US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: Invitations to Middle East Peace Conference Announced
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Press briefing in Jerusalem, Israel
Date: Oct 18, 199110/18/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel, USSR (former)
Subject: EC
[TEXT]
Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I want to apologize for running up
so close to the Sabbath, but today is an important day and this is an
important moment. An American Secretary of State and a Soviet
Foreign Minister are together in Jerusalem for the first time in
history. What's more, the Soviet Union has today restored full
diplomatic relations with the state of Israel after a break of 24
years.
..........But our joint presence here today represents something more:
[Soviet] Foreign Minister Pankin and I are pleased to announce that
President Bush and President Gorbachev are today inviting Israel,
Arab states, and Palestinians to attend a Middle East peace
conference to be held beginning October 30 in Madrid. That
conference is to be followed by direct negotiations designed to
achieve real peace.
..........We have witnessed new beginnings in other parts of the world.
The negotiating process we are seeking to launch with this
invitation holds the hope of a new era in the Middle East:
..........-- The hope of an era marked by acceptance and not by
rejection;
..........-- The hope of an era marked by dialogue and not by violence;
..........-- The hope of an era marked by cooperation and not by
conflict; and
..........-- The hope of an era marked by hope and not by despair.
..........This invitation offers the peoples in this region a pathway to
ending an era of confrontation and a basis for a new future. The
road to peace will not be simple; to the contrary, it will be
extremely difficul,t with many problems, hitches, and interruptions
along the way. Old suspicions will not quickly disappear. The gaps
are real and won't easily be overcome. We have no illusions about
the hard work ahead.
..........But we take encouragement from the issuance of these
invitations, the product of work of the last 8 months. As we have
all along, we intend to take this one step at a time. And, so, if we
receive positive responses to this invitation, we will be taking one
more step forward toward achieving the peace and security that the
peoples of the Middle East have so long been denied. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: Invitations to Middle East Peace Conference Announced
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement released by the White House Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 18, 199110/18/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel, USSR (former)
Subject: EC
[TEXT]
President Bush
October 18, 1991.
I am extremely pleased that Secretary of State Baker and Foreign
Minister Pankin have announced that the United States and the
Soviet Union are issuing invitations to a Middle East peace
conference in Madrid beginning on October 30.
..........I myself plan to be there to help open this historic gathering,
one with the potential to bring true peace and security to the
peoples of the area.
..........As the invitation makes clear, the objective of the effort is
nothing less than a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement of
the Arab-Israeli conflict to be achieved through a two-track
approach of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states
and Israel and the Palestinians based upon UN Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338.
..........I very much hope that all those invited will respond quickly
and affirmatively so that the necessary organization and
preparations can be completed for this historic
undertaking. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: Prospects for Peace in Cambodia
Solomon
Source: Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs
Description: Statement before the Asian and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Oct 17, 199110/17/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Cambodia, Vietnam
Subject: Democratization, POW/MIA Issues,
United Nations
[TEXT]
We stand today at the edge of what could be a new era in Cambodia
and throughout Indochina--one holding the prospect of national
reconciliation, reconstruction, and renewed hope for the future.
..........Next Wednesday [October 23, 1991] in Paris, a comprehensive
political settlement agreement for Cambodia will be signed.
Virtually every nation that has been involved in Cambodia's long
years of violent conflict or has been affected by its turbulence and
instability will formally express its commitment to this
settlement process. We have, at last, achieved a new and
constructive international consensus on Cambodia. There is, at
last, the prospect that the Khmer people's long night of agony may
be ending.
..........This achievement reflects 2 years of persistent effort by the
UN Permanent Five, the Paris conference co-chairmen, and a number
of the Paris conference participant countries, especially Indonesia,
Australia, Japan, and Thailand. It has also been based on the work
of the UN Secretariat, and--in the end game--the cooperation of the
four Cambodian factions. In our efforts, we have been aided by the
policy support, critical probing, and encouragement of this
subcommittee, and especially by you, Mr. Chairman.
..........The comprehensive settlement agreement is the culmination
of a negotiating effort initiated by Secretary Baker in the fall of
1989. After the first session of the Paris conference failed to
achieve the basis for a settlement in the summer of 1989, the
Permanent Five, responding to Secretary Baker's suggestion, began
work on a settlement framework premised on a strong UN role in
monitoring a cease-fire, demobilizing the factional military forces,
and organizing and conducting free and fair elections.
..........A framework document was completed in August 1990 and
immediately gained the unanimous endorsement of the UN Security
Council in Resolution 668, and approval by the UN General Assembly.
The four Cambodian factions accepted the framework agreement as
well--however tentatively. In September 1990, they formed the
Supreme National Council (SNC) as called for in the framework
document. The SNC is an interim leadership group designed to serve
as the embodiment of Cambodian national sovereignty in the
transitional period leading to elections, to represent Cambodia
abroad, and to promote national reconciliation.
..........In the ensuing 12 months, the Permanent Five and the Paris
conference Coordinating Committee worked with the SNC to create
an expanded settlement agreement that would serve as the blueprint
for a UN-managed settlement process. For a time, it looked as if
final agreement would be blocked by disagreements on two key
issues: arrangements for dealing with the factional military
forces; and the division of authority between the SNC and the UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Then, beginning this
past June, a series of SNC meetings unexpectedly but rapidly
resolved all the remaining issues of substance. The political will
to come to closure on a settlement plan was at last evident.
..........There is no question but that the settlement process was
given its final impetus by the decision of China and Vietnam to
resolve their bilateral differences. This was done in a series of
high-level meetings that began in September 1990 and were
resumed this past summer after a Vietnamese Party Congress
brought about some important changes in Vietnam's foreign policy.
These two countries concluded, after more than a decade of fighting
out their differences over Cambodia, that a political settlement
was in their interests. This view was rapidly reflected in the
attitudes of their friends among the Cambodian parties in the
negotiating process.
..........At the same time, the decision of Prince Sihanouk to become
actively involved in the settlement effort was of special
importance. The prince's leadership, formalized in his election last
July as the president of the Supreme National Council, facilitated
the coming together of the heads of the Khmer factions and their
engagement in serious negotiations for the first time since 1989.
By the time the SNC gathered for a session in Pattaya, Thailand, at
the end of this past August, there was an evident willingness to
compromise by all the factions. This spirit of reconciliation, as
much as anything, made the final agreement possible; it also gives
us hope that implementation of the agreement that lies just ahead
will have the cooperation of the four factions.
..........The final settlement agreement is a complex but sound
document. It faithfully elaborates the principles laid down in the
framework agreement. The settlement process provides for the
following key elements:
..........-- A strong UN role that will help achieve free and fair
elections;
..........-- Verification of the withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces
and advisers from Cambodia;
..........-- Return of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons under
conditions of peace and security, and the right of all Cambodians to
express their preferences for repatriation without intimidation or
coercion of any kind; and
..........-- Immediate cantonment of all factional military forces,
followed by demobilization of at least 70% of these forces during
the transitional period. The remaining 30% must either be
demobilized shortly after the elections or merged into a new
Cambodian national army to be created by the government formed as
a result of the elections.
..........-- Strong human rights protections, so that there are
safeguards against a return to violent practices by the Khmer Rouge
or by any other Cambodian faction.
..........It is important to understand how this agreement furthers the
goals of US policy. Our objectives in Cambodia have been, and
remain:
..........-- To prevent the return to power of the Khmer Rouge and to
guard against its resumption of genocidal violence;
..........-- To verify the withdrawal of all foreign forces; and
..........-- To give the Cambodian people the opportunity for self-
determination through free and fair elections.
..........A fundamental premise of our negotiating effort has been that
continuing warfare in Cambodia would give the Khmer Rouge their
best chance at a return to power and impose on the long-suffering
Khmer people all the burdens of an endless military conflict. Our
judgment has been that the only practical way to control the Khmer
Rouge is to bind them to a comprehensive agreement supported by
China, cut off their access to foreign arms, disarm and demobilize
their forces, and subject them to international monitoring. The
settlement agreement obliges the Khmer Rouge to turn from the
battlefield, where they have particular strengths and experience, to
the ballot box, where they can be held accountable by the Cambodian
people for their bloody record.
..........The Khmer Rouge were not voted into power in 1975, and we
believe it highly unlikely they will be voted into power now. Most
observers believe they will win a limited share of the vote in
certain areas of the country but that they are unlikely to gain any
significant power in a new government. Again, the alternative to
letting the Cambodian people express their judgment about the
Khmer Rouge in free and fair elections was to support those who
tried for a decade, with limited success, to fight it out with the
Khmer Rouge on the battlefield.
..........The settlement process will be the most complicated
operation the UN has ever taken on. In addition to supervising the
cease-fire, verifying the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the
cessation of external arms supply, and demobilizing more than
150,000 troops, the UN will be responsible for the repatriation and
resettlement of some 350,000 displaced Cambodians now in camps
along the Thai border to areas of their free choice. Extensive de-
mining operations will be an early priority to facilitate both
repatriation and demobilization. The UN will then oversee the
administrative processes of the various Cambodian factions to
ensure political neutrality and conduct voter registration and
education campaigns in preparation for the national election, which
it will supervise. We expect this process to unfold over a period of
approximately 18 months after the agreement is signed.
..........The UN operation will be unprecedented in scope; yet every
aspect of the process specified in the settlement agreement is
necessary for the whole settlement to work. From the beginning,
we have proceeded on the assumption that Cambodia's recent past of
genocidal violence and factional conflict required a strong UN
presence.
..........It is not only in Cambodia that we have sought such a UN role.
In El Salvador, Angola, and the Western Sahara as well, we have
encouraged the UN to take on important peace-keeping
responsibilities to resolve regional conflicts. We are living in a
global environment that has been profoundly transformed by the
disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War. One of
the most positive elements in this transforming world is the newly
constructive role of the United Nations, as demonstrated so clearly
in Namibia, in the Persian Gulf crisis, and now in Cambodia.
..........Resolution of the conflict in Cambodia will open the way to
reconciliation throughout Southeast Asia. It will bring an end to
Vietnamese military intervention in a neighboring state and
promote peaceful relations between the states of Indochina and
their neighbors in ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations].
And it will open the way for the United States to begin the process
of normalizing bilateral relations with Vietnam--although the pace
and scope of that process, as you know, will be influenced by
progress in resolving our POW/MIA and other humanitarian concerns.
..........As soon as the Cambodia settlement agreement is signed in
Paris and implementation has begun, we are prepared to lift the
trade embargo against Cambodia and support plans for the World
Bank and other international financial institutions to begin projects
there. We will also set up a liaison mission in Phnom Penh to
interact with the SNC and the UN authorities.
..........In addition to our support for the UN operation in Cambodia,
we intend to continue the humanitarian assistance programs we
began in Cambodia last year. In FY 1991, we provided over
$25 million of humanitarian assistance for civilians in areas
controlled by the non-communist resistance and by the Phnom Penh
authorities. This has made us the largest aid donor in Cambodia.
We have proposed funding at a comparable level in FY 1992. We are
also contributing an initial $5 million to the UNHCR appeal for funds
to carry out the repatriation of Khmer displaced persons along the
Thai border. This is over and above the $11.5 million we provided in
FY 1991 for the care and maintenance of these displaced
Cambodians in Thai camps.
..........Mr. Chairman, the antagonisms and tragedies that have
wracked Cambodia--indeed, all of Indochina--since the end of World
War II have been associated with the Cold War, but they are also
conflicts rooted in historic and ethnic rivalries among the nations
of the region. Cambodia's tragedy has reflected, in part, tensions
between the Vietnamese, Khmer, and Thai that have existed for
centuries. Yet in the Khmer Rouge, we witnessed a combination of
Khmer hostility toward the Vietnamese and the communist ideal
carried to its grotesque and violent conclusion.
..........Today, totalitarianism is in retreat, even in those countries
that still adhere to Marxism-Leninism, and the forces of democracy
and free enterprise are rapidly transforming the processes of
national development and international relations. The UN
settlement plan for Cambodia is a direct expression of this new
reality in Southeast Asia. It provides the best vehicle for ensuring
that Cambodians are able to join the modern world as quickly as
possible and begin the long process of national reconstruction.
Cambodia can once again become a great rice-producing country,
with two or three crops a year in its fertile fields watered by the
Mekong. But Cambodia needs the help of the international
community to make its transition to the future--to end the fighting,
eliminate the mine fields, repatriate those displaced by decades of
warfare, and adopt a stable political system.
..........Today we can foresee the possibility that Cambodia, and the
other states of Indochina, will become members of the economic
and political organizations of the Asia-Pacific region, the most
dynamic region on the globe. This is what reconciliation is all
about. The comprehensive settlement agreement is an important
first step toward regional as well as national reconciliation.
Implementation of the agreement will be a difficult and expensive
process. There are very likely to be setbacks. But the alternative
to this political process, all along, has been ongoing warfare. The
United States can be proud of the role it has played in creating this
settlement agreement, this process of reconciliation. We should
now do everything we can to ensure its full and successful
implementation. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: Country Profile: Cambodia
Date: Oct 21, 199110/21/91
Category: Country Data
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Cambodia
Subject: History, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Official Name: Cambodia
Geography
Area: 181,040 sq. km. (69,900 sq. mi.); about the size of Missouri.
Cities: Capital--Phnom Penh (pop. 400,000 est.). Other cities--
Battambang, Siem Reap, Kompong Cham, Kompong Som, Kompong
Thom.
Terrain: Central plain drained by the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) and
Mekong and Bassac Rivers. Heavy forests away from the rivers and
the lake, mountains in the southwest (Cardamom Mountains) and
north (Dangrek Mountains) along the border with Thailand.
Climate: Tropical monsoon with rainy season June through October
and dry season November through May.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Cambodian(s), Khmer.
Population (1990): 7 million.
Avg. annual growth rate: 2.2%.
Infant mortality rate (1990): 128/1,000 live births.
Life expectancy (1990): 47 yrs. male; 50 yrs. female.
Ethnic groups: Cambodian 90%; Chinese and Vietnamese 5% each;
small numbers of hill tribes, Chams, and Burmese.
Religions: Theravada Buddhism 95%; Islam; animism; atheism.
Languages: Khmer (official) spoken by more than 95% of the
population, including minorities; some French still spoken.
Literacy: About 50%.
Government
Government is disputed between the resistance groups of the
National Government of Cambodia (NGC)--which formerly called
itself the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)--
and the Vietnamese-installed authorities in Phnom Penh: the
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) -- which now calls itself the
State of Cambodia. No single authority controls the entire country.
Administrative subdivisions: 19 provinces and municipalities.
Independence: November 9, 1953.
Constitution: (PRK) April 30, 1989.
Elections: None.
Political parties and leaders:
NGC--Umbrella organization for the three resistance groups,
including National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia led by Prince Norodom
Sihanouk; Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by
Son Sann; and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge)
ostensibly led by Khieu Samphan (all since July 1982).
PRK--Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), the
communist party installed by Vietnam in 1979, led by Heng Samrin,
KPRP General Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State since
1981, and Hun Sen, Chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1985.
Flag: NGC--two horizontal blue bands, divided by a wider red band on
which is centered a white stylized representation of Angkor Wat.
PRK--a red field with five stylized yellow towers in the center.
Economy
GDP (1989 est.): $890 million.
Per capita GDP (1989 est.): $130.
Natural resources: Timber, gemstones, some iron ore, manganese
and phosphate, hydroelectric potential from the Mekong River.
Agriculture: About 5 million hectares (12 million acres) are
unforested land; all are arable with irrigation, but less than 2
million hectares are cultivated.
Products: Rice, rubber, corn, meat, vegetables, dairy products,
sugar, flour.
Industry: Types--rice milling, fishing, wood and wood products,
textiles, cement, some rubber production (largely abandoned since
1975).
Trade: Exports (1988)--$32 million: natural rubber, rice, pepper,
wood. Major partners--Vietnam, USSR, Eastern Europe, Japan, India.
Imports (1988)--$147 million: international food aid, fuels,
consumer goods. Major Partners--Vietnam, USSR, Eastern Europe,
Japan, India.
Economic Aid: Unknown amount from USSR and Eastern Europe to
areas under PRK control. Some humanitarian aid from the UN and
private groups. UN relief efforts coordinated by the Secretary
General's Special Representative for Kampuchean Humanitarian
Assistance provide more than $56 million per year in assistance
(cash and in-kind contributions) for displaced Cambodians along the
Thai-Cambodian border.
Principal Government Officials
NGC: President--Prince Norodom Sihanouk
Prime Minister/Head of Government--Son Sann
Vice President for Foreign Affairs--Khieu Samphan
PRK: Chairman, Council of State--Heng Samrin
Chairman of the National Assembly--Chea Sim
Chairman, Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister--Hun Sen
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: A Comprehensive Political Settlement in Cambodia
Date: Oct 21, 199110/21/91
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Cambodia
Subject: Democratization, State Department,
Military Affairs, United Nations
[TEXT]
US Policy
The United States has worked with the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand), with the four other permanent members of
the UN Security Council (China, France, UK, and USSR), and other
nations in pursuit of three objectives with regard to Cambodia:
..........1. Preventing a Khmer Rouge return to power;
..........2. Ensuring self-determination for the Cambodian people
through free elections; and
..........3. Verifying the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from
Cambodia.
..........The US Government has not recognized either the National
Government of Cambodia (formerly the Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea) or the Vietnamese-imposed Phnom Penh
regime. (See box.) Secretary Baker announced a new initiative in
US policy on Cambodia on July 18, 1990:
..........-- The United States would open a dialogue with Vietnam on
the subject of Cambodia. (On September 5, 1990, Secretary Baker
announced that the US would open a similar dialogue with the Phnom
Penh regime.)
..........-- The United States would vote against seating the
Cambodian resistance coalition in the UN General Assembly so long
as that coalition includes the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge left a
legacy of death and destruction from their 1975-78 reign; the
United States is unalterably opposed to their return to power.
..........-- While maintaining US economic sanctions against
Cambodia and Vietnam, including US opposition to new lending by
international financial institutions, the US Government would be
prepared to loosen restrictions on licensing humanitarian projects
for those two countries.
..........-- The US Government would implement a program of
assistance to Cambodian children victimized by the war, in addition
to continuing assistance to displaced persons along the
Thai/Cambodian border.
UN Role in Settlement
The United States has been working to achieve a comprehensive
Cambodian settlement with an enhanced role for the UN that would
lead to a cease-fire, arms cutoff, and free and fair elections.
Without such a settlement, continued fighting would provide the
Khmer Rouge an opportunity to seize power again. In addition,
strong and effective measures, supported by the major powers, will
be required to ensure that the Khmer Rouge are contained during the
settlement.
..........The UN is the only international body with the experience and
capabilities necessary to support the settlement, including the
ability to achieve a neutral environment in which to organize and
conduct free and fair elections for the Cambodian people.
..........Following the adjournment of the Paris Conference on
Cambodia in August 1989, the United States proposed that the five
permanent members of the Security Council (Permanent Five) seek
to bridge their differences on a Cambodian settlement. On August
28, 1990, after 8 months of negotiation, they agreed on a
framework for a comprehensive political settlement. All
Cambodian factions accepted the framework, which calls for
establishing a supreme national council and includes a UN peace-
keeping role, as the basis for resolving their differences. There is a
consensus among the four Cambodian factions and interested
countries that representatives of a supreme national council should
be seated in the UN General Assembly as the Cambodian delegation.
..........The August framework agreement was endorsed unanimously
by the UN Security Council in Resolution 668 in September and by
acclamation by the General Assembly in October 1990. The
Permanent Five subsequently agreed in November on a detailed draft
settlement agreement.
.......... The Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC) was formed in
September 1990. On May 1, 1991, the four factions announced a
voluntary cease-fire and arms moratorium. From then on, under the
leadership of Prince Sihanouk, the SNC has moved forward rapidly to
reach consensus on a final comprehensive settlement based on the
Permanent Five framework. It met five times in Jakarta, Pattaya,
Thailand (twice), Beijing, and New York to work out differences
over the Permanent Five draft agreements.
..........The SNC members agreed to elect Prince Sihanouk as president
of the SNC and to designate him the final arbiter in the absence of a
consensus. They then decided on at least 70% demobilization of all
factional forces during the transitional period, with the rest to be
demobilized or merged into a new national army after elections.
They agreed that the first election will be conducted through a
proportional representation system along provincial lines. Finally,
they delegated to the UN the last word on all matters relating to the
organization and conduct of the elections during the transitional
period.
..........The Permanent Five welcomed these agreements and will meet
at the Paris conference on October 23 to sign the final peace accord.
Prince Sihanouk and the SNC plan to return to Phnom Penh on
November 14 to establish the SNC headquarters. The United States
plans to establish a liaison office in Phnom Penh early in 1992.
US Assistance.
Since 1986, the US Government has provided political and economic
support to the non-communist resistance. The assistance, entirely
non-lethal, helped strengthen the capacity of the non-communist
groups to participate in the political settlement of the Cambodian
conflict and will give them the opportunity to test their popular
appeal in a free and fair election. In FY 1991, the focus of our $25
million non-communist aid program shifted to benefit primarily the
civilian population living in areas of Cambodia under non-
communist control. By law, any assistance must not aid, directly or
indirectly, the military capacity of the Khmer Rouge.
..........Starting in 1990, the United States also began providing aid to
Cambodian children living in Phnom Penh regime controlled areas
through international and private American voluntary organizations.
This assistance continues and has been expanded to include
victims of war and other needy individuals.
..........The United States looks forward to when it can work with a
freely and fairly elected Cambodian government in providing
assistance that will improve the well-being and livelihood of the
Cambodian people. (###)
BACKGROUND
Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Kampuchea) in December 1978 and did
not substantially withdraw its troops until 1989. Although the
Vietnamese threw out the brutal Khmer Rouge government, a
continued Vietnamese presence in Cambodia was not acceptable to
the world community.
..........Four principal factions are involved in the struggle for a
solution in Cambodia.
..........-- The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia, loyal to former monarch and
head of state Prince Sihanouk.
..........-- The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF),
headed by former Prime Minister Son Sann. The forces of Prince
Sihanouk and the KPNLF together form the non-communist
resistance.
..........-- The Khmer Rouge, a Marxist-Leninist group headed by Pol
Pot that took power in 1975 and established one of the most
oppressive regimes in modern world history. The Khmer Rouge and
the non-communist resistance constitute the resistance coalition
now known as the National Government of Cambodia.
..........-- The Phnom Penh regime (known as the State of Cambodia),
led by Heng Samrin, Chea Sim, and Hun Sen, includes former Khmer
Rouge officials and was installed and sustained by the Vietnamese
in the wake of their invasion. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: New US Approach on Missile Deployment
Fitzwater
Description: Statement released by the Office of the White House
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 15, 199110/15/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
Following up on the President's initiative to reduce nuclear
weapons, the US Defense and Space Negotiating Group in Geneva,
Switzerland, has tabled a new US approach to an agreement
facilitating deployment of ballistic missile defenses.
..........The United States is now prepared to discuss limits on the
scope and timing of defense deployments, consistent with the
President's direction to pursue a system providing Global Protection
Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). This new approach builds on the
climate reflected by the President's nuclear initiative and the
positive Soviet response and should make it possible to reach an
agreement facilitating the deployment of ballistic missile defenses
to protect against accidental, unauthorized, or third-country
launches.
..........As we pursue agreement in Geneva, it is essential for
Congress to do its part by supporting our efforts there and by
funding the Strategic Defense Initiative at a level that will enable
us to deploy ballistic missile defenses at the earliest point
feasible. The Senate's support for deployment of highly effective
defenses against limited ballistic missile attacks is encouraging.
President Bush urges the Congress as a whole to support this
worthy goal.
..........A negotiated solution governing deployment of defenses that
will protect the United States, our allies, and our forces abroad
from limited ballistic missile strikes, together with congressional
determination to fund such defenses, will make the world a safer
place. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: US Efforts To Promote A Peaceful Settlement in Yugoslavia
Johnson
Source: Ralph Johnson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European and Canadian Affairs
Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 17, 199110/17/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia,
Albania, Slovenia
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights,
Democratization, Trade/Economics, EC
[TEXT]
The events we are witnessing today in Yugoslavia are nothing less
than a tragedy: a tragedy for the peoples of Yugoslavia, a tragedy
for Europe, and a tragedy for the entire world community. Forty-six
years after the killing ended in the bloodiest war that human
civilization has known--a war that was particularly devastating to
Yugoslavia-- Yugoslavia is poised on the brink of massive violence.
What has occurred already is terrible enough, but if the peace
process fails, the future may hold far worse horrors.
..........That is why we believe it is essential for the United States to
assist efforts to bring about a negotiated, peaceful solution to this
crisis, one that is based on democratic principles and respect for
the rights of all the people involved. Our policy toward Yugoslavia
has evolved over the past year, but its central elements have not
changed: We strongly oppose the use of force, violence, and
intimidation to settle political disputes; we will not accept
changes in internal or external borders that are achieved by force;
and we insist that human rights, including the rights of members of
minority groups, be guaranteed in all republics.
Can We Do More?
Many Americans are asking why we haven't done even more to
resolve this crisis. That's an understandable question. It goes
against all our instincts to see Yugoslavia descend into violence
without stepping in to stop this tragic process. The bottom line in
this crisis, however, is that the world community cannot stop
Yugoslavs from killing one another so long as they are determined to
do so. What we can do is use our influence and powers of persuasion
to convince the parties to this conflict that they cannot win, and,
indeed, can only lose, if the violence is not stopped. We can assure
them that they will have our support and good will if they turn away
from killing and sit down in good faith to work out a fair and
equitable solution. We can support the efforts of other countries
and of international organizations to mediate an end to the fighting
and work to keep doors open for a peaceful resolution of disputes.
But we ourselves cannot stop the violence or resolve this conflict.
Only the peoples of Yugoslavia and their leaders can do that.
What We Have Done
Let me lay out for you what we have done in response to the
Yugoslav crisis, and how we assess prospects for a peaceful
resolution. Starting last year, when trouble began looming larger in
Yugoslavia, we made clear that our policy toward Yugoslavia would
be consistent with our policy toward the region as a whole, based
on support for democratization, market economic reform, respect
for human rights, and peaceful settlement of all disputes. This
emphasis applied to both the country as a whole and its individual
republics and provinces. Let me quote for you our statement of
October 19, 1990:
.......... The US Government is concerned about increasing political
and ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia and their potential impact on the
transition to democracy and free markets which we have encouraged
throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The US firmly supports
unity, democratic change, respect for human rights, and market
reform in Yugoslavia. We believe that democracy is the only
enduring basis for a united, prosperous and voluntary Yugoslav
union. Free and fair elections, both at the republic and federal
level, are essential to establishing democracy throughout
Yugoslavia. . . . We would strongly oppose any use of force that
would block democratic change in Yugoslavia.
..........Many have asked why we chose to include unity among the
goals we supported in Yugoslavia. From the beginning, our
fundamental policy objective in Yugoslavia has been democracy, not
unity. But when the Yugoslav crisis began, we decided to state our
support for both unity and democracy because we believed that
unity offered the best prospects for democracy and stability
throughout Yugoslavia. Given Yugoslavia's crazy-quilt ethnic
makeup and history of deep-seated ethnic disputes, we believed
that the only alternative to some form of democratic unity was
violence, suffering, and long-term instability. And I think we were
right on that; the events of the past year have confirmed our
deepest worries about the consequences of a Yugoslav breakup. We
knew that feelings were so bitter and animosities so intense that
unity might be impossible, despite the lack of peaceful alternatives.
We also believed, however, that unity and respect for the rights of
minorities offered the most viable formula for peace in Yugoslavia,
and that fragmentation would bring terrible violence and suffering.
And it did. We were not alone in pushing for what may have been an
unattainable outcome; all of our allies felt the same way, as did
many of Yugoslavia's neighbors and its traditional allies in the Non-
Aligned Movement.
..........In light of developments over the last year in Yugoslavia, we
have stopped talking about unity, not because we no longer think it
the best solution, but because the deterioration of the situation has
made other goals more immediate: namely, an end to the fighting
through a durable cease-fire and an agreement to sit down and
hammer out a solution acceptable to all the republics. We still
think that some form of voluntary association offers the best hope
for a durable resolution. But we have made clear that this is a
decision that the parties involved will have to decide for
themselves. Our position now is consistent with what we have been
saying since last year: the US will accept any future political
arrangements that are decided on peacefully and democratically by
the peoples of Yugoslavia, through dialogue and negotiation.
..........Let me mention what we have been doing concretely to assist
efforts to resolve this crisis. We have been supporting and intend
to continue to support the European Community's CSCE [Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe]-mandated effort to bring
about a genuine cease-fire and a political settlement. We believe
that collective efforts have the best prospects for influencing the
situation. Our leverage in this conflict is not by itself sufficient to
influence the outcome. The current conference on Yugoslavia,
organized by the European Community [EC], supported by all CSCE
member nations and chaired by former British Foreign Secretary
Lord Carrington, offers the best vehicle for conducting a dialogue
among the parties and securing a peaceful settlement. We will
continue to support this process. Should such a settlement emerge,
I would hope the United States would be able to contribute
materially as well as diplomatically to its implementation.
Supporting the EC
Why are we supporting the EC's efforts, rather than taking the lead
ourselves? In the first place, because we believe that Europe has
the most at stake in this crisis, and because European leverage--
economic as well as political--is, in general, greater than ours.
Europe's trade and investment ties with Yugoslavia far exceed ours,
and Yugoslavia has an association agreement with the EC that
provides access to the EC's markets that is vital to Yugoslavia's
economy. While exports account for 30% of Yugoslavia's GDP,
making it more dependent on foreign trade than many of its
neighbors, the US accounts for only about 5% of Yugoslav trade.
Yugoslavia is our 57th trading partner, whereas Europe accounts for
nearly 80% of Yugoslav trade, about half of which goes to the EC.
Its largest individual trading partners are Germany, Italy, and USSR.
Unilateral economic sanctions would have no more than a symbolic
effect while at the same time they could hurt other countries in the
region.
..........We also support the EC's efforts because we believe it is
appropriate for the EC to take the lead, and the nations of CSCE
agreed to support the EC in that role. That doesn't mean, however,
that we are not actively involved ourselves. Our Ambassador in
Belgrade and his staff have a remarkable range of contacts
throughout Yugoslavia, in the federal and republic governments, in
the political parties, and in the nationalist movements.
Ambassador [Warren] Zimmermann is in almost constant touch with
the leaders of all parties to this conflict. He and his staff have
been engaged every day in working to bring the parties together and
prevent a worsening of the conflict. Here in Washington, we, too,
have been active. We imposed an arms embargo in July, long before
the UN took action on a global basis. Deputy Secretary [Lawrence]
Eagleburger and many other officials have met with a long list of
Yugoslav central and republic leaders, as well as with opposition
politicians and human rights activists.
Economic Sanctions?
The main goal of our policy is to try to have a constructive impact
on this crisis. Should the EC decide to impose sanctions, we would
support its decision and work to coordinate with the EC to impose
sanctions ourselves. The kind of sanctions we would impose would
depend in part on what the EC did, since we would want to act in a
way that reinforced the EC's actions. It would also depend,
however, on what steps we considered to be most effective and the
constraints imposed by US law. An example of the kind of action we
might take--this is hypothetical--in coordination with the EC's
imposition of sanctions would be an embargo against US trade and
economic relations with Yugoslavia, with possible exceptions for
humanitarian supplies.
..........Acting in concert with the EC would be consistent with what
experience has taught us about the effectiveness of economic
sanctions: they are most effective when part of a comprehensive
strategy which includes diplomatic, political, and possibly military
actions as well, and when implemented in coordination with other
countries.
..........Yugoslavia is dependent on imported oil, and a disruption of
supplies would have a severe impact on the country's economy.
However, the Yugoslavs have effectively imposed an oil embargo on
themselves. Petroleum enters the country only at Rijeka and is
transported through the Adria pipeline. The Croats have closed the
pipeline to deny oil to Serbia. The Serbs retaliated by damaging the
pipeline in Croatia, thus disrupting that republic's oil supplies. In
addition, closing the Adria pipeline has cut off oil to Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, leaving them dependent on the Soviet Druzhba
pipeline.
..........As for specific sanctions, the EC is considering a number of
options, including the imposition of sanctions on those republics
which have not fulfilled their commitments in the peace process
and which continue to block progress toward a peaceful solution.
This would be difficult to do, given the extent to which the Yugoslav
republics are economically interdependent. We are looking closely
at this question and will coordinate with the EC to ensure that any
action we take enhances the prospects for success of the EC's
efforts.
..........In that regard, I would like to turn briefly to the proposals
contained in [Senate Bill] 1793. We do not believe that legislation
of this kind would advance the goal of achieving a peaceful,
negotiated settlement in Yugoslavia. The current crisis is
complicated and fluid, and the Administration must have the
flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and tailor its
approach accordingly. This legislation would deny us that
flexibility and could thus hamper, rather than improve, the
effectiveness of our policy in Yugoslavia. For example, in the area
of assistance, the United States has few incentives to offer which
might affect behavior. Yugoslavia traditionally has not received
substantial US assistance, because it was better off economically,
in relative terms, than other countries in the region. Our assistance
package for Yugoslavia amounts to $5 million of primarily technical
assistance. This is insignificant beside $925 million that the EC
was providing before the crisis. No US carrier currently flies to
Yugoslavia, and a cutoff of landing rights for the Yugoslav national
airline, JAT, would not have an appreciable impact on the crisis. We
endorse the thrust of the conditions imposed in Section 6(b) of the
legislation, but as I have already stated, we do not believe that this
kind of rigid, inflexible approach is the best way to achieve these
goals.
..........Before leaving the question of sanctions, I want to address
how they could best be implemented, if we decide they are
necessary. The President has sufficient authority under the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) to implement
economic sanctions. This, rather than separate legislation, would
be the preferable approach. IEEPA requires the President to declare
a national emergency which originates outside the United States
and includes provisions requiring consultations with and reporting
to the Congress. The act has been used in the past to implement
economic sanctions, most recently in response to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, and has proven to be an effective, flexible vehicle to
address this aspect of foreign policy.
Violence and Cruelty
Let me turn now to what is happening inside Yugoslavia. The nearly
continuous fighting between Croatian forces and those of the
federal military and the Serbian republic, with the accompanying
naval blockades and air strikes, is the worst aspect of this crisis.
It has led to death, destruction, and suffering in much of Croatia
and has prompted tens of thousands of people to flee their towns
and villages, in some cases for the safety of other countries. It has
reintroduced in Europe a level of violence and cruelty that has not
been seen since the Second World War. And it has inflamed ancient
grievances and hatreds, making a peaceful solution even more
difficult to achieve.
..........But this is not the only aspect of the crisis that concerns us.
The aggressive expansionism of the Serbian regime of Slobodan
Milosevic, with the frequent support of the Yugoslav federal
military, has intimidated the moderate governments of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia, both of which fear that the fighting
could at any day spill over into their republics and ignite an even
worse explosion.
Serbian Repression
The Serbian Government has repressed dissent at home and has
revoked the autonomy of the Provinces of Vojvo-dina and Kosovo.
The Hungarian minority in Vojvodina is fearful for its future, but
for the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, their worst nightmares have
already come true: Serbia has closed down Kosovo's schools, fired
ethnic Albanians from the civil service, schools, and universities;
arrested hundreds of Albanians on trumped-up charges; embarked on
a campaign to "Serbianize" the province; and blocked the free
exercise of democracy during the recent vote on independence. The
US Government was the first to condemn these actions and, along
with 16 other CSCE states, invoked the CSCE human dimension
mechanism in August 1990 to underscore our concern over the
repression. Since then, the situation has worsened. The US again
raised the issue of Serbian actions at the Moscow human rights
conference last month. But Serbia's intentions have become
increasingly clear, and increasingly more disturbing. Our public
position on this has been unambiguous. To give you a sense of where
we stand on this, let me quote from our most recent public
statement, issued on October 2 following Deputy Secretary
Eagleburger's meeting with Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Kosutic:
.......... The Deputy Secretary reiterated to Mr. Kosutic that the US
assesses actions by the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav
military aimed at redrawing by force the internal borders of
Yugoslavia as a grave challenge to the basic values and principles
which underlie the CSCE. The Deputy Secretary emphasized to Mr.
Kosutic that while the US appreciates the concerns of Serbs inside
and outside Serbia in the present context, the US does not and will
not accept repression and aggression in the name of those concerns.
The Deputy Secretary underscored to Mr. Kosutic that the US, like
the European Community, is determined not to recognize any
outcome of the Yugoslav crisis that would be based on the use of
force to change Yugoslavia's internal borders. The Deputy Secretary
underscored to Mr. Kosutic that continued use of aggressive force by
the Serbian leadership in tandem with the Yugoslav military will
only ensure their exile from the new Europe. He urged that the
Serbian government take clear and concrete steps to demonstrate
its commitment to the EC-sponsored peace conference chaired by
Lord Carrington, and to renounce any intention of seeking internal
border changes through the use of force. . . . We note that Serbian
violations of the human rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
continue to be a major concern in the CSCE context.
..........I believe this and other statements we have made leave no
room for doubt, either here or in Yugoslavia, about where the US
stands as far as Serbia's actions. But I also want to stress that no
one is blameless in this conflict. The policies of the Croatian
government toward the Serbian minority do not justify Serbia's
actions, but they have contributed to the atmosphere of tension and
recrimination that led to violence. There are also sensitivities
related to the historic experience of Croatian-Serbian conflict in
World War II, during which the Croatian puppet government allied
with Nazi Germany, run by the "Ustasha" movement, massacred
hundreds of thousands of people, mainly Serbs and Jews. And there
are, unfortunately a sizable number of people in Croatia today--not
the current government but of more extreme elements of the
nationalist movement--who are proud to call themselves the heirs
of the Ustasha. I certainly do not associate all Croatian
nationalists with that tendency, but to Serbs this is a real and
understandable concern.
Slovenia and Republic Recognition
Let me turn to Slovenia. With the departure this month of most
federal military units from Slovenia, the republic has traveled far
down the road to independence. Our position on the future of
Slovenia is identical to that toward Yugoslavia as a whole. We will
accept any future political arrangements that are decided on
peacefully and democratically by the peoples of Yugoslavia, through
dialogue and negotiation, but we do not believe that partial
solutions, unilateral actions or outcomes achieved by force and
intimidation are conducive to achieving a comprehensive
settlement. Let me add that the five principles that Secretary
Baker enunciated in his address to the CSCE meeting in Moscow last
month are also central to our policy toward Yugoslavia as a whole
and its individual republics. We have made this position very clear
in response to requests from Croatia and Slovenia for US
recognition of their independence. To reiterate, the five points are:
..........-- Determining the future of the country peacefully and
democratically, consistent with CSCE principles;
..........-- Respect for all existing borders, both internal and
external, and change to those borders only through peaceful and
consensual means;
..........-- Support for democracy and the rule of law, emphasizing
the key role of elections in the democratic process;
..........-- Safeguarding of human rights, based on full respect for the
individual and including equal treatment of minorities; and
..........-- Respect for international law and obligations, especially
adherence to the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.
Conclusion
I can assure you that this Administration is committed to playing a
constructive role in helping the world community and the people of
Yugoslavia respond to that nation's agonizing crisis. But I believe
strongly that unilateral action by the US, no matter how appealing,
is unlikely to move the Yugoslavs toward resolution of the conflict.
The best option we have is to continue to act in concert with the EC
and other European countries in implementing a broad strategy,
possibly including economic sanctions and benefits, that will
encourage all the parties in Yugoslavia to move toward peaceful
rather than military resolution of their differences. We think this
approach offers the best chance of stopping the Yugoslav tragedy
from claiming even more lives and destroying hope for a better
future for all the peoples of Yugoslavia. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: President Bush Meets With NATO Secretary General
Fitzwater
Description: Statement released by the Office of the White House
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 11, 199110/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Subject: NATO, CSCE
[TEXT]
The President met with the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred
Woerner, for approximately 30 minutes in the Oval Office. They
discussed the preparations for the November Rome NATO summit.
They reaffirmed NATO's central role, not only in providing security
and stability, but in the continuing development of a democratic
Europe. The President thanked Secretary General Woerner for
NATO's strong support for his nuclear initiative, in particular for
NATO's endorsement of the decision to withdraw and destroy all
ground-based tactical nuclear weapons. The President and the
Secretary General noted the importance of reaching out to the new
democracies in Europe through deepening NATO's ties to these
countries. The President and Secretary General Woerner also
emphasized the importance of NATO, the European Community, and
the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] in
continuing the positive transformation throughout Europe. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: Bahrain--A Valued Coalition Partner
Bush, Isa
Source: President Bush, Shaikh Isa
Description: Remarks at arrival ceremony of the Amir of Bahrain, the
White House, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 15, 199110/15/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Bahrain
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization,
Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
President Bush:
Your Highness, it is my great
honor to welcome you to the White House today and to have this
opportunity to consult with you on the many challenges that face
our two countries and to convey my heartfelt thanks to you, a valued
coalition partner. Bahrain has been a firm friend and a close ally
for half a century but never more than in this past year as we've
stood together to turn back aggression.
..........Your Highness, we spoke together many times in the aftermath
of August 2 [1990] and at key moments during Desert Storm, and
never once did you waver; always you stood strong and resolute.
From its strategic position in the Gulf, Bahrain served as a key
staging point in Desert Storm. Your air force, the Bahraini Air
Force, helped the coalition secure the air superiority so decisive to
victory. Bahrain endured Scud attacks, shook off Saddam's
desperate attempt to sow terror, and emerged each time more
determined to prevail.
..........Your Highness, your country's conduct in this crisis is a credit
to your leadership and to the courage of the people of Bahrain. Just
as we joined forces to liberate Kuwait, common action remains a
key to meeting the challenges we face today.
..........In a few minutes, we'll begin our meetings, building on the
common ground we share. Let me focus now on our approach to Iraq,
and let me state our position in the simplest possible terms.
Saddam Hussein will not scorn the will of the world. Iraq must
never again threaten its neighbors. We will keep the pressure on
until we are satisfied that all of Saddam's weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them have been destroyed,
until a new leadership in Iraq stands ready to live in peace with its
neighbors.
..........Your Highness, as leader of a country that knows too well
what it means to be menaced by Saddam, I know you join me in
looking ahead to the day Iraq closes this sad chapter in its history
and joins the cause of peace. I've said many times--and I'll repeat
it here--that our quarrel has never been with the people of Iraq.
The United States, in concert with the United Nations, has proposed
a comprehensive program allowing Iraq to resume oil exports to
fund the purchase of food and medicine. But the international
community deserves to know with certainty that the food and
medicine purchased under this plan reach the people of Iraq rather
than Saddam's armed forces.
..........This program can go forward the instant Saddam Hussein
accepts UN Resolutions 706 and 712 and puts in place a UN-
supervised system to monitor oil exports and food distribution.
History teaches that the consequences of war echo far beyond the
battlefield. Our coalition in the Gulf war did more than defeat an
aggressor; our common effort created new opportunities for lasting
peace throughout the Middle East. All Americans hope to see this
region, so long driven by war, blessed by peace. In that spirit, the
United States supports Bahrain's decision to participate along with
its GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] partners in the upcoming peace
conference. This readiness, this willingness to reach out
strengthens the prospect for the only peace that can endure--a fair
and comprehensive peace acceptable to all parties in the region.
..........Your Highness, from the moment the first American engineers
arrived in your country to help develop your oil resources some 60
years ago, our countries have worked together in many ways. Our
discussions today will touch on all aspects of our relations, from
investment opportunities to security cooperation; and, as always,
we seek to build on common ground--on the goodwill of nations that
have worked together in the past, the goodwill that gives us faith in
a better future.
..........Once again, Your Highness, it is my pleasure to meet with you
today for what I'm confident will be productive discussions.
..........Welcome to the White House and may God bless the people of
Bahrain.
Shaikh Isa:
Mr. President, it is a pleasure for me to
be visiting this great country at your kind invitation. And I
sincerely appreciate the warmth and the friendship shown to myself
and to my delegation. It's also given me great pleasure, Mr.
President, to extend to you and to all the American people my
heartfelt greetings and the warm wishes of the people of Bahrain.
..........During my visit here, I'm looking forward to renewing our
long-standing and mutual[ly] valued friendship, to exchanging views
on matters of mutual interest to our two countries. The links
between the United States and Bahrain have developed in many
fields for well over half a century. The cooperation between our
two countries first began in the 1940s and has strengthened
considerably since then, more particularly so during the last decade.
..........Through the Iran-Iraq war, we worked closely together to
ensure freedom of navigation in the Arabian Gulf and, more recently,
as part of a multinational effort to reverse the Iraqi aggression
against Kuwait. Our people and forces were united as never before.
This experience will never be forgotten and has formed a deep bond
between our two countries.
..........I take this opportunity to sincerely thank you, Mr. President,
and the American people for your courageous stand against
aggression and for your determination that right and justice should
prevail. Your stand in the multinational effort is undoubtedly a
major positive contribution to future international relations. The
association between the United States and Bahrain stands as an
example of what can be achieved irrespective of physical size,
distance apart, or cultural differences.
..........When good will and cooperation exist on both sides, it is our
duty to continue to work together and through the United Nations to
ensure that peace and stability prevails between all nations. Mr.
President, the world is currently witnessing major political and
ideological changes, and we must all assure that the rules of law
and civilized conduct are not overshadowed during these
transformations.
..........As a superpower, the United States has a major role to play in
this respect. I would like to take this opportunity, Mr. President, to
praise you and your Administration for your commitment to
reducing confrontation and to promoting peace and cooperation
though the world. We have recently witnessed the end of the Cold
War, following the rapid collapse of historic East-West
confrontation. It is my belief that we are currently also on the
verge of a major breakthrough in the peace process in the Middle
East, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338.
..........There is no doubt that the United States has been a major
catalyst to what has been achieved in these events. Our strategic
cooperation, however, should not be allowed to overshadow the
many other close links between Bahrain and the United States.
These include trade, commerce, education, science, and technology.
These links have brought the people of two countries close together,
and there now exist many strong personal relationships between the
Americans and Bahrainis. These personal relationships are the true
test of friendship between our two countries.
..........To this end, the American Bahrain Friendship Society was
founded in Washington last year. And both the society and all its
members have my sincere good wishes and support for the future. It
is my hope that my visit will further consolidate the many ties
between our two countries. It is my wish and the wish of the
Bahraini people that our close relationship with the United States
will continue to flourish and prosper in the years ahead, and become
even stronger in the 21st century.
..........On this occasion, I would like to take this opportunity, Mr.
President, to renew my invitation to you and to Mrs. Bush to visit
Bahrain. It would give me great pleasure to welcome you to Bahrain
and enable the Bahraini people to show their friendship and
appreciation to you and to the American people.
..........Finally, Mr. President, it is my pleasure to extend to you and
to the American people my very best wishes for continued peace and
progress and prosperity. Thank you very much, sir. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: The Amir of Bahrain Visits Washington, DC
Date: Oct 15, 199110/15/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Bahrain
Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The Amir of Bahrain, Shaikh Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa, made his
second state visit to Washington, DC, on October 15, 1991, meeting
with President Bush, Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger, and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood. His previous visit was in
1983.
US-Bahrain Relations
Close relations between the United States and Bahrain were further
strengthened during the Gulf war, when Bahrain's geographically
strategic position became even more important due to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. During the war, Bahrain was the primary allied
naval base and proved to be an invaluable point of origin for allied
air strikes against Iraqi targets. Furthermore, Bahraini pilots
joined the United States and other members of the coalition in
flying strikes into Iraq.
..........The commitment of Bahrain to peace and harmony in the
Persian Gulf continued to be evident in the post-war period. As one
of the moderate Arab states to endorse Secretary Baker's plan for
collective regional security, Bahrain always has been an
enthusiastic participant in creating progress and stability in the
Gulf. As a result of joint air and ground exercises and an increased
US naval presence, US-Bahraini ties have been further cemented.
..........Economic repercussions of the Gulf war also have created
avenues for closer US-Bahraini ties. Since displacing Japan as the
top exporter to Bahrain in 1986, US exports to Bahrain exceeded
$240 million 1989. Although foreign investment formerly was
limited to those firms with at least 51% Bahraini ownership, in
July 1991, Bahrain removed domestic ownership requirements for
foreign investors. By eliminating this restriction, Bahrain aims to
make its economy more attractive to foreign investment and,
ultimately, to encourage widespread economic recovery.
..........The US Government provides a limited amount of
administrative and advisory support, and the Department of Defense
sponsors the Bahrain School.
Consolidation of Democracy
In 1973, 2 years after achieving independence from the United
Kingdom, Bahrain's new constitution institutionalized the Amir's
hereditary rule. Currently under the leadership of Shaikh Isa bin
Sulman al-Khalifa, the Al-Khalifa family has controlled the
government since the late 18th century. The Amir is advised by the
Prime Minister (presently his brother) and an appointed Council of
Ministers. Bahrain has an independent judiciary but no legislature.
..........Despite the lack of universal suffrage, Bahrain traditionally
has provided rights guarantees, unlike those of its regional
counterparts. Women are guaranteed maternity benefits such as a
45-day paid leave for child care. Labor laws have been generous to
workers, allowing for national labor representation. National
health care has been provided free of charge since the 1920s.
Economy, Trade, and Investment
Characterized by an almost overwhelming reliance on oil revenues
and a relatively free market, Bahrain's economy has been
significantly influenced by the instability of the global
marketplace. Since the decline of world oil prices in 1986, the
government has attempted to diversify its oil-dominated economy.
Forays into financial services, manufacturing, and new oil-
derivative industries have helped establish Bahrain as a financial
center for the entire region, thus supporting the domestic economy
and infrastructure. Barriers to foreign investment are few. US
investment focuses primarily on modest holdings in the oil
industry, such as part ownership of Bahrain Petroleum Company.
..........In the wake of the Gulf crisis, Bahrain has suffered from an
interruption in financial aid from Kuwait and an overall decline in
business confidence. Foreign investment in the country has been
curtailed, while some foreign banks have withdrawn entirely. Oil
released into the Gulf during the conflict has caused an
unquantifiable amount of ecological damage. The government has
taken steps to restore its economy and global perceptions by
reducing non-essential spending, postponing capital projects, and
continuing its diversification efforts. (###)
Bahrain at a Glance
An archipelago of 33 islands in the Persian Gulf, Bahrain is located
about halfway down the Gulf off the coast of Saudi Arabia. A 25-
kilometer (16-mile) causeway links the two countries. Carved of
limestone and sand, the main island is primarily barren and flat,
occasionally marked by small hills, rocky cliffs, and scrub
vegetation suited for the hot climate. Unlike its Gulf neighbors,
Bahrain has reserves of fresh spring water which are commonly
used for irrigation.
..........Bahrain traditionally has served as a crucial stopover for
Persian Gulf trade. Archaeological remains indicate that thousands
of years ago the island was a key regional trading post. It
maintained this status until the influx of Europeans disrupted
traditional routes in the 19th century.
..........Manama, the capital, has a population of about 122,000. The
population of Bahrain is composed of a mix of indigenous peoples
and foreigners. The native groups, which make up about 66% of the
total population, are a mix of about two-thirds Shi'a Muslims and
one-third Sunni Muslims. In addition, foreigners include other
Arabs, Iranians, Indians, Pakistanis, East Asians, and Europeans.
..........One of the first of the Gulf states to discover and refine oil,
Bahrain has traditionally been at the forefront of regional
modernization efforts. Health care, free education, and social
security programs typify the achievements of the oil-based
economy. However, with oil reserves dwindling, Bahrain now must
seek innovative economic alternatives to maintain the progress
made in the past. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: Country Profile: Bahrain
Date: Oct 21, 199110/21/91
Category: Country Data
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Bahrain
Subject: History, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Official Name: State of Bahrain
Geography
Area: 692 sq. km. (267 sq. mi.); about four times the size of
Washington, DC. Bahrain is an archipelago consisting of 33 islands,
only 5 of them inhabited.
Cities: Capital--Manama (1985 est.)--pop. 122,000. Other city--
Al Muharraq.
Terrain: Low interior plateau and hill on main island.
Climate: Hot and humid from April to October, temperate from
November to March.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Bahraini(s).
Population (1989 est.): 500,000 (66% indigenous).
Ethnic groups: Arab 73%, Iranian 9%, Pakistani, Indian.
Religions: Shi'a Muslim (more than 60% of the indigenous
population); Sunni Muslim (about 30%).
Languages: Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu.
Education: Attendance--73%.
Literacy--about 74%.
Work force (1989 est.): 190,000. About 44% indigenous, 56%
expatriate. Agriculture-- 4%. Industry and commerce--74%.
Services--19%. Government--3%.
Government
Type: Traditional amirate (cabinet-executive system).
Independence: August 15, 1971.
Constitution: May 26, 1973.
Branches: Executive--amir (chief of state), prime minister (head
of government), Council of Ministers (cabinet). Judicial--
independent judiciary with right of judicial review.
Subdivisions: Six towns and cities.
Political parties: None.
Suffrage: None.
Central government budget (1986-87): $3 billion.
Defense (1986): $134 million, or 9% of the published budget.
Flag: Three-fourths red field with serrated line separating white
field on staff side.
Economy
GDP (1988 est.): $4 billion.
Real growth (est.): 2%.
Per capita income (1988 est.): $8,495.
Avg. inflation rate (1985): 0.3%.
Natural resources: Oil, associated and non-associated natural gas,
fish.
Agriculture (1.5% of GDP): Products-- eggs, vegetables, dates.
Industry (36% of GDP): Types--oil, aluminum, ship repair, natural
gas, fish.
Services (62% of GDP): Banking, real estate, insurance.
Trade (1987 est.): Exports--$2.4 billion: oil, aluminum, fish. Major
markets--US, Japan, Saudi Arabia, UK. Imports--$2.7 billion:
machinery, industrial equipment, motor vehicles, foodstuffs,
clothing. Major suppliers--US, Japan, UK.
Economic aid received: Significant budgetary support and project
grants from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.
Principal Government Officials
Chief of State--Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa
Prime Minister--Khalifa bin Sulman al-Khalifa
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Muhammed bin Mubarak al-Khalifa
Ambassador to the United States--Ghazi Muhammed al-Gosaibi
(until Oct. 30).
..........Abdul Rahman bin Faris al-Khalifa (after Oct. 30)
Ambassador to the United Nations--Hussein al-Sabbagh (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991
Title: UN Security Council Resolution 715 on Iraq
Description: Released by the UN Security Council, New York, New York
Date: Oct 11, 199110/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, United Nations
[TEXT]
UNSC Resolution 715 (October 11, 1991)
The Security Council,
..........Recalling its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and 707
(1991) of
15 August 1991, and its other resolutions on this matter,
..........Recalling in particular that under resolution 687 (1991) the
Secretary-General and the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency were requested to develop plans for future
ongoing monitoring and verification, and to submit them to the
Security Council for approval,
..........Taking note of the report and note of the Secretary-General,1
(S/22871Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev. 1), transmitting the plans
submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency,
..........Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
..........1. Approves, in accordance with the provisions of resolutions
687 (1991), 707 (1991) and the present resolution, the plans
submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency;1
..........2. Decides that the Special Commission shall carry out the
plan submitted by the Secretary-General,2 as well as continuing to
discharge its other responsibilities under resolutions 687 (1991),
699 (1991) and 707 (1991) and performing such other functions as
are conferred upon it under the present resolution;
..........3. Requests the Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency to carry out, with the assistance and cooperation of
the Special Commission, the plan submitted by him3 and to continue
to discharge his other responsibilities under resolutions 687
(1991), 699 (1991) and 707 (1991);
..........4. Decides that the Special Commission, in the exercise of its
responsibilities as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council,
shall:
..........(a) Continue to have the responsibility for designating
additional locations for inspection and overflights;
..........(b) Continue to render assistance and cooperation to the
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by
providing him by mutual agreement with the necessary special
expertise and logistical, informational and other operational
support for the carrying out of the plan submitted by him;
..........(c) Perform such other functions, in cooperation in the
nuclear field with the Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, as may be necessary to coordinate activities under
the plans approved by the present resolution, including making use
of commonly available services and information to the fullest
extent possible, in order to achieve maximum efficiency and
optimum use of resources;
..........5. Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations
under the plans approved by the present resolution and cooperate
fully with the Special Commission and the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the plans;
..........6. Decides to encourage the maximum assistance, in cash and
in kind, from all Member States to support the Special Commission
and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
in carrying out their activities under the plans approved by the
present resolution, without prejudice to Iraq's liability for the full
costs of such activities;
..........7. Requests the Committee established under resolution 661
(1990), the Special Commission and the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency to develop in cooperation a
mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other
countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section
C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, including
the present resolution and the plans approved hereunder;
..........8. Requests the Secretary-General and the Director General of
the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit to the Security
Council reports on the implementation of the plans approved by the
present resolution, when requested by the Security Council and in
any event at least every six months after the adoption of this
resolution;
..........9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
VOTE: Unanimous 15-0.
..........1 S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev. and Corr. 1.
..........2 S/22871/Rev.1.
..........3 S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1. (###)