US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991


Opening Session of Middle East Peace Conference

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address before the opening session, Madrid, Spain Date: Oct 30, 199110/30/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: USSR (former), Spain Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] Prime Minister [Felipe Marquez] Gonzalez [of Spain], and [Soviet] President [Mikhail] Gorbachev, Excellencies. Let me begin by thanking the Government of Spain for hosting this historic gathering. With short notice, the Spanish people and their leaders stepped forward to make available this magnificent setting. Let us hope that this conference of Madrid will mark the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the Middle East. I also want to express at the outset my pleasure at the presence of our fellow co-sponsor, President Gorbachev. At a time of momentous challenges at home, President Gorbachev and his senior associates have demonstrated their intent to engage the Soviet Union as a force for positive change in the Middle East. This sends a powerful signal to all those who long for peace. We come to Madrid on a mission of hope--to begin work on a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement to the conflict in the Middle East. We come here to seek peace for a part of the world that in the long memory of man has known far too much hatred, anguish, and war. I can think of no endeavor more worthy or more necessary. Our objective must be clear and straightforward. It is not simply to end the state of war in the Middle East and replace it with a state of non-belligerency. This is not enough; this would not last. Rather, we seek peace--real peace--and by real peace I mean treaties, security, diplomatic relations, economic relations, trade, investment, cultural exchange, even tourism. What we seek is a Middle East where vast resources are no longer devoted to armaments; a Middle East where young people no longer have to dedicate and, all too often, give their lives to combat; a Middle East no longer victimized by fear and terror; a Middle East where normal men and women lead normal lives. Let no one mistake the magnitude of this challenge. The struggle we seek to end has a long and painful history. Every life lost--every outrage, every act of violence--is etched deep in the hearts and history of the people of this region. Theirs is a history that weighs heavily against hope. And yet history need not be man's master. I expect that some will say that what I am suggesting is impossible. But think back. Who back in 1945 would have thought that France and Germany, bitter rivals for nearly a century, would become allies in the aftermath of World War II? And who, 2 years ago, would have predicted that the Berlin Wall would come down? And who in the early 1960s would have believed that the Cold War would come to a peaceful end, replaced by cooperation--exemplified by the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are here today not as rivals but as partners, as Prime Minister Gonzalez pointed out. No, peace in the Middle East need not be a dream. Peace is possible. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty is striking proof that former adversaries can make and sustain peace. And, moreover, parties in the Middle East have respected agreements not only in the Sinai but on the Golan Heights as well. The fact that we are all gathered here today for the first time attests to a new potential for peace. Each of us has taken an important step toward real peace by meeting here in Madrid. All the formulas on paper, all the pious declarations in the world won't bring peace if there is no practical mechanism for moving ahead. Peace will only come as the result of direct negotiations, compromise, give-and-take. Peace cannot be imposed from the outside by the United States or anyone else. While we will continue to do everything possible to help the parties overcome obstacles, peace must come from within. We come here to Madrid as realists. We do not expect peace to be negotiated in a day, or a week, or a month, or even a year. It will take time; indeed, it should take time--time for parties so long at war to learn to talk to one another, to listen to one another. Time to heal old wounds and build trust. In this quest, time need not be the enemy of progress. What we envision is a process of direct negotiations proceeding along two tracks: one between Israel and the Arab states, the other between Israel and the Palestinians. Negotiations are to be conducted on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The real work will not happen here in the plenary session but in direct bilateral negotiations. This conference cannot impose a settlement on the participants or veto agreements, and, just as important, the conference can only be reconvened with the consent of every participant. Progress is in the hands of the parties who must live with the consequences. Soon after the bilateral talks commence, parties will convene as well to organize multilateral negotiations. These will focus on issues that cross national boundaries and are common to the region: arms control, water, refugee concerns, economic development. Progress in these forums is not intended as a substitute for what must be decided in the bilateral talks; to the contrary, progress in the multilateral issues can help create an atmosphere in which longstanding bilateral disputes can more easily be settled. For Israel and the Palestinians, a framework already exists for diplomacy. Negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements. We aim to reach agreement within 1 year. And once agreed, interim self- government arrangements will last for 5 years; beginning the third year, negotiations will commence on permanent status. No one can say with any precision what the end result will be; in our view, something must be developed, something acceptable to Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan that gives the Palestinian people meaningful control over their own lives and fate and provides for the acceptance and security of Israel. We can all appreciate that both Israelis and Palestinians are worried about compromise, worried about compromising even the smallest point for fear it becomes a precedent for what really matters. But no one should avoid compromise on interim arrangements for a simple reason: Nothing agreed to now will prejudice permanent status negotiations. To the contrary, these subsequent negotiations will be determined on their own merits. Peace cannot depend upon promises alone. Real peace-- lasting peace--must be based upon security for all states and peoples, including Israel. For too long, the Israeli people have lived in fear, surrounded by an unaccepting Arab world. Now is the ideal moment for the Arab world to demonstrate that attitudes have changed, that the Arab world is willing to live in peace with Israel and make allowances for Israel's reasonable security needs. We know that peace must also be based on fairness. In the absence of fairness, there will be no legitimacy--no stability. This applies above all to the Palestinian people, many of whom have known turmoil and frustration above all else. Israel now has an opportunity to demonstrate that it is willing to enter into a new relationship with its Palestinian neighbors, one predicated upon mutual respect and cooperation. Throughout the Middle East, we seek a stable and enduring settlement. We've not defined what this means; indeed, I make these points with no map showing where the final borders are to be drawn. Nevertheless, we believe territorial compromise is essential for peace. Boundaries should reflect the quality of both security and political arrangements. The United States is prepared to accept whatever the parties themselves find acceptable. What we seek, as I said on March 6, is a solution that meets the twin tests of fairness and security. I know--I expect we all know--that these negotiations will not be easy. I know, too, that these negotiations will not be smooth. There will be disagreement and criticism, setbacks--who knows-- possibly interruptions. Negotiation and compromise are always painful. Success will escape us if we focus solely upon what is being given up. We must fix our vision on what real peace would bring. Peace, after all, means not just avoiding war and the costs of preparing for it. The Middle East is blessed with great resources: physical, financial, and, yes, above all, human. New opportunities are within reach--if we only have the vision to embrace them. To succeed, we must recognize that peace is in the interest of all parties; war--absolute advantage of none. The alternative to peace in the Middle East is a future of violence and waste and tragedy. In any future war lurks the danger of weapons of mass destruction. As we learned in the Gulf war, modern arsenals make it possible to attack urban areas--to put the lives of innocent men, women, and children at risk; to transform city streets, schools, and children's playgrounds into battlefields. Today, we can decide to take a different path to the future-- to avoid conflict. I call upon all parties to avoid unilateral acts, be they words or deeds, that would invite retaliation or, worse yet, prejudice or even threaten this process itself. I call upon all parties to consider taking measures that will bolster mutual confidence and trust--steps that signal a sincere commitment to reconciliation. I want to say something about the role of the United States of America. We played an active role in making this conference possible; both the Secretary of State, Jim Baker, and I will play an active role in helping the process succeed. Toward this end, we've provided written assurances to Israel, to Syria, to Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. In the spirit of openness and honesty, we will brief all parties on the assurances that we have provided to the other. We're prepared to extend guarantees, provide technology and support, if that is what peace requires. And we will call upon our friends and allies in Europe and in Asia to join with us in providing resources so that peace and prosperity go hand in hand. Outsiders can assist, but, in the end, it is up to the peoples and governments of the Middle East to shape the future of the Middle East. It is their opportunity and it is their responsibility to do all that they can to take advantage of this gathering, this historic gathering, and what it symbolizes and what it promises. No one should assume that the opportunity before us to make peace will remain if we fail to seize the moment. Ironically, this is an opportunity born of war--the destruction of past wars, the fear of future wars. The time has come to put an end to war--the time has come to choose peace. Speaking for the American people, I want to reaffirm that the United States is prepared to facilitate the search for peace, to be a catalyst as we've been in the past and as we've been very recently. We seek only one thing, and this we seek not for ourselves but for the peoples of the area and particularly the children: that this and future generations of the Middle East may know the meaning and blessing of peace. We have seen too many generations of children whose haunted eyes show only fear, too many funerals for their brothers and sisters, the mothers and fathers who died too soon, too much hatred, too little love. And if we cannot summon the courage to lay down the past for ourselves, let us resolve to do it for the children. May God bless and guide the work of this conference, and may this conference set us on the path of peace. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

Meeting Between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev

Bush, Gorbachev Source: President Bush, President Gorbachev Description: Excerpts from opening remarks at a news conference, Madrid, Spain Date: Oct 29, 199110/29/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] President Bush: I want to thank President Gorbachev. We've had yet another very constructive meeting. We're here, of course, for this international conference on the Middle East, and I can express my gratitude to President Gorbachev for the very constructive role that the Soviet Union has played in the actions leading up to this conference; we are grateful to him for that. We also discussed some of the matters of mutual interest involving the situation inside the Soviet Union, the dynamic change there, the commitment to reform that is still very strong. And all in all, as far as I'm concerned, it was yet one more very good meeting with the president. President Gorbachev:I join what Mr. President just said and wanted only to say a couple of words for myself. We agreed on holding this meeting since it was a very convenient opportunity . . . to coordinate our watches-- synchronize our watches--to talk a little about what is of mutual interest to the Soviet Union and to the United States. Yes, it's true that we began by--we talked about all the many years of effort that we made. Especially our joint efforts in the very recent past, both of the United States and the Soviet Union has brought us to the point now where today--tomorrow--this long- awaited forum, this long-awaited conference is opening. And let's hope that given everything that we might encounter along the way during these negotiations within the confines of this conference; let's hope that it all turns out for the best and positively. In any case, President Bush and I have agreed that having opened this conference and having left Madrid, we [do] not at all expect to be somewhere on the side. On the contrary, we're going to facilitate as much as possible, use all the remedies that we have at our disposal. I think that all the participants of the conference and we, too, wanted--both today and tomorrow we'll talk about it some more, maybe--to appeal to everybody that they act responsibly with great understanding that what is beginning within the framework of this Madrid conference--how meaningful it is and that everybody be very constructive as much as possible. Further, we said a lot and talked a lot about--since I had the intention to pose before President Bush several questions, several issues vis-a-vis what's happening internally in the Soviet Union and also because he and [the] Secretary of State also had a whole series of questions . . . to ask for the benefit of their own understanding to try to find out where we now are in the Soviet Union and to get a better grasp of what kind of issues and problems we're trying to solve. This took quite a large percentage of our time, maybe-- probably--the majority of our meeting. I'm very satisfied by the position which was held, by the position of the President of the United States, and hope that--have all the basis to believe and feel- -that this is yet another step in strengthening the mutual understanding and cooperation between our two countries right at the stage of all the great and momentous changes that are taking place. And, finally, we had an exchange of information and views as to what each of the sides is doing in the context of disarmament and all the initiatives that have been undertaken. The President and I very highly--gave a very high mark to the way we are solving a lot of these very burning issues, which for many years have plagued us. But, now, basing ourselves on all the experiences that have happened over the last few years, especially how well we're getting along now with our two countries, between the Soviet Union and the United States, also among the members of the two governments of the two countries, that we're finding very good solutions. In any event, we wanted to have a very short meeting to chat and maybe not overload ourselves too much because the subject of this meeting, in fact, is the opening of the conference. But, in fact, we had a very substantive discussion. I think it will be very useful for both parties, for both sides. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

Middle East Peace Conference

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: News conferences, US Embassy, Madrid, Spain Date: Nov 30, 199111/30/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT]
October 30, 1991: 8:02 am EDT
Ladies and gentlemen, let me simply say that the President and the [Israeli] Prime Minister [Yitzhak Shamir] and their respective colleagues have just had a very full and friendly meeting as we go into the first session of the conference. We discussed a range of matters, some having to do with logistics but having to do as well with a reaffirmation of the very close relationship between the United States and Israel. The President, of course, expressed his unyielding and absolute commitment to the security of the state of Israel, something that I have expressed on my recent visits to Israel. It was a good meeting, a full meeting, a very friendly meeting. And let me take this opportunity to correct a statement or two that I've seen this morning coming--at least appearing in some of the press in the United States to the effect, generally, that in my meeting last night with the Prime Minister we didn't shake hands. Nothing is further from the truth. We had about four waves of press come in there and we shook hands, that I can recall specifically, for the first three. Then someone tells us that there was a request to shake hands for the fourth one--something we didn't hear. And so we didn't shake hands because we didn't hear the request. But I want to make sure we correct the record on that because the relationship here--it is strong and it is firm and it is very warm and friendly. Q. Do the Israelis sound as if they are willing to make some compromises if the other parties do as well? A. I think the Government of Israel is here, as the Prime Minister has put it, in good faith seeking peace. And, of course, if we are going to get to peace, it's going to require compromises on the part of all, and there's no doubt that that commitment of the Government of Israel is real. It wouldn't be here if it wasn't. The decisionmaker in Israel is here, the Prime Minister himself. I've said before that I think that it is good that Prime Minister Shamir is here because he, after all, more than anybody else, made the decision for the Government of Israel to come to this conference.
October 30, 1991: 9:40 am EDT
Let me give you a brief readout on the President's meeting with the heads of the various Arab delegations. The President emphasized in all of these meetings the importance of everybody keeping their eye on the ball and keeping their eye on the objective, which is the creation of a viable peace process in the hopes of moving toward real peace in the Middle East. He condemned the terrorist incidents that have taken place here recently--the attack on our Embassy in Beirut, the very regrettable and unfortunate killing of Israeli settlers, and the killing of Israeli soldiers in the northern part of the Israeli security zone in Lebanon. And he made the point to each and every one of the delegations that it is the intention and desire of the United States to serve to the extent that we can as a catalyst for peace. That's our objective. That's our intention in bringing forward this conference. And he stressed to everyone the importance of keeping in the back of their minds as we begin this peace conference the real goal, which is peace in the region. Q. You said that everyone--there has to be compromises on all parts--all sides--like what? A. It's not up to the United States to determine what the parties are going to--how the parties are going to come together, what the agreements are going to be. As the President said yesterday, we have our well-known and long-established policy positions. But it's not up to us to put a proposal on the table. There are going to be, hopefully, extensive negotiations as we move forward from the conference, both bilateral and multilateral. I think it's important to keep in mind that the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians in the first instance have to do with interim self-government arrangements, arrangements that will last for a period of 5 years. Beginning the third year, there will be discussions between Israelis and Palestinians on permanent status. So it's perhaps premature to-- Q. That's the plan, isn't it? A. It's perhaps premature for us to, today, say this is what the permanent status arrangement should be. These will come only after extended negotiations between the parties. Talks cannot be-- talks are not a guarantee that peace will result. But it is for sure that without talks we won't get peace. Q. Well, have they agreed on autonomy for 5 years? Is this on the table? Is it set? A. What is set is that--and this is embraced within the invitations that were sent to the parties to this conference and the parties accepted the parameters by their attendance here, is that they--with respect to negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, there will be negotiations in phases. The first negotiations will deal with interim, self-government arrangements. It is hoped that those negotiations can be concluded within 1 year. That's by no means certain, but our invitation says that we begin those discussions with the objective of concluding them within 1 year. Beginning the third year of a 5-year interim self-government period, they will begin to talk about a permanent status. Now those are the discussions between Israel and the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. There will also be discussions between Israel-- bilateral discussions between Israel and Lebanon and between Israel and Syria, having to do, of course, with different issues. Q. Mr. Baker, can you tell us whether any of the delegations this morning expressed any concern about balance going into this or whether they think it really will be fairly evenhanded? A. I think it's fair to say that everyone understands that this is the beginning of a process. And everybody, I think, is here in good faith in order to promote peace.
Opening statement at a news conference, IFEMA Press Center, Madrid, Spain: October 30, 1991
Today, Israel, her Arab neighbors, and the Palestinians all came together for the first time to begin the search for peace. That old taboo that Arabs and Israelis cannot meet and cannot talk is now something that we want to relegate to history. From this day forward, dialogue and negotiations, not violence and confrontation, should be the hallmark of the Middle East. The road to peace will be very long, and it will be very difficult, and, as I have said before, there will be undoubtedly many, many interruptions along the way. But we have to crawl before we walk, and we have to walk before we run, and today I think we all began to crawl.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

Middle East Peace Conference

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks at the Royal Palace, Madrid, Spain Date: Nov 1, 199111/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] Distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen: Over the last 8 months, many people in the region have exerted great efforts and contributed in many ways to make this conference and negotiations possible. All of you in this hall fall into that category. But there are some who are not here now, individuals who have made essential contributions to the process, without which, in my view, this conference would not have happened. In this regard, I want to pay tribute: -- To President Mubarak of Egypt, who was a confidant, adviser, friend, and advocate for this process from the very beginning; -- To King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who demonstrated by word and deed that new opportunities for Arab-Israeli peace existed after the Gulf war, and who personified this new approach in the Arab world; -- To President Assad of Syria, whose assurance to me that Syria had made an historic choice and decision in favor of peace, and whose early commitment to this process, both proved to be vital; -- To King Hussein of Jordan, whose courage, leadership, and willingness to commit publicly and quickly in support of this process transformed the dynamics in the region; -- To Prime Minister Shamir of Israel, whose steady determination and strong leadership proved essential to reaching an agreement to convene this conference and to launch direct bilateral negotiations for real peace between Israel and its neighbors; -- To Foreign Minister Levy of Israel, who was determined to develop an active and meaningful peace process and who worked creatively to overcome obstacles in our path; -- To President Hrawi of Lebanon, who has worked to re- establish central authority in his war-ravaged country, which is a necessary step toward peace in the region; -- To Palestinians with whom I met, like Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi, whose personal courage in the face of enormous pressures has created the possibility of a better life for Palestinians. Even in a period of dramatic and far-reaching change around the world, this conference stands apart. Fourteen days ago, President Bush and President Gorbachev invited Israel, the Arab states, and Palestinians to this peace conference and to direct negotiations that follow. In response to that invitation, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon agreed to attend the conference and to participate in the direct negotiations. In addition, the European Community, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania agreed to participate in this process. This conference demonstrates vividly the end of the Cold War and the flowering of US-Soviet partnership in resolving regional conflicts. Where we once competed, we now cooperate. Where there was once polarization, there is now coordination. What was once unthinkable--the United States and the Soviet Union co- sponsoring a process of peace in the Middle East--became a reality this week. Our work--making peace through negotiations--has just begun. As we look at the challenges ahead, it is worth noting and learning from what we have already accomplished. -- For decades, agreement on whether to negotiate eluded the parties. This weekend, direct, bilateral negotiations aimed at comprehensive, genuine peace will start. -- For decades, agreement on what to negotiate eluded the parties. This weekend, negotiations should begin on the accepted basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. -- For decades, agreement on how to negotiate eluded the parties. This weekend, negotiations will begin on two tracks and in phases; and in a few weeks, those parties who wish to participate will convene to organize multilateral negotiations on a wide range of issues that affect the well being of all peoples in the region. These are not mere platitudes. During these 8 months of diplomacy, though the parties sometimes fell back on old slogans and outmoded code words, they also came to understand the need to engage concretely and pragmatically to resolve problems. I said often that the parties would probably stake out maximum positions, especially as they got closer to negotiations. This is not surprising, especially in a public forum. The key, however, is to get beyond the rhetoric and into the direct negotiations.
Fundamentals of American Policy
A basic tenet of American thinking is that negotiations are the best way to resolve disputes and achieve peace. Negotiations do not guarantee peace. But without negotiations, there is no way to produce genuine peace and no mechanism to develop understandings that can endure. The United States is willing to be a catalytic force, an energizing force, and a driving force in the negotiating process. Our involvement in this process will be rooted solidly in the core principles enunciated by President Bush last March. They will remain the cornerstone that guides our participation in the negotiating process. The United States is and will be an honest broker. We have our own positions and views on the peace process, and we will not forego our right to state these. But, as an honest broker with experience--successful experience--in the Middle East negotiations, we also know that our critical contribution will often be to exert quiet, behind-the-scenes influence and persuasion. Let no one mistake our role as an honest broker to mean that we will change longstanding US policy positions, and let no one mistake our policy positions as undercutting our determination to help the parties reach fair and mutually acceptable solutions to problems. As President Bush and I have both said this week: It is not our policies that matter; it is those of the parties. They are the ones that must negotiate peace. This week, the parties provided insight into their thinking about a negotiated settlement. They outlined three broad requirements in the search for peace. First, we heard a yearning for peace --the wish of peoples in the region to live in a mutually satisfying relationship with neighbors, a relationship characterized by peace treaties, economic relations, cultural ties, and political dialogue. Second, we heard an emphasis on land--the desire of peoples in the region to exercise authority and political governance over territory they consider part of their national, political, historical, or religious patrimony. Third, we heard a need for security --the requirement of people to live free of fear and the obligation of governments to do their best to protect their citizens. What the parties, in fact, said this week is that these core issues--land, peace, and security--are inseparable elements in the search for a comprehensive settlement. The parties have made clear that peace by itself is unachievable without a territorial solution and security; that a territorial solution by itself will not resolve the conflict without there also being peace and security; and that security by itself is impossible to achieve without a territorial solution and peace. The process on which we are embarked can work only if all issues are put on the table, and if all issues are satisfactorily resolved.
The Negotiating Process
One key issue is the style of negotiations. Today, the Soviet Union and the United States are on the same side of the table--literally and figuratively--in striving for global peace and the resolution of regional conflicts. Today, and in the future, we will work together in pursuit of a Middle East settlement. The United States, at the highest levels, will remain intimately engaged in this process. We expect to be available to the parties throughout this process. The United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to participate directly in the negotiations themselves, with the consent of all parties. We will do our part. But we cannot do your part as well. The United States and the Soviet Union will provide encouragement, advice, recommendations, proposals, and views to help the peace process. Sometimes, you will be satisfied with our views; sometimes frustrated. Sometimes, we will support your positions and sometimes not. Sometimes, we will act quietly and behind the scenes, and sometimes we will make known our views and positions in public. None of this, however, will relieve you--the parties--of the obligation of making peace. If you won't do it, we certainly can't. As I have said from the beginning of this effort, we cannot want peace more than you, the parties most directly affected by its absence. Parties in this process cannot reasonably be expected to operate outside their political environment; but they should be expected to educate, shape, guide, and lead politics and opinion. Leaders in the region have taken difficult and courageous decisions to get to this conference and to negotiations. More difficult and more courageous decisions will be required to settle this conflict.
Venue of Bilateral Negotiations
As you know, the invitation sent to the parties on October 18 contained the terms of reference for this peace process, terms of reference that had been meticulously negotiated and agreed. This invitation specified that direct, bilateral negotiations would begin 4 days after the opening of the conference. But there was never agreement regarding the location for those bilateral negotiations. The parties have not yet been able to agree on where to hold these negotiations. It is the view of the co-sponsors that the direct, bilateral negotiations should start in Madrid as soon as possible. It is the intention of the co-sponsors to continue to consult with the parties with a view to fulfilling the requirements of the invitation on this subject. From the perspective of the co-sponsors, and, indeed, from the perspective of most of the rest of the world, it would be very difficult to understand how a party could now refuse to attend bilateral negotiations simply because of a disagreement over the site of those negotiations. Finally, I want to note that a meeting will take place in several weeks among those parties who wish to participate in multilateral negotiations to organize those negotiations. These talks will focus on issues of critical interest to many parties in the region. They will be a complement to the bilateral negotiations. I am pleased that the multilateral negotiations have already gained widespread support and interest both in and outside the Middle East.
Building Confidence and Trust
This week, many have focused on the need for steps that would build confidence and trust. The United States continues to believe that confidence-building measures are important for the process and for the parties, themselves. I want to be perfectly honest, standing here as I am before colleagues with whom I have spent many, many hours since last March. The unwillingness of the parties to take confidence- building steps has been disappointing. You have dealt successfully with formulas and positions. You have agreed on terms of reference that are fair and equitable. You have launched a process of negotiations that can succeed. But you have failed to deal adequately with the human dimension of the conflict. As I traveled through the region, I witnessed terrible scenes of human tragedy, suffering, and despair. Innocent civilians caught in the crossfire of a conflict they wish would end: refugees and displaced persons wandering across the vast expanses of time; mothers and fathers, afraid of the future that awaits their children; and children, being schooled in the lessons of animosity and conflict, rather than friendship and accommodation. Formulas, terms of reference, and negotiations are not enough. Support for a negotiating process will not be sustainable unless the human dimension is addressed by all parties. A way must be found to send signals of peace and reconciliation that affect the peoples of the region. Don't wait for the other side to start; each of you needs to get off the mark quickly. You should know best what is needed. Through negotiations and through these and other steps, you can demonstrate respect for the rights of others. You can express understanding of the fears of others. You can touch the people--the women, men, and children--who are the victims of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We can only succeed at the table, if we find ways of reaching out to one another away from the table. The challenges have been great, and the obstacles have been many, on the road to peace. Your decisions over these 8 months of intensive diplomacy have created a new baseline of realism and commitment to peace. This conference has been vital in breaking down the barriers of communication and in establishing for all to see that Arab and Israeli leaders can meet face to face.
In closing, let me speak to each of you personally and directly. For over 4 decades, the world waited for this week. Peace- loving peoples everywhere tried time and again to get you--the makers of this intractable conflict--to join together to discuss your differences. This week, here in Madrid, you finally have met and held such a meeting. This has been a start--a good start--a historic start that has broken old taboos--an important start that opens further opportunities. But it is only a start--and that's not enough. You must not let this start become an end. When you walk out these doors, you carry with you great responsibilities. You carry with you the responsibility to your peoples to seek peace. You carry with you the responsibility to the world to build a comprehensive and just peace. You carry with you the responsibility to yourselves to break with the past and pursue a new future. For if you do not seize this historic opportunity, no one will blame anyone outside your region. You now shoulder the destiny and challenge of making peace as you enter direct negotiations with your neighbors. The continuation and success of this process is in your hands. The world still looks to each of you to make the choice for peace.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

Middle East Peace Conference

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Opening statement at a news conference, IFEMA Press Center, Madrid, Spain Date: Nov 3, 199111/3/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] Let me begin by saying that the Madrid conference was a beginning. I think it was a good beginning. Today, the parties have taken another critical step beginning direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria. There have been and, as I have said before, there will be obstacles in this process to be overcome, but they have not deterred us until now, and they do not, in my view, diminish the importance of what has happened this week. Let me emphasize another point that I made in my address to the peace conference on Friday. The parties have not agreed on venue and, in fact, as you know, the major issue that we had to work over the weekend was where to hold the bilateral negotiations. This is still an open question, and it is one that will need to be resolved as the negotiations proceed. The United States and the Soviet Union expressed the hope that the parties, themselves, will continue to negotiate in order to reach an understanding. In the absence of agreement, we will work together with the parties. And we will make proposals as necessary. The United States and the Soviet Union intend to maintain our position that bilateral negotiations should be face-to-face and take place separately between an Israeli delegation and each of the other delegations. On behalf of the co-sponsors, I want all to know that the arrangements that have been so laboriously worked out for these initial bilateral meetings will not be considered precedential for future rounds of talks. Amidst all of the procedural wrangling, it is important, I think, not to lose sight of the breakthrough represented by the start of direct bilateral negotiations. As I have stressed all along, direct negotiations are the only way in which real progress is going to be made and the only way in which real progress--real peace--is ever going to be achieved. I want to take special note of the steadfast commitment of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to beginning bilateral negotiations. And I want to express appreciation to all those who have gone the extra mile to make these opening meetings possible today, particularly the Government of Israel. From the initial reports I have received from the delegations themselves, I am especially pleased with the quality of the first negotiating session between the Israeli and joint Jordanian- Palestinian delegations. As they told me, and as their public statement made clear, they surely intend to proceed in a serious and constructive fashion, and that gives us reason to believe that we really are entering a new phase in the Middle East. I will be leaving Madrid at the conclusion of this press conference. Assistant Secretary [of Near East and South Asian Affairs Edward] Djerejian and many of my senior experts will remain in Madrid until the delegations have departed. And before I take your questions, let me say a word, since I've gotten a number of questions recently about this, a word about my plans for the next 2 weeks. I will leave immediately after this press conference to join President Bush to attend the opening of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Center in California. I will then travel with the President to attend the NATO summit in Rome as well as the US-EC meeting in the Netherlands. Then I plan to go directly from there to Japan, Korea, and China, returning to Washington in mid-November. I will be attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Korea. I have been looking forward for a long time to in-depth consultations with the Japanese in Japan. I regret that I was not able to visit Japan when I was in Asia earlier this year, because the United States has no bilateral relationship in Asia that is any more important than our relationship with Japan. And let me conclude by saying a word about my trip to China. China has almost one-fourth of all the people in the world. It has nuclear weapons. It has great influence in the region, and it has immense economic potential. We have some real problems, and we can't expect to make headway with these problems unless we discuss them. Ignoring them will not make the problems go away. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

FY 1992-93 Foreign Relations Act Signed

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Nov 28, 199111/28/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department, Arms Control, Travel [TEXT] Today, I have signed into law HR 1415, the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993." The act contains welcome new authorities for the Department of State, many of them included at the Administration's request. For example, the act provides an important authorization of funds for construction of a secure chancery in Moscow and for full payment of assessed contributions and arrearages to international organizations and for peace-keeping activities. These are especially helpful in light of our current relationship with the Soviet Union and the expanding peacekeeping role of the United Nations. I want to express my appreciation to the Congress for its cooperation in this effort. I regret, however, that the Congress has included several provisions in the act that raise constitutional or other difficulties. Article II of the Constitution confers the executive power of the United States on the President alone. Executive power includes the authority to receive and appoint ambassadors and to conduct diplomacy. Thus, under our system of government, all decisions concerning the conduct of negotiations with foreign governments are within the exclusive control of the President. Some of the provisions of HR 1415 could be interpreted as directing or limiting through legislation the conduct by the President of foreign relations. Such an interpretation would violate fundamental constitutional principles. For example, Section 129 would prohibit the issuance of Israel-only passports and the issuance of more than one official or diplomatic passport to any US Government employee for the purpose of acquiescing in the Arab League countries' policy of denying entry to persons whose passports reflect that they have traveled to Israel. It also directs the Secretary of State to enter into negotiations to seek an end to this policy. I am sympathetic to the goals of this legislation and have made this issue part of the Administration's discussions with the countries that engage in such practices. The Constitution, however, vests exclusive authority in the President to control the timing and substance of negotiations with foreign governments and to choose the officials who will negotiate on behalf of the United States. A purported blanket prohibition on the issuance of more than one official or diplomatic passport to US Government officials could interfere with my ability to conduct diplomacy by denying US diplomats the documentation necessary for them to travel to all countries in the Middle East and could upset delicate and complex negotiations. I, therefore, am directing the Secretary of State to ensure that this provision does not interfere with my constitutional prerogatives and responsibilities. Section 322 and Title IV also raise constitutional concerns. These sections deal with Middle East arms control policy and purport to direct the President specifically how to proceed in negotiations with the United Nations and with foreign governments. This Administration is strongly committed to ongoing negotiations regarding restraints on the transfer of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction to the Middle East. However, I must construe these sections consistent with my responsibility for conducting negotiations with foreign governments. Section 301(b) requires the Secretary of State to designate an official with responsibility for, among other things, developing a proposal for the prosecution of Persian Gulf war criminals in an international tribunal, including proposing to the United Nations the establishment of such tribunal. I am sympathetic to the goal of this provision. I note, however, that the responsibilities of this official are to be understood by reference to Section 301(a). In guiding him in the performance of his duties, therefore, I will keep in mind that Section 301(a) expressed only "the sense of the Congress." In conjunction with these provisions, Section 301(c) requires me to submit a report to the Congress describing evidence of war crimes and identifying war criminals. I will interpret this provision in a manner consistent with my constitutional authority to protect state secrets and sensitive law enforcement information. On a different matter, several sections impose significant reporting requirements on the Secretary of State that could be read to compel the disclosure of sensitive diplomatic activities or communications and/or state secrets. Section 114 requires unclassified reporting of certain activities in the confidential fund maintained for emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service. The mandatory public disclosure of some of these activities would be inimical to the success of US foreign policy, and I shall, therefore, interpret this provision consistent with my constitutional authority to protect such information. Title V, Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW), raises concerns with respect to both the President's control over negotiations with foreign governments and the possible disclosure of sensitive information. Title V's provisions establish sanctions against foreign companies and countries involved in the spread or use of chemical and biological weapons. Title V demonstrates that the Congress endorses my goal of stemming dangerous CBW proliferation. In signing this act, it is my understanding, as reflected in the legislative history, that Title V gives me the flexibility to protect intelligence sources and methods essential to the acquisition of intelligence abut CBW proliferation. In part, such flexibility is available because Title V does not dictate the timing of determinations that would lead to sanctions against foreign persons. In connection with another arms control provision, Section 323, I am signing this act on the understanding that the sanctions that must be imposed as a result of this new section apply only to exports to foreign persons of items controlled pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and not to exports to foreign persons of items controlled by any other law. Section 198 deals with the publication of the "Foreign Relations of the United States historical series" and the declassification of Department of State documents. This section also must be interpreted in conformity with my constitutional responsibility and authority to protect the national security of the United States by preventing the disclosure of state secrets and to protect deliberative communications within the executive branch. To the extent that Section 198 addresses the standards for declassification of national security information, it will be interpreted to effect no change in the standards set forth in the existing executive order on national security information. Further, Section 198 will be implemented in a manner and on a schedule that will not risk ill-considered release of protected information. Other provisions that might be construed to require disclosure of the content of sensitive diplomatic communications, state secrets, or intelligence information will also be interpreted consistent with the President's responsibility to protect such information. See, e.g., Sections 127, 129(c), 133, 192, 193, 356(b), 404, 506(b), and 508. Similarly, Section 235 will be interpreted consistent with my responsibility to protect privileged material. A number of other provisions of HR 1415 also pose serious constitutional problems. Section 173 would impose unconstitutional restrictions on my appointment power with respect to members of the Board of the Inter-American Foundation. Section 175(b), by requiring the Secretary of State to submit "legislative recommendations" to the Congress, would infringe on the executive's constitutional prerogative to submit "such measures as [the President] shall deem necessary and expedient." US Const., Art. II, Section 3. By directing the opening or restricting the closing of consular, diplomatic, and United States Information Agency offices, Sections 112, 206, 216, and 223 would constrain the exercise of my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and, in particular, to direct ambassadors and other representatives of the United States. Because of these constitutional difficulties, I will treat these provisions as advisory. Section 234 mandates the creation of a Kurdish broadcast service at the Voice of America (VOA). This Administration agrees that the Iraqi Kurds need information on events in the free world and pertaining to their own situation and also agrees with the statement in Section 234 that the Voice of America provides an effective means to accomplish this. However, this Administration believes that the creation of VOA language services through legislation limits the ability of the agency to respond to rapidly changing international situations in a flexible and timely manner. For these reasons, this Administration will continue to oppose the specification in legislation of languages, broadcast hours, and organizational arrangements. HR 1415 also includes requirements for more than 60 new reports to be submitted to the Congress. While I recognize the value of reports in assisting the Congress in its legislative responsibility, taken together such reports put a heavy burden on the reporting agencies at a time of scarce resources. I hope that, in the future, the Congress will balance its legitimate need for information with the time and expense involved in preparing a report and make an effort to minimize reporting requirements, both in terms of the number and frequency of reports that must be submitted as well as the level of detail required. Finally, I object strongly to Section 122, creating the position of Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs. A single Assistant Secretary handling both the Near East and South Asia, as is the case under the Department's current organization, is best for the conduct of foreign policy as well as from a management perspective. Having a single bureau enables the Department of State to develop an integrated approach to such crucial issues as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Islamic revival, and the Afghan situation--all of which involve both the countries of South Asia as well as those of the Near East. From a management perspective, this would be the smallest geographic bureau in the Department and, therefore, would be inefficient and expensive. More generally, I will continue to work with the Congress to obtain the organizational flexibility needed to conduct our foreign policy most effectively. George Bush (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

US To Host Anti-Narcotics Summit

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Washington, DC Date: Nov 28, 199111/28/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America, North America Country: United States, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela Subject: Narcotics [TEXT] President Bush has accepted an invitation from the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela to attend a second anti-narcotics summit. The President has invited the participants to the United States for this summit and proposed that it be held in early 1992, perhaps as early as February. This is also the second anniversary of the successful Cartagena summit of February 1990. Since that day in Cartagena when the President met with the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, we have made tremendous strides in the drug fight, both at home and abroad. That meeting brought the international effort against drugs into focus as has no other event. The struggle has become a national priority for many nations, including Mexico, which has been invited to participate in this summit. Since we set forth our common goals in the Declaration of Cartagena, cocaine consumption in the United States is down. The drug mafias have been attacked, and trafficker routes have been disrupted throughout the region. We have been working together to create alternative development and new trade opportunities in the hemisphere, and we have negotiated bilateral agreements to strengthen our unified front against drug abuse and trafficking. Efforts against chemical supplies and money laundering are also improving. The five Andean presidents jointly invited President Bush to meet with them to "undertake a joint evaluation of the advances made in the battle against narcotics so as to be able to set even more audacious goals in our effort to defeat once and for all this scourge of mankind." Hence, this summit will be expanded and will build on the excellent base established at Cartagena 2 years ago. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

The Free Baltic Republics-- A Victory of Self-Liberation

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Address before the Hudson Institute's Conference on the Baltics, Indianapolis, Indiana Date: Nov 28, 199111/28/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Subject: Democratization, United Nations [TEXT] On behalf of President Bush, I would like to take this opportunity to formally welcome to America: Prime Minister Savisaar of Estonia, Prime Minister Godmanis of Latvia, and Prime Minister Vagnorius of Lithuania. We are meeting today at an amazing moment in history. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are no longer captive nations. They are free and independent countries. It seems an incredible thing to say, but I'll say it anyway: The Cold War is over. That doesn't mean the world is not a dangerous place. It means there is only one superpower and that the ideas of freedom and democracy have triumphed. It is most appropriate that we meet today at the Hudson Institute. For the Hudson Institute is dedicated to the primacy of ideas--ideas about individuals, ideas about societies, and ideas about the international community. Hudson's founder, the great Herman Kahn, knew the importance of ideas, and believed, as Victor Hugo wrote many years ago, that there is nothing more powerful than a new idea. The Cold War was a classic battle of ideas. On our side is the belief in democratic values, the belief that all men and women are created in God's image and are endowed with certain inalienable rights--among the most important of which is the right to self- government. The other side was the Leninist side. That view held that mankind is sharply divided into antagonistic classes, and that it is the historical role of the Communist Party, as the vanguard of the proletariat, to lead progressive mankind to victory over a supposedly decadent and divided West. The peoples of the Baltic republics have achieved a tremendous victory of self-liberation--a victory of freedom over oppression and democracy over authoritarianism. The ideas of freedom and self-government bind the Baltic peoples, the American people, and institutions like Hudson. So once again, on behalf of the President, welcome forever to the family of the democracies. For 51 years, the United States refused to acknowledge the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union. Your nations' histories are replete with suffering and tragedy. For more than 1,000 years, you have endured waves of invasion and domination. Never again should your countries lose the right of self- determination. Your having been a captive nation is a fact of the past--not a sign of the future. Your future will be one of freedom and opportunity. Last month, President Bush talked to your presidents about a partnership of freedom--and he was right. This fall, we established our embassies in your capitals: Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. We were proud to sponsor the Baltic republics for UN membership. We were equally proud to sponsor your membership in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Now the real work begins. We must make democracy work, and you must integrate yourselves into the international community. Unfortunately, your recent past is 51 years of Soviet rule. Many changes will have to be made, and we want to be a partner in those changes. We are working with our Congress on issues such as aid, technical assistance, and most-favored-nation [trade] status. Our Peace Corps will soon be operating in your countries. [Peace Corps Director] Elaine Chao will send a team over next year. I know that one of the remaining issues with the Soviet Union is the continued presence of Soviet troops on your soil without your consent. As you know, we support a prompt resolution of this matter. It is a fundamental right of national sovereignty to invite foreign troops to come--but also to invite them to leave. The United States will never stay on foreign soil unless we are invited and wanted. When our presence is no longer welcome, we leave. As for your security in the future, look to the West. The NATO leaders have said that the security of NATO's members is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. I would especially call your attention to the proposal that the United States and Germany issued 3 weeks ago. This proposal builds on the liaison relationship established by NATO during the London summit last year. We now have proposed that NATO formalize, deepen, and expand the liaison relationships with the new democracies in the East. And we were delighted to see the North Atlantic Assembly last week admit the three Baltic countries as associate members. These new relationships should help in your efforts to promote security, stability, and democratic reforms in your countries. And while we are on the subject of democratic reforms, let me raise one point: One of the legacies of more than 50 years of Soviet rule is the presence of large ethnic minorities in all three of your countries. I would respectfully urge you to take all steps possible to ensure that their fundamental freedoms and human rights are fully protected. As you know, these rights are guaranteed under the Helsinki Final Act, which the Baltic states formally signed earlier this month. By strictly adhering to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, your people stand to gain a lot. You will find that your minorities add strength, richness, and vitality to your social fabric. This has certainly been our experience here in the United States, and we are confident that it can be yours as well. So far, I have talked mainly about the political and security challenges facing the Baltic republics. It may be, however, that the economic challenges you confront will prove to be the most difficult. So let me say a few words about them. We know that the reforms necessary to move to market-based economies will not be easy to accomplish. But, as nations around the world have found, they are absolutely necessary. You must be bold. You must be radical. You must change. Membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank will help a great deal. As you know, we are supporting your candidacies. Last fiscal year, we provided $14 million in assistance for the three Baltic nations. This year, we are seeking an additional $15 million from the Congress. The United States has been safeguarding some of your financial assets for over 50 years. The President has pledged to unfreeze them and return them to you. We will move rapidly to do this. I am also proposing that each of your countries engage in a broad-ranging economic dialogue with the United States. We would like to begin such dialogues before the end of this year. This would involve meetings in Washington and your capitals and would include discussions with US Government officials and the US business and industrial communities. The objective of these dialogues will be to help your nations become attractive sites for private business activity. But, in the final analysis, neither assistance nor aid will be enough to provide your people with the quality of life they deserve. Foreign aid can alleviate short-term needs, and borrowing from international financial institutions can facilitate medium-term structural adjustments. Over the long-term, however, there is one and only one path to achieving your full economic potential: unleashing the creativity and enterprise of your people in a free market. You will need to move rapidly on true economic reform to do this. Economic reform means accepting the market-oriented economic model. Economic reform means reducing the role of the state and freeing the forces of individual initiative. Above all, economic reform means tapping into your most precious resource-- the skills, the ingenuity, and the entrepreneurship of your people. Make no mistake about it: With economic reform will come private investment and growth. And economic growth will generate more trade, more investment, and more jobs for all. A few minutes ago, I was pleased to sign three historic documents on behalf of the United States. These bilateral agreements with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania permit OPIC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, to promote joint ventures and other US private investments in the Baltics. OPIC represents the new wave of US foreign assistance. Instead of massive bailouts financed by the tax-payer, OPIC mobilizes private capital to encourage economic growth and helps nations make the transition to a market economy. I am confident that these agreements will help spread the word to our business community--including some of the great companies located here in Indiana--that the Baltic countries are open for business and that we can work together to enhance trade, investment, and global prosperity. Let me conclude on a personal note: As you know, Indiana is my home. I served for 12 years in Congress, both in the House and the Senate. The people of this state are simply wonderful. They are full of life. They love their families. They are God-fearing and hard-working. And what I firmly believe is that if you really want to know how the United States works, don't spend all your time in Washington, DC--stay in the Midwest. Come to places like Indianapolis. Look at our streets and our schools, at our factories and our markets, at our town halls and our corporate headquarters. We are self-reliant people-- people who treasure freedom above all. Free markets, free government, and the free exchange of ideas: That is what Indiana is all about; that is what America is all about; and I know that is what the Baltic nations will be all about. So let me congratulate our distinguished Baltic visitors again for coming to the Hudson Institute. I am confident that the ties you have forged here will strengthen the bonds of friendship between our countries and will help you build the bright future that your people so richly deserve. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

Restoring Democracy to Haiti

Aronson Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Oct 31, 199110/31/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, OAS, Trade/Economics [TEXT] I want to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify on the crisis in Haiti and US policy to help restore democracy there. The United States was one of the prime movers in promoting and supporting the first free and fair elections in Haiti's history. This Administration set as its goal, not only elections, but elections free of violence and made a continuing, persistent, and determined effort to help the Haitian Government and people reach that historic achievement. The United States sponsored the resolution that committed the OAS [Organization of American States] to oversee the Haitian elections. The United States was the principal supporter of the UN General Assembly's decision to send an observer mission to Haiti as well. With the support of the Congress, US assistance helped pay for and equip the Haitian Supreme Electoral Council. Strong, determined US political and diplomatic efforts helped to keep the Haitian electoral process on track. Vice President Quayle traveled to Haiti during the electoral period to emphasize US insistence on a free and fair vote in a secure climate. President Bush welcomed provisional President Ertha Trouillot to show our support for her key role in overseeing the electoral process. I, myself, made three separate trips to Haiti to promote fair elections and an orderly transition. Our Ambassador there, Al Adams, played a personal and decisive role in supporting this electoral process. When the votes were counted, the United States was the first country to voice strong support for President [Jean-Bertrand] Aristide as the clear and overriding choice of the Haitian people on December 16 [1990]. Following the election, working with the Congress and this committee, the Administration helped mobilize strong bilateral and multilateral support for the new Government of Haiti. We provided immediate balance- of-payments support and helped rally generous international and multilateral economic assistance for the fledgling government. On the day before the coup, the United States forgave virtually all of Haiti's official bilateral debt--$99 million. When Haiti held its first democratic elections, it was not only a proud moment in Haiti's history, it also marked another decisive step in the consolidation of democracy in this hemisphere. Indeed, until the violent coup of September 30, every nation in this hemisphere, with the sole exception of Cuba, was led by a government that had come to office through an electoral process. The United States is not the only government that has a deep stake in the survival and consolidation of democracy in Haiti. So do governments throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. At the OAS General Assembly meeting in Santiago, Chile, in June of this year, the 34 members of the OAS adopted, by unanimous vote, a new mechanism to defend democracy when it is threatened in this hemisphere. That resolution empowered the Secretary General to convene an emergency meeting of foreign ministers when a democratic government is threatened or overthrown. That resolution was born out of the OAS' failed experience in Panama and its recognition, as the December 1990 coup in Suriname proved, that violent anti-democratic forces remain in many nations, threatening the stability and survival of elected governments. When President Aristide was forced to leave Haiti on September 30, the OAS mobilized in record time to defend his government. So too, did the United States. On October 2, President Bush suspended all direct assistance to Haiti. On October 3, the Administration blocked the export of all arms and ammunition to the Haitian police and military. On October 4, President Bush signed an executive order freezing the assets of the Haitian Government and prohibiting any American citizen or company from financial transfers to the illegal authorities. These steps were taken in consultation with, and in support of, our partners in the OAS. Secretary Baker represented the United States at the first emergency OAS meeting held on October 3. He called upon the delegates to pass the strongest possible resolution, and the OAS enacted the toughest sanctions in its history by unanimous vote. The OAS at that meeting also delegated a commission of foreign ministers to travel to Haiti to try to negotiate a settlement. The United States was a part of that mission, and I traveled to Haiti with that commission on October 4, 5, and 7 in an effort to find a settlement. The United States supported the follow-up OAS resolution of October 8 which called for a trade embargo. President Bush issued an executive order formalizing such an embargo earlier this week. But in the essential areas of fuel, arms, ammunition, and financial transfers, the United States already had acted and blocked any such transfers to Haiti in the first days following the coup. The State Department has ordered the departure of all non- essential personnel from Haiti and recommended that American citizens there depart as quickly as possible. Of the 8,300 Americans registered with the Embassy, our best estimate is [that] some 3,500 have left Haiti since the events of September 30. The 34 members of the Organization of American States, including the United States, are united in their determination to support the restoration of President Aristide's Government in Haiti. The tough sanctions which have been levied against Haiti are designed to convince those who have seized and hold power illegally to resume negotiations to achieve that goal. The OAS, in both its resolutions, and the United States in designing these sanctions, have tried to protect ordinary Haitians by exempting food staples and medicines. US assistance continues for humanitarian purposes through non-governmental and international organizations. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these sanctions have had, and will have in the future, a severe impact on this impoverished nation. No one wants more suffering for Haiti nor damage to its vulnerable economy. Our strong hope is that those who hold power in Haiti will recognize that there is no alternative to a negotiated settlement. The OAS recognizes that this is a complex crisis with many roots, and that many groups and individuals in Haiti have legitimate concerns about their own constitutional protections. In both its resolutions, the OAS has taken on a responsibility, not only to see President Aristide's authority restored, but also to protect the human rights of all Haitians and create conditions in which constitutional guarantees can be respected. To achieve that purpose, the OAS has authorized creation of a civilian mission that would travel to Haiti to help create the necessary conditions for a successful negotiation. The mission would remain in Haiti at the request of the parties there to help provide the necessary guarantee that a negotiated settlement would be respected by all sides. President Aristide has formally invited this mission to go to Haiti. This past week, the President of the Haitian Senate, Dejean Belizaire, formally invited the [OAS] Secretary General to send this mission to Haiti. Secretary General Baena Soares has appointed a distinguished former Foreign Minister of Colombia, Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, to head the mission. I understand from my conversations with the Secretary General that they hope to send the initial contingent to Haiti in a matter of days. There is no guarantee that this crisis will be resolved through these diplomatic efforts. There is a real threat that order and authority will simply break down in Haiti. That is one reason why we strongly urge those holding power in Haiti to begin a serious process of negotiation as quickly as possible. It is also one of the reasons why we have ordered departure of our personnel in Haiti and recommended that all American citizens leave. Commercial airlines are currently flying into Haiti on a regular basis, including US carriers, and we believe Haitians and US citizens have opportunities to depart. We face many difficult choices in our policy in Haiti--none attractive; all fraught with difficulty and risk. But the one choice that the democratic community of the Organization of American States never contemplated was to stand by and do nothing when Haiti's first democratically elected government was violently overthrown. The international community has a deep interest in defending the December elections because its presence in Haiti helped to guarantee that the process could, and did, succeed. We have a responsibility also because the unanimous decision in Santiago to defend democracy is being tested and watched by others throughout this hemisphere who might harbor similar designs. Finally, we have an obligation to act because after 200 years of waiting, the Haitian people need and deserve the solidarity of the democratic community to defend their hard-won, fragile, and new democratic liberties. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

US Embargo on Haitian Trade

Tutwiler Description: Statement and fact sheets released by Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman Date: Oct 29, 199110/29/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Trade/Economics, Travel [TEXT]
Executive Order Formalizing the Embargo
(Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman) The President has signed an executive order formalizing a comprehensive trade embargo on Haiti, effective November 5. The Administration is taking this additional step to comply with the resolutions of the OAS [Organization of American States] to tighten further the sanctions imposed on Haiti in the wake of the illegal overthrow of the Aristide Government earlier this month. The order applies to all commercial trade with Haiti, both exports and imports of goods and services. The only exception will be for humanitarian purposes: basic food staples, like wheat, sugar, rice, flour, cooking oil, and essential medicines. The OAS resolution, which called for a trade embargo, specifically made an exception for such humanitarian assistance. In addition, the Department of State has today ordered the departure from Haiti of all non-essential US Government employees and dependents and has urged all US citizens in Haiti to depart the country as soon as possible. This executive order is the fourth major step taken by the United States to impose rigorous sanctions on Haiti since the forcible exile of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on October 1. On October 2, the United States suspended all direct assistance to Haiti. On October 3, the Administration blocked exports to the Haitian police and military. On October 4, President Bush signed an executive order to freeze the assets of the Haitian Government and to prohibit all financial transfers by any American citizen or company to the illegal government in Haiti. Today's action is an additional step to make it clear that the United States will have no normal trade or diplomatic relations with Haiti until constitutional democracy is restored there. The United States continues to hope to see a peaceful resolution to this crisis. The disruptions which these additional sanctions will place on the Haitian economy have been brought upon the Haitian people by those who seized and hold power in Haiti today. The United States strongly supports the effort of the OAS Secretary General [Baena Soares] to negotiate the return of the constitutionally elected government headed by President Aristide. The United States hopes that those who hold power in Haiti will work with the OAS civilian mission to Haiti as soon as possible to help stabilize the situation there, create conditions that will allow peaceful negotiations to proceed, and help to offer guarantees to all Haitian sectors that constitutional rights will be respected in any resolution of this crisis. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control is responsible for implementation and enforcement of the President's executive order, and we would refer you to them for specific details of its implementation.
Implementing the Order
(Fact sheet released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/ Department Spokesman) The order implementing the trade embargo will become effective within 1 week. In the essential areas of fuel, arms, ammunition, and financial dealings with the Haitian Government, which will have the greatest impact, the embargo already is in effect for all intents and purposes. To allow for an orderly implementation of this order on the assembly sector, for a period of 30 days from the effective date of this order, goods containing parts or materials exported from the United States prior to the effective date of the trade embargo may be imported into the United States following assembly or processing in Haiti. The embargo already has begun to have an effect in Haiti. Fuel supplies are running low; the new government virtually has no hard currency as a result of the freezing of assets by President Bush and the prohibitions against financial transactions with the illegal government in Haiti. Already gasoline, and in some cases electricity, is being rationed. We think the effects of these additional measures will be felt very quickly. Since they are not covered by the embargo, food commodities specified in our announcement and other humanitarian items will be delivered via normal commercial channels without special authorization, although subject to US Customs scrutiny for compliance with embargo terms. Any questions on the details of the implementation will have to be answered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. That is the office that will write the regulations associated with the embargo and grant licenses under the exceptions outlined in the statement. The embargo's duration remains to be determined. The embargo can be reviewed and modified to narrow or broaden its scope. We will closely monitor the situation in Haiti to see if any modifications are warranted.
Departure of US Citizens and Non-Essential Embassy Personnel
(Fact sheet released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman) All US Embassy employees and dependents, except those determined to be essential, must depart Haiti. Before the coup, there were 156 employees and dependents in the US Embassy. By November 2, there will be approximately 30 essential US Embassy employees in Haiti; this number is subject to change. About 70 US citizens connected to the Embassy had left as of last weekend. This step has been taken, on the recommendation of our ambassador, as a precaution against a possible deterioration in the security situation in Haiti resulting from the military takeover there. Approximately 8,300 US citizens have registered at the US Embassy. We believe the number of Americans remaining in Haiti may be higher than the number of those registered. We had estimated that up to 3,000 US citizens had left Haiti. We do not know how many Americans have departed or entered Haiti since commercial flights resumed approximately 1 week after the September 30 coup. While the situation in Haiti remains calm, the effect of OAS sanctions will be increasingly felt in disruptions to the economy and basic services. We believe Americans should leave in order to avoid these disruptions. We expect that our actions will further increase the effect already felt from the suspension of aid by the United States and others, from the freeze we imposed on Haitian Government assets, and from sanctions imposed by other OAS states. The embassy remains open to provide essential services to American citizens, to monitor and report on the situation in Haiti, and to administer humanitarian assistance programs. We will continue to monitor the situation in Haiti closely, especially as it affects US citizens. Commercial airlines are operating on normal schedules, allowing those who wish to leave to do so. In addition to the non- US airlines that have been flying to Haiti for a number of weeks, two US carriers, American and Pan Am, resumed flights on Friday, October 25, and Saturday, October 26, respectively. Flights departing Haiti over the weekend have not been fully booked. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

US Embargo on Haitian Trade

Tutwiler Description: Statement released by Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman Date: Oct 31, 199110/31/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] The opening of the Central American Parliament in Guatemala on October 28 marks an important step toward the strengthening of Central America's new agenda for peace, democracy, and dialogue. At Esquipulas in 1987, the Central American presidents committed themselves to a plan for democracy and national reconciliation. They also envisioned a parliament as a symbol and instrument that would help "to make dialogue prevail over violence and reason over rancor." The Esquipulas peace process continues to hold the hope for millions of Central Americans for a more secure, prosperous life based on democratic freedom. The Central American Parliament is a new institution, but it expresses a deep, historic aspiration for strong cooperation among the individual Central American states. We are encouraged by its establishment as an effective forum to support regional peace, democracy, and protection of human rights, the rule of law, and the region's economic well-being. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991 Title:

The Evolving Security Environment In the Asia-Pacific Region

Solomon Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Oct 30, 199110/30/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific Country: New Zealand, South Korea, North Korea, USSR (former), Philippines, Thailand, Australia Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, POW/MIA Issues [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to once again present an overview of the evolving security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The process of global transformation is working in varying patterns and paces region by region. In East Asia and the Pacific, the security situation has changed significantly since May when I last presented our views to this committee. Among recent developments reshaping the region's security environment are: -- The veritable revolution in the Soviet Union resulting in the abandonment of communism, great uncertainties about the state of that union, and an increasingly active role in Asia of the Russian Republic; -- The President's September 27 announcement that tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from all surface ships and attack submarines; -- The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines, which last June forced the closure of Clark Air Base, and the failure of the Philippine Senate to ratify the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security, rendering uncertain the future of our military presence at Subic Bay Naval Station; and -- The signing in Paris on October 23 of a comprehensive agreement to resolve the Cambodia conflict that will, after implementation and along with resolution of our POW/MIA concerns, make possible normalization of US relations with the states of Indochina. These disparate developments underscore the broad sweep of change now underway as we advance into a new phase of history. New patterns of diplomacy and international cooperation are also emerging in Asia amidst the region's unique historical, political, and economic circumstances. There is new activity between Moscow and Tokyo designed to resolve Japan's Northern Territories issue with the Soviet Union; the two Koreas have joined the United Nations and have held four rounds of prime ministerial- level talks; and the Cambodian peace accord will make possible over the coming months broadening international involvement in Vietnam as well as in Cambodia. At the same time, East Asia and the Pacific remains a diverse political environment with a deep sense of history and its own security challenges--some enduring from times past. Most prominently, the decades-long military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula remains, but with the added danger of nuclear proliferation. In his speech before the UN General Assembly last month, President Bush observed that the collapse of communism has resulted in a revival of historical forces long frozen by the Cold War confrontation. Ancient interstate disputes, ethnic rivalries, nationalist aspirations, and old prejudices have rapidly re-surfaced. In East Asia and the Pacific, these challenges to stability appear less pronounced than in some other regions, but there are areas of concern. Among them are a number of unresolved territorial disputes such as the Spratly Islands and historical suspicions among various Asian states. In Burma, the tyranny of a brutal military dictatorship endures, despite the clear expression of popular will for civilian democratic government in the elections of 1990. Aside from continuing uncertainty about the future of the Soviet Union, the residual Asian communist states--China, North Korea, and Vietnam--face internal pressures for change that can have a significant impact on regional stability. In addition, we face transnational problems such as nuclear and missile proliferation, illegal narcotics trafficking, degradation of the environment, and outflows of refugees. These challenges to collective security are now on our regional agenda as important elements of a comprehensive approach to security. Addressing issues such as curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related issues--as we have seen from the Gulf war- -are basic requirements of the post-Cold War international system now taking form. Our broad policy challenge is to manage this mixture of old and new problems while forging post-Cold War institutions that will shape the world of the 21st century. In our view, sustained American engagement in the Pacific is fundamental to US national interests and to the international system we hope to see become a reality.
US Policy
In formulating US policy toward the region and its emerging security environment, we are guided by the many successes of our past policies. Forward defense based on a network of bilateral defense relations and economic engagement premised on an open global trading system have maintained decades of stability in the region and secured its remarkable economic dynamism. We have large and growing interests in East Asia and the Pacific, now one of the regional engines of global growth. Together, the economies of the region have a GNP roughly equal to that of the United States and are increasingly integrated into the global trading system. US trans-Pacific two-way trade now exceeds $300 billion annually--about one-third larger than our transatlantic trade. US firms have more than $61 billion invested in the region. We export more to Malaysia than to the Soviet Union, more to Indonesia than to Central and Eastern Europe, and more to Singapore than to Spain or Italy. Clearly, our future prosperity is inextricably linked to that of the Asia-Pacific region. In an age of instantaneous global flows of information and capital, these burgeoning economic linkages and the continuing democratization of the region are among the factors creating a deepening sense of Asia-Pacific community. Through initiatives such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process we are trying to foster greater cohesion among all the Pacific rim economies.
Influence of Current Changes on Security Strategies
Against this background, let me review our broad security strategy for East Asia and the Pacific and explore how it is likely to be influenced by the recent changes in the region I have mentioned. The enhanced capabilities of our allies and friends, changing security circumstances, and budget constraints led the Bush Administration--at the request of Congress--to review over a year ago our defense strategy for East Asia and the Pacific. We presented a comprehensive assessment of our policies and strategies to the Congress in April 1990 in a Presidential report entitled, "A Strategic Framework for Asia: Looking to the 21st Century"--also known as the EASI study. This framework outlined a three-phased approach for adjustments in our forward deployed presence in Asia designed to safeguard US interests, preserve our deterrent capability, and enable us to maintain our security commitments to our friends and allies. My colleague from the Department of Defense will discuss this policy reassessment in more detail, but I would like to review our basic approach. What has given structure to security activities in the Asia- Pacific region for 4 decades is a loose constellation of bilateral alliances with the United States at its core. Central to this informal, yet highly effective, security structure has been the US- Japan alliance, the keystone of our engagement in the region. This association, combined with the US bilateral alliances with Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia has been and remains the structure of Asian security. This system has been effective precisely because it has respected the political and cultural diversity and the geo-political realities of the region as well as the national interests of our partners. Unlike Europe, there has not been a single threat commonly perceived throughout the region. Instead, there is a multiplicity of security concerns that vary from country to country and subregion to subregion. As the overlay of US-Soviet competition has been removed from Asia, the region's diverse interests and concerns stand out in sharper relief. What had been a secondary aspect of our Cold War security presence is now evolving into the primary rationale for our defense engagement in the region: to provide geo-political balance, to be an honest broker, and to reassure against uncertainty. As Phase II of our EASI strategic framework is being formulated, the political and security environment I have sketched here implies that the US role as a balancer will remain essential to regional stability for the foreseeable future--a view widely held in the region. This perspective reinforces the continuing importance of our bilateral security relationships. In the post-Cold War world, however, the enhanced capabilities of our allies and friends and new security challenges require a greater sharing of responsibility; continuing adjustments in our force structure, defense activities, and relations; and consideration of new mechanisms for sustaining regional stability. The process of more equal responsibility-sharing is now well underway as evidenced by developments such as Japan's increased host nation support (by 1995, Japan will pay 73% of non-salary costs of US forces stationed there), South Korea's increasing cost- sharing, and our recent agreement with Singapore for increased base access.
Implications of Recent Developments
First, developments in the Philippines are altering the character of our historic relationship. Following the refusal of the Philippine Senate to ratify the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security, we have had discussions with the Aquino Government in light of the Senate's action. At this point, President [Corazon] Aquino has indicated a desire to discuss a 3-year withdrawal agreement. I want to emphasize that regardless of the fate of Subic Bay, our overriding concern is to sustain friendly and productive relations with a democratic and economically resurgent Philippines. A withdrawal from permanent basing in the Philippines would make it less convenient, and perhaps more costly, to maintain our force projection capabilities in the region. But the combination of technological advances, a changed strategic environment, and alternative basing arrangements allow us more flexibility in foreign basing than was the case in the past. Indeed, there are a number of advantages to a more diversified, flexible security presence in the region. The Gulf war demonstrated that we have the strategic capability to rapidly deploy forces to distant areas in response to aggression. Given the vast distances in the Asia-Pacific region, this ability is not a substitute for a forward presence in the western Pacific. But it does serve as an effective augmentation to the reduced military presence we will maintain outside the continental United States. I want to emphasize our firm commitment to sustaining close defense and political relationships with the Philippines, the other nations of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], and Australia in Southeast Asia, as with Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia. While we have no intention of building new military bases abroad, we have the option of working out new access arrangements with other nations in the region. In Australia, for example, we have joint facilities as part of our long- standing alliance relationship. Earlier this year, we concluded an access agreement with Singapore, a clear expression of our desire to maintain a defense presence in the region and a reflection of the widespread desire of our friends to have us do so in concert with them. Second, the President's September 27 nuclear initiative is relevant to the security environment in East Asia and the Pacific in several respects. As a matter of national policy, US Navy ships will not carry nuclear weapons in normal circumstances, although we would retain the option to redeploy them in a future crisis. One such policy implication is the prospect of reactivating ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States security treaty], an alliance in limbo since 1985 as a result of New Zealand's legal prohibition of visits to its ports of nuclear-powered and nuclear- armed naval vessels. The President's initiative has sparked increased debate in New Zealand on its anti-nuclear legislation, and, as President Bush indicated to Prime Minister Bolger during their recent chat in New York, we retain warm feelings for the people and Government of New Zealand and have an identity of view on many non-defense issues. Following the President's historic announcement, Prime Minister Bolger called for the formation of a commission to study the safety and environmental aspects of nuclear-powered ships. We view this as a welcome first step. The United States has made clear to the New Zealand Government the requirements for resuming a full alliance partnership. We maintain alliances on the basis of shared responsibilities as well as common benefits. We hope New Zealand will take the steps that would make possible a reactivation of ANZUS, although this is fundamentally a matter for the people and Government of New Zealand to decide. In regard to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), we are studying the ramifications of the President's initiative and other ongoing arms reduction negotiations. Our position has long been that our defense activities in the region are consistent with the SPNFZ treaty and its protocols. All the same, the President's announcement has not altered our reluctance to accede to the SPNFZ protocols. Various aspects of the protocols of the Treaty of Raratonga remain problematic. In some respects, the treaty's provisions are more restrictive than those of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and do not meet our criteria for acceptable nuclear free zones.
North Korea's Nuclear Program and Policies
While not directly related to the President's initiative, let me say a word about North Korea's nuclear program and policies. Pyongyang is pursuing a largely indigenous, nuclear program that has raised widespread concern and suspicions throughout the region, particularly about its development of an unsafeguarded reprocessing capability--an essential requirement for making nuclear weapons. The DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] in 1985. This freely assumed obligation requires Pyongyang to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards within 18 months of accession. Six years later, however, it has not ratified or implemented an IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards agreement. North Korea's persistent refusal to meet its international obligations is creating a serious threat to security in the region. The DPRK has in the past conditioned compliance with its NPT obligations on the removal of alleged US nuclear weapons in South Korea. The President's initiative makes that demand more specious than ever. The United States has not and will not offer any quid pro quo to North Korea for fulfillment of its international obligations. This would undermine the NPT regime as well as the stabilizing role on the peninsula the United States has maintained with its ally, South Korea, for almost 4 decades. We would, however, view full compliance by the North Koreans with the IAEA safeguard regime as an indispensable step toward the larger objective of agreement by both Seoul and Pyongyang to keep the Korean Peninsula free from the production or acquisition of any weapons-grade nuclear material--the essential requirement for ensuring that there is no nuclear arms race on the peninsula.
Role of the Soviet Union
Finally, let me comment on the implications of recent changes in the Soviet Union for Asian security. Even before the failed coup of August 19, the Soviet military threat in the region had significantly declined. Moscow is reducing troop strength in the Northern Territories, continuing to withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay, and decreasing the Soviet Pacific Ocean activities of its naval forces. Nevertheless, there remain in the Far East substantial Soviet military assets which have not been reduced, and modernization of Soviet forces there continues. We anticipate, however, further reductions in the Soviet military presence in the region in light of the ongoing transformation of the Soviet Union. We note that the Russian Republic is playing a growing role in Asian-Pacific affairs. Continued reduction of Soviet military forces in the Far East, implementation of market-oriented reforms, and resolution of the dispute over Japan's Northern Territories can pave the way for the Russian Republic and the union government to become active members of the emerging Pacific community.
In sum, while today's transition away from the Cold War era holds its uncertainties, we know something of the global trends that are shaping tomorrow's world: the movement toward democratic government, market-oriented economics, and a global culture knitted together by the communication technologies of the information age. These trends give us ample cause for optimism about the future. Yet it is also clear that the US forward-deployed security presence continues to be a necessary stabilizing force in East Asia and the Pacific. Despite modest progress in talks between North and South Korea, the Korean Peninsula remains our most immediate security concern. The prospect of an American departure from the Philippines introduces a new element of uncertainty into the Southeast Asia subregion. We are confident, however, that our robust security partners in Asia--and their demonstrated willingness to share greater responsibilities in matters of defense- -will enable us to maintain a security presence adequate for deterrence compatible with US interests and budget realities.