US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: A Time of Decision For the NATO Alliance
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Intervention at the NATO Summit, Rome, Italy
Date: Nov 7, 199111/7/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia, North America
Country: USSR (former), United States
Subject: NATO
[TEXT]
The [North Atlantic] Council meets at a turning point in history for
the second time. The first was the day this alliance was born. Then
the world was divided--one half suppressed, the other fearful.
[Secretary of State] Dean Acheson said then our task was to create
a world half free.
My friends, we did more than keep half the world free. We
helped create a new world. We must now confront the forces of
change that have been liberated by our success--forces that are
powerful, exciting, unfamiliar, and ripe with both danger and
opportunity. The challenges of this world are as daunting as
Stalin's army was menacing 40 years ago.
Like then, this is a time for decision for the alliance. We
should decide wisely, for we have awesome and inescapable
responsibilities, not only for our peoples but for the future. To
decide wisely, we must speak directly. I will not talk of bridges,
pillars, or cornerstones. We are not here as engineers but as
political leaders and trustees of democracy.
[In] North America, in Western Europe, and even in the East,
the alliance is rightly viewed as the core of European--indeed,
world--stability. As its stewards, it is up to us to give the
alliance direction and to employ its towering strengths toward
noble ends. To do this, we must provide answers to four defining
questions.
First, in this uncertain world, how can we be sure that every
ally can be safe from any threat of any sort?
Second, how should we answer the calls of Europe's new
democracies to join us?
Third, how should we respond to the disintegration of Soviet
power?
And lastly, how should we relate to each other as Europe
travels toward union?
We must answer these questions now, but we must answer
them right.
A New Strategic Doctrine
Talk of military strategy is sometimes awkward for politicians
who pride themselves as men of peace. But our first responsibility
is to remove any doubt that our peoples, their homes, and their vital
interests are secure. Our history teaches us that adequate military
strength is a prerequisite for political confidence and the pursuit of
cooperation.
Today, we should approve a fundamentally new strategic
doctrine. Our forces will be lean, agile, and unmatched in human and
technological quality. No corner of the alliance will be unprotected.
And we will, let us be clear, maintain a credible--though radically
reduced--nuclear deterrent. Thus, whoever might contemplate
aggression against any ally will face the power of a united alliance
with a full range of options. Without doubt, the withdrawal of
Soviet power from the heart of Europe has improved our general
security. But this is still a dangerous world, and the first principle
of this alliance still stands: A threat to any single ally is a threat
to all.
As we look to the East, the unwilling allies of our former
enemy now want to be our allies. Their aspiration should neither
surprise nor alarm us. I submit that the liaison program that has
been suggested is not the most we should do but the least we can
do. We must clasp the outreached hand of the peoples whose
freedom has at last been won by a combination of their courage and
our resolve.
If we, at this table, are concerned about instability in the
Soviet Union, consider how the world must look to our fellow
Europeans who live on the edge. Look back to a time when we lived
on that edge. Forty years ago, the names were Ernest Bevin, Robert
Schuman, Paul Henri Spaak. Today the names are Lech Walesa,
Vaclav Havel, Jozsef Antall.
Security for those nations lives not in new legal undertakings
but in helping them transform their countries.
It is our duty--and in our interest--to help them change their
military apparatus from a weapon of the state into a guardian of a
free people. The liaison program will play an indispensable part in
a much larger strategy, involving all of our institutions. We cannot
welcome these nations to our world of values and yet hold them at
arms length from our affairs. For 40 years we said: Even though
your voices are silenced by tyranny, we hear you. Now that these
voices are free, can we turn a deaf ear?
Change in the USSR
We and the Europeans to our east are riveted on developments to
their east, in that space once home to a power that threatened our
interests and our values--a power whose armies have more than
once marched through Europe. While we cannot exclude that one day,
despite our every wish and effort, a threat will rise again in that
space, for the foreseeable future we see other powerful
revolutionary forces at work:
-- A brave struggle to create a legitimate government; and
-- A rapid devolution of authority from what had been an
immensely powerful central state.
Men of principle--Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, and others-
-are attempting to navigate through this perilous transition, and
they deserve our understanding and support.
Europe and America cannot respond to this situation
separately. We must share our assessments, harmonize on
strategies, and act in concert. The alliance has, since its birth,
been indispensable in forging common policies toward the USSR--
and so it is now. This is why we have proposed to intensify
consultations in the North Atlantic Council. We should be clear at
this moment about our principles, and we should use the alliance to
promote them in practice.
Partners in the Alliance
I come now to the fourth question: How do we deal with each other?
Let me offer the American perspective:
First, the United States will not--because it cannot--abandon
its responsibilities, its interests, and its place in Europe. We have
learned one of this bloody century's most painful lessons.
Second, while some suggest that the United States wants
followers in the alliance, what we want are partners. The alliance
is not an American enterprise nor a vehicle of American power. We
never sought preponderance, and we certainly do not seek to keep it.
Nor do we claim a monopoly on ideas for the alliance. If we did,
none of us would be sitting here today, for the idea of the
Washington treaty [establishing NATO] was Europe's.
Third, the United States has been, is, and will remain an
unhesitating proponent of the aim and process of European
integration. This strong American support extends to the prospect
of a political union--as well as the goal of a defense identity.
Fourth, even the attainment of European union, however, will
not diminish the need for NATO--as far as we are concerned and as
far as we can see. We do not see how there can be a substitute for
the alliance as the provider of our defense and Europe's security.
We support the development of the WEU [Western European Union]
because it can complement the alliance and strengthen the European
role in it. It can help Europe and North America face together
threats to shared vital interests outside of Europe. But we do not
see the WEU as a European alternative to the alliance. Our premise
is that the American role in the defense and the affairs of Europe
will not be made superfluous by European union.
And lastly, at a time when our societies clamor for a peace
dividend, redundant capabilities can be built only at the expense of
those that exist. If we can depend on each other--and I have no
doubt that we can--then our interdependence should be satisfactory
to one and all, and redundant capabilities are unnecessary.
I will close with this thought. This alliance has been more
successful than any of us dared to dream. It was designed to defend
our freedom, but, in fact, it triumphed over totalitarianism. What
we have built is not some military pact but a community of values
and trust--unique in history, perpetual, and vital for the new order.
There is no roadmap for the new world, no way to know what the
next year, let alone the next century, will bring. But our ability to
cope with the future--indeed, to shape it--will be immeasurably
greater if we walk out of here tomorrow with an alliance renewed.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: Post-Cold War Opportunities For Security and Partnership
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: President's remarks on departure for Rome, Washington,
DC
Date: Nov 6, 199111/6/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, North America
Country: United States
Subject: NATO, EC, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
NATO and the American presence in Europe have helped keep the
peace for over 40 years, and now I am going to be meeting with the
NATO leaders in Rome to talk about the challenges of security in the
post-Cold War world and the opportunity for partnership with
former adversaries. I view this as a very important part of the
responsibilities of the President working for peace around the
world.
At The Hague, that is more economic because we'll be talking
about our growing cooperation in helping the democratic
transformations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the
ways of expanding free and fair trade all around the world--
something that is going to generate a lot of new business
opportunities for American farmers particularly but manufacturers
and service industries as well. For example, just to put this in
perspective, we will do more than $200 billion worth of trade this
year with the EC nations, and every billion dollars' worth of
manufactured exports means 20,000 jobs here in the United States.
The best thing for American agriculture, incidentally, is to
have a successful conclusion to the GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] talks, to the Uruguay Round. The American
farmer can compete with anybody, but he's got to have free and fair
access to the markets of Europe, and that is a lot of what we'll be
talking about when we meet with the EC leaders in The Hague . . . .
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: NATO Summit and EC Meeting
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Opening statement at a news conference at the White
House, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 2, 199111/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Italy
Subject: EC, NATO
[TEXT]
Tomorrow, the President will go to Rome for the NATO summit, and
he will go to The Hague to meet with the European Community [EC].
In Rome, the summit will open a new chapter in the history of
the alliance, a time for genuine peace and partnership.
First, NATO will further extend its hand eastward by
expanding the scope and depth of its liaison program. Last year, in
London, the alliance recognized the need to reach out to the
emerging democracies of the East. And, last month, I put forward
with [German] Foreign Minister Genscher several proposals which
we think can strengthen these efforts.
Rome will push this process forward, committing the alliance
to institutionalize consultation and cooperation on political and
security issues with the countries of the East. Our work will
include such critical areas as civil-military relations and defense
conversion. Specifically, we will invite high-level representatives
from Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Soviet Union to join us at
our December 20, North Atlantic Council [NAC] ministerial meeting
in Brussels. We will offer them annual meetings with the NAC at
[the] ministerial level and more frequent meetings at lower levels.
Second, as a part of this effort to reach out to the East, we
will discuss with the allies our approach to the historic
transformation of the Soviet Union and its republics. We are
working with our friends and allies to establish principles that can
guide our support, assistance, and relations with the republics and
that can, in fact, determine the acceptability of their actions in the
eyes of the international community.
Our policy revolves around internationally accepted standards
in three basic areas. First, politically: As I said at a briefing at
the Department on the 4th of September, the authorities at all
levels of government throughout the Soviet Union should respect
democracy, the rule of law, and other CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe] standards and norms as transformations
take place in the Soviet Union and in the republics thereof.
Militarily, we have talked about the necessity for all
authorities to pursue policies that do not threaten international
peace and security. This includes, of course, the need for all
authorities to refrain from any steps that could lead to
proliferation of nuclear weapons or proliferation of other means of
mass destruction. In this connection, we welcome the statements
by the Soviet leadership about their plans to ensure the safe,
responsible, and reliable control of these weapons. Soviet nuclear
weapons should not become the object of political bargaining of any
kind.
Economically, we see the need for political change to be
accompanied by economic liberty and the building of free markets.
Third, President Bush and the other heads of state will
approve the alliance's new strategic concept.
Fourth, Rome will provide a key opportunity for NATO heads
of government to discuss relevant aspects of the ongoing debate
about a European security identity in advance of the EC summit in
December.
Last June, in Copenhagen, the foreign ministers at the North
Atlantic Council meeting then set forth an alliance framework for
the debate over a European security identity. A number of proposals
have been made in the run-up to the Maastricht summit--the EC
summit. Of late, the debate has centered on how various
organizations--the WEU [Western European Union], NATO, and the
EC--will relate to each other in the security realm.
The United States supports the development of a European
security identity and defense role reflected in the strengthening of
the European pillar within the alliance but one which will reinforce
the integrity and effectiveness of NATO. Within this context, we
want to see that the European security identity develops in line
with those principles that we laid out in Copenhagen.
With respect to the meeting with the EC, when the President
travels to The Hague, it will be the first time an American
President has held a summit with the European Community in
Europe. And it will come at a time when our relations with the
Community have never been closer.
Making progress in the Uruguay Round [of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] will be at the top of the
President's agenda. We think we have an opportunity to make a
lasting contribution to the liberalization of world trade, an
achievement that helps both American workers and businesses. But
the President will also want to discuss ways we can work together
on political issues as well.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: NATO Summit and EC Meeting
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Opening statement at a news conference at the Excelsior
Hotel, Rome, Italy
Date: Nov 7, 199111/7/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Subject: EC, NATO
[TEXT]
Let me start by saying that I think we're well on our way to
accomplishing our objectives. The overall goal, of course, of this
NATO summit is to adapt NATO to changed circumstances. NATO is
the most successful security organization that I can ever remember
hearing anything about and one that has protected the West for over
40 years. It helped create the momentum for democratic
revolutions in the former[ly] communist East. But now, there is new
and different work to do in three main ways.
Today, we took a big step by approving a new strategic
doctrine, which has been released to you. We expect tomorrow to
move forward on new alliance ties with the emerging democracies
to the East. New problems, of course, involve and require a
different type of engagement, so we are institutionalizing our new
ties to those emerging democracies.
We also expect tomorrow that the alliance will send a
common message to the Soviet Union and to its republics about
principles and policies that can help guide their transformation into
becoming constructive members of the larger Euro-Atlantic
community.
In sum, the alliance is both adjusting its strategic concept to
meet the changing times and is opening a new agenda with Central
and Eastern Europe and the evolving Soviet Union. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: NATO's Evolving Role in Atlantic Security
Fitzwater
Description: Fact sheets released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Rome Italy
Date: Nov 8, 199111/8/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: NATO, CSCE, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
NATO'S New Strategic Concept
The 16 alliance leaders announced in Rome today a new strategic
concept, replacing one adopted at the height of the Cold War. This
concept takes account of the profound political changes that have
greatly altered the security environment. Its realization fulfills
the promise of the 1990 London Declaration to adapt NATO to the
new Europe.
Alliance objectives are to safeguard the security and
territorial integrity of its members and to establish a just and
lasting peaceful order in Europe. The new strategy is designed to
realize these goals in peacetime, crises, and war.
This new concept embodies a broad approach to security
based on three reinforcing elements: dialogue, cooperation, and the
maintenance of a collective defense capability.
The alliance supports increased political efforts to ensure
peace, including in the field of arms control and disarmament. The
enhanced liaison program with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union is a part of this effort.
The alliance seeks to defuse crises using a range of political
and, if necessary, military means. Should these efforts fail and
aggression occur, allied armed forces would restore peace.
Rather than facing the over-arching threat of a simultaneous
full-scale attack on NATO territory, the alliance now confronts
threats that are multi-faceted and less predictable.
To implement this concept, NATO's force will move away
from linear forward deployments to a more flexible defense of all
NATO territory with a reduced forward presence. The strategy of
flexible response will be modified to reflect a reduced reliance on
nuclear weapons.
-- The overall size, and in many cases the readiness, of
conventional forces will be reduced, but those retained will be more
flexible, more mobile, and sufficient to maintain an effective
military capability. These forces will include both rapid reaction
forces and assured augmentation capabilities.
-- The alliance reaffirms its decision to reduce drastically
its nuclear forces by 80%. At the same time, allies agreed that
nuclear forces committed to NATO will continue to play an
essential role safeguarding its members from coercion or war.
-- The ability of the allies to work together is embodied in
the integrated military structure, and cooperation and coordination
agreements, which will include an unprecedented level of
multinational forces.
Strengthening the European Identity in Security and
Defense
Alliance leaders today reaffirmed their support for strengthening
the European identity in security and defense, consistent with
agreed NATO principles.
NATO welcomed the development of such an identity in the
July 1990 London Summit Declaration:
The move within the European Community towards political union,
including the development of a European identity in the domain of
security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the
establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the
whole of Europe.
Since then, considerable discussion of this issue has taken
place in the European Community and Western European Union, as
well as within NATO.
At the June 1991 Copenhagen ministerial [meeting], alliance
foreign ministers outlined NATO's core security functions in the
new Europe, including the principle that "NATO is the essential
forum for consultation among the allies and the forum for
agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense
commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty."
More recently, member states reaffirmed in Rome the
necessity to consult closely on ideas for strengthening the European
security and defense identity. Today's agreement reaffirms the
Copenhagen principles and reflects our shared understanding within
NATO that strengthening the alliance and building the European
security and defense identity are complementary and mutually
reinforcing processes.
As stated in the Rome Summit Communique:
We feel confident that in line with the consensus in Copenhagen, the
result will contribute to a strong, new transatlantic partnership by
strengthening the European component in a transformed alliance.
Further Strengthening of the CSCE
Since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has worked to bring
about change through elaborating principles, commitments, and a
common code of behavior among the now 38 member-states
representing all the countries of Europe plus Canada and the United
States.
With the end of the Cold War, CSCE has taken on a new
function as the forum for the common management of problems
affecting all of its member states. To perform this task, the CSCE
heads of state adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe last
November to provide CSCE with a small secretariat in Prague, a
Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office for Free
Elections in Warsaw. These changes were the result of proposals
first put forward by the alliance at the NATO summit last year in
London.
Today in Rome, the leaders of the alliance laid out additional
proposals to strengthen CSCE by reinforcing member [states']
political direction of the process, refining its structure, and
further developing its institutions and procedures. Their overall
objective is to enhance CSCE's ability to promote security and
democracy in Europe in ways that complement the work of other
relevant European and transatlantic institutions.
They will be discussed at the general CSCE Follow-Up Meeting
next March in Helsinki. They call in particular for:
-- Transforming the Office for Free Elections into an Office
of Democratic Institutions to promote cooperation in the fields of
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law;
-- Improving CSCE's capabilities to prevent conflict and
manage crises;
-- Continuing CSCE's important human rights work;
-- Designating the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials and
CSCE's coordinating and managing body between meetings of CSCE
Foreign Ministers (Council of Ministers); and
-- Giving further political impetus to economic, scientific,
and environmental cooperation.
Developments in the Soviet Union
Today in Rome, NATO leaders pledged their support for the efforts
of the Soviet peoples to transform their society into one based on
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and economic liberty.
Building on the five principles enunciated by Secretary Baker on
September 4, the alliance called on Soviet authorities to:
-- Respect the principles of democracy and the rule of law,
in particular those of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris,
and other CSCE documents;
-- Promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, in
accordance with CSCE and other international standards;
-- Refrain from any steps that could lead to the proliferation
of nuclear weapons; and,
-- Implement policies to promote economic liberty and
market economies, improve trade and economic cooperation among
the republics, and integrate the Soviet Union and the republics into
the world economy.
The allies noted their readiness to assist the Soviet Union in
developing comprehensive market economic reforms, in particular,
through support of defense conversion efforts. They also pledged to
extend humanitarian support to the Soviet peoples as they cope with
the political and economic crises that confront them.
The allies also called on the Soviet Union and republics to
ensure that international agreements signed by the USSR, including
the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] treaty, the CFE
[Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention, are
respected, ratified, and implemented. In particular, they noted that
the CFE Treaty is in the interests of the Soviet Union and the
republics because it reduces the dangers of instability and enhances
openness.
In order to harmonize a common approach to developments in
the Soviet Union and the republics, allied leaders agreed to continue
their close coordination in the North Atlantic Council. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: US Policy and the Crisis in Zaire
Cohen
Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 6, 199111/6/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Zaire
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization,
Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
The Present Situation
On September 23, troops considered to be among the most reliable
in Zaire mutinied because their paychecks had become worthless
due to hyper-inflation. Since then, looting and disorder have spread
throughout the country, ravaging Zaire's already crippled economy,
provoking the flight of most expatriates and destroying their
businesses, and raising the specter of hunger in Kinshasa itself.
As the September 23 mutiny illustrates, the immediate cause
of the current unrest is economic. Decades of economic indiscipline
have reduced this potentially rich country to penury. At the end of
1990, the Government of Zaire abandoned all pretext of economic
reform. The World Bank and most other donors stopped balance-of-
payments support and reduced their programs to humanitarian aid
only. The situation was further complicated by human rights abuse.
Following a massacre of students at the Lubumbashi University
campus in May 1990, Belgium terminated all aid and withdrew
technicians. More recently, France has terminated all aid. Today,
economic decline has reached the point where President Mobutu,
once among the strongest rulers in Africa, can no longer pay or
consistently control his own military. The security forces which
used to be the glue that held Zaire together are now, themselves,
the cause of deepening instability.
In March 1990, Secretary Baker visited Kinshasa and gave
President Mobutu some friendly advice about economic reform,
human rights, and democracy. His message was that Mobutu should
heed the forces of change, which were already visibly sweeping
Africa, or risk being swept aside by them. We were somewhat
encouraged by Mobutu's pledge--a month later--to lead Zaire into a
democratic system with presidential and legislative elections.
In the months that followed, the press was liberated, the
once-powerful government party weakened and divided, and many of
the president's closest confidants deserted him. More than 250
parties came into existence. Increasingly, the most important
opposition parties began to work together in an alliance called the
Holy Union. Their collective influence steadily chipped away at the
president's prestige and authority.
Following a pattern familiar elsewhere in French-speaking
Africa, the opposition insisted on a sovereign national conference
which they hoped would discredit the president and then establish a
transitional government pending a new constitution and elections.
But, utilizing funds from the national treasury, the president was
able to pack the conference with his own adherents, and it led
nowhere. After the disturbances of September 23, President Mobutu
agreed to name a transition government headed by his leading
opponent and arch rival, Etienne Tshisekedi. But Mobutu and
Tshisekedi were unable to work together, and on October 30, the
president named a new government headed by Mungul Diaka, a man
who does not enjoy the confidence of the opposition coalition. In
response, on October 31, the opposition named a parallel
"government," once again headed by Tshisekedi. Including the
President, Zaire now has three "governments," and none of them is
governing.
Throughout this fruitless maneuvering, looting has continued,
and hyper-inflation has escalated. Foreigners, their safety assured
only by the temporary presence of French and Belgian troops, all of
whom left Zaire this week, have continued to flee the country,
abandoning their homes, missions, and investments to looters. They
include virtually all the expatriates who operated Zaire's commerce
and industry. Over 3,000 Americans have left the country, our
Embassy has been reduced to a skeleton staff, and we have
withdrawn all of the staff from our consulate in the mining center
of Lubumbashi.
Past US Policy
US policy toward Zaire has been based on both positive and negative
factors. For many years, Zaire has been a loyal ally in international
fora. Most recently, Zaire provided us valuable support as a member
of the [UN] Security Council during the Gulf crisis. Zaire supported
our policy on Angola, and Mobutu was responsible for initiating the
long process that led to the end of civil war in that country.
We recognized President Mobutu as a leader who had united
his country after the ethnic strife and civil war of the 1960s. We
questioned whether anyone else could maintain national unity in
Zaire.
At the same time, we were increasingly disturbed by Zaire's
poor human rights record and lack of movement toward democracy,
as well as by the president's apparent unwillingness to distinguish
between state finances and his own, a failing which lies at the
heart of Zaire's dismal economic record.
President Mobutu's poor record on human rights and economic
development led to congressional restrictions on economic aid,
barring any transfer of funds to the government, and a cutoff of all
military assistance beginning in late 1990. Zairian inability to
repay debt led to the application of Brooke Amendment Sanctions in
June 1991 and the termination of all development assistance (DFA),
leaving only PL 480 food aid still operative.
In recent years, as the Cold War waned and pro-democracy
sentiment grew in Africa, we counseled Mobutu to heed popular
sentiment or risk being destroyed by it. As noted above, the
Secretary's March 1990 visit to Kinshasa was a benchmark in this
process, but we repeated the same message on many subsequent
occasions.
In recent months, since the emergence of a strong and
increasingly unified opposition, there has been an obvious and
urgent need for a credible transition government that could restore
order, prepare for democracy, and stop Zaire's catastrophic
economic decline. We have urged Mobutu to share power with the
opposition in order to achieve such a government. We have urged
both sides to compromise in the name of national survival.
So far, this effort has failed. The President and the
opposition leader, Mr. Tshisekedi, have engaged in personal conflict
at the expense of compromise. As a result, Zaire still does not have
a functioning government; there is no consistent control over the
military; the economic catastrophe continues; and the threat of
national disintegration looms larger every day.
What is Needed Now
With every day that slips by, human suffering in Zaire increases
and, along with it, the risk of ethnic conflict and civil war.
Zaire needs a functioning government that can restore order,
begin the long process of economic recovery, and lay the basis for a
democratic system.
Recent events have proved beyond any doubt that the present
regime under President Mobutu has lost the legitimacy to govern
Zaire during the transition to democracy. The best hope for Zaire
now is genuine power sharing between President Mobutu and the
opposition. In particular, President Mobutu must break with the
past and allow a transitional government to run the economic and
domestic political affairs of the country without interference,
including control over finance.
The transitional government must come from the ranks of the
opposition. It must not be tied to any one personality or ethnic
group. To be stable, it must implement a democratic process that
will give adequate representation to all regions and ethnic groups.
It must lead directly to free and fair national elections.
Such a government will have to act immediately to place
Zaire's financial institutions under independent, transparent control
acceptable to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
It will have to avoid seeking vengeance against President
Mobutu and members of his party, the MPR [Popular Movement of the
Revolution]. In the interest of national unity, we believe it should
guarantee the President's personal safety and his right to
participate in the democratic process. In other words, a
commitment to the basic human and political rights of all Zairians
will be of the utmost importance.
Achieving such goals will pose an enormous challenge to the
Zairian people. None of us should overestimate our ability to shape
events inside Zaire, but neither can we ignore the opportunity to
help. We, as Americans, will have little influence unless we can act
in concert with our French and Belgian allies and with the
international financial institutions. But if we can work with our
friends and with the people of Zaire, there is a possibility that this
huge and populous country can overcome what could become the
worst crisis in its history as an independent nation.
The alternative is not pleasant to contemplate--civil war,
famine, and national disintegration. The kind of ethnic-based civil
war, which is now a live possibility in Zaire, would destroy what is
left of the country's infrastructure. It would create waves of
refugees that would destabilize Zaire's neighbors. It would require
a massive humanitarian relief effort which the United States would
inevitably be asked to help finance. Zaire's political and economic
development would be set back for years.
For the moment, there is little we can do to help solve Zaire's
fundamental problems until a transitional government committed to
accountability and democracy is in place. We are, however,
investigating the requirement for emergency food and other
assistance and will, in concert with [the US] Agency for
International Development and OFDA [Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance], implement appropriate relief measures. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: Successful Peace Negotiations in Liberia
Tutwiler
Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman,
Washington, DC
Date: Nov 1, 199111/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Liberia
Subject: Democratization
The US Government congratulates the Economic Community of West
African (ECOWAS) heads of state and other participants in the
conference held at Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire, October 29-30,
1991, for their successful efforts in formulating a comprehensive
framework and timetable for the peaceful resolution of the civil
war in Liberia.
The Communique of Yamoussoukro IV addresses the difficult
questions and outlines a program for the orderly and peaceful
disarmament and encampment of the rival factions under the
supervision of a neutral peacekeeping force comprised of troops
from Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Mali, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and
Guinea. West African leaders can be proud of their success in
forging a regional solution to a regional problem. The agreement
demonstrates that, where there is a consensus, collective action
can play a pre-eminent role in resolving regional conflicts.
The United States encourages all of the parties to comply
promptly and fully with the timetable and the program of
implementation, especially encampment, disarmament, and
elections in 6 months as set forth in the communique. This is a
major step forward, which the United States fully supports. We
call upon all Liberians to embark on the critical path of national
reconciliation, reconstruction, and development. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: US Welcomes Zambian Elections
Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 4, 199111/4/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Zambia
Subject: Democratization
The United States welcomes the successful conclusion of
presidential and parliamentary elections in Zambia. We
congratulate President Frederick Chiluba on his victory. The
elections, certified free and fair by international election
observers, including former President Jimmy Carter, are the
culmination of a long but steady process of change initiated almost
2 years ago. We commend President Kaunda for his statesmanlike
decision to introduce multi-party politics to Zambia. These
elections are an important milestone for Zambia and an inspiration
for others in Africa. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: Recent Progress on POW/MIA Issues
Quinn
Source: Kenneth M. Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Description: Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA
Affairs, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 5, 199111/5/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Vietnam, Cambodia
Subject: POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
In my testimony today, I would like to provide the committee [with]
an accounting of diplomatic activities and other efforts of the US
Government on the POW/MIA [prisoners of war/missing in action]
issue since I became chairman of the inter-agency group (IAG) in
July 1990. I realize that you will likely have questions about other
periods of time and I will, of course, endeavor to answer them. But,
in terms of effort on POW/MIA, this has been an extremely active
period, perhaps the most active since the end of the war. It is
important to note just what has occurred.
We now have a clear, carefully spelled-out and written-down
policy approach on normalization of relations with Vietnam--called
the roadmap--which blends two important US foreign policy goals--
a comprehensive political settlement on Cambodia and POW/MIA
accounting. This policy was conveyed to the Vietnam[ese]
Government in writing.
We now have an established process to communicate with the
Vietnamese Government at the policy level. This channel was
established in July 1990 by Secretary Baker and initially focused on
the Cambodian peace negotiations but has also served as an
important vehicle to impress upon Vietnam the centrality of the
POW/MIA issue to improving our relationship. The first meeting
within that channel was held in New York on August 6, 1990.
We now have a POW/MIA office in Hanoi, with the staff
working full time on this issue. And we now have had--over the
past 15 months--a number of high-level exchanges with Vietnam,
Laos, and authorities in Phnom Penh, all of which had POW/MIA as a
central topic.
-- Secretary Baker met with then [Vietnamese] Foreign
Minister Nguyen Co Thach in New York in September 1990 and with
newly appointed Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam in Paris on
October 23. These represented the first bilateral meetings at the
Secretary level since the end of the war.
-- Foreign Minister Thach visited Washington in October
1990 for meetings with General Vessey and the IAG, exclusively on
POW/MIA. Minister Thach also came here to Capitol Hill to meet
with Members of Congress.
-- Secretary Baker met twice with Lao Foreign Minister
Phoun in this same period, also the first time since the war the
POW/MIA issue has been raised directly at the ministerial level.
-- General Vessey made two trips to Hanoi this year which
led to the establishment of our first POW/MIA office as well as
Vietnamese agreements to take certain specific steps which
supplement and implement the roadmap.
-- Assistant Secretary Solomon met twice with Vietnamese
Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai to discuss both Cambodia and POW/MIA
issues. Mr. Solomon also met with Mr. Hun Sen in Paris October 24,
during which POW/MIA cooperation was discussed extensively.
-- Also important to note are the recent visits to
Washington of Phnom Penh Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong and
Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, the first senior
Vietnamese official to visit the Pentagon. Both met with IAG
principals to discuss POW/MIA.
Not all of our diplomatic activities during the past 15 months
have been with the Governments of Vietnam and Laos and the Phnom
Penh authorities. We have also coordinated diplomatic approaches
with many countries active in the area to ensure they understood
our policy objectives in Indochina, particularly on a Cambodian
settlement and POW/MIA. We have urged friendly countries to limit
diplomatic, aid, and economic activities with Vietnam until
progress was made on these objectives.
We have also approached countries which potentially might
have information about the POW/MIA issue. Secretary Baker has
personally raised the issue with senior Soviet officials. So has
Acting Assistant Secretary Carl Ford. Since July 1990, I have
carried on a dialogue with Soviet diplomats particularly about the
possibility of Americans still being alive in Vietnam. We have also
discussed the issue with officials of the Peoples Republic of China.
Just recently, we worked with China to facilitate a visit by a
family member which resulted in important information being
obtained relating to that family's missing loved one.
In sum, the past 15 months have seen diplomatic efforts of an
unprecedented breadth and scope on behalf of our POW/MIA effort.
Reports of Live Americans
Another aspect of our efforts of which it is important to take note
has been our rapid reaction to reports of Americans alive in
captivity.
There have been two such cases to come before the IAG in the
last 12 months. The first, which occurred in October 1990, involved
a report and a photo of an individual identified as Walter T.
Robinson. Even though a careful analysis indicated that the person
in the photo was not the Walter T. Robinson who served in the US
military or the one who was a crewman on the Glomar Java Sea, we
could not preclude the possibility that he was an American. So the
IAG urgently dispatched a plane and team to Vietnam to investigate
the case. We eventually determined that the man involved was not
an American.
The second instance surrounded several highly publicized
photos which were identified by family members as being five
American servicemen. The first of these photos was brought to my
attention on July 12 [1991] by Shelby Quast, the daughter of one of
the men. The certainty with which she and more than a dozen other
family members identified the three men in the photo as Colonel
Robertson, Lt. Commander Stevens, and Major Lundy was powerful
and compelling evidence. Within an hour, I had convened an
emergency session of the IAG, including General Vessey, at which
[an] agreement was quickly reached on specific steps to be taken.
Before the day was out, and with the concurrence of the three
families, I communicated the photo to the Vietnamese and
instructed our Embassy in Vientiane to approach the Lao Government
and Phnom Penh's ambassador. In all three instances, we called on
the authorities to undertake an urgent and immediate investigation.
Shortly thereafter, Secretary Baker wrote to Foreign Minister Thach
stressing the importance of Vietnam's urgent cooperation.
I met for 2 hours with the three families involved. During
that meeting, they implored me to go to Hanoi to investigate the
photos. I said I would, and I did.
Three days later, I left for Asia to investigate that photo, as
well as two other photos which, subsequently, became available
which pictured men identified by their families as Lt. Borah and
Captain Carr. My meeting with Cambodian officials in Beijing led to
unprecedented cooperation by Phnom Penh's authorities in
investigating not only these photos but also a number of other
POW/MIA incidents. A DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]
investigative team, which was received in Phnom Penh, immediately
developed important information relevant to the photos of the three
men. This led to follow-on visits, including a recent field activity
on Tang Island, the site of the Mayaguez incident.
On this same trip, I also traveled to Hanoi and Vientiane. In
both cases, I stressed the importance of immediate and thorough
action to investigate the photo of the three men. I am able to report
that the response by both the Lao and Vietnamese Governments to
this, the most urgent information about possibly alive Americans to
come before the IAG since I have been its chair, was very positive.
In Hanoi, in my meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai, I
obtained agreement for access to prisons
where we had reports the photos were taken--an action totally
without precedent.
The Vietnamese also provided information from military
archives and records which, heretofore, was unavailable and agreed
to an immediate re-excavation of the crash site of Colonel
Robertson's plane.
Lao officials also pledged full cooperation and shortly
thereafter, acting unilaterally, located the Lao citizen who
apparently was the person in the photo identified as Lt. Borah. They
also made this person available to US POW/MIA experts.
I would be remiss if I did not make specific reference to the
superb support I received from Department of Defense personnel
from DIA headquarters in Washington and stationed in Bangkok and
Hanoi throughout this trip to Asia.
In addition to the diplomatic steps I have just outlined, there
have been other quite significant actions taken during the past 16
months by General Vessey, officials of the Defense Department,
other members of the IAG and, indeed, by Members of Congress and
private organizations, all of which are very important parts of the
mosaic of America's POW/MIA efforts. I have not detailed them in
my testimony because you will be hearing directly from many of
them about what they have accomplished. I do want to note,
however, that they form part--an essential part--of this picture of
greatly increased activity aimed at assuring the fullest possible
accounting for our missing service members.
The Roadmap
I believe it would be useful if I said a few words about US policy
vis-a-vis Vietnam on normalization of relations with Vietnam. Our
policy today remains unchanged. The United States is prepared to
proceed toward normalization of relations with Vietnam only in the
context of a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. The
pace and scope of the normalization process will be directly
affected by the seriousness with which Vietnam cooperates on the
POW/MIA issue.
Let me emphasize that the roadmap did not change that
policy--rather it details a path we could follow based on that
policy. It fuses together our objectives on Cambodia and POW/MIA
and lays out a four-phased game plan within which, as progress is
made on Cambodia and POW/MIA, we are prepared to take
concomitant steps in expanding US economic and political activity
with Vietnam and Cambodia. At first, the steps with Vietnam will
be small, but as mutual confidence is developed and, I emphasize,
progress on Cambodia and POW/MIA continues, the steps [will]
increase in importance. The roadmap is constructed in a way so
that we could move rapidly or slowly, depending on Vietnamese
cooperation. It is important to stress that central to the roadmap
is Hanoi's addressing the live prisoner issue, returning available US
remains, and implementing a 24-month process to investigate every
POW/MIA case. It is also important to note that the roadmap
addresses the humanitarian issue of the release of political
prisoners still held in re-education.
While it is useful to enumerate the various diplomatic
actions we have taken, we have to judge our success based on the
results we achieve, and there has been progress.
Our office in Hanoi has had access to information from
official Vietnamese records, archives, and files as well as war
museums. This has been a significant help in advancing our
knowledge on a number of discrepancy cases and therefore, directly
related to the live prisoner issue. Vietnam responded immediately
and positively in the photo investigation, including granting access
to the two prisons. In the past 12 months, the United States has
removed 51 remains from Vietnam, 19 of which have been identified
as particular US servicemen and 18 others as possibly Americans.
In Phnom Penh, we have had more significant assistance on the
photo cases and a demonstrated willingness to work cooperatively
on other individual cases as well, including missing American
journalists.
We have also seen a number of important breakthroughs in Lao
POW/MIA cooperation. We have conducted our first-ever
investigations into discrepancy cases involving men last known to
have been alive in Lao hands. We have expanded our POW/MIA
efforts, previously limited to two southern provinces, into four
additional provinces. In May, the Lao agreed to an expanded annual
schedule of POW/MIA activities, including field activities during
the rainy season. Most recently, the Lao Foreign Minister told
Secretary Baker that his government would participate in a
trilateral meeting with [the] United States and the Vietnamese to
discuss cases along the Lao-SRV border. And as I noted earlier, the
Lao cooperated very effectively on the photo believed to be of Lt.
Borah.
We have consistently told Vietnam that the formal process of
normalization of relations could only begin with the signing of the
Paris Agreement. That approach was embodied in our policy as
presented to the Vietnamese by Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Solomon last April. Based on the fact that both Vietnam
and the Phnom Penh authorities did sign the Paris Agreement on
Cambodia, and that POW/MIA cooperation and the release of re-
education prisoners has begun, the United States has responded by
announcing that we are taking the steps we said we would to begin
the road map.
Secretary Baker announced in Paris that the United States
would:
-- Soon send a diplomatic mission to Cambodia to represent
us to the Supreme National Council;
-- Lift our trade embargo on Cambodia once UNAMIC [UN
Advance Mission in Cambodia] is in place and implementation of the
Peace agreement has begun;
-- Remove the 25-mile travel restriction on Vietnamese
diplomats at the United Nations;
-- Revise our trade embargo to permit US-organized travel
to Vietnam by groups, such as veterans, business organizations, and
others; and
-- Start talks with Vietnam on the issues and modalities
involved in the normalization process.
These are the only steps in the roadmap we have taken with
Vietnam. No other decisions have been made to take any further
steps. Our policy remains as stated and laid out in the roadmap.
That will continue to be our policy. We are in control of the
process. We are prepared to move forward but only with continued
progress on Cambodia and POW/MIAs. In that regard, I note that
following the Secretary's announcement in Paris, the Vietnamese
have given us the increased access we requested to some key
military records and have indicated they have a significant number
of additional remains ready for the two sides to jointly examine.
I would hope that this development indicates that we can look
to more progress and greater results because, our policy is driven
by a desire to end the agony suffered by families of our POW/MIAs
as well as the agony of the Cambodian people. We have made
progress toward both these goals. We have a Cambodian agreement.
We have an office in Hanoi. We have some important advances on
POW/MIA [issues]. But we still have a considerable way to go. So
let me end by saying, on behalf of Secretary Baker as well as for
myself, that we intend to build on the accomplishments we have
achieved and continue our efforts toward the goal we all share--the
fullest possible accounting for all our POW/MIAs. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: Kuwait's Burning Wells Extinguished
Fitzwater
Description: Statement issued by the Office of the Press Secretary,
the White House, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 6, 199111/6/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Kuwait
Subject: Environment, Science/Technology
Today, we celebrate with the people and the Government of Kuwait
as they complete a major step along the road to recovery. The
extinguishing of the last of Kuwait's burning oil wells represents a
remarkable achievement. In less than 9 months, a unique
international coalition capped nearly 700 wells, reversing Saddam
[Hussein's] cruel efforts to achieve with sabotage what he could not
do with his military--the destruction of Iraq's peaceful neighbor
and the fouling of an entire region in an act of mass ecological
terrorism.
Upon the liberation of Kuwait last March, the President
directed US agencies to come to Kuwait's assistance in tackling the
disaster perpetrated by Saddam's retreating army. Seven hundred
fifty-two of the country's 1,037 oil wells had been damaged, and
610 were burning. Working closely with the Government of Kuwait,
the United States lent vital support in engineering, transport, and
other areas--support which was critical to the success in
extinguishing the blazing wells. We are delighted to have been
partners in every phase of the firefighting effort. We are
particularly proud that three of the first four teams on the ground
in March were American. It was these teams that laid the
groundwork for the success that followed. American teams capped
over half of the damaged wells in the effort that grew eventually to
include firefighters from 28 countries.
We share Kuwait's joy and salute the brave men and women
who met this historic challenge. We support Kuwait's demand for
just compensation by Iraq for these and other war-related damages,
and we remain determined to stand with Kuwait and others against
Saddam and his policies. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: US Policy on Repatriation Of Vietnamese in Hong Kong
Lyman
Source: Princeton Lyman, Director, Bureau for Refugee
Programs Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Nov 5, 199111/5/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia
Country: Vietnam, Hong Kong, United Kingdom
Subject: Refugees, United Nations
[TEXT]
I am pleased to be here to discuss with you our understanding of
recent developments between the United Kingdom and Vietnam
regarding the repatriation of Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong
who have been determined not to be refugees. This is a complex
issue which highlights the moral and political difficulties of
resolving a humanitarian problem of great dimension.
As this committee knows, since 1989 the United States has
adhered to an international agreement called the Comprehensive
Plan of Action (CPA) to deal with Indochinese asylum-seekers. That
agreement preserved the practice of first asylum in almost all
countries of Southeast Asia, and in Hong Kong, with the regrettable
exception of Malaysia. The CPA established a system for screening
asylum seekers to determine which are refugees according to
internationally accepted definition and which are not. Those who
are determined to be refugees are resettled in third countries (the
United States alone is committed to admitting up to 50% of them).
Those who are not determined to be refugees are not eligible for
resettlement and should return home.
As of mid-September, according to UNHCR [Office of the UN
High Commissioner on Refugees], 38% of the total camp population
of approximately 115,000 had been screened, with about 22%
screened in and 78% screened-out region-wide. Screened-in rates
vary from 13% in Hong Kong to 42% in the Philippines. Although
UNHCR, with full US support, is making every effort to insure the
uniformity of screening procedures, it is not surprising that the
rates among countries of first asylum should differ, given the
different origins of their boat people populations. UNHCR estimates
that if conditions do not change, the first instance screening
backlog could be cleared up by the middle of next year in the ASEAN
[Association of South East Asian Nations] countries, but not in Hong
Kong, where it will take longer. After a slow start, due largely to
the difficulties of recruiting qualified personnel and the labor-
intensive case-work required, screening of unaccompanied minors
by the special committees is picking up speed. UNHCR now plans to
finish processing all cases by the end of 1991, except for Hong
Kong, where it should be finished by mid-1992.
Voluntary repatriation has fluctuated under the CPA but
seems to be gaining momentum. It increased from 4,570 in Fiscal
Year (FY)1990 to 8,164 in FY 1991. In Hong Kong, monthly return
figures have varied widely. Recently, they are moving strongly
upward, such that departure rates are exceeding arrival rates. In
October, a record 1,173 boat people returned voluntarily to Vietnam
under UNHCR auspices.
In the same month, an unprecedented number of people applied
for voluntary repatriation, approximately 2,300. Of particular note,
the percentage of older cases, particularly people who came in
1989, has begun to inch up. Of course, these encouraging trends may
collapse, as they have before, particularly if there is a resurgence
in the erroneous belief that somehow, some way, the screened-out
will be resettled. Under the terms of the CPA and US policy, the
screened-out will not be resettled. The CPA specifies that "in the
first instance, every effort will be made to encourage the voluntary
return" of the screened-out. It goes on to say that "if, after the
passage of reasonable time, it becomes clear that voluntary
repatriation is not making sufficient progress toward the desired
objective, alternatives recognized as being acceptable under
international practices would be examined."
With the Cambodian settlement and the attendant possibility
of Vietnam's having more normal relations with the international
community, we hope that conditions in Vietnam may improve. There
is some inconclusive evidence that they have already begun to
change. In addition, there is progress under the CPA in discouraging
clandestine departures from Vietnam. Except for Hong Kong, there
have been sharp declines this year compared with last in the number
of boat people leaving Vietnam for all other countries in the region,
for example, down 81% for the Philippines, 74% for Thailand, and
83% for Indonesia. The UNHCR, which monitors the situation of the
over 13,000 Vietnamese who have returned home voluntarily, has
not discovered any persecution or discrimination against the
returnees, and our own admittedly impressionistic reporting
confirms this.
During 1991, while the number of newly arrived asylum
seekers in ASEAN countries decreased dramatically, the arrival rate
for Hong Kong increased. During the first 9 months of 1991, 19,671
boat people arrived in Hong Kong, compared with 5,228 during the
same period in 1990. This created a political problem in Hong Kong,
where many local inhabitants resent the welcome given Vietnamese
when Chinese asylum seekers find much less hospitality and are
frequently deported to China. It also filled the camps to their
limits, topping 64,000 people.
Feeling the need to relieve the situation, UK and Hong Kong
officials met with US officials in Washington June 3-4, 1991, to
discuss measures to deal with the sharply increasing number of
Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving in Hong Kong. The British and
Hong Kong sides informed the United States that they intended as a
matter of urgency to seek bilateral discussions with Vietnam,
especially on the proposal for establishment of internationally
managed and controlled centers on Vietnamese territory. Within the
context of the CPA and the US position on involuntary repatriation,
the United States did not object to these discussions.
On September 30, following talks among the UK, Hong Kong,
Vietnam, the UNHCR, and the International Organization for
Migration, the parties announced agreement in a joint statement
that the high arrival rates in Hong Kong needed to be stemmed to
avoid undermining the CPA. Vietnam rejected a British proposal to
establish an internationally managed holding center for the
screened-out on Vietnamese territory. However, there was
discussion of possible alternative methods of accelerating
repatriation of non-refugees "with a view," as the UK/SRV [United
Kingdom/Socialist Republic of Vietnam] statement put it, "to
reinforcing the CPA provision that such persons should return to
their country of origin in accordance with international practice."
The UNHCR announced that since their repatriation allowance
appeared to be serving more as an incentive to leave Vietnam than
to return, the amount would be reduced--effective September 27--
for those who leave Vietnam after that date. (We understand the
new stipend comprises $50 in lump-sum payments per person and an
additional $10 per month for a year for the head of family. This
compares with a total of $50 per person lump-sum and $30 per
month per person for 1 year, which was the previous repatriation
allowance and which is still available for asylum seekers who
arrived in Hong Kong before September 27.) Subsequently, on
October 21, the British Government announced a "first step" in their
on-going negotiations with the Vietnamese: an agreement that
those who had returned to Hong Kong a second time after having
returned home with repatriation assistance--the so-called "double-
backers"--would be returned.
The British reiterated the Vietnamese Government's
guarantee that no "illegal immigrant" (as the agreement puts it)
who returns home will face persecution and that UNHCR will
continue monitoring their situation. On October 29, the British
announced agreement on other topics of discussion with the
Vietnamese. As of October 29, all new arrivals in Hong Kong would
be given priority screening in accordance with established practice
under UNHCR auspices. The screened-in will continue to be
resettled, and the screened-out returned to Vietnam. Vietnam
agreed "in principle" to accept the return of those previously
screened-out. The British have announced that they will effect the
repatriations in accordance with normal international practice and
under the terms of the CPA. We expect that force will not be used
to return the screened-out to Vietnam. I have seen the agreement,
and it does not explicitly mention forcible return. However, the
British have not yet given us the details of the procedures they will
use to effect the return. We will judge these procedures by what
actually occurs. Given time needed for screening and possibly
appeals, it will be at least 6 weeks or more before any new arrivals
could be scheduled for return. The British are well aware of our
position on mandatory and forced repatriation under current
conditions in Vietnam and our support for voluntary return and
return without objection.
The screened-out should be equally aware of our position that
they will not be resettled and that they should return home. We can
all hope with some reason that the prospect for peace and
normalization opened by the Cambodia settlement will make the
future for Vietnamese in Vietnam a more attractive one and help
facilitate an end to the phenomenon of the boat people. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: US Restores Bratislava Consulate General
Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman,
Washington, DC
Date: Nov 4, 199111/4/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Czechoslovakia (former), Slovak Republic.
We are pleased to announce that the United States is upgrading our
Consulate in Bratislava, Slovakia, to a Consulate General. The
President confirmed with President Havel during their meeting at
the White House on Tuesday that the Government of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic welcomed this step.
Prior to 1949, we had a Consulate General in Bratislava to
demonstrate our recognition of both Slovakia's political and
economic importance and of its equal but separate identity in the
common Czechoslovak state. We closed Consulate General
Bratislava in 1949 as a result of the communist takeover of
Czechoslovakia.
Now, 42 years later, American interest in Slovakia has
revived and is flourishing. American tourists, many of them of
Slovak heritage, are visiting Slovakia in ever greater numbers.
American business is showing growing interest in the republic,
Peace Corps volunteers are present, and more and more American
students are going to Slovakia to study. Furthermore, there is an
increasing flow of Slovak tourists, businessmen, officials,
academicians, students, and others to the United States. The time
has come to re-establish our Consulate General in Bratislava to
ensure that legitimate and natural American and Slovak interests
are better served. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People's
Army
Date: Nov 11, 199111/11/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: East Asia
Country: Philippines
Subject: Democratization, Terrorism
[TEXT]
Background
In 1969, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) created a
military arm, the New People's Army (NPA). The broad aim of the
CPP/NPA is straightforward: to overthrow the elected government
by violent means and replace it with a communist regime. A
component of their program is the removal of US military facilities
and influence from the Philippines.
The CPP/NPA has always placed a high premium on rural
military operations and control of the rural peasantry, including the
sometimes forced collection of "revolutionary taxes" from both
peasants and landowners. In recent years, NPA operations have
increasingly included the towns and cities. For example, the Alex
Boncayo Brigade (ABB), an NPA urban terrorist force named after a
leftist labor leader killed in the late 1970s, operates in the greater
Manila area.
The restoration of democracy under Philippine President
Aquino has undercut the NPA's appeal among the middle class, but
wide disparities of wealth and economic stagnation continue to
ensure a measure of NPA support among the country's urban and
rural poor. The communists seek to rally support by arguing that
the government is still corrupt and abusive, and that it remains
under foreign--that is, US--influence.
Accordingly, communist use of the anti-American theme has
become even more prominent. Removal of the US military facilities
is a cause that the CPP/NPA hopes can appeal to nationalistic
Filipinos even if they have little sympathy with other communist
aims. US officials and interests have become priority NPA targets.
While official Americans remain the chief foreign targets,
some other nationalities have also become victims. For example,
Japanese citizens were kidnapped for ransom in 1986 and 1990.
Methods
NPA units, including the ABB, operate in towns and cities. Its small
"sparrow unit" death squads usually try to get as close as possible
to victims to kill them with shots to the head. Fellow squad
members then help the killers escape.
The NPA appears to choose victims in such a way as to
impress common people with concern for their welfare. Philippine
Government or military officials with a reputation for corruption or
arbitrary use of power are among likely victims. US military
personnel have been chosen at random to protest the continued
presence of US military facilities and military assistance to the
Philippine Government. Sometimes they are specifically chosen, as
in the case of Col. James N. Rowe who was slain in 1989 to protest
US assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
When attacking property, the NPA often uses directed
explosives, such as rifle grenades. Timed explosives are sometimes
used as the most effective means of low risk destruction. This was
the case with the April 1989 bombings at a US military
communications facility on Mount Cabuyao, near Baguio, and
bombings of the Voice of America (VOA) transmitter site in Tarlac
Province in September 1990 and January 1991.
Size and Funding
The current strength of the NPA is about 17,500 fighters. A typical
NPA fighter is an unemployed male in his early twenties, of rural
extraction, and with little education. Female fighters are not
unusual. More educated persons of both sexes are commonly found
in positions of authority.
Funding for the organization comes from a variety of sources,
including robbery, "revolutionary taxes" extorted from farmers and
businesses, illegal enterprises, and external support groups and
fund raisers. The principal overseas support group, located in the
Netherlands, is run by Jose Maria Sison, the exiled founder of the
CPP. The proportion of foreign-raised money in CPP/NPA coffers is
not known with certainty but may be considerable.
NPA Strengths and Weaknesses
The NPA enjoys the same advantages as irregular fighters and
terrorists anywhere. Its members blend in with the population,
choosing the time, place, and target for their attacks. In some rural
areas, CPP/NPA influence is substantial, even among local
government authorities--sometimes due to intimidation, sometimes
out of sympathy for NPA goals. The inability of the Philippine
Government to provide adequate services to these areas has long
played into the hands of the communists. A supply of disaffected
poor has thus far assured replenishment of the NPA's lower ranks.
Some factors suggest that the CPP/NPA is experiencing
difficulties. Indeed, its ability to attain its strategic goals appears
to be diminishing. Bloody attacks during 1990 may reflect a loss of
direction as much as a new and clear agenda. Among the NPA's
problems:
-- It is likely that the extortion of "revolutionary taxes" and
other fund-raising tactics erode popular support for the NPA. The
Philippines' more open and democratic system also reduces the
number of people attracted to violent revolution.
-- The recent collapse of European communism has left the
CPP ideologically stranded and has reduced the number of potential
donors of funds, training, and equipment.
-- A chronic lack of funds and supplies means that the NPA
is frequently short of ammunition and must depend largely upon
captured government weapons and supplies.
-- Improved AFP professionalism has resulted in military
setbacks for the NPA. Government forces have bested it in many
encounters, further reinforcing the NPA's tendency toward small
ambush operations and assassinations.
-- Aggressive Philippine Government intelligence analysis
and law enforcement have led to the arrests of several important
CPP/NPA members. The government maintains a reward system for
information on terrorists and acts against them with energy and
skill. Attempts by CPP/NPA to identify and purge government
agents have also led to the murder of many suspected collaborators.
-- Good security measures, particularly for "high-profile"
targets, have forced the NPA to direct its operations toward "soft"
targets.
-- The CPP/NPA is divided over the question of whether a
rural guerrilla campaign or an urban terror campaign would be more
effective. Some in the party would even prefer participation in the
democratic process to armed struggle.
Prospects
The CPP/NPA presents a serious long-term problem that will
continue to drain government resources but currently lacks the
power to overthrow the government. The NPA threatens the safety
of any unsympathetic Filipino, military personnel and government
officials, and certain resident foreigners. Because terrorism is
cheaper and more visible than military operations, terrorist attacks
may be intensified, with Americans remaining among the prime
targets. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: NPA Attacks 1986-90
Date: Nov 11, 199111/11/91
Category: Chronologies
Region: East Asia
Country: Philippines
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
The following chronology includes NPA attacks against non-Filipino
targets as well as attacks against major Filipino targets. Attacks
against foreign interests constitute a small part of the total
number mounted by Philippine communists.
1986
November--The NPA, with some Japanese Red Army guidance,
kidnapped a Japanese businessman for ransom.
1987
March--NPA gunmen ambushed the mayor of a Manila suburb,
wounding him and killing seven of his bodyguards.
October--The NPA murdered two active-duty American
servicemen, an American retiree, and a Filipino passerby.1989
March--NPA gunmen murdered a Filipino businessman who had
actively supported keeping US military facilities in the country.
April--A US military security patrol surprised an NPA team
laying land-mines in a road used by Clark Air Base personnel, foiling
a planned ambush.
--NPA rebels set off 18 explosive devices at a US military
communications facility at Mount Cabuyao. One antenna was
destroyed and another damaged, but there were no casualties.
--An NPA "sparrow unit" assassinated US Army Col. James N.
Rowe. Gunmen pulled alongside his car as he drove to work in
metropolitan Manila and shot him with automatic weapons. Two
NPA members were convicted of complicity in Rowe's assassination
in February 1991 and sentenced to life imprisonment.
June--In Mindanao, NPA guerrillas attacked a United Church
of Christ religious service. Using machetes and firearms, they
murdered 39 Filipino worshippers, including women and a dozen
children.
September--The NPA killed two American employees of a US
Air Force contractor near Clark Air Base. Also in September, the
NPA claimed responsibility for the killing of an officer in President
Aquino's security force.
December--Two anti-personnel rifle grenades were fired at
the US Embassy's Seafront Compound in Manila. Only minor damage
resulted.
1990
January--The NPA claimed responsibility for the detonation
of a small explosive device at the US Cultural Center in Davao.
February--On the island of Bohol, the NPA killed an American
geologist, his Filipino wife, and his father-in-law in an ambush.
The father-in-law, a prominent local official, is believed to have
been targeted in the attack for refusing to pay "revolutionary
taxes."
March--On Masbate island, an American was murdered by NPA
guerrillas at his ranch for refusing to pay "revolutionary taxes."
May--On the eve of US-Philippine base talks, NPA assassins
killed two US Air Force airmen. A third airman escaped and
described the typical ambush method of the NPA, with assassins
approaching their victims and firing at their heads from close
range. The NPA claimed responsibility for these murders in a
"declaration of war" against the US military presence in the
Philippines.
--In the early morning hours of May 18, two rifle grenades
were fired at the US Information Service Thomas Jefferson Cultural
Center in Makati, metropolitan Manila. One grenade exploded; there
were no injuries.
June--US Peace Corps volunteers were removed from the
Philippines because of reported NPA threats. When the volunteers
were assembled for departure, it was found that one had already
been abducted by the NPA on the island of Negros. The NPA released
him unharmed in early August.
July--Four NPA members in a jeep drove past the US Cultural
Center in Davao, firing rifles at the building. There were no
casualties.
September--An NPA bomb destroyed an antenna base at the
Voice of America (VOA) site in Tarlac Province.
October--An American citizen traveling in Cagayan Province
was kidnapped, apparently by the NPA. He has not been released.
Demands for ransom have not, at this writing, been received.
November--Two rifle grenades were fired at the US Embassy
in Manila. There were no injuries.
1991
January--Philippine police engaged in a firefight with NPA
members and defused 15 explosive devices that had been set at the
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 45, November 11, 1991
Title: Current Treaty Actions
Tutwiler
Date: Nov 11, 199111/11/91
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Country: Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia (former), Fiji,
Guyana, Japan, Laos, Peru, Sri Lanka,
United Arab Emirates
Subject: International Law, Trade/Economics,
State Department, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Environment,
Media/Telecommunications, Arms Control
[TEXT]
Multilateral
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24,
1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the US Dec. 24, 1969.
TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Malaysia, Oct. 1, 1991.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered
into force Dec 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, formulated at Bretton Woods Conference, July 1-
22, 1944. Entered into force, Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Albania, Oct. 15, 1991.
Load Lines
International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April
5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, and
6720.
Accession deposited: Sudan, Sept. 26, 1991.
Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Accessions deposited: Lithuania, Sept. 23, 1991; Zimbabwe, Oct. 4,
1991.
Pollution
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of
wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico
City, Moscow, and Washington, Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force
August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.
Accession deposited: Jamaica, Mar. 22, 1991.
Bilateral
Costa Rica
Memorandum of understanding establishing a Caribbean Basin Radar
Network (CBRN) in Costa Rica. Signed at San Jose, Aug.17, 1990.
Entered into force Aug. 17, 1990.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with
annexes. Signed at Washington Oct. 22, 1991. Enters into force
upon date of receipt of later notification indicating completion of
respective internal requirements.
Fiji
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.
Signed at Suva and Washington Sept. 13 and Oct. 10, 1991. Entered
into force Nov. 16, 1991.
Guyana
Agreement regarding the discharge of certain debts owed to the
Government of the United States, with annex. Signed at Georgetown
Sept. 30, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1991.
Japan
Agreement concerning Japan's financial contribution for US
administrative and related expenses for the Japanese fiscal year
1991 pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of Mar.
8, 1954 (TIAS 2957; 5 UST 661). Effected by exchange of notes at
Tokyo Sept. 27, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 27, 1991.
Laos
International express mail agreement. Signed at Vientiane and
Washington Sept. 10 and Oct. 16, 1991. Entered into force Nov. 16,
1991.
Peru
Project grant agreement for economic stabilization and recovery
program. Signed at Lima Sept. 30, 1991. Entered into force Sept.
30, 1991.
Sri Lanka
Agreement on the protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights. Signed at Colombo Sept. 20, 1991. Entered into
force Oct. 20, 1991.
Protocol amending the Convention of March 14, 1985, for the
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion
with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Colombo Sept. 20, 1991.
Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.
United Arab Emirates
Agreement on investment guaranties. Signed at Abu Dhabi Sept. 29,
1991. Enters into force upon date of an exchange of notes
confirming approval pursuant to applicable constitutional
procedures. (###)