US Department of State Dispatch Supplement VOL. 3, NO 6


President's 30th CSCE Report, Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, April 1, 1991-March 31, 1992

PA Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs Date: Sep, 15 19929/15/92 Category: Statements Category: Reports Region: Whole World Country: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, USSR (former), Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia (former), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Subject: CSCE, Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid, Media/Telecommunications

Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act

Text of the President's 30th CSCE Report, "Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, April 1, 1991 - March 31, 1992," submitted to Congress on June 2, 1992
The 30th report to Congress on the implementation of the principles of the Final Act and other documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) appears during a momentous period. The Fourth CSCE Follow-up Meeting is in session in Helsinki, marking the great progress made since the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975. The report itself covers a period of dramatic change in Europe which saw the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the emergence of newly independent states. In responding to the challenges of these developments, CSCE experienced great growth and development. During the reporting period, its membership increased from 35 to 51. It sought new ways of dealing with the ethnic tension and aggressive nationalism that have been unleashed by the fall of communism. It affirmed that its concept of security goes beyond arms control and confidence- and security-building measures to include political, social, economic, and environmental factors. Above all, it made remarkable progress in furthering development of a Euro-Atlantic community of open, civil societies, with market economies, based on the rule of law. With the urgent need in this new phase of CSCE to consolidate progress already made toward democratization and to integrate new members, implementation review takes on even greater importance. Active, ongoing implementation review can help all members establish a baseline of compliance, identify possible areas for improvement, and find ways cooperatively to help bring about such improvement. Implementation review can also play a major role in conflict prevention by identifying and addressing human rights and military security issues at an early stage before problems escalate into open conflict. Thus, a key US goal at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting is to continue comprehensive implementation review of all areas of CSCE commitments, emphasizing cooperative problem solving when deficiencies are pointed out and concerted political action in cases involving "clear, gross, and uncorrected" violations. The following Implementation Review reflects some of these new emphases. As mandated by Public Law 94-304, it focuses on "actions by the signatories of the Final Act reflecting compliance with or violation of the provisions of the Final Act." In view of new developments in CSCE, the report also focuses on the extent of progress being made by individual countries, especially CSCE's newest members, in demonstrating commitment to CSCE principles.
At the heart of the CSCE process are the ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act and additional commitments elaborated over the years, which define the basic code of conduct that CSCE states have adopted. The Helsinki principles are listed below: -- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; -- Refraining from the threat of use of force; -- Inviolability of frontiers; -- Territorial integrity of states; -- Peaceful settlement of disputes; -- Non-intervention in internal affairs; -- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief; -- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; -- Co-operation among states; and -- Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law. In the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, these principles were reaffirmed, launching a new era of hope for realization of a Europe "whole and free," based on human rights, democracy, and rule of law. During the reporting period, progress toward this goal, through improved implementation of CSCE principles, was remarkable. In Albania, free elections on March 22, 1992, brought to power the first non-communist government since before WW II. Bulgaria held free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections, and its new national assembly adopted a constitution reflecting key CSCE principles. Romania held its first local elections since the events of December 1989. Russia and all the new states of the former Soviet Union pledged to implement CSCE principles. Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia also undertook such a pledge, although the latter two were not CSCE members during the period covered by the report. There were serious problems with compliance as well. Yugoslavia's dissolution in 1991-1992 was characterized by violence and massive violations of CSCE principles. Repression of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo and other minority groups in Yugoslavia worsened. Violence resulting in over a thousand deaths and major refugee flows continued over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave of Azerbaijan. There were continuing problems throughout the CSCE community with racism, intolerance, anti-Semitism, and discrimination against individuals belonging to national minorities.
The CSCE process, including implementation review, continued its dynamic development along lines established by the 1990 Charter of Paris. A new CSBMs [confidence- and security-building measures] agreement was signed, furthering progress toward openness and transparency in military security matters and contributing substantially to confidence-building among the CSCE participating States. Intersessional meetings on cultural heritage, national minorities, the human dimension, and democratic institutions were held. The CSCE Office for Free Elections was transformed into the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The political consultative process continued to develop with more frequent meetings of the CSCE Council of Ministers [COM] and Committee of Senior Officials [CSO] on an increasing number of topics, especially the emergency situations in Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh. CSCE mechanisms were invoked in response to concerns about possible threats to security and violations of human dimension commitments.
In the military security area, the second agreement on Confidence- and Security Building Measures (CSBM), which supersedes all previous CSBM agreements, was adopted by CSCE participating States March 1992 in Vienna. The 1992 Vienna Document, which expands upon the 1990 Vienna Document and extends the zone of application to cover the territories of new CSCE members, enters into force May 1, 1992. It contains a number of improved provisions and some new CSBMs, including: -- Annual exchange of data on stationed troops and equipment; -- Voluntary hosting of visits to verify information exchanged on stationed troops and equipment; -- Provision for demonstration of new weapon and equipment types; -- Lowered military exercise notification thresholds (from 13,000 troops and 300 tanks to 9,000 troops and 250 tanks); -- Lowered observation thresholds for large-scale military exercises (from 17,000 troops to 13,000 troops and 300 tanks for ground force activities and from 5,000 troops to 3,500 troops for amphibious landings and airborne assaults); -- Constraints on size, frequency, and scheduling of notifiable military exercises; [and] -- The right to include other CSCE states on national CSBM inspection teams. The first Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIM), mandated by the 1990 Vienna Document to review CSBMs implementation, was held in Vienna, November 11-15, 1991. A seminar on military doctrine (October 8-18, 1991) and shorter seminars on defense conversion (February 19-21, 1992) and Western concepts of civil-military relations (March 4-6, 1992) were held in Vienna by the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center.
Intersessional Meetings
Although the focus in CSCE during the reporting period was less on formulation of new commitments than on implementation of existing ones, intersessional conferences and expert meetings continued to examine areas of concern in the human dimension. The Krakow Symposium on Cultural Heritage (May 28-June 7, 1991) focused on the need for cooperation in preserving cultural heritage. The Geneva Meeting on National Minorities (July 1-19, 1991) expanded on the 1990 Copenhagen Document by underlining that minority problems should be addressed in the first instance through respect for individual rights and the creation of democratic and legal systems enabling those rights to be guaranteed to all citizens. The Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (September 10- October 4, 1991) enhanced the Human Dimension Mechanism to include good offices and rapporteur mission components and expressly acknowledged for the first time that specific CSCE commitments in the broad area of human rights and fundamental freedoms are issues of legitimate international concern and not exclusively the internal affairs of any one state. Moscow also broadened commitments undertaken by CSCE states in several key areas relating to human and civil rights, including independence of the judiciary, freedom of expression, the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and women's rights. The Oslo Seminar on Democratic Institutions (November 4-15, 1991) addressed the need to consolidate progress in building democratic institutions and to support new initiatives in this area, especially under the auspices of the Office for Free Elections (since January 31, 1992, the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) in Warsaw.
Political Consultative Process
The 1990 Charter of Paris called for strengthening the political consultative process in CSCE through more regular meetings of senior officials, ministers, and heads of state or government. This process is now the central CSCE forum. As CSCE's highest decision-making body, with a mandate from the Paris Charter to deal with any issue relevant to security and cooperation in Europe, the Council of Ministers (the Council or COM) held its first meeting June 19-20, 1991, in Berlin. As a result of the ministers' deliberations, Albania was admitted to full CSCE membership and a strong statement calling for a ceasefire in Yugoslavia was issued. (For text of this and other CSCE statements on the Yugoslav crisis, see Appendix 1.) At the September 1992 ad hoc meeting in Moscow, the Council admitted Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to full CSCE membership. At its second full meeting January 30-31, 1992, in Prague, the Council agreed to full membership for all former Soviet republics except Georgia on the basis of written pledges to implement CSCE commitments. (For text of these pledges in the model accession letter, see Appendix 2.) Slovenia and Croatia were granted observer status at the same time. The Council issued another declaration on the conflict in Yugoslavia and agreed to send rapporteur missions to all new participating states and Nagorno-Karabakh. (For Council and CSO statements on Nagorno-Karabakh, see Appendix 3. For texts of Berlin and Prague Summaries of Conclusion, see Appendix 4.) Georgia, Slovenia, and Croatia were admitted to full membership March 24, 1992, at the Council of Ministers meeting in Helsinki. [Bosnia was admitted on April 30, 1992.] The Charter of Paris also established the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), a working group and executive body at the ambassadorial/political director level charged with preparing for meetings of the Council, carrying out their decisions, reviewing current issues, and considering future work of the CSCE. Between Council sessions, the CSO acts as the Council's agent. During the reporting period, especially as it dealt with developments in Yugoslavia, the CSO was augmented and strengthened. In a series of emergency meetings on the crisis, the CSO strongly condemned violations of CSCE principles and approved EC [European Community] mediation efforts. The CSO also laid the groundwork in March 1992 meetings for a peace conference scheduled to be convened in Minsk. (For CSCE statements on Nagorno-Karabakh, see Appendix 3.)
CSCE Mechanisms
As part of the political consultative process, various CSCE mechanisms were invoked during the reporting period to address implementation concerns. The Human Dimension Mechanism (HDM), established to consider possible violations of CSCE human rights commitments, was used once during the reporting period. On March 28, 1992, Austria invoked the first step of the mechanism, i.e., a bilateral request for information, regarding Turkey's treatment of its citizens of Kurdish descent. The Unusual Military Activities Mechanism (UMA), which permits any state with a "security concern" to query another participating State about military activities it views as potentially threatening, was used three times concerning Yugoslavia. On June 27, 1991, Italy invoked the UMA in response to Yugoslav military activities near the Italian border. On July 1, 1991, Austria called for a meeting to consider Yugoslav military activities near the Austrian border and in Austrian airspace. On August 26, 1991, Hungary invoked the mechanism asking the Yugoslav government for information on recent overflights of Hungarian territory. The Hazardous Military Incidents Mechanism was invoked for the first time on January 14, 1992, by Portugal on behalf of the EC in the wake of the downing of a helicopter carrying an EC monitor over Yugoslav territory. The Emergency Meeting Mechanism agreed at the June 1991 Berlin Council of Ministers was used almost immediately when the United States, Austria, Hungary, and the countries of the Western European Union (WEU) called for an emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials in response to the eruption of full-scale conflict in Yugoslavia. At the first such meeting (July 3-4, 1991), it was agreed that the Chairman-in-Office could re-convene the committee as necessary to deal with the Yugoslav conflict. During the reporting period, seven additional emergency meetings were held on Yugoslavia. CSCE rapporteur missions also played a key role in implementation review during the reporting period. Following the precedent set at the Berlin COM meeting for linking Albania's membership to the dispatch of a CSCE rapporteur mission, the 1992 Prague COM meeting agreed that the same should be done in connection with the admission of the former Soviet republics. Such missions were subsequently undertaken in March 1992 to Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus and to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Others were planned for the near future. The CSO dispatched rapporteur missions to Yugoslavia in December 1991 and January 1992 and to Nagorno-Karabakh in February 1992.
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
In June 1991, Secretary of State Baker called for expansion of the Warsaw Office for Free Elections into an office for encouraging democratic institution building in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Such expansion and a new, more descriptive name--the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights--were agreed at the 1992 Prague COM meeting. The Warsaw office is now mandated to support a range of activities in the areas of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and to provide institutional support for the Human Dimension Mechanism. The Warsaw office was very active in carrying out its mandate during the reporting period. It organized election seminars for election officials in Bulgaria and Albania and coordinated the activities of international observers of the October 13, 1991, Bulgarian national elections; October 27, 1991, Polish general elections; and the March 22, 1992, Albanian parliamentary elections. The Warsaw office also participated in the rapporteur missions to Albania, September 16-20, 1991; to Yugoslavia, December 12, 1991- January 10, 1992; and to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, February 12-18, 1992.
US Implementation Efforts in New States
The United States is actively committed to full integration of the former Soviet republics into CSCE. To demonstrate this commitment, Secretary of State Baker visited Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine in December 1991 and Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in February 1992 to emphasize the importance of their adherence to CSCE principles and their commitment to becoming part of the democratic, market-oriented world community. US Ambassador John Maresca made visits to the area, at Secretary Baker's request, to explain the CSCE process and to encourage efforts toward full implementation of CSCE principles. The US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, an independent agency created by the US Congress, undertook a major program of election and referendum observation during the reporting period, observing and reporting on elections or referendums in Albania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Moldova, and Uzbekistan.
The following reports focus on certain member countries where further progress on meeting CSCE standards appears necessary or where remarkable progress has recently been achieved. Because the USSR and Yugoslavia were intact for much of the reporting period, they are dealt with in single reports followed by overviews of the newly independent states. Each country report contains an assessment of CSCE implementation overall and specific assessments of the three traditional CSCE areas: security, economics (including science and technology and the environment), and the human dimension. Systematic reporting on the former Soviet republics is complicated by the varying accessibility of information from state to state. In states where US embassies have been established longest, as in Russia, examples of CSCE implementation concerns are most readily available, although Russia has one of the most positive records of human rights compliance and democratic reform.
General Assessment. Albania has continued to make progress toward establishing a pluralistic, democratic government and ensuring respect for human rights since the country's first post-WW II multi- party elections were held March 31, 1991. Although changes in Albania at first came more slowly than elsewhere in Eastern Europe, gradual improvements in the political system have led to general respect for freedom of speech, press, religion, and association. Elections held on March 22, 1992, brought to power the first completely non-communist government since before WW II. The new democratic government appears committed to instituting reforms to end the abuses of power that were commonplace during 47 years of communist rule. On June 19, 1991, Albania was admitted to the CSCE after agreeing to implement all CSCE principles and standards. Although there was considerable political change during the reporting period, economic reform was slower. During the 1992 election campaign, the Albanian government was criticized by CSCE countries, including the United States, for not living up to its commitments to safeguard the rights of members of the ethnic Greek minority party to take part in the elections by presenting their own candidates. Overall, however, these elections represented a substantial and commendable improvement over the 1991 national elections, particularly with respect to commitments to free and fair campaigns and voting procedures under the Copenhagen Document. Security. As has been the case with all elements of Albanian society during this period, the Albanian military faced the challenge of responding to the democratization of the country. The Albanian military command and civilian leaders in the Ministry of Defense have sought out their counterparts from Turkey and other states for regional talks on how to modernize command and control mechanisms. Albanian officials have also conferred with US military officials from European headquarters in Germany. During the reporting period, Albanian officials were very concerned with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Although Albania has kept its forces at a state of readiness along the border, at no time has any government leader advocated the use of military force. In particular, the repression of the Albanian minority in Kosovo and shooting incidents by Yugoslav border guards have continued to concern Albanian government officials and the public. While some leaders call for the union of lands within former Yugoslavia inhabited by Albanians with Albania itself, none has yet urged that this be accomplished by force. Tensions along the Albanian-Greek border have also resulted in a higher state of readiness by both Albanian and Greek militaries. There have been shooting incidents involving Albanian refugees on the border. Albania has pledged that it has no claims on any Greek territory; Greece has made similar pledges concerning Albanian territory. With regard to fulfilling CSBM obligations, Albania did not forecast any notifiable military activities for 1991 or 1992. Albania failed to provide data on its forces and equipment and its national military budget under the annual CSBM information regime but is expected to provide this data in 1992. Albania plans shortly to complete its requirements for full connectivity to the CSCE communications network which is used to facilitate the transmission of CSBM- related information. Economics. The economic situation in Albania is grave. Land reform, involving distribution of the properties of former state farms and collectives to private peasant farmers, was implemented, but in the absence of means through which to obtain financial assistance and supplies, agricultural yields plummeted 56% in 1991. Virtually all industry ground to a halt for lack of spare parts for machinery and raw materials. Services, particularly those related to finance and the economy, were not a priority under the communist regime, but they now have begun to improve. Unemployment at the end of the reporting period was approximately 50%. In 1991, the parliament approved laws to permit foreign investment and to safeguard it against expropriation. However, substantive economic reform was held up by the former parliament and awaited the outcome of the elections. Now that a non-communist coalition is in power, officials are expected to move quickly to reach agreement with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and to replace the command economy with market incentives. Albania survived throughout most of the reporting period on foreign assistance. The United States, Italy, Greece, and Germany provided most of the aid, though other CSCE countries also contributed. The governments of the United States, Canada, the EC, and certain other European countries are now preparing to assist the new Albanian government with agricultural support, technical assistance, and training programs for the new crop of leaders who will replace the old regime's apparatchiks. In certain sections of the country, most notably Elbasan and Fier, there has been very serious damage done to the environment by the misguided "growth first" policies of the former regime. (For example, the metal refineries near Elbasan were built on a plain surrounded by mountains, and air pollution, which cannot be dissipated by wind, hovers over the city.) The new government may begin to address some of these problems, but it will be constrained by the lack of domestic expertise, the terrible state of the economy, and the absence of any public funds for clean-up. Moreover, in comparison with most other former East bloc countries, Albania has barely begun to explore opportunities for environmental assistance available through international organizations such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). Human Dimension. After elections on March 31, 1991, the communist government used force on several occasions to suppress demonstrations by students in Tirana and the northern city of Shkodra, where four persons were killed by police. A general strike in May and June 1991 led to the fall of the government and the formation of a coalition government in which opposition groups held several of the 24 cabinet positions. The non-communists withdrew from the coalition government in December, and new elections were held March 22, 1992. The March 22 elections were judged by most diplomatic, international, and domestic Albanian observers to be free and fair. A coalition led by the Democratic Party, also including the Republican and Social-Democratic Parties, gained 100 of 140 seats in the parliament. The Socialist Party (which changed its name from the Party of Labor, or Communist Party, in June, 1991) won 38 seats. Albania is a relatively homogeneous country. Ethnic Albanians constitute 93% of the population; ethnic Greeks, 5%. The ethnic Greek minority is represented by the OMONIA organization. Estimates of the size of the Greek population range from 50,000 to 100,000 people, living primarily in the southern districts of the country near the border with Greece. Ethnic identity was suppressed under the communist dictatorship, and cross-border contacts and cultural expression by ethnic Greeks was severely limited. Only in the past two years have restrictions on the use of the Greek language in Albania been relaxed. Ethnic Greeks now have their own schools, primarily in the districts of Saranda and Gjirokaster, where a Greek language newspaper is also published. Many ethnic Greeks and Albanians claiming to be of Greek origin fled to Greece during late 1990 and early 1991. Greek authorities have permitted them to remain, and many now work in large cities such as Athens, Thessaloniki, and Ionina. In early 1992, allegations surfaced that Greek border officials abused several Albanians who sought to enter Greece illegally, or who had already done so, resulting in at least two deaths. Reports of these border incidents sparked anti-Greek riots in Saranda, Albania, where shops of ethnic Greeks were looted and the headquarters of OMONIA were destroyed. The law regulating the March 1992 parliamentary elections excluded ethnically based organizations. As a result OMONIA candidates were banned from participating in the contests. The Albanian authorities were severely criticized for having excluded the country's only ethnic Greek organization. In its place, the Unity for Human Rights Party was founded, which fielded a slate of principally ethnic Greek candidates and received the backing of the ethnic Greek communities. Two ethnic Greek deputies were elected to parliament, one from Saranda and the other from Gjirokaster. Ethnic Greeks are also represented in the new cabinet of the democratic government. During this reporting period, the parliament abrogated the Albanian constitution of 1976 and, pending adoption of a new constitution, passed a series of constitutional provisions guaranteeing basic human rights and declaring Albania to be a parliamentary republic based on free elections. The assembly approved legislation to de- politicize the army, police, and court system. All political prisoners have been released. Freedom of speech, religion, travel, and the press have been established, as have independent trade unions. A major concern of the new, non-communist government is to move quickly to dismantle the state security apparatus.
General Assessment. Bulgaria continued political and economic reforms during the reporting period at a rapid pace. After free and fair parliamentary elections in October 1991, the former opposition Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) gained the largest share of seats in the parliament and formed a government led by Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov. The parliamentary majority is held by a coalition of the UDF and the predominantly ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). In January, incumbent President and former UDF Chairman Zhelyu Zhelev emerged the victor from Bulgaria's first ever direct presidential elections. The Grand National Assembly, elected in June 1990 with a socialist (former communist) majority, adopted a new constitution in July 1991. The constitution came under fire from more radical UDF reformers in the parliament, several of whom went on a 10-day hunger strike protesting its passage. Their primary criticisms were that the constitution did not go far enough in protecting human rights or ridding the country of the remaining vestiges of communism. The current UDF-led government is addressing de-communization through legislation. One of the most controversial and problematic provisions in the constitution is a prohibition on ethnic and religious-based political parties. The Bulgarian government was strongly criticized by CSCE countries, including the United States, for not living up to its commitments to safeguard the rights of members of the Turkish minority in establishing this law. In the lead-up to the October parliamentary elections, efforts were made by the former authorities to employ this provision to ban the MRF from independent participation. Bulgaria's democratic forces opposed this ban, and the MRF garnered nearly eight percent of the total vote and 24 of 240 seats in the parliament, making the group the third largest force in the assembly. The UDF government has pledged to change this constitutional provision. General observance of human rights and treatment of national minorities continued to improve during the reporting period. Mother tongue language classes were implemented according to an MRF plan for all ethnic Turkish children and plans made for future implementation of similar programs for other language groups including Romani (Gypsy), Greek, and Armenian. While the assimilation campaigns of the communist regime have been abandoned, some residual societal discrimination against minority groups remains. Extra-parliamentary nationalist parties continued to stir up anti-Turkish sentiments, often with the assistance of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Security. Bulgaria made enormous strides in paring down its military structures to a manageable size and establishing civilian oversight and openness. In November 1991, the first civilian defense minister in postwar Bulgaria took office. A restructuring of the defense ministry commenced, including retirement of many officers who had served the former system. Civilian advisers were also appointed to key positions to increase transparency in the decision making process. Great progress was made in the number of contacts between the Bulgarian military and Western military services, including both high-level (e.g., NATO Secretary General Woerner) and numerous working-level contacts. The Bulgarian government signed security agreements with Greece and Turkey. Bulgaria has signed bilateral treaties of friendship with most of the former East bloc countries and some Western European nations. The Bulgarians have facilitated inspections within the framework of multilateral agreements, and there were several visits to naval facilities by vessels from US and other Western navies. Travel restrictions were lifted for US diplomatic personnel. During the reporting period, Bulgaria received a CSBM inspection from France on November 20, 1991. With regard to military activities, Bulgaria forecast no notifiable exercises for 1991 or 1992. Under the provisions of Vienna Document 1990 (VD 90), Bulgaria received an evaluation visit from the UK [United Kingdom] on January 15, 1992. On January 28, 1992, Bulgaria conducted an evaluation of a unit in Greece. Pursuant to the Vienna Document provisions on annual information exchange, Bulgaria submitted military data on its forces and equipment and its national military budget. Bulgaria is connected to the CSCE communication network. Bulgaria has been active in encouraging peaceful settlement of disputes in what has been a very stormy period for the Balkans. Although concerned about possible overflow of the Yugoslav conflict or the possible influx of refugees as a result, the Bulgarians have acted in a very restrained manner in response to events in its war- torn neighbor. Bulgaria was the first country to recognize all four former Yugoslav republics and moved rapidly to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the former Soviet republics. Economics. Bulgaria progressed rapidly in 1991 and the first part of 1992 toward a market-based economy. Key parts of the reform program were enacted by the parliament, including a new commercial code, a foreign investment law allowing full repatriation of profits, a new banking law, and bills for restitution of property confiscated by the communist government. The UDF- controlled parliament elected in October 1991 passed a series of amendments to the law on the return of agricultural land in March 1992. Anyone able to document ownership of land before collectivization will be able to make a claim to the government for its return, up to 30 hectares. A highly flexible draft privatization law was praised by the World Bank, and [passed in April, 1992] should provide the impetus for further reform. The review period has been one of many economic hardships for the average Bulgarian. Inflation has run at approximately 70-75%, and unemployment exceeded 10% in early 1992. Chronic energy shortages forced the government to enforce electricity rationing of three hours on and one hour off for much of the winter. At the same time, numerous small private firms have appeared, offering for the first time a broad range of consumer goods. In contrast to previous winters, food is now in constant supply, and market forces are governing most prices and the availability of products. Prices are much higher, but people are buying. In December 1991, the country's first stock exchange opened and several commodity exchanges have been active as well. The Bulgarian government has been highly active in the areas of environmental protection and scientific exchange. The government has concluded an agreement on environmental protection with Romania, and held discussions on protection of the Black Sea. The Bulgarians have worked closely with AID [US Agency for International Development], EPA [US Environmental Protection Agency] , the EC, and international financial institutions to develop a broadly based environmental strategy. They have also participated actively in the environmental bodies of the UN Economic Commission for Europe and have signed several multilateral environmental agreements, e.g., the ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. A branch of the regional environmental center in Budapest is due to open spring 1992 in Sofia. The government has also cooperated closely with international groups in developing a new energy policy and upgrading the facilities at the Kozluduy nuclear power plant in northern Bulgaria. Some tensions have developed between government and labor over decisions to close highly polluting industrial/mining operations, but thus far these disputes have reached negotiated conclusions. Human Dimension. In 1991, Bulgaria held a second round of post- communist parliamentary elections and the first ever direct presidential elections. After a wide array of domestic and international observers judged the parliamentary elections to have been conducted in an openly free and fair manner despite administrative difficulties, it was deemed unnecessary by most international groups to send observers to the January 1992 presidential elections. The Grand National Assembly elected in June 1990 in Bulgaria's first round of free elections passed a new constitution in July 1991. The Assembly was dominated by members of the Socialist Party (the renamed Communists) and was seen by many members of the then- opposition UDF as tainted. The new constitution creates a parliamentary republic with a clear separation of powers and guarantees of basic human rights. However, in some areas it falls short of expectations by relegating important rights to subsequent legislation rather than enshrining them in the constitution. A two- thirds majority of the parliament is required to pass constitutional amendments. No changes are expected in the near future. The most controversial aspect of the constitution has been a provision banning ethnic or religious-based political parties. This provision was employed prior to the October 1991 parliamentary elections in an effort to prevent the predominantly Muslim and ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms from participating on an independent ticket. An electoral commission ruling that the party's registration from the 1990 elections remained valid allowed them to participate; however, a challenge to the MRF's legitimacy from the Bulgarian Socialist Party remains before the constitutional court. [The court ruled in the MRF's favor in April 1992.] The 24 seats currently held by the MRF in the parliament provide the pivotal number of votes to allow the UDF to govern in an informal coalition with the MRF. A similar clause in the previous constitution was successfully employed to prevent the registration of other groups, including a party representing Gypsy (Roma) rights. We know of no registrations of political parties representing the interests of ethnic or religious minorities since the adoption of the new constitution. Respect for the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities improved dramatically on the whole. All legal restrictions on observance of traditions, religious customs, and the speaking of native languages have been removed. Members of the dominant ethnic group in areas of mixed population were elected to city councils and mayorships in local elections, and most areas are now governed by a representative mix of officials. With the beginning of the 1991 school year, the government enacted a program, judged satisfactory by the MRF, allowing ethnic Turkish children to study Turkish as a mother tongue voluntarily as part of the regular school program. Preparations are also underway to introduce Gypsy and other languages for which there is a demand. Nevertheless, some discrimination and inequities in the treatment of minorities remain. Ethnic Turks, Gypsies, and Pomaks claimed they were usually among the first to be laid off in any factory closures. They suffer widely from exclusion from positions of responsibility. Muslims and Gypsies also were reportedly offered only the most inferior housing in many cities. In early 1992, the government directorate on religious affairs ruled that the 1985 election of the Chief Mufti and the 1971 election of the Orthodox Patriarch were illegitimate, and that new elections should be held in accordance with each organization's charter. Both individuals had long been under attack for alleged collaboration with the communist government and the secret services. New elections are expected in late 1992. Religious education is in no way limited. University theological faculties closed by the former regime have been re-established, and a number of Muslim religious institutes have been opened. The UDF government has undertaken a series of measures aimed at breaking the monopoly on the civil service long enjoyed by supporters of the Communist Party. This has included purges in many ministries of employees past retirement age and of those who are either unqualified for the positions they held or were given their jobs as a direct result of their support for the party. The UDF/MRF parliamentary majority also passed a bill requiring confiscation of the property of the Communist Party and its constituent organizations. One of the sectors most greatly affected by structural reforms and personnel changes is the judiciary. Many prosecutors and judges compromised by their service under the former regime or participation in the assimilation campaign against the ethnic Turks have been retired or replaced. A new prosecutor and chairman of the Supreme Court were named in early 1992. The Minister of Justice has begun reforms aimed at bringing the prosecution function into the ministry and revamping administrative and criminal procedures. Procedures have also become increasingly transparent and open to observation by human rights groups and interested parties.
General Assessment. Romania took a number of important steps in the last year toward improved implementation of CSCE principles. On December 8, 1991, Romania ratified a new constitution, which contains guarantees for fundamental freedoms and provides for a multi-party democracy. Local elections were held in February 1992, resulting in the first free elections of mayors and local counselors in almost 50 years. While the electoral process was often disorganized and suffered a number of shortcomings, almost all political groups, as well as domestic and international observers, accepted the validity of the results and recognized the elections as registering significant advances in meeting CSCE criteria and generally accepted international standards for free and fair elections. This important step forward for democracy contrasted with the events of September 1991, when Prime Minister Petre Roman was removed from office in the wake of violent demonstrations by striking coal miners. Respect for human rights increased in Romania during the last year, despite disturbing events in certain areas. Progress was made in reforming the judicial system, including constitutional bans against illegal searches, torture, and the death penalty. People were generally free to state and hear a variety of opinions, and the new constitution contains provisions for freedom of expression. The government no longer monopolizes television, radio, or the print media. However, Romanian Television (RTV), the sole station with nationwide broadcasting capabilities, remains under state control, and the independent press continues to suffer from problems of newsprint cost and availability and the state-controlled distribution system. Political parties fielding candidates in the local elections were allowed free air time on state-run television. Beatings of independent journalists and opposition activists under suspicious circumstances also marred this positive progress on human rights. Romanian authorities did not consistently investigate these cases or prosecute offenders; there have been no prosecutions in these cases. There were continuing, credible reports of interference with the right to privacy of Romanians, including surveillance of domestic opposition. Gypsies are subject to societal discrimination and some Gypsy communities were physically attacked, leading to the burning of Gypsy homes. Also disturbing was the prominence of extreme nationalist publications, which often fprinted virulent articles against ethnic Hungarians, Gypsies, and Jews. The government has on several occasions publicly denounced anti-Semitism. On the international scene, Romania signed bilateral treaties with other European countries reaffirming its commitment to Helsinki principles and the CSCE process. Romania did not conduct any notifiable activities under the CSBM agreement. Security. In the conduct of CSBM activities, Romania forecast no notifiable exercises for 1991 or 1992. The government has fulfilled the initial reporting requirements of the 1990 Vienna Document. Romania does not plan to hold any notifiable military activities in 1992 and no military activities involving more than 40,000 troops in 1993. Romania received two evaluation visits during the reporting period. One visit was conducted by the UK on October 22, 1991, and the other was conducted by France on October 23, 1991. Romania exchanged military data on its forces and equipment in accordance with CSBM requirements but failed to provide information on its national military budget. Romania is connected to the CSCE communication network. Romania ratified an "Open Skies" agreement with Hungary in December 1991 and is negotiating or has concluded friendship and cooperation treaties with its neighbors. The proposed Romanian- Hungarian Friendship Treaty continues to be stalled. Romania has not accepted civilian control of its military. The current Minister of Defense is a military officer, and the senior positions in the ministry continue to be held by military officers. Romania is seeking to develop counter-terrorism cooperation with other countries. In December 1991, the Romanian government issued a public statement condemning terrorism in all forms and supporting the US, UK, and French demands on Libya in response to the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772. Economics. Romania has largely completed the process of creating a legal framework for a market economy. However, its record on implementation of market reforms remains mixed. Most importantly and basically, Article 41 of the new constitution (December 1991) guarantees the right of private property, though foreigners cannot own land. The second privatization law (Law 58 of August 1991) moved the privatization process forward but would leave a substantial share of industry under government control. No large enterprise has yet been sold or allowed to fail. A new law regulating the intelligence service permits that organization to own and operate its own businesses. The foreign investment law (Law 35 of April 1991) allows a variety of foreign investment options. The only restriction which remains is a legal provision preventing foreigners from owning land. In January 1992, Romania adopted a harmonized tariff system and set a maximum tariff of 30%. A new, modern patent law has been enacted providing stronger protection for intellectual property rights. In an institutional sense, Romania is moving toward a free economy by giving the national bank more regulatory and supervisory powers. The Romanian Development Agency is more active in encouraging and facilitating foreign investment. In the agricultural sector, land reform appears to have slowed. Despite the fact that the land law has been in force since February 1991, little progress has been made in transferring land titles to private individuals. Access to credit is limited owing to tight monetary policies and an inadequate commercial banking infrastructure. Access to foreign exchange is also limited. The foreign exchange regime adopted in November 1991 failed to achieve the established policy goal of allowing full, fair, and rapid access to foreign exchange for all Romanians. Finally, recent restrictions on independent exchange houses severely limit possibilities for Romanian citizens to obtain hard currency for travel abroad. Romania operated under an IMF standby arrangement for most of 1991, consistently meeting performance criteria until the end of the final quarter of the program. Several IMF performance targets were relaxed, partly in recognition of limited external financing. By mutual agreement the arrangement was terminated in January 1992. A major step backward in the move to a free market occurred in January 1992 when the government allowed credit to expand in order to finance inter-enterprise debt arrears. This contributed to the early termination of the IMF standby arrangement. The government appears committed to reducing direct and indirect subsidies by the end of 1993. Nevertheless, it tries to control prices and profits indirectly. Government Decision 776 (November 1991) limits the markup and profit margin from wholesale to retail sales. In addition, the decision requires government approval and notification for changes in the prices of certain goods. Romanian officials appear to have a realistic view of the current environmental situation in Romania and the steps needed to correct past environmental abuses. Socialist industrialization plans took little heed of environmental concerns and resulted in a variety of serious environmental problems. Romania has also suffered from a relatively high turnover of senior environmental officials. The solutions to these problems will require considerable funding for the restructuring of industrial production to reflect real environmental costs and reduce potentially toxic emissions, but Romania has limited financial resources to begin addressing these problems. Little progress on environmental concerns was made during the reporting period. Nevertheless, the Romanian government has committed itself to improving the environment as the economy is being restructured. A World Bank/EPA/AID team spent February 1992 in Romania assessing the state of the environment and planning a seminar to be held in May 1992 to help develop Romania's environmental strategy. Romania is active in international meetings concerning the environment and has signed key agreements on environmental transboundary air pollution. In June 1992, the government plans to sign the Biodiversity Convention and the Climate Change Convention at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The Danube delta's role as a world resource is slowly being acknowledged by Romanians living in the area. A new environmental law is expected to be passed in the coming year. The law calls for an environmental tax to fund cleanup and modernization projects. In the strategy for industrial restructuring announced in March 1992 by the Ministry of Industry, one of the ten program goals is to ensure the compatibility of the new industrial structure with the environment. Romanian scientists and technology centers engage in exchanges with other countries and multilateral organizations. Some cooperation with US institutions and scientists is funded by non- governmental organizations (National Academy of Sciences, IREX) or as part of other broader public programs (Fulbright Program, International Visitors Program, National Institutes of Health, etc.). Human Dimension. Romania's new constitution, passed by a referendum on December 8, 1991, contains provisions for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, expression, movement, assembly, and association. The structure of the government is envisioned as a democratically elected bicameral legislature and president, with an independent judiciary. There are concerns, however, about how the new constitution and some new legislation can be interpreted and applied. For example, some legal protections are subordinate, under law, to considerations of "national security and public order," concepts which are not clearly defined. Moreover, Romanians continue to report that the government interferes with their privacy and political activities through the monitoring of conversations and the interception of correspondence. The government, while acknowledging that some of the allegations are true, has not investigated them vigorously or taken steps publicly to stop the abuses. In addition, legal protections available in principle are often not fully respected. For example, human rights groups report that few defendants have access to a lawyer during questioning by police or before trial and that beatings are common in police lockups and prisons. In March 1992, police conducted searches of several churches and homes of ethnic Hungarians, apparently without appropriate authorization. The local prosecutor filed a protest against the police actions. Controversy continues to surround the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI). Though the SRI's legal powers are limited to investigation and do not include the authority to arrest, there has been concern that the SRI engages in political surveillance. In a renewed incursion into Bucharest in September 1991, striking coal miners vehemently protested their deteriorating standard of living, assaulted government headquarters, the Presidential Palace, the TV station, and besieged the parliament. At least three people died and several hundred were injured. No one has been arrested in connection with the riots. In their wake, Prime Minister Roman and his government were removed from office when President Iliescu accepted the miners' demands for their ouster. Serious questions have been raised about the role of the security services, particularly the Romanian Intelligence Service, in these events. In a significant step toward democracy in Romania, local elections for mayors and other local officials took place in February 1992, for the first time since December 1989. The campaign was notable for the relative absence of violence and intimidation as compared to the May 1990 elections, and improved access to television for political parties. Nevertheless, there were reports of isolated threats, incidents of physical intimidation, and harassment, as well as other electoral irregularities. Perhaps the most serious incident occurred when a local court disqualified the ethnic Hungarian party's candidate for mayor in Tirgu-Mures (the scene of serious inter- ethnic conflict in March 1990) on dubious grounds. Considerable confusion in the electoral process also posed problems during the elections, with the electoral law not being applied consistently across the country. All political parties, except those of the extreme nationalist left, however, accepted the validity of the election results. Thousands of domestic electoral observers made important contributions to the successful completion of the elections. The Romanian government issued a statement on national minorities on November 20, 1991, stating that "discrimination based on race, ethnic, or national origin, as well as any urge to national, racial, or religious hatred are prohibited" and that "public authorities shall encourage inter-ethnic tolerance and understanding and shall renounce and fight national hatred extremism, racism, and anti- Semitism." However, the document was given little domestic publicity. Romania's new constitution contains provisions against discrimination based on "race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political opinion, political adherence, property or social origin." Nevertheless, minorities issues and ethnic tensions remained focal points in Romania during the past year, with chauvinistic elements of Romanian society increasing their visibility. Leaders of the ethnic Hungarian and Jewish communities were targets of death threats, and there were repeated attacks in the extremist press (which includes some of the most widely read papers in Romania) against minorities, especially ethnic Hungarians and Jews. Extreme nationalism also surfaced in several parliamentary debates, including acrimonious debate over a contentious report on treatment of Romanians in predominantly ethnic Hungarian counties in Transylvania. Results of the local elections showed that nationalist parties have increased in popularity since the May 1990 elections. Anti-Gypsy attitudes are common in almost all elements of Romanian society. There were a number of violent incidents directed against Gypsy communities during the last year, and public authorities have generally not acted to defend them or sought to prosecute leaders of anti-Gypsy mob violence. The Romanian government has tried to institute some programs designed to aid Gypsies, including special educational classes for Gypsy children, a short television program in the Romany language, and attempts to recruit Gypsies into the police force. Serious tensions between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians persist, exacerbated by extremists on both sides. While conditions for ethnic Hungarians have improved since the Ceaucescu era, anti- Hungarian attitudes are also common. Ethnic Hungarians also continue to report that they are discriminated against in Romania. There is continued controversy about the availability of education in the Hungarian language. Ethnic Hungarians also seek reinstatement of a government-funded, Hungarian-language university eliminated early in the communist period. Representatives of Romania's ethnic Hungarian community also complained about aspects of the constitution affecting the rights of persons belonging to minorities, for example, the deletion of a draft article that stipulated that, when appearing in a court of law, "citizens belonging to national minorities may use their mother tongue." According to Article 127, as it now stands, members of ethnic minorities have the right to the services of an interpreter in a court of law; this right is ensured free of charge in criminal trials. President Iliescu and some other Romanian authorities have strongly criticized ethnic Hungarian leaders who advocate an expansion of minority rights. Many strongly anti-Hungarian articles appeared in the press, including the pro-regime media. On occasion, Romanian border police have confiscated Hungarian language materials and harassed people carrying these publications. Many articles with strongly anti-Semitic content appeared in the extremist press and occasionally in the pro-regime media. They included attacks on leading members of the Jewish community as well as politicians believed to be of Jewish origin and accused Jews of bringing communism to Romania and of attempting to colonize Romania. On March 17, 1992, President Iliescu condemned certain anti-Semitic publications by name and asked the Romanian legal authorities to investigate them on the grounds that they sought to revive fascism in Romania. Government does not impede the free observance of religious belief. There are 15 recognized denominations and religions in Romania. The Romanian Orthodox Church, to which approximately 80% of the population belongs, predominates. The state licenses each religious denomination, a process which confers legal status and exemptions from income taxes and customs duties. The ultimate licensing authority will be determined according to a new draft law on religion, drawn up in consultation with representatives of recognized religions but not yet submitted to the parliament. Continued controversy over the former property of the Greek Catholic (or Uniate) Church has led to disputes, including some violent incidents, between Uniates and members of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Romanian government declared the Uniate Church illegal in 1948 and confiscated its property. Most of the Uniate Churches were eventually turned over to the Romanian Orthodox Church. After the December 1989 revolution, the provisional government repealed the law abolishing the Uniate Church and decreed that it would restore the former Uniate property still held by the state. The return of those state-owned properties has been constantly delayed, and only a small portion of those assets have been restored to date. Even more complicated is the situation of those formerly Uniate Churches and other properties now held by the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Uniates have insisted upon the return of these assets, but the Orthodox Church has resisted, arguing that it is not a purely legal matter and that the wishes of the respective congregations must be taken into account. Legislation enacted in 1991, as well as the country's new constitution, guarantee the right to bargain collectively, to strike (within certain parameters), to form federations and confederations, and to affiliate internationally. The law stipulates that unions must refrain from political activity, but the definition of what constitutes such activity has been open to various interpretations. Some organizations, notably Alfa Cartel and the League of Jiu Valley Miners, were politically active in 1991. The former failed in its efforts to force the resignation of the Romanian government through peaceful strikes, while violent assaults by the latter on the government headquarters and other public institutions culminated in the ouster of the Romanian government. Some progress was made during the reporting period in areas of concern about freedom of expression and information in Romania raised in the last implementation report. While state-run Romanian Television still controls the only two national channels, there are now twelve local, independent TV stations in the country although many are able to broadcast only during RTV's limited off-hours. Five of them have joined together to form a Romanian union of local, private television stations for further commercial development. The Society for the Creation of Independent Television (SOTI) also began broadcasting on RTV-controlled Channel Two (which reaches approximately 30% of the country). Initially RTV allowed SOTI to broadcast only in the late evening for one hour and barred it from showing any advertising. SOTI now has additional afternoon broadcasting time on Friday afternoons and can carry a limited amount of advertising. Minority-language broadcasting, mainly in either Hungarian or German, continues to encounter significant problems. The minority language broadcasting that was cut back last year has not been restored, although some nonpolitical minority programming was added to the second channel and to local broadcasts during non- prime hours. RTV has focused on regionalization of minority broadcasts, concentrating on ethnic geographic enclaves. This has met with the opposition of minority broadcasters at RTV and the greater ethnic Hungarian community, who argue that ethnic Hungarians are too geographically widespread to be served by Hungarian-language broadcasts solely to specific locales. All local TV stations, whether independent or state-run affiliates, were given additional air time during the campaign for the February 1992 local elections as the campaign got under way. This step was undertaken with the support of Prime Minister Stolojan. During the electoral campaign, a large number of political parties sought and were granted access to television. Access was more even-handed and decidedly fairer than during the May 1990 elections. Observers reported that the national television channel was biased in favor of the ruling party in its election coverage. There are several independent radio stations operating in Bucharest and other independent radio stations in six other cities, some with cooperative agreements, or outright support, from Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom. The association of Romanian journalists (AZR), established after the 1989 revolution, has applied for a radio frequency for "Radio Z," which plans, when it begins broadcasting, to become a Voice of American (VOA) affiliate. State-run Romanian radio has also been in touch with VOA's Romanian service to discuss cooperative relationships. Romanian radio has consistently proven itself to be professional in its journalistic techniques and in its adherence to news reporting without editorial comment. VOA, Radio Free Europe (RFE), and other foreign radio stations are heard in Romania without hindrance. While an estimated 95% of the population listen to Romanian radio, about 33% also listen to foreign radio stations. An audio-visual law was passed by both houses of the parliament, but President Iliescu returned it for revision. Many independent Romanian newspapers, magazines, and book publishers are in severe financial distress, influenced primarily by high production costs, lack of advertising revenue, and purchase prices. Yet, pro-regime and extreme nationalist publications do not appear to suffer the same economic difficulties. The print media also suffers from state domination of printing, distribution facilities, and newsprint supplies. Newsprint prices were above world levels for much of the reporting period. International observers to the local elections cited reports that the independent and opposition press was prevented from reaching some parts of the country during the campaign period. Privatization of the largely state-owned distribution system began in the first quarter of 1992, though some independent publications also began their own distribution systems beforehand in order to circumvent irregularities in and possible manipulation of deliveries. While the state-run Rompres is still the basic distributor of foreign news, several other competing foreign news services have started, usually in affiliation with established newspapers. The demand for foreign newspapers, magazines, and books remains great. The general lack of hard currency is the principal barrier to their increased availability. The present government of Prime Minister Stolojan has welcomed the presence of foreign journalists. Visas are readily available, and there is an established procedure for members of the press to obtain credentials in Romania. Print and broadcast journalists generally have good access to government officials and institutions. The government also regularly holds press briefings that are open to both foreign and domestic journalists. While foreign journalists have not been harassed or physically threatened during the reporting period, there have been instances of intimidation and of some violent attacks on Romanian journalists that are still under investigation. Direct cultural contacts between Romanians and foreigners continue to grow through musical performances, exhibits, film, and TV. American and French films are popular, both in cinemas and on television, but hard currency cost makes it difficult for would-be Romanian distributors to obtain recent foreign movies and television series. Cultural exchanges appear to be thriving. Traces of political control still manifest themselves, however, through the denial of international travel funds to grantees not favored by institutional leaders. Recently, the increased cost of travel on TAROM, the state airline, has also been a contributing factor to the inability of some Romanians to participate in international exchanges. New fields for research and lecturing--including law, journalism, and economics-- which were previously off-limits are now all included in an expanded Fulbright Program. Plans are also moving ahead to open an academic exchange office in Bucharest before the end of 1992 under a Fulbright agreement. The USIA [US Information Agency] library in Bucharest, renamed the "American Cultural Center" in 1992, continues to be the most- visited Western library in Romania, attracting a daily average of 1,500 visitors in 1991. Access to it is unimpeded. The center receives requests for assistance from all over Romania and in a wide variety of disciplines.
General Assessment. A year marked by the most sweeping political changes since the 1917 revolution, and culminating in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, presented new challenges for the Helsinki process. All of the republics of the former Soviet Union have joined the CSCE as independent states and agreed to abide by CSCE principles. The degree of compliance by the former Soviet republics with CSCE principles varied widely during the reporting period. On the one hand, the governments of the Baltic states (whose incorporation into the former USSR was not recognized by the United States), the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan made considerable efforts to bring their policies and practices into line with their CSCE commitments. On the other hand, some of the Caucasus and Central Asian states have made little progress in this regard. Tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh have occasioned continuing CSCE rapporteur missions to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Beyond its own borders, the USSR--succeeded by Russia--actively supported the peaceful settlement of disputes arising between states, acting as co-sponsor for the Middle East peace process. The vast Russian Federation took a major step toward regularizing internal political relations by concluding a Federation Treaty March 31, which was signed by 29 of its 31 autonomous territories. Fulfilling its obligations under international law, the USSR--and subsequently Russia--supported the international community on full Iraqi and Libyan compliance with UN resolutions. As in other areas of policy, the reporting period was a watershed for human rights practices in the territory of the former Soviet Union. One high point before the failed August coup was the passage in May 1991 of an emigration bill which brought the Soviet Union's legislation on freedom of movement more in line with its CSCE obligations. The low point was in August, when the hardline communist coup leaders made an attempt to turn back the clock of reform. After the coup attempt and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR, the former Soviet republics pledged to uphold international human rights obligations. However, practice and implementation of that commitment varied from state to state. In its attempt to effect radical economic change, the Yeltsin government in Russia took numerous steps toward dismantling the centralized Soviet economy, including measures aimed at price decontrol, privatization, de-monopolization, and the creation of a more favorable climate for foreign investment. Nevertheless, the economy failed to stabilize and, in fact, steadily declined after the attempted coup. Cultural exchanges in the arts fell off dramatically in the period under review as the rapid deterioration of the Soviet economy necessitated huge cuts in financial subsidies to cultural institutions and organizations. Regarding the Soviet government's treatment of persons belonging to national minorities, the reporting period witnessed a mixed picture. One of the worst violations occurred in July 1991 when Lithuanian customs agents were shot and killed in execution fashion at a Lithuanian border post. The Lithuanian government investigation concluded that Riga-based USSR Ministry of Interior "Black Beret" troops were responsible for the murders. In the Caucasus, in April 1991, Soviet army and Interior Ministry troops reportedly cooperated with Azerbaijan Interior Ministry troops in the forced deportation of Armenian villagers from their homes in and near the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, according to numerous official and non-governmental human rights bodies. Security. In 1991, the Soviet Union, as did most other CSCE states, provided data on its military forces and equipment as required by the 1990 Vienna Document. (It should be noted that two such information exchanges took place during the first year of VD 90 implementation. Normally, and after the first year, exchanges are to take place once a year, each December 15.) In the case of the Soviet Union, its first submission contained a number of errors and omitted required data. By the second exchange, in December 1991, the Soviet Union had adopted a much broader interpretation of the CSBM data exchange requirements and had corrected its previous errors. Unable to provide more current data, the Soviet Union submitted its 1990 national military budget. During the reporting period, the Soviet Union conducted five CSBM evaluation visits. These evaluations included visits to US and UK units located in Germany on July 30, 1991, and September 21, 1991, respectively. The other visits covered units in Spain on October 15, 1991, in France on November 27, 1991, and in Greece on December 3, 1991. The Soviet Union received its full quota of evaluation visits from CSCE states during 1991, involving visits from the United States, Germany, France, Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union forecast four notifiable activities for 1991 but during the year cancelled or down-scaled these activities below notification levels. The Soviet Union forecast no notifiable activities for 1992. In 1991, the Soviet Union conducted a CSBM inspection in Italy on May 15, in France on September 18, and in Turkey on October 2. Similarly, and during the reporting period, the Soviet Union received CSBM inspections from Canada on September 5, France on September 6, and the United States on October 28. As was the Soviet Union, Russia now is connected to the CSCE communication network. The United States and the Soviet Union maintained a policy-level dialogue on counter-terrorism issues and signed a memorandum of understanding July 30, 1991, promoting bilateral cooperation on civil aviation security. Russia has supported international efforts to curb Libyan sponsorship of terrorism, joining the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and others in voting in favor of UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 in April 1992, which imposed limited sanctions on Libya for its failure to extradite two suspects connected with the downing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988. Economics. Among its other historic effects, the collapse of the August coup attempt cleared the way for dismantling the Soviet centralized planned economy. By October 1991, Russian President Yeltsin and his new Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar had begun developing the program to do this and to create a market-based economy in Russia. Gaydar's top goal was to stabilize the ruble and thus lay the basis for convertibility by freeing prices, limiting the 1992 government budget deficit to 2% of GNP, and imposing tight monetary and credit policies. To this end, as of January 2, 1992, most retail prices were freed and most consumer subsidies (other than for energy, housing, and a very few basic items) abolished. Expenditures on defense procurement were cut by 85%. The tax system was redesigned, and a 28% value added tax introduced. Restrictions on private trade for most goods were lifted, limited forms of private land ownership were legalized, and private farming was encouraged but still confronts serious constraints. Work on privatization, de-monopolization, and foreign investment legislation intensified, although in none of these areas had new laws or procedures taken real effect as of March 1992. The government's privatization program calls for transfer to private hands this year of more than half of all small shops, restaurants, service establishments, as well as all firms in the light and food industries. The need to create a legal framework to govern the process combined with political opposition, however, is preventing the government from coming close to these goals. Decontrol of energy prices, originally scheduled to occur in April 1992, was postponed until at least June 1992. As the old command structures continued to collapse, economic decline across the former USSR accelerated after the attempted coup. The total 1991 fall in GNP was estimated at over 15%. Output in the crucial oil sector continued to decline steeply, with exports halved during 1991. Foreign exchange reserves all but vanished, obliging the USSR in November 1991 to ask G-7 nations for deferment of payments of principal due on official foreign debt obligations in November 1991. In the first quarter of 1992, industrial production reportedly dropped a further 13%, and exports to countries outside the former Soviet Union fell by 20%. However, Western financial assistance supported a 15% recovery in imports. The first quarter budget deficit was sharply reduced to about 8% of GDP compared to 20% in 1991. Although political pressure forced some relaxation of budgetary discipline in the run-up to the April congress, monetary policy remains tight--the interest rate rose to 50% in April 1992. While the Yeltsin government's commitment to radical economic reform is undisputed, the scale of its task is stupendous. The extraordinary extent of inherited state ownership and monopoly structures in industry, trade, and services complicates price decontrol and retards supply-side response. As economic decision making has shifted from the center of the old Soviet Union to the new successor states, export controls and monetary conflicts intensified in the wake of Russian price liberalization. In order to gain control of monetary policy in the ruble zone, in early 1992, Russia created a new clearing system and payments mechanism with other former republics by introducing a system of correspondent accounts. However, many important details such as credit limits have not yet been set. Tendencies toward autarky and the breakdown of intraregional economic links have deepened. Military-industrial production remains the backbone of the former USSR's industrial economy, but, in the absence of the huge amounts of capital needed, efforts at defense conversion as a whole have been uncoordinated and ineffective. Due to housing shortages, labor mobility is very low, making reallocation of labor resources from outmoded industries to potential growth areas problematic. Private ownership of most productive assets, land, and housing remains insignificant, with most land still considered state property under the jurisdiction of local councils of people's deputies. Given such conditions, the general climate for foreign investment cannot yet be termed favorable, though long-term potential could be great, given the huge domestic demand and the potentially rich resources in the energy and other raw materials sector. Heavy export customs duties introduced in early 1992 had a chilling effect on existing joint ventures. Regional authorities within the Russian Federation now assert ownership over key industrial assets and natural resources, making it still difficult to know whose signature makes a contract valid. Division of hard currency profits from exploitation of mineral resources among the central government, local governments, and enterprises themselves has been a particular focus of contention. Until the ruble becomes convertible--now slated for July 1, 1992--investors are reluctant to invest because ruble profits cannot be repatriated. The Russian parliament is considering draft laws to strengthen intellectual property rights, following passage in 1991 of basic USSR laws on copyright, patents, and trademarks. Progress on the economic front was varied among the newly independent states of the former USSR and the Baltic states. Russia has set the pace among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in passing the laws and regulations required to establish a market economy. In January 1992, Russia implemented a comprehensive price liberalization program that freed 80% of wholesale and 90% of retail prices. Budget reforms have begun, but there are still serious imbalances between revenues and expenditures. Russia's reforms are currently guided by a "shadow" IMF program which the IMF does not consider adequate to qualify as a standby program upon membership. The dialogue between the IMF and Russia is continuing. Ukraine has provided the IMF with a new economic reform program which proposes anti-inflationary position including attempts to reduce the budget deficit, control wage growth, and limit credit expansion. Ukraine intends to implement a policy of strict emission and credit control by increasing reserve requirements and limiting the supply of credit by commercial banks. Much of the plan depends on the introduction of a national currency, the hyrvna, but no schedule for introduction is included. The program explains that Ukraine's diversion in pricing policy was based primarily on the fear of uncontrolled monopoly pricing, and efforts are outlined to de-monopolize the economy. Foreign economic relations will retain the ruble as its common currency for international transactions until it moves to introduce the hryvna and to enable the free movement of goods, money, and people within the Commonwealth of Independent States. With respect to Western investors in Ukraine, legislation on foreign investment guarantees compensation upon expropriation and national treatment, although the lack of hard currency still is a problem in the transfers area. This program will likely be the basis for ongoing discussions with the IMF regarding a possible standby program upon membership. Except for Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, which have adopted a more aggressive stance toward economic reform, the other republics have not developed a consensus or programs for free market reform. In some, former communists continue in power and have failed to demonstrate a commitment to reform. Nonetheless, most have made some attempt at reforms in the price, privatization, and budget areas, and all have applied for IMF membership. The current Russian constitution prohibits the buying and selling of land and a proposed constitutional amendment that would have permitted the unrestricted sale of land was defeated at the April 1992 Congress of People's Deputies, despite Yeltsin's strong support. Yeltsin has proposed holding a separate referendum on the land issue. The access of US business people not resident in Moscow to business people of the former USSR improved. Most US business visitors receive support from a sponsor in one of the former republics when applying for their visas. Some business people have received multiple-entry visas. Traveling without a visa is strongly discouraged. Although one could sometimes purchase a visa at Moscow's Sheremetevo airport for a dollar fee, this was by no means always the case. Applications for accreditation of US representative offices in the former Soviet republics did not encounter serious problems. The Russian government accredits companies previously accredited in the USSR by a simple process involving approximately 30 minutes worth of paperwork. Accreditation from scratch seems to be progressing at the same pace experienced under the administration of the USSR. Russia no longer registers joint ventures as a separate category of legal entity. The Russian government encourages joint ventures formed under the USSR to re-register in one of the accepted categories of legal entities under Russian legislation. These categories are joint stock company (public and private) and partnership with limited liability, all of which may include foreign participation up to and including 100% foreign ownership. Many US companies prefer wholly owned subsidiaries. Some 60 US companies opened offices in Moscow between October 1, 1991 and February 1, 1992, and new companies continue to arrive weekly. Commercial information continued to be very uneven. English language publications such as Kommersant, Moscow Times, and We, as well as an ever-increasing number of specialized newsletters, are read frequently by US businessmen. A few of the US law and auditing firms operating in Moscow occasionally circulate a brief on certain aspects of doing business in the former USSR. Databank services are available at fairly high subscription prices. Two or three "yellow pages"-type telephone directories have appeared, also at rather high prices. Access to business contacts and commercial officials is without official hindrance. International communications with the US have improved since the introduction by several companies of direct satellite telephone and fax services. Additional international class hotels have also opened up or been refurbished in Moscow, alleviating a major problem in the city. Accommodations elsewhere in the former republics remain largely inadequate. Demand in Moscow for office and residential space remains high, pushing rentals of properties with Western standards to $800- $1,200 per square meter per year. Several US real estate, construction, and relocation companies are actively engaged in trying to meet the demand. Western-standard housing is currently in a state of crisis. The few projects in progress fall far short of what is needed. In the meantime, because the foreign community is in a period of rapid growth, more and more foreigners are having to move into apartments in Russian buildings. Although strictly speaking this is illegal, the Russian government is looking the other way. Russian apartments do not meet Western standards, especially in the area of security. Western cars, for example, are often vandalized and/or broken into when parked in unguarded parking areas. It will probably be three to five years before the availability of housing up to Western standards satisfies the demand. The transportation system of the former USSR has continued to deteriorate. Air travel is increasingly subject to disruption by fuel shortages and strikes. Aeroflot tickets for foreign travelers, excluding accredited journalists and diplomats, is for hard currency only. Train travel is for rubles with a small reservation fee in hard currency. City streets are plagued with potholes, and the quality of major highways tends to be mixed--some are excellent, others quite bad. Trade promotion and other marketing activities, including media advertising and the staging of trade fairs and conferences, are on the increase. Moscow has become an "in" place for international meetings of all kinds. Over 800 trading "stock" exchanges have sprung up and are actively advertising throughout the newly independent states. Many of the new additions to the local business scene are trade-related service firms. A majority of them gather at monthly networking luncheons of the newly formed American Business Club in Moscow to exchange operating know-how and cultivate clients in what is still very much an insider's market in constant and rapid flux. The upheaval that shook Soviet society in 1991 had a profound impact on the science and technology sector. Political liberalization expanded permissible science and technology activity to new levels, reinforcing the desire of Soviet scientists to integrate themselves fully into the world science and technology community. Meanwhile, the faltering economy and government budget cuts caused severe hardship to many research establishments. Many Russians fear that without money their scientific establishment will suffer irreparable damage. Scientists in the former USSR cannot purchase up-to-date equipment and are even unable to maintain subscriptions to scientific journals. Institutes and scientific enterprises often look to foreign investment or other forms of cooperation to relieve the severe economic deprivation born of tight budgets and galloping inflation. On the positive side, many scientific institutes, once constrained by stifling rules designed to protect "state secrets" and subjected to meddlesome interference by bureaucrats, now enjoy unprecedented freedom to interact with one another and with their foreign partners. Scientists are now permitted to establish independent businesses providing services (e.g., consulting, software development) or engaged in manufacturing. Insufficient legal protection of intellectual property, however, discourages many scientists from releasing their entrepreneurial energies. During the period under review, no incidents were reported of deliberate, official denial to Soviet scientists of the freedom to establish and maintain direct contacts with professional colleagues in other countries. In fact, the proliferation of electronic mail networks with international capabilities has lowered communication barriers between Soviet scholars and the outside world to an unprecedented degree. Nonetheless, travel abroad remains beyond the means of all but a small fraction of the Soviet scientific community. The cost of travel exploded when prices were liberalized in January 1992. One institute director lamented--but without exaggeration--that a ticket to New York now costs the equivalent of 10 years' salary. Although obtaining permission to travel is no longer dependent on political loyalty, it is still not granted automatically or expeditiously due to bureaucratic inertia and corruption. In international environmental cooperation, Russia and the other states of the former USSR continued the process of integration begun by President Gorbachev in the late 1980s. By virtue of their UN membership, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus all participate in multilateral forums addressing protection of the ozone layer, global climate change, and other issues. Lately we have noted the absence of these countries at several key environmental negotiations; this will probably change as internal conditions stabilize. As the other former republics have joined the UN, they can be expected to participate to the extent that their resources permit. In Russia, several competing agencies have been consolidated into the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources. The ministry's leadership faces the formidable task of reconciling competing pressures for stringent environmental regulation with the need for rapid development of Russia's valuable natural resources. For the Central Asian countries, which are heavily dependent on agriculture, the ecology-versus-development tradeoffs are particularly vexing. In Tajikistan, for example, the government's decision to maintain cotton planting at roughly the same level as in previous years has done little to alleviate the environmental damage associated with pesticide use for cotton. In Uzbekistan, the draining of the Aral Sea in order to water the cotton fields has left the region suffering a serious ecological disaster. In Kazakhstan, the environmental disaster at the Aral Sea mobilized public concern. While the government expressed interest, it took no concrete steps to solve this complex inter-republic problem. The expanded access to information has led to a recognition of the possibilities and need for bilateral and multilateral environmental cooperation with the former Soviet Union. Information made available recently has illustrated as never before the magnitude of the environmental damage caused by industrial and military activities in the former Soviet Union, and the United States and other countries are investigating a variety of appropriate responses. To illustrate, the Nordic countries are working with Russia to arrange the financing and installation of badly needed emissions control at nonferrous metal smelters in the Kola Peninsula, now the largest single point source of sulfur dioxide emissions in the world. In addition, a number of countries may work jointly with Russia to investigate and quantify the environment damage in the Arctic region, and Arctic Ocean itself, caused by industrial and military activities throughout the former Soviet Union. Freedom of political activity and expanded access to information have improved the possibilities for non-governmental environmental groups. Many veterans of the green movement have assumed prominent positions in newly independent governments. The leader of Ukraine's "Green World" movement is now that country's environment minister, and Russian President Yeltsin's personal adviser on environment and health was a staunch opponent of Soviet environmental policy for several years. In most of the USSR's successor states, non-governmental organizations, including those engaged in environmental activities, enjoyed a large degree of freedom to organize rallies, publish their views, and run for political office. The leadership in Kazakhstan co- opted the program of the quasi-opposition anti-nuclear movement by banning nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk. International environmental NGOs also increased their activities, particularly in Russia and Ukraine. In some regions, particularly in Central Asia, local authorities remained intolerant of groups critical of the ruling party. Although permitted to exist, NGOs in these areas often suffered from harassment by local bureaucrats. Human Dimension. The August coup attempt was the nadir of a negative trend begun in late 1990 with regard to human rights in the former Soviet Union that appeared to reverse some of the progress made under Mikhail Gorbachev after 1985. The hardline tendency signaled by the three-day replacement of reformist ministers in the Soviet government by stalwart communists had manifested itself earlier in the January crackdown in the Baltic states, the use of Soviet army troops in the forced deportation of Armenian villagers in Azerbaijan in the spring and summer, and the killing of Lithuanian customs officials in July. Nevertheless, as in the previous reporting period, the downward trend was mixed with occasional bright spots, the brightest being the passage in May of a new law on exit from and entry into the USSR. After the failed coup attempt, with the reformers in control of the USSR government, progress on the human rights front renewed. In addition, the republics began to fashion their own human rights policies. Republic performance varied widely, however, with Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltics leading the way--though not without their problems. For example, concerns were raised about the discriminatory nature of new citizenship laws with respect to non-Balts in the Baltic states . In Central Asia-- especially Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan--progress in the human rights field was intermittent at best. In the Caucasus, Georgia, and Azerbaijan regressed into open civil war, and relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan deteriorated over the bloody conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Internally, the Armenian government demonstrated strong commitment to CSCE principles and obligations. Ethnic tensions surfaced as well in the Transdniester region of Moldova. At the end of the reporting period, none of the former republics had fully established a state based on the rule of law, and the degree of effort toward this end varied widely. Procuracies and judicial organs, with some exceptions, had not been reformed. Nor had the legal system developed to the extent that legal counsel is available to every citizen with a human rights complaint. Legislative attempts to address human rights concerns were sporadic, as legislators grappled with fundamental economic and political issues. With the exception of the three-day coup attempt in August 1992, the policy of glasnost, or "openness," continued mostly unabated. Yeltsin did close down Soviet-run Tass and Pravda after the coup on August 22 but allowed them to resume operations on September 11. Before and after the failed coup attempt, demonstrations large and small were regular occurrences. The broadcast media, especially radio, experienced more liberty to broadcast freely, and newspapers, journals, magazines, and books multiplied profusely. Only three weeks after the failed coup attempt, the Soviet government successfully hosted the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension in Moscow. Although the USSR president left office and the USSR itself dissolved in December, the policy of glasnost continued, albeit unevenly, in the newly independent states. Even some of the more reformist governments acted contrary to the tenets of freedom of expression and assembly. For example, the Russian government issued a warning to one popular newspaper for coverage of a sensitive issue in a manner not to its liking. And in February 1992, the city of Moscow banned an opposition demonstration; when the demonstration proceeded anyway, there were minor clashes between demonstrators and riot police. In the reporting period, domestic and cross-border political disputes erupted into violence within the disintegrating Soviet Union involving, variously, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, Lithuania, and Russia's Chechen-Ingush region. In Azerbaijan and Lithuania, Soviet army and/or Interior Ministry forces were involved in the violence. In Azerbaijan, in the spring and summer of 1991, Soviet troops assisted Azeri forces in the forced relocation of Armenian villagers from their homes, according to numerous reports from Azeri, Armenian, and Russian sources, both official and non- governmental. USSR Interior Ministry forces based in Riga, Latvia, are believed responsible for the coldblooded killings of six Lithuanian customs post officials in July 1991. There was continued, although uneven, progress toward freedom of religion in the former Soviet Union. Authorities in all of the former republics displayed a more tolerant attitude toward religion, although local pockets of bureaucratic resistance or even hostility could still be found. The visibility of religion in the Soviet Union and its successor states increased dramatically during the reporting period. On January 7, 1992, Orthodox Christmas was observed as an official national holiday in Russia for the first time since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. Orthodox religious services were held on several occasions during the reporting period in churches inside the Kremlin, also a post-revolution first. Religious services were frequently shown on Soviet and Russian television, particularly during the Christmas and Easter holiday seasons. In addition, Protestant religious programming from the United States was broadcast on Sunday mornings on Soviet television. Religious groups, official and unofficial, continued to be allowed to hold seminars, conferences, and revival meetings, frequently in public facilities rented for that purpose. It was common to see public proselytizing in major cities, including street stands with placards calling passersby to rejoin and revitalize the Russian Orthodox Church, individuals speaking about their Protestant faith, and appeals from adherents of groups as diverse as the Hari Krishna and the Baha'i faith. The press contained extensive coverage of religious issues and statements of religious leaders. Visits by foreign religious figures were numerous and unimpeded, including by representatives of evangelical Protestant ministries in the West. Missionaries from almost every world religion were present on the territory of the former USSR, and a number of these groups maintained permanent representatives in Moscow and other major cities. State academic institutions, including Moscow State University, not only renamed their "Departments of Religion and Atheism" to focus instead on religious ethics and liberty but also hosted western lecturers on religious ethics and the role of religion in public policy. Obstacles to complete freedom of religion still existed in the former Soviet Union, largely on the local level. There, remnants of the old state party bureaucracy sometimes hindered religious believers, though even this problem was sporadic and decreasing in severity. A primary cause of these problems was the fact that the 1990 freedom of religion law required registration of religious groups of 10 or more adults by local authorities. Some groups viewed the registration requirement itself as contradicting the tenets of their beliefs and, therefore, refused to register. In other cases, although failure to register did not result in harassment, local authorities used obstructionist tactics against groups' attempts to register, thereby denying groups the status of a "juridical person" and the benefits of the new law, including access to the media and the right to establish their own schools, own property, and engage in social work. A second problem, increasing in importance, was the official favoritism shown to the Russian Orthodox Church and the growing influence of that church in governmental regulations affecting religion, especially at the local level. This resulted in fewer restrictions on the Orthodox Church than on other religious groups and an increase in difficulties for non-Russian Orthodox groups, principally Protestant groups, the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Orthodox Free Church (ROFC). The ROFC is the Russian branch of the US-based Free Orthodox Church, which earlier had broken from the traditional Russian Orthodox Church claiming it was controlled by the communist regime. The ROFC reported that it found it sometimes difficult at the local level to register new congregations or to acquire facilities. A number of Orthodox congregations which switched to the ROFC subsequently lost their church buildings and then were unable to find new property. In Russia, some western Protestant groups experienced difficulties in obtaining access to prime time television or to some of the better known sites for large religious events. In Ukraine, disagreements over property continued between the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) church and the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In Georgia, where the Georgian Orthodox Church commands the traditional loyalty of Georgian believers, the Baptist Church has reported instances of intimidation and threats by some Orthodox priests, the lack of permission to secure necessary facilities, and the denial of press permits to allow the Baptist community to publish its own Bibles and religious literature. Jews continued to enjoy freedom in the practice and teaching of their religion during the reporting period. Hebrew schools were opened and additional synagogues were returned to the Jewish community. An Islamic revival spread in Central Asia as Muslims continued to receive more freedom to practice and learn about Islam. This revival included the opening of many new mosques in the region. A Buddhist revival in the eastern Soviet Union also continued, with the opening of houses of worship, monasteries, and schools. Throughout Central Asia, new working mosques continued to open. In Tajikistan alone, the number of mosques increased tenfold over the last few years, and Islamic authorities completed a new building for the theological seminary in Dushanbe. The importation of religious materials into the Soviet Union was largely unrestricted. Bibles, children's Bible stories, and other religious literature were common items on sale at street kiosks in major cities. Korans were imported into the Central Asian states in large numbers. The number of clergy and places of worship in all parts of the former Soviet Union is still inadequate for the population, but new churches, synagogues, and mosques were reopened in many places, and seminaries and other institutions of clerical education expanded their enrollment. As a rule, young men who objected to military service because of their faith continued to be subject to prison terms. In July 1991, Moldova joined Georgia as the only two non-Baltic states to pass a law providing for alternative forms of service for conscientious objectors. In some other former republics, legislation providing alternatives to military service for conscientious objectors was under discussion. In general, freedom to criticize the government thrived around the USSR, and, since the Soviet Union's demise, in the former republics. The exceptions to this rule were Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, where restrictions on the opposition's ability to propagate its views continued. Before President Gamsakhurdia's removal, the Georgian government prohibited certain journalists from reporting from its territory. In addition, a 1990 USSR law making it a crime to "insult the honor and dignity of the Soviet president" continued to be enforced selectively, resulting in cases of persons being persecuted for expressing their political beliefs. For example, in June 1991, 28-year-old lawyer and radical opposition Democratic Union activist Viktor Leontev was arrested and sentenced to two years of correctional labor in the Kazakhstan city of Petropavlovsk for selling a calendar which portrayed a caricature of Gorbachev wearing a hammer and sickle crown. Radical opposition Democratic Union leaders Valeriy Novodvorskiy and Vladimir Danilov were arrested in May (and held in a Moscow prison until their release in the aftermath of the August coup attempt) under Article 70 of the Russian Federation criminal code (public calls for the violent overthrow or change of the Soviet government or social order). They had signed a letter analyzing the actions of the Soviet government in the Caucasus and in Lithuania which said "that in these conditions armed counteraction, out of place in other times, becomes a legal means of struggle by the people against the authorities whose hands are stained with blood." On January 31, 1992, during a demonstration in Ulan Ude in Russia's far east, Democratic Union member Andrey Kapitonov was detained for displaying a placard calling the local Supreme Soviet Chairman Potapov "a fascist criminal." He was released the next day but-- obviously because of the ill will toward him held by the local authorities--was re-arrested on February 6 for having refused to serve in the army two years earlier. On March 16, Kapitonov was sentenced in absentia to 10 months correctional labor with a fine of 10% of his income. The law on public organizations which took effect in Russia in January 1992 defined such organizations to include political parties and mass movements, including national fronts, trade unions, veterans organizations, and youth groups, among others. According to a Russian government order of December 1991, public organizations must register their by-laws with the Ministry of Justice within 30 days of formation. The order does not specify grounds for refusing to register an organization. Generally, much greater freedom of association was exercised in the Soviet Union and in some of the new states during the reporting period. New political, cultural, and social organizations of all stripes sprang to life. Human rights groups functioned freely for the most part. In Georgia, however, groups in opposition to President Zviad Gamsakhurdia experienced harassment and arrest of their members. Since Gamsakhurdia's removal, his supporters have asserted that they face restrictions imposed by the government. In Turkmenistan, opposition groups also were subject to harassment by government agents. Around the Soviet Union and its successor states, demonstrations, authorized and unauthorized, proliferated. Even in former republics with poorer human rights records, opposition forces were able to demonstrate in the streets. Unfortunately, in the cases of Georgia and Uzbekistan, use of force against demonstrators resulted in fatalities among the participants. In Moscow in February 1992, anti-government demonstrators attempted to rally without permission and were met with force, resulting in minor injuries. The long-awaited emigration law, formally known as the law "on procedures for the departure from and entry into the USSR of citizens of the USSR," was passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on May 20, 1991. Under the terms of the implementing resolution passed the same day, however, the law will not come fully into force until January 1, 1993. The law, designed to bring the USSR closer to compliance with CSCE commitments, has as its chief feature the removal of the requirement for an exit visa. Under the law, travel abroad will be allowed on the basis of a foreign travel passport, valid for five years, and the appropriate entry visa. A vestigial "exit visa" will remain in the form of an endorsement in the passport for temporary travel or permanent residence abroad, but, according to the new law, the onerous requirement for an invitation from abroad will be abolished. In the interim, the measure did away with the requirement that emigrants have an invitation from a first-degree relative abroad and allowed them to submit with their exit visa application an invitation from any relative residing permanently abroad or, in lieu of that, "permission to enter the receiving country." This loosening of the regulations contributed to a sharp increase in refugee departures to the US over the second half of the reporting period. The resolution also revoked the 1967 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree under which emigrants to Israel were stripped of their Soviet citizenship. Since July 1, 1991, all emigrants to Israel have been able to depart using Soviet passports. Senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation have informed the US government that the Russian government will abide by the terms of the new emigration law and will implement it as scheduled on January 1, 1993. Officials of other former republics have given their governments' assurances that freedom of emigration and travel abroad will be respected. A Russian presidential commission established to review refusenik cases began work in November 1991 and has positively resolved dozens of cases of persons who had been denied exit permission on the basis of alleged previous access to state secrets. Nevertheless, the US still maintains a list of persons denied permission to emigrate from the former Soviet Union, some of whom have not had access to state secrets for more than five years. Denials of exit permission still occur because of alleged access to state secrets, inability to secure written permission from relatives, and often what appear to be purely arbitrary reasons. In addition, freedom of movement is hampered by a frequently corrupt bureaucracy that may take many months to process an application for exit permission. Also, the bureaucratic requirements imposed by local offices of the exit permit and passport issuing agency vary from region to region. In September 1991, the Russian government released the last prisoners whose names appeared on US lists as persons known to be held for political acts. In early 1992, President Yeltsin released 10 additional prisoners serving sentences for crimes against the Soviet state (such as espionage or hijacking aircraft for allegedly political reasons). Throughout the reporting period, no prisoners were known to be serving sentences in the former Soviet Union solely under the so-called political and religious articles of the criminal code (Articles 70, 142, 227, and the now-abolished 190-1). Although all known political prisoners have been released, a large number of "economic prisoners" are suspected of being held for such crimes as "speculation," an activity which should no longer be illegal in the emerging market economies of the former Soviet Union. One such prisoner is Mark Glizer of Moscow, held in a Moscow jail under investigation since July 10, 1991, for "repairing an automobile for resale," i.e., speculation. Around the former Soviet Union, persons may still be detained arbitrarily and without arrest warrants. Once charged (within 72 hours of detention), under the former republic criminal codes, the accused may be held in pretrial detention for up to 18 months with no requirement for judicial approval. In criminal cases, detainees may be restricted to their place of residence pending trial. During the reporting period, there were no reports of persons being punished by being sent into internal exile. Credible reports of torture by government agents emanated from Georgia and Azerbaijan during the armed conflicts there. In addition, detention and incarceration practices throughout the former Soviet Union remained generally harsh. Many prisoners suffered from mental and physical abuse and mistreatment during interrogation, trial, and confinement, according to a variety of reliable sources. Prisoners were frequently placed in punishment cells for violation of prison rules, sometimes for several months. Conditions in these cells are excessively severe, allowing exposure to extreme cold. As a result of such treatment in a Russian prison in Tobolsk, one prisoner froze to death. No administrative process exists to ensure that prisoners are not arbitrarily sent to such cells. No instances of long-term psychiatric hospitalization of sane persons were reported in the reporting period. Current laws in the former republics, however, still provide for compulsory psychiatric hospitalization without adequate legal protection of persons arrested and diagnosed as mentally ill. There were reports of the use of psychiatric examination and the threat of compulsory commitment as ways of intimidating persons considered irritants to local officials. Democratic forces won elections in the spring of 1991 in many parts of the USSR; at the local and republic level, the first freely elected governments in Soviet history took the reins of government. The elections were carried out by secret ballot and, in most cases, featured multiple candidates fielded by groups from across the political spectrum. This was the first practical demonstration of citizens' right and ability to change their governments peacefully. However, parliaments in most of the former republics contained high numbers of former communist delegates not selected in free and open campaigns. In some republics, citizens faced problems in exercising the right to free and fair elections. Azerbaijan, for example, held presidential elections on September 8, 1991, in which one candidate ran unopposed. Some opposition parties declined to field candidates; another contender withdrew his candidacy a week before the election, saying he did not wish to lend credibility to the voting. Opposition leaders claimed that the state of emergency, which was lifted only a few weeks before the election, prevented them from adequately presenting their views to the public. Azerbaijan utilized the traditional Communist Party system of voting, in which voters enter a private polling booth only to cast a negative ballot. Although suffrage in Azerbaijan was ostensibly universal, the former republic's traditional Islamic culture discouraged women from voting. Similar reports were received regarding the October 1991 elections in Tajikistan, with claims from opposition figures of fraud, intimidation of voters in rural areas, and unfair pre-electoral campaign practices carried out by officials and supporters of the Tajik President. In Georgia, President Gamsa-khurdia won a landslide victory in May 1991. His opponents, however, charged that Gamsakhurdia, who was previously appointed president by Georgia's parliament, purposely scheduled the election quickly in order to ensure that his competition would not have time to mount an effective campaign. In addition, Gamsakhurdia's domination of the Georgian media denied opposition candidates a forum to propagate their views. In several former republics, political pluralism remained embryonic. In Moldova, there was only one candidate in the December 1991 presidential elections. In Kyrgyzstan, secret ballot, universal suffrage elections were held on October 12, 1991, but opposition parties were still forming and put up no candidates. In the other four central Asian states, the right to free and fair elections remained even less developed. In Uzbekistan, authorities have refused to allow the Birlik opposition movement to register officially as a political party. In Turkmenistan, the Communist Party has appropriated the name of the Democratic Party and continues to harass opposition parties and activists. Following demonstrations in 1991, the Tajik government allowed opposition parties to register, but its refusal to schedule new parliamentary elections led to major protests in 1992 and, eventually, creation of a new coalition government. Kazakh authorities have also harassed opposition leaders and hindered opposition political parties from organizing. In all four republics, the leaders of the new governments were all former members of the old Communist Party leadership. Despite the strengthening of democratic forces during 1991, until the failed August coup attempt, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) continued to be the single most powerful political force in Soviet society. The CPSU continued to exercise its greatest influence in the all-union government, still dominated by CPSU members; in the all-union legislature, where its numbers continued to rank in the majority; and in all-union defense and security organs, where party cells prevailed, albeit unofficially. Nevertheless, the CPSU and its network of influence began to show signs of factionalization. Successive CPSU plenary meetings revealed that the party's ability to speak with one voice had dissipated. In the wake of the failed August coup, the Russian government suspended CPSU activities and the party's once all-powerful influence significantly waned. During the coup attempt in August 1991, the Soviet military split between support for the coup plotters and support for Russia's President Yeltsin, who represented elected governmental authority. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, much of the former Soviet military has come under the control of the Council of the Presidents of the Commonwealth of Independent States created in December. The CIS, however, remains vaguely defined. Some former republics- -including Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan and others--are establishing their own independent militaries, under their own control. Russia is currently undergoing the same process. As the newly independent states vie to divide up the resources of the former Soviet Union, control over some elements of the former Soviet military has been contested. With the creation of the Russian Ministry of Defense in March 1992, President Yeltsin became Russia's civilian Defense Minister, with one civilian deputy and one military deputy. Strategic nuclear forces remain under CIS control. Four of the five Central Asian states remain the only new states not committed to forming their own armed forces. Reform of the judicial, legal, and law enforcement systems throughout the former Soviet Union is proceeding slowly. A combination of inertia, local resistance, and preoccupation with political and economic crises generally has put the issues of judicial and legal reform on the back burner. While the worst abuses of the judicial system under the former CPSU may be a thing of the past, considerable time and effort will be required before such basic rights as equal protection before the law, effective redress against administrative decisions, impartial judges, a fair and public hearing before an impartial and independent legal tribunal, and other legal rights provided for in CSCE documents are guaranteed in principle throughout the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Since the failed August coup attempt, political organizations, including parties, have continued to proliferate in most of the former republics. The singular outright ban in Russia and in most other former Soviet states was imposed on the former CPSU, which was dissolved for its involvement in the attempted coup. Individuals from the political far left to far right have formed groups which actively and openly compete for public support. In certain Central Asian states, particularly Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, some opposition political groupings have been harassed and obstacles put in the way of their full participation in the public life of the country. Access to the media for all political groupings continued for the most part unrestricted, the major exceptions being in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, where some opposition newspapers have not been registered by the state. Newspapers representing the spectrum of political viewpoints are published around the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the governments of the various members of the Commonwealth of Independent States continued to exercise some control over major media outlets. In Georgia under President Gamsakhurdia, opposition political groups were hindered in their attempts to publish their views. In some cases, their papers were closed down and their members subjected to threats and harassment by government agents. In Russia, there were claims by some newspapers, including the long-time Communist Party organ Pravda, that Russian government policies unfairly favored uncritical press organs. For the most part, however, the problems of these Russian newspapers were primarily related to their inability to compete in the open media market. The Russian law on mass media, adopted on December 27, 1991, guarantees freedom of the press, but, until an independent judicial branch and a system of rule of law develops in the country, observance and enforcement of the law often still depends on interpretation by government officials. Even before the demise of the USSR, power in the Soviet Union was devolving to the republics. In the end, each state was free to implement language, cultural, religious and political rights according to its own wishes. However, each was also freed from central government restraint in dealing with its own ethnic minorities, and the attitude toward and degree of discrimination against minorities varied from country to country. There are over 60 million former Soviet citizens who live outside their nationality's administrative region or who belong to a nationality that has no such region. For many of these people, devolution of power has unleashed long-suppressed ethnic hostilities. The worst cases were in Georgia and Azerbaijan where ethnic conflicts escalated into civil conflict and open warfare that resulted in hundreds of deaths. In Moldova and parts of Russia as well, ethnic conflict resulted in fatalities. In the Baltic states, non-Balts, especially Russians, protested that new citizenship laws discriminated against them. Throughout the reporting period, Jews enjoyed increasing cultural and religious freedom, but at the same time continued to be subjected to public expressions of anti-Semitism. On May Day 1991, thousands marched to accuse Soviet leaders of favoring Jews at the expense of Russians. Demonstrators carried anti-Semitic placards and called Russian President Yeltsin "a stooge for Jewish international capital." Anti-Semitic posters were posted, and the openly anti-Semitic organization Pamyat published a paper containing excerpts from the long-discredited Protocols of the Elders of Zion and began radio broadcasts in September. These expressions of anti-Semitic attitudes added to Jews' fear that in times of economic hardship and political unrest they could be singled out for arbitrary retribution by an increasingly desperate populace. Jewish groups' long-standing complaint that the Soviet government did not speak out strongly enough against anti-Semitism was assuaged to some extent by the forceful statement of President Gorbachev condemning anti-Semitism read at the commemorative ceremony at Babi Yar in Ukraine in October 1991. At the same ceremony, Ukrainian President Kravchuk apologized for injustices perpetrated by Ukrainians against Jews in the past. Additionally, around the former Soviet Union opportunities increased for Jews to take advantage of cultural and religious freedom, including the study of Hebrew and Yiddish and publication of Jewish periodicals. Synagogues returned to Jewish hands; yeshivas and other Jewish schools were opened. In Moldova, the government expressed intentions to add a chair of Jewish Studies at Chisinau University. Women had the same legal rights as men, including the right to participate in all areas of the social, political, and economic life of the Soviet Union and the successor republics. An extensive system of day care service and maternity leave benefits allowed women, after bearing children, to retain employment. Women were represented at many levels of the general economy and were generally paid the same as men for equal work. Despite their nominal legal equality, however, women faced many forms of discrimination and tended to be concentrated in low-paying or low prestige jobs such as doctors and textile workers. In addition, women bore the brunt of many of the hardships of daily life. Virtually all women had no economic choice but to work both inside and outside the home. One report estimated that more than three million Soviet women work in conditions harmful to their health, and five hundred thousand women work at hard, physical labor. In the Central Asian states, where women's rights in reality most often diverged from those they nominally enjoy, traditional national practices often prevented women from taking their equal place alongside men in economic and political life. In Azerbaijan, for example, Western observers of the December referendum on independence witnessed many instances of men voting on behalf of their wives. Emigration from the former USSR contributed to further expansion of human contacts over the reporting period. During 1991, over 222,000 ethnic Germans emigrated from the Soviet Union to Germany, up from the previous year's total of approximately 150,000. Emigration to Israel in 1991, however, dropped to approximately 145,000, a decrease of nearly 40,000 from the previous year, due mainly to increased uncertainty about the future that awaited the newly arrived in Israel. Approximately 46,500 refugees traveled to the United States under the US resettlement program from April 1, 1991 through March 31, 1992. About 80% of these were Jews. Armenians, Evangelical Christians, Ukrainian Catholics, and Ukrainian Orthodox accounted for most of the rest. In addition, the US embassy in Moscow issued over 1,450 immigrant visas during the reporting period, more than twice the number issued the previous year. Most of the recipients of these visas had first- degree relatives who are US citizens or resident aliens. Strict party control over the mass media, long a mainstay of Soviet politics, was exercised less assiduously under Gorbachev's rule, and collapsed completely in the wake of the failed coup attempt in August 1991. As a result, there is now more freedom of information in Russia than at any time since the Bolshevik revolution. Even so, some governments on the territory of the former Soviet Union continue to attempt to restrict the media's independence and exercise some control over the news. Under former President Gamsakhurdia, the Georgian government, in response to articles it perceived as anti-Georgian, prohibited journalists representing several national publications from reporting from its territory. In Azerbaijan, opposition newspapers were required to submit their publications to government censors. By the end of 1991, an opposition newspaper editor reported that the government had ceased censorship of his organization's publications but continued to threaten other nominally independent newspapers with restricted access to printing supplies and services in the event of unfavorable reporting. In Moldova and the Caucasus, journalists for several publications were the targets of death threats and arson attacks by nationalist groups. Prior to the failed coup attempt in August 1991, most major newspapers and magazines were controlled and subsidized by government or Communist Party organizations. Now most are independent and some are privately owned. However, as they shift to a free market system during a period of economic hardship, many publications are suffering from acute financial problems. Control over paper and ink resources remain in the hands of a few monopolies, distribution costs are rapidly increasing, and many papers are underpriced and overextended in subscriptions. Consequently, many publications, including well-known newspapers such as Pravda and Komsomol'Skaya Pravda, are on the brink of financial collapse, and many publishers are hoping for renewed government subsidies and intervention to help save the publishing industry. Newspapers rely on a number of sources for their news: their own correspondents, domestic news agencies (such as Interfax and Itar- Tass), and, increasingly, foreign news agencies and other media. The Russian government sponsors several semi-official media organizations, including Itar-Tass (formerly known as Tass); Ria- Novosti, a government information service; and the newspapers Rossiya, Rossiskiye Vesti, and Rossiskaya Gazeta. Although the government has permitted the publication of information unfavorable to the government in these publications, it also uses them as official news organs and has shown favoritism over other publications in allocating office space and extending the 1991 subscription campaign for them alone. The number of journalists based in Moscow for US and other Western news organizations continued to grow during the reporting period. Correspondents were increasingly free to travel throughout the former Soviet Union, and access to previously closed areas was regularly granted. There are approximately 150 accredited American journalists in Moscow, representing more than 40 news organizations. Among the new American bureaus this past year were The Washington Times and USA Today. During the past year, the Foreign Correspondents' Association (FCA) actively represented the collective interests of the foreign news media in dealings with various government offices and ministries. A growing number of government officials began to request payment for interviews and information. The FCA monitored this phenomenon and aired their grievances concerning access to press conferences with Foreign Ministry officials and Deputy Prime Minister Poltoranin. Western correspondents were sometimes barred from news conferences in Moscow and not informed of others. The movement toward a free and independent broadcast media in the Soviet Union and its successor states took on added momentum in 1991, after the failed August coup attempt. Following the all-union state television and radio company Gosteleradio's earlier voluntary divestiture to republic jurisdiction of TV and radio studios on their territories, Gosteleradio was forced to cede the second national television and radio channels to the all-Russian state television and radio company (RTR). Under new leadership from liberal reformer Yegor Yakovlev, Gosteleradio began broadcasting in autumn 1991 the popular talk-show "Vzglyad," which had been banned previously. Television correspondents who had lost their jobs under the previous administration returned to anchor news broadcasts that began to make regular use of foreign broadcast material and commentary from CNN [Cable News Network], VOA, Radio Liberty, and the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation]. On the other hand, the Russian government's decision to suspend six publications accused of supporting the coup and to force other publications to re-register provoked concerns that it was also resorting to censorship and to government control of the media. Most of the suspended publications were later allowed to resume publication, but those media traditionally reliant on funding from the Communist Party suffered a grave financial crisis since the party's assets were frozen. The 1991 law on mass media, which legalized commercial broadcasting, together with the breakup of the Soviet Union have opened up fertile ground in Russia for private ex-Soviet and foreign broadcast companies to establish alternative broadcast and cable systems. Hundreds of large and small television, radio, and cable companies reflecting a wide range of political perspectives have received licenses to broadcast. The biggest obstacle to an even larger independent broadcast media is financial rather than political. The situation in other parts of the former Soviet Union is less clear. Some former republics are still drafting their press laws, and in Georgia there have been violations of press freedoms. Television and radio stations of the other new independent states continue to be financed by the state, and independence from official government policy varies. Many of the state broadcast media are subject to pressure, if not censorship, from their respective governments, and self-censorship is still prevalent. Public and private television and radio broadcasting in the former USSR is generally open to foreign broadcasting without restriction. British, French, German, Finnish, and US television programs are regularly re-broadcast by Ostankino TV and Russian television, as well as by many other state broadcast companies in the former USSR. Israeli, Turkish, and Iranian satellite TV programming is re- broadcast by the Central Asian radio and television organizations. As satellite receivers become more numerous, foreign media organizations such as Worldnet, CNN, Super Channel, TV5, and others, with and without agreement with the owner company, are also rebroadcast by private broadcasters and cable networks. The BBC, VOA, and Radio Liberty are heard everywhere without jamming and are increasingly being rebroadcast on medium wave. In addition, American and other TV and radio joint ventures are broadcasting international programming in Moscow, Kiev, and St. Petersburg. Foreign films enter the former Soviet Union freely. American, French, German, Italian, Japanese, and other foreign films are shown in movie theaters and on television networks in large and small cities everywhere. However, none of the former republics has signed the Bern convention, and the absence of strong intellectual property rights laws has resulted in the consistent pirating of movie and VCR [videocassette recorder] films throughout the former USSR. In May 1991, the American Motion Picture Export Association called for the withdrawal of all American entries from the annual Moscow international film festival to protest continued copyright violations. Although the Russian film industry supported the action, there has been no apparent decrease in the illegal showing of foreign films in the former USSR, especially by video salons and cable television companies. Under the USIA book translation program, 44 American books are being translated into Russian and Ukrainian by Russian and Ukrainian publishing houses. These include economics and business textbooks, as well as books about American law, history, society, and the environment. In late 1990, the US embassy opened an American reading room at the Library of Foreign Literature in Moscow. This is the first collection of American books open to the general public at a Russian library. The collection includes reference books, periodicals, and special collections of books on English teaching and American business and economics. Exchanges in the performing and fine arts fell off dramatically in 1991-1992. The rapidly deteriorating economic situation in the country, as well as the political restructuring of the government, greatly reduced subsidies to Russian cultural institutions. In the past few years, many artists used performances or exhibitions abroad to supplement their income and provide much-needed hard currency. However, the rapid increase in the cost of international travel has, in most cases, removed that option. With their own financial survival in question, few cultural organizations can afford to host their foreign counterparts. Some Russian cultural organizations, particularly those in energy-rich Siberia and the far east, are thriving under these changing conditions. With the income from natural resources remaining in these areas rather than being turned over to the national government, local governments and industries have begun to invest in their local cultural institutions. Private sponsorship of the arts has dramatically increased in the past year, ensuring the survival of those institutions with the foresight to attract a sponsor. The only risk to those organizations is that these companies usually see sponsorship as an investment-- not as a charitable contribution--and expect a return on their investment. The Russian government now allows complete freedom to individuals and groups to negotiate directly with their foreign counterparts. The obstacles they face are now economic, rather than political. Dramatic growth in educational exchange programs on all levels continued during the reporting period, highlighted by the inauguration of the Benjamin Franklin scholarship program. This provides 160 grants for citizens of the former USSR to study business, law, economics, or public administration in the United States. Grants will be awarded on the basis of the first free and open competition to be administered in the history of the former Soviet Union. Four American exchange organizations--ACTR, IREX, the SOROS foundation, and IIE--received grants from USIA to administer this program. The number of students traveling under the three existing major programs--Samantha Smith Memorial Exchange for Undergraduates, the Presidential Initiative for Undergraduate Exchange, and the High School Partnership Program--decreased during the reporting period due to the Persian Gulf war, the coup attempt in Moscow, and the recession in the United States. Nevertheless, interest in exchanges remained extremely high, particularly on the side of the former USSR, posing a significant opportunity and challenge for the US government and private organizations involved in exchange programs. The collapse of the Soviet government and the coincidental expiration of the bilateral general agreement governing educational exchange threw bilateral programs into a state of confusion. A new structure is emerging on the Russian side, as well as in the other former republics, but the new governments do not have resources to spend on exchange programs. The US side has stepped in to keep the exchanges going until a new system can be negotiated. For example, the Fulbright program is being run on a reciprocal basis: Only if a university is willing to host a scholar can it then nominate one of its professors. The amount of archival and research materials which are now available to US scholars has increased dramatically. The number of instances, however, in which scholars have been asked to pay for access to materials in hard currency or offered the opportunity to buy documents outright is increasing to a disturbing level.
Overview. Although hampered by the continued stationing of ex- Soviet military forces on their territory, the Baltic states have made great progress toward establishing pluralistic democratic governments and ensuring respect for human rights. Much remains to be done, but the Baltic peoples today enjoy considerably greater personal freedoms since gaining their independence last August. On September 10, 1991, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were admitted to the CSCE after agreeing to implement all CSCE principles and standards. Security. All three Baltic states emphatically maintain that the withdrawal of ex-Soviet troops, now troops of the Commonwealth of Independent States under Russian control, remains their highest priority and that resolution of this issue will exponentially speed economic and political reform. Although some symbolic troop withdrawals in March 1992 occurred in Lithuania and Latvia, talks with Russia for all three countries are proceeding at a very slow pace. Lack of communication between recalcitrant Northwest Military District officers and the Russian Defense and Foreign Ministries is one of the factors delaying withdrawals. But by early 1992, it became increasingly clear that the Russian government headed by Boris Yeltsin was dragging its feet in dealing with the Balts, in part to minimize tension with the Russian military, in part to try to preserve air and naval bases considered vital for the strategic protection of Russia's western flank. The three states possess legitimate concerns regarding environmental damage caused by the occupying forces and concerning potential nuclear reactor leaks and waste (e.g., the Russian land- based submarine reactors at Paldiski, Estonia). Troop movements into and within the Baltic states are not coordinated with host governments, and some units have threatened to remain until the Russian government assures them of adequate relocation facilities in Russia. The first scheduled withdrawal of troops from Lithuania occurred March 3, 1992, after a week's delay, and from Latvia on March 19, 1992. Those withdrawals were token; in each case about one hundred troops were involved. Estimated troop presence is about 46,000 soldiers in Lithuania; 60,000 in Latvia; and 22,000 in Estonia. The governments of Germany, Sweden, and Denmark have offered to finance construction of military housing for withdrawn troops, primarily in the Pskov region of Russia. The Baltic states are amenable to such multilateral assistance and have agreed to help in construction. Russia appears agreeable to this if it is pursued tactfully. Furthermore, the Baltic states are willing to "swap" housing between the departing troops and native Baltic families forcibly removed to other regions of the former Soviet Union after World War II, and Lithuania has offered military officers the right to remain in Lithuania, and title to their housing, if they resign their military commissions and pursue civilian employment. The three Baltic states began to assemble military establishments virtually from scratch. By March 1992, the rough outlines of their new structures began to emerge. These structures remained to be fleshed out, however. In the conduct of CSCE CSBMs activities, the Baltic states forecast no notifiable exercises for 1991 or 1992. Economics. The largest impediment to economic reform remains the de facto integration of the Baltic economies into those of other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, especially Russia. All three resource-poor countries rely heavily upon imports of Russian raw materials, especially oil. The Baltic states have signed trade agreements with Russia, but the Russian government says that distribution and production problems often cause delays or cancellation of deliveries. In addition, the demand for payment in hard currency generally reduces the Baltic states' capacity to obtain goods. All three countries continue for the most part to deliver contracted goods not dependent upon imported Russian raw materials. Meanwhile, fuel dependency compels the Baltics to turn to the West for energy assistance or to the spot market for costly hard currency purchases. All three Baltic states are eager to introduce their own currencies but have heeded IMF and World Bank advice to delay implementation until at least summer 1992. Fear of being "bought out" by Western firms has inhibited large-scale privatization, particularly of key industries. Estonia boasts more joint ventures (1,500) than Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus combined. Banking and infrastructure reform rank as high priorities in each state. As a matter of sovereignty, the Baltics officially refuse to accept responsibility for Soviet debt unless given access to Soviet assets. Ukraine has consented to assume Latvian debt in return for Latvian assets, to which the Latvian government has tentatively agreed. The Russian Central Bank has threatened the national banks of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania over the fate of their share of hard currency deposits if they fail to pay their share of the Soviet debt. The Estonian government has contemplated use of its US gold reserves as payment. The Baltic states have participated only minimally in recent sessions of multilateral environmental organizations, especially the UN Economic Commission for Europe, but they have expressed their commitment to accede to relevant conventions of the ECE. They have been somewhat more active in pursuing regional interests with nearby countries, most notably the protection of the Baltic Sea. Human Dimension. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are continuing to wrestle with the question of who is a citizen and who is not. The status of the non-indigenous residents of the three (38% of the population of Estonia, 49% of the population of Latvia, and 20% of Lithuania) remains the largest point of contention. All seek to enact citizenship legislation consistent with West European practice. Estonia and Lithuania have, in particular, moved far along in the process of passing citizenship laws. Below is a brief summary of the status of citizenship laws, constitutional reform, and elections in each of the three Baltic countries. Estonia On February 26, 1992, the Estonian parliament renewed the liberal 1938 citizenship law. Accordingly, those who were citizens in 1940 are citizens now; those who moved to Estonia subsequently can become citizens after one year, following a two-year residence retroactive to March 30, 1990, and a minimal knowledge of the Estonian language. The government has funded Estonian language training for next year. The 1938 law also provides equal civil protection to resident aliens. Dual citizenship will be allowed for those Estonians and their families who fled. On February 28, 1992, the Estonian constitutional assembly completed its work on the draft constitution as well as a draft implementation act and forwarded them in March to the Supreme Council and the Estonian Congress for review. If approved, a public referendum would decide its implementation. The document establishes a parliamentary form of government that would elect a president who, in turn, would submit a prime ministerial nominee for parliamentary approval. However, as a one-time phenomenon, the first president would be popularly elected. If the election law can be passed early enough for voter registration preparations, the Estonian government would hold elections before June 15. That appears in doubt due to continued discussions over small points of disagreement in the draft constitution. Questions concerning KGB/Communist Party leader eligibility for government positions may yet be subject to a direct vote. Latvia In October 1991, the Latvian parliament passed a resolution which outlined principles for a future law on citizenship. This action does not constitute a citizenship law in any usual sense. The resolution also proposes five criteria for naturalization: a conversational knowledge of Latvian, renunciation of former citizenship, residence of at least 16 years in Latvia, a knowledge of the Latvian constitution, and a loyalty oath. (It is estimated that 80% of resident Russians in Latvia would pass the residency requirement.) Dual citizenship would be allowed for those who were forced to leave Latvia during the Soviet occupation and adopted another citizenship. In addition, the resolution calls for excluding criminals, drug addicts, former members of the Soviet army, and certain other groups from becoming citizens. The current draft can best be regarded as a straw man, and the situation is likely to remain fluid for several months at least. The Latvian President, for example, counter-proposed a 10-year residency requirement (similar to that of Switzerland). In addition, on March 19, 1992, the Latvian parliament passed a law explicitly guaranteeing "equal rights to all nationalities and ethnic groups" and "guarantees to all permanent residents in the Republic regardless of their nationality, equal rights to work and wages." The law also prohibits "any activity directed toward nationality discrimination or the promotion of national superiority or hatred." However, as of May 5, 1992, the right to secondary education in the Russian language will expire. Significant portions of the 1922 constitution were temporarily re- implemented last autumn until a new constitution can be drafted. The Latvian government intends to abolish the old Supreme Council in favor of a parliamentary system. However, the adoption of a constitution and holding of parliamentary elections cannot be undertaken until the citizenship issue is resolved. Lithuania Lithuania adopted a full citizenship law on December 13, 1991. The law extends citizenship to persons who were born in Lithuania; who were citizens prior to 1940 and to their descendants; and to those who became citizens prior to December 11, 1991. All applications for retention, restoration, and naturalization must go through a citizenship committee appointed by the Supreme Council, which appears to have wide discretion in case handling. Qualification for naturalization requires a 10-year residency, a permanent job or source of income, knowledge of the constitution (not yet ratified), renunciation of current citizenship, and proficiency in Lithuanian; allegedly, no one has been rejected for failure in the latter. Many Poles and some Russians are unhappy that the latest law does not clearly specify equal civil treatment for them if they choose not to become citizens. Vilnius, however, has stated that these minorities would enjoy equal rights. On the other hand, district by- elections in the ethnically Polish-dominated and conservative districts of Salcininkai and Vilnius were planned for the month of March but again have been indefinitely postponed. The Lithuanian leadership deposed ethnic Polish deputies and local leadership of these districts after the failure of the August 1991 coup in Moscow on the grounds that they had collaborated with the anti-Gorbachev plotters. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Poland and Lithuania was signed on January 16, 1992, and the sizeable ethnic Polish minority in Lithuania now has access to use of Polish- language textbooks (approved by the Lithuanian government), newspapers, amateur theater, and other ethnically based organizations. As in Latvia, Lithuania intends to adopt a parliamentary system, and anticipates a May 23, 1992, referendum on the establishment of the office of president. A draft constitution is being debated presently; upon ratification by the parliament, the document will be put to a public referendum no later than three months thereafter. National elections are not anticipated until late summer or autumn 1992.
Former Republics/New States Overview
All republics and new states of the former Soviet Union have agreed to accept in entirety all commitments and responsibilities contained in CSCE documents, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and have declared their determination to act in accordance with these CSCE provisions. After signing letters of accession to this effect, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan were granted full CSCE membership by the Council of Ministers in Prague on January 30, 1992. Georgia was admitted to full membership by the Council of Ministers in Helsinki on March 24, 1992. (For model letter of accession signed by all new members, see Appendix 2.) Armenia The Armenian government has stated its strong commitment to CSCE principles, including democratic practices, human rights, and commitment to international obligations. Internally, it has a strong record of human dimension compliance. No republic with the exception of Russia has gone further than Armenia in moving toward a market based economy. Nearly 80% of republic lands are privatized and rules on resale are the most liberal of any republic. President Ter-Petrosyan's government is now making efforts to sell many small and medium-sized republic enterprises to private citizens. Armenia has been slower in implementing price reform, however. The Armenian government continues to support the Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh fighting with Azerbaijani government forces for control of the province. Armenia, in retaliation for the Azerbaijani blockade, has refused to allow rail and truck shipments into the Azerbaijani autonomous oblast of Nakhichevan, separated from Azerbaijan by Armenian territory, unless goods in the shipments are also provided to Armenia. Armenian government officials have stated Armenia may intervene directly in Nagorno-Karabakh if the level of violence increases or third parties intervene in the fighting. Armenia has expressed its willingness to accept outside intervention, including CSCE mediation, and has agreed to participate in the planned CSCE Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh to be held in Minsk. Azerbaijan Azerbaijan's implementation of CSCE commitments was marred by the ongoing violence over Nagorno-Karabakh, the primarily Armenian populated enclave of Azerbaijan. The progress of political and economic reform has been adversely affected by the conflict. Despite ongoing international efforts to mediate a solution, violence and bloodshed continue to escalate. Azerbaijan has stated its willingness to adhere to all CSCE principles and agreements. Azerbaijan views the principles of territorial integrity and rejection of forcible border changes as main components of its position in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. For the moment, Azerbaijan still relies upon independent groups of fighters to carry on the conflict with Armenians living in Nagorno- Karabakh. Some of these groups are nominally affiliated with the government--the militia and interior ministry troops--and some are associated with independent political movements such as the National Front. The government is now trying to bring the groups under its direct control as part of the plan to create a national army. Azerbaijan has declared its intention to seek a political, not military, solution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the population is unenthusiastic about military mobilization. Azerbaijan's progress toward a free market economy is most visible in the proliferation of small free enterprises. Larger economic entities are still under government control. Azerbaijan is seeking foreign trade and investment and has passed laws to guarantee against government expropriation. Work on cleaning up Caspian Sea petroleum and petrochemical pollution has not yet begun. Several environmental organizations exist, and Azerbaijan has expressed the most interest in scientific and technological exchange in this field. The Supreme Soviet is dominated by "renamed" communists. However, the Azerbaijan popular front, a loose coalition of 17 non- communist parties, wields political power far beyond its numbers in the Supreme Soviet. The front forced the resignation of President Mutalibov in early March 1992, following the alleged massacre of Azeri civilians at Khojali February 27, 1992. Presidential elections are scheduled for June 7, 1992, with a wide spectrum of political forces expected to take part. Ethnic tensions throughout Azerbaijan have mounted following the alleged massacre at Khojali and government claims of participation by renegade forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenians resident in Baku--mostly members of about 15,000 mixed families--have reported instances of harassment and their fear for the future, and are seeking to emigrate. They have spoken of kidnappings, threats, break-ins, and of children being beaten up at school. President Mamedov has denied there is any policy of refusing passports or departure from Azerbaijan to members of ethnic minorities. Although Armenia maintains that the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh is essentially an internal Azerbaijan affair, it continues to insist on the right of the region's inhabitants to self-determination. Fighting in the region intensified beginning in November 1991 after several Azerbaijan officials and Russian and Kazakh observers died in a helicopter crash. Azerbaijan accused Armenian militants of shooting down the aircraft. Following the incident, Azerbaijan imposed a state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh and abolished the area's autonomous status. Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian population voted for independence in a December 1991 referendum. Azerbaijan officials claimed in early 1992 that Armenian forces had succeeded in taking almost all of the Azeri settlements in the region. Azerbaijan's president, Ayaz Mutalibov, resigned in early March 1992 after reports of a massacre of Azeri civilians in Khojali outraged Azerbaijan citizens who perceived that the country was losing the conflict. In response to the worsening situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, the CSCE moved to bring the parties to the conflict together to begin a process of good faith negotiation that would find a lasting solution to the conflict. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier, in his capacity as CSCE Council Chairman-in-Office, visited the region in late March 1992 with a delegation that included US Ambassador John Maresca to explore the possibilities for arranging a negotiated settlement. This visit, made possible through provision of US government military aircraft, led to agreement to hold a CSCE sponsored conference on Nagorno-Karabakh in Minsk. Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Mario Raffaelli has been named chairman of the conference and has traveled to the region to lay its foundation, the date of which has not yet been set. Separate two- person advance teams, one of which includes a US State Department officer, have been sent to Yerevan and Baku to help plan for the conference and any future dispatch of CSCE ceasefire observers to the region. The UN Secretary-General dispatched a fact-finding mission headed by former [US] secretary of state Cyrus Vance to the region in March 1992. The mission concluded that the CSCE mediation effort was the best hope for bringing the parties together and recommended the UN offer its support to facilitate the CSCE effort. Belarus Like other new states of the former USSR, Belarus faces a daunting task in changing from a militarized to a civilian society. According to the government, one out of every forty-three people in Belarus is currently employed in the military. The major constraint to such change is financial, thus explaining Belarus' keen interest in obtaining part of the $400 million authorized by the US Congress for assisting members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to dismantle nuclear and chemical weapons. The government of Belarus would also like to use some of the money to integrate military forces engaged in controlling weaponry into the Belarus civilian workforce. Belarus has repeatedly advocated resolution of disputes through peaceful means, viz., their proposal to host the CSCE peace conference on Nagorno-Karabakh and their agreement to form a joint commission with Lithuania to resolve outstanding border disputes. In the economic sphere, the Belarusians are only now beginning to take meaningful steps toward the establishment of a free market economy. Privatization is taking place on the basis of a Council of Minister's decree; a privatization law has yet to be passed by the legislature. Thus far, only 36 enterprises have been privatized. A foreign investment law was passed by the Belarus Supreme Soviet last November, but ruble inconvertibility and other restrictions continue to hamper investment opportunities. It is unclear, for example, whether foreigners will be able to own land in the state. Revisions to the investment law are currently still under discussion. The chief environmental issue in Belarus is related to Chernobyl. Seventy percent of the nuclear fallout from the Chernobyl disaster fell on Belarusian territory. Scientific exchanges, on Chernobyl and other issues as well, occur regularly between Belarus and other nations. Belarus is a long-standing member of the UN Economic Commission for Europe and has been a fairly active participant in ECE environmental sessions. Belarus has also signed key ECE conventions on long-range transboundary air pollution and environmental impact assessment in a transboundary context, but its capacity to implement these agreements is constrained by many of the same factors neighboring countries face. A referendum on whether or not to hold early parliamentary elections is under consideration. Opposition parties, under the leadership of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF), have gathered well over the 350,000 signatures required by law to force such a referendum. The signatures are currently being counted by the legislature's election commission. The timing of a referendum and the possibility of subsequent elections remain unclear. Although there are Russian, Polish, and other minorities in Belarus, their rights appear to be respected. The rights of persons belonging to minority groups have not been a political issue in Belarus. Belarusian political life, despite the presence of a significant contingent of the old guard in many areas of government, takes place in an open and free environment. The nascent free press, for example, continues to foster lively debate over the referendum issue. The Belarusians have given their assurances on freedom of emigration (and have received a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik agreement.) Local ovir officials have said that Belarus intends to continue implementation of the for-mer Soviet law on emigration (originally scheduled to come into force in 1993) and that Belarus is committed to conform to international norms on emigration. Two out of only three known refusenik cases have recently been resolved favorably. Georgia Georgian President Zviad Gamsa-khurdia fled Tbilisi in January 1992, after intense fighting between government forces and opposition troops destroyed much of the downtown area of the capital. Gamsakhurdia's opposition claimed that the President stifled basic freedoms, including freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, and provoked conflicts between ethnic groups. Gamsakhurdia also had large numbers of political opponents arrested. On February 21, 1992, Georgia applied for membership in CSCE. On March 10, 1992, a provisional government was formed, and former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadzi was appointed chairman of the governing council. After assurances were received that Georgia intended to work toward full implementation of all CSCE commitments, the state was admitted as a full member to CSCE on March 24, 1992. The provisional government declared its intention to hold new parliamentary elections by fall 1992. Despite the new governments stated desire to negotiate with ethnic minorities in Georgia, separatist violence continued in South Ossetia. At the same time, many Georgian leaders expressed fears that the escalating conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh might lead to tension between Armenians and Azeris residing in Georgia, thereby further destabilizing the country. Meanwhile, toward the end of the reporting period, sporadic armed conflict between government forces and supporters of deposed president Gamsakhurdia continued. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan's unique demographic composition strongly influenced its politics--Kazakhs are only a plurality in their own country. The country's President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is a strong advocate of ethnic tolerance. The leadership advocated a "go slow" approach in implementing legal requirements for use of the Kazakh language, and ethnic relations were relatively harmonious. Following the demise of the Communist Party, Nazarbayev declined to join any political party. Although in principle other parties are free to form, in practice there are complex legal obstacles. The Peoples' Congress of Kazakhstan formally registered as a party and inherited some of the Communist Party's members--although the membership is largely Kazakh. Numerous movements formed with a wide range of agendas, from environmental to openly nationalist. Nazarbayev enjoyed broadly based popular support and won a sweeping victory in the December 1, 1991, single-candidate presidential election. However, his appearance as a supporter of democracy was tarnished by the refusal of government authorities to permit an opponent, Kazakh nationalist Hasan Kojakhmetov, to register. Kyrgyzstan The Kyrgyzstan government, under President Askar Akayev, has frequently affirmed its determination to meet international standards on human rights questions. The government adopted a law on the protection of national minorities with an emphasis on human rights of individuals. President Akayev reformed the structure of the government to give more authority to presidential appointees, both in the central government and in the six regional governments. This was characterized by the government as a necessary step to avert chaos and crisis, but it was also a political move to gain more power for the advocates of reform. The current parliament was elected in 1990 and is dominated by members of the old Communist Party establishment. Political parties are free to organize and there are many political groups. However, there are few true political parties. Much remains to be done before they operate as effective channels for citizen oversight and participation. Moldova Moldova's move toward independence from the Soviet Union was accelerated by the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, which Moldova firmly opposed. In the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt, the Moldovan parliament declared the country independent, outlawed the Communist Party, and nationalized the party's assets. Seeking a stronger mandate, President Mircea Snegur called for direct elections in December 1991. His overwhelming victory, despite a boycott by opposition groups, appeared to show support for Snegur's policy of maintaining Moldovan independence rather than moving toward immediate unification with Romania. In response to Moldovan independence, some leaders of Moldova's substantial Slavic (mostly Russian and Ukrainian) and small Gagauz minorities declared the formation of their own independent republics in areas where their ethnic groups are concentrated. While the Gagauz republic has shown increasing willingness to negotiate with the government about its concerns, the situation in the Trans- Dniester area has deteriorated, resulting in several dozen deaths and over 100 wounded during the clashes between Moldovan and Trans- Dniester forces. The Moldovan government has repeatedly denied charges by Trans- Dniester "President" Smirnov and his supporters that the goal of the Moldovan government is unification with Romania and subsequent repression of the Russian-speaking minority. Instead, the government of Moldova continues to advocate a peaceful solution to the continuing unrest in the Trans-Dniester region and maintains that it intends to guarantee respect for the rights of all minorities. Denying that the conflict is ethnic, Moldovan leaders insist the conflict reflects the tension between anti-reform elements, some of whom oppose the dissolution of the USSR, and pro-reform forces. The government has refrained from extreme military measures in responding to the Trans-Dniester situation despite growing pressure from the Moldovan public, which is concerned about increasing numbers of casualties and refugees. However, on March 28, 1992, President Snegur declared a state of emergency, which gave the government additional powers to search for illegal weapons and disarm para-military groups. At the same time, the government reiterated its desire to resolve the dispute through negotiations. On April 7, 1992, foreign ministers of Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine agreed that the four powers involved would seek to implement a truce and seek a settlement of the conflict. Although Moldovan nationalism appeared to have moderated prior to the most recent outbreak of fighting in March 1992, it clearly remains a potent political force in Moldova. The government has issued decrees stating its support for cultural freedom and development for ethnic minorities and is actively supporting the formation of cultural organizations and schools which will offer instruction in minority languages. Continuing unrest in the Trans- Dniester region may, however, have a negative effect on progress toward greater tolerance for national minorities. In the language law passed in August 1989, the government had established a deadline of 1994, after which time all official correspondence would be conducted in Romanian, the official language. In response to complaints from the Russophone population, the government has extended that deadline to the year 2000 for areas with large Russophone minorities. After that time, people who are unable to speak Romanian cannot hold leadership positions in government or state-owned economic enterprises. Russia In the Russian Federation, inter-ethnic relations and the issue of independence and/or sovereignty of various sub-units of the federation were items of intense controversy during the reporting period. Several autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs based on national minorities declared sovereignty, held referenda on independence or otherwise asserted their right to determine their own polities. In Tatarstan, for example, old-line communist political leaders retained their hold on power and called a referendum on "sovereignty." In some cases, inter-ethnic conflicts burst into violence. For example, in the northern Caucasus, territorial disputes flared among various ethnic groups. In April, after the USSR Supreme Soviet annulled deportation decrees from the 1940s, Ingush and Ossetian groups clashed in North Ossetia when the Ingush attempted to repossess their former homes in the area. The Ingush also clashed repeatedly with Cossacks in the region. In November 1991, Chechen activists forced the dissolution of the Chechen-Ingushetia government and declared themselves independent from "Russian chauvinism." The Russian government tried unsuccessfully to pressure them to reverse their action. At the end of the reporting period, the Russian government had not recognized the Chechen declaration of independence as valid. The Ingush, for their part, voted to remain inside Russia, provided that lands expropriated in the 1940s were returned. This exacerbated the Ingush territorial dispute with North Ossetia, and Ingush guerrilla attacks were met by creation of an Ossetian national guard. Tajikistan By law, political parties can be formed and operate as long as they do not work to overthrow the government by force. Three major political parties now function. Nonetheless, the government of Tajikistan has been strongly criticized by democratic opposition forces for its performance in the area of democratic freedoms and human rights. Some opposition leaders claimed that the November presidential elections, which saw the Communist Party of Tajikistan garner 58% of the vote, entailed significant vote fraud. The government has sought to circumscribe political activity. Some opposition members assert that incarceration and/or harassment of individuals involved in the February 1990 demonstrations continued during the reporting period. In demonstrations by the opposition on March 22, 1992, in Dushanbe and on March 23, 1992, in Kurgan Tyube, some participants were arrested, then released some hours later. The government announced March 25, 1992, that these demonstrations had been illegal because the leaders had not obtained the necessary permit 10 days in advance. This announcement, in turn, prompted a demonstration by approximately 400 people at the Ministry of Interior on the following day, March 26. Opposition members claim that the government often hinders their free-dom to demonstrate by delaying or manipulating the permit-issuing process. Before the entry of opposition leaders into the Nabiyev government, democratic leaders and the small but vocal opposition press complained that the government censors the press and denies the opposition or independent press access to state-controlled radio and television. The chairman of the democratic opposition party currently faces trial for alleged slander of the President. New amendments to the criminal code, signed by the President March 25, 1992, make "insulting public officials" a criminal act, punishable by fines or imprisonment for up to two years. The new amendments specifically single out reporters and newspaper editors for the stiffest penalties--up to three years in prison or fines of up to 50,000 rubles. In early March 1992, the government arrested Makhsud Ikramov, Mayor of Dushanbe, for alleged corruption. He was replaced on March 23. Democratic forces have said that the government action in replacing Ikramov, an opponent of President Nabiyev, was inappropriate inasmuch as the charges against him have yet to be proven. As of March 27, 1992, his case had not been brought before the procurator. At the end of the reporting period, the government was also under challenge from regional political forces. A hunger strike was underway among prominent figures in the mountains of Badakhshanskaya Oblast demanding autonomy for the area. A Tajikistan Supreme Soviet decree passed March 25, 1992, declaring the oblast autonomous appears not to have gone far enough to meet the demands of at least some of the Pamir protesters, such as participants in the March 26, 1992, demonstration. The government permits travel into the Pamir area only with special visas. Even residents of the region, such as students studying in Dushanbe, must obtain these permits to travel to the area. Jewish community leaders generally take the position that social and institutional incidents of anti-Semitism have worsened recently, although official tolerance of public celebration of significant religious holidays appears to be growing. Jewish emigration from the region continued at a steady pace. Turkmenistan The Turkmenistan government has publicly stated its commitment to UN and CSCE principles and its understanding that fulfilling such obligations is necessary for successful relations with other nations, especially Western countries. Nevertheless, senior government officials have publicly stated that they will not "play at" democracy and subject themselves to what they see as political chaos elsewhere. Ukraine Ukraine's August 24, 1992, declaration of independence was ratified by an overwhelming 90.3% of voters in the December 1, 1991, referendum. The independence referendum and presidential elections were held on the same day, and both were open and fair according to Helsinki Commission and other international observers. All oblasts in Ukraine voted in favor of independence, including regions with large Russian minority populations. The 1991 Ukrainian law on minority rights confers equal legal status on all citizens regardless of ethnic affiliation. While a 1989 law establishes Ukrainian as the state language, individual citizens retain the right to use other languages in private and business transactions. No minority group in Ukraine has complained of lack of respect for its linguistic and cultural rights. The April 1991 law on freedom of religion and conscience extends to all religious groups and organizations the right to establish congregations in Ukraine, subject to registration with local authorities. Parishes of the long- banned Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox churches are being registered throughout Ukraine. City councils in Kiev and Lviv restored synagogues in their respective Jewish communities, and a yeshiva was opened in Kiev in 1990. The office of the Ukrainian prosecutor general has insisted on pursing a retrial of Dmitri Berman on murder charges, claiming they have new evidence. The US government has asked the Ukrainian government to speed resolution of this case. Uzbekistan The collapse of the centralized Soviet structure and Uzbekistan's consequent independence opened the way to some progress in the area of democratic pluralism, albeit limited. Uzbekistan's leadership allowed one opposition party to register in 1991, the "ERK" party, headed by writer and Supreme Soviet Deputy Mohammed Solikh. At the same time, the largest opposition group in the country, Birlik, a popular-front organization, was allowed to register as a movement but not as a party. The Islamic Renaissance Party, which represents the politics of Islamic fundamentalism, is banned. As a result, the December 29, 1991, presidential elections featured only two candidates. Demonstrations are banned by a government decree issued in early 1990. Several attempts by the Birlik movement to hold demonstrations have been forcibly prevented by militia. In the wake of the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, August 26 and September 8 attempts to hold mass demonstrations were forcibly blocked. This decree is still in effect.
General Assessment. The former Yugoslavia's breakup over the course of the reporting period was characterized by grave, extensive, and continuing violations of CSCE commitments and norms. In the security area, there were massive infringements of Helsinki principles, CSBMs, the Geneva conventions, and other international norms of humanitarian behavior. Several parties attempted to violate the UN-imposed arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. In the economy, progress toward a free market economy begun in 1989-1990 under the Markovic federal government's program was negated by the war and the destruction of a unified Yugoslav economy. Throughout the republics of the former Yugoslavia, unemployment was high, inflation skyrocketed, and production plummeted. Respect for human rights deteriorated drastically in the deepening political and economic crisis. Extreme inter-republic, political, and ethnic animosities and the spread of armed conflict reversed many earlier promising advances in human rights and brought about serious new human rights violations. While violations in all these areas were perpetrated by many participants in the conflict, the weight of responsibility lay with the Serbian leadership and the so-called Yugoslav National Army (JNA). Particularly grievous was the use of heavy artillery and firepower. Security. During the reporting period, there were large-scale violations of Helsinki principles, especially those calling on CSCE participating states to refrain from the use of force and to seek peaceful settlement of disputes. The conflict claimed thousands of lives during the reporting period, including those of many noncombatants. In the areas most affected by the fighting, there were widespread and credible reports of atrocities, including the massacre of villagers, the torture and killing of prisoners, the use of human shields, and the taking of hostages. Such behavior was rarely punished. Croats and Serbs both fled or were expelled from areas of Croatia that came under the control of the other ethnic group. Following Croatia's and Slovenia's declarations of independence on June 25, 1991, the violence spread [a pattern which began to repeat itself in spring 1992 in newly independent Bosnia-Hercegovina]. Throughout the latter portion of 1991, the JNA was increasingly aggressive in using its vastly superior ground and air power on civilian targets. Its disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force, including heavy artillery and air strikes during the sieges of Vukovar, Osijek, Dubrovnik, and other Croatian population centers resulted in thousands of civilian casualties, severe damage or destruction to Croatian cities and villages, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents. An estimated 10,000 people died in the armed conflict in Croatia during the reporting period, many of them civilian non-combatants. To add to this, the conflict has been marked by policies of deliberate targeting by all sides of places of worship and cultural legacies. Much has been destroyed by heavy artillery and aerial bombing by the JNA, including Dubrovnik and Vukovar. Forces involved in the conflict frequently failed to observe internationally accepted humanitarian standards. For example, in September 1992, Croatian forces near Karlovac reportedly killed more than ten JNA soldiers who were attempting to surrender. Croatian authorities subsequently investigated and charged at least one person with the murders. Both Croatian and Serbian forces regularly beat prisoners. There were credible reports of Serbian irregular forces using civilian non-combatants as human shields and to sweep minefields. International observers reported widespread looting of Croatian villages by Serbian irregulars and JNA reservists in the Dalmatian hinterlands. In September 1992, the government-controlled Belgrade television broadcast interviews with Croatian prisoners of war. The families of JNA soldiers residing in Croatia were threatened and at times used as hostages by Croatian forces. Members of opposing ethnic groups were captured and held as hostages for barter in prisoner exchanges. The Croatian blockade of JNA garrisons in Croatia resulted in the denial of essential food and supplies to some families and noncombatants. Many Catholic and Serbian Orthodox churches were destroyed or damaged during the conflict. International conventions protecting medical personnel and relief supplies were not respected. A convoy of medical and food supplies for the city of Vukovar, besieged by the JNA, was repeatedly stopped in October, despite the agreement of all sides that it should proceed. The convoy was fired upon, allegedly by JNA forces. Another convoy, led by the French organization Doctors Without Borders, came under artillery attack while it was evacuating patients. In a separate incident, a clearly marked vehicle carrying delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was attacked by mortar fire. In numerous instances, including in Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci, and Karlovac, clearly identified hospitals were repeatedly and apparently intentionally hit by JNA and Serbian irregular artillery and air attacks. In October 1991, Serbian irregulars fired mortar rounds at a clearly marked ambulance near Karlovac and killed the doctor inside it. In several instances, international ceasefire monitors were attacked. In January 1992, two JNA fighter planes, in the air despite the restrictions placed on air movements in a recently agreed ceasefire, shot down an unarmed, clearly marked helicopter carrying EC monitors and flying over a non-conflicted area of Croatia. All five EC monitors were killed in an incident for which the JNA apologized, while also placing partial blame on the EC monitors themselves. Spurred by violent rivalry between ethnic groups, the breakdown in civil order, and all-out war in some areas, Serbs and Croats regularly accused each other of "massacres" and "genocide" against innocent civilians. While both sides were prone to exaggerate for propaganda purposes and hard evidence was often scarce, the statements of those fleeing the fighting and other evidence make clear that many deaths resulted from summary executions on ethnic or political grounds. For example, some 80 Croatian residents of the town of Dalj were reportedly massacred in August 1991. At least 35 Croats, mostly elderly, in the Croatian village of Vocin were murdered and mutilated in December 1991, apparently by Serbian irregular forces. There were credible reports of Croatian forces killing unarmed Serbian villagers in the Sisak area and in Sarvas. At least 24 Serb civilians were kidnapped and murdered, apparently by Croatian forces, in Gospic; Croatian authorities investigated but did not make any arrests. Following the February 1992 referendum on independence for Bosnia-Hercegovina, armed Serbian militants erected barricades in Sarajevo and elsewhere, protesting the referendum. Dozens of people from all ethnic groups were killed in the ensuing weeks as violence increased. The breakdown of federal authority and increasing "Serbianization" of the military effectively ended legitimate federal civilian control over the JNA which, along with elements of other security and police forces, technically remained under federal civilian jurisdiction in 1991. After its nominal commander in chief, the collective federal presidency, became paralyzed, the JNA allied itself squarely with Serbian politicians in the armed conflict with Croatia. The size and activities of other military, paramilitary, and police units increased dramatically in 1991, including those of the Croatian territorial forces and the irregular units organized by Serbian citizens of Croatia with substantial support from Serbian authorities and the JNA. The outbreak of fighting between these groups and the aggressive role of the JNA, with its vastly superior firepower, in support of these Serbs resulted in many civilian casualties and the displacement of over 600,000 persons from the war-torn areas. In 1991, Yugoslavia failed to provide CSBM data on military forces and equipment and on its military budget as required by the 1990 Vienna Document. It complied with military exercise forecasts required under this same document, indicating it planned no exercises at a notifiable level in 1991 or 1992. With regard to the Vienna Document Mechanism on Unusual Military Activities, Yugoslavia was called upon by Austria, Hungary, and Italy to provide clarification of military activities taking place on Yugoslav soil in the course of 1991. The clarifications provided were generally not found to be adequate at meetings held under the auspices of this mechanism. Portugal, on behalf of the EC, invoked the 1990 Vienna Document mechanism requiring explanations of hazardous military incidents in the wake of the downing of a helicopter carrying an EC monitor team over Yugoslav territory. To date, the EC has not found the explanations given by the former Yugoslavia in response to this request to be adequate. Yugoslavia was not connected to the CSCE communication network. Economics. Though largely stalled by early 1991, the Markovic government's remaining program of federal economic reforms was wiped out by the violent disintegration of the Yugoslav federation which erupted in mid-1991 and the concurrent destruction of a unified Yugoslav economy. Economic developments during the reporting period have been dominated by inter-republic protectionism, property seizures, and the suspension or reversal of privatization programs. By November 1991, the former Yugoslavia consisted of three major currency and/or economic zones--Slovenia, Croatia, and the remainder of "Yugoslavia." The cost of financing the "Yugoslav" military and Serbian forces grew substantially to claim the overwhelming share of the federal budget. Monetary discipline collapsed as these cumulative costs were largely financed through hyperinflation. None of the currencies is convertible internationally nor among the republics. This has helped slow inter-republic commerce to a trickle. All of the currencies are also under pressure from high domestic inflation, but the Yugoslav dinar, in particular, has declined in value from approximately 15 dinars per US dollar in March 1991 to over 400 dinars per dollar by March 1992. As the Yugoslav federal government's authority disintegrated in 1991, foreign exchange reserves declined to $2.5 billion by mid- March 1992. There is little prospect that the former Yugoslavia will be able to continue to service its international debt obligations in 1992. Throughout the republics, for the most part, unemployment is high (20-25%), inflation skyrocketing (over 2,000% annually in Serbia), and production plummeting (down 20% in 1991). Although the degree of economic collapse varies from republic to republic (with Slovenia generally better off and Bosnia-Hercegovina most severely affected), there is little prospect of near-term improvement, or a resumption of progress toward a free market economy, in any of the republics--with the partial exceptions of Slovenia and Macedonia-- until a political resolution to the Yugoslav crisis is found. The former Yugoslavia was long active in science and technology exchanges with the West. Despite the outbreak of war, which precluded US partners in scientific exchanges from visiting Yugoslavia, there were 263 research projects underway with US cooperating scientists as of March 1992. Even during the height of fighting in Croatia, university research facilities paused for no more than a month or two in their activities, and some kept going despite the threat of attack. The former Yugoslavia was also active in science and technology exchanges elsewhere with 86 signed agreements throughout the world. The former Yugoslavia has monumental environmental problems, but, with the war and its consequences, there was virtually no progress during the reporting period in improving environmental protection. Follow-up teams to a G-24 fact-finding group which visited Yugoslavia in early 1991 to assess environmental conditions were unable to visit due to the fighting. The siege and shelling of such cities as Vukovar, Dubrovnik, and Osijek has had incalculable effect on the environment and will take years to mitigate. The former Yugoslavia was a signatory to the Montreal Protocol and an active participant at the federal level in international forums on the environment. Despite the dissolution of Yugoslavia, federal authorities continued to operate on the thesis that cooperation among the separate parts of the former Yugoslavia will be just as necessary as before in addressing environmental problems. The former Yugoslavia was interested in but, because of the war, largely left out of programs of the regional environmental center in Budapest. A host of non-governmental organizations with environmental platforms took root in all the republics, but few were as powerful as Slovenia's Greens, who kept up the pressure to close the Krsko nuclear generator by 1995. Serbia put a new environmental law into effect and involved Jacques Cousteau in assessing degradation of the Danube. Montenegro declared itself the "first ecological state." Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina struggled to keep their heavy industry in operation while searching for outside assistance to offset the impact of industrial degradation to the environment. Croatia was seized with the environmental consequences of the civil war on its territory as well as the cost of reconstruction that will limit the resources available for environmental protection in the future. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the former Yugoslavia had been one of the more active, constructive, and forthcoming former East bloc participants in the environmental programs of the UN Economic Commission for Europe. It had also attempted to comply with ECE conventions to which it was a party. Human Dimension. During the reporting period, there were massive violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and failure to live up to commitments in the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents, including the Copenhagen and Moscow Documents and the Paris Charter. Discrimination with respect to members of minorities worsened in most parts of the former Yugoslavia during the reporting period. In Serbia, authorities intensified repressive measures against the majority Albanian population of the formerly autonomous Kosovo province, eliminating virtually all Albanian-language schooling and intensifying repression in other areas. Other minorities in Serbia, including Hungarians, Croats, and Muslims, also cited instances of growing discrimination and violence directed against them. Although the Croatian government passed legislation according Serbs and other minorities in Croatia greater autonomy, the new law has not been implemented with Croatia's loss of control over its territory where Serbs are most numerous. Serbs in areas remaining under Croatian control faced increasing pressures, including discrimination and violence. It was in Croatia, however, that the most serious and prolonged violence occurred. Relations between the Serb minority and the newly elected Croatian government worsened in spring 1991 with the introduction of a new republic constitution which relegated Serbs to "minority" status rather than the "constituent nation" status they had previously enjoyed. The new government's use of nationalistic Croatian symbols and rhetoric reminiscent to Serbs of the hated fascist Croatian state of World War II further increased tensions. For their part, Serbian media and officials frequently exacerbated political and ethnic tensions through strong anti-Croat broadcasts and statements. In areas where Serbs comprised a majority or large element of the population, some Serbs began arming themselves and barricading roads and rail lines with the complicity of the JNA. As incidents of violence increased, the Yugoslav federal presidency tasked the JNA with intervening in Croatia to separate the antagonists and maintain peace. However, instead of playing a neutral peacekeeping role, the JNA increasingly aligned itself with armed Serbian separatist forces and provided them with substantial material and logistical support. The governments of each of Yugoslavia's six republics were headed by leaders elected in republic-level multi-party elections held in 1990. International observers found all of these elections, with the exception of those in Serbia and Montenegro, to have been consistent generally with democratic rules and procedures. During the course of the reporting period, there were credible reports of oppression by the Serbian leadership of the democratic opposition, including forced drafting of older men and anonymous threats credibly tied to the security forces. Members of the democratic opposition have also had difficulty getting access to the media. In Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro, the republic presidents held extensive executive power. In Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia, power-sharing among ethnic groups or with the legislature made for a more diffused decision making process. Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia- Hercegovina declared "autonomous enclaves" independent of the republic governments. Abusing the 1974 constitutional provision giving the autonomous provinces an equal voice in the collective presidency, Serbia installed its own choices to represent Kosovo and Vojvodina and used these votes, together with the regular support of Montenegro, to exercise a decisive blocking role in the presidency. The Serbian- led bloc in the federal presidency sought in May 1991 to deny Croatian representative Stipe Mesic his turn at the head of the rotating presidency. Under intense domestic and international pressure, Mesic was finally seated. After the opening of the armed conflict, Slovenia and Croatia walked out of the presidency. Mesic declared several months later that the JNA was acting in Croatia not at the bequest of the presidency but on its own and that a de facto coup had taken place. In October 1991, the Serbian-led bloc created a rump presidency by altering procedural rules concerning quorums and the number of votes required for decision making. The Croatian, Slovenian, Bosnia-Hercegovinian, and Macedonian representatives refused to participate in the rump presidency and denied its legitimacy, as did federal Prime Minister Markovic and a number of foreign governments. In December 1992, Mesic resigned as president of the federal presidency and in a separate action Markovic resigned as federal prime minister. The Serbian government blocked separate efforts by Muslim residents of the Sandzak region (which extends into Montenegro) and Albanian residents of Kosovo to hold referendums on their desired political status during the reporting period. In a referendum in early 1992, in which observers noted significant irregularities, some two-thirds of the Montenegrin electorate voted to "stay in Yugoslavia." Macedonians voted overwhelmingly for independence in a referendum in September 1991, although its substantial Albanian minority boycotted the referendum and subsequently conducted its own referendum declaring autonomy. The republic government of Bosnia-Hercegovina held a referendum in February 1992 on the future status of that republic; 64% of the republic's electorate voted for independence, despite a boycott by most ethnic Serbs in the republic. There was considerable violence in the aftermath of the referendum. The federal constitution of 1974 provided that each of the six "nations" of Yugoslavia--Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, Muslim, Macedonian, and Montenegrin--should be the majority nation in its republic. It also provided for two autonomous provinces within the Republic of Serbia--Kosovo and Vojvodina--in which the Albanian, Hungarian, and other minorities would enjoy broad individual and group rights. In Kosovo, where the Albanians totaled more than 90% of the population, Albanians controlled the Communist Party and government. In Vojvodina, Hungarians and Romanians were among the minorities with the right to have schools in their languages, as well as their own newspapers, cultural associations, and radio programs. Since 1989, the Serbian republic's policy has been to take away the powers of the Kosovo government from the Albanians and to assert Serbian domination over all aspects of life. This policy has led to unrestrained discrimination against Albanians in every area, including medical care and social services, employment, and education. In 1991, at least 430 professors and other professional staff were dismissed from Pristina University on a variety of pretexts, including charges of using the Albanian language for official work. Most of Kosovo's Albanian-language primary and secondary schools were closed because Albanian teachers refused to implement the Serbian republic's curriculum, which mandates the teaching of Serbian cultural themes. At least 6,000 Albanian teachers have been fired for this refusal. Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro also suffered discrimination in education and political expression. Albanian human rights activists claimed that scores of Albanian youths serving in the JNA died under unexplained and suspicious circumstances in 1991. The rights of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina came under pressure from Serbian authorities who denounced ethnic Hungarian publications and political groups as "anti-Serb." The publication of the Hungarian- language weekly Magyar Szo was in question and Hungarian-language radio programs on Novi Sad radio were cancelled. In August 1991, Serbia introduced a new language law which gave the Serbian government added power to restrict the use of minority languages, including Hungarian and Albanian. Discrimination against Serbian residents of Croatia increased in 1991. Ethnic Serbs working at non-governmental jobs who refused to sign loyalty oaths to Croatia were often fired. Vandalism and violence against Serbs and their property in Croatia also increased. Although Croatian authorities investigated many such incidents and the state insurance company paid claims on them, culprits were almost never identified and punished. The Croatian government also imposed special, higher taxes on property in Croatia owned by residents of Serbia, while properties and businesses in Serbia owned by Croats and Slovenes were seized and their assets frozen. There were allegations of major dismissals of Serbs in Croatia on ethnic grounds. Croatian authorities claimed that in most cases they were for cause or were due to the economic downturn. In December, the Croatian parliament passed a sweeping law granting increased autonomy to communities of ethnic minorities in Croatia; implementation of that law, however, was in large part impossible due to the war and the loss of Croatian governmental control over the affected areas. Gypsies have complained that the rights extended to other minorities have not been extended to them. Gypsies in Yugoslavia do appear to suffer discrimination in employment, social services, and education. There were also reports that Gypsies were expelled from areas of Croatia experiencing fighting. There is a Gypsy cultural organization, and the President of the World Romany Federation is a Yugoslav Gypsy. In Macedonia, there is a Gypsy political party with one representative in the legislature. Religion is identified with ethnicity in Yugoslavia. In the context of increasing ethnic animosities and armed conflict, the nationalist governments which came to power in 1990 in the republics have established close public ties with the dominant religious establishments and usually discriminated against minority religions. Senior Catholic and Serbian Orthodox clerics have taken political stands in support of the Croatian and Serbian government positions respectively. The minority Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia has complained of official discrimination in such areas as the issuance of building permits. It has also protested the vandalism, damage, and destruction to 96 of its churches in Croatia. There has been little official effort to identify and punish those responsible. Several Serbian priests in Croatia, including Bishop Lukijan of Pakrac, were reportedly placed under house arrest or prevented from performing their duties freely. In August 1991, the Jewish community center in Zagreb was badly damaged by a bomb; the government responded promptly with promises to investigate fully but by the end of 1991 had not identified the culprits. The Croatian government reported in December 1991 that 223 churches and monasteries in Croatia had been damaged or destroyed in the war. In addition to instances of vandalism by Serbian irregular forces operating in the area, the Croatian authorities accused the JNA of intentionally targeting Catholic churches in artillery and air attacks. Although the JNA denied this allegation and charged Croatian forces with staging attacks from churches and other civilian buildings, the testimony of numerous reliable international observers suggested that churches had been intentionally and repeatedly targeted. In July 1991, a Croatian Catholic priest in the Serbian-held town of Old Tenja in Croatia reported he was held hostage by Serbian forces. Four Franciscan priests were taken prisoner by the JNA when Vukovar fell. Catholics in Vojvodina claimed that Serbs who allegedly placed a bomb in Subotica's Catholic Cathedral, though known to the police, went unpunished. Yugoslav federal and republic laws during the reporting period provided for freedom of speech and press. Federal rules, laws, and institutions, however, became increasingly irrelevant in 1991. With the outbreak of the armed conflict, the governments of some republics enforced tighter controls on the press, mainly over coverage of domestic politics, the armed conflict, and allegations of human rights abuses. Although press freedom varied substantially from republic to republic, most areas of the former Yugoslavia generally had less press freedom in 1991 than they did in 1990. Although the major changes made in federal and republic legal systems in 1990 provided greater due process protection, the breakdown or nonfunctioning of legitimate federal authority and of the rule of law in many parts of the former Yugoslavia resulted in widespread denials of due process, particularly in those areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina where ethnic Serbs declared local autonomy and rejected republic authority over their regions. These denials of due process and persecution for political offenses extended to ethnic Serbs in opposition to the Serbian group in power as well as to members of other ethnic groups. Thousands of noncombatants were imprisoned in the context of the armed conflict often but not always for relatively brief periods and usually without any form of due process. In October 1991, it was estimated that some 2,500 such persons, including prisoners of war, were being detained at any given time. In early 1992, nearly 10,000 persons remained missing and unaccounted for. Noncombatants were detained because of the ethnic group to which they belonged, because of suspected political activities or sympathies, or as hostages. The judiciary is not free of political influence nor of ethnic bias. In the Republic of Serbia, provincial courts in Kosovo and Vojvodina were closed, and some of their functions were transferred to Belgrade. In Kosovo, ethnic Albanian judges were replaced by ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins, who were said by ethnic Albanians to be unqualified, inexperienced, and anti-Albanian.
Council of Ministers June 20, 1991
Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia
Ministers discussed the situation in Yugoslavia. They were informed by HE [His Excellency] the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Budimir Loncar, about the latest developments in Yugoslavia. The Ministers expressed their friendly concern and their support for democratic development, unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, based on economic reforms, full application of human rights in all parts of Yugoslavia, including the rights of minorities, and the peaceful solution of the current crisis in the country. They called for continued progress in these fields. Ministers stressed that it is only for the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves to decide on the country's future. Ministers therefore called for a continued dialogue among all parties concerned and confirmed their view that the possibilities for such a dialogue were not yet exhausted. They expressed their belief that the existing constitutional disputes should be remedied and that the way out of the present difficult impasse should be found without recourse to the use of force and in conformity with legal and constitutional procedures. They urged all parties concerned to redouble their efforts to resolve their differences peacefully through negotiations. Ministers expressed their confidence that on this basis the international community would stand ready to assist Yugoslavia's efforts to transform itself economically and political. Committee of Senior Officials July 3, 1991
Urgent Appeal for a Ceasefire
Recalling the statement on the situation in Yugoslavia issued by the Council of Ministers in Berlin on 19 June 1991, the CSO makes an urgent appeal that any recourse to the use of force in the present crisis in Yugoslavia continues to be absolutely inadmissible. The CSO also reiterates the appeal issued at the end of the meeting of the consultative committee of the CPC on 1 July 1991 stressing the importance of an immediate and complete cessation of hostilities by all parties involved. A prompt implementation of the commitments undertaken by all concerned Yugoslav parties remains mandatory. The CSO calls upon all relevant authorities in Yugoslavia to comply with these appeals and fulfill all commitments under the Charter of Paris and the Ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act, in particular the unequivocal renunciation of the use of force. All fighting has to stop immediately. There must be political control over all armed forces. These forces have to return to their barracks and stay there. Hostile actions against these barracks must stop. Prisoners taken during the hostilities have to be released immediately. All parties involved in this conflict are called upon to comply with this appeal immediately. The CSO offers its assistance in order to help restore peace in the area and is examining urgently relevant practical steps it can take, in particular the despatch of observers to Yugoslavia, in consultation and agreement with Yugoslav authorities. Committee of Senior Officials July 4, 1991
Offer of a CSCE Good Offices Mission to Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials, -- Deeply concerned about the difficult situation in Yugoslavia; -- Recalling the statement on Yugoslavia adopted by the Council of Ministers of the CSCE in Berlin on 19 June 1991; -- Eager to help Yugoslavia in overcoming the difficult situation, in the restoration of peace and stability without any delay; Offered to make available, upon the invitation of Yugoslavia, a mission of good offices to facilitate the political dialogue among the parties concerned. The good offices mission, if and when accepted by Yugoslavia and established, could enter, in compliance with these conditions and aims, into contact with the parties concerned in order to determine how it can be of help and, if useful, put recommendations to be considered by all Yugoslav authorities. This mission will be at the disposal of the Yugoslav authorities as long as they deem it necessary. The composition and modalities for the operation of the mission will be established by the Chairman of the CSO in consultation with the Yugoslav authorities. The CSCE participating States may put forward through the Chairman proposals in this regard. The Chairman of the CSO will inform all participating States of subsequent developments. Committee of Senior Officials July 4, 1991
Mission to Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials, -- Recalled the statement of the Council of Ministers of the CSCE in Berlin in which they expressed their friendly concern and their support for democratic development and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, full application of human rights in all parts of Yugoslavia, including the rights of minorities, and the peaceful solution of the current crisis in the country, as well as their emphasis that it is only for the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves to decide on the country's future, -- Noted the strong interest of the CSCE participating States to make a concrete contribution to the resolution of the present Yugoslav crisis, -- Welcomed the restoration of the constitutional order by the appointment of a president and a vice-president at the head of the collegiate Presidency, -- Urged the full implementation by all Yugoslav parties of the other two elements of the agreement recently reached between them with the contribution of the European Community, namely: --the acceptance of a ceasefire, accompanied by the return of all armed forces to their previous positions; --the suspension of the implementation of the declarations of independence for a period of three months. -- Welcomed the readiness expressed by the EC Member States, building on their initiatives, to organize a mission to help stabilize a ceasefire and to monitor the implementation of the above- mentioned elements of the agreement. This will be done at the invitation of the Yugoslav authorities and in full co-operation with them, -- Welcomed also the interest of other CSCE participating States to take part in the mission on the basis of the arrangements between the European Community and Yugoslav authorities, -- Requested the mission to inform the Committee on the progress of its work at the earliest opportunity. Committee of Senior Officials August 8, 1991
Appeal for a Ceasefire
The Committee of Senior Officials, -- Greatly disturbed by the appalling losses of human lives that have occurred in Yugoslavia after the urgent appeal for a ceasefire issued by the CSO on 3 July 1991, -- Emphasizing the importance of a permanent, complete, and effective ceasefire accepted and fully respected by all parties involved, -- Welcomes the ceasefire proclaimed by the federal presidency of Yugoslavia on 6 August 1991 and urges that it will be fully maintained; -- Therefore, urges all concerned parties to stabilize the ceasefire by separating their forces and withdrawing them from areas of conflict; -- Reiterates its strong condemnation of any recourse to the use of force; -- Alerts all parties to their responsibility to exercise the necessary political control over their regular or irregular armed forces; -- Welcomes the offer by the EC to continue all their efforts to monitor an effective ceasefire and include other CSCE participating States invited by Yugoslavia. Committee of Senior Officials August 9, 1991
Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials, -- Reaffirming its decision on a "Mission to Yugoslavia" adopted at its First Emergency Meeting on 3 and 4 July 1991, -- Welcomes the activities of the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia, based upon the memorandum of understanding which was signed by representatives of the European Community and its Member States, the Federal Authorities of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia in Belgrade on 13 July 1991; -- Appreciates the reports on the activities of the mission provided by the EC presidency and welcomes the progress made in the implementation of the Brioni Agreement of 7 July 1991, which they reflect; -- Appeals to all parties concerned in Yugoslavia to cooperate in maintaining a permanent and effective cease-fire and welcomes EC readiness to extend their monitoring activities, through appropriate arrangement with Yugoslavia; -- Supports an enlargement of the mission, in agreement with the Yugoslav authorities, through the inclusion of members of other CSCE participating States on the basis of arrangements between the European Community and Yugoslav authorities; -- Requests the European Community and its Member States and other interested CSCE participating States to continue their efforts towards a peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis; -- Requests the mission to continue to report to the Committee on the progress of its activities on a regular basis. Committee of Senior Officials August 9, 1991
Assistance to Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials, -- Underlines the urgent necessity that all parties concerned immediately begin negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia; -- Supports strongly the intention of the Yugoslav authorities to begin these negotiations as soon as possible and not later than 15 August 1991; -- Noting the Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia of the CSCE Council in Berlin on 19 June 1991, urges the parties concerned to seek a peaceful settlement based on all the principles and commitments agreed upon in the CSCE process and to abstain from all acts of force or violence or other acts prejudicing the outcome of negotiations which must be acceptable to all people in Yugoslavia; -- Stresses that the use of force to achieve political objectives is inadmissible and insists strongly that all parties act in full respect for all human rights, including the rights of national minorities; -- Expresses its hope that the process of negotiations will lead to positive results and in this context reaffirms the offer of a CSCE Good Offices Mission, as decided at the First Emergency Meeting on 3 and 4 July 1991, and invites Yugoslavia to make use of this offer, if necessary, in order to facilitate dialogue and negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia; -- Notes with satisfaction that the Yugoslav authorities, as an initial step to this end, have extended an invitation to the European Community and its Member States to assist the process of negotiations, as agreed at Brioni; -- Supports the readiness of the European Community and its Member States, expressed in their declaration of 6 August 1991, as well as of other interested CSCE participating States, to facilitate and assist these negotiations, at a time and under conditions to be agreed with Yugoslavia; -- Emphasizes its resolve to remain seized of this matter. The Committee will convened by the Chairman for an additional meeting whenever the situation requires, and in any event no later than the first week of September 1991. Committee of Senior Officials September 3, 1991
Statement on the Ceasefire in Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE, -- Greatly disturbed by the appalling losses of human lives that have occurred in spite of the urgent calls for a ceasefire issued on 3 July and 8 August 1991, -- Stressing that no territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable, -- Welcomes the cease-fire agreed in Belgrade on 1 September 1991 and insists upon strict implementation of and compliance with all its provisions; -- Strongly endorses the agreement reached between the European Community and its Member States and Yugoslav parties on 1 September 1991 in Belgrade on the extension of the activities in Croatia of the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia, enlarged to include members of other CSCE participating States, which is fully in accordance with the statements by the Committee of Senior Officials of 4 July and 9 August 1991; -- Stresses the need for full respect for all provisions contained in the memorandum of understanding on the extension of monitoring activities of the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia, including the commitments by the Yugoslav parties concerned regarded the monitoring of the ceasefire; -- Demands strongly that all political and military authorities in Yugoslavia co-operate fully and without restrictions with the Monitor Mission and guarantee the personal safety of the members of the Monitor Mission as indispensable prerequisites for successful extension if its monitoring activities; -- Stresses that any body responsible for any violation of these provisions will bear the full consequences of its action; -- Warmly supports the initiative by the European Community and its Member States to convene the Conference on Yugoslavia. Committee of Senior Officials September 4, 1991
Statement on Arms Embargo
The CSCE Committee of Senior Officials, -- Aiming to prevent military escalation of the conflict in Yugoslavia and wishing to contribute to its peaceful settlement, -- Calls upon all States to stop and refrain--for the duration of the crisis in Yugoslavia--from supplying arms and military equipment to all Yugoslav parties concerned. This should include taking necessary measures to prevent any transfer of weapons. -- Requests all CSCE participating States to submit to the Conflict Prevention Center appropriate information outlining their governments' policies on this subject. Committee of Senior Officials September 4, 1991
Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE, -- Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia, and insisting on the immediate implementation of the agreed ceasefire, -- Underlines the necessity that the negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia begin immediately, with the view to achieving an outcome of the negotiations which must be acceptable to all people in Yugoslavia, -- Fully endorses the decision taken by the European Community and its Member States to convene a Conference on Yugoslavia in the Peace Palace in The Hague on 7 September 1991, to be chaired by Lord Carrington, and at the same time set up an arbitration procedure, -- Urges the political and military authorities to restore and maintain full control over all military actions, thus contributing to the success of the Conference. -- Urges the parties concerned to seek a peaceful settlement based on all the principles and commitments agreed upon in the CSCE process and to abstain from all acts of force or violence or other acts, -- Recalling the Committee's statement of 9 August on assistance to negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia, welcomes the readiness of other interested CSCE participating States to assist the peace process, -- Stresses once again that the use of force to achieve political objectives is inadmissible and insists strongly that all parties act in full respect for all human rights, including the rights of national minorities, -- Considers that all refugees who so wish must be allowed to return to their homes in safety, -- Notes with satisfaction the preparedness of the European Community and its Member States and other CSCE participating States to continue their monitoring activities, as long as will be needed for the conference to be successful, and emphasizes the need that the Yugoslav parties fulfill their obligations accordingly, -- Welcomes the decision of the European Community and its Member States to keep the other CSCE participating States fully informed of the proceedings of the Conference on Yugoslavia, through the Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials and the CSCE Secretariat. Committee of Senior Officials October 10, 1991
The Situation in Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE, -- Reaffirming its earlier resolutions on Yugoslavia and deeply concerned about the lack of respect therefor, -- Deeply disturbed by the recent escalation of violence in Yugoslavia, causing loss of life and human suffering, -- Appalled by the irresponsible behavior of different Yugoslav parties which calls into doubt their willingness to settle their disputes by peaceful means, -- Reiterating the determination of all participating States never to recognize any changes of borders, whether external or internal, brought about by force, -- Deeply concerned about the increasing destruction and loss of life, -- Noting that most delegations expressed their unreserved condemnation of the usurpation of power by the representatives of two republics in the Yugoslav federal presidency contrary to the established constitutional order of Yugoslavia as well as the Charter of Paris, -- Recalling the Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE which emphasizes that issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedom, national minorities, democracy, and the rule of law do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned, -- Recalling UN Security Council resolution 713/91, -- Welcomes the conclusions reached at the meeting held in The Hague on 4 October 1991 which was chaired by the EC presidency, with the participation of the President of Croatia, the President of Serbia, and the Federal Minister of Defense, on the principles which should guide a solution for the Yugoslav crisis, notably the principle that a political solution should be sought on the basis of the perspective of recognition of the independence of those republics in Yugoslavia wishing it at the end of a negotiating process conducted in good faith and involving all parties; -- Welcomes the memorandum of understanding, which was signed on 8 October 1991 in Zagreb under the auspices of the European Community by representatives for the Federal Secretary for National Defense of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and for the Republic of Croatia, on a general ceasefire in the territory of Croatia and urges all parties concerned fully to abide by this agreement, particularly the renunciation of the use of major weapons systems; -- Warmly commends both the collective and individual efforts of the men and women of the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia; -- Strongly supports the activities of the Monitor Mission and welcomes the extension and strengthening of these activities in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and recommends that consideration be given to the extension of activities to other areas as appropriate; -- Welcomes the protocol on the Monitor Mission signed by the representatives of Hungary and the EC; -- Condemns any acts endangering the security of members of the Monitor Mission and its equipment and demands that all Yugoslav parties comply fully with their obligation to protect and ensure the safety of the Mission and its members; -- Takes note of the fact that the Western European Union is exploring ways in which the activities of the monitors could be supported so as to make their work a more effective contribution to the peace-keeping effort, the possibilities of which have not been exhausted; -- Insists on compliance with the commitment, accepted by participating States at the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, to ensure that military and para-military forces be subject to the effective direction and control of appropriate democratically elected civilian authorities and to maintain and strengthen executive control over such forces so that their participation in acts of violence and warfare be ended once and for all. The Committee furthermore insists on the immediate cessation of mobilization on all sides; -- Condemns all violations of relevant norms of international law applicable to non-international armed conflict which have occurred during the escalation of violence in Yugoslavia; -- Expresses its conviction that those responsible for the unprecedented violence against people in Yugoslavia, with its ever- increasing loss of life, should be held personally accountable under international law for their actions; -- Takes note of the support of many other participating States for the intention expressed on 6 October 1991 by the European Community and its Member States to apply restrictive measures to those parties continuing to flaunt the desire of the other Yugoslav parties as well as the international community for a successful outcome of the Conference on Yugoslavia; -- Welcomes the continued engagement by all parties to he Yugoslav crisis in the Conference on Yugoslavia; -- Urges all Yugoslav parties to take an active and constructive part without delay in the Conference on Yugoslavia which provides the essential framework for finding a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis which respects the rights of all who live in Yugoslavia, including minorities; -- Welcomes the progress which has been made at the Conference on Yugoslavia on 10 October 1991; -- Welcomes the fact that parties which are not participating in its proceedings have been given access to the Conference and recommends that such access by granted to other parties concerned; -- Considers that the unsettled issue of national minorities perpetuates the tension and instability and considers that the conflict must not be used for forcible change in the ethnic composition of the different areas; -- Agrees that a successful outcome of the Conference on Yugoslavia should contain international guarantees for the protection of the rights of national minorities in accordance with the standards and commitments of the CSCE; -- Underlines the importance of the immediate and full implementation of resolution 713/91 of the United Nations Security Council and welcomes the appointment of Mr. Cyrus Vance as the special representative of the UN Secretary General. -- Will examine ways in which the institutions of the CSCE, including the CPC, could further assist in the implementation of the provisions of this resolution. Committee of Senior Officials October 22, 1991
CSCE Human Rights Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia
Recalling the Document of the Moscow Meeting, the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials agreed to form a human rights rapporteur mission. The mission will visit Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia at a time to be agreed through consultation with Yugoslavia. It will inform itself of the situation with respect to human rights, including the rights of minorities, and will report to the Committee. Its report will be circulated by the CSCE Secretariat through the CSCE points of contact and will be considered by the Committee at a future meeting. The report will be made available to the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia. The mission will be led by the designated representative of the Chairman of the CSCE Council of Ministers. A representative from the CSCE Office for Free Elections will serve as secretary for the mission. The mission will also include, inter alia, a representative from the European Community, and a representative of the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia. Committee of Senior Officials October 22, 1991
The Situation in Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE, 1. Reaffirming its earlier resolutions on Yugoslavia, 2. Deeply concerned by the continuing violence and bloodshed in Yugoslavia and by the obstacles encountered by the monitor mission to Yugoslavia, 3. Strongly condemns the constant and blatant violations of all ceasefire agreements concluded until the present day and any attempt to bring about changes by force. No such change will be recognized as legal; 4. Welcomes the agreement reached on 14 October 1991 to continue the activities of the monitor mission to Yugoslavia and reiterates its demand that all Yugoslav parties comply fully with their obligation to protect and ensure the safety of the mission and its members; 5. Underlines the importance of concerting all efforts made by CSCE participating States to solve the crisis in Yugoslavia and in this spirit endorses the Declaration on Yugoslavia adopted by the European Community and its member States, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 18 October 1991, and it supports the continuing efforts by the Secretary General of the United States; 6. Welcomes the fact that on 18 October 1991 the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia presented arrangements for a general settlement of the Yugoslav crisis and notes with great interest that it covers, inter alia, general principles, guidelines with regard to the implementation of human rights and rights of ethnic and national groups, other areas of cooperation, and institutional aspects; 7. Urges all Yugoslav parties to continue their co-operation in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia; 8. Insists that the agreement reached in The Hague on 18 October 1991 at which the collective presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and President Tudjman, in the presence of President Milosevic, agreed to give their respective forces instructions to abide by the terms of a new ceasefire agreement, be immediately and fully implemented; 9. Calls upon all Yugoslav parties to strictly observe these terms and expresses grave concern about recent violations of these terms; 10. Reiterates its conviction that those responsible for the acts of unprecedented violence against people in Yugoslavia and for violations of ceasefire agreements be held personally accountable under international law for their actions, including those in contravention of relevant norms of international humanitarian law; 11. Calls upon all Yugoslav parties to strive to ensure the free movement of individuals and the free circulation of goods among different parts of Europe transiting Yugoslavia, by land, air and water; 12. Decides to continue to keep the crisis in Yugoslavia under closest consideration and invites the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee of Senior Officials to convene the Committee at a time he deems appropriate. Committee of Senior Officials January 8, 1992
Declaration on Yugoslavia
The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE, 1. Profoundly distressed over the domestic events that occurred in Yugoslavia as a result of the inadmissible use of totally unwarranted force, particularly that which yesterday caused the death of five members of the Monitoring Mission, 2. Condemns in the strongest possible terms those responsible for shooting down an unarmed helicopter of the Monitoring Mission, requests an immediate and exhaustive evaluation of responsibility, and expects those responsible to be held accountable for these and other equally unacceptable acts, 3. Strongly urges all parties in Yugoslavia, without exception, to fully cooperate with the efforts which have been ordered and are already underway aiming at a thorough investigation of this tragic occurrence, 4. Reaffirms its support and solidarity towards the members of the Monitor Mission, whose actions and courage deserve to be praised, 5. Urges all parties to take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of the Monitor Mission and of personnel sent by the United Nations. 6. Reiterating its firm commitment to seek a peaceful and lasting settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia, in accordance with the principles and commitments of the CSCE, 7. Condemns in particular any use of major weapon systems in this conflict, 8. Strongly supports resolution 724, adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on 15 December 1991, 9. Takes note of the statement of the representative of the European Community and its Member States referring to their declaration of 16 December 1991, 10. Welcomes the accord reached in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992 under the auspices of the special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Cyrus Vance, establishing modalities for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement of 23 November 1991, and underlines the importance of a strict compliance by all parties, of the dispositions of the above- mentioned agreements, 11. Urges the Security Council of the United Nations to take a decision on an early deployment of UN peace-keeping forces in Yugoslavia insisting that all parties concerned effectively implement all relevant conditions therefor, 12. Welcomes the decision taken by the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington, to reconvene the Conference, which remains the appropriate forum for reaching a durable and comprehensive settlement of the crisis, 13. Warns against any extension of the present conflict and calls upon all parties to adopt a constructive participation in the Conference, 14. Recalls in this context its repeated affirmation to reject the use of force to change established borders, whether internal or external, 15. Decides to keep the situation in Yugoslavia under close consideration. Committee of Senior Officials March 2, 1992
Second Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia
Referring to the summary of conclusions of the Prague meeting of the CSCE Council, the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials examined the need for further action concerning the human rights situation in Yugoslavia. The Committee agreed that the human rights situation, including the situation of national minorities, requires further consideration and follow-up action by the CSCE. To that end, the Committee decided to send a follow-up mission to the human rights rapporteur mission to Yugoslavia as established by decision of the Committee on 22 October 1991 in Prague. The follow-up mission will examine further the situation in the previously visited republics and give particular attention to the subjects mentioned for consecutive action in the first report. The mission will not take place before the end of April and it will report to the Committee. The report will be circulated by the CSCE Secretariat through the CSCE points of contact and will be considered by the Committee at a future meeting. The report will be made available to the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia.
Model Accession Letter Dear Mr. Minister, The Government of (NAME OF STATE) hereby adopts the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, and all other documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Government of (NAME OF STATE) accepts in their entirety all commitments and responsibilities contained in those documents and declares its determination to act in accordance with their provisions. Concerning the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures, the Government of (NAME OF STATE) agrees to apply all the provisions of the Vienna Document on CSBMs and to an understanding that the geographic scope of its application should be revised as soon as possible in order to ensure full effect of the rules of transparency, predictability, and conflict prevention on its territory. Specific provisions on the above matter will be negotiated in the CSBM negotiations and included in the Vienna Document 1992. The Government of (NAME OF STATE) recognizes the requirement for prompt entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. To that end, the Government of (NAME OF STATE) underlines the need for states with territory in the CFE area of application to undertake to move forward promptly with the ratification of the CFE Treaty and to assume, in cooperation with other relevant newly independent states, all CFE obligations of the former Soviet Union. The Government of (NAME OF STATE) invites and will fully facilitate the visit of a rapporteur mission to be arranged by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the CSCE. This mission will report to the participating States on progress in (NAME OF STATE) toward full implementation of CSCE commitments and provide assistance toward that objective. The Government of (NAME OF STATE) will concur in the admission of all other states established on the territory of the former Soviet Union as full participating States. The Government of (NAME OF STATE) expresses its readiness for signature of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris by the head of state or Government of (NAME OF STATE) at the earliest convenience. I kindly ask you, Mr. Minister, to circulate copies of this letter to all representatives of the participating States of the CSCE Council of Ministers. Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Committee of Senior Officials February 28, 1992
Decision on Nagorno-Karabakh
(1) The Committee of Senior Officials noted the "Interim Report of the Rapporteur Mission on the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh". The Committee of Senior Officials: (2) Urges the interested parties to impose an immediate ceasefire on all forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh area of the Azerbaijan Republic, the population of which expresses their will to enjoy all their rights including all those contained in the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, and to implement fully their undertakings in the Communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Russian Federation in Moscow on February 28, 1992; (3) Underlines the fact that the presence in the area of groups of eminent persons from CSCE participating States will contribute to the establishment of an effective ceasefire and urges concerned parties to guarantee their safety and to take all necessary steps to this end; (4) Requests that all participating States and all States in region impose an immediate embargo on all deliveries of weapons and munitions to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area and inform the Conflict Prevention Center of steps taken in this respect; (5) Urgently requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE to contact international and voluntary organizations with appropriate resources to provide humanitarian assistance and to encourage them to provide such assistance, both to the inhabitants of Nagorno- Karabakh and to the refugees and displaced persons on both sides of this conflict, including those from the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan; (6) Requests that the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE convene representatives of the States concerned with a view to immediately establishing safe corridors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh; (7) Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE, in contact with the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as local authorities and representatives in Nagorno-Karabakh, to promote, if necessary under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the immediate exchange of hostages; (8) Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE, in conjunction with the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as local authorities and representatives in Nagorno-Karabakh, to promote, if necessary under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the immediate return of remains of all the dead to their families for respectful burial; (9) The Committee of Senior Officials, seeking a peaceful and lasting settlement to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh in accordance with the principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE and the equal legitimate aspirations of all peoples concerned, agreed that this requires from all the concerned parties; (10) Respect for international obligations with regard to the rule of law, democracy, and human rights, including all those based on the principles, commitments, and provisions of the CSCE; (11) Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national communities and minorities, in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE; (12) Respect for the inviolability of all borders, whether internal or external, which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement; (13) Commitment to settle by agreement all questions concerning regional disputes; (14) Guarantees for the absence of territorial claims towards any neighboring state, including abstention from hostile propaganda activities that would, inter alia, promote such territorial claims. The Committee of Senior Officials: (15) Requests participating States in the region, in particular Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, to continue their efforts to achieve a final and complete ceasefire and to promote negotiation among the parties, in the framework of the CSCE and on the basis of CSCE principles; (16) Strongly urges the continuation of the dialogue among all interested parties, including local authorities from Nagorno- Karabakh and representatives of Armenian and Azeri inhabitants from Nagorno-Karabakh. Among the first issues to be discussed in this dialogue should be the question of observers to monitor the ceasefire, the immediate needs of the refugees and displaced persons, the re-establishment of normal trade relations, and the establishment of an independent commission, including third parties, to review further problems relating to the refugees and displaced persons; (17) Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE to stand ready to participate in this dialogue and, if requested by the parties, to pursue it under the auspices of the CSCE; (18) Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE to contact the governments of CSCE participating States to determine whether it would be possible to provide a group of observers to monitor a ceasefire when it is established and to make recommendations on this subject; (19) Calls the attention of the interested parties to the possibility of using the various CSCE mechanisms to facilitate progress toward a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and, in this connection, to the possibility of requesting the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE to form an International Advisory Commission on constitutional questions; (20) Requests the CSCE participating States which may be able to influence positively the situation to report on progress toward a peaceful settlement at subsequent CSO meetings, in particular on the elements mentioned above; (21) Agrees that the possibility of additional missions to Nagorno- Karabakh to monitor the evolving situation will be considered whenever useful. Committee of Senior Officials March 14, 1992
Communique on Nagorno-Karabakh
The Committee of Senior Officials of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, -- Deeply concerned by the escalation of the armed conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh resulting in greater loss of life and increased suffering of the inhabitants, -- Reiterating its support for the goals of the mediation effort of the Russian Federation as embodied in the Communique issued on 28 February 1992 in Moscow by the Foreign Ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Russian Federation, -- Welcoming the complementary efforts taken by the European Community and its Member States, members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and by the Secretary General of the United Nations through his recent decision to send a personal representative to the area, 1. Reaffirms its decisions of 28 February 1992 under the heading "Interim report of the CSCE rapporteur mission to Nagorno-Karabakh" (7-CSO/Journal 2/Annex 1) and its determination to have their provisions implemented as soon as possible; 2. Reiterates, in the strongest terms, its call for an immediate and effective ceasefire, to include an active commitment by responsible local commanders to its implementation; 3. Agrees to convene an additional meeting of the Council in Helsinki on 24 March 1992; 4. Recommends that the Council request the CSCE Chairman-in- Office to convene as soon as possible a conference on Nagorno- Karabakh under the auspices of the CSCE to provide an ongoing forum for negotiations toward a peaceful settlement of the crisis in accordance with the principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE; 5. Welcomes the intention of Foreign Minister Dienstbier, in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council, to visit the region shortly in order to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of an effective ceasefire and the achieving of a peaceful settlement; 6. Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE to organize and despatch without delay a second CSCE mission to the region to examine the modalities of: --the negotiation and implementation of an immediate and effective ceasefire as an essential element of a long-term process leading to a political settlement; --the establishment of conditions conducive to the visit of the Chairman-in-Office; --the deployment of observers to monitor the ceasefire as soon as it is firmly established, including political and organizational aspects; --and report as soon as possible to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council in preparation for his visit, the report to be circulated to the participating States; 7. Notes the commitment of Armenia and Azerbaijan to fully support the visits of this second mission and of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council in the realization of their tasks; 8. Stresses once again the urgent need to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance and for efforts to establish safe corridors as foreshadowed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of its decision of 28 February 1992, including, in particular, convening a meeting of the states concerned; and encourages the Chairman-in-Office in the activities he undertakes to implement his corresponding mandate; 9. Reiterates its request that all participating States and all States in the region impose an immediate embargo on all deliveries of weapons and munitions to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno- Karabakh area and that all participating States inform the Conflict Prevention Center of steps taken in this respect; 10. Welcomes the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross and endorses its appeal for respect by all concerned for international humanitarian law in armed conflict.
Council of Ministers June 19-20, 1992
Summary of Conclusions
The Council of Ministers of the CSCE, 1. Welcomed the Republic of Albania as a participating State of the CSCE following receipt of a letter accepting all CSCE commitments and responsibilities from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania, Mr. Kapllani, to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Genscher (Annex 1); 2. Held political consultations on the European architecture and the strengthening of security in Europe as well as the consolidation of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, on prospects for economic transition and social change in Europe, on current issues, and on the future work of the CSCE; 3. Affirmed the importance of continued political and economic transformation in the democratic countries in transition toward a market economy. They stressed the necessity to continue support of these countries in their efforts to consolidate democracy and transform their economies; 4. Affirmed that cooperation in the fields of economy, science, technology, and the environment remains an important pillar of the CSCE; 5. Adopted a mechanism for consultation and cooperation with regard to emergency situations (Annex 2); 6. Decided that the communication network, to be established under the provisions of the Vienna CSBMs Document 1990, will be preferably used for all communications foreseen in the procedures in emergency situations. In this connection the CSCE Secretariat will be integrated into this communication network; 7. Endorsed the report of the Valletta Meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and agreed to designate the Conflict Prevention Center as the nominating institution for the CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism under the provisions of the recommendations thereto of Committee of Senior Officials (Annex 3); 8. Welcomed the establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly (Annex 4); 9. Noted with satisfaction the results of the Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage of the CSCE participating States; 10. Invited the United Nations Center for Human Rights to contribute to the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities; 11. Decided to invite the Council of Europe to make a contribution at the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension; 12. Encouraged the exchange of information and relevant documents among CSCE and the main European and trans-Atlantic institutions, such as the European Community, Council of Europe, ECE, NATO, and WEU. The procedure concerning the CSCE's participating in this exchange should be considered at the next meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials and reviewed after six months; 13. Requested the Committee of Senior Officials to prepare recommendations for the next meeting of the Council on the further development of the CSCE institutions and structures, taking into account the debate at the first council meeting. The Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Center would contribute those sections of the recommendations which concern the enhancement of the role of the Conflict Prevention Center; 14. Looked forward to a range of informal discussions and consultations on new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all CSCE participating States. In this context they requested their representatives in Vienna, as a rule their representatives to the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Center, to start informal preparatory consultations in September this year aimed at establishing by 1992, from the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all participating States as set out in the Charter of Paris. They decided that formal preparatory for the risk forum will be carried out at the Helsinki Follow-up meeting; 15. Welcomed the fact that a further seminar on military doctrine would be held within the context of the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, from 8 to 18 October 1991 and also welcomed the possibility of further seminars as may be agreed by the participating States; 16. See a need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, in light of the recent experience in the Gulf region, and for restraint and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons and weapons technologies, particularly to regions of tension. This should be a priority of CSCE governments, and ministers agreed to maintain a dialogue on these issues among CSCE countries; 17. Recalled the links of solidarity and of cooperation that unite their countries with the developing countries as well as the importance they attach. In this context, to respect for human rights and to the promotion of the fundamental values of the CSCE. They underlined the usefulness of an increasing cooperation among their countries on these questions in the appropriate forums; 18. Stressed that the CSCE must remain open to dialogue and cooperation with rest of the world and noted the interest of other countries in the CSCE. In this regard, they requested the CSO to explore this idea and to report to a future meeting of the Council; 19. Agreed that the next meeting of the Council will be held in Prague on 30 and 31 January 1992.
Tirana, 18 June 1991 Mr. Minister, The Government of the Republic of Albania hereby adopts the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and all other documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Government of the Republic of Albania accepts in their entirety all commitments and responsibilities contained in those documents and declares its determination to act in accordance with their provisions. The Government of the Republic of Albania welcomes a visit of a rapporteur mission to be arranged by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Government of Albania will do everything possible to facilitate and assist this mission. The Government of Albania is confident that his mission will inform the participating States of progress in Albania toward full implementation of CSCE commitments as well as assist Albania towards that objective. The Government of Albania understands that this mission will draw upon the expertise of persons from participating States, CSCE institutions, and other relevant organizations. The Government of Albania expresses its readiness for signature of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris by the Head of State of Government of the Republic of Albania at the earliest opportunity. I kindly ask you, Mr. Minister, to circulate copies of this letter to all representatives of the participating States at the CSCE Council of Ministers. Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration. Muhamet Kapllani HE Hans-Dietrich Genscher Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council of Ministers, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bonn
Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation with regard to Emergency Situations
The participating States will in accordance with the following provisions, consult and cooperate with each other concerning a serious emergency situation which may arise from a violation of one of the principles of the Final Act or as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security, or stability. In applying the mechanism for consultation and co-operation with regard to emergency situations all the principles of the Final Act, including the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, and those of the Charter of Paris are of primary significance and accordingly will be equally and unreservedly applied each of them being interpreted taking into account the others. 1. If any participating State concludes that an emergency situation, as described above, is developing, it may seek clarification from the State or States involved. The request will state the cause, or causes, of the concern. 1.1 The requested State or States will provide within 48 hours all relevant information in order to clarify the situation giving rise to the request. 1.2 The request and the reply will be transmitted to all other participating States without delay. 2. Should the situation remain unresolved, any of the States involved in the procedure described under point 1 above may address to the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee of Senior Officials a request that an emergency meeting of the Committee be held. 2.1 Any request addressed by the same state on an identical subject between two regular meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials will be inadmissible. 2.2 Any request should state the reasons why the matter is urgent and why the emergency mechanism is the most appropriate. 2.3 Any request should be accompanied by the texts of the request for clarification and of the reply provided for under point 1 above. 2.4 On receipt of the request, the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee of Senior Officials will immediately inform all participating States and the CSCE Secretariat and submit the relevant documentation. 2.5 The Chairman will also enter into contact with the states involved within a period of 24 hours following receipt of the request. 2.6 As soon as 12 or more participating States have seconded the request within a maximum period of 48 hours by addressing their support to the Chairman, he will immediately notify all participating States of the date and time of the meeting, which will be held at the earliest 48 hours and at the latest three days after this notification. The notification will also include the reason for, and the agenda of, the meeting. 2.7 Subject to the conditions set out in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.6 above, no judgment as to the facts nor any possible dispute as to the validity of the reasons offered for requesting the emergency convening of a meeting may be invoked for postponing or preventing the holding of an emergency meeting. 2.8 The meeting will be held at the seat of the Secretariat and last no more than two days, unless otherwise agreed. 2.9 The agenda of the emergency meeting will consist of a single item. Its formulation will be identical to that contained in the notification provided for in paragraph 2.6 above. It will not be open to amendment. The Chairman of the meeting will ensure that discussions do not depart from the subject on the agenda. 2.10 The meeting will be chaired by the representative of the state holding the chairmanship of the Committee of Senior Officials. 2.11 If the Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials is a nation of one of the States involved, as defined under point 1 above, the meeting will be chaired by the representative of the next state, in French alphabetical order, which is not involved in the situation. 2.12 The proceedings will be introduced by a short statement by the Chairman recalling the facts and stages of development of the situation. He will then indicate the number of speakers who have asked for the floor and will open the debate. 2.13 In the light of its assessment of the situation, the meeting may agree on recommendations or conclusions to arrive at a solution. It may also decide to convene a meeting at ministerial level. 2.14 The procedures for convening meetings under this mechanism do not affect the rule of consensus in other circumstances. 3. The procedures defined above will not be used in place of the mechanism concerning unusual military activities. 4. The communications between participating States provided for above will be transmitted preferably through the CSBMs communications network. The above procedures will be reviewed and, if necessary, revised at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting.
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Taking into account the report of the Valletta 1991 meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, containing the principles for Dispute Settlement and the provisions for a CSCE procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, the Council establishes the following arrangements in accordance with the Charter of Paris. The Council 1. Designates the Conflict Prevention Center to act as the nominating institution in accordance with Section V of the said provisions, and requests the Director of the Secretariat of the CPC to assume his functions accordingly under the overall responsibility of the Council; 2. Invites each participating State desiring to do so to communicate as soon as possible and preferably by 30 August 1991 the names of up to four persons to be entered into the register of qualified candidates to be maintained by the nominating institution in accordance with Section V of said provisions; 3. Decides that the mechanism will come into force as soon as 40 nominations have been received by the director; 4. Instructs the Director of the Secretariat of the CPC to notify the full list of nominations as soon as the fortieth nomination is received and subsequently to notify any additions or revisions which may be made; 5. Recalls the experience of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and its Secretary General which should be drawn upon, if so agreed, when the CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes is implemented; 6. Notes that appropriate use can be made of the premises and facilities of the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
The Council welcomes the successful outcome of the meeting in Madrid on 2 and 3 April 1991 of parliamentarians from CSCE participating States. They note with satisfaction the consensus reached to adopt the "Final resolution concerning the establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly". The Council considers that this resolution represents an important step forward for the development of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe regarding greater parliamentary involvement in the CSCE. Reaffirming their commitment to strengthening democracy as the only system of government of their countries, the Ministers look forward to the collective expression of the views of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly on Security and Cooperation in Europe and on the future development of the CSCE. Council of Ministers January 30-31, 1992
Declaration of the CSCE Council on Non-Proliferation And Arms Transfers
The Council of Ministers of the CSCE, 1. Reiterated the commitment of their governments to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the control of missile technology. They underlined their willingness to contribute to the ongoing efforts and international co-operation to this end. In this context, they expressed their support for the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and for universal adherence to it. They welcomed the intention of all those CSCE States not yet party to the NPT [Non-proliferation Treaty] to accede to it and urged other states, who are not yet party to it, to do so as well. They also renewed their support for a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable Chemical Weapons Convention to be concluded in 1992. They also reaffirmed their support for the Biological Weapons Convention, welcomed the results of the September 1991 Review Conference and called for universal adherence to it; 2. Expressed their view that excessive buildups of conventional weapons beyond legitimate defensive needs pose a threat to international peace and security in particular in regions of tension. Based on the principles of transparency, consultation, and restraint, they declared their commitment to address the threat of excessive accumulations of conventional weapons and committed themselves to exercise responsibility, in particular with regard to arms transfers to states engaging in such excessive accumulations and to regions of tension; 3. Confirmed their support for and firmly committed themselves to provide full information to the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms. They called upon all other States to take the same action; 4. Agreed that effective national control of weapons and equipment transfer is acquiring the greatest importance. They declared their readiness to exchange views and to provide mutual assistance in the establishment of efficient national control mechanisms; 5. Agreed that in this connection the conversion of arms production to civilian production is also acquiring special importance; 6. Decided that the question of non-proliferation, including the transfer of sensitive expertise, and the establishment of a responsible approach to international armaments transfers should be included as a matter of priority in the work program for the post Helsinki Arms Control Process. Council of Ministers January 30-31, 1992
Summary of Conclusions
The Council of Ministers of the CSCE, 1. Welcomed Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan as participating States, following receipt of letters accepting CSCE commitments and responsibilities from each of them (Annex); 2. Granted Observer Status to Croatia and Slovenia in the CSCE Process; 3. Welcomed as guests of honor the representatives of the Heads of the following international institutions and organizations: United Nations; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe; Council of Europe; Western European Union; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 4. Held political consultations on the transformation in Europe--the role of the CSCE and the contribution of European and other institutions and on the strengthening of CSCE institutions and structures and orientations for the Helsinki Follow-up meeting. They adopted with immediate effect the Prague Document on the further development of the CSCE institutions and structures; 5. Agreed that the Helsinki Follow-up meeting should be an important milestone in the development of the CSCE process and should provide a clear vision for its future course. Representatives to the follow-up meeting should, in particular, be guided by: -- The CSCE's comprehensive concept of security and stability, which includes human rights, political, military, economic and environmental components; -- The important role of the CSCE in fostering democratic development and fully integrating participating States into the network of shared CSCE valves, principles and norms and its role in promoting a stable security environment in Europe; -- The importance of a thorough implementation review, particularly in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which will take account of the new situation in Europe and the enlarged number of CSCE participating States; -- The objective of the CSCE to prevent conflict and consolidate peace through eliminating the root causes of tensions, by attaining in particular full respect for human rights, including those inscribed in the CSCE provisions on national minorities, by building democratic institutions and by fostering economic and social progress; -- The need to strengthen the capacity of the CSCE to contribute, in accordance with CSCE principles, to a peaceful solution of problems involving national minorities which could lead to tensions and conflict--both within and between States--including possibilities for "early warning"; -- The need for further development of the CSCE's capability for conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes; and -- The need to strengthen the effectiveness of CSCE institutions by matching their functions more closely to the achievement of these objectives. 6. Had a comprehensive discussion on the Yugoslav crisis. They welcomed the ceasefire agreements reached under the auspices of the United Nations, which are in the process of implementation, and renewed their strong appeal for strict compliance with those agreements; the Ministers also warned against any extension of the present conflict. They reaffirmed their support for the efforts undertaken by the Secretary General and the Security Council of the United Nations, and reiterated the need to create the conditions for an early deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces on the basis of Resolution 727 of the United Nations Security Council on Yugoslavia. They endorsed the concept of the United Nations peacekeeping operation and expressed their hope that it would facilitate the political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. The Ministers reiterated the commitment of the participating States to seek a peaceful and lasting settlement of the crisis, in accordance with the commitments and provisions of the CSCE and the equal legitimate aspirations of all the peoples concerned. The Ministers agreed that this requires from all the concerned parties: -- Respect for international obligations with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights; -- Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national communities and minorities, in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE; -- Respect for the inviolability of all borders, whether internal or external, which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement; -- Commitment to settle by agreement all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes; and -- Guarantees for the absence of territorial claims toward any neighboring state, including abstention from hostile propaganda activities that would, inter alia, promote such territorial claims. The Ministers reiterated the determination of their States to cooperate closely in the search for a comprehensive solution to the crisis, in particular to refrain from any action impeding these goals. They stressed the special need for dialogue and enhanced cooperation between neighboring states to this end. The Ministers expressed their profound concern about the humanitarian aspects of the crisis. They insisted that all parties involved allow emergency aid to reach all people and communities in need. They declared their support for all efforts, in particular those by the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations, to facilitate the return to their homes of all persons displaced by the hostilities who desire to do so. They reminded all those responsible for acts of violence and for violations of ceasefire agreements that under international law they are personally accountable for their actions that are in contravention of relevant norms of international humanitarian law. The Ministers fully endorsed the efforts of the Committee of Senior Officials, including those undertaken within the framework of the mechanism for consultation and cooperation with regard to emergency situations. The Ministers expressed their appreciation for the activities of the monitor mission and recalled their support for the Conference on Yugoslavia, and its Chairman, taking place under the sponsorship of the European Community and its member States, expressing the hope that agreement on a global settlement of the Yugoslav crisis, including all issues under consideration by the conference, will soon be reached. A CSCE human rights rapporteur mission visited Yugoslavia and submitted its report. Taking into account the conclusions of this report, the Ministers expressed their view that the human rights situation in Yugoslavia, including the situation of national minorities, should be kept under review by the CSCE, and that full use should be made to that end of the various CSCE mechanisms, including, if necessary, other missions. They requested the Committee of Senior Officials at its next meeting to examine the need for further action. 7. Expressed their concern over new signs of intolerance, aggressive nationals, xenophobia and racism. They recalled the importance of non-discrimination and stressed the need to build their societies according to the basic values of the CSCE. The Ministers requested the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to address the need to ensure full compliance through appropriate means with commitments to protect individuals and groups from racial, ethnic and religious discrimination. The Ministers also came to the following conclusions: 8. Reaffirmed that the CSCE has a vital role to play in the building and consolidation of a new Europe. The contribution that the CSCE has to make to the fostering of political stability and security is indispensable. The CSCE, with its comprehensive mandate and wide participation, constitutes a unique forum for security negotiations; 9. Stressed that the CSCE also has a prominent role to play in the evolving European architecture and that the challenges facing Europe call for multi-faceted forms of cooperation, and a close relationship among European, trans-Atlantic and other international institutions and organizations, drawing as appropriate upon their respective competences; They requested their representatives at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to study further ways and means of fostering such cooperation with a view to enhancing its effectiveness and to avoid duplication. 10. Adopted the declaration on non-proliferation and arms transfers; 11. Stressed that the establishment, by 1992, from the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, of new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all participating States--as well as of a broader security dialogue and of effective mechanisms for conflict prevention--will mark an important step in consolidating a new cooperative order in Europe. They assessed the progress made so far in the informal consultations in Vienna for the new forum. They requested that these consultations be accelerated and that their conclusions be transmitted to the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting at its beginning; 12. Agreed that the CFE Treaty forms an important element for stability and security in Europe. They called upon all signatories and all relevant newly independent States to take all the necessary steps to ensure the early entry into force of the treaty; 13. Assessed the progress made so far in the negotiations in Vienna; They instructed their representatives at the negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures to conclude them prior to the opening of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting with a substantial new CSBM package. They expressed the hope that an Open Skies agreement will be ready for conclusion in time for the opening of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. They welcomed the determination of the participants in the negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe to conclude, in connection with the entry into force of the CFE Treaty, an agreement limiting the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces within the area of application in time for the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. In this context they stressed the need for the early participation of the relevant newly independent States in these negotiations. 14. Took note of the discussion at the second seminar on military doctrine held within the framework of the Conflict Prevention Center; 15. Took note and endorsed, as appropriate, the results of -- the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities; -- The Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE; -- The Oslo Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions; 16. Noted the report of the rapporteur mission to Albania; 17. Noted with satisfaction that the CSCE communications network is now operational and they expressed their expectations that full use will be made of it. They expressed special thanks to the Netherlands for the key role which that country had played in establishing this network; 18. Agreed that, in the light of the conclusions of the rapporteur missions to new CSCE States and of any requests received from them, and from other states recently admitted to the CSCE process, informal consultations under the direction of the Chairman of the CSO should take place at Helsinki, during the follow-up meeting, in order to establish the modalities for a program of coordinated support to such States, through which appropriate diplomatic, academic, legal and administrative expertise and advice on CSCE matters could be made available; 19. Encouraged the establishment and strengthening of independent Chambers of Commerce in countries in transition to open market economies, to function as a point of contact for private business and financial interests, and to encourage entrepreneurial activity. The Ministers would welcome the development and expansion of the activities of the International Chamber of Commerce in this area in cooperation with other institutions undertaking similar work; 20. Took note of a proposal to invite a high-level group of legal experts from CSCE participating States to elaborate a draft statute for a CSCE conciliation and arbitration body, taking into account the work already done within the CSCE. They welcomed the intention to submit this draft to the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting; 21. Agreed that the next meeting of the Council will be held in Stockholm in early December 1992. They will seek to confirm the specific days for this meeting at the opening of the Helsinki Follow- up Meeting based on the proposal of the host country (3-4 December 1992); 22. Recalling that the Heads of State or Government decided in the Charter of Paris to meet on the occasion of the CSCE Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the Council proposed that the summit meeting should be held over two days beginning on 9 July 1992. Council of Ministers January 30-31, 1992
Prague Document on Strengthening CSCE Institutions and Structures
1. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to pursue actively all the objectives set out in the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, and their determination to further strengthen CSCE institutions and structures for this purpose. To this end they took the following decisions and established certain guidelines for the discussions at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. I

Overview and Co-ordination

2. Between meetings of the CSCE Council, the Committee of Senior Officials will be responsible for overview, management and co- ordination and will act as the Council's agent in taking appropriate decisions. 3. In order to increase its effectiveness, the Committee of Senior Officials will meet more regularly, at least every three months. In conformity with the Charter of Paris and building on established practice, the Committee of Senior Officials may delegate tasks to other CSCE institutions or to open-ended ad hoc groups of participating States with a precise mandate. II

Political Consultations

4. In order to further strengthen the political consultation process, the Committee of Senior Officials may set aside certain meetings, or parts thereof, for addressing previously agreed specific issues. Other relevant policy-level officials could attend such meetings. 5. The facilities of the CSCE communications network will be made available to the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee of Senior Officials for transmission of urgent messages related to the work of the Committee. III

Human Dimension

6. The Ministers agreed that monitoring and promoting progress in the human dimension remains a key function of the CSCE. 7. Issues related to the human dimension will therefore be considered by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials whenever necessary. 8. In addition, meetings of a short duration may also be decided upon by the Committee of Senior Officials to address clearly defined issues. Results of such meetings will be submitted to the Council through the Committee of Senior Officials for consideration or decisions as required. 9. In order to extend practical cooperation among participating States in the human dimension, the Ministers decided to give additional functions to the Office for Free Elections which will henceforth be called the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 10. Under the general guidance of the CSO, the office should, inter alia: -- Organize a short CSCE meeting at the seat of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to address implementation of CSCE human dimension commitments every year in which a follow-up meeting does not take place. The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting will work out the organizational modalities for such meetings; -- Serve as an institutional framework for sharing and exchanging information on available technical assistance, expertise, and national and international programs aimed at assisting the new democracies in their institution building; -- Facilitate contacts between those offering such resources and those wishing to make use of them; -- Develop cooperation with Council of Europe in order to make use of its database of such resources and services; -- Establish contacts with non-governmental organizations active in the field of democratic institution building, with a view to enabling interested participating States to make use of their extensive resources and expertise; -- Facilitate cooperation in training and education in disciplines relevant to democratic institutions; -- Organize meetings and seminars among all participating States on subjects related to the building and revitalization of democratic institutions, such as short seminar on free media and, at an appropriate time, one on migration. These meetings and seminars will be held in Warsaw unless otherwise decided. 11. In order to avoid duplication of work specially in the fields enumerated above, the Ministers directed the office to work closely with other institutions active in the field of democratic institution building and human rights, particularly the Council of Europe and the European Commission for Democracy through Law. 12. The CSO will on an annual basis examine the need for meetings and seminars on the human dimension and democratic institutions and will establish a work program. 13. The Ministers requested the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to further specify the task of the Warsaw office and to decide now the human dimension activities of the CSCE may be further carried forward. 14. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is designated as the CSCE institution charged with the tasks in connection with expert and rapporteur missions according to the document of the Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. 15. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights will be connected to the CSCE communications network. IV

Safeguarding Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law

16. The Council decided, in order to develop further the CSCE's capability to safeguard human rights, democracy and the rule of law through peaceful means, that appropriate action may be taken by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the state concerned, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments. Such actions would consist of political declarations or other political steps to apply outside the territory of the state concerned. This decision is without prejudice to existing CSCE mechanisms. 17. The Council requested the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to consider further modalities in applying this decision. V

Economic Cooperation

18. The Ministers agreed on the need to continue their efforts to strengthen the focus of CSCE on the transition to and development of free market economies as an essential contribution to the building of democracy. 19. To this end, they agreed to establish an economic forum within the framework of the CSO. The CSO would convene as the economic forum to give political stimulus to the dialogue on these topics, to suggest practical efforts for the development of free market systems and economic cooperation, and to encourage activities already underway within organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). The forum will meet periodically in Prague and can invite contributions to its meetings by those European and trans- Atlantic organizations relevant to the subject under discussion. It was agreed that the first meeting of the economic forum would be in early 1992. 20. The Ministers agreed that the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting will consider appropriate further measures to promote discussions in the framework of the CSCE on economic cooperation and related topics. VI

Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Instruments

21. The Council agreed that the capabilities of the CSCE to engage in crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution should be improved. 22. To this end, the Council requested the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to study possibilities for improving the following instruments: -- Fact finding and rapporteur missions; -- Monitor missions; -- Good offices; -- Counselling and conciliation; -- Dispute settlement. 23. In this context the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting should also give careful consideration to possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping or a CSCE role in peacekeeping. 24. Provision should be made for the further operational implementation within the CSCE of decisions by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials. 25. Tasks may be delegated to the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee of Senior Officials, to the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Center or to open-ended groups of participating States of an ad hoc character. In each case a precise mandate and arrangements for reporting back should be established.
Conflict Prevention Center
26. In addition to the tasks already given to the Conflict Prevention Center in the supplementary document of the Paris Charter and in the summary of conclusions of the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council, the functions and working methods of the CPC are enhanced as follows: 27. The Consultative Committee will serve as a forum in the security field wherein the CSCE participating States will conduct comprehensive and regular consultations on security issues with politico-military implications. In this context, any participating State may, in order to reduce the risk of conflict, promptly raise an issue which in its view has such implications. This is without prejudice to later decisions on the structure of a new security/arms control forum and the relationship it may have to the CPC. 28. The Consultative Committee will serve as a forum for consultation and cooperation in conflict prevention and for cooperation in the implementation of decisions on crisis management taken by the Council or by the CSO acting as its agent. 29. The Consultative Committee has the authority to initiate and, with the assistance of the CPC Secretariat, execute fact finding and monitor missions in connection with paragraph 17 of the Vienna Document 1990 (mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities). 30. The Consultative Committee, with the assistance of the CPC Secretariat, will execute any additional tasks assigned to it by the Council, or by the Committee of Senior Officials acting as its agent. This will include full responsibility in the implementation of such tasks. The Consultative Committee will report in an appropriate manner on the implementation of these tasks to the Committee of Senior Officials. 31. The Consultative Committee will develop general guidelines for the implementation of its operational tasks including, in due time, those that may be assigned to it by the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting and in the future. 32. In addition to the existing support to the implementation of CSBMs, the CPC will fulfill other functions as regards the implementation and verification of agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control if so requested by the parties to those agreements and agreed upon by the Consultative Committee. 33. The Consultative Committee may at any time draw the attention of the Committee of Senior Officials to a situation which it considers requires the consideration of the Committee of Senior Officials. 34. The Consultative Committee will meet regularly, as a rule at least once a month. Working schedules should be flexible and additional meetings may be held, in the light of circumstances and future requirements. 35. The Consultative Committee may establish subsidiary working bodies, including open-ended ad hoc groups entrusted with specific tasks. 36. The regular meetings of the Consultative Committee will be chaired in alphabetical rotation. The Chairmanship will rotate immediately after the last regular meeting in every month. 37. The Chairman of the Consultative Committee and the Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials will maintain contact with each other. 38. The Chairman of the Consultative Committee or his representative will attend meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials which are relevant to the tasks of the CPC. 39. In accordance with the paragraph on "CSCE Relationship with International Organizations", European, trans-Atlantic and other international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and relevant United Nations bodies, will be invited to make appropriate contributions to future seminars organized by the CPC. 40. The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting should also examine further how the CSCE could cooperate with other international organizations in these fields. VII

Parliamentary Assembly

41. In the interest of encouraging an active dialogue with the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council will be in contact with the Chairman of the Committee of Heads of Delegation of the Assembly in order to explore possible interest in the presence of the Chairman of the Council at the Budapest meeting of the Assembly in July 1992. The Chairman of the Council will be prepared to make himself available to report on the work of the CSCE; to answer parliamentarians' questions in this regard; and to take note of parliamentarians' views for subsequent transmission to the Council. VIII

Non-Governmental Organizations

42. The Council requests the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to strengthen relations between the CSCE and non-governmental organizations, in order to increase the role of non-governmental organizations in implementing CSCE goals and commitments. In particular, the follow-up meeting will develop opportunities and procedures for meaningful non-governmental organization involvement in the CSCE and possibilities for non-governmental organizations to communicate with CSCE structures and institutions, recalling, inter alia, the texts on non-governmental organizations agreed by the Sofia and Moscow meetings and by the Oslo Seminar. IV

CSCE Relationship with International Organizations

43. The Council of Europe, ECE, NATO, the Western European Union, OECD, EBRD, EIB and other European and trans-Atlantic organizations which may be agreed will be invited to make contributions on the basis of CSCE precedent and practice to specialized CSCE meetings where they have relevant expertise. 44. To ensure full coordination, the Ministers would welcome it if the above organizations would inform the CSCE Secretariat annually of their current work program and of the facilities available for work relevant to the CSCE. X

Relations with Non-Participating States

45. The Council requests the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to recommend practical ways to establish a flexible dialogue between the CSCE and interested non-participating States or groups of States, for example through contacts between the said States and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council or of the Committee of Senior Officials. XI

Financial Arrangements of the CSCE and Cost- Effectiveness

46. The Council requested the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to develop procedures which would ensure greater predictability and transparency of the costs of CSCE meetings and other activities. Measures to provide for increased cost-effectiveness should also be examined. 47. States proposing to host future CSCE meetings will present draft budgets along with their proposals. Detailed provisions in this respect will be developed at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting.(###)