US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991


The US and Asia: Building Democracy and Freedom

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from remarks before the Asia Society, New York, New York Date: Nov 12, 199111/12/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific Country: Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, Burma, China, North Korea, Vietnam, Germany Subject: Trade/Economics, International Organizations, POW/MIA Issues, Democratization [TEXT] As you know, I have just returned from Rome, that NATO meeting, and The Hague for an EC [European Community] meeting. There, I worked with other Western leaders to help build a post-Cold War world that's characterized by mutual security, democracy, individual liberty, free enterprise, and unfettered international trade. I want to talk tonight about those topics, with the accent on Asia. But first, for audiences here and in Asia, I think it's important to discuss, once again, why I will not travel to the region later this month. As president, I must serve the entire nation in the domestic and foreign arenas. Sometimes those obligations clash. When we planned our trip a couple of months ago--worked out the schedule--Congress had planned to adjourn early in this month. I believe it was November 2, possibly November 4. Now the members say that they will wrap up by November 22, but who knows? We will reschedule the trip, but I will not leave while Congress is wrapping up a session. . . . But make no mistake, however, I will not turn my back on my responsibility to do the nation's business here and abroad. In times of economic pain, I certainly will not give up an opportunity to work with our allies to create new markets, new jobs, and new opportunities for American workers--in agriculture, in manufacturing, and in service industries. And, I certainly will not permit us to retreat into a kind of "Fortress America," which will doom us to irrelevance and poverty. The notion that we can separate domestic and foreign policy rests upon a stubborn fantasy that we can live as an isolated island surrounded by a changing and developing world. We tried isolationism, and we ended up fighting two bloody world wars. We tried economic isolationism--protectionism--and we helped set off a worldwide depression. I remain deeply committed to building closer ties with the Asia-Pacific region. Although much of our nation's heritage comes from Europe, our future points equally, importantly, toward Asia. Asia has transformed itself in the space of a generation into the most rapidly growing region on the face of the earth. Asia- Pacific nations enjoyed staggering real economic growth in the decade of the 1980s: The Australian economy grew 41%; Japan's nearly 52%; Malaysia almost 60%; Hong Kong--there are many here from Hong Kong tonight--89%; Singapore, 93%; Taiwan, 116%; and South Korea, 150%. The Asia-Pacific region has become our largest and fastest growing trade partner. We conduct more than $300 billion-worth of two-way trade annually. Together, we generate nearly half the world's gross national product. American firms have invested more than $61 billion in the region, and that figure will grow. Asians have invested more than $95 billion in the United States. In everything from automobiles to microchips, from baseball to Australian-rules football, we grow closer each day. A few years ago, it was fashionable to refer to the 20th century as the "American Century" and the 21st as the "Pacific Century," as if we were engaged in some long-term competition with our Asian allies. I don't see it that way. The United States will remain large and powerful, but in years to come, we will deepen our partnership with our Asian friends in building democracy and freedom. We'd be here forever if I tried to tick off our interests and activities, country by country. So, forgive me. Instead, I will address three central issues in our relationships with the nations of the region: security, democracy, and trade.
A Strong Foundation For Future Security
In the area of security, Asia's variety has spawned a diverse pattern of political and strategic cooperation. Our custom-made agreements and relationships provide a strong foundation for future security. Let me give you a few examples of how we seek to build the peace. The conflict in Indochina has preoccupied this nation for years. Finally, we have entered into a period of healing and constructive cooperation. We will work step by step to resolve the painful issues left by that war. The ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] nations, Japan, Australia, and the UN Security Council's permanent members recently forged a Cambodian peace process that promises free elections in a nation previously rent by tyranny and genocide. Just yesterday, for the first time in 16 years, we sent an accredited diplomat to Cambodia, to participate in the peace-making arrangements. We envision normal relations with Vietnam as the logical conclusion to a step-by-step process that begins by resolving the problems in Cambodia and by addressing thoroughly, openly, and conclusively the status of American POW-MIAs [prisoners of war/missing in action]. Today, I am announcing that we will upgrade our relations with Laos, and that we soon will place an ambassador in Vientiane. The Republic of Korea has moved to build better ties with North Korea while boldly challenging the North to abandon its menacing nuclear weapons program, which is the greatest threat to regional peace. We welcome recently organized efforts involving us and the Japanese and the Soviets, Chinese, and Koreans to bring North Korea's nuclear program under international supervision. Meanwhile, we will maintain our military presence in the South as long as the people want and need us. In laying the foundation for peace through our global partnership, we have worked closely with Japan in the area of foreign aid. We are the world's two foremost providers of such aid. We also cooperate on development assistance, more and more environmental protection, trade, arms control, refugees, and regional peace. We have urged the Soviet Union to take a progressive attitude toward the Northern Territories in its discussions with Japan. The Japanese have joined us in trying to lead the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe toward free enterprise. They support more than 45,000 US military forces in Japan with $3 billion in annual host- nation contributions. Japan contributed nearly $13 billion to the multinational forces for the Gulf war, $10 billion of which went to the United States. This required new taxes--a very tough thing for any politician to ask of working people--but Japan deserves praise for choosing the right course. To the south, Australia casts a presence far larger than its relatively small population would suggest. It takes justifiable pride in its long tradition of defending democracy, and its economic, political, and cultural presence helps unite the Asia-Pacific region with the rest of the world. We can help ensure future peace in the region and defend our interests through a range of military arrangements. Bilateral alliances, access agreements, and structures such as the five- power defense arrangement give us the flexibility we need. While we must adjust our force structure to reflect post- Cold War realities, we also must protect our interests and allies. In this light, we cannot afford to ignore the important sources of instability: in North Korea; in Burma, where socialist despotism holds sway, despite, I might add, the heroic efforts of freedom fighters like Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi; in China, and other states that resist the worldwide movement toward political pluralism--and that contribute to the proliferation of dangerous weapons. Let me mention just a few words regarding China. China is vitally important. It is our policy to remain engaged. We believe this is the way to effect positive change in the world's most populous nation. That's exactly what Secretary of State Jim Baker is doing there this week. Fortunately, the key to future stability in the region lies not with arms but with ballots. Democracy has swept across Asia-- with some notable exceptions, such as Burma, China, North Korea, and Vietnam. Yet we remain engaged in the region, and especially in China. If we retreat from the challenge of building democracy, we will have failed many who have worked hard, even died, for the cause. The United States will support democracy wherever it can, understanding that nations adopt political freedom in their own ways, in manners consistent with their histories and cultures. After decades of uncertainty, the future really does seems full of hope, and even the intransigent few seem likely to join the rest of the world in building a commonwealth of freedom.
Building Economic Prosperity
This brings us then to the third focal point, and a crucial ingredient in a stable, free society: I'm talking, of course, about economic prosperity. No nation can ignore the incredible vitality of this region--or afford to. Yes, we disagree on some important trade issues, but we also recognize a more important fact: Our fates and values have become linked forever. Contrary to the opinions of American protectionists, free trade requires efforts by all parties involved. Too often, trade disputes bring out the worst in people. Japan bashing--you've heard that expression--has become a minor sport in some places in the United States, and some in Japan have become equally scornful of the United States. Both our nations must reject those who would rather seek out scapegoats than tackle their own problems. We've made a good start: The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group encourages growth and trade. The Uruguay Round of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] talks remains the single most important vehicle for advancing the cause of free trade and fending off the scourge of protectionism. We call upon Japan and Korea to work with us in breaking down old barriers to trade, opening up markets in manufacturing, services, and agriculture. Our Structural Impediments Initiative talks have helped lower barriers to trade and investment. But we need to give those talks new life--give them a kick--and create a better climate in Japan for US businesses. The fact is that Japan, which nearly half a century ago became a focal point of American hatred, has become one of our closest and most treasured allies. I enjoyed a warm and constructive relationship working with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, and I look forward to spending time with my old friend, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa--significantly, a man steeped in Western and Eastern culture and superbly equipped to build bridges of culture and trade between our two great nations. Together, we can build an even more prosperous and spectacular future--but only if we take up the tough, rewarding task of promoting worldwide economic liberty. We seek a vibrant international economic system that unites markets on every continent. We in the United States also must strengthen our economy. We levy an unacceptably high effective tax rate on capital gains. Germany levies no capital gains tax. The complicated Japanese tax averages about 1%. This puts our own business people, our own entrepreneurs and venture capitalists at a huge and shameful disadvantage compared to our Asian trading partners. We run an enormous and growing budget deficit, which inflames political divisions within our own country. We must take powerful action to reduce that deficit while nourishing economic growth. To compete internationally, we must modernize our banking industry and make our industrial base more competitive. We must work with our allies to build a stable and sound monetary regime. Perhaps most important, we must build human capital. We have an obligation to prepare future generations for life in the 21st century. The integrated global economy will demand more of us than ever before, and our schools must meet the challenge. Technological change can do much more than make our lives more comfortable. It can sweep away totalitarianism and forge the foundation for lasting liberty. We live in an age of liberation technology, and no technology does more for the cause of freedom than the means of mass communication. No wall is high enough and no government sufficiently despotic to shut off what some call a revolution of electrons. As we compete with our allies in this area, we must remember that information feeds intellect, and good information fosters freedom.
The Six Keys to Peace
Let me close by summarizing our general approach to relations with Asia. Our Administration sees six keys to promoting lasting peace in the Asia-Pacific region: -- Progressive trade liberalization; -- Security cooperation; -- A shared commitment to democracy and human rights; -- Educational and scientific innovation; -- Respect for the environment; and -- An appreciation of our distinct cultural heritages. Americans have always looked to the horizons for their destiny, even from our earliest days. We have grown great because we have welcomed people from every continent and every country, and we have tried to make use of their distinct talents when they come here, while constructing a common culture. Today, we celebrate that diversity, and celebrate the prospect that in years to come, we will develop with our Asian friends even greater ties of trade and culture. I look forward to traveling soon to Asia, to advance these important principles and to expand market opportunities for tens of thousands of American workers and businesses. As president, I will continue building ties with our allies, because those ties mean peace at home and jobs for American men and women. I want to thank the Asia Society for its vital contributions to the cause of peace, prosperity, and understanding. I look forward to your help as I seek to build closer bonds of affection and interest with the peoples of the vast, marvelous, varied Asia-Pacific region. Thank you all. And may God bless our Asian-Pacific friends and the United States of America. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

The US and Japan: Global Partners In a Pacific Community

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address before the Japan Institute for International Affairs,Tokyo, Japan Date: Nov 11, 199111/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific Country: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Australia, China, USSR (former), Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, Burma Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights, POW/MIA Issues, Democratization, Science/Technology, International Organizations, North America Free Trade [TEXT] Two years ago, in New York, I told the Asia Society that Japan and the United States needed to establish a new partnership to help shape the 21st century. Today, in Tokyo, I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak to the leaders of Japan about the Pacific and global communities we are creating. I see in the audience friends and colleagues of long standing--former Prime Minister [Noboru] Takeshita, former Foreign Minister [Taro] Nakayama, Ambassador [Nubuo] Matsunaga, and many others--people who I know, like me, care deeply about the relationship between our two countries. You honor me with your presence. I recall a speech Prime Minister [Kiichi] Miyazawa made on a similar topic in London over a decade ago. On that occasion, he stressed the importance of developing new three-way ties between Japan, the United States, and Europe. So, it seems appropriate that I have come to Japan directly from the NATO and US-EC [European Community] summits in Rome and The Hague. Our agenda in Europe, like my consultations here, focused on political, economic, and security issues that will affect the shape of the post-Cold War world. This is the heart of my message to you: America's destiny lies across the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. The development of an enduring sense of community in this diverse and dynamic region is fundamental to the new international system we are shaping together. And we will only be successful in building this system through a full partnership between Japan and the United States. I gave two speeches in Berlin that presented our ideas about the new post-Cold War architecture of the Euro-Atlantic community. My remarks today will offer a complementary perspective about the United States, Japan, and the Pacific community. To visualize the structure of US engagement in the Pacific, imagine a fan spread wide, with its base in North America and radiating westward. Its central support is the alliance and partnership between the United States and Japan. To the north, one spoke represents our alliance with the Republic of Korea. To the south, another line extends to our ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] colleagues. Further south, a spoke reaches to Australia--an important political, economic, and security partner. Connecting these spokes is the fabric of shared economic interests now given form by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process. Within this flexible construct, new political and economic ties offer additional support for cooperative actions by groups of Pacific nations. Over time, we should strive to draw China and the Soviet Union or the Russian Republic closer to this system. The flexibility of this structure suits the vast geographic expanse, the diversity, and the multiple security concerns of East Asia and the Pacific. Unlike Europe, no single threat has bound the region together. Yet the network of security, political, and economic ties with the United States--especially the US-Japan relationship--has fostered stability and economic dynamism in the region. This economic vitality, in turn, is now drawing the Pacific community closer together. In the future, our bilateral security ties will continue to provide geopolitical balance, enable us to serve as an honest broker, and reassure against uncertainty. But multilateral actions may also supplement these bilateral ties. As we have seen in the Cambodian peace process, the combined efforts of the ASEAN countries, Japan, Australia and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council tailor-made a process of conflict resolution. Similarly, the recent forum on the disputed islands of the South China Sea hosted by Indonesia reflects such an ad hoc, multilateral approach to reducing suspicions. The security dangers on the Korean Peninsula might also be addressed in a multinational framework. At this stage in this new post-Cold War era, we should be attentive to the possibilities for such multilateral action without locking ourselves into an overly structured approach. Form should follow function.
US-Japan Relations
Ambassador Mike Mansfield, during his decade of service in Tokyo, emphasized that America's relationship with Japan is our most important bilateral association in the world, bar none. Nothing is more fundamental to the security of the region, to global economic growth, and, indeed, to the effectiveness of the post-Cold War international system than the US-Japan relationship. We recognize that Japan's leaders, and its people, are now grappling with a difficult adjustment in Japan's world role. You are beginning to fully appreciate your national capabilities-- and your responsibilities--around the globe. Your "checkbook diplomacy," like our "dollar diplomacy" of an earlier era, is clearly too narrow. The Gulf war might turn out to have been a watershed event in this transformation. We recognize the difficulty of achieving a consensus on a security challenge in what might have appeared to be a far-off land. We appreciate Japan's generous financial contribution to the allied effort. And we know the significance of Japan's minesweepers plying the troubled waters of the Persian Gulf. In the aftermath of the war, Japan's foreign policy may now be headed toward the assumption of broader global responsibilities. As a major beneficiary of the global system, Japan must be a leader in the promotion and evolution of this system. This call for leadership should not just apply to the field of economics but also in building democracy, respect for human rights, stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in facing transnational challenges in areas such as the environment, narcotics, and refugees. This gradual broadening in foreign policy offers a historic opportunity to synergize our policies in pursuit of shared interests and goals in the post-Cold War world. Yet to achieve this new level of partnership, we must recognize that our relations have to adjust to reflect the new circumstances. I see four basic, interrelated elements as necessary to accomplishing this goal. First, the foundation of the relationship remains the US- Japan Security Treaty. Japan has built an appropriate self-defense capability that complements US forces and contributes to regional stability. Japan also provides the most generous host-nation support of any of our allies. By 1995, this support will reach 73% of the non-salary costs for maintaining our forward-deployed forces in Japan. We need to do more, however, to achieve the goal of a balanced two-way flow of defense-related technology, an increasingly critical resource in the security system. Second, and equally important, we need an economic relationship with openness on both sides. Otherwise, we will not be able to sustain our political partnership. Japan will need to make greater efforts to open its markets; the United States must strengthen its competitiveness. The consumers in both countries will be the beneficiaries. To this end, we should intensify the important and unprecedented economic dialogue we have begun through the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks. Japanese structural adjustments in areas such as the retail distribution system and public sector investment demonstrate signs of progress. We look to further efforts to eliminate exclusionary business practices and create a business climate conducive to foreign competition. And we know that we have work to do in improving our educational system, lowering our cost of capital, and encouraging American businesses to promote exports through sustained efforts. Third, we must fulfill the promise of the global partnership that President Bush called for at the Palm Springs summit last year. As stable democracies and highly productive market economies, the United States and Japan have a unique opportunity to marshal unparalleled resources and skills to address the challenges that will shape the post-Cold War world. Together, we produce nearly 40% of the world's GNP. We can do great good if we work together. On issues from Central and South America to Central and Eastern Europe, from safeguarding the environment to helping developing nations, we need to coordinate our diplomatic and economic efforts on a global scale. I think it is especially notable that Japan is interested in participating in the multilateral negotiations phase of the Middle East peace process. In particular, this is a critical moment for the Uruguay Round and the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] system itself. Our recent discussions with the European Community produced progress in a number of important areas. Japan must likewise accept the mantle of economic responsibility. As one of the primary beneficiaries of the open world trading system, Japan should lead, not follow, in the effort to preserve and strengthen that system. We also need to work more closely through trilateral arrangements with Western Europe, as Prime Minister Miyazawa suggested in his far-sighted London speech. Finally, we must deepen our understanding of each other's cultures. Fast food and Hollywood movies have their merits, but Japanese youth must be introduced to more about American life and values--and we have much more to offer. Americans, in turn, must come to know Japan's rich history and traditions. More of our students should learn the Japanese language. The newly created Abe Fund offers one important opportunity to expand a host of exchanges and ties--intellectual, scientific, cultural, and people-to-people-- that can help us better appreciate each other's society. If we pursue these four elements together, we will not only strengthen this most important bilateral relationship, but we can also make it a moving force around the globe. In Asia, Japan and the United States need to face three challenges if we are going to help bring a strong Pacific community into being. First, together with like-minded states in the region, we must build a framework for economic cooperation and growth that will support an open, global trading system. Second, we must ensure a flexible yet strong security structure that helps us reduce intra-regional fears and suspicions. Third, we must support the trend toward democratization and the protection of human rights so as to deepen the shared values that will reinforce a sense of community.
Regional Economic Cooperation and Growth
If there is one quality that most distinguishes East Asia today from other regions of the world, it is economic dynamism. This region is one of the major engines of global growth; and burgeoning intra-Asian and trans-Pacific trade and investment provide the broad common interests on which to build the Pacific community. This is what the United States, Japan, and 10 other Pacific Basin economies sought to do when they came together 2 years ago to initiate the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process. We see APEC as an important mechanism for sustaining market-oriented growth, for advancing global and regional trade liberalization, and for meeting related challenges such as protecting the environment. APEC is as much a hallmark of our engagement in the region, as are our security ties. We will convene APEC's third ministerial meeting in Seoul later this week. For the first time, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong will join us. But even with this expansion, APEC respects the role of the ASEAN nations at its core. Over time, we hope to establish a record of practical progress within APEC's 10 working groups--on topics ranging from energy, fisheries, and human resource development to telecommunications, tourism, and transportation. By overcoming structural inefficiencies through coordinated efforts, we will seek to promote economic growth throughout the Pacific Basin. APEC is also exploring regional trade liberalization discussions. Finally, APEC promotes the open global trading regime through its support for a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Similarly, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) that we are negotiating will support both APEC and the global trading system. Unlike a customs union, NAFTA will not establish common barriers to those outside. Instead, its purpose is to eliminate internal barriers among its participants so as to increase their efficiency, productivity, and growth. Growth will expand markets for Asian traders and investors, thus strengthening, not weakening, trans-Pacific links. To speak frankly, it would not be in the US interest to isolate ourselves within one economic region of the world. Our future depends on strong economic ties with all regions, as well as a successful GATT system. That's why we have demonstrated an un- wavering commitment to the Uruguay Round. Our efforts to reduce economic barriers with Latin America, in Asia, or with the EC are companion measures to advancing liberalization wherever possible. The sensible response of others should be to join with us to reduce impediments to trade and investment through the Uruguay Round, APEC, the US-ASEAN framework, and bilaterally.
My visit to Seoul for the APEC meeting will also be an occasion for bilateral consultations with our Korean allies. [The President's visit to Asia was postponed on November 5]. The achievements of the Republic of Korea are impressive by any measure. In the space of a generation, South Korea has transformed itself from a poor, war-ravaged society into one of the world's leading export economies. We respect its democratic transition, and the success of nordpolitik. The dynamism of South Korean society should help us meet the challenges of transforming what has been primarily a military alliance into a more equal political, defense, and economic partnership. This is the logic of the US force restructuring now underway, of Seoul's increasing host nation support, of our economic dialogue to reduce trade barriers that are still far too numerous, and enhanced political consultations. South Korea's successes are all the more remarkable in that they have been achieved in the face of the continuing bitter military and political confrontation with North Korea. Indeed, the very real danger of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula is now the number one threat to security in Northeast Asia. North Korea's repeated failures to meet its international treaty obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by implementing full-scope IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards have raised serious questions about its intentions. Yet, as important as is the NPT regime, we have learned from the case of Iraq that even IAEA safeguards cannot ensure that a renegade regime will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The only firm assurance against a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula would be a credible agreement by both Seoul and Pyongyang to abstain from the production or acquisition of any weapons-grade nuclear material. President Roh Tae Woo's November 7 initiative embraces such a policy. We welcome his bold and far-sighted declaration, and we now look to North Korea to respond in kind. The key to reducing tensions on the peninsula--and ultimately to reunification--is an active North-South dialogue. We welcome the four prime ministerial-level talks that have been held in recent years, because we know that the road to peace and reunification must be traversed by the Koreans themselves. But the current, halting effort at reconciliation suggests the possible need for others to help foster a climate of trust and confidence. There may be potential for European-style confidence- building measures and, ultimately, arms reductions on the Korean Peninsula. The major powers have valuable experience in this regard. As the North-South dialogue progresses, we will explore opportunities for cooperation among the United States, Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and the two Koreas--opportunities that will support the North-South dialogue, help to ease tensions, facilitate discussion of common security concerns, and possibly guarantee outcomes negotiated between the two Koreas.
Southeast Asia
Korea is not alone in its successes. Recall that just 15 years ago many feared that some of the countries of Southeast Asia-- Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia--would become "dominoes" in a continuing wave of communist expansion. Today, their talented, industrious people and vigorous market economies are setting standards for development worldwide. We have built a productive structure of economic, political, and security cooperation with our ASEAN friends; ASEAN is now the focal point of our engagement in Southeast Asia. ASEAN has become our fifth largest trading partner. We are ASEAN's largest market. ASEAN was a leader in launching the Uruguay Round of the GATT, and we look to support from ASEAN in successfully completing those negotiations. In the political realm, the progress toward peace in Cambodia is among the fruits of a decade of cooperative efforts with ASEAN. As we look to the future, a just and durable peace in Cambodia can open the door to a new era in Southeast Asia--the integration of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos into the mainstream of the region. At the Paris Conference on Cambodia last month, I stated that the United States hopes to achieve reconciliation and normal relations with the three states of Indochina. We have made important progress with all three countries in recent months. Japan, too, has an active interest in this region, and our close consultation and cooperation on regional problems has been an important factor in making this progress possible. Later this month in New York, the United States will begin talks with Vietnam on the issues and modalities associated with normalization of relations. I must emphasize, however, that more remains to be done by Vietnam--especially on POW/MIA accounting- -before the United States can proceed to normal relations or support economic assistance to Vietnam by the international community. We hope that Vietnam will accelerate its efforts so that we can move forward step-by-step toward a new era in Southeast Asia. It is time to close the last chapter of a terrible period of conflict for all involved. Beyond our multilateral engagement with ASEAN, two of its members, the Philippines and Thailand, are bilateral treaty allies. Thailand's cooperation during Desert Storm was greatly appreciated, and we look forward to the further development of our traditionally warm friendship with Thailand as it returns to constitutional government early next year. I know there is much concern about the future of our presence in the Philippines. Let me emphasize two points in this regard. First, our overriding concern is to sustain friendly and productive relations with a democratic and economically dynamic Philippines. Second, regardless of the future of our military presence in Subic Bay, our security engagement in Southeast Asia will remain undiminished, even if realized through other arrangements. Indeed, we are now exploring ways of enhancing security cooperation with our friends throughout the region to ensure our ability to sustain an adequate defense presence in Southeast Asia. The access agreement reached last year with Singapore is an example of our commitment. It also reflects the desire of our allies and friends to work with us to ensure regional stability.
Australia is our strong link to the South Pacific. Canberra's activism in both global and regional affairs--from efforts to rid the world of chemical weapons to the Cairns Group* in the GATT-- demonstrates its importance as a stalwart global ally. In efforts to achieve a settlement in Cambodia, in APEC, and in its role of honest broker and catalyst for development in the South Pacific, Australia plays a vital role in regional affairs. Moreover, Canberra has been an important bridge to New Zealand as we have sought to encourage policy changes that will make possible a reactivation of the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States] alliance. *Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay. The group was named after the town in Australia where the group first met in 1991.
China and the USSR
At the end of the week, I will visit China. Great uncertainty still clouds our relations. The tragic violence at Tiananmen Square shattered the bipartisan consensus in the United States--carefully constructed over 2 decades--for engagement with China. Rebuilding that consensus is proving to be a daunting task. Our agenda is open for all to see. We will continue to encourage respect for human rights. We want to counter the threat of nuclear and missile proliferation. We want free and fair trade that benefits both countries and the region. With its 23% of the human race, its economic potential, and permanent seat on the UN Security Council, China casts a long shadow in Asia and beyond. But China is in a time of transition. The rigid communist regime has alienated us by lashing out, by seeking to repress an irrepressible spirit. Yet a return to a hostile confrontation will not help the people of China, nor will it serve our national interests. The only sensible course is to move ahead with our agenda, secure improvements where possible, and create the context for managing the change that will come some day. So, too, we should engage the Soviet Union and Russia in Asia. The USSR is a power with interests in Asia as well as Europe. Increasingly, we see the Russian Republic playing a more active role in the region. The opening of Vladivostok, the establishment of a free trade zone in Nakhodka, and moves toward resolving the Northern Territories issue are important steps that can pave the way for this greater participation in the Asia-Pacific region.
Democracy and Human Rights
While shared economic interests and security concerns are fundamental elements of our ties to Japan and East Asia, an enduring sense of community must also be based on common values. Without such a foundation, alliances and other ties will not have resilience, since relations based solely on realpolitik can fracture as circumstances change. We are pleased by the advance of democracy and the increasing respect for human rights throughout East Asia and the Pacific. Not long ago, some claimed that democracy was a European or American concept, inappropriate for Asia. But during the 1980s, the people of Asia began to say otherwise. In the Philippines, in South Korea, in Taiwan, and most recently in Mongolia, people's yearning for freedom could not be denied. The collapse of communism as a social and political order was brought about in part by its economic failures. Conversely, we have seen that economic liberalization--open markets, entrepreneurship, private ownership--is both the source of growth and the stimulus for political reform. Rising standards of education and income bring with them popular demands for open political participation. Similarly, the view that concern for human rights is uniquely a Western preoccupation is a disparagement of Asian cultures that share universal concerns for human dignity, individual welfare, and freedom of thought and expression. Our outrage against the genocidal violence of the Khmer Rouge, or political repression in Burma and North Korea, can be no less than our revulsion at the genocide of the Nazis or totalitarian repression by European or Latin dictators. I will never accept the view that the hopes and aspirations of an individual in Asia should count less than a person elsewhere. Therefore, we welcome the increasing emphasis in Japan's foreign policy on political reform and human rights. Together with other like-minded states, we must work for the establishment of civilian, democratic government in Burma, the strengthening of democracy in Mongolia, and the promotion of political as well as economic reform in the few remaining Marxist-Leninist states in Asia. Only through such a commitment can we advance the human values that give soul to a sense of community in East Asia and the Pacific. Japan's promotion of the democratic and humanitarian agenda--for example in its dealings with Burma, China, Indochina and the Soviet Union--would enable it to reinforce its economic efforts with goals that strengthen the political stability of the region. It would help to make Japan a true leader in the international system.
The United States in Asia
America's fate is ever more closely tied to East Asia and the Pacific. Having fought three major wars in this region during the past half century, we know full well that our security is inextricably linked to stability in Asia. While we will make adjustments in our military posture to fit changing circumstances, we intend to firmly maintain our alliance relationships and our forward-deployed forces. Today, the Asia-Pacific region is our largest trading partner, with more than $300 billion a year in two-way trans-Pacific trade. This trade is nearly one-third larger than that across the Atlantic. US firms have invested more than $61 billion in the Asia-Pacific region. We now export more to Thailand than to the Soviet Union, more to Indonesia than to Eastern Europe, and more to Singapore than to Spain or Italy. At the same time, the spread of democratic values and institutions further deepens our sense of a Pacific community. There is, moreover, another enduring American bond with Asia: the growing numbers of Asian-Americans--some 7 million strong and our fastest growing group of immigrants. There are more Lao today in the United States than in the Lao capital of Vientiane; more Filipinos in California than in Cebu. Japanese- Americans and Chinese-Americans fill leadership positions in all segments of American society. Their presence and successes enrich our society; they give us a deeper understanding of, and unique affinity with, the region. Taken together, these ties give us a strong mutuality of interests and a growing sense of community with the nations of the Pacific Basin. Our interest in the security and stability of Asia is overriding; our commitment is unshakable; our engagement is beyond question. In conclusion, I want to leave no doubt that the United States is fully committed to working with Japan and others in the region to shape a new era in world affairs and a new order in Asia. Neither of us can afford the narrow self-indulgence of bashing or kenbei [contempt for Americans]. Neither of us will prosper in a world that retreats into protectionism. As a partner, the United States works with Japan on the basis of respect and understanding. And the United States must fairly examine its own economic strengths and weaknesses so it can enhance its competitiveness. But we also look to Japan to press ahead with the fundamental structural reforms that will make possible more balanced trading relationships with its commercial partners. And Japan should step forward as a leader in confronting global issues rather than relying on gaiatsu--foreign pressures--to justify decisions on economics or security affairs that are in its own interests. These commitments to change can form the lasting basis for our global partnership and for enhancing the Pacific community. While it will take time to realize these goals, I know they are within reach. For both our nations have been strikingly successful in accomplishing what we have set out to do. If we work together, our potential will know few limits. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

North Korean Nuclear Weapons Threat

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpt from the joint ministerial news conference held by Secretary Baker and other ministers following the third Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial meeting, Seoul, Korea Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: North Korea Subject: Arms Control, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] Q: According to the report released by the Blue House today, of the conversation between you and President Roh Tae Woo, he said that the two-plus-four formula, which has been suggested, is not applicable to Korea because conditions are essentially different than those which obtain in Europe or Germany. In your article for Foreign Affairs, you suggested that the two Koreas and four other powers should create some kind of forum to work on this problem. Could you explain what you had in mind and how it squares with President Roh's feeling that this does. . . . Secretary Baker: Yes, I can . . . because what President Roh said--based on what you've just reported to me that he said-- squares exactly with our discussion. Let me say that I think--we think--the greatest threat to regional security and stability in this area is the threat of nuclear weapons development by North Korea. It is a threat that we believe needs to be addressed. We're in a period of time and in other parts of the world where we seem to be moving, generally speaking, to a lessening of tensions. There are some increased tensions in places like Yugoslavia, I recognize. But there are generally some lessening of tensions around the world from what existed over the past few years. This issue is one that remains firmly on the agenda, not just of this region, I think, but of the world. We see it as a major regional issue, but we also see it as a global issue. I think the statements recently by President Bush and President Roh give North Korea an opportunity and a reason to deal with this matter and to deal with it in the manner that most of the international community have been requesting for a long, long time. And I am talking about IAEA safeguards and the like. I believe that the United States is joined by some other countries in wanting to see the matter dealt with satisfactorily, politically, and diplomatically. I believe that is the position of the Government of Japan based on my talks in Tokyo, although the Government of Japan is represented here, and they can certainly speak for themselves. I believe it is the position of the Soviet Union. I would hope it would be the position of the People's Republic of China, but they are here and they can speak for themselves. It's not up to me to do that. But I don't see--I don't think any country can be sanguine or willing to accept the development of a nuclear weapons capability by North Korea. So we have suggested that those of us who are concerned about this should go about the business of trying to get a satisfactory solution to it, if necessary in a multilateral context. But it is different completely and totally from the two-plus-four mechanism and procedure that we used in connection with the unification of Germany, because we are not talking about it with reference to the solution of the problems between the two Koreas. It has always been the position of the United States that South Korea should have the lead in that--that we would be helpful where we could. I think there are other countries that would like to be helpful in that regard. That is still our position with respect to questions involving resolution of the underlying problems between the North and the South. But with respect to this question of nuclear capability of the North, we think there is a place for multilateral approach to that. It is my understanding that the Government of South Korea agrees with us based on the discussions I've had with the foreign minister here and with President Roh this morning....(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

US Support for South Korean Policy

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Washington, DC Date: Nov 8, 199111/8/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: South Korea Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] We strongly welcome and support Republic of Korea President Roh Tae Woo's declaration of his government's policy regarding nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. We believe it is a comprehensive and bold initiative which makes a significant contribution to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. President Roh's announcement reiterates the Republic of Korea's policy to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and to continue placing all of South Korea's nuclear facilities and materials under full-scope international inspections by the IAEA, in compliance with its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards obligation. President Roh's declaration that the Republic of Korea will not possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities is an especially welcome and important decision. President Roh has ruled out acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by the Republic of Korea and pledged to actively participate in international efforts to eliminate those weapons. We hope that North Korea will respond positively to this initiative by taking corresponding measures in all these areas, especially not to possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities, and that North Korea will quickly fulfill its unconditional international obligation under the NPT to bring its nuclear program under IAEA safeguards. North Korea's quest for a nuclear weapons capability is the most significant threat to the security and stability of the Northeast Asia region. We reiterate our call for North Korea to halt this quest. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

Argentine President Carlos Menem Visits Washington, DC: Defending Democracy at Home and Abroad

Bush, Menem Source: President Bush, Argentine President Carlos Menem Description: Remarks at arrival ceremony, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Argentina Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization, Arms Control, International Organizations [TEXT] President Bush: Thank you all very much. President Menem, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you to the White House. The ties between our countries have never been stronger, and a great deal of credit goes to you and your administration. Nearly a year ago, a revolt by renegade soldiers faced you in your nation's capital. You stood firm in defense of freedom and liberty and in defense of your people's right to a government of their choice. In the end, freedom triumphed. It was an honor to join you, just a few days later, in beautiful Buenos Aires, the capital of a proud and free Argentina. In your inaugural address you asked Argentina to "arise and walk." When we met last year in the capital, we spoke about the challenges your country faces and the changes that have already been set in motion. Today, Argentina is assuming its rightful place as a leader in the democratic community of nations. Nowhere in this hemisphere is the shape of the post-Cold War world more evident than in Argentina. Under your leadership, Argentina has become one of the hemisphere's strongest defenders of democracy, both at home and abroad. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, you sent your navy to join the international coalition which liberated that pillaged nation. When tanks rumbled through the streets of Moscow, threatening the Soviet Union's forces of democratic reform, you were one of the very first in Latin America to speak out in defense of liberty. You have called for democratic reform in Cuba and made major contributions to the efforts of the Organization of American States to restore democratic government to Haiti. At home, you have slashed government spending, privatized state-owned industries, and abolished harmful overregulation of the economy. You have brought once-rampant inflation under control. Last year, Argentina had a trade surplus of nearly $8 billion, and US firms, alone, invested over $200 million in Argentina. Despite facing many difficult challenges when you took office in 1989, your efforts have earned the respect of the international community. More importantly, they strengthened Argentina's competitive position in the global economy by attracting new confidence and investment from around the world. I share that confidence in Argentina's future under your leadership. In the rapidly evolving relationship among the nations of the Southern Cone, you have taken the lead in achieving regional economic integration and arms control. For example, by the end of 1995, the MERCOSUR common market aims to eliminate tariffs between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay--linking your economies together in a way consistent with GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] to form one of the hemisphere's largest open markets. You're taking a giant step toward the goal I stated last year in announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: to make the Americas the world's largest partnership of free-trading nations. We also welcome your efforts to set in place nuclear safeguards that will increase international security. Your decisions to forswear chemical weapons and halt missile proliferation do create a safer hemisphere, a safer world. From Rivadavia to Rio Gallegos, from Zapala to Buenos Aires, your strong, committed leadership is bringing your people hope for change, faith in their countrymen, and the courage to "arise and walk" together. On behalf of the people of the United States, it is my great pleasure to welcome you to the White House. And may God bless the Argentine Republic. President Menem: My dear friend, Mr. President, distinguished Mrs. Bush. Ladies and gentlemen, sisters and brothers of America. Thank you very much for your warm words of welcome. It is to me a source of deep satisfaction to be once again here in this great country whose institutions and values have been and still are an example of freedom and human dignity. Moreover, I come back with the satisfaction of having already traveled a long distance along the path of transformation my government has chosen. There is still a lot to be done in Argentina. Many expectations are still unfulfilled. Many are the problems. However, with effort, firmness, and determination, we are conquering the slope of decadence. With civil freedom, with economic freedom, with an unprecedented freedom of the press, [and] after 2 years of hard work to achieve change, most of the Argentine people have ratified recently their support during our last elections. This means backing the government, backing the economic cause, and also a new way of insertion in the world. Our determination is today firmer than ever before to continue implementing state reform, privatizations, open trade, stimulating foreign investment, deregulation, and also the return to Argentina of assets that were sent abroad. Argentina has also decided to continue playing an active role in the defense of peace and international security, giving all possible support to UN initiatives. When this year began, a distant region in the world was in crisis. In the Gulf, we faced, then, serious risks with possible consequences for the whole planet. Within the framework of what the United Nations decided and as the result of the great effort of the United States and its allies, it was possible to end aggression and restore the full rule of international law. We participated in that joint action, and we are proud we did. Some months later, you yourself, my friend, had the initiative to propose unilaterally a significant reduction of nuclear weaponry. The Middle East had, for time immemorial, been a region where all expectations to obtain a just and lasting peace floundered and were thwarted. A few days ago, you inaugurated a conference that has renewed the hope of a constructive dialogue in the region when calling to the same negotiating table antagonists who seemed, only yesterday, to be implacably hostile. This is a really formidable progress--I insist--a formidable and spectacular progress. A new international order is being generated on the basis of peace, of justice, [and] of reason and under the guidance of God--our only source of reason and justice. This is the reason why we recognize, today, our vast coincidence with the United States. For instance, in the common aim of restoring the democratic Government of the Republic of Haiti. That is why we rely on integration. We want to consolidate MERCOSUR with our regional brothers. And we also want to add our own efforts so that the ambitious Enterprise for the Americas Initiative that you conceived and announced last year will bear fruit. With Brazil, we have signed an agreement for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, and we are about to conclude an agreement on safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency. With Brazil, too, and Chile and Uruguay--Paraguay and Bolivia will join us in the future--we have made the commitment of not producing nor buying, storing, or transferring chemical or biological weapons [and], of course, banning any kind of use for them. Furthermore, we have also joined the control system for missile technology, known by the acronym MTCR. Whitman's prophetical dreams are renewed, entwined with the illusions of having a single and great America as they were presaged [by] Ruben Dario, Jose Marti, and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento. To this end, it will be necessary to find in each and every country of our America a representative democracy with full respect for human rights and a free economy; I repeat, in all the countries of this continent with absolutely no exceptions. To this end, it will be necessary to bring a message of a nation that is looking inward. The message is very simple: The Argentine nation faces, with seriousness, the need of having a place in the new international order. This we are sure to obtain since we have a representative democracy, we respect human rights, and we chose a free economy. We trust that the European Economic Community and the developed world will not persist in applying old protectionist schemes that menace the hope of a better future. We hope that we may be able to cooperate firmly so that--and I quote your own words, my dear [Mr.] President and friend--"we may eliminate subsidies that distort trade." We hope we may be able to translate into concrete results some political statements allowing markets to exist whose transparency will reward efficient producers. We trust in the oldest constitutional democracy in the world, and that democracy is the one in the United States. We place our trust in the United States and its leaders who, in 1991, have faced up to their responsibilities toward the international community with maturity and imagination and commendable moderation. I am really moved by this reception. I am sure that our stay here will not only be a pleasure but also very fruitful. I thank you for your warmth and your hospitality. God bless you, Mr. President; God bless your country, and God bless our America.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

Argentine President Carlos Menem Visits Washington, DC: US-Argentina: Sharing a Common Destiny

Eagleburger Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger Description: Remarks at US State Department luncheon Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Argentina Subject: International Organizations, Trade/Economics, Democratization [TEXT] An earlier American President, Woodrow Wilson, once noted that great nations are not governed by those who simply repeat what is being said on street corners. True leaders, he said, divine from such talk what he called the shared meaning of the common voice, which is the true will of the people. Often this meaning is hidden from the people; in fact, it may require a great leader to help them discover the difference between willfulness and their own true will. You listened to what was being said on street corners in Argentina, and you heard the sound of many voices--not only the voices of those dissatisfied with the present but of those nostalgic for a past and for past ways which could no longer be. In that din of many voices, you divined a meaning, and you claimed a mandate for change--change that would rock the status quo and even court unpopularity. This is the kind of leadership which Wilson spoke of. It is the kind which democracy needs the most but, unfortunately, so rarely produces. What is most remarkable is that you met Wilson's highest standard by proving that you knew what your countrymen wanted and required even before they did themselves. Now your foresight has been vindicated by the Argentine people in the recent elections which were so favorable to the cause of reform. You have, sir, not only our congratulations but also our admiration for achieving the political equivalent of a miracle: popular statesmanship. The fact of the matter, however, is that the Argentine people have seen more than simply change; they have seen progress directly associated with the Menem Government's reform agenda-- an agenda including sound monetary policy, currency convertibility, streamlined bureaucracy, privatization, deregulation, and opening of the economy to international trade and investment. Meanwhile, Argentina has made great progress toward meeting its foreign debt commitments. The results speak for themselves: Inflation is down, confidence is up, and the economy is growing. A leader does not acquire the mantle of statesmanship, as you have, simply by doing well for his countrymen. He must act on a wider stage as well. When so many nations are preoccupied with internal problems and parochial considerations, it is heartening to see a leader who understands that there can be no artificial wall between foreign and domestic policies. This is a belief which I know unites you and President Bush, and it is especially important today when the free market democracies truly share a common fate and destiny. Thus, we applaud your commitment to the development of the MERCOSUR common market, which we hope will serve, along with President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, as the foundation stone for our ultimate goal of a free trading hemisphere. We also applaud your staunch stand internationally in opposition to aggression and in defense of democracy--from Kuwait to Cuba. You understand that freedom is indivisible, and nowhere is that principle more important to us than here in the Americas, where you have guided regional efforts to restore democracy in Haiti. Finally, we applaud your courageous and visionary efforts to curb nuclear proliferation and stop the spread of chemical and biological weapons in the Americas. The Mendoza Declaration you signed with Brazil and Chile, which bans chemical weapons in the region, and the bilateral nuclear safeguards agreement you signed with Brazil are milestones in this effort. In the future, we look forward to seeing an Argentine-Brazilian safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Commission and to Argentina's ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. On behalf of Secretary Baker and of the Department of State, let me propose this toast to the enduring friendship between our peoples, to the common values which unite us, and to the promise of a lasting partnership between the United States and the Argentine Republic which will further the development of freedom and prosperity throughout the Americas.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

Review of Presidential Discussions

Aronson Source: Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Bernard W. Aronson Description: Opening statement at a news conference in Washington, DC Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America, MidEast/North Africa Country: Argentina, Israel Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization, Arms Control, International Organizations, Nuclear Nonproliferation, OAS [TEXT] President Menem took office in December of 1989, I believe, in a country in a deep economic crisis. Inflation was over 4,900%. The economy was declining. Argentina had an enormous debt burden, enormous trade barriers. President Menem, from the very beginning, has set out to fundamentally restructure and reform that economy. Export taxes have been eliminated; barriers to trade and investment have been drastically reduced. They've set out on a program to privatize state enterprises. They've sold the telephone company, the airlines. They have signed--with Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay- -a framework agreement on trade and investment with the United States. Today, they will sign a bilateral investment treaty which is the first with a major country in Latin America, and it's, in many ways, a revolutionary treaty because it allows for international arbitration of disputes, which is a sea change in investment policy in Latin America. The economy today is growing at about 5%. Inflation is at a monthly rate of less than 2%. And, in fact, President Menem told President Bush that this month it's expected to be less than 1%. They have a trade surplus. There is new, growing confidence in the investment community, which the American investment community shares. American investors put about $200 million in[to] Argentina last year. Our Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insures about $173 million of US investments. In April, OPIC led a mission there in which 21 US companies participated. The Vice President visited this past year and brought about eight CEOs [chief executive officers]. We're confident that Argentina is well positioned to move forward with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] on a new agreement; and that, we believe, will set the stage for negotiations with the commercial banks under the Brady Plan to restructure Argentina's $37 million debt with the commercial banks. I think both Presidents discussed the historic and important changes in Argentina's policy with regard to nuclear proliferation, missile proliferation, chemical weapons, its leadership in defending democracy in Haiti, its role as a member of the coalition in the Gulf. And, I think, if you look at where Argentina was when this President took office and where it is today, it is just an enormous success story and a growing success story. And as President Bush said in his welcoming remarks, this Administration has enormous confidence in Argentina's future under President Menem. The two Presidents had a one-on-one discussion in the Oval Office, and then they came out to the Cabinet Room with the various members of the two governments. The President reiterated his appreciation for the hospitality of the visit he and [his daughter] Dorothy made in December. He said it was a visit he'd never forget. He reiterated how strongly he feels in support and recognition of the economic reforms, their commitment to democracy, their steps in nuclear non-proliferation; reiterated that relations have never been better. President Menem made the same point. Both Presidents agreed they'd work to improve relations. The two Presidents had an extended discussion both in the Oval Office and in the Cabinet Room of Argentina's current economic reforms, specifically its discussions with the IMF and its hopes for successful debt negotiations. The President made it clear that we want to be supportive and cooperative and helpful in all of those fronts. President Menem went through, in some detail, the recent economic numbers. As I mentioned, he said that inflation this month will be less than 1%. The two Presidents had an extensive discussion of the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)]. On this, I think they both reiterated what they feel is the crucial importance of movement by the European Community on agriculture. Argentina is a major agricultural exporter, as is the United States. The Finance Minister, Mr. Cavallo, felt that the recent steps Argentina has taken to deregulate the service economy and to introduce a very strong intellectual property rights bill ought to prove an incentive to the Europeans who feel strongly about those two areas of the GATT to make further progress in agriculture. The two Presidents had a discussion of Cuba, of Haiti, and the OAS [Organization of American States] mission there. They had an extensive discussion of the Middle East. President Menem described his recent trip to the Middle East. He said he was the first Argentine president to visit Israel. He mentioned he visited Egypt and had discussions with [President] Mubarak as well. There was an extensive discussion of the peace conference and the progress that's being made. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

Humanitarian Appeal to Haitian Boat People

Tutwiler Description: Text of a statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Department Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Nov 15, 199111/15/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] The following message was prepared for the Voice of America Creole broadcast to Haiti today: The United States is deeply concerned by the humanitarian tragedy of the Haitian boat people. Over the past 3 weeks, hundreds of Haitians have put out to sea, often risking their lives in unseaworthy vessels, in a mistaken belief that they will be picked up and brought to the United States. With very few exceptions, Haitians picked up on the high seas will not be brought to the United States. Despite continuing efforts to rescue people at sea, the tragic reality is that many boats may not be found, and many people may die. The US Government urgently advises Haitians that risking their lives in small boats is not the answer to their situation. The United States reaffirms its strong support for the efforts of the Organization of American States to bring about a solution to the current political crisis in Haiti.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

US-Venezuela Drug Interdiction Agreement Signed

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Washington, DC Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America, North America Country: United States, Venezuela Subject: International Law, Narcotics On November 9, 1991, the Governments of Venezuela and the United States signed a mutual maritime counter-narcotics agreement to facilitate the identification and interdiction of drug-trafficking vessels on the high seas. This is the first reciprocal agreement of this nature concluded by the United States with any country. The agreement was signed at the Venezuelan navy headquarters by Ambassador Michael Skol and US Coast Guard Vice Admiral Paul Welling for the United States and by Rear Admiral Ignacio Pena Cimarro and Dr. Elias Osorio Belisario for the Republic of Venezuela. This agreement provides a framework for the maritime forces of each country to request permission to board and inspect vessels registered in the other signatory nation that are suspected of illicit narcotics activities on the high seas. This agreement represents another aspect of the multidimensional mutual effort against illegal drug activity by the United States and the Republic of Venezuela. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

Humanitarian Situation in Iraq

Walcott Source: Jackie Walcott, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Social and Humanitarian Affairs Description: Statement before the International Task Force of the House Select Committee on Hunger, Washington, DC Date: Nov 13, 199111/13/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics [TEXT] I appreciate this opportunity to update you and the other members of the committee on the humanitarian situation in Iraq. There have been several recent developments that I think will be of interest.
Humanitarian Issues
On August 15, the [UN] Security Council adopted Resolution 706 in response to repeated Iraqi requests to be allowed to resume sales of oil for the purchase of urgently needed food and other humanitarian items and to fund other Iraqi obligations. While approving the sale [of] $1.6 billion of oil in order to meet the needs of Iraqi civilians before winter, this resolution imposes certain requirements to ensure that the proceeds are used as intended. As part of the humanitarian aid component, the resolution requires the Secretary General to establish a system of monitoring and control that would prevent any revenues from this one-time sale of oil from reaching the coffers of the Government of Iraq and ensure that humanitarian supplies are distributed throughout Iraq to the population groups who are most in need. It should be noted that since March 22, when the [UN] Sanctions Committee lifted the embargo on food, the Sanctions Committee has been notified of some 4.2 million metric tons of food to be sent to Iraq. It should also be recognized that the United States has provided over $500 million in humanitarian assistance in Iraq, including our contributions to Operation Provide Comfort which assisted the Kurds in the north. On September 28, the Security Council adopted Resolution 712, which approved the Secretary General's proposals for implementing Resolution 706. Over 2 months after passage of Resolution 706, and more than a month and a half after passage of [Resolution] 712, Iraq has still neither accepted nor rejected the terms of these resolutions, although various Iraqi officials have made some critical comments concerning their provisions. In addition, a request to visit Iraq by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the Secretary General's Executive Delegate for Humanitarian Assistance in the Gulf area, has been delayed by the Iraqi Government at least until November 18. A number of international teams have visited Iraq to assess humanitarian requirements. There is general agreement that certain groups in the Iraqi civilian population do, indeed, face serious food shortages and lack adequate medical care. These groups include, in particular, the Shi'a in southern Iraq, Kurds in the north, and poor Sunnis living in central Iraq, especially women and children. There is evidence of chronic malnutrition in Iraq for an extended time, predating the invasion of Kuwait. While Saddam Hussein cynically calculated that the misery he has inflicted on his own people might serve to sway the international community on the lifting of sanctions, Resolutions 706 and 712 have disappointed and, apparently, annoyed Saddam. However, if Iraq wants to obtain food and other humanitarian items, these resolutions provide the mechanism for that to be done, and it is now up to the Government of Iraq to permit these resolutions to be implemented. We continue to receive reports from knowledgeable sources that the Iraqi Government is blocking the distribution of needed food and medicine to vulnerable populations inside Iraq by private voluntary organizations. Until now, despite Iraq's non-acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712, many PVOs [private voluntary organizations] were able to use health clinics, churches, and mosques as food distribution sites. This now has ended. New pressure on PVO food distribution adds to the evidence that Saddam is pressing fora propaganda showdown over the Iraqi "starvation" issue. Further, we have been informed by international organizations and private voluntary organizations that Iraq is refusing to extend visas for their humanitarian assistance personnel after December 31. The latest battle fought by Saddam uses his population as pawns. He systematically denies much needed humanitarian assistance and then blames the sanctions regime for the problem. There is a solution: rapid implementation of Security Council Resolutions 706 [and] 712, which provide an internationally agreed- upon mechanism for the equitable distribution of assistance within Iraq. At present, the issue is not one of insufficient resources but of Saddam's indifference to the needs of many sectors of the population. We recognize that malnutrition is a problem in Iraq, but we have insufficient information on its extent. A thorough baseline assessment of humanitarian needs in Iraq is called for in Resolution 706. As far as we know, the problems are gravest for the Kurds and the Shi'a and for the very poor in Baghdad. In fact, recent reporting from northern Iraq indicates that the government is setting up roadblocks to prevent the movement of fuel and food to the north. In the south, we continue to receive reports about people trapped in the marshes by the Iraqi army as well as the refusal by the Iraqi Government to allow the United Nations to establish humanitarian centers in the marsh area. Nevertheless, we have not given up on eventual Iraqi acceptance of Resolutions 706 and 712. There are some recent indications that Iraq may be moving in the direction of accepting them. Prince Sadruddin will visit Iraq and will be able to explain exactly how the oil sale and food purchase mechanisms of the resolutions will work. Further, businessmen who have dealings with Iraq have approached us with questions on [Resolution] 706, indicating that the Iraqi Government does not have a complete understanding of the implementing mechanisms. These small signals give us hope that there might be a change in Saddam's position on these humanitarian resolutions. It is our understanding that Sadruddin plans to discuss with [Iraqi] officials an extension of the memorandum of understanding under which the United Nations operates in Iraq as well as the implementation of Resolutions 706 and 712. We are saddened by reports of the suffering of the Iraqi people. But there is a limit to what we, as part of the international community, can do in the absence of Iraqi cooperation. Only Iraq stands in the way of implementing an internationally approved mechanism to deal with its humanitarian crisis.
Frozen Iraqi Assets
We are aware of the various proposals that have been put forward to make use of official Iraqi assets frozen in this country and elsewhere as a source of funding to bring humanitarian relief to the people of Iraq. The sanctions regime does provide for this possibility under certain circumstances. The Chairman of the UN Sanctions Committee has informed all governments holding such assets that they may unfreeze them for the purposes specified in paragraph 20 of Resolution 687, i.e., for permissible humanitarian exports to Iraq. We understand that some countries have chosen to do so in limited amounts. However, the Security Council, in Paragraph 9 of Resolution 712, also urged that any humanitarian exports to Iraq be undertaken through arrangements that assure their equitable distribution to meet humanitarian needs. The method adopted by the Security Council for this purpose is the mechanism provided under Resolutions 706 and 712--which the Council specifically made available for frozen Iraqi assets as well as the proceeds of Iraqi oil sales. This mechanism ensures that humanitarian supplies will be equitably distributed and that Iraq will not withhold supplies from the Kurds or other disfavored sectors of the civilian population. In our view, this is by far the preferable method, and at least one large holder of Iraqi assets has expressed an interest in making use of this channel. But the Iraqis have so far refused. This refusal has nothing to do with the UN terms for the sale of oil, since these funds could be used regardless of whether and when oil sales occur. In the alternative, a state might release frozen assets to finance the shipment of humanitarian items directly to Iraq, perhaps with some sort of attempt to impose conditions on how Iraq will use and distribute those items. Based on the Iraqi track record to date, most countries are understandably reluctant to do so. In our view, it would be a serious mistake for the United States to entrust the distribution of such items to Iraq, and we have urged others who are holding Iraqi assets not to do so. Under either alternative, the United States--like many other countries--faces an additional problem. US Government, corporate, and individual claims against Iraq currently total many billions of dollars. A large proportion of the 1,300 claims reported so far involve unpaid Iraqi debts and obligations from the pre-crisis period and certain other types of claims which are unlikely to be paid by the UN Compensation Fund. Frozen Iraqi assets in this country total just $1.2 billion. These assets offer our best hope for at least partial payment of the outstanding US claims. Clearly, every dollar of US-held Iraqi assets released today means one less dollar available in the future for the 1,300 American claimants from all around the United States--many of whom have reported that they are already be facing serious financial difficulties. Indeed, such a release of Iraqi assets could result in litigation against the US Government by US citizens who had counted on the use of those assets to satisfy their claims. We believe the agreed international approach represented by Resolutions 706 and 712 offers the most effective and equitable way of providing relief to the Iraqi people. We remain hopeful that this approach will be accepted by Iraq and put into effect before the humanitarian situation in Iraq reaches crisis proportions. In any event, the problem is not finding a source of funds--these funds are available for such use now, if only Iraq will agree to an effective monitoring system to ensure equitable distribution. We believe there is no need [to use]--and no point in using--the Iraqi assets held by the United States for this purpose. Iraqi Non-Compliance with Other Humanitarian Resolutions There have been numerous Iraqi violations of both the letter and spirit of Resolution 688, which was adopted by the Security Council last April following the brutal repression of uprisings by both the Shi'a in the south and the Kurds in the north against Saddam's regime. This resolution demands that the Government of Iraq cease attacks against civilians and that it permit unhindered UN access to the Iraqi people for the purpose of providing them assistance.
Shi'a in the South
In July, we received credible reports that a number of Shi'a, who had fled their homes following the brutal repression of their rebellion by Iraqi forces, were trapped in the vast marsh areas separating southern Iraq and Iran. What made these reports most ominous were eyewitness accounts by UN personnel that the Iraqi army had surrounded part of these marshes and appeared intent upon keeping the Shi'a pinned down in an area totally unfit for human habitation. Prince Sadruddin, in the course of his assessment mission to Iraq in July, requested permission to visit the marshlands and to establish a base for the United Nations to monitor the situation and provide assistance to the people in that area. Following several days of stalling, the Iraqi authorities finally allowed Sadruddin to travel to the area. It was clear to Sadruddin and his team that Iraqi military had been hastily withdrawn just prior to his visit. The UN staff, which Sadruddin left to keep an eye on the situation, were, subsequently, ordered out of the area by Iraq on the grounds that they were no longer needed and, as of now, have not been permitted to return. We are disturbed by reports indicating that there are still numbers of people, including women and children, trapped in the marshes with little food [and] only swamp water to drink who are unable to return to their homes because of the continuing large military presence in the area.
Kurds in the North
Last month, fighting again flared up between Iraqi forces and the Kurds in northern Iraq. Several days ago, we received reports of renewed fighting outside the Kurdish city of Erbil. This renewed fighting comes despite Saddam's promise to work out a plan for increased Kurdish autonomy and some degree of democracy throughout Iraq. The fighting is causing thousands of Kurdish men, women, and children to flee toward Iran once again. This most recent fighting is only the latest in a series of armed conflicts. It is clear that failure to work out an agreement that would provide for a degree of autonomy for the Kurds, as well as allow them to exercise their right to choose their own form of government, will create further instability in northern Iraq and fuel the deplorable cycle of violence in that region. Saddam's continuing repression of the Kurds--including indiscriminate sustained artillery bombardment of residential areas--vastly complicates the UN efforts to provide adequate shelter in the north before the onset of winter. The Government of Iraq has refused to allow the United Nations to open humanitarian centers in Kirkuk and Nasiriyah. It bases its refusal on a deliberate misinterpretation of the memorandum of understanding it signed with the United Nations in April which provides for both the Iraqis and the United Nations to agree on locations for UN humanitarian centers. The Iraqis now claim the unilateral right to designate the location of these centers, and they have refused UN requests despite the 250,000 refugees located near these towns who have recently returned from Iran but are prevented from getting to their homes by the Iraqi authorities. There are an estimated 300,000 people who have returned to the vicinity of their homes but are still living in tents or other temporary shelter because their homes have either been destroyed or are unsafe due to fighting or the presence of Iraqi forces. While the United Nations is providing assistance, the task is made more difficult by Iraqi refusal to permit the establishment of humanitarian centers. Saddam Hussein's continued brutality against his own people has driven many hitherto reluctant countries to concede that circumstances may, indeed, arise in which extraordinary humanitarian needs compel the international community's intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. This concern lies behind the substance of Resolution 688 and also indicates why Resolutions 706 and 712 are so strict in their requirements for UN control over Iraq's future oil revenues. Under Resolution 687, the Security Council is to consider every 60 days whether Iraq is in compliance with this cease-fire resolution so that the economic sanctions can either be modified or terminated. There have been three such reviews to date. Saddam Hussein's regime has done its utmost to evade requirements to disclose all details of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. It continues to make war upon Iraqi citizens who reject it. It has probed the firmness of the international community in enforcing Iraq's border with Kuwait. It has not been difficult for Security Council members to agree that, given the continued blatant disregard for the requirements of Resolution 687 by the Government of Iraq, it would be completely inappropriate to consider lifting sanctions or modifying them in any way. In conclusion, Saddam Hussein's continuation in power will present the international community with the challenge of seeing that he remains incapable of once again posing a threat to his own people, his neighbors, and to the rest of the world. Let us be perfectly clear about one thing: This is not an issue between Saddam Hussein and the United States but between Saddam Hussein and the United Nations. The United Nations has lived up to the daunting challenge of fulfilling the requirements of [Resolution] 687. The UN perseverance in this matter demonstrates that our faith in the United Nations has not been misplaced and bodes well for an increased UN role in international problem solving as the new world order continues to evolve. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

Fact Sheet: Additional Information on the Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103

Date: Nov 18, 199111/18/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa, Europe Country: United Kingdom, Libya Subject: Terrorism, International Law [TEXT] The Government of Libya was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988. This paper reviews both evidentiary material upon which the US indictment of two Libyan officials is based, and background information that establishes links between those indicted and senior Libyan Government officials.
Scottish authorities and the US Department of Justice have charged two Libyans with carrying out the attack: Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi, a senior Libyan intelligence official, and Lamin Fhimah, the former manager of the Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) office in Malta. The charges are based on clear evidence that al-Maqrahi, Fhimah, and other unidentified co-conspirators planned to bomb Pan Am 103 by: -- Obtaining and attaching an appropriately marked Air Malta tag that circumvented baggage security measures and routed the bag containing the bomb to the Pan Am 103 feeder flight to Heathrow and then to Pan Am 103; -- Setting the timer that activated the device so that the bomb would explode about 1 hour after Pan Am 103 was scheduled to depart Heathrow Airport in London; -- Using the knowledge and access gained from their official status as representatives of Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) to facilitate the operation at the Luqa airport in Valetta, Malta. This would have enabled them to bypass security checks and ensure that the suitcase containing the bomb was inserted into the baggage of an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt. Al-Maqrahi, a senior Libyan intelligence official, acted with the approval of the highest levels of the Libyan Government. We believe Sa'id Rashid--a leading architect and executor of Libya's anti-US and anti-dissident terrorist policies for the last decade, and a member of the Libyan Government's inner circle--was the senior government official who orchestrated the attack. An operation of this sophistication and magnitude, involving people so close to the Libyan leadership, could have been undertaken only with the approval of senior Libyan officials.
The Case
The US indictment is based on evidence, summarized below, directly linking Libyan officials to the suitcase containing the bomb and its insertion into the baggage system. The evidence also directly links al-Maqrahi to the Swiss company that manufactured the timer used in the attack. The Suitcase. Forensic analysis has identified the bag that contained the Pan Am 103 bomb as a brown, hardsided Samsonite suitcase. The following evidence links al-Maqrahi and Fhimah to the suitcase. -- Al-Maqrahi, traveling in alias, arrived in Valletta with Fhimah from Libya on the evening of December 20, 1988, the day before the bombing. Fhimah, the former manager of the LAA office in Valletta, retained full access to the airport. Al-Maqrahi and Fhimah brought a large, brown, hardsided Samsonite suitcase with them into Malta on that occasion. -- Scottish investigators traced clothing that had been packed in the bomb suitcase to a Maltese clothing shop. A Libyan bought the items several weeks before the bombing, most likely on December 7, 1988. Airport arrival cards demonstrate that al- Maqrahi was in Malta on December 7. -- In February 1991, al-Maqrahi was described as resembling the Libyan who had purchased the clothing items. The Insertion. Frankfurt airport records for December 21 show that an unaccompanied bag was routed from Air Malta Flight 180 (KM 180), out of Valletta's Luqa airport, to Frankfurt, where it was loaded onto the Pan Am 103 feeder flight to London. The evidence indicates that a properly marked Air Malta baggage tag would have routed the suitcase containing the bomb to John F. Kennedy airport in New York via Pan Am 103. The following evidence directly implicates al-Maqrahi and Fhimah in this process. -- Fhimah's diary contains a reminder for December 15, 1988, to pick up Air Malta tags--a violation of airport and airline regulations. Other diary notations indicate that Fhimah accomplished this task. -- According to Luqa airport records and staff, the baggage for KM 180 was processed at about the same time as their bags for a Libyan Arab Airlines flight (LN 147), bound for Tripoli. -- Al-Maqrahi, still traveling in alias, boarded LN 147 on the morning of December 21, 1988, the same morning that the bomb was inserted into the baggage of the KM 180 flight. Al-Maqrahi's flight back to Libya checked in at the same airport passenger check-in counter as KM 180, and the check-in periods for the two flights overlapped. The Timer. A circuit board fragment recovered from the Pan Am 103 bomb was part of a sophisticated electronic timer of a type that Senegalese authorities discovered in the possession of two Libyan terrorists arrested in February 1988. The timers, marked MST-13, were manufactured by Meister et Bollier (MEBO), a Swiss electronics firm located in Zurich. The MST-13 timers are unique. MEBO was the sole manufacturer. All the MST-13 timers produced were delivered to the Libyans. MEBO provided the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO, also referred to as the Jamahirya Security Organization--JSO) with 20 MST-13 timers in late 1985 and made no more MST-13 timers. Two ESO electrical engineers commissioned and took possession of the timers: Izz Aldin Hinshiri, Libya's current Minister of Communications and Transport, and Sa'id Rashid. Al-Maqrahi is a close relative and longtime associate of Sa'id Rashid. At the time Rashid took delivery of the timers, al-Maqrahi was his immediate subordinate. Al-Maqrahi rented office space at MEBO and transited Zurich on at least two occasions in December 1988.
Libyan Government Responsibility
The conclusion that the Libyan Government approved the Pan Am 103 bombing is based on Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi's central and continuing role in Libyan intelligence operations and on his close association with Libyan Government officials who have implemented and directed Libya's use of terrorism over the years as a tool of government policy. The career progress of these officials over the years indicates that the Libyan Government has consistently endorsed their operations, tactics, and targets. Al-Maqrahi's Intelligence Responsibilities. Abd al-Basit al- Maqrahi's deep involvement in Libya's most sensitive, high priority procurement operations indicates that he enjoyed the fullest confidence of Libya's leadership. We believe that his contacts and experience in the fields of civil aviation, cargo movement, and small business operations also provided him with a ready-made infrastructure to support the staging of the Pan Am 103 bombing. Al-Maqrahi is a senior intelligence official with strong ties to Libya's military procurement apparatus and to the External Security Organization (ESO). In 1987, he became the director of the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), a unit that served the ESO and the Department of Military Procurement through a variety of activities, including: -- Procurement of chemical weapons precursors. An al- Maqrahi subordinate operating in Germany in 1988 played an important role in acquiring and shipping chemical weapons precursors to Libya. Al-Maqrahi is also linked to a senior manager of Libya's chemical weapons development program; -- Procurement of aircraft and aircraft components for the Libyan military and LAA. Badri Hasan, another close collaborator of al-Maqrahi, is one of Libya's leading experts in circumventing US embargo provisions barring the sale of US technology and aircraft components to Libya; -- Assisting with Libya's effort to co-opt or sponsor Latin American terrorist groups. Under al-Maqrahi's leadership, the CSS assisted other Libyan outreach agencies by contributing to propaganda campaigns, collecting intelligence on the attitudes of radical groups, and assessing the intelligence or operational utility of Arabs who resided in target countries; and -- Setting up travel agencies and other front companies to facilitate the travel and movement of goods and people, an activity that we believe supported both the procurement and outreach programs of the CSS and other Libyan intelligence entities. Senior Libyans who worked closely with al-Maqrahi and other CSS officials involved in these activities include: Col. Rifi Ali al-Sharif, a senior Libyan military officer with a prominent role in Libya's procurement effort. Col. al-Sharif, the mentor/patron of Badri Hasan, reportedly assisted efforts by al- Maqrahi and Badri Hasan to illegally acquire US aircraft via Benin in 1986 and 1987 and sponsored the establishment of a travel agency as a joint CSS/military procurement enterprise in Eastern Europe. Sa'id Rashid, who in 1988 paid and instructed the chemical weapons precursor procurement specialist working for al-Maqrahi in Germany.
Al-Maqrahi's Terrorist Record
Al-Maqrahi's position and contacts in the Libyan intelligence apparatus place him firmly in the camp of his first cousin Sa'id Rashid--a leading architect and implementer of Libya's terrorist policies and a powerful member of the Libyan Government's inner circle. For at least 2 years prior to his early 1987 appointment as CSS director, al-Maqrahi was ESO chief of airline security, reporting directly to Rashid, who was ESO chief of operations throughout 1986. Al-Maqrahi continued his terrorist activities after becoming CSS director in early 1987. During 1988, al-Maqrahi: -- Met in Malta with a team of Libyan intelligence operatives planning to travel to Chad to conduct an unspecified operation. Abdallah Sanussi, newly appointed chief of ESO operations, ordered the team to abort the operation when it was unable to make appropriate airline connections. Sanussi is one of four Libyans whom France indicted on October 30, 1991, for the September 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772, which exploded after leaving Ndjamena airport in Chad. -- Met with Greek arms dealers and expressed interest in acquiring 1,000 letter bombs and associated technical equipment.
Sa'id Rashid and Libyan Terrorist Operations
Sa'id Rashid has managed a sustained Libyan effort to conduct terrorist attacks against US interests since the early 1980s. Rashid has long enjoyed privileged access to the top levels of the Libyan Government and is involved in a wide range of intelligence activities. He is a senior member of the Revolutionary Committees Bureau, which oversees the execution of the Libyan Government's radical policies in Libya and abroad. Rashid rose rapidly in the ESO and in Libya's revolutionary committee apparatus during the early- and mid-1980s while aggressively pursuing the Libyan Government's dissident assassination programs and the terrorist and subversive aspects of the government's African policies. An Italian court has sentenced Rashid in absentia to life imprisonment for his leadership of a team that assassinated a Libyan exile in a Milan train station in July 1980. This assassination was one of many in an anti-dissident campaign that spanned Western Europe and was directed by Rashid through at least 1985. -- In October 1980, Rashid led a team to Togo that planned to assassinate Chadian President Hissan Habre. -- In 1983, Libya illegally detained 37 French citizens in a successful effort to force France to release Rashid, who had been jailed in Paris pending extradition to Italy on murder charges related to the 1980 assassination in Milan. Rashid began to direct attacks specifically against US interests in late 1981, when he assumed overall operational responsibility for Libya's effort to overthrow the Sudanese regime of President Ja'far Numeiri, then a close ally of the United States. During this period, Rashid and his subordinates trained, equipped, and directed Sudanese terrorists who attempted to bomb US interests, on several occasions using concealed bombs equipped with "decade" timers and containing Semtex-H. Decade timers were a signature item of Libyan and Libyan-sponsored terrorists during the early 1980s. One such bomb, concealed in a cigarette carton, was used in a failed attempt to bomb a Pan Am flight in December 1983. The terrorist attempted to check an unaccompanied bag onto an Alitalia flight departing Istanbul for Rome. The bag, which was discovered by Turkish authorities as a result of heightened security procedures, was tagged in such a way that it would have connected with a Pan Am flight departing Rome for New York, thus following essentially the same procedure that succeeded in the case of Pan Am 103. Rashid continued to play a key role in Libyan targeting of US interests after tensions mounted between the two countries in mid- 1985. -- Rashid's operatives began planning an attack on US facilities in Turkey in early 1986, culminating in a failed attempt to bomb the US Officers Club in Ankara in late April 1986. The Libyan intelligence officer who directed the operation within Turkey was operating under cover as an LAA official. -- Rashid tasked several Palestinians to target US facilities in Germany and directed the April 1986 bombing of the La Belle disco in Berlin. The La Belle bomb, specifically intended to kill American service personnel and their dependents, killed three people, two of them Americans. -- The day after the La Belle disco bombing, Rashid traveled to Khartoum, where he continued his work with Sudanese oppositionists. Rashid was in Khartoum on April 15, 1986, when a US Embassy official was seriously wounded in retaliation for the US bombing of Libya earlier the same day. -- Rashid was one of the Libyan engineers who provided design specifications to the Swiss firm (MEBO) that manufactured the timer used in the Pan Am 103 bomb. He also demonstrated a MEBO remotely activated briefcase bomb to Palestinian recruits. -- Both the Libyans arrested in Senegal with the MEBO timer had been Rashid's subordinates since the early 1980s. In early 1987, the Libyan Government moved Rashid from the ESO to the directorship of the Libyan Electronics Company, which is heavily involved in technology transfer and other procurement activities. At the same time, the Libyan Government placed al- Maqrahi in charge of the Center for Strategic Studies. We believe that the two cousins continued to coordinate their activities as they became more deeply involved in procurement programs--as in their joint supervision of al-Maqrahi's chemical weapons procurement specialist in Germany. Al-Maqrahi's Other Supervisors. Al-Maqrahi, as CSS director, reported, or can be linked directly, to the following prominent Libyans: ESO director Ibrahim al-Bishari used al-Maqrahi's office at MEBO, in Zurich, as an accommodation address and claimed that al- Maqrahi worked directly under him as director of the CSS. Al- Bishari is currently Libya's Foreign Minister and reportedly retains his intelligence portfolio. In fall 1988, Abdallah al-Sanussi was al-Maqrahi's immediate ESO supervisor. Al-Maqrahi was a terrorist who worked at the CSS for Sanussi. Al-Sanussi is one of the Libyan Government's chief intelligence aides. He authorized, directed, and provided funding for a number of Libyan terrorist operations over the years. French judicial authorities have lodged criminal charges against al- Sanussi for the September 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772. Nasir Ali Ashur has been linked both to al-Maqrahi and to the MEBO timers. Ashur, who oversaw earlier tests of the timers to ensure they would be completely destroyed by an explosion, was seen at a meeting at al-Maqrahi's house 2 days before the Pan Am 103 bombing. Maltese embarkation records and a US intelligence source also show that Ashur and al-Maqrahi met on Malta in early October 1988 and that the two traveled together from Zurich to Malta in August 1987. Ashur has been declared by the French to be the equivalent of an unindicted co-conspirator for his management of Libya's policies of providing massive amounts of arms--including tons of Semtex-H--to the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Abdallah Mahmud Hijazi is probably also a key contact of al- Maqrahi, although we lack concrete evidence of direct linkage. Hijazi, Rashid's longtime patron, was until 1986 the director of Libya's Department of Military Procurement. In 1988, he was reportedly a key organizer of Libyan subversive operations in West Africa and Chad. Ibrahim Nayili, whom the French indicted on October 30, 1991, for his role in the bombing of UTA 772, has been identified by several sources as the ESO official in Athens who placed potential sources of arms and aircraft components in contact with al- Maqrahi. Al-Nayili became ESO chief of airline security in mid- 1989, the same position that al-Maqrahi held before becoming CSS director.
The Historical Context
The foregoing has described Libya's links to Pan Am 103, the individuals involved, and the central role those individuals play in the terrorist and intelligence programs of the Libyan Government. The terrorist case against the government does not begin or end with the destruction of Pan Am 103. We have seen a consistent pattern of Libyan-inspired terrorism that continues after the Pan Am 103 atrocity to the present. This pattern seriously undermines any argument that Pan Am 103 was a rogue operation that did not meet with the approval of Libya's most senior authorities. An operation this important could not have been undertaken without the consent of the highest levels in the Libyan Government. Many more Libyan-sponsored terrorist events are described in unclassified white papers published by the Department of State in mid-November 1991, August 1990, January 1989, and throughout 1986. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

Pan Am Flight 103 Indictments

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Washington, DC Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Europe Country: Libya, United Kingdom Subject: Terrorism, International Law [TEXT] You've seen the briefings by the Justice Department on the indictments and criminal responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am 103. We have made available to you and have in the Press Office the indictment itself and a paper on the Libyan Government's continuing support for terrorism. I will run through some of the basic facts about the bombing and how it was organized. I want to make some things clear from the outset. -- The bombers were Libyan Government intelligence operatives. -- This was a Libyan Government operation from start to finish. -- We hold the Libyan Government responsible for the murder of 270 people over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988. Today, Scottish authorities and the US Department of Justice charged two Libyan officials with carrying out the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. All 259 people aboard the aircraft and 11 people on the ground were killed. The charges are based on evidence that directly and conclusively links Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi, a senior Libyan intelligence official, and Lamin Fhimah, the former manager of the Libyan Arab Airlines office in Malta, and other unidentified co- conspirators to the suitcase containing the bomb and to its insertion into the baggage system leading to Pan Am flight 103. The evidence also directly links Al-Maqrahi to the Swiss company that manufactured the sophisticated electronic timer used in the attack. The timer is unique. It is produced solely by a single Swiss firm and the entire production lot was delivered to the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO). Two intelligence operatives were indicted, but don't mistake this--the bombing of Pan Am 103 was not a rogue operation. An operation of this magnitude, involving people so close to the Libyan leadership could only have been undertaken with the approval of senior Libyan officials. That is the pattern of past Libyan terrorist operations. That is the pattern of the Pan Am 103 attack. Al-Maqrahi is a well-connected senior Libyan intelligence official whose extensive experience in the fields of civil aviation, cargo movement, and small business operations helped him stage the Pan Am 103 bombing. Al-Maqrahi works closely with his first cousin, Sa'id Rashid- -a leading architect and implementer of Libya's terrorist policies and a powerful member of Libya's inner circle. It was Rashid who earlier purchased the timers. Abdallah Al-Sanussi was Al-Maqrahi's immediate supervisor in the External Security Organization in the fall of 1988. French judicial authorities have lodged criminal charges against Al- Sanussi for the September 1989 bombing of UTA [Flight] 772. Ibrahim Al-Bishari, currently Libya's Foreign Minister, used Al-Maqrahi's office at the Swiss firm as an accommodation address in Zurich and claimed that Al-Maqrahi worked directly under him as director of the Center for Strategic Studies. The terrorist case against the Libyan regime does not begin or end with the destruction of Pan Am 103. We have seen a consistent pattern of Libyan-inspired terrorism that continues to the present. The charges made today, however, are based solely on the evidence gathered during the criminal investigation. The Libyan Government is responsible for this monstrous act--the murder of 270 citizens of 21 countries in the bombing of Pan Am 103. We will be in touch with our friends and allies regarding steps the international community should take to ensure that action is taken to punish the Government of Libya in a way which will deter others. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991 Title:

Fact Sheet: The Iranians and the PFLP-GC--Early Suspects In the Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing

Date: Nov 18, 199111/18/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa, Europe Country: Iran, Libya, United Kingdom Subject: Terrorism [TEXT] The dominant hypothesis of the early stages of the Pan Am 103 investigation focused on indications that the bombing was the outcome of joint planning by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-- General Command (PFLP-GC). -- Reliable intelligence reporting indicated that the PFLP-GC and elements of the Iranian Government were planning to attack a US target in retaliation for the accidental downing in July 1988 of an Iranian Airbus by a US warship. -- On October 26, 1988, German police arrested members of a PFLP-GC cell led by Hafiz Dalkamoni. Police found a bomb in Dalkamoni's automobile that had been designed specifically for use against civilian aircraft. It contained an altimeter switch that ensured both that the bomb exploded at cruising altitude and that brief alterations in pressure at airport security facilities would not trigger a premature detonation. -- An early finding in the Pan Am 103 investigation was that the 103 bomb, like the PFLP-GC device found in Dalkamoni's automobile, had been concealed in a Toshiba radio and consisted of less than 500 grams of PETN and RDX--the two explosive ingredients used in Semtex-H. -- Investigators determined that the suitcase containing the bomb was in a luggage container that held bags transferred from the Pan Am 103 feeder flight out of Frankfurt--the location of much of the PFLP-GC cell's activity during October 1988. Over time, however, fresh evidence undermined the initial theory linking the PFLP-GC to the Pan Am 103 bomb and led the continuing investigation in other directions. -- It was determined that the Toshiba radio housing the PFLP-GC bomb found in Dalkamoni's car differed markedly from the appearance of the radio that forensic examiners said had contained the Pan Am 103 bomb. -- Clothing items packed with the Pan Am 103 bomb had been purchased in Valletta, Malta, on or about December 7, 1988. Frankfurt airport records also indicated that the suitcase containing the bomb had been transferred as an unaccompanied bag to the Pan Am 103 feeder flight from an Air Malta flight that had departed Valletta earlier on the day of the bombing. -- It was discovered in June 1990 that the Pan Am 103 bomb had been activated by a sophisticated electronic timer, in contrast to the PFLP-GC bombs, which had altimeter switches and relatively crude timers. Furthermore, we learned that the Pan Am 103 timer had been delivered to Libyan intelligence officials in 1985 and that two Libyan terrorists had been arrested with an identical timer in February 1988 in Senegal. -- No evidence has surfaced at the Pan Am 103 crash site indicating that the terrorists used an altimeter switch.
Collusion by Multiple State Sponsors?
The United States now holds the Libyan Government responsible for the Pan Am 103 bombing. We cannot rule out a broader conspiracy between Libya and other governments or terrorist organizations, but the available information does not support that conclusion. We believe that Libya--the primary source of PFLP-GC funding during the 1980s--was probably aware of Dalkamoni's earlier plans to bomb aircraft. The activities in fall 1988 by those Libyans directly responsible for the December 1988 Pan Am bombing indicate that Libya was planning an aircraft bombing at the same time as the PFLP-GC cell was building its bombs in Germany. Tripoli was also aware of the PFLP-GC's relationship with Iran--and itself was a close ally of Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war. Syria, the primary political sponsor of the PFLP-GC and another strong ally of Iran, was at least broadly aware of the PFLP- GC's alliances and operations. Despite these links, the United States lacks information indicating direct collaboration among Iran, Syria, and Libya, either in sponsoring the PFLP-GC's planned bombings of aircraft or in Libya's bombing of Pan Am 103. (###)