US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: Opening Session of Middle East Peace Conference
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address before the opening session, Madrid, Spain
Date: Oct 30, 199110/30/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: USSR (former), Spain
Subject: Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
Prime Minister [Felipe Marquez] Gonzalez [of Spain], and [Soviet]
President [Mikhail] Gorbachev, Excellencies. Let me begin by
thanking the Government of Spain for hosting this historic
gathering. With short notice, the Spanish people and their leaders
stepped forward to make available this magnificent setting. Let us
hope that this conference of Madrid will mark the beginning of a
new chapter in the history of the Middle East.
I also want to express at the outset my pleasure at the
presence of our fellow co-sponsor, President Gorbachev. At a time
of momentous challenges at home, President Gorbachev and his
senior associates have demonstrated their intent to engage the
Soviet Union as a force for positive change in the Middle East. This
sends a powerful signal to all those who long for peace.
We come to Madrid on a mission of hope--to begin work on a
just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement to the conflict in the
Middle East. We come here to seek peace for a part of the world
that in the long memory of man has known far too much hatred,
anguish, and war. I can think of no endeavor more worthy or more
necessary.
Our objective must be clear and straightforward. It is not
simply to end the state of war in the Middle East and replace it with
a state of non-belligerency. This is not enough; this would not last.
Rather, we seek peace--real peace--and by real peace I mean
treaties, security, diplomatic relations, economic relations, trade,
investment, cultural exchange, even tourism.
What we seek is a Middle East where vast resources are no
longer devoted to armaments; a Middle East where young people no
longer have to dedicate and, all too often, give their lives to
combat; a Middle East no longer victimized by fear and terror; a
Middle East where normal men and women lead normal lives.
Let no one mistake the magnitude of this challenge. The
struggle we seek to end has a long and painful history. Every life
lost--every outrage, every act of violence--is etched deep in the
hearts and history of the people of this region. Theirs is a history
that weighs heavily against hope. And yet history need not be man's
master.
I expect that some will say that what I am suggesting is
impossible. But think back. Who back in 1945 would have thought
that France and Germany, bitter rivals for nearly a century, would
become allies in the aftermath of World War II? And who, 2 years
ago, would have predicted that the Berlin Wall would come down?
And who in the early 1960s would have believed that the Cold War
would come to a peaceful end, replaced by cooperation--exemplified
by the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are here
today not as rivals but as partners, as Prime Minister Gonzalez
pointed out.
No, peace in the Middle East need not be a dream. Peace is
possible. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty is striking proof that
former adversaries can make and sustain peace. And, moreover,
parties in the Middle East have respected agreements not only in the
Sinai but on the Golan Heights as well.
The fact that we are all gathered here today for the first
time attests to a new potential for peace. Each of us has taken an
important step toward real peace by meeting here in Madrid. All the
formulas on paper, all the pious declarations in the world won't
bring peace if there is no practical mechanism for moving ahead.
Peace will only come as the result of direct negotiations,
compromise, give-and-take. Peace cannot be imposed from the
outside by the United States or anyone else. While we will continue
to do everything possible to help the parties overcome obstacles,
peace must come from within.
We come here to Madrid as realists. We do not expect peace
to be negotiated in a day, or a week, or a month, or even a year. It
will take time; indeed, it should take time--time for parties so long
at war to learn to talk to one another, to listen to one another.
Time to heal old wounds and build trust. In this quest, time need
not be the enemy of progress.
What we envision is a process of direct negotiations
proceeding along two tracks: one between Israel and the Arab
states, the other between Israel and the Palestinians. Negotiations
are to be conducted on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338.
The real work will not happen here in the plenary session but
in direct bilateral negotiations. This conference cannot impose a
settlement on the participants or veto agreements, and, just as
important, the conference can only be reconvened with the consent
of every participant. Progress is in the hands of the parties who
must live with the consequences.
Soon after the bilateral talks commence, parties will convene
as well to organize multilateral negotiations. These will focus on
issues that cross national boundaries and are common to the region:
arms control, water, refugee concerns, economic development.
Progress in these forums is not intended as a substitute for what
must be decided in the bilateral talks; to the contrary, progress in
the multilateral issues can help create an atmosphere in which
longstanding bilateral disputes can more easily be settled.
For Israel and the Palestinians, a framework already exists
for diplomacy. Negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning
with talks on interim self-government arrangements. We aim to
reach agreement within 1 year. And once agreed, interim self-
government arrangements will last for 5 years; beginning the third
year, negotiations will commence on permanent status. No one can
say with any precision what the end result will be; in our view,
something must be developed, something acceptable to Israel, the
Palestinians, and Jordan that gives the Palestinian people
meaningful control over their own lives and fate and provides for
the acceptance and security of Israel.
We can all appreciate that both Israelis and Palestinians are
worried about compromise, worried about compromising even the
smallest point for fear it becomes a precedent for what really
matters. But no one should avoid compromise on interim
arrangements for a simple reason: Nothing agreed to now will
prejudice permanent status negotiations. To the contrary, these
subsequent negotiations will be determined on their own merits.
Peace cannot depend upon promises alone. Real peace--
lasting peace--must be based upon security for all states and
peoples, including Israel. For too long, the Israeli people have lived
in fear, surrounded by an unaccepting Arab world. Now is the ideal
moment for the Arab world to demonstrate that attitudes have
changed, that the Arab world is willing to live in peace with Israel
and make allowances for Israel's reasonable security needs.
We know that peace must also be based on fairness. In the
absence of fairness, there will be no legitimacy--no stability. This
applies above all to the Palestinian people, many of whom have
known turmoil and frustration above all else. Israel now has an
opportunity to demonstrate that it is willing to enter into a new
relationship with its Palestinian neighbors, one predicated upon
mutual respect and cooperation.
Throughout the Middle East, we seek a stable and enduring
settlement. We've not defined what this means; indeed, I make
these points with no map showing where the final borders are to be
drawn. Nevertheless, we believe territorial compromise is
essential for peace. Boundaries should reflect the quality of both
security and political arrangements. The United States is prepared
to accept whatever the parties themselves find acceptable. What
we seek, as I said on March 6, is a solution that meets the twin
tests of fairness and security.
I know--I expect we all know--that these negotiations will
not be easy. I know, too, that these negotiations will not be smooth.
There will be disagreement and criticism, setbacks--who knows--
possibly interruptions. Negotiation and compromise are always
painful. Success will escape us if we focus solely upon what is
being given up.
We must fix our vision on what real peace would bring.
Peace, after all, means not just avoiding war and the costs of
preparing for it. The Middle East is blessed with great resources:
physical, financial, and, yes, above all, human. New opportunities
are within reach--if we only have the vision to embrace them.
To succeed, we must recognize that peace is in the interest
of all parties; war--absolute advantage of none. The alternative to
peace in the Middle East is a future of violence and waste and
tragedy. In any future war lurks the danger of weapons of mass
destruction. As we learned in the Gulf war, modern arsenals make
it possible to attack urban areas--to put the lives of innocent men,
women, and children at risk; to transform city streets, schools, and
children's playgrounds into battlefields.
Today, we can decide to take a different path to the future--
to avoid conflict. I call upon all parties to avoid unilateral acts, be
they words or deeds, that would invite retaliation or, worse yet,
prejudice or even threaten this process itself. I call upon all
parties to consider taking measures that will bolster mutual
confidence and trust--steps that signal a sincere commitment to
reconciliation.
I want to say something about the role of the United States of
America. We played an active role in making this conference
possible; both the Secretary of State, Jim Baker, and I will play an
active role in helping the process succeed. Toward this end, we've
provided written assurances to Israel, to Syria, to Jordan, Lebanon,
and the Palestinians. In the spirit of openness and honesty, we will
brief all parties on the assurances that we have provided to the
other. We're prepared to extend guarantees, provide technology and
support, if that is what peace requires. And we will call upon our
friends and allies in Europe and in Asia to join with us in providing
resources so that peace and prosperity go hand in hand.
Outsiders can assist, but, in the end, it is up to the peoples
and governments of the Middle East to shape the future of the Middle
East. It is their opportunity and it is their responsibility to do all
that they can to take advantage of this gathering, this historic
gathering, and what it symbolizes and what it promises.
No one should assume that the opportunity before us to make
peace will remain if we fail to seize the moment. Ironically, this is
an opportunity born of war--the destruction of past wars, the fear
of future wars. The time has come to put an end to war--the time
has come to choose peace.
Speaking for the American people, I want to reaffirm that the
United States is prepared to facilitate the search for peace, to be a
catalyst as we've been in the past and as we've been very recently.
We seek only one thing, and this we seek not for ourselves but for
the peoples of the area and particularly the children: that this and
future generations of the Middle East may know the meaning and
blessing of peace.
We have seen too many generations of children whose haunted
eyes show only fear, too many funerals for their brothers and
sisters, the mothers and fathers who died too soon, too much
hatred, too little love. And if we cannot summon the courage to lay
down the past for ourselves, let us resolve to do it for the children.
May God bless and guide the work of this conference, and may
this conference set us on the path of peace. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: Meeting Between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev
Bush, Gorbachev
Source: President Bush, President Gorbachev
Description: Excerpts from opening remarks at a news conference,
Madrid, Spain
Date: Oct 29, 199110/29/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: USSR (former), United States
Subject: Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
President Bush: I want to thank President Gorbachev. We've had yet
another very constructive meeting. We're here, of course, for this
international conference on the Middle East, and I can express my
gratitude to President Gorbachev for the very constructive role that
the Soviet Union has played in the actions leading up to this
conference; we are grateful to him for that.
We also discussed some of the matters of mutual interest
involving the situation inside the Soviet Union, the dynamic change
there, the commitment to reform that is still very strong. And all
in all, as far as I'm concerned, it was yet one more very good
meeting with the president.
President Gorbachev:I join what Mr. President just said and wanted
only to say a couple of words for myself. We agreed on holding this
meeting since it was a very convenient opportunity . . . to coordinate
our watches-- synchronize our watches--to talk a little about what
is of mutual interest to the Soviet Union and to the United States.
Yes, it's true that we began by--we talked about all the many
years of effort that we made. Especially our joint efforts in the
very recent past, both of the United States and the Soviet Union has
brought us to the point now where today--tomorrow--this long-
awaited forum, this long-awaited conference is opening. And let's
hope that given everything that we might encounter along the way
during these negotiations within the confines of this conference;
let's hope that it all turns out for the best and positively.
In any case, President Bush and I have agreed that having
opened this conference and having left Madrid, we [do] not at all
expect to be somewhere on the side. On the contrary, we're going to
facilitate as much as possible, use all the remedies that we have at
our disposal. I think that all the participants of the conference and
we, too, wanted--both today and tomorrow we'll talk about it some
more, maybe--to appeal to everybody that they act responsibly with
great understanding that what is beginning within the framework of
this Madrid conference--how meaningful it is and that everybody be
very constructive as much as possible.
Further, we said a lot and talked a lot about--since I had the
intention to pose before President Bush several questions, several
issues vis-a-vis what's happening internally in the Soviet Union and
also because he and [the] Secretary of State also had a whole series
of questions . . . to ask for the benefit of their own understanding to
try to find out where we now are in the Soviet Union and to get a
better grasp of what kind of issues and problems we're trying to
solve.
This took quite a large percentage of our time, maybe--
probably--the majority of our meeting. I'm very satisfied by the
position which was held, by the position of the President of the
United States, and hope that--have all the basis to believe and feel-
-that this is yet another step in strengthening the mutual
understanding and cooperation between our two countries right at
the stage of all the great and momentous changes that are taking
place.
And, finally, we had an exchange of information and views as
to what each of the sides is doing in the context of disarmament
and all the initiatives that have been undertaken.
The President and I very highly--gave a very high mark to the
way we are solving a lot of these very burning issues, which for
many years have plagued us. But, now, basing ourselves on all the
experiences that have happened over the last few years, especially
how well we're getting along now with our two countries, between
the Soviet Union and the United States, also among the members of
the two governments of the two countries, that we're finding very
good solutions.
In any event, we wanted to have a very short meeting to chat
and maybe not overload ourselves too much because the subject of
this meeting, in fact, is the opening of the conference. But, in fact,
we had a very substantive discussion. I think it will be very useful
for both parties, for both sides. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: Middle East Peace Conference
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: News conferences, US Embassy, Madrid, Spain
Date: Nov 30, 199111/30/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Subject: Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
October 30, 1991: 8:02 am EDT
Ladies and gentlemen, let me simply say that the President and the
[Israeli] Prime Minister [Yitzhak Shamir] and their respective
colleagues have just had a very full and friendly meeting as we go
into the first session of the conference. We discussed a range of
matters, some having to do with logistics but having to do as well
with a reaffirmation of the very close relationship between the
United States and Israel.
The President, of course, expressed his unyielding and
absolute commitment to the security of the state of Israel,
something that I have expressed on my recent visits to Israel. It
was a good meeting, a full meeting, a very friendly meeting.
And let me take this opportunity to correct a statement or
two that I've seen this morning coming--at least appearing in some
of the press in the United States to the effect, generally, that in my
meeting last night with the Prime Minister we didn't shake hands.
Nothing is further from the truth. We had about four waves of press
come in there and we shook hands, that I can recall specifically, for
the first three. Then someone tells us that there was a request to
shake hands for the fourth one--something we didn't hear. And so
we didn't shake hands because we didn't hear the request. But I
want to make sure we correct the record on that because the
relationship here--it
is strong and it is firm and it is very warm and friendly.
Q. Do the Israelis sound as if they are willing to make some
compromises if the other parties do as well?
A. I think the Government of Israel is here, as the Prime
Minister has put it, in good faith seeking peace. And, of course, if
we are going to get to peace, it's going to require compromises on
the part of all, and there's no doubt that that commitment of the
Government of Israel is real. It wouldn't be here if it wasn't. The
decisionmaker in Israel is here, the Prime Minister himself.
I've said before that I think that it is good that Prime
Minister Shamir is here because he, after all, more than anybody
else, made the decision for the Government of Israel to come to this
conference.
October 30, 1991: 9:40 am EDT
Let me give you a brief readout on the President's meeting with the
heads of the various Arab delegations.
The President emphasized in all of these meetings the
importance of everybody keeping their eye on the ball and keeping
their eye on the objective, which is the creation of a viable peace
process in the hopes of moving toward real peace in the Middle East.
He condemned the terrorist incidents that have taken place here
recently--the attack on our Embassy in Beirut, the very regrettable
and unfortunate killing of Israeli settlers, and the killing of Israeli
soldiers in the northern part of the Israeli security zone in Lebanon.
And he made the point to each and every one of the delegations that
it is the intention and desire of the United States to serve to the
extent that we can as a catalyst for peace. That's our objective.
That's our intention in bringing forward this conference. And he
stressed to everyone the importance of keeping in the back of their
minds as we begin this peace conference the real goal, which is
peace in the region.
Q. You said that everyone--there has to be compromises on
all parts--all sides--like what?
A. It's not up to the United States to determine what the
parties are going to--how the parties are going to come together,
what the agreements are going to be. As the President said
yesterday, we have our well-known and long-established policy
positions. But it's not up to us to put a proposal on the table. There
are going to be, hopefully, extensive negotiations as we move
forward from the conference, both bilateral and multilateral. I
think it's important to keep in mind that the negotiations between
Israelis and Palestinians in the first instance have to do with
interim self-government arrangements, arrangements that will last
for a period of 5 years. Beginning the third year, there will be
discussions between Israelis and Palestinians on permanent status.
So it's perhaps premature to--
Q. That's the plan, isn't it?
A. It's perhaps premature for us to, today, say this is what
the permanent status arrangement should be. These will come only
after extended negotiations between the parties. Talks cannot be--
talks are not a guarantee that peace will result. But it is for sure
that without talks we won't get peace.
Q. Well, have they agreed on autonomy for 5 years? Is this on
the table? Is it set?
A. What is set is that--and this is embraced within the
invitations that were sent to the parties to this conference and the
parties accepted the parameters by their attendance here, is that
they--with respect to negotiations between Israelis and
Palestinians, there will be negotiations in phases. The first
negotiations will deal with interim, self-government arrangements.
It is hoped that those negotiations can be concluded within 1 year.
That's by no means certain, but our invitation says that we begin
those discussions with the objective of concluding them within 1
year. Beginning the third year of a 5-year interim self-government
period, they will begin to talk about a permanent status. Now those
are the discussions between Israel and the Palestinian-Jordanian
delegation. There will also be discussions between Israel--
bilateral discussions between Israel and Lebanon and between
Israel and Syria, having to do, of course, with different issues.
Q. Mr. Baker, can you tell us whether any of the delegations
this morning expressed any concern about balance going into this or
whether they think it really will be fairly evenhanded?
A. I think it's fair to say that everyone understands that this
is the beginning of a process. And everybody, I think, is here in good
faith in order to promote peace.
Opening statement at a news conference, IFEMA Press
Center, Madrid, Spain: October 30, 1991
Today, Israel, her Arab neighbors, and the Palestinians all came
together for the first time to begin the search for peace. That old
taboo that Arabs and Israelis cannot meet and cannot talk is now
something that we want to relegate to history. From this day
forward, dialogue and negotiations, not violence and confrontation,
should be the hallmark of the Middle East. The road to peace will be
very long, and it will be very difficult, and, as I have said before,
there will be undoubtedly many, many interruptions along the way.
But we have to crawl before we walk, and we have to walk before
we run, and today I think we all began to crawl.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: Middle East Peace Conference
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks at the Royal Palace, Madrid, Spain
Date: Nov 1, 199111/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Subject: Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
Distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen: Over the last 8
months, many people in the region have exerted great efforts and
contributed in many ways to make this conference and negotiations
possible. All of you in this hall fall into that category. But there
are some who are not here now, individuals who have made
essential contributions to the process, without which, in my view,
this conference would not have happened. In this regard, I want to
pay tribute:
-- To President Mubarak of Egypt, who was a confidant,
adviser, friend, and advocate for this process from the very
beginning;
-- To King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who demonstrated by word
and deed that new opportunities for Arab-Israeli peace existed
after the Gulf war, and who personified this new approach in the
Arab world;
-- To President Assad of Syria, whose assurance to me that
Syria had made an historic choice and decision in favor of peace,
and whose early commitment to this process, both proved to be
vital;
-- To King Hussein of Jordan, whose courage, leadership, and
willingness to commit publicly and quickly in support of this
process transformed the dynamics in the region;
-- To Prime Minister Shamir of Israel, whose steady
determination and strong leadership proved essential to reaching an
agreement to convene this conference and to launch direct bilateral
negotiations for real peace between Israel and its neighbors;
-- To Foreign Minister Levy of Israel, who was determined to
develop an active and meaningful peace process and who worked
creatively to overcome obstacles in our path;
-- To President Hrawi of Lebanon, who has worked to re-
establish central authority in his war-ravaged country, which is a
necessary step toward peace in the region;
-- To Palestinians with whom I met, like Faisal Husseini and
Hanan Ashrawi, whose personal courage in the face of enormous
pressures has created the possibility of a better life for
Palestinians.
Even in a period of dramatic and far-reaching change around
the world, this conference stands apart. Fourteen days ago,
President Bush and President Gorbachev invited Israel, the Arab
states, and Palestinians to this peace conference and to direct
negotiations that follow. In response to that invitation, Israel,
Jordan, the Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon agreed to attend the
conference and to participate in the direct negotiations. In
addition, the European Community, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco,
Algeria, and Mauritania agreed to participate in this process.
This conference demonstrates vividly the end of the Cold War
and the flowering of US-Soviet partnership in resolving regional
conflicts. Where we once competed, we now cooperate. Where
there was once polarization, there is now coordination. What was
once unthinkable--the United States and the Soviet Union co-
sponsoring a process of peace in the Middle East--became a reality
this week.
Our work--making peace through negotiations--has just
begun. As we look at the challenges ahead, it is worth noting and
learning from what we have already accomplished.
-- For decades, agreement on whether to negotiate eluded
the parties. This weekend, direct, bilateral negotiations aimed at
comprehensive, genuine peace will start.
-- For decades, agreement on what to negotiate eluded the
parties. This weekend, negotiations should begin on the accepted
basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
-- For decades, agreement on how to negotiate eluded the
parties. This weekend, negotiations will begin on two tracks and in
phases; and in a few weeks, those parties who wish to participate
will convene to organize multilateral negotiations on a wide range
of issues that affect the well being of all peoples in the region.
These are not mere platitudes. During these 8 months of
diplomacy, though the parties sometimes fell back on old slogans
and outmoded code words, they also came to understand the need to
engage concretely and pragmatically to resolve problems. I said
often that the parties would probably stake out maximum positions,
especially as they got closer to negotiations.
This is not surprising, especially in a public forum. The key,
however, is to get beyond the rhetoric and into the direct
negotiations.
Fundamentals of American Policy
A basic tenet of American thinking is that negotiations are the best
way to resolve disputes and achieve peace. Negotiations do not
guarantee peace. But without negotiations, there is no way to
produce genuine peace and no mechanism to develop understandings
that can endure.
The United States is willing to be a catalytic force, an
energizing force, and a driving force in the negotiating process. Our
involvement in this process will be rooted solidly in the core
principles enunciated by President Bush last March. They will
remain the cornerstone that guides our participation in the
negotiating process.
The United States is and will be an honest broker. We have
our own positions and views on the peace process, and we will not
forego our right to state these. But, as an honest broker with
experience--successful experience--in the Middle East
negotiations, we also know that our critical contribution will often
be to exert quiet, behind-the-scenes influence and persuasion.
Let no one mistake our role as an honest broker to mean that
we will change longstanding US policy positions, and let no one
mistake our policy positions as undercutting our determination to
help the parties reach fair and mutually acceptable solutions to
problems. As President Bush and I have both said this week: It is
not our policies that matter; it is those of the parties. They are the
ones that must negotiate peace.
This week, the parties provided insight into their thinking
about a negotiated settlement. They outlined three broad
requirements in the search for peace.
First, we heard a yearning for peace --the wish of peoples in
the region to live in a mutually satisfying relationship with
neighbors, a relationship characterized by peace treaties, economic
relations, cultural ties, and political dialogue.
Second, we heard an emphasis on land--the desire of peoples
in the region to exercise authority and political governance over
territory they consider part of their national, political, historical,
or religious patrimony.
Third, we heard a need for security --the requirement of
people to live free of fear and the obligation of governments to do
their best to protect their citizens.
What the parties, in fact, said this week is that these core
issues--land, peace, and security--are inseparable elements in the
search for a comprehensive settlement.
The parties have made clear that peace by itself is
unachievable without a territorial solution and security; that a
territorial solution by itself will not resolve the conflict without
there also being peace and security; and that security by itself is
impossible to achieve without a territorial solution and peace. The
process on which we are embarked can work only if all issues are
put on the table, and if all issues are satisfactorily resolved.
The Negotiating Process
One key issue is the style of negotiations. Today, the Soviet Union
and the United States are on the same side of the table--literally
and figuratively--in striving for global peace and the resolution of
regional conflicts. Today, and in the future, we will work together
in pursuit of a Middle East settlement.
The United States, at the highest levels, will remain
intimately engaged in this process. We expect to be available to the
parties throughout this process. The United States and the Soviet
Union are prepared to participate directly in the negotiations
themselves, with the consent of all parties.
We will do our part. But we cannot do your part as well. The
United States and the Soviet Union will provide encouragement,
advice, recommendations, proposals, and views to help the peace
process. Sometimes, you will be satisfied with our views;
sometimes frustrated. Sometimes, we will support your positions
and sometimes not. Sometimes, we will act quietly and behind the
scenes, and sometimes we will make known our views and positions
in public. None of this, however, will relieve you--the parties--of
the obligation of making peace. If you won't do it, we certainly
can't. As I have said from the beginning of this effort, we cannot
want peace more than you, the parties most directly affected by its
absence.
Parties in this process cannot reasonably be expected to
operate outside their political environment; but they should be
expected to educate, shape, guide, and lead politics and opinion.
Leaders in the region have taken difficult and courageous decisions
to get to this conference and to negotiations. More difficult and
more courageous decisions will be required to settle this conflict.
Venue of Bilateral Negotiations
As you know, the invitation sent to the parties on October 18
contained the terms of reference for this peace process, terms of
reference that had been meticulously negotiated and agreed. This
invitation specified that direct, bilateral negotiations would begin
4 days after the opening of the conference. But there was never
agreement regarding the location for those bilateral negotiations.
The parties have not yet been able to agree on where to hold
these negotiations. It is the view of the co-sponsors that the
direct, bilateral negotiations should start in Madrid as soon as
possible. It is the intention of the co-sponsors to continue to
consult with the parties with a view to fulfilling the requirements
of the invitation on this subject.
From the perspective of the co-sponsors, and, indeed, from
the perspective of most of the rest of the world, it would be very
difficult to understand how a party could now refuse to attend
bilateral negotiations simply because of a disagreement over the
site of those negotiations.
Finally, I want to note that a meeting will take place in
several weeks among those parties who wish to participate in
multilateral negotiations to organize those negotiations. These
talks will focus on issues of critical interest to many parties in the
region. They will be a complement to the bilateral negotiations. I
am pleased that the multilateral negotiations have already gained
widespread support and interest both in and outside the Middle East.
Building Confidence and Trust
This week, many have focused on the need for steps that would build
confidence and trust. The United States continues to believe that
confidence-building measures are important for the process and for
the parties, themselves.
I want to be perfectly honest, standing here as I am before
colleagues with whom I have spent many, many hours since last
March. The unwillingness of the parties to take confidence-
building steps has been disappointing. You have dealt successfully
with formulas and positions. You have agreed on terms of reference
that are fair and equitable. You have launched a process of
negotiations that can succeed. But you have failed to deal
adequately with the human dimension of the conflict.
As I traveled through the region, I witnessed terrible scenes
of human tragedy, suffering, and despair. Innocent civilians caught
in the crossfire of a conflict they wish would end: refugees and
displaced persons wandering across the vast expanses of time;
mothers and fathers, afraid of the future that awaits their children;
and children, being schooled in the lessons of animosity and
conflict, rather than friendship and accommodation.
Formulas, terms of reference, and negotiations are not
enough. Support for a negotiating process will not be sustainable
unless the human dimension is addressed by all parties. A way must
be found to send signals of peace and reconciliation that affect the
peoples of the region. Don't wait for the other side to start; each of
you needs to get off the mark quickly. You should know best what is
needed.
Through negotiations and through these and other steps, you
can demonstrate respect for the rights of others. You can express
understanding of the fears of others. You can touch the people--the
women, men, and children--who are the victims of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. We can only succeed at the table, if we find ways of
reaching out to one another away from the table.
The challenges have been great, and the obstacles have been
many, on the road to peace. Your decisions over these 8 months of
intensive diplomacy have created a new baseline of realism and
commitment to peace. This conference has been vital in breaking
down the barriers of communication and in establishing for all to
see that Arab and Israeli leaders can meet face to face.
Conclusion
In closing, let me speak to each of you personally and directly.
For over 4 decades, the world waited for this week. Peace-
loving peoples everywhere tried time and again to get you--the
makers of this intractable conflict--to join together to discuss
your differences. This week, here in Madrid, you finally have met
and held such a meeting.
This has been a start--a good start--a historic start that has
broken old taboos--an important start that opens further
opportunities.
But it is only a start--and that's not enough. You must not let
this start become an end.
When you walk out these doors, you carry with you great
responsibilities. You carry with you the responsibility to your
peoples to seek peace. You carry with you the responsibility to the
world to build a comprehensive and just peace. You carry with you
the responsibility to yourselves to break with the past and pursue a
new future.
For if you do not seize this historic opportunity, no one will
blame anyone outside your region.
You now shoulder the destiny and challenge of making peace
as you enter direct negotiations with your neighbors. The
continuation and success of this process is in your hands. The
world still looks to each of you to make the choice for peace.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: Middle East Peace Conference
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Opening statement at a news conference, IFEMA Press
Center, Madrid, Spain
Date: Nov 3, 199111/3/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Subject: Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
Let me begin by saying that the Madrid conference was a beginning.
I think it was a good beginning. Today, the parties have taken
another critical step beginning direct bilateral negotiations
between Israel and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation,
Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria. There have been and, as I
have said before, there will be obstacles in this process to be
overcome, but they have not deterred us until now, and they do not,
in my view, diminish the importance of what has happened this
week.
Let me emphasize another point that I made in my address to
the peace conference on Friday. The parties have not agreed on
venue and, in fact, as you know, the major issue that we had to work
over the weekend was where to hold the bilateral negotiations.
This is still an open question, and it is one that will need to be
resolved as the negotiations proceed. The United States and the
Soviet Union expressed the hope that the parties, themselves, will
continue to negotiate in order to reach an understanding. In the
absence of agreement, we will work together with the parties. And
we will make proposals as necessary.
The United States and the Soviet Union intend to maintain our
position that bilateral negotiations should be face-to-face and take
place separately between an Israeli delegation and each of the other
delegations. On behalf of the co-sponsors, I want all to know that
the arrangements that have been so laboriously worked out for
these initial bilateral meetings will not be considered precedential
for future rounds of talks.
Amidst all of the procedural wrangling, it is important, I
think, not to lose sight of the breakthrough represented by the start
of direct bilateral negotiations. As I have stressed all along, direct
negotiations are the only way in which real progress is going to be
made and the only way in which real progress--real peace--is ever
going to be achieved.
I want to take special note of the steadfast commitment of
the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to beginning bilateral
negotiations. And I want to express appreciation to all those who
have gone the extra mile to make these opening meetings possible
today, particularly the Government of Israel.
From the initial reports I have received from the delegations
themselves, I am especially pleased with the quality of the first
negotiating session between the Israeli and joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegations. As they told me, and as their public
statement made clear, they surely intend to proceed in a serious and
constructive fashion, and that gives us reason to believe that we
really are entering a new phase in the Middle East.
I will be leaving Madrid at the conclusion of this press
conference. Assistant Secretary [of Near East and South Asian
Affairs Edward] Djerejian and many of my senior experts will
remain in Madrid until the delegations have departed.
And before I take your questions, let me say a word, since I've
gotten a number of questions recently about this, a word about my
plans for the next 2 weeks. I will leave immediately after this
press conference to join President Bush to attend the opening of the
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Center in California. I will
then travel with the President to attend the NATO summit in Rome
as well as the US-EC meeting in the Netherlands. Then I plan to go
directly from there to Japan, Korea, and China, returning to
Washington in mid-November. I will be attending the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation meeting in Korea.
I have been looking forward for a long time to in-depth
consultations with the Japanese in Japan. I regret that I was not
able to visit Japan when I was in Asia earlier this year, because the
United States has no bilateral relationship in Asia that is any more
important than our relationship with Japan.
And let me conclude by saying a word about my trip to China.
China has almost one-fourth of all the people in the world. It has
nuclear weapons. It has great influence in the region, and it has
immense economic potential. We have some real problems, and we
can't expect to make headway with these problems unless we
discuss them. Ignoring them will not make the problems go away.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: FY 1992-93 Foreign Relations Act Signed
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement released by the White House Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 28, 199111/28/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: State Department, Arms Control, Travel
[TEXT]
Today, I have signed into law HR 1415, the "Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993." The act contains
welcome new authorities for the Department of State, many of them
included at the Administration's request. For example, the act
provides an important authorization of funds for construction of a
secure chancery in Moscow and for full payment of assessed
contributions and arrearages to international organizations and for
peace-keeping activities. These are especially helpful in light of
our current relationship with the Soviet Union and the expanding
peacekeeping role of the United Nations. I want to express my
appreciation to the Congress for its cooperation in this effort. I
regret, however, that the Congress has included several provisions
in the act that raise constitutional or other difficulties.
Article II of the Constitution confers the executive power of
the United States on the President alone. Executive power includes
the authority to receive and appoint ambassadors and to conduct
diplomacy. Thus, under our system of government, all decisions
concerning the conduct of negotiations with foreign governments
are within the exclusive control of the President. Some of the
provisions of HR 1415 could be interpreted as directing or limiting
through legislation the conduct by the President of foreign
relations. Such an interpretation would violate fundamental
constitutional principles.
For example, Section 129 would prohibit the issuance of
Israel-only passports and the issuance of more than one official or
diplomatic passport to any US Government employee for the purpose
of acquiescing in the Arab League countries' policy of denying entry
to persons whose passports reflect that they have traveled to
Israel. It also directs the Secretary of State to enter into
negotiations to seek an end to this policy. I am sympathetic to the
goals of this legislation and have made this issue part of the
Administration's discussions with the countries that engage in
such practices.
The Constitution, however, vests exclusive authority in the
President to control the timing and substance of negotiations with
foreign governments and to choose the officials who will negotiate
on behalf of the United States. A purported blanket prohibition on
the issuance of more than one official or diplomatic passport to US
Government officials could interfere with my ability to conduct
diplomacy by denying US diplomats the documentation necessary for
them to travel to all countries in the Middle East and could upset
delicate and complex negotiations. I, therefore, am directing the
Secretary of State to ensure that this provision does not interfere
with my constitutional prerogatives and responsibilities.
Section 322 and Title IV also raise constitutional concerns.
These sections deal with Middle East arms control policy and
purport to direct the President specifically how to proceed in
negotiations with the United Nations and with foreign governments.
This Administration is strongly committed to ongoing negotiations
regarding restraints on the transfer of conventional arms and
weapons of mass destruction to the Middle East. However, I must
construe these sections consistent with my responsibility for
conducting negotiations with foreign governments.
Section 301(b) requires the Secretary of State to designate
an official with responsibility for, among other things, developing a
proposal for the prosecution of Persian Gulf war criminals in an
international tribunal, including proposing to the United Nations the
establishment of such tribunal. I am sympathetic to the goal of this
provision. I note, however, that the responsibilities of this official
are to be understood by reference to Section 301(a). In guiding him
in the performance of his duties, therefore, I will keep in mind that
Section 301(a) expressed only "the sense of the Congress." In
conjunction with these provisions, Section 301(c) requires me to
submit a report to the Congress describing evidence of war crimes
and identifying war criminals. I will interpret this provision in a
manner consistent with my constitutional authority to protect
state secrets and sensitive law enforcement information.
On a different matter, several sections impose significant
reporting requirements on the Secretary of State that could be read
to compel the disclosure of sensitive diplomatic activities or
communications and/or state secrets. Section 114 requires
unclassified reporting of certain activities in the confidential fund
maintained for emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service.
The mandatory public disclosure of some of these activities would
be inimical to the success of US foreign policy, and I shall,
therefore, interpret this provision consistent with my
constitutional authority to protect such information.
Title V, Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW), raises
concerns with respect to both the President's control over
negotiations with foreign governments and the possible disclosure
of sensitive information. Title V's provisions establish sanctions
against foreign companies and countries involved in the spread or
use of chemical and biological weapons. Title V demonstrates that
the Congress endorses my goal of stemming dangerous CBW
proliferation. In signing this act, it is my understanding, as
reflected in the legislative history, that Title V gives me the
flexibility to protect intelligence sources and methods essential to
the acquisition of intelligence abut CBW proliferation. In part, such
flexibility is available because Title V does not dictate the timing
of determinations that would lead to sanctions against foreign
persons.
In connection with another arms control provision, Section
323, I am signing this act on the understanding that the sanctions
that must be imposed as a result of this new section apply only to
exports to foreign persons of items controlled pursuant to the Arms
Export Control Act and not to exports to foreign persons of items
controlled by any other law.
Section 198 deals with the publication of the "Foreign
Relations of the United States historical series" and the
declassification of Department of State documents. This section
also must be interpreted in conformity with my constitutional
responsibility and authority to protect the national security of the
United States by preventing the disclosure of state secrets and to
protect deliberative communications within the executive branch.
To the extent that Section 198 addresses the standards for
declassification of national security information, it will be
interpreted to effect no change in the standards set forth in the
existing executive order on national security information. Further,
Section 198 will be implemented in a manner and on a schedule that
will not risk ill-considered release of protected information.
Other provisions that might be construed to require
disclosure of the content of sensitive diplomatic communications,
state secrets, or intelligence information will also be interpreted
consistent with the President's responsibility to protect such
information. See, e.g., Sections 127, 129(c), 133, 192, 193, 356(b),
404, 506(b), and 508. Similarly, Section 235 will be interpreted
consistent with my responsibility to protect privileged material.
A number of other provisions of HR 1415 also pose serious
constitutional problems. Section 173 would impose
unconstitutional restrictions on my appointment power with
respect to members of the Board of the Inter-American Foundation.
Section 175(b), by requiring the Secretary of State to submit
"legislative recommendations" to the Congress, would infringe on
the executive's constitutional prerogative to submit "such measures
as [the President] shall deem necessary and expedient." US Const.,
Art. II, Section 3. By directing the opening or restricting the
closing of consular, diplomatic, and United States Information
Agency offices, Sections 112, 206, 216, and 223 would constrain
the exercise of my constitutional authority to conduct foreign
relations and, in particular, to direct ambassadors and other
representatives of the United States. Because of these
constitutional difficulties, I will treat these provisions as
advisory.
Section 234 mandates the creation of a Kurdish broadcast
service at the Voice of America (VOA). This Administration agrees
that the Iraqi Kurds need information on events in the free world
and pertaining to their own situation and also agrees with the
statement in Section 234 that the Voice of America provides an
effective means to accomplish this. However, this Administration
believes that the creation of VOA language services through
legislation limits the ability of the agency to respond to rapidly
changing international situations in a flexible and timely manner.
For these reasons, this Administration will continue to oppose the
specification in legislation of languages, broadcast hours, and
organizational arrangements.
HR 1415 also includes requirements for more than 60 new
reports to be submitted to the Congress. While I recognize the
value of reports in assisting the Congress in its legislative
responsibility, taken together such reports put a heavy burden on
the reporting agencies at a time of scarce resources. I hope that, in
the future, the Congress will balance its legitimate need for
information with the time and expense involved in preparing a
report and make an effort to minimize reporting requirements, both
in terms of the number and frequency of reports that must be
submitted as well as the level of detail required.
Finally, I object strongly to Section 122, creating the
position of Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs. A
single Assistant Secretary handling both the Near East and South
Asia, as is the case under the Department's current organization,
is best for the conduct of foreign policy as well as from a
management perspective. Having a single bureau enables the
Department of State to develop an integrated approach to such
crucial issues as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the
Islamic revival, and the Afghan situation--all of which involve both
the countries of South Asia as well as those of the Near East. From
a management perspective, this would be the smallest geographic
bureau in the Department and, therefore, would be inefficient and
expensive. More generally, I will continue to work with the
Congress to obtain the organizational flexibility needed to conduct
our foreign policy most effectively.
George Bush (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: US To Host Anti-Narcotics Summit
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Nov 28, 199111/28/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America, North America
Country: United States, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Venezuela
Subject: Narcotics
[TEXT]
President Bush has accepted an invitation from the Presidents of
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela to attend a second
anti-narcotics summit. The President has invited the participants
to the United States for this summit and proposed that it be held in
early 1992, perhaps as early as February. This is also the second
anniversary of the successful Cartagena summit of February 1990.
Since that day in Cartagena when the President met with the
Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, we have made tremendous
strides in the drug fight, both at home and abroad. That meeting
brought the international effort against drugs into focus as has no
other event. The struggle has become a national priority for many
nations, including Mexico, which has been invited to participate in
this summit.
Since we set forth our common goals in the Declaration of
Cartagena, cocaine consumption in the United States is down. The
drug mafias have been attacked, and trafficker routes have been
disrupted throughout the region. We have been working together to
create alternative development and new trade opportunities in the
hemisphere, and we have negotiated bilateral agreements to
strengthen our unified front against drug abuse and trafficking.
Efforts against chemical supplies and money laundering are also
improving.
The five Andean presidents jointly invited President Bush to
meet with them to "undertake a joint evaluation of the advances
made in the battle against narcotics so as to be able to set even
more audacious goals in our effort to defeat once and for all this
scourge of mankind." Hence, this summit will be expanded and will
build on the excellent base established at Cartagena 2 years ago.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: The Free Baltic Republics-- A Victory of Self-Liberation
Quayle
Source: Vice President Quayle
Description: Address before the Hudson Institute's Conference on the
Baltics, Indianapolis, Indiana
Date: Nov 28, 199111/28/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Subject: Democratization, United Nations
[TEXT]
On behalf of President Bush, I would like to take this opportunity to
formally welcome to America: Prime Minister Savisaar of Estonia,
Prime Minister Godmanis of Latvia, and Prime Minister Vagnorius of
Lithuania.
We are meeting today at an amazing moment in history.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are no longer captive nations. They
are free and independent countries. It seems an incredible thing to
say, but I'll say it anyway: The Cold War is over. That doesn't mean
the world is not a dangerous place. It means there is only one
superpower and that the ideas of freedom and democracy have
triumphed.
It is most appropriate that we meet today at the Hudson
Institute. For the Hudson Institute is dedicated to the primacy of
ideas--ideas about individuals, ideas about societies, and ideas
about the international community.
Hudson's founder, the great Herman Kahn, knew the
importance of ideas, and believed, as Victor Hugo wrote many years
ago, that there is nothing more powerful than a new idea.
The Cold War was a classic battle of ideas. On our side is the
belief in democratic values, the belief that all men and women are
created in God's image and are endowed with certain inalienable
rights--among the most important of which is the right to self-
government.
The other side was the Leninist side. That view held that
mankind is sharply divided into antagonistic classes, and that it is
the historical role of the Communist Party, as the vanguard of the
proletariat, to lead progressive mankind to victory over a
supposedly decadent and divided West.
The peoples of the Baltic republics have achieved a
tremendous victory of self-liberation--a victory of freedom over
oppression and democracy over authoritarianism. The ideas of
freedom and self-government bind the Baltic peoples, the American
people, and institutions like Hudson. So once again, on behalf of the
President, welcome forever to the family of the democracies.
For 51 years, the United States refused to acknowledge the
incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union. Your nations'
histories are replete with suffering and tragedy. For more than
1,000 years, you have endured waves of invasion and domination.
Never again should your countries lose the right of self-
determination. Your having been a captive nation is a fact of the
past--not a sign of the future. Your future will be one of freedom
and opportunity.
Last month, President Bush talked to your presidents about a
partnership of freedom--and he was right. This fall, we established
our embassies in your capitals: Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. We were
proud to sponsor the Baltic republics for UN membership. We were
equally proud to sponsor your membership in the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Now the real work begins. We must make democracy work,
and you must integrate yourselves into the international community.
Unfortunately, your recent past is 51 years of Soviet rule. Many
changes will have to be made, and we want to be a partner in those
changes. We are working with our Congress on issues such as aid,
technical assistance, and most-favored-nation [trade] status. Our
Peace Corps will soon be operating in your countries. [Peace Corps
Director] Elaine Chao will send a team over next year.
I know that one of the remaining issues with the Soviet Union
is the continued presence of Soviet troops on your soil without your
consent. As you know, we support a prompt resolution of this
matter. It is a fundamental right of national sovereignty to invite
foreign troops to come--but also to invite them to leave. The
United States will never stay on foreign soil unless we are invited
and wanted. When our presence is no longer welcome, we leave.
As for your security in the future, look to the West. The
NATO leaders have said that the security of NATO's members is
inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. I would
especially call your attention to the proposal that the United States
and Germany issued 3 weeks ago. This proposal builds on the liaison
relationship established by NATO during the London summit last
year.
We now have proposed that NATO formalize, deepen, and
expand the liaison relationships with the new democracies in the
East. And we were delighted to see the North Atlantic Assembly
last week admit the three Baltic countries as associate members.
These new relationships should help in your efforts to promote
security, stability, and democratic reforms in your countries.
And while we are on the subject of democratic reforms, let
me raise one point: One of the legacies of more than 50 years of
Soviet rule is the presence of large ethnic minorities in all three of
your countries. I would respectfully urge you to take all steps
possible to ensure that their fundamental freedoms and human
rights are fully protected.
As you know, these rights are guaranteed under the Helsinki
Final Act, which the Baltic states formally signed earlier this
month. By strictly adhering to the provisions of the Helsinki Final
Act, your people stand to gain a lot. You will find that your
minorities add strength, richness, and vitality to your social fabric.
This has certainly been our experience here in the United States,
and we are confident that it can be yours as well.
So far, I have talked mainly about the political and security
challenges facing the Baltic republics. It may be, however, that the
economic challenges you confront will prove to be the most
difficult. So let me say a few words about them. We know that the
reforms necessary to move to market-based economies will not be
easy to accomplish. But, as nations around the world have found,
they are absolutely necessary. You must be bold. You must be
radical. You must change.
Membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank will help a great deal. As you know, we are supporting your
candidacies. Last fiscal year, we provided $14 million in
assistance for the three Baltic nations. This year, we are seeking
an additional $15 million from the Congress. The United States has
been safeguarding some of your financial assets for over 50 years.
The President has pledged to unfreeze them and return them to you.
We will move rapidly to do this.
I am also proposing that each of your countries engage in a
broad-ranging economic dialogue with the United States. We would
like to begin such dialogues before the end of this year. This would
involve meetings in Washington and your capitals and would include
discussions with US Government officials and the US business and
industrial communities. The objective of these dialogues will be to
help your nations become attractive sites for private business
activity.
But, in the final analysis, neither assistance nor aid will be
enough to provide your people with the quality of life they deserve.
Foreign aid can alleviate short-term needs, and borrowing from
international financial institutions can facilitate medium-term
structural adjustments. Over the long-term, however, there is one
and only one path to achieving your full economic potential:
unleashing the creativity and enterprise of your people in a free
market.
You will need to move rapidly on true economic reform to do
this. Economic reform means accepting the market-oriented
economic model. Economic reform means reducing the role of the
state and freeing the forces of individual initiative. Above all,
economic reform means tapping into your most precious resource--
the skills, the ingenuity, and the entrepreneurship of your people.
Make no mistake about it: With economic reform will come private
investment and growth. And economic growth will generate more
trade, more investment, and more jobs for all.
A few minutes ago, I was pleased to sign three historic
documents on behalf of the United States. These bilateral
agreements with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania permit OPIC, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, to promote joint ventures
and other US private investments in the Baltics.
OPIC represents the new wave of US foreign assistance.
Instead of massive bailouts financed by the tax-payer, OPIC
mobilizes private capital to encourage economic growth and helps
nations make the transition to a market economy.
I am confident that these agreements will help spread the
word to our business community--including some of the great
companies located here in Indiana--that the Baltic countries are
open for business and that we can work together to enhance trade,
investment, and global prosperity.
Let me conclude on a personal note: As you know, Indiana is
my home. I served for 12 years in Congress, both in the House and
the Senate. The people of this state are simply wonderful. They are
full of life. They love their families. They are God-fearing and
hard-working. And what I firmly believe is that if you really want
to know how the United States works, don't spend all your time in
Washington, DC--stay in the Midwest.
Come to places like Indianapolis. Look at our streets and our
schools, at our factories and our markets, at our town halls and our
corporate headquarters. We are self-reliant people-- people who
treasure freedom above all.
Free markets, free government, and the free exchange of
ideas: That is what Indiana is all about; that is what America is all
about; and I know that is what the Baltic nations will be all about.
So let me congratulate our distinguished Baltic visitors again
for coming to the Hudson Institute. I am confident that the ties you
have forged here will strengthen the bonds of friendship between
our countries and will help you build the bright future that your
people so richly deserve. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: Restoring Democracy to Haiti
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington,
DC
Date: Oct 31, 199110/31/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, OAS,
Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
I want to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify on
the crisis in Haiti and US policy to help restore democracy there.
The United States was one of the prime movers in promoting
and supporting the first free and fair elections in Haiti's history.
This Administration set as its goal, not only elections, but
elections free of violence and made a continuing, persistent, and
determined effort to help the Haitian Government and people reach
that historic achievement. The United States sponsored the
resolution that committed the OAS [Organization of American
States] to oversee the Haitian elections. The United States was the
principal supporter of the UN General Assembly's decision to send
an observer mission to Haiti as well. With the support of the
Congress, US assistance helped pay for and equip the Haitian
Supreme Electoral Council. Strong, determined US political and
diplomatic efforts helped to keep the Haitian electoral process on
track.
Vice President Quayle traveled to Haiti during the electoral
period to emphasize US insistence on a free and fair vote in a
secure climate. President Bush welcomed provisional President
Ertha Trouillot to show our support for her key role in overseeing
the electoral process. I, myself, made three separate trips to Haiti
to promote fair elections and an orderly transition. Our Ambassador
there, Al Adams, played a personal and decisive role in supporting
this electoral process. When the votes were counted, the United
States was the first country to voice strong support for President
[Jean-Bertrand] Aristide as the clear and overriding choice of the
Haitian people on December 16 [1990].
Following the election, working with the Congress and this
committee, the Administration helped mobilize strong bilateral and
multilateral support for the new Government of Haiti. We provided
immediate balance- of-payments support and helped rally generous
international and multilateral economic assistance for the fledgling
government. On the day before the coup, the United States forgave
virtually all of Haiti's official bilateral debt--$99 million.
When Haiti held its first democratic elections, it was not
only a proud moment in Haiti's history, it also marked another
decisive step in the consolidation of democracy in this hemisphere.
Indeed, until the violent coup of September 30, every nation in this
hemisphere, with the sole exception of Cuba, was led by a
government that had come to office through an electoral process.
The United States is not the only government that has a deep
stake in the survival and consolidation of democracy in Haiti. So do
governments throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. At the
OAS General Assembly meeting in Santiago, Chile, in June of this
year, the 34 members of the OAS adopted, by unanimous vote, a new
mechanism to defend democracy when it is threatened in this
hemisphere. That resolution empowered the Secretary General to
convene an emergency meeting of foreign ministers when a
democratic government is threatened or overthrown.
That resolution was born out of the OAS' failed experience in
Panama and its recognition, as the December 1990 coup in Suriname
proved, that violent anti-democratic forces remain in many nations,
threatening the stability and survival of elected governments.
When President Aristide was forced to leave Haiti on
September 30, the OAS mobilized in record time to defend his
government. So too, did the United States. On October 2, President
Bush suspended all direct assistance to Haiti. On October 3, the
Administration blocked the export of all arms and ammunition to
the Haitian police and military. On October 4, President Bush signed
an executive order freezing the assets of the Haitian Government
and prohibiting any American citizen or company from financial
transfers to the illegal authorities.
These steps were taken in consultation with, and in support
of, our partners in the OAS. Secretary Baker represented the United
States at the first emergency OAS meeting held on October 3. He
called upon the delegates to pass the strongest possible resolution,
and the OAS enacted the toughest sanctions in its history by
unanimous vote. The OAS at that meeting also delegated a
commission of foreign ministers to travel to Haiti to try to
negotiate a settlement. The United States was a part of that
mission, and I traveled to Haiti with that commission on October 4,
5, and 7 in an effort to find a settlement.
The United States supported the follow-up OAS resolution of
October 8 which called for a trade embargo. President Bush issued
an executive order formalizing such an embargo earlier this week.
But in the essential areas of fuel, arms, ammunition, and financial
transfers, the United States already had acted and blocked any such
transfers to Haiti in the first days following the coup.
The State Department has ordered the departure of all non-
essential personnel from Haiti and recommended that American
citizens there depart as quickly as possible. Of the 8,300
Americans registered with the Embassy, our best estimate is [that]
some 3,500 have left Haiti since the events of September 30.
The 34 members of the Organization of American States,
including the United States, are united in their determination to
support the restoration of President Aristide's Government in Haiti.
The tough sanctions which have been levied against Haiti are
designed to convince those who have seized and hold power illegally
to resume negotiations to achieve that goal.
The OAS, in both its resolutions, and the United States in
designing these sanctions, have tried to protect ordinary Haitians
by exempting food staples and medicines. US assistance continues
for humanitarian purposes through non-governmental and
international organizations. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that
these sanctions have had, and will have in the future, a severe
impact on this impoverished nation. No one wants more suffering
for Haiti nor damage to its vulnerable economy. Our strong hope is
that those who hold power in Haiti will recognize that there is no
alternative to a negotiated settlement.
The OAS recognizes that this is a complex crisis with many
roots, and that many groups and individuals in Haiti have legitimate
concerns about their own constitutional protections. In both its
resolutions, the OAS has taken on a responsibility, not only to see
President Aristide's authority restored, but also to protect the
human rights of all Haitians and create conditions in which
constitutional guarantees can be respected. To achieve that
purpose, the OAS has authorized creation of a civilian mission that
would travel to Haiti to help create the necessary conditions for a
successful negotiation. The mission would remain in Haiti at the
request of the parties there to help provide the necessary guarantee
that a negotiated settlement would be respected by all sides.
President Aristide has formally invited this mission to go to
Haiti. This past week, the President of the Haitian Senate, Dejean
Belizaire, formally invited the [OAS] Secretary General to send this
mission to Haiti. Secretary General Baena Soares has appointed a
distinguished former Foreign Minister of Colombia, Augusto Ramirez
Ocampo, to head the mission. I understand from my conversations
with the Secretary General that they hope to send the initial
contingent to Haiti in a matter of days.
There is no guarantee that this crisis will be resolved
through these diplomatic efforts. There is a real threat that order
and authority will simply break down in Haiti. That is one reason
why we strongly urge those holding power in Haiti to begin a
serious process of negotiation as quickly as possible. It is also one
of the reasons why we have ordered departure of our personnel in
Haiti and recommended that all American citizens leave.
Commercial airlines are currently flying into Haiti on a regular
basis, including US carriers, and we believe Haitians and US
citizens have opportunities to depart.
We face many difficult choices in our policy in Haiti--none
attractive; all fraught with difficulty and risk. But the one choice
that the democratic community of the Organization of American
States never contemplated was to stand by and do nothing when
Haiti's first democratically elected government was violently
overthrown. The international community has a deep interest in
defending the December elections because its presence in Haiti
helped to guarantee that the process could, and did, succeed. We
have a responsibility also because the unanimous decision in
Santiago to defend democracy is being tested and watched by others
throughout this hemisphere who might harbor similar designs.
Finally, we have an obligation to act because after 200 years of
waiting, the Haitian people need and deserve the solidarity of the
democratic community to defend their hard-won, fragile, and new
democratic liberties. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: US Embargo on Haitian Trade
Tutwiler
Description: Statement and fact sheets released by Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman
Date: Oct 29, 199110/29/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Trade/Economics, Travel
[TEXT]
Executive Order Formalizing the Embargo
(Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs/Department Spokesman)
The President has signed an executive order formalizing a
comprehensive trade embargo on Haiti, effective November 5. The
Administration is taking this additional step to comply with the
resolutions of the OAS [Organization of American States] to tighten
further the sanctions imposed on Haiti in the wake of the illegal
overthrow of the Aristide Government earlier this month. The order
applies to all commercial trade with Haiti, both exports and
imports of goods and services. The only exception will be for
humanitarian purposes: basic food staples, like wheat, sugar, rice,
flour, cooking oil, and essential medicines. The OAS resolution,
which called for a trade embargo, specifically made an exception
for such humanitarian assistance.
In addition, the Department of State has today ordered the
departure from Haiti of all non-essential US Government employees
and dependents and has urged all US citizens in Haiti to depart the
country as soon as possible.
This executive order is the fourth major step taken by the
United States to impose rigorous sanctions on Haiti since the
forcible exile of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on October 1. On
October 2, the United States suspended all direct assistance to
Haiti. On October 3, the Administration blocked exports to the
Haitian police and military. On October 4, President Bush signed an
executive order to freeze the assets of the Haitian Government and
to prohibit all financial transfers by any American citizen or
company to the illegal government in Haiti. Today's action is an
additional step to make it clear that the United States will have no
normal trade or diplomatic relations with Haiti until constitutional
democracy is restored there.
The United States continues to hope to see a peaceful
resolution to this crisis. The disruptions which these additional
sanctions will place on the Haitian economy have been brought upon
the Haitian people by those who seized and hold power in Haiti
today.
The United States strongly supports the effort of the OAS
Secretary General [Baena Soares] to negotiate the return of the
constitutionally elected government headed by President Aristide.
The United States hopes that those who hold power in Haiti
will work with the OAS civilian mission to Haiti as soon as possible
to help stabilize the situation there, create conditions that will
allow peaceful negotiations to proceed, and help to offer guarantees
to all Haitian sectors that constitutional rights will be respected in
any resolution of this crisis.
The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control is responsible for implementation and enforcement of the
President's executive order, and we would refer you to them for
specific details of its implementation.
Implementing the Order
(Fact sheet released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs/ Department Spokesman)
The order implementing the trade embargo will become effective
within 1 week. In the essential areas of fuel, arms, ammunition,
and financial dealings with the Haitian Government, which will have
the greatest impact, the embargo already is in effect for all intents
and purposes. To allow for an orderly implementation of this order
on the assembly sector, for a period of 30 days from the effective
date of this order, goods containing parts or materials exported
from the United States prior to the effective date of the trade
embargo may be imported into the United States following assembly
or processing in Haiti.
The embargo already has begun to have an effect in Haiti.
Fuel supplies are running low; the new government virtually has no
hard currency as a result of the freezing of assets by President
Bush and the prohibitions against financial transactions with the
illegal government in Haiti. Already gasoline, and in some cases
electricity, is being rationed. We think the effects of these
additional measures will be felt very quickly.
Since they are not covered by the embargo, food commodities
specified in our announcement and other humanitarian items will be
delivered via normal commercial channels without special
authorization, although subject to US Customs scrutiny for
compliance with embargo terms.
Any questions on the details of the implementation will have
to be answered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control. That is the office that will write the regulations
associated with the embargo and grant licenses under the
exceptions outlined in the statement.
The embargo's duration remains to be determined. The
embargo can be reviewed and modified to narrow or broaden its
scope. We will closely monitor the situation in Haiti to see if any
modifications are warranted.
Departure of US Citizens and Non-Essential Embassy
Personnel
(Fact sheet released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs/Department Spokesman)
All US Embassy employees and dependents, except those determined
to be essential, must depart Haiti. Before the coup, there were 156
employees and dependents in the US Embassy. By November 2, there
will be approximately 30 essential US Embassy employees in Haiti;
this number is subject to change. About 70 US citizens connected
to the Embassy had left as of last weekend.
This step has been taken, on the recommendation of our
ambassador, as a precaution against a possible deterioration in the
security situation in Haiti resulting from the military takeover
there.
Approximately 8,300 US citizens have registered at the US
Embassy. We believe the number of Americans remaining in Haiti
may be higher than the number of those registered.
We had estimated that up to 3,000 US citizens had left Haiti.
We do not know how many Americans have departed or entered Haiti
since commercial flights resumed approximately 1 week after the
September 30 coup.
While the situation in Haiti remains calm, the effect of OAS
sanctions will be increasingly felt in disruptions to the economy
and basic services. We believe Americans should leave in order to
avoid these disruptions.
We expect that our actions will further increase the effect
already felt from the suspension of aid by the United States and
others, from the freeze we imposed on Haitian Government assets,
and from sanctions imposed by other OAS states.
The embassy remains open to provide essential services to
American citizens, to monitor and report on the situation in Haiti,
and to administer humanitarian assistance programs. We will
continue to monitor the situation in Haiti closely, especially as it
affects US citizens.
Commercial airlines are operating on normal schedules,
allowing those who wish to leave to do so. In addition to the non-
US airlines that have been flying to Haiti for a number of weeks,
two US carriers, American and Pan Am, resumed flights on Friday,
October 25, and Saturday, October 26, respectively. Flights
departing Haiti over the weekend have not been fully booked. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: US Embargo on Haitian Trade
Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman
Date: Oct 31, 199110/31/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The opening of the Central American Parliament in Guatemala on
October 28 marks an important step toward the strengthening of
Central America's new agenda for peace, democracy, and dialogue.
At Esquipulas in 1987, the Central American presidents committed
themselves to a plan for democracy and national reconciliation.
They also envisioned a parliament as a symbol and instrument that
would help "to make dialogue prevail over violence and reason over
rancor." The Esquipulas peace process continues to hold the hope
for millions of Central Americans for a more secure, prosperous
life based on democratic freedom.
The Central American Parliament is a new institution, but it
expresses a deep, historic aspiration for strong cooperation among
the individual Central American states. We are encouraged by its
establishment as an effective forum to support regional peace,
democracy, and protection of human rights, the rule of law, and the
region's economic well-being. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 44, November 4, 1991
Title: The Evolving Security Environment In the Asia-Pacific
Region
Solomon
Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and
Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Oct 30, 199110/30/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific
Country: New Zealand, South Korea, North Korea,
USSR (former), Philippines, Thailand, Australia
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control,
Security Assistance and Sales, POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to once again present an
overview of the evolving security environment in the Asia-Pacific
region.
The process of global transformation is working in varying
patterns and paces region by region. In East Asia and the Pacific,
the security situation has changed significantly since May when I
last presented our views to this committee. Among recent
developments reshaping the region's security environment are:
-- The veritable revolution in the Soviet Union resulting in
the abandonment of communism, great uncertainties about the state
of that union, and an increasingly active role in Asia of the Russian
Republic;
-- The President's September 27 announcement that tactical
nuclear weapons would be removed from all surface ships and
attack submarines;
-- The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines, which last
June forced the closure of Clark Air Base, and the failure of the
Philippine Senate to ratify the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Security, rendering uncertain the future of our military
presence at Subic Bay Naval Station; and
-- The signing in Paris on October 23 of a comprehensive
agreement to resolve the Cambodia conflict that will, after
implementation and along with resolution of our POW/MIA concerns,
make possible normalization of US relations with the states of
Indochina.
These disparate developments underscore the broad sweep of
change now underway as we advance into a new phase of history.
New patterns of diplomacy and international cooperation are
also emerging in Asia amidst the region's unique historical,
political, and economic circumstances. There is new activity
between Moscow and Tokyo designed to resolve Japan's Northern
Territories issue with the Soviet Union; the two Koreas have joined
the United Nations and have held four rounds of prime ministerial-
level talks; and the Cambodian peace accord will make possible over
the coming months broadening international involvement in Vietnam
as well as in Cambodia.
At the same time, East Asia and the Pacific remains a diverse
political environment with a deep sense of history and its own
security challenges--some enduring from times past. Most
prominently, the decades-long military confrontation on the Korean
Peninsula remains, but with the added danger of nuclear
proliferation.
In his speech before the UN General Assembly last month,
President Bush observed that the collapse of communism has
resulted in a revival of historical forces long frozen by the Cold
War confrontation. Ancient interstate disputes, ethnic rivalries,
nationalist aspirations, and old prejudices have rapidly re-surfaced.
In East Asia and the Pacific, these challenges to stability
appear less pronounced than in some other regions, but there are
areas of concern. Among them are a number of unresolved
territorial disputes such as the Spratly Islands and historical
suspicions among various Asian states. In Burma, the tyranny of a
brutal military dictatorship endures, despite the clear expression
of popular will for civilian democratic government in the elections
of 1990. Aside from continuing uncertainty about the future of the
Soviet Union, the residual Asian communist states--China, North
Korea, and Vietnam--face internal pressures for change that can
have a significant impact on regional stability.
In addition, we face transnational problems such as nuclear
and missile proliferation, illegal narcotics trafficking, degradation
of the environment, and outflows of refugees. These challenges to
collective security are now on our regional agenda as important
elements of a comprehensive approach to security. Addressing
issues such as curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and related issues--as we have seen from the Gulf war-
-are basic requirements of the post-Cold War international system
now taking form.
Our broad policy challenge is to manage this mixture of old
and new problems while forging post-Cold War institutions that
will shape the world of the 21st century. In our view, sustained
American engagement in the Pacific is fundamental to US national
interests and to the international system we hope to see become a
reality.
US Policy
In formulating US policy toward the region and its emerging
security environment, we are guided by the many successes of our
past policies. Forward defense based on a network of bilateral
defense relations and economic engagement premised on an open
global trading system have maintained decades of stability in the
region and secured its remarkable economic dynamism.
We have large and growing interests in East Asia and the
Pacific, now one of the regional engines of global growth. Together,
the economies of the region have a GNP roughly equal to that of the
United States and are increasingly integrated into the global trading
system. US trans-Pacific two-way trade now exceeds $300 billion
annually--about one-third larger than our transatlantic trade. US
firms have more than $61 billion invested in the region. We export
more to Malaysia than to the Soviet Union, more to Indonesia than to
Central and Eastern Europe, and more to Singapore than to Spain or
Italy. Clearly, our future prosperity is inextricably linked to that of
the Asia-Pacific region.
In an age of instantaneous global flows of information and
capital, these burgeoning economic linkages and the continuing
democratization of the region are among the factors creating a
deepening sense of Asia-Pacific community. Through initiatives
such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process we
are trying to foster greater cohesion among all the Pacific rim
economies.
Influence of Current Changes on Security
Strategies
Against this background, let me review our broad security strategy
for East Asia and the Pacific and explore how it is likely to be
influenced by the recent changes in the region I have mentioned.
The enhanced capabilities of our allies and friends, changing
security circumstances, and budget constraints led the Bush
Administration--at the request of Congress--to review over a year
ago our defense strategy for East Asia and the Pacific. We
presented a comprehensive assessment of our policies and
strategies to the Congress in April 1990 in a Presidential report
entitled, "A Strategic Framework for Asia: Looking to the 21st
Century"--also known as the EASI study.
This framework outlined a three-phased approach for
adjustments in our forward deployed presence in Asia designed to
safeguard US interests, preserve our deterrent capability, and
enable us to maintain our security commitments to our friends and
allies. My colleague from the Department of Defense will discuss
this policy reassessment in more detail, but I would like to review
our basic approach.
What has given structure to security activities in the Asia-
Pacific region for 4 decades is a loose constellation of bilateral
alliances with the United States at its core. Central to this
informal, yet highly effective, security structure has been the US-
Japan alliance, the keystone of our engagement in the region. This
association, combined with the US bilateral alliances with Korea,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia has been and remains the
structure of Asian security.
This system has been effective precisely because it has
respected the political and cultural diversity and the geo-political
realities of the region as well as the national interests of our
partners. Unlike Europe, there has not been a single threat
commonly perceived throughout the region. Instead, there is a
multiplicity of security concerns that vary from country to country
and subregion to subregion.
As the overlay of US-Soviet competition has been removed
from Asia, the region's diverse interests and concerns stand out in
sharper relief. What had been a secondary aspect of our Cold War
security presence is now evolving into the primary rationale for our
defense engagement in the region: to provide geo-political balance,
to be an honest broker, and to reassure against uncertainty.
As Phase II of our EASI strategic framework is being
formulated, the political and security environment I have sketched
here implies that the US role as a balancer will remain essential to
regional stability for the foreseeable future--a view widely held in
the region. This perspective reinforces the continuing importance
of our bilateral security relationships.
In the post-Cold War world, however, the enhanced
capabilities of our allies and friends and new security challenges
require a greater sharing of responsibility; continuing adjustments
in our force structure, defense activities, and relations; and
consideration of new mechanisms for sustaining regional stability.
The process of more equal responsibility-sharing is now well
underway as evidenced by developments such as Japan's increased
host nation support (by 1995, Japan will pay 73% of non-salary
costs of US forces stationed there), South Korea's increasing cost-
sharing, and our recent agreement with Singapore for increased
base access.
Implications of Recent Developments
First, developments in the Philippines are altering the character of
our historic relationship. Following the refusal of the Philippine
Senate to ratify the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security,
we have had discussions with the Aquino Government in light of the
Senate's action. At this point, President [Corazon] Aquino has
indicated a desire to discuss a 3-year withdrawal agreement.
I want to emphasize that regardless of the fate of Subic Bay,
our overriding concern is to sustain friendly and productive
relations with a democratic and economically resurgent Philippines.
A withdrawal from permanent basing in the Philippines would
make it less convenient, and perhaps more costly, to maintain our
force projection capabilities in the region. But the combination of
technological advances, a changed strategic environment, and
alternative basing arrangements allow us more flexibility in
foreign basing than was the case in the past. Indeed, there are a
number of advantages to a more diversified, flexible security
presence in the region.
The Gulf war demonstrated that we have the strategic
capability to rapidly deploy forces to distant areas in response to
aggression. Given the vast distances in the Asia-Pacific region,
this ability is not a substitute for a forward presence in the
western Pacific. But it does serve as an effective augmentation to
the reduced military presence we will maintain outside the
continental United States.
I want to emphasize our firm commitment to sustaining close
defense and political relationships with the Philippines, the other
nations of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], and
Australia in Southeast Asia, as with Japan and South Korea in
Northeast Asia. While we have no intention of building new military
bases abroad, we have the option of working out new access
arrangements with other nations in the region.
In Australia, for example, we have joint facilities as part of
our long- standing alliance relationship. Earlier this year, we
concluded an access agreement with Singapore, a clear expression
of our desire to maintain a defense presence in the region and a
reflection of the widespread desire of our friends to have us do so
in concert with them.
Second, the President's September 27 nuclear initiative is
relevant to the security environment in East Asia and the Pacific in
several respects. As a matter of national policy, US Navy ships will
not carry nuclear weapons in normal circumstances, although we
would retain the option to redeploy them in a future crisis.
One such policy implication is the prospect of reactivating
ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States security treaty], an
alliance in limbo since 1985 as a result of New Zealand's legal
prohibition of visits to its ports of nuclear-powered and nuclear-
armed naval vessels. The President's initiative has sparked
increased debate in New Zealand on its anti-nuclear legislation,
and, as President Bush indicated to Prime Minister Bolger during
their recent chat in New York, we retain warm feelings for the
people and Government of New Zealand and have an identity of view
on many non-defense issues.
Following the President's historic announcement, Prime
Minister Bolger called for the formation of a commission to study
the safety and environmental aspects of nuclear-powered ships. We
view this as a welcome first step. The United States has made
clear to the New Zealand Government the requirements for resuming
a full alliance partnership. We maintain alliances on the basis of
shared responsibilities as well as common benefits. We hope New
Zealand will take the steps that would make possible a reactivation
of ANZUS, although this is fundamentally a matter for the people
and Government of New Zealand to decide.
In regard to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), we
are studying the ramifications of the President's initiative and
other ongoing arms reduction negotiations. Our position has long
been that our defense activities in the region are consistent with
the SPNFZ treaty and its protocols. All the same, the President's
announcement has not altered our reluctance to accede to the SPNFZ
protocols. Various aspects of the protocols of the Treaty of
Raratonga remain problematic. In some respects, the treaty's
provisions are more restrictive than those of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco and do not meet our criteria for acceptable nuclear free
zones.
North Korea's Nuclear Program and Policies
While not directly related to the President's initiative, let me say a
word about North Korea's nuclear program and policies. Pyongyang
is pursuing a largely indigenous, nuclear program that has raised
widespread concern and suspicions throughout the region,
particularly about its development of an unsafeguarded
reprocessing capability--an essential requirement for making
nuclear weapons.
The DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] acceded to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] in 1985. This freely assumed
obligation requires Pyongyang to place all its nuclear facilities
under full-scope safeguards within 18 months of accession. Six
years later, however, it has not ratified or implemented an IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards agreement. North
Korea's persistent refusal to meet its international obligations is
creating a serious threat to security in the region.
The DPRK has in the past conditioned compliance with its NPT
obligations on the removal of alleged US nuclear weapons in South
Korea. The President's initiative makes that demand more specious
than ever. The United States has not and will not offer any quid pro
quo to North Korea for fulfillment of its international obligations.
This would undermine the NPT regime as well as the stabilizing role
on the peninsula the United States has maintained with its ally,
South Korea, for almost 4 decades.
We would, however, view full compliance by the North
Koreans with the IAEA safeguard regime as an indispensable step
toward the larger objective of agreement by both Seoul and
Pyongyang to keep the Korean Peninsula free from the production or
acquisition of any weapons-grade nuclear material--the essential
requirement for ensuring that there is no nuclear arms race on the
peninsula.
Role of the Soviet Union
Finally, let me comment on the implications of recent changes in
the Soviet Union for Asian security. Even before the failed coup of
August 19, the Soviet military threat in the region had significantly
declined. Moscow is reducing troop strength in the Northern
Territories, continuing to withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay, and
decreasing the Soviet Pacific Ocean activities of its naval forces.
Nevertheless, there remain in the Far East substantial Soviet
military assets which have not been reduced, and modernization of
Soviet forces there continues. We anticipate, however, further
reductions in the Soviet military presence in the region in light of
the ongoing transformation of the Soviet Union.
We note that the Russian Republic is playing a growing role in
Asian-Pacific affairs. Continued reduction of Soviet military
forces in the Far East, implementation of market-oriented reforms,
and resolution of the dispute over Japan's Northern Territories can
pave the way for the Russian Republic and the union government to
become active members of the emerging Pacific community.
Conclusion
In sum, while today's transition away from the Cold War era holds
its uncertainties, we know something of the global trends that are
shaping tomorrow's world: the movement toward democratic
government, market-oriented economics, and a global culture
knitted together by the communication technologies of the
information age. These trends give us ample cause for optimism
about the future. Yet it is also clear that the US forward-deployed
security presence continues to be a necessary stabilizing force in
East Asia and the Pacific.
Despite modest progress in talks between North and South
Korea, the Korean Peninsula remains our most immediate security
concern. The prospect of an American departure from the
Philippines introduces a new element of uncertainty into the
Southeast Asia subregion. We are confident, however, that our
robust security partners in Asia--and their demonstrated
willingness to share greater responsibilities in matters of defense-
-will enable us to maintain a security presence adequate for
deterrence compatible with US interests and budget realities.