US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991


Secretary's Talks in China: A Summary of Results

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Opening statement at a news conference, Shangri-La Hotel, Beijing Date: Nov 17, 199111/17/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Democratization, Arms Control, Trade/Economics, Human Rights [TEXT] I have a statement that is going to be a little longer than I would usually give, but I want to give you as full a readout as I can of our discussions. Let me start by saying that this was an important visit, and we had important issues to discuss. The only way to address our differences, I think, is by working at them, by talking face to face. In my discussions with the Foreign Minister and other Chinese leaders this weekend, we covered--in depth and at length-- issues across the entire relationship, including human rights, arms sales or proliferation, and trade. We also discussed important regional and bilateral issues. We spent, all told, about 18 hours with the Chinese on these topics, spending the largest portion on human rights, as the Foreign Minister himself noted in our final meeting. It has now been 21/2 years since the tragedy of Tiananmen. Unless we were to keep US-China relations in the deep freeze forever, we had to start talking. But I did not come here expecting a dramatic breakthrough. The gulf is too wide to accomplish that in one trip. The talks were difficult, but I think that we accomplished some important things and I would like to give you a summary of the results. First of all, on the missile technology control regime [MTCR], the Chinese have told us that they intend to observe the MTCR guidelines and parameters. To us, this means that they will apply them to any exports of missiles and related technology. We understand that this applies to the M-9 and M-11 missiles. The Chinese have told us that they will make this unconditional commitment to the MTCR guidelines if we will remove the proliferation sanctions imposed June 16 on two Chinese companies and on the licensing of high-speed computers and satellites for China. This is a matter that we will be examining further in Washington. With respect to the question of the Korean Peninsula, China and the United States share the international concern about the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, and we will work on this issue. On the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] , the Government of China will propose that the National Peoples Congress complete the ratification of the NPT by the end of the year and that the Government of China complete the formalities of the NPT accession within 3 months of that time. Turning now to trade, with respect to questions of intellectual property rights, the Chinese Government made positive intellectual property rights proposals which the US Government welcomes. These proposals are in the areas of copyright, sound recordings, computer software, and patent protection. On November 21 and 22, a Chinese delegation will come to Washington where we will seek to resolve the special 301 case [regarding the aforementioned intellectual property rights]. With respect to the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the US Government supports the membership of China as a contracting party in the GATT and also [that of] Taiwan as a separate customs territory when GATT requirements are met. Assuming that both Taiwan and China qualify according to GATT standards, the example of APEC [Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation] demonstrates that we should be able to solve the membership problem. On human rights, we gave the Chinese a clear and comprehensive statement on human rights. Having raised the issue of denial of exit permits to prominent intellectuals and families of Chinese personalities now abroad, we were assured that any person against whom no criminal proceedings were pending would be allowed to leave after completing the usual formalities. Regarding a list of about 800 names of reported political prisoners, which we handed the Chinese authorities last June, we received a response by individual name as to which of these persons have been convicted, which are still under investigation, which have been released, and which cannot be identified. We have not received any such response heretofore. Regarding the prison labor issue which, of course, has both human rights and trade implications, we have reached agreement, in principle, on the text of a memorandum of understanding providing for cooperative efforts to prevent the import of Chinese prison labor products into the United States. The memorandum of understanding will provide for prompt investigation of suspected violations of the laws and regulations of each side relating to trade and prison labor products, exchanges of information, meetings between officials and experts of the two sides, and the furnishing of evidence that can be used in judicial or administrative proceedings against violators. Finally, we reached agreement that as to all other issues which we raised in the human rights field, there will be a continuing dialogue between the official of the Foreign Ministry specifically designated by the Foreign Minister to work on this task and Assistant Secretary [for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs] Dick Schifter. Let me say something about an agreement that was reached by our negotiators not in Beijing but a very important agreement with respect to US-Chinese relations. That is a civil aviation agreement, a multi-year agreement, on the substance of an amendment to the present civil aviation agreement between the two countries which will permit many more flights and an all-cargo route between the United States and China and, I think, demonstrates the tangible benefits that can come with cooperation between our two countries. I think, ladies and gentlemen, that all of this represents gains. As I said, by far the greatest amount of time was devoted to human rights. I made clear that progress in human rights is essential to progress in the overall relationship. I told my Chinese counterparts that my country will not turn a blind eye to the plight of human suffering or political repression, and I said that freedom was something that I thought that people everywhere would continue to aspire to. The Chinese also know exactly where we stand on the full range of issues. They know in precise terms what is necessary if progress is to be sustained. If this process falters, it will not be for lack of our effort. This visit to China without preconditions, I think, is proof of the US commitment to an improvement in the climate between our nations and in the well-being of the Chinese people. Now we look to China also to continue to address the problems in the relationship in a sustained way. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991 Title:

US-Vietnam Discussions

Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Nov 21, 199111/21/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Vietnam, Canada Subject: POW/MIA Issues, State Department, Democratization [TEXT] As Secretary Baker and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Cam agreed in Paris last month, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard H.] Solomon met in New York on November 21, 1991, with Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai to discuss the issues and modalities associated with normalization of relations between our two countries. In the course of these talks, which lasted over 6 hours, Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard H.] Solomon reviewed the issues of greatest concern to the United States: notably full implementation of the UN Comprehensive Political Settlement for Cambodia and the fullest possible accounting for our POW/MIAs [prisoners of war/missing in action]. Assistant Secretary Solomon recalled that he had presented our policy on normalization of relations with Vietnam to the Vietnamese in New York on April 9. He reiterated the US Governments commitment to that policy. In that connection, he stressed that to continue moving forward step-by-step toward full normalization, it is essential that there be further, concrete results on the POW/MIA issue to build on the momentum we had recently achieved. He also expressed the hope that Vietnam would address other humanitarian issues of importance to the United States, and indicated that we plan to continue our efforts to respond to humanitarian needs in Vietnam. Assistant Secretary Solomon also took note of the progress both sides had made since that time toward achieving the objectives he set forth on April 9. Specifically, he welcomed the Vietnamese decision to support the UN Comprehensive Settlement for Cambodia and expressed hope that Vietnam and the Phnom Penh authorities would continue to facilitate full implementation of the agreement. He also provided the US Government's view of Vietnam's efforts to account for our POW/MIAs and discussed various approaches to accelerate progress toward reaching the fullest possible accounting. The Vietnamese again affirmed their desire to help achieve the fullest possible accounting of all American POW/MIAs. Vice Minister Le Mai and Assistant Secretary Solomon agreed to establish a working group to deal with the issues associated with normalization of relations. The group, which will meet in New York, will be headed by Ambassador Lang on the Vietnamese side and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kenneth Quinn on the US side. They agreed to continue discussions at mutually agreeable dates in the future. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991 Title:

The Middle East in The Post-Gulf War Period

Djerejian Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Nov 20, 199111/20/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, United States, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Democratization, United Nations, International Organizations [TEXT] It is a distinct privilege for me to make my first appearance before this distinguished subcommittee. With your permission, I would like to comment on the historic achievements of the Madrid peace conference and describe what the road ahead of the Arab-Israeli peace process looks like. Further, I will make a few comments on the situation in Iraq. Of course, I am prepared to address these and whatever other issues the members of the subcommittee may wish to raise during the subsequent discussion.
Arab/Israeli Peace Process
In his opening remarks at the peace conference in Madrid, President Bush termed the event a "mission of hope." With the opening of the conference, the Middle East turned an important historical page-- away from the intractability and insolubility of this over 4 decades-old conflict and toward the achievement of genuine, comprehensive peace and reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors through direct dialogue and negotiations. The hope to which the President referred during the opening session of the conference, in fact, turned to reality just 4 days later on November 3 when direct, bilateral negotiations were launched between Israeli delegations and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, a Lebanese delegation, and a Syrian delegation. Never before had there been direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and each of its Arab and Palestinian neighbors, and never again will there be such a taboo against such face-to-face contacts. In his closing press conference in Madrid, Secretary Baker termed these developments a "good start". Indeed, it was. For over 12 hours on November 3, Israeli and Arab delegates debated the issues across the table of negotiations. To be sure, the road ahead will not be easy to navigate. Fundamental differences separate the parties, and those differences will be hard fought at the negotiating table. But they will be fought with words and position papers and policy statements, and, hopefully, no longer with weapons and violence. The road to Madrid was long and difficult. Secretary Baker traveled to the Middle East 8 times between March and October to fulfill the promise of the initiative launched by President Bush last March in his address to a joint session of Congress. Many, many hours were spent in discussion with key Middle East figures--Prime Minister Shamir of Israel, President Assad of Syria, King Hussein of Jordan, President Mubarak of Egypt, President Hrawi of Lebanon, and Palestinians like Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi--in an effort to understand their concerns, examine the differences between their positions, evolve bridging positions to overcome problems, and develop the terms of reference for the peace conference and negotiations. Enormous political strains were placed on each party by this effort. Persistent efforts were undertaken by extremists to undermine the search for peace by acts of terror and in Southern Lebanon. Yet, throughout, Secretary Baker found the parties ready to engage and ready to confront the difficult decisions required to get to the negotiating table. Important and far reaching agreements among the parties permitted this process to proceed. -- The parties agreed that the goal is a comprehensive peace settlement achieved through direct negotiations based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. -- They agreed on two negotiating tracks between Israel and Arab states, and between Israel and Palestinians. -- They agreed that the negotiations between Israel and Palestinians would be conducted in phases, with the initial phase focusing on interim self-government arrangements and the second phase focusing on a permanent settlement. -- They agreed that the direct negotiations would be launched by a peace conference--co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union--and that the conference would not be able to impose solutions, veto agreements, make decisions, or vote. -- They agreed that Palestinians would participate in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and that Palestinians who participate would be those who accept to negotiate on two tracks and in phases and who accept to live in peace with Israel. -- They agreed to invite the European Community and Egypt to participate alongside the co-sponsors. -- They agreed to invite the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Maghreb Union, and the United Nations to each send an observer to the conference.
Three Crucial Issues
In translating these agreements into a workable peace conference and negotiations, we were also reminded by the parties of the central substantive issues which need to be addressed in order to resolve the conflict. In his remarks to the peace conference, Secretary Baker noted that the parties themselves had identified three critical issues. -- The parties had expressed a yearning for peace; a desire to live in mutually satisfying relationships with neighbors; and to have those relations characterized by peace treaties; diplomatic relations, economic relations, cultural ties, and political dialogue. -- The parties emphasized the importance of land and the desire of peoples to exercise authority and political governance over territories they consider part of their patrimony. -- And the parties stressed the need for security. That is, the requirement that people live free of fear and the obligation of governments to do their best to protect their citizens. Listening to these views expressed by the parties, the Secretary made clear our belief that progress toward a comprehensive settlement on all fronts would be possible only if all the issues were put on the table. This is our assessment of what needs to be done to ensure progress in the negotiations. Our upbeat mood after the conference is tempered only by the sober realization that much hard work and difficult procedural and substantive decisions lie ahead. The first issue the parties face is the venue of the bilateral negotiations. Before Madrid, there had not been agreement on where the talks would be held. The parties held different views and still do. As the Secretary made clear in Madrid, we hope the parties can resolve this issue on their own. If they cannot, we stand ready soon to make proposals that will help get the negotiations resumed as quickly as possible. We are also working to ensure a successful start in the multilateral negotiations to which we attach much importance. As you know, the invitation to the conference indicated that those parties who wish to participate should convene to organize multilateral negotiations on such key topics for the peace, security, and prosperity of the region as arms control and regional security, economic development, refugees, water, the environment, and the like. We will begin shortly to consult with parties in the region and outside in order to plan for the organizational meeting of these negotiations. We are gratified that a significant number of regional parties have already stated publicly their intention to participate in these talks.
The Role of the United States
The role of the United States throughout this process will be that of an honest broker, a catalyst for peace, and a driving force to help ensure that negotiations work. Both the President and the Secretary have reiterated their personal commitments to play an active role in helping the process succeed and that we are in it for the long haul. The United States maintains long-standing positions on peace process issues that remain the basis of our own policy. But we also know well from experience that the role of the mediator often benefits as much from the non-articulation of one's own positions, as from their repetition. When needed, we will state our views; and when needed, we will work quietly with the parties, out of the public view to help build trust and agreement between them. I would like to add a final word about the most important, and often most neglected facet, of the peace process--namely, the human dimension. This is a conflict between people. It is a conflict in which people have urgent and basic needs--to live more securely, to live free of fear, to live with dignity, to live in peace. There are practical prescriptions available to meet the urgent needs of the peoples of the Middle East. Each party can and must think about and adopt whatever measures are possible to reach out to peoples on the other side of the conflict. The parties, themselves, know best which actions would have the greatest impact. They, themselves, know how important these steps would be for their own constituencies and, thus, also how important they would be for the other side. They, themselves, know that the formulas of negotiations will have little meaning if the people of the region lose faith in what must be a process of peace and reconciliation. We offer no specific prescriptions for the parties to follow-- either with regard to the substance of the negotiations or to the confidence-building steps that should be adopted by all sides. We do call upon all parties to avoid unilateral acts which might prejudice or even threaten the process, and we share the hope that the same courage which regional leaders have brought to the tough decisions on the peace conference and the start of negotiations will also be applied to the pressing human problems that need to be confronted.
Concerning the situation in Iraq, the victory of the US-led coalition in Desert Storm reversed Saddam Hussein's aggression against his neighbors. Ever since, the international community has shown its determination to ensure that Iraq complies with all its UN- mandated obligations. We and our coalition partners remain committed to that end. In so doing, we bear no animus toward the Iraqi people who have suffered too long under a brutal regime. They deserve new leadership. President Bush has made it clear that sanctions will continue as long as the ruthless dictator Saddam Hussein remains in power. At the same time, we will continue to broaden our contacts with the Iraqi opposition and to support the emergence of an Iraqi Government representative of Iraq's pluralistic society including the Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Kurds. In fact, on my very first day as Assistant Secretary, I met with a delegation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, which included Assyrian, Turcoman, and Kurdish representatives. In summary, and as President Bush has said, we are prepared to work with a successor regime in the interest of the Iraqi people. Sadly, Saddam Hussein continues to try to blame the international sanctions for the continuing suffering of the Iraqi people which he himself has caused. The facts are quite different. First, Medicine has never been denied to the Iraqis by the international community, and UN sanctions on food shipments ended in March. While assuring that his clique is provided for, Saddam Hussein is cynically denying food and medicine to the Iraqi people and is trying to fix the blame on the sanctions. Second, The mechanism to help the Iraqi people is in place-- all he has to do is use it. He has not done so because the UN- mandated monitoring regime would make it difficult for him to manipulate the flow of food to the Iraqi people. Third, The continuing deprivation in Iraq is the result of Saddam's deliberate refusal to accept UN Resolutions 706 and 712-- namely food for oil--and his callous policy of diverting supplies away from those who oppose him. Once again, Saddam Hussein is prepared to sacrifice the Iraqi people for the sake of hanging on to his own, personal power. As we maintain all possible political and economic pressure on this brutal regime, we will work with the international community to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through implementation of Security Council Resolutions 688, 706, and 712. We are confident, that Saddam's attempt will fail. He miscalculated the will of the international community over his invasion of Kuwait. If he thinks he can fool the world with a shell game with food and medicine, he will have miscalculated badly, once again. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991 Title:

Invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference

Description: Text of the October 18, 1991 letter of invitation sent to each participant of the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid, Spain. It was released to Congress on November 22, 1991 Date: Nov 22, 199111/22/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT]
Invitation to Peace Conference
After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians, the United States and the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace. Toward that end, the President of the United States and the President of the USSR invite you to a peace conference, which their countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct negotiations. The conference will be convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991. President Bush and President Gorbachev request your acceptance of this invitation no later than 6:00 p.m. Washington time, October 23, 1991, in order to ensure proper organization and preparation of the conference. Direct bilateral negotiations will begin four days after the opening of the conference. Those parties who wish to attend multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after the opening of the conference to organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest. The co-sponsors will chair the conference which will be held at ministerial level. Governments to be invited include Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Palestinians will be invited and attend as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Egypt will be invited to the conference as a participant. The European Community will be a participant in the conference alongside the United States and the Soviet Union and will be represented by its Presidency. The Gulf Cooperation Council will be invited to send its Secretary General to the conference as an observer, and GCC member states will be invited to participate in organizing the negotiations on multilateral issues. The United Nations will be invited to send an observer, representing the Secretary General. The conference will have no power to impose solutions on the parties or veto agreements reached by them. It will have no authority to make decisions for the parties and no ability to vote on issues or results. The conference can reconvene only with the consent of all the parties. With respect to negotiations between Israel and Palestinians who are part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements. These talks will be conducted with the objective of reaching agreement within one year. Once agreed, the interim self-government arrangements will last for a period of five years. Beginning the third year of the period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will take place on permanent status. These permanent status negotiations, and the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, will take place on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. It is understood that the co-sponsors are committed to making this process succeed. It is their intention to convene the conference and negotiations with those parties who agree to attend. The co-sponsors believe that this process offers the promise of ending decades of confrontation and conflict and the hope of a lasting peace. Thus, the co-sponsors hope that the parties will approach these negotiations in a spirit of good will and mutual respect. In this way, the peace process can begin to break down the mutual suspicions and mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and allow the parties to begin to resolve their differences. Indeed, only through such a process can real peace and reconciliation among the Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians be achieved. And only through this process can the peoples of the Middle East attain the peace and security they richly deserve.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991 Title:

US Response to Recent Haitian Exodus

Gelbard Source: Robert Gelbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the House Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC Date: Nov 20, 199111/20/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti, United States Subject: Human Rights, United Nations, OAS, Refugees [TEXT] I appreciate this opportunity to discuss our actions in response to the recent exodus of Haitian boat people and our immigration policy toward Cuba. The democratically elected Government of Haiti was usurped September 30, when elements of the Haitian military drove President Aristide from office and forced him to leave the country. Acting through the Organization of American States (OAS), the nations of this hemisphere unanimously condemned this attack on Haitian democracy, then voted on October 8 in favor of a trade embargo until Haitian democracy is restored. Within days of the coup, the United States cut off aid, froze Haitian Government assets, blocked financial transfers to the Haitian regime, and blocked exports to the Haitian military and police. In the course of the month, we and our neighbors in the OAS- -including Venezuela, Haiti's oil supplier--proceeded to cut off our trade. The trade embargo is having a clear impact: There is little traffic in the streets; there are long lines for fuel; and business activity is markedly down. We have a standing agreement with the Government of Haiti which permits us to rescue at sea Haitians who are intending to emigrate to the United States and to return to Haiti those who lack a basis for asylum. This agreement was reached in 1981 to give the Haitian and US Governments a mutually acceptable way of dealing with the regular flow of Haitians who seek to come illegally to the United States for economic reasons. When President Aristide was forced from office, we expected that an exodus of Haitians might occur in response to that political crisis. That did not occur. From the time President Aristide left Haiti until October 28, the Coast Guard found no boats with Haitians coming to the United States. On October 28, the cutter Steadfast picked up a boat with 19 Haitians aboard. The next boat was found November 4, and the flow has greatly increased since then. As of November 19, we had picked up nearly 2,200 Haitians. Seven of these boats had over 100 Haitians on board; none of these craft was over 40 feet in length. For example, on November 14 the cutter Confidence interdicted a 40-foot sailing vessel with 238 Haitians aboard. This boat was not designed for use on the high seas. It was severely overloaded. It carried no life jackets, no flares, no radio, no beacons, no charts, no navigational equipment-- in short, it was not equipped to survive the voyage it intended to make. This was typical of the conditions on these boats, any of which could easily have capsized in rough seas. In responding to this difficult situation, our overriding concern has been to save lives. We have taken the following factors into account. -- In keeping with the intent of the US-Haitian immigration agreement, the interdiction program, and US law, we have an obligation to prevent an unimpeded flow of Haitians to the United States. -- We want to rescue people from vessels that put them at high risk of losing their lives at sea. -- We want to ensure that those who have a well-founded fear of persecution, and hence a good claim to asylum, are interviewed carefully, identified, and brought to the United States. -- Above all, we want to avoid any action that would encourage more Haitians to risk their lives by boarding unsafe vessels in the belief that this would ensure them passage to the United States. At first, we sought a regional solution. On November 8, we began to work with the [Office of the] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration, and countries across the Caribbean region to see which countries might accept a number of Haitians that had been picked up by Coast Guard vessels. We had hoped that a sufficient number of countries would accept these people and that arrangements could be made for their temporary safe haven under the auspices of the UNHCR. Regrettably, after nearly 2 weeks of intense diplomacy, with both the United States and UNHCR canvassing the region, we have not yet been able to elicit a sufficient number of positive responses from the countries of the region. Many are already host to large numbers of Haitians--the Bahamas has 40,000 illegal Haitian immigrants, for example. We will continue to pursue discussions with countries in the region to arrange temporary safe haven for additional Haitians. Yesterday at a meeting hosted by the OAS in Washington, the UNHCR made a renewed appeal to countries in the region to accept some Haitians. By the beginning of this week, we had 483 Haitians temporarily ashore at our naval base at Guantanamo and over 1,200 on Coast Guard vessels. Despite renewed warnings broadcast over the Voice of America's Creole service beginning November 15 to urge Haitians not to set sail, the numbers were growing. Four countries--Honduras, Venezuela, Belize, and Trinidad and Tobago-- had generously agreed to accept some refugees, but they would only accept a total of 550. It was clear that the regional safe haven solution was not going to be sufficient to deal with the number of Haitians who were leaving Haiti, and another solution would have to be found. As a result, we reluctantly reached a decision on Monday, November 18, to repatriate those Haitians on Coast Guard vessels, to bring to the United States those Haitians who appear to qualify for asylum, and to bring those at Guantanamo to regional countries for temporary safehaven. As of yesterday, 53 have been brought to Miami to have their asylum claims processed by INS [US Immigration and Naturalization Service] and 538 have been repatriated to Haiti by the Coast Guard. Today, we expect that a number of Haitians will begin to be transported from Guantanamo to Honduras and Venezuela under UNHCR auspices. The repatriation has now been suspended by court order. As long as that order remains in effect, we expect it will encourage Haitians to continue to go to sea in small, dangerous boats, and we fear it will lead to loss of life. This was a difficult set of circumstances that offered no perfect solution. Given a range of difficult choices, we would have preferred to arrange safe haven in the region for all the Haitians, but the numbers of Haitians and the difficulty of making those arrangements made it impossible to continue pursuing that option alone. Under the circumstances, we strongly believe we have made the right decision. The Coast Guard has, without any doubt, saved hundreds of lives by rescuing people from boats that had only a minimal chance of reaching any destination safely. People who fled Haiti for political reasons and fear political persecution are being identified through careful interviews and brought to the United States. No Haitian is being repatriated without a careful interview that gives him or her a chance to describe circumstances that might justify an asylum claim. Our embassy is observing the repatriations, which have been uneventful to date. The Haitian Red Cross has been present to receive the returnees and to give them a cash stipend. Our embassy will remain in contact with local and international human rights and humanitarian organizations to see if there is any evidence that these people are mistreated after their return. I underscore that there is no history of reprisals against Haitians repatriated under our bilateral agreement. Most important of all, this course of action will send a clear message to discourage more Haitians from going to sea in dangerous conditions based on the mistaken belief that they will be guaranteed entry into the United States. That message will save lives. Some have drawn comparisons to our immigration law and policy toward Cuba and charged that we are wrong to repatriate Haitians when we don't repatriate Cubans. The facts are these: -- Cubans are fleeing one of the world's remaining communist dictatorships; they fear returning, if for no other reason than that it is a crime in Cuba to leave without an exit permit. Cubans have been prosecuted and jailed for that offense. Those conditions do not apply in Haiti. -- Haiti is now under the control of a military-dominated government. We hope that negotiations about to begin between President Aristide and Haitian legislators will lead to the prompt restoration of constitutional rule. However, neither Haiti's current conditions nor the conditions before September 30 can be compared with the systematic, extensive repression that is a condition of daily life in Cuba. -- The current exodus from Haiti began not when the Aristide Government was forced from power nor in the violence that followed but 1 month later. This indicates that the political crisis, in itself, did not spark significant emigration. We are interviewing each Haitian in careful detail to determine whether there is a well- founded fear of persecution. As I noted, we are bringing to the United States those who establish a sound basis for an asylum claim. In conclusion, we believe we have executed US law and immigration policy in a fair and humane manner. We believe the Coast Guard's actions and our policy decisions have saved lives. We welcome your interest in this situation and look forward to continuing consultations with Congress as we continue to work for the restoration of Haiti's democratically elected government. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991 Title:

Haitian Boat People

Tutwiler Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Nov 18, 199111/18/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Human Rights, Refugees, United Nations [TEXT] The United States is deeply concerned by the humanitarian tragedy of the Haitian boat people. Over the past 3 weeks, nearly 2,000 Haitians have put out to sea, in unseaworthy vessels, with the mistaken belief that they will be picked up and brought to the United States whether or not they have plausible claims for asylum. The United States has worked urgently with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to create temporary safehaven facilities in third countries as a regional solution to this humanitarian problem. We regret that it now appears the safehaven plan will not be sufficient to deal with the magnitude of the problem. As of Monday morning, nearly 1,800 Haitians had been picked up. In the absence of a sufficient safehaven option, the Coast Guard has been directed to return most of the boat people to Haiti beginning on Monday, November 18. Only those who may be able to qualify for asylum will be brought to the United States. To date, some 50 Haitians have met the eligibility criteria. They are being brought to the United States today. Others who qualify from interviews on the Coast Guard ships will be brought to the United States as soon as possible. We fear that any action by the United States to bring large numbers of Haitians without claim to asylum to the United States would create a massive outflow, resulting in large numbers of deaths on the high sea. We do not believe that those individuals returned to Haiti will be subject to persecution there. There is no history of such persons being persecuted. We hope this return of boat people to Haiti will deter others from risking their lives by taking to the sea in unseaworthy boats.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991 Title:

State Department's Role In International Athletics

Wolcott Source: Jackie Wolcott, Deputy Assistant Secretary For International Social and Humanitarian Affairs Description: Remarks to the US Olympic Congress, Colorado Springs, Colorado Date: Nov 1, 199111/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Country: United States Subject: Cultural Exchange [TEXT] (introductory remarks deleted). Before I begin to explain our role in the scheme of international athletic competition, I think I should start with why the US Government is involved at all in international athletics. At the outset, I should emphasize that in my bureau the independence of the international sports movement is appreciated and protected, and this attitude is generally shared throughout the US Government. We believe that the Olympics and other competitions at the international level provide the opportunity for the American people to demonstrate of what they, themselves, are capable. With the support of our vibrant and generous private sector and, mostly, through their own grit and determination, American athletes represent the best of what the American people can offer, without the close involvement or supervision of the government. This is the way it should be. For a long time, the Department of State approached the question of support for international athletics in a less than well organized fashion. To be sure, we responded to particular events in an ad hoc fashion, with little real attempt to create an institutional memory. When he was Counselor for the Department, Ed Derwinski, now the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, took on responsibility for international sports. I can tell you personally that his experience with the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 and other athletic events was out of true love of sport, and I think many of you know of his numerous successes on behalf of the sports community. But when he left the Department, much of what he and his staff learned left with him, and the sports function briefly languished. In recognition of the importance of international sports, Secretary Baker, with the enthusiastic support of Assistant Secretary [for International Organizations John R.] Bolton, created the Office of International Athletic Programs within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. There is now a full-time institutional link with American and international athletic bodies, as well as a permanent point of contact with the State Department, and I invite you all to utilize it whenever the need arises. We are all vividly aware of the negative role governments can play in international sports. The prime example of this was the 1936 Olympics where Hitler tried to portray the hosting of the Olympics in Berlin that year as a kind of international seal of approval for the Nazi movement and its pernicious racist program. By 1936, the Olympic movement had developed its own stature. It was recognized as a powerful symbol of competition--man to man, woman to woman, team to team. The coincidence of the development of the Olympic movement with the rise of excessively nationalistic states and governments led to the unfortunate attempt by those governments to usurp the movement for their own illegitimate ends. Although Hitler did suffer the embarrassment of seeing Jesse Owens give the lie to his myth of Aryan supremacy, overall the Berlin Olympics were a great triumph for Germany and the National Socialist Party and helped enormously in conferring a degree of legitimacy upon the German Government, helping Hitler convince the German people that he was accepted internationally. So why, then, is the US Government involved at all, and why am I here right now? The answer is that, while we ought not play a directive role in your affairs, the government, particularly, the Department of State, can play a supportive role. Our intervention can be positive and supportive of your needs as you are involved in athletic competition in various nations around the world, or as this country plays host to various international sporting events. International athletics are big business with large political overtones. The international exchange of athletes promotes peaceful diplomatic objectives such as increased international friendship and understanding, but it requires also the resolution of business, consular, security, and protocol issues. Your non- governmental sports bodies and the private sector provide much of what you will require in modern international athletic competition, but there are also limited and very particular circumstances in which the US Government can be of assistance in making these competitions and your participation in them a success. For example, a couple of years ago, a major track event was held on the west coast. One of the main draws was a Romanian sprinter. Unfortunately, this event coincided with the Romanian revolution, and the athlete disappeared in the midst of the tumultuous events of that time, much to the sponsor's concern. My office cabled our embassy, explained the situation, and requested the embassy's assistance in locating the athlete, seeing to her welfare, and helping her depart Romania to compete in the event in the United States. The embassy came through and the athlete, very gratefully, was able to travel in time. Although this is a fairly dramatic example, it does demonstrate that there are certain things a government can do that individuals can't. We are well aware that in many countries, the sporting leadership, whether at the level of governing bodies or national Olympic committees, is made up of individuals who are either a part of the government or who are closely associated with it. Many countries have ministries of sports or at least have the function attached to another associated ministry such as education or health. Of course, it is the job of our embassies and consulates abroad to know their host governments and the people who play leading roles. Therefore, we are prepared to help when help is needed in identifying the right official to work with on issues involving international sports. The State Department and our embassies abroad are eager to help secure for cities in the United States the prestige and other benefits hosting an international event such as the Olympics can bring. During the campaign to bring the Olympics to Atlanta, we worked closely with the Atlanta organizing committee. I can tell you that our ambassadors and their staffs were exceedingly enthusiastic when asked to lobby IOC [International Olympic Committee] members in their respective countries. We all shared in the triumph when Atlanta's bid was selected against the odds. We look forward to working again with Salt Lake City as it tries to attract the Winter Olympics in 2002. The goal of my bureau's Office of International Athletic Programs is to be as helpful and responsive to your needs as possible, while maintaining the US Government's traditional non- intrusive involvement in the Olympic movement. Although our office is small, it can command the resources of the entire Department of State throughout the world, as well as other parts of the government when required. For example, within the Department, we work closely with the Bureau of Consular Affairs to solve problems and help expedite the issuance of visas for foreign athletes, coaches, and other individuals who need to come to this country for competition or other purposes. In addition, our Bureau of Diplomatic Security provides advice on proper security arrangements and precautions, and, of course, our embassies lend support in a variety of ways. On certain occasions, the White House plays an active role in international sports activities. The White House created a task force to follow preparations for the 1996 Atlanta games. The Department will be represented by our bureau and provide a point of contact for other Federal agencies which may have responsibilities in this area, such as the Department of Defense and the FBI. Outside the framework of the White House, we will coordinate with other Federal agencies to anticipate problems and resolve them. For example, we have established a working relationship with senior management at the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] to map out procedures for handling the influx of people to Atlanta for the 1996 games. These relationships also serve everyday needs by allowing us to resolve a variety of issues in a quick and effective manner. Not long ago, for example, a foreign-born coach, working for one of the US national governing bodies, inadvertently violated the terms of his visa by accompanying his team to an international event outside the United States. Upon his return to the United States, he was stopped at the port of entry by INS inspectors. He was within about 2 hours of being put on the first plane back to his native country when we were called. One phone call to our contacts at INS took care of the problem. Frankly, it would have been much better had the national governing body taken the time to be aware of all the requirements of their coach's visa. By no means do I wish to leave you with the impression that we can solve every problem thrown our way. Of course, you have certain obligations under the law as we all do. But we try to provide a hand when you need one. The recent Pan American Games in Cuba perhaps best demonstrate the supportive relationship we have established with the USOC [US Olympic Committee]. As you can imagine, the obstacles to US participation in any event in Cuba, to say nothing of one as complex, large, and visible as the Pan American Games, were many and varied. They ranged from the basic question of US participation to the intricacies of licensing rifles and ammunition- -a process that engaged two separate US Government agencies. The Department worked with the USOC--and through them, with the participating national governing bodies--on an almost daily basis, resolving questions of who could and could not go to Cuba, what licenses were needed for what products and for which individuals, what the US interest section in Havana--the equivalent of the US Embassy--could do for the delegation and the team and what it could not. In all instances--and I believe this is the essential point--the USOC, and through it, the national governing bodies and other interested parties had, in our office, a voice within the foreign affairs establishment that accurately and vigorously represented them and their needs. We will continue to perform that function. We are looking forward to the 1992 games in Albertville [France] and Barcelona [Spain] and to working closely with you in the years ahead as you prepare for the Atlanta games in 1996. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991 Title:

Human Rights in Kenya

Tutwiler Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Nov 18, 199111/18/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Kenya Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] The US Government has received the statement made by Kenyan Foreign Minister Wilson Ndolo Ayah, in which he asserts that US Ambassador Smith Hempstone has acted inappropriately and has abetted opposition elements in Kenya. The Foreign Minister suggests that Ambassador Hempstone's behavior and statements reflect the Ambassador's personal views rather than those of the US Government. The US Government wishes to make it clear that Ambassador Smith Hempstone is the President's personal representative in Kenya. The President has full confidence in his ability to carry out US policy toward Kenya. The US Government position in Kenya is to support the basic principles of universal human rights. The US Government encourages, in particular, the right of the Kenyan people, and of all peoples around the world, to the basic freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly. The United States, however, does not encourage any given Kenyan political figure or group. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991 Title:

Food Assistance to the Soviet Union

Fitzwater Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Nov 20, 199111/20/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] The President decided today to make available an additional $1.5 billion in food assistance to help the Soviet Union, the republics, and their peoples cope with immediate food shortages and aid in the longer term restructuring of the country's food distribution system. With this announcement, total US food assistance for the union and republics since January 1991 is $4 billion. The President made this decision after having sent four separate experts missions on food to the USSR since May 1991, including the early October Presidential mission led by Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan. The President is proud that America's abundance can help alleviate food shortages this winter. Extension of agricultural credit guarantees to the union and republics will not only assist them during this critical period but will provide a needed boost to the US food and agriculture community. Sales of this magnitude will stimulate economic activity through the entire chain, from fertilizer companies, to farmers, to transporters. Further, as increased demand raises the average price for grain, significantly lower deficiency payments will result in substantial budget savings. These credit guarantees will stimulate the US economy and save near-term dollars in budget outlays for commodity programs. The agreement was worked out in Moscow in meetings with representatives of republics and the Inter-Republic Food Committee. The union and the republics agreed as part of the negotiations to share responsibility for the debt, and they agreed on both the value of US food commodities to be purchased and the method of distribution. Continued responsibility for payments on existing CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] credit guarantees also is necessary for the disbursement of new credit guarantees. The $1.5 billion will be provided in three different channels: Credit assistance. An additional $1.25 billion in credit guarantees under the CCC's GSM-102 program will be made available to the union and republics in tranches over the next 6 months for the purchase of critical food and feed commodities. The initial tranche of $500 million will be immediately available with tranches of $250 million each made available on February 1, March 1, and April 1 of 1992. These credit guarantees will provide a flow of critical supplies during the winter and spring months when Soviet food supplies will be lowest. Humanitarian assistance. Up to $165 million in food aid will be provided to particularly hard-hit food deficit regions in the USSR where shortages are likely to be most severe this winter. Initial discussions have been held with union and republic officials in an attempt to identify regions most in need. We intend to deliver food shipments first to Armenia and the Urals region of the Russian Republic and will then target additional areas over the course of the winter. To the degree practicable, this assistance will be provided through American and indigenous private voluntary organizations. Technical assistance. The President has decided to go forward with a package of five projects aimed at improving Soviet food production and, importantly, distribution. These are: -- A model demonstration farm in the St. Petersburg region targeted toward new private farmers; -- Assistance in developing wholesale markets in Moscow and Kiev; -- Extension service projects in the Armenian, Kazak, and Uzbek Republics; -- A public/private sector initiative to have US private sector executives work in processing plants and at distribution centers to improve the efficiency of key Soviet food distribution enterprises. Planning is underway on each of these projects and implementation will begin in January 1992; and -- Credit guarantees for US-Soviet food processing and distribution development projects. (###)