US Department of State Dispatch Supplement
VOL. 3, NO 2
Title: The Middle East Peace Process.
PA
Bush
Baker
Bohlen
Reilly
Djerejian
Source: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs
Date: Feb, 15 19922/15/92
Description: A collection
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Category: Fact Sheets
Category: Reports
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria
Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Democratization,
Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights,
International Organizations, Immigration, Military Affairs,
Refugees, Cultural Exchange, Security Assistance and Sales,
Trade/Economics
[Text]
[NOTE; CHARTS AND TABLES ARE NOT INCLUDED]
President Bush: The World After the Persian Gulf War
[Address before a joint session of Congress, Washington, DC, March 6,
1991]
[TEXT]
Mr. President, and Mr. Speaker, thank you, sir, for those very
generous words spoken from the heart about the wonderful
performance of our military.
Members of Congress, 5 short weeks ago, I came to this House to
speak to you about the State of the Union. We met then in time of
war. Tonight, we meet in a world blessed by the promise of peace.
From the moment Operation Desert Storm commenced on January 16
until the time the guns fell silent at midnight 1 week ago, this
nation has watched its sons and daughters with pride--watched over
them with prayer. As Commander in Chief, I can report to you our
armed forces fought with honor and valor. And as President, I can
report to the nation aggression is defeated. The war is over.
This is a victory for every country in the coalition; for the United
Nations; a victory for unprecedented international cooperation and
diplomacy--so well led by our Secretary of State James Baker. It is
a victory for the rule of law and for what is right.
Desert Storm's success belongs to the team that so ably leads our
armed forces: our Secretary of Defense and our Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, Dick Cheney and Colin Powell.
And while you're standing, this military victory also belongs to the
one the British call the "Man of the Match"--the tower of calm at
the eye of Desert Storm, General Norman Schwarzkopf. And let us--
recognizing this was a coalition effort--let us not forget Saudi
General Khalid, Britain's General de la Billiere, or General
Roquejoffre of France, and all the others whose leadership played
such a vital role. And most importantly, most importantly of all, all
those who served in the field.
I thank the members of this Congress; support here for our troops in
battle was overwhelming. And above all, I thank those whose
unfailing love and support sustained our courageous men and women.
I thank the American people.
Tonight, I come to this House to speak about the world--the world
after war. The recent challenge could not have been clearer. Saddam
Hussein was the villain; Kuwait the victim. To the aid of this small
country came the nations from North America and Europe, from Asia
and South America, from Africa and the Arab world--all united
against aggression. Our uncommon coalition must now work in
common purpose: to forge a future that should never again be held
hostage to the darker side of human nature.
Tonight in Iraq, Saddam walks amidst ruin. His war machine is
crushed. His ability to threaten mass destruction is itself
destroyed. His people have been lied to, denied the truth. And when
his defeated legions come home, all Iraqis will see and feel the
havoc he has wrought. And this I promise you: For all that Saddam
has done to his own people, to the Kuwaitis, and to the entire world,
Saddam and those around him are accountable.
All of us grieve for the victims of war, for the people of Kuwait, and
the suffering that scars the soul of that proud nation. We grieve for
all our fallen soldiers and their families, for all the innocents
caught up in this conflict. And, yes, we grieve for the people of Iraq,
a people who have never been our enemy. My hope is that one day we
will once again welcome them as friends into the community of
nations.
Four Key Challenges
Our commitment to peace in the Middle East does not end with the
liberation of Kuwait. So tonight, let me outline four key challenges
to be met.
First, we must work together to create shared security
arrangements in the region. Our friends and allies in the Middle East
recognize that they will bear the bulk of the responsibility for
regional security. But we want them to know that just as we stood
with them to repel aggression, so now America stands ready to work
with them to secure the peace.
This does not mean stationing US ground forces in the Arabian
Peninsula, but it does mean American participation in joint
exercises involving both air and ground forces. It means maintaining
a capable US naval presence in the region, just as we have for over
40 years. Let it be clear: Our vital national interests depend on a
stable and secure Gulf.
Second, we must act to control the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. It would be
tragic if the nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf were now,
in the wake of war, to embark on a new arms race. Iraq requires
special vigilance. Until Iraq convinces the world of its peaceful
intentions--that its leaders will not use new revenues to rearm and
rebuild its menacing war machine--Iraq must not have access to the
instruments of war.
Third, we must work to create new opportunities for peace and
stability in the Middle East. On the night I an-nounced Operation
Desert Storm, I expressed my hope that out of the horrors of war
might come new momentum for peace. We've learned in the modern
age geography cannot guarantee security and security does not come
from military power alone.
All of us know the depth of bitterness that has made the dispute
between Israel and its neighbors so painful and intractable. Yet, in
the conflict just concluded, Israel and many of the Arab states have,
for the first time, found themselves confronting the same aggressor.
By now, it should be plain to all parties that peacemaking in the
Middle East requires compromise. At the same time, peace brings
real benefits to everyone. We must do all that we can to close the
gap between Israel and the Arab states and between Israelis and
Palestinians. The tactics of terror lead absolutely nowhere. There
can be no substitute for diplomacy.
A comprehensive peace must be grounded in UN Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace.
This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and
recognition and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political
rights. Anything else would fail the twin test of fairness and
security. The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict.
The war with Iraq is over. The quest for solutions to the problems
in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in the Gulf must go
forward with new vigor and determination. And I guarantee you, no
one will work harder for a stable peace in the region than we will.
Fourth, we must foster economic development for the sake of peace
and progress. The Persian Gulf and Middle East form a region rich in
natural resources with a wealth of untapped human potential.
Resources once squandered on military might must be redirected to
more peaceful ends. We are already addressing the immediate
economic consequences of Iraq's aggression. Now, the challenge is
to reach higher, to foster economic freedom and prosperity for all
the people of the region.
Building a Framework for Peace
By meeting these four challenges we can build a framework for
peace. I've asked Secretary of State Baker to go to the Middle East
to begin the process. He will go to listen, to probe, to offer
suggestions, to advance the search for peace and stability. I've also
asked him to raise the plight of the hostages held in Lebanon. We
have not forgotten them, and we will not forget them. To all the
challenges that confront this region of the world there is no single
solution, no solely American answer. But we can make a difference.
America will work tirelessly as a catalyst for positive change.
But we cannot lead a new world abroad if, at home, it's politics as
usual on American defense and diplomacy. It's time to turn away
from the temptation to protect unneeded weapons systems and
obsolete bases. It's time to put an end to micromanagement of
foreign and security assistance programs, micromanagement that
humiliates our friends and allies and hamstrings our diplomacy. It's
time to rise above the parochial and the pork barrel--to do what is
necessary, what's right, and what will enable this nation to play the
leadership role required of us.
The consequences of the conflict in the Gulf reach far beyond the
confines of the Middle East. Twice before in this century, an entire
world was convulsed by war. Twice this century, out of the horrors
of war, hope emerged for enduring peace. Twice before, those hopes
proved to be a distant dream, beyond the grasp of man.
Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided--a world
of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict, and Cold War. Now, we
can see a new world coming into view, a world in which there is the
very real prospect of a new world order: in the words of Winston
Churchill, a world order in which "the principles of justice and fair
play protect the weak against the strong"; a world where the United
Nations--freed from Cold War stalemate--is poised to fulfill the
historic vision of its founders; a world in which freedom and respect
for human rights find a home among all nations.
The Gulf war put this new world to its first test. And, my fellow
Americans, we passed that test. For the sake of our principles, for
the sake of the Kuwaiti people, we stood our ground. Because the
world would not look the other way, Ambassador [to the US Saud
Nasir] al-Sabah, tonight, Kuwait is free. And we are very happy
about that.
Tonight, as our troops begin to come home, let us recognize that the
hard work of freedom still calls us forward. We've learned the hard
lessons of history. The victory over Iraq was not waged as a "war to
end all wars." Even the new world order cannot guarantee an era of
perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our mission.
Challenges at Home
Our success in the Gulf will shape not only the world order we seek
but our mission here at home. In the war just ended, there were
clear-cut objectives, timetables, and, above all, an overriding
imperative to achieve results. We must bring that same sense of
self-discipline, that same sense of urgency, to the way we meet
challenges here at home. In my State of the Union address and in my
budget, I defined a comprehensive agenda to prepare for the next
American century.
Our first priority is to get this economy rolling again. The fear and
uncertainty caused by the Gulf crisis were understandable. But now
that the war is over, oil prices are down, interest rates are down,
and confidence is rightly coming back. Americans can move
forward--to lend, spend, and invest in this, the strongest economy
on earth.
We must also enact the legislation that is key to building a better
America. For example, in 1990, we enacted a historic Clean Air Act.
And, now, we've proposed a national energy strategy. We passed a
child care bill that put power in the hands of parents. And, today,
we're ready to do the same thing with our schools and expand choice
in education. We passed a crime bill that made a useful start in
fighting crime and drugs. This year, we're sending to Congress our
comprehensive crime package to finish the job. We passed the
landmark Americans with Disabilities Act. And, now, we've sent
forward our civil rights bill. We also passed the aviation bill. This
year we've sent up our new highway bill. And these are just a few of
our pending proposals for reform and renewal.
So, tonight, I call on Congress to move forward aggressively on our
domestic front. Let's begin with two initiatives we should be able
to agree on quickly: transportation and crime. And then, let's build
on success with those and enact the rest of our agenda. If our forces
could win the ground war in 100 hours, then surely the Congress can
pass this legislation in 100 days. Let that be a promise we make
tonight to the American people.
Honoring US Troops
When I spoke in this House about the state of our union, I asked all of
you: If we can selflessly confront evil for the sake of good in a land
so far away, then surely we can make this land all that it should be.
In the time since then, the brave men and women of Desert Storm
accomplished more than even they may realize. They set out to
confront an enemy abroad, and, in the process, they transformed a
nation at home. Think of the way they went about their mission--
with confidence and quiet pride. Think about their sense of duty,
about all they taught us, about our values, about ourselves.
We hear so often about our young people in turmoil: how our children
fall short, how our schools fail us, how American products and
American workers are second-class. Well, don't you believe it. The
America we saw in Desert Storm was first-class talent. They did it
using America's state-of-the-art technology. We saw the excellence
embodied in the Patriot missile and the patriots who made it work.
And, we saw soldiers who know about honor and bravery and duty and
country and the world-shaking power of these simple words.
There is something noble and majestic about the pride, about the
patriotism that we feel tonight. So to everyone here and everyone
watching at home, think about the men and women of Desert Storm.
Let us honor them with our gratitude. Let us comfort the families of
the fallen and remember each precious life lost. Let us learn from
them as well. Let us honor those who have served us by serving
others. Let us honor them as individuals--men and women of every
race, all creeds and colors--by setting the face of this nation
against discrimination, bigotry, and hate. Eliminate them.
I'm sure that many of you saw on the television the unforgettable
scene of four terrified Iraqi soldiers surrendering. They emerged
from their bunker broken, tears streaming from their eyes, fearing
the worst. And then there was an American soldier. Remember what
he said? He said: "It's okay. You're all right now. You're all right
now." That scene says a lot about America, a lot about who we are.
Americans are a caring people. We are a good people, a generous
people. Let us always be caring and good and generous in all we do.
Soon, very soon, our troops will begin the march we've all been
waiting for--their march home. And, I have directed Secretary
Cheney to begin the immediate return of American combat units
from the Gulf. Less than 2 hours from now, the first planeload of
American soldiers will lift off from Saudi Arabia headed for the
USA. It will carry men and women of the 24th Mechanized Infantry
Division bound for Fort Stewart, Georgia. This is just the beginning
of a steady flow of American troops coming home. Let their return
remind us that all those who have gone before are linked with us in
the long line of freedom's march.
Americans have always tried to serve, to sacrifice nobly for what
we believe to be right. Tonight, I ask every community in this
country to make this coming 4th of July a day of special celebration
for our returning troops. They may have missed Thanksgiving and
Christmas, but I can tell you this: For them and for their families,
we can make this a holiday they'll never forget.
In a very real sense, this victory belongs to them--to the privates
and the pilots, to the sergeants and the supply officers, to the men
and women in the machines and the men and women who made them
work. It belongs to the regulars, to the reserves, to the National
Guard. This victory belongs to the finest fighting force this nation
has ever known in its history.
We went halfway around the world to do what is moral and just and
right. We fought hard, and, with others, we won the war. We lifted
the yoke of aggression and tyranny from a small country that many
Americans had never even heard of, and we shall ask nothing in
return.
We're coming home now--proud, confident, heads high. There is
much that we must do at home and abroad. And we will do it. We are
Americans. May God bless this great nation, the United States of
America. Thank you all very, very much.
Secretary Baker: Foreign Assistance Funding Proposal for FY
1992
[Excerpt from statement prepared for delivery before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations
Committee, Washington, DC, May 22, 1991]
[Text]
Mr. Chairman, I am privileged to appear before this subcommittee to
testify on behalf of our foreign assistance funding proposal for
fiscal year (FY) 1992.
I would like to report on my recent trips to the Middle East, devoting
the bulk of my remarks to the Middle East peace process and to the
situation in Iraq. I also would like to make some brief observations
about the Soviet Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
The Peace Process
For the past 2 months, we've been engaged in an intensive effort to
find a path to a comprehensive settlement through direct
negotiations between Israel, the Arab states, and Palestinians.
Since we began that effort, I have had no illusions about the
challenges and difficulties involved. But I also have had a strong
sense that the Gulf war may have created some new possibilities for
peace-making in the region and that the United States has a unique
obligation to help explore them. While it would be sad if it turns out
that old obstacles are more formidable than new opportunities, it
would be sadder still if the United States failed to energetically
pursue a chance for peace. Those chances do not come along very
often in the Middle East.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait brought together a historic international
coalition. The United States, the Soviet Union, Europeans, Arabs, and
others joined to reverse Iraq's aggression. The United Nations
played the role its founders had intended. And through its restraint
in the face of Iraqi provocation, Israel became a silent partner in the
coalition's success. The net result was a staggering defeat for
Saddam Hussein and the path of violence and intimidation that he
represented and new hope for the alternative path of diplomacy and
negotiations.
To test the moment and transform the ground rules for Arab-Israeli
peace-making, we felt it important to engage in a process that
would break the taboos on direct dialogue. If the impulse to make
peace was different, we needed to overcome the barriers to Israelis,
Arabs, and Palestinians meeting directly. We needed to establish
that dialogue and diplomacy--not violence or rejectionism--could
become the currency of politics in the region.
The war provided a grim reminder of the dangers of conflict in an
era of escalating military competition. It was a reminder that the
dispute between Israelis and Palestinians was
still at the core of the Arab-Israeli problem--but that the state-to-
state dimension also had to be addressed. And it was a hopeful
reminder that Israel and the Arab states sometimes find common
ground between them--common ground which might provide room for
maneuver to encourage Israeli-Palestinian accommodation.
Our post-war task, therefore, was to try to blend what was new and
promising following the crisis with the enduring principles of Arab-
Israeli diplomacy. That was the purpose of my first three trips to
the region after the war. The result was a consensus among the
parties on five key points.
First, general agreement that the objective of the process is a
comprehensive settlement achieved through direct negotiations
based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Second, broad understanding that the negotiating process would
proceed simultaneously along two tracks, involving direct
negotiations between Israel and Arab states and between Israel and
Palestinians from the occupied territories.
Third, agreement that the negotiations between Israel and
Palestinians would proceed in phases, with talks on interim self-
government preceding negotiations over the permanent status of the
occupied territories.
Fourth, agreement that Palestinians would be represented in the
process by leaders from the occupied territories who accept the
two-track process and phased approach to negotiations and who
commit to living in peace with Israel.
Fifth, general acceptance that a conference, co-sponsored by the
United States and the Soviet Union, would break the old taboos about
public launching pad for direct negotiations between the parties.
These are not insignificant areas of consensus. And they certainly
provide a baseline for progress. But they still have to be translated
into a practical process, and that was the purpose of my most recent
trip to the area. Let me give you a sense of the key issues we are
still trying to resolve.
Resolution of Key Issues
The first set of issues relates to modalities of the peace
conference. There has been a great deal of misunderstanding on this
question so let me lay out simply what we have in mind. Our
objective is to launch direct negotiations. That's what this effort is
all about. We believe the best way to do this is through a peace
conference that would lead directly to bilateral negotiations
between Israel and its Arab and Palestinian neighbors and
multilateral negotiations on issues such as arms control and
regional security, the environment, and water.
Let me be clear about this. We are not considering an international
conference with a plenary that has the power or authority to impose
its views, nor are we considering any mechanism that would
interfere in any way with negotiations. In fact, as I've told those in
the region, the conference is not a forum for negotiations. Quite
simply, it's a means to an end, a tool in our effort to get the parties
to sit down face-to-face to sort out their differences and to break
anachronistic taboos.
This conference would be co-sponsored by the United States and the
Soviet Union. Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestinians
from the occupied territories would attend. As you know, the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) has already taken a very important step
and agreed to send its Secretary General as observer. In addition,
each of the member states of the GCC, the six Gulf states, have
announced they will participate in the direct negotiations on
multilateral issues.
We also believe the European Community (EC) could play a
constructive role in support of this process, and especially in the
hard work of economic development that would follow a negotiated
peace. The EC should be able to participate in the conference.
Similarly, the United Nations should have some role; a formula ought
to be found that is acceptable to all the parties, that prejudices
none, and that channels the new-found potential of the United
Nations in ways that can be helpful in promoting peace and
reconciliation in the area. The exact nature of EC and UN
involvement is still unresolved. Another open question is the ability
of the conference to reconvene. The United States believes it should
be able to do so, if all the parties agree, in order to hear reports
from the bilateral and multilateral negotiating groups.
The point is that none of this will, in any way, interfere with direct
negotiations. Indeed, face-to-face negotiations offer the only way
to make any progress, and we would not accept any proposal that
would lead any party to believe that it could avoid negotiations or
have others relieve it of the need to negotiate.
The other set of issues deals with the question of Palestinian
representation in the negotiations.
From the beginning of this Administration, we have made it clear
that our objective is to get Israel and Palestinians from the
occupied territories into negotiations. Of course, Palestinians must
choose their representatives, but our view is--and many other
parties agree--that a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation could
be a useful vehicle to get to the conference as well as to handle any
number of issues that might arise during the negotiations.
So the purpose of my recent trip to the region was to continue to
explore these issues with the parties and to determine where there
was consensus and which areas required more work. Overall, I found
that there is more agreement than disagreement on the key elements
of our approach. And I found a willingness to continue looking for
ways to resolve those areas that are still not nailed down.
I also had extremely useful discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh in the Soviet Union and in Cairo. The Soviets have
been very supportive of our approach. The fact that the Soviet Union
and the United States are in basic agreement about how to proceed
on the peace process creates a new factor--one that improves the
chances of getting this process launched.
Nonetheless, we are obviously not at the point I would like to be.
There are areas of disagreement, particularly between Israel and
Syria over the modalities of the conference, both on the issue of the
UN role and over the issue of reconvening the conference. I'm not
going to pretend that sorting these out will be easy or that it will be
done quickly.
But I will say that we will continue to try so long as we believe that
all parties are working in good faith and are serious about finding
ways to resolve differences. The President and I have talked about
our next steps, and we believe we should continue to press ahead and
see if we can overcome the gaps and get to negotiations.
Finally, I believe the parties in the region do appreciate that there's
a real chance to launch a process. We've defined a workable pathway
to negotiations that would enable Israel, Arab states, and
Palestinians to capture that chance and make a real break with the
past in favor of peace. It is there for the taking, but it will not last
forever.
What remains to be seen is whether the parties are willing to seize
this chance. The United States is there, ready and willing to help
them try. But we cannot create the political will to act, if it does
not exist in the region....
Promoting Peace in the Middle East
[Text of a joint statement released by the White House on July 31,
1991].
President Bush and President Gorbachev reaffirmed their strong
mutual commitment to promote peace and genuine reconciliation
among the Arab States, Israel, and the Palestinians. They believe
there is an historic opportunity now to launch a process that can
lead to a just and enduring peace and to a. comprehensive settlement
in the Middle East. They share the strong conviction that this
historic opportunity must not be lost.
While recognizing that peace cannot be imposed and that it can only
result from direct negotiations between the parties, the United
States and the Soviet Union pledge to do their utmost to promote and
sustain the peace-making process. To that end, the United States
and the Soviet Union, acting as co-sponsors, will work to convene in
October a peace conference designed to launch bilateral and
multilateral negotiations. Invitations to the conference will be
issued at least ten days prior to the date the conference is to
convene. In the interim, Secretary Baker and Minister Bessmertnykh
will continue to work with the parties to prepare for the conference.
Secretary Baker: Middle East Peace Conference--The Hope of a
New Era
[Excerpts from a news conference, Jerusalem, October 18, 1991].
Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I want to apologize for running up
so close to the Sabbath, but today is an important day and this is an
important moment. An American Secretary of State and a Soviet
Foreign Minister are together in Jerusalem for the first time in
history. What's more, the Soviet Union has today restored full
diplomatic relations with the State of Israel after a break of 24
years.
But our joint presence here today represents something more:
Foreign Minister Pankin and I are pleased to announce that President
Bush and President Gorbachev are today inviting Israel, Arab states,
and Palestinians to attend a Middle East peace conference to be held
beginning October 30 in Madrid. That conference is to be followed by
direct negotiations designed to achieve real peace.
We have witnessed new beginnings in other parts of the world. The
negotiating process we are seeking to launch with this invitation
holds the hope of a new era in the Middle East:
-- The hope of an era marked by acceptance and not by rejection;
-- The hope of an era marked by dialogue and not by violence;
-- The hope of an era marked by cooperation and not by conflict;
-- The hope of an era marked by hope and not by despair.
This invitation offers the peoples in this region a pathway to ending
an era of confrontation and a basis for a new future. The road to
peace will not be simple; to the contrary, it will be extremely
difficult, with many problems, hitches, and interruptions along the
way. Old suspicions will not quickly disappear. The gaps are real
and won't easily be overcome. We have no illusions about the hard
work ahead.
But we take encouragement from the issuance of these invitations,
the product of work of the last 8 months. As we have all along, we
intend to take this one step at a time. And so, if we receive positive
responses to this invitation, we will be taking one more step
forward toward achieving the peace and security that the peoples of
the Middle East have so long been denied.
President Bush, Soviet President Gorbachev: Meeting Between
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev
[Excerpts from opening remarks at a news conference, Madrid, Spain,
October 29, 1991]
President Bush:
I want to thank President Gorbachev.
We've had yet another very constructive meeting. We're here, of
course, for this international conference on the Middle East, and I
can express my gratitude to President Gorbachev for the very
constructive role that the Soviet Union has played in the actions
leading up to this conference; we are grateful to him for that.
We also discussed some of the matters of mutual interest involving
the situation inside the Soviet Union, the dynamic change there, the
commitment to reform that is still very strong. And all in all, as far
as I'm concerned, it was yet one more very good meeting with the
president.
President Gorbachev:
[Through an interpreter.] I join what
Mr. President just said and wanted only to say a couple of words for
myself. We agreed on holding this meeting since it was a very
convenient opportunity . . . to coordinate our watches-- synchronize
our watches--to talk a little about what is of mutual interest to the
Soviet Union and to the United States.
Yes, it's true that we began by--we talked about all the many years
of effort that we made. Especially our joint efforts in the very
recent past, both of the United States and the Soviet Union, have
brought us to the point now where today--tomorrow--this long-
awaited forum, this long-awaited conference is opening. And let's
hope that given everything that we might encounter along the way
during these negotiations within the confines of this conference;
let's hope that it all turns out for the best and positively.
In any case, President Bush and I have agreed that having opened this
conference and having left Madrid, we [do] not at all expect to be
somewhere on the side. On the contrary, we're going to facilitate as
much as possible, use all the remedies that we have at our disposal.
I think that all the participants of the conference and we, too,
wanted--both today and tomorrow we'll talk about it some more,
maybe--to appeal to everybody that they act responsibly with great
understanding that what is beginning within the framework of this
Madrid conference--how meaningful it is and that everybody be very
constructive as much as possible.
Further, we said a lot and talked a lot about--since I had the
intention to pose before President Bush several questions, several
issues vis-a-vis what's happening internally in the Soviet Union and
also because he and [the] Secretary of State also had a whole series
of questions . . . to ask for the benefit of their own understanding to
try to find out where we now are in the Soviet Union and to get a
better grasp of what kind of issues and problems we're trying to
solve.
This took quite a large percentage of our time, maybe--probably--
the majority of our meeting. I'm very satisfied by the position
which was held, by the position of the President of the United
States, and hope that--have all the basis to believe and feel--that
this is yet another step in strengthening the mutual understanding
and cooperation between our two countries right at the stage of all
the great and momentous changes that are taking place.
And, finally, we had an exchange of information and views as to
what each of the sides is doing in the context of disarmament and
all the initiatives that have been undertaken.
The President and I very highly--gave a very high mark to the way
we are solving a lot of these very burning issues, which for many
years have plagued us. But, now, basing ourselves on all the
experiences that have happened over the last few years, especially
how well we're getting along now with our two countries, between
the Soviet Union and the United States, also among the members of
the two governments of the two countries, that we're finding very
good solutions.
In any event, we wanted to have a very short meeting to chat and
maybe not overload ourselves too much because the subject of this
meeting, in fact, is the opening of the conference. But, in fact, we
had a very substantive discussion. I think it will be very useful for
both parties, for both sides.
President Bush: Opening Session of Middle East Peace
Conference
[Address before the opening session of the Middle East Peace
Conference, Madrid, October 30, 1991]
Prime Minister Gonzalez [of Spain], and [Soviet] President Gorbachev,
Excellencies. Let me begin by thanking the Government of Spain for
hosting this historic gathering. With short notice, the Spanish
people and their leaders stepped forward to make available this
magnificent setting. Let us hope that this conference of Madrid will
mark the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the Middle
East.
I also want to express at the outset my pleasure at the presence of
our fellow co-sponsor, President Gorbachev. At a time of
momentous challenges at home, President Gorbachev and his senior
associates have demonstrated their intent to engage the Soviet
Union as a force for positive change in the Middle East. This sends a
powerful signal to all those who long for peace.
We come to Madrid on a mission of hope--to begin work on a just,
lasting, and comprehensive settlement to the conflict in the Middle
East. We come here to seek peace for a part of the world that in the
long memory of man has known far too much hatred, anguish, and
war. I can think of no endeavor more worthy or more necessary.
Our objective must be clear and straightforward. It is not simply to
end the state of war in the Middle East and replace it with a state of
non-belligerency. This is not enough; this would not last. Rather,
we seek peace--real peace--and by real peace I mean treaties,
security, diplomatic relations, economic relations, trade,
investment, cultural exchange, even tourism.
What we seek is a Middle East where vast resources are no longer
devoted to armaments; a Middle East where young people no longer
have to dedicate and, all too often, give their lives to combat; a
Middle East no longer victimized by fear and terror;
[and] a Middle East where normal men and women lead normal lives.
Let no one mistake the magnitude of this challenge. The struggle we
seek to end has a long and painful history. Every life lost--every
outrage, every act of violence--is etched deep in the hearts and
history of the people of this region. Theirs is a history that weighs
heavily against hope. And yet history need not be man's master.
I expect that some will say that what I am suggesting is impossible.
But think back. Who back in 1945 would have thought that France
and Germany, bitter rivals for nearly a century, would become allies
in the aftermath of World War II? And who, 2 years ago, would have
predicted that the Berlin Wall would come down? And who in the
early 1960s would have believed that the Cold War would come to a
peaceful end, replaced by cooperation--exemplified by the fact that
the United States and the Soviet Union are here today not as rivals
but as partners, as Prime Minister Gonzalez pointed out.
No, peace in the Middle East need not be a dream. Peace is possible.
The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty is striking proof that former
adversaries can make and sustain peace. And, moreover, parties in
the Middle East have respected agreements not only in the Sinai but
on the Golan Heights as well.
The fact that we are all gathered here today for the first time
attests to a new potential for peace. Each of us has taken an
important step toward real peace by meeting here in Madrid. All the
formulas on paper, all the pious declarations in the world won't
bring peace if there is no practical mechanism for moving ahead.
Peace will only come as the result of direct negotiations,
compromise, give-and-take. Peace cannot be imposed from the
outside by the United States or anyone else. While we will continue
to do everything possible to help the parties overcome obstacles,
peace must come from within.
We come here to Madrid as realists. We do not expect peace to be
negotiated in a day, or a week, or a month, or even a year. It will
take time; indeed, it should take time--time for parties so long at
war to learn to talk to one another, to listen to one another. Time to
heal old wounds and build trust. In this quest, time need not be the
enemy of progress.
What we envision is a process of direct negotiations proceeding
along two tracks: one between Israel and the Arab states, the other
between Israel and the Palestinians. Negotiations are to be
conducted on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338.
The real work will not happen here in the plenary session but in
direct bilateral negotiations. This conference cannot impose a
settlement on the participants or veto agreements, and, just as
important, the conference can only be reconvened with the consent
of every participant. Progress is in the hands of the parties who
must live with the consequences.
Soon after the bilateral talks commence, parties will convene as
well to organize multilateral negotiations. These will focus on
issues that cross national boundaries and are common to the region:
arms control, water, refugee concerns, economic development.
Progress in these forums is not intended as a substitute for what
must be decided in the bilateral talks; to the contrary, progress in
the multilateral issues can help create an atmosphere in which long-
standing bilateral disputes can more easily be settled.
For Israel and the Palestinians, a framework already exists for
diplomacy. Negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with
talks on interim self-government arrangements. We aim to reach
agreement within 1 year. And once agreed, interim self-government
arrangements will last for 5 years; beginning the third year,
negotiations will commence on permanent status. No one can say
with any precision what the end result will be; in our view,
something must be developed, something acceptable to Israel, the
Palestinians, and Jordan that gives the Palestinian people
meaningful control over their own lives and fate and provides for the
acceptance and security of Israel.
We can all appreciate that both Israelis and Palestinians are worried
about compromise, worried about compromising even the smallest
point for fear it becomes a precedent for what really matters. But
no one should avoid compromise on interim arrangements for a
simple reason: Nothing agreed to now will prejudice permanent
status negotiations. To the contrary, these subsequent negotiations
will be determined on their own merits.
Peace cannot depend upon promises alone. Real peace--lasting
peace--must be based upon security for all states and peoples,
including Israel. For too long, the Israeli people have lived in fear,
surrounded by an unaccepting Arab world. Now is the ideal moment
for the Arab world to demonstrate that attitudes have changed, that
the Arab world is willing to live in peace with Israel and make
allowances for Israel's reasonable security needs.
We know that peace must also be based on fairness. In the absence
of fairness, there will be no legitimacy--no stability. This applies
above all to the Palestinian people, many of whom have known
turmoil and frustration above all else. Israel now has an opportunity
to demonstrate that it is willing to enter into a new relationship
with its Palestinian neighbors, one predicated upon mutual respect
and cooperation.
Throughout the Middle East, we seek a stable and enduring
settlement. We've not defined what this means; indeed, I make these
points with no map showing where the final borders are to be drawn.
Nevertheless, we believe territorial compromise is essential for
peace. Boundaries should reflect the quality of both security and
political arrangements. The United States is prepared to accept
whatever the parties themselves find acceptable. What we seek, as
I said on March 6, is a solution that meets the twin tests of fairness
and security.
I know--I expect we all know--that these negotiations will not be
easy. I know, too, that these negotiations will not be smooth. There
will be disagreement and criticism, setbacks--who knows--possibly
interruptions. Negotiation and compromise are always painful.
Success will escape us if we focus solely upon what is being given
up.
We must fix our vision on what real peace would bring. Peace, after
all, means not just avoiding war and the costs of preparing for it.
The Middle East is blessed with great resources: physical, financial,
and, yes, above all, human. New opportunities are within reach--if
we only have the vision to embrace them.
To succeed, we must recognize that peace is in the interest of all
parties--war, absolute advantage of none. The alternative to peace
in the Middle East is a future of violence and waste and tragedy. In
any future war lurks the danger of weapons of mass destruction. As
we learned in the Gulf war, modern arsenals make it possible to
attack urban areas--to put the lives of innocent men, women, and
children at risk, to transform city streets, schools, and children's
playgrounds into battlefields.
Today, we can decide to take a different path to the future--to avoid
conflict. I call upon all parties to avoid unilateral acts, be they
words or deeds, that would invite retaliation or, worse yet,
prejudice or even threaten this process itself. I call upon all parties
to consider taking measures that will bolster mutual confidence and
trust--steps that signal a sincere commitment to reconciliation.
I want to say something about the role of the United States of
America. We played an active role in making this conference
possible; both the Secretary of State, Jim Baker, and I will play an
active role in helping the process succeed. Toward this end, we've
provided written assurances to Israel, to Syria, to Jordan, Lebanon,
and the Palestinians. In the spirit of openness and honesty, we will
brief all parties on the assurances that we have provided to the
other. We're prepared to extend guarantees, provide technology and
support, if that is what peace requires. And we will call upon our
friends and allies in Europe and in Asia to join with us in providing
resources so that peace and prosperity go hand in hand.
Outsiders can assist, but, in the end, it is up to the peoples and
governments of the Middle East to shape the future of the Middle
East. It is their opportunity and it is their responsibility to do all
that they can to take advantage of this gathering, this historic
gathering, and what it symbolizes and what it promises.
No one should assume that the opportunity before us to make peace
will remain if we fail to seize the moment. Ironically, this is an
opportunity born of war--the destruction of past wars, the fear of
future wars. The time has come to put an end to war--the time has
come to choose peace.
Speaking for the American people, I want to reaffirm that the United
States is prepared to facilitate the search for peace, to be a
catalyst as we've been in the past and as we've been very recently.
We seek only one thing, and this we seek not for ourselves but for
the peoples of the area and particularly the children: That this and
future generations of the Middle East may know the meaning and
blessing of peace.
We have seen too many generations of children whose haunted eyes
show only fear, too many funerals for their brothers and sisters, the
mothers and fathers who died too soon, too much hatred, too little
love. And if we cannot summon the courage to lay down the past for
ourselves, let us resolve to do it for the children.
May God bless and guide the work of this conference, and may this
conference set us on the path of peace. Thank you.
Secretary Baker: Middle East Peace Conference
Middle East Peace Conference
[Opening remarks at the Middle East Peace Conference, the Royal
Palace, Madrid, November 1, 1991.]
Distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen: Over the last 8
months, many people in the region have exerted great efforts and
contributed in many ways to make this conference and negotiations
possible. All of you in this hall fall into that category. But there
are some who are not here now, individuals who have made essential
contributions to the process, without which, in my view, this
conference would not have happened. In this regard, I want to pay
tribute:
-- To President Mubarak of Egypt, who was a confidant, adviser,
friend, and advocate for this process from the very beginning;
-- To King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who demonstrated by word and deed
that new opportunities for Arab-Israeli peace existed after the Gulf
war, and who personified this new approach in the Arab world;
-- To President Assad of Syria, whose assurance to me that Syria
had made an historic choice and decision in favor of peace and whose
early commitment to this process both proved to be vital;
-- To King Hussein of Jordan, whose courage, leadership, and
willingness to commit publicly and quickly in support of this
process transformed the dynamics in the region;
-- To Prime Minister Shamir of Israel, whose steady determination
and strong leadership proved essential to reaching an agreement to
convene this conference and to launch direct bilateral negotiations
for real peace between Israel and its neighbors;
-- To Foreign Minister Levy of Israel, who was determined to
develop an active and meaningful peace process and who worked
creatively to overcome obstacles in our path;
-- To President Hrawi of Lebanon, who has worked to re-establish
central authority in his war-ravaged country, which is a necessary
step toward peace in the region; [and]
-- To Palestinians with whom I met, like Faisal Husseini and Hanan
Ashrawi, whose personal courage in the face of enormous pressures
has created the possibility of a better life for Palestinians.
Even in a period of dramatic and far-reaching change around the
world, this conference stands apart. Fourteen days ago, President
Bush and President Gorbachev invited Israel, the Arab states, and
Palestinians to this peace conference and to direct negotiations that
follow. In response to that invitation, Israel, Jordan, the
Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon agreed to attend the conference and
to participate in the direct negotiations. In addition, the European
Community, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, the United
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania
agreed to participate in this process.
This conference demonstrates vividly the end of the Cold War and
the flowering of US-Soviet partnership in resolving regional
conflicts. Where we once competed, we now cooperate. Where there
was once polarization, there is now coordination. What was once
unthinkable--the United States and the Soviet Union co-sponsoring a
process of peace in the Middle East--became a reality this week.
Our work--making peace through negotiations--has just begun. As
we look at the challenges ahead, it is worth noting and learning from
what we have already accomplished.
-- For decades, agreement on whether to negotiate eluded the
parties. This weekend, direct, bilateral negotiations aimed at
comprehensive, genuine peace will start.
-- For decades, agreement on what to negotiate eluded the parties.
This weekend, negotiations should begin on the accepted basis of UN
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
-- For decades, agreement on how to negotiate eluded the parties.
This weekend, negotiations will begin on two tracks and in phases;
and in a few weeks, those parties who wish to participate will
convene to organize multilateral negotiations on a wide range of
issues that affect the well-being of all peoples in the region.
These are not mere platitudes. During these 8 months of diplomacy,
though the parties sometimes fell back on old slogans and outmoded
code words, they also came to understand the need to engage
concretely and pragmatically to resolve problems. I said often that
the parties would probably stake out maximum positions, especially
as they got closer to negotiations.
This is not surprising, especially in a public forum. The key,
however, is to get beyond the rhetoric and into the direct
negotiations.
Fundamentals of American Policy
A basic tenet of American thinking is that negotiations are the best
way to resolve disputes and achieve peace. Negotiations do not
guarantee peace. But without negotiations, there is no way to
produce genuine peace and no mechanism to develop understandings
that can endure.
The United States is willing to be a catalytic force, an energizing
force, and a driving force in the negotiating process. Our
involvement in this process will be rooted solidly in the core
principles enunciated by President Bush last March. They will
remain the cornerstone that guides our participation in the
negotiating process.
The United States is and will be an honest broker. We have our own
positions and views on the peace process, and we will not forego our
right to state these. But, as an honest broker with experience--
successful experience--in the Middle East negotiations, we also
know that our critical contribution will often be to exert quiet,
behind-the-scenes influence and persuasion.
Let no one mistake our role as an honest broker to mean that we will
change longstanding US policy positions, and let no one mistake our
policy positions as undercutting our determination to help the
parties reach fair and mutually acceptable solutions to problems.
As President Bush and I have both said this week: It is not our
policies that matter; it is those of the parties. They are the ones
that must negotiate peace.
This week, the parties provided insight into their thinking about a
negotiated settlement. They outlined three broad requirements in
the search for peace.
First, we heard a yearning for peace --the wish of peoples in the
region to live in a mutually satisfying relationship with neighbors, a
relationship characterized by peace treaties, economic relations,
cultural ties, and political dialogue.
Second, we heard an emphasis on land--the desire of peoples in the
region to exercise authority and political governance over territory
they consider part of their national, political, historical, or
religious patrimony.
Third, we heard a need for security --the requirement of people to
live free of fear and the obligation of governments to do their best
to protect their citizens.
What the parties, in fact, said this week is that these core issues--
land, peace, and security--are inseparable elements in the search
for a comprehensive settlement.
The parties have made clear that peace by itself is unachievable
without a territorial solution and security; that a territorial
solution by itself will not resolve the conflict without there also
being peace and security; and that security by itself is impossible to
achieve without a territorial solution and peace. The process on
which we are embarked can work only if all issues are put on the
table, and if all issues are satisfactorily resolved.
The Negotiating Process
One key issue is the style of negotiations. Today, the Soviet Union
and the United States are on the same side of the table--literally
and figuratively--in striving for global peace and the resolution of
regional conflicts. Today, and in the future, we will work together
in pursuit of a Middle East settlement.
The United States, at the highest levels, will remain intimately
engaged in this process. We expect to be available to the parties
throughout this process. The United States and the Soviet Union are
prepared to participate directly in the negotiations themselves,
with the consent of all parties.
We will do our part. But we cannot do your part as well. The United
States and the Soviet Union will provide encouragement, advice,
recommendations, proposals, and views to help the peace process.
Sometimes, you will be satisfied with our views; sometimes
frustrated. Sometimes, we will support your positions and
sometimes not. Sometimes, we will act quietly and behind the
scenes, and sometimes we will make known our views and positions
in public. None of this, however, will relieve you--the parties--of
the obligation of making peace. If you won't do it, we certainly
can't. As I have said from the beginning of this effort, we cannot
want peace more than you, the parties most directly affected by its
absence.
Parties in this process cannot reasonably be expected to operate
outside their political environment; but they should be expected to
educate, shape, guide, and lead politics and opinion. Leaders in the
region have taken difficult and courageous deci-sions to get to this
conference and to negotiations. More difficult and more courageous
decisions will be required to settle this conflict.
Venue of Bilateral Negotiations
As you know, the invitation sent to the parties on October 18
contained the terms of reference for this peace process, terms of
reference that had been meticulously negotiated and agreed. This
invitation specified that direct, bilateral negotiations would begin 4
days after the opening of the conference. But there was never
agreement regarding the location for those bilateral negotiations.
The parties have not yet been able to agree on where to hold these
negotiations. It is the view of the co-sponsors that the direct,
bilateral negotiations should start in Madrid as soon as possible. It
is the intention of the co-sponsors to continue to consult with the
parties with a view to fulfilling the requirements of the invitation
on this subject.
From the perspective of the co-sponsors, and, indeed, from the
perspective of most of the rest of the world, it would be very
difficult to understand how a party could now refuse to attend
bilateral negotiations simply because of a disagreement over the
site of those negotiations.
Finally, I want to note that a meeting will take place in several
weeks among those parties who wish to participate in multilateral
negotiations to organize those negotiations. These talks will focus
on issues of critical interest to many parties in the region. They
will be a complement to the bilateral negotiations. I am pleased
that the multilateral negotiations have already gained widespread
support and interest both in and outside the Middle East.
Building Confidence and Trust
This week, many have focused on the need for steps that would build
confidence and trust. The United States continues to believe that
confidence-building measures are important for the process and for
the parties themselves.
I want to be perfectly honest, standing here as I am before
colleagues with whom I have spent many, many hours since last
March. The unwillingness of the parties to take confidence- building
steps has been disappointing. You have dealt successfully with
formulas and positions. You have agreed on terms of reference that
are fair and equitable. You have launched a process of negotiations
that can succeed. But you have failed to deal adequately with the
human dimension of the conflict.
As I traveled through the region, I witnessed terrible scenes of
human tragedy, suffering, and despair. Innocent civilians caught in
the crossfire of a conflict they wish would end: refugees and
displaced persons wandering across the vast expanses of time,
mothers and fathers afraid of the future that awaits their children,
and children being schooled in the lessons of animosity and conflict
rather than friendship and accommodation.
Formulas, terms of reference, and negotiations are not enough.
Support for a negotiating process will not be sustainable unless the
human dimension is addressed by all parties. A way must be found
to send signals of peace and reconciliation that affect the peoples of
the region. Don't wait for the other side to start; each of you needs
to get off the mark quickly. You should know best what is needed.
Through negotiations and through these and other steps, you can
demonstrate respect for the rights of others. You can express
understanding of the fears of others. You can touch the people--the
women, men, and children--who are the victims of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. We can only succeed at the table, if we find ways of
reaching out to one another away from the table.
The challenges have been great, and the obstacles have been many, on
the road to peace. Your decisions over these 8 months of intensive
diplomacy have created a new baseline of realism and commitment
to peace. This conference has been vital in breaking down the
barriers of communication and in establishing for all to see that
Arab and Israeli leaders can meet face to face.
Conclusion
In closing, let me speak to each of you personally and directly.
For over 4 decades, the world waited for this week. Peace-loving
peoples everywhere tried time and again to get you--the makers of
this intractable conflict--to join together to discuss your
differences. This week, here in Madrid, you finally have met and held
such a meeting.
This has been a start--a good start--a historic start that has broken
old taboos--an important start that opens further opportunities.
But it is only a start--and that's not enough. You must not let this
start become an end.
When you walk out these doors, you carry with you great
responsibilities. You carry with you the responsibility to your
peoples to seek peace. You carry with you the responsibility to the
world to build a comprehensive and just peace. You carry with you
the responsibility to yourselves to break with the past and pursue a
new future.
For if you do not seize this historic opportunity, no one will blame
anyone outside your region.
You now shoulder the destiny and challenge of making peace as you
enter direct negotiations with your neighbors. The continuation and
success of this process is in your hands. The world still looks to
each of you to make the choice for peace.
News Conference
[Opening statement at a news conference, IFEMA Press Center,
Madrid, November 3, 1991.]
Let me begin by saying that the Madrid conference was a beginning. I
think it was a good beginning. Today, the parties have taken another
critical step beginning direct bilateral negotiations between Israel
and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Israel and Lebanon,
and Israel and Syria. There have been and, as I have said before,
there will be obstacles in this process to be overcome, but they have
not deterred us until now, and they do not, in my view, diminish the
importance of what has happened this week.
Let me emphasize another point that I made in my address to the
peace conference on Friday. The parties have not agreed on venue
and, in fact, as you know, the major issue that we had to work over
the weekend was where to hold the bilateral negotiations. This is
still an open question, and it is one that will need to be resolved as
the negotiations proceed. The United States and the Soviet Union
expressed the hope that the parties themselves will continue to
negotiate in order to reach an understanding. In the absence of
agreement, we will work together with the parties. And we will
make proposals as necessary.
The United States and the Soviet Union intend to maintain our
position that bilateral negotiations should be face-to-face and take
place separately between an Israeli delegation and each of the other
delegations. On behalf of the co-sponsors, I want all to know that
the arrangements that have been so laboriously worked out for these
initial bilateral meetings will not be considered precedential for
future rounds of talks.
Amidst all of the procedural wrangling, it is important, I think, not
to lose sight of the breakthrough represented by the start of direct
bilateral negotiations. As I have stressed all along, direct
negotiations are the only way in which real progress is going to be
made and the only way in which real progress--real peace--is ever
going to be achieved.
I want to take special note of the steadfast commitment of the
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to beginning bilateral negotiations.
And I want to express appreciation to all those who have gone the
extra mile to make these opening meetings possible today,
particularly the Government of Israel.
From the initial reports I have received from the delegations
themselves, I am especially pleased with the quality of the first
negotiating session between the Israeli and joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegations. As they told me, and as their public
statement made clear, they surely intend to proceed in a serious and
constructive fashion, and that gives us reason to believe that we
really are entering a new phase in the Middle East.
I will be leaving Madrid at the conclusion of this press conference.
Assistant Secretary [for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Edward] Djerejian and many of my senior experts will remain in
Madrid until the delegations have departed.
And before I take your questions, let me say a word, since I've gotten
a number of questions recently about this, a word about my plans for
the next 2 weeks. I will leave immediately after this press
conference to join President Bush to attend the opening of the
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Center in California. I will
then travel with the President to attend the NATO summit in Rome
as well as the US-EC meeting in the Netherlands. Then I plan to go
directly from there to Japan, Korea, and China, returning to
Washington in mid-November. I will be attending the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation meeting in Korea.
I have been looking forward for a long time to in-depth consultations
with the Japanese in Japan. I regret that I was not able to visit
Japan when I was in Asia earlier this year, because the United
States has no bilateral relationship in Asia that is any more
important than our relationship with Japan.
And let me conclude by saying a word about my trip to China. China
has almost one-fourth of all the people in the world. It has nuclear
weapons. It has great influence in the region, and it has immense
economic potential. We have some real problems, and we can't
expect to make headway with these problems unless we discuss
them. Ignoring them will not make the problems go away.
Edward P. Djerejian: The Middle East in the Post-Gulf War
Period
[Statement by the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle
East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC,
November 20, 1991]
[Introduction]
Mr. Chairman, it is a distinct privilege for me to make my first
appearance before this distinguished subcommittee. With your
permission I would like to comment on the historic achievements of
the Madrid peace conference and describe what the road ahead of the
Arab-Israeli peace process looks like. Further, I will make a few
comments on the situation in Iraq. Of course, I am prepared to
address these and whatever other issues the members of the
subcommittee may wish to raise during the subsequent discussion.
Arab-Israeli Peace Process
In his opening remarks at the peace conference in Madrid, President
Bush termed the event a "mission of hope." With the opening of the
conference, the Middle East turned an important historical page--
away from the intractability and insolubility of this over 4 decades-
old conflict and toward the achievement of genuine, comprehensive
peace and reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors
through direct dialogue and negotiations.
The hope to which the President referred during the opening session
of the conference, in fact, turned to reality just 4 days later on
November 3 when direct, bilateral negotiations were launched
between Israeli delegations and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation,
a Lebanese delegation, and a Syrian delegation.
Never before had there been direct, bilateral negotiations between
Israel and each of its Arab and Palestinian neighbors, and never
again will there be such a taboo against such face-to-face contacts.
In his closing press conference in Madrid, Secretary Baker termed
these developments a "good start." Indeed it was. For over 12 hours
on November 3, Israeli and Arab delegates debated the issues across
the table of negotiations.
To be sure, the road ahead will not be easy to navigate. Fundamental
differences separate the parties, and those differences will be hard
fought at the negotiating table. But they will be fought with words
and position papers and policy statements, and hopefully no longer
with weapons and violence.
Mr. Chairman, the road to Madrid was long and difficult. Secretary
Baker traveled to the Middle East 8 times between March and October
to fulfill the promise of the initiative launched by President Bush
last March in his address to a joint session of Congress. Many, many
hours were spent in discussion with key Middle East figures--Prime
Minister Shamir of Israel, President Assad of Syria, King Hussein of
Jordan, President Mubarak of Egypt, President Hrawi of Lebanon, and
Palestinians like Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi--in an effort to
understand their concerns, examine the differences between their
positions, evolve bridging positions to overcome problems, and
develop the terms of reference for the peace conference and
negotiations. Enormous political strains were placed on each party
by this effort. Persistent efforts were undertaken by extremists to
undermine the search for peace by acts of terror and in southern
Lebanon. Yet, throughout, Secretary Baker found the parties ready to
engage and ready to confront the difficult decisions required to get
to the negotiating table.
Important and far-reaching agreements among the parties permitted
this process to proceed:
-- The parties agreed that the goal is a comprehensive peace
settlement achieved through direct negotiations based on UN
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
-- They agreed on two negotiating tracks between Israel and Arab
states, and between Israel and Palestinians.
-- They agreed that the negotiations between Israel and
Palestinians would be conducted in phases, with the initial phase
focusing on interim self-government arrangements, and the second
phase focusing on a permanent settlement.
-- They agreed that the direct negotiations would be launched by a
peace conference--co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet
Union--and that the conference would not be able to impose
solutions, veto agreements, make decisions, or vote.
-- They agreed that Palestinians would participate in a joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and that Palestinians who
participate would be those who accept to negotiate on two tracks
and in phases and who accept to live in peace with Israel.
-- They agreed to invite the European Community and Egypt to
participate alongside the co-sponsors.
-- They agreed to invite the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab
Maghreb Union, and the United Nations to each send an observer to
the conference.
Three Crucial Issues
In translating these agreements into a workable peace conference
and negotiations, we were also reminded by the parties of the
central substantive issues which need to be addressed in order to
resolve the conflict. In his remarks to the peace conference,
Secretary Baker noted that the parties themselves had identified
three critical issues:
-- The parties had expressed a yearning for peace, a desire to live
in mutually satisfying relationships with neighbors, and to have
those relations characterized by peace treaties, diplomatic
relations, economic relations, cultural ties, and political dialogue.
-- The parties emphasized the importance of land and the desire of
peoples to exercise authority and political governance over
territories they consider part of their patrimony.
-- And the parties stressed the need for security. That is, the
requirement that people live free of fear and the obligation of
governments to do their best to protect their citizens.
Listening to these views expressed by the parties, the Secretary
made clear our belief that progress toward a comprehensive
settlement on all fronts would be possible only if all the issues
were put on the table. This is our assessment of what needs to be
done to ensure progress in the negotiations.
Mr. Chairman, our upbeat mood after the conference is tempered only
by the sober realization that much hard work and difficult
procedural and substantive decisions lie ahead. The first issue the
parties face is the venue of the bilateral negotiations. Before
Madrid, there had not been agreement on where the talks would be
held. The parties held different views and still do. As the Secretary
made clear in Madrid, we hope the parties can resolve this issue on
their own. If they cannot, we stand ready soon to make proposals
that will help get the negotiations resumed as quickly as possible.
We are also working to ensure a successful start in the multilateral
negotiations to which we attach much importance. As you know, the
invitation to the conference indicated that those parties who wish
to participate should convene to organize multilateral negotiations
on such key topics for the peace, security, and prosperity of the
region as arms control and regional security, economic development,
refugees, water, the environment, and the like. We will begin
shortly to consult with parties in the region and outside in order to
plan for the organizational meeting of these negotiations. We are
gratified that a significant number of regional parties have already
stated publicly their intention to participate in these talks.
The Role of the United States
The role of the United States throughout this process will be that of
an honest broker, a catalyst for peace, and a driving force to help
ensure that negotiations work. Both the President and the Secretary
have reiterated their personal commitments to play an active role in
helping the process succeed and that we are in it for the long haul.
The United States maintains long-standing positions on peace
process issues that remain the basis of our own policy. But we also
know well from experience that the role of the mediator often
benefits as much from the non-articulation of one's own positions,
as from their repetition. When needed, we will state our views; and,
when needed, we will work quietly with the parties, out of the
public view, to help build trust and agreement between them.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to add a final word about the most
important, and often most neglected facet, of the peace process--
namely, the human dimension.
This is a conflict between people. It is a conflict in which people
have urgent and basic needs--to live more securely, to live free of
fear, to live with dignity, to live in peace.
There are practical prescriptions available to meet the urgent needs
of the peoples of the Middle East. Each party can and must think
about and adopt whatever measures are possible to reach out to
peoples on the other side of the conflict. The parties themselves
know best which actions would have the greatest impact. They
themselves know how important these steps would be for their own
constituencies and thus also how important they would be for the
other side. They themselves know that the formulas of negotiations
will have little meaning if the people of the region lose faith in
what must be a process of peace and reconciliation.
We offer no specific prescriptions for the parties to follow--either
with regard to the substance of the negotiations or to the
confidence-building steps that should be adopted by all sides. We do
call upon all parties to avoid unilateral acts which might prejudice
or even threaten the process, and we share the hope that the same
courage which regional leaders have brought to the tough decisions
on the peace conference and the start of negotiations will also be
applied to the pressing human problems that need to be confronted.
Iraq
Mr. Chairman, concerning the situation in Iraq, the victory of the US-
led coalition in Desert Storm reversed Saddam Hussein's aggression
against his neighbors. Ever since, the international community has
shown its determination to ensure that Iraq complies with all its
UN-mandated obligations. We and our coalition partners remain
committed to that end. In so doing, we bear no animus toward the
Iraqi people who have suffered too long under a brutal regime. They
deserve new leadership.
President Bush has made it clear that sanctions will continue as
long as the ruthless dictator Saddam Hussein remains in power. At
the same time, we will continue to broaden our contacts with the
Iraqi opposition and to support the emergence of an Iraqi Government
representative of Iraq's pluralistic society including the Shi'ites,
Sunnis, and Kurds. In fact, on my very first day as Assistant
Secretary, I met with a delegation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front,
which included Assyrian, Turcoman, and Kurdish representatives. In
summary, and as President Bush has said, we are prepared to work
with a successor regime in the interest of the Iraqi people.
Sadly, Mr. Chairman, Saddam Hussein continues to try to blame the
international sanctions for the continuing suffering of the Iraqi
people which he himself has caused. The facts are quite different:
First, medicine has never been denied to the Iraqis by the
international community, and UN sanctions on food shipments ended
in March. While assuring that his clique is provided for, Saddam
Hussein is cynically denying food and medicine to the Iraqi people
and is trying to fix the blame on the sanctions.
Second, the mechanism to help the Iraqi people is in place--all he
has to do is use it. He has not done so because the UN-mandated
monitoring regime would make it difficult for him to manipulate the
flow of food to the Iraqi people.
Third, the continuing deprivation in Iraq is the result of Saddam's
deliberate refusal to accept UN Resolutions 706 and 712--namely
food for oil--and his callous policy of diverting supplies away from
those who oppose him.
Once again, Saddam Hussein is prepared to sacrifice the Iraqi people
for the sake of hanging on to his own, personal power. As we
maintain all possible political and economic pressure on this brutal
regime, we will work with the international community to meet the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through implementation of
Security Council Resolutions 688, 706, and 712.
We are confident, Mr. Chairman, that Saddam's attempt will fail. He
miscalculated the will of the international community over his
invasion of Kuwait. If he thinks he can fool the world with a shell
game with food and medicine, he will have miscalculated badly, once
again.
Middle East Peace Process: US Invites Parties to Bilateral Talks
in Washington
[Statement by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler,
Washington, DC, November 22, 1991.]
Today, after waiting 3 weeks for the parties directly involved in the
Middle East peace talks to work out among themselves the question
of venue for additional bilateral talks, we proposed that the parties
meet here in Washington on December 4 for the next round.
It is important to give the parties the chance to work this out, but it
is even more important to resume the direct talks.
We want to make clear the view of the United States that, over time,
there is no reason to exclude holding negotiations in the region.
Many successful talks have been held in the region in the past, and a
regional venue would allow close proximity for the negotiators to
consult with their respective political leaderships.
Update on Middle East Peace Talks
[Statement by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler,
Washington, DC, December 3, 1991.]
The Soviet Union and the United States, as co-sponsors of the
process launched in Madrid, have agreed to convene a meeting at the
level of ministers in Moscow on January 28 to 29, 1992, for the
purpose of organizing multilateral negotiations on issues of regional
concern.
The co-sponsors hope for the widest possible participation from
among the parties in the region and other interested parties,
believing that the multilateral negotiations can serve as a positive
influence on and complement to the critical bilateral negotiations
aimed at achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace
settlement.
In the period ahead, the co-sponsors will consult with a wide range
of parties to help ensure that the negotiations get off to a
productive start.
President Bush Meets Israeli Foreign Minister
[Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater,
Washington, DC, December 17,1991.]
The President met today for approximately 20 minutes in the Oval
Office with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy. Their discussion
centered mainly on the UN General Assembly's revocation of the
Zionism is Racism determination and on the Middle East peace
process. The President expressed his satisfaction with the repeal,
calling it a responsible action on the part of the UN. The President
emphasized the importance of not allowing procedural concerns to
dominate the peace talks and of seizing this historic opportunity for
peace.
Statements on the Middle East Peace Process
March 10, 1991 En route from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to Cairo,
Egypt
[News conference by Secretary Baker.]
Secretary Baker:
Let me say that I think we've had a good
series of meetings today, particularly the meeting with the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers, the Foreign Minister of
Egypt, and myself. After that, I had separate bilaterals with the
ministers from Syria and from Egypt, and before the plenary
meeting, I had separate bilaterals with each of the GCC foreign
ministers.
I know you are interested in the peace process, so let me say a word
or two about that, and then I'll try and respond to your questions.
First of all, as you know, we have been trying to work a two-track
approach. I've been exploring with our Arab coalition partners what
steps they might be able to take to signal their commitment to
peace and reconciliation with Israel. Before this trip began, we had
communicated to Israel the general outlines of our two-track
approach, and I am now going to have the opportunity, when we get
to Israel, to talk in detail and specifically with their leadership
about what steps they might be willing to consider. Let me say, I am
not going to go into the specific steps now because we are still
exploring that. We still have a long way to go. It is very, very early.
We are trying to get a process going, and I would simply say that I
have a sense that even though it is early, there is a greater
willingness to be active on this issue in the aftermath of the Gulf
crisis than there was before.
Q: Reading the statement tonight, both the Arab portion of it and the
latter part, there doesn't appear to be anything here on the track of
direct contacts with Israel, state to state. It all refers to the
Palestinian issue, and I ask you--also, I should tell you that in the
public statement of the ministers today, there was no indication of
a willingness to go on that track. We have been told over and over
again, this is a two-track process. Did you hear anything in private
that would dissuade us from the view that the Arab foreign
ministers and Gulf ministers were only talking about one track?
Secretary Baker:
Well, we talked at length about two
tracks, and I made it very clear, at a very early stage in what we
hope will be a process, we have not as yet even arrived in Israel. We
have not had detailed discussions with the Israeli government about
what steps they might be willing to consider and so, therefore, I
don't think it is surprising that you don't have Arab governments
coming out and unilaterally making statements about steps that they
would be willing to take in the absence of knowing a little bit more
about what might develop as the process moves forward.
Q: You still are not really saying though whether the two-track
approach is still alive and the second half of the question is in your
statement: You say that the United States plans to signal peace and
reconciliation to Israel. Is there any signal here beyond their
traditional approach?
Secretary Baker:
Well, you read the language. The wording
you just read sounds to me like it's like a signal. In terms of
whether it's still alive, let me simply say that it was only born very,
very recently, so please don't declare it dead until it's actually dead.
I happen to think that it's at least alive until we explore the concept
and the possibilities with the leadership of Israel. Let me say that I
think that the Arab governments with whom we talked generally
about this today exhibited, as I have just indicated to you, a greater
willingness to be active than they had in the past or than they did
before the Gulf crisis was resolved, and I would interpret that to be
a willingness to be active along both tracks, assuming it is a
process that is embraced by others, including, most importantly,
Israel.
Q: Did the Arab states with whom you met today give you specific
concrete things they are willing to do, assuming that there is
reciprocity of some sort on the part of the Israelis?
Secretary Baker:
We are not at that point. I did not ask
them to commit themselves in the absence of knowing what might or
might not be possible on the other side of the equation. What I asked
them to do was to simply consider the possibility of participating in
this process and developing, in due course, some specific steps that
they would be willing to consider taking if there was a willingness
expressed on the part of the government of Israel.
Q: Have you gotten any response back from your offer to meet with
Palestinians when you're in Israel? And, there's a second part to
that--as you go into Israel, there are new reports of the Israelis
shooting and wounding Arabs after a disturbance--it seems that
there's quite a lot of violence. What kind of signal does that send to
you as you embark on a peace process?
Secretary Baker:
Well, obviously we have expressed our
deep concern about violence in the past. I don't know the
circumstances of the incident that you're talking about, so I don't
want to comment beyond saying what I just said. With respect to
the question of meeting with the Palestinians, it's my understanding
that we have received some indication very recently that there was
an interest on the part of some Palestinians in meeting with us, and,
as far as I know, they're still working that question; I don't have a
final answer for you.
Q: Their statement seems to suggest that they did not support all of
what President Bush had to say the other night although some
participants said they did. Can you tell us whether they supported
everything the President said on the issue of Arab-Israeli peace in
the speech?
Secretary Baker:
I don't know--we did not sit down and go
line-by-line through the President's speech, nor for that matter his
interview with--the recent interview he had, I don't remember who
the three journalists were. But in their general comments they were
very supportive of the President's speech and conveyed their overall
general agreement, I think, with the thrust of what he had to say.
Q: Then I just want to add--can you tell me what it is you see in
this statement that gives you the optimism or the hope that you
expressed earlier about their willingness to be more forthcoming
and change their view?
Secretary Baker:
I didn't suggest to you that my optimism-
-don't by the way, don't make me overly optimistic, because I don't
mean to be--but whatever sense I have there of a greater
willingness to be active derives not just from that formal
statement that's been put out.
Q: Can you talk in a little more detail about the Gulf security
structure? What kind of role are we going to have, what kind of role
would they like us to have, what are your concerns about Iran, and
how are we going to get 537,000 troops home?
Secretary Baker:
On the last question, I'm not going to get
into that because that's basically an operational matter that the
Defense Department could better answer for you, except to say that
the President continues to make it clear that he wants to bring all
of our forces home at the earliest possible opportunity. He
continues to make the point that we do not desire a permanent
ground presence in the Gulf, a fact that has been communicated in
the meetings that I've had with all of these representatives--all of
the governments that I've met with here--and one that I feel
comfortable telling you that they not only accept but agree with.
With respect to the security structure, let me say that we're
talking about various levels. We're talking about an enhanced GCC.
We're talking about an Arab force much as was indicated by the
Damascus communique of these very countries that I've just met
with that would be, in addition to GCC forces, would contain
Egyptian and Syrian elements. We are talking about a role for the
United Nations in terms of observers, particularly with respect to
the Iraq-Kuwait border. We are talking about as well the possibility
that the United States--not the possibility but the probability--that
the United States will continue its naval presence in the Gulf which
it has maintained for over 40 years, perhaps enhanced. We will be
discussing with some countries in the Gulf the pre-positioning of
equipment. We will be discussing as well, joint participation in
training exercises and things like that.
March 11, 1991 Jerusalem
News conference by Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Levy.
Q: Mr. Secretary, either in your talks tonight or in your meeting
tomorrow with Prime Minister Shamir, have you or will you ask
Israel to commit itself in principle to trading land for peace?
Secretary Baker:
I have not asked that during the course of
the discussions tonight with David Levy. I don't think it comes as
any surprise to all to know that the US policy position calls for a
comprehensive settlement based on direct negotiations on the basis
of [UN Resolutions] 242 and 338. And of course, President Bush made
specific reference to this policy position in his address to the
Congress several nights ago. Let me say that I do not come to Israel,
to the region, with any specific, particular blueprint with regard to
peace. But I do come with ideas. I come with a desire and a
willingness to explore ideas that might be generated by others. I
have corresponded with the minister about the importance of our
developing ideas that might lead to peace. I told the minister and
his colleagues this evening that I think that there are great
opportunities in the aftermath of the recently concluded war; that I
think the time is now for us to try and seize the moment to try and
take advantage of these opportunities; that I sensed during my 2
days in Riyadh the beginnings of perhaps a bit of a different attitude
on the part of some countries; that we would like to pursue the
possibilities of peace on a dual track--moving in parallel on the
track of Arab state-Israeli relations and on the path of Israeli-
Palestinian relations, dialogue, and so forth.
Q: Mr. Secretary, when your Administration speaks of political
rights for the Palestinians, do you mean self-determination or do
you consider self-rule, autonomy in the territories, as political
rights?
Secretary Baker:
Well, I think that discussions of self-
government fall within the definition of political rights. I think
that the term is one that needs further definition and is subject to
further definition, and perhaps further definition through direct
negotiation between the parties.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you spoke of what you sensed in Riyadh which
sounds not quite concrete. Did you hear real, specific words from
any specific Arab leaders of any specific step they're prepared to
take to accept Israel, or do you just find a sort of an atmosphere
that you find conducive to pursuing this mission? And secondly--
Secretary Baker:
Let me answer the first question first,
because I'll forget it by the time you ask your third question, so--
Let me elaborate on that by saying that on this trip, so far, I have
seen what I consider to be at least signs of new thinking. I have
seen what I consider to be a willingness to consider new approaches.
I think that whether that ripens and materializes into specific,
concrete commitments will depend in large part upon whether or not
there is a similar attitude coming from the other side of the
equation. And we hope very much that there will be. I have heard
from others that the United States as a consequence of this recently
concluded war has acquired an even greater credibility than it had
before with Arabs and with Israel; I hope that's true. I don't assume
it. And I hope when I say that, that it is understood that I do so
without arrogance or without any sort of hubris. But I do want to
say that it is the firm hope and desire and wish of my government,
of my president, that we will not let what could be a historic
opportunity pass for want of a willingness to commit ourselves to
do the real, hard work of peace.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I'll change my follow-up then, based on what you've
just said. Then you spoke of looking for an attitude here. Is it
correct then that here, too, you're not soliciting specific moves,
specific actions from this government--you're trying to solicit some
disposition, some attitude, some sense of giving to equate the sense
of giving you found on the other side?
Secretary Baker:
That's a pretty good way to express it, I
think.
I'm encouraged by what I think was a very positive meeting that
David and I have just concluded, together with our colleagues. Of
course let me say that this war was only recently concluded. We are
dealing here--talking about--an issue that is extraordinarily
intractable, has proven to be so for many, many years. It will take a
great deal of work and a great deal of goodwill, and a great deal of
good faith on the part of all. The United States is committed to
working just as hard as it knows how to contribute to the process.
It is our view that we hopefully can serve as a catalyst, but we
cannot impose peace. We would not try if we thought we could. We
do not intend to engage in what some have referred to as pressure.
We intend to reason, to cajole, to plead, and to offer our good offices
to see if we can seize this opportunity and make progress for peace.
Q: Mr. Baker, you are interested in the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue.
There are Palestinians who are facing major problems in the
occupied territories, both in the sense that political discourse is not
allowed--it is illegal to have any kind of political meetings--and
economic problems are very difficult with more than 120,000 people
out of work. Will you nudge or cajole or plead with the Israelis to
legitimize political discourse, including legitimizing support or
sympathy with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)?
Secretary Baker:
Including what?
Q: Would you encourage them to legitimize political discourse,
including sympathy or support or membership of the PLO, which is
illegal now? And secondly, would you encourage them to ease the
economic strain on the Palestinians in the occupied territories?
Secretary Baker:
Certainly we would like to see the
economic strain and burden eased. Certainly we could like to see--
being people who believe as strongly as we believe in democracy and
knowing that Israel is the only real democracy now in the region--
we would like to see freedom of expression; we would like to see
democratic principles permitted to flourish. We have our problems
with the PLO, as you know. We used to have a dialogue with the PLO.
That dialogue is terminated. We think the PLO made a substantial
error in supporting Saddam Hussein in his brutal invasion and
suppression of an Arab nation.
Foreign Minister Levy:
[Remarks as translated.] With your
permission I would like to add to the question which was put to you
here. Israel aspires to see to it that the Arab population in Judea,
Samaria, and Gaza may have the benefit of the freedom, of true
freedom, which Israel only has in this part of the world. In other
words, we would like to enable this population to improve its
economic situation, just as Israel makes it possible for the Arab
population to do. All of these aspirations can be realized. This can
be done and the affairs of the population can be managed by the
population itself. Israel has proposed this, and continues to do so,
provided of course, the population we are referring to behaves in
keeping with what such an approach would require. When this
population is incited to lash out against Israel, to wreak
destruction, to kill people, to commit murders, as you saw with your
own eyes just yesterday in that heinous and barbarous act, the
slaughter of women, innocent women without protection, in a
manner which is unspeakable, and in fact cannot even be compared
with what an animal would do because no animal would commit such
a murder. When such a population then is incited to such deeds, and
to murder of fellow Arabs as well--in fact 500 men and women
were killed in this manner, barbarously--when anyone thinks that on
the one hand such tactics can be adopted, terrorist tactics coupled
with destruction, while on the other hand benefiting from full
rights--this does not even exist in the world to come. It simply
cannot be. So that Israel cannot but adopt measures designed to
protect its own security and the security of its population.
Our desire is to see a different era open--an era in which this
population no longer follows the incitement of these terrorists, of
these wreakers of destruction who have led them into an impasse--
who have led the population into a road which spells no hope. If,
indeed, they decide to follow the course of peace, and we do, indeed,
offer the course of peace to them--we strive for peace--and we
have reiterated this point--we have repeatedly reiterated the peace
initiative of the government of Israel in 1989. If they are
responsive to this, they will discover that Israel is at the forefront
of those who have offered this population the possibility of taking
part in determining their own fate. No one proposed this before
Israel did--no one, not the British, certainly not the Jordanians, and
we are in fact interested in resolving the problem. We will not give
in. We will not be brought to our knees by terrorism. We will stand
firm. We will stand up to any attempt to lash out against our
citizens, and against that population itself, while at the same time
holding out our hand to them, offering them freedoms and liberties
and the possibility of managing their own affairs--the affairs of the
population--sitting around the same table and discussing this
peacefully, not in a manner which is marked by murder and
destruction.
Therefore, the option is open to this population--the option to
choose to respond to this population--the option to choose to
respond to this initiative at long last. It is time that this came to
pass, just as my friend, the Secretary of State Mr. Baker said, we
find ourselves following two parallel courses--two lines of action-
-both of which offer a definite hope of making progress toward
peace. As far as Israel is concerned, peace is the greatest victory of
all. To date, there was a refusal among the Arab states to talk face-
to-face with Israel about peace. I am pleased that they are
beginning to show signs of change, and we will have to work
together, patiently and courageously, with a sense of faith and hope
in order to move toward the goal which is best for all of us--peace
in this region.
Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, are you speaking of the beginning of a change
on the Arab side? From the standpoint of Israel have you drawn
encouragement from anything Mr. Baker told you about positions
expressed by the Arab states where he visited? Is there any change
which shows a direction toward Israel? A move to Israel?
Foreign Minister Levy:
The discussions which we had this
evening first of all from the standpoint of both nations, were frank
ones, open ones, and constructive ones. We share a common
interest--the United States and Israel. The United States in this
regard does not have any interest which runs counter to the need to
coordinate with Israel and to agree with Israel on the measures
being taken, and we appreciate this deeply.
What we have heard--and we will, of course, keep discussing this
and working on this--certainly shows encouraging signs which we
did not see until now. If we do succeed in continuing to cooperate in
reinforcing this direction, we will together succeed, with the
nations of this region, in coming closer to those goals which seemed
so far away until recently. We will have to continue working in that
direction, but we are closer than we were just yesterday.
Q: Mr. Secretary, did you hear any new thinking tonight from Foreign
Minister Levy, and do you think that if what Israel offers is the May
1989 Shamir plan, that that will be sufficient for the Arab states--
that that will be sufficient political cover for them--to then go
ahead with some of the measures you've been talking about with
them?
Secretary Baker:
Let me say, I think it's important to
recognize that all parties should avoid retreating into stating final
positions as being non-negotiable demands. We should move--if I
can borrow a phrase--to new thinking and away from old thinking.
As I mentioned, the sense I got on my trip was that there is a chance
for new thinking. I think you just heard the minister say he was
somewhat encouraged by what he heard, and maybe we have a chance
now for some new thinking in both directions. It is not--we will not
make progress on either track frankly, either, if one side or the
other says we do not move until after the other side moves. And I
did not detect that attitude or position here tonight. And so to
answer your question, I remain cautiously optimistic that maybe we
can capitalize on what has been a very significant event in the
region, and in the aftermath of this war, maybe we can begin to
grapple with this issue--these issues--and move toward peace,
which is the best guarantee of security for the region.
Q: Would you just answer my question on the May 1989 plan?
Secretary Baker:
The May 1989 plan--I expressed to the
minister our pleasure that the government of Israel--that the
cabinet of the government of Israel--reconfirmed that plan. As you
know, we worked very hard for a period of 14 months to implement
that proposal; came very, very close; we didn't quite make it at the
last minute, but there are many features, and many elements of that
proposal that we view very favorably. We think there are elements
of that proposal with which the parties can work.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I'm wondering if you feel on this trip, that not
enough of the flexibility that you mentioned is expressed. I wanted
to know what is the commitment of this Administration to keep
coming back to the region and keep trying it again and again, or is
this like take or leave it--I mean this is an exploratory visit--are
we in a take it or leave it situation if the parties don't do enough for
throwing up our hands. That's one point, and the second question is,
can you tell us--
Secretary Baker:
Let me answer the first one, then you ask
the second one, OK? We are certainly not in a take it or leave it. As
I just said, we do not come with a particular, specific blueprint. We
come with some ideas. We hope we'll hear some ideas. I think we've
heard some ideas in the first couple of days. I believe we've heard
some ideas here this evening. We cannot impose peace. There will
not be peace in the region unless the parties themselves conclude
that they want peace and are willing to do the hard, nitty-gritty
work that's involved in getting there. For our part, the United States
is willing to do the hard, nitty-gritty, repetitive work that will
clearly be involved if we're going to make progress on this very, very
difficult problem.
Q: The support that this Administration has shown until now for
Soviet Jewish immigration is known here, and I was wondering if
you could say definitively that any future assistance, be it in
housing guarantees or other forms of assistance, would be totally
unlinked to progress in the peace process or totally divorced from
any movement that you have been speaking of?
Secretary Baker:
We have not linked aid to progress on the
peace process, and I told the minister tonight that there's one thing
of which he and the government of Israel should be very, very sure,
and that is that the commitment of the United States to the security
of Israel is firm. That will not change; that will not waiver. We are
willing to work very, very hard. We think and hope that we can serve
as a catalyst, and particularly in the aftermath of what has just
taken place in connection with this war.
March 14, 1991 Damascus, Syria
[News conference by Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shara.]
Secretary Baker:
I will start by telling you that in the
meeting last night with President Assad and Minister Shara, we
covered a number of different topics and subjects. Of course, we
discussed in detail the four broad issue areas that I have been
discussing during the course of my trip in the region, and I will
continue to discuss as we move on now to Moscow. Those four issue
areas being regional security in the Gulf, arms control and
proliferation, economic cooperation, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
We also talked about hostages; we talked about Lebanon and the
importance of implementing in both letter and spirit the Taif
agreement. We talked, as well, about terrorism.
With respect to the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I think
that the minister would agree with me that we find ourselves in
agreement with respect to sharing a commitment to seek a
comprehensive settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338. We find ourselves in agreement with respect to the
fact that there is, we think, a window of opportunity now in the
aftermath of the Gulf crisis that should be seized, if at all possible-
-a window of opportunity which could make it possible for us to
make significant progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. I
sense a very serious intent on the part of the Syrian government to
pursue an active peace process and to continue to work toward that
end with the coalition countries that worked together to reverse
Saddam Hussein's aggression.
Q: Mr. Secretary, after the Gulf crisis has ended, now there is
determination by the international community to implement UN
resolutions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the Italian
foreign minister said here a few days ago, that there should be no
double standard in dealing with this issue. What are you going to do
as the United States on this respect?
Secretary Baker:
I agree that there should be no double
standard, and I would submit to you that, indeed, there is not. The
United States, as evidenced by the activity in which I have been
engaged over the past 4 or 5 days, is going to be very vigorous in
attempting to use whatever influence and good offices it might have
to pursue a comprehensive settlement based on those UN
Resolutions, 242 and 338.
Q: Mr. Secretary, after Saudi Arabia, you said you had heard "new
thinking" from some of the Arab leaders you had met with on the
peace process. After talks here, you said you are leaving with a
sense that the Syrians want to proceed with things. But, do you have
a sense of new thinking here by the Syrian government on how to
break the deadlock in the Arab-Israeli conflict?
Secretary Baker:
I have a sense, as I have just mentioned,
that the Syrian government agrees with the US government and other
governments that there is now a window of opportunity--that we
should all be very active in trying to capitalize on that. But, that's
not to say that we don't all realize the difficulties of this problem.
It is very intractable. It has been there a long, long time, and I
sense a desire, frankly, on the part of the Syrian government to
pursue an active peace process and an active role in that process.
That sense is pretty much the same as the sense that I had in the
meeting in Riyadh with the eight Arab countries that formed part of
the coalition that fought the Gulf war.
Q: Minister Shara, is there any change on the hostage situation? Do
you see any progress with the release, the freedom for the Dawa
prisoners? Does that change the situation? Have you had any recent
talks that might indicate that that problem would be set behind?
Minister Shara?
Minister Shara:
What was our question, please?
Q: On the hostages, sir, have our--had any recent information that
would suggest that there might be progress toward freedom for all
Western hostages, particularly now that the Dawa prisoners no
longer are being held?
Minister Shara:
Well, we have the feeling that the hostage
issue has to be resolved, and we would exert maximum effort to help
in securing the release of all the foreign hostages in Lebanon, and
we are not pessimistic that this will happen.
Q: Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with Syrian progress on the issue
of terrorism, or do you still feel it is necessary for Syria to do more
to be removed from the terrorist list?
Secretary Baker:
We still have some differences on this
issue, differences that we discussed last night. We would like to
resolve this problem, and I am confident that the Syrian government
would like to resolve the problem. I do believe that there has, as I
said in Washington, that there has been progress. We hope that there
can be some further progress, and we intend to continue the dialogue
which we have had on this issue to see if we can make further
progress.
Minister Shara:
Let me try and add to, or just to clarify
what Secretary Baker has said. Well, the difference on terrorism is
not on our joint desire and will to combat terrorism, but the
difference is on the definition of terrorism--what is terrorism and
what is not terrorism.
Q: Mr. Secretary, what if Israel refused to implement Security
Council resolutions concerning the Middle East crisis, and what
would be the US position toward--particularly after Mr. Bush said
that we are going for peace with the same force as we went for the
war?
Secretary Baker:
Well, I don't think we ought to assume
that countries, particularly countries that are directly involved,
will not be participating actively in the search for peace during this
window of opportunity that has been presented. I am quite confident
that they will be. The sense that I got from my trip to Israel of a
day or so ago was that that government shares a strong desire for
peace and so I can't accept the hypothesis of your question. But let
me say that the President was very clear in the statement that he
made to the US Congress, and I had just said it again here today that
the US policy position is that we support and will actively work for
a comprehensive settlement based on 242 and 338.
Q: Mr. Secretary, can you please tell me why the United States has
not dealt with or talked with the Iraqi opposition which has just
been meeting in Beirut, even though the Turks have and the British
have? Are we, are your people authorized to talk with the Iraqi
opposition that is [inaudible] together?
Secretary Baker:
The question of what government Iraq
ends up with in the aftermath of this crisis is a matter for, and we
have said, for the Iraqi people to determine. Now, I don't want to
comment any further beyond saying that.
Q: Mr. Secretary, is Syria still receiving missiles from North Korea,
and, Mr. Secretary, did this come up in your talks?
Secretary Baker:
There is, in our opinion, there has been
recently a delivery of Scud missiles to Syria. We discussed at quite
some length the importance of addressing the question of weapons
of mass destruction and the instruments of delivery, therefore. I
thought I'd make that clear.
Q: Minister Shara, would you comment on that question, please?
Why is Syria continuing to seek additional supplies of those types of
weapons against which Syria fought so recently with Iraq?
Foreign Minister Shara:
Well, Syria is still in a state of
war with Israel, and Israel has so many missiles and so many
different types of mass destruction weapons. Yes, a just and
comprehensive peace would solve all these problems. We aspire, of
course, to see our region free of all mass destruction weapons.
Q: Mr. Secretary, don't you find it significant that countries that
subscribe to 242 and 338 on the record in the Security Council in
1967 and 1973 are talking to you about 242 and 338? What has
progressed here? Israel, Syria, they all agreed on the UN
resolutions. Is there some new interpretation of it? Did you find a
new sense of willingness to go further? What is it that makes it
significant?
Secretary Baker:
I think that what makes the situation
perhaps significant today, and as I've made very clear as we left on
this trip, we are dealing with perhaps the most intractable problem
I think that there is, and we ought not to let expectations get out of
control. This is very early in the process of trying to address this
problem in the aftermath of the war, and what is significant is that
there has been a change in the region as a consequence of what has
happened in the Gulf, and I think that all countries involved on all
sides really want to try to seize this opportunity, if possible, to
make progress. It's going to take that kind of an attitude if there is
going to be peace in the region. I want to say one more time that the
United States sees its role as that of a catalyst. We believe there is
some enhanced credibility here as a consequence of what has
happened in the Gulf. We say that with a total absence of arrogance,
as I pointed out in Israel. But, nobody can impose peace in the Middle
East, if the parties to the conflict don't really want real, true
reconciliation. And I think, in the aftermath of this Gulf war, that
there is a better chance than there has been before that the parties
will want real reconciliation.
Q: You say better chance, but are you ready to say--you've met with
the foreign ministers of nine Arab countries, only one of which has
accepted Israel. Can you, as you end this trip, say there are others
that now will accept Israel, or do you sense--
Secretary Baker:
I don't understand the question--
Q: Well, there's only one Arab country at peace with Israel--
Secretary Baker:
There is one Arab country at peace with
Israel, and we need to move the process forward so that there is a
complete peace between Arabs and Israelis, and you've got to take it
a step at a time. You have to crawl before you walk, and you have to
walk before you run, and we've been at it for maybe 5 or 6 days, and
it's a little bit premature to be, it seems to me, suggesting that
somehow there is no opportunity here because we haven't had instant
peace. Let's work at this. This is extraordinarily difficult, and I
think, if I can say this, I think it's reasonably significant that the
Foreign Minister of Israel made the statement that he made in the
aftermath of our visit there, that the Prime Minister said what he
said. I think it's reasonably significant that you find the degree of
agreement that exists here between the United States and Syria on
approaching this issue and between the United States and eight Arab
countries. Now, maybe you don't think that's progress, and maybe it
isn't. Maybe the wheels will come off tomorrow. Let's give it a
chance. We're not going to get there if we're not willing to work at
it--the United States is willing to work at it, and see if we can
serve as a catalyst to peace.
Q: [Inaudible]--that you are going to use your influence and your
good offices with Israel, do you think this will work?
Secretary Baker:
Well, I hope so. We certainly believe that
we, as a strong ally of Israel through the years, should have the
ability at least to reason with Israel, help Israel to understand--
which I think they probably already understand--nobody benefits
more from true reconciliation and true peace than does Israel.
Q: Since you saw Prime Minister Shamir, could you tell us whether
or not you saw any evidence of new thinking on the Prime Minister's
part?
Secretary Baker:
Well, I think you heard what the Prime
Minister's press spokesman said in the aftermath of our meeting, and
I really do believe that the Prime Minister is willing to, again, work
actively in the aftermath of this crisis to seek peace.
Q: [Inaudible]--that showed that there was perhaps more
convergence than you've seen before?
Secretary Baker:
I'm not going to get into the specifics
and the details. It's premature to do that. I think that the
government of Israel is strongly interested in moving rapidly and
actively toward peace. I certainly hope that's the case. I hope that's
the case with the Arab parties to the conflict.
Q: You seem to have better relations with the Arab governments in
the region as a consequence after the war, but what about the people
in the Arab countries, considering that most of the governments
aren't democratically elected--surely the government might have
better relations but the people--[inaudible].
Secretary Baker:
That was a question that was asked on
August 3, if you recall: the region was going to go up into flames,
that things were going to totally fall apart on the street. It didn't
happen, did it? It didn't happen to anywhere near the extent or
degree that was predicted. And I certainly don't think that it's going
to happen in the aftermath of a successful stand against aggression
by eight Arab countries and a coalition of other countries around the
world.
Q: Just by definition, do you think that there is a difference between
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and Israel's occupation of the Syrian and
Palestinian lands [inaudible].
Secretary Baker:
Do I see a difference there? I see a
difference there. I see a difference in how it came about, certainly.
Foreign Minister Shara:
I will comment on that question. I
don't think that Secretary Baker is talking about the significance and
the importance of using one standard, that is the UN Security Council
resolutions which will resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. I think he
means the difference in the way that things are taking place, but the
substance we are in full agreement that international [inaudible] and
UN Security Council resolutions have to be abided by and to be
implemented [inaudible]. And the Palestinian question, I can say that
this double standard should not only be used and we are optimistic
[inaudible]--that's why we are optimistic for the future. That's why
we see a window of optimism and hope to give the momentum to the
peace process in our region.
Q: This window of opportunity you're talking about, does that have a
limit; is there a deadline since we have to think ahead toward the
next election cycle?
Secretary Baker:
We really don't know the answer to that.
We don't know. We don't know how long the window might be open,
and that's all the more reason why we think we ought to all work as
actively as we can to try and take advantage of whatever time there
is. We don't know.
Q: You don't have a time set?
Secretary Baker:
We don't know.
Foreign Minister Shara:
Let me just say a couple of words-
-that the visit of Secretary Baker to Damascus and the talks that he
held yesterday with President Hafez al-Assad and myself were
positive and constructive, and they will help all of us to work
actively for a just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the Palestinian question. We are optimistic that this
opportunity will be utilized in the proper manner, and we don't like
to see the first Gulf crisis era as the same era in the past. That's
why we will keep contacts, and there was agreement on keeping in
touch and keeping these contacts in order to give a momentum to the
peace process for the months to come.
April 25, 1991 Kislovodsk, USSR
[Excerpts from a news conference by Secretary Baker and Soviet
Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh.]
Secretary Baker:
Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by
expressing my great appreciation to the Minister and his colleagues
for seeing us here on such short notice and making arrangements for
us to come here from Damascus. We have had an opportunity to cover
in quite some detail the discussions that I have been having in the
region, and I have had an opportunity to bring the Minister even more
up to date than I have been able to do through written
communications and telephone conversations over the course of the
past 2 or 3 weeks.
We have the prospect before us of continuing our joint efforts to
craft a process that might lead to peace in the Middle East. We have
the opportunity as we look forward now to continue efforts to
jointly convene a peace conference that could operate on two tracks
and bring into direct negotiations Israelis and Palestinians and
could, as well, bring about direct negotiations between Israel and
their Arab neighbors. There are still a number of issues that will
have to be resolved. We have discussed those in quite a bit of detail.
The Minister was able to fill me in on some of the discussions that
he has had with representatives from interest groups in countries in
the region, and we will continue to work in the days ahead to craft
this process--to create this process in the hopes that we might
move toward peace in the Middle East.
May 16, 1991 Tel Aviv, Israel
[Excerpts from a news conference by Secretary Baker and Foreign
Minister Levy.]
Minister Levy:
. . . We discussed various ideas and the
elements which are part of this initiative. We devoted considerable
time to several notions which will undoubtedly help us progress
toward this goal. We are pleased with the progress, and we support
your efforts to continue along the lines of the effort you have
assumed responsibility for. Whatever we do for the sake of
promoting these understandings was done in an atmosphere that was
sometimes not all that good, but now I am pleased that progress is
being made toward shared understandings among all of us. We were
in need of a great deal of patience and perseverance, and in both
these regards I believe that our determination proved very evident.
Now what is needed for the Arab states is to prove their
determination and their aspiration for a meeting which will involve
direct negotiations in the interest of solving a conflict which has
been long and brutal. True, there are other issues to be dealt with
still, but do not think that the difficulties are immense as it may
seem. As you yourself said, we have made a great deal of progress,
more than what still lies ahead.
Q: Mr. Secretary, if we take Israel at its word, that it feels the
United Nations will show bias at a peace conference, what can the
United States do to allay these fears, so things can get moving
already?
Secretary Baker:
Well, I think one thing that could be done
is to make it clear, as we have in our discussions with all countries,
including Israel, that a peace conference would not be convened with
the authority to impose solutions or to veto results or to command
the parties. That is not the purpose of the conference we have in
mind. The purpose of the conference we have in mind is to launch
direct negotiations between the parties. And I might say that this
understanding of the role of the conference is shared as far as I can
determine by all the countries with whom I have discussed the
matter.
July 18, 1991 Damascus, Syria
[Excerpts from a news conference by Secretary Baker and Foreign
Minister Shara.]
Secretary Baker:
. . . I am pleased to report that Syria has agreed to the proposals
that we have made, including coming to a peace conference, the
terms of reference of which would be a comprehensive settlement
based on Resolutions 242 and 338. I think that this is an
extraordinarily important and positive step. It gives us something
to work with, and we are going to try and build on it throughout this
trip in an effort to promote the cause of peace.
Minister Shara:
I agree with Secretary Baker. The meeting
was good with President Assad. There was no difficulty having
agreement on the contents of President Bush's letter to President
Assad and the positive response President Assad made to the
American proposals--these proposals, which are based on UN
Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principles of international
legitimacy.
Q: . . . Could you describe to us exactly what kind of a UN presence
has Syria approved, and what have you approved? Are you in
agreement with Syria?
Secretary Baker:
Yes, we are in agreement, and there are a
number of elements here relating to the UN. Perhaps the most
important is that, as I've just mentioned, the terms of reference of
this conference and of the negotiations that will follow--and this
would be reflected in any invitation issued--would be for the
purpose of seeking a comprehensive settlement based on UN
Resolutions 242 and 338. In addition to that, of course, as you know
there would be in attendance a UN observer, perhaps as a
representative from the Secretary General.
Q: But the point being, would he be a participant?
Secretary Baker:
The representative would be an observer-
-not a co-sponsor--and he would be in our view--the role that he
would perform would be similar to that performed by the Secretary
General's representative at the conference in Cairo in 1977, and it
would be a role not unlike the role that observers perform in other
multilateral gatherings from time to time.
Q: Will he be able to speak, contribute, participate, offer
suggestions?
Secretary Baker:
The observer will be there as a
representative of the Secretary General. He will be able to take
notes. He will be able, of course, to communicate with the
participants and with the sponsors, but he will be an observer. That
is the proposal that we have made, and that is the proposal that
President Assad has agreed with.
Secretary Baker:
. . . Now with respect to the question of
secret assurances, let me say that from the very beginning of my
efforts on Middle East peace, I have made it clear that there would
be no assurances given to any one party that are not made known to
the others. That's the approach we took in our prior effort, and
that's the approach we are following in this effort, and we will not
be making and giving secret assurances that will not be shared with
other parties.
July 19, 1991 Alexandria, Egypt
[Excerpts from a news conference by Secretary Baker and President
Mubarak of Egypt.]
President Mubarak:
. . . What worries me is the building of
the new settlements on the occupied territories. I think and I
believe if Israel could suspend building the settlements on the
occupied territories, I believe that the Arab states should take a
reciprocal step by suspending the boycotting. These steps could
pave the way for much more progress in the peace process. I am
very pleased again to discuss with the Secretary so many issues and
mainly the problem of the Middle East. The United States is making
big efforts, and all of us hope that we could reach a comprehensive
settlement so as peace could prevail in this area which has stayed
for more than 50 years now. And if peace prevails, it is my personal
opinion, Israel will be the biggest winner in the whole area.
Secretary Baker:
Let me simply say, Mr. President, that I'm
very pleased to have the opportunity to be here with you and to meet
with you and to meet with the Minister. We are going to, as I said
last night in Damascus, we are going to continue to work very hard
to create a process that could lead us toward the goal of peace in
the Middle East. And let me say with respect to the statement that
you just made respecting reciprocal steps, that is suspension of the
Arab boycott of Israel in exchange in effect for suspension by Israel
of settlement activity in the occupied territories, I think if steps
like that could be taken, clearly it would evidence, I think, a mutual
desire to improve the climate for negotiations--negotiations, of
course, between Israel and her Arab neighbors and between Israel
and Palestinians, which are the follow-on objectives of the peace
conference that we have been seeking to arrange. . . .
July 20, 1991 Cairo, Egypt
[Excerpts from a news conference by Secretary Baker and Lebanese
Foreign Minister Bouez.]
Q: . . . What kind of message are you trying to build up for the
Israelis before you arrive there?
Secretary Baker:
Well, I would hope that we would be able
to convince the Israelis that there are Arab states that are now
ready for direct face-to-face discussions with Israel. As you know,
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states indicated they were ready to do this
in a multilateral context during the course of our last trip here.
Now I hope and believe there will be other Arab states that are
willing to do it in a bilateral context and specifically to talk about
the political issue of peace.
This is something that I think a lot of people have wanted for a long,
long time, and I hope that I would be in a position to assure Israel
that that is the position of some Arab governments. We haven't had
a chance yet to talk about that here with the Minister, but that's one
of the things that we will be talking about because as you know the
conference we are trying to arrange would serve to launch direct
bilateral discussions between Israel and Palestinians but also
between Israel and her Arab neighbors.
Q: Mr. Minister, are you prepared for bilateral talks with Israel in
the context of a peace conference?
Minister Bouez:
We think Lebanon will work positively
with this peace process, and at the same time, Lebanon will be with
the other countries in the same position with new negotiations with
Israel