US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: OAS Support for Democracy In Haiti
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs
Description: Remarks before the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the
Organization of American States, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 8, 199110/8/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: OAS, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
First of all, I would like to associate myself with those who have
paid tribute to you for your leadership not just of this ad hoc
meeting but of the previous one, and for your leadership of the
mission [of] foreign ministers. I think that we've accomplished an
enormous amount in both forums, and your personal efforts and
personal leadership is one of the important reasons why.
..........I would also like to pay similar tribute to our Secretary
General [Javier Baena Soares], who has a much more difficult job
than I think we realize, and who, I think, has transformed this
organization in an extremely important way during his tenure--in
ways in which, I think, that all of us are proud.
..........It's hard to believe, but it was just 5 days ago that the
foreign ministers of 34 nations that make up the Organization of
American States gathered in this room. Secretary Baker came here
for the same reason that each of you came to this room, because the
United States recognizes that the violent attack on the democratic
Government of Haiti was an assault not just on the democratic
rights of the people of Haiti, who had struggled and sacrificed for
so many years to attain those rights, but it was also an assault on
the Inter-American system and on the democratic community of
this hemisphere.
..........Secretary Baker said in his remarks 5 days ago that that
assault was a test of the democratic community and of the
Organization of American States. I'm proud to say that I believe
this organization and this democratic community have risen to that
test with enormous distinction and enormous political will.
..........The first meeting of foreign ministers was convened at the
Secretary General's direction, using the new mechanism that we
adopted in Santiago just 3 days after the coup d'etat. The
resolution we adopted at that time, I think, was one of the
strongest in the history of this Organization.
..........The very next day, a mission of distinguished foreign
ministers--and one slightly less distinguished Assistant
Secretary--from eight nations was in Haiti. That mission returned
two other times. I think, as I said earlier, the mission came very
close to helping to foster a national dialogue that would have led to
a solution. But events on the ground temporarily over-ran that
diplomacy.
..........Now, just 3 days later, this meeting of foreign ministers has
acted again. We said in our first resolution that we would take
additional measures. We've taken two strong measures here tonight.
We have done so not to punish Haiti or the suffering people of Haiti
but--as other delegations have said--to send a clear message
throughout this hemisphere that those who have used violence to
threaten democracy will not go unpunished. They will be isolated.
They will be cut off. They will be denied legitimacy, and they will
be pariahs until democracy is restored. That message should be
heard by any group or individuals in this hemisphere who believe
that democracy is vulnerable today.
..........We said something else as well, though. We said that once
democracy is restored and the dialogue is resumed, this
Organization is prepared, in an unprecedented way, to go to Haiti.
As other speakers said, not just for a short time, but for an
extended period of time, to give that nation the chance that it
thought it gained in December of last year--a chance to consolidate
democratic institutions and to ensure the respect for institutions
and human rights that are essential to democracy.
..........And if conditions should permit us to send such a mission, I
think we must have the same will to ensure its success for the
duration as we have in defending democracy against this coup,
because we have taken on an important political and moral
responsibility.
..........There is much talk of building a new world order. Today, I
think what we are doing, in fact, is the creation of a genuine
democratic community. I think there is no other part of the world
where that democratic community is being built more strongly and
more clearly than in the Western Hemisphere. It is democratic
because we do not accept any other form of government as
legitimate in our community, and it is a community because we are
bound by bonds of commitment and respect and affection that make
us something more than just a collection of separate nations.
..........I think that is at evidence here today. There are foreign
ministers here from throughout this hemisphere, who have scrapped
their schedules for days and weeks. There are governments who
have dispatched airplanes, all to defend the rights of the Haitian
people. And I think that's a very important event. I think it says
something special about the democracies around this table. So I'm
very proud to have participated on behalf of the United States in
these meetings.
..........We have talked for many decades about acting through
multilateral mechanisms in this hemisphere, but I think in these
days and months we are doing more than talking: We are creating
and developing and establishing those multilateral mechanisms. We
are learning to work together in these kinds of forums and pool our
collective strength to create something that has never existed
before: the force of a democratic community, committed to defend
the rights of democracy.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: OAS Resolution: Support to the Democratic Government of
Haiti
Description: Released by the Organization of American States,
Washington, DC
Date: Oct 3, 199110/3/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Democratization, OAS, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti
MRE/RES. 1/91 (October 3, 1991)
The Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Having Seen:
..........The resolution of the Permanent Council of September 30,
1991, convoking an ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
pursuant to resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), in response to the
gravity of the events that have taken place in Haiti;
..........The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of
the Inter-American System, approved at the twenty-first regular
session of the General Assembly, held at Santiago, Chile, in June
1991; and
..........Resolution AG/RES. 1117 (XXI-0/91) "Support for the
Democratic Process in the Republic of Haiti";
Having Heard:
..........The statement made to this meeting by the President of Haiti,
Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide;
Reaffirming:
..........That the true significance of American solidarity and good
neighborliness can only mean the consolidation in this hemisphere,
within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of
individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the
essential rights of man;
..........That one of the essential purposes of the Organization of
American States is to promote and consolidate representative
democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention;
and
..........That the solidarity of the American states and the high aims
which are sought through it require the political organization of
those states on the basis of the effective exercise of
representative democracy;
Considering:
..........That the grave events that have occurred in Haiti constitute
an abrupt, violent, and irregular disruption of the legitimate
exercise of power by the democratic government of that country;
..........That these events represent disregard for the legitimate
Government of Haiti, which was constituted by the will of its
people freely expressed in a free and democratic electoral process
under international observation with the participation of this
Organization; and
..........That those events have compelled President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide to leave Haitian territory temporarily and against his will,
Resolves:
.......... 1. To reiterate the vigorous condemnation voiced by the
Permanent Council of the grave events taking place in Haiti, which
deny the right of its people to self-determination, and to demand
full restoration of the rule of law and of constitutional order and
the immediate reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
in the exercise of his legitimate authority.
.......... 2. To request that the Secretary General of the Organization,
together with a group of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member
states, go to Haiti immediately to inform those who hold power
illegally that the American states reject the disruption of
constitutional order and to advise them of the decisions adopted by
this meeting.
.......... 3. To recognize the representatives designated by the
constitutional Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide as
the only legitimate representatives of the Government of Haiti to
the organs, agencies, and entities of the inter-American system.
.......... 4. To urge the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
in response to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's request, to take
immediately all measures within its competence to protect and
defend human rights in Haiti and to report thereon to the Permanent
Council of the Organization.
.......... 5. To recommend, with due respect for the policy of each
member state on the recognition of states and governments, action
to bring about the diplomatic isolation of those who hold power
illegally in Haiti.
.......... 6. To recommend to all states that they suspend their
economic, financial, and commercial ties with Haiti and any aid and
technical cooperation except that provided for strictly
humanitarian purposes.
.......... 7. To request the Secretary General of the Organization to
pursue efforts to increase the Inter-American Fund for Priority
Assistance to Haiti, but to refrain from using it so long as the
present situation prevails.
.......... 8. To recommend to the General Secretariat of the
Organization the suspension of all assistance to those who hold
power illegally in Haiti and to request the regional organs and
institutions, such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the
Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Institute for
Cooperation on Agriculture, and the Latin American Economic
System (SELA), to adopt the same measure.
.......... 9. To urge all states to provide no military, police, or
security assistance of any kind and to prevent the delivery of arms,
munitions, or equipment to that country in any manner, public or
private.
..........10. To keep open the ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs to receive, with the urgency that this situation demands,
the report of the Mission referred to in operative paragraph 2 of
this resolution and to adopt, in accordance with the Charter of the
OAS and international law, any additional measures that may be
necessary and appropriate to ensure the immediate reinstatement
of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the exercise of his
legitimate authority.
..........11. To transmit this resolution to the United Nations and its
specialized agencies and to urge them to consider its spirit and
aims.
VOTE: Adopted by consensus. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: OAS Resolution: Support For Democracy in Haiti
Description: Released by the Organization of American States,
Washington, DC
Date: Oct 8, 199110/8/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Democratization, OAS, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Support For Democracy in Haiti
MRE/RES. 2/91 (October 8, 1991)
The Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Having Seen resolution MRE/RES. 1/91 "Support for the
Democratic Government of Haiti" and the report of the mission
designated in operative paragraph 2 of said resolution, and the
request presented by the President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
in his letter of 7 October 1991 (MRE/doc. 3/91) to the Secretary
General,
Considering:
..........That the crisis in Haiti has become more serious and that,
consequently, it is necessary to adopt additional measures in
accordance with operative paragraph 10 of resolution MRE/RES.
1/91, and
..........The request received from President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
to have the Organization, through a civilian mission, establish a
presence in Haiti in order to contribute to the solution of the crisis
in the country.
Resolves:
I
..........1. To reiterate resolution MRE/RES. 1/91 "Support for the
Democratic Government of Haiti", particularly with regard to the
restoration of the exercise of the legitimate authority of President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and to the need to restore constitutional
order, and to maintain the measures adopted in that resolution.
..........2. To strongly condemn the use of violence and military
coercion and the decision to replace illegally the constitutional
President of Haiti Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
..........3. To declare that no government that may result from this
illegal situation will be accepted and, consequently, to declare that
no representative of such government will be accepted.
..........4. To urge the Member states to proceed immediately to
freeze the assets of the Haitian State and to impose a trade
embargo on Haiti, except for humanitarian aid. All humanitarian
assistance must be channeled through international agencies or
non-governmental organizations.
II
..........1. To accede to the request of President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide that a civilian mission be constituted to reestablish and
strengthen constitutional democracy in Haiti (OEA-DEMOC), which
should go to that country in order to facilitate the reestablishment
and strengthening of democratic institutions, the full force and
effect of the Constitution, respect for the human rights of all
Haitians, and to support the administration of justice and adequate
functioning of all the institutions that will make it possible to
achieve these objectives. The Mission must have the guarantees
that are indispensable for the security of its members.
..........2. To entrust to the Secretary General the organization of
OEA-DEMOC and to finance it by means of a special fund. To urge
Member states, Permanent Observers and the international
community to make urgent contributions to the accomplishment of
that mission.
III
..........1. To request the Secretary General to keep the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs informed, through the Permanent Council, on the
effectiveness of the measures adopted so that they may decide on
any further measures that may be necessary.
..........2. To request the Secretary General also to report on the
activities of the Mission OEA-DEMOC.
..........3. To request the Secretary General to keep open channels of
communication with the democratically constituted political
institutions and other sectors in Haiti in order to facilitate
dialogue with a view to ensuring the modalities and guarantees that
will make it possible for President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to
return to office.
..........4. To transmit this resolution to the United Nations and to
request its Member states to adopt the same measures agreed upon
by the American states.
VOTE: Adopted by consensus. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: UN General Assembly Resolution 46/7 on Haiti
Description: Released by the United Nations, New York, New York
Date: Oct 12, 199110/12/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations,
Democratization
[TEXT]
Resolution 46/7 (October 12, 1991)
The General Assembly,
..........Having considered the item entitled "Crisis of Democracy and
Human Rights in Haiti,"
..........Bearing in mind that, on the basis of General Assembly
Resolution 45/2, the United Nations system, at the request of the
lawful authorities of that country and in cooperation with the
Organization of American States, supported the efforts of the
people of Haiti to consolidate their democratic institutions and also
supported the holding of free elections on 16 December 1990,
..........Concerned about the critical events occurring in Haiti since
29 September 1991, which have brought about a sudden and violent
interruption of the democratic process in that country, entailing
human rights abuses and the loss of human lives,
..........Bearing in mind the presentation made by the President of
Haiti, Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to the Security Council on 3
October 1991[1]
..........Given the importance of the international community's
supporting the development of democracy in Haiti through the
strengthening of its institutions and high priority for the serious
social and economic problems that it faces,
..........Aware that, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, the organization promotes and encourages respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "The will of the
people shall be the basis of the authority of government"[2]
..........Welcoming resolutions MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES. 2/91
adopted on 3 and 8 October respectively by the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs of the member countries of the Organization of
American States,
..........1. Strongly condemns both the attempted illegal replacement
of the constitutional president of Haiti and the use of violence,
military coercion and the violation of human rights in that country;
..........2. Affirms as unacceptable any entity resulting from that
illegal situation and demands the immediate restoration of the
legitimate government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
together with the full application of the national constitution and
hence the full observance of human rights in Haiti;
..........3. Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with his
functions, to consider providing support sought by the Secretary-
General of the Organization of American States, in implementing
the mandates arising from resolutions MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES.
2/91 adopted by that organization;
..........4. Appeals to the member states of the United Nations to take
measures in support of the Organization of American States
resolutions referred to in the preceding paragraph;
..........5. Emphasizes that an increase in technical, economic and
financial cooperation when constitutional order is restored in Haiti,
is necessary to support its economic and social development efforts
in order to strengthen its democratic institutions.
..........6. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report as soon
as possible on the implementation of the present resolution;
..........7. Decides to keep open the consideration of this item until a
solution to the crisis is found.
VOTE: Adopted by consensus.
1 (S/PV.3011)
2 General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), Art. 21, Para. 3.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: US-Costa Rican Friendship
Bush, Calderon
Source: President Bush, Costa Rican President Calderon
Description: Departure remarks, the White House, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 10, 199110/10/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: Costa Rica
Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics,
Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
President Bush:
It's a great honor and pleasure to
meet with you today at the White House. And I warmly remember
my visits to Costa Rica as Vice President in 1986 and then as
President in 1989. I will never, ever forget the cheers, the genuine
enthusiasm that the Costa Rican people showed for the United
States of America when our flag was displayed there in that
stadium. I'll never forget it. I know Barbara was touched by the
warm hospitality extended by you and Mrs. Calderon and the Costa
Rican people at your inauguration last May. There can be no doubt,
Mr. President, that the people of Costa Rica and of the United States
have a deep and abiding friendship, one for the other.
..........Costa Rica and the United States stand shoulder to shoulder
for common values and aspirations. Our friendship is rooted in
shared commitments to human rights, economic and social freedom,
democracy, and peaceful foreign relations.
..........Costa Rica stands tall as a model of courage. For most of your
lifetime, Mr. President, Costa Rica's neighbors have suffered from
violence and instability, often under dictatorship. Political
violence, border conflicts, death squads, subversion by Marxist
guerrillas--all of these have scarred Central America and the
isthmus. Through all of this, without an army, Costa Rica stood
fast. Costa Rica is a rock of stability in Central America because
its people believe in permanent things: the sanctity of the person
and of the family, the centrality of human freedom.
..........Almost half a century ago, the Costa Rican people made a
civilized political and social compact. Costa Ricans strictly
limited the power of government to interfere with civil liberties.
Against all threats, domestic and external, Costa Ricans have kept
faith with that promise. Costa Rica practices robust competitive
politics, peacefully transferring power from party to party, from
person to person. With its independent judiciary and limited public
security forces, Costa Rica is a model civil society based on the
rule of law.
..........Your country keeps faith with its international commitments,
even when doing so is costly. Through all of the Central American
turmoil during the 1980s, Costa Rica gave safe haven to refugees
and respected universal human rights.
..........Mr. President, we strongly support your efforts, courageous
efforts, to renew Costa Rica's economic strength. You've put
together a very effective economic team. You've shown personal
courage and impressive skills of leadership in advancing such
reforms as price deregulation, privatization of government
agencies, and tax reform. And I applaud these efforts which will
help assure prosperity for the Costa Rican people.
..........And, yes, we know--I know--that sacrifice by the people of
Costa Rica is involved here. But I also know that the difficult
economic decisions that you have taken will pay off for the
wonderful people of Costa Rica.
..........I encourage you to continue to exercise the leadership
necessary to complete the reform effort. We are recognizing that
leadership today in making available $24 million in Economic
Support Funds. I promise to work unceasingly with you to let the
liberating power of free markets help your country and mine--and
our neighbors as well.
..........Already we're working together to promote the Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative for expanded trade and investment in the
hemisphere. And I thank you, sir, for your very strong support of
this initiative. The framework agreement for trade and investment
between our countries will join with other accords to create new
jobs and improve living conditions throughout the Americas. Our
common efforts will hasten the day when the Americas will become
a flourishing trade area from the Arctic Circle to the Strait of
Magellan.
..........Mr. President, Costa Rica is a haven of peace, and Costa Ricans
have always helped to resolve conflicts in your region. Today, we
see the best of the Costa Rican tradition in your efforts to help
bring about a just and peaceful solution to El Salvador's civil
conflict. Fundamentally, all these efforts have been possible
because Costa Ricans have labored for decades to cultivate the
habits of civil society--habits of freedom and responsibility.
Because of this abiding faith, Costa Rica is assisting in a new birth
of freedom, prosperity, and peace for all of Central America.
..........Thank you again, Mr. President, my friend--thank you for your
visit. And may God bless the people of Costa Rica.
President Calderon:
Mr. President, Mr. Secretary,
we are extremely thrilled today. I must recall that during an entire
lifetime we have had the best relations of friendship, solidarity,
and cooperation with the United States. It is not in vain that the
United States is the oldest and most solid democracy in the
Americas and Costa Rica is the oldest and most solid democracy in
Latin America.
..........On a personal note, I am so very pleased with the relationship
of affection which binds you, Barbara, and your entire family to me
and my entire family. And also on a personal note, just as you and I
are standing here, my father stood here 51 years ago with President
Roosevelt, strengthening the ties of friendship and solidarity
binding the United States and Costa Rica.
..........As one governing a Latin American country, I have come here
to express my thanks for your idea and your program of the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. I have affirmed, and I
repeat, that the history of the economic relations of Latin America
and the United States will be divided into two phases, pre- and
post-Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.
..........We have come here not out of a desire to ask the United States
for economic assistance but rather armed with a desire to come
over the next few years to a free trade agreement with the United
States which will increase the number of jobs, the amount of
investment, the amount of exports, and the amount of wealth and
employment of our country. We hope that by the first quarter of
1992 that we will be eligible for the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative facilities, having by then reduced considerably our
external debt and being ready by that time to take advantage of a
free trade agreement.
..........Thank you once more, President Bush, for your support, your
backing, your warmth, and your affection toward us and toward the
entire Costa Rican people. Thank you once again for the cooperation
of you and of your government in the various international
organizations in which the United States is represented.
..........Thank you once again for your cooperation in terms of
equipment for our fight against drug trafficking, which is a major
concern of both of us. We are bound to be the first line of defense
of American youth against drug trafficking, as well as the first line
of defense of our own youth.
..........Thank you, finally, for continuing this endless, ceaseless
struggle that the United States and Costa Rica have been waging and
continue to wage for freedom and democracy in the world.
..........Thank you once again, President Bush. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: Costa Rican President Calderon Visits Washington, DC
Date: Oct 14, 199110/14/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Central America
Country: Costa Rica
Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics,
Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
Costa Rican President Rafael Angel Calderon made his first official
visit to Washington, DC, on October 10, 1991. He met with
President Bush, Secretary Baker, US congressional leaders, and
other government and business officials. Discussions included
bilateral and regional political and economic issues, and counter-
narcotics.
US-Costa Rica Relations
President Calderon has continued the close and friendly relations
that the United States and Costa Rica have enjoyed for years. Both
countries share an interest in promoting democracy and economic
development throughout Central America. Costa Rica was among the
first Latin American countries to back the US-led re-establishment
of order in Panama in 1989 and was a firm supporter
of US policy in the Persian Gulf after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
1990. Costa Rica also plays a key role in the Organization of
American States to restore democracy in Haiti.
..........The United States recognizes that Costa Rica remains the
most stable country in the region and has responded to its economic
needs through development assistance programs. In FY 1992, the
Bush Administration has requested $24 million in economic aid to
Costa Rica. The Peace Corps, with about 200 volunteers, has helped
Costa Ricans develop skills in agriculture, education, health,
nutrition, and natural resources. The US Agency for International
Development promotes efforts to accelerate economic growth
through policy reforms and open trade.
..........Costa Rica has no army and has maintained a stance of strict
neutrality in Central America, a policy supported by a majority of
Costa Ricans and one that President Calderon has asserted his
country will continue to follow. Costa Rica faces no serious
external or internal threats and looks to the United States under the
1954 Rio Treaty to defend it against external aggression.
..........In 1987, former President Oscar Arias initiated a regional
peace plan that became the basis for an agreement signed by the
presidents of the other Central American countries (excluding
Belize and Panama). His efforts earned Arias the 1987 Nobel Peace
Prize. The Esquipulas Process, as the peace plan became known,
contributed to free and open elections in Nicaragua in February
1990 and the subsequent end of the civil war in that country.
..........Under President Calderon, Costa Rica continues to play a
leading role in the process. In addition, Costa Rica has facilitated
negotiations between the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo
Marti guerrillas and is a key participant in efforts to foster
regional cooperation on political and economic development and on
continuing to reduce the military's role in Central America.
A Tradition of Democracy
Unlike many other Central American countries, Costa Rica has had a
long history of civilian government and democratic institutions.
Costa Rica has continued that tradition in the last decade even as it
was buffeted by political and military turbulence in Nicaragua to
the north and Panama to the south.
..........Several elements have contributed to Costa Rica's democratic
development, including educational opportunity, enlightened
political leadership, comparative prosperity, a significant middle
class, and the absence of a politically intrusive military. It has
developed an orderly, constitutional scheme for succession. Only
twice in the country's history (1974, 1986) has the governing party
been returned to office.
..........In the February 1990 elections, the candidate of the more
conservative Partido Unidad Social Cristiano (PUSC), Rafael Angel
Calderon, narrowly defeated Carlos Manuel Castillo of the more
liberal Partido de Liberacion National (PLN). The PUSC also won
control of the 57-seat Legislative Assembly by a slim margin of 29
seats to the PLN's 25. The PLN and the PUSC dominate the political
scene in Costa Rica. Third parties were able to muster 1.5% of the
vote in the most recent elections and claim three seats in the
assembly.
..........The PLN traditionally has supported higher tax rates and more
government control of the economy, while the PUSC has advocated
free market policies and support for private enterprise. Policy
differences between the two parties have been narrowing in recent
years, however, as both accept the need for economic reform and
budget austerity. External debt has been reduced from $4.01 billion
1989 to $3.07 billion at the end of 1990--one of the higher per
capita levels in Latin America.
..........In addition to debt and fiscal problems, the country faces a
continuing decline in the price of coffee, one of its chief exports, as
well as rising imports. Against this background, President Calderon
has indicated that Costa Rica will pursue further austerity
measures, such as cuts in government spending and tax increases.
He also wants to continue efforts to integrate Costa Rica into the
world economy, reduce the size of the public sector, and encourage
the private sector to expand production and diversify exports, thus
reducing the country's reliance on commodity exports and regional
markets.
Economy
Until recently, agriculture dominated the Costa Rican economy,
typically contributing 25% of gross domestic product (GDP) and
producing coffee and bananas for export and maize, rice, and beans
for domestic consumption. The manufacturing sector expanded
rapidly in the 1970s and, by the end of 1988, constituted about 22%
of Costa Rica's GDP, compared with 19% for agriculture and 18% for
commerce. In the early 1980s, however, the economy suffered
from the worldwide recession and a decline in intra-regional trade.
Rising oil prices and interest rates and falling trade enlarged the
national debt and prompted the government to resort to heavy
external borrowing. Costa Rica was forced to negotiate several
debt reschedulings since 1982 and to restrict debt repayments. The
government requested new loans from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, but money was made available only on
condition that the government pursue reform.
..........Since its economic crisis in the early 1980s, Costa Rica has
adopted a series of economic adjustments, focusing on internal
stability and growth through export development. The measures
have produced results: GDP grew an average of 5% since 1986, non-
traditional exports have increased 20-30% annually, official
employment has shrunk below 6%, and inflation has remained low.
..........In May 1990, Costa Rica completed a debt buy-back program
under the Brady Plan, enabling it to repurchase 60% of its
commercial bank debt, cover interest for bonds issued in exchange
for part of the debt, and cover payments on debt not repurchased.
..........Costa Rica has considerable natural resources, including
timber, minerals, and fisheries. The government has decided to
open the door to foreign oil exploration and is trying to develop
more trade with Japan and Taiwan. It has encouraged the growth of
tourism, which should ease the scarcity of foreign exchange.
..........The United States is Costa Rica's largest trading partner,
accounting for more than 40% of its exports and about 35% of its
imports. Other markets for Costa Rican exports include the Central
American Common Market (CACM) and Germany, while CACM and
Japan also supply much of its imports. Major exports include
bananas, coffee, beef, sugar and cocoa. Manufactured goods,
machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, fuel, foodstuffs,
and fertilizer make up the majority of imports.
..........Costa Rica actively supports President Bush's Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative (EAI), which was announced in June 1990.
The two countries signed a bilateral trade and investment
framework agreement in November 1990 under the EAI. This should
help remove restrictions on Costa Rica's export of sugar, textiles,
shoes, flowers, and coffee to the United States. Costa Rica,
meanwhile, has pledged to increase the quality of its goods, remove
barriers to foreign investment, and consult with the United States
on the issue of intellectual property rights. Also in 1990, Costa
Rica became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).
..........In January 1991, Costa Rica joined its Central American
neighbors in committing to discuss the creation of a free trade zone
with Mexico by 1996. Costa Rica is holding talks with Canada and
Venezuela on similar arrangements. (###)
Costa Rica at a Glance
Known as the "Switzerland of Central America," Costa Rica is the
second smallest Central American country. Costa Rica is bordered
by Nicaragua on the north and Panama on the south. A rugged,
central mountain ridge runs the length of the country separating the
coastal plains. The climate is tropical along the coasts
and cooler in the highlands.
..........Unlike most of their Central American neighbors, Costa Ricans
are primarily of European rather than mestizo descent, with Spain
the principal country of origin. The indigenous Indian population is
only about 1%, while blacks constitute about 3% of the population.
Literacy is more than 93% nationwide, with life expectancy rates
comparable to North American and West European levels.
..........Costa Rica was first settled by Europeans in 1522. Nearly
three centuries later, Costa Rica in 1821 joined other Central
American provinces in declaring independence from Spain and
declared itself a sovereign country in 1838. Costa Rica's
democratic tradition began with the 1889 elections, considered the
first free and honest ones in the country's history. In 1948, Jose
Figueres led a bloody revolution in the wake of a disputed
presidential election. The victorious junta drafted a constitution
that abolished the army and guaranteed free elections with
universal suffrage. Since then, 11 presidential elections have been
held, with the next one scheduled in 1994. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: Country Profile: Costa Rica
Date: Oct 14, 199110/14/91
Category: Country Data
Region: Central America
Country: Costa Rica
Subject: History
[TEXT]
Official Name: Republic of Costa Rica
Geography
Area: 51,032 sq. km. (19,652 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than West
Virginia.
Cities: Capital--San Jose (metropolitan pop. 890,434). Other
cities--Alajuela (34,556), Limon (33,925), Golfito (29,043).
Terrain: A rugged, central massif runs the length of the country
separating coastal plains.
Climate: Tropical and subtropical.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Costa Rican(s).
Population (1989): 2.7 million.
Annual growth rate (1989): 2.4%.
Density: 55/sq. km. (144/sq. mi.).
Ethnic groups: White (including a few mestizos) 96%; black 3%;
indigenous 1%.
Religion: Roman Catholic 95%.
Language: Spanish, with a Jamaican dialect of English spoken
around Puerto Limon.
Education: Years compulsory--6. Attendance--nearly 100%.
Literacy--93%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--15/1,000. Life expectancy--men 67
yrs.; women 72 yrs.
Work force (1 million, 1989): Agriculture--32%. Industry and
commerce--25%. Services and government--38%. Banking and
finance--5%.
Government
Type: Democratic republic.
Independence: September 15, 1821.
Constitution: November 9, 1949.
Branches: Executive--President (head of government and chief of
state) elected for a single 4-year term, two vice presidents,
cabinet (20 ministers). Legislative--57-deputy unicameral
Legislative Assembly elected at 4-year intervals. Judicial--
Supreme Court of Justice (17 magistrates elected by Legislative
Assembly at 8-year intervals).
Subdivisions: Seven provinces divided into 80 cantons that are
subdivided into districts.
Political parties: Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC), National
Liberation Party (PLN), United Peoples Party (PU), Costa Rican
Socialist Party (PSC).
Suffrage: Obligatory over age 18.
Central government budget (1990): $915 million.
Defense: Costa Rica has no army.
Holiday: Independence Day, September 15.
Flag: Two blue horizontal stripes top and bottom, two white inner
stripes, and a wide, red central band with the national coat of arms.
Economy
GDP (1990): $5.6 billion.
Real growth rate (1990): 3.6%.
Per capita income (1990): $1,900.
Inflation (1990 consumer price index change): 27%.
Natural resource: Hydroelectric power.
Agriculture (18% of GDP): Products--bananas, coffee, beef,
sugarcane, grain.
Industry (23% of GDP): Types--food processing, textiles and
clothing, construction materials, fertilizer.
Trade (1990): Exports--$1.4 million: bananas, coffee, beef, sugar,
cocoa. Major markets--US 43%, Central America 13%, Germany 9%.
Imports--$2 million: manufactured goods, machinery,
transportation equipment, chemicals, fuel, foodstuffs, fertilizer.
Major suppliers--US 40%, Central America 8%, Japan 15%.
Fiscal year: Calendar year.
Debt service charges as % of exports: 41% in 1990.
Principal Government Officials
President--Rafael Angel CALDERON Fournier
First Vice President--German SERRANO Pinto
Minister of Foreign Relations--Bernd NIEHAUS Quesada
Ambassador to the United States--Gonzalo J. FACIO Segrada
Ambassador to the United Nations--Cristian TATTENBACH Yglesias
Ambassador to the Organization of American States--Carlos
PEREIRA Garro (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: Report to Congress on the Status of Apartheid
Description: Text of State Department report to Congress prepared by
the Bureau of African Affairs, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91
Category: Reports
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: South Africa
Subject: Human Rights
[TEXT]
Herewith is transmitted to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate the report required by section 501 of the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA or the Act) for
the period from October 3, 1990, to October 2, 1991.
Background
Executive Order 12571 directed all affected executive departments
and agencies to take all steps necessary, consistent with the
Constitution, to implement the requirements of the Act. They have
implemented the Act fully and faithfully.
..........Section 101 of the Act states that it and other actions of the
United States are intended to encourage the Government of South
Africa to take the following steps:
..........Bring about reforms leading to the establishment of a
nonracial democracy in South Africa.
..........Repeal the present state of emergency and respect the
principle of equal justice under law for citizens of all races.
..........Release Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, and Walter Sisulu, black
trade union leaders, and all political prisoners.
..........Permit the free exercise by South Africans of all races the
right to form political parties, express political opinions and
otherwise participate in the political process.
..........Establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws.
..........Negotiate with representatives of all racial groups in South
Africa the future political system in South Africa.
..........End military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighboring
states.
..........This report assesses the extent to which the South African
Government has taken steps toward ending the system of apartheid,
moving toward a nonracial democracy, and reaching a negotiated
settlement of the South African conflict.
The Status of Apartheid: October 1990 to October
1991
.
Actions taken by the South African Government in ending the system
of apartheid and moving toward a nonracial democracy. South
Africa's reform process, set into motion with the unbanning of the
ANC [African National Congress] and the release of Nelson Mandela
in early 1990, moved rapidly ahead during the past twelve months.
During this period, the South African Government, the ANC, and
other organizations made significant progress in removing
obstacles to negotiations. The government took major steps to
eliminate the legal underpinnings of the apartheid system.
Preparations for multiparty talks on a new constitution are
underway. The governing National Party, headed by President F.W. de
Klerk, has committed itself irreversibly to the dismantling of
apartheid and the establishment of nonracial multiparty democracy.
..........The remaining legislative pillars of apartheid were repealed
by Parliament in 1991. These included the Group Areas Act, which
mandated residential segregation; the Land Acts, which prohibited
black land ownership outside rural "homelands"; and the Population
Registration Act, which assigned a racial classification to each
South African at birth. The repeal of the Separate Amenities Act,
which permitted segregation of municipal facilities, took effect in
October 1990.
..........Under the terms of an agreement with the ANC, and by
unilateral action, the South African Government has released well
over 1,000 prisoners, including all prisoners meeting the CAAA [IO]
criteria of "persons persecuted for their political beliefs or
detained unduly without trial." In October 1990, the state of
emergency, which had been repealed earlier that year except in the
province of Natal, was lifted there as well. An amendment to the
Internal Security Act prohibited long-term detentions.
..........Under the current constitution, South Africa's racial groups
are separately represented in Parliament under the "own affairs"
system. The Parliament contains separate houses for white,
"colored," and Indian members. Blacks are not represented, and
black "own affairs" are handled by white cabinet ministers.
However, with the repeal of apartheid legislation, the "own affairs"
system controls an increasingly narrow range of activities. The
system was further eroded during the 1991 parliamentary session,
when the ruling National Party opened up its ranks to members of
all races and a large number of "colored" parliamentarians joined
the National Party caucus. Parliamentary politics as a whole has
become less central as the focus of political activity has shifted
the negotiating process. The government does not support the
continuation of the "own affairs" concept under a future
constitution. Currently, the principal remaining element of "own
affairs" is the education system, which with a few exceptions
remains segregated.
Progress made in reaching a negotiated settlement to the conflict
in South Africa. The South African Government has taken steps to
foster a climate conducive to negotiations, including repeal of
apartheid legislation and release of over a thousand prisoners.
However, the ANC disputes the government's contention that the
prisoner release process has been completed. Primarily at issue are
prisoners who committed for political ends acts of violence which
resulted in deaths or injuries. At the end of September 1991,
discussions on this issue continued.
..........During 1991, the repatriation of exiles--one of the ANC's
preconditions for negotiations--began. In March, the government
agreed in principle to allow the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) to assist in exile repatriation, but a final agreement was
not reached until August. A non-governmental committee on
refugees repatriated a few planeloads of returning exiles early in
the year but later halted large-scale repatriations pending the
signing of the UNHCR agreement.
..........Violence remained the major obstacle to constitutional talks.
During 1991, clashes between the ANC and Inkatha, primarily in the
Johannesburg area and in Natal, continued. Upsurges of violence
alternated with relatively peaceful periods. The ANC and other
organizations continued to accuse the security forces of fueling the
violence. Nelson Mandela and Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi
met in February 1991, and again on March 30, in an attempt to
reduce tensions between the two organizations. In early September,
Buthelezi again called for the two leaders to meet to recommit
themselves to ending the violence.
..........In April, primarily in response to escalating violence, the ANC
threatened in an open letter to President de Klerk to break off
preparations for constitutional talks if the government did not take
certain actions, including firing security ministers Adriaan Vlok
and Magnus Malan, punishing members of the security forces
implicated in violence, outlawing the public carrying of weapons,
and releasing remaining political prisoners. President de Klerk
subsequently placed restrictions on the carrying of weapons and
pledged to take action on other issues raised in the letter. Although
he refused to dismiss the cabinet ministers, both were later
demoted in the wake of the "Inkathagate" scandal (see below). The
ANC concluded that these actions did not address its concerns
sufficiently, and announced its withdrawal from talks on
constitutional issues. However, this had little practical effect,
since the two sides were primarily engaged in talks on removing
obstacles to negotiations, which were not affected by the ANC's
action.
..........In July, news reports revealed that the government had
secretly funded two Inkatha political rallies, in addition to covertly
channeling money to an Inkatha-affiliated union and to participants
in the Namibian elections. In the wake of the "Inkathagate"
revelations, President de Klerk pledged to place strict limits on
secret government spending and reassigned to other duties Law and
Order Minister Vlok and Defense Minister Malan. The government
also agreed to place the issue of transitional government
arrangements at the top of the agenda at the planned all-party
conference on constitutional principles. President de Klerk has
suggested that parties taking part in the negotiations could have a
role in the government, perhaps including representation in the
cabinet. Some parties, including the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)
and Inkatha, have indicated they would reject "co-optation" into the
present government.
..........All major parties except the Conservative Party and other
right-wing organizations attended a church-sponsored peace
conference held in June. At the conference, a standing committee
was established to explore peace initiatives. On August 14, the
committee produced a draft peace agreement. The draft called for
codes of conduct for political parties and for the security forces. It
also provided for national, regional, and local bodies to oversee the
peace accord process and to begin addressing the socio-economic
needs of the areas affected by violence.
..........A week before the scheduled September 14 signing of the
agreement (which was widely seen as a prerequisite for
constitutional talks), violence erupted in the Johannesburg
townships after unknown attackers opened fire on a group of
Inkatha supporters, killing 23. The timing of the attack led many to
speculate that it was orchestrated by elements attempting to
sabotage the peace process. However, leaders of the major parties
to the agreement reiterated their commitment to peace, and the
signing took place as scheduled. The PAC and the Azanian People's
Organization (AZAPO), which had participated in discussions on the
agreement, refused to sign it but agreed to adhere to most of its
provisions.
..........Concurrently with these developments, South Africa's
political organizations continued to prepare internally for
negotiations. In April, the ANC issued a constitutional proposal
which called for multiparty democracy, a bicameral parliament, and
a justiciable bill of rights. In July, at its first party conference
inside South Africa in 30 years, the ANC gave newly elected
President Nelson Mandela a renewed mandate to move ahead with
constitutional negotiations.
..........The National Party constitutional proposal unveiled in
September stressed consensus government, with multiparty
collective leadership, strong safeguards for minorities, and a
federal system vesting considerable powers in regional and local
bodies. While the ANC rejected the proposal as an attempt to
maintain a white veto over the country's political life, the two
parties' proposals actually share many common features (such as a
justiciable bill of rights), albeit in very different forms. The two
proposals are likely to serve as springboards for discussion during
the planned all-party conference. Many other organizations,
including Inkatha and the Democratic Party, have pledged to
participate in constitutional talks. Others on both the left and the
right, however, continue to reject participation. The PAC and
AZAPO both retain their long-standing opposition to constitutional
talks, maintaining that the constitution must be drawn up by a
popularly elected constituent assembly following the resignation of
the present government. However, the two organizations and the
ANC plan to discuss a united approach at a Patriotic Front
Conference scheduled for late October. On the right, the
Conservative Party continues to support the "grand apartheid" vision
of a partitioned South Africa and refuses to participate in talks,
equating negotiations with white surrender. Some party members,
however, favor participation in negotiations with the aim of
obtaining a separate white homeland. Most of the smaller parties on
the right, including the far-right Afrikaner Weerstand-sbeweging
(AWB) led by Eugene Terreblanche, also oppose talks.
..........The planned all-parties conference on constitutional
principles, slated to take place sometime after the Patriotic Front
Conference, is expected to be the next major step in negotiations.
Although the ANC continues to call for the election of a constituent
assembly to negotiate a constitution, there is speculation that the
all-parties conference could evolve into a body which would draft a
constitution and present it for ratification in a referendum. The
unofficial deadline for the completion of negotiations is 1994,
when the term of the current Parliament expires.
Section 101(b) Progress or Lack Thereof
Repeal the present state of emergency and respect the principle of
equal justice under law for citizens of all races. The state of
emergency was repealed in 1990. The repeal of apartheid
legislation, amendments to security legislation, and an increasingly
liberal (though still virtually all-white) judiciary have improved
the legal status of non-white South Africans. The South African
Government has endorsed a justiciable bill of rights under a future
South African constitution.
Release Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki and Walter Sisulu, black trade
union leaders, and all political prisoners. Mandela, Mbeki, and
Sisulu have been released. No trade union leaders remain
imprisoned for political or union activities. More than 1,000
persons were released under an agreement between the South
African Government and the ANC and by unilateral government
action. In July 1991, the President concluded that all persons
persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly without
trial had been released.
Permit the free exercise by South Africans of all races of the right
to form political parties, express political opinions, and otherwise
participate in the political process. President de Klerk unbanned all
political parties on February 2, 1990. Since then, South Africans of
all races have freely exercised the right to form political parties,
express political opinions, and participate in the political process,
which is currently focused on negotiating a new constitution for a
nonracial South Africa.
Establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws. All
major remaining apartheid laws were repealed in 1991. These
included the Group Areas Act, the Land Acts, and the Population
Registration Act (see above). The June 1990 repeal of the Separate
Amenities Act, which allowed the segregation of municipal
facilities, went into effect in October 1990. Many less well-known
apartheid laws were also repealed.
Negotiate with representatives of all racial groups in South Africa
the future political system in South Africa. The South African
Government has irrevocably committed itself to negotiating a new
nonracial political system. Since May 1990, it has been holding
talks with the ANC aimed at removing obstacles to constitutional
talks. A planned all-parties conference (see above) is widely seen
as a springboard to full constitutional negotiations. The ANC and
the National Party have both released draft constitutional proposals
in preparation for these talks.
End military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighboring
states. There were no reports of cross-border raids or paramilitary
activities by South Africa in the past year. South Africa's relations
with neighboring countries improved dramatically during the year,
although in August the Mozambican Government repeated its charge
that South Africa continues to support RENAMO insurgents.
President de Klerk met with several of his African counterparts
during this period, and many African nations resumed or increased
trade links with South Africa. (###)
Summary
Pursuant to Section 501 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
of 1986 (the Act), herewith is transmitted to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the extent to which
significant progress has been made toward ending the system of
apartheid.
..........Sanctions specified in Section 311(a) of the Act terminated
when the President certified that the South African Government had
met all five conditions specified in that section.
..........The termination of these sanctions followed significant
progress toward the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment
of non-racial democracy. The last legislative "pillars of apartheid,"
the Group-Areas Act, the Land Acts, and the Population Registration
Act, were repealed in 1991. Over 1,000 prisoners were released,
including all persons meeting the criteria in the Act of "persons
persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly without
trial." The ANC [African National Congress], South African
Government and other organizations are currently preparing for
talks on a new, non-racial constitution.
..........Violence was the principal obstacle to a constitutional
settlement during the past year. Clashes between the ANC and
Inkatha, principally in the Johannesburg area and in Natal,
continued, although the level of violence tapered off after peaking
in August-September 1990. The ANC continued to criticize the
government's handling of the situation and accused the security
forces of complicity in the violence. The government, the ANC,
Inkatha, and 26 other organizations signed a peace accord on
September 14 establishing codes of conduct for political
organizations and the security forces.
..........The South African Government has accepted the necessity of
negotiating a new non-racial constitution. In spite of the inevitable
ups and downs of the negotiating process, South Africa is moving
irreversibly away from apartheid. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: Support for the Convention on Control Of International
Hazardous Waste Movement
Smith
Source: Richard J. Smith, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Oceans, International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Transportation,
Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 10, 199110/10/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Environment
[TEXT]
I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of HR 2398, which
will enable the United States to ratify the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal. The Administration regards ratification of the convention
as a significant component in US leadership in international
environmental matters. It will enhance the ability of the
international community to monitor waste shipments, to ensure
their proper handling, and, when necessary, to make those who ship
wastes accountable.
..........I want to stress the importance of enacting the bill
expeditiously. At risk if HR 2398 is not enacted, Mr. Chairman, is
the US Government's ability to provide for environmentally
responsible recycling and resource recovery, which is a multi-
billion-dollar international industry. To continue this trade, and to
obtain the associated environmental benefits, we must be a party to
the Basel Convention. We cannot become a party to the Basel
Convention without legislation providing the authorities needed to
comply with it.
..........We expect the convention to enter into force by the middle of
next year, 90 days after the 20th instrument of ratification is
deposited. Thirteen states have now ratified. To become a party to
the Basel Convention, the United States must complete three steps:
signing the convention, obtaining the Senate's advice and consent to
ratification, and deposit by the President of our instrument of
ratification. The United States signed the convention in March
1990. In May 1991, the President requested the Senate's advice and
consent, which we expect to obtain this fall.
..........Even with the Senate's consent to ratification, however, we
will not be in a position to deposit our instrument of ratification
until the necessary domestic legal authorities are in place. Once
the United States deposits its instrument of ratification and the
convention enters into force for this country, we will be legally
bound to comply with the terms of the convention in good faith and,
under customary international law, may not invoke domestic law or
the absence of domestic law to justify failure to perform our treaty
obligations. As [Administrator of the US Environmental Protection
Agency--EPA] Mr. Reilly has explained, our current statutory
authorities are fundamentally inadequate: Not all wastes covered
by the Basel Convention fall within our current authority; once an
importing state has consented to a shipment, we lack authority to
stop it, even if we have reason to believe that the wastes will not
be managed in an environmentally sound manner; and we need
authority under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to take
charge of wastes handled improperly abroad.
..........Failure to ratify expeditiously would adversely affect the
environment, the economy, and our foreign policy. It would send a
signal that the United States does not support monitoring and
regulating international waste movements. This message would be
ironic and inappropriate, because we have been a world leader in
this area, in particular by enacting the first national law requiring
that importing states consent to hazardous wastes shipments.
Moreover, if we were not a party to the convention, we could not
participate on an equal footing in the conference of the parties and,
therefore, could not be assured of protecting our interests. The
first conference, which will decide issues such as the definition of
environmentally sound management, international liability, and
funding a secretariat, has been tentatively scheduled for May 1992,
on the assumption that the convention will have come into force by
then.
..........Substantial trade and environmental consequences would flow
from a failure to ratify the Basel Convention quickly. The
convention expressly forbids parties from trading with non-parties
in wastes covered by the convention, unless they have an
international agreement provided for in Article 11. For example,
the United States has agreements with Canada and Mexico;
movements under these agreements would not be affected. Our
trade in secondary materials, which include some materials
classified as wastes in domestic law and some that are not,
amounts to roughly $7 billion annually. We do not regard all these
secondary materials as wastes within the Basel Convention. Other
parties may determine that they do fall within the convention,
however, which would result in a cutoff of trade in those materials.
If we become a party to the convention, such disagreements in
classification would not lead to a prohibition on trade. The 13
countries that have ratified account for about $923 million annually
in trade in potentially governed wastes. The European Economic
Community (EEC), with which we trade roughly $1.8 billion annually
in recyclable materials, has indicated that it intends to ratify in
the spring of 1992. Canada, our second largest single trading
partner in recyclables at about $1 billion annually, is also expected
to ratify the convention in 1992.
..........The disruption of international trade for resource recovery
will undermine our domestic recycling initiatives. The loss of
international markets would create domestic surpluses; these
would combine with resulting low prices to reduce or eliminate
markets and profits needed for the survival of domestic programs
recycling materials such as paper and scrap metal. The loss of our
$75.3 million annual trade in recyclable paper with the EEC, for
example, would almost certainly lead to increased landfilling of
paper at home. Inhibiting recycling will, in the end, expand demand
for virgin materials, with associated environmental costs.
..........It is possible that some recycling of hazardous wastes will
shift to countries not party to the Basel Convention. These states
may not have the environmental protections provided by our current
trading partners. And, without the authorities provided by HR 2398,
the US Government will lack the statutory authorities needed to
ensure that such shipments are handled in an environmentally sound
manner.
..........The Basel Convention provides one exception to its ban on
trade between parties and non-parties. Such trade may continue
pursuant to international agreements in force before the convention
enters into force, as long as the agreement is "compatible" with the
environmentally sound management of wastes. Our agreement with
Canada meets this standard, as does our agreement with Mexico,
which has already ratified the convention. International waste
movements between parties and non-parties may also continue
under agreements that enter into force after the convention itself
if those agreements contain provisions that are "not less stringent"
than those in the convention.
..........The United States is working to conclude an agreement
governing movements of wastes for recovery operations within the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The
OECD agreement, which is now in draft form, would control
movements of wastes for recycling in a three-tier system which
would gear the level of controls to the characteristics of the
materials involved and the international community's experience
with the materials.
..........I would like to emphasize that no regional or bilateral
agreement, however, can substitute fully for enactment of HR 2398.
This is because we lack the statutory authority to regulate
transboundary movements of wastes subject to the Basel
Convention. The unregulated trade in such materials would be
susceptible to the convention's trade prohibition, even if regional
agreements were concluded. Indeed, we may not be able to become a
party to the proposed OECD agreement, because it could require
controls on wastes we lack authority to regulate unless HR 2398 is
enacted. Our agreements with Canada and Mexico govern only
movements regulated domestically as hazardous waste.
..........Moreover, it is not realistic to expect that we can conclude
agreements with every trading partner before the Basel
Convention's prohibition on trade becomes effective. The proposed
OECD agreement, for example, may not be concluded by then.
..........The subcommittee has heard testimony on proposals either to
ban international waste movements or to permit them only when the
wastes will be handled in a manner "no less strict than" in the
United States. Neither is acceptable. A ban would incur the
substantial economic, foreign policy, and environmental costs I
have just described. The "no less strict than" standard would be
unworkably vague. No country's waste management practices are
identical to ours. The "no less strict than" standard would require
complex and arguable judgments about which US practices may be
absent without jeopardizing the "strictness" of waste management.
EPA as the administering agency could well be forced to interpret
this standard as banning all waste shipments on the ground that any
aspect of US waste management practices could, in a hypothetical
situation, be a necessary part of waste management "no less strict
than" in the United States. Of course, every decision would be
subject to lawsuits, some seeking to stop movements, some to
prohibit the Administrator from stopping movements.
Consequently, the "no less strict than standard" could leave the US
Government's waste management policies to the vagaries of
litigation in different contexts throughout the country.
..........The proposals present two foreign policy difficulties. Both
would impede US leadership in international recycling efforts, an
important aspect of our environmental policy. Moreover, HR
2358--which incorporates the "no less strict than" standard--
would not enable us to proceed immediately to ratify the Basel
Convention because it: does not address waste imports as is
required by the convention; does not prohibit waste exports to
Antarctica, as the convention requires; and defers to regulations
decisions concerning the consent of transit countries and the
content of the documents that will accompany all wastes. The
convention has strict requirements relating to both. Until the
regulations were promulgated, and they could well be delayed in
litigation, we would not be certain that we could comply with the
convention fully.
..........Mr. Chairman, we will be in a position to ratify the Basel
Convention only when legislation implementing the convention
completely is enacted. Unless we ratify as soon as possible after
the convention enters into force next year, a major export market in
recyclable materials will be at risk. Because those markets would
be inaccessible to us, there would be increased environmental
degradation at home and abroad as wastes are disposed of rather
than reused, as virgin materials are obtained at economic and
environmental expense, and as wastes are shifted to nations outside
the environmental protections of the Basel Convention. The United
States has been a leader in establishing policies to regulate wastes
properly and responsibly. A failure to enact legislation enabling us
to ratify the Basel Convention would undercut that leadership.
..........The Administration's proposal, embodied in HR 2398, is the
best instrument to provide the authorities we need to remain a
world leader in recycling and waste control. I urge you and the rest
of the subcommittee to give it your serious consideration in the
light of the needs described in Mr. Reilly's and my testimony and to
support it as the only effective and workable of the various
proposals that have been drafted to address this matter.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: US Signs Environmental Protocol to Antarctic Treaty
Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 4, 199110/4/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Polar Regions
Country: Antarctica
Subject: Environment, Science/Technology
[TEXT]
The United States today signed the Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty at a meeting of the Antarctic
Treaty parties in Madrid, Spain. The protocol was signed today by
most Antarctic Treaty parties and will remain open for signature
until October 1992. R. Tucker Scully, Department of State Director
for Oceans and Polar Affairs, signed on behalf of the US delegation.
..........The new protocol builds upon the Antarctic Treaty to provide
improved environmental protection measures that can be
strengthened in the future as necessary. The protocol sets forth
basic principles on the protection of the Antarctic environment,
establishes an advisory body, and provides for a system of annexes
to incorporate detailed mandatory rules for environmental
protection. The annexes establish legally binding measures on the
conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora, waste disposal, marine
pollution, and environmental impact assessment procedures which
will be subject to compulsory and binding dispute settlement.
Future annexes could be added following entry into force of the
protocol.
..........The protocol also prohibits any activities other than
scientific research that relate to Antarctic mineral resources. The
prohibition can be reviewed at any time after 50 years following
entry into force of the protocol. This will provide effective
protection for the Antarctic environment without foreclosing the
options of future generations. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: Moscow Human Dimension Meeting
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Oct 4, 199110/4/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, Europe, E/C Europe, North America
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Human Rights, CSCE
[TEXT]
The Moscow meeting of the CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Conference on the Human Dimension, which
began September 10, concluded Friday afternoon, October 4. We are
extremely pleased with the results of the meeting and the
atmosphere of cooperation in which it took place.
..........The Moscow meeting is a further step in enriching the CSCE
process, a goal Secretary Baker set in his address to the Aspen
Institute in Berlin this June. The Secretary's call to add fact-
finding missions as a fifth step in the Human Dimension Mechanism
has been fulfilled by the establishment of a "good offices"
procedure for facilitating resolution of problems relating to human
rights.
..........Ambassador Max Kampelman, the US Head of Delegation, his
staff, and the delegations of the other participating states worked
hard to produce a concluding document which reflects CSCE states'
serious commitment to and respect for human rights.
..........In addition to the "good offices" procedure, the concluding
document strengthens the CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism by
broadening the CSCE participating states' commitments over a wide
range of human, civil, and political rights, including women's rights,
freedom of expression, and promotion of the role of non-governmental
organizations.
..........The concluding document also for the first time expressly
acknowledges that specific, enumerated CSCE commitments in the
broad area of human rights and fundamental freedoms are issues of
legitimate international concern and do not belong exclusively to
the internal affairs of any one state.
..........The meeting, which saw the admission of the Baltic states to
the CSCE, also supported expanding the Office of Free Elections to
enable it to assist in strengthening democratic institutions in
participating states. This proposal, originally made by Secretary
Baker in Berlin, will be discussed in upcoming CSCE meetings,
including the November 4-15 Seminar of Experts on Democratic
Institutions to be held in Oslo.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991
Title: Current Treaty Actions
Date: Oct 14, 199110/14/91
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Country: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Costa Rica,
Czechoslovakia (former), Denmark, Egypt,
El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, Jamaica,
South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Mozambique,
Panama, Nigeria, Poland, Philippines, Singapore,
Spain, Thailand, USSR (former),
Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: International Law, Arms Control, Human Rights,
Narcotics, Terrorism, United Nations
[TEXT]
Multilateral
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and
stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on
their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10,
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.
Ratification Deposited: Malaysia, Sept. 26, 1991.1
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights. Done at New
York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.2
International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. Done
at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.2
Accession Deposited: Grenada, Sept. 6, 1991.
Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21,
1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the US July 15, 1980.
TIAS 9725.
Accession Deposited: Micronesia, Apr. 29, 1991.
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at
Vienna Dec. 20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990.
Ratification Deposited: Czechoslovakia, June 4, 1991; Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Rep., Aug. 28, 1991.
Accession Deposited: Syria, Sept. 3, 1991.
Terrorism
International convention against the taking of hostages. Done at
New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the US
Jan. 6, 1985. TIAS 11081. Accession Deposited: Argentina, Sept.
18, 1991.
Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. Adopted at New York Dec. 10, 1984.
Entered into force June 26, 1987.2 Ratification Deposited:
Yugoslavia, Sept. 10, 1991.
United Nations Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO), with annexes. Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.
Entered into force June 21, 1985. Ratification Deposited: Chad,
Aug. 22, 1991.
Bilateral
Argentina
Agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of space. Signed at
Buenos Aires Aug. 6, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1991.
Memorandum of understanding concerning the SAC-B [satellite]
Astrophysics Engineering Demonstration Mission. Signed at Buenos
Aires Aug. 6, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1991.
Agreement establishing a Peace Corps program in Argentina.
Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires July 18 and Aug. 30,
1991. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1991.
Belgium
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs services.
Signed at Brussels June 26, 1991. Enters into force on the first day
of the third month following notification by the parties that all
national legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Bolivia
Agreement regarding the discharge of certain debts owed to the
United States, with annex. Signed at Washington Aug. 22, 1991.
Entered into force Aug. 22, 1991.
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts owed to the
United States Government and its agencies, with appendices. Signed
at Washington Aug. 22, 1991. Enters into force upon written
notification by the US to Bolivia that all necessary domestic legal
requirements have been fulfilled.
Costa Rica
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Mexico Aug. 16, 1991.
Entered into force: Oct. 1, 1991.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs services.
Signed at Prague May 7, 1991. Entered into force provisionally May
7, 1991; definitively on the date of notification by the parties that
all necessary national legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with
annex and agreed minute. Signed at Vienna June 13, 1991. Enters
into force on the date the parties inform each other of completion
of all applicable requirements. House Doc. 102-113.
Denmark
Agreement on mutual assistance in customs matters. Signed at
Nyborg Castle (Denmark) June 20, 1991. Enters into force 90 days
after an exchange of notes indicating acceptance of terms and that
all necessary national legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Egypt
Agreement regarding the reorganization of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington July 18, 1991.
Entered into force: Sept. 3, 1991.
Grant agreement for commodity imports. Signed at CairoSept. 9,
1991. Entered into force Sept. 9, 1991.
Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 27, 1989, as amended,
for power sector support. Signed at Cairo Sept. 9, 1991. Entered
into force Sept. 9, 1991.
El Salvador
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Mexico Aug. 16, 1991.
Entered into force Oct. 1, 1991.
Estonia
Memorandum of understanding concerning diplomatic relations.
Signed at Tallinn Sept. 4, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 4, 1991.
Finland
Protocol to the treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights
of Feb. 13, 1934, as modified (TS 868; TIAS 2861). Signed at
Washington July 1, 1991. Enters into force upon the exchange of
instruments of ratification.
Agreement on social security, with administrative arrangement.
Signed at Helsinki June 3, 1991. Enters into force on the first day
of the third month following written notification by the parties of
compliance with all statutory and constitutional requirements.
Germany
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Berlin Sept. 14, 1990.
Entered into force: Aug. 9, 1991.
Agreement relating to and bringing into force the investment
incentive agreement of Sept. 14, 1990. Exchange of notes at
Washington Aug. 9, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 9, 1991.
Greece
Agreement regarding mutual administrative assistance between
customs administrations. Signed at Athens July 31, 1991. Enters
into force on the 90th day following notification by the parties that
they have accepted its terms and that all national legal
requirements have been fulfilled.
Guinea-Bissau
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.
Signed at Bissau and Washington July 17 and Aug. 28, 1991. Entered
into force Sept. 30, 1991.
Hungary
Agreement regarding cooperation and mutual assistance between
customs services. Signed at Budapest May 8, 1991. Enters into
force on the 90th day following notification by the parties that they
have accepted its terms and that all national legal requirements
have been fulfilled.
Agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with
annex and agreed minute. Signed at Vienna June 10, 1991. Enters
into force on the date the parties inform each other of completion
of all applicable requirements. House Doc. 102-114.
Iceland
Agreement amending and extending the memorandum of
understanding of Jan. 28 and Apr. 9, 1982, for scientific and
technical cooperation in earth sciences. Signed at Reston and
Reykjavik Mar. 5 and Aug. 9, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 9, 1991;
effective Apr. 9, 1990.
Jamaica
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts owed to the
United States Government and its agencies, with appendices. Signed
at Washington Aug. 23, 1991. Enters into force upon written
notification by the United States to Jamaica that all necessary
domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Korea, South
Memorandum of agreement for a cooperative research and
development program for new underground ammunition storage
technologies, with annex. Signed at Alexandria and Seoul July 3 and
Aug. 12, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 12, 1991.
Latvia
Memorandum of understanding concerning diplomatic relations.
Signed at Riga Sept. 5, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1991.
Lithuania
Memorandum of understanding concerning diplomatic relations.
Signed at Vilnius Sept. 6, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1991.
Mexico
Agreement regarding an earth station
[telecommunications]coordination procedure, with annex. Signed at
Chestertown (Maryland) July 2, 1991. Enters into force on the date
of notification by the parties of completion of their constitutional
requirements.
Mozambique
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain
debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Maputo Aug.
27, 1991. Entered into forceSept. 30, 1991.
Nigeria
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or
refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by
the United States Government and its agencies with annexes.
Signed at Lagos Aug. 2, 1991. Entered into force: Sept. 18, 1991.
Agreement establishing a Peace Corps program in Nigeria. Effected
by exchange of notes at Lagos Aug. 19 and 22, 1991. Entered into
force Aug. 22, 1991.
Panama
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain
debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Panama Aug.
21, 1991. Enters into force upon receipt by Panama of written
notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements
have been fulfilled.
Philippines
Grant agreement for the private enterprise policy support program,
with annexes and related letter. Signed at Manila Aug. 30, 1991.
Entered into force Aug. 30, 1991.
Agreement concerning mapping, charting and geodesy cooperation,
with annexes. Signed at Makati and Fairfax June 27 and Sept. 9,
1991. Entered into force Sept. 9, 1991.
Treaty of friendship, cooperation and security. Signed at Manila
Aug. 27, 1991. Enters into force on the date on which instruments
of ratification or acceptance have been exchanged at Manila.
Supplemental agreement No. 1 to the Treaty of friendship,
cooperation and security: Agreement on cultural and education
cooperation. Signed at Manila Aug. 27, 1991. Enters into force on
the date on which instruments of ratification or acceptance have
been exchanged in Manila.
Supplementary agreement
No. 2 to the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and security:
Agreement on installations and military operating procedures, with
annexes and minute. Signed at Manila Aug. 27, 1991. Enters into
force on the date on which instruments of ratification or
acceptance have been exchanged in Manila.
Supplementary agreement No. 3 to the Treaty of friendship,
cooperation and security: Agreement on the Status of Forces with
annex and agreed minutes (5). Signed at Manila Aug. 27, 1991.
Enters into force on the date on which instruments of ratification
or acceptance have been exchanged in Manila.
Poland
Agreement regarding the reduction and reorganization of certain
debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the Government of the
United States and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Warsaw
July 17, 1991. Entered into force: Sept. 3, 1991.
Singapore
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of May 30 and
June 5, 1986, relating to trade in cotton, wool and man-made fiber
textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at
Singapore Mar. 6, Apr. 1 and July 22, 1991. Entered into force July
22, 1991; effective Jan. 1, 1991.
Spain
Agreement on space cooperation. Signed at Madrid July 11, 1991.
Enters into force upon written communication between the parties
when they have met their constitutional requirements.
Thailand
Agreement relating to trade in textiles and textile products,with
annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Bangkok
Sept. 3, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1991; effective Jan. 1,
1991.
USSR
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in housing and
economic development. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991. Entered
into force July 30, 1991.
Agreement on emergency medical supplies and related assistance.
Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991. Entered into force July 30, 1991.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in natural and man-
made emergency prevention and response. Signed at Moscow July
30, 1991. Entered into force July 30, 1991.
Yugoslavia
Agreement concerning the program of the United States Peace Corps
in Yugoslavia. Signed at Belgrade July 1, 1991. Enters into force
when the parties inform each other that they have carried out their
legal procedures.
1 With reservation.
2 Not in force for the US. (###)