US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991
Title: Secretary's Talks in China: A Summary of Results
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Opening statement at a news conference, Shangri-La
Hotel, Beijing
Date: Nov 17, 199111/17/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: China
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Democratization,
Arms Control, Trade/Economics, Human Rights
[TEXT]
I have a statement that is going to be a little longer than I would
usually give, but I want to give you as full a readout as I can of our
discussions. Let me start by saying that this was an important
visit, and we had important issues to discuss. The only way to
address our differences, I think, is by working at them, by talking
face to face. In my discussions with the Foreign Minister and other
Chinese leaders this weekend, we covered--in depth and at length--
issues across the entire relationship, including human rights, arms
sales or proliferation, and trade. We also discussed important
regional and bilateral issues. We spent, all told, about 18 hours
with the Chinese on these topics, spending the largest portion on
human rights, as the Foreign Minister himself noted in our final
meeting.
It has now been 21/2 years since the tragedy of Tiananmen.
Unless we were to keep US-China relations in the deep freeze
forever, we had to start talking. But I did not come here expecting a
dramatic breakthrough. The gulf is too wide to accomplish that in
one trip. The talks were difficult, but I think that we accomplished
some important things and I would like to give you a summary of the
results.
First of all, on the missile technology control regime [MTCR],
the Chinese have told us that they intend to observe the MTCR
guidelines and parameters. To us, this means that they will apply
them to any exports of missiles and related technology. We
understand that this applies to the M-9 and M-11 missiles. The
Chinese have told us that they will make this unconditional
commitment to the MTCR guidelines if we will remove the
proliferation sanctions imposed June 16 on two Chinese companies
and on the licensing of high-speed computers and satellites for
China. This is a matter that we will be examining further in
Washington.
With respect to the question of the Korean Peninsula, China
and the United States share the international concern about the
nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, and we will work on this
issue.
On the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] , the Government of
China will propose that the National Peoples Congress complete the
ratification of the NPT by the end of the year and that the
Government of China complete the formalities of the NPT accession
within 3 months of that time.
Turning now to trade, with respect to questions of
intellectual property rights, the Chinese Government made positive
intellectual property rights proposals which the US Government
welcomes. These proposals are in the areas of copyright, sound
recordings, computer software, and patent protection. On November
21 and 22, a Chinese delegation will come to Washington where we
will seek to resolve the special 301 case [regarding the
aforementioned intellectual property rights].
With respect to the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade], the US Government supports the membership of China as a
contracting party in the GATT and also [that of] Taiwan as a
separate customs territory when GATT requirements are met.
Assuming that both Taiwan and China qualify according to GATT
standards, the example of APEC [Asian-Pacific Economic
Cooperation] demonstrates that we should be able to solve the
membership problem.
On human rights, we gave the Chinese a clear and
comprehensive statement on human rights. Having raised the issue
of denial of exit permits to prominent intellectuals and families of
Chinese personalities now abroad, we were assured that any person
against whom no criminal proceedings were pending would be
allowed to leave after completing the usual formalities. Regarding
a list of about 800 names of reported political prisoners, which we
handed the Chinese authorities last June, we received a response by
individual name as to which of these persons have been convicted,
which are still under investigation, which have been released, and
which cannot be identified. We have not received any such response
heretofore.
Regarding the prison labor issue which, of course, has both
human rights and trade implications, we have reached agreement, in
principle, on the text of a memorandum of understanding providing
for cooperative efforts to prevent the import of Chinese prison
labor products into the United States. The memorandum of
understanding will provide for prompt investigation of suspected
violations of the laws and regulations of each side relating to trade
and prison labor products, exchanges of information, meetings
between officials and experts of the two sides, and the furnishing
of evidence that can be used in judicial or administrative
proceedings against violators.
Finally, we reached agreement that as to all other issues
which we raised in the human rights field, there will be a
continuing dialogue between the official of the Foreign Ministry
specifically designated by the Foreign Minister to work on this task
and Assistant Secretary [for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs] Dick Schifter.
Let me say something about an agreement that was reached
by our negotiators not in Beijing but a very important agreement
with respect to US-Chinese relations. That is a civil aviation
agreement, a multi-year agreement, on the substance of an
amendment to the present civil aviation agreement between the two
countries which will permit many more flights and an all-cargo
route between the United States and China and, I think,
demonstrates the tangible benefits that can come with cooperation
between our two countries.
I think, ladies and gentlemen, that all of this represents
gains. As I said, by far the greatest amount of time was devoted to
human rights. I made clear that progress in human rights is
essential to progress in the overall relationship. I told my Chinese
counterparts that my country will not turn a blind eye to the plight
of human suffering or political repression, and I said that freedom
was something that I thought that people everywhere would
continue to aspire to.
The Chinese also know exactly where we stand on the full
range of issues. They know in precise terms what is necessary if
progress is to be sustained. If this process falters, it will not be
for lack of our effort. This visit to China without preconditions, I
think, is proof of the US commitment to an improvement in the
climate between our nations and in the well-being of the Chinese
people. Now we look to China also to continue to address the
problems in the relationship in a sustained way. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991
Title: US-Vietnam Discussions
Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 21, 199111/21/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Vietnam, Canada
Subject: POW/MIA Issues, State Department,
Democratization
[TEXT]
As Secretary Baker and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Cam agreed in
Paris last month, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Richard H.] Solomon met in New York on November 21, 1991,
with Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai to discuss the issues
and modalities associated with normalization of relations between
our two countries. In the course of these talks, which lasted over 6
hours, Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H.] Solomon reviewed the issues of greatest concern to the
United States: notably full implementation of the UN
Comprehensive Political Settlement for Cambodia and the fullest
possible accounting for our POW/MIAs [prisoners of war/missing in
action].
Assistant Secretary Solomon recalled that he had presented
our policy on normalization of relations with Vietnam to the
Vietnamese in New York on April 9. He reiterated the US
Governments commitment to that policy. In that connection, he
stressed that to continue moving forward step-by-step toward full
normalization, it is essential that there be further, concrete
results on the POW/MIA issue to build on the momentum we had
recently achieved. He also expressed the hope that Vietnam would
address other humanitarian issues of importance to the United
States, and indicated that we plan to continue our efforts to
respond to humanitarian needs in Vietnam.
Assistant Secretary Solomon also took note of the progress
both sides had made since that time toward achieving the
objectives he set forth on April 9. Specifically, he welcomed the
Vietnamese decision to support the UN Comprehensive Settlement
for Cambodia and expressed hope that Vietnam and the Phnom Penh
authorities would continue to facilitate full implementation of the
agreement. He also provided the US Government's view of Vietnam's
efforts to account for our POW/MIAs and discussed various
approaches to accelerate progress toward reaching the fullest
possible accounting. The Vietnamese again affirmed their desire to
help achieve the fullest possible accounting of all American
POW/MIAs.
Vice Minister Le Mai and Assistant Secretary Solomon agreed
to establish a working group to deal with the issues associated
with normalization of relations. The group, which will meet in New
York, will be headed by Ambassador Lang on the Vietnamese side and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kenneth Quinn on the US side.
They agreed to continue discussions at mutually agreeable dates in
the future. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991
Title: The Middle East in The Post-Gulf War Period
Djerejian
Source: Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Nov 20, 199111/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, United States, Israel, Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon, Egypt
Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Democratization,
United Nations, International Organizations
[TEXT]
It is a distinct privilege for me to make my first appearance before
this distinguished subcommittee. With your permission, I would
like to comment on the historic achievements of the Madrid peace
conference and describe what the road ahead of the Arab-Israeli
peace process looks like. Further, I will make a few comments on
the situation in Iraq. Of course, I am prepared to address these and
whatever other issues the members of the subcommittee may wish
to raise during the subsequent discussion.
Arab/Israeli Peace Process
In his opening remarks at the peace conference in Madrid, President
Bush termed the event a "mission of hope." With the opening of the
conference, the Middle East turned an important historical page--
away from the intractability and insolubility of this over 4
decades-old conflict and toward the achievement of genuine,
comprehensive peace and reconciliation between Israel and its Arab
neighbors through direct dialogue and negotiations.
The hope to which the President referred during the opening
session of the conference, in fact, turned to reality just 4 days
later on November 3 when direct, bilateral negotiations were
launched between Israeli delegations and a Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation, a Lebanese delegation, and a Syrian delegation.
Never before had there been direct, bilateral negotiations
between Israel and each of its Arab and Palestinian neighbors, and
never again will there be such a taboo against such face-to-face
contacts. In his closing press conference in Madrid, Secretary Baker
termed these developments a "good start". Indeed, it was. For over
12 hours on November 3, Israeli and Arab delegates debated the
issues across the table of negotiations.
To be sure, the road ahead will not be easy to navigate.
Fundamental differences separate the parties, and those differences
will be hard fought at the negotiating table. But they will be fought
with words and position papers and policy statements, and,
hopefully, no longer with weapons and violence.
The road to Madrid was long and difficult. Secretary Baker
traveled to the Middle East 8 times between March and October to
fulfill the promise of the initiative launched by President Bush last
March in his address to a joint session of Congress. Many, many
hours were spent in discussion with key Middle East figures--Prime
Minister Shamir of Israel, President Assad of Syria, King Hussein of
Jordan, President Mubarak of Egypt, President Hrawi of Lebanon, and
Palestinians like Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi--in an effort
to understand their concerns, examine the differences between
their positions, evolve bridging positions to overcome problems, and
develop the terms of reference for the peace conference and
negotiations. Enormous political strains were placed on each party
by this effort. Persistent efforts were undertaken by extremists to
undermine the search for peace by acts of terror and in Southern
Lebanon. Yet, throughout, Secretary Baker found the parties ready
to engage and ready to confront the difficult decisions required to
get to the negotiating table.
Important and far reaching agreements among the parties
permitted this process to proceed.
-- The parties agreed that the goal is a comprehensive peace
settlement achieved through direct negotiations based on UN
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
-- They agreed on two negotiating tracks between Israel and
Arab states, and between Israel and Palestinians.
-- They agreed that the negotiations between Israel and
Palestinians would be conducted in phases, with the initial phase
focusing on interim self-government arrangements and the second
phase focusing on a permanent settlement.
-- They agreed that the direct negotiations would be
launched by a peace conference--co-sponsored by the United States
and the Soviet Union--and that the conference would not be able to
impose solutions, veto agreements, make decisions, or vote.
-- They agreed that Palestinians would participate in a joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and that Palestinians who
participate would be those who accept to negotiate on two tracks
and in phases and who accept to live in peace with Israel.
-- They agreed to invite the European Community and Egypt
to participate alongside the co-sponsors.
-- They agreed to invite the Gulf Cooperation Council, the
Arab Maghreb Union, and the United Nations to each send an observer
to the conference.
Three Crucial Issues
In translating these agreements into a workable peace conference
and negotiations, we were also reminded by the parties of the
central substantive issues which need to be addressed in order to
resolve the conflict. In his remarks to the peace conference,
Secretary Baker noted that the parties themselves had identified
three critical issues.
-- The parties had expressed a yearning for peace; a desire
to live in mutually satisfying relationships with neighbors; and to
have those relations characterized by peace treaties; diplomatic
relations, economic relations, cultural ties, and political dialogue.
-- The parties emphasized the importance of land and the
desire of peoples to exercise authority and political governance
over territories they consider part of their patrimony.
-- And the parties stressed the need for security. That is,
the requirement that people live free of fear and the obligation of
governments to do their best to protect their citizens.
Listening to these views expressed by the parties, the
Secretary made clear our belief that progress toward a
comprehensive settlement on all fronts would be possible only if all
the issues were put on the table. This is our assessment of what
needs to be done to ensure progress in the negotiations.
Our upbeat mood after the conference is tempered only by the
sober realization that much hard work and difficult procedural and
substantive decisions lie ahead. The first issue the parties face is
the venue of the bilateral negotiations. Before Madrid, there had not
been agreement on where the talks would be held. The parties held
different views and still do. As the Secretary made clear in Madrid,
we hope the parties can resolve this issue on their own. If they
cannot, we stand ready soon to make proposals that will help get
the negotiations resumed as quickly as possible.
We are also working to ensure a successful start in the
multilateral negotiations to which we attach much importance. As
you know, the invitation to the conference indicated that those
parties who wish to participate should convene to organize
multilateral negotiations on such key topics for the peace, security,
and prosperity of the region as arms control and regional security,
economic development, refugees, water, the environment, and the
like. We will begin shortly to consult with parties in the region and
outside in order to plan for the organizational meeting of these
negotiations. We are gratified that a significant number of regional
parties have already stated publicly their intention to participate in
these talks.
The Role of the United States
The role of the United States throughout this process will be that of
an honest broker, a catalyst for peace, and a driving force to help
ensure that negotiations work. Both the President and the
Secretary have reiterated their personal commitments to play an
active role in helping the process succeed and that we are in it for
the long haul. The United States maintains long-standing positions
on peace process issues that remain the basis of our own policy.
But we also know well from experience that the role of the
mediator often benefits as much from the non-articulation of one's
own positions, as from their repetition. When needed, we will state
our views; and when needed, we will work quietly with the parties,
out of the public view to help build trust and agreement between
them.
I would like to add a final word about the most important, and
often most neglected facet, of the peace process--namely, the
human dimension.
This is a conflict between people. It is a conflict in which
people have urgent and basic needs--to live more securely, to live
free of fear, to live with dignity, to live in peace.
There are practical prescriptions available to meet the
urgent needs of the peoples of the Middle East. Each party can and
must think about and adopt whatever measures are possible to reach
out to peoples on the other side of the conflict. The parties,
themselves, know best which actions would have the greatest
impact. They, themselves, know how important these steps would
be for their own constituencies and, thus, also how important they
would be for the other side. They, themselves, know that the
formulas of negotiations will have little meaning if the people of
the region lose faith in what must be a process of peace and
reconciliation.
We offer no specific prescriptions for the parties to follow--
either with regard to the substance of the negotiations or to the
confidence-building steps that should be adopted by all sides. We
do call upon all parties to avoid unilateral acts which might
prejudice or even threaten the process, and we share the hope that
the same courage which regional leaders have brought to the tough
decisions on the peace conference and the start of negotiations will
also be applied to the pressing human problems that need to be
confronted.
Iraq
Concerning the situation in Iraq, the victory of the US-led coalition
in Desert Storm reversed Saddam Hussein's aggression against his
neighbors. Ever since, the international community has shown its
determination to ensure that Iraq complies with all its UN-
mandated obligations. We and our coalition partners remain
committed to that end. In so doing, we bear no animus toward the
Iraqi people who have suffered too long under a brutal regime. They
deserve new leadership.
President Bush has made it clear that sanctions will continue
as long as the ruthless dictator Saddam Hussein remains in power.
At the same time, we will continue to broaden our contacts with
the Iraqi opposition and to support the emergence of an Iraqi
Government representative of Iraq's pluralistic society including
the Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Kurds. In fact, on my very first day as
Assistant Secretary, I met with a delegation of the Iraqi Kurdistan
Front, which included Assyrian, Turcoman, and Kurdish
representatives. In summary, and as President Bush has said, we
are prepared to work with a successor regime in the interest of the
Iraqi people.
Sadly, Saddam Hussein continues to try to blame the
international sanctions for the continuing suffering of the Iraqi
people which he himself has caused. The facts are quite different.
First, Medicine has never been denied to the Iraqis by the
international community, and UN sanctions on food shipments ended
in March. While assuring that his clique is provided for, Saddam
Hussein is cynically denying food and medicine to the Iraqi people
and is trying to fix the blame on the sanctions.
Second, The mechanism to help the Iraqi people is in place--
all he has to do is use it. He has not done so because the UN-
mandated monitoring regime would make it difficult for him to
manipulate the flow of food to the Iraqi people.
Third, The continuing deprivation in Iraq is the result of
Saddam's deliberate refusal to accept UN Resolutions 706 and 712--
namely food for oil--and his callous policy of diverting supplies
away from those who oppose him.
Once again, Saddam Hussein is prepared to sacrifice the Iraqi
people for the sake of hanging on to his own, personal power. As we
maintain all possible political and economic pressure on this brutal
regime, we will work with the international community to meet the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through implementation of
Security Council Resolutions 688, 706, and 712.
We are confident, that Saddam's attempt will fail. He
miscalculated the will of the international community over his
invasion of Kuwait. If he thinks he can fool the world with a
shell game with food and medicine, he will have miscalculated
badly, once again. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991
Title: Invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference
Description: Text of the October 18, 1991 letter of invitation sent
to each participant of the Middle East Peace Conference in
Madrid, Spain. It was released to Congress on November 22,
1991
Date: Nov 22, 199111/22/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon
Subject: Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
Invitation to Peace Conference
After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel and the
Palestinians, the United States and the Soviet Union believe that an
historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine
peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet Union
are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and
comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along
two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel
and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real
peace.
Toward that end, the President of the United States and the
President of the USSR invite you to a peace conference, which their
countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct
negotiations. The conference will be convened in Madrid on October
30, 1991. President Bush and President Gorbachev request your
acceptance of this invitation no later than 6:00 p.m. Washington
time, October 23, 1991, in order to ensure proper organization and
preparation of the conference.
Direct bilateral negotiations will begin four days after the
opening of the conference. Those parties who wish to attend
multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after the opening
of the conference to organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors
believe that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues
such as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues,
environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual
interest.
The co-sponsors will chair the conference which will be held
at ministerial level. Governments to be invited include Israel, Syria,
Lebanon and Jordan. Palestinians will be invited and attend as part
of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Egypt will be invited to
the conference as a participant. The European Community will be a
participant in the conference alongside the United States and the
Soviet Union and will be represented by its Presidency. The Gulf
Cooperation Council will be invited to send its Secretary General to
the conference as an observer, and GCC member states will be
invited to participate in organizing the negotiations on multilateral
issues. The United Nations will be invited to send an observer,
representing the Secretary General.
The conference will have no power to impose solutions on the
parties or veto agreements reached by them. It will have no
authority to make decisions for the parties and no ability to vote on
issues or results. The conference can reconvene only with the
consent of all the parties.
With respect to negotiations between Israel and Palestinians
who are part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation,
negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on
interim self-government arrangements. These talks will be
conducted with the objective of reaching agreement within one
year. Once agreed, the interim self-government arrangements will
last for a period of five years. Beginning the third year of the
period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will
take place on permanent status. These permanent status
negotiations, and the negotiations between Israel and the Arab
states, will take place on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338.
It is understood that the co-sponsors are committed to
making this process succeed. It is their intention to convene the
conference and negotiations with those parties who agree to attend.
The co-sponsors believe that this process offers the promise
of ending decades of confrontation and conflict and the hope of a
lasting peace. Thus, the co-sponsors hope that the parties will
approach these negotiations in a spirit of good will and mutual
respect. In this way, the peace process can begin to break down the
mutual suspicions and mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and
allow the parties to begin to resolve their differences. Indeed, only
through such a process can real peace and reconciliation among the
Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians be achieved. And only
through this process can the peoples of the Middle East attain the
peace and security they richly deserve.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991
Title: US Response to Recent Haitian Exodus
Gelbard
Source: Robert Gelbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Inter- American Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on International Law,
Immigration, and Refugees of the House Judiciary Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Nov 20, 199111/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti, United States
Subject: Human Rights, United Nations, OAS, Refugees
[TEXT]
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss our actions in response to
the recent exodus of Haitian boat people and our immigration policy
toward Cuba.
The democratically elected Government of Haiti was usurped
September 30, when elements of the Haitian military drove
President Aristide from office and forced him to leave the country.
Acting through the Organization of American States (OAS), the
nations of this hemisphere unanimously condemned this attack on
Haitian democracy, then voted on October 8 in favor of a trade
embargo until Haitian democracy is restored.
Within days of the coup, the United States cut off aid, froze
Haitian Government assets, blocked financial transfers to the
Haitian regime, and blocked exports to the Haitian military and
police. In the course of the month, we and our neighbors in the OAS-
-including Venezuela, Haiti's oil supplier--proceeded to cut off our
trade. The trade embargo is having a clear impact: There is little
traffic in the streets; there are long lines for fuel; and business
activity is markedly down.
We have a standing agreement with the Government of Haiti
which permits us to rescue at sea Haitians who are intending to
emigrate to the United States and to return to Haiti those who lack
a basis for asylum. This agreement was reached in 1981 to give the
Haitian and US Governments a mutually acceptable way of dealing
with the regular flow of Haitians who seek to come illegally to the
United States for economic reasons.
When President Aristide was forced from office, we expected
that an exodus of Haitians might occur in response to that political
crisis. That did not occur. From the time President Aristide left
Haiti until October 28, the Coast Guard found no boats with Haitians
coming to the United States. On October 28, the cutter Steadfast
picked up a boat with 19 Haitians aboard. The next boat was found
November 4, and the flow has greatly increased since then.
As of November 19, we had picked up nearly 2,200 Haitians.
Seven of these boats had over 100 Haitians on board; none of these
craft was over 40 feet in length. For example, on November 14 the
cutter Confidence interdicted a 40-foot sailing vessel with 238
Haitians aboard. This boat was not designed for use on the high
seas. It was severely overloaded. It carried no life jackets, no
flares, no radio, no beacons, no charts, no navigational equipment--
in short, it was not equipped to survive the voyage it intended to
make. This was typical of the conditions on these boats, any of
which could easily have capsized in rough seas.
In responding to this difficult situation, our overriding
concern has been to save lives. We have taken the following factors
into account.
-- In keeping with the intent of the US-Haitian immigration
agreement, the interdiction program, and US law, we have an
obligation to prevent an unimpeded flow of Haitians to the United
States.
-- We want to rescue people from vessels that put them at
high risk of losing their lives at sea.
-- We want to ensure that those who have a well-founded
fear of persecution, and hence a good claim to asylum, are
interviewed carefully, identified, and brought to the United States.
-- Above all, we want to avoid any action that would
encourage more Haitians to risk their lives by boarding unsafe
vessels in the belief that this would ensure them passage to the
United States.
At first, we sought a regional solution. On November 8, we
began to work with the [Office of the] UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration, and
countries across the Caribbean region to see which countries might
accept a number of Haitians that had been picked up by Coast Guard
vessels. We had hoped that a sufficient number of countries would
accept these people and that arrangements could be made for their
temporary safe haven under the auspices of the UNHCR.
Regrettably, after nearly 2 weeks of intense diplomacy, with
both the United States and UNHCR canvassing the region, we have
not yet been able to elicit a sufficient number of positive responses
from the countries of the region. Many are already host to large
numbers of Haitians--the Bahamas has 40,000 illegal Haitian
immigrants, for example. We will continue to pursue discussions
with countries in the region to arrange temporary safe haven for
additional Haitians. Yesterday at a meeting hosted by the OAS in
Washington, the UNHCR made a renewed appeal to countries in the
region to accept some Haitians.
By the beginning of this week, we had 483 Haitians
temporarily ashore at our naval base at Guantanamo and over 1,200
on Coast Guard vessels. Despite renewed warnings broadcast over
the Voice of America's Creole service beginning November 15 to
urge Haitians not to set sail, the numbers were growing. Four
countries--Honduras, Venezuela, Belize, and Trinidad and Tobago--
had generously agreed to accept some refugees, but they would only
accept a total of 550. It was clear that the regional safe haven
solution was not going to be sufficient to deal with the number of
Haitians who were leaving Haiti, and another solution would have to
be found.
As a result, we reluctantly reached a decision on Monday,
November 18, to repatriate those Haitians on Coast Guard vessels,
to bring to the United States those Haitians who appear to qualify
for asylum, and to bring those at Guantanamo to regional countries
for temporary safehaven. As of yesterday, 53 have been brought to
Miami to have their asylum claims processed by INS [US
Immigration and Naturalization Service] and 538 have been
repatriated to Haiti by the Coast Guard. Today, we expect that a
number of Haitians will begin to be transported from Guantanamo to
Honduras and Venezuela under UNHCR auspices. The repatriation has
now been suspended by court order. As long as that order remains in
effect, we expect it will encourage Haitians to continue to go to sea
in small, dangerous boats, and we fear it will lead to loss of life.
This was a difficult set of circumstances that offered no
perfect solution. Given a range of difficult choices, we would have
preferred to arrange safe haven in the region for all the Haitians,
but the numbers of Haitians and the difficulty of making those
arrangements made it impossible to continue pursuing that option
alone. Under the circumstances, we strongly believe we have made
the right decision.
The Coast Guard has, without any doubt, saved hundreds of
lives by rescuing people from boats that had only a minimal chance
of reaching any destination safely.
People who fled Haiti for political reasons and fear political
persecution are being identified through careful interviews and
brought to the United States. No Haitian is being repatriated
without a careful interview that gives him or her a chance to
describe circumstances that might justify an asylum claim.
Our embassy is observing the repatriations, which have been
uneventful to date. The Haitian Red Cross has been present to
receive the returnees and to give them a cash stipend. Our embassy
will remain in contact with local and international human rights
and humanitarian organizations to see if there is any evidence that
these people are mistreated after their return. I underscore that
there is no history of reprisals against Haitians repatriated under
our bilateral agreement.
Most important of all, this course of action will send a clear
message to discourage more Haitians from going to sea in dangerous
conditions based on the mistaken belief that they will be
guaranteed entry into the United States. That message will save
lives.
Some have drawn comparisons to our immigration law and
policy toward Cuba and charged that we are wrong to repatriate
Haitians when we don't repatriate Cubans. The facts are these:
-- Cubans are fleeing one of the world's remaining
communist dictatorships; they fear returning, if for no other reason
than that it is a crime in Cuba to leave without an exit permit.
Cubans have been prosecuted and jailed for that offense. Those
conditions do not apply in Haiti.
-- Haiti is now under the control of a military-dominated
government. We hope that negotiations about to begin between
President Aristide and Haitian legislators will lead to the prompt
restoration of constitutional rule. However, neither Haiti's current
conditions nor the conditions before September 30 can be compared
with the systematic, extensive repression that is a condition of
daily life in Cuba.
-- The current exodus from Haiti began not when the Aristide
Government was forced from power nor in the violence that
followed but 1 month later. This indicates that the political crisis,
in itself, did not spark significant emigration. We are interviewing
each Haitian in careful detail to determine whether there is a well-
founded fear of persecution. As I noted, we are bringing to the
United States those who establish a sound basis for an asylum
claim.
In conclusion, we believe we have executed US law and
immigration policy in a fair and humane manner. We believe the
Coast Guard's actions and our policy decisions have saved lives. We
welcome your interest in this situation and look forward to
continuing consultations with Congress as we continue to work for
the restoration of Haiti's democratically elected government. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991
Title: Haitian Boat People
Tutwiler
Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 18, 199111/18/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Human Rights, Refugees, United Nations
[TEXT]
The United States is deeply concerned by the humanitarian tragedy
of the Haitian boat people. Over the past 3 weeks, nearly 2,000
Haitians have put out to sea, in unseaworthy vessels, with the
mistaken belief that they will be picked up and brought to the
United States whether or not they have plausible claims for asylum.
The United States has worked urgently with the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) to create temporary safehaven
facilities in third countries as a regional solution to this
humanitarian problem.
We regret that it now appears the safehaven plan will not be
sufficient to deal with the magnitude of the problem. As of
Monday morning, nearly 1,800 Haitians had been picked up.
In the absence of a sufficient safehaven option, the Coast
Guard has been directed to return most of the boat people to Haiti
beginning on Monday, November 18.
Only those who may be able to qualify for asylum will be
brought to the United States. To date, some 50 Haitians have met
the eligibility criteria. They are being brought to the United States
today. Others who qualify from interviews on the Coast Guard ships
will be brought to the United States as soon as possible.
We fear that any action by the United States to bring large
numbers of Haitians without claim to asylum to the United States
would create a massive outflow, resulting in large numbers of
deaths on the high sea.
We do not believe that those individuals returned to Haiti
will be subject to persecution there. There is no history of such
persons being persecuted.
We hope this return of boat people to Haiti will deter others
from risking their lives by taking to the sea in unseaworthy
boats.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991
Title: State Department's Role In International Athletics
Wolcott
Source: Jackie Wolcott, Deputy Assistant Secretary For
International Social and Humanitarian Affairs
Description: Remarks to the US Olympic Congress, Colorado Springs,
Colorado
Date: Nov 1, 199111/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Country: United States
Subject: Cultural Exchange
[TEXT]
(introductory remarks deleted).
Before I begin to explain our role in the scheme of international
athletic competition, I think I should start with why the US
Government is involved at all in international athletics. At the
outset, I should emphasize that in my bureau the independence of
the international sports movement is appreciated and protected, and
this attitude is generally shared throughout the US Government. We
believe that the Olympics and other competitions at the
international level provide the opportunity for the American people
to demonstrate of what they, themselves, are capable. With the
support of our vibrant and generous private sector and, mostly,
through their own grit and determination, American athletes
represent the best of what the American people can offer, without
the close involvement or supervision of the government. This is the
way it should be.
For a long time, the Department of State approached the
question of support for international athletics in a less than well
organized fashion. To be sure, we responded to particular events in
an ad hoc fashion, with little real attempt to create an institutional
memory.
When he was Counselor for the Department, Ed Derwinski,
now the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, took on responsibility for
international sports. I can tell you personally that his experience
with the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 and other athletic events
was out of true love of sport, and I think many of you know of his
numerous successes on behalf of the sports community. But when
he left the Department, much of what he and his staff learned left
with him, and the sports function briefly languished. In recognition
of the importance of international sports, Secretary Baker, with the
enthusiastic support of Assistant Secretary [for International
Organizations John R.] Bolton, created the Office of International
Athletic Programs within the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs. There is now a full-time institutional link with American
and international athletic bodies, as well as a permanent point of
contact with the State Department, and I invite you all to utilize it
whenever the need arises.
We are all vividly aware of the negative role governments can
play in international sports. The prime example of this was the
1936 Olympics where Hitler tried to portray the hosting of the
Olympics in Berlin that year as a kind of international seal of
approval for the Nazi movement and its pernicious racist program.
By 1936, the Olympic movement had developed its own stature. It
was recognized as a powerful symbol of competition--man to man,
woman to woman, team to team. The coincidence of the
development of the Olympic movement with the rise of excessively
nationalistic states and governments led to the unfortunate attempt
by those governments to usurp the movement for their own
illegitimate ends. Although Hitler did suffer the embarrassment of
seeing Jesse Owens give the lie to his myth of Aryan supremacy,
overall the Berlin Olympics were a great triumph for Germany and
the National Socialist Party and helped enormously in conferring a
degree of legitimacy upon the German Government, helping Hitler
convince the German people that he was accepted internationally.
So why, then, is the US Government involved at all, and why
am I here right now? The answer is that, while we ought not play a
directive role in your affairs, the government, particularly, the
Department of State, can play a supportive role. Our intervention
can be positive and supportive of your needs as you are involved in
athletic competition in various nations around the world, or as this
country plays host to various international sporting events.
International athletics are big business with large political
overtones. The international exchange of athletes promotes
peaceful diplomatic objectives such as increased international
friendship and understanding, but it requires also the resolution of
business, consular, security, and protocol issues. Your non-
governmental sports bodies and the private sector provide much of
what you will require in modern international athletic competition,
but there are also limited and very particular circumstances in
which the US Government can be of assistance in making these
competitions and your participation in them a success.
For example, a couple of years ago, a major track event was
held on the west coast. One of the main draws was a Romanian
sprinter. Unfortunately, this event coincided with the Romanian
revolution, and the athlete disappeared in the midst of the
tumultuous events of that time, much to the sponsor's concern. My
office cabled our embassy, explained the situation, and requested
the embassy's assistance in locating the athlete, seeing to her
welfare, and helping her depart Romania to compete in the event in
the United States. The embassy came through and the athlete, very
gratefully, was able to travel in time. Although this is a fairly
dramatic example, it does demonstrate that there are certain things
a government can do that individuals can't.
We are well aware that in many countries, the sporting
leadership, whether at the level of governing bodies or national
Olympic committees, is made up of individuals who are either a part
of the government or who are closely associated with it. Many
countries have ministries of sports or at least have the function
attached to another associated ministry such as education or health.
Of course, it is the job of our embassies and consulates abroad to
know their host governments and the people who play leading roles.
Therefore, we are prepared to help when help is needed in
identifying the right official to work with on issues involving
international sports.
The State Department and our embassies abroad are eager to
help secure for cities in the United States the prestige and other
benefits hosting an international event such as the Olympics can
bring. During the campaign to bring the Olympics to Atlanta, we
worked closely with the Atlanta organizing committee. I can tell
you that our ambassadors and their staffs were exceedingly
enthusiastic when asked to lobby IOC [International Olympic
Committee] members in their respective countries. We all shared in
the triumph when Atlanta's bid was selected against the odds. We
look forward to working again with Salt Lake City as it tries to
attract the Winter Olympics in 2002.
The goal of my bureau's Office of International Athletic
Programs is to be as helpful and responsive to your needs as
possible, while maintaining the US Government's traditional non-
intrusive involvement in the Olympic movement. Although our
office is small, it can command the resources of the entire
Department of State throughout the world, as well as
other parts of the government when required.
For example, within the Department, we work closely with
the Bureau of Consular Affairs to solve problems and help expedite
the issuance of visas for foreign athletes, coaches, and other
individuals who need to come to this country for competition or
other purposes. In addition, our Bureau of Diplomatic Security
provides advice on proper security arrangements and precautions,
and, of course, our embassies lend support in a variety of ways.
On certain occasions, the White House plays an active role in
international sports activities. The White House created a task
force to follow preparations for the 1996 Atlanta games. The
Department will be represented by our bureau and provide a point of
contact for other Federal agencies which may have responsibilities
in this area, such as the Department of Defense and the FBI. Outside
the framework of the White House, we will coordinate with other
Federal agencies to anticipate problems and resolve them. For
example, we have established a working relationship with senior
management at the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] to
map out procedures for handling the influx of people to Atlanta for
the 1996 games.
These relationships also serve everyday needs by allowing us
to resolve a variety of issues in a quick and effective manner. Not
long ago, for example, a foreign-born coach, working for one of the
US national governing bodies, inadvertently violated the terms of
his visa by accompanying his team to an international event outside
the United States. Upon his return to the United States, he was
stopped at the port of entry by INS inspectors. He was within about
2 hours of being put on the first plane back to his native country
when we were called. One phone call to our contacts at INS took
care of the problem.
Frankly, it would have been much better had the national
governing body taken the time to be aware of all the requirements
of their coach's visa. By no means do I wish to leave you with the
impression that we can solve every problem thrown our way. Of
course, you have certain obligations under the law as we all do. But
we try to provide a hand when you need one.
The recent Pan American Games in Cuba perhaps best
demonstrate the supportive relationship we have established with
the USOC [US Olympic Committee]. As you can imagine, the
obstacles to US participation in any event in Cuba, to say nothing of
one as complex, large, and visible as the Pan American Games, were
many and varied. They ranged from the basic question of US
participation to the intricacies of licensing rifles and ammunition-
-a process that engaged two separate US Government agencies. The
Department worked with the USOC--and through them, with the
participating national governing bodies--on an almost daily basis,
resolving questions of who could and could not go to Cuba, what
licenses were needed for what products and for which individuals,
what the US interest section in Havana--the equivalent of the US
Embassy--could do for the delegation and the team and what it
could not. In all instances--and I believe this is the essential
point--the USOC, and through it, the national governing bodies and
other interested parties had, in our office, a voice within the
foreign affairs establishment that accurately and vigorously
represented them and their needs. We will continue to perform that
function.
We are looking forward to the 1992 games in Albertville
[France] and Barcelona [Spain] and to working closely with you in the
years ahead as you prepare for the Atlanta games in 1996. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991
Title: Human Rights in Kenya
Tutwiler
Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 18, 199111/18/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Kenya
Subject: Human Rights
[TEXT]
The US Government has received the statement made by Kenyan
Foreign Minister Wilson Ndolo Ayah, in which he asserts that US
Ambassador Smith Hempstone has acted inappropriately and has
abetted opposition elements in Kenya. The Foreign Minister
suggests that Ambassador Hempstone's behavior and statements
reflect the Ambassador's personal views rather than those of the US
Government.
The US Government wishes to make it clear that Ambassador
Smith Hempstone is the President's personal representative in
Kenya. The President has full confidence in his ability to carry out
US policy toward Kenya.
The US Government position in Kenya is to support the basic
principles of universal human rights. The US Government
encourages, in particular, the right of the Kenyan people, and of all
peoples around the world, to the basic freedoms of expression and
peaceful assembly. The United States, however, does not encourage
any given Kenyan political figure or group. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 47, November 25, 1991
Title: Food Assistance to the Soviet Union
Fitzwater
Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Press Secretary,
the White House, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 20, 199111/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
The President decided today to make available an additional $1.5
billion in food assistance to help the Soviet Union, the republics,
and their peoples cope with immediate food shortages and aid in the
longer term restructuring of the country's food distribution system.
With this announcement, total US food assistance for the union and
republics since January 1991 is $4 billion.
The President made this decision after having sent four
separate experts missions on food to the USSR since May 1991,
including the early October Presidential mission led by Secretary of
Agriculture Edward Madigan.
The President is proud that America's abundance can help
alleviate food shortages this winter. Extension of agricultural
credit guarantees to the union and republics will not only assist
them during this critical period but will provide a needed boost to
the US food and agriculture community. Sales of this magnitude
will stimulate economic activity through the entire chain, from
fertilizer companies, to farmers, to transporters. Further, as
increased demand raises the average price for grain, significantly
lower deficiency payments will result in substantial budget
savings. These credit guarantees will stimulate the US economy
and save near-term dollars in budget outlays for commodity
programs.
The agreement was worked out in Moscow in meetings with
representatives of republics and the Inter-Republic Food
Committee. The union and the republics agreed as part of the
negotiations to share responsibility for the debt, and they agreed on
both the value of US food commodities to be purchased and the
method of distribution. Continued responsibility for payments on
existing CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] credit guarantees also
is necessary for the disbursement of new credit guarantees.
The $1.5 billion will be provided in three different channels:
Credit assistance. An additional $1.25 billion in credit
guarantees under the CCC's GSM-102 program will be made available
to the union and republics in tranches over the next
6 months for the purchase of critical food and feed commodities.
The initial tranche of $500 million will be immediately available
with tranches of $250 million each made available on February 1,
March 1, and April 1 of 1992. These credit guarantees will provide
a flow of critical supplies during the winter and spring months
when Soviet food supplies will be lowest.
Humanitarian assistance. Up to $165 million in food aid will
be provided to particularly hard-hit food deficit regions in the USSR
where shortages are likely to be most severe this winter. Initial
discussions have been held with union and republic officials in an
attempt to identify regions most in need. We intend to deliver food
shipments first to Armenia and the Urals region of the Russian
Republic and will then target additional areas over the course of the
winter. To the degree practicable, this assistance will be provided
through American and indigenous private voluntary organizations.
Technical assistance. The President has decided to go
forward with a package of five projects aimed at improving Soviet
food production and, importantly, distribution. These are:
-- A model demonstration farm in the St. Petersburg region
targeted toward new private farmers;
-- Assistance in developing wholesale markets in Moscow
and Kiev;
-- Extension service projects in the Armenian, Kazak, and
Uzbek Republics;
-- A public/private sector initiative to have US private
sector executives work in processing plants and at distribution
centers to improve the efficiency of key Soviet food distribution
enterprises. Planning is underway on each of these projects and
implementation will begin in January 1992; and
-- Credit guarantees for US-Soviet food processing and
distribution development projects. (###)