US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991

Title:

A Time of Decision For the NATO Alliance

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Intervention at the NATO Summit, Rome, Italy Date: Nov 7, 199111/7/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: NATO [TEXT] The [North Atlantic] Council meets at a turning point in history for the second time. The first was the day this alliance was born. Then the world was divided--one half suppressed, the other fearful. [Secretary of State] Dean Acheson said then our task was to create a world half free. My friends, we did more than keep half the world free. We helped create a new world. We must now confront the forces of change that have been liberated by our success--forces that are powerful, exciting, unfamiliar, and ripe with both danger and opportunity. The challenges of this world are as daunting as Stalin's army was menacing 40 years ago. Like then, this is a time for decision for the alliance. We should decide wisely, for we have awesome and inescapable responsibilities, not only for our peoples but for the future. To decide wisely, we must speak directly. I will not talk of bridges, pillars, or cornerstones. We are not here as engineers but as political leaders and trustees of democracy. [In] North America, in Western Europe, and even in the East, the alliance is rightly viewed as the core of European--indeed, world--stability. As its stewards, it is up to us to give the alliance direction and to employ its towering strengths toward noble ends. To do this, we must provide answers to four defining questions. First, in this uncertain world, how can we be sure that every ally can be safe from any threat of any sort? Second, how should we answer the calls of Europe's new democracies to join us? Third, how should we respond to the disintegration of Soviet power? And lastly, how should we relate to each other as Europe travels toward union? We must answer these questions now, but we must answer them right.
A New Strategic Doctrine
Talk of military strategy is sometimes awkward for politicians who pride themselves as men of peace. But our first responsibility is to remove any doubt that our peoples, their homes, and their vital interests are secure. Our history teaches us that adequate military strength is a prerequisite for political confidence and the pursuit of cooperation. Today, we should approve a fundamentally new strategic doctrine. Our forces will be lean, agile, and unmatched in human and technological quality. No corner of the alliance will be unprotected. And we will, let us be clear, maintain a credible--though radically reduced--nuclear deterrent. Thus, whoever might contemplate aggression against any ally will face the power of a united alliance with a full range of options. Without doubt, the withdrawal of Soviet power from the heart of Europe has improved our general security. But this is still a dangerous world, and the first principle of this alliance still stands: A threat to any single ally is a threat to all. As we look to the East, the unwilling allies of our former enemy now want to be our allies. Their aspiration should neither surprise nor alarm us. I submit that the liaison program that has been suggested is not the most we should do but the least we can do. We must clasp the outreached hand of the peoples whose freedom has at last been won by a combination of their courage and our resolve. If we, at this table, are concerned about instability in the Soviet Union, consider how the world must look to our fellow Europeans who live on the edge. Look back to a time when we lived on that edge. Forty years ago, the names were Ernest Bevin, Robert Schuman, Paul Henri Spaak. Today the names are Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Jozsef Antall. Security for those nations lives not in new legal undertakings but in helping them transform their countries. It is our duty--and in our interest--to help them change their military apparatus from a weapon of the state into a guardian of a free people. The liaison program will play an indispensable part in a much larger strategy, involving all of our institutions. We cannot welcome these nations to our world of values and yet hold them at arms length from our affairs. For 40 years we said: Even though your voices are silenced by tyranny, we hear you. Now that these voices are free, can we turn a deaf ear?
Change in the USSR
We and the Europeans to our east are riveted on developments to their east, in that space once home to a power that threatened our interests and our values--a power whose armies have more than once marched through Europe. While we cannot exclude that one day, despite our every wish and effort, a threat will rise again in that space, for the foreseeable future we see other powerful revolutionary forces at work: -- A brave struggle to create a legitimate government; and -- A rapid devolution of authority from what had been an immensely powerful central state. Men of principle--Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, and others- -are attempting to navigate through this perilous transition, and they deserve our understanding and support. Europe and America cannot respond to this situation separately. We must share our assessments, harmonize on strategies, and act in concert. The alliance has, since its birth, been indispensable in forging common policies toward the USSR-- and so it is now. This is why we have proposed to intensify consultations in the North Atlantic Council. We should be clear at this moment about our principles, and we should use the alliance to promote them in practice.
Partners in the Alliance
I come now to the fourth question: How do we deal with each other? Let me offer the American perspective: First, the United States will not--because it cannot--abandon its responsibilities, its interests, and its place in Europe. We have learned one of this bloody century's most painful lessons. Second, while some suggest that the United States wants followers in the alliance, what we want are partners. The alliance is not an American enterprise nor a vehicle of American power. We never sought preponderance, and we certainly do not seek to keep it. Nor do we claim a monopoly on ideas for the alliance. If we did, none of us would be sitting here today, for the idea of the Washington treaty [establishing NATO] was Europe's. Third, the United States has been, is, and will remain an unhesitating proponent of the aim and process of European integration. This strong American support extends to the prospect of a political union--as well as the goal of a defense identity. Fourth, even the attainment of European union, however, will not diminish the need for NATO--as far as we are concerned and as far as we can see. We do not see how there can be a substitute for the alliance as the provider of our defense and Europe's security. We support the development of the WEU [Western European Union] because it can complement the alliance and strengthen the European role in it. It can help Europe and North America face together threats to shared vital interests outside of Europe. But we do not see the WEU as a European alternative to the alliance. Our premise is that the American role in the defense and the affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European union. And lastly, at a time when our societies clamor for a peace dividend, redundant capabilities can be built only at the expense of those that exist. If we can depend on each other--and I have no doubt that we can--then our interdependence should be satisfactory to one and all, and redundant capabilities are unnecessary. I will close with this thought. This alliance has been more successful than any of us dared to dream. It was designed to defend our freedom, but, in fact, it triumphed over totalitarianism. What we have built is not some military pact but a community of values and trust--unique in history, perpetual, and vital for the new order. There is no roadmap for the new world, no way to know what the next year, let alone the next century, will bring. But our ability to cope with the future--indeed, to shape it--will be immeasurably greater if we walk out of here tomorrow with an alliance renewed.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

Post-Cold War Opportunities For Security and Partnership

Bush Source: President Bush Description: President's remarks on departure for Rome, Washington, DC Date: Nov 6, 199111/6/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, North America Country: United States Subject: NATO, EC, Trade/Economics [TEXT] NATO and the American presence in Europe have helped keep the peace for over 40 years, and now I am going to be meeting with the NATO leaders in Rome to talk about the challenges of security in the post-Cold War world and the opportunity for partnership with former adversaries. I view this as a very important part of the responsibilities of the President working for peace around the world. At The Hague, that is more economic because we'll be talking about our growing cooperation in helping the democratic transformations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the ways of expanding free and fair trade all around the world-- something that is going to generate a lot of new business opportunities for American farmers particularly but manufacturers and service industries as well. For example, just to put this in perspective, we will do more than $200 billion worth of trade this year with the EC nations, and every billion dollars' worth of manufactured exports means 20,000 jobs here in the United States. The best thing for American agriculture, incidentally, is to have a successful conclusion to the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] talks, to the Uruguay Round. The American farmer can compete with anybody, but he's got to have free and fair access to the markets of Europe, and that is a lot of what we'll be talking about when we meet with the EC leaders in The Hague . . . . (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

NATO Summit and EC Meeting

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Opening statement at a news conference at the White House, Washington, DC Date: Nov 2, 199111/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: Italy Subject: EC, NATO [TEXT] Tomorrow, the President will go to Rome for the NATO summit, and he will go to The Hague to meet with the European Community [EC]. In Rome, the summit will open a new chapter in the history of the alliance, a time for genuine peace and partnership. First, NATO will further extend its hand eastward by expanding the scope and depth of its liaison program. Last year, in London, the alliance recognized the need to reach out to the emerging democracies of the East. And, last month, I put forward with [German] Foreign Minister Genscher several proposals which we think can strengthen these efforts. Rome will push this process forward, committing the alliance to institutionalize consultation and cooperation on political and security issues with the countries of the East. Our work will include such critical areas as civil-military relations and defense conversion. Specifically, we will invite high-level representatives from Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Soviet Union to join us at our December 20, North Atlantic Council [NAC] ministerial meeting in Brussels. We will offer them annual meetings with the NAC at [the] ministerial level and more frequent meetings at lower levels. Second, as a part of this effort to reach out to the East, we will discuss with the allies our approach to the historic transformation of the Soviet Union and its republics. We are working with our friends and allies to establish principles that can guide our support, assistance, and relations with the republics and that can, in fact, determine the acceptability of their actions in the eyes of the international community. Our policy revolves around internationally accepted standards in three basic areas. First, politically: As I said at a briefing at the Department on the 4th of September, the authorities at all levels of government throughout the Soviet Union should respect democracy, the rule of law, and other CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] standards and norms as transformations take place in the Soviet Union and in the republics thereof. Militarily, we have talked about the necessity for all authorities to pursue policies that do not threaten international peace and security. This includes, of course, the need for all authorities to refrain from any steps that could lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons or proliferation of other means of mass destruction. In this connection, we welcome the statements by the Soviet leadership about their plans to ensure the safe, responsible, and reliable control of these weapons. Soviet nuclear weapons should not become the object of political bargaining of any kind. Economically, we see the need for political change to be accompanied by economic liberty and the building of free markets. Third, President Bush and the other heads of state will approve the alliance's new strategic concept. Fourth, Rome will provide a key opportunity for NATO heads of government to discuss relevant aspects of the ongoing debate about a European security identity in advance of the EC summit in December. Last June, in Copenhagen, the foreign ministers at the North Atlantic Council meeting then set forth an alliance framework for the debate over a European security identity. A number of proposals have been made in the run-up to the Maastricht summit--the EC summit. Of late, the debate has centered on how various organizations--the WEU [Western European Union], NATO, and the EC--will relate to each other in the security realm. The United States supports the development of a European security identity and defense role reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance but one which will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of NATO. Within this context, we want to see that the European security identity develops in line with those principles that we laid out in Copenhagen. With respect to the meeting with the EC, when the President travels to The Hague, it will be the first time an American President has held a summit with the European Community in Europe. And it will come at a time when our relations with the Community have never been closer. Making progress in the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] will be at the top of the President's agenda. We think we have an opportunity to make a lasting contribution to the liberalization of world trade, an achievement that helps both American workers and businesses. But the President will also want to discuss ways we can work together on political issues as well.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

NATO Summit and EC Meeting

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Opening statement at a news conference at the Excelsior Hotel, Rome, Italy Date: Nov 7, 199111/7/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Subject: EC, NATO [TEXT] Let me start by saying that I think we're well on our way to accomplishing our objectives. The overall goal, of course, of this NATO summit is to adapt NATO to changed circumstances. NATO is the most successful security organization that I can ever remember hearing anything about and one that has protected the West for over 40 years. It helped create the momentum for democratic revolutions in the former[ly] communist East. But now, there is new and different work to do in three main ways. Today, we took a big step by approving a new strategic doctrine, which has been released to you. We expect tomorrow to move forward on new alliance ties with the emerging democracies to the East. New problems, of course, involve and require a different type of engagement, so we are institutionalizing our new ties to those emerging democracies. We also expect tomorrow that the alliance will send a common message to the Soviet Union and to its republics about principles and policies that can help guide their transformation into becoming constructive members of the larger Euro-Atlantic community. In sum, the alliance is both adjusting its strategic concept to meet the changing times and is opening a new agenda with Central and Eastern Europe and the evolving Soviet Union. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

NATO's Evolving Role in Atlantic Security

Fitzwater Description: Fact sheets released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Rome Italy Date: Nov 8, 199111/8/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe Country: USSR (former) Subject: NATO, CSCE, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT]
NATO'S New Strategic Concept
The 16 alliance leaders announced in Rome today a new strategic concept, replacing one adopted at the height of the Cold War. This concept takes account of the profound political changes that have greatly altered the security environment. Its realization fulfills the promise of the 1990 London Declaration to adapt NATO to the new Europe. Alliance objectives are to safeguard the security and territorial integrity of its members and to establish a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. The new strategy is designed to realize these goals in peacetime, crises, and war. This new concept embodies a broad approach to security based on three reinforcing elements: dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability. The alliance supports increased political efforts to ensure peace, including in the field of arms control and disarmament. The enhanced liaison program with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is a part of this effort. The alliance seeks to defuse crises using a range of political and, if necessary, military means. Should these efforts fail and aggression occur, allied armed forces would restore peace. Rather than facing the over-arching threat of a simultaneous full-scale attack on NATO territory, the alliance now confronts threats that are multi-faceted and less predictable. To implement this concept, NATO's force will move away from linear forward deployments to a more flexible defense of all NATO territory with a reduced forward presence. The strategy of flexible response will be modified to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. -- The overall size, and in many cases the readiness, of conventional forces will be reduced, but those retained will be more flexible, more mobile, and sufficient to maintain an effective military capability. These forces will include both rapid reaction forces and assured augmentation capabilities. -- The alliance reaffirms its decision to reduce drastically its nuclear forces by 80%. At the same time, allies agreed that nuclear forces committed to NATO will continue to play an essential role safeguarding its members from coercion or war. -- The ability of the allies to work together is embodied in the integrated military structure, and cooperation and coordination agreements, which will include an unprecedented level of multinational forces.
Strengthening the European Identity in Security and Defense
Alliance leaders today reaffirmed their support for strengthening the European identity in security and defense, consistent with agreed NATO principles. NATO welcomed the development of such an identity in the July 1990 London Summit Declaration: The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe. Since then, considerable discussion of this issue has taken place in the European Community and Western European Union, as well as within NATO. At the June 1991 Copenhagen ministerial [meeting], alliance foreign ministers outlined NATO's core security functions in the new Europe, including the principle that "NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty." More recently, member states reaffirmed in Rome the necessity to consult closely on ideas for strengthening the European security and defense identity. Today's agreement reaffirms the Copenhagen principles and reflects our shared understanding within NATO that strengthening the alliance and building the European security and defense identity are complementary and mutually reinforcing processes. As stated in the Rome Summit Communique: We feel confident that in line with the consensus in Copenhagen, the result will contribute to a strong, new transatlantic partnership by strengthening the European component in a transformed alliance.
Further Strengthening of the CSCE
Since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has worked to bring about change through elaborating principles, commitments, and a common code of behavior among the now 38 member-states representing all the countries of Europe plus Canada and the United States. With the end of the Cold War, CSCE has taken on a new function as the forum for the common management of problems affecting all of its member states. To perform this task, the CSCE heads of state adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe last November to provide CSCE with a small secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. These changes were the result of proposals first put forward by the alliance at the NATO summit last year in London. Today in Rome, the leaders of the alliance laid out additional proposals to strengthen CSCE by reinforcing member [states'] political direction of the process, refining its structure, and further developing its institutions and procedures. Their overall objective is to enhance CSCE's ability to promote security and democracy in Europe in ways that complement the work of other relevant European and transatlantic institutions. They will be discussed at the general CSCE Follow-Up Meeting next March in Helsinki. They call in particular for: -- Transforming the Office for Free Elections into an Office of Democratic Institutions to promote cooperation in the fields of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; -- Improving CSCE's capabilities to prevent conflict and manage crises; -- Continuing CSCE's important human rights work; -- Designating the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials and CSCE's coordinating and managing body between meetings of CSCE Foreign Ministers (Council of Ministers); and -- Giving further political impetus to economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation.
Developments in the Soviet Union
Today in Rome, NATO leaders pledged their support for the efforts of the Soviet peoples to transform their society into one based on democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and economic liberty. Building on the five principles enunciated by Secretary Baker on September 4, the alliance called on Soviet authorities to: -- Respect the principles of democracy and the rule of law, in particular those of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other CSCE documents; -- Promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, in accordance with CSCE and other international standards; -- Refrain from any steps that could lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and, -- Implement policies to promote economic liberty and market economies, improve trade and economic cooperation among the republics, and integrate the Soviet Union and the republics into the world economy. The allies noted their readiness to assist the Soviet Union in developing comprehensive market economic reforms, in particular, through support of defense conversion efforts. They also pledged to extend humanitarian support to the Soviet peoples as they cope with the political and economic crises that confront them. The allies also called on the Soviet Union and republics to ensure that international agreements signed by the USSR, including the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] treaty, the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention, are respected, ratified, and implemented. In particular, they noted that the CFE Treaty is in the interests of the Soviet Union and the republics because it reduces the dangers of instability and enhances openness. In order to harmonize a common approach to developments in the Soviet Union and the republics, allied leaders agreed to continue their close coordination in the North Atlantic Council. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

US Policy and the Crisis in Zaire

Cohen Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Nov 6, 199111/6/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Zaire Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT]
The Present Situation
On September 23, troops considered to be among the most reliable in Zaire mutinied because their paychecks had become worthless due to hyper-inflation. Since then, looting and disorder have spread throughout the country, ravaging Zaire's already crippled economy, provoking the flight of most expatriates and destroying their businesses, and raising the specter of hunger in Kinshasa itself. As the September 23 mutiny illustrates, the immediate cause of the current unrest is economic. Decades of economic indiscipline have reduced this potentially rich country to penury. At the end of 1990, the Government of Zaire abandoned all pretext of economic reform. The World Bank and most other donors stopped balance-of- payments support and reduced their programs to humanitarian aid only. The situation was further complicated by human rights abuse. Following a massacre of students at the Lubumbashi University campus in May 1990, Belgium terminated all aid and withdrew technicians. More recently, France has terminated all aid. Today, economic decline has reached the point where President Mobutu, once among the strongest rulers in Africa, can no longer pay or consistently control his own military. The security forces which used to be the glue that held Zaire together are now, themselves, the cause of deepening instability. In March 1990, Secretary Baker visited Kinshasa and gave President Mobutu some friendly advice about economic reform, human rights, and democracy. His message was that Mobutu should heed the forces of change, which were already visibly sweeping Africa, or risk being swept aside by them. We were somewhat encouraged by Mobutu's pledge--a month later--to lead Zaire into a democratic system with presidential and legislative elections. In the months that followed, the press was liberated, the once-powerful government party weakened and divided, and many of the president's closest confidants deserted him. More than 250 parties came into existence. Increasingly, the most important opposition parties began to work together in an alliance called the Holy Union. Their collective influence steadily chipped away at the president's prestige and authority. Following a pattern familiar elsewhere in French-speaking Africa, the opposition insisted on a sovereign national conference which they hoped would discredit the president and then establish a transitional government pending a new constitution and elections. But, utilizing funds from the national treasury, the president was able to pack the conference with his own adherents, and it led nowhere. After the disturbances of September 23, President Mobutu agreed to name a transition government headed by his leading opponent and arch rival, Etienne Tshisekedi. But Mobutu and Tshisekedi were unable to work together, and on October 30, the president named a new government headed by Mungul Diaka, a man who does not enjoy the confidence of the opposition coalition. In response, on October 31, the opposition named a parallel "government," once again headed by Tshisekedi. Including the President, Zaire now has three "governments," and none of them is governing. Throughout this fruitless maneuvering, looting has continued, and hyper-inflation has escalated. Foreigners, their safety assured only by the temporary presence of French and Belgian troops, all of whom left Zaire this week, have continued to flee the country, abandoning their homes, missions, and investments to looters. They include virtually all the expatriates who operated Zaire's commerce and industry. Over 3,000 Americans have left the country, our Embassy has been reduced to a skeleton staff, and we have withdrawn all of the staff from our consulate in the mining center of Lubumbashi.
Past US Policy
US policy toward Zaire has been based on both positive and negative factors. For many years, Zaire has been a loyal ally in international fora. Most recently, Zaire provided us valuable support as a member of the [UN] Security Council during the Gulf crisis. Zaire supported our policy on Angola, and Mobutu was responsible for initiating the long process that led to the end of civil war in that country. We recognized President Mobutu as a leader who had united his country after the ethnic strife and civil war of the 1960s. We questioned whether anyone else could maintain national unity in Zaire. At the same time, we were increasingly disturbed by Zaire's poor human rights record and lack of movement toward democracy, as well as by the president's apparent unwillingness to distinguish between state finances and his own, a failing which lies at the heart of Zaire's dismal economic record. President Mobutu's poor record on human rights and economic development led to congressional restrictions on economic aid, barring any transfer of funds to the government, and a cutoff of all military assistance beginning in late 1990. Zairian inability to repay debt led to the application of Brooke Amendment Sanctions in June 1991 and the termination of all development assistance (DFA), leaving only PL 480 food aid still operative. In recent years, as the Cold War waned and pro-democracy sentiment grew in Africa, we counseled Mobutu to heed popular sentiment or risk being destroyed by it. As noted above, the Secretary's March 1990 visit to Kinshasa was a benchmark in this process, but we repeated the same message on many subsequent occasions. In recent months, since the emergence of a strong and increasingly unified opposition, there has been an obvious and urgent need for a credible transition government that could restore order, prepare for democracy, and stop Zaire's catastrophic economic decline. We have urged Mobutu to share power with the opposition in order to achieve such a government. We have urged both sides to compromise in the name of national survival. So far, this effort has failed. The President and the opposition leader, Mr. Tshisekedi, have engaged in personal conflict at the expense of compromise. As a result, Zaire still does not have a functioning government; there is no consistent control over the military; the economic catastrophe continues; and the threat of national disintegration looms larger every day.
What is Needed Now
With every day that slips by, human suffering in Zaire increases and, along with it, the risk of ethnic conflict and civil war. Zaire needs a functioning government that can restore order, begin the long process of economic recovery, and lay the basis for a democratic system. Recent events have proved beyond any doubt that the present regime under President Mobutu has lost the legitimacy to govern Zaire during the transition to democracy. The best hope for Zaire now is genuine power sharing between President Mobutu and the opposition. In particular, President Mobutu must break with the past and allow a transitional government to run the economic and domestic political affairs of the country without interference, including control over finance. The transitional government must come from the ranks of the opposition. It must not be tied to any one personality or ethnic group. To be stable, it must implement a democratic process that will give adequate representation to all regions and ethnic groups. It must lead directly to free and fair national elections. Such a government will have to act immediately to place Zaire's financial institutions under independent, transparent control acceptable to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It will have to avoid seeking vengeance against President Mobutu and members of his party, the MPR [Popular Movement of the Revolution]. In the interest of national unity, we believe it should guarantee the President's personal safety and his right to participate in the democratic process. In other words, a commitment to the basic human and political rights of all Zairians will be of the utmost importance. Achieving such goals will pose an enormous challenge to the Zairian people. None of us should overestimate our ability to shape events inside Zaire, but neither can we ignore the opportunity to help. We, as Americans, will have little influence unless we can act in concert with our French and Belgian allies and with the international financial institutions. But if we can work with our friends and with the people of Zaire, there is a possibility that this huge and populous country can overcome what could become the worst crisis in its history as an independent nation. The alternative is not pleasant to contemplate--civil war, famine, and national disintegration. The kind of ethnic-based civil war, which is now a live possibility in Zaire, would destroy what is left of the country's infrastructure. It would create waves of refugees that would destabilize Zaire's neighbors. It would require a massive humanitarian relief effort which the United States would inevitably be asked to help finance. Zaire's political and economic development would be set back for years. For the moment, there is little we can do to help solve Zaire's fundamental problems until a transitional government committed to accountability and democracy is in place. We are, however, investigating the requirement for emergency food and other assistance and will, in concert with [the US] Agency for International Development and OFDA [Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance], implement appropriate relief measures. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

Successful Peace Negotiations in Liberia

Tutwiler Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Nov 1, 199111/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Liberia Subject: Democratization The US Government congratulates the Economic Community of West African (ECOWAS) heads of state and other participants in the conference held at Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire, October 29-30, 1991, for their successful efforts in formulating a comprehensive framework and timetable for the peaceful resolution of the civil war in Liberia. The Communique of Yamoussoukro IV addresses the difficult questions and outlines a program for the orderly and peaceful disarmament and encampment of the rival factions under the supervision of a neutral peacekeeping force comprised of troops from Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Mali, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. West African leaders can be proud of their success in forging a regional solution to a regional problem. The agreement demonstrates that, where there is a consensus, collective action can play a pre-eminent role in resolving regional conflicts. The United States encourages all of the parties to comply promptly and fully with the timetable and the program of implementation, especially encampment, disarmament, and elections in 6 months as set forth in the communique. This is a major step forward, which the United States fully supports. We call upon all Liberians to embark on the critical path of national reconciliation, reconstruction, and development. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

US Welcomes Zambian Elections

Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Nov 4, 199111/4/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Zambia Subject: Democratization The United States welcomes the successful conclusion of presidential and parliamentary elections in Zambia. We congratulate President Frederick Chiluba on his victory. The elections, certified free and fair by international election observers, including former President Jimmy Carter, are the culmination of a long but steady process of change initiated almost 2 years ago. We commend President Kaunda for his statesmanlike decision to introduce multi-party politics to Zambia. These elections are an important milestone for Zambia and an inspiration for others in Africa. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

Recent Progress on POW/MIA Issues

Quinn Source: Kenneth M. Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary Description: Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, Washington, DC Date: Nov 5, 199111/5/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Vietnam, Cambodia Subject: POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] In my testimony today, I would like to provide the committee [with] an accounting of diplomatic activities and other efforts of the US Government on the POW/MIA [prisoners of war/missing in action] issue since I became chairman of the inter-agency group (IAG) in July 1990. I realize that you will likely have questions about other periods of time and I will, of course, endeavor to answer them. But, in terms of effort on POW/MIA, this has been an extremely active period, perhaps the most active since the end of the war. It is important to note just what has occurred. We now have a clear, carefully spelled-out and written-down policy approach on normalization of relations with Vietnam--called the roadmap--which blends two important US foreign policy goals-- a comprehensive political settlement on Cambodia and POW/MIA accounting. This policy was conveyed to the Vietnam[ese] Government in writing. We now have an established process to communicate with the Vietnamese Government at the policy level. This channel was established in July 1990 by Secretary Baker and initially focused on the Cambodian peace negotiations but has also served as an important vehicle to impress upon Vietnam the centrality of the POW/MIA issue to improving our relationship. The first meeting within that channel was held in New York on August 6, 1990. We now have a POW/MIA office in Hanoi, with the staff working full time on this issue. And we now have had--over the past 15 months--a number of high-level exchanges with Vietnam, Laos, and authorities in Phnom Penh, all of which had POW/MIA as a central topic. -- Secretary Baker met with then [Vietnamese] Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach in New York in September 1990 and with newly appointed Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam in Paris on October 23. These represented the first bilateral meetings at the Secretary level since the end of the war. -- Foreign Minister Thach visited Washington in October 1990 for meetings with General Vessey and the IAG, exclusively on POW/MIA. Minister Thach also came here to Capitol Hill to meet with Members of Congress. -- Secretary Baker met twice with Lao Foreign Minister Phoun in this same period, also the first time since the war the POW/MIA issue has been raised directly at the ministerial level. -- General Vessey made two trips to Hanoi this year which led to the establishment of our first POW/MIA office as well as Vietnamese agreements to take certain specific steps which supplement and implement the roadmap. -- Assistant Secretary Solomon met twice with Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai to discuss both Cambodia and POW/MIA issues. Mr. Solomon also met with Mr. Hun Sen in Paris October 24, during which POW/MIA cooperation was discussed extensively. -- Also important to note are the recent visits to Washington of Phnom Penh Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong and Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, the first senior Vietnamese official to visit the Pentagon. Both met with IAG principals to discuss POW/MIA. Not all of our diplomatic activities during the past 15 months have been with the Governments of Vietnam and Laos and the Phnom Penh authorities. We have also coordinated diplomatic approaches with many countries active in the area to ensure they understood our policy objectives in Indochina, particularly on a Cambodian settlement and POW/MIA. We have urged friendly countries to limit diplomatic, aid, and economic activities with Vietnam until progress was made on these objectives. We have also approached countries which potentially might have information about the POW/MIA issue. Secretary Baker has personally raised the issue with senior Soviet officials. So has Acting Assistant Secretary Carl Ford. Since July 1990, I have carried on a dialogue with Soviet diplomats particularly about the possibility of Americans still being alive in Vietnam. We have also discussed the issue with officials of the Peoples Republic of China. Just recently, we worked with China to facilitate a visit by a family member which resulted in important information being obtained relating to that family's missing loved one. In sum, the past 15 months have seen diplomatic efforts of an unprecedented breadth and scope on behalf of our POW/MIA effort.
Reports of Live Americans
Another aspect of our efforts of which it is important to take note has been our rapid reaction to reports of Americans alive in captivity. There have been two such cases to come before the IAG in the last 12 months. The first, which occurred in October 1990, involved a report and a photo of an individual identified as Walter T. Robinson. Even though a careful analysis indicated that the person in the photo was not the Walter T. Robinson who served in the US military or the one who was a crewman on the Glomar Java Sea, we could not preclude the possibility that he was an American. So the IAG urgently dispatched a plane and team to Vietnam to investigate the case. We eventually determined that the man involved was not an American. The second instance surrounded several highly publicized photos which were identified by family members as being five American servicemen. The first of these photos was brought to my attention on July 12 [1991] by Shelby Quast, the daughter of one of the men. The certainty with which she and more than a dozen other family members identified the three men in the photo as Colonel Robertson, Lt. Commander Stevens, and Major Lundy was powerful and compelling evidence. Within an hour, I had convened an emergency session of the IAG, including General Vessey, at which [an] agreement was quickly reached on specific steps to be taken. Before the day was out, and with the concurrence of the three families, I communicated the photo to the Vietnamese and instructed our Embassy in Vientiane to approach the Lao Government and Phnom Penh's ambassador. In all three instances, we called on the authorities to undertake an urgent and immediate investigation. Shortly thereafter, Secretary Baker wrote to Foreign Minister Thach stressing the importance of Vietnam's urgent cooperation. I met for 2 hours with the three families involved. During that meeting, they implored me to go to Hanoi to investigate the photos. I said I would, and I did. Three days later, I left for Asia to investigate that photo, as well as two other photos which, subsequently, became available which pictured men identified by their families as Lt. Borah and Captain Carr. My meeting with Cambodian officials in Beijing led to unprecedented cooperation by Phnom Penh's authorities in investigating not only these photos but also a number of other POW/MIA incidents. A DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] investigative team, which was received in Phnom Penh, immediately developed important information relevant to the photos of the three men. This led to follow-on visits, including a recent field activity on Tang Island, the site of the Mayaguez incident. On this same trip, I also traveled to Hanoi and Vientiane. In both cases, I stressed the importance of immediate and thorough action to investigate the photo of the three men. I am able to report that the response by both the Lao and Vietnamese Governments to this, the most urgent information about possibly alive Americans to come before the IAG since I have been its chair, was very positive. In Hanoi, in my meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai, I obtained agreement for access to prisons where we had reports the photos were taken--an action totally without precedent. The Vietnamese also provided information from military archives and records which, heretofore, was unavailable and agreed to an immediate re-excavation of the crash site of Colonel Robertson's plane. Lao officials also pledged full cooperation and shortly thereafter, acting unilaterally, located the Lao citizen who apparently was the person in the photo identified as Lt. Borah. They also made this person available to US POW/MIA experts. I would be remiss if I did not make specific reference to the superb support I received from Department of Defense personnel from DIA headquarters in Washington and stationed in Bangkok and Hanoi throughout this trip to Asia. In addition to the diplomatic steps I have just outlined, there have been other quite significant actions taken during the past 16 months by General Vessey, officials of the Defense Department, other members of the IAG and, indeed, by Members of Congress and private organizations, all of which are very important parts of the mosaic of America's POW/MIA efforts. I have not detailed them in my testimony because you will be hearing directly from many of them about what they have accomplished. I do want to note, however, that they form part--an essential part--of this picture of greatly increased activity aimed at assuring the fullest possible accounting for our missing service members.
The Roadmap
I believe it would be useful if I said a few words about US policy vis-a-vis Vietnam on normalization of relations with Vietnam. Our policy today remains unchanged. The United States is prepared to proceed toward normalization of relations with Vietnam only in the context of a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. The pace and scope of the normalization process will be directly affected by the seriousness with which Vietnam cooperates on the POW/MIA issue. Let me emphasize that the roadmap did not change that policy--rather it details a path we could follow based on that policy. It fuses together our objectives on Cambodia and POW/MIA and lays out a four-phased game plan within which, as progress is made on Cambodia and POW/MIA, we are prepared to take concomitant steps in expanding US economic and political activity with Vietnam and Cambodia. At first, the steps with Vietnam will be small, but as mutual confidence is developed and, I emphasize, progress on Cambodia and POW/MIA continues, the steps [will] increase in importance. The roadmap is constructed in a way so that we could move rapidly or slowly, depending on Vietnamese cooperation. It is important to stress that central to the roadmap is Hanoi's addressing the live prisoner issue, returning available US remains, and implementing a 24-month process to investigate every POW/MIA case. It is also important to note that the roadmap addresses the humanitarian issue of the release of political prisoners still held in re-education. While it is useful to enumerate the various diplomatic actions we have taken, we have to judge our success based on the results we achieve, and there has been progress. Our office in Hanoi has had access to information from official Vietnamese records, archives, and files as well as war museums. This has been a significant help in advancing our knowledge on a number of discrepancy cases and therefore, directly related to the live prisoner issue. Vietnam responded immediately and positively in the photo investigation, including granting access to the two prisons. In the past 12 months, the United States has removed 51 remains from Vietnam, 19 of which have been identified as particular US servicemen and 18 others as possibly Americans. In Phnom Penh, we have had more significant assistance on the photo cases and a demonstrated willingness to work cooperatively on other individual cases as well, including missing American journalists. We have also seen a number of important breakthroughs in Lao POW/MIA cooperation. We have conducted our first-ever investigations into discrepancy cases involving men last known to have been alive in Lao hands. We have expanded our POW/MIA efforts, previously limited to two southern provinces, into four additional provinces. In May, the Lao agreed to an expanded annual schedule of POW/MIA activities, including field activities during the rainy season. Most recently, the Lao Foreign Minister told Secretary Baker that his government would participate in a trilateral meeting with [the] United States and the Vietnamese to discuss cases along the Lao-SRV border. And as I noted earlier, the Lao cooperated very effectively on the photo believed to be of Lt. Borah. We have consistently told Vietnam that the formal process of normalization of relations could only begin with the signing of the Paris Agreement. That approach was embodied in our policy as presented to the Vietnamese by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon last April. Based on the fact that both Vietnam and the Phnom Penh authorities did sign the Paris Agreement on Cambodia, and that POW/MIA cooperation and the release of re- education prisoners has begun, the United States has responded by announcing that we are taking the steps we said we would to begin the road map. Secretary Baker announced in Paris that the United States would: -- Soon send a diplomatic mission to Cambodia to represent us to the Supreme National Council; -- Lift our trade embargo on Cambodia once UNAMIC [UN Advance Mission in Cambodia] is in place and implementation of the Peace agreement has begun; -- Remove the 25-mile travel restriction on Vietnamese diplomats at the United Nations; -- Revise our trade embargo to permit US-organized travel to Vietnam by groups, such as veterans, business organizations, and others; and -- Start talks with Vietnam on the issues and modalities involved in the normalization process. These are the only steps in the roadmap we have taken with Vietnam. No other decisions have been made to take any further steps. Our policy remains as stated and laid out in the roadmap. That will continue to be our policy. We are in control of the process. We are prepared to move forward but only with continued progress on Cambodia and POW/MIAs. In that regard, I note that following the Secretary's announcement in Paris, the Vietnamese have given us the increased access we requested to some key military records and have indicated they have a significant number of additional remains ready for the two sides to jointly examine. I would hope that this development indicates that we can look to more progress and greater results because, our policy is driven by a desire to end the agony suffered by families of our POW/MIAs as well as the agony of the Cambodian people. We have made progress toward both these goals. We have a Cambodian agreement. We have an office in Hanoi. We have some important advances on POW/MIA [issues]. But we still have a considerable way to go. So let me end by saying, on behalf of Secretary Baker as well as for myself, that we intend to build on the accomplishments we have achieved and continue our efforts toward the goal we all share--the fullest possible accounting for all our POW/MIAs. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

Kuwait's Burning Wells Extinguished

Fitzwater Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Nov 6, 199111/6/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Kuwait Subject: Environment, Science/Technology Today, we celebrate with the people and the Government of Kuwait as they complete a major step along the road to recovery. The extinguishing of the last of Kuwait's burning oil wells represents a remarkable achievement. In less than 9 months, a unique international coalition capped nearly 700 wells, reversing Saddam [Hussein's] cruel efforts to achieve with sabotage what he could not do with his military--the destruction of Iraq's peaceful neighbor and the fouling of an entire region in an act of mass ecological terrorism. Upon the liberation of Kuwait last March, the President directed US agencies to come to Kuwait's assistance in tackling the disaster perpetrated by Saddam's retreating army. Seven hundred fifty-two of the country's 1,037 oil wells had been damaged, and 610 were burning. Working closely with the Government of Kuwait, the United States lent vital support in engineering, transport, and other areas--support which was critical to the success in extinguishing the blazing wells. We are delighted to have been partners in every phase of the firefighting effort. We are particularly proud that three of the first four teams on the ground in March were American. It was these teams that laid the groundwork for the success that followed. American teams capped over half of the damaged wells in the effort that grew eventually to include firefighters from 28 countries. We share Kuwait's joy and salute the brave men and women who met this historic challenge. We support Kuwait's demand for just compensation by Iraq for these and other war-related damages, and we remain determined to stand with Kuwait and others against Saddam and his policies. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

US Policy on Repatriation Of Vietnamese in Hong Kong

Lyman Source: Princeton Lyman, Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Nov 5, 199111/5/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia Country: Vietnam, Hong Kong, United Kingdom Subject: Refugees, United Nations [TEXT] I am pleased to be here to discuss with you our understanding of recent developments between the United Kingdom and Vietnam regarding the repatriation of Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong who have been determined not to be refugees. This is a complex issue which highlights the moral and political difficulties of resolving a humanitarian problem of great dimension. As this committee knows, since 1989 the United States has adhered to an international agreement called the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) to deal with Indochinese asylum-seekers. That agreement preserved the practice of first asylum in almost all countries of Southeast Asia, and in Hong Kong, with the regrettable exception of Malaysia. The CPA established a system for screening asylum seekers to determine which are refugees according to internationally accepted definition and which are not. Those who are determined to be refugees are resettled in third countries (the United States alone is committed to admitting up to 50% of them). Those who are not determined to be refugees are not eligible for resettlement and should return home. As of mid-September, according to UNHCR [Office of the UN High Commissioner on Refugees], 38% of the total camp population of approximately 115,000 had been screened, with about 22% screened in and 78% screened-out region-wide. Screened-in rates vary from 13% in Hong Kong to 42% in the Philippines. Although UNHCR, with full US support, is making every effort to insure the uniformity of screening procedures, it is not surprising that the rates among countries of first asylum should differ, given the different origins of their boat people populations. UNHCR estimates that if conditions do not change, the first instance screening backlog could be cleared up by the middle of next year in the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] countries, but not in Hong Kong, where it will take longer. After a slow start, due largely to the difficulties of recruiting qualified personnel and the labor- intensive case-work required, screening of unaccompanied minors by the special committees is picking up speed. UNHCR now plans to finish processing all cases by the end of 1991, except for Hong Kong, where it should be finished by mid-1992. Voluntary repatriation has fluctuated under the CPA but seems to be gaining momentum. It increased from 4,570 in Fiscal Year (FY)1990 to 8,164 in FY 1991. In Hong Kong, monthly return figures have varied widely. Recently, they are moving strongly upward, such that departure rates are exceeding arrival rates. In October, a record 1,173 boat people returned voluntarily to Vietnam under UNHCR auspices. In the same month, an unprecedented number of people applied for voluntary repatriation, approximately 2,300. Of particular note, the percentage of older cases, particularly people who came in 1989, has begun to inch up. Of course, these encouraging trends may collapse, as they have before, particularly if there is a resurgence in the erroneous belief that somehow, some way, the screened-out will be resettled. Under the terms of the CPA and US policy, the screened-out will not be resettled. The CPA specifies that "in the first instance, every effort will be made to encourage the voluntary return" of the screened-out. It goes on to say that "if, after the passage of reasonable time, it becomes clear that voluntary repatriation is not making sufficient progress toward the desired objective, alternatives recognized as being acceptable under international practices would be examined." With the Cambodian settlement and the attendant possibility of Vietnam's having more normal relations with the international community, we hope that conditions in Vietnam may improve. There is some inconclusive evidence that they have already begun to change. In addition, there is progress under the CPA in discouraging clandestine departures from Vietnam. Except for Hong Kong, there have been sharp declines this year compared with last in the number of boat people leaving Vietnam for all other countries in the region, for example, down 81% for the Philippines, 74% for Thailand, and 83% for Indonesia. The UNHCR, which monitors the situation of the over 13,000 Vietnamese who have returned home voluntarily, has not discovered any persecution or discrimination against the returnees, and our own admittedly impressionistic reporting confirms this. During 1991, while the number of newly arrived asylum seekers in ASEAN countries decreased dramatically, the arrival rate for Hong Kong increased. During the first 9 months of 1991, 19,671 boat people arrived in Hong Kong, compared with 5,228 during the same period in 1990. This created a political problem in Hong Kong, where many local inhabitants resent the welcome given Vietnamese when Chinese asylum seekers find much less hospitality and are frequently deported to China. It also filled the camps to their limits, topping 64,000 people. Feeling the need to relieve the situation, UK and Hong Kong officials met with US officials in Washington June 3-4, 1991, to discuss measures to deal with the sharply increasing number of Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving in Hong Kong. The British and Hong Kong sides informed the United States that they intended as a matter of urgency to seek bilateral discussions with Vietnam, especially on the proposal for establishment of internationally managed and controlled centers on Vietnamese territory. Within the context of the CPA and the US position on involuntary repatriation, the United States did not object to these discussions. On September 30, following talks among the UK, Hong Kong, Vietnam, the UNHCR, and the International Organization for Migration, the parties announced agreement in a joint statement that the high arrival rates in Hong Kong needed to be stemmed to avoid undermining the CPA. Vietnam rejected a British proposal to establish an internationally managed holding center for the screened-out on Vietnamese territory. However, there was discussion of possible alternative methods of accelerating repatriation of non-refugees "with a view," as the UK/SRV [United Kingdom/Socialist Republic of Vietnam] statement put it, "to reinforcing the CPA provision that such persons should return to their country of origin in accordance with international practice." The UNHCR announced that since their repatriation allowance appeared to be serving more as an incentive to leave Vietnam than to return, the amount would be reduced--effective September 27-- for those who leave Vietnam after that date. (We understand the new stipend comprises $50 in lump-sum payments per person and an additional $10 per month for a year for the head of family. This compares with a total of $50 per person lump-sum and $30 per month per person for 1 year, which was the previous repatriation allowance and which is still available for asylum seekers who arrived in Hong Kong before September 27.) Subsequently, on October 21, the British Government announced a "first step" in their on-going negotiations with the Vietnamese: an agreement that those who had returned to Hong Kong a second time after having returned home with repatriation assistance--the so-called "double- backers"--would be returned. The British reiterated the Vietnamese Government's guarantee that no "illegal immigrant" (as the agreement puts it) who returns home will face persecution and that UNHCR will continue monitoring their situation. On October 29, the British announced agreement on other topics of discussion with the Vietnamese. As of October 29, all new arrivals in Hong Kong would be given priority screening in accordance with established practice under UNHCR auspices. The screened-in will continue to be resettled, and the screened-out returned to Vietnam. Vietnam agreed "in principle" to accept the return of those previously screened-out. The British have announced that they will effect the repatriations in accordance with normal international practice and under the terms of the CPA. We expect that force will not be used to return the screened-out to Vietnam. I have seen the agreement, and it does not explicitly mention forcible return. However, the British have not yet given us the details of the procedures they will use to effect the return. We will judge these procedures by what actually occurs. Given time needed for screening and possibly appeals, it will be at least 6 weeks or more before any new arrivals could be scheduled for return. The British are well aware of our position on mandatory and forced repatriation under current conditions in Vietnam and our support for voluntary return and return without objection. The screened-out should be equally aware of our position that they will not be resettled and that they should return home. We can all hope with some reason that the prospect for peace and normalization opened by the Cambodia settlement will make the future for Vietnamese in Vietnam a more attractive one and help facilitate an end to the phenomenon of the boat people. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

US Restores Bratislava Consulate General

Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Nov 4, 199111/4/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Czechoslovakia (former), Slovak Republic. We are pleased to announce that the United States is upgrading our Consulate in Bratislava, Slovakia, to a Consulate General. The President confirmed with President Havel during their meeting at the White House on Tuesday that the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic welcomed this step. Prior to 1949, we had a Consulate General in Bratislava to demonstrate our recognition of both Slovakia's political and economic importance and of its equal but separate identity in the common Czechoslovak state. We closed Consulate General Bratislava in 1949 as a result of the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia. Now, 42 years later, American interest in Slovakia has revived and is flourishing. American tourists, many of them of Slovak heritage, are visiting Slovakia in ever greater numbers. American business is showing growing interest in the republic, Peace Corps volunteers are present, and more and more American students are going to Slovakia to study. Furthermore, there is an increasing flow of Slovak tourists, businessmen, officials, academicians, students, and others to the United States. The time has come to re-establish our Consulate General in Bratislava to ensure that legitimate and natural American and Slovak interests are better served. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People's Army

Date: Nov 11, 199111/11/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: East Asia Country: Philippines Subject: Democratization, Terrorism [TEXT]
Background
In 1969, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) created a military arm, the New People's Army (NPA). The broad aim of the CPP/NPA is straightforward: to overthrow the elected government by violent means and replace it with a communist regime. A component of their program is the removal of US military facilities and influence from the Philippines. The CPP/NPA has always placed a high premium on rural military operations and control of the rural peasantry, including the sometimes forced collection of "revolutionary taxes" from both peasants and landowners. In recent years, NPA operations have increasingly included the towns and cities. For example, the Alex Boncayo Brigade (ABB), an NPA urban terrorist force named after a leftist labor leader killed in the late 1970s, operates in the greater Manila area. The restoration of democracy under Philippine President Aquino has undercut the NPA's appeal among the middle class, but wide disparities of wealth and economic stagnation continue to ensure a measure of NPA support among the country's urban and rural poor. The communists seek to rally support by arguing that the government is still corrupt and abusive, and that it remains under foreign--that is, US--influence. Accordingly, communist use of the anti-American theme has become even more prominent. Removal of the US military facilities is a cause that the CPP/NPA hopes can appeal to nationalistic Filipinos even if they have little sympathy with other communist aims. US officials and interests have become priority NPA targets. While official Americans remain the chief foreign targets, some other nationalities have also become victims. For example, Japanese citizens were kidnapped for ransom in 1986 and 1990.
Methods
NPA units, including the ABB, operate in towns and cities. Its small "sparrow unit" death squads usually try to get as close as possible to victims to kill them with shots to the head. Fellow squad members then help the killers escape. The NPA appears to choose victims in such a way as to impress common people with concern for their welfare. Philippine Government or military officials with a reputation for corruption or arbitrary use of power are among likely victims. US military personnel have been chosen at random to protest the continued presence of US military facilities and military assistance to the Philippine Government. Sometimes they are specifically chosen, as in the case of Col. James N. Rowe who was slain in 1989 to protest US assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). When attacking property, the NPA often uses directed explosives, such as rifle grenades. Timed explosives are sometimes used as the most effective means of low risk destruction. This was the case with the April 1989 bombings at a US military communications facility on Mount Cabuyao, near Baguio, and bombings of the Voice of America (VOA) transmitter site in Tarlac Province in September 1990 and January 1991.
Size and Funding
The current strength of the NPA is about 17,500 fighters. A typical NPA fighter is an unemployed male in his early twenties, of rural extraction, and with little education. Female fighters are not unusual. More educated persons of both sexes are commonly found in positions of authority. Funding for the organization comes from a variety of sources, including robbery, "revolutionary taxes" extorted from farmers and businesses, illegal enterprises, and external support groups and fund raisers. The principal overseas support group, located in the Netherlands, is run by Jose Maria Sison, the exiled founder of the CPP. The proportion of foreign-raised money in CPP/NPA coffers is not known with certainty but may be considerable.
NPA Strengths and Weaknesses
The NPA enjoys the same advantages as irregular fighters and terrorists anywhere. Its members blend in with the population, choosing the time, place, and target for their attacks. In some rural areas, CPP/NPA influence is substantial, even among local government authorities--sometimes due to intimidation, sometimes out of sympathy for NPA goals. The inability of the Philippine Government to provide adequate services to these areas has long played into the hands of the communists. A supply of disaffected poor has thus far assured replenishment of the NPA's lower ranks. Some factors suggest that the CPP/NPA is experiencing difficulties. Indeed, its ability to attain its strategic goals appears to be diminishing. Bloody attacks during 1990 may reflect a loss of direction as much as a new and clear agenda. Among the NPA's problems: -- It is likely that the extortion of "revolutionary taxes" and other fund-raising tactics erode popular support for the NPA. The Philippines' more open and democratic system also reduces the number of people attracted to violent revolution. -- The recent collapse of European communism has left the CPP ideologically stranded and has reduced the number of potential donors of funds, training, and equipment. -- A chronic lack of funds and supplies means that the NPA is frequently short of ammunition and must depend largely upon captured government weapons and supplies. -- Improved AFP professionalism has resulted in military setbacks for the NPA. Government forces have bested it in many encounters, further reinforcing the NPA's tendency toward small ambush operations and assassinations. -- Aggressive Philippine Government intelligence analysis and law enforcement have led to the arrests of several important CPP/NPA members. The government maintains a reward system for information on terrorists and acts against them with energy and skill. Attempts by CPP/NPA to identify and purge government agents have also led to the murder of many suspected collaborators. -- Good security measures, particularly for "high-profile" targets, have forced the NPA to direct its operations toward "soft" targets. -- The CPP/NPA is divided over the question of whether a rural guerrilla campaign or an urban terror campaign would be more effective. Some in the party would even prefer participation in the democratic process to armed struggle.
Prospects
The CPP/NPA presents a serious long-term problem that will continue to drain government resources but currently lacks the power to overthrow the government. The NPA threatens the safety of any unsympathetic Filipino, military personnel and government officials, and certain resident foreigners. Because terrorism is cheaper and more visible than military operations, terrorist attacks may be intensified, with Americans remaining among the prime targets. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

NPA Attacks 1986-90

Date: Nov 11, 199111/11/91 Category: Chronologies Region: East Asia Country: Philippines Subject: Terrorism [TEXT] The following chronology includes NPA attacks against non-Filipino targets as well as attacks against major Filipino targets. Attacks against foreign interests constitute a small part of the total number mounted by Philippine communists. 1986 November--The NPA, with some Japanese Red Army guidance, kidnapped a Japanese businessman for ransom. 1987 March--NPA gunmen ambushed the mayor of a Manila suburb, wounding him and killing seven of his bodyguards. October--The NPA murdered two active-duty American servicemen, an American retiree, and a Filipino passerby.1989 March--NPA gunmen murdered a Filipino businessman who had actively supported keeping US military facilities in the country. April--A US military security patrol surprised an NPA team laying land-mines in a road used by Clark Air Base personnel, foiling a planned ambush. --NPA rebels set off 18 explosive devices at a US military communications facility at Mount Cabuyao. One antenna was destroyed and another damaged, but there were no casualties. --An NPA "sparrow unit" assassinated US Army Col. James N. Rowe. Gunmen pulled alongside his car as he drove to work in metropolitan Manila and shot him with automatic weapons. Two NPA members were convicted of complicity in Rowe's assassination in February 1991 and sentenced to life imprisonment. June--In Mindanao, NPA guerrillas attacked a United Church of Christ religious service. Using machetes and firearms, they murdered 39 Filipino worshippers, including women and a dozen children. September--The NPA killed two American employees of a US Air Force contractor near Clark Air Base. Also in September, the NPA claimed responsibility for the killing of an officer in President Aquino's security force. December--Two anti-personnel rifle grenades were fired at the US Embassy's Seafront Compound in Manila. Only minor damage resulted. 1990 January--The NPA claimed responsibility for the detonation of a small explosive device at the US Cultural Center in Davao. February--On the island of Bohol, the NPA killed an American geologist, his Filipino wife, and his father-in-law in an ambush. The father-in-law, a prominent local official, is believed to have been targeted in the attack for refusing to pay "revolutionary taxes." March--On Masbate island, an American was murdered by NPA guerrillas at his ranch for refusing to pay "revolutionary taxes." May--On the eve of US-Philippine base talks, NPA assassins killed two US Air Force airmen. A third airman escaped and described the typical ambush method of the NPA, with assassins approaching their victims and firing at their heads from close range. The NPA claimed responsibility for these murders in a "declaration of war" against the US military presence in the Philippines. --In the early morning hours of May 18, two rifle grenades were fired at the US Information Service Thomas Jefferson Cultural Center in Makati, metropolitan Manila. One grenade exploded; there were no injuries. June--US Peace Corps volunteers were removed from the Philippines because of reported NPA threats. When the volunteers were assembled for departure, it was found that one had already been abducted by the NPA on the island of Negros. The NPA released him unharmed in early August. July--Four NPA members in a jeep drove past the US Cultural Center in Davao, firing rifles at the building. There were no casualties. September--An NPA bomb destroyed an antenna base at the Voice of America (VOA) site in Tarlac Province. October--An American citizen traveling in Cagayan Province was kidnapped, apparently by the NPA. He has not been released. Demands for ransom have not, at this writing, been received. November--Two rifle grenades were fired at the US Embassy in Manila. There were no injuries. 1991 January--Philippine police engaged in a firefight with NPA members and defused 15 explosive devices that had been set at the
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991 Title:

Current Treaty Actions

Tutwiler Date: Nov 11, 199111/11/91 Category: Treaties/Agreements Country: Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia (former), Fiji, Guyana, Japan, Laos, Peru, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates Subject: International Law, Trade/Economics, State Department, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Environment, Media/Telecommunications, Arms Control [TEXT]
Multilateral
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the US Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. Accession deposited: Malaysia, Oct. 1, 1991.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, formulated at Bretton Woods Conference, July 1- 22, 1944. Entered into force, Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. Signature and acceptance: Albania, Oct. 15, 1991.
Load Lines
International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, and 6720. Accession deposited: Sudan, Sept. 26, 1991.
Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. Accessions deposited: Lithuania, Sept. 23, 1991; Zimbabwe, Oct. 4, 1991.
Pollution
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington, Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165. Accession deposited: Jamaica, Mar. 22, 1991.
Bilateral
Costa Rica
Memorandum of understanding establishing a Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN) in Costa Rica. Signed at San Jose, Aug.17, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 17, 1990.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Washington Oct. 22, 1991. Enters into force upon date of receipt of later notification indicating completion of respective internal requirements.
Fiji
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Suva and Washington Sept. 13 and Oct. 10, 1991. Entered into force Nov. 16, 1991.
Guyana
Agreement regarding the discharge of certain debts owed to the Government of the United States, with annex. Signed at Georgetown Sept. 30, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1991.
Japan
Agreement concerning Japan's financial contribution for US administrative and related expenses for the Japanese fiscal year 1991 pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of Mar. 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957; 5 UST 661). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Sept. 27, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 27, 1991.
Laos
International express mail agreement. Signed at Vientiane and Washington Sept. 10 and Oct. 16, 1991. Entered into force Nov. 16, 1991.
Peru
Project grant agreement for economic stabilization and recovery program. Signed at Lima Sept. 30, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1991.
Sri Lanka
Agreement on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Signed at Colombo Sept. 20, 1991. Entered into force Oct. 20, 1991. Protocol amending the Convention of March 14, 1985, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Colombo Sept. 20, 1991. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.
United Arab Emirates
Agreement on investment guaranties. Signed at Abu Dhabi Sept. 29, 1991. Enters into force upon date of an exchange of notes confirming approval pursuant to applicable constitutional procedures. (###)