minorities (July 1-19, 1991) expanded on the
1990 Copenhagen Document by underlining that minority problems
should be addressed in the first instance through respect for
individual rights and the creation of democratic and legal systems
enabling those rights to be guaranteed to all citizens. The Moscow
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (September 10-
October 4, 1991) enhanced the Human Dimension Mechanism to
include good offices and rapporteur mission components and
expressly acknowledged for the first time that specific CSCE
commitments in the broad area of human rights and fundamental
freedoms are issues of legitimate international concern and not
exclusively the internal affairs of any one state. Moscow also
broadened commitments undertaken by CSCE states in several key
areas relating to human and civil rights, including independence of
the judiciary, freedom of expression, the role of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and women's rights. The Oslo Seminar on
Democratic Institutions (November 4-15, 1991) addressed the need
to consolidate progress in building democratic institutions and to
support new initiatives in this area, especially under the auspices of
the Office for Free Elections (since January 31, 1992, the Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) in Warsaw.
Political Consultative Process
The 1990 Charter of Paris called for strengthening the political
consultative process in CSCE through more regular meetings of
senior officials, ministers, and heads of state or government. This
process is now the central CSCE forum.
As CSCE's highest decision-making body, with a mandate from the
Paris Charter to deal with any issue relevant to security and
cooperation in Europe, the Council of Ministers (the Council or COM)
held its first meeting June 19-20, 1991, in Berlin. As a result of
the ministers' deliberations, Albania was admitted to full CSCE
membership and a strong statement calling for a ceasefire in
Yugoslavia was issued. (For text of this and other CSCE statements
on the Yugoslav crisis, see Appendix 1.) At the September 1992 ad
hoc meeting in Moscow, the Council admitted Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania to full CSCE membership.
At its second full meeting January 30-31, 1992, in Prague, the
Council agreed to full membership for all former Soviet republics
except Georgia on the basis of written pledges to implement CSCE
commitments. (For text of these pledges in the model accession
letter, see Appendix 2.) Slovenia and Croatia were granted observer
status at the same time. The Council issued another declaration on
the conflict in Yugoslavia and agreed to send rapporteur missions to
all new participating states and Nagorno-Karabakh. (For Council and
CSO statements on Nagorno-Karabakh, see Appendix 3. For texts of
Berlin and Prague Summaries of Conclusion, see Appendix 4.)
Georgia, Slovenia, and Croatia were admitted to full membership
March 24, 1992, at the Council of Ministers meeting in Helsinki.
[Bosnia was admitted on April 30, 1992.]
The Charter of Paris also established the Committee of Senior
Officials (CSO), a working group and executive body at the
ambassadorial/political director level charged with preparing for
meetings of the Council, carrying out their decisions, reviewing
current issues, and considering future work of the CSCE. Between
Council sessions, the CSO acts as the Council's agent. During the
reporting period, especially as it dealt with developments in
Yugoslavia, the CSO was augmented and strengthened. In a series of
emergency meetings on the crisis, the CSO strongly condemned
violations of CSCE principles and approved EC [European Community]
mediation efforts. The CSO also laid the groundwork in March 1992
meetings for a peace conference scheduled to be convened in Minsk.
(For CSCE statements on Nagorno-Karabakh, see Appendix 3.)
CSCE Mechanisms
As part of the political consultative process, various CSCE
mechanisms were invoked during the reporting period to address
implementation concerns.
The Human Dimension Mechanism (HDM), established to consider
possible violations of CSCE human rights commitments, was used
once during the reporting period. On March 28, 1992, Austria invoked
the first step of the mechanism, i.e., a bilateral request for
information, regarding Turkey's treatment of its citizens of Kurdish
descent.
The Unusual Military Activities Mechanism (UMA), which permits any
state with a "security concern" to query another participating State
about military activities it views as potentially threatening, was
used three times concerning Yugoslavia. On June 27, 1991, Italy
invoked the UMA in response to Yugoslav military activities near the
Italian border. On July 1, 1991, Austria called for a meeting to
consider Yugoslav military activities near the Austrian border and in
Austrian airspace. On August 26, 1991, Hungary invoked the
mechanism asking the Yugoslav government for information on
recent overflights of Hungarian territory.
The Hazardous Military Incidents Mechanism was invoked for the
first time on January 14, 1992, by Portugal on behalf of the EC in
the wake of the downing of a helicopter carrying an EC monitor over
Yugoslav territory.
The Emergency Meeting Mechanism agreed at the June 1991 Berlin
Council of Ministers was used almost immediately when the United
States, Austria, Hungary, and the countries of the Western European
Union (WEU) called for an emergency meeting of the Committee of
Senior Officials in response to the eruption of full-scale conflict in
Yugoslavia. At the first such meeting (July 3-4, 1991), it was
agreed that the Chairman-in-Office could re-convene the committee
as necessary to deal with the Yugoslav conflict. During the
reporting period, seven additional emergency meetings were held on
Yugoslavia.
CSCE rapporteur missions also played a key role in implementation
review during the reporting period. Following the precedent set at
the Berlin COM meeting for linking Albania's membership to the
dispatch of a CSCE rapporteur mission, the 1992 Prague COM meeting
agreed that the same should be done in connection with the
admission of the former Soviet republics. Such missions were
subsequently undertaken in March 1992 to Ukraine, Moldova, and
Belarus and to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Others
were planned for the near future. The CSO dispatched rapporteur
missions to Yugoslavia in December 1991 and January 1992 and to
Nagorno-Karabakh in February 1992.
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
In June 1991, Secretary of State Baker called for expansion of the
Warsaw Office for Free Elections into an office for encouraging
democratic institution building in the countries of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. Such expansion and a new, more
descriptive name--the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights--were agreed at the 1992 Prague COM meeting. The Warsaw
office is now mandated to support a range of activities in the areas
of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and to provide
institutional support for the Human Dimension Mechanism.
The Warsaw office was very active in carrying out its mandate
during the reporting period. It organized election seminars for
election officials in Bulgaria and Albania and coordinated the
activities of international observers of the October 13, 1991,
Bulgarian national elections; October 27, 1991, Polish general
elections; and the March 22, 1992, Albanian parliamentary elections.
The Warsaw office also participated in the rapporteur missions to
Albania, September 16-20, 1991; to Yugoslavia, December 12, 1991-
January 10, 1992; and to the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union, February 12-18, 1992.
US Implementation Efforts in New States
The United States is actively committed to full integration of the
former Soviet republics into CSCE. To demonstrate this
commitment, Secretary of State Baker visited Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine in December 1991 and Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in
February 1992 to emphasize the importance of their adherence to
CSCE principles and their commitment to becoming part of the
democratic, market-oriented world community. US Ambassador John
Maresca made visits to the area, at Secretary Baker's request, to
explain the CSCE process and to encourage efforts toward full
implementation of CSCE principles.
The US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, an
independent agency created by the US Congress, undertook a major
program of election and referendum observation during the reporting
period, observing and reporting on elections or referendums in
Albania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia,
Armenia, Turkmenistan, Moldova, and Uzbekistan.
COUNTRY REPORTS
The following reports focus on certain member countries where
further progress on meeting CSCE standards appears necessary or
where remarkable progress has recently been achieved. Because the
USSR and Yugoslavia were intact for much of the reporting period,
they are dealt with in single reports followed by overviews of the
newly independent states. Each country report contains an
assessment of CSCE implementation overall and specific
assessments of the three traditional CSCE areas: security,
economics (including science and technology and the environment),
and the human dimension.
Systematic reporting on the former Soviet republics is complicated
by the varying accessibility of information from state to state. In
states where US embassies have been established longest, as in
Russia, examples of CSCE implementation concerns are most readily
available, although Russia has one of the most positive records of
human rights compliance and democratic reform.
Albania
General Assessment. Albania has continued to make progress toward
establishing a pluralistic, democratic government and ensuring
respect for human rights since the country's first post-WW II multi-
party elections were held March 31, 1991. Although changes in
Albania at first came more slowly than elsewhere in Eastern Europe,
gradual improvements in the political system have led to general
respect for freedom of speech, press, religion, and association.
Elections held on March 22, 1992, brought to power the first
completely non-communist government since before WW II. The new
democratic government appears committed to instituting reforms to
end the abuses of power that were commonplace during 47 years of
communist rule.
On June 19, 1991, Albania was admitted to the CSCE after agreeing
to implement all CSCE principles and standards. Although there was
considerable political change during the reporting period, economic
reform was slower. During the 1992 election campaign, the
Albanian government was criticized by CSCE countries, including the
United States, for not living up to its commitments to safeguard the
rights of members of the ethnic Greek minority party to take part in
the elections by presenting their own candidates. Overall, however,
these elections represented a substantial and commendable
improvement over the 1991 national elections, particularly with
respect to commitments to free and fair campaigns and voting
procedures under the Copenhagen Document.
Security. As has been the case with all elements of Albanian
society during this period, the Albanian military faced the challenge
of responding to the democratization of the country. The Albanian
military command and civilian leaders in the Ministry of Defense
have sought out their counterparts from Turkey and other states for
regional talks on how to modernize command and control
mechanisms. Albanian officials have also conferred with US
military officials from European headquarters in Germany.
During the reporting period, Albanian officials were very concerned
with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Although Albania has
kept its forces at a state of readiness along the border, at no time
has any government leader advocated the use of military force. In
particular, the repression of the Albanian minority in Kosovo and
shooting incidents by Yugoslav border guards have continued to
concern Albanian government officials and the public. While some
leaders call for the union of lands within former Yugoslavia
inhabited by Albanians with Albania itself, none has yet urged that
this be accomplished by force.
Tensions along the Albanian-Greek border have also resulted in a
higher state of readiness by both Albanian and Greek militaries.
There have been shooting incidents involving Albanian refugees on
the border. Albania has pledged that it has no claims on any Greek
territory; Greece has made similar pledges concerning Albanian
territory.
With regard to fulfilling CSBM obligations, Albania did not forecast
any notifiable military activities for 1991 or 1992. Albania failed
to provide data on its forces and equipment and its national military
budget under the annual CSBM information regime but is expected to
provide this data in 1992. Albania plans shortly to complete its
requirements for full connectivity to the CSCE communications
network which is used to facilitate the transmission of CSBM-
related information.
Economics. The economic situation in Albania is grave. Land reform,
involving distribution of the properties of former state farms and
collectives to private peasant farmers, was implemented, but in the
absence of means through which to obtain financial assistance and
supplies, agricultural yields plummeted 56% in 1991. Virtually all
industry ground to a halt for lack of spare parts for machinery and
raw materials. Services, particularly those related to finance and
the economy, were not a priority under the communist regime, but
they now have begun to improve. Unemployment at the end of the
reporting period was approximately 50%.
In 1991, the parliament approved laws to permit foreign investment
and to safeguard it against expropriation. However, substantive
economic reform was held up by the former parliament and awaited
the outcome of the elections. Now that a non-communist coalition
is in power, officials are expected to move quickly to reach
agreement with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and to replace
the command economy with market incentives.
Albania survived throughout most of the reporting period on foreign
assistance. The United States, Italy, Greece, and Germany provided
most of the aid, though other CSCE countries also contributed. The
governments of the United States, Canada, the EC, and certain other
European countries are now preparing to assist the new Albanian
government with agricultural support, technical assistance, and
training programs for the new crop of leaders who will replace the
old regime's apparatchiks.
In certain sections of the country, most notably Elbasan and Fier,
there has been very serious damage done to the environment by the
misguided "growth first" policies of the former regime. (For
example, the metal refineries near Elbasan were built on a plain
surrounded by mountains, and air pollution, which cannot be
dissipated by wind, hovers over the city.) The new government may
begin to address some of these problems, but it will be constrained
by the lack of domestic expertise, the terrible state of the economy,
and the absence of any public funds for clean-up. Moreover, in
comparison with most other former East bloc countries, Albania has
barely begun to explore opportunities for environmental assistance
available through international organizations such as the UN
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).
Human Dimension. After elections on March 31, 1991, the
communist government used force on several occasions to suppress
demonstrations by students in Tirana and the northern city of
Shkodra, where four persons were killed by police. A general strike
in May and June 1991 led to the fall of the government and the
formation of a coalition government in which opposition groups held
several of the 24 cabinet positions. The non-communists withdrew
from the coalition government in December, and new elections were
held March 22, 1992.
The March 22 elections were judged by most diplomatic,
international, and domestic Albanian observers to be free and fair.
A coalition led by the Democratic Party, also including the
Republican and Social-Democratic Parties, gained 100 of 140 seats
in the parliament. The Socialist Party (which changed its name from
the Party of Labor, or Communist Party, in June, 1991) won 38 seats.
Albania is a relatively homogeneous country. Ethnic Albanians
constitute 93% of the population; ethnic Greeks, 5%. The ethnic
Greek minority is represented by the OMONIA organization.
Estimates of the size of the Greek population range from 50,000 to
100,000 people, living primarily in the southern districts of the
country near the border with Greece.
Ethnic identity was suppressed under the communist dictatorship,
and cross-border contacts and cultural expression by ethnic Greeks
was severely limited. Only in the past two years have restrictions
on the use of the Greek language in Albania been relaxed. Ethnic
Greeks now have their own schools, primarily in the districts of
Saranda and Gjirokaster, where a Greek language newspaper is also
published.
Many ethnic Greeks and Albanians claiming to be of Greek origin fled
to Greece during late 1990 and early 1991. Greek authorities have
permitted them to remain, and many now work in large cities such
as Athens, Thessaloniki, and Ionina. In early 1992, allegations
surfaced that Greek border officials abused several Albanians who
sought to enter Greece illegally, or who had already done so,
resulting in at least two deaths. Reports of these border incidents
sparked anti-Greek riots in Saranda, Albania, where shops of ethnic
Greeks were looted and the headquarters of OMONIA were destroyed.
The law regulating the March 1992 parliamentary elections excluded
ethnically based organizations. As a result OMONIA candidates were
banned from participating in the contests. The Albanian authorities
were severely criticized for having excluded the country's only
ethnic Greek organization. In its place, the Unity for Human Rights
Party was founded, which fielded a slate of principally ethnic Greek
candidates and received the backing of the ethnic Greek
communities. Two ethnic Greek deputies were elected to
parliament, one from Saranda and the other from Gjirokaster. Ethnic
Greeks are also represented in the new cabinet of the democratic
government.
During this reporting period, the parliament abrogated the Albanian
constitution of 1976 and, pending adoption of a new constitution,
passed a series of constitutional provisions guaranteeing basic
human rights and declaring Albania to be a parliamentary republic
based on free elections. The assembly approved legislation to de-
politicize the army, police, and court system. All political prisoners
have been released. Freedom of speech, religion, travel, and the
press have been established, as have independent trade unions. A
major concern of the new, non-communist government is to move
quickly to dismantle the state security apparatus.
Bulgaria
General Assessment. Bulgaria continued political and economic
reforms during the reporting period at a rapid pace. After free and
fair parliamentary elections in October 1991, the former opposition
Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) gained the largest share of seats
in the parliament and formed a government led by Prime Minister
Filip Dimitrov. The parliamentary majority is held by a coalition of
the UDF and the predominantly ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights
and Freedoms (MRF). In January, incumbent President and former UDF
Chairman Zhelyu Zhelev emerged the victor from Bulgaria's first
ever direct presidential elections. The Grand National Assembly,
elected in June 1990 with a socialist (former communist) majority,
adopted a new constitution in July 1991. The constitution came
under fire from more radical UDF reformers in the parliament,
several of whom went on a 10-day hunger strike protesting its
passage. Their primary criticisms were that the constitution did
not go far enough in protecting human rights or ridding the country
of the remaining vestiges of communism. The current UDF-led
government is addressing de-communization through legislation.
One of the most controversial and problematic provisions in the
constitution is a prohibition on ethnic and religious-based political
parties. The Bulgarian government was strongly criticized by CSCE
countries, including the United States, for not living up to its
commitments to safeguard the rights of members of the Turkish
minority in establishing this law. In the lead-up to the October
parliamentary elections, efforts were made by the former
authorities to employ this provision to ban the MRF from independent
participation. Bulgaria's democratic forces opposed this ban, and
the MRF garnered nearly eight percent of the total vote and 24 of
240 seats in the parliament, making the group the third largest
force in the assembly. The UDF government has pledged to change
this constitutional provision.
General observance of human rights and treatment of national
minorities continued to improve during the reporting period. Mother
tongue language classes were implemented according to an MRF plan
for all ethnic Turkish children and plans made for future
implementation of similar programs for other language groups
including Romani (Gypsy), Greek, and Armenian. While the
assimilation campaigns of the communist regime have been
abandoned, some residual societal discrimination against minority
groups remains. Extra-parliamentary nationalist parties continued
to stir up anti-Turkish sentiments, often with the assistance of the
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP).
Security. Bulgaria made enormous strides in paring down its
military structures to a manageable size and establishing civilian
oversight and openness. In November 1991, the first civilian
defense minister in postwar Bulgaria took office. A restructuring of
the defense ministry commenced, including retirement of many
officers who had served the former system. Civilian advisers were
also appointed to key positions to increase transparency in the
decision making process. Great progress was made in the number of
contacts between the Bulgarian military and Western military
services, including both high-level (e.g., NATO Secretary General
Woerner) and numerous working-level contacts.
The Bulgarian government signed security agreements with Greece
and Turkey. Bulgaria has signed bilateral treaties of friendship with
most of the former East bloc countries and some Western European
nations. The Bulgarians have facilitated inspections within the
framework of multilateral agreements, and there were several
visits to naval facilities by vessels from US and other Western
navies. Travel restrictions were lifted for US diplomatic personnel.
During the reporting period, Bulgaria received a CSBM inspection
from France on November 20, 1991. With regard to military
activities, Bulgaria forecast no notifiable exercises for 1991 or
1992. Under the provisions of Vienna Document 1990 (VD 90),
Bulgaria received an evaluation visit from the UK [United Kingdom]
on January 15, 1992. On January 28, 1992, Bulgaria conducted an
evaluation of a unit in Greece. Pursuant to the Vienna Document
provisions on annual information exchange, Bulgaria submitted
military data on its forces and equipment and its national military
budget. Bulgaria is connected to the CSCE communication network.
Bulgaria has been active in encouraging peaceful settlement of
disputes in what has been a very stormy period for the Balkans.
Although concerned about possible overflow of the Yugoslav conflict
or the possible influx of refugees as a result, the Bulgarians have
acted in a very restrained manner in response to events in its war-
torn neighbor. Bulgaria was the first country to recognize all four
former Yugoslav republics and moved rapidly to recognize and
establish diplomatic relations with the former Soviet republics.
Economics. Bulgaria progressed rapidly in 1991 and the first part of
1992 toward a market-based economy. Key parts of the reform
program were enacted by the parliament, including a new
commercial code, a foreign investment law allowing full
repatriation of profits, a new banking law, and bills for restitution
of property confiscated by the communist government. The UDF-
controlled parliament elected in October 1991 passed a series of
amendments to the law on the return of agricultural land in March
1992. Anyone able to document ownership of land before
collectivization will be able to make a claim to the government for
its return, up to 30 hectares. A highly flexible draft privatization
law was praised by the World Bank, and [passed in April, 1992]
should provide the impetus for further reform.
The review period has been one of many economic hardships for the
average Bulgarian. Inflation has run at approximately 70-75%, and
unemployment exceeded 10% in early 1992. Chronic energy
shortages forced the government to enforce electricity rationing of
three hours on and one hour off for much of the winter. At the same
time, numerous small private firms have appeared, offering for the
first time a broad range of consumer goods. In contrast to previous
winters, food is now in constant supply, and market forces are
governing most prices and the availability of products. Prices are
much higher, but people are buying. In December 1991, the country's
first stock exchange opened and several commodity exchanges have
been active as well.
The Bulgarian government has been highly active in the areas of
environmental protection and scientific exchange. The government
has concluded an agreement on environmental protection with
Romania, and held discussions on protection of the Black Sea. The
Bulgarians have worked closely with AID [US Agency for
International Development], EPA [US Environmental Protection
Agency] , the EC, and international financial institutions to develop a
broadly based environmental strategy. They have also participated
actively in the environmental bodies of the UN Economic Commission
for Europe and have signed several multilateral environmental
agreements, e.g., the ECE Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context. A branch of the regional
environmental center in Budapest is due to open spring 1992 in
Sofia. The government has also cooperated closely with
international groups in developing a new energy policy and upgrading
the facilities at the Kozluduy nuclear power plant in northern
Bulgaria. Some tensions have developed between government and
labor over decisions to close highly polluting industrial/mining
operations, but thus far these disputes have reached negotiated
conclusions.
Human Dimension. In 1991, Bulgaria held a second round of post-
communist parliamentary elections and the first ever direct
presidential elections. After a wide array of domestic and
international observers judged the parliamentary elections to have
been conducted in an openly free and fair manner despite
administrative difficulties, it was deemed unnecessary by most
international groups to send observers to the January 1992
presidential elections.
The Grand National Assembly elected in June 1990 in Bulgaria's first
round of free elections passed a new constitution in July 1991. The
Assembly was dominated by members of the Socialist Party (the
renamed Communists) and was seen by many members of the then-
opposition UDF as tainted. The new constitution creates a
parliamentary republic with a clear separation of powers and
guarantees of basic human rights. However, in some areas it falls
short of expectations by relegating important rights to subsequent
legislation rather than enshrining them in the constitution. A two-
thirds majority of the parliament is required to pass constitutional
amendments. No changes are expected in the near future.
The most controversial aspect of the constitution has been a
provision banning ethnic or religious-based political parties. This
provision was employed prior to the October 1991 parliamentary
elections in an effort to prevent the predominantly Muslim and
ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms from participating
on an independent ticket. An electoral commission ruling that the
party's registration from the 1990 elections remained valid allowed
them to participate; however, a challenge to the MRF's legitimacy
from the Bulgarian Socialist Party remains before the constitutional
court. [The court ruled in the MRF's favor in April 1992.] The 24
seats currently held by the MRF in the parliament provide the pivotal
number of votes to allow the UDF to govern in an informal coalition
with the MRF. A similar clause in the previous constitution was
successfully employed to prevent the registration of other groups,
including a party representing Gypsy (Roma) rights. We know of no
registrations of political parties representing the interests of
ethnic or religious minorities since the adoption of the new
constitution.
Respect for the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities
improved dramatically on the whole. All legal restrictions on
observance of traditions, religious customs, and the speaking of
native languages have been removed. Members of the dominant
ethnic group in areas of mixed population were elected to city
councils and mayorships in local elections, and most areas are now
governed by a representative mix of officials. With the beginning of
the 1991 school year, the government enacted a program, judged
satisfactory by the MRF, allowing ethnic Turkish children to study
Turkish as a mother tongue voluntarily as part of the regular school
program. Preparations are also underway to introduce Gypsy and
other languages for which there is a demand. Nevertheless, some
discrimination and inequities in the treatment of minorities remain.
Ethnic Turks, Gypsies, and Pomaks claimed they were usually among
the first to be laid off in any factory closures. They suffer widely
from exclusion from positions of responsibility. Muslims and
Gypsies also were reportedly offered only the most inferior housing
in many cities.
In early 1992, the government directorate on religious affairs ruled
that the 1985 election of the Chief Mufti and the 1971 election of
the Orthodox Patriarch were illegitimate, and that new elections
should be held in accordance with each organization's charter. Both
individuals had long been under attack for alleged collaboration with
the communist government and the secret services. New elections
are expected in late 1992.
Religious education is in no way limited. University theological
faculties closed by the former regime have been re-established, and
a number of Muslim religious institutes have been opened.
The UDF government has undertaken a series of measures aimed at
breaking the monopoly on the civil service long enjoyed by
supporters of the Communist Party. This has included purges in
many ministries of employees past retirement age and of those who
are either unqualified for the positions they held or were given their
jobs as a direct result of their support for the party. The UDF/MRF
parliamentary majority also passed a bill requiring confiscation of
the property of the Communist Party and its constituent
organizations.
One of the sectors most greatly affected by structural reforms and
personnel changes is the judiciary. Many prosecutors and judges
compromised by their service under the former regime or
participation in the assimilation campaign against the ethnic Turks
have been retired or replaced. A new prosecutor and chairman of the
Supreme Court were named in early 1992. The Minister of Justice
has begun reforms aimed at bringing the prosecution function into
the ministry and revamping administrative and criminal procedures.
Procedures have also become increasingly transparent and open to
observation by human rights groups and interested parties.
Romania
General Assessment. Romania took a number of important steps in
the last year toward improved implementation of CSCE principles.
On December 8, 1991, Romania ratified a new constitution, which
contains guarantees for fundamental freedoms and provides for a
multi-party democracy. Local elections were held in February 1992,
resulting in the first free elections of mayors and local counselors
in almost 50 years. While the electoral process was often
disorganized and suffered a number of shortcomings, almost all
political groups, as well as domestic and international observers,
accepted the validity of the results and recognized the elections as
registering significant advances in meeting CSCE criteria and
generally accepted international standards for free and fair
elections. This important step forward for democracy contrasted
with the events of September 1991, when Prime Minister Petre
Roman was removed from office in the wake of violent
demonstrations by striking coal miners.
Respect for human rights increased in Romania during the last year,
despite disturbing events in certain areas. Progress was made in
reforming the judicial system, including constitutional bans against
illegal searches, torture, and the death penalty. People were
generally free to state and hear a variety of opinions, and the new
constitution contains provisions for freedom of expression. The
government no longer monopolizes television, radio, or the print
media. However, Romanian Television (RTV), the sole station with
nationwide broadcasting capabilities, remains under state control,
and the independent press continues to suffer from problems of
newsprint cost and availability and the state-controlled distribution
system. Political parties fielding candidates in the local elections
were allowed free air time on state-run television.
Beatings of independent journalists and opposition activists under
suspicious circumstances also marred this positive progress on
human rights. Romanian authorities did not consistently investigate
these cases or prosecute offenders; there have been no prosecutions
in these cases. There were continuing, credible reports of
interference with the right to privacy of Romanians, including
surveillance of domestic opposition. Gypsies are subject to societal
discrimination and some Gypsy communities were physically
attacked, leading to the burning of Gypsy homes. Also disturbing
was the prominence of extreme nationalist publications, which often
fprinted virulent articles against ethnic Hungarians, Gypsies, and
Jews. The government has on several occasions publicly denounced
anti-Semitism.
On the international scene, Romania signed bilateral treaties with
other European countries reaffirming its commitment to Helsinki
principles and the CSCE process. Romania did not conduct any
notifiable activities under the CSBM agreement.
Security. In the conduct of CSBM activities, Romania forecast no
notifiable exercises for 1991 or 1992. The government has fulfilled
the initial reporting requirements of the 1990 Vienna Document.
Romania does not plan to hold any notifiable military activities in
1992 and no military activities involving more than 40,000 troops in
1993. Romania received two evaluation visits during the reporting
period. One visit was conducted by the UK on October 22, 1991, and
the other was conducted by France on October 23, 1991. Romania
exchanged military data on its forces and equipment in accordance
with CSBM requirements but failed to provide information on its
national military budget. Romania is connected to the CSCE
communication network.
Romania ratified an "Open Skies" agreement with Hungary in
December 1991 and is negotiating or has concluded friendship and
cooperation treaties with its neighbors. The proposed Romanian-
Hungarian Friendship Treaty continues to be stalled.
Romania has not accepted civilian control of its military. The
current Minister of Defense is a military officer, and the senior
positions in the ministry continue to be held by military officers.
Romania is seeking to develop counter-terrorism cooperation with
other countries. In December 1991, the Romanian government issued
a public statement condemning terrorism in all forms and supporting
the US, UK, and French demands on Libya in response to the bombings
of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772.
Economics. Romania has largely completed the process of creating a
legal framework for a market economy. However, its record on
implementation of market reforms remains mixed. Most importantly
and basically, Article 41 of the new constitution (December 1991)
guarantees the right of private property, though foreigners cannot
own land. The second privatization law (Law 58 of August 1991)
moved the privatization process forward but would leave a
substantial share of industry under government control. No large
enterprise has yet been sold or allowed to fail. A new law
regulating the intelligence service permits that organization to own
and operate its own businesses. The foreign investment law (Law 35
of April 1991) allows a variety of foreign investment options. The
only restriction which remains is a legal provision preventing
foreigners from owning land. In January 1992, Romania adopted a
harmonized tariff system and set a maximum tariff of 30%. A new,
modern patent law has been enacted providing stronger protection
for intellectual property rights.
In an institutional sense, Romania is moving toward a free economy
by giving the national bank more regulatory and supervisory powers.
The Romanian Development Agency is more active in encouraging and
facilitating foreign investment.
In the agricultural sector, land reform appears to have slowed.
Despite the fact that the land law has been in force since February
1991, little progress has been made in transferring land titles to
private individuals.
Access to credit is limited owing to tight monetary policies and an
inadequate commercial banking infrastructure. Access to foreign
exchange is also limited. The foreign exchange regime adopted in
November 1991 failed to achieve the established policy goal of
allowing full, fair, and rapid access to foreign exchange for all
Romanians. Finally, recent restrictions on independent exchange
houses severely limit possibilities for Romanian citizens to obtain
hard currency for travel abroad.
Romania operated under an IMF standby arrangement for most of
1991, consistently meeting performance criteria until the end of the
final quarter of the program. Several IMF performance targets were
relaxed, partly in recognition of limited external financing. By
mutual agreement the arrangement was terminated in January 1992.
A major step backward in the move to a free market occurred in
January 1992 when the government allowed credit to expand in order
to finance inter-enterprise debt arrears. This contributed to the
early termination of the IMF standby arrangement.
The government appears committed to reducing direct and indirect
subsidies by the end of 1993. Nevertheless, it tries to control
prices and profits indirectly. Government Decision 776 (November
1991) limits the markup and profit margin from wholesale to retail
sales. In addition, the decision requires government approval and
notification for changes in the prices of certain goods.
Romanian officials appear to have a realistic view of the current
environmental situation in Romania and the steps needed to correct
past environmental abuses. Socialist industrialization plans took
little heed of environmental concerns and resulted in a variety of
serious environmental problems. Romania has also suffered from a
relatively high turnover of senior environmental officials. The
solutions to these problems will require considerable funding for
the restructuring of industrial production to reflect real
environmental costs and reduce potentially toxic emissions, but
Romania has limited financial resources to begin addressing these
problems. Little progress on environmental concerns was made
during the reporting period. Nevertheless, the Romanian government
has committed itself to improving the environment as the economy
is being restructured. A World Bank/EPA/AID team spent February
1992 in Romania assessing the state of the environment and
planning a seminar to be held in May 1992 to help develop Romania's
environmental strategy.
Romania is active in international meetings concerning the
environment and has signed key agreements on environmental
transboundary air pollution. In June 1992, the government plans to
sign the Biodiversity Convention and the Climate Change Convention
at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The
Danube delta's role as a world resource is slowly being
acknowledged by Romanians living in the area.
A new environmental law is expected to be passed in the coming
year. The law calls for an environmental tax to fund cleanup and
modernization projects. In the strategy for industrial restructuring
announced in March 1992 by the Ministry of Industry, one of the ten
program goals is to ensure the compatibility of the new industrial
structure with the environment.
Romanian scientists and technology centers engage in exchanges
with other countries and multilateral organizations. Some
cooperation with US institutions and scientists is funded by non-
governmental organizations (National Academy of Sciences, IREX) or
as part of other broader public programs (Fulbright Program,
International Visitors Program, National Institutes of Health, etc.).
Human Dimension. Romania's new constitution, passed by a
referendum on December 8, 1991, contains provisions for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience,
expression, movement, assembly, and association. The structure of
the government is envisioned as a democratically elected bicameral
legislature and president, with an independent judiciary.
There are concerns, however, about how the new constitution and
some new legislation can be interpreted and applied. For example,
some legal protections are subordinate, under law, to considerations
of "national security and public order," concepts which are not
clearly defined. Moreover, Romanians continue to report that the
government interferes with their privacy and political activities
through the monitoring of conversations and the interception of
correspondence. The government, while acknowledging that some of
the allegations are true, has not investigated them vigorously or
taken steps publicly to stop the abuses. In addition, legal
protections available in principle are often not fully respected. For
example, human rights groups report that few defendants have
access to a lawyer during questioning by police or before trial and
that beatings are common in police lockups and prisons. In March
1992, police conducted searches of several churches and homes of
ethnic Hungarians, apparently without appropriate authorization.
The local prosecutor filed a protest against the police actions.
Controversy continues to surround the Romanian Intelligence Service
(SRI). Though the SRI's legal powers are limited to investigation and
do not include the authority to arrest, there has been concern that
the SRI engages in political surveillance.
In a renewed incursion into Bucharest in September 1991, striking
coal miners vehemently protested their deteriorating standard of
living, assaulted government headquarters, the Presidential Palace,
the TV station, and besieged the parliament. At least three people
died and several hundred were injured. No one has been arrested in
connection with the riots. In their wake, Prime Minister Roman and
his government were removed from office when President Iliescu
accepted the miners' demands for their ouster. Serious questions
have been raised about the role of the security services, particularly
the Romanian Intelligence Service, in these events.
In a significant step toward democracy in Romania, local elections
for mayors and other local officials took place in February 1992, for
the first time since December 1989. The campaign was notable for
the relative absence of violence and intimidation as compared to the
May 1990 elections, and improved access to television for political
parties. Nevertheless, there were reports of isolated threats,
incidents of physical intimidation, and harassment, as well as other
electoral irregularities. Perhaps the most serious incident occurred
when a local court disqualified the ethnic Hungarian party's
candidate for mayor in Tirgu-Mures (the scene of serious inter-
ethnic conflict in March 1990) on dubious grounds. Considerable
confusion in the electoral process also posed problems during the
elections, with the electoral law not being applied consistently
across the country. All political parties, except those of the
extreme nationalist left, however, accepted the validity of the
election results. Thousands of domestic electoral observers made
important contributions to the successful completion of the
elections.
The Romanian government issued a statement on national minorities
on November 20, 1991, stating that "discrimination based on race,
ethnic, or national origin, as well as any urge to national, racial, or
religious hatred are prohibited" and that "public authorities shall
encourage inter-ethnic tolerance and understanding and shall
renounce and fight national hatred extremism, racism, and anti-
Semitism." However, the document was given little domestic
publicity. Romania's new constitution contains provisions against
discrimination based on "race, nationality, ethnic origin, language,
religion, sex, opinion, political opinion, political adherence, property
or social origin."
Nevertheless, minorities issues and ethnic tensions remained focal
points in Romania during the past year, with chauvinistic elements
of Romanian society increasing their visibility. Leaders of the
ethnic Hungarian and Jewish communities were targets of death
threats, and there were repeated attacks in the extremist press
(which includes some of the most widely read papers in Romania)
against minorities, especially ethnic Hungarians and Jews. Extreme
nationalism also surfaced in several parliamentary debates,
including acrimonious debate over a contentious report on treatment
of Romanians in predominantly ethnic Hungarian counties in
Transylvania. Results of the local elections showed that nationalist
parties have increased in popularity since the May 1990 elections.
Anti-Gypsy attitudes are common in almost all elements of
Romanian society. There were a number of violent incidents
directed against Gypsy communities during the last year, and public
authorities have generally not acted to defend them or sought to
prosecute leaders of anti-Gypsy mob violence. The Romanian
government has tried to institute some programs designed to aid
Gypsies, including special educational classes for Gypsy children, a
short television program in the Romany language, and attempts to
recruit Gypsies into the police force.
Serious tensions between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians persist,
exacerbated by extremists on both sides. While conditions for
ethnic Hungarians have improved since the Ceaucescu era, anti-
Hungarian attitudes are also common. Ethnic Hungarians also
continue to report that they are discriminated against in Romania.
There is continued controversy about the availability of education in
the Hungarian language. Ethnic Hungarians also seek reinstatement
of a government-funded, Hungarian-language university eliminated
early in the communist period. Representatives of Romania's ethnic
Hungarian community also complained about aspects of the
constitution affecting the rights of persons belonging to minorities,
for example, the deletion of a draft article that stipulated that,
when appearing in a court of law, "citizens belonging to national
minorities may use their mother tongue." According to Article 127,
as it now stands, members of ethnic minorities have the right to the
services of an interpreter in a court of law; this right is ensured
free of charge in criminal trials.
President Iliescu and some other Romanian authorities have strongly
criticized ethnic Hungarian leaders who advocate an expansion of
minority rights. Many strongly anti-Hungarian articles appeared in
the press, including the pro-regime media. On occasion, Romanian
border police have confiscated Hungarian language materials and
harassed people carrying these publications.
Many articles with strongly anti-Semitic content appeared in the
extremist press and occasionally in the pro-regime media. They
included attacks on leading members of the Jewish community as
well as politicians believed to be of Jewish origin and accused Jews
of bringing communism to Romania and of attempting to colonize
Romania. On March 17, 1992, President Iliescu condemned certain
anti-Semitic publications by name and asked the Romanian legal
authorities to investigate them on the grounds that they sought to
revive fascism in Romania.
Government does not impede the free observance of religious belief.
There are 15 recognized denominations and religions in Romania.
The Romanian Orthodox Church, to which approximately 80% of the
population belongs, predominates. The state licenses each religious
denomination, a process which confers legal status and exemptions
from income taxes and customs duties. The ultimate licensing
authority will be determined according to a new draft law on
religion, drawn up in consultation with representatives of
recognized religions but not yet submitted to the parliament.
Continued controversy over the former property of the Greek
Catholic (or Uniate) Church has led to disputes, including some
violent incidents, between Uniates and members of the Romanian
Orthodox Church. The Romanian government declared the Uniate
Church illegal in 1948 and confiscated its property. Most of the
Uniate Churches were eventually turned over to the Romanian
Orthodox Church. After the December 1989 revolution, the
provisional government repealed the law abolishing the Uniate
Church and decreed that it would restore the former Uniate property
still held by the state. The return of those state-owned properties
has been constantly delayed, and only a small portion of those assets
have been restored to date. Even more complicated is the situation
of those formerly Uniate Churches and other properties now held by
the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Uniates have insisted upon the
return of these assets, but the Orthodox Church has resisted, arguing
that it is not a purely legal matter and that the wishes of the
respective congregations must be taken into account.
Legislation enacted in 1991, as well as the country's new
constitution, guarantee the right to bargain collectively, to strike
(within certain parameters), to form federations and confederations,
and to affiliate internationally. The law stipulates that unions must
refrain from political activity, but the definition of what
constitutes such activity has been open to various interpretations.
Some organizations, notably Alfa Cartel and the League of Jiu Valley
Miners, were politically active in 1991. The former failed in its
efforts to force the resignation of the Romanian government through
peaceful strikes, while violent assaults by the latter on the
government headquarters and other public institutions culminated in
the ouster of the Romanian government.
Some progress was made during the reporting period in areas of
concern about freedom of expression and information in Romania
raised in the last implementation report. While state-run Romanian
Television still controls the only two national channels, there are
now twelve local, independent TV stations in the country although
many are able to broadcast only during RTV's limited off-hours. Five
of them have joined together to form a Romanian union of local,
private television stations for further commercial development. The
Society for the Creation of Independent Television (SOTI) also began
broadcasting on RTV-controlled Channel Two (which reaches
approximately 30% of the country). Initially RTV allowed SOTI to
broadcast only in the late evening for one hour and barred it from
showing any advertising. SOTI now has additional afternoon
broadcasting time on Friday afternoons and can carry a limited
amount of advertising.
Minority-language broadcasting, mainly in either Hungarian or
German, continues to encounter significant problems. The minority
language broadcasting that was cut back last year has not been
restored, although some nonpolitical minority programming was
added to the second channel and to local broadcasts during non-
prime hours. RTV has focused on regionalization of minority
broadcasts, concentrating on ethnic geographic enclaves. This has
met with the opposition of minority broadcasters at RTV and the
greater ethnic Hungarian community, who argue that ethnic
Hungarians are too geographically widespread to be served by
Hungarian-language broadcasts solely to specific locales.
All local TV stations, whether independent or state-run affiliates,
were given additional air time during the campaign for the February
1992 local elections as the campaign got under way. This step was
undertaken with the support of Prime Minister Stolojan. During the
electoral campaign, a large number of political parties sought and
were granted access to television. Access was more even-handed
and decidedly fairer than during the May 1990 elections. Observers
reported that the national television channel was biased in favor of
the ruling party in its election coverage.
There are several independent radio stations operating in Bucharest
and other independent radio stations in six other cities, some with
cooperative agreements, or outright support, from Belgium, France,
and the United Kingdom. The association of Romanian journalists
(AZR), established after the 1989 revolution, has applied for a radio
frequency for "Radio Z," which plans, when it begins broadcasting, to
become a Voice of American (VOA) affiliate. State-run Romanian
radio has also been in touch with VOA's Romanian service to discuss
cooperative relationships. Romanian radio has consistently proven
itself to be professional in its journalistic techniques and in its
adherence to news reporting without editorial comment. VOA, Radio
Free Europe (RFE), and other foreign radio stations are heard in
Romania without hindrance. While an estimated 95% of the
population listen to Romanian radio, about 33% also listen to foreign
radio stations. An audio-visual law was passed by both houses of
the parliament, but President Iliescu returned it for revision.
Many independent Romanian newspapers, magazines, and book
publishers are in severe financial distress, influenced primarily by
high production costs, lack of advertising revenue, and purchase
prices. Yet, pro-regime and extreme nationalist publications do not
appear to suffer the same economic difficulties. The print media
also suffers from state domination of printing, distribution
facilities, and newsprint supplies. Newsprint prices were above
world levels for much of the reporting period. International
observers to the local elections cited reports that the independent
and opposition press was prevented from reaching some parts of the
country during the campaign period. Privatization of the largely
state-owned distribution system began in the first quarter of 1992,
though some independent publications also began their own
distribution systems beforehand in order to circumvent
irregularities in and possible manipulation of deliveries.
While the state-run Rompres is still the basic distributor of foreign
news, several other competing foreign news services have started,
usually in affiliation with established newspapers. The demand for
foreign newspapers, magazines, and books remains great. The
general lack of hard currency is the principal barrier to their
increased availability.
The present government of Prime Minister Stolojan has welcomed
the presence of foreign journalists. Visas are readily available, and
there is an established procedure for members of the press to obtain
credentials in Romania. Print and broadcast journalists generally
have good access to government officials and institutions. The
government also regularly holds press briefings that are open to
both foreign and domestic journalists. While foreign journalists
have not been harassed or physically threatened during the reporting
period, there have been instances of intimidation and of some
violent attacks on Romanian journalists that are still under
investigation.
Direct cultural contacts between Romanians and foreigners continue
to grow through musical performances, exhibits, film, and TV.
American and French films are popular, both in cinemas and on
television, but hard currency cost makes it difficult for would-be
Romanian distributors to obtain recent foreign movies and television
series.
Cultural exchanges appear to be thriving. Traces of political control
still manifest themselves, however, through the denial of
international travel funds to grantees not favored by institutional
leaders. Recently, the increased cost of travel on TAROM, the state
airline, has also been a contributing factor to the inability of some
Romanians to participate in international exchanges. New fields for
research and lecturing--including law, journalism, and economics--
which were previously off-limits are now all included in an
expanded Fulbright Program. Plans are also moving ahead to open an
academic exchange office in Bucharest before the end of 1992 under
a Fulbright agreement.
The USIA [US Information Agency] library in Bucharest, renamed the
"American Cultural Center" in 1992, continues to be the most-
visited Western library in Romania, attracting a daily average of
1,500 visitors in 1991. Access to it is unimpeded. The center
receives requests for assistance from all over Romania and in a
wide variety of disciplines.
USSR
General Assessment. A year marked by the most sweeping political
changes since the 1917 revolution, and culminating in the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, presented new challenges for the
Helsinki process. All of the republics of the former Soviet Union
have joined the CSCE as independent states and agreed to abide by
CSCE principles. The degree of compliance by the former Soviet
republics with CSCE principles varied widely during the reporting
period. On the one hand, the governments of the Baltic states (whose
incorporation into the former USSR was not recognized by the United
States), the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan made
considerable efforts to bring their policies and practices into line
with their CSCE commitments. On the other hand, some of the
Caucasus and Central Asian states have made little progress in this
regard. Tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh have occasioned continuing
CSCE rapporteur missions to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Beyond its
own borders, the USSR--succeeded by Russia--actively supported
the peaceful settlement of disputes arising between states, acting
as co-sponsor for the Middle East peace process. The vast Russian
Federation took a major step toward regularizing internal political
relations by concluding a Federation Treaty March 31, which was
signed by 29 of its 31 autonomous territories. Fulfilling its
obligations under international law, the USSR--and subsequently
Russia--supported the international community on full Iraqi and
Libyan compliance with UN resolutions.
As in other areas of policy, the reporting period was a watershed for
human rights practices in the territory of the former Soviet Union.
One high point before the failed August coup was the passage in May
1991 of an emigration bill which brought the Soviet Union's
legislation on freedom of movement more in line with its CSCE
obligations. The low point was in August, when the hardline
communist coup leaders made an attempt to turn back the clock of
reform. After the coup attempt and the subsequent dissolution of
the USSR, the former Soviet republics pledged to uphold
international human rights obligations. However, practice and
implementation of that commitment varied from state to state. In
its attempt to effect radical economic change, the Yeltsin
government in Russia took numerous steps toward dismantling the
centralized Soviet economy, including measures aimed at price
decontrol, privatization, de-monopolization, and the creation of a
more favorable climate for foreign investment. Nevertheless, the
economy failed to stabilize and, in fact, steadily declined after the
attempted coup. Cultural exchanges in the arts fell off dramatically
in the period under review as the rapid deterioration of the Soviet
economy necessitated huge cuts in financial subsidies to cultural
institutions and organizations.
Regarding the Soviet government's treatment of persons belonging to
national minorities, the reporting period witnessed a mixed picture.
One of the worst violations occurred in July 1991 when Lithuanian
customs agents were shot and killed in execution fashion at a
Lithuanian border post. The Lithuanian government investigation
concluded that Riga-based USSR Ministry of Interior "Black Beret"
troops were responsible for the murders. In the Caucasus, in April
1991, Soviet army and Interior Ministry troops reportedly
cooperated with Azerbaijan Interior Ministry troops in the forced
deportation of Armenian villagers from their homes in and near the
disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, according to numerous
official and non-governmental human rights bodies.
Security. In 1991, the Soviet Union, as did most other CSCE states,
provided data on its military forces and equipment as required by
the 1990 Vienna Document. (It should be noted that two such
information exchanges took place during the first year of VD 90
implementation. Normally, and after the first year, exchanges are to
take place once a year, each December 15.) In the case of the Soviet
Union, its first submission contained a number of errors and omitted
required data. By the second exchange, in December 1991, the Soviet
Union had adopted a much broader interpretation of the CSBM data
exchange requirements and had corrected its previous errors. Unable
to provide more current data, the Soviet Union submitted its 1990
national military budget.
During the reporting period, the Soviet Union conducted five CSBM
evaluation visits. These evaluations included visits to US and UK
units located in Germany on July 30, 1991, and September 21, 1991,
respectively. The other visits covered units in Spain on October 15,
1991, in France on November 27, 1991, and in Greece on December 3,
1991. The Soviet Union received its full quota of evaluation visits
from CSCE states during 1991, involving visits from the United
States, Germany, France, Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom.
The Soviet Union forecast four notifiable activities for 1991 but
during the year cancelled or down-scaled these activities below
notification levels. The Soviet Union forecast no notifiable
activities for 1992. In 1991, the Soviet Union conducted a CSBM
inspection in Italy on May 15, in France on September 18, and in
Turkey on October 2. Similarly, and during the reporting period, the
Soviet Union received CSBM inspections from Canada on September
5, France on September 6, and the United States on October 28. As
was the Soviet Union, Russia now is connected to the CSCE
communication network.
The United States and the Soviet Union maintained a policy-level
dialogue on counter-terrorism issues and signed a memorandum of
understanding July 30, 1991, promoting bilateral cooperation on
civil aviation security. Russia has supported international efforts
to curb Libyan sponsorship of terrorism, joining the United States,
the United Kingdom, France, and others in voting in favor of UN
Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 in April 1992, which
imposed limited sanctions on Libya for its failure to extradite two
suspects connected with the downing of Pan Am flight 103 in
December 1988.
Economics. Among its other historic effects, the collapse of the
August coup attempt cleared the way for dismantling the Soviet
centralized planned economy. By October 1991, Russian President
Yeltsin and his new Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar had begun
developing the program to do this and to create a market-based
economy in Russia. Gaydar's top goal was to stabilize the ruble and
thus lay the basis for convertibility by freeing prices, limiting the
1992 government budget deficit to 2% of GNP, and imposing tight
monetary and credit policies. To this end, as of January 2, 1992,
most retail prices were freed and most consumer subsidies (other
than for energy, housing, and a very few basic items) abolished.
Expenditures on defense procurement were cut by 85%. The tax
system was redesigned, and a 28% value added tax introduced.
Restrictions on private trade for most goods were lifted, limited
forms of private land ownership were legalized, and private farming
was encouraged but still confronts serious constraints. Work on
privatization, de-monopolization, and foreign investment legislation
intensified, although in none of these areas had new laws or
procedures taken real effect as of March 1992. The government's
privatization program calls for transfer to private hands this year
of more than half of all small shops, restaurants, service
establishments, as well as all firms in the light and food industries.
The need to create a legal framework to govern the process
combined with political opposition, however, is preventing the
government from coming close to these goals. Decontrol of energy
prices, originally scheduled to occur in April 1992, was postponed
until at least June 1992.
As the old command structures continued to collapse, economic
decline across the former USSR accelerated after the attempted
coup. The total 1991 fall in GNP was estimated at over 15%. Output
in the crucial oil sector continued to decline steeply, with exports
halved during 1991. Foreign exchange reserves all but vanished,
obliging the USSR in November 1991 to ask G-7 nations for
deferment of payments of principal due on official foreign debt
obligations in November 1991. In the first quarter of 1992,
industrial production reportedly dropped a further 13%, and exports
to countries outside the former Soviet Union fell by 20%. However,
Western financial assistance supported a 15% recovery in imports.
The first quarter budget deficit was sharply reduced to about 8% of
GDP compared to 20% in 1991. Although political pressure forced
some relaxation of budgetary discipline in the run-up to the April
congress, monetary policy remains tight--the interest rate rose to
50% in April 1992.
While the Yeltsin government's commitment to radical economic
reform is undisputed, the scale of its task is stupendous. The
extraordinary extent of inherited state ownership and monopoly
structures in industry, trade, and services complicates price
decontrol and retards supply-side response. As economic decision
making has shifted from the center of the old Soviet Union to the
new successor states, export controls and monetary conflicts
intensified in the wake of Russian price liberalization. In order to
gain control of monetary policy in the ruble zone, in early 1992,
Russia created a new clearing system and payments mechanism with
other former republics by introducing a system of correspondent
accounts. However, many important details such as credit limits
have not yet been set. Tendencies toward autarky and the breakdown
of intraregional economic links have deepened.
Military-industrial production remains the backbone of the former
USSR's industrial economy, but, in the absence of the huge amounts
of capital needed, efforts at defense conversion as a whole have
been uncoordinated and ineffective. Due to housing shortages, labor
mobility is very low, making reallocation of labor resources from
outmoded industries to potential growth areas problematic. Private
ownership of most productive assets, land, and housing remains
insignificant, with most land still considered state property under
the jurisdiction of local councils of people's deputies.
Given such conditions, the general climate for foreign investment
cannot yet be termed favorable, though long-term potential could be
great, given the huge domestic demand and the potentially rich
resources in the energy and other raw materials sector. Heavy
export customs duties introduced in early 1992 had a chilling effect
on existing joint ventures. Regional authorities within the Russian
Federation now assert ownership over key industrial assets and
natural resources, making it still difficult to know whose signature
makes a contract valid. Division of hard currency profits from
exploitation of mineral resources among the central government,
local governments, and enterprises themselves has been a particular
focus of contention. Until the ruble becomes convertible--now
slated for July 1, 1992--investors are reluctant to invest because
ruble profits cannot be repatriated. The Russian parliament is
considering draft laws to strengthen intellectual property rights,
following passage in 1991 of basic USSR laws on copyright, patents,
and trademarks.
Progress on the economic front was varied among the newly
independent states of the former USSR and the Baltic states. Russia
has set the pace among the members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) in passing the laws and regulations
required to establish a market economy. In January 1992, Russia
implemented a comprehensive price liberalization program that
freed 80% of wholesale and 90% of retail prices. Budget reforms
have begun, but there are still serious imbalances between revenues
and expenditures. Russia's reforms are currently guided by a
"shadow" IMF program which the IMF does not consider adequate to
qualify as a standby program upon membership. The dialogue
between the IMF and Russia is continuing.
Ukraine has provided the IMF with a new economic reform program
which proposes anti-inflationary position including attempts to
reduce the budget deficit, control wage growth, and limit credit
expansion. Ukraine intends to implement a policy of strict emission
and credit control by increasing reserve requirements and limiting
the supply of credit by commercial banks.
Much of the plan depends on the introduction of a national currency,
the hyrvna, but no schedule for introduction is included. The
program explains that Ukraine's diversion in pricing policy was
based primarily on the fear of uncontrolled monopoly pricing, and
efforts are outlined to de-monopolize the economy. Foreign
economic relations will retain the ruble as its common currency for
international transactions until it moves to introduce the hryvna and
to enable the free movement of goods, money, and people within the
Commonwealth of Independent States. With respect to Western
investors in Ukraine, legislation on foreign investment guarantees
compensation upon expropriation and national treatment, although
the lack of hard currency still is a problem in the transfers area.
This program will likely be the basis for ongoing discussions with
the IMF regarding a possible standby program upon membership.
Except for Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, which have adopted a more
aggressive stance toward economic reform, the other republics have
not developed a consensus or programs for free market reform. In
some, former communists continue in power and have failed to
demonstrate a commitment to reform. Nonetheless, most have made
some attempt at reforms in the price, privatization, and budget
areas, and all have applied for IMF membership.
The current Russian constitution prohibits the buying and selling of
land and a proposed constitutional amendment that would have
permitted the unrestricted sale of land was defeated at the April
1992 Congress of People's Deputies, despite Yeltsin's strong support.
Yeltsin has proposed holding a separate referendum on the land
issue. The access of US business people not resident in Moscow to
business people of the former USSR improved. Most US business
visitors receive support from a sponsor in one of the former
republics when applying for their visas. Some business people have
received multiple-entry visas. Traveling without a visa is strongly
discouraged. Although one could sometimes purchase a visa at
Moscow's Sheremetevo airport for a dollar fee, this was by no means
always the case.
Applications for accreditation of US representative offices in the
former Soviet republics did not encounter serious problems. The
Russian government accredits companies previously accredited in
the USSR by a simple process involving approximately 30 minutes
worth of paperwork. Accreditation from scratch seems to be
progressing at the same pace experienced under the administration
of the USSR.
Russia no longer registers joint ventures as a separate category of
legal entity. The Russian government encourages joint ventures
formed under the USSR to re-register in one of the accepted
categories of legal entities under Russian legislation. These
categories are joint stock company (public and private) and
partnership with limited liability, all of which may include foreign
participation up to and including 100% foreign ownership. Many US
companies prefer wholly owned subsidiaries. Some 60 US companies
opened offices in Moscow between October 1, 1991 and February 1,
1992, and new companies continue to arrive weekly.
Commercial information continued to be very uneven. English
language publications such as Kommersant, Moscow Times, and We,
as well as an ever-increasing number of specialized newsletters,
are read frequently by US businessmen. A few of the US law and
auditing firms operating in Moscow occasionally circulate a brief on
certain aspects of doing business in the former USSR. Databank
services are available at fairly high subscription prices. Two or
three "yellow pages"-type telephone directories have appeared, also
at rather high prices. Access to business contacts and commercial
officials is without official hindrance.
International communications with the US have improved since the
introduction by several companies of direct satellite telephone and
fax services. Additional international class hotels have also opened
up or been refurbished in Moscow, alleviating a major problem in the
city. Accommodations elsewhere in the former republics remain
largely inadequate.
Demand in Moscow for office and residential space remains high,
pushing rentals of properties with Western standards to $800-
$1,200 per square meter per year. Several US real estate,
construction, and relocation companies are actively engaged in
trying to meet the demand. Western-standard housing is currently in
a state of crisis. The few projects in progress fall far short of
what is needed. In the meantime, because the foreign community is
in a period of rapid growth, more and more foreigners are having to
move into apartments in Russian buildings. Although strictly
speaking this is illegal, the Russian government is looking the other
way. Russian apartments do not meet Western standards, especially
in the area of security. Western cars, for example, are often
vandalized and/or broken into when parked in unguarded parking
areas. It will probably be three to five years before the availability
of housing up to Western standards satisfies the demand.
The transportation system of the former USSR has continued to
deteriorate. Air travel is increasingly subject to disruption by fuel
shortages and strikes. Aeroflot tickets for foreign travelers,
excluding accredited journalists and diplomats, is for hard currency
only. Train travel is for rubles with a small reservation fee in hard
currency. City streets are plagued with potholes, and the quality of
major highways tends to be mixed--some are excellent, others quite
bad.
Trade promotion and other marketing activities, including media
advertising and the staging of trade fairs and conferences, are on
the increase. Moscow has become an "in" place for international
meetings of all kinds. Over 800 trading "stock" exchanges have
sprung up and are actively advertising throughout the newly
independent states. Many of the new additions to the local business
scene are trade-related service firms. A majority of them gather at
monthly networking luncheons of the newly formed American
Business Club in Moscow to exchange operating know-how and
cultivate clients in what is still very much an insider's market in
constant and rapid flux.
The upheaval that shook Soviet society in 1991 had a profound
impact on the science and technology sector. Political liberalization
expanded permissible science and technology activity to new levels,
reinforcing the desire of Soviet scientists to integrate themselves
fully into the world science and technology community.
Meanwhile, the faltering economy and government budget cuts
caused severe hardship to many research establishments. Many
Russians fear that without money their scientific establishment
will suffer irreparable damage. Scientists in the former USSR
cannot purchase up-to-date equipment and are even unable to
maintain subscriptions to scientific journals. Institutes and
scientific enterprises often look to foreign investment or other
forms of cooperation to relieve the severe economic deprivation
born of tight budgets and galloping inflation.
On the positive side, many scientific institutes, once constrained by
stifling rules designed to protect "state secrets" and subjected to
meddlesome interference by bureaucrats, now enjoy unprecedented
freedom to interact with one another and with their foreign
partners. Scientists are now permitted to establish independent
businesses providing services (e.g., consulting, software
development) or engaged in manufacturing. Insufficient legal
protection of intellectual property, however, discourages many
scientists from releasing their entrepreneurial energies.
During the period under review, no incidents were reported of
deliberate, official denial to Soviet scientists of the freedom to
establish and maintain direct contacts with professional colleagues
in other countries. In fact, the proliferation of electronic mail
networks with international capabilities has lowered
communication barriers between Soviet scholars and the outside
world to an unprecedented degree.
Nonetheless, travel abroad remains beyond the means of all but a
small fraction of the Soviet scientific community. The cost of
travel exploded when prices were liberalized in January 1992. One
institute director lamented--but without exaggeration--that a
ticket to New York now costs the equivalent of 10 years' salary.
Although obtaining permission to travel is no longer dependent on
political loyalty, it is still not granted automatically or
expeditiously due to bureaucratic inertia and corruption.
In international environmental cooperation, Russia and the other
states of the former USSR continued the process of integration
begun by President Gorbachev in the late 1980s. By virtue of their
UN membership, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus all participate in
multilateral forums addressing protection of the ozone layer, global
climate change, and other issues. Lately we have noted the absence
of these countries at several key environmental negotiations; this
will probably change as internal conditions stabilize. As the other
former republics have joined the UN, they can be expected to
participate to the extent that their resources permit.
In Russia, several competing agencies have been consolidated into
the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources. The ministry's
leadership faces the formidable task of reconciling competing
pressures for stringent environmental regulation with the need for
rapid development of Russia's valuable natural resources. For the
Central Asian countries, which are heavily dependent on agriculture,
the ecology-versus-development tradeoffs are particularly vexing.
In Tajikistan, for example, the government's decision to maintain
cotton planting at roughly the same level as in previous years has
done little to alleviate the environmental damage associated with
pesticide use for cotton. In Uzbekistan, the draining of the Aral Sea
in order to water the cotton fields has left the region suffering a
serious ecological disaster. In Kazakhstan, the environmental
disaster at the Aral Sea mobilized public concern. While the
government expressed interest, it took no concrete steps to solve
this complex inter-republic problem.
The expanded access to information has led to a recognition of the
possibilities and need for bilateral and multilateral environmental
cooperation with the former Soviet Union. Information made
available recently has illustrated as never before the magnitude of
the environmental damage caused by industrial and military
activities in the former Soviet Union, and the United States and
other countries are investigating a variety of appropriate responses.
To illustrate, the Nordic countries are working with Russia to
arrange the financing and installation of badly needed emissions
control at nonferrous metal smelters in the Kola Peninsula, now the
largest single point source of sulfur dioxide emissions in the world.
In addition, a number of countries may work jointly with Russia to
investigate and quantify the environment damage in the Arctic
region, and Arctic Ocean itself, caused by industrial and military
activities throughout the former Soviet Union.
Freedom of political activity and expanded access to information
have improved the possibilities for non-governmental environmental
groups. Many veterans of the green movement have assumed
prominent positions in newly independent governments. The leader
of Ukraine's "Green World" movement is now that country's
environment minister, and Russian President Yeltsin's personal
adviser on environment and health was a staunch opponent of Soviet
environmental policy for several years.
In most of the USSR's successor states, non-governmental
organizations, including those engaged in environmental activities,
enjoyed a large degree of freedom to organize rallies, publish their
views, and run for political office. The leadership in Kazakhstan co-
opted the program of the quasi-opposition anti-nuclear movement by
banning nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk. International
environmental NGOs also increased their activities, particularly in
Russia and Ukraine. In some regions, particularly in Central Asia,
local authorities remained intolerant of groups critical of the ruling
party. Although permitted to exist, NGOs in these areas often
suffered from harassment by local bureaucrats.
Human Dimension. The August coup attempt was the nadir of a
negative trend begun in late 1990 with regard to human rights in the
former Soviet Union that appeared to reverse some of the progress
made under Mikhail Gorbachev after 1985. The hardline tendency
signaled by the three-day replacement of reformist ministers in the
Soviet government by stalwart communists had manifested itself
earlier in the January crackdown in the Baltic states, the use of
Soviet army troops in the forced deportation of Armenian villagers
in Azerbaijan in the spring and summer, and the killing of Lithuanian
customs officials in July. Nevertheless, as in the previous reporting
period, the downward trend was mixed with occasional bright spots,
the brightest being the passage in May of a new law on exit from and
entry into the USSR. After the failed coup attempt, with the
reformers in control of the USSR government, progress on the human
rights front renewed. In addition, the republics began to fashion
their own human rights policies. Republic performance varied
widely, however, with Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltics leading the
way--though not without their problems. For example, concerns
were raised about the discriminatory nature of new citizenship laws
with respect to non-Balts in the Baltic states . In Central Asia--
especially Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan--progress in
the human rights field was intermittent at best. In the Caucasus,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan regressed into open civil war, and relations
between Armenia and Azerbaijan deteriorated over the bloody
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Internally, the Armenian government
demonstrated strong commitment to CSCE principles and obligations.
Ethnic tensions surfaced as well in the Transdniester region of
Moldova.
At the end of the reporting period, none of the former republics had
fully established a state based on the rule of law, and the degree of
effort toward this end varied widely. Procuracies and judicial
organs, with some exceptions, had not been reformed. Nor had the
legal system developed to the extent that legal counsel is available
to every citizen with a human rights complaint. Legislative
attempts to address human rights concerns were sporadic, as
legislators grappled with fundamental economic and political issues.
With the exception of the three-day coup attempt in August 1992,
the policy of glasnost, or "openness," continued mostly unabated.
Yeltsin did close down Soviet-run Tass and Pravda after the coup on
August 22 but allowed them to resume operations on September 11.
Before and after the failed coup attempt, demonstrations large and
small were regular occurrences. The broadcast media, especially
radio, experienced more liberty to broadcast freely, and newspapers,
journals, magazines, and books multiplied profusely. Only three
weeks after the failed coup attempt, the Soviet government
successfully hosted the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension in
Moscow.
Although the USSR president left office and the USSR itself
dissolved in December, the policy of glasnost continued, albeit
unevenly, in the newly independent states. Even some of the more
reformist governments acted contrary to the tenets of freedom of
expression and assembly. For example, the Russian government
issued a warning to one popular newspaper for coverage of a
sensitive issue in a manner not to its liking. And in February 1992,
the city of Moscow banned an opposition demonstration; when the
demonstration proceeded anyway, there were minor clashes between
demonstrators and riot police.
In the reporting period, domestic and cross-border political disputes
erupted into violence within the disintegrating Soviet Union
involving, variously, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia,
Lithuania, and Russia's Chechen-Ingush region. In Azerbaijan and
Lithuania, Soviet army and/or Interior Ministry forces were involved
in the violence. In Azerbaijan, in the spring and summer of 1991,
Soviet troops assisted Azeri forces in the forced relocation of
Armenian villagers from their homes, according to numerous reports
from Azeri, Armenian, and Russian sources, both official and non-
governmental. USSR Interior Ministry forces based in Riga, Latvia,
are believed responsible for the coldblooded killings of six
Lithuanian customs post officials in July 1991.
There was continued, although uneven, progress toward freedom of
religion in the former Soviet Union. Authorities in all of the former
republics displayed a more tolerant attitude toward religion,
although local pockets of bureaucratic resistance or even hostility
could still be found.
The visibility of religion in the Soviet Union and its successor
states increased dramatically during the reporting period. On
January 7, 1992, Orthodox Christmas was observed as an official
national holiday in Russia for the first time since the 1917
Bolshevik revolution. Orthodox religious services were held on
several occasions during the reporting period in churches inside the
Kremlin, also a post-revolution first. Religious services were
frequently shown on Soviet and Russian television, particularly
during the Christmas and Easter holiday seasons. In addition,
Protestant religious programming from the United States was
broadcast on Sunday mornings on Soviet television. Religious
groups, official and unofficial, continued to be allowed to hold
seminars, conferences, and revival meetings, frequently in public
facilities rented for that purpose. It was common to see public
proselytizing in major cities, including street stands with placards
calling passersby to rejoin and revitalize the Russian Orthodox
Church, individuals speaking about their Protestant faith, and
appeals from adherents of groups as diverse as the Hari Krishna and
the Baha'i faith.
The press contained extensive coverage of religious issues and
statements of religious leaders. Visits by foreign religious figures
were numerous and unimpeded, including by representatives of
evangelical Protestant ministries in the West. Missionaries from
almost every world religion were present on the territory of the
former USSR, and a number of these groups maintained permanent
representatives in Moscow and other major cities. State academic
institutions, including Moscow State University, not only renamed
their "Departments of Religion and Atheism" to focus instead on
religious ethics and liberty but also hosted western lecturers on
religious ethics and the role of religion in public policy.
Obstacles to complete freedom of religion still existed in the
former Soviet Union, largely on the local level. There, remnants of
the old state party bureaucracy sometimes hindered religious
believers, though even this problem was sporadic and decreasing in
severity. A primary cause of these problems was the fact that the
1990 freedom of religion law required registration of religious
groups of 10 or more adults by local authorities. Some groups
viewed the registration requirement itself as contradicting the
tenets of their beliefs and, therefore, refused to register. In other
cases, although failure to register did not result in harassment,
local authorities used obstructionist tactics against groups'
attempts to register, thereby denying groups the status of a
"juridical person" and the benefits of the new law, including access
to the media and the right to establish their own schools, own
property, and engage in social work.
A second problem, increasing in importance, was the official
favoritism shown to the Russian Orthodox Church and the growing
influence of that church in governmental regulations affecting
religion, especially at the local level. This resulted in fewer
restrictions on the Orthodox Church than on other religious groups
and an increase in difficulties for non-Russian Orthodox groups,
principally Protestant groups, the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox
Church, and the Russian Orthodox Free Church (ROFC). The ROFC is
the Russian branch of the US-based Free Orthodox Church, which
earlier had broken from the traditional Russian Orthodox Church
claiming it was controlled by the communist regime. The ROFC
reported that it found it sometimes difficult at the local level to
register new congregations or to acquire facilities. A number of
Orthodox congregations which switched to the ROFC subsequently
lost their church buildings and then were unable to find new
property. In Russia, some western Protestant groups experienced
difficulties in obtaining access to prime time television or to some
of the better known sites for large religious events. In Ukraine,
disagreements over property continued between the Ukrainian
Catholic (Uniate) church and the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox
Church. In Georgia, where the Georgian Orthodox Church commands
the traditional loyalty of Georgian believers, the Baptist Church has
reported instances of intimidation and threats by some Orthodox
priests, the lack of permission to secure necessary facilities, and
the denial of press permits to allow the Baptist community to
publish its own Bibles and religious literature.
Jews continued to enjoy freedom in the practice and teaching of
their religion during the reporting period. Hebrew schools were
opened and additional synagogues were returned to the Jewish
community. An Islamic revival spread in Central Asia as Muslims
continued to receive more freedom to practice and learn about Islam.
This revival included the opening of many new mosques in the region.
A Buddhist revival in the eastern Soviet Union also continued, with
the opening of houses of worship, monasteries, and schools.
Throughout Central Asia, new working mosques continued to open. In
Tajikistan alone, the number of mosques increased tenfold over the
last few years, and Islamic authorities completed a new building for
the theological seminary in Dushanbe.
The importation of religious materials into the Soviet Union was
largely unrestricted. Bibles, children's Bible stories, and other
religious literature were common items on sale at street kiosks in
major cities. Korans were imported into the Central Asian states in
large numbers.
The number of clergy and places of worship in all parts of the
former Soviet Union is still inadequate for the population, but new
churches, synagogues, and mosques were reopened in many places,
and seminaries and other institutions of clerical education expanded
their enrollment.
As a rule, young men who objected to military service because of
their faith continued to be subject to prison terms. In July 1991,
Moldova joined Georgia as the only two non-Baltic states to pass a
law providing for alternative forms of service for conscientious
objectors. In some other former republics, legislation providing
alternatives to military service for conscientious objectors was
under discussion.
In general, freedom to criticize the government thrived around the
USSR, and, since the Soviet Union's demise, in the former republics.
The exceptions to this rule were Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenistan, where restrictions on the opposition's ability to
propagate its views continued. Before President Gamsakhurdia's
removal, the Georgian government prohibited certain journalists
from reporting from its territory. In addition, a 1990 USSR law
making it a crime to "insult the honor and dignity of the Soviet
president" continued to be enforced selectively, resulting in cases of
persons being persecuted for expressing their political beliefs.
For example, in June 1991, 28-year-old lawyer and radical
opposition Democratic Union activist Viktor Leontev was arrested
and sentenced to two years of correctional labor in the Kazakhstan
city of Petropavlovsk for selling a calendar which portrayed a
caricature of Gorbachev wearing a hammer and sickle crown.
Radical opposition Democratic Union leaders Valeriy Novodvorskiy
and Vladimir Danilov were arrested in May (and held in a Moscow
prison until their release in the aftermath of the August coup
attempt) under Article 70 of the Russian Federation criminal code
(public calls for the violent overthrow or change of the Soviet
government or social order). They had signed a letter analyzing the
actions of the Soviet government in the Caucasus and in Lithuania
which said "that in these conditions armed counteraction, out of
place in other times, becomes a legal means of struggle by the
people against the authorities whose hands are stained with blood."
On January 31, 1992, during a demonstration in Ulan Ude in Russia's
far east, Democratic Union member Andrey Kapitonov was detained
for displaying a placard calling the local Supreme Soviet Chairman
Potapov "a fascist criminal." He was released the next day but--
obviously because of the ill will toward him held by the local
authorities--was re-arrested on February 6 for having refused to
serve in the army two years earlier. On March 16, Kapitonov was
sentenced in absentia to 10 months correctional labor with a fine of
10% of his income.
The law on public organizations which took effect in Russia in
January 1992 defined such organizations to include political parties
and mass movements, including national fronts, trade unions,
veterans organizations, and youth groups, among others. According
to a Russian government order of December 1991, public
organizations must register their by-laws with the Ministry of
Justice within 30 days of formation. The order does not specify
grounds for refusing to register an organization.
Generally, much greater freedom of association was exercised in the
Soviet Union and in some of the new states during the reporting
period. New political, cultural, and social organizations of all
stripes sprang to life. Human rights groups functioned freely for the
most part. In Georgia, however, groups in opposition to President
Zviad Gamsakhurdia experienced harassment and arrest of their
members. Since Gamsakhurdia's removal, his supporters have
asserted that they face restrictions imposed by the government. In
Turkmenistan, opposition groups also were subject to harassment by
government agents. Around the Soviet Union and its successor
states, demonstrations, authorized and unauthorized, proliferated.
Even in former republics with poorer human rights records,
opposition forces were able to demonstrate in the streets.
Unfortunately, in the cases of Georgia and Uzbekistan, use of force
against demonstrators resulted in fatalities among the participants.
In Moscow in February 1992, anti-government demonstrators
attempted to rally without permission and were met with force,
resulting in minor injuries.
The long-awaited emigration law, formally known as the law "on
procedures for the departure from and entry into the USSR of
citizens of the USSR," was passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on
May 20, 1991. Under the terms of the implementing resolution
passed the same day, however, the law will not come fully into force
until January 1, 1993. The law, designed to bring the USSR closer to
compliance with CSCE commitments, has as its chief feature the
removal of the requirement for an exit visa. Under the law, travel
abroad will be allowed on the basis of a foreign travel passport,
valid for five years, and the appropriate entry visa. A vestigial "exit
visa" will remain in the form of an endorsement in the passport for
temporary travel or permanent residence abroad, but, according to
the new law, the onerous requirement for an invitation from abroad
will be abolished.
In the interim, the measure did away with the requirement that
emigrants have an invitation from a first-degree relative abroad and
allowed them to submit with their exit visa application an
invitation from any relative residing permanently abroad or, in lieu
of that, "permission to enter the receiving country." This loosening
of the regulations contributed to a sharp increase in refugee
departures to the US over the second half of the reporting period.
The resolution also revoked the 1967 USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium decree under which emigrants to Israel were stripped of
their Soviet citizenship. Since July 1, 1991, all emigrants to Israel
have been able to depart using Soviet passports.
Senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation have informed the US government that the Russian
government will abide by the terms of the new emigration law and
will implement it as scheduled on January 1, 1993. Officials of
other former republics have given their governments' assurances
that freedom of emigration and travel abroad will be respected.
A Russian presidential commission established to review refusenik
cases began work in November 1991 and has positively resolved
dozens of cases of persons who had been denied exit permission on
the basis of alleged previous access to state secrets. Nevertheless,
the US still maintains a list of persons denied permission to
emigrate from the former Soviet Union, some of whom have not had
access to state secrets for more than five years. Denials of exit
permission still occur because of alleged access to state secrets,
inability to secure written permission from relatives, and often
what appear to be purely arbitrary reasons. In addition, freedom of
movement is hampered by a frequently corrupt bureaucracy that may
take many months to process an application for exit permission.
Also, the bureaucratic requirements imposed by local offices of the
exit permit and passport issuing agency vary from region to region.
In September 1991, the Russian government released the last
prisoners whose names appeared on US lists as persons known to be
held for political acts. In early 1992, President Yeltsin released 10
additional prisoners serving sentences for crimes against the Soviet
state (such as espionage or hijacking aircraft for allegedly political
reasons). Throughout the reporting period, no prisoners were known
to be serving sentences in the former Soviet Union solely under the
so-called political and religious articles of the criminal code
(Articles 70, 142, 227, and the now-abolished 190-1). Although all
known political prisoners have been released, a large number of
"economic prisoners" are suspected of being held for such crimes as
"speculation," an activity which should no longer be illegal in the
emerging market economies of the former Soviet Union. One such
prisoner is Mark Glizer of Moscow, held in a Moscow jail under
investigation since July 10, 1991, for "repairing an automobile for
resale," i.e., speculation.
Around the former Soviet Union, persons may still be detained
arbitrarily and without arrest warrants. Once charged (within 72
hours of detention), under the former republic criminal codes, the
accused may be held in pretrial detention for up to 18 months with
no requirement for judicial approval. In criminal cases, detainees
may be restricted to their place of residence pending trial.
During the reporting period, there were no reports of persons being
punished by being sent into internal exile. Credible reports of
torture by government agents emanated from Georgia and Azerbaijan
during the armed conflicts there. In addition, detention and
incarceration practices throughout the former Soviet Union remained
generally harsh. Many prisoners suffered from mental and physical
abuse and mistreatment during interrogation, trial, and confinement,
according to a variety of reliable sources. Prisoners were
frequently placed in punishment cells for violation of prison rules,
sometimes for several months. Conditions in these cells are
excessively severe, allowing exposure to extreme cold. As a result
of such treatment in a Russian prison in Tobolsk, one prisoner froze
to death. No administrative process exists to ensure that prisoners
are not arbitrarily sent to such cells.
No instances of long-term psychiatric hospitalization of sane
persons were reported in the reporting period. Current laws in the
former republics, however, still provide for compulsory psychiatric
hospitalization without adequate legal protection of persons
arrested and diagnosed as mentally ill. There were reports of the
use of psychiatric examination and the threat of compulsory
commitment as ways of intimidating persons considered irritants to
local officials.
Democratic forces won elections in the spring of 1991 in many parts
of the USSR; at the local and republic level, the first freely elected
governments in Soviet history took the reins of government. The
elections were carried out by secret ballot and, in most cases,
featured multiple candidates fielded by groups from across the
political spectrum. This was the first practical demonstration of
citizens' right and ability to change their governments peacefully.
However, parliaments in most of the former republics contained high
numbers of former communist delegates not selected in free and
open campaigns.
In some republics, citizens faced problems in exercising the right to
free and fair elections. Azerbaijan, for example, held presidential
elections on September 8, 1991, in which one candidate ran
unopposed. Some opposition parties declined to field candidates;
another contender withdrew his candidacy a week before the
election, saying he did not wish to lend credibility to the voting.
Opposition leaders claimed that the state of emergency, which was
lifted only a few weeks before the election, prevented them from
adequately presenting their views to the public. Azerbaijan utilized
the traditional Communist Party system of voting, in which voters
enter a private polling booth only to cast a negative ballot. Although
suffrage in Azerbaijan was ostensibly universal, the former
republic's traditional Islamic culture discouraged women from
voting. Similar reports were received regarding the October 1991
elections in Tajikistan, with claims from opposition figures of
fraud, intimidation of voters in rural areas, and unfair pre-electoral
campaign practices carried out by officials and supporters of the
Tajik President.
In Georgia, President Gamsa-khurdia won a landslide victory in May
1991. His opponents, however, charged that Gamsakhurdia, who was
previously appointed president by Georgia's parliament, purposely
scheduled the election quickly in order to ensure that his
competition would not have time to mount an effective campaign. In
addition, Gamsakhurdia's domination of the Georgian media denied
opposition candidates a forum to propagate their views.
In several former republics, political pluralism remained embryonic.
In Moldova, there was only one candidate in the December 1991
presidential elections. In Kyrgyzstan, secret ballot, universal
suffrage elections were held on October 12, 1991, but opposition
parties were still forming and put up no candidates. In the other
four central Asian states, the right to free and fair elections
remained even less developed. In Uzbekistan, authorities have
refused to allow the Birlik opposition movement to register
officially as a political party. In Turkmenistan, the Communist
Party has appropriated the name of the Democratic Party and
continues to harass opposition parties and activists. Following
demonstrations in 1991, the Tajik government allowed opposition
parties to register, but its refusal to schedule new parliamentary
elections led to major protests in 1992 and, eventually, creation of
a new coalition government. Kazakh authorities have also harassed
opposition leaders and hindered opposition political parties from
organizing. In all four republics, the leaders of the new governments
were all former members of the old Communist Party leadership.
Despite the strengthening of democratic forces during 1991, until
the failed August coup attempt, the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) continued to be the single most powerful political
force in Soviet society. The CPSU continued to exercise its greatest
influence in the all-union government, still dominated by CPSU
members; in the all-union legislature, where its numbers continued
to rank in the majority; and in all-union defense and security organs,
where party cells prevailed, albeit unofficially. Nevertheless, the
CPSU and its network of influence began to show signs of
factionalization. Successive CPSU plenary meetings revealed that
the party's ability to speak with one voice had dissipated. In the
wake of the failed August coup, the Russian government suspended
CPSU activities and the party's once all-powerful influence
significantly waned.
During the coup attempt in August 1991, the Soviet military split
between support for the coup plotters and support for Russia's
President Yeltsin, who represented elected governmental authority.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, much of the former Soviet
military has come under the control of the Council of the Presidents
of the Commonwealth of Independent States created in December.
The CIS, however, remains vaguely defined. Some former republics-
-including Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan and
others--are establishing their own independent militaries, under
their own control. Russia is currently undergoing the same process.
As the newly independent states vie to divide up the resources of
the former Soviet Union, control over some elements of the former
Soviet military has been contested. With the creation of the Russian
Ministry of Defense in March 1992, President Yeltsin became
Russia's civilian Defense Minister, with one civilian deputy and one
military deputy. Strategic nuclear forces remain under CIS control.
Four of the five Central Asian states remain the only new states not
committed to forming their own armed forces.
Reform of the judicial, legal, and law enforcement systems
throughout the former Soviet Union is proceeding slowly. A
combination of inertia, local resistance, and preoccupation with
political and economic crises generally has put the issues of
judicial and legal reform on the back burner. While the worst abuses
of the judicial system under the former CPSU may be a thing of the
past, considerable time and effort will be required before such basic
rights as equal protection before the law, effective redress against
administrative decisions, impartial judges, a fair and public hearing
before an impartial and independent legal tribunal, and other legal
rights provided for in CSCE documents are guaranteed in principle
throughout the independent states of the former Soviet Union.
Since the failed August coup attempt, political organizations,
including parties, have continued to proliferate in most of the
former republics. The singular outright ban in Russia and in most
other former Soviet states was imposed on the former CPSU, which
was dissolved for its involvement in the attempted coup.
Individuals from the political far left to far right have formed
groups which actively and openly compete for public support. In
certain Central Asian states, particularly Turkmenistan and
Tajikistan, some opposition political groupings have been harassed
and obstacles put in the way of their full participation in the public
life of the country.
Access to the media for all political groupings continued for the
most part unrestricted, the major exceptions being in Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, where some opposition newspapers have
not been registered by the state. Newspapers representing the
spectrum of political viewpoints are published around the former
Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, the governments of the various members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States continued to exercise some
control over major media outlets. In Georgia under President
Gamsakhurdia, opposition political groups were hindered in their
attempts to publish their views. In some cases, their papers were
closed down and their members subjected to threats and harassment
by government agents. In Russia, there were claims by some
newspapers, including the long-time Communist Party organ Pravda,
that Russian government policies unfairly favored uncritical press
organs. For the most part, however, the problems of these Russian
newspapers were primarily related to their inability to compete in
the open media market. The Russian law on mass media, adopted on
December 27, 1991, guarantees freedom of the press, but, until an
independent judicial branch and a system of rule of law develops in
the country, observance and enforcement of the law often still
depends on interpretation by government officials.
Even before the demise of the USSR, power in the Soviet Union was
devolving to the republics. In the end, each state was free to
implement language, cultural, religious and political rights
according to its own wishes. However, each was also freed from
central government restraint in dealing with its own ethnic
minorities, and the attitude toward and degree of discrimination
against minorities varied from country to country. There are over
60 million former Soviet citizens who live outside their
nationality's administrative region or who belong to a nationality
that has no such region. For many of these people, devolution of
power has unleashed long-suppressed ethnic hostilities. The worst
cases were in Georgia and Azerbaijan where ethnic conflicts
escalated into civil conflict and open warfare that resulted in
hundreds of deaths. In Moldova and parts of Russia as well, ethnic
conflict resulted in fatalities. In the Baltic states, non-Balts,
especially Russians, protested that new citizenship laws
discriminated against them.
Throughout the reporting period, Jews enjoyed increasing cultural
and religious freedom, but at the same time continued to be
subjected to public expressions of anti-Semitism. On May Day 1991,
thousands marched to accuse Soviet leaders of favoring Jews at the
expense of Russians. Demonstrators carried anti-Semitic placards
and called Russian President Yeltsin "a stooge for Jewish
international capital." Anti-Semitic posters were posted, and the
openly anti-Semitic organization Pamyat published a paper
containing excerpts from the long-discredited Protocols of the
Elders of Zion and began radio broadcasts in September. These
expressions of anti-Semitic attitudes added to Jews' fear that in
times of economic hardship and political unrest they could be
singled out for arbitrary retribution by an increasingly desperate
populace.
Jewish groups' long-standing complaint that the Soviet government
did not speak out strongly enough against anti-Semitism was
assuaged to some extent by the forceful statement of President
Gorbachev condemning anti-Semitism read at the commemorative
ceremony at Babi Yar in Ukraine in October 1991. At the same
ceremony, Ukrainian President Kravchuk apologized for injustices
perpetrated by Ukrainians against Jews in the past. Additionally,
around the former Soviet Union opportunities increased for Jews to
take advantage of cultural and religious freedom, including the study
of Hebrew and Yiddish and publication of Jewish periodicals.
Synagogues returned to Jewish hands; yeshivas and other Jewish
schools were opened. In Moldova, the government expressed
intentions to add a chair of Jewish Studies at Chisinau University.
Women had the same legal rights as men, including the right to
participate in all areas of the social, political, and economic life of
the Soviet Union and the successor republics. An extensive system
of day care service and maternity leave benefits allowed women,
after bearing children, to retain employment. Women were
represented at many levels of the general economy and were
generally paid the same as men for equal work. Despite their
nominal legal equality, however, women faced many forms of
discrimination and tended to be concentrated in low-paying or low
prestige jobs such as doctors and textile workers. In addition,
women bore the brunt of many of the hardships of daily life.
Virtually all women had no economic choice but to work both inside
and outside the home. One report estimated that more than three
million Soviet women work in conditions harmful to their health,
and five hundred thousand women work at hard, physical labor. In
the Central Asian states, where women's rights in reality most
often diverged from those they nominally enjoy, traditional national
practices often prevented women from taking their equal place
alongside men in economic and political life. In Azerbaijan, for
example, Western observers of the December referendum on
independence witnessed many instances of men voting on behalf of
their wives.
Emigration from the former USSR contributed to further expansion
of human contacts over the reporting period. During 1991, over
222,000 ethnic Germans emigrated from the Soviet Union to
Germany, up from the previous year's total of approximately
150,000. Emigration to Israel in 1991, however, dropped to
approximately 145,000, a decrease of nearly 40,000 from the
previous year, due mainly to increased uncertainty about the future
that awaited the newly arrived in Israel. Approximately 46,500
refugees traveled to the United States under the US resettlement
program from April 1, 1991 through March 31, 1992. About 80% of
these were Jews. Armenians, Evangelical Christians, Ukrainian
Catholics, and Ukrainian Orthodox accounted for most of the rest. In
addition, the US embassy in Moscow issued over 1,450 immigrant
visas during the reporting period, more than twice the number issued
the previous year. Most of the recipients of these visas had first-
degree relatives who are US citizens or resident aliens.
Strict party control over the mass media, long a mainstay of Soviet
politics, was exercised less assiduously under Gorbachev's rule, and
collapsed completely in the wake of the failed coup attempt in
August 1991. As a result, there is now more freedom of information
in Russia than at any time since the Bolshevik revolution. Even so,
some governments on the territory of the former Soviet Union
continue to attempt to restrict the media's independence and
exercise some control over the news. Under former President
Gamsakhurdia, the Georgian government, in response to articles it
perceived as anti-Georgian, prohibited journalists representing
several national publications from reporting from its territory. In
Azerbaijan, opposition newspapers were required to submit their
publications to government censors. By the end of 1991, an
opposition newspaper editor reported that the government had
ceased censorship of his organization's publications but continued to
threaten other nominally independent newspapers with restricted
access to printing supplies and services in the event of unfavorable
reporting. In Moldova and the Caucasus, journalists for several
publications were the targets of death threats and arson attacks by
nationalist groups.
Prior to the failed coup attempt in August 1991, most major
newspapers and magazines were controlled and subsidized by
government or Communist Party organizations. Now most are
independent and some are privately owned. However, as they shift to
a free market system during a period of economic hardship, many
publications are suffering from acute financial problems. Control
over paper and ink resources remain in the hands of a few
monopolies, distribution costs are rapidly increasing, and many
papers are underpriced and overextended in subscriptions.
Consequently, many publications, including well-known newspapers
such as Pravda and Komsomol'Skaya Pravda, are on the brink of
financial collapse, and many publishers are hoping for renewed
government subsidies and intervention to help save the publishing
industry.
Newspapers rely on a number of sources for their news: their own
correspondents, domestic news agencies (such as Interfax and Itar-
Tass), and, increasingly, foreign news agencies and other media. The
Russian government sponsors several semi-official media
organizations, including Itar-Tass (formerly known as Tass); Ria-
Novosti, a government information service; and the newspapers
Rossiya, Rossiskiye Vesti, and Rossiskaya Gazeta. Although the
government has permitted the publication of information
unfavorable to the government in these publications, it also uses
them as official news organs and has shown favoritism over other
publications in allocating office space and extending the 1991
subscription campaign for them alone.
The number of journalists based in Moscow for US and other Western
news organizations continued to grow during the reporting period.
Correspondents were increasingly free to travel throughout the
former Soviet Union, and access to previously closed areas was
regularly granted. There are approximately 150 accredited American
journalists in Moscow, representing more than 40 news
organizations. Among the new American bureaus this past year were
The Washington Times and USA Today. During the past year, the
Foreign Correspondents' Association (FCA) actively represented the
collective interests of the foreign news media in dealings with
various government offices and ministries. A growing number of
government officials began to request payment for interviews and
information. The FCA monitored this phenomenon and aired their
grievances concerning access to press conferences with Foreign
Ministry officials and Deputy Prime Minister Poltoranin. Western
correspondents were sometimes barred from news conferences in
Moscow and not informed of others.
The movement toward a free and independent broadcast media in the
Soviet Union and its successor states took on added momentum in
1991, after the failed August coup attempt. Following the all-union
state television and radio company Gosteleradio's earlier voluntary
divestiture to republic jurisdiction of TV and radio studios on their
territories, Gosteleradio was forced to cede the second national
television and radio channels to the all-Russian state television and
radio company (RTR). Under new leadership from liberal reformer
Yegor Yakovlev, Gosteleradio began broadcasting in autumn 1991 the
popular talk-show "Vzglyad," which had been banned previously.
Television correspondents who had lost their jobs under the previous
administration returned to anchor news broadcasts that began to
make regular use of foreign broadcast material and commentary
from CNN [Cable News Network], VOA, Radio Liberty, and the BBC
[British Broadcasting Corporation].
On the other hand, the Russian government's decision to suspend six
publications accused of supporting the coup and to force other
publications to re-register provoked concerns that it was also
resorting to censorship and to government control of the media.
Most of the suspended publications were later allowed to resume
publication, but those media traditionally reliant on funding from
the Communist Party suffered a grave financial crisis since the
party's assets were frozen.
The 1991 law on mass media, which legalized commercial
broadcasting, together with the breakup of the Soviet Union have
opened up fertile ground in Russia for private ex-Soviet and foreign
broadcast companies to establish alternative broadcast and cable
systems. Hundreds of large and small television, radio, and cable
companies reflecting a wide range of political perspectives have
received licenses to broadcast. The biggest obstacle to an even
larger independent broadcast media is financial rather than
political. The situation in other parts of the former Soviet Union is
less clear. Some former republics are still drafting their press
laws, and in Georgia there have been violations of press freedoms.
Television and radio stations of the other new independent states
continue to be financed by the state, and independence from official
government policy varies. Many of the state broadcast media are
subject to pressure, if not censorship, from their respective
governments, and self-censorship is still prevalent.
Public and private television and radio broadcasting in the former
USSR is generally open to foreign broadcasting without restriction.
British, French, German, Finnish, and US television programs are
regularly re-broadcast by Ostankino TV and Russian television, as
well as by many other state broadcast companies in the former
USSR. Israeli, Turkish, and Iranian satellite TV programming is re-
broadcast by the Central Asian radio and television organizations.
As satellite receivers become more numerous, foreign media
organizations such as Worldnet, CNN, Super Channel, TV5, and others,
with and without agreement with the owner company, are also
rebroadcast by private broadcasters and cable networks. The BBC,
VOA, and Radio Liberty are heard everywhere without jamming and
are increasingly being rebroadcast on medium wave. In addition,
American and other TV and radio joint ventures are broadcasting
international programming in Moscow, Kiev, and St. Petersburg.
Foreign films enter the former Soviet Union freely. American,
French, German, Italian, Japanese, and other foreign films are shown
in movie theaters and on television networks in large and small
cities everywhere. However, none of the former republics has signed
the Bern convention, and the absence of strong intellectual property
rights laws has resulted in the consistent pirating of movie and VCR
[videocassette recorder] films throughout the former USSR. In May
1991, the American Motion Picture Export Association called for the
withdrawal of all American entries from the annual Moscow
international film festival to protest continued copyright violations.
Although the Russian film industry supported the action, there has
been no apparent decrease in the illegal showing of foreign films in
the former USSR, especially by video salons and cable television
companies.
Under the USIA book translation program, 44 American books are
being translated into Russian and Ukrainian by Russian and Ukrainian
publishing houses. These include economics and business textbooks,
as well as books about American law, history, society, and the
environment. In late 1990, the US embassy opened an American
reading room at the Library of Foreign Literature in Moscow. This is
the first collection of American books open to the general public at
a Russian library. The collection includes reference books,
periodicals, and special collections of books on English teaching and
American business and economics.
Exchanges in the performing and fine arts fell off dramatically in
1991-1992. The rapidly deteriorating economic situation in the
country, as well as the political restructuring of the government,
greatly reduced subsidies to Russian cultural institutions. In the
past few years, many artists used performances or exhibitions
abroad to supplement their income and provide much-needed hard
currency. However, the rapid increase in the cost of international
travel has, in most cases, removed that option. With their own
financial survival in question, few cultural organizations can afford
to host their foreign counterparts. Some Russian cultural
organizations, particularly those in energy-rich Siberia and the far
east, are thriving under these changing conditions. With the income
from natural resources remaining in these areas rather than being
turned over to the national government, local governments and
industries have begun to invest in their local cultural institutions.
Private sponsorship of the arts has dramatically increased in the
past year, ensuring the survival of those institutions with the
foresight to attract a sponsor. The only risk to those organizations
is that these companies usually see sponsorship as an investment--
not as a charitable contribution--and expect a return on their
investment. The Russian government now allows complete freedom
to individuals and groups to negotiate directly with their foreign
counterparts. The obstacles they face are now economic, rather than
political.
Dramatic growth in educational exchange programs on all levels
continued during the reporting period, highlighted by the
inauguration of the Benjamin Franklin scholarship program. This
provides 160 grants for citizens of the former USSR to study
business, law, economics, or public administration in the United
States. Grants will be awarded on the basis of the first free and
open competition to be administered in the history of the former
Soviet Union. Four American exchange organizations--ACTR, IREX,
the SOROS foundation, and IIE--received grants from USIA to
administer this program. The number of students traveling under the
three existing major programs--Samantha Smith Memorial Exchange
for Undergraduates, the Presidential Initiative for Undergraduate
Exchange, and the High School Partnership Program--decreased
during the reporting period due to the Persian Gulf war, the coup
attempt in Moscow, and the recession in the United States.
Nevertheless, interest in exchanges remained extremely high,
particularly on the side of the former USSR, posing a significant
opportunity and challenge for the US government and private
organizations involved in exchange programs.
The collapse of the Soviet government and the coincidental
expiration of the bilateral general agreement governing educational
exchange threw bilateral programs into a state of confusion. A new
structure is emerging on the Russian side, as well as in the other
former republics, but the new governments do not have resources to
spend on exchange programs. The US side has stepped in to keep the
exchanges going until a new system can be negotiated. For example,
the Fulbright program is being run on a reciprocal basis: Only if a
university is willing to host a scholar can it then nominate one of
its professors. The amount of archival and research materials which
are now available to US scholars has increased dramatically. The
number of instances, however, in which scholars have been asked to
pay for access to materials in hard currency or offered the
opportunity to buy documents outright is increasing to a disturbing
level.
Baltics
Overview. Although hampered by the continued stationing of ex-
Soviet military forces on their territory, the Baltic states have
made great progress toward establishing pluralistic democratic
governments and ensuring respect for human rights. Much remains to
be done, but the Baltic peoples today enjoy considerably greater
personal freedoms since gaining their independence last August. On
September 10, 1991, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were admitted to
the CSCE after agreeing to implement all CSCE principles and
standards.
Security. All three Baltic states emphatically maintain that the
withdrawal of ex-Soviet troops, now troops of the Commonwealth of
Independent States under Russian control, remains their highest
priority and that resolution of this issue will exponentially speed
economic and political reform.
Although some symbolic troop withdrawals in March 1992 occurred
in Lithuania and Latvia, talks with Russia for all three countries are
proceeding at a very slow pace. Lack of communication between
recalcitrant Northwest Military District officers and the Russian
Defense and Foreign Ministries is one of the factors delaying
withdrawals. But by early 1992, it became increasingly clear that
the Russian government headed by Boris Yeltsin was dragging its
feet in dealing with the Balts, in part to minimize tension with the
Russian military, in part to try to preserve air and naval bases
considered vital for the strategic protection of Russia's western
flank. The three states possess legitimate concerns regarding
environmental damage caused by the occupying forces and concerning
potential nuclear reactor leaks and waste (e.g., the Russian land-
based submarine reactors at Paldiski, Estonia). Troop movements
into and within the Baltic states are not coordinated with host
governments, and some units have threatened to remain until the
Russian government assures them of adequate relocation facilities
in Russia. The first scheduled withdrawal of troops from Lithuania
occurred March 3, 1992, after a week's delay, and from Latvia on
March 19, 1992. Those withdrawals were token; in each case about
one hundred troops were involved. Estimated troop presence is about
46,000 soldiers in Lithuania; 60,000 in Latvia; and 22,000 in
Estonia.
The governments of Germany, Sweden, and Denmark have offered to
finance construction of military housing for withdrawn troops,
primarily in the Pskov region of Russia. The Baltic states are
amenable to such multilateral assistance and have agreed to help in
construction. Russia appears agreeable to this if it is pursued
tactfully. Furthermore, the Baltic states are willing to "swap"
housing between the departing troops and native Baltic families
forcibly removed to other regions of the former Soviet Union after
World War II, and Lithuania has offered military officers the right to
remain in Lithuania, and title to their housing, if they resign their
military commissions and pursue civilian employment.
The three Baltic states began to assemble military establishments
virtually from scratch. By March 1992, the rough outlines of their
new structures began to emerge. These structures remained to be
fleshed out, however. In the conduct of CSCE CSBMs activities, the
Baltic states forecast no notifiable exercises for 1991 or 1992.
Economics. The largest impediment to economic reform remains the
de facto integration of the Baltic economies into those of other
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, especially
Russia. All three resource-poor countries rely heavily upon imports
of Russian raw materials, especially oil. The Baltic states have
signed trade agreements with Russia, but the Russian government
says that distribution and production problems often cause delays or
cancellation of deliveries. In addition, the demand for payment in
hard currency generally reduces the Baltic states' capacity to obtain
goods. All three countries continue for the most part to deliver
contracted goods not dependent upon imported Russian raw
materials. Meanwhile, fuel dependency compels the Baltics to turn
to the West for energy assistance or to the spot market for costly
hard currency purchases.
All three Baltic states are eager to introduce their own currencies
but have heeded IMF and World Bank advice to delay implementation
until at least summer 1992. Fear of being "bought out" by Western
firms has inhibited large-scale privatization, particularly of key
industries. Estonia boasts more joint ventures (1,500) than Latvia,
Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus combined. Banking and
infrastructure reform rank as high priorities in each state.
As a matter of sovereignty, the Baltics officially refuse to accept
responsibility for Soviet debt unless given access to Soviet assets.
Ukraine has consented to assume Latvian debt in return for Latvian
assets, to which the Latvian government has tentatively agreed. The
Russian Central Bank has threatened the national banks of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania over the fate of their share of hard currency
deposits if they fail to pay their share of the Soviet debt. The
Estonian government has contemplated use of its US gold reserves as
payment.
The Baltic states have participated only minimally in recent
sessions of multilateral environmental organizations, especially the
UN Economic Commission for Europe, but they have expressed their
commitment to accede to relevant conventions of the ECE. They have
been somewhat more active in pursuing regional interests with
nearby countries, most notably the protection of the Baltic Sea.
Human Dimension. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are continuing to
wrestle with the question of who is a citizen and who is not. The
status of the non-indigenous residents of the three (38% of the
population of Estonia, 49% of the population of Latvia, and 20% of
Lithuania) remains the largest point of contention. All seek to enact
citizenship legislation consistent with West European practice.
Estonia and Lithuania have, in particular, moved far along in the
process of passing citizenship laws.
Below is a brief summary of the status of citizenship laws,
constitutional reform, and elections in each of the three Baltic
countries.
Estonia
On February 26, 1992, the Estonian parliament renewed the liberal
1938 citizenship law. Accordingly, those who were citizens in 1940
are citizens now; those who moved to Estonia subsequently can
become citizens after one year, following a two-year residence
retroactive to March 30, 1990, and a minimal knowledge of the
Estonian language. The government has funded Estonian language
training for next year. The 1938 law also provides equal civil
protection to resident aliens. Dual citizenship will be allowed for
those Estonians and their families who fled.
On February 28, 1992, the Estonian constitutional assembly
completed its work on the draft constitution as well as a draft
implementation act and forwarded them in March to the Supreme
Council and the Estonian Congress for review. If approved, a public
referendum would decide its implementation. The document
establishes a parliamentary form of government that would elect a
president who, in turn, would submit a prime ministerial nominee
for parliamentary approval. However, as a one-time phenomenon, the
first president would be popularly elected. If the election law can
be passed early enough for voter registration preparations, the
Estonian government would hold elections before June 15. That
appears in doubt due to continued discussions over small points of
disagreement in the draft constitution. Questions concerning
KGB/Communist Party leader eligibility for government positions
may yet be subject to a direct vote.
Latvia
In October 1991, the Latvian parliament passed a resolution which
outlined principles for a future law on citizenship. This action does
not constitute a citizenship law in any usual sense. The resolution
also proposes five criteria for naturalization: a conversational
knowledge of Latvian, renunciation of former citizenship, residence
of at least 16 years in Latvia, a knowledge of the Latvian
constitution, and a loyalty oath. (It is estimated that 80% of
resident Russians in Latvia would pass the residency requirement.)
Dual citizenship would be allowed for those who were forced to
leave Latvia during the Soviet occupation and adopted another
citizenship. In addition, the resolution calls for excluding
criminals, drug addicts, former members of the Soviet army, and
certain other groups from becoming citizens. The current draft can
best be regarded as a straw man, and the situation is likely to
remain fluid for several months at least. The Latvian President, for
example, counter-proposed a 10-year residency requirement (similar
to that of Switzerland).
In addition, on March 19, 1992, the Latvian parliament passed a law
explicitly guaranteeing "equal rights to all nationalities and ethnic
groups" and "guarantees to all permanent residents in the Republic
regardless of their nationality, equal rights to work and wages." The
law also prohibits "any activity directed toward nationality
discrimination or the promotion of national superiority or hatred."
However, as of May 5, 1992, the right to secondary education in the
Russian language will expire.
Significant portions of the 1922 constitution were temporarily re-
implemented last autumn until a new constitution can be drafted.
The Latvian government intends to abolish the old Supreme Council
in favor of a parliamentary system. However, the adoption of a
constitution and holding of parliamentary elections cannot be
undertaken until the citizenship issue is resolved.
Lithuania
Lithuania adopted a full citizenship law on December 13, 1991. The
law extends citizenship to persons who were born in Lithuania; who
were citizens prior to 1940 and to their descendants; and to those
who became citizens prior to December 11, 1991. All applications
for retention, restoration, and naturalization must go through a
citizenship committee appointed by the Supreme Council, which
appears to have wide discretion in case handling. Qualification for
naturalization requires a 10-year residency, a permanent job or
source of income, knowledge of the constitution (not yet ratified),
renunciation of current citizenship, and proficiency in Lithuanian;
allegedly, no one has been rejected for failure in the latter.
Many Poles and some Russians are unhappy that the latest law does
not clearly specify equal civil treatment for them if they choose not
to become citizens. Vilnius, however, has stated that these
minorities would enjoy equal rights. On the other hand, district by-
elections in the ethnically Polish-dominated and conservative
districts of Salcininkai and Vilnius were planned for the month of
March but again have been indefinitely postponed. The Lithuanian
leadership deposed ethnic Polish deputies and local leadership of
these districts after the failure of the August 1991 coup in Moscow
on the grounds that they had collaborated with the anti-Gorbachev
plotters. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Poland and
Lithuania was signed on January 16, 1992, and the sizeable ethnic
Polish minority in Lithuania now has access to use of Polish-
language textbooks (approved by the Lithuanian government),
newspapers, amateur theater, and other ethnically based
organizations.
As in Latvia, Lithuania intends to adopt a parliamentary system, and
anticipates a May 23, 1992, referendum on the establishment of the
office of president. A draft constitution is being debated presently;
upon ratification by the parliament, the document will be put to a
public referendum no later than three months thereafter. National
elections are not anticipated until late summer or autumn 1992.
Former Republics/New States Overview
All republics and new states of the former Soviet Union have agreed
to accept in entirety all commitments and responsibilities contained
in CSCE documents, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter
of Paris for a New Europe, and have declared their determination to
act in accordance with these CSCE provisions. After signing letters
of accession to this effect, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan were granted full CSCE membership by the Council of
Ministers in Prague on January 30, 1992. Georgia was admitted to
full membership by the Council of Ministers in Helsinki on March 24,
1992. (For model letter of accession signed by all new members,
see Appendix 2.)
Armenia
The Armenian government has stated its strong commitment to CSCE
principles, including democratic practices, human rights, and
commitment to international obligations. Internally, it has a strong
record of human dimension compliance.
No republic with the exception of Russia has gone further than
Armenia in moving toward a market based economy. Nearly 80% of
republic lands are privatized and rules on resale are the most liberal
of any republic. President Ter-Petrosyan's government is now
making efforts to sell many small and medium-sized republic
enterprises to private citizens. Armenia has been slower in
implementing price reform, however.
The Armenian government continues to support the Armenian
community in Nagorno-Karabakh fighting with Azerbaijani
government forces for control of the province. Armenia, in
retaliation for the Azerbaijani blockade, has refused to allow rail
and truck shipments into the Azerbaijani autonomous oblast of
Nakhichevan, separated from Azerbaijan by Armenian territory,
unless goods in the shipments are also provided to Armenia.
Armenian government officials have stated Armenia may intervene
directly in Nagorno-Karabakh if the level of violence increases or
third parties intervene in the fighting. Armenia has expressed its
willingness to accept outside intervention, including CSCE
mediation, and has agreed to participate in the planned CSCE
Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh to be held in Minsk.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan's implementation of CSCE commitments was marred by
the ongoing violence over Nagorno-Karabakh, the primarily Armenian
populated enclave of Azerbaijan. The progress of political and
economic reform has been adversely affected by the conflict.
Despite ongoing international efforts to mediate a solution, violence
and bloodshed continue to escalate.
Azerbaijan has stated its willingness to adhere to all CSCE
principles and agreements. Azerbaijan views the principles of
territorial integrity and rejection of forcible border changes as
main components of its position in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.
For the moment, Azerbaijan still relies upon independent groups of
fighters to carry on the conflict with Armenians living in Nagorno-
Karabakh. Some of these groups are nominally affiliated with the
government--the militia and interior ministry troops--and some are
associated with independent political movements such as the
National Front. The government is now trying to bring the groups
under its direct control as part of the plan to create a national army.
Azerbaijan has declared its intention to seek a political, not
military, solution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the
population is unenthusiastic about military mobilization.
Azerbaijan's progress toward a free market economy is most visible
in the proliferation of small free enterprises. Larger economic
entities are still under government control. Azerbaijan is seeking
foreign trade and investment and has passed laws to guarantee
against government expropriation. Work on cleaning up Caspian Sea
petroleum and petrochemical pollution has not yet begun. Several
environmental organizations exist, and Azerbaijan has expressed the
most interest in scientific and technological exchange in this field.
The Supreme Soviet is dominated by "renamed" communists.
However, the Azerbaijan popular front, a loose coalition of 17 non-
communist parties, wields political power far beyond its numbers in
the Supreme Soviet. The front forced the resignation of President
Mutalibov in early March 1992, following the alleged massacre of
Azeri civilians at Khojali February 27, 1992. Presidential elections
are scheduled for June 7, 1992, with a wide spectrum of political
forces expected to take part. Ethnic tensions throughout Azerbaijan
have mounted following the alleged massacre at Khojali and
government claims of participation by renegade forces of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Armenians resident in Baku--mostly members of about
15,000 mixed families--have reported instances of harassment and
their fear for the future, and are seeking to emigrate. They have
spoken of kidnappings, threats, break-ins, and of children being
beaten up at school. President Mamedov has denied there is any
policy of refusing passports or departure from Azerbaijan to
members of ethnic minorities.
Although Armenia maintains that the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh
is essentially an internal Azerbaijan affair, it continues to insist on
the right of the region's inhabitants to self-determination. Fighting
in the region intensified beginning in November 1991 after several
Azerbaijan officials and Russian and Kazakh observers died in a
helicopter crash. Azerbaijan accused Armenian militants of
shooting down the aircraft. Following the incident, Azerbaijan
imposed a state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh and abolished the
area's autonomous status. Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian population
voted for independence in a December 1991 referendum. Azerbaijan
officials claimed in early 1992 that Armenian forces had succeeded
in taking almost all of the Azeri settlements in the region.
Azerbaijan's president, Ayaz Mutalibov, resigned in early March 1992
after reports of a massacre of Azeri civilians in Khojali outraged
Azerbaijan citizens who perceived that the country was losing the
conflict.
In response to the worsening situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, the
CSCE moved to bring the parties to the conflict together to begin a
process of good faith negotiation that would find a lasting solution
to the conflict. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier, in his
capacity as CSCE Council Chairman-in-Office, visited the region in
late March 1992 with a delegation that included US Ambassador John
Maresca to explore the possibilities for arranging a negotiated
settlement. This visit, made possible through provision of US
government military aircraft, led to agreement to hold a CSCE
sponsored conference on Nagorno-Karabakh in Minsk.
Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Mario Raffaelli has been named
chairman of the conference and has traveled to the region to lay its
foundation, the date of which has not yet been set. Separate two-
person advance teams, one of which includes a US State Department
officer, have been sent to Yerevan and Baku to help plan for the
conference and any future dispatch of CSCE ceasefire observers to
the region. The UN Secretary-General dispatched a fact-finding
mission headed by former [US] secretary of state Cyrus Vance to the
region in March 1992. The mission concluded that the CSCE
mediation effort was the best hope for bringing the parties together
and recommended the UN offer its support to facilitate the CSCE
effort.
Belarus
Like other new states of the former USSR, Belarus faces a daunting
task in changing from a militarized to a civilian society. According
to the government, one out of every forty-three people in Belarus is
currently employed in the military. The major constraint to such
change is financial, thus explaining Belarus' keen interest in
obtaining part of the $400 million authorized by the US Congress for
assisting members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to
dismantle nuclear and chemical weapons. The government of Belarus
would also like to use some of the money to integrate military
forces engaged in controlling weaponry into the Belarus civilian
workforce.
Belarus has repeatedly advocated resolution of disputes through
peaceful means, viz., their proposal to host the CSCE peace
conference on Nagorno-Karabakh and their agreement to form a joint
commission with Lithuania to resolve outstanding border disputes.
In the economic sphere, the Belarusians are only now beginning to
take meaningful steps toward the establishment of a free market
economy. Privatization is taking place on the basis of a Council of
Minister's decree; a privatization law has yet to be passed by the
legislature. Thus far, only 36 enterprises have been privatized. A
foreign investment law was passed by the Belarus Supreme Soviet
last November, but ruble inconvertibility and other restrictions
continue to hamper investment opportunities. It is unclear, for
example, whether foreigners will be able to own land in the state.
Revisions to the investment law are currently still under discussion.
The chief environmental issue in Belarus is related to Chernobyl.
Seventy percent of the nuclear fallout from the Chernobyl disaster
fell on Belarusian territory. Scientific exchanges, on Chernobyl and
other issues as well, occur regularly between Belarus and other
nations. Belarus is a long-standing member of the UN Economic
Commission for Europe and has been a fairly active participant in
ECE environmental sessions. Belarus has also signed key ECE
conventions on long-range transboundary air pollution and
environmental impact assessment in a transboundary context, but
its capacity to implement these agreements is constrained by many
of the same factors neighboring countries face.
A referendum on whether or not to hold early parliamentary
elections is under consideration. Opposition parties, under the
leadership of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF), have gathered well
over the 350,000 signatures required by law to force such a
referendum. The signatures are currently being counted by the
legislature's election commission. The timing of a referendum and
the possibility of subsequent elections remain unclear.
Although there are Russian, Polish, and other minorities in Belarus,
their rights appear to be respected. The rights of persons belonging
to minority groups have not been a political issue in Belarus.
Belarusian political life, despite the presence of a significant
contingent of the old guard in many areas of government, takes place
in an open and free environment. The nascent free press, for
example, continues to foster lively debate over the referendum
issue.
The Belarusians have given their assurances on freedom of
emigration (and have received a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik
agreement.) Local ovir officials have said that Belarus intends to
continue implementation of the for-mer Soviet law on emigration
(originally scheduled to come into force in 1993) and that Belarus is
committed to conform to international norms on emigration. Two
out of only three known refusenik cases have recently been resolved
favorably.
Georgia
Georgian President Zviad Gamsa-khurdia fled Tbilisi in January
1992, after intense fighting between government forces and
opposition troops destroyed much of the downtown area of the
capital. Gamsakhurdia's opposition claimed that the President
stifled basic freedoms, including freedom of the press and freedom
of assembly, and provoked conflicts between ethnic groups.
Gamsakhurdia also had large numbers of political opponents
arrested.
On February 21, 1992, Georgia applied for membership in CSCE. On
March 10, 1992, a provisional government was formed, and former
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadzi was appointed chairman
of the governing council. After assurances were received that
Georgia intended to work toward full implementation of all CSCE
commitments, the state was admitted as a full member to CSCE on
March 24, 1992. The provisional government declared its intention
to hold new parliamentary elections by fall 1992. Despite the new
governments stated desire to negotiate with ethnic minorities in
Georgia, separatist violence continued in South Ossetia. At the same
time, many Georgian leaders expressed fears that the escalating
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh might lead to tension between
Armenians and Azeris residing in Georgia, thereby further
destabilizing the country. Meanwhile, toward the end of the
reporting period, sporadic armed conflict between government
forces and supporters of deposed president Gamsakhurdia continued.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan's unique demographic composition strongly influenced
its politics--Kazakhs are only a plurality in their own country. The
country's President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is a strong advocate of
ethnic tolerance. The leadership advocated a "go slow" approach in
implementing legal requirements for use of the Kazakh language, and
ethnic relations were relatively harmonious. Following the demise
of the Communist Party, Nazarbayev declined to join any political
party. Although in principle other parties are free to form, in
practice there are complex legal obstacles. The Peoples' Congress of
Kazakhstan formally registered as a party and inherited some of the
Communist Party's members--although the membership is largely
Kazakh. Numerous movements formed with a wide range of agendas,
from environmental to openly nationalist. Nazarbayev enjoyed
broadly based popular support and won a sweeping victory in the
December 1, 1991, single-candidate presidential election. However,
his appearance as a supporter of democracy was tarnished by the
refusal of government authorities to permit an opponent, Kazakh
nationalist Hasan Kojakhmetov, to register.
Kyrgyzstan
The Kyrgyzstan government, under President Askar Akayev, has
frequently affirmed its determination to meet international
standards on human rights questions. The government adopted a law
on the protection of national minorities with an emphasis on human
rights of individuals.
President Akayev reformed the structure of the government to give
more authority to presidential appointees, both in the central
government and in the six regional governments. This was
characterized by the government as a necessary step to avert chaos
and crisis, but it was also a political move to gain more power for
the advocates of reform. The current parliament was elected in
1990 and is dominated by members of the old Communist Party
establishment. Political parties are free to organize and there are
many political groups. However, there are few true political parties.
Much remains to be done before they operate as effective channels
for citizen oversight and participation.
Moldova
Moldova's move toward independence from the Soviet Union was
accelerated by the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, which
Moldova firmly opposed. In the immediate aftermath of the coup
attempt, the Moldovan parliament declared the country independent,
outlawed the Communist Party, and nationalized the party's assets.
Seeking a stronger mandate, President Mircea Snegur called for
direct elections in December 1991. His overwhelming victory,
despite a boycott by opposition groups, appeared to show support for
Snegur's policy of maintaining Moldovan independence rather than
moving toward immediate unification with Romania.
In response to Moldovan independence, some leaders of Moldova's
substantial Slavic (mostly Russian and Ukrainian) and small Gagauz
minorities declared the formation of their own independent
republics in areas where their ethnic groups are concentrated. While
the Gagauz republic has shown increasing willingness to negotiate
with the government about its concerns, the situation in the Trans-
Dniester area has deteriorated, resulting in several dozen deaths and
over 100 wounded during the clashes between Moldovan and Trans-
Dniester forces.
The Moldovan government has repeatedly denied charges by Trans-
Dniester "President" Smirnov and his supporters that the goal of the
Moldovan government is unification with Romania and subsequent
repression of the Russian-speaking minority. Instead, the
government of Moldova continues to advocate a peaceful solution to
the continuing unrest in the Trans-Dniester region and maintains
that it intends to guarantee respect for the rights of all minorities.
Denying that the conflict is ethnic, Moldovan leaders insist the
conflict reflects the tension between anti-reform elements, some of
whom oppose the dissolution of the USSR, and pro-reform forces.
The government has refrained from extreme military measures in
responding to the Trans-Dniester situation despite growing pressure
from the Moldovan public, which is concerned about increasing
numbers of casualties and refugees. However, on March 28, 1992,
President Snegur declared a state of emergency, which gave the
government additional powers to search for illegal weapons and
disarm para-military groups. At the same time, the government
reiterated its desire to resolve the dispute through negotiations. On
April 7, 1992, foreign ministers of Moldova, Romania, Russia, and
Ukraine agreed that the four powers involved would seek to
implement a truce and seek a settlement of the conflict.
Although Moldovan nationalism appeared to have moderated prior to
the most recent outbreak of fighting in March 1992, it clearly
remains a potent political force in Moldova. The government has
issued decrees stating its support for cultural freedom and
development for ethnic minorities and is actively supporting the
formation of cultural organizations and schools which will offer
instruction in minority languages. Continuing unrest in the Trans-
Dniester region may, however, have a negative effect on progress
toward greater tolerance for national minorities. In the language
law passed in August 1989, the government had established a
deadline of 1994, after which time all official correspondence
would be conducted in Romanian, the official language. In response
to complaints from the Russophone population, the government has
extended that deadline to the year 2000 for areas with large
Russophone minorities. After that time, people who are unable to
speak Romanian cannot hold leadership positions in government or
state-owned economic enterprises.
Russia
In the Russian Federation, inter-ethnic relations and the issue of
independence and/or sovereignty of various sub-units of the
federation were items of intense controversy during the reporting
period. Several autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs based on
national minorities declared sovereignty, held referenda on
independence or otherwise asserted their right to determine their
own polities. In Tatarstan, for example, old-line communist
political leaders retained their hold on power and called a
referendum on "sovereignty." In some cases, inter-ethnic conflicts
burst into violence. For example, in the northern Caucasus,
territorial disputes flared among various ethnic groups. In April,
after the USSR Supreme Soviet annulled deportation decrees from
the 1940s, Ingush and Ossetian groups clashed in North Ossetia when
the Ingush attempted to repossess their former homes in the area.
The Ingush also clashed repeatedly with Cossacks in the region. In
November 1991, Chechen activists forced the dissolution of the
Chechen-Ingushetia government and declared themselves
independent from "Russian chauvinism." The Russian government
tried unsuccessfully to pressure them to reverse their action. At
the end of the reporting period, the Russian government had not
recognized the Chechen declaration of independence as valid. The
Ingush, for their part, voted to remain inside Russia, provided that
lands expropriated in the 1940s were returned. This exacerbated the
Ingush territorial dispute with North Ossetia, and Ingush guerrilla
attacks were met by creation of an Ossetian national guard.
Tajikistan
By law, political parties can be formed and operate as long as they
do not work to overthrow the government by force. Three major
political parties now function. Nonetheless, the government of
Tajikistan has been strongly criticized by democratic opposition
forces for its performance in the area of democratic freedoms and
human rights. Some opposition leaders claimed that the November
presidential elections, which saw the Communist Party of
Tajikistan garner 58% of the vote, entailed significant vote fraud.
The government has sought to circumscribe political activity. Some
opposition members assert that incarceration and/or harassment of
individuals involved in the February 1990 demonstrations continued
during the reporting period. In demonstrations by the opposition on
March 22, 1992, in Dushanbe and on March 23, 1992, in Kurgan Tyube,
some participants were arrested, then released some hours later.
The government announced March 25, 1992, that these
demonstrations had been illegal because the leaders had not obtained
the necessary permit 10 days in advance. This announcement, in
turn, prompted a demonstration by approximately 400 people at the
Ministry of Interior on the following day, March 26. Opposition
members claim that the government often hinders their free-dom to
demonstrate by delaying or manipulating the permit-issuing process.
Before the entry of opposition leaders into the Nabiyev government,
democratic leaders and the small but vocal opposition press
complained that the government censors the press and denies the
opposition or independent press access to state-controlled radio and
television. The chairman of the democratic opposition party
currently faces trial for alleged slander of the President. New
amendments to the criminal code, signed by the President March 25,
1992, make "insulting public officials" a criminal act, punishable by
fines or imprisonment for up to two years. The new amendments
specifically single out reporters and newspaper editors for the
stiffest penalties--up to three years in prison or fines of up to
50,000 rubles. In early March 1992, the government arrested
Makhsud Ikramov, Mayor of Dushanbe, for alleged corruption. He was
replaced on March 23. Democratic forces have said that the
government action in replacing Ikramov, an opponent of President
Nabiyev, was inappropriate inasmuch as the charges against him
have yet to be proven. As of March 27, 1992, his case had not been
brought before the procurator.
At the end of the reporting period, the government was also under
challenge from regional political forces. A hunger strike was
underway among prominent figures in the mountains of
Badakhshanskaya Oblast demanding autonomy for the area. A
Tajikistan Supreme Soviet decree passed March 25, 1992, declaring
the oblast autonomous appears not to have gone far enough to meet
the demands of at least some of the Pamir protesters, such as
participants in the March 26, 1992, demonstration. The government
permits travel into the Pamir area only with special visas. Even
residents of the region, such as students studying in Dushanbe, must
obtain these permits to travel to the area. Jewish community
leaders generally take the position that social and institutional
incidents of anti-Semitism have worsened recently, although
official tolerance of public celebration of significant religious
holidays appears to be growing. Jewish emigration from the region
continued at a steady pace.
Turkmenistan
The Turkmenistan government has publicly stated its commitment to
UN and CSCE principles and its understanding that fulfilling such
obligations is necessary for successful relations with other nations,
especially Western countries. Nevertheless, senior government
officials have publicly stated that they will not "play at" democracy
and subject themselves to what they see as political chaos
elsewhere.
Ukraine
Ukraine's August 24, 1992, declaration of independence was ratified
by an overwhelming 90.3% of voters in the December 1, 1991,
referendum. The independence referendum and presidential elections
were held on the same day, and both were open and fair according to
Helsinki Commission and other international observers. All oblasts
in Ukraine voted in favor of independence, including regions with
large Russian minority populations.
The 1991 Ukrainian law on minority rights confers equal legal
status on all citizens regardless of ethnic affiliation. While a 1989
law establishes Ukrainian as the state language, individual citizens
retain the right to use other languages in private and business
transactions. No minority group in Ukraine has complained of lack of
respect for its linguistic and cultural rights. The April 1991 law on
freedom of religion and conscience extends to all religious groups
and organizations the right to establish congregations in Ukraine,
subject to registration with local authorities. Parishes of the long-
banned Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox
churches are being registered throughout Ukraine. City councils in
Kiev and Lviv restored synagogues in their respective Jewish
communities, and a yeshiva was opened in Kiev in 1990.
The office of the Ukrainian prosecutor general has insisted on
pursing a retrial of Dmitri Berman on murder charges, claiming they
have new evidence. The US government has asked the Ukrainian
government to speed resolution of this case.
Uzbekistan
The collapse of the centralized Soviet structure and Uzbekistan's
consequent independence opened the way to some progress in the
area of democratic pluralism, albeit limited. Uzbekistan's
leadership allowed one opposition party to register in 1991, the
"ERK" party, headed by writer and Supreme Soviet Deputy Mohammed
Solikh. At the same time, the largest opposition group in the
country, Birlik, a popular-front organization, was allowed to
register as a movement but not as a party. The Islamic Renaissance
Party, which represents the politics of Islamic fundamentalism, is
banned. As a result, the December 29, 1991, presidential elections
featured only two candidates. Demonstrations are banned by a
government decree issued in early 1990. Several attempts by the
Birlik movement to hold demonstrations have been forcibly
prevented by militia. In the wake of the August 1991 coup attempt
in Moscow, August 26 and September 8 attempts to hold mass
demonstrations were forcibly blocked. This decree is still in effect.
Yugoslavia
General Assessment. The former Yugoslavia's breakup over the
course of the reporting period was characterized by grave,
extensive, and continuing violations of CSCE commitments and
norms.
In the security area, there were massive infringements of Helsinki
principles, CSBMs, the Geneva conventions, and other international
norms of humanitarian behavior. Several parties attempted to
violate the UN-imposed arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.
In the economy, progress toward a free market economy begun in
1989-1990 under the Markovic federal government's program was
negated by the war and the destruction of a unified Yugoslav
economy. Throughout the republics of the former Yugoslavia,
unemployment was high, inflation skyrocketed, and production
plummeted.
Respect for human rights deteriorated drastically in the deepening
political and economic crisis. Extreme inter-republic, political, and
ethnic animosities and the spread of armed conflict reversed many
earlier promising advances in human rights and brought about
serious new human rights violations.
While violations in all these areas were perpetrated by many
participants in the conflict, the weight of responsibility lay with
the Serbian leadership and the so-called Yugoslav National Army
(JNA). Particularly grievous was the use of heavy artillery and
firepower.
Security. During the reporting period, there were large-scale
violations of Helsinki principles, especially those calling on CSCE
participating states to refrain from the use of force and to seek
peaceful settlement of disputes.
The conflict claimed thousands of lives during the reporting period,
including those of many noncombatants. In the areas most affected
by the fighting, there were widespread and credible reports of
atrocities, including the massacre of villagers, the torture and
killing of prisoners, the use of human shields, and the taking of
hostages. Such behavior was rarely punished. Croats and Serbs both
fled or were expelled from areas of Croatia that came under the
control of the other ethnic group.
Following Croatia's and Slovenia's declarations of independence on
June 25, 1991, the violence spread [a pattern which began to repeat
itself in spring 1992 in newly independent Bosnia-Hercegovina].
Throughout the latter portion of 1991, the JNA was increasingly
aggressive in using its vastly superior ground and air power on
civilian targets. Its disproportionate and indiscriminate use of
force, including heavy artillery and air strikes during the sieges of
Vukovar, Osijek, Dubrovnik, and other Croatian population centers
resulted in thousands of civilian casualties, severe damage or
destruction to Croatian cities and villages, and the displacement of
hundreds of thousands of residents. An estimated 10,000 people
died in the armed conflict in Croatia during the reporting period,
many of them civilian non-combatants.
To add to this, the conflict has been marked by policies of deliberate
targeting by all sides of places of worship and cultural legacies.
Much has been destroyed by heavy artillery and aerial bombing by the
JNA, including Dubrovnik and Vukovar.
Forces involved in the conflict frequently failed to observe
internationally accepted humanitarian standards. For example, in
September 1992, Croatian forces near Karlovac reportedly killed
more than ten JNA soldiers who were attempting to surrender.
Croatian authorities subsequently investigated and charged at least
one person with the murders. Both Croatian and Serbian forces
regularly beat prisoners. There were credible reports of Serbian
irregular forces using civilian non-combatants as human shields and
to sweep minefields.
International observers reported widespread looting of Croatian
villages by Serbian irregulars and JNA reservists in the Dalmatian
hinterlands. In September 1992, the government-controlled
Belgrade television broadcast interviews with Croatian prisoners of
war. The families of JNA soldiers residing in Croatia were
threatened and at times used as hostages by Croatian forces.
Members of opposing ethnic groups were captured and held as
hostages for barter in prisoner exchanges. The Croatian blockade of
JNA garrisons in Croatia resulted in the denial of essential food and
supplies to some families and noncombatants. Many Catholic and
Serbian Orthodox churches were destroyed or damaged during the
conflict.
International conventions protecting medical personnel and relief
supplies were not respected. A convoy of medical and food supplies
for the city of Vukovar, besieged by the JNA, was repeatedly stopped
in October, despite the agreement of all sides that it should proceed.
The convoy was fired upon, allegedly by JNA forces. Another convoy,
led by the French organization Doctors Without Borders, came under
artillery attack while it was evacuating patients. In a separate
incident, a clearly marked vehicle carrying delegates of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was attacked by
mortar fire. In numerous instances, including in Vukovar, Osijek,
Vinkovci, and Karlovac, clearly identified hospitals were repeatedly
and apparently intentionally hit by JNA and Serbian irregular
artillery and air attacks. In October 1991, Serbian irregulars fired
mortar rounds at a clearly marked ambulance near Karlovac and
killed the doctor inside it.
In several instances, international ceasefire monitors were
attacked. In January 1992, two JNA fighter planes, in the air
despite the restrictions placed on air movements in a recently
agreed ceasefire, shot down an unarmed, clearly marked helicopter
carrying EC monitors and flying over a non-conflicted area of
Croatia. All five EC monitors were killed in an incident for which
the JNA apologized, while also placing partial blame on the EC
monitors themselves.
Spurred by violent rivalry between ethnic groups, the breakdown in
civil order, and all-out war in some areas, Serbs and Croats
regularly accused each other of "massacres" and "genocide" against
innocent civilians. While both sides were prone to exaggerate for
propaganda purposes and hard evidence was often scarce, the
statements of those fleeing the fighting and other evidence make
clear that many deaths resulted from summary executions on ethnic
or political grounds. For example, some 80 Croatian residents of the
town of Dalj were reportedly massacred in August 1991. At least
35 Croats, mostly elderly, in the Croatian village of Vocin were
murdered and mutilated in December 1991, apparently by Serbian
irregular forces. There were credible reports of Croatian forces
killing unarmed Serbian villagers in the Sisak area and in Sarvas. At
least 24 Serb civilians were kidnapped and murdered, apparently by
Croatian forces, in Gospic; Croatian authorities investigated but did
not make any arrests. Following the February 1992 referendum on
independence for Bosnia-Hercegovina, armed Serbian militants
erected barricades in Sarajevo and elsewhere, protesting the
referendum. Dozens of people from all ethnic groups were killed in
the ensuing weeks as violence increased.
The breakdown of federal authority and increasing "Serbianization"
of the military effectively ended legitimate federal civilian control
over the JNA which, along with elements of other security and police
forces, technically remained under federal civilian jurisdiction in
1991. After its nominal commander in chief, the collective federal
presidency, became paralyzed, the JNA allied itself squarely with
Serbian politicians in the armed conflict with Croatia. The size and
activities of other military, paramilitary, and police units increased
dramatically in 1991, including those of the Croatian territorial
forces and the irregular units organized by Serbian citizens of
Croatia with substantial support from Serbian authorities and the
JNA. The outbreak of fighting between these groups and the
aggressive role of the JNA, with its vastly superior firepower, in
support of these Serbs resulted in many civilian casualties and the
displacement of over 600,000 persons from the war-torn areas.
In 1991, Yugoslavia failed to provide CSBM data on military forces
and equipment and on its military budget as required by the 1990
Vienna Document. It complied with military exercise forecasts
required under this same document, indicating it planned no
exercises at a notifiable level in 1991 or 1992. With regard to the
Vienna Document Mechanism on Unusual Military Activities,
Yugoslavia was called upon by Austria, Hungary, and Italy to provide
clarification of military activities taking place on Yugoslav soil in
the course of 1991. The clarifications provided were generally not
found to be adequate at meetings held under the auspices of this
mechanism. Portugal, on behalf of the EC, invoked the 1990 Vienna
Document mechanism requiring explanations of hazardous military
incidents in the wake of the downing of a helicopter carrying an EC
monitor team over Yugoslav territory. To date, the EC has not found
the explanations given by the former Yugoslavia in response to this
request to be adequate. Yugoslavia was not connected to the CSCE
communication network.
Economics. Though largely stalled by early 1991, the Markovic
government's remaining program of federal economic reforms was
wiped out by the violent disintegration of the Yugoslav federation
which erupted in mid-1991 and the concurrent destruction of a
unified Yugoslav economy. Economic developments during the
reporting period have been dominated by inter-republic
protectionism, property seizures, and the suspension or reversal of
privatization programs. By November 1991, the former Yugoslavia
consisted of three major currency and/or economic zones--Slovenia,
Croatia, and the remainder of "Yugoslavia." The cost of financing the
"Yugoslav" military and Serbian forces grew substantially to claim
the overwhelming share of the federal budget. Monetary discipline
collapsed as these cumulative costs were largely financed through
hyperinflation. None of the currencies is convertible internationally
nor among the republics. This has helped slow inter-republic
commerce to a trickle. All of the currencies are also under pressure
from high domestic inflation, but the Yugoslav dinar, in particular,
has declined in value from approximately 15 dinars per US dollar in
March 1991 to over 400 dinars per dollar by March 1992.
As the Yugoslav federal government's authority disintegrated in
1991, foreign exchange reserves declined to $2.5 billion by mid-
March 1992. There is little prospect that the former Yugoslavia will
be able to continue to service its international debt obligations in
1992.
Throughout the republics, for the most part, unemployment is high
(20-25%), inflation skyrocketing (over 2,000% annually in Serbia),
and production plummeting (down 20% in 1991). Although the degree
of economic collapse varies from republic to republic (with Slovenia
generally better off and Bosnia-Hercegovina most severely
affected), there is little prospect of near-term improvement, or a
resumption of progress toward a free market economy, in any of the
republics--with the partial exceptions of Slovenia and Macedonia--
until a political resolution to the Yugoslav crisis is found.
The former Yugoslavia was long active in science and technology
exchanges with the West. Despite the outbreak of war, which
precluded US partners in scientific exchanges from visiting
Yugoslavia, there were 263 research projects underway with US
cooperating scientists as of March 1992. Even during the height of
fighting in Croatia, university research facilities paused for no more
than a month or two in their activities, and some kept going despite
the threat of attack. The former Yugoslavia was also active in
science and technology exchanges elsewhere with 86 signed
agreements throughout the world.
The former Yugoslavia has monumental environmental problems, but,
with the war and its consequences, there was virtually no progress
during the reporting period in improving environmental protection.
Follow-up teams to a G-24 fact-finding group which visited
Yugoslavia in early 1991 to assess environmental conditions were
unable to visit due to the fighting. The siege and shelling of such
cities as Vukovar, Dubrovnik, and Osijek has had incalculable effect
on the environment and will take years to mitigate.
The former Yugoslavia was a signatory to the Montreal Protocol and
an active participant at the federal level in international forums on
the environment. Despite the dissolution of Yugoslavia, federal
authorities continued to operate on the thesis that cooperation
among the separate parts of the former Yugoslavia will be just as
necessary as before in addressing environmental problems. The
former Yugoslavia was interested in but, because of the war, largely
left out of programs of the regional environmental center in
Budapest. A host of non-governmental organizations with
environmental platforms took root in all the republics, but few were
as powerful as Slovenia's Greens, who kept up the pressure to close
the Krsko nuclear generator by 1995. Serbia put a new
environmental law into effect and involved Jacques Cousteau in
assessing degradation of the Danube. Montenegro declared itself the
"first ecological state." Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina
struggled to keep their heavy industry in operation while searching
for outside assistance to offset the impact of industrial degradation
to the environment. Croatia was seized with the environmental
consequences of the civil war on its territory as well as the cost of
reconstruction that will limit the resources available for
environmental protection in the future.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the former Yugoslavia had been
one of the more active, constructive, and forthcoming former East
bloc participants in the environmental programs of the UN Economic
Commission for Europe. It had also attempted to comply with ECE
conventions to which it was a party.
Human Dimension. During the reporting period, there were massive
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and failure to
live up to commitments in the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE
documents, including the Copenhagen and Moscow Documents and the
Paris Charter.
Discrimination with respect to members of minorities worsened in
most parts of the former Yugoslavia during the reporting period. In
Serbia, authorities intensified repressive measures against the
majority Albanian population of the formerly autonomous Kosovo
province, eliminating virtually all Albanian-language schooling and
intensifying repression in other areas. Other minorities in Serbia,
including Hungarians, Croats, and Muslims, also cited instances of
growing discrimination and violence directed against them.
Although the Croatian government passed legislation according
Serbs and other minorities in Croatia greater autonomy, the new law
has not been implemented with Croatia's loss of control over its
territory where Serbs are most numerous. Serbs in areas remaining
under Croatian control faced increasing pressures, including
discrimination and violence.
It was in Croatia, however, that the most serious and prolonged
violence occurred. Relations between the Serb minority and the
newly elected Croatian government worsened in spring 1991 with
the introduction of a new republic constitution which relegated
Serbs to "minority" status rather than the "constituent nation"
status they had previously enjoyed. The new government's use of
nationalistic Croatian symbols and rhetoric reminiscent to Serbs of
the hated fascist Croatian state of World War II further increased
tensions. For their part, Serbian media and officials frequently
exacerbated political and ethnic tensions through strong anti-Croat
broadcasts and statements. In areas where Serbs comprised a
majority or large element of the population, some Serbs began
arming themselves and barricading roads and rail lines with the
complicity of the JNA. As incidents of violence increased, the
Yugoslav federal presidency tasked the JNA with intervening in
Croatia to separate the antagonists and maintain peace. However,
instead of playing a neutral peacekeeping role, the JNA increasingly
aligned itself with armed Serbian separatist forces and provided
them with substantial material and logistical support.
The governments of each of Yugoslavia's six republics were headed
by leaders elected in republic-level multi-party elections held in
1990. International observers found all of these elections, with the
exception of those in Serbia and Montenegro, to have been consistent
generally with democratic rules and procedures. During the course
of the reporting period, there were credible reports of oppression by
the Serbian leadership of the democratic opposition, including
forced drafting of older men and anonymous threats credibly tied to
the security forces. Members of the democratic opposition have also
had difficulty getting access to the media. In Serbia, Croatia, and
Montenegro, the republic presidents held extensive executive power.
In Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia, power-sharing
among ethnic groups or with the legislature made for a more
diffused decision making process. Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina declared "autonomous enclaves" independent of the
republic governments.
Abusing the 1974 constitutional provision giving the autonomous
provinces an equal voice in the collective presidency, Serbia
installed its own choices to represent Kosovo and Vojvodina and
used these votes, together with the regular support of Montenegro,
to exercise a decisive blocking role in the presidency. The Serbian-
led bloc in the federal presidency sought in May 1991 to deny
Croatian representative Stipe Mesic his turn at the head of the
rotating presidency. Under intense domestic and international
pressure, Mesic was finally seated. After the opening of the armed
conflict, Slovenia and Croatia walked out of the presidency. Mesic
declared several months later that the JNA was acting in Croatia not
at the bequest of the presidency but on its own and that a de facto
coup had taken place. In October 1991, the Serbian-led bloc created
a rump presidency by altering procedural rules concerning quorums
and the number of votes required for decision making. The Croatian,
Slovenian, Bosnia-Hercegovinian, and Macedonian representatives
refused to participate in the rump presidency and denied its
legitimacy, as did federal Prime Minister Markovic and a number of
foreign governments. In December 1992, Mesic resigned as president
of the federal presidency and in a separate action Markovic resigned
as federal prime minister.
The Serbian government blocked separate efforts by Muslim
residents of the Sandzak region (which extends into Montenegro) and
Albanian residents of Kosovo to hold referendums on their desired
political status during the reporting period. In a referendum in early
1992, in which observers noted significant irregularities, some
two-thirds of the Montenegrin electorate voted to "stay in
Yugoslavia." Macedonians voted overwhelmingly for independence in
a referendum in September 1991, although its substantial Albanian
minority boycotted the referendum and subsequently conducted its
own referendum declaring autonomy. The republic government of
Bosnia-Hercegovina held a referendum in February 1992 on the
future status of that republic; 64% of the republic's electorate voted
for independence, despite a boycott by most ethnic Serbs in the
republic. There was considerable violence in the aftermath of the
referendum.
The federal constitution of 1974 provided that each of the six
"nations" of Yugoslavia--Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, Muslim,
Macedonian, and Montenegrin--should be the majority nation in its
republic. It also provided for two autonomous provinces within the
Republic of Serbia--Kosovo and Vojvodina--in which the Albanian,
Hungarian, and other minorities would enjoy broad individual and
group rights. In Kosovo, where the Albanians totaled more than 90%
of the population, Albanians controlled the Communist Party and
government. In Vojvodina, Hungarians and Romanians were among
the minorities with the right to have schools in their languages, as
well as their own newspapers, cultural associations, and radio
programs.
Since 1989, the Serbian republic's policy has been to take away the
powers of the Kosovo government from the Albanians and to assert
Serbian domination over all aspects of life. This policy has led to
unrestrained discrimination against Albanians in every area,
including medical care and social services, employment, and
education. In 1991, at least 430 professors and other professional
staff were dismissed from Pristina University on a variety of
pretexts, including charges of using the Albanian language for
official work. Most of Kosovo's Albanian-language primary and
secondary schools were closed because Albanian teachers refused to
implement the Serbian republic's curriculum, which mandates the
teaching of Serbian cultural themes. At least 6,000 Albanian
teachers have been fired for this refusal. Ethnic Albanians in
Macedonia and Montenegro also suffered discrimination in education
and political expression. Albanian human rights activists claimed
that scores of Albanian youths serving in the JNA died under
unexplained and suspicious circumstances in 1991. The rights of
ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina came under pressure from Serbian
authorities who denounced ethnic Hungarian publications and
political groups as "anti-Serb." The publication of the Hungarian-
language weekly Magyar Szo was in question and Hungarian-language
radio programs on Novi Sad radio were cancelled. In August 1991,
Serbia introduced a new language law which gave the Serbian
government added power to restrict the use of minority languages,
including Hungarian and Albanian.
Discrimination against Serbian residents of Croatia increased in
1991. Ethnic Serbs working at non-governmental jobs who refused
to sign loyalty oaths to Croatia were often fired. Vandalism and
violence against Serbs and their property in Croatia also increased.
Although Croatian authorities investigated many such incidents and
the state insurance company paid claims on them, culprits were
almost never identified and punished. The Croatian government also
imposed special, higher taxes on property in Croatia owned by
residents of Serbia, while properties and businesses in Serbia owned
by Croats and Slovenes were seized and their assets frozen. There
were allegations of major dismissals of Serbs in Croatia on ethnic
grounds. Croatian authorities claimed that in most cases they were
for cause or were due to the economic downturn. In December, the
Croatian parliament passed a sweeping law granting increased
autonomy to communities of ethnic minorities in Croatia;
implementation of that law, however, was in large part impossible
due to the war and the loss of Croatian governmental control over
the affected areas.
Gypsies have complained that the rights extended to other
minorities have not been extended to them. Gypsies in Yugoslavia do
appear to suffer discrimination in employment, social services, and
education. There were also reports that Gypsies were expelled from
areas of Croatia experiencing fighting. There is a Gypsy cultural
organization, and the President of the World Romany Federation is a
Yugoslav Gypsy. In Macedonia, there is a Gypsy political party with
one representative in the legislature.
Religion is identified with ethnicity in Yugoslavia. In the context of
increasing ethnic animosities and armed conflict, the nationalist
governments which came to power in 1990 in the republics have
established close public ties with the dominant religious
establishments and usually discriminated against minority religions.
Senior Catholic and Serbian Orthodox clerics have taken political
stands in support of the Croatian and Serbian government positions
respectively. The minority Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia has
complained of official discrimination in such areas as the issuance
of building permits. It has also protested the vandalism, damage,
and destruction to 96 of its churches in Croatia. There has been
little official effort to identify and punish those responsible.
Several Serbian priests in Croatia, including Bishop Lukijan of
Pakrac, were reportedly placed under house arrest or prevented from
performing their duties freely. In August 1991, the Jewish
community center in Zagreb was badly damaged by a bomb; the
government responded promptly with promises to investigate fully
but by the end of 1991 had not identified the culprits. The Croatian
government reported in December 1991 that 223 churches and
monasteries in Croatia had been damaged or destroyed in the war. In
addition to instances of vandalism by Serbian irregular forces
operating in the area, the Croatian authorities accused the JNA of
intentionally targeting Catholic churches in artillery and air
attacks. Although the JNA denied this allegation and charged
Croatian forces with staging attacks from churches and other
civilian buildings, the testimony of numerous reliable international
observers suggested that churches had been intentionally and
repeatedly targeted. In July 1991, a Croatian Catholic priest in the
Serbian-held town of Old Tenja in Croatia reported he was held
hostage by Serbian forces. Four Franciscan priests were taken
prisoner by the JNA when Vukovar fell. Catholics in Vojvodina
claimed that Serbs who allegedly placed a bomb in Subotica's
Catholic Cathedral, though known to the police, went unpunished.
Yugoslav federal and republic laws during the reporting period
provided for freedom of speech and press. Federal rules, laws, and
institutions, however, became increasingly irrelevant in 1991. With
the outbreak of the armed conflict, the governments of some
republics enforced tighter controls on the press, mainly over
coverage of domestic politics, the armed conflict, and allegations of
human rights abuses. Although press freedom varied substantially
from republic to republic, most areas of the former Yugoslavia
generally had less press freedom in 1991 than they did in 1990.
Although the major changes made in federal and republic legal
systems in 1990 provided greater due process protection, the
breakdown or nonfunctioning of legitimate federal authority and of
the rule of law in many parts of the former Yugoslavia resulted in
widespread denials of due process, particularly in those areas of
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina where ethnic Serbs declared local
autonomy and rejected republic authority over their regions. These
denials of due process and persecution for political offenses
extended to ethnic Serbs in opposition to the Serbian group in power
as well as to members of other ethnic groups. Thousands of
noncombatants were imprisoned in the context of the armed conflict
often but not always for relatively brief periods and usually without
any form of due process. In October 1991, it was estimated that
some 2,500 such persons, including prisoners of war, were being
detained at any given time. In early 1992, nearly 10,000 persons
remained missing and unaccounted for. Noncombatants were
detained because of the ethnic group to which they belonged, because
of suspected political activities or sympathies, or as hostages.
The judiciary is not free of political influence nor of ethnic bias. In
the Republic of Serbia, provincial courts in Kosovo and Vojvodina
were closed, and some of their functions were transferred to
Belgrade. In Kosovo, ethnic Albanian judges were replaced by ethnic
Serbs and Montenegrins, who were said by ethnic Albanians to be
unqualified, inexperienced, and anti-Albanian.
APPENDIX I
Council of Ministers
June 20, 1991
Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia
Ministers discussed the situation in Yugoslavia.
They were informed by HE [His Excellency] the Federal Secretary for
Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Budimir Loncar, about the latest
developments in Yugoslavia.
The Ministers expressed their friendly concern and their support for
democratic development, unity and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia, based on economic reforms, full application of human
rights in all parts of Yugoslavia, including the rights of minorities,
and the peaceful solution of the current crisis in the country. They
called for continued progress in these fields.
Ministers stressed that it is only for the peoples of Yugoslavia
themselves to decide on the country's future. Ministers therefore
called for a continued dialogue among all parties concerned and
confirmed their view that the possibilities for such a dialogue were
not yet exhausted.
They expressed their belief that the existing constitutional disputes
should be remedied and that the way out of the present difficult
impasse should be found without recourse to the use of force and in
conformity with legal and constitutional procedures. They urged all
parties concerned to redouble their efforts to resolve their
differences peacefully through negotiations.
Ministers expressed their confidence that on this basis the
international community would stand ready to assist Yugoslavia's
efforts to transform itself economically and political.
Committee of Senior Officials
July 3, 1991
Urgent Appeal for a Ceasefire
Recalling the statement on the situation in Yugoslavia issued by the
Council of Ministers in Berlin on 19 June 1991, the CSO makes an
urgent appeal that any recourse to the use of force in the present
crisis in Yugoslavia continues to be absolutely inadmissible.
The CSO also reiterates the appeal issued at the end of the meeting
of the consultative committee of the CPC on 1 July 1991 stressing
the importance of an immediate and complete cessation of
hostilities by all parties involved. A prompt implementation of the
commitments undertaken by all concerned Yugoslav parties remains
mandatory.
The CSO calls upon all relevant authorities in Yugoslavia to comply
with these appeals and fulfill all commitments under the Charter of
Paris and the Ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act, in particular
the unequivocal renunciation of the use of force. All fighting has to
stop immediately. There must be political control over all armed
forces. These forces have to return to their barracks and stay there.
Hostile actions against these barracks must stop. Prisoners taken
during the hostilities have to be released immediately.
All parties involved in this conflict are called upon to comply with
this appeal immediately. The CSO offers its assistance in order to
help restore peace in the area and is examining urgently relevant
practical steps it can take, in particular the despatch of observers
to Yugoslavia, in consultation and agreement with Yugoslav
authorities.
Committee of Senior Officials
July 4, 1991
Offer of a CSCE Good Offices Mission to Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials,
-- Deeply concerned about the difficult situation in Yugoslavia;
-- Recalling the statement on Yugoslavia adopted by the Council of
Ministers of the CSCE in Berlin on
19 June 1991;
-- Eager to help Yugoslavia in overcoming the difficult situation, in
the restoration of peace and stability without any delay;
Offered to make available, upon the invitation of Yugoslavia, a
mission of good offices to facilitate the political dialogue among
the parties concerned.
The good offices mission, if and when accepted by Yugoslavia and
established, could enter, in compliance with these conditions and
aims, into contact with the parties concerned in order to determine
how it can be of help and, if useful, put recommendations to be
considered by all Yugoslav authorities.
This mission will be at the disposal of the Yugoslav authorities as
long as they deem it necessary.
The composition and modalities for the operation of the mission will
be established by the Chairman of the CSO in consultation with the
Yugoslav authorities. The CSCE participating States may put
forward through the Chairman proposals in this regard. The
Chairman of the CSO will inform all participating States of
subsequent developments.
Committee of Senior Officials
July 4, 1991
Mission to Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials,
-- Recalled the statement of the Council of Ministers of the CSCE in
Berlin in which they expressed their friendly concern and their
support for democratic development and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia, full application of human rights in all parts of
Yugoslavia, including the rights of minorities, and the peaceful
solution of the current crisis in the country, as well as their
emphasis that it is only for the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves to
decide on the country's future,
-- Noted the strong interest of the CSCE participating States to
make a concrete contribution to the resolution of the present
Yugoslav crisis,
-- Welcomed the restoration of the constitutional order by the
appointment of a president and a vice-president at the head of the
collegiate Presidency,
-- Urged the full implementation by all Yugoslav parties of the
other two elements of the agreement recently reached between them
with the contribution of the European Community, namely:
--the acceptance of a ceasefire, accompanied by the return of all
armed forces to their previous positions;
--the suspension of the implementation of the declarations of
independence for a period of three months.
-- Welcomed the readiness expressed by the EC Member States,
building on their initiatives, to organize a mission to help stabilize
a ceasefire and to monitor the implementation of the above-
mentioned elements of the agreement. This will be done at the
invitation of the Yugoslav authorities and in full co-operation with
them,
-- Welcomed also the interest of other CSCE participating States to
take part in the mission on the basis of the arrangements between
the European Community and Yugoslav authorities,
-- Requested the mission to inform the Committee on the progress
of its work at the earliest opportunity.
Committee of Senior Officials
August 8, 1991
Appeal for a Ceasefire
The Committee of Senior Officials,
-- Greatly disturbed by the appalling losses of human lives that
have occurred in Yugoslavia after the urgent appeal for a ceasefire
issued by the CSO on 3 July 1991,
-- Emphasizing the importance of a permanent, complete, and
effective ceasefire accepted and fully respected by all parties
involved,
-- Welcomes the ceasefire proclaimed by the federal presidency of
Yugoslavia on 6 August 1991 and urges that it will be fully
maintained;
-- Therefore, urges all concerned parties to stabilize the ceasefire
by separating their forces and withdrawing them from areas of
conflict;
-- Reiterates its strong condemnation of any recourse to the use of
force;
-- Alerts all parties to their responsibility to exercise the
necessary political control over their regular or irregular armed
forces;
-- Welcomes the offer by the EC to continue all their efforts to
monitor an effective ceasefire and include other CSCE participating
States invited by Yugoslavia.
Committee of Senior Officials
August 9, 1991
Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials,
-- Reaffirming its decision on a "Mission to Yugoslavia" adopted at
its First Emergency Meeting on 3 and 4 July 1991,
-- Welcomes the activities of the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia,
based upon the memorandum of understanding which was signed by
representatives of the European Community and its Member States,
the Federal Authorities of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia and
the Republic of Slovenia in Belgrade on 13 July 1991;
-- Appreciates the reports on the activities of the mission provided
by the EC presidency and welcomes the progress made in the
implementation of the Brioni Agreement of 7 July 1991, which they
reflect;
-- Appeals to all parties concerned in Yugoslavia to cooperate in
maintaining a permanent and effective cease-fire and welcomes EC
readiness to extend their monitoring activities, through appropriate
arrangement with Yugoslavia;
-- Supports an enlargement of the mission, in agreement with the
Yugoslav authorities, through the inclusion of members of other
CSCE participating States on the basis of arrangements between the
European Community and Yugoslav authorities;
-- Requests the European Community and its Member States and
other interested CSCE participating States to continue their efforts
towards a peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis;
-- Requests the mission to continue to report to the Committee on
the progress of its activities on a regular basis.
Committee of Senior Officials
August 9, 1991
Assistance to Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials,
-- Underlines the urgent necessity that all parties concerned
immediately begin negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia;
-- Supports strongly the intention of the Yugoslav authorities to
begin these negotiations as soon as possible and not later than 15
August 1991;
-- Noting the Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia of the CSCE
Council in Berlin on 19 June 1991, urges the parties concerned to
seek a peaceful settlement based on all the principles and
commitments agreed upon in the CSCE process and to abstain from
all acts of force or violence or other acts prejudicing the outcome of
negotiations which must be acceptable to all people in Yugoslavia;
-- Stresses that the use of force to achieve political objectives is
inadmissible and insists strongly that all parties act in full respect
for all human rights, including the rights of national minorities;
-- Expresses its hope that the process of negotiations will lead to
positive results and in this context reaffirms the offer of a CSCE
Good Offices Mission, as decided at the First Emergency Meeting on 3
and 4 July 1991, and invites Yugoslavia to make use of this offer, if
necessary, in order to facilitate dialogue and negotiations on the
future of Yugoslavia;
-- Notes with satisfaction that the Yugoslav authorities, as an
initial step to this end, have extended an invitation to the European
Community and its Member States to assist the process of
negotiations, as agreed at Brioni;
-- Supports the readiness of the European Community and its
Member States, expressed in their declaration of 6 August 1991, as
well as of other interested CSCE participating States, to facilitate
and assist these negotiations, at a time and under conditions to be
agreed with Yugoslavia;
-- Emphasizes its resolve to remain seized of this matter. The
Committee will convened by the Chairman for an additional meeting
whenever the situation requires, and in any event no later than the
first week of September 1991.
Committee of Senior Officials
September 3, 1991
Statement on the Ceasefire in Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE,
-- Greatly disturbed by the appalling losses of human lives that
have occurred in spite of the urgent calls for a ceasefire issued on 3
July and 8 August 1991,
-- Stressing that no territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia
brought about by violence are acceptable,
-- Welcomes the cease-fire agreed in Belgrade on 1 September
1991 and insists upon strict implementation of and compliance with
all its provisions;
-- Strongly endorses the agreement reached between the European
Community and its Member States and Yugoslav parties on 1
September 1991 in Belgrade on the extension of the activities in
Croatia of the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia, enlarged to include
members of other CSCE participating States, which is fully in
accordance with the statements by the Committee of Senior
Officials of 4 July and 9 August 1991;
-- Stresses the need for full respect for all provisions contained in
the memorandum of understanding on the extension of monitoring
activities of the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia, including the
commitments by the Yugoslav parties concerned regarded the
monitoring of the ceasefire;
-- Demands strongly that all political and military authorities in
Yugoslavia co-operate fully and without restrictions with the
Monitor Mission and guarantee the personal safety of the members of
the Monitor Mission as indispensable prerequisites for successful
extension if its monitoring activities;
-- Stresses that any body responsible for any violation of these
provisions will bear the full consequences of its action;
-- Warmly supports the initiative by the European Community and
its Member States to convene the Conference on Yugoslavia.
Committee of Senior Officials
September 4, 1991
Statement on Arms Embargo
The CSCE Committee of Senior Officials,
-- Aiming to prevent military escalation of the conflict in
Yugoslavia and wishing to contribute to its peaceful settlement,
-- Calls upon all States to stop and refrain--for the duration of the
crisis in Yugoslavia--from supplying arms and military equipment to
all Yugoslav parties concerned. This should include taking necessary
measures to prevent any transfer of weapons.
-- Requests all CSCE participating States to submit to the Conflict
Prevention Center appropriate information outlining their
governments' policies on this subject.
Committee of Senior Officials
September 4, 1991
Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE,
-- Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation in
Yugoslavia, and insisting on the immediate implementation of the
agreed ceasefire,
-- Underlines the necessity that the negotiations on the future of
Yugoslavia begin immediately, with the view to achieving an
outcome of the negotiations which must be acceptable to all people
in Yugoslavia,
-- Fully endorses the decision taken by the European Community and
its Member States to convene a Conference on Yugoslavia in the
Peace Palace in The Hague on 7 September 1991, to be chaired by
Lord Carrington, and at the same time set up an arbitration
procedure,
-- Urges the political and military authorities to restore and
maintain full control over all military actions, thus contributing to
the success of the Conference.
-- Urges the parties concerned to seek a peaceful settlement based
on all the principles and commitments agreed upon in the CSCE
process and to abstain from all acts of force or violence or other
acts,
-- Recalling the Committee's statement of 9 August on assistance
to negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia, welcomes the readiness
of other interested CSCE participating States to assist the peace
process,
-- Stresses once again that the use of force to achieve political
objectives is inadmissible and insists strongly that all parties act
in full respect for all human rights, including the rights of national
minorities,
-- Considers that all refugees who so wish must be allowed to
return to their homes in safety,
-- Notes with satisfaction the preparedness of the European
Community and its Member States and other CSCE participating
States to continue their monitoring activities, as long as will be
needed for the conference to be successful, and emphasizes the need
that the Yugoslav parties fulfill their obligations accordingly,
-- Welcomes the decision of the European Community and its
Member States to keep the other CSCE participating States fully
informed of the proceedings of the Conference on Yugoslavia, through
the Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials and the CSCE
Secretariat.
Committee of Senior Officials
October 10, 1991
The Situation in Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE,
-- Reaffirming its earlier resolutions on Yugoslavia and deeply
concerned about the lack of respect therefor,
-- Deeply disturbed by the recent escalation of violence in
Yugoslavia, causing loss of life and human suffering,
-- Appalled by the irresponsible behavior of different Yugoslav
parties which calls into doubt their willingness to settle their
disputes by peaceful means,
-- Reiterating the determination of all participating States never
to recognize any changes of borders, whether external or internal,
brought about by force,
-- Deeply concerned about the increasing destruction and loss of
life,
-- Noting that most delegations expressed their unreserved
condemnation of the usurpation of power by the representatives of
two republics in the Yugoslav federal presidency contrary to the
established constitutional order of Yugoslavia as well as the Charter
of Paris,
-- Recalling the Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference
on the Human Dimension of the CSCE which emphasizes that issues
relating to human rights, fundamental freedom, national minorities,
democracy, and the rule of law do not belong exclusively to the
internal affairs of the State concerned,
-- Recalling UN Security Council resolution 713/91,
-- Welcomes the conclusions reached at the meeting held in The
Hague on 4 October 1991 which was chaired by the EC presidency,
with the participation of the President of Croatia, the President of
Serbia, and the Federal Minister of Defense, on the principles which
should guide a solution for the Yugoslav crisis, notably the principle
that a political solution should be sought on the basis of the
perspective of recognition of the independence of those republics in
Yugoslavia wishing it at the end of a negotiating process conducted
in good faith and involving all parties;
-- Welcomes the memorandum of understanding, which was signed
on 8 October 1991 in Zagreb under the auspices of the European
Community by representatives for the Federal Secretary for National
Defense of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and
for the Republic of Croatia, on a general ceasefire in the territory of
Croatia and urges all parties concerned fully to abide by this
agreement, particularly the renunciation of the use of major
weapons systems;
-- Warmly commends both the collective and individual efforts of
the men and women of the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia;
-- Strongly supports the activities of the Monitor Mission and
welcomes the extension and strengthening of these activities in
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and recommends that consideration
be given to the extension of activities to other areas as appropriate;
-- Welcomes the protocol on the Monitor Mission signed by the
representatives of Hungary and the EC;
-- Condemns any acts endangering the security of members of the
Monitor Mission and its equipment and demands that all Yugoslav
parties comply fully with their obligation to protect and ensure the
safety of the Mission and its members;
-- Takes note of the fact that the Western European Union is
exploring ways in which the activities of the monitors could be
supported so as to make their work a more effective contribution to
the peace-keeping effort, the possibilities of which have not been
exhausted;
-- Insists on compliance with the commitment, accepted by
participating States at the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension, to ensure that military and para-military forces
be subject to the effective direction and control of appropriate
democratically elected civilian authorities and to maintain and
strengthen executive control over such forces so that their
participation in acts of violence and warfare be ended once and for
all. The Committee furthermore insists on the immediate cessation
of mobilization on all sides;
-- Condemns all violations of relevant norms of international law
applicable to non-international armed conflict which have occurred
during the escalation of violence in Yugoslavia;
-- Expresses its conviction that those responsible for the
unprecedented violence against people in Yugoslavia, with its ever-
increasing loss of life, should be held personally accountable under
international law for their actions;
-- Takes note of the support of many other participating States for
the intention expressed on 6 October 1991 by the European
Community and its Member States to apply restrictive measures to
those parties continuing to flaunt the desire of the other Yugoslav
parties as well as the international community for a successful
outcome of the Conference on Yugoslavia;
-- Welcomes the continued engagement by all parties to he Yugoslav
crisis in the Conference on Yugoslavia;
-- Urges all Yugoslav parties to take an active and constructive part
without delay in the Conference on Yugoslavia which provides the
essential framework for finding a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav
crisis which respects the rights of all who live in Yugoslavia,
including minorities;
-- Welcomes the progress which has been made at the Conference on
Yugoslavia on 10 October 1991;
-- Welcomes the fact that parties which are not participating in its
proceedings have been given access to the Conference and
recommends that such access by granted to other parties concerned;
-- Considers that the unsettled issue of national minorities
perpetuates the tension and instability and considers that the
conflict must not be used for forcible change in the ethnic
composition of the different areas;
-- Agrees that a successful outcome of the Conference on
Yugoslavia should contain international guarantees for the
protection of the rights of national minorities in accordance with
the standards and commitments of the CSCE;
-- Underlines the importance of the immediate and full
implementation of resolution 713/91 of the United Nations Security
Council and welcomes the appointment of Mr. Cyrus Vance as the
special representative of the UN Secretary General.
-- Will examine ways in which the institutions of the CSCE,
including the CPC, could further assist in the implementation of the
provisions of this resolution.
Committee of Senior Officials
October 22, 1991
CSCE Human Rights Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia
Recalling the Document of the Moscow Meeting, the CSCE Committee
of Senior Officials agreed to form a human rights rapporteur
mission. The mission will visit Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia at a time to be agreed
through consultation with Yugoslavia. It will inform itself of the
situation with respect to human rights, including the rights of
minorities, and will report to the Committee. Its report will be
circulated by the CSCE Secretariat through the CSCE points of
contact and will be considered by the Committee at a future
meeting. The report will be made available to the Chairman of the
Conference on Yugoslavia.
The mission will be led by the designated representative of the
Chairman of the CSCE Council of Ministers. A representative from
the CSCE Office for Free Elections will serve as secretary for the
mission. The mission will also include, inter alia, a representative
from the European Community, and a representative of the Chairman
of the Conference on Yugoslavia.
Committee of Senior Officials
October 22, 1991
The Situation in Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE,
1. Reaffirming its earlier resolutions on Yugoslavia,
2. Deeply concerned by the continuing violence and bloodshed in
Yugoslavia and by the obstacles encountered by the monitor mission
to Yugoslavia,
3. Strongly condemns the constant and blatant violations of all
ceasefire agreements concluded until the present day and any
attempt to bring about changes by force. No such change will be
recognized as legal;
4. Welcomes the agreement reached on 14 October 1991 to continue
the activities of the monitor mission to Yugoslavia and reiterates
its demand that all Yugoslav parties comply fully with their
obligation to protect and ensure the safety of the mission and its
members;
5. Underlines the importance of concerting all efforts made by CSCE
participating States to solve the crisis in Yugoslavia and in this
spirit endorses the Declaration on Yugoslavia adopted by the
European Community and its member States, the United States, and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 18 October 1991, and it
supports the continuing efforts by the Secretary General of the
United States;
6. Welcomes the fact that on
18 October 1991 the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia
presented arrangements for a general settlement of the Yugoslav
crisis and notes with great interest that it covers, inter alia,
general principles, guidelines with regard to the implementation of
human rights and rights of ethnic and national groups, other areas of
cooperation, and institutional aspects;
7. Urges all Yugoslav parties to continue their co-operation in the
framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia;
8. Insists that the agreement reached in The Hague on 18 October
1991 at which the collective presidency of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and President Tudjman, in the presence of
President Milosevic, agreed to give their respective forces
instructions to abide by the terms of a new ceasefire agreement, be
immediately and fully implemented;
9. Calls upon all Yugoslav parties to strictly observe these terms
and expresses grave concern about recent violations of these terms;
10. Reiterates its conviction that those responsible for the acts of
unprecedented violence against people in Yugoslavia and for
violations of ceasefire agreements be held personally accountable
under international law for their actions, including those in
contravention of relevant norms of international humanitarian law;
11. Calls upon all Yugoslav parties to strive to ensure the free
movement of individuals and the free circulation of goods among
different parts of Europe transiting Yugoslavia, by land, air and
water;
12. Decides to continue to keep the crisis in Yugoslavia under
closest consideration and invites the Chairman-in-Office of the
Committee of Senior Officials to convene the Committee at a time
he deems appropriate.
Committee of Senior Officials
January 8, 1992
Declaration on Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE,
1. Profoundly distressed over the domestic events that occurred in
Yugoslavia as a result of the inadmissible use of totally
unwarranted force, particularly that which yesterday caused the
death of five members of the Monitoring Mission,
2. Condemns in the strongest possible terms those responsible for
shooting down an unarmed helicopter of the Monitoring Mission,
requests an immediate and exhaustive evaluation of responsibility,
and expects those responsible to be held accountable for these and
other equally unacceptable acts,
3. Strongly urges all parties in Yugoslavia, without exception, to
fully cooperate with the efforts which have been ordered and are
already underway aiming at a thorough investigation of this tragic
occurrence,
4. Reaffirms its support and solidarity towards the members of the
Monitor Mission, whose actions and courage deserve to be praised,
5. Urges all parties to take the necessary steps to ensure the safety
of the Monitor Mission and of personnel sent by the United Nations.
6. Reiterating its firm commitment to seek a peaceful and lasting
settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia, in accordance with the
principles and commitments of the CSCE,
7. Condemns in particular any use of major weapon systems in this
conflict,
8. Strongly supports resolution 724, adopted by the Security Council
of the United Nations on 15 December 1991,
9. Takes note of the statement of the representative of the European
Community and its Member States referring to their declaration of
16 December 1991,
10. Welcomes the accord reached in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992
under the auspices of the special representative of the Secretary
General of the United Nations, Mr. Cyrus Vance, establishing
modalities for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement of 23
November 1991, and underlines the importance of a strict
compliance by all parties, of the dispositions of the above-
mentioned agreements,
11. Urges the Security Council of the United Nations to take a
decision on an early deployment of UN peace-keeping forces in
Yugoslavia insisting that all parties concerned effectively
implement all relevant conditions therefor,
12. Welcomes the decision taken by the Chairman of the Conference
on Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington, to reconvene the Conference, which
remains the appropriate forum for reaching a durable and
comprehensive settlement of the crisis,
13. Warns against any extension of the present conflict and calls
upon all parties to adopt a constructive participation in the
Conference,
14. Recalls in this context its repeated affirmation to reject the
use of force to change established borders, whether internal or
external,
15. Decides to keep the situation in Yugoslavia under close
consideration.
Committee of Senior Officials
March 2, 1992
Second Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia
Referring to the summary of conclusions of the Prague meeting of
the CSCE Council, the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials examined
the need for further action concerning the human rights situation in
Yugoslavia. The Committee agreed that the human rights situation,
including the situation of national minorities, requires further
consideration and follow-up action by the CSCE. To that end, the
Committee decided to send a follow-up mission to the human rights
rapporteur mission to Yugoslavia as established by decision of the
Committee on 22 October 1991 in Prague. The follow-up mission
will examine further the situation in the previously visited
republics and give particular attention to the subjects mentioned for
consecutive action in the first report.
The mission will not take place before the end of April and it will
report to the Committee. The report will be circulated by the CSCE
Secretariat through the CSCE points of contact and will be
considered by the Committee at a future meeting. The report will be
made available to the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia.
APPENDIX II
Model Accession Letter
Dear Mr. Minister,
The Government of (NAME OF STATE) hereby adopts the Helsinki Final
Act, the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, and all other documents
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The Government of (NAME OF STATE) accepts in their entirety all
commitments and responsibilities contained in those documents and
declares its determination to act in accordance with their
provisions.
Concerning the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures, the Government of (NAME OF STATE) agrees to
apply all the provisions of the Vienna Document on CSBMs and to an
understanding that the geographic scope of its application should be
revised as soon as possible in order to ensure full effect of the rules
of transparency, predictability, and conflict prevention on its
territory. Specific provisions on the above matter will be
negotiated in the CSBM negotiations and included in the Vienna
Document 1992.
The Government of (NAME OF STATE) recognizes the requirement for
prompt entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe. To that end, the Government of (NAME OF STATE)
underlines the need for states with territory in the CFE area of
application to undertake to move forward promptly with the
ratification of the CFE Treaty and to assume, in cooperation with
other relevant newly independent states, all CFE obligations of the
former Soviet Union.
The Government of (NAME OF STATE) invites and will fully facilitate
the visit of a rapporteur mission to be arranged by the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the CSCE. This mission will report to the
participating States on progress in (NAME OF STATE) toward full
implementation of CSCE commitments and provide assistance
toward that objective.
The Government of (NAME OF STATE) will concur in the admission of
all other states established on the territory of the former Soviet
Union as full participating States.
The Government of (NAME OF STATE) expresses its readiness for
signature of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris by the
head of state or Government of (NAME OF STATE) at the earliest
convenience.
I kindly ask you, Mr. Minister, to circulate copies of this letter to all
representatives of the participating States of the CSCE Council of
Ministers.
Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my highest
consideration.
APPENDIX III
Committee of Senior Officials
February 28, 1992
Decision on Nagorno-Karabakh
(1) The Committee of Senior Officials noted the "Interim Report of
the Rapporteur Mission on the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh".
The Committee of Senior Officials:
(2) Urges the interested parties to impose an immediate ceasefire
on all forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh area of the Azerbaijan
Republic, the population of which expresses their will to enjoy all
their rights including all those contained in the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act, and to implement fully their undertakings in the
Communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and the Russian Federation in Moscow on February 28, 1992;
(3) Underlines the fact that the presence in the area of groups of
eminent persons from CSCE participating States will contribute to
the establishment of an effective ceasefire and urges concerned
parties to guarantee their safety and to take all necessary steps to
this end;
(4) Requests that all participating States and all States in region
impose an immediate embargo on all deliveries of weapons and
munitions to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area
and inform the Conflict Prevention Center of steps taken in this
respect;
(5) Urgently requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE to contact
international and voluntary organizations with appropriate
resources to provide humanitarian assistance and to encourage them
to provide such assistance, both to the inhabitants of Nagorno-
Karabakh and to the refugees and displaced persons on both sides of
this conflict, including those from the republics of Armenia and
Azerbaijan;
(6) Requests that the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE convene
representatives of the States concerned with a view to immediately
establishing safe corridors for the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh;
(7) Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE, in contact with
the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as local
authorities and representatives in Nagorno-Karabakh, to promote, if
necessary under the auspices of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, the immediate exchange of hostages;
(8) Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE, in conjunction
with the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as local
authorities and representatives in Nagorno-Karabakh, to promote, if
necessary under the auspices of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, the immediate return of remains of all the dead to their
families for respectful burial;
(9) The Committee of Senior Officials, seeking a peaceful and
lasting settlement to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh in
accordance with the principles, commitments and provisions of the
CSCE and the equal legitimate aspirations of all peoples concerned,
agreed that this requires from all the concerned parties;
(10) Respect for international obligations with regard to the rule of
law, democracy, and human rights, including all those based on the
principles, commitments, and provisions of the CSCE;
(11) Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national communities
and minorities, in accordance with the commitments subscribed to
in the framework of the CSCE;
(12) Respect for the inviolability of all borders, whether internal or
external, which can only be changed by peaceful means and by
common agreement;
(13) Commitment to settle by agreement all questions concerning
regional disputes;
(14) Guarantees for the absence of territorial claims towards any
neighboring state, including abstention from hostile propaganda
activities that would, inter alia, promote such territorial claims.
The Committee of Senior Officials:
(15) Requests participating States in the region, in particular
Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, to continue their efforts to
achieve a final and complete ceasefire and to promote negotiation
among the parties, in the framework of the CSCE and on the basis of
CSCE principles;
(16) Strongly urges the continuation of the dialogue among all
interested parties, including local authorities from Nagorno-
Karabakh and representatives of Armenian and Azeri inhabitants
from Nagorno-Karabakh. Among the first issues to be discussed in
this dialogue should be the question of observers to monitor the
ceasefire, the immediate needs of the refugees and displaced
persons, the re-establishment of normal trade relations, and the
establishment of an independent commission, including third
parties, to review further problems relating to the refugees and
displaced persons;
(17) Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE to stand ready to
participate in this dialogue and, if requested by the parties, to
pursue it under the auspices of the CSCE;
(18) Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE to contact the
governments of CSCE participating States to determine whether it
would be possible to provide a group of observers to monitor a
ceasefire when it is established and to make recommendations on
this subject;
(19) Calls the attention of the interested parties to the possibility
of using the various CSCE mechanisms to facilitate progress toward
a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and, in this connection,
to the possibility of requesting the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE
to form an International Advisory Commission on constitutional
questions;
(20) Requests the CSCE participating States which may be able to
influence positively the situation to report on progress toward a
peaceful settlement at subsequent CSO meetings, in particular on
the elements mentioned above;
(21) Agrees that the possibility of additional missions to Nagorno-
Karabakh to monitor the evolving situation will be considered
whenever useful.
Committee of Senior Officials
March 14, 1992
Communique on Nagorno-Karabakh
The Committee of Senior Officials of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe,
-- Deeply concerned by the escalation of the armed conflict in and
around Nagorno-Karabakh resulting in greater loss of life and
increased suffering of the inhabitants,
-- Reiterating its support for the goals of the mediation effort of
the Russian Federation as embodied in the Communique issued on 28
February 1992 in Moscow by the Foreign Ministers of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and the Russian Federation,
-- Welcoming the complementary efforts taken by the European
Community and its Member States, members of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council and by the Secretary General of the United
Nations through his recent decision to send a personal
representative to the area,
1. Reaffirms its decisions of 28 February 1992 under the heading
"Interim report of the CSCE rapporteur mission to Nagorno-Karabakh"
(7-CSO/Journal 2/Annex 1) and its determination to have their
provisions implemented as soon as possible;
2. Reiterates, in the strongest terms, its call for an immediate and
effective ceasefire, to include an active commitment by responsible
local commanders to its implementation;
3. Agrees to convene an additional meeting of the Council in
Helsinki on 24 March 1992;
4. Recommends that the Council request the CSCE Chairman-in-
Office to convene as soon as possible a conference on Nagorno-
Karabakh under the auspices of the CSCE to provide an ongoing forum
for negotiations toward a peaceful settlement of the crisis in
accordance with the principles, commitments and provisions of the
CSCE;
5. Welcomes the intention of Foreign Minister Dienstbier, in his
capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council, to visit the
region shortly in order to contribute to the establishment and
maintenance of an effective ceasefire and the achieving of a
peaceful settlement;
6. Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE to organize and
despatch without delay a second CSCE mission to the region to
examine the modalities of:
--the negotiation and implementation of an immediate and effective
ceasefire as an essential element of a long-term process leading to
a political settlement;
--the establishment of conditions conducive to the visit of the
Chairman-in-Office;
--the deployment of observers to monitor the ceasefire as soon as it
is firmly established, including political and organizational aspects;
--and report as soon as possible to the Chairman-in-Office of the
Council in preparation for his visit, the report to be circulated to
the participating States;
7. Notes the commitment of Armenia and Azerbaijan to fully support
the visits of this second mission and of the Chairman-in-Office of
the Council in the realization of their tasks;
8. Stresses once again the urgent need to ensure the provision of
humanitarian assistance and for efforts to establish safe corridors
as foreshadowed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of its decision of 28 February
1992, including, in particular, convening a meeting of the states
concerned; and encourages the Chairman-in-Office in the activities
he undertakes to implement his corresponding mandate;
9. Reiterates its request that all participating States and all States
in the region impose an immediate embargo on all deliveries of
weapons and munitions to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-
Karabakh area and that all participating States inform the Conflict
Prevention Center of steps taken in this respect;
10. Welcomes the activities of the International Committee of the
Red Cross and endorses its appeal for respect by all concerned for
international humanitarian law in armed conflict.
APPENDIX IV
Council of Ministers
June 19-20, 1992
Summary of Conclusions
The Council of Ministers of the CSCE,
1. Welcomed the Republic of Albania as a participating State of the
CSCE following receipt of a letter accepting all CSCE commitments
and responsibilities from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Albania, Mr. Kapllani, to the Chairman-in-Office of the
Council, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Genscher (Annex 1);
2. Held political consultations on the European architecture and the
strengthening of security in Europe as well as the consolidation of
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, on prospects for
economic transition and social change in Europe, on current issues,
and on the future work of the CSCE;
3. Affirmed the importance of continued political and economic
transformation in the democratic countries in transition toward a
market economy. They stressed the necessity to continue support of
these countries in their efforts to consolidate democracy and
transform their economies;
4. Affirmed that cooperation in the fields of economy, science,
technology, and the environment remains an important pillar of the
CSCE;
5. Adopted a mechanism for consultation and cooperation with
regard to emergency situations
(Annex 2);
6. Decided that the communication network, to be established under
the provisions of the Vienna CSBMs Document 1990, will be
preferably used for all communications foreseen in the procedures in
emergency situations. In this connection the CSCE Secretariat will
be integrated into this communication network;
7. Endorsed the report of the Valletta Meeting on Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes and agreed to designate the Conflict
Prevention Center as the nominating institution for the CSCE Dispute
Settlement Mechanism under the provisions of the recommendations
thereto of Committee of Senior Officials (Annex 3);
8. Welcomed the establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(Annex 4);
9. Noted with satisfaction the results of the Cracow Symposium on
the Cultural Heritage of the CSCE participating States;
10. Invited the United Nations Center for Human Rights to contribute
to the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities;
11. Decided to invite the Council of Europe to make a contribution at
the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension;
12. Encouraged the exchange of information and relevant documents
among CSCE and the main European and trans-Atlantic institutions,
such as the European Community, Council of Europe, ECE, NATO, and
WEU. The procedure concerning the CSCE's participating in this
exchange should be considered at the next meeting of the Committee
of Senior Officials and reviewed after six months;
13. Requested the Committee of Senior Officials to prepare
recommendations for the next meeting of the Council on the further
development of the CSCE institutions and structures, taking into
account the debate at the first council meeting. The Consultative
Committee of the Conflict Prevention Center would contribute those
sections of the recommendations which concern the enhancement of
the role of the Conflict Prevention Center;
14. Looked forward to a range of informal discussions and
consultations on new negotiations on disarmament and confidence-
and security-building open to all CSCE participating States. In this
context they requested their representatives in Vienna, as a rule
their representatives to the Consultative Committee of the Conflict
Prevention Center, to start informal preparatory consultations in
September this year aimed at establishing by 1992, from the
conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, new negotiations on
disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all
participating States as set out in the Charter of Paris. They decided
that formal preparatory for the risk forum will be carried out at the
Helsinki Follow-up meeting;
15. Welcomed the fact that a further seminar on military doctrine
would be held within the context of the Conflict Prevention Center
in Vienna, from 8 to 18 October 1991 and also welcomed the
possibility of further seminars as may be agreed by the
participating States;
16. See a need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, in
light of the recent experience in the Gulf region, and for restraint
and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons and
weapons technologies, particularly to regions of tension. This
should be a priority of CSCE governments, and ministers agreed to
maintain a dialogue on these issues among CSCE countries;
17. Recalled the links of solidarity and of cooperation that unite
their countries with the developing countries as well as the
importance they attach. In this context, to respect for human rights
and to the promotion of the fundamental values of the CSCE. They
underlined the usefulness of an increasing cooperation among their
countries on these questions in the appropriate forums;
18. Stressed that the CSCE must remain open to dialogue and
cooperation with rest of the world and noted the interest of other
countries in the CSCE. In this regard, they requested the CSO to
explore this idea and to report to a future meeting of the Council;
19. Agreed that the next meeting of the Council will be held in
Prague on 30 and 31 January 1992.
ANNEX 1
Tirana, 18 June 1991
Mr. Minister,
The Government of the Republic of Albania hereby adopts the
Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and all
other documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe.
The Government of the Republic of Albania accepts in their entirety
all commitments and responsibilities contained in those documents
and declares its determination to act in accordance with their
provisions.
The Government of the Republic of Albania welcomes a visit of a
rapporteur mission to be arranged by the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The Government of Albania will do everything possible to facilitate
and assist this mission. The Government of Albania is confident
that his mission will inform the participating States of progress in
Albania toward full implementation of CSCE commitments as well
as assist Albania towards that objective. The Government of
Albania understands that this mission will draw upon the expertise
of persons from participating States, CSCE institutions, and other
relevant organizations.
The Government of Albania expresses its readiness for signature of
the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris by the Head of State
of Government of the Republic of Albania at the earliest opportunity.
I kindly ask you, Mr. Minister, to circulate copies of this letter to all
representatives of the participating States at the CSCE Council of
Ministers.
Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my highest
consideration.
Muhamet Kapllani
HE Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council of Ministers, Federal
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bonn
ANNEX 2
Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation with regard to
Emergency Situations
The participating States will in accordance with the following
provisions, consult and cooperate with each other concerning a
serious emergency situation which may arise from a violation of one
of the principles of the Final Act or as the result of major
disruptions endangering peace, security, or stability. In applying the
mechanism for consultation and co-operation with regard to
emergency situations all the principles of the Final Act, including
the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, and those of the
Charter of Paris are of primary significance and accordingly will be
equally and unreservedly applied each of them being interpreted
taking into account the others.
1. If any participating State concludes that an emergency situation,
as described above, is developing, it may seek clarification from the
State or States involved. The request will state the cause, or
causes, of the concern.
1.1 The requested State or States will provide within 48 hours all
relevant information in order to clarify the situation giving rise to
the request.
1.2 The request and the reply will be transmitted to all other
participating States without delay.
2. Should the situation remain unresolved, any of the States
involved in the procedure described under point 1 above may address
to the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee of Senior Officials a
request that an emergency meeting of the Committee be held.
2.1 Any request addressed by the same state on an identical subject
between two regular meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials
will be inadmissible.
2.2 Any request should state the reasons why the matter is urgent
and why the emergency mechanism is the most appropriate.
2.3 Any request should be accompanied by the texts of the request
for clarification and of the reply provided for under point 1 above.
2.4 On receipt of the request, the Chairman-in-Office of the
Committee of Senior Officials will immediately inform all
participating States and the CSCE Secretariat and submit the
relevant documentation.
2.5 The Chairman will also enter into contact with the states
involved within a period of 24 hours following receipt of the
request.
2.6 As soon as 12 or more participating States have seconded the
request within a maximum period of 48 hours by addressing their
support to the Chairman, he will immediately notify all
participating States of the date and time of the meeting, which will
be held at the earliest 48 hours and at the latest three days after
this notification. The notification will also include the reason for,
and the agenda of, the meeting.
2.7 Subject to the conditions set out in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.6
above, no judgment as to the facts nor any possible dispute as to the
validity of the reasons offered for requesting the emergency
convening of a meeting may be invoked for postponing or preventing
the holding of an emergency meeting.
2.8 The meeting will be held at the seat of the Secretariat and last
no more than two days, unless otherwise agreed.
2.9 The agenda of the emergency meeting will consist of a single
item. Its formulation will be identical to that contained in the
notification provided for in paragraph 2.6 above. It will not be open
to amendment. The Chairman of the meeting will ensure that
discussions do not depart from the subject on the agenda.
2.10 The meeting will be chaired by the representative of the state
holding the chairmanship of the Committee of Senior Officials.
2.11 If the Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials is a
nation of one of the States involved, as defined under point 1 above,
the meeting will be chaired by the representative of the next state,
in French alphabetical order, which is not involved in the situation.
2.12 The proceedings will be introduced by a short statement by the
Chairman recalling the facts and stages of development of the
situation. He will then indicate the number of speakers who have
asked for the floor and will open the debate.
2.13 In the light of its assessment of the situation, the meeting
may agree on recommendations or conclusions to arrive at a
solution. It may also decide to convene a meeting at ministerial
level.
2.14 The procedures for convening meetings under this mechanism
do not affect the rule of consensus in other circumstances.
3. The procedures defined above will not be used in place of the
mechanism concerning unusual military activities.
4. The communications between participating States provided for
above will be transmitted preferably through the CSBMs
communications network.
The above procedures will be reviewed and, if necessary, revised at
the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting.
ANNEX 3
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Taking into account the report of the Valletta 1991 meeting on
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, containing the principles for
Dispute Settlement and the provisions for a CSCE procedure for
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, the Council establishes the
following arrangements in accordance with the Charter of Paris.
The Council
1. Designates the Conflict Prevention Center to act as the
nominating institution in accordance with Section V of the said
provisions, and requests the Director of the Secretariat of the CPC
to assume his functions accordingly under the overall responsibility
of the Council;
2. Invites each participating State desiring to do so to communicate
as soon as possible and preferably by
30 August 1991 the names of up to four persons to be entered into
the register of qualified candidates to be maintained by the
nominating institution in accordance with Section V of said
provisions;
3. Decides that the mechanism will come into force as soon as 40
nominations have been received by the director;
4. Instructs the Director of the Secretariat of the CPC to notify the
full list of nominations as soon as the fortieth nomination is
received and subsequently to notify any additions or revisions which
may be made;
5. Recalls the experience of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and
its Secretary General which should be drawn upon, if so agreed,
when the CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes is
implemented;
6. Notes that appropriate use can be made of the premises and
facilities of the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.
ANNEX 4
The Council welcomes the successful outcome of the meeting in
Madrid on 2 and 3 April 1991 of parliamentarians from CSCE
participating States.
They note with satisfaction the consensus reached to adopt the
"Final resolution concerning the establishment of the CSCE
Parliamentary Assembly". The Council considers that this resolution
represents an important step forward for the development of the
Charter of Paris for a new Europe regarding greater parliamentary
involvement in the CSCE.
Reaffirming their commitment to strengthening democracy as the
only system of government of their countries, the Ministers look
forward to the collective expression of the views of the CSCE
Parliamentary Assembly on Security and Cooperation in Europe and
on the future development of the CSCE.
Council of Ministers
January 30-31, 1992
Declaration of the CSCE Council on Non-Proliferation And Arms
Transfers
The Council of Ministers of the CSCE,
1. Reiterated the commitment of their governments to the
prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the control of missile technology. They underlined their willingness
to contribute to the ongoing efforts and international co-operation
to this end. In this context, they expressed their support for the
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and for universal
adherence to it. They welcomed the intention of all those CSCE
States not yet party to the NPT [Non-proliferation Treaty] to accede
to it and urged other states, who are not yet party to it, to do so as
well. They also renewed their support for a global, comprehensive,
and effectively verifiable Chemical Weapons Convention to be
concluded in 1992. They also reaffirmed their support for the
Biological Weapons Convention, welcomed the results of the
September 1991 Review Conference and called for universal
adherence to it;
2. Expressed their view that excessive buildups of conventional
weapons beyond legitimate defensive needs pose a threat to
international peace and security in particular in regions of tension.
Based on the principles of transparency, consultation, and restraint,
they declared their commitment to address the threat of excessive
accumulations of conventional weapons and committed themselves
to exercise responsibility, in particular with regard to arms
transfers to states engaging in such excessive accumulations and to
regions of tension;
3. Confirmed their support for and firmly committed themselves to
provide full information to the United Nations Register on
Conventional Arms. They called upon all other States to take the
same action;
4. Agreed that effective national control of weapons and equipment
transfer is acquiring the greatest importance. They declared their
readiness to exchange views and to provide mutual assistance in the
establishment of efficient national control mechanisms;
5. Agreed that in this connection the conversion of arms production
to civilian production is also acquiring special importance;
6. Decided that the question of non-proliferation, including the
transfer of sensitive expertise, and the establishment of a
responsible approach to international armaments transfers should be
included as a matter of priority in the work program for the post
Helsinki Arms Control Process.
Council of Ministers
January 30-31, 1992
Summary of Conclusions
The Council of Ministers of the CSCE,
1. Welcomed Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan as
participating States, following receipt of letters accepting CSCE
commitments and responsibilities from each of them (Annex);
2. Granted Observer Status to Croatia and Slovenia in the CSCE
Process;
3. Welcomed as guests of honor the representatives of the Heads of
the following international institutions and organizations: United
Nations; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe; Council of
Europe; Western European Union; North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development;
4. Held political consultations on the transformation in Europe--the
role of the CSCE and the contribution of European and other
institutions and on the strengthening of CSCE institutions and
structures and orientations for the Helsinki Follow-up meeting.
They adopted with immediate effect the Prague Document on the
further development of the CSCE institutions and structures;
5. Agreed that the Helsinki Follow-up meeting should be an
important milestone in the development of the CSCE process and
should provide a clear vision for its future course. Representatives
to the follow-up meeting should, in particular, be guided by:
-- The CSCE's comprehensive concept of security and stability,
which includes human rights, political, military, economic and
environmental components;
-- The important role of the CSCE in fostering democratic
development and fully integrating participating States into the
network of shared CSCE valves, principles and norms and its role in
promoting a stable security environment in Europe;
-- The importance of a thorough implementation review,
particularly in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
which will take account of the new situation in Europe and the
enlarged number of CSCE participating States;
-- The objective of the CSCE to prevent conflict and consolidate
peace through eliminating the root causes of tensions, by attaining
in particular full respect for human rights, including those inscribed
in the CSCE provisions on national minorities, by building
democratic institutions and by fostering economic and social
progress;
-- The need to strengthen the capacity of the CSCE to contribute, in
accordance with CSCE principles, to a peaceful solution of problems
involving national minorities which could lead to tensions and
conflict--both within and between States--including possibilities
for "early warning";
-- The need for further development of the CSCE's capability for
conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of
disputes; and
-- The need to strengthen the effectiveness of CSCE institutions by
matching their functions more closely to the achievement of these
objectives.
6. Had a comprehensive discussion on the Yugoslav crisis. They
welcomed the ceasefire agreements reached under the auspices of
the United Nations, which are in the process of implementation, and
renewed their strong appeal for strict compliance with those
agreements; the Ministers also warned against any extension of the
present conflict.
They reaffirmed their support for the efforts undertaken by the
Secretary General and the Security Council of the United Nations,
and reiterated the need to create the conditions for an early
deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces on the basis of
Resolution 727 of the United Nations Security Council on Yugoslavia.
They endorsed the concept of the United Nations peacekeeping
operation and expressed their hope that it would facilitate the
political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.
The Ministers reiterated the commitment of the participating States
to seek a peaceful and lasting settlement of the crisis, in
accordance with the commitments and provisions of the CSCE and
the equal legitimate aspirations of all the peoples concerned. The
Ministers agreed that this requires from all the concerned parties:
-- Respect for international obligations with regard to the rule of
law, democracy and human rights;
-- Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national communities and
minorities, in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in
the framework of the CSCE;
-- Respect for the inviolability of all borders, whether internal or
external, which can only be changed by peaceful means and by
common agreement;
-- Commitment to settle by agreement all questions concerning
State succession and regional disputes; and
-- Guarantees for the absence of territorial claims toward any
neighboring state, including abstention from hostile propaganda
activities that would, inter alia, promote such territorial claims.
The Ministers reiterated the determination of their States to
cooperate closely in the search for a comprehensive solution to the
crisis, in particular to refrain from any action impeding these goals.
They stressed the special need for dialogue and enhanced
cooperation between neighboring states to this end.
The Ministers expressed their profound concern about the
humanitarian aspects of the crisis. They insisted that all parties
involved allow emergency aid to reach all people and communities in
need. They declared their support for all efforts, in particular those
by the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations, to facilitate the
return to their homes of all persons displaced by the hostilities who
desire to do so.
They reminded all those responsible for acts of violence and for
violations of ceasefire agreements that under international law they
are personally accountable for their actions that are in
contravention of relevant norms of international humanitarian law.
The Ministers fully endorsed the efforts of the Committee of Senior
Officials, including those undertaken within the framework of the
mechanism for consultation and cooperation with regard to
emergency situations.
The Ministers expressed their appreciation for the activities of the
monitor mission and recalled their support for the Conference on
Yugoslavia, and its Chairman, taking place under the sponsorship of
the European Community and its member States, expressing the hope
that agreement on a global settlement of the Yugoslav crisis,
including all issues under consideration by the conference, will soon
be reached.
A CSCE human rights rapporteur mission visited Yugoslavia and
submitted its report. Taking into account the conclusions of this
report, the Ministers expressed their view that the human rights
situation in Yugoslavia, including the situation of national
minorities, should be kept under review by the CSCE, and that full
use should be made to that end of the various CSCE mechanisms,
including, if necessary, other missions. They requested the
Committee of Senior Officials at its next meeting to examine the
need for further action.
7. Expressed their concern over new signs of intolerance, aggressive
nationals, xenophobia and racism. They recalled the importance of
non-discrimination and stressed the need to build their societies
according to the basic values of the CSCE.
The Ministers requested the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to address
the need to ensure full compliance through appropriate means with
commitments to protect individuals and groups from racial, ethnic
and religious discrimination.
The Ministers also came to the following conclusions:
8. Reaffirmed that the CSCE has a vital role to play in the building
and consolidation of a new Europe. The contribution that the CSCE
has to make to the fostering of political stability and security is
indispensable. The CSCE, with its comprehensive mandate and wide
participation, constitutes a unique forum for security negotiations;
9. Stressed that the CSCE also has a prominent role to play in the
evolving European architecture and that the challenges facing Europe
call for multi-faceted forms of cooperation, and a close relationship
among European, trans-Atlantic and other international institutions
and organizations, drawing as appropriate upon their respective
competences;
They requested their representatives at the Helsinki Follow-up
Meeting to study further ways and means of fostering such
cooperation with a view to enhancing its effectiveness and to avoid
duplication.
10. Adopted the declaration on non-proliferation and arms
transfers;
11. Stressed that the establishment, by 1992, from the conclusion
of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, of new negotiations on
disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all
participating States--as well as of a broader security dialogue and
of effective mechanisms for conflict prevention--will mark an
important step in consolidating a new cooperative order in Europe.
They assessed the progress made so far in the informal
consultations in Vienna for the new forum. They requested that
these consultations be accelerated and that their conclusions be
transmitted to the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting at its beginning;
12. Agreed that the CFE Treaty forms an important element for
stability and security in Europe. They called upon all signatories and
all relevant newly independent States to take all the necessary
steps to ensure the early entry into force of the treaty;
13. Assessed the progress made so far in the negotiations in Vienna;
They instructed their representatives at the negotiations on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures to conclude them prior
to the opening of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting with a substantial
new CSBM package.
They expressed the hope that an Open Skies agreement will be ready
for conclusion in time for the opening of the Helsinki Follow-up
Meeting.
They welcomed the determination of the participants in the
negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe to conclude, in
connection with the entry into force of the CFE Treaty, an agreement
limiting the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces
within the area of application in time for the Helsinki Follow-up
Meeting. In this context they stressed the need for the early
participation of the relevant newly independent States in these
negotiations.
14. Took note of the discussion at the second seminar on military
doctrine held within the framework of the Conflict Prevention
Center;
15. Took note and endorsed, as appropriate, the results of
-- the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities;
-- The Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension
of the CSCE;
-- The Oslo Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions;
16. Noted the report of the rapporteur mission to Albania;
17. Noted with satisfaction that the CSCE communications network
is now operational and they expressed their expectations that full
use will be made of it. They expressed special thanks to the
Netherlands for the key role which that country had played in
establishing this network;
18. Agreed that, in the light of the conclusions of the rapporteur
missions to new CSCE States and of any requests received from
them, and from other states recently admitted to the CSCE process,
informal consultations under the direction of the Chairman of the
CSO should take place at Helsinki, during the follow-up meeting, in
order to establish the modalities for a program of coordinated
support to such States, through which appropriate diplomatic,
academic, legal and administrative expertise and advice on CSCE
matters could be made available;
19. Encouraged the establishment and strengthening of independent
Chambers of Commerce in countries in transition to open market
economies, to function as a point of contact for private business and
financial interests, and to encourage entrepreneurial activity. The
Ministers would welcome the development and expansion of the
activities of the International Chamber of Commerce in this area in
cooperation with other institutions undertaking similar work;
20. Took note of a proposal to invite a high-level group of legal
experts from CSCE participating States to elaborate a draft statute
for a CSCE conciliation and arbitration body, taking into account the
work already done within the CSCE. They welcomed the intention to
submit this draft to the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting;
21. Agreed that the next meeting of the Council will be held in
Stockholm in early December 1992. They will seek to confirm the
specific days for this meeting at the opening of the Helsinki Follow-
up Meeting based on the proposal of the host country (3-4 December
1992);
22. Recalling that the Heads of State or Government decided in the
Charter of Paris to meet on the occasion of the CSCE Helsinki
Follow-up Meeting, the Council proposed that the summit meeting
should be held over two days beginning on 9 July 1992.
Council of Ministers
January 30-31, 1992
Prague Document on Strengthening CSCE Institutions and
Structures
1. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to pursue actively all
the objectives set out in the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, and
their determination to further strengthen CSCE institutions and
structures for this purpose. To this end they took the following
decisions and established certain guidelines for the discussions at
the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting.
I
Overview and Co-ordination
2. Between meetings of the CSCE Council, the Committee of Senior
Officials will be responsible for overview, management and co-
ordination and will act as the Council's agent in taking appropriate
decisions.
3. In order to increase its effectiveness, the Committee of Senior
Officials will meet more regularly, at least every three months. In
conformity with the Charter of Paris and building on established
practice, the Committee of Senior Officials may delegate tasks to
other CSCE institutions or to open-ended ad hoc groups of
participating States with a precise mandate.
II
Political Consultations
4. In order to further strengthen the political consultation process,
the Committee of Senior Officials may set aside certain meetings,
or parts thereof, for addressing previously agreed specific issues.
Other relevant policy-level officials could attend such meetings.
5. The facilities of the CSCE communications network will be made
available to the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee of Senior
Officials for transmission of urgent messages related to the work of
the Committee.
III
Human Dimension
6. The Ministers agreed that monitoring and promoting progress in
the human dimension remains a key function of the CSCE.
7. Issues related to the human dimension will therefore be
considered by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials
whenever necessary.
8. In addition, meetings of a short duration may also be decided upon
by the Committee of Senior Officials to address clearly defined
issues. Results of such meetings will be submitted to the Council
through the Committee of Senior Officials for consideration or
decisions as required.
9. In order to extend practical cooperation among participating
States in the human dimension, the Ministers decided to give
additional functions to the Office for Free Elections which will
henceforth be called the Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights.
10. Under the general guidance of the CSO, the office should, inter
alia:
-- Organize a short CSCE meeting at the seat of the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to address
implementation of CSCE human dimension commitments every year
in which a follow-up meeting does not take place. The Helsinki
Follow-up Meeting will work out the organizational modalities for
such meetings;
-- Serve as an institutional framework for sharing and exchanging
information on available technical assistance, expertise, and
national and international programs aimed at assisting the new
democracies in their institution building;
-- Facilitate contacts between those offering such resources and
those wishing to make use of them;
-- Develop cooperation with Council of Europe in order to make use
of its database of such resources and services;
-- Establish contacts with non-governmental organizations active
in the field of democratic institution building, with a view to
enabling interested participating States to make use of their
extensive resources and expertise;
-- Facilitate cooperation in training and education in disciplines
relevant to democratic institutions;
-- Organize meetings and seminars among all participating States
on subjects related to the building and revitalization of democratic
institutions, such as short seminar on free media and, at an
appropriate time, one on migration. These meetings and seminars
will be held in Warsaw unless otherwise decided.
11. In order to avoid duplication of work specially in the fields
enumerated above, the Ministers directed the office to work closely
with other institutions active in the field of democratic institution
building and human rights, particularly the Council of Europe and the
European Commission for Democracy through Law.
12. The CSO will on an annual basis examine the need for meetings
and seminars on the human dimension and democratic institutions
and will establish a work program.
13. The Ministers requested the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to
further specify the task of the Warsaw office and to decide now the
human dimension activities of the CSCE may be further carried
forward.
14. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is
designated as the CSCE institution charged with the tasks in
connection with expert and rapporteur missions according to the
document of the Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the CSCE.
15. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights will be
connected to the CSCE communications network.
IV
Safeguarding Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law
16. The Council decided, in order to develop further the CSCE's
capability to safeguard human rights, democracy and the rule of law
through peaceful means, that appropriate action may be taken by the
Council or the Committee of Senior Officials, if necessary in the
absence of the consent of the state concerned, in cases of clear,
gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments.
Such actions would consist of political declarations or other
political steps to apply outside the territory of the state concerned.
This decision is without prejudice to existing CSCE mechanisms.
17. The Council requested the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to
consider further modalities in applying this decision.
V
Economic Cooperation
18. The Ministers agreed on the need to continue their efforts to
strengthen the focus of CSCE on the transition to and development of
free market economies as an essential contribution to the building
of democracy.
19. To this end, they agreed to establish an economic forum within
the framework of the CSO. The CSO would convene as the economic
forum to give political stimulus to the dialogue on these topics, to
suggest practical efforts for the development of free market
systems and economic cooperation, and to encourage activities
already underway within organizations such as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The European
Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) and the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (ECE). The forum will meet periodically in Prague and can
invite contributions to its meetings by those European and trans-
Atlantic organizations relevant to the subject under discussion. It
was agreed that the first meeting of the economic forum would be in
early 1992.
20. The Ministers agreed that the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting will
consider appropriate further measures to promote discussions in the
framework of the CSCE on economic cooperation and related topics.
VI
Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Instruments
21. The Council agreed that the capabilities of the CSCE to engage in
crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution should be
improved.
22. To this end, the Council requested the Helsinki Follow-up
Meeting to study possibilities for improving the following
instruments:
-- Fact finding and rapporteur missions;
-- Monitor missions;
-- Good offices;
-- Counselling and conciliation;
-- Dispute settlement.
23. In this context the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting should also give
careful consideration to possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping or a
CSCE role in peacekeeping.
24. Provision should be made for the further operational
implementation within the CSCE of decisions by the Council or the
Committee of Senior Officials.
25. Tasks may be delegated to the Chairman-in-Office of the
Committee of Senior Officials, to the Consultative Committee of the
Conflict Prevention Center or to open-ended groups of participating
States of an ad hoc character. In each case a precise mandate and
arrangements for reporting back should be established.
Conflict Prevention Center
26. In addition to the tasks already given to the Conflict Prevention
Center in the supplementary document of the Paris Charter and in
the summary of conclusions of the Berlin meeting of the CSCE
Council, the functions and working methods of the CPC are enhanced
as follows:
27. The Consultative Committee will serve as a forum in the
security field wherein the CSCE participating States will conduct
comprehensive and regular consultations on security issues with
politico-military implications. In this context, any participating
State may, in order to reduce the risk of conflict, promptly raise an
issue which in its view has such implications. This is without
prejudice to later decisions on the structure of a new security/arms
control forum and the relationship it may have to the CPC.
28. The Consultative Committee will serve as a forum for
consultation and cooperation in conflict prevention and for
cooperation in the implementation of decisions on crisis
management taken by the Council or by the CSO acting as its agent.
29. The Consultative Committee has the authority to initiate and,
with the assistance of the CPC Secretariat, execute fact finding and
monitor missions in connection with paragraph 17 of the Vienna
Document 1990 (mechanism for consultation and cooperation as
regards unusual military activities).
30. The Consultative Committee, with the assistance of the CPC
Secretariat, will execute any additional tasks assigned to it by the
Council, or by the Committee of Senior Officials acting as its agent.
This will include full responsibility in the implementation of such
tasks. The Consultative Committee will report in an appropriate
manner on the implementation of these tasks to the Committee of
Senior Officials.
31. The Consultative Committee will develop general guidelines for
the implementation of its operational tasks including, in due time,
those that may be assigned to it by the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting
and in the future.
32. In addition to the existing support to the implementation of
CSBMs, the CPC will fulfill other functions as regards the
implementation and verification of agreements in the field of
disarmament and arms control if so requested by the parties to
those agreements and agreed upon by the Consultative Committee.
33. The Consultative Committee may at any time draw the attention
of the Committee of Senior Officials to a situation which it
considers requires the consideration of the Committee of Senior
Officials.
34. The Consultative Committee will meet regularly, as a rule at
least once a month. Working schedules should be flexible and
additional meetings may be held, in the light of circumstances and
future requirements.
35. The Consultative Committee may establish subsidiary working
bodies, including open-ended ad hoc groups entrusted with specific
tasks.
36. The regular meetings of the Consultative Committee will be
chaired in alphabetical rotation. The Chairmanship will rotate
immediately after the last regular meeting in every month.
37. The Chairman of the Consultative Committee and the Chairman
of the Committee of Senior Officials will maintain contact with
each other.
38. The Chairman of the Consultative Committee or his
representative will attend meetings of the Committee of Senior
Officials which are relevant to the tasks of the CPC.
39. In accordance with the paragraph on "CSCE Relationship with
International Organizations", European, trans-Atlantic and other
international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and relevant
United Nations bodies, will be invited to make appropriate
contributions to future seminars organized by the CPC.
40. The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting should also examine further how
the CSCE could cooperate with other international organizations in
these fields.
VII
Parliamentary Assembly
41. In the interest of encouraging an active dialogue with the CSCE
Parliamentary Assembly, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council will
be in contact with the Chairman of the Committee of Heads of
Delegation of the Assembly in order to explore possible interest in
the presence of the Chairman of the Council at the Budapest meeting
of the Assembly in July 1992.
The Chairman of the Council will be prepared to make himself
available to report on the work of the CSCE; to answer
parliamentarians' questions in this regard; and to take note of
parliamentarians' views for subsequent transmission to the Council.
VIII
Non-Governmental Organizations
42. The Council requests the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to
strengthen relations between the CSCE and non-governmental
organizations, in order to increase the role of non-governmental
organizations in implementing CSCE goals and commitments. In
particular, the follow-up meeting will develop opportunities and
procedures for meaningful non-governmental organization
involvement in the CSCE and possibilities for non-governmental
organizations to communicate with CSCE structures and
institutions, recalling, inter alia, the texts on non-governmental
organizations agreed by the Sofia and Moscow meetings and by the
Oslo Seminar.
IV
CSCE Relationship with International Organizations
43. The Council of Europe, ECE, NATO, the Western European Union,
OECD, EBRD, EIB and other European and trans-Atlantic organizations
which may be agreed will be invited to make contributions on the
basis of CSCE precedent and practice to specialized CSCE meetings
where they have relevant expertise.
44. To ensure full coordination, the Ministers would welcome it if
the above organizations would inform the CSCE Secretariat annually
of their current work program and of the facilities available for
work relevant to the CSCE.
X
Relations with Non-Participating States
45. The Council requests the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to
recommend practical ways to establish a flexible dialogue between
the CSCE and interested non-participating States or groups of
States, for example through contacts between the said States and
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council or of the Committee of Senior
Officials.
XI
Financial Arrangements of the CSCE and Cost-
Effectiveness
46. The Council requested the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to develop
procedures which would ensure greater predictability and
transparency of the costs of CSCE meetings and other activities.
Measures to provide for increased cost-effectiveness should also be
examined.
47. States proposing to host future CSCE meetings will present
draft budgets along with their proposals. Detailed provisions in this
respect will be developed at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting.(###)