US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991

Title:

Invitations to Middle East Peace Conference Announced

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Press briefing in Jerusalem, Israel Date: Oct 18, 199110/18/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, USSR (former) Subject: EC [TEXT] Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I want to apologize for running up so close to the Sabbath, but today is an important day and this is an important moment. An American Secretary of State and a Soviet Foreign Minister are together in Jerusalem for the first time in history. What's more, the Soviet Union has today restored full diplomatic relations with the state of Israel after a break of 24 years. ..........But our joint presence here today represents something more: [Soviet] Foreign Minister Pankin and I are pleased to announce that President Bush and President Gorbachev are today inviting Israel, Arab states, and Palestinians to attend a Middle East peace conference to be held beginning October 30 in Madrid. That conference is to be followed by direct negotiations designed to achieve real peace. ..........We have witnessed new beginnings in other parts of the world. The negotiating process we are seeking to launch with this invitation holds the hope of a new era in the Middle East: ..........-- The hope of an era marked by acceptance and not by rejection; ..........-- The hope of an era marked by dialogue and not by violence; ..........-- The hope of an era marked by cooperation and not by conflict; and ..........-- The hope of an era marked by hope and not by despair. ..........This invitation offers the peoples in this region a pathway to ending an era of confrontation and a basis for a new future. The road to peace will not be simple; to the contrary, it will be extremely difficul,t with many problems, hitches, and interruptions along the way. Old suspicions will not quickly disappear. The gaps are real and won't easily be overcome. We have no illusions about the hard work ahead. ..........But we take encouragement from the issuance of these invitations, the product of work of the last 8 months. As we have all along, we intend to take this one step at a time. And, so, if we receive positive responses to this invitation, we will be taking one more step forward toward achieving the peace and security that the peoples of the Middle East have so long been denied. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

Invitations to Middle East Peace Conference Announced

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Oct 18, 199110/18/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, USSR (former) Subject: EC [TEXT] President Bush October 18, 1991. I am extremely pleased that Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Pankin have announced that the United States and the Soviet Union are issuing invitations to a Middle East peace conference in Madrid beginning on October 30. ..........I myself plan to be there to help open this historic gathering, one with the potential to bring true peace and security to the peoples of the area. ..........As the invitation makes clear, the objective of the effort is nothing less than a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict to be achieved through a two-track approach of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and Israel and the Palestinians based upon UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. ..........I very much hope that all those invited will respond quickly and affirmatively so that the necessary organization and preparations can be completed for this historic undertaking. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

Prospects for Peace in Cambodia

Solomon Source: Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Statement before the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Oct 17, 199110/17/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Cambodia, Vietnam Subject: Democratization, POW/MIA Issues, United Nations [TEXT] We stand today at the edge of what could be a new era in Cambodia and throughout Indochina--one holding the prospect of national reconciliation, reconstruction, and renewed hope for the future. ..........Next Wednesday [October 23, 1991] in Paris, a comprehensive political settlement agreement for Cambodia will be signed. Virtually every nation that has been involved in Cambodia's long years of violent conflict or has been affected by its turbulence and instability will formally express its commitment to this settlement process. We have, at last, achieved a new and constructive international consensus on Cambodia. There is, at last, the prospect that the Khmer people's long night of agony may be ending. ..........This achievement reflects 2 years of persistent effort by the UN Permanent Five, the Paris conference co-chairmen, and a number of the Paris conference participant countries, especially Indonesia, Australia, Japan, and Thailand. It has also been based on the work of the UN Secretariat, and--in the end game--the cooperation of the four Cambodian factions. In our efforts, we have been aided by the policy support, critical probing, and encouragement of this subcommittee, and especially by you, Mr. Chairman. ..........The comprehensive settlement agreement is the culmination of a negotiating effort initiated by Secretary Baker in the fall of 1989. After the first session of the Paris conference failed to achieve the basis for a settlement in the summer of 1989, the Permanent Five, responding to Secretary Baker's suggestion, began work on a settlement framework premised on a strong UN role in monitoring a cease-fire, demobilizing the factional military forces, and organizing and conducting free and fair elections. ..........A framework document was completed in August 1990 and immediately gained the unanimous endorsement of the UN Security Council in Resolution 668, and approval by the UN General Assembly. The four Cambodian factions accepted the framework agreement as well--however tentatively. In September 1990, they formed the Supreme National Council (SNC) as called for in the framework document. The SNC is an interim leadership group designed to serve as the embodiment of Cambodian national sovereignty in the transitional period leading to elections, to represent Cambodia abroad, and to promote national reconciliation. ..........In the ensuing 12 months, the Permanent Five and the Paris conference Coordinating Committee worked with the SNC to create an expanded settlement agreement that would serve as the blueprint for a UN-managed settlement process. For a time, it looked as if final agreement would be blocked by disagreements on two key issues: arrangements for dealing with the factional military forces; and the division of authority between the SNC and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Then, beginning this past June, a series of SNC meetings unexpectedly but rapidly resolved all the remaining issues of substance. The political will to come to closure on a settlement plan was at last evident. ..........There is no question but that the settlement process was given its final impetus by the decision of China and Vietnam to resolve their bilateral differences. This was done in a series of high-level meetings that began in September 1990 and were resumed this past summer after a Vietnamese Party Congress brought about some important changes in Vietnam's foreign policy. These two countries concluded, after more than a decade of fighting out their differences over Cambodia, that a political settlement was in their interests. This view was rapidly reflected in the attitudes of their friends among the Cambodian parties in the negotiating process. ..........At the same time, the decision of Prince Sihanouk to become actively involved in the settlement effort was of special importance. The prince's leadership, formalized in his election last July as the president of the Supreme National Council, facilitated the coming together of the heads of the Khmer factions and their engagement in serious negotiations for the first time since 1989. By the time the SNC gathered for a session in Pattaya, Thailand, at the end of this past August, there was an evident willingness to compromise by all the factions. This spirit of reconciliation, as much as anything, made the final agreement possible; it also gives us hope that implementation of the agreement that lies just ahead will have the cooperation of the four factions. ..........The final settlement agreement is a complex but sound document. It faithfully elaborates the principles laid down in the framework agreement. The settlement process provides for the following key elements: ..........-- A strong UN role that will help achieve free and fair elections; ..........-- Verification of the withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces and advisers from Cambodia; ..........-- Return of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons under conditions of peace and security, and the right of all Cambodians to express their preferences for repatriation without intimidation or coercion of any kind; and ..........-- Immediate cantonment of all factional military forces, followed by demobilization of at least 70% of these forces during the transitional period. The remaining 30% must either be demobilized shortly after the elections or merged into a new Cambodian national army to be created by the government formed as a result of the elections. ..........-- Strong human rights protections, so that there are safeguards against a return to violent practices by the Khmer Rouge or by any other Cambodian faction. ..........It is important to understand how this agreement furthers the goals of US policy. Our objectives in Cambodia have been, and remain: ..........-- To prevent the return to power of the Khmer Rouge and to guard against its resumption of genocidal violence; ..........-- To verify the withdrawal of all foreign forces; and ..........-- To give the Cambodian people the opportunity for self- determination through free and fair elections. ..........A fundamental premise of our negotiating effort has been that continuing warfare in Cambodia would give the Khmer Rouge their best chance at a return to power and impose on the long-suffering Khmer people all the burdens of an endless military conflict. Our judgment has been that the only practical way to control the Khmer Rouge is to bind them to a comprehensive agreement supported by China, cut off their access to foreign arms, disarm and demobilize their forces, and subject them to international monitoring. The settlement agreement obliges the Khmer Rouge to turn from the battlefield, where they have particular strengths and experience, to the ballot box, where they can be held accountable by the Cambodian people for their bloody record. ..........The Khmer Rouge were not voted into power in 1975, and we believe it highly unlikely they will be voted into power now. Most observers believe they will win a limited share of the vote in certain areas of the country but that they are unlikely to gain any significant power in a new government. Again, the alternative to letting the Cambodian people express their judgment about the Khmer Rouge in free and fair elections was to support those who tried for a decade, with limited success, to fight it out with the Khmer Rouge on the battlefield. ..........The settlement process will be the most complicated operation the UN has ever taken on. In addition to supervising the cease-fire, verifying the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the cessation of external arms supply, and demobilizing more than 150,000 troops, the UN will be responsible for the repatriation and resettlement of some 350,000 displaced Cambodians now in camps along the Thai border to areas of their free choice. Extensive de- mining operations will be an early priority to facilitate both repatriation and demobilization. The UN will then oversee the administrative processes of the various Cambodian factions to ensure political neutrality and conduct voter registration and education campaigns in preparation for the national election, which it will supervise. We expect this process to unfold over a period of approximately 18 months after the agreement is signed. ..........The UN operation will be unprecedented in scope; yet every aspect of the process specified in the settlement agreement is necessary for the whole settlement to work. From the beginning, we have proceeded on the assumption that Cambodia's recent past of genocidal violence and factional conflict required a strong UN presence. ..........It is not only in Cambodia that we have sought such a UN role. In El Salvador, Angola, and the Western Sahara as well, we have encouraged the UN to take on important peace-keeping responsibilities to resolve regional conflicts. We are living in a global environment that has been profoundly transformed by the disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War. One of the most positive elements in this transforming world is the newly constructive role of the United Nations, as demonstrated so clearly in Namibia, in the Persian Gulf crisis, and now in Cambodia. ..........Resolution of the conflict in Cambodia will open the way to reconciliation throughout Southeast Asia. It will bring an end to Vietnamese military intervention in a neighboring state and promote peaceful relations between the states of Indochina and their neighbors in ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations]. And it will open the way for the United States to begin the process of normalizing bilateral relations with Vietnam--although the pace and scope of that process, as you know, will be influenced by progress in resolving our POW/MIA and other humanitarian concerns. ..........As soon as the Cambodia settlement agreement is signed in Paris and implementation has begun, we are prepared to lift the trade embargo against Cambodia and support plans for the World Bank and other international financial institutions to begin projects there. We will also set up a liaison mission in Phnom Penh to interact with the SNC and the UN authorities. ..........In addition to our support for the UN operation in Cambodia, we intend to continue the humanitarian assistance programs we began in Cambodia last year. In FY 1991, we provided over $25 million of humanitarian assistance for civilians in areas controlled by the non-communist resistance and by the Phnom Penh authorities. This has made us the largest aid donor in Cambodia. We have proposed funding at a comparable level in FY 1992. We are also contributing an initial $5 million to the UNHCR appeal for funds to carry out the repatriation of Khmer displaced persons along the Thai border. This is over and above the $11.5 million we provided in FY 1991 for the care and maintenance of these displaced Cambodians in Thai camps. ..........Mr. Chairman, the antagonisms and tragedies that have wracked Cambodia--indeed, all of Indochina--since the end of World War II have been associated with the Cold War, but they are also conflicts rooted in historic and ethnic rivalries among the nations of the region. Cambodia's tragedy has reflected, in part, tensions between the Vietnamese, Khmer, and Thai that have existed for centuries. Yet in the Khmer Rouge, we witnessed a combination of Khmer hostility toward the Vietnamese and the communist ideal carried to its grotesque and violent conclusion. ..........Today, totalitarianism is in retreat, even in those countries that still adhere to Marxism-Leninism, and the forces of democracy and free enterprise are rapidly transforming the processes of national development and international relations. The UN settlement plan for Cambodia is a direct expression of this new reality in Southeast Asia. It provides the best vehicle for ensuring that Cambodians are able to join the modern world as quickly as possible and begin the long process of national reconstruction. Cambodia can once again become a great rice-producing country, with two or three crops a year in its fertile fields watered by the Mekong. But Cambodia needs the help of the international community to make its transition to the future--to end the fighting, eliminate the mine fields, repatriate those displaced by decades of warfare, and adopt a stable political system. ..........Today we can foresee the possibility that Cambodia, and the other states of Indochina, will become members of the economic and political organizations of the Asia-Pacific region, the most dynamic region on the globe. This is what reconciliation is all about. The comprehensive settlement agreement is an important first step toward regional as well as national reconciliation. Implementation of the agreement will be a difficult and expensive process. There are very likely to be setbacks. But the alternative to this political process, all along, has been ongoing warfare. The United States can be proud of the role it has played in creating this settlement agreement, this process of reconciliation. We should now do everything we can to ensure its full and successful implementation. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Cambodia

Date: Oct 21, 199110/21/91 Category: Country Data Region: Southeast Asia Country: Cambodia Subject: History, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Official Name: Cambodia
Geography
Area: 181,040 sq. km. (69,900 sq. mi.); about the size of Missouri. Cities: Capital--Phnom Penh (pop. 400,000 est.). Other cities-- Battambang, Siem Reap, Kompong Cham, Kompong Som, Kompong Thom. Terrain: Central plain drained by the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) and Mekong and Bassac Rivers. Heavy forests away from the rivers and the lake, mountains in the southwest (Cardamom Mountains) and north (Dangrek Mountains) along the border with Thailand. Climate: Tropical monsoon with rainy season June through October and dry season November through May.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Cambodian(s), Khmer. Population (1990): 7 million. Avg. annual growth rate: 2.2%. Infant mortality rate (1990): 128/1,000 live births. Life expectancy (1990): 47 yrs. male; 50 yrs. female. Ethnic groups: Cambodian 90%; Chinese and Vietnamese 5% each; small numbers of hill tribes, Chams, and Burmese. Religions: Theravada Buddhism 95%; Islam; animism; atheism. Languages: Khmer (official) spoken by more than 95% of the population, including minorities; some French still spoken. Literacy: About 50%.
Government
Government is disputed between the resistance groups of the National Government of Cambodia (NGC)--which formerly called itself the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)-- and the Vietnamese-installed authorities in Phnom Penh: the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) -- which now calls itself the State of Cambodia. No single authority controls the entire country. Administrative subdivisions: 19 provinces and municipalities. Independence: November 9, 1953. Constitution: (PRK) April 30, 1989. Elections: None. Political parties and leaders: NGC--Umbrella organization for the three resistance groups, including National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk; Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann; and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge) ostensibly led by Khieu Samphan (all since July 1982). PRK--Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), the communist party installed by Vietnam in 1979, led by Heng Samrin, KPRP General Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State since 1981, and Hun Sen, Chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1985. Flag: NGC--two horizontal blue bands, divided by a wider red band on which is centered a white stylized representation of Angkor Wat. PRK--a red field with five stylized yellow towers in the center.
Economy
GDP (1989 est.): $890 million. Per capita GDP (1989 est.): $130. Natural resources: Timber, gemstones, some iron ore, manganese and phosphate, hydroelectric potential from the Mekong River. Agriculture: About 5 million hectares (12 million acres) are unforested land; all are arable with irrigation, but less than 2 million hectares are cultivated. Products: Rice, rubber, corn, meat, vegetables, dairy products, sugar, flour. Industry: Types--rice milling, fishing, wood and wood products, textiles, cement, some rubber production (largely abandoned since 1975). Trade: Exports (1988)--$32 million: natural rubber, rice, pepper, wood. Major partners--Vietnam, USSR, Eastern Europe, Japan, India. Imports (1988)--$147 million: international food aid, fuels, consumer goods. Major Partners--Vietnam, USSR, Eastern Europe, Japan, India. Economic Aid: Unknown amount from USSR and Eastern Europe to areas under PRK control. Some humanitarian aid from the UN and private groups. UN relief efforts coordinated by the Secretary General's Special Representative for Kampuchean Humanitarian Assistance provide more than $56 million per year in assistance (cash and in-kind contributions) for displaced Cambodians along the Thai-Cambodian border.
Principal Government Officials
NGC: President--Prince Norodom Sihanouk Prime Minister/Head of Government--Son Sann Vice President for Foreign Affairs--Khieu Samphan PRK: Chairman, Council of State--Heng Samrin Chairman of the National Assembly--Chea Sim Chairman, Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister--Hun Sen (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

A Comprehensive Political Settlement in Cambodia

Date: Oct 21, 199110/21/91 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: Southeast Asia Country: Cambodia Subject: Democratization, State Department, Military Affairs, United Nations [TEXT]
US Policy
The United States has worked with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), with the four other permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, UK, and USSR), and other nations in pursuit of three objectives with regard to Cambodia: ..........1. Preventing a Khmer Rouge return to power; ..........2. Ensuring self-determination for the Cambodian people through free elections; and ..........3. Verifying the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. ..........The US Government has not recognized either the National Government of Cambodia (formerly the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea) or the Vietnamese-imposed Phnom Penh regime. (See box.) Secretary Baker announced a new initiative in US policy on Cambodia on July 18, 1990: ..........-- The United States would open a dialogue with Vietnam on the subject of Cambodia. (On September 5, 1990, Secretary Baker announced that the US would open a similar dialogue with the Phnom Penh regime.) ..........-- The United States would vote against seating the Cambodian resistance coalition in the UN General Assembly so long as that coalition includes the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge left a legacy of death and destruction from their 1975-78 reign; the United States is unalterably opposed to their return to power. ..........-- While maintaining US economic sanctions against Cambodia and Vietnam, including US opposition to new lending by international financial institutions, the US Government would be prepared to loosen restrictions on licensing humanitarian projects for those two countries. ..........-- The US Government would implement a program of assistance to Cambodian children victimized by the war, in addition to continuing assistance to displaced persons along the Thai/Cambodian border.
UN Role in Settlement
The United States has been working to achieve a comprehensive Cambodian settlement with an enhanced role for the UN that would lead to a cease-fire, arms cutoff, and free and fair elections. Without such a settlement, continued fighting would provide the Khmer Rouge an opportunity to seize power again. In addition, strong and effective measures, supported by the major powers, will be required to ensure that the Khmer Rouge are contained during the settlement. ..........The UN is the only international body with the experience and capabilities necessary to support the settlement, including the ability to achieve a neutral environment in which to organize and conduct free and fair elections for the Cambodian people. ..........Following the adjournment of the Paris Conference on Cambodia in August 1989, the United States proposed that the five permanent members of the Security Council (Permanent Five) seek to bridge their differences on a Cambodian settlement. On August 28, 1990, after 8 months of negotiation, they agreed on a framework for a comprehensive political settlement. All Cambodian factions accepted the framework, which calls for establishing a supreme national council and includes a UN peace- keeping role, as the basis for resolving their differences. There is a consensus among the four Cambodian factions and interested countries that representatives of a supreme national council should be seated in the UN General Assembly as the Cambodian delegation. ..........The August framework agreement was endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council in Resolution 668 in September and by acclamation by the General Assembly in October 1990. The Permanent Five subsequently agreed in November on a detailed draft settlement agreement. .......... The Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC) was formed in September 1990. On May 1, 1991, the four factions announced a voluntary cease-fire and arms moratorium. From then on, under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk, the SNC has moved forward rapidly to reach consensus on a final comprehensive settlement based on the Permanent Five framework. It met five times in Jakarta, Pattaya, Thailand (twice), Beijing, and New York to work out differences over the Permanent Five draft agreements. ..........The SNC members agreed to elect Prince Sihanouk as president of the SNC and to designate him the final arbiter in the absence of a consensus. They then decided on at least 70% demobilization of all factional forces during the transitional period, with the rest to be demobilized or merged into a new national army after elections. They agreed that the first election will be conducted through a proportional representation system along provincial lines. Finally, they delegated to the UN the last word on all matters relating to the organization and conduct of the elections during the transitional period. ..........The Permanent Five welcomed these agreements and will meet at the Paris conference on October 23 to sign the final peace accord. Prince Sihanouk and the SNC plan to return to Phnom Penh on November 14 to establish the SNC headquarters. The United States plans to establish a liaison office in Phnom Penh early in 1992.
US Assistance.
Since 1986, the US Government has provided political and economic support to the non-communist resistance. The assistance, entirely non-lethal, helped strengthen the capacity of the non-communist groups to participate in the political settlement of the Cambodian conflict and will give them the opportunity to test their popular appeal in a free and fair election. In FY 1991, the focus of our $25 million non-communist aid program shifted to benefit primarily the civilian population living in areas of Cambodia under non- communist control. By law, any assistance must not aid, directly or indirectly, the military capacity of the Khmer Rouge. ..........Starting in 1990, the United States also began providing aid to Cambodian children living in Phnom Penh regime controlled areas through international and private American voluntary organizations. This assistance continues and has been expanded to include victims of war and other needy individuals. ..........The United States looks forward to when it can work with a freely and fairly elected Cambodian government in providing assistance that will improve the well-being and livelihood of the Cambodian people. (###)
BACKGROUND
Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Kampuchea) in December 1978 and did not substantially withdraw its troops until 1989. Although the Vietnamese threw out the brutal Khmer Rouge government, a continued Vietnamese presence in Cambodia was not acceptable to the world community. ..........Four principal factions are involved in the struggle for a solution in Cambodia. ..........-- The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia, loyal to former monarch and head of state Prince Sihanouk. ..........-- The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), headed by former Prime Minister Son Sann. The forces of Prince Sihanouk and the KPNLF together form the non-communist resistance. ..........-- The Khmer Rouge, a Marxist-Leninist group headed by Pol Pot that took power in 1975 and established one of the most oppressive regimes in modern world history. The Khmer Rouge and the non-communist resistance constitute the resistance coalition now known as the National Government of Cambodia. ..........-- The Phnom Penh regime (known as the State of Cambodia), led by Heng Samrin, Chea Sim, and Hun Sen, includes former Khmer Rouge officials and was installed and sustained by the Vietnamese in the wake of their invasion. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

New US Approach on Missile Deployment

Fitzwater Description: Statement released by the Office of the White House Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Oct 15, 199110/15/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] Following up on the President's initiative to reduce nuclear weapons, the US Defense and Space Negotiating Group in Geneva, Switzerland, has tabled a new US approach to an agreement facilitating deployment of ballistic missile defenses. ..........The United States is now prepared to discuss limits on the scope and timing of defense deployments, consistent with the President's direction to pursue a system providing Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). This new approach builds on the climate reflected by the President's nuclear initiative and the positive Soviet response and should make it possible to reach an agreement facilitating the deployment of ballistic missile defenses to protect against accidental, unauthorized, or third-country launches. ..........As we pursue agreement in Geneva, it is essential for Congress to do its part by supporting our efforts there and by funding the Strategic Defense Initiative at a level that will enable us to deploy ballistic missile defenses at the earliest point feasible. The Senate's support for deployment of highly effective defenses against limited ballistic missile attacks is encouraging. President Bush urges the Congress as a whole to support this worthy goal. ..........A negotiated solution governing deployment of defenses that will protect the United States, our allies, and our forces abroad from limited ballistic missile strikes, together with congressional determination to fund such defenses, will make the world a safer place. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

US Efforts To Promote A Peaceful Settlement in Yugoslavia

Johnson Source: Ralph Johnson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Oct 17, 199110/17/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia, Albania, Slovenia Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights, Democratization, Trade/Economics, EC [TEXT] The events we are witnessing today in Yugoslavia are nothing less than a tragedy: a tragedy for the peoples of Yugoslavia, a tragedy for Europe, and a tragedy for the entire world community. Forty-six years after the killing ended in the bloodiest war that human civilization has known--a war that was particularly devastating to Yugoslavia-- Yugoslavia is poised on the brink of massive violence. What has occurred already is terrible enough, but if the peace process fails, the future may hold far worse horrors. ..........That is why we believe it is essential for the United States to assist efforts to bring about a negotiated, peaceful solution to this crisis, one that is based on democratic principles and respect for the rights of all the people involved. Our policy toward Yugoslavia has evolved over the past year, but its central elements have not changed: We strongly oppose the use of force, violence, and intimidation to settle political disputes; we will not accept changes in internal or external borders that are achieved by force; and we insist that human rights, including the rights of members of minority groups, be guaranteed in all republics.
Can We Do More?
Many Americans are asking why we haven't done even more to resolve this crisis. That's an understandable question. It goes against all our instincts to see Yugoslavia descend into violence without stepping in to stop this tragic process. The bottom line in this crisis, however, is that the world community cannot stop Yugoslavs from killing one another so long as they are determined to do so. What we can do is use our influence and powers of persuasion to convince the parties to this conflict that they cannot win, and, indeed, can only lose, if the violence is not stopped. We can assure them that they will have our support and good will if they turn away from killing and sit down in good faith to work out a fair and equitable solution. We can support the efforts of other countries and of international organizations to mediate an end to the fighting and work to keep doors open for a peaceful resolution of disputes. But we ourselves cannot stop the violence or resolve this conflict. Only the peoples of Yugoslavia and their leaders can do that.
What We Have Done
Let me lay out for you what we have done in response to the Yugoslav crisis, and how we assess prospects for a peaceful resolution. Starting last year, when trouble began looming larger in Yugoslavia, we made clear that our policy toward Yugoslavia would be consistent with our policy toward the region as a whole, based on support for democratization, market economic reform, respect for human rights, and peaceful settlement of all disputes. This emphasis applied to both the country as a whole and its individual republics and provinces. Let me quote for you our statement of October 19, 1990: .......... The US Government is concerned about increasing political and ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia and their potential impact on the transition to democracy and free markets which we have encouraged throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The US firmly supports unity, democratic change, respect for human rights, and market reform in Yugoslavia. We believe that democracy is the only enduring basis for a united, prosperous and voluntary Yugoslav union. Free and fair elections, both at the republic and federal level, are essential to establishing democracy throughout Yugoslavia. . . . We would strongly oppose any use of force that would block democratic change in Yugoslavia. ..........Many have asked why we chose to include unity among the goals we supported in Yugoslavia. From the beginning, our fundamental policy objective in Yugoslavia has been democracy, not unity. But when the Yugoslav crisis began, we decided to state our support for both unity and democracy because we believed that unity offered the best prospects for democracy and stability throughout Yugoslavia. Given Yugoslavia's crazy-quilt ethnic makeup and history of deep-seated ethnic disputes, we believed that the only alternative to some form of democratic unity was violence, suffering, and long-term instability. And I think we were right on that; the events of the past year have confirmed our deepest worries about the consequences of a Yugoslav breakup. We knew that feelings were so bitter and animosities so intense that unity might be impossible, despite the lack of peaceful alternatives. We also believed, however, that unity and respect for the rights of minorities offered the most viable formula for peace in Yugoslavia, and that fragmentation would bring terrible violence and suffering. And it did. We were not alone in pushing for what may have been an unattainable outcome; all of our allies felt the same way, as did many of Yugoslavia's neighbors and its traditional allies in the Non- Aligned Movement. ..........In light of developments over the last year in Yugoslavia, we have stopped talking about unity, not because we no longer think it the best solution, but because the deterioration of the situation has made other goals more immediate: namely, an end to the fighting through a durable cease-fire and an agreement to sit down and hammer out a solution acceptable to all the republics. We still think that some form of voluntary association offers the best hope for a durable resolution. But we have made clear that this is a decision that the parties involved will have to decide for themselves. Our position now is consistent with what we have been saying since last year: the US will accept any future political arrangements that are decided on peacefully and democratically by the peoples of Yugoslavia, through dialogue and negotiation. ..........Let me mention what we have been doing concretely to assist efforts to resolve this crisis. We have been supporting and intend to continue to support the European Community's CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]-mandated effort to bring about a genuine cease-fire and a political settlement. We believe that collective efforts have the best prospects for influencing the situation. Our leverage in this conflict is not by itself sufficient to influence the outcome. The current conference on Yugoslavia, organized by the European Community [EC], supported by all CSCE member nations and chaired by former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, offers the best vehicle for conducting a dialogue among the parties and securing a peaceful settlement. We will continue to support this process. Should such a settlement emerge, I would hope the United States would be able to contribute materially as well as diplomatically to its implementation.
Supporting the EC
Why are we supporting the EC's efforts, rather than taking the lead ourselves? In the first place, because we believe that Europe has the most at stake in this crisis, and because European leverage-- economic as well as political--is, in general, greater than ours. Europe's trade and investment ties with Yugoslavia far exceed ours, and Yugoslavia has an association agreement with the EC that provides access to the EC's markets that is vital to Yugoslavia's economy. While exports account for 30% of Yugoslavia's GDP, making it more dependent on foreign trade than many of its neighbors, the US accounts for only about 5% of Yugoslav trade. Yugoslavia is our 57th trading partner, whereas Europe accounts for nearly 80% of Yugoslav trade, about half of which goes to the EC. Its largest individual trading partners are Germany, Italy, and USSR. Unilateral economic sanctions would have no more than a symbolic effect while at the same time they could hurt other countries in the region. ..........We also support the EC's efforts because we believe it is appropriate for the EC to take the lead, and the nations of CSCE agreed to support the EC in that role. That doesn't mean, however, that we are not actively involved ourselves. Our Ambassador in Belgrade and his staff have a remarkable range of contacts throughout Yugoslavia, in the federal and republic governments, in the political parties, and in the nationalist movements. Ambassador [Warren] Zimmermann is in almost constant touch with the leaders of all parties to this conflict. He and his staff have been engaged every day in working to bring the parties together and prevent a worsening of the conflict. Here in Washington, we, too, have been active. We imposed an arms embargo in July, long before the UN took action on a global basis. Deputy Secretary [Lawrence] Eagleburger and many other officials have met with a long list of Yugoslav central and republic leaders, as well as with opposition politicians and human rights activists.
Economic Sanctions?
The main goal of our policy is to try to have a constructive impact on this crisis. Should the EC decide to impose sanctions, we would support its decision and work to coordinate with the EC to impose sanctions ourselves. The kind of sanctions we would impose would depend in part on what the EC did, since we would want to act in a way that reinforced the EC's actions. It would also depend, however, on what steps we considered to be most effective and the constraints imposed by US law. An example of the kind of action we might take--this is hypothetical--in coordination with the EC's imposition of sanctions would be an embargo against US trade and economic relations with Yugoslavia, with possible exceptions for humanitarian supplies. ..........Acting in concert with the EC would be consistent with what experience has taught us about the effectiveness of economic sanctions: they are most effective when part of a comprehensive strategy which includes diplomatic, political, and possibly military actions as well, and when implemented in coordination with other countries. ..........Yugoslavia is dependent on imported oil, and a disruption of supplies would have a severe impact on the country's economy. However, the Yugoslavs have effectively imposed an oil embargo on themselves. Petroleum enters the country only at Rijeka and is transported through the Adria pipeline. The Croats have closed the pipeline to deny oil to Serbia. The Serbs retaliated by damaging the pipeline in Croatia, thus disrupting that republic's oil supplies. In addition, closing the Adria pipeline has cut off oil to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, leaving them dependent on the Soviet Druzhba pipeline. ..........As for specific sanctions, the EC is considering a number of options, including the imposition of sanctions on those republics which have not fulfilled their commitments in the peace process and which continue to block progress toward a peaceful solution. This would be difficult to do, given the extent to which the Yugoslav republics are economically interdependent. We are looking closely at this question and will coordinate with the EC to ensure that any action we take enhances the prospects for success of the EC's efforts. ..........In that regard, I would like to turn briefly to the proposals contained in [Senate Bill] 1793. We do not believe that legislation of this kind would advance the goal of achieving a peaceful, negotiated settlement in Yugoslavia. The current crisis is complicated and fluid, and the Administration must have the flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and tailor its approach accordingly. This legislation would deny us that flexibility and could thus hamper, rather than improve, the effectiveness of our policy in Yugoslavia. For example, in the area of assistance, the United States has few incentives to offer which might affect behavior. Yugoslavia traditionally has not received substantial US assistance, because it was better off economically, in relative terms, than other countries in the region. Our assistance package for Yugoslavia amounts to $5 million of primarily technical assistance. This is insignificant beside $925 million that the EC was providing before the crisis. No US carrier currently flies to Yugoslavia, and a cutoff of landing rights for the Yugoslav national airline, JAT, would not have an appreciable impact on the crisis. We endorse the thrust of the conditions imposed in Section 6(b) of the legislation, but as I have already stated, we do not believe that this kind of rigid, inflexible approach is the best way to achieve these goals. ..........Before leaving the question of sanctions, I want to address how they could best be implemented, if we decide they are necessary. The President has sufficient authority under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) to implement economic sanctions. This, rather than separate legislation, would be the preferable approach. IEEPA requires the President to declare a national emergency which originates outside the United States and includes provisions requiring consultations with and reporting to the Congress. The act has been used in the past to implement economic sanctions, most recently in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and has proven to be an effective, flexible vehicle to address this aspect of foreign policy.
Violence and Cruelty
Let me turn now to what is happening inside Yugoslavia. The nearly continuous fighting between Croatian forces and those of the federal military and the Serbian republic, with the accompanying naval blockades and air strikes, is the worst aspect of this crisis. It has led to death, destruction, and suffering in much of Croatia and has prompted tens of thousands of people to flee their towns and villages, in some cases for the safety of other countries. It has reintroduced in Europe a level of violence and cruelty that has not been seen since the Second World War. And it has inflamed ancient grievances and hatreds, making a peaceful solution even more difficult to achieve. ..........But this is not the only aspect of the crisis that concerns us. The aggressive expansionism of the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic, with the frequent support of the Yugoslav federal military, has intimidated the moderate governments of Bosnia- Herzegovina and Macedonia, both of which fear that the fighting could at any day spill over into their republics and ignite an even worse explosion.
Serbian Repression
The Serbian Government has repressed dissent at home and has revoked the autonomy of the Provinces of Vojvo-dina and Kosovo. The Hungarian minority in Vojvodina is fearful for its future, but for the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, their worst nightmares have already come true: Serbia has closed down Kosovo's schools, fired ethnic Albanians from the civil service, schools, and universities; arrested hundreds of Albanians on trumped-up charges; embarked on a campaign to "Serbianize" the province; and blocked the free exercise of democracy during the recent vote on independence. The US Government was the first to condemn these actions and, along with 16 other CSCE states, invoked the CSCE human dimension mechanism in August 1990 to underscore our concern over the repression. Since then, the situation has worsened. The US again raised the issue of Serbian actions at the Moscow human rights conference last month. But Serbia's intentions have become increasingly clear, and increasingly more disturbing. Our public position on this has been unambiguous. To give you a sense of where we stand on this, let me quote from our most recent public statement, issued on October 2 following Deputy Secretary Eagleburger's meeting with Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Kosutic: .......... The Deputy Secretary reiterated to Mr. Kosutic that the US assesses actions by the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav military aimed at redrawing by force the internal borders of Yugoslavia as a grave challenge to the basic values and principles which underlie the CSCE. The Deputy Secretary emphasized to Mr. Kosutic that while the US appreciates the concerns of Serbs inside and outside Serbia in the present context, the US does not and will not accept repression and aggression in the name of those concerns. The Deputy Secretary underscored to Mr. Kosutic that the US, like the European Community, is determined not to recognize any outcome of the Yugoslav crisis that would be based on the use of force to change Yugoslavia's internal borders. The Deputy Secretary underscored to Mr. Kosutic that continued use of aggressive force by the Serbian leadership in tandem with the Yugoslav military will only ensure their exile from the new Europe. He urged that the Serbian government take clear and concrete steps to demonstrate its commitment to the EC-sponsored peace conference chaired by Lord Carrington, and to renounce any intention of seeking internal border changes through the use of force. . . . We note that Serbian violations of the human rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo continue to be a major concern in the CSCE context. ..........I believe this and other statements we have made leave no room for doubt, either here or in Yugoslavia, about where the US stands as far as Serbia's actions. But I also want to stress that no one is blameless in this conflict. The policies of the Croatian government toward the Serbian minority do not justify Serbia's actions, but they have contributed to the atmosphere of tension and recrimination that led to violence. There are also sensitivities related to the historic experience of Croatian-Serbian conflict in World War II, during which the Croatian puppet government allied with Nazi Germany, run by the "Ustasha" movement, massacred hundreds of thousands of people, mainly Serbs and Jews. And there are, unfortunately a sizable number of people in Croatia today--not the current government but of more extreme elements of the nationalist movement--who are proud to call themselves the heirs of the Ustasha. I certainly do not associate all Croatian nationalists with that tendency, but to Serbs this is a real and understandable concern.
Slovenia and Republic Recognition
Let me turn to Slovenia. With the departure this month of most federal military units from Slovenia, the republic has traveled far down the road to independence. Our position on the future of Slovenia is identical to that toward Yugoslavia as a whole. We will accept any future political arrangements that are decided on peacefully and democratically by the peoples of Yugoslavia, through dialogue and negotiation, but we do not believe that partial solutions, unilateral actions or outcomes achieved by force and intimidation are conducive to achieving a comprehensive settlement. Let me add that the five principles that Secretary Baker enunciated in his address to the CSCE meeting in Moscow last month are also central to our policy toward Yugoslavia as a whole and its individual republics. We have made this position very clear in response to requests from Croatia and Slovenia for US recognition of their independence. To reiterate, the five points are: ..........-- Determining the future of the country peacefully and democratically, consistent with CSCE principles; ..........-- Respect for all existing borders, both internal and external, and change to those borders only through peaceful and consensual means; ..........-- Support for democracy and the rule of law, emphasizing the key role of elections in the democratic process; ..........-- Safeguarding of human rights, based on full respect for the individual and including equal treatment of minorities; and ..........-- Respect for international law and obligations, especially adherence to the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.
Conclusion
I can assure you that this Administration is committed to playing a constructive role in helping the world community and the people of Yugoslavia respond to that nation's agonizing crisis. But I believe strongly that unilateral action by the US, no matter how appealing, is unlikely to move the Yugoslavs toward resolution of the conflict. The best option we have is to continue to act in concert with the EC and other European countries in implementing a broad strategy, possibly including economic sanctions and benefits, that will encourage all the parties in Yugoslavia to move toward peaceful rather than military resolution of their differences. We think this approach offers the best chance of stopping the Yugoslav tragedy from claiming even more lives and destroying hope for a better future for all the peoples of Yugoslavia. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

President Bush Meets With NATO Secretary General

Fitzwater Description: Statement released by the Office of the White House Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Oct 11, 199110/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Subject: NATO, CSCE [TEXT] The President met with the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Woerner, for approximately 30 minutes in the Oval Office. They discussed the preparations for the November Rome NATO summit. They reaffirmed NATO's central role, not only in providing security and stability, but in the continuing development of a democratic Europe. The President thanked Secretary General Woerner for NATO's strong support for his nuclear initiative, in particular for NATO's endorsement of the decision to withdraw and destroy all ground-based tactical nuclear weapons. The President and the Secretary General noted the importance of reaching out to the new democracies in Europe through deepening NATO's ties to these countries. The President and Secretary General Woerner also emphasized the importance of NATO, the European Community, and the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] in continuing the positive transformation throughout Europe. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

Bahrain--A Valued Coalition Partner

Bush, Isa Source: President Bush, Shaikh Isa Description: Remarks at arrival ceremony of the Amir of Bahrain, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Oct 15, 199110/15/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Bahrain Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT]
President Bush:
Your Highness, it is my great honor to welcome you to the White House today and to have this opportunity to consult with you on the many challenges that face our two countries and to convey my heartfelt thanks to you, a valued coalition partner. Bahrain has been a firm friend and a close ally for half a century but never more than in this past year as we've stood together to turn back aggression. ..........Your Highness, we spoke together many times in the aftermath of August 2 [1990] and at key moments during Desert Storm, and never once did you waver; always you stood strong and resolute. From its strategic position in the Gulf, Bahrain served as a key staging point in Desert Storm. Your air force, the Bahraini Air Force, helped the coalition secure the air superiority so decisive to victory. Bahrain endured Scud attacks, shook off Saddam's desperate attempt to sow terror, and emerged each time more determined to prevail. ..........Your Highness, your country's conduct in this crisis is a credit to your leadership and to the courage of the people of Bahrain. Just as we joined forces to liberate Kuwait, common action remains a key to meeting the challenges we face today. ..........In a few minutes, we'll begin our meetings, building on the common ground we share. Let me focus now on our approach to Iraq, and let me state our position in the simplest possible terms. Saddam Hussein will not scorn the will of the world. Iraq must never again threaten its neighbors. We will keep the pressure on until we are satisfied that all of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them have been destroyed, until a new leadership in Iraq stands ready to live in peace with its neighbors. ..........Your Highness, as leader of a country that knows too well what it means to be menaced by Saddam, I know you join me in looking ahead to the day Iraq closes this sad chapter in its history and joins the cause of peace. I've said many times--and I'll repeat it here--that our quarrel has never been with the people of Iraq. The United States, in concert with the United Nations, has proposed a comprehensive program allowing Iraq to resume oil exports to fund the purchase of food and medicine. But the international community deserves to know with certainty that the food and medicine purchased under this plan reach the people of Iraq rather than Saddam's armed forces. ..........This program can go forward the instant Saddam Hussein accepts UN Resolutions 706 and 712 and puts in place a UN- supervised system to monitor oil exports and food distribution. History teaches that the consequences of war echo far beyond the battlefield. Our coalition in the Gulf war did more than defeat an aggressor; our common effort created new opportunities for lasting peace throughout the Middle East. All Americans hope to see this region, so long driven by war, blessed by peace. In that spirit, the United States supports Bahrain's decision to participate along with its GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] partners in the upcoming peace conference. This readiness, this willingness to reach out strengthens the prospect for the only peace that can endure--a fair and comprehensive peace acceptable to all parties in the region. ..........Your Highness, from the moment the first American engineers arrived in your country to help develop your oil resources some 60 years ago, our countries have worked together in many ways. Our discussions today will touch on all aspects of our relations, from investment opportunities to security cooperation; and, as always, we seek to build on common ground--on the goodwill of nations that have worked together in the past, the goodwill that gives us faith in a better future. ..........Once again, Your Highness, it is my pleasure to meet with you today for what I'm confident will be productive discussions. ..........Welcome to the White House and may God bless the people of Bahrain.
Shaikh Isa:
Mr. President, it is a pleasure for me to be visiting this great country at your kind invitation. And I sincerely appreciate the warmth and the friendship shown to myself and to my delegation. It's also given me great pleasure, Mr. President, to extend to you and to all the American people my heartfelt greetings and the warm wishes of the people of Bahrain. ..........During my visit here, I'm looking forward to renewing our long-standing and mutual[ly] valued friendship, to exchanging views on matters of mutual interest to our two countries. The links between the United States and Bahrain have developed in many fields for well over half a century. The cooperation between our two countries first began in the 1940s and has strengthened considerably since then, more particularly so during the last decade. ..........Through the Iran-Iraq war, we worked closely together to ensure freedom of navigation in the Arabian Gulf and, more recently, as part of a multinational effort to reverse the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. Our people and forces were united as never before. This experience will never be forgotten and has formed a deep bond between our two countries. ..........I take this opportunity to sincerely thank you, Mr. President, and the American people for your courageous stand against aggression and for your determination that right and justice should prevail. Your stand in the multinational effort is undoubtedly a major positive contribution to future international relations. The association between the United States and Bahrain stands as an example of what can be achieved irrespective of physical size, distance apart, or cultural differences. ..........When good will and cooperation exist on both sides, it is our duty to continue to work together and through the United Nations to ensure that peace and stability prevails between all nations. Mr. President, the world is currently witnessing major political and ideological changes, and we must all assure that the rules of law and civilized conduct are not overshadowed during these transformations. ..........As a superpower, the United States has a major role to play in this respect. I would like to take this opportunity, Mr. President, to praise you and your Administration for your commitment to reducing confrontation and to promoting peace and cooperation though the world. We have recently witnessed the end of the Cold War, following the rapid collapse of historic East-West confrontation. It is my belief that we are currently also on the verge of a major breakthrough in the peace process in the Middle East, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. ..........There is no doubt that the United States has been a major catalyst to what has been achieved in these events. Our strategic cooperation, however, should not be allowed to overshadow the many other close links between Bahrain and the United States. These include trade, commerce, education, science, and technology. These links have brought the people of two countries close together, and there now exist many strong personal relationships between the Americans and Bahrainis. These personal relationships are the true test of friendship between our two countries. ..........To this end, the American Bahrain Friendship Society was founded in Washington last year. And both the society and all its members have my sincere good wishes and support for the future. It is my hope that my visit will further consolidate the many ties between our two countries. It is my wish and the wish of the Bahraini people that our close relationship with the United States will continue to flourish and prosper in the years ahead, and become even stronger in the 21st century. ..........On this occasion, I would like to take this opportunity, Mr. President, to renew my invitation to you and to Mrs. Bush to visit Bahrain. It would give me great pleasure to welcome you to Bahrain and enable the Bahraini people to show their friendship and appreciation to you and to the American people. ..........Finally, Mr. President, it is my pleasure to extend to you and to the American people my very best wishes for continued peace and progress and prosperity. Thank you very much, sir. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

The Amir of Bahrain Visits Washington, DC

Date: Oct 15, 199110/15/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Bahrain Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] The Amir of Bahrain, Shaikh Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa, made his second state visit to Washington, DC, on October 15, 1991, meeting with President Bush, Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood. His previous visit was in 1983.
US-Bahrain Relations
Close relations between the United States and Bahrain were further strengthened during the Gulf war, when Bahrain's geographically strategic position became even more important due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. During the war, Bahrain was the primary allied naval base and proved to be an invaluable point of origin for allied air strikes against Iraqi targets. Furthermore, Bahraini pilots joined the United States and other members of the coalition in flying strikes into Iraq. ..........The commitment of Bahrain to peace and harmony in the Persian Gulf continued to be evident in the post-war period. As one of the moderate Arab states to endorse Secretary Baker's plan for collective regional security, Bahrain always has been an enthusiastic participant in creating progress and stability in the Gulf. As a result of joint air and ground exercises and an increased US naval presence, US-Bahraini ties have been further cemented. ..........Economic repercussions of the Gulf war also have created avenues for closer US-Bahraini ties. Since displacing Japan as the top exporter to Bahrain in 1986, US exports to Bahrain exceeded $240 million 1989. Although foreign investment formerly was limited to those firms with at least 51% Bahraini ownership, in July 1991, Bahrain removed domestic ownership requirements for foreign investors. By eliminating this restriction, Bahrain aims to make its economy more attractive to foreign investment and, ultimately, to encourage widespread economic recovery. ..........The US Government provides a limited amount of administrative and advisory support, and the Department of Defense sponsors the Bahrain School.
Consolidation of Democracy
In 1973, 2 years after achieving independence from the United Kingdom, Bahrain's new constitution institutionalized the Amir's hereditary rule. Currently under the leadership of Shaikh Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa, the Al-Khalifa family has controlled the government since the late 18th century. The Amir is advised by the Prime Minister (presently his brother) and an appointed Council of Ministers. Bahrain has an independent judiciary but no legislature. ..........Despite the lack of universal suffrage, Bahrain traditionally has provided rights guarantees, unlike those of its regional counterparts. Women are guaranteed maternity benefits such as a 45-day paid leave for child care. Labor laws have been generous to workers, allowing for national labor representation. National health care has been provided free of charge since the 1920s.
Economy, Trade, and Investment
Characterized by an almost overwhelming reliance on oil revenues and a relatively free market, Bahrain's economy has been significantly influenced by the instability of the global marketplace. Since the decline of world oil prices in 1986, the government has attempted to diversify its oil-dominated economy. Forays into financial services, manufacturing, and new oil- derivative industries have helped establish Bahrain as a financial center for the entire region, thus supporting the domestic economy and infrastructure. Barriers to foreign investment are few. US investment focuses primarily on modest holdings in the oil industry, such as part ownership of Bahrain Petroleum Company. ..........In the wake of the Gulf crisis, Bahrain has suffered from an interruption in financial aid from Kuwait and an overall decline in business confidence. Foreign investment in the country has been curtailed, while some foreign banks have withdrawn entirely. Oil released into the Gulf during the conflict has caused an unquantifiable amount of ecological damage. The government has taken steps to restore its economy and global perceptions by reducing non-essential spending, postponing capital projects, and continuing its diversification efforts. (###)
Bahrain at a Glance
An archipelago of 33 islands in the Persian Gulf, Bahrain is located about halfway down the Gulf off the coast of Saudi Arabia. A 25- kilometer (16-mile) causeway links the two countries. Carved of limestone and sand, the main island is primarily barren and flat, occasionally marked by small hills, rocky cliffs, and scrub vegetation suited for the hot climate. Unlike its Gulf neighbors, Bahrain has reserves of fresh spring water which are commonly used for irrigation. ..........Bahrain traditionally has served as a crucial stopover for Persian Gulf trade. Archaeological remains indicate that thousands of years ago the island was a key regional trading post. It maintained this status until the influx of Europeans disrupted traditional routes in the 19th century. ..........Manama, the capital, has a population of about 122,000. The population of Bahrain is composed of a mix of indigenous peoples and foreigners. The native groups, which make up about 66% of the total population, are a mix of about two-thirds Shi'a Muslims and one-third Sunni Muslims. In addition, foreigners include other Arabs, Iranians, Indians, Pakistanis, East Asians, and Europeans. ..........One of the first of the Gulf states to discover and refine oil, Bahrain has traditionally been at the forefront of regional modernization efforts. Health care, free education, and social security programs typify the achievements of the oil-based economy. However, with oil reserves dwindling, Bahrain now must seek innovative economic alternatives to maintain the progress made in the past. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Bahrain

Date: Oct 21, 199110/21/91 Category: Country Data Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Bahrain Subject: History, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Official Name: State of Bahrain
Geography
Area: 692 sq. km. (267 sq. mi.); about four times the size of Washington, DC. Bahrain is an archipelago consisting of 33 islands, only 5 of them inhabited. Cities: Capital--Manama (1985 est.)--pop. 122,000. Other city-- Al Muharraq. Terrain: Low interior plateau and hill on main island. Climate: Hot and humid from April to October, temperate from November to March.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Bahraini(s). Population (1989 est.): 500,000 (66% indigenous). Ethnic groups: Arab 73%, Iranian 9%, Pakistani, Indian. Religions: Shi'a Muslim (more than 60% of the indigenous population); Sunni Muslim (about 30%). Languages: Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu. Education: Attendance--73%. Literacy--about 74%. Work force (1989 est.): 190,000. About 44% indigenous, 56% expatriate. Agriculture-- 4%. Industry and commerce--74%. Services--19%. Government--3%.
Government
Type: Traditional amirate (cabinet-executive system). Independence: August 15, 1971. Constitution: May 26, 1973. Branches: Executive--amir (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), Council of Ministers (cabinet). Judicial-- independent judiciary with right of judicial review. Subdivisions: Six towns and cities. Political parties: None. Suffrage: None. Central government budget (1986-87): $3 billion. Defense (1986): $134 million, or 9% of the published budget. Flag: Three-fourths red field with serrated line separating white field on staff side.
Economy
GDP (1988 est.): $4 billion. Real growth (est.): 2%. Per capita income (1988 est.): $8,495. Avg. inflation rate (1985): 0.3%. Natural resources: Oil, associated and non-associated natural gas, fish. Agriculture (1.5% of GDP): Products-- eggs, vegetables, dates. Industry (36% of GDP): Types--oil, aluminum, ship repair, natural gas, fish. Services (62% of GDP): Banking, real estate, insurance. Trade (1987 est.): Exports--$2.4 billion: oil, aluminum, fish. Major markets--US, Japan, Saudi Arabia, UK. Imports--$2.7 billion: machinery, industrial equipment, motor vehicles, foodstuffs, clothing. Major suppliers--US, Japan, UK. Economic aid received: Significant budgetary support and project grants from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.
Principal Government Officials
Chief of State--Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa Prime Minister--Khalifa bin Sulman al-Khalifa Minister of Foreign Affairs--Muhammed bin Mubarak al-Khalifa Ambassador to the United States--Ghazi Muhammed al-Gosaibi (until Oct. 30). ..........Abdul Rahman bin Faris al-Khalifa (after Oct. 30) Ambassador to the United Nations--Hussein al-Sabbagh (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 42, October 21, 1991 Title:

UN Security Council Resolution 715 on Iraq

Description: Released by the UN Security Council, New York, New York Date: Oct 11, 199110/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, United Nations [TEXT] UNSC Resolution 715 (October 11, 1991) The Security Council, ..........Recalling its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and its other resolutions on this matter, ..........Recalling in particular that under resolution 687 (1991) the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency were requested to develop plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification, and to submit them to the Security Council for approval, ..........Taking note of the report and note of the Secretary-General,1 (S/22871Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev. 1), transmitting the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, ..........Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, ..........1. Approves, in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and the present resolution, the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency;1 ..........2. Decides that the Special Commission shall carry out the plan submitted by the Secretary-General,2 as well as continuing to discharge its other responsibilities under resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991) and 707 (1991) and performing such other functions as are conferred upon it under the present resolution; ..........3. Requests the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission, the plan submitted by him3 and to continue to discharge his other responsibilities under resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991) and 707 (1991); ..........4. Decides that the Special Commission, in the exercise of its responsibilities as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, shall: ..........(a) Continue to have the responsibility for designating additional locations for inspection and overflights; ..........(b) Continue to render assistance and cooperation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by providing him by mutual agreement with the necessary special expertise and logistical, informational and other operational support for the carrying out of the plan submitted by him; ..........(c) Perform such other functions, in cooperation in the nuclear field with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as may be necessary to coordinate activities under the plans approved by the present resolution, including making use of commonly available services and information to the fullest extent possible, in order to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum use of resources; ..........5. Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the plans approved by the present resolution and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the plans; ..........6. Decides to encourage the maximum assistance, in cash and in kind, from all Member States to support the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out their activities under the plans approved by the present resolution, without prejudice to Iraq's liability for the full costs of such activities; ..........7. Requests the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990), the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop in cooperation a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, including the present resolution and the plans approved hereunder; ..........8. Requests the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit to the Security Council reports on the implementation of the plans approved by the present resolution, when requested by the Security Council and in any event at least every six months after the adoption of this resolution; ..........9. Decides to remain seized of the matter. VOTE: Unanimous 15-0. ..........1 S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev. and Corr. 1. ..........2 S/22871/Rev.1. ..........3 S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1. (###)