US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: The US and Asia: Building Democracy and Freedom
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpts from remarks before the Asia Society, New
York, New York
Date: Nov 12, 199111/12/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific
Country: Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan,
South Korea, Australia, Burma, China, North Korea,
Vietnam, Germany
Subject: Trade/Economics, International Organizations,
POW/MIA Issues, Democratization
[TEXT]
As you know, I have just returned from Rome, that NATO meeting,
and The Hague for an EC [European Community] meeting. There, I
worked with other Western leaders to help build a post-Cold War
world that's characterized by mutual security, democracy,
individual liberty, free enterprise, and unfettered international
trade. I want to talk tonight about those topics, with the accent on
Asia.
But first, for audiences here and in Asia, I think it's
important to discuss, once again, why I will not travel to the region
later this month. As president, I must serve the entire nation in the
domestic and foreign arenas. Sometimes those obligations clash.
When we planned our trip a couple of months ago--worked out the
schedule--Congress had planned to adjourn early in this month. I
believe it was November 2, possibly November 4. Now the members
say that they will wrap up by November 22, but who knows? We
will reschedule the trip, but I will not leave while Congress is
wrapping up a session. . . .
But make no mistake, however, I will not turn my back on my
responsibility to do the nation's business here and abroad. In times
of economic pain, I certainly will not give up an opportunity to work
with our allies to create new markets, new jobs, and new
opportunities for American workers--in agriculture, in
manufacturing, and in service industries.
And, I certainly will not permit us to retreat into a kind of
"Fortress America," which will doom us to irrelevance and poverty.
The notion that we can separate domestic and foreign policy rests
upon a stubborn fantasy that we can live as an isolated island
surrounded by a changing and developing world. We tried
isolationism, and we ended up fighting two bloody world wars.
We tried economic isolationism--protectionism--and we
helped set off a worldwide depression. I remain deeply committed
to building closer ties with the Asia-Pacific region. Although much
of our nation's heritage comes from Europe, our future points
equally, importantly, toward Asia.
Asia has transformed itself in the space of a generation into
the most rapidly growing region on the face of the earth. Asia-
Pacific nations enjoyed staggering real economic growth in the
decade of the 1980s: The Australian economy grew 41%; Japan's
nearly 52%; Malaysia almost 60%; Hong Kong--there are many here
from Hong Kong tonight--89%; Singapore, 93%; Taiwan, 116%; and
South Korea, 150%.
The Asia-Pacific region has become our largest and fastest
growing trade partner. We conduct more than $300 billion-worth of
two-way trade annually. Together, we generate nearly half the
world's gross national product. American firms have invested more
than $61 billion in the region, and that figure will grow. Asians
have invested more than $95 billion in the United States. In
everything from automobiles to microchips, from baseball to
Australian-rules football, we grow closer each day.
A few years ago, it was fashionable to refer to the 20th
century as the "American Century" and the 21st as the "Pacific
Century," as if we were engaged in some long-term competition
with our Asian allies. I don't see it that way. The United States
will remain large and powerful, but in years to come, we will
deepen our partnership with our Asian friends in building democracy
and freedom.
We'd be here forever if I tried to tick off our interests and
activities, country by country. So, forgive me. Instead, I will
address three central issues in our relationships with the nations
of the region: security, democracy, and trade.
A Strong Foundation For Future Security
In the area of security, Asia's variety has spawned a diverse pattern
of political and strategic cooperation. Our custom-made
agreements and relationships provide a strong foundation for future
security.
Let me give you a few examples of how we seek to build the
peace. The conflict in Indochina has preoccupied this nation for
years. Finally, we have entered into a period of healing and
constructive cooperation. We will work step by step to resolve the
painful issues left by that war. The ASEAN [Association of South
East Asian Nations] nations, Japan, Australia, and the UN Security
Council's permanent members recently forged a Cambodian peace
process that promises free elections in a nation previously rent by
tyranny and genocide. Just yesterday, for the first time in 16
years, we sent an accredited diplomat to Cambodia, to participate
in the peace-making arrangements.
We envision normal relations with Vietnam as the logical
conclusion to a step-by-step process that begins by resolving the
problems in Cambodia and by addressing thoroughly, openly, and
conclusively the status of American POW-MIAs [prisoners of
war/missing in action].
Today, I am announcing that we will upgrade our relations
with Laos, and that we soon will place an ambassador in Vientiane.
The Republic of Korea has moved to build better ties with
North Korea while boldly challenging the North to abandon its
menacing nuclear weapons program, which is the greatest threat to
regional peace.
We welcome recently organized efforts involving us and the
Japanese and the Soviets, Chinese, and Koreans to bring North
Korea's nuclear program under international supervision.
Meanwhile, we will maintain our military presence in the South as
long as the people want and need us.
In laying the foundation for peace through our global
partnership, we have worked closely with Japan in the area of
foreign aid. We are the world's two foremost providers of such aid.
We also cooperate on development assistance, more and more
environmental protection, trade, arms control, refugees, and
regional peace. We have urged the Soviet Union to take a
progressive attitude toward the Northern Territories in its
discussions with Japan.
The Japanese have joined us in trying to lead the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe toward free enterprise. They support more than
45,000 US military forces in Japan with $3 billion in annual host-
nation contributions. Japan contributed nearly $13 billion to the
multinational forces for the Gulf war, $10 billion of which went to
the United States. This required new taxes--a very tough thing for
any politician to ask of working people--but Japan deserves praise
for choosing the right course.
To the south, Australia casts a presence far larger than its
relatively small population would suggest. It takes justifiable
pride in its long tradition of defending democracy, and its economic,
political, and cultural presence helps unite the Asia-Pacific region
with the rest of the world.
We can help ensure future peace in the region and defend our
interests through a range of military arrangements. Bilateral
alliances, access agreements, and structures such as the five-
power defense arrangement give us the flexibility we need.
While we must adjust our force structure to reflect post-
Cold War realities, we also must protect our interests and allies.
In this light, we cannot afford to ignore the important sources of
instability: in North Korea; in Burma, where socialist despotism
holds sway, despite, I might add, the heroic efforts of freedom
fighters like Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi; in China, and other
states that resist the worldwide movement toward political
pluralism--and that contribute to the proliferation of dangerous
weapons.
Let me mention just a few words regarding China. China is
vitally important. It is our policy to remain engaged. We believe
this is the way to effect positive change in the world's most
populous nation. That's exactly what Secretary of State Jim Baker
is doing there this week.
Fortunately, the key to future stability in the region lies not
with arms but with ballots. Democracy has swept across Asia--
with some notable exceptions, such as Burma, China, North Korea,
and Vietnam. Yet we remain engaged in the region, and especially in
China. If we retreat from the challenge of building democracy, we
will have failed many who have worked hard, even died, for the
cause.
The United States will support democracy wherever it can,
understanding that nations adopt political freedom in their own
ways, in manners consistent with their histories and cultures.
After decades of uncertainty, the future really does seems full of
hope, and even the intransigent few seem likely to join the rest of
the world in building a commonwealth of freedom.
Building Economic Prosperity
This brings us then to the third focal point, and a crucial ingredient
in a stable, free society: I'm talking, of course, about economic
prosperity. No nation can ignore the incredible vitality of this
region--or afford to. Yes, we disagree on some important trade
issues, but we also recognize a more important fact: Our fates and
values have become linked forever.
Contrary to the opinions of American protectionists, free
trade requires efforts by all parties involved. Too often, trade
disputes bring out the worst in people. Japan bashing--you've heard
that expression--has become a minor sport in some places in the
United States, and some in Japan have become equally scornful of
the United States. Both our nations must reject those who would
rather seek out scapegoats than tackle their own problems.
We've made a good start: The Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) group encourages growth and trade. The Uruguay
Round of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] talks
remains the single most important vehicle for advancing the cause
of free trade and fending off the scourge of protectionism. We call
upon Japan and Korea to work with us in breaking down old barriers
to trade, opening up markets in manufacturing, services, and
agriculture. Our Structural Impediments Initiative talks have
helped lower barriers to trade and investment. But we need to give
those talks new life--give them a kick--and create a better climate
in Japan for US businesses.
The fact is that Japan, which nearly half a century ago
became a focal point of American hatred, has become one of our
closest and most treasured allies. I enjoyed a warm and
constructive relationship working with Prime Minister Toshiki
Kaifu, and I look forward to spending time with my old friend, Prime
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa--significantly, a man steeped in Western
and Eastern culture and superbly equipped to build bridges of
culture and trade between our two great nations.
Together, we can build an even more prosperous and
spectacular future--but only if we take up the tough, rewarding
task of promoting worldwide economic liberty. We seek a vibrant
international economic system that unites markets on every
continent.
We in the United States also must strengthen our economy.
We levy an unacceptably high effective tax rate on capital gains.
Germany levies no capital gains tax. The complicated Japanese tax
averages about 1%. This puts our own business people, our own
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists at a huge and shameful
disadvantage compared to our Asian trading partners.
We run an enormous and growing budget deficit, which
inflames political divisions within our own country. We must take
powerful action to reduce that deficit while nourishing economic
growth. To compete internationally, we must modernize our banking
industry and make our industrial base more competitive. We must
work with our allies to build a stable and sound monetary regime.
Perhaps most important, we must build human capital. We
have an obligation to prepare future generations for life in the 21st
century. The integrated global economy will demand more of us
than ever before, and our schools must meet the challenge.
Technological change can do much more than make our lives
more comfortable. It can sweep away totalitarianism and forge the
foundation for lasting liberty. We live in an age of liberation
technology, and no technology does more for the cause of freedom
than the means of mass communication. No wall is high enough and
no government sufficiently despotic to shut off what some call a
revolution of electrons. As we compete with our allies in this area,
we must remember that information feeds intellect, and good
information fosters freedom.
The Six Keys to Peace
Let me close by summarizing our general approach to relations with
Asia. Our Administration sees six keys to promoting lasting peace
in the Asia-Pacific region:
-- Progressive trade liberalization;
-- Security cooperation;
-- A shared commitment to democracy and human rights;
-- Educational and scientific innovation;
-- Respect for the environment; and
-- An appreciation of our distinct cultural heritages.
Americans have always looked to the horizons for their
destiny, even from our earliest days. We have grown great because
we have welcomed people from every continent and every country,
and we have tried to make use of their distinct talents when they
come here, while constructing a common culture.
Today, we celebrate that diversity, and celebrate the
prospect that in years to come, we will develop with our Asian
friends even greater ties of trade and culture.
I look forward to traveling soon to Asia, to advance these
important principles and to expand market opportunities for tens of
thousands of American workers and businesses. As president, I will
continue building ties with our allies, because those ties mean
peace at home and jobs for American men and women.
I want to thank the Asia Society for its vital contributions to
the cause of peace, prosperity, and understanding. I look forward to
your help as I seek to build closer bonds of affection and interest
with the peoples of the vast, marvelous, varied Asia-Pacific region.
Thank you all. And may God bless our Asian-Pacific friends
and the United States of America. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: The US and Japan: Global Partners In a Pacific Community
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Address before the Japan Institute for International
Affairs,Tokyo, Japan
Date: Nov 11, 199111/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific
Country: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Australia,
China, USSR (former), Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand,
Singapore, Taiwan, Burma
Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights, POW/MIA Issues,
Democratization, Science/Technology,
International Organizations,
North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
Two years ago, in New York, I told the Asia Society that Japan and
the United States needed to establish a new partnership to help
shape the 21st century.
Today, in Tokyo, I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak
to the leaders of Japan about the Pacific and global communities we
are creating. I see in the audience friends and colleagues of long
standing--former Prime Minister [Noboru] Takeshita, former Foreign
Minister [Taro] Nakayama, Ambassador [Nubuo] Matsunaga, and many
others--people who I know, like me, care deeply about the
relationship between our two countries. You honor me with your
presence.
I recall a speech Prime Minister [Kiichi] Miyazawa made on a
similar topic in London over a decade ago. On that occasion, he
stressed the importance of developing new three-way ties between
Japan, the United States, and Europe.
So, it seems appropriate that I have come to Japan directly
from the NATO and US-EC [European Community] summits in Rome
and The Hague. Our agenda in Europe, like my consultations here,
focused on political, economic, and security issues that will affect
the shape of the post-Cold War world.
This is the heart of my message to you: America's destiny
lies across the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. The development of
an enduring sense of community in this diverse and dynamic region
is fundamental to the new international system we are shaping
together. And we will only be successful in building this system
through a full partnership between Japan and the United States.
I gave two speeches in Berlin that presented our ideas about
the new post-Cold War architecture of the Euro-Atlantic
community. My remarks today will offer a complementary
perspective about the United States, Japan, and the Pacific
community.
To visualize the structure of US engagement in the Pacific,
imagine a fan spread wide, with its base in North America and
radiating westward. Its central support is the alliance and
partnership between the United States and Japan. To the north, one
spoke represents our alliance with the Republic of Korea. To the
south, another line extends to our ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations] colleagues. Further south, a spoke reaches to
Australia--an important political, economic, and security partner.
Connecting these spokes is the fabric of shared economic interests
now given form by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
process. Within this flexible construct, new political and economic
ties offer additional support for cooperative actions by groups of
Pacific nations. Over time, we should strive to draw China and the
Soviet Union or the Russian Republic closer to this system.
The flexibility of this structure suits the vast geographic
expanse, the diversity, and the multiple security concerns of East
Asia and the Pacific. Unlike Europe, no single threat has bound the
region together. Yet the network of security, political, and
economic ties with the United States--especially the US-Japan
relationship--has fostered stability and economic dynamism in the
region. This economic vitality, in turn, is now drawing the Pacific
community closer together.
In the future, our bilateral security ties will continue to
provide geopolitical balance, enable us to serve as an honest broker,
and reassure against uncertainty. But multilateral actions may also
supplement these bilateral ties.
As we have seen in the Cambodian peace process, the
combined efforts of the ASEAN countries, Japan, Australia and the
five permanent members of the UN Security Council tailor-made a
process of conflict resolution. Similarly, the recent forum on the
disputed islands of the South China Sea hosted by Indonesia reflects
such an ad hoc, multilateral approach to reducing suspicions. The
security dangers on the Korean Peninsula might also be addressed in
a multinational framework.
At this stage in this new post-Cold War era, we should be
attentive to the possibilities for such multilateral action without
locking ourselves into an overly structured approach. Form should
follow function.
US-Japan Relations
Ambassador Mike Mansfield, during his decade of service in Tokyo,
emphasized that America's relationship with Japan is our most
important bilateral association in the world, bar none. Nothing is
more fundamental to the security of the region, to global economic
growth, and, indeed, to the effectiveness of the post-Cold War
international system than the US-Japan relationship.
We recognize that Japan's leaders, and its people, are now
grappling with a difficult adjustment in Japan's world role. You are
beginning to fully appreciate your national capabilities-- and your
responsibilities--around the globe. Your "checkbook diplomacy,"
like our "dollar diplomacy" of an earlier era, is clearly too narrow.
The Gulf war might turn out to have been a watershed event
in this transformation. We recognize the difficulty of achieving a
consensus on a security challenge in what might have appeared to be
a far-off land. We appreciate Japan's generous financial
contribution to the allied effort. And we know the significance of
Japan's minesweepers plying the troubled waters of the Persian
Gulf.
In the aftermath of the war, Japan's foreign policy may now
be headed toward the assumption of broader global responsibilities.
As a major beneficiary of the global system, Japan must be a leader
in the promotion and evolution of this system. This call for
leadership should not just apply to the field of economics but also
in building democracy, respect for human rights, stopping the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in facing
transnational challenges in areas such as the environment,
narcotics, and refugees.
This gradual broadening in foreign policy offers a historic
opportunity to synergize our policies in pursuit of shared interests
and goals in the post-Cold War world. Yet to achieve this new level
of partnership, we must recognize that our relations have to adjust
to reflect the new circumstances. I see four basic, interrelated
elements as necessary to accomplishing this goal.
First, the foundation of the relationship remains the US-
Japan Security Treaty. Japan has built an appropriate self-defense
capability that complements US forces and contributes to regional
stability. Japan also provides the most generous host-nation
support of any of our allies. By 1995, this support will reach 73%
of the non-salary costs for maintaining our forward-deployed
forces in Japan. We need to do more, however, to achieve the goal
of a balanced two-way flow of defense-related technology, an
increasingly critical resource in the security system.
Second, and equally important, we need an economic
relationship with openness on both sides. Otherwise, we will not be
able to sustain our political partnership.
Japan will need to make greater efforts to open its markets;
the United States must strengthen its competitiveness. The
consumers in both countries will be the beneficiaries. To this end,
we should intensify the important and unprecedented economic
dialogue we have begun through the Structural Impediments
Initiative (SII) talks. Japanese structural adjustments in areas
such as the retail distribution system and public sector investment
demonstrate signs of progress. We look to further efforts to
eliminate exclusionary business practices and create a business
climate conducive to foreign competition. And we know that we
have work to do in improving our educational system, lowering our
cost of capital, and encouraging American businesses to promote
exports through sustained efforts.
Third, we must fulfill the promise of the global partnership
that President Bush called for at the Palm Springs summit last
year. As stable democracies and highly productive market
economies, the United States and Japan have a unique opportunity to
marshal unparalleled resources and skills to address the challenges
that will shape the post-Cold War world. Together, we produce
nearly 40% of the world's GNP. We can do great good if we work
together.
On issues from Central and South America to Central and
Eastern Europe, from safeguarding the environment to helping
developing nations, we need to coordinate our diplomatic and
economic efforts on a global scale. I think it is especially notable
that Japan is interested in participating in the multilateral
negotiations phase of the Middle East peace process.
In particular, this is a critical moment for the Uruguay Round
and the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] system
itself. Our recent discussions with the European Community
produced progress in a number of important areas. Japan must
likewise accept the mantle of economic responsibility. As one of
the primary beneficiaries of the open world trading system, Japan
should lead, not follow, in the effort to preserve and strengthen
that system.
We also need to work more closely through trilateral
arrangements with Western Europe, as Prime Minister Miyazawa
suggested in his far-sighted London speech.
Finally, we must deepen our understanding of each other's
cultures. Fast food and Hollywood movies have their merits, but
Japanese youth must be introduced to more about American life and
values--and we have much more to offer. Americans, in turn, must
come to know Japan's rich history and traditions. More of our
students should learn the Japanese language. The newly created Abe
Fund offers one important opportunity to expand a host of exchanges
and ties--intellectual, scientific, cultural, and people-to-people--
that can help us better appreciate each other's society.
If we pursue these four elements together, we will not only
strengthen this most important bilateral relationship, but we can
also make it a moving force around the globe.
In Asia, Japan and the United States need to face three
challenges if we are going to help bring a strong Pacific community
into being.
First, together with like-minded states in the region, we
must build a framework for economic cooperation and growth that
will support an open, global trading system.
Second, we must ensure a flexible yet strong security
structure that helps us reduce intra-regional fears and suspicions.
Third, we must support the trend toward democratization and
the protection of human rights so as to deepen the shared values
that will reinforce a sense of community.
Regional Economic Cooperation and Growth
If there is one quality that most distinguishes East Asia today
from other regions of the world, it is economic dynamism. This
region is one of the major engines of global growth; and burgeoning
intra-Asian and trans-Pacific trade and investment provide the
broad common interests on which to build the Pacific community.
This is what the United States, Japan, and 10 other Pacific
Basin economies sought to do when they came together 2 years ago
to initiate the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process. We see
APEC as an important mechanism for sustaining market-oriented
growth, for advancing global and regional trade liberalization, and
for meeting related challenges such as protecting the environment.
APEC is as much a hallmark of our engagement in the region, as are
our security ties.
We will convene APEC's third ministerial meeting in Seoul
later this week. For the first time, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong
will join us. But even with this expansion, APEC respects the role
of the ASEAN nations at its core.
Over time, we hope to establish a record of practical
progress within APEC's 10 working groups--on topics ranging from
energy, fisheries, and human resource development to
telecommunications, tourism, and transportation. By overcoming
structural inefficiencies through coordinated efforts, we will seek
to promote economic growth throughout the Pacific Basin. APEC is
also exploring regional trade liberalization discussions. Finally,
APEC promotes the open global trading regime through its support
for a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
Similarly, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) that
we are negotiating will support both APEC and the global trading
system. Unlike a customs union, NAFTA will not establish common
barriers to those outside. Instead, its purpose is to eliminate
internal barriers among its participants so as to increase their
efficiency, productivity, and growth. Growth will expand markets
for Asian traders and investors, thus strengthening, not weakening,
trans-Pacific links.
To speak frankly, it would not be in the US interest to isolate
ourselves within one economic region of the world. Our future
depends on strong economic ties with all regions, as well as a
successful GATT system. That's why we have demonstrated an un-
wavering commitment to the Uruguay Round. Our efforts to reduce
economic barriers with Latin America, in Asia, or with the EC are
companion measures to advancing liberalization wherever possible.
The sensible response of others should be to join with us to reduce
impediments to trade and investment through the Uruguay Round,
APEC, the US-ASEAN framework, and bilaterally.
Korea
My visit to Seoul for the APEC meeting will also be an occasion for
bilateral consultations with our Korean allies. [The President's
visit to Asia was postponed on November 5]. The achievements of
the Republic of Korea are impressive by any measure. In the space
of a generation, South Korea has transformed itself from a poor,
war-ravaged society into one of the world's leading export
economies. We respect its democratic transition, and the success
of nordpolitik.
The dynamism of South Korean society should help us meet
the challenges of transforming what has been primarily a military
alliance into a more equal political, defense, and economic
partnership. This is the logic of the US force restructuring now
underway, of Seoul's increasing host nation support, of our
economic dialogue to reduce trade barriers that are still far too
numerous, and enhanced political consultations.
South Korea's successes are all the more remarkable in that
they have been achieved in the face of the continuing bitter military
and political confrontation with North Korea. Indeed, the very real
danger of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula is now the
number one threat to security in Northeast Asia.
North Korea's repeated failures to meet its international
treaty obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by
implementing full-scope IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]
safeguards have raised serious questions about its intentions. Yet,
as important as is the NPT regime, we have learned from the case of
Iraq that even IAEA safeguards cannot ensure that a renegade
regime will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The only firm
assurance against a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula
would be a credible agreement by both Seoul and Pyongyang to
abstain from the production or acquisition of any weapons-grade
nuclear material. President Roh Tae Woo's November 7 initiative
embraces such a policy. We welcome his bold and far-sighted
declaration, and we now look to North Korea to respond in kind.
The key to reducing tensions on the peninsula--and ultimately
to reunification--is an active North-South dialogue. We welcome
the four prime ministerial-level talks that have been held in recent
years, because we know that the road to peace and reunification
must be traversed by the Koreans themselves. But the current,
halting effort at reconciliation suggests the possible need for
others to help foster a climate of trust and confidence.
There may be potential for European-style confidence-
building measures and, ultimately, arms reductions on the Korean
Peninsula. The major powers have valuable experience in this
regard. As the North-South dialogue progresses, we will explore
opportunities for cooperation among the United States, Japan,
China, the Soviet Union, and the two Koreas--opportunities that
will support the North-South dialogue, help to ease tensions,
facilitate discussion of common security concerns, and possibly
guarantee outcomes negotiated between the two Koreas.
Southeast Asia
Korea is not alone in its successes. Recall that just 15 years ago
many feared that some of the countries of Southeast Asia--
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia--would become "dominoes" in a
continuing wave of communist expansion. Today, their talented,
industrious people and vigorous market economies are setting
standards for development worldwide.
We have built a productive structure of economic, political,
and security cooperation with our ASEAN friends; ASEAN is now the
focal point of our engagement in Southeast Asia. ASEAN has become
our fifth largest trading partner. We are ASEAN's largest market.
ASEAN was a leader in launching the Uruguay Round of the GATT, and
we look to support from ASEAN in successfully completing those
negotiations.
In the political realm, the progress toward peace in Cambodia
is among the fruits of a decade of cooperative efforts with ASEAN.
As we look to the future, a just and durable peace in Cambodia can
open the door to a new era in Southeast Asia--the integration of
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos into the mainstream of the region.
At the Paris Conference on Cambodia last month, I stated that
the United States hopes to achieve reconciliation and normal
relations with the three states of Indochina. We have made
important progress with all three countries in recent months.
Japan, too, has an active interest in this region, and our close
consultation and cooperation on regional problems has been an
important factor in making this progress possible.
Later this month in New York, the United States will begin
talks with Vietnam on the issues and modalities associated with
normalization of relations. I must emphasize, however, that more
remains to be done by Vietnam--especially on POW/MIA accounting-
-before the United States can proceed to normal relations or
support economic assistance to Vietnam by the international
community. We hope that Vietnam will accelerate its efforts so
that we can move forward step-by-step toward a new era in
Southeast Asia. It is time to close the last chapter of a terrible
period of conflict for all involved.
Beyond our multilateral engagement with ASEAN, two of its
members, the Philippines and Thailand, are bilateral treaty allies.
Thailand's cooperation during Desert Storm was greatly
appreciated, and we look forward to the further development of our
traditionally warm friendship with Thailand as it returns to
constitutional government early next year.
I know there is much concern about the future of our presence
in the Philippines. Let me emphasize two points in this regard.
First, our overriding concern is to sustain friendly and
productive relations with a democratic and economically dynamic
Philippines.
Second, regardless of the future of our military presence in
Subic Bay, our security engagement in Southeast Asia will remain
undiminished, even if realized through other arrangements.
Indeed, we are now exploring ways of enhancing security
cooperation with our friends throughout the region to ensure our
ability to sustain an adequate defense presence in Southeast Asia.
The access agreement reached last year with Singapore is an
example of our commitment. It also reflects the desire of our
allies and friends to work with us to ensure regional stability.
Australia
Australia is our strong link to the South Pacific. Canberra's
activism in both global and regional affairs--from efforts to rid the
world of chemical weapons to the Cairns Group* in the GATT--
demonstrates its importance as a stalwart global ally. In efforts to
achieve a settlement in Cambodia, in APEC, and in its role of honest
broker and catalyst for development in the South Pacific, Australia
plays a vital role in regional affairs. Moreover, Canberra has been
an important bridge to New Zealand as we have sought to encourage
policy changes that will make possible a reactivation of the ANZUS
[Australia, New Zealand, United States] alliance.
*Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand,
Uruguay. The group was named after the town in Australia where
the group first met in 1991.
China and the USSR
At the end of the week, I will visit China. Great uncertainty still
clouds our relations. The tragic violence at Tiananmen Square
shattered the bipartisan consensus in the United States--carefully
constructed over 2 decades--for engagement with China. Rebuilding
that consensus is proving to be a daunting task.
Our agenda is open for all to see. We will continue to
encourage respect for human rights. We want to counter the threat
of nuclear and missile proliferation. We want free and fair trade
that benefits both countries and the region.
With its 23% of the human race, its economic potential, and
permanent seat on the UN Security Council, China casts a long
shadow in Asia and beyond. But China is in a time of transition. The
rigid communist regime has alienated us by lashing out, by seeking
to repress an irrepressible spirit. Yet a return to a hostile
confrontation will not help the people of China, nor will it serve our
national interests. The only sensible course is to move ahead with
our agenda, secure improvements where possible, and create the
context for managing the change that will come some day.
So, too, we should engage the Soviet Union and Russia in Asia.
The USSR is a power with interests in Asia as well as Europe.
Increasingly, we see the Russian Republic playing a more active role
in the region. The opening of Vladivostok, the establishment of a
free trade zone in Nakhodka, and moves toward resolving the
Northern Territories issue are important steps that can pave the
way for this greater participation in the Asia-Pacific region.
Democracy and Human Rights
While shared economic interests and security concerns are
fundamental elements of our ties to Japan and East Asia, an
enduring sense of community must also be based on common values.
Without such a foundation, alliances and other ties will not have
resilience, since relations based solely on realpolitik can fracture
as circumstances change.
We are pleased by the advance of democracy and the
increasing respect for human rights throughout East Asia and the
Pacific. Not long ago, some claimed that democracy was a European
or American concept, inappropriate for Asia. But during the 1980s,
the people of Asia began to say otherwise. In the Philippines, in
South Korea, in Taiwan, and most recently in Mongolia, people's
yearning for freedom could not be denied.
The collapse of communism as a social and political order
was brought about in part by its economic failures. Conversely, we
have seen that economic liberalization--open markets,
entrepreneurship, private ownership--is both the source of growth
and the stimulus for political reform. Rising standards of education
and income bring with them popular demands for open political
participation.
Similarly, the view that concern for human rights is uniquely
a Western preoccupation is a disparagement of Asian cultures that
share universal concerns for human dignity, individual welfare, and
freedom of thought and expression. Our outrage against the
genocidal violence of the Khmer Rouge, or political repression in
Burma and North Korea, can be no less than our revulsion at the
genocide of the Nazis or totalitarian repression by European or Latin
dictators. I will never accept the view that the hopes and
aspirations of an individual in Asia should count less than a person
elsewhere.
Therefore, we welcome the increasing emphasis in Japan's
foreign policy on political reform and human rights. Together with
other like-minded states, we must work for the establishment of
civilian, democratic government in Burma, the strengthening of
democracy in Mongolia, and the promotion of political as well as
economic reform in the few remaining Marxist-Leninist states in
Asia. Only through such a commitment can we advance the human
values that give soul to a sense of community in East Asia and the
Pacific.
Japan's promotion of the democratic and humanitarian
agenda--for example in its dealings with Burma, China, Indochina
and the Soviet Union--would enable it to reinforce its economic
efforts with goals that strengthen the political stability of the
region. It would help to make Japan a true leader in the
international system.
The United States in Asia
America's fate is ever more closely tied to East Asia and the
Pacific.
Having fought three major wars in this region during the past
half century, we know full well that our security is inextricably
linked to stability in Asia. While we will make adjustments in our
military posture to fit changing circumstances, we intend to firmly
maintain our alliance relationships and our forward-deployed
forces.
Today, the Asia-Pacific region is our largest trading partner,
with more than $300 billion a year in two-way trans-Pacific trade.
This trade is nearly one-third larger than that across the Atlantic.
US firms have invested more than $61 billion in the Asia-Pacific
region. We now export more to Thailand than to the Soviet Union,
more to Indonesia than to Eastern Europe, and more to Singapore
than to Spain or Italy.
At the same time, the spread of democratic values and
institutions further deepens our sense of a Pacific community.
There is, moreover, another enduring American bond with
Asia: the growing numbers of Asian-Americans--some 7 million
strong and our fastest growing group of immigrants. There are
more Lao today in the United States than in the Lao capital of
Vientiane; more Filipinos in California than in Cebu. Japanese-
Americans and Chinese-Americans fill leadership positions in all
segments of American society. Their presence and successes enrich
our society; they give us a deeper understanding of, and unique
affinity with, the region.
Taken together, these ties give us a strong mutuality of
interests and a growing sense of community with the nations of the
Pacific Basin. Our interest in the security and stability of Asia is
overriding; our commitment is unshakable; our engagement is
beyond question.
In conclusion, I want to leave no doubt that the United States
is fully committed to working with Japan and others in the region
to shape a new era in world affairs and a new order in Asia. Neither
of us can afford the narrow self-indulgence of bashing or kenbei
[contempt for Americans]. Neither of us will prosper in a world
that retreats into protectionism.
As a partner, the United States works with Japan on the basis
of respect and understanding. And the United States must fairly
examine its own economic strengths and weaknesses so it can
enhance its competitiveness.
But we also look to Japan to press ahead with the
fundamental structural reforms that will make possible more
balanced trading relationships with its commercial partners. And
Japan should step forward as a leader in confronting global issues
rather than relying on gaiatsu--foreign pressures--to justify
decisions on economics or security affairs that are in its own
interests.
These commitments to change can form the lasting basis for
our global partnership and for enhancing the Pacific community.
While it will take time to realize these goals, I know they are
within reach. For both our nations have been strikingly successful
in accomplishing what we have set out to do. If we work together,
our potential will know few limits. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: North Korean Nuclear Weapons Threat
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpt from the joint ministerial news conference held
by Secretary Baker and other ministers following the third
Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial
meeting, Seoul, Korea
Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: North Korea
Subject: Arms Control, Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
Q: According to the report released by the Blue House today, of the
conversation between you and President Roh Tae Woo, he said that
the two-plus-four formula, which has been suggested, is not
applicable to Korea because conditions are essentially different
than those which obtain in Europe or Germany.
In your article for Foreign Affairs, you suggested that the
two Koreas and four other powers should create some kind of forum
to work on this problem. Could you explain what you had in mind and
how it squares with President Roh's feeling that this does. . . .
Secretary Baker: Yes, I can . . . because what President
Roh said--based on what you've just reported to me that he said--
squares exactly with our discussion. Let me say that I think--we
think--the greatest threat to regional security and stability in this
area is the threat of nuclear weapons development by North Korea.
It is a threat that we believe needs to be addressed. We're in a
period of time and in other parts of the world where we seem to be
moving, generally speaking, to a lessening of tensions. There are
some increased tensions in places like Yugoslavia, I
recognize. But there are generally some lessening of tensions
around the world from what existed over the past few years. This
issue is one that remains firmly on the agenda, not just of this
region, I think, but of the world. We see it as a major regional
issue, but we also see it as a global issue.
I think the statements recently by President Bush and
President Roh give North Korea an opportunity and a reason to deal
with this matter and to deal with it in the manner that most of the
international community have been requesting for a long, long time.
And I am talking about IAEA safeguards and the like.
I believe that the United States is joined by some other
countries in wanting to see the matter dealt with satisfactorily,
politically, and diplomatically. I believe that is the position of the
Government of Japan based on my talks in Tokyo, although the
Government of Japan is represented here, and they can certainly
speak for themselves. I believe it is the position of the Soviet
Union. I would hope it would be the position of the People's
Republic of China, but they are here and they can speak for
themselves. It's not up to me to do that. But I don't see--I don't
think any country can be sanguine or willing to accept the
development of a nuclear weapons capability by North Korea. So we
have suggested that those of us who are concerned about this should
go about the business of trying to get a satisfactory solution to it,
if necessary in a multilateral context. But it is different
completely and totally from the two-plus-four mechanism and
procedure that we used in connection with the unification of
Germany, because we are not talking about it with reference to the
solution of the problems between the two Koreas.
It has always been the position of the United States that
South Korea should have the lead in that--that we would be helpful
where we could. I think there are other countries that would like to
be helpful in that regard. That is still our position with respect to
questions involving resolution of the underlying problems between
the North and the South. But with respect to this question of
nuclear capability of the North, we think there is a place for
multilateral approach to that. It is my understanding that the
Government of South Korea agrees with us based on the discussions
I've had with the foreign minister here and with President Roh this
morning....(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: US Support for South Korean Policy
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Nov 8, 199111/8/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: South Korea
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
We strongly welcome and support Republic of Korea President Roh
Tae Woo's declaration of his government's policy regarding nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. We believe it is a comprehensive
and bold initiative which makes a significant contribution to peace
and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
President Roh's announcement reiterates the Republic of
Korea's policy to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and
to continue placing all of South Korea's nuclear facilities and
materials under full-scope international inspections by the IAEA, in
compliance with its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards
obligation.
President Roh's declaration that the Republic of Korea will
not possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities is
an especially welcome and important decision. President Roh has
ruled out acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by the
Republic of Korea and pledged to actively participate in
international efforts to eliminate those weapons.
We hope that North Korea will respond positively to this
initiative by taking corresponding measures in all these areas,
especially not to possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment
facilities, and that North Korea will quickly fulfill its unconditional
international obligation under the NPT to bring its nuclear program
under IAEA safeguards.
North Korea's quest for a nuclear weapons capability is the
most significant threat to the security and stability of the
Northeast Asia region. We reiterate our call for North Korea to halt
this quest. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: Argentine President Carlos Menem Visits Washington, DC:
Defending Democracy at Home and Abroad
Bush, Menem
Source: President Bush, Argentine President Carlos
Menem
Description: Remarks at arrival ceremony, the White House,
Washington, DC
Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Argentina
Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization, Arms Control,
International Organizations
[TEXT]
President Bush: Thank you all very much. President Menem, it gives
me great pleasure to welcome you to the White House. The ties
between our countries have never been stronger, and a great deal of
credit goes to you and your administration.
Nearly a year ago, a revolt by renegade soldiers faced you in
your nation's capital. You stood firm in defense of freedom and
liberty and in defense of your people's right to a government of
their choice.
In the end, freedom triumphed. It was an honor to join you,
just a few days later, in beautiful Buenos Aires, the capital of a
proud and free Argentina.
In your inaugural address you asked Argentina to "arise and
walk." When we met last year in the capital, we spoke about the
challenges your country faces and the changes that have already
been set in motion.
Today, Argentina is assuming its rightful place as a leader in
the democratic community of nations. Nowhere in this hemisphere
is the shape of the post-Cold War world more evident than in
Argentina. Under your leadership, Argentina has become one of the
hemisphere's strongest defenders of democracy, both at home and
abroad.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, you sent your navy to
join the international coalition which liberated that pillaged nation.
When tanks rumbled through the streets of Moscow, threatening the
Soviet Union's forces of democratic reform, you were one of the
very first in Latin America to speak out in defense of liberty. You
have called for democratic reform in Cuba and made major
contributions to the efforts of the Organization of American States
to restore democratic government to Haiti.
At home, you have slashed government spending, privatized
state-owned industries, and abolished harmful overregulation of the
economy. You have brought once-rampant inflation under control.
Last year, Argentina had a trade surplus of nearly $8 billion, and US
firms, alone, invested over $200 million in Argentina.
Despite facing many difficult challenges when you took office
in 1989, your efforts have earned the respect of the international
community. More importantly, they strengthened Argentina's
competitive position in the global economy by attracting new
confidence and investment from around the world. I share that
confidence in Argentina's future under your leadership.
In the rapidly evolving relationship among the nations of the
Southern Cone, you have taken the lead in achieving regional
economic integration and arms control.
For example, by the end of 1995, the MERCOSUR common
market aims to eliminate tariffs between Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay--linking your economies together in a way
consistent with GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] to
form one of the hemisphere's largest open markets. You're taking a
giant step toward the goal I stated last year in announcing the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: to make the Americas the
world's largest partnership of free-trading nations.
We also welcome your efforts to set in place nuclear
safeguards that will increase international security. Your decisions
to forswear chemical weapons and halt missile proliferation do
create a safer hemisphere, a safer world.
From Rivadavia to Rio Gallegos, from Zapala to Buenos Aires,
your strong, committed leadership is bringing your people hope for
change, faith in their countrymen, and the courage to "arise and
walk" together.
On behalf of the people of the United States, it is my great
pleasure to welcome you to the White House. And may God bless the
Argentine Republic.
President Menem: My dear friend, Mr. President, distinguished Mrs.
Bush. Ladies and gentlemen, sisters and brothers of America. Thank
you very much for your warm words of welcome. It is to me a
source of deep satisfaction to be once again here in this great
country whose institutions and values have been and still are an
example of freedom and human dignity. Moreover, I come back with
the satisfaction of having already traveled a long distance along the
path of transformation my government has chosen.
There is still a lot to be done in Argentina. Many
expectations are still unfulfilled. Many are the problems. However,
with effort, firmness, and determination, we are conquering the
slope of decadence. With civil freedom, with economic freedom,
with an unprecedented freedom of the press, [and] after 2 years of
hard work to achieve change, most of the Argentine people have
ratified recently their support during our last elections.
This means backing the government, backing the economic
cause, and also a new way of insertion in the world. Our
determination is today firmer than ever before to continue
implementing state reform, privatizations, open trade, stimulating
foreign investment, deregulation, and also the return to Argentina
of assets that were sent abroad. Argentina has also decided to
continue playing an active role in the defense of peace and
international security, giving all possible support to UN initiatives.
When this year began, a distant region in the world was in
crisis. In the Gulf, we faced, then, serious risks with possible
consequences for the whole planet. Within the framework of what
the United Nations decided and as the result of the great effort of
the United States and its allies, it was possible to end aggression
and restore the full rule of international law. We participated in
that joint action, and we are proud we did. Some months later, you
yourself, my friend, had the initiative to propose unilaterally a
significant reduction of nuclear weaponry.
The Middle East had, for time immemorial, been a region
where all expectations to obtain a just and lasting peace floundered
and were thwarted.
A few days ago, you inaugurated a conference that has
renewed the hope of a constructive dialogue in the region when
calling to the same negotiating table antagonists who seemed, only
yesterday, to be implacably hostile. This is a really formidable
progress--I insist--a formidable and spectacular progress. A new
international order is being generated on the basis of peace, of
justice, [and] of reason and under the guidance of God--our only
source of reason and justice.
This is the reason why we recognize, today, our vast
coincidence with the United States. For instance, in the common
aim of restoring the democratic Government of the Republic of
Haiti. That is why we rely on integration. We want to consolidate
MERCOSUR with our regional brothers. And we also want to add our
own efforts so that the ambitious Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative that you conceived and announced last year will bear
fruit.
With Brazil, we have signed an agreement for the exclusively
peaceful use of nuclear energy, and we are about to conclude an
agreement on safeguards with the International Atomic Energy
Agency. With Brazil, too, and Chile and Uruguay--Paraguay and
Bolivia will join us in the future--we have made the commitment of
not producing nor buying, storing, or transferring chemical or
biological weapons [and], of course, banning any kind of use for
them.
Furthermore, we have also joined the control system for
missile technology, known by the acronym MTCR. Whitman's
prophetical dreams are renewed, entwined with the illusions of
having a single and great America as they were presaged [by] Ruben
Dario, Jose Marti, and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento.
To this end, it will be necessary to find in each and every
country of our America a representative democracy with full
respect for human rights and a free economy; I repeat, in all the
countries of this continent with absolutely no exceptions.
To this end, it will be necessary to bring a message of a
nation that is looking inward. The message is very simple: The
Argentine nation faces, with seriousness, the need of having a place
in the new international order. This we are sure to obtain since we
have a representative democracy, we respect human rights, and we
chose a free economy.
We trust that the European Economic Community and the
developed world will not persist in applying old protectionist
schemes that menace the hope of a better future.
We hope that we may be able to cooperate firmly so that--and
I quote your own words, my dear [Mr.] President and friend--"we
may eliminate subsidies that distort trade." We hope we may be
able to translate into concrete results some political statements
allowing markets to exist whose transparency will reward efficient
producers. We trust in the oldest constitutional democracy in the
world, and that democracy is the one in the United States.
We place our trust in the United States and its leaders who,
in 1991, have faced up to their responsibilities toward the
international community with maturity and imagination and
commendable moderation.
I am really moved by this reception. I am sure that our stay
here will not only be a pleasure but also very fruitful. I thank you
for your warmth and your hospitality.
God bless you, Mr. President; God bless your country, and God
bless our America.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: Argentine President Carlos Menem Visits Washington, DC:
US-Argentina: Sharing a Common Destiny
Eagleburger
Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Remarks at US State Department luncheon
Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Argentina
Subject: International Organizations, Trade/Economics,
Democratization
[TEXT]
An earlier American President, Woodrow Wilson, once noted that
great nations are not governed by those who simply repeat what is
being said on street corners. True leaders, he said, divine from such
talk what he called the shared meaning of the common voice, which
is the true will of the people. Often this meaning is hidden from the
people; in fact, it may require a great leader to help them discover
the difference between willfulness and their own true will.
You listened to what was being said on street corners in
Argentina, and you heard the sound of many voices--not only the
voices of those dissatisfied with the present but of those nostalgic
for a past and for past ways which could no longer be. In that din of
many voices, you divined a meaning, and you claimed a mandate for
change--change that would rock the status quo and even court
unpopularity. This is the kind of leadership which Wilson spoke of.
It is the kind which democracy needs the most but, unfortunately,
so rarely produces.
What is most remarkable is that you met Wilson's highest
standard by proving that you knew what your countrymen wanted
and required even before they did themselves. Now your foresight
has been vindicated by the Argentine people in the recent elections
which were so favorable to the cause of reform. You have, sir, not
only our congratulations but also our admiration for achieving the
political equivalent of a miracle: popular statesmanship.
The fact of the matter, however, is that the Argentine people
have seen more than simply change; they have seen progress
directly associated with the Menem Government's reform agenda--
an agenda including sound monetary policy, currency convertibility,
streamlined bureaucracy, privatization, deregulation, and opening
of the economy to international trade and investment. Meanwhile,
Argentina has made great progress toward meeting its foreign debt
commitments. The results speak for themselves: Inflation is down,
confidence is up, and the economy is growing.
A leader does not acquire the mantle of statesmanship, as
you have, simply by doing well for his countrymen. He must act on a
wider stage as well. When so many nations are preoccupied with
internal problems and parochial considerations, it is heartening to
see a leader who understands that there can be no artificial wall
between foreign and domestic policies. This is a belief which I
know unites you and President Bush, and it is especially important
today when the free market democracies truly share a common fate
and destiny.
Thus, we applaud your commitment to the development of
the MERCOSUR common market, which we hope will serve, along
with President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, as the
foundation stone for our ultimate goal of a free trading hemisphere.
We also applaud your staunch stand internationally in
opposition to aggression and in defense of democracy--from Kuwait
to Cuba. You understand that freedom is indivisible, and nowhere is
that principle more important to us than here in the Americas,
where you have guided regional efforts to restore democracy in
Haiti.
Finally, we applaud your courageous and visionary efforts to
curb nuclear proliferation and stop the spread of chemical and
biological weapons in the Americas. The Mendoza Declaration you
signed with Brazil and Chile, which bans chemical weapons in the
region, and the bilateral nuclear safeguards agreement you signed
with Brazil are milestones in this effort. In the future, we look
forward to seeing an Argentine-Brazilian safeguards agreement
with the International Atomic Energy Commission and to
Argentina's ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
On behalf of Secretary Baker and of the Department of State,
let me propose this toast to the enduring friendship between our
peoples, to the common values which unite us, and to the promise of
a lasting partnership between the United States and the Argentine
Republic which will further the development of freedom and
prosperity throughout the Americas.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: Review of Presidential Discussions
Aronson
Source: Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson
Description: Opening statement at a news conference in Washington,
DC
Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Argentina, Israel
Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization, Arms Control,
International Organizations,
Nuclear Nonproliferation, OAS
[TEXT]
President Menem took office in December of 1989, I believe, in a
country in a deep economic crisis. Inflation was over 4,900%. The
economy was declining. Argentina had an enormous debt burden,
enormous trade barriers. President Menem, from the very beginning,
has set out to fundamentally restructure and reform that economy.
Export taxes have been eliminated; barriers to trade and investment
have been drastically reduced. They've set out on a program to
privatize state enterprises. They've sold the telephone company,
the airlines. They have signed--with Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay-
-a framework agreement on trade and investment with the United
States. Today, they will sign a bilateral investment treaty which is
the first with a major country in Latin America, and it's, in many
ways, a revolutionary treaty because it allows for international
arbitration of disputes, which is a sea change in investment policy
in Latin America.
The economy today is growing at about 5%. Inflation is at a
monthly rate of less than 2%. And, in fact, President Menem told
President Bush that this month it's expected to be less than 1%.
They have a trade surplus. There is new, growing confidence in the
investment community, which the American investment community
shares. American investors put about $200 million in[to] Argentina
last year. Our Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
insures about $173 million of US investments. In April, OPIC led a
mission there in which 21 US companies participated.
The Vice President visited this past year and brought about
eight CEOs [chief executive officers]. We're confident that
Argentina is well positioned to move forward with the IMF
[International Monetary Fund] on a new agreement; and that, we
believe, will set the stage for negotiations with the commercial
banks under the Brady Plan to restructure Argentina's $37 million
debt with the commercial banks.
I think both Presidents discussed the historic and important
changes in Argentina's policy with regard to nuclear proliferation,
missile proliferation, chemical weapons, its leadership in defending
democracy in Haiti, its role as a member of the coalition in the Gulf.
And, I think, if you look at where Argentina was when this President
took office and where it is today, it is just an enormous success
story and a growing success story. And as President Bush said in
his welcoming remarks, this Administration has enormous
confidence in Argentina's future under President Menem.
The two Presidents had a one-on-one discussion in the Oval
Office, and then they came out to the Cabinet Room with the various
members of the two governments.
The President reiterated his appreciation for the hospitality
of the visit he and [his daughter] Dorothy made in December. He said
it was a visit he'd never forget. He reiterated how strongly he feels
in support and recognition of the economic reforms, their
commitment to democracy, their steps in nuclear non-proliferation;
reiterated that relations have never been better. President Menem
made the same point. Both Presidents agreed they'd work to
improve relations.
The two Presidents had an extended discussion both in the
Oval Office and in the Cabinet Room of Argentina's current economic
reforms, specifically its discussions with the IMF and its hopes for
successful debt negotiations. The President made it clear that we
want to be supportive and cooperative and helpful in all of those
fronts.
President Menem went through, in some detail, the recent
economic numbers. As I mentioned, he said that inflation this
month will be less than 1%.
The two Presidents had an extensive discussion of the
Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)]. On this, I think they both reiterated what they feel is the
crucial importance of movement by the European Community on
agriculture. Argentina is a major agricultural exporter, as is the
United States. The Finance Minister, Mr. Cavallo, felt that the
recent steps Argentina has taken to deregulate the service economy
and to introduce a very strong intellectual property rights bill ought
to prove an incentive to the Europeans who feel strongly about those
two areas of the GATT to make further progress in agriculture.
The two Presidents had a discussion of Cuba, of Haiti, and the
OAS [Organization of American States] mission there. They had an
extensive discussion of the Middle East. President Menem described
his recent trip to the Middle East. He said he was the first
Argentine president to visit Israel. He mentioned he visited Egypt
and had discussions with [President] Mubarak as well. There was an
extensive discussion of the peace conference and the progress
that's being made. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: Humanitarian Appeal to Haitian Boat People
Tutwiler
Description: Text of a statement released by the Office of the
Assistant Secretary/Department Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 15, 199111/15/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Human Rights
[TEXT]
The following message was prepared for the Voice of America
Creole broadcast to Haiti today: The United States is deeply
concerned by the humanitarian tragedy of the Haitian boat people.
Over the past 3 weeks, hundreds of Haitians have put out to sea,
often risking their lives in unseaworthy vessels, in a mistaken
belief that they will be picked up and brought to the United States.
With very few exceptions, Haitians picked up on the high seas will
not be brought to the United States.
Despite continuing efforts to rescue people at sea, the tragic
reality is that many boats may not be found, and many people may
die. The US Government urgently advises Haitians that risking their
lives in small boats is not the answer to their situation.
The United States reaffirms its strong support for the
efforts of the Organization of American States to bring about a
solution to the current political crisis in Haiti.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: US-Venezuela Drug Interdiction Agreement Signed
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America, North America
Country: United States, Venezuela
Subject: International Law, Narcotics
On November 9, 1991, the Governments of Venezuela and the United
States signed a mutual maritime counter-narcotics agreement to
facilitate the identification and interdiction of drug-trafficking
vessels on the high seas. This is the first reciprocal agreement of
this nature concluded by the United States with any country.
The agreement was signed at the Venezuelan navy
headquarters by Ambassador Michael Skol and US Coast Guard Vice
Admiral Paul Welling for the United States and by Rear Admiral
Ignacio Pena Cimarro and Dr. Elias Osorio Belisario for the Republic
of Venezuela.
This agreement provides a framework for the maritime
forces of each country to request permission to board and inspect
vessels registered in the other signatory nation that are suspected
of illicit narcotics activities on the high seas. This agreement
represents another aspect of the multidimensional mutual effort
against illegal drug activity by the United States and the Republic
of Venezuela. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: Humanitarian Situation in Iraq
Walcott
Source: Jackie Walcott, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Social and Humanitarian Affairs
Description: Statement before the International Task Force of the
House Select Committee on Hunger, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 13, 199111/13/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Human Rights, Regional/Civil Unrest,
United Nations, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
I appreciate this opportunity to update you and the other members
of the committee on the humanitarian situation in Iraq. There have
been several recent developments that I think will be of interest.
Humanitarian Issues
On August 15, the [UN] Security Council adopted Resolution 706 in
response to repeated Iraqi requests to be allowed to resume sales
of oil for the purchase of urgently needed food and other
humanitarian items and to fund other Iraqi obligations. While
approving the sale [of] $1.6 billion of oil in order to meet the needs
of Iraqi civilians before winter, this resolution imposes certain
requirements to ensure that the proceeds are used as intended. As
part of the humanitarian aid component, the resolution requires the
Secretary General to establish a system of monitoring and control
that would prevent any revenues from this one-time sale of oil from
reaching the coffers of the Government of Iraq and ensure that
humanitarian supplies are distributed throughout Iraq to the
population groups who are most in need. It should be noted that
since March 22, when the [UN] Sanctions Committee lifted the
embargo on food, the Sanctions Committee has been notified of
some 4.2 million metric tons of food to be sent to Iraq. It should
also be recognized that the United States has provided over $500
million in humanitarian assistance in Iraq, including our
contributions to Operation Provide Comfort which assisted the
Kurds in the north.
On September 28, the Security Council adopted Resolution
712, which approved the Secretary General's proposals for
implementing Resolution 706. Over 2 months after passage of
Resolution 706, and more than a month and a half after passage of
[Resolution] 712, Iraq has still neither accepted nor rejected the
terms of these resolutions, although various Iraqi officials have
made some critical comments concerning their provisions. In
addition, a request to visit Iraq by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the
Secretary General's Executive Delegate for Humanitarian Assistance
in the Gulf area, has been delayed by the Iraqi Government at least
until November 18.
A number of international teams have visited Iraq to assess
humanitarian requirements. There is general agreement that
certain groups in the Iraqi civilian population do, indeed, face
serious food shortages and lack adequate medical care. These
groups include, in particular, the Shi'a in southern Iraq, Kurds in the
north, and poor Sunnis living in central Iraq, especially women and
children. There is evidence of chronic malnutrition in Iraq for an
extended time, predating the invasion of Kuwait.
While Saddam Hussein cynically calculated that the misery he
has inflicted on his own people might serve to sway the
international community on the lifting of sanctions, Resolutions
706 and 712 have disappointed and, apparently, annoyed Saddam.
However, if Iraq wants to obtain food and other humanitarian items,
these resolutions provide the mechanism for that to be done, and it
is now up to the Government of Iraq to permit these resolutions to
be implemented.
We continue to receive reports from knowledgeable sources
that the Iraqi Government is blocking the distribution of needed
food and medicine to vulnerable populations inside Iraq by private
voluntary organizations. Until now, despite Iraq's non-acceptance
of Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712, many PVOs [private
voluntary organizations] were able to use health clinics, churches,
and mosques as food distribution sites. This now has ended. New
pressure on PVO food distribution adds to the evidence that Saddam
is pressing fora propaganda showdown over the Iraqi "starvation"
issue. Further, we have been informed by international
organizations and private voluntary organizations that Iraq is
refusing to extend visas for their humanitarian assistance
personnel after December 31.
The latest battle fought by Saddam uses his population as
pawns. He systematically denies much needed humanitarian
assistance and then blames the sanctions regime for the problem.
There is a solution: rapid implementation of Security Council
Resolutions 706 [and] 712, which provide an internationally agreed-
upon mechanism for the equitable distribution of assistance within
Iraq. At present, the issue is not one of insufficient resources but
of Saddam's indifference to the needs of many sectors of the
population.
We recognize that malnutrition is a problem in Iraq, but we
have insufficient information on its extent. A thorough baseline
assessment of humanitarian needs in Iraq is called for in Resolution
706. As far as we know, the problems are gravest for the Kurds and
the Shi'a and for the very poor in Baghdad. In fact, recent reporting
from northern Iraq indicates that the government is setting up
roadblocks to prevent the movement of fuel and food to the north.
In the south, we continue to receive reports about people trapped in
the marshes by the Iraqi army as well as the refusal by the Iraqi
Government to allow the United Nations to establish humanitarian
centers in the marsh area.
Nevertheless, we have not given up on eventual Iraqi
acceptance of Resolutions 706 and 712. There are some recent
indications that Iraq may be moving in the direction of accepting
them. Prince Sadruddin will visit Iraq and will be able to explain
exactly how the oil sale and food purchase mechanisms of the
resolutions will work. Further, businessmen who have dealings
with Iraq have approached us with questions on [Resolution] 706,
indicating that the Iraqi Government does not have a complete
understanding of the implementing mechanisms. These small
signals give us hope that there might be a change in Saddam's
position on these humanitarian resolutions. It is our understanding
that Sadruddin plans to discuss with [Iraqi] officials an extension
of the memorandum of understanding under which the United Nations
operates in Iraq as well as the implementation of Resolutions 706
and 712.
We are saddened by reports of the suffering of the Iraqi
people. But there is a limit to what we, as part of the international
community, can do in the absence of Iraqi cooperation. Only Iraq
stands in the way of implementing an internationally approved
mechanism to deal with its humanitarian crisis.
Frozen Iraqi Assets
We are aware of the various proposals that have been put forward to
make use of official Iraqi assets frozen in this country and
elsewhere as a source of funding to bring humanitarian relief to the
people of Iraq.
The sanctions regime does provide for this possibility under
certain circumstances. The Chairman of the UN Sanctions
Committee has informed all governments holding such assets that
they may unfreeze them for the purposes specified in paragraph 20
of Resolution 687, i.e., for permissible humanitarian exports to Iraq.
We understand that some countries have chosen to do so in limited
amounts.
However, the Security Council, in Paragraph 9 of Resolution
712, also urged that any humanitarian exports to Iraq be undertaken
through arrangements that assure their equitable distribution to
meet humanitarian needs. The method adopted by the Security
Council for this purpose is the mechanism provided under
Resolutions 706 and 712--which the Council specifically made
available for frozen Iraqi assets as well as the proceeds of Iraqi oil
sales. This mechanism ensures that humanitarian supplies will be
equitably distributed and that Iraq will not withhold supplies from
the Kurds or other disfavored sectors of the civilian population. In
our view, this is by far the preferable method, and at least one
large holder of Iraqi assets has expressed an interest in making use
of this channel. But the Iraqis have so far refused. This refusal has
nothing to do with the UN terms for the sale of oil, since these
funds could be used regardless of whether and when oil sales occur.
In the alternative, a state might release frozen assets to
finance the shipment of humanitarian items directly to Iraq,
perhaps with some sort of attempt to impose conditions on how Iraq
will use and distribute those items. Based on the Iraqi track record
to date, most countries are understandably reluctant to do so. In
our view, it would be a serious mistake for the United States to
entrust the distribution of such items to Iraq, and we have urged
others who are holding Iraqi assets not to do so.
Under either alternative, the United States--like many other
countries--faces an additional problem. US Government, corporate,
and individual claims against Iraq currently total many billions of
dollars. A large proportion of the 1,300 claims reported so far
involve unpaid Iraqi debts and obligations from the pre-crisis
period and certain other types of claims which are unlikely to be
paid by the UN Compensation Fund. Frozen Iraqi assets in this
country total just $1.2 billion. These assets offer our best hope for
at least partial payment of the outstanding US claims. Clearly,
every dollar of US-held Iraqi assets released today means one less
dollar available in the future for the 1,300 American claimants
from all around the United States--many of whom have reported
that they are already be facing serious financial difficulties.
Indeed, such a release of Iraqi assets could result in litigation
against the US Government by US citizens who had counted on the
use of those assets to satisfy their claims.
We believe the agreed international approach represented by
Resolutions 706 and 712 offers the most effective and equitable
way of providing relief to the Iraqi people. We remain hopeful that
this approach will be accepted by Iraq and put into effect before the
humanitarian situation in Iraq reaches crisis proportions. In any
event, the problem is not finding a source of funds--these funds are
available for such use now, if only Iraq will agree to an effective
monitoring system to ensure equitable distribution. We believe
there is no need [to use]--and no point in using--the Iraqi assets
held by the United States for this purpose.
Iraqi Non-Compliance with Other Humanitarian Resolutions
There have been numerous Iraqi violations of both the letter and
spirit of Resolution 688, which was adopted by the Security Council
last April following the brutal repression of uprisings by both the
Shi'a in the south and the Kurds in the north against Saddam's
regime. This resolution demands that the Government of Iraq cease
attacks against civilians and that it permit unhindered UN access to
the Iraqi people for the purpose of providing them assistance.
Shi'a in the South
In July, we received credible reports that a number of Shi'a, who
had fled their homes following the brutal repression of their
rebellion by Iraqi forces, were trapped in the vast marsh areas
separating southern Iraq and Iran. What made these reports most
ominous were eyewitness accounts by UN personnel that the Iraqi
army had surrounded part of these marshes and appeared intent upon
keeping the Shi'a pinned down in an area totally unfit for human
habitation.
Prince Sadruddin, in the course of his assessment mission to
Iraq in July, requested permission to visit the marshlands and to
establish a base for the United Nations to monitor the situation and
provide assistance to the people in that area. Following several
days of stalling, the Iraqi authorities finally allowed Sadruddin to
travel to the area. It was clear to Sadruddin and his team that Iraqi
military had been hastily withdrawn just prior to his visit. The UN
staff, which Sadruddin left to keep an eye on the situation, were,
subsequently, ordered out of the area by Iraq on the grounds that
they were no longer needed and, as of now, have not been permitted
to return.
We are disturbed by reports indicating that there are still
numbers of people, including women and children, trapped in the
marshes with little food [and] only swamp water to drink who are
unable to return to their homes because of the continuing large
military presence in the area.
Kurds in the North
Last month, fighting again flared up between Iraqi forces and the
Kurds in northern Iraq. Several days ago, we received reports of
renewed fighting outside the Kurdish city of Erbil. This renewed
fighting comes despite Saddam's promise to work out a plan for
increased Kurdish autonomy and some degree of democracy
throughout Iraq. The fighting is causing thousands of Kurdish men,
women, and children to flee toward Iran once again. This most
recent fighting is only the latest in a series of armed conflicts.
It is clear that failure to work out an agreement that would
provide for a degree of autonomy for the Kurds, as well as allow
them to exercise their right to choose their own form of
government, will create further instability in northern Iraq and
fuel the deplorable cycle of violence in that region. Saddam's
continuing repression of the Kurds--including indiscriminate
sustained artillery bombardment of residential areas--vastly
complicates the UN efforts to provide adequate shelter in the north
before the onset of winter.
The Government of Iraq has refused to allow the United
Nations to open humanitarian centers in Kirkuk and Nasiriyah. It
bases its refusal on a deliberate misinterpretation of the
memorandum of understanding it signed with the United Nations in
April which provides for both the Iraqis and the United Nations to
agree on locations for UN humanitarian centers. The Iraqis now
claim the unilateral right to designate the location of these
centers, and they have refused UN requests despite the 250,000
refugees located near these towns who have recently returned from
Iran but are prevented from getting to their homes by the Iraqi
authorities. There are an estimated 300,000 people who have
returned to the vicinity of their homes but are still living in tents
or other temporary shelter because their homes have either been
destroyed or are unsafe due to fighting or the presence of Iraqi
forces. While the United Nations is providing assistance, the task
is made more difficult by Iraqi refusal to permit the establishment
of humanitarian centers.
Saddam Hussein's continued brutality against his own people
has driven many hitherto reluctant countries to concede that
circumstances may, indeed, arise in which extraordinary
humanitarian needs compel the international community's
intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. This
concern lies behind the substance of Resolution 688 and also
indicates why Resolutions 706 and 712 are so strict in their
requirements for UN control over Iraq's future oil revenues.
Under Resolution 687, the Security Council is to consider
every 60 days whether Iraq is in compliance with this cease-fire
resolution so that the economic sanctions can either be modified or
terminated. There have been three such reviews to date. Saddam
Hussein's regime has done its utmost to evade requirements to
disclose all details of its programs to develop weapons of mass
destruction. It continues to make war upon Iraqi citizens who
reject it. It has probed the firmness of the international
community in enforcing Iraq's border with Kuwait. It has not been
difficult for Security Council members to agree that, given the
continued blatant disregard for the requirements of Resolution 687
by the Government of Iraq, it would be completely inappropriate to
consider lifting sanctions or modifying them in any way.
In conclusion, Saddam Hussein's continuation in power will
present the international community with the challenge of seeing
that he remains incapable of once again posing a threat to his own
people, his neighbors, and to the rest of the world. Let us be
perfectly clear about one thing: This is not an issue between
Saddam Hussein and the United States but between Saddam Hussein
and the United Nations. The United Nations has lived up to the
daunting challenge of fulfilling the requirements of [Resolution]
687. The UN perseverance in this matter demonstrates that our
faith in the United Nations has not been misplaced and bodes well
for an increased UN role in international problem solving as the new
world order continues to evolve. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: Fact Sheet: Additional Information on the Bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103
Date: Nov 18, 199111/18/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Europe
Country: United Kingdom, Libya
Subject: Terrorism, International Law
[TEXT]
The Government of Libya was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 on December 21, 1988. This paper reviews both
evidentiary material upon which the US indictment of two Libyan
officials is based, and background information that establishes
links between those indicted and senior Libyan Government
officials.
Summary
Scottish authorities and the US Department of Justice have charged
two Libyans with carrying out the attack: Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi,
a senior Libyan intelligence official, and Lamin Fhimah, the former
manager of the Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) office in Malta. The
charges are based on clear evidence that al-Maqrahi, Fhimah, and
other unidentified co-conspirators planned to bomb Pan Am 103 by:
-- Obtaining and attaching an appropriately marked Air Malta
tag that circumvented baggage security measures and routed the bag
containing the bomb to the Pan Am 103 feeder flight to Heathrow
and then to Pan Am 103;
-- Setting the timer that activated the device so that the
bomb would explode about 1 hour after Pan Am 103 was scheduled
to depart Heathrow Airport in London;
-- Using the knowledge and access gained from their official
status as representatives of Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) to
facilitate the operation at the Luqa airport in Valetta, Malta. This
would have enabled them to bypass security checks and ensure that
the suitcase containing the bomb was inserted into the baggage of
an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt.
Al-Maqrahi, a senior Libyan intelligence official, acted with
the approval of the highest levels of the Libyan Government. We
believe Sa'id Rashid--a leading architect and executor of Libya's
anti-US and anti-dissident terrorist policies for the last decade,
and a member of the Libyan Government's inner circle--was the
senior government official who orchestrated the attack. An
operation of this sophistication and magnitude, involving people so
close to the Libyan leadership, could have been undertaken only with
the approval of senior Libyan officials.
The Case
The US indictment is based on evidence, summarized below, directly
linking Libyan officials to the suitcase containing the bomb and its
insertion into the baggage system. The evidence also directly links
al-Maqrahi to the Swiss company that manufactured the timer used
in the attack.
The Suitcase. Forensic analysis has identified the bag that
contained the Pan Am 103 bomb as a brown, hardsided Samsonite
suitcase. The following evidence links al-Maqrahi and Fhimah to the
suitcase.
-- Al-Maqrahi, traveling in alias, arrived in Valletta with
Fhimah from Libya on the evening of December 20, 1988, the day
before the bombing. Fhimah, the former manager of the LAA office
in Valletta, retained full access to the airport. Al-Maqrahi and
Fhimah brought a large, brown, hardsided Samsonite suitcase with
them into Malta on that occasion.
-- Scottish investigators traced clothing that had been
packed in the bomb suitcase to a Maltese clothing shop. A Libyan
bought the items several weeks before the bombing, most likely on
December 7, 1988. Airport arrival cards demonstrate that al-
Maqrahi was in Malta on December 7.
-- In February 1991, al-Maqrahi was described as resembling
the Libyan who had purchased the clothing items.
The Insertion. Frankfurt airport records for December 21
show that an unaccompanied bag was routed from Air Malta Flight
180 (KM 180), out of Valletta's Luqa airport, to Frankfurt, where it
was loaded onto the Pan Am 103 feeder flight to London. The
evidence indicates that a properly marked Air Malta baggage tag
would have routed the suitcase containing the bomb to John F.
Kennedy airport in New York via Pan Am 103. The following
evidence directly implicates al-Maqrahi and Fhimah in this process.
-- Fhimah's diary contains a reminder for December 15,
1988, to pick up Air Malta tags--a violation of airport and airline
regulations. Other diary notations indicate that Fhimah
accomplished this task.
-- According to Luqa airport records and staff, the baggage
for KM 180 was processed at about the same time as their bags for
a Libyan Arab Airlines flight (LN 147), bound for Tripoli.
-- Al-Maqrahi, still traveling in alias, boarded LN 147 on the
morning of December 21, 1988, the same morning that the bomb was
inserted into the baggage of the KM 180 flight. Al-Maqrahi's flight
back to Libya checked in at the same airport passenger check-in
counter as KM 180, and the check-in periods for the two flights
overlapped.
The Timer. A circuit board fragment recovered from the Pan
Am 103 bomb was part of a sophisticated electronic timer of a type
that Senegalese authorities discovered in the possession of two
Libyan terrorists arrested in February 1988. The timers, marked
MST-13, were manufactured by Meister et Bollier (MEBO), a Swiss
electronics firm located in Zurich.
The MST-13 timers are unique. MEBO was the sole
manufacturer. All the MST-13 timers produced were delivered to
the Libyans.
MEBO provided the Libyan External Security Organization
(ESO, also referred to as the Jamahirya Security Organization--JSO)
with 20 MST-13 timers in late 1985 and made no more MST-13
timers. Two ESO electrical engineers commissioned and took
possession of the timers: Izz Aldin Hinshiri, Libya's current
Minister of Communications and Transport, and Sa'id Rashid.
Al-Maqrahi is a close relative and longtime associate of Sa'id
Rashid. At the time Rashid took delivery of the timers, al-Maqrahi
was his immediate subordinate.
Al-Maqrahi rented office space at MEBO and transited Zurich
on at least two occasions in December 1988.
Libyan Government Responsibility
The conclusion that the Libyan Government approved the Pan Am 103
bombing is based on Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi's central and
continuing role in Libyan intelligence operations and on his close
association with Libyan Government officials who have
implemented and directed Libya's use of terrorism over the years as
a tool of government policy. The career progress of these officials
over the years indicates that the Libyan Government has
consistently endorsed their operations, tactics, and targets.
Al-Maqrahi's Intelligence Responsibilities. Abd al-Basit al-
Maqrahi's deep involvement in Libya's most sensitive, high priority
procurement operations indicates that he enjoyed the fullest
confidence of Libya's leadership. We believe that his contacts and
experience in the fields of civil aviation, cargo movement, and
small business operations also provided him with a ready-made
infrastructure to support the staging of the Pan Am 103 bombing.
Al-Maqrahi is a senior intelligence official with strong ties
to Libya's military procurement apparatus and to the External
Security Organization (ESO). In 1987, he became the director of the
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), a unit that served the ESO and
the Department of Military Procurement through a variety of
activities, including:
-- Procurement of chemical weapons precursors. An al-
Maqrahi subordinate operating in Germany in 1988 played an
important role in acquiring and shipping chemical weapons
precursors to Libya. Al-Maqrahi is also linked to a senior manager
of Libya's chemical weapons development program;
-- Procurement of aircraft and aircraft components for the
Libyan military and LAA. Badri Hasan, another close collaborator of
al-Maqrahi, is one of Libya's leading experts in circumventing US
embargo provisions barring the sale of US technology and aircraft
components to Libya;
-- Assisting with Libya's effort to co-opt or sponsor Latin
American terrorist groups. Under al-Maqrahi's leadership, the CSS
assisted other Libyan outreach agencies by contributing to
propaganda campaigns, collecting intelligence on the attitudes of
radical groups, and assessing the intelligence or operational utility
of Arabs who resided in target countries; and
-- Setting up travel agencies and other front companies to
facilitate the travel and movement of goods and people, an activity
that we believe supported both the procurement and outreach
programs of the CSS and other Libyan intelligence entities.
Senior Libyans who worked closely with al-Maqrahi and other
CSS officials involved in these activities include:
Col. Rifi Ali al-Sharif, a senior Libyan military officer with a
prominent role in Libya's procurement effort. Col. al-Sharif, the
mentor/patron of Badri Hasan, reportedly assisted efforts by al-
Maqrahi and Badri Hasan to illegally acquire US aircraft via Benin in
1986 and 1987 and sponsored the establishment of a travel agency
as a joint CSS/military procurement enterprise in Eastern Europe.
Sa'id Rashid, who in 1988 paid and instructed the chemical
weapons precursor procurement specialist working for al-Maqrahi
in Germany.
Al-Maqrahi's Terrorist Record
Al-Maqrahi's position and contacts in the Libyan intelligence
apparatus place him firmly in the camp of his first cousin Sa'id
Rashid--a leading architect and implementer of Libya's terrorist
policies and a powerful member of the Libyan Government's inner
circle. For at least 2 years prior to his early 1987 appointment as
CSS director, al-Maqrahi was ESO chief of airline security,
reporting directly to Rashid, who was ESO chief of operations
throughout 1986.
Al-Maqrahi continued his terrorist activities after becoming
CSS director in early 1987. During 1988, al-Maqrahi:
-- Met in Malta with a team of Libyan intelligence operatives
planning to travel to Chad to conduct an unspecified operation.
Abdallah Sanussi, newly appointed chief of ESO operations, ordered
the team to abort the operation when it was unable to make
appropriate airline connections. Sanussi is one of four Libyans
whom France indicted on October 30, 1991, for the September 1989
bombing of UTA Flight 772, which exploded after leaving Ndjamena
airport in Chad.
-- Met with Greek arms dealers and expressed interest in
acquiring 1,000 letter bombs and associated technical equipment.
Sa'id Rashid and Libyan Terrorist Operations
Sa'id Rashid has managed a sustained Libyan effort to conduct
terrorist attacks against US interests since the early 1980s.
Rashid has long enjoyed privileged access to the top levels of the
Libyan Government and is involved in a wide range of intelligence
activities. He is a senior member of the Revolutionary Committees
Bureau, which oversees the execution of the Libyan Government's
radical policies in Libya and abroad.
Rashid rose rapidly in the ESO and in Libya's revolutionary
committee apparatus during the early- and mid-1980s while
aggressively pursuing the Libyan Government's dissident
assassination programs and the terrorist and subversive aspects of
the government's African policies.
An Italian court has sentenced Rashid in absentia to life
imprisonment for his leadership of a team that assassinated a
Libyan exile in a Milan train station in July 1980. This
assassination was one of many in an anti-dissident campaign that
spanned Western Europe and was directed by Rashid through at least
1985.
-- In October 1980, Rashid led a team to Togo that planned to
assassinate Chadian President Hissan Habre.
-- In 1983, Libya illegally detained 37 French citizens in a
successful effort to force France to release Rashid, who had been
jailed in Paris pending extradition to Italy on murder charges
related to the 1980 assassination in Milan.
Rashid began to direct attacks specifically against US
interests in late 1981, when he assumed overall operational
responsibility for Libya's effort to overthrow the Sudanese regime
of President Ja'far Numeiri, then a close ally of the United States.
During this period, Rashid and his subordinates trained, equipped,
and directed Sudanese terrorists who attempted to bomb US
interests, on several occasions using concealed bombs equipped
with "decade" timers and containing Semtex-H. Decade timers were
a signature item of Libyan and Libyan-sponsored terrorists during
the early 1980s.
One such bomb, concealed in a cigarette carton, was used in a
failed attempt to bomb a Pan Am flight in December 1983. The
terrorist attempted to check an unaccompanied bag onto an Alitalia
flight departing Istanbul for Rome. The bag, which was discovered
by Turkish authorities as a result of heightened security
procedures, was tagged in such a way that it would have connected
with a Pan Am flight departing Rome for New York, thus following
essentially the same procedure that succeeded in the case of Pan
Am 103.
Rashid continued to play a key role in Libyan targeting of US
interests after tensions mounted between the two countries in mid-
1985.
-- Rashid's operatives began planning an attack on US
facilities in Turkey in early 1986, culminating in
a failed attempt to bomb the US Officers Club in Ankara in late
April 1986. The Libyan intelligence officer who directed the
operation within Turkey was operating under cover as an LAA
official.
-- Rashid tasked several Palestinians to target US facilities
in Germany and directed the April 1986 bombing of the La Belle
disco in Berlin. The La Belle bomb, specifically intended to kill
American service personnel and their dependents, killed three
people, two of them Americans.
-- The day after the La Belle disco bombing, Rashid traveled
to Khartoum, where he continued his work with Sudanese
oppositionists. Rashid was in Khartoum on April 15, 1986, when a
US Embassy official was seriously wounded in retaliation for the US
bombing of Libya earlier the same day.
-- Rashid was one of the Libyan engineers who provided
design specifications to the Swiss firm (MEBO) that manufactured
the timer used in the Pan Am 103 bomb. He also demonstrated a
MEBO remotely activated briefcase bomb to Palestinian recruits.
-- Both the Libyans arrested in Senegal with the MEBO timer
had been Rashid's subordinates since the early 1980s.
In early 1987, the Libyan Government moved Rashid from the
ESO to the directorship of the Libyan Electronics Company, which is
heavily involved in technology transfer and other procurement
activities. At the same time, the Libyan Government placed al-
Maqrahi in charge of the Center for Strategic Studies. We believe
that the two cousins continued to coordinate their activities as
they became more deeply involved in procurement programs--as in
their joint supervision of al-Maqrahi's chemical weapons
procurement specialist in Germany.
Al-Maqrahi's Other Supervisors. Al-Maqrahi, as CSS director,
reported, or can be linked directly, to the following prominent
Libyans:
ESO director Ibrahim al-Bishari used al-Maqrahi's office at
MEBO, in Zurich, as an accommodation address and claimed that al-
Maqrahi worked directly under him as director of the CSS. Al-
Bishari is currently Libya's Foreign Minister and reportedly retains
his intelligence portfolio.
In fall 1988, Abdallah al-Sanussi was al-Maqrahi's immediate
ESO supervisor. Al-Maqrahi was a terrorist who worked at the CSS
for Sanussi. Al-Sanussi is one of the Libyan Government's chief
intelligence aides. He authorized, directed, and provided funding for
a number of Libyan terrorist operations over the years. French
judicial authorities have lodged criminal charges against al-
Sanussi for the September 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772.
Nasir Ali Ashur has been linked both to al-Maqrahi and to the
MEBO timers. Ashur, who oversaw earlier tests of the timers to
ensure they would be completely destroyed by an explosion, was
seen at a meeting at al-Maqrahi's house 2 days before the Pan Am
103 bombing. Maltese embarkation records and a US intelligence
source also show that Ashur and al-Maqrahi met on Malta in early
October 1988 and that the two traveled together from Zurich to
Malta in August 1987. Ashur has been declared by the French to be
the equivalent of an unindicted co-conspirator for his management
of Libya's policies of providing massive amounts of arms--including
tons of Semtex-H--to the Provisional Irish Republican Army.
Abdallah Mahmud Hijazi is probably also a key contact of al-
Maqrahi, although we lack concrete evidence of direct linkage.
Hijazi, Rashid's longtime patron, was until 1986 the director of
Libya's Department of Military Procurement. In 1988, he was
reportedly a key organizer of Libyan subversive operations in West
Africa and Chad.
Ibrahim Nayili, whom the French indicted on October 30,
1991, for his role in the bombing of UTA 772, has been identified by
several sources as the ESO official in Athens who placed potential
sources of arms and aircraft components in contact with al-
Maqrahi. Al-Nayili became ESO chief of airline security in mid-
1989, the same position that al-Maqrahi held before becoming CSS
director.
The Historical Context
The foregoing has described Libya's links to Pan Am 103, the
individuals involved, and the central role those individuals play in
the terrorist and intelligence programs of the Libyan Government.
The terrorist case against the government does not begin or end
with the destruction of Pan Am 103. We have seen a consistent
pattern of Libyan-inspired terrorism that continues after the Pan
Am 103 atrocity to the present. This pattern seriously undermines
any argument that Pan Am 103 was a rogue operation that did not
meet with the approval of Libya's most senior authorities. An
operation this important could not have been undertaken without the
consent of the highest levels in the Libyan Government.
Many more Libyan-sponsored terrorist events are described in
unclassified white papers published by the Department of State in
mid-November 1991, August 1990, January 1989, and throughout
1986. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: Pan Am Flight 103 Indictments
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Nov 14, 199111/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Europe
Country: Libya, United Kingdom
Subject: Terrorism, International Law
[TEXT]
You've seen the briefings by the Justice Department on the
indictments and criminal responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am
103.
We have made available to you and have in the Press Office
the indictment itself and a paper on the Libyan Government's
continuing support for terrorism.
I will run through some of the basic facts about the bombing
and how it was organized. I want to make some things clear from
the outset.
-- The bombers were Libyan Government intelligence
operatives.
-- This was a Libyan Government operation from start to
finish.
-- We hold the Libyan Government responsible for the murder
of 270 people over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988.
Today, Scottish authorities and the US Department of Justice
charged two Libyan officials with carrying out the December 1988
bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. All 259 people
aboard the aircraft and 11 people on the ground were killed.
The charges are based on evidence that directly and
conclusively links Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi, a senior Libyan
intelligence official, and Lamin Fhimah, the former manager of the
Libyan Arab Airlines office in Malta, and other unidentified co-
conspirators to the suitcase containing the bomb and to its
insertion into the baggage system leading to Pan Am flight 103.
The evidence also directly links Al-Maqrahi to the Swiss
company that manufactured the sophisticated electronic timer used
in the attack. The timer is unique. It is produced solely by a single
Swiss firm and the entire production lot was delivered to the
Libyan External Security Organization (ESO).
Two intelligence operatives were indicted, but don't mistake
this--the bombing of Pan Am 103 was not a rogue operation.
An operation of this magnitude, involving people so close to
the Libyan leadership could only have been undertaken with the
approval of senior Libyan officials. That is the pattern of past
Libyan terrorist operations. That is the pattern of the Pan Am 103
attack.
Al-Maqrahi is a well-connected senior Libyan intelligence
official whose extensive experience in the fields of civil aviation,
cargo movement, and small business operations helped him stage
the Pan Am 103 bombing.
Al-Maqrahi works closely with his first cousin, Sa'id Rashid-
-a leading architect and implementer of Libya's terrorist policies
and a powerful member of Libya's inner circle. It was Rashid who
earlier purchased the timers.
Abdallah Al-Sanussi was Al-Maqrahi's immediate supervisor
in the External Security Organization in the fall of 1988. French
judicial authorities have lodged criminal charges against Al-
Sanussi for the September 1989 bombing of UTA [Flight] 772.
Ibrahim Al-Bishari, currently Libya's Foreign Minister, used
Al-Maqrahi's office at the Swiss firm as an accommodation address
in Zurich and claimed that Al-Maqrahi worked directly under him as
director of the Center for Strategic Studies.
The terrorist case against the Libyan regime does not begin
or end with the destruction of Pan Am 103. We have seen a
consistent pattern of Libyan-inspired terrorism that continues to
the present.
The charges made today, however, are based solely on the
evidence gathered during the criminal investigation. The Libyan
Government is responsible for this monstrous act--the murder of
270 citizens of 21 countries in the bombing of Pan Am 103.
We will be in touch with our friends and allies regarding
steps the international community should take to ensure that action
is taken to punish the Government of Libya in a way which will
deter others. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 46, November 18, 1991
Title: Fact Sheet: The Iranians and the PFLP-GC--Early Suspects
In the Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing
Date: Nov 18, 199111/18/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Europe
Country: Iran, Libya, United Kingdom
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
The dominant hypothesis of the early stages of the Pan Am 103
investigation focused on indications that the bombing was the
outcome of joint planning by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--
General Command (PFLP-GC).
-- Reliable intelligence reporting indicated that the PFLP-GC
and elements of the Iranian Government were planning to attack a
US target in retaliation for the accidental downing in July 1988 of
an Iranian Airbus by a
US warship.
-- On October 26, 1988, German police arrested members of
a PFLP-GC cell led by Hafiz Dalkamoni. Police found a bomb in
Dalkamoni's automobile that had been designed specifically for use
against civilian aircraft. It contained an altimeter switch that
ensured both that the bomb exploded at cruising altitude and that
brief alterations in pressure at airport security facilities would
not trigger a premature detonation.
-- An early finding in the Pan Am 103 investigation was that
the 103 bomb, like the PFLP-GC device found in Dalkamoni's
automobile, had been concealed in a Toshiba radio and consisted of
less than 500 grams of PETN and RDX--the two explosive
ingredients used in Semtex-H.
-- Investigators determined that the suitcase containing the
bomb was in a luggage container that held bags transferred from the
Pan Am 103 feeder flight out of Frankfurt--the location of much of
the PFLP-GC cell's activity during October 1988.
Over time, however, fresh evidence undermined the initial
theory linking the PFLP-GC to the Pan Am 103 bomb and led the
continuing investigation in other directions.
-- It was determined that the Toshiba radio housing the
PFLP-GC bomb found in Dalkamoni's car differed markedly from the
appearance of the radio that forensic examiners said had contained
the Pan Am 103 bomb.
-- Clothing items packed with the Pan Am 103 bomb had been
purchased in Valletta, Malta, on or about December 7, 1988.
Frankfurt airport records also indicated that the suitcase
containing the bomb had been transferred as an unaccompanied bag
to the Pan Am 103 feeder flight from an Air Malta flight that had
departed Valletta earlier on the day of the bombing.
-- It was discovered in June 1990 that the Pan Am 103 bomb
had been activated by a sophisticated electronic timer, in contrast
to the PFLP-GC bombs, which had altimeter switches and relatively
crude timers. Furthermore, we learned that the Pan Am 103 timer
had been delivered to Libyan intelligence officials in 1985 and that
two Libyan terrorists had been arrested with an identical timer in
February 1988 in Senegal.
-- No evidence has surfaced at the Pan Am 103 crash site
indicating that the terrorists used an altimeter switch.
Collusion by Multiple State Sponsors?
The United States now holds the Libyan Government responsible for
the Pan Am 103 bombing. We cannot rule out a broader conspiracy
between Libya and other governments or terrorist organizations, but
the available information does not support that conclusion. We
believe that Libya--the primary source of PFLP-GC funding during
the 1980s--was probably aware of Dalkamoni's earlier plans to
bomb aircraft. The activities in fall 1988 by those Libyans directly
responsible for the December 1988 Pan Am bombing indicate that
Libya was planning an aircraft bombing at the same time as the
PFLP-GC cell was building its bombs in Germany. Tripoli was also
aware of the PFLP-GC's relationship with Iran--and itself was a
close ally of Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war.
Syria, the primary political sponsor of the PFLP-GC and
another strong ally of Iran, was at least broadly aware of the PFLP-
GC's alliances and operations. Despite these links, the United
States lacks information indicating direct collaboration among Iran,
Syria, and Libya, either in sponsoring the PFLP-GC's planned
bombings of aircraft or in Libya's bombing of Pan Am 103. (###)