US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991

Title:

OAS Support for Democracy In Haiti

Aronson Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs Description: Remarks before the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, Washington, DC Date: Oct 8, 199110/8/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: OAS, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] First of all, I would like to associate myself with those who have paid tribute to you for your leadership not just of this ad hoc meeting but of the previous one, and for your leadership of the mission [of] foreign ministers. I think that we've accomplished an enormous amount in both forums, and your personal efforts and personal leadership is one of the important reasons why. ..........I would also like to pay similar tribute to our Secretary General [Javier Baena Soares], who has a much more difficult job than I think we realize, and who, I think, has transformed this organization in an extremely important way during his tenure--in ways in which, I think, that all of us are proud. ..........It's hard to believe, but it was just 5 days ago that the foreign ministers of 34 nations that make up the Organization of American States gathered in this room. Secretary Baker came here for the same reason that each of you came to this room, because the United States recognizes that the violent attack on the democratic Government of Haiti was an assault not just on the democratic rights of the people of Haiti, who had struggled and sacrificed for so many years to attain those rights, but it was also an assault on the Inter-American system and on the democratic community of this hemisphere. ..........Secretary Baker said in his remarks 5 days ago that that assault was a test of the democratic community and of the Organization of American States. I'm proud to say that I believe this organization and this democratic community have risen to that test with enormous distinction and enormous political will. ..........The first meeting of foreign ministers was convened at the Secretary General's direction, using the new mechanism that we adopted in Santiago just 3 days after the coup d'etat. The resolution we adopted at that time, I think, was one of the strongest in the history of this Organization. ..........The very next day, a mission of distinguished foreign ministers--and one slightly less distinguished Assistant Secretary--from eight nations was in Haiti. That mission returned two other times. I think, as I said earlier, the mission came very close to helping to foster a national dialogue that would have led to a solution. But events on the ground temporarily over-ran that diplomacy. ..........Now, just 3 days later, this meeting of foreign ministers has acted again. We said in our first resolution that we would take additional measures. We've taken two strong measures here tonight. We have done so not to punish Haiti or the suffering people of Haiti but--as other delegations have said--to send a clear message throughout this hemisphere that those who have used violence to threaten democracy will not go unpunished. They will be isolated. They will be cut off. They will be denied legitimacy, and they will be pariahs until democracy is restored. That message should be heard by any group or individuals in this hemisphere who believe that democracy is vulnerable today. ..........We said something else as well, though. We said that once democracy is restored and the dialogue is resumed, this Organization is prepared, in an unprecedented way, to go to Haiti. As other speakers said, not just for a short time, but for an extended period of time, to give that nation the chance that it thought it gained in December of last year--a chance to consolidate democratic institutions and to ensure the respect for institutions and human rights that are essential to democracy. ..........And if conditions should permit us to send such a mission, I think we must have the same will to ensure its success for the duration as we have in defending democracy against this coup, because we have taken on an important political and moral responsibility. ..........There is much talk of building a new world order. Today, I think what we are doing, in fact, is the creation of a genuine democratic community. I think there is no other part of the world where that democratic community is being built more strongly and more clearly than in the Western Hemisphere. It is democratic because we do not accept any other form of government as legitimate in our community, and it is a community because we are bound by bonds of commitment and respect and affection that make us something more than just a collection of separate nations. ..........I think that is at evidence here today. There are foreign ministers here from throughout this hemisphere, who have scrapped their schedules for days and weeks. There are governments who have dispatched airplanes, all to defend the rights of the Haitian people. And I think that's a very important event. I think it says something special about the democracies around this table. So I'm very proud to have participated on behalf of the United States in these meetings. ..........We have talked for many decades about acting through multilateral mechanisms in this hemisphere, but I think in these days and months we are doing more than talking: We are creating and developing and establishing those multilateral mechanisms. We are learning to work together in these kinds of forums and pool our collective strength to create something that has never existed before: the force of a democratic community, committed to defend the rights of democracy.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

OAS Resolution: Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti

Description: Released by the Organization of American States, Washington, DC Date: Oct 3, 199110/3/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, OAS, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti MRE/RES. 1/91 (October 3, 1991) The Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Having Seen: ..........The resolution of the Permanent Council of September 30, 1991, convoking an ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), in response to the gravity of the events that have taken place in Haiti; ..........The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, approved at the twenty-first regular session of the General Assembly, held at Santiago, Chile, in June 1991; and ..........Resolution AG/RES. 1117 (XXI-0/91) "Support for the Democratic Process in the Republic of Haiti"; Having Heard: ..........The statement made to this meeting by the President of Haiti, Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide; Reaffirming: ..........That the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation in this hemisphere, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man; ..........That one of the essential purposes of the Organization of American States is to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention; and ..........That the solidarity of the American states and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those states on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy; Considering: ..........That the grave events that have occurred in Haiti constitute an abrupt, violent, and irregular disruption of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratic government of that country; ..........That these events represent disregard for the legitimate Government of Haiti, which was constituted by the will of its people freely expressed in a free and democratic electoral process under international observation with the participation of this Organization; and ..........That those events have compelled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to leave Haitian territory temporarily and against his will, Resolves: .......... 1. To reiterate the vigorous condemnation voiced by the Permanent Council of the grave events taking place in Haiti, which deny the right of its people to self-determination, and to demand full restoration of the rule of law and of constitutional order and the immediate reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the exercise of his legitimate authority. .......... 2. To request that the Secretary General of the Organization, together with a group of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member states, go to Haiti immediately to inform those who hold power illegally that the American states reject the disruption of constitutional order and to advise them of the decisions adopted by this meeting. .......... 3. To recognize the representatives designated by the constitutional Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the only legitimate representatives of the Government of Haiti to the organs, agencies, and entities of the inter-American system. .......... 4. To urge the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in response to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's request, to take immediately all measures within its competence to protect and defend human rights in Haiti and to report thereon to the Permanent Council of the Organization. .......... 5. To recommend, with due respect for the policy of each member state on the recognition of states and governments, action to bring about the diplomatic isolation of those who hold power illegally in Haiti. .......... 6. To recommend to all states that they suspend their economic, financial, and commercial ties with Haiti and any aid and technical cooperation except that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes. .......... 7. To request the Secretary General of the Organization to pursue efforts to increase the Inter-American Fund for Priority Assistance to Haiti, but to refrain from using it so long as the present situation prevails. .......... 8. To recommend to the General Secretariat of the Organization the suspension of all assistance to those who hold power illegally in Haiti and to request the regional organs and institutions, such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture, and the Latin American Economic System (SELA), to adopt the same measure. .......... 9. To urge all states to provide no military, police, or security assistance of any kind and to prevent the delivery of arms, munitions, or equipment to that country in any manner, public or private. ..........10. To keep open the ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to receive, with the urgency that this situation demands, the report of the Mission referred to in operative paragraph 2 of this resolution and to adopt, in accordance with the Charter of the OAS and international law, any additional measures that may be necessary and appropriate to ensure the immediate reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the exercise of his legitimate authority. ..........11. To transmit this resolution to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and to urge them to consider its spirit and aims. VOTE: Adopted by consensus. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

OAS Resolution: Support For Democracy in Haiti

Description: Released by the Organization of American States, Washington, DC Date: Oct 8, 199110/8/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, OAS, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Support For Democracy in Haiti MRE/RES. 2/91 (October 8, 1991) The Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Having Seen resolution MRE/RES. 1/91 "Support for the Democratic Government of Haiti" and the report of the mission designated in operative paragraph 2 of said resolution, and the request presented by the President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in his letter of 7 October 1991 (MRE/doc. 3/91) to the Secretary General, Considering: ..........That the crisis in Haiti has become more serious and that, consequently, it is necessary to adopt additional measures in accordance with operative paragraph 10 of resolution MRE/RES. 1/91, and ..........The request received from President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to have the Organization, through a civilian mission, establish a presence in Haiti in order to contribute to the solution of the crisis in the country. Resolves: I ..........1. To reiterate resolution MRE/RES. 1/91 "Support for the Democratic Government of Haiti", particularly with regard to the restoration of the exercise of the legitimate authority of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and to the need to restore constitutional order, and to maintain the measures adopted in that resolution. ..........2. To strongly condemn the use of violence and military coercion and the decision to replace illegally the constitutional President of Haiti Jean-Bertrand Aristide. ..........3. To declare that no government that may result from this illegal situation will be accepted and, consequently, to declare that no representative of such government will be accepted. ..........4. To urge the Member states to proceed immediately to freeze the assets of the Haitian State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti, except for humanitarian aid. All humanitarian assistance must be channeled through international agencies or non-governmental organizations. II ..........1. To accede to the request of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide that a civilian mission be constituted to reestablish and strengthen constitutional democracy in Haiti (OEA-DEMOC), which should go to that country in order to facilitate the reestablishment and strengthening of democratic institutions, the full force and effect of the Constitution, respect for the human rights of all Haitians, and to support the administration of justice and adequate functioning of all the institutions that will make it possible to achieve these objectives. The Mission must have the guarantees that are indispensable for the security of its members. ..........2. To entrust to the Secretary General the organization of OEA-DEMOC and to finance it by means of a special fund. To urge Member states, Permanent Observers and the international community to make urgent contributions to the accomplishment of that mission. III ..........1. To request the Secretary General to keep the Ministers of Foreign Affairs informed, through the Permanent Council, on the effectiveness of the measures adopted so that they may decide on any further measures that may be necessary. ..........2. To request the Secretary General also to report on the activities of the Mission OEA-DEMOC. ..........3. To request the Secretary General to keep open channels of communication with the democratically constituted political institutions and other sectors in Haiti in order to facilitate dialogue with a view to ensuring the modalities and guarantees that will make it possible for President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to return to office. ..........4. To transmit this resolution to the United Nations and to request its Member states to adopt the same measures agreed upon by the American states. VOTE: Adopted by consensus. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

UN General Assembly Resolution 46/7 on Haiti

Description: Released by the United Nations, New York, New York Date: Oct 12, 199110/12/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, United Nations, Democratization [TEXT] Resolution 46/7 (October 12, 1991) The General Assembly, ..........Having considered the item entitled "Crisis of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti," ..........Bearing in mind that, on the basis of General Assembly Resolution 45/2, the United Nations system, at the request of the lawful authorities of that country and in cooperation with the Organization of American States, supported the efforts of the people of Haiti to consolidate their democratic institutions and also supported the holding of free elections on 16 December 1990, ..........Concerned about the critical events occurring in Haiti since 29 September 1991, which have brought about a sudden and violent interruption of the democratic process in that country, entailing human rights abuses and the loss of human lives, ..........Bearing in mind the presentation made by the President of Haiti, Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to the Security Council on 3 October 1991[1] ..........Given the importance of the international community's supporting the development of democracy in Haiti through the strengthening of its institutions and high priority for the serious social and economic problems that it faces, ..........Aware that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the organization promotes and encourages respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government"[2] ..........Welcoming resolutions MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES. 2/91 adopted on 3 and 8 October respectively by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the member countries of the Organization of American States, ..........1. Strongly condemns both the attempted illegal replacement of the constitutional president of Haiti and the use of violence, military coercion and the violation of human rights in that country; ..........2. Affirms as unacceptable any entity resulting from that illegal situation and demands the immediate restoration of the legitimate government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, together with the full application of the national constitution and hence the full observance of human rights in Haiti; ..........3. Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with his functions, to consider providing support sought by the Secretary- General of the Organization of American States, in implementing the mandates arising from resolutions MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES. 2/91 adopted by that organization; ..........4. Appeals to the member states of the United Nations to take measures in support of the Organization of American States resolutions referred to in the preceding paragraph; ..........5. Emphasizes that an increase in technical, economic and financial cooperation when constitutional order is restored in Haiti, is necessary to support its economic and social development efforts in order to strengthen its democratic institutions. ..........6. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report as soon as possible on the implementation of the present resolution; ..........7. Decides to keep open the consideration of this item until a solution to the crisis is found. VOTE: Adopted by consensus. 1 (S/PV.3011) 2 General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), Art. 21, Para. 3. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

US-Costa Rican Friendship

Bush, Calderon Source: President Bush, Costa Rican President Calderon Description: Departure remarks, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Oct 10, 199110/10/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: Costa Rica Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT]
President Bush:
It's a great honor and pleasure to meet with you today at the White House. And I warmly remember my visits to Costa Rica as Vice President in 1986 and then as President in 1989. I will never, ever forget the cheers, the genuine enthusiasm that the Costa Rican people showed for the United States of America when our flag was displayed there in that stadium. I'll never forget it. I know Barbara was touched by the warm hospitality extended by you and Mrs. Calderon and the Costa Rican people at your inauguration last May. There can be no doubt, Mr. President, that the people of Costa Rica and of the United States have a deep and abiding friendship, one for the other. ..........Costa Rica and the United States stand shoulder to shoulder for common values and aspirations. Our friendship is rooted in shared commitments to human rights, economic and social freedom, democracy, and peaceful foreign relations. ..........Costa Rica stands tall as a model of courage. For most of your lifetime, Mr. President, Costa Rica's neighbors have suffered from violence and instability, often under dictatorship. Political violence, border conflicts, death squads, subversion by Marxist guerrillas--all of these have scarred Central America and the isthmus. Through all of this, without an army, Costa Rica stood fast. Costa Rica is a rock of stability in Central America because its people believe in permanent things: the sanctity of the person and of the family, the centrality of human freedom. ..........Almost half a century ago, the Costa Rican people made a civilized political and social compact. Costa Ricans strictly limited the power of government to interfere with civil liberties. Against all threats, domestic and external, Costa Ricans have kept faith with that promise. Costa Rica practices robust competitive politics, peacefully transferring power from party to party, from person to person. With its independent judiciary and limited public security forces, Costa Rica is a model civil society based on the rule of law. ..........Your country keeps faith with its international commitments, even when doing so is costly. Through all of the Central American turmoil during the 1980s, Costa Rica gave safe haven to refugees and respected universal human rights. ..........Mr. President, we strongly support your efforts, courageous efforts, to renew Costa Rica's economic strength. You've put together a very effective economic team. You've shown personal courage and impressive skills of leadership in advancing such reforms as price deregulation, privatization of government agencies, and tax reform. And I applaud these efforts which will help assure prosperity for the Costa Rican people. ..........And, yes, we know--I know--that sacrifice by the people of Costa Rica is involved here. But I also know that the difficult economic decisions that you have taken will pay off for the wonderful people of Costa Rica. ..........I encourage you to continue to exercise the leadership necessary to complete the reform effort. We are recognizing that leadership today in making available $24 million in Economic Support Funds. I promise to work unceasingly with you to let the liberating power of free markets help your country and mine--and our neighbors as well. ..........Already we're working together to promote the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative for expanded trade and investment in the hemisphere. And I thank you, sir, for your very strong support of this initiative. The framework agreement for trade and investment between our countries will join with other accords to create new jobs and improve living conditions throughout the Americas. Our common efforts will hasten the day when the Americas will become a flourishing trade area from the Arctic Circle to the Strait of Magellan. ..........Mr. President, Costa Rica is a haven of peace, and Costa Ricans have always helped to resolve conflicts in your region. Today, we see the best of the Costa Rican tradition in your efforts to help bring about a just and peaceful solution to El Salvador's civil conflict. Fundamentally, all these efforts have been possible because Costa Ricans have labored for decades to cultivate the habits of civil society--habits of freedom and responsibility. Because of this abiding faith, Costa Rica is assisting in a new birth of freedom, prosperity, and peace for all of Central America. ..........Thank you again, Mr. President, my friend--thank you for your visit. And may God bless the people of Costa Rica.
President Calderon:
Mr. President, Mr. Secretary, we are extremely thrilled today. I must recall that during an entire lifetime we have had the best relations of friendship, solidarity, and cooperation with the United States. It is not in vain that the United States is the oldest and most solid democracy in the Americas and Costa Rica is the oldest and most solid democracy in Latin America. ..........On a personal note, I am so very pleased with the relationship of affection which binds you, Barbara, and your entire family to me and my entire family. And also on a personal note, just as you and I are standing here, my father stood here 51 years ago with President Roosevelt, strengthening the ties of friendship and solidarity binding the United States and Costa Rica. ..........As one governing a Latin American country, I have come here to express my thanks for your idea and your program of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. I have affirmed, and I repeat, that the history of the economic relations of Latin America and the United States will be divided into two phases, pre- and post-Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. ..........We have come here not out of a desire to ask the United States for economic assistance but rather armed with a desire to come over the next few years to a free trade agreement with the United States which will increase the number of jobs, the amount of investment, the amount of exports, and the amount of wealth and employment of our country. We hope that by the first quarter of 1992 that we will be eligible for the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative facilities, having by then reduced considerably our external debt and being ready by that time to take advantage of a free trade agreement. ..........Thank you once more, President Bush, for your support, your backing, your warmth, and your affection toward us and toward the entire Costa Rican people. Thank you once again for the cooperation of you and of your government in the various international organizations in which the United States is represented. ..........Thank you once again for your cooperation in terms of equipment for our fight against drug trafficking, which is a major concern of both of us. We are bound to be the first line of defense of American youth against drug trafficking, as well as the first line of defense of our own youth. ..........Thank you, finally, for continuing this endless, ceaseless struggle that the United States and Costa Rica have been waging and continue to wage for freedom and democracy in the world. ..........Thank you once again, President Bush. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

Costa Rican President Calderon Visits Washington, DC

Date: Oct 14, 199110/14/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Central America Country: Costa Rica Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] Costa Rican President Rafael Angel Calderon made his first official visit to Washington, DC, on October 10, 1991. He met with President Bush, Secretary Baker, US congressional leaders, and other government and business officials. Discussions included bilateral and regional political and economic issues, and counter- narcotics.
US-Costa Rica Relations
President Calderon has continued the close and friendly relations that the United States and Costa Rica have enjoyed for years. Both countries share an interest in promoting democracy and economic development throughout Central America. Costa Rica was among the first Latin American countries to back the US-led re-establishment of order in Panama in 1989 and was a firm supporter of US policy in the Persian Gulf after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Costa Rica also plays a key role in the Organization of American States to restore democracy in Haiti. ..........The United States recognizes that Costa Rica remains the most stable country in the region and has responded to its economic needs through development assistance programs. In FY 1992, the Bush Administration has requested $24 million in economic aid to Costa Rica. The Peace Corps, with about 200 volunteers, has helped Costa Ricans develop skills in agriculture, education, health, nutrition, and natural resources. The US Agency for International Development promotes efforts to accelerate economic growth through policy reforms and open trade. ..........Costa Rica has no army and has maintained a stance of strict neutrality in Central America, a policy supported by a majority of Costa Ricans and one that President Calderon has asserted his country will continue to follow. Costa Rica faces no serious external or internal threats and looks to the United States under the 1954 Rio Treaty to defend it against external aggression. ..........In 1987, former President Oscar Arias initiated a regional peace plan that became the basis for an agreement signed by the presidents of the other Central American countries (excluding Belize and Panama). His efforts earned Arias the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize. The Esquipulas Process, as the peace plan became known, contributed to free and open elections in Nicaragua in February 1990 and the subsequent end of the civil war in that country. ..........Under President Calderon, Costa Rica continues to play a leading role in the process. In addition, Costa Rica has facilitated negotiations between the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti guerrillas and is a key participant in efforts to foster regional cooperation on political and economic development and on continuing to reduce the military's role in Central America.
A Tradition of Democracy
Unlike many other Central American countries, Costa Rica has had a long history of civilian government and democratic institutions. Costa Rica has continued that tradition in the last decade even as it was buffeted by political and military turbulence in Nicaragua to the north and Panama to the south. ..........Several elements have contributed to Costa Rica's democratic development, including educational opportunity, enlightened political leadership, comparative prosperity, a significant middle class, and the absence of a politically intrusive military. It has developed an orderly, constitutional scheme for succession. Only twice in the country's history (1974, 1986) has the governing party been returned to office. ..........In the February 1990 elections, the candidate of the more conservative Partido Unidad Social Cristiano (PUSC), Rafael Angel Calderon, narrowly defeated Carlos Manuel Castillo of the more liberal Partido de Liberacion National (PLN). The PUSC also won control of the 57-seat Legislative Assembly by a slim margin of 29 seats to the PLN's 25. The PLN and the PUSC dominate the political scene in Costa Rica. Third parties were able to muster 1.5% of the vote in the most recent elections and claim three seats in the assembly. ..........The PLN traditionally has supported higher tax rates and more government control of the economy, while the PUSC has advocated free market policies and support for private enterprise. Policy differences between the two parties have been narrowing in recent years, however, as both accept the need for economic reform and budget austerity. External debt has been reduced from $4.01 billion 1989 to $3.07 billion at the end of 1990--one of the higher per capita levels in Latin America. ..........In addition to debt and fiscal problems, the country faces a continuing decline in the price of coffee, one of its chief exports, as well as rising imports. Against this background, President Calderon has indicated that Costa Rica will pursue further austerity measures, such as cuts in government spending and tax increases. He also wants to continue efforts to integrate Costa Rica into the world economy, reduce the size of the public sector, and encourage the private sector to expand production and diversify exports, thus reducing the country's reliance on commodity exports and regional markets.
Economy
Until recently, agriculture dominated the Costa Rican economy, typically contributing 25% of gross domestic product (GDP) and producing coffee and bananas for export and maize, rice, and beans for domestic consumption. The manufacturing sector expanded rapidly in the 1970s and, by the end of 1988, constituted about 22% of Costa Rica's GDP, compared with 19% for agriculture and 18% for commerce. In the early 1980s, however, the economy suffered from the worldwide recession and a decline in intra-regional trade. Rising oil prices and interest rates and falling trade enlarged the national debt and prompted the government to resort to heavy external borrowing. Costa Rica was forced to negotiate several debt reschedulings since 1982 and to restrict debt repayments. The government requested new loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but money was made available only on condition that the government pursue reform. ..........Since its economic crisis in the early 1980s, Costa Rica has adopted a series of economic adjustments, focusing on internal stability and growth through export development. The measures have produced results: GDP grew an average of 5% since 1986, non- traditional exports have increased 20-30% annually, official employment has shrunk below 6%, and inflation has remained low. ..........In May 1990, Costa Rica completed a debt buy-back program under the Brady Plan, enabling it to repurchase 60% of its commercial bank debt, cover interest for bonds issued in exchange for part of the debt, and cover payments on debt not repurchased. ..........Costa Rica has considerable natural resources, including timber, minerals, and fisheries. The government has decided to open the door to foreign oil exploration and is trying to develop more trade with Japan and Taiwan. It has encouraged the growth of tourism, which should ease the scarcity of foreign exchange. ..........The United States is Costa Rica's largest trading partner, accounting for more than 40% of its exports and about 35% of its imports. Other markets for Costa Rican exports include the Central American Common Market (CACM) and Germany, while CACM and Japan also supply much of its imports. Major exports include bananas, coffee, beef, sugar and cocoa. Manufactured goods, machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, fuel, foodstuffs, and fertilizer make up the majority of imports. ..........Costa Rica actively supports President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), which was announced in June 1990. The two countries signed a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement in November 1990 under the EAI. This should help remove restrictions on Costa Rica's export of sugar, textiles, shoes, flowers, and coffee to the United States. Costa Rica, meanwhile, has pledged to increase the quality of its goods, remove barriers to foreign investment, and consult with the United States on the issue of intellectual property rights. Also in 1990, Costa Rica became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). ..........In January 1991, Costa Rica joined its Central American neighbors in committing to discuss the creation of a free trade zone with Mexico by 1996. Costa Rica is holding talks with Canada and Venezuela on similar arrangements. (###)
Costa Rica at a Glance
Known as the "Switzerland of Central America," Costa Rica is the second smallest Central American country. Costa Rica is bordered by Nicaragua on the north and Panama on the south. A rugged, central mountain ridge runs the length of the country separating the coastal plains. The climate is tropical along the coasts and cooler in the highlands. ..........Unlike most of their Central American neighbors, Costa Ricans are primarily of European rather than mestizo descent, with Spain the principal country of origin. The indigenous Indian population is only about 1%, while blacks constitute about 3% of the population. Literacy is more than 93% nationwide, with life expectancy rates comparable to North American and West European levels. ..........Costa Rica was first settled by Europeans in 1522. Nearly three centuries later, Costa Rica in 1821 joined other Central American provinces in declaring independence from Spain and declared itself a sovereign country in 1838. Costa Rica's democratic tradition began with the 1889 elections, considered the first free and honest ones in the country's history. In 1948, Jose Figueres led a bloody revolution in the wake of a disputed presidential election. The victorious junta drafted a constitution that abolished the army and guaranteed free elections with universal suffrage. Since then, 11 presidential elections have been held, with the next one scheduled in 1994. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Costa Rica

Date: Oct 14, 199110/14/91 Category: Country Data Region: Central America Country: Costa Rica Subject: History [TEXT] Official Name: Republic of Costa Rica
Geography
Area: 51,032 sq. km. (19,652 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than West Virginia. Cities: Capital--San Jose (metropolitan pop. 890,434). Other cities--Alajuela (34,556), Limon (33,925), Golfito (29,043). Terrain: A rugged, central massif runs the length of the country separating coastal plains. Climate: Tropical and subtropical.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Costa Rican(s). Population (1989): 2.7 million. Annual growth rate (1989): 2.4%. Density: 55/sq. km. (144/sq. mi.). Ethnic groups: White (including a few mestizos) 96%; black 3%; indigenous 1%. Religion: Roman Catholic 95%. Language: Spanish, with a Jamaican dialect of English spoken around Puerto Limon. Education: Years compulsory--6. Attendance--nearly 100%. Literacy--93%. Health: Infant mortality rate--15/1,000. Life expectancy--men 67 yrs.; women 72 yrs. Work force (1 million, 1989): Agriculture--32%. Industry and commerce--25%. Services and government--38%. Banking and finance--5%.
Government
Type: Democratic republic. Independence: September 15, 1821. Constitution: November 9, 1949. Branches: Executive--President (head of government and chief of state) elected for a single 4-year term, two vice presidents, cabinet (20 ministers). Legislative--57-deputy unicameral Legislative Assembly elected at 4-year intervals. Judicial-- Supreme Court of Justice (17 magistrates elected by Legislative Assembly at 8-year intervals). Subdivisions: Seven provinces divided into 80 cantons that are subdivided into districts. Political parties: Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC), National Liberation Party (PLN), United Peoples Party (PU), Costa Rican Socialist Party (PSC). Suffrage: Obligatory over age 18. Central government budget (1990): $915 million. Defense: Costa Rica has no army. Holiday: Independence Day, September 15. Flag: Two blue horizontal stripes top and bottom, two white inner stripes, and a wide, red central band with the national coat of arms.
Economy
GDP (1990): $5.6 billion. Real growth rate (1990): 3.6%. Per capita income (1990): $1,900. Inflation (1990 consumer price index change): 27%. Natural resource: Hydroelectric power. Agriculture (18% of GDP): Products--bananas, coffee, beef, sugarcane, grain. Industry (23% of GDP): Types--food processing, textiles and clothing, construction materials, fertilizer. Trade (1990): Exports--$1.4 million: bananas, coffee, beef, sugar, cocoa. Major markets--US 43%, Central America 13%, Germany 9%. Imports--$2 million: manufactured goods, machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, fuel, foodstuffs, fertilizer. Major suppliers--US 40%, Central America 8%, Japan 15%. Fiscal year: Calendar year. Debt service charges as % of exports: 41% in 1990.
Principal Government Officials
President--Rafael Angel CALDERON Fournier First Vice President--German SERRANO Pinto Minister of Foreign Relations--Bernd NIEHAUS Quesada Ambassador to the United States--Gonzalo J. FACIO Segrada Ambassador to the United Nations--Cristian TATTENBACH Yglesias Ambassador to the Organization of American States--Carlos PEREIRA Garro (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

Report to Congress on the Status of Apartheid

Description: Text of State Department report to Congress prepared by the Bureau of African Affairs, Washington, DC Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91 Category: Reports Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: South Africa Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] Herewith is transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the report required by section 501 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA or the Act) for the period from October 3, 1990, to October 2, 1991.
Background
Executive Order 12571 directed all affected executive departments and agencies to take all steps necessary, consistent with the Constitution, to implement the requirements of the Act. They have implemented the Act fully and faithfully. ..........Section 101 of the Act states that it and other actions of the United States are intended to encourage the Government of South Africa to take the following steps: ..........Bring about reforms leading to the establishment of a nonracial democracy in South Africa. ..........Repeal the present state of emergency and respect the principle of equal justice under law for citizens of all races. ..........Release Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, and Walter Sisulu, black trade union leaders, and all political prisoners. ..........Permit the free exercise by South Africans of all races the right to form political parties, express political opinions and otherwise participate in the political process. ..........Establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws. ..........Negotiate with representatives of all racial groups in South Africa the future political system in South Africa. ..........End military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighboring states. ..........This report assesses the extent to which the South African Government has taken steps toward ending the system of apartheid, moving toward a nonracial democracy, and reaching a negotiated settlement of the South African conflict.
The Status of Apartheid: October 1990 to October 1991
. Actions taken by the South African Government in ending the system of apartheid and moving toward a nonracial democracy. South Africa's reform process, set into motion with the unbanning of the ANC [African National Congress] and the release of Nelson Mandela in early 1990, moved rapidly ahead during the past twelve months. During this period, the South African Government, the ANC, and other organizations made significant progress in removing obstacles to negotiations. The government took major steps to eliminate the legal underpinnings of the apartheid system. Preparations for multiparty talks on a new constitution are underway. The governing National Party, headed by President F.W. de Klerk, has committed itself irreversibly to the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of nonracial multiparty democracy. ..........The remaining legislative pillars of apartheid were repealed by Parliament in 1991. These included the Group Areas Act, which mandated residential segregation; the Land Acts, which prohibited black land ownership outside rural "homelands"; and the Population Registration Act, which assigned a racial classification to each South African at birth. The repeal of the Separate Amenities Act, which permitted segregation of municipal facilities, took effect in October 1990. ..........Under the terms of an agreement with the ANC, and by unilateral action, the South African Government has released well over 1,000 prisoners, including all prisoners meeting the CAAA [IO] criteria of "persons persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly without trial." In October 1990, the state of emergency, which had been repealed earlier that year except in the province of Natal, was lifted there as well. An amendment to the Internal Security Act prohibited long-term detentions. ..........Under the current constitution, South Africa's racial groups are separately represented in Parliament under the "own affairs" system. The Parliament contains separate houses for white, "colored," and Indian members. Blacks are not represented, and black "own affairs" are handled by white cabinet ministers. However, with the repeal of apartheid legislation, the "own affairs" system controls an increasingly narrow range of activities. The system was further eroded during the 1991 parliamentary session, when the ruling National Party opened up its ranks to members of all races and a large number of "colored" parliamentarians joined the National Party caucus. Parliamentary politics as a whole has become less central as the focus of political activity has shifted the negotiating process. The government does not support the continuation of the "own affairs" concept under a future constitution. Currently, the principal remaining element of "own affairs" is the education system, which with a few exceptions remains segregated. Progress made in reaching a negotiated settlement to the conflict in South Africa. The South African Government has taken steps to foster a climate conducive to negotiations, including repeal of apartheid legislation and release of over a thousand prisoners. However, the ANC disputes the government's contention that the prisoner release process has been completed. Primarily at issue are prisoners who committed for political ends acts of violence which resulted in deaths or injuries. At the end of September 1991, discussions on this issue continued. ..........During 1991, the repatriation of exiles--one of the ANC's preconditions for negotiations--began. In March, the government agreed in principle to allow the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assist in exile repatriation, but a final agreement was not reached until August. A non-governmental committee on refugees repatriated a few planeloads of returning exiles early in the year but later halted large-scale repatriations pending the signing of the UNHCR agreement. ..........Violence remained the major obstacle to constitutional talks. During 1991, clashes between the ANC and Inkatha, primarily in the Johannesburg area and in Natal, continued. Upsurges of violence alternated with relatively peaceful periods. The ANC and other organizations continued to accuse the security forces of fueling the violence. Nelson Mandela and Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi met in February 1991, and again on March 30, in an attempt to reduce tensions between the two organizations. In early September, Buthelezi again called for the two leaders to meet to recommit themselves to ending the violence. ..........In April, primarily in response to escalating violence, the ANC threatened in an open letter to President de Klerk to break off preparations for constitutional talks if the government did not take certain actions, including firing security ministers Adriaan Vlok and Magnus Malan, punishing members of the security forces implicated in violence, outlawing the public carrying of weapons, and releasing remaining political prisoners. President de Klerk subsequently placed restrictions on the carrying of weapons and pledged to take action on other issues raised in the letter. Although he refused to dismiss the cabinet ministers, both were later demoted in the wake of the "Inkathagate" scandal (see below). The ANC concluded that these actions did not address its concerns sufficiently, and announced its withdrawal from talks on constitutional issues. However, this had little practical effect, since the two sides were primarily engaged in talks on removing obstacles to negotiations, which were not affected by the ANC's action. ..........In July, news reports revealed that the government had secretly funded two Inkatha political rallies, in addition to covertly channeling money to an Inkatha-affiliated union and to participants in the Namibian elections. In the wake of the "Inkathagate" revelations, President de Klerk pledged to place strict limits on secret government spending and reassigned to other duties Law and Order Minister Vlok and Defense Minister Malan. The government also agreed to place the issue of transitional government arrangements at the top of the agenda at the planned all-party conference on constitutional principles. President de Klerk has suggested that parties taking part in the negotiations could have a role in the government, perhaps including representation in the cabinet. Some parties, including the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and Inkatha, have indicated they would reject "co-optation" into the present government. ..........All major parties except the Conservative Party and other right-wing organizations attended a church-sponsored peace conference held in June. At the conference, a standing committee was established to explore peace initiatives. On August 14, the committee produced a draft peace agreement. The draft called for codes of conduct for political parties and for the security forces. It also provided for national, regional, and local bodies to oversee the peace accord process and to begin addressing the socio-economic needs of the areas affected by violence. ..........A week before the scheduled September 14 signing of the agreement (which was widely seen as a prerequisite for constitutional talks), violence erupted in the Johannesburg townships after unknown attackers opened fire on a group of Inkatha supporters, killing 23. The timing of the attack led many to speculate that it was orchestrated by elements attempting to sabotage the peace process. However, leaders of the major parties to the agreement reiterated their commitment to peace, and the signing took place as scheduled. The PAC and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), which had participated in discussions on the agreement, refused to sign it but agreed to adhere to most of its provisions. ..........Concurrently with these developments, South Africa's political organizations continued to prepare internally for negotiations. In April, the ANC issued a constitutional proposal which called for multiparty democracy, a bicameral parliament, and a justiciable bill of rights. In July, at its first party conference inside South Africa in 30 years, the ANC gave newly elected President Nelson Mandela a renewed mandate to move ahead with constitutional negotiations. ..........The National Party constitutional proposal unveiled in September stressed consensus government, with multiparty collective leadership, strong safeguards for minorities, and a federal system vesting considerable powers in regional and local bodies. While the ANC rejected the proposal as an attempt to maintain a white veto over the country's political life, the two parties' proposals actually share many common features (such as a justiciable bill of rights), albeit in very different forms. The two proposals are likely to serve as springboards for discussion during the planned all-party conference. Many other organizations, including Inkatha and the Democratic Party, have pledged to participate in constitutional talks. Others on both the left and the right, however, continue to reject participation. The PAC and AZAPO both retain their long-standing opposition to constitutional talks, maintaining that the constitution must be drawn up by a popularly elected constituent assembly following the resignation of the present government. However, the two organizations and the ANC plan to discuss a united approach at a Patriotic Front Conference scheduled for late October. On the right, the Conservative Party continues to support the "grand apartheid" vision of a partitioned South Africa and refuses to participate in talks, equating negotiations with white surrender. Some party members, however, favor participation in negotiations with the aim of obtaining a separate white homeland. Most of the smaller parties on the right, including the far-right Afrikaner Weerstand-sbeweging (AWB) led by Eugene Terreblanche, also oppose talks. ..........The planned all-parties conference on constitutional principles, slated to take place sometime after the Patriotic Front Conference, is expected to be the next major step in negotiations. Although the ANC continues to call for the election of a constituent assembly to negotiate a constitution, there is speculation that the all-parties conference could evolve into a body which would draft a constitution and present it for ratification in a referendum. The unofficial deadline for the completion of negotiations is 1994, when the term of the current Parliament expires.
Section 101(b) Progress or Lack Thereof
Repeal the present state of emergency and respect the principle of equal justice under law for citizens of all races. The state of emergency was repealed in 1990. The repeal of apartheid legislation, amendments to security legislation, and an increasingly liberal (though still virtually all-white) judiciary have improved the legal status of non-white South Africans. The South African Government has endorsed a justiciable bill of rights under a future South African constitution. Release Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki and Walter Sisulu, black trade union leaders, and all political prisoners. Mandela, Mbeki, and Sisulu have been released. No trade union leaders remain imprisoned for political or union activities. More than 1,000 persons were released under an agreement between the South African Government and the ANC and by unilateral government action. In July 1991, the President concluded that all persons persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly without trial had been released. Permit the free exercise by South Africans of all races of the right to form political parties, express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the political process. President de Klerk unbanned all political parties on February 2, 1990. Since then, South Africans of all races have freely exercised the right to form political parties, express political opinions, and participate in the political process, which is currently focused on negotiating a new constitution for a nonracial South Africa. Establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws. All major remaining apartheid laws were repealed in 1991. These included the Group Areas Act, the Land Acts, and the Population Registration Act (see above). The June 1990 repeal of the Separate Amenities Act, which allowed the segregation of municipal facilities, went into effect in October 1990. Many less well-known apartheid laws were also repealed. Negotiate with representatives of all racial groups in South Africa the future political system in South Africa. The South African Government has irrevocably committed itself to negotiating a new nonracial political system. Since May 1990, it has been holding talks with the ANC aimed at removing obstacles to constitutional talks. A planned all-parties conference (see above) is widely seen as a springboard to full constitutional negotiations. The ANC and the National Party have both released draft constitutional proposals in preparation for these talks. End military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighboring states. There were no reports of cross-border raids or paramilitary activities by South Africa in the past year. South Africa's relations with neighboring countries improved dramatically during the year, although in August the Mozambican Government repeated its charge that South Africa continues to support RENAMO insurgents. President de Klerk met with several of his African counterparts during this period, and many African nations resumed or increased trade links with South Africa. (###)
Summary
Pursuant to Section 501 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (the Act), herewith is transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the extent to which significant progress has been made toward ending the system of apartheid. ..........Sanctions specified in Section 311(a) of the Act terminated when the President certified that the South African Government had met all five conditions specified in that section. ..........The termination of these sanctions followed significant progress toward the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of non-racial democracy. The last legislative "pillars of apartheid," the Group-Areas Act, the Land Acts, and the Population Registration Act, were repealed in 1991. Over 1,000 prisoners were released, including all persons meeting the criteria in the Act of "persons persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly without trial." The ANC [African National Congress], South African Government and other organizations are currently preparing for talks on a new, non-racial constitution. ..........Violence was the principal obstacle to a constitutional settlement during the past year. Clashes between the ANC and Inkatha, principally in the Johannesburg area and in Natal, continued, although the level of violence tapered off after peaking in August-September 1990. The ANC continued to criticize the government's handling of the situation and accused the security forces of complicity in the violence. The government, the ANC, Inkatha, and 26 other organizations signed a peace accord on September 14 establishing codes of conduct for political organizations and the security forces. ..........The South African Government has accepted the necessity of negotiating a new non-racial constitution. In spite of the inevitable ups and downs of the negotiating process, South Africa is moving irreversibly away from apartheid. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

Support for the Convention on Control Of International Hazardous Waste Movement

Smith Source: Richard J. Smith, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Washington, DC Date: Oct 10, 199110/10/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Environment [TEXT] I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of HR 2398, which will enable the United States to ratify the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. The Administration regards ratification of the convention as a significant component in US leadership in international environmental matters. It will enhance the ability of the international community to monitor waste shipments, to ensure their proper handling, and, when necessary, to make those who ship wastes accountable. ..........I want to stress the importance of enacting the bill expeditiously. At risk if HR 2398 is not enacted, Mr. Chairman, is the US Government's ability to provide for environmentally responsible recycling and resource recovery, which is a multi- billion-dollar international industry. To continue this trade, and to obtain the associated environmental benefits, we must be a party to the Basel Convention. We cannot become a party to the Basel Convention without legislation providing the authorities needed to comply with it. ..........We expect the convention to enter into force by the middle of next year, 90 days after the 20th instrument of ratification is deposited. Thirteen states have now ratified. To become a party to the Basel Convention, the United States must complete three steps: signing the convention, obtaining the Senate's advice and consent to ratification, and deposit by the President of our instrument of ratification. The United States signed the convention in March 1990. In May 1991, the President requested the Senate's advice and consent, which we expect to obtain this fall. ..........Even with the Senate's consent to ratification, however, we will not be in a position to deposit our instrument of ratification until the necessary domestic legal authorities are in place. Once the United States deposits its instrument of ratification and the convention enters into force for this country, we will be legally bound to comply with the terms of the convention in good faith and, under customary international law, may not invoke domestic law or the absence of domestic law to justify failure to perform our treaty obligations. As [Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency--EPA] Mr. Reilly has explained, our current statutory authorities are fundamentally inadequate: Not all wastes covered by the Basel Convention fall within our current authority; once an importing state has consented to a shipment, we lack authority to stop it, even if we have reason to believe that the wastes will not be managed in an environmentally sound manner; and we need authority under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to take charge of wastes handled improperly abroad. ..........Failure to ratify expeditiously would adversely affect the environment, the economy, and our foreign policy. It would send a signal that the United States does not support monitoring and regulating international waste movements. This message would be ironic and inappropriate, because we have been a world leader in this area, in particular by enacting the first national law requiring that importing states consent to hazardous wastes shipments. Moreover, if we were not a party to the convention, we could not participate on an equal footing in the conference of the parties and, therefore, could not be assured of protecting our interests. The first conference, which will decide issues such as the definition of environmentally sound management, international liability, and funding a secretariat, has been tentatively scheduled for May 1992, on the assumption that the convention will have come into force by then. ..........Substantial trade and environmental consequences would flow from a failure to ratify the Basel Convention quickly. The convention expressly forbids parties from trading with non-parties in wastes covered by the convention, unless they have an international agreement provided for in Article 11. For example, the United States has agreements with Canada and Mexico; movements under these agreements would not be affected. Our trade in secondary materials, which include some materials classified as wastes in domestic law and some that are not, amounts to roughly $7 billion annually. We do not regard all these secondary materials as wastes within the Basel Convention. Other parties may determine that they do fall within the convention, however, which would result in a cutoff of trade in those materials. If we become a party to the convention, such disagreements in classification would not lead to a prohibition on trade. The 13 countries that have ratified account for about $923 million annually in trade in potentially governed wastes. The European Economic Community (EEC), with which we trade roughly $1.8 billion annually in recyclable materials, has indicated that it intends to ratify in the spring of 1992. Canada, our second largest single trading partner in recyclables at about $1 billion annually, is also expected to ratify the convention in 1992. ..........The disruption of international trade for resource recovery will undermine our domestic recycling initiatives. The loss of international markets would create domestic surpluses; these would combine with resulting low prices to reduce or eliminate markets and profits needed for the survival of domestic programs recycling materials such as paper and scrap metal. The loss of our $75.3 million annual trade in recyclable paper with the EEC, for example, would almost certainly lead to increased landfilling of paper at home. Inhibiting recycling will, in the end, expand demand for virgin materials, with associated environmental costs. ..........It is possible that some recycling of hazardous wastes will shift to countries not party to the Basel Convention. These states may not have the environmental protections provided by our current trading partners. And, without the authorities provided by HR 2398, the US Government will lack the statutory authorities needed to ensure that such shipments are handled in an environmentally sound manner. ..........The Basel Convention provides one exception to its ban on trade between parties and non-parties. Such trade may continue pursuant to international agreements in force before the convention enters into force, as long as the agreement is "compatible" with the environmentally sound management of wastes. Our agreement with Canada meets this standard, as does our agreement with Mexico, which has already ratified the convention. International waste movements between parties and non-parties may also continue under agreements that enter into force after the convention itself if those agreements contain provisions that are "not less stringent" than those in the convention. ..........The United States is working to conclude an agreement governing movements of wastes for recovery operations within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD agreement, which is now in draft form, would control movements of wastes for recycling in a three-tier system which would gear the level of controls to the characteristics of the materials involved and the international community's experience with the materials. ..........I would like to emphasize that no regional or bilateral agreement, however, can substitute fully for enactment of HR 2398. This is because we lack the statutory authority to regulate transboundary movements of wastes subject to the Basel Convention. The unregulated trade in such materials would be susceptible to the convention's trade prohibition, even if regional agreements were concluded. Indeed, we may not be able to become a party to the proposed OECD agreement, because it could require controls on wastes we lack authority to regulate unless HR 2398 is enacted. Our agreements with Canada and Mexico govern only movements regulated domestically as hazardous waste. ..........Moreover, it is not realistic to expect that we can conclude agreements with every trading partner before the Basel Convention's prohibition on trade becomes effective. The proposed OECD agreement, for example, may not be concluded by then. ..........The subcommittee has heard testimony on proposals either to ban international waste movements or to permit them only when the wastes will be handled in a manner "no less strict than" in the United States. Neither is acceptable. A ban would incur the substantial economic, foreign policy, and environmental costs I have just described. The "no less strict than" standard would be unworkably vague. No country's waste management practices are identical to ours. The "no less strict than" standard would require complex and arguable judgments about which US practices may be absent without jeopardizing the "strictness" of waste management. EPA as the administering agency could well be forced to interpret this standard as banning all waste shipments on the ground that any aspect of US waste management practices could, in a hypothetical situation, be a necessary part of waste management "no less strict than" in the United States. Of course, every decision would be subject to lawsuits, some seeking to stop movements, some to prohibit the Administrator from stopping movements. Consequently, the "no less strict than standard" could leave the US Government's waste management policies to the vagaries of litigation in different contexts throughout the country. ..........The proposals present two foreign policy difficulties. Both would impede US leadership in international recycling efforts, an important aspect of our environmental policy. Moreover, HR 2358--which incorporates the "no less strict than" standard-- would not enable us to proceed immediately to ratify the Basel Convention because it: does not address waste imports as is required by the convention; does not prohibit waste exports to Antarctica, as the convention requires; and defers to regulations decisions concerning the consent of transit countries and the content of the documents that will accompany all wastes. The convention has strict requirements relating to both. Until the regulations were promulgated, and they could well be delayed in litigation, we would not be certain that we could comply with the convention fully. ..........Mr. Chairman, we will be in a position to ratify the Basel Convention only when legislation implementing the convention completely is enacted. Unless we ratify as soon as possible after the convention enters into force next year, a major export market in recyclable materials will be at risk. Because those markets would be inaccessible to us, there would be increased environmental degradation at home and abroad as wastes are disposed of rather than reused, as virgin materials are obtained at economic and environmental expense, and as wastes are shifted to nations outside the environmental protections of the Basel Convention. The United States has been a leader in establishing policies to regulate wastes properly and responsibly. A failure to enact legislation enabling us to ratify the Basel Convention would undercut that leadership. ..........The Administration's proposal, embodied in HR 2398, is the best instrument to provide the authorities we need to remain a world leader in recycling and waste control. I urge you and the rest of the subcommittee to give it your serious consideration in the light of the needs described in Mr. Reilly's and my testimony and to support it as the only effective and workable of the various proposals that have been drafted to address this matter.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

US Signs Environmental Protocol to Antarctic Treaty

Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Oct 4, 199110/4/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Polar Regions Country: Antarctica Subject: Environment, Science/Technology [TEXT] The United States today signed the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty at a meeting of the Antarctic Treaty parties in Madrid, Spain. The protocol was signed today by most Antarctic Treaty parties and will remain open for signature until October 1992. R. Tucker Scully, Department of State Director for Oceans and Polar Affairs, signed on behalf of the US delegation. ..........The new protocol builds upon the Antarctic Treaty to provide improved environmental protection measures that can be strengthened in the future as necessary. The protocol sets forth basic principles on the protection of the Antarctic environment, establishes an advisory body, and provides for a system of annexes to incorporate detailed mandatory rules for environmental protection. The annexes establish legally binding measures on the conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora, waste disposal, marine pollution, and environmental impact assessment procedures which will be subject to compulsory and binding dispute settlement. Future annexes could be added following entry into force of the protocol. ..........The protocol also prohibits any activities other than scientific research that relate to Antarctic mineral resources. The prohibition can be reviewed at any time after 50 years following entry into force of the protocol. This will provide effective protection for the Antarctic environment without foreclosing the options of future generations. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

Moscow Human Dimension Meeting

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Washington, DC Date: Oct 4, 199110/4/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, Europe, E/C Europe, North America Country: USSR (former) Subject: Human Rights, CSCE [TEXT] The Moscow meeting of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Conference on the Human Dimension, which began September 10, concluded Friday afternoon, October 4. We are extremely pleased with the results of the meeting and the atmosphere of cooperation in which it took place. ..........The Moscow meeting is a further step in enriching the CSCE process, a goal Secretary Baker set in his address to the Aspen Institute in Berlin this June. The Secretary's call to add fact- finding missions as a fifth step in the Human Dimension Mechanism has been fulfilled by the establishment of a "good offices" procedure for facilitating resolution of problems relating to human rights. ..........Ambassador Max Kampelman, the US Head of Delegation, his staff, and the delegations of the other participating states worked hard to produce a concluding document which reflects CSCE states' serious commitment to and respect for human rights. ..........In addition to the "good offices" procedure, the concluding document strengthens the CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism by broadening the CSCE participating states' commitments over a wide range of human, civil, and political rights, including women's rights, freedom of expression, and promotion of the role of non-governmental organizations. ..........The concluding document also for the first time expressly acknowledges that specific, enumerated CSCE commitments in the broad area of human rights and fundamental freedoms are issues of legitimate international concern and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of any one state. ..........The meeting, which saw the admission of the Baltic states to the CSCE, also supported expanding the Office of Free Elections to enable it to assist in strengthening democratic institutions in participating states. This proposal, originally made by Secretary Baker in Berlin, will be discussed in upcoming CSCE meetings, including the November 4-15 Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions to be held in Oslo.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 41, October 14, 1991 Title:

Current Treaty Actions

Date: Oct 14, 199110/14/91 Category: Treaties/Agreements Country: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia (former), Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, Jamaica, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Mozambique, Panama, Nigeria, Poland, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, USSR (former), Yugoslavia (former) Subject: International Law, Arms Control, Human Rights, Narcotics, Terrorism, United Nations [TEXT]
Multilateral
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062. Ratification Deposited: Malaysia, Sept. 26, 1991.1
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.2 International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.2 Accession Deposited: Grenada, Sept. 6, 1991.
Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the US July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725. Accession Deposited: Micronesia, Apr. 29, 1991. United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. Ratification Deposited: Czechoslovakia, June 4, 1991; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Rep., Aug. 28, 1991. Accession Deposited: Syria, Sept. 3, 1991.
Terrorism
International convention against the taking of hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the US Jan. 6, 1985. TIAS 11081. Accession Deposited: Argentina, Sept. 18, 1991.
Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Adopted at New York Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987.2 Ratification Deposited: Yugoslavia, Sept. 10, 1991. United Nations Industrial Development Organization Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), with annexes. Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force June 21, 1985. Ratification Deposited: Chad, Aug. 22, 1991.
Bilateral
Argentina
Agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of space. Signed at Buenos Aires Aug. 6, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1991. Memorandum of understanding concerning the SAC-B [satellite] Astrophysics Engineering Demonstration Mission. Signed at Buenos Aires Aug. 6, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1991. Agreement establishing a Peace Corps program in Argentina. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires July 18 and Aug. 30, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1991.
Belgium
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs services. Signed at Brussels June 26, 1991. Enters into force on the first day of the third month following notification by the parties that all national legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Bolivia
Agreement regarding the discharge of certain debts owed to the United States, with annex. Signed at Washington Aug. 22, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1991. Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts owed to the United States Government and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at Washington Aug. 22, 1991. Enters into force upon written notification by the US to Bolivia that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Costa Rica
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Mexico Aug. 16, 1991. Entered into force: Oct. 1, 1991.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs services. Signed at Prague May 7, 1991. Entered into force provisionally May 7, 1991; definitively on the date of notification by the parties that all necessary national legal requirements have been fulfilled. Agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Vienna June 13, 1991. Enters into force on the date the parties inform each other of completion of all applicable requirements. House Doc. 102-113.
Denmark
Agreement on mutual assistance in customs matters. Signed at Nyborg Castle (Denmark) June 20, 1991. Enters into force 90 days after an exchange of notes indicating acceptance of terms and that all necessary national legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Egypt
Agreement regarding the reorganization of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington July 18, 1991. Entered into force: Sept. 3, 1991. Grant agreement for commodity imports. Signed at CairoSept. 9, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 9, 1991. Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 27, 1989, as amended, for power sector support. Signed at Cairo Sept. 9, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 9, 1991.
El Salvador
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Mexico Aug. 16, 1991. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1991.
Estonia
Memorandum of understanding concerning diplomatic relations. Signed at Tallinn Sept. 4, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 4, 1991.
Finland
Protocol to the treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights of Feb. 13, 1934, as modified (TS 868; TIAS 2861). Signed at Washington July 1, 1991. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. Agreement on social security, with administrative arrangement. Signed at Helsinki June 3, 1991. Enters into force on the first day of the third month following written notification by the parties of compliance with all statutory and constitutional requirements.
Germany
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Berlin Sept. 14, 1990. Entered into force: Aug. 9, 1991. Agreement relating to and bringing into force the investment incentive agreement of Sept. 14, 1990. Exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 9, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 9, 1991.
Greece
Agreement regarding mutual administrative assistance between customs administrations. Signed at Athens July 31, 1991. Enters into force on the 90th day following notification by the parties that they have accepted its terms and that all national legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Guinea-Bissau
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Bissau and Washington July 17 and Aug. 28, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1991.
Hungary
Agreement regarding cooperation and mutual assistance between customs services. Signed at Budapest May 8, 1991. Enters into force on the 90th day following notification by the parties that they have accepted its terms and that all national legal requirements have been fulfilled. Agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Vienna June 10, 1991. Enters into force on the date the parties inform each other of completion of all applicable requirements. House Doc. 102-114.
Iceland
Agreement amending and extending the memorandum of understanding of Jan. 28 and Apr. 9, 1982, for scientific and technical cooperation in earth sciences. Signed at Reston and Reykjavik Mar. 5 and Aug. 9, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 9, 1991; effective Apr. 9, 1990.
Jamaica
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts owed to the United States Government and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at Washington Aug. 23, 1991. Enters into force upon written notification by the United States to Jamaica that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Korea, South
Memorandum of agreement for a cooperative research and development program for new underground ammunition storage technologies, with annex. Signed at Alexandria and Seoul July 3 and Aug. 12, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 12, 1991.
Latvia
Memorandum of understanding concerning diplomatic relations. Signed at Riga Sept. 5, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1991.
Lithuania
Memorandum of understanding concerning diplomatic relations. Signed at Vilnius Sept. 6, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1991.
Mexico
Agreement regarding an earth station [telecommunications]coordination procedure, with annex. Signed at Chestertown (Maryland) July 2, 1991. Enters into force on the date of notification by the parties of completion of their constitutional requirements.
Mozambique
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Maputo Aug. 27, 1991. Entered into forceSept. 30, 1991.
Nigeria
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies with annexes. Signed at Lagos Aug. 2, 1991. Entered into force: Sept. 18, 1991. Agreement establishing a Peace Corps program in Nigeria. Effected by exchange of notes at Lagos Aug. 19 and 22, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1991.
Panama
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Panama Aug. 21, 1991. Enters into force upon receipt by Panama of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Philippines
Grant agreement for the private enterprise policy support program, with annexes and related letter. Signed at Manila Aug. 30, 1991. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1991. Agreement concerning mapping, charting and geodesy cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Makati and Fairfax June 27 and Sept. 9, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 9, 1991. Treaty of friendship, cooperation and security. Signed at Manila Aug. 27, 1991. Enters into force on the date on which instruments of ratification or acceptance have been exchanged at Manila. Supplemental agreement No. 1 to the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and security: Agreement on cultural and education cooperation. Signed at Manila Aug. 27, 1991. Enters into force on the date on which instruments of ratification or acceptance have been exchanged in Manila. Supplementary agreement No. 2 to the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and security: Agreement on installations and military operating procedures, with annexes and minute. Signed at Manila Aug. 27, 1991. Enters into force on the date on which instruments of ratification or acceptance have been exchanged in Manila. Supplementary agreement No. 3 to the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and security: Agreement on the Status of Forces with annex and agreed minutes (5). Signed at Manila Aug. 27, 1991. Enters into force on the date on which instruments of ratification or acceptance have been exchanged in Manila.
Poland
Agreement regarding the reduction and reorganization of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the Government of the United States and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Warsaw July 17, 1991. Entered into force: Sept. 3, 1991.
Singapore
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of May 30 and June 5, 1986, relating to trade in cotton, wool and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Singapore Mar. 6, Apr. 1 and July 22, 1991. Entered into force July 22, 1991; effective Jan. 1, 1991.
Spain
Agreement on space cooperation. Signed at Madrid July 11, 1991. Enters into force upon written communication between the parties when they have met their constitutional requirements.
Thailand
Agreement relating to trade in textiles and textile products,with annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Bangkok Sept. 3, 1991. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1991; effective Jan. 1, 1991.
USSR
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in housing and economic development. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991. Entered into force July 30, 1991. Agreement on emergency medical supplies and related assistance. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991. Entered into force July 30, 1991. Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in natural and man- made emergency prevention and response. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991. Entered into force July 30, 1991.
Yugoslavia
Agreement concerning the program of the United States Peace Corps in Yugoslavia. Signed at Belgrade July 1, 1991. Enters into force when the parties inform each other that they have carried out their legal procedures. 1 With reservation. 2 Not in force for the US. (###)