US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991


Presidential Mission To Assess Soviet Food Situation

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement at the White House, Washington, DC Date: Oct 1, 199110/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Resource Management [TEXT] I am very pleased that Secretary of Agriculture Ed Madigan will depart this afternoon for Moscow as head of a presidential mission to assess the food situation in the Soviet Union. Secretary Madigan will lead a delegation of senior private-sector officials and government experts to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev over the next 9 days. I have just met with this distinguished group and have every confidence they will be a credit to the United States on this important mission. Their expertise in US agriculture, the world's most productive and efficient, covers the spectrum from on-farm production to consumer retailing. Their mandate is two-fold. First, Secretary Madigan and his team will work intensively with union and republic leaders to develop ways by which the United States and its allies can help institute needed improvements in the country's systems of transportation, distribution, storage, and marketing of agricultural goods. This follows the excellent preparatory work done by Under Secretary Richard Crowder's expert mission last month. The ultimate answer, of course, is for the union and republics to effect a rapid transition to a free market economy. Second, they will work closely with union and republic leaders to identify likely food shortage areas in that vast country this winter and will discuss with them ways US farmers can help reduce their needs. ..........In the meantime, I have decided to take another step to ensure that the United States does everything possible to help with the food situation. The Administration will, therefore, make available today $585 million in credit guarantees for private sales of US agricultural commodities to the USSR. This makes immediately available all remaining credit guarantees originally scheduled to be offered through February 1992. This action will put more American grain and other food into the pipeline now so that it will arrive at its destination in time to be of assistance during the hard winter facing the Soviet people. So far this calendar year, US agricultural export credit guarantees will total $2.5 billion for the Soviet Union. The millions of tons of grain and other agricultural products shipped under these credit guarantees have kept American farm exports moving while making possible badly needed food imports into the Soviet Union. ..........These are exciting days, and we are at a historic juncture in US-Soviet relations. I am proud that America's agricultural abundance and expertise can play a crucial role in supporting the leaders--[Soviet] President Gorbachev, [Russian Republic] President Yeltsin, [Ukrainian] President [Leonid] Nazarbaev, and [Kazakhstan] Chairman [Nusulutan] Kravchuk--and others who are transforming their country and its relations with the rest of the world. We are with them, and working with them we strive to remake US-Soviet relations for a brighter and more peaceful future.
Presidential Mission Delegation
Edward R. Madigan, Secretary of Agriculture Richard T. Crowder, Under Secretary of Agriculture
Private Sector
Eddie L. Moyer, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Illinois Central Railroad Robert H. Peyton, President, Conagra Eastern Europe and USSR Russell Bragg, Pillsbury Howard S. Gochberg, Land O' Lakes Maurice Gordon, Farmer Majeed Gheissari, FMC Mark Kuechler, Division Manager, The Southland Distribution Centers Chester McCorkle, University of California Gary Ray, Group Vice President for Operations, Hormel Wayne A. Showers, President, Griffin ∧ Bran, Incorporated (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

US-German Joint Statement on the Transatlantic Community

Baker, Genscher Source: Secretary Baker, Foreign Minister Genscher Description: Text of joint statement by Secretary Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Washington, DC Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, North America Country: United States, Germany Subject: Democratization, CSCE, NATO [TEXT] Meeting today in Washington, Foreign Minister Genscher and Secretary Baker reviewed the next steps in strengthening and extending the transatlantic community. ..........They did so in the context of the dramatic changes brought about by two momentous developments: the ascendancy of the forces of reform in the Soviet Union and the initiative by President Bush to put behind us the balance of nuclear terror that characterized the Cold War and to achieve the goal of a just and lasting order of peace in Europe. They look forward to the NATO summit in Rome, the European Community summit in Maastricht, and the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Review Conference next year in Helsinki as key opportunities to help build a new system of cooperative security in Europe based on democracy and respect for the Helsinki principles which would complement and not detract from NATO and its indispensable role. On the first anniversary of German unification, Secretary Baker congratulated the Minister on the success of the German people and leaders in meeting the difficult challenge that it posed. Minister Genscher expressed appreciation for the strong and continuing support of the United States throughout the process of unification. ..........On behalf of the Government and people of Germany, Minister Genscher welcomed the President's initiative of September 27, which clearly signals to the leaders and peoples of the Soviet Union that the course that NATO is embarked on will enhance their security and build stability. It sends the same message to all the peoples of the transatlantic community and around the globe. It opens the door to an era of cooperation, peace, and common responsibility for the whole world. This initiative clearly demonstrates the enduring value of the close consultations which are the lifeblood of the NATO alliance and of the US-German relationship. They call on the Soviet Union to respond with equal boldness and imagination to President Bush's initiative. ..........Minister Genscher and Secretary Baker agreed that the President's initiative does even more than transform the European security landscape. It also helps immeasurably in the construction of the new Euro-Atlantic Commonwealth of free nations we are working to bring into being. In that context, the ministers today reviewed the successful implementation of many of the ideas in their May 10 statement and discussed their long-range political goals for this Euro-Atlantic community. They also surveyed progress made under the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 and considered future prospects. ..........The ministers agreed that the success of the forthcoming summit meetings of NATO and of the EC will be critical to this objective. Both institutions--as well as CSCE, WEU [Western European Union] , and the Council of Europe--are of fundamental importance to the stability and prosperity of Europe and of the wider Euro-Atlantic community. They are in the process of fundamental transformations which will ensure that they maintain their vitality. These processes are complementary and interdependent, and the ministers reiterated their commitment to work together with their counterparts to ensure the full success of both summits. ..........They agreed that, as Secretary Baker stated this June in Berlin, their common objective is a Euro-Atlantic community that extends east from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The Atlantic link, European integration, and cooperation with our Eastern neighbors are the linchpins of this community. Recent events have demonstrated once again the strength of this vision. Now, the Western allies, recognizing their common responsibility to help the reform efforts to succeed, must focus on the practical relationships that will help promote and secure for countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the institutions of democracy, free economies, and respect for human rights to which they have committed themselves. ..........Secretary Baker and Minister Genscher see a special place for CSCE in their vision of the future of Europe. They agreed that the CSCE has a unique role in both widening and deepening the reach of democracy throughout Europe, and that the NATO summit must, therefore, contribute to the further evolution of the CSCE process and its new institutions. The Rome summit should look to the 1992 Helsinki Review Conference, in the spirit of the contributions to the development of the CSCE made by NATO's London summit and Copenhagen declaration, to take major steps toward these goals. ..........NATO itself can directly contribute to the establishment of a strong democratic Europe, as it has done since its founding 42 years ago. NATO will work to adapt its structures to encompass European desires for a distinct security identity within the alliance and will encourage greater European responsibility for European defense. The development of a European security identity and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. ..........The ministers also agreed to work with their allied partners to develop NATO's new institutional relationship with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They believe that promoting democratic institutions and reform in the East complements the maintenance of a common defense in ensuring our security. In addition to moving ahead with the ideas they set forth in May, they believe that NATO should give serious consideration at its Rome summit to: ..........-- Formalizing the liaison relationship by establishing a more routine set of meetings among the Sixteen and the liaison countries, perhaps as a "North Atlantic Cooperation Council;" ..........-- Having such a council meet regularly at the ambassadorial level, and periodically at the ministerial level, and at other times as the NAC [North Atlantic Council] agrees that circumstances warrant; ..........-- Welcoming periodic liaison participation in meetings of NATO's Political and Economic Committees and policy planning sessions of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, as well as routine participation in NATO's Civilian Emergency Planning sessions and the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society; ..........-- Encouraging new civilian and military exchanges designed to promote Western concepts of civil-military relations; ..........-- Considering the dedication of NATO resources as available to the opening of NATO information offices in Eastern capitals; ..........-- Offering to commence planning with liaison countries for joint action on disaster relief and refugee programs, and pledging NATO's support for CSCE in dealing with these and other new security challenges in Europe; and ..........-- Examining on a priority basis the contribution that NATO can make to support efforts to convert defense industries in the emerging democracies to civilian production. ..........The ministers also noted the diversity of the ties that bind the members of the Atlantic community. In particular, they stressed that the successful completion of the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] is imperative if we are to be able successfully to pursue our common goals of economic growth, support for reform in the East and assistance to the poorer countries of the world. ..........In this connection, they expressed strong support for the efforts underway by President Gorbachev, President Yeltsin, and other union and republic leaders in the Soviet Union, together with the international financial institutions, to develop a new economic reform program. They expressed their readiness, together with other members of the international community, to provide humanitarian assistance to the Soviet Union to help meet the needs of the winter. They also pledged their continuing support for the efforts, undertaken in the context of the Group of 24, to provide assistance to the reforming economies of Central and Eastern Europe. They invite the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to join in the effort to promote democracy in the Soviet Union. ..........They noted that the situation in Yugoslavia poses a serious threat to peace and security in Europe. Secretary Baker expressed continued US support for the efforts of the European Community, in the context of the CSCE, to bring this crisis to a peaceful and democratic solution. ..........Finally, they called on their partners to join with them in seizing the extraordinary opportunity the end of Cold War has opened for the members of the Euro-Atlantic Community, and, indeed, for the entire world. Rarely have prospects been so bright, thanks in large part to the cooperation between Europe and North America to which both ministers re-dedicated their support. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

Engagement vs. Withdrawal: US Foreign Policy After the Cold War

Eagleburger Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger Description: Remarks at a Business Week Symposium, Washington, DC Date: Oct 3, 199110/3/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department, Democratization The recent collapse of the post-war international order has recently given rise to a vigorous debate within this country over American foreign policy and American purpose in a vastly changed and changing world. In a democracy such as ours, a debate of this kind is healthy and necessary. It enables us to examine old policies in order to determine their relevance to new circumstances--in Abraham Lincoln's words, it enables us to "think anew." ..........This debate has really only begun, and it is unlikely to produce a consensus until a new international order has taken shape--a seemingly elusive goal, at least for the foreseeable future. There is one aspect of the debate, however, which I find worrisome and which I would like to discuss today in view of its particular relevance to this distinguished group of corporate executives assembled here under the auspices of Business Week. ..........I am referring to a body of opinion which holds that the elements which made for American success in the Cold War are a liability in a post-Cold War world characterized by an entirely different set of challenges. To be precise, it is being said in some quarters that our military and diplomatic prowess will be, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, a handicap to us in the coming struggle to be waged largely on new issues and new challenges--most of which will be of an economic character. As a result, we are being urged to cut military spending drastically, and to cut back on overseas commitments, in order to gird ourselves for the remorseless economic combat which lies ahead. ..........At present this argument, at least in its extreme form, is coming mostly from the margins of the political spectrum. However, it is fairly clear that fertile ground exists within the body politic at large upon which such sentiments could grow. The fact is that the American people have a well-founded desire to see our domestic challenges addressed and to see our allies assume a greater and fairer share of international responsibilities. The danger is that these legitimate concerns may be exploited to undermine the public's support for the kind of US global leadership role which continues to be important--even in terms of the narrowest definition of our national interests.
US Well-Being and a Stable International Order
I do not intend to discuss the merits of particular foreign policy programs or commitments, and, as the person responsible for the State Department budget, I will be the first to admit that we need above all to prioritize in light of changing realities and constrained resources. But I do submit to you that fundamentally the United States is not overextended internationally, and I also submit that our domestic problems do not result from our engagements overseas or from the activist foreign policy we have pursued for the past 45 years. On the contrary, it is my belief that our national well-being, including the health of our economy, is dependent upon a stable international order--an order which will not exist if we do not shape and lead it. ..........And so, I would like to make the case today that what we did to win the Cold War is in fact very much relevant to the challenges we are now facing at home and abroad, and that we must ignore the siren song of those who urge us to "come home" and set aside the burden of world leadership which was thrust upon us 50 years ago this December. I suspect, or at least hope, that I am preaching to the converted here in this room, where there are many who are on the frontlines battling to keep America competitive in an intensely competitive global market. But the public as a whole will have to be persuaded that, having won the Cold War, we must now eschew disengagement and instead be willing to deal with the confusion and instability that inevitably will follow in the wake of that victory. ..........A wise man has said that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. We need to understand just how appalling the first half of the 20th century was--perhaps the most tragic 50- year period in recorded history--and how American disengagement helped contribute to the disasters of that time. We need to understand, as well, that American engagement and leadership helped make the Cold War which followed an era of stability and prosperity for ourselves and our Western partners. ..........History thus presents us with the example of two widely contrasting US foreign policy approaches in this century, with widely contrasting results. Now that we are entering a new era, it goes without saying that we must rethink our approach and make whatever changes are necessary to meet new challenges. But if we do not want the post-Cold War era to resemble the first half of this century --which it is already beginning to do in some ways--then we must identify what it is we did right during the Cold War and think long and hard before we jettison those policies. In short, we must take especial care not to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Past Reluctance To Assume Responsibility
The story of our Cold War accomplishments is rooted in the failure of European and American diplomacy to convert victory in World War I into a stable and durable peace. We entered that conflict to prevent an imperial power from bringing the European continent under its control. But having achieved that end with the military defeat of the Kaiser's Germany, we failed to render it secure because of our unwillingness to assume responsibilities commensurate with the global power we had come to possess. The result was a resurgence of a German threat to the European order, and a second world conflagration into which we were inevitably drawn. ..........As powerful as that lesson was, we very nearly succumbed once again to the temptation to disengage at the close of World War II. But with the Red Army at the gates and Western Europe lying in ruins, it became clear either that we would fashion a new international order ourselves or there would be no international order at all. Thus, for the first time in our history, we determined to assume risks, incur obligations, and make sacrifices on behalf of and in conjunction with other nations. In short, we contracted an entangling alliance, linking our destiny to that of distant peoples on a more or less permanent basis.
A Revolution in US Foreign Policy
This represented nothing less than a revolution in American foreign policy, completely at variance with our traditions and with our deepest inclination as a people. The architects of this revolution were men of vision and courage--Harry Truman, George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Dean Acheson, Arthur Vandenberg, and others, Republicans and Democrats--and they gave birth to a whole new world in which sovereign nations would coordinate their economic policies and collaborate on behalf of a common defense. Moreover, they institutionalized these novel patterns of international cooperation by creating multilateral bodies such as the IMF [International Monetary Fund], World Bank, OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and NATO. ..........It is inconceivable, in my view, that democratic movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union would have emerged were it not for the legacy of those pioneers. In the confrontation between a totalitarian colossus with seemingly limitless military resources and an alliance of parliamentary democracies, the line drawn against Soviet expansion held for 45 years. On our side of that line, behind NATO's shield, the West Europeans, fortified by the Marshall Plan, consolidated their democratic institutions, integrated their economies, and achieved phenomenal growth and prosperity. Meanwhile, those who lived behind the Iron Curtain drew inspiration from both the West Europeans' success and their impunity from Soviet intimidation and aggression. In the long run, the totalitarian system simply could not abide the example of freedom and prosperity on its doorstep. Unable to destroy that example, the system withered and died of its own internal contradictions. ..........Today as we contemplate our victory in the Cold War, it is sobering to realize that we have been this way before. Twice in the first half of this century we sacrificed greatly to defeat a foe which threatened to overwhelm our democratic friends and establish hegemony in Europe, only to see those victories either squandered or threatened in peacetime. Now, with the collapse of communism, we face yet again the temptation to disengage from involvement in world affairs and to turn in upon ourselves. ..........There are two ways of looking at the choice we now face. To my mind, it is axiomatic that we should maintain the basic approach which brought us not only victory, but peace and prosperity during the Cold War. To others, the end of the Cold War means, ipso facto, that a new era requires a new approach. ..........As before in this century, the way we resolve our dilemma of engagement versus withdrawal will go a long way toward determining, for better or worse, the shape of the world to come. We are simply too large for it to be otherwise. Meanwhile, the post-Cold War world is poised to go in one of two widely divergent directions. On the one hand it could go the way of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union these past 45 years, where repression did nothing to attenuate ethnic hatreds and national rivalries now coming out of the woodwork. History, there, could return with a vengeance, threatening the consolidation of democracy, and presaging a new disorder in the wake of the Cold War. ..........On the other hand, there is the example of what the Western nations have accomplished between and among themselves since World War II. In that brief period of time, ancient enmities have been buried, patterns of cooperation institutionalized, and armies integrated into a unified command instead of being arrayed against each other. History, there, has been transcended, and a model established which points the way to what the new world order could be like. ..........Clearly, then, we must try to build upon that model by continuing to link our destiny to that of our democratic partners. We must strengthen the institutions which have fostered multilateral cooperation and at the same time widen the democratic circle to include our former foes to the east. This was how we turned enemies into allies following World War II.
No Illusions of Easy Success
We should be under no illusion that maintaining, not to mention expanding, the legacy of post-war cooperation will be easy. Such cooperation was unprecedented in history, and it was imposed by circumstances which themselves were unprecedented and which exist no more--namely the rigidly bipolar logic of the Cold War system. Gone is the crusade against communism which reconciled Americans to their international responsibilities and made foreign policy what we often thought was a simple matter of choosing between good and evil. Gone, too, is a Soviet threat of such a magnitude as to force the Western democracies to compromise their differences and accommodate each other's interests on a continuing basis. ..........And yet, if we do not summon the will to learn from history, we may become victims of history once again. The fact is that we are dealing with a fragmenting world. The breakdown of the Cold War structure has translated into a loss of control of sovereign states over their internal affairs and of the international system over the behavior of its constituent members. The multipolar world to which we are returning is one in which nations will be tempted to go their own way with little regard for the common good or for the international order. Saddam Hussein, with his unchecked ambitions and his weapons of mass destruction, has given us a glimpse of what that world could look like. ..........Those who preach American disengagement do not have much to say about how we should deal with a fragmenting world, except to assert that what happens beyond our borders is of little significance. In truth, however, we cannot possibly shield ourselves from a host of international problems or their consequences, from debt to overpopulation, pollution to drug trafficking, terrorism to weapons proliferation. Perhaps most important of all, we cannot isolate ourselves from the fast- integrating global market, upon which we depend increasingly for jobs, technology, raw materials, and capital. That is why the maintenance of the world's free trading order ought to be our highest priority in foreign policy. Our economy depends upon it, and so does the peace and prosperity of a world that may begin to look like the 1930s in more ways than one unless we avoid a slide into protectionism.
US Foreign Policy Needs
In short, the United States requires a foreign policy which promotes a stable, though by no means static, international order. We have a stake, for example, in the success of the democratic and free market experiment underway in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which is measured in political, security and, ultimately, economic terms. Similarly, we are pursuing a vision of a hemispheric free trading zone which could energize US exports and strengthen democracy throughout the hemisphere for decades to come. ..........Thus in the final analysis the "America First" argument fails on its own terms--it fails to serve America's national interests by defining them too narrowly. We are very much a part of a world which cannot afford to do without the leadership role exercised by the United States over the past 50 years. We remain the only candidate with the wisdom, the experience, and the global reach needed for the job. Even our narrowest interests will suffer unless we continue to do our part to keep the forces of global anarchy at bay. ..........By the same token, it is absolutely true that our ability to exercise global leadership requires that we put our economic house in order here at home. And it is inevitable that we will come down from the Cold War high-water mark of overseas engagement and expenditure, and that we will look to our prosperous friends and allies to assume their proper share of global responsibilities. We did so after World War II; they must do so now. ..........We had better get used, however, to sharing with them, as well, decision-making on a host of issues where our views do not necessarily coincide. It is simply a fact of life in the post-Cold War era that "getting our way" will require compromise and engagement. If Saddam Hussein pointed to the path of global anarchy ahead, George Bush defined the only alternative: a world in which the United States serves as a leading and galvanizing force behind international cooperation and collective action. ..........We are, without doubt, entering a new and different world. The bad old days of potential nuclear holocaust are, hopefully, behind us forever. But poverty, hunger, competition for markets, rampant nationalism, and instability are with us still. If the 21st century is to be a time of hope rather than a replay of the first half of the 20th century, it will only be so because the United States was prepared to lead the way in making it so. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

Relations of the United States With The Soviet Union and the Republics

Zoellick Source: Robert B. Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs and Counselor Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization, State Department [TEXT] I am pleased to have this opportunity to report on recent events in the Soviet Union and the republics. I will stress five points: ..........First, the events of August 1991 in the Soviet Union constitute one of the undeniable watersheds of our age. As President Bush stated last week, "[t]his revival of history ushers in a new era, teeming with opportunities and perils." And the President took a major initiative in setting the course for this new age last Friday through his announcement of bold steps and proposals to reduce the nuclear threat. ..........Second, power has shifted almost completely to the republics of the Soviet Union; the fundamental question now is whether a new form of cohesion among them is possible or desirable. ..........Third, democratic reformers are now in key positions, but myriad threats lurk around them. Their success is by no means assured. ..........Fourth, in this new post-Cold War era, the US must continue to be deeply engaged with the Soviet Union and the republics--on matters of internal political evolution, economic reform, and foreign and security policy. ..........Fifth, we need a sensible and realistic basis for assessing what constitutes successful policy in this time of transition.
A New Era of History
Government officials are frequently accused, fairly I suppose, of over-dramatizing changes in policy or events. Not this time. We have leapt into a new era of history. ..........Consider the situation in the wake of the failed Apparatchik Counterrevolution. The Russian Empire, and then the Communist Empire that succeeded it, have been among the great forces that determined the history of Europe, Asia, and indeed the world, for the past three centuries. That empire is now shattered. The Communist Party that ran it is banned or suspended in its homeland, its assets have been taken away, and it is under investigation. A country that reaches across 11 time zones is in the throes of political, economic, and social upheaval. ..........It may be many years before this new age settles into its own pattern. Even the first label in common usage--the post-Cold War era--reflects the fact that to date its single most dominant characteristic is the abandonment of the Cold War that came before. (Indeed, a former colleague recalled the story of the Chinese historian who, when asked recently to comment on the historical consequences of the French Revolution, responded, "It is too soon to tell.") ..........In grasping for historical analogies, it is natural to seize on other lost, multinational empires--for example, the Austro- Hungarian or the Ottoman. Like earlier multinational empires that fragmented, our long-standing antagonist is struggling to determine how the pieces might relate to one another. But I would also like to draw attention to another point of comparison: the dangers and opportunities that the United States faced in the aftermath of World War II, when we reached out to former enemies, Germany and Japan, helping to establish them as democratic market economies and allies. Now the Cold War has ended. Many of the new leaders in the Soviet Union and the republics are looking to the United States to help guide them into becoming contributors in the democratic community of nations. ..........Last week at the United Nations, President Bush referred to the challenges of building peace and prosperity as we face this "resumption of history." Last Friday, the President outlined steps we will take, and others that we propose, to stand down from the tense nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union--a state of imminent danger that my generation had etched onto its early consciousness in 1962 and had expected to have persist through its existence. ..........The new security environment that President Bush hopes to establish also has enormous political implications for the future. As Secretary Baker stated this June in Berlin, "The door to the Euro- Atlantic community is open. But only the Soviets can decide to step over the threshold." ..........The agents of the old Soviet regime did not want to take that step. But ironically, their actions in August to backtrack ended up toppling them and sending the Soviet Union and its republics stumbling ahead. The direction is right, but there are serious questions as to whether new leaders of reform can keep their footing. ..........The reformers are attempting to transform the traditional institutions of repression in the Soviet Union. Their effort with the KGB and the Army may offer one of the most startling examples of the Soviet Union's metamorphosis. ..........Vadim Bakatin, the new head of the KGB, told us in September that he intended to cut back many of the KGB's activities and establish those that remain on a legal foundation. Bakatin was particularly interested in learning more about the legal and oversight systems that Western countries have developed for their intelligence services. Nor were these just musings; he demonstrated the detailed knowledge he had already obtained about Western legislation on wiretaps. Bakatin also seemed eager to strengthen exchanges with the CIA. While our anti-terrorism discussions with the KGB have already broken new and potentially beneficial ground, Bakatin's interest clearly extended further. He wanted to draw from the experience of Western intelligence agencies to establish the KGB as a responsible institution in the new Soviet society. ..........One important element of Bakatin's strategy is to bring in new people and then build up new leaders who are committed to reform. The new democrats were deeply troubled by the quiescence of many officials during the August coup. ..........The new ways have dangers of their own, of course. One Russian told us that when the new head of the KGB for a large city asked what he was supposed to do, he was told that one task alone would ensure success: He was to make sure his democratic bosses were alerted in advance of any other coup attempt. ..........The new Minister of Defense, Air Marshal Shaposhnikov, also outlined his intention to redirect a defense establishment that for decades had been a pillar of the totalitarian state. He is seeking to build upon the military's pride in being an army of the people. At critical moments in Russian and Soviet history, the military became the embodiment of the Motherland. Shaposhnikov is proud that during the critical moments of August, this army of the people would not fire on them. ..........But Shaposhnikov is not content with an army guided by its heart; he wants to support these impulses by winning over the minds of soldiers and civilians alike. His strategy, like Bakatin's, is to establish a Defense Ministry and military subject to civilians and the rule of law. ..........Shaposhnikov intends to reduce the size of his forces and to increase the role of volunteers. He plans to transform the military to reflect a new state of center-republic relations. He speculated about working out legal arrangements with each republic, establishing clearly that the military's role would be to defend, and not to interfere, in the republics. Indeed, his questions about US stationing and status of forces arrangements abroad appeared to be a search for appropriate models. ..........I was struck particularly by Shaposhnikov's interest in the US code of military justice and our military police. He wants to build public legitimacy for the Soviet Army. And he believes that to do so, the civilian public must trust that the military adheres to the rule of law in its own internal affairs as well as toward the society at large. Given all the demands on Shaposh-Shaposhnikov's time, his attention to this means of building the military's place in a civilian society suggested to me that a very new man is in charge. ..........The democrats hope to transform the old institutions of repression into what they describe as a "safety net" for democracy. They can build on the fact that during the August coup many people in the security apparat simply refused to act against democratic leaders or, just as important, against the people in the streets. Nevertheless, it will take time for the new thinking to be accepted by all the old rank and file. ..........It is too early to know whether these courageous leaders will succeed. If this is indeed a second Russian revolution, we must also face up to the fact that the furies of revolutions have frequently created consequences that were impossible to foresee or control. The forces now unleashed in the Soviet Union could lead to disintegration and conflict that could plague Eurasia and the world for decades to come. One or more autocrats may seek to impose dominating authority at a terrible price, as Lenin was able to do after the Civil War period. Whatever the course of the future, we can shape it only if we recognize that the policy framework that we have used for the Soviet Union over the past 40 years is now history.
The Great Power Shift: The Dominance of the Republics
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the post-coup environment is the dramatic shift of power from the center to the republics. Almost overnight, the key question about the political compact has been transformed: Before August, we asked what would be the division of political power between the center and the republics; today the question is whether cohesion among republics is possible.
1. From the Center to the Republics to...
Mayor Popov of Moscow placed this dramatic development within a context. He outlined three different stages of political contract and related them to the reform impulse. In the first, Gorbachev had tried to reform Soviet society from the center. Like Peter the Great or Alexander II, the other great Russian modernizers who preceded him, Gorbachev had launched an era of reform from above. ..........But as the reforms met resistance from the established order, an order based on the entrenched power of highly centralized institutions, some Soviets--Russians and non-Russians--speculated that the route to reform would have to run through the individual republics. But this second alternative, while theoretically possible, also confronted many obstacles. It divided the combined force of reformers. Nationalism, and old animosities, at times superseded the drive for democracy and market reforms. Moreover, the republics were linked by a highly centralized industrial structure, and even if the old economic structure could be overcome, autarkic republics would forgo the potential benefits from higher degrees of integration. ..........Popov's third stage was a division of labor between the center and the republics. The first effort to legally establish such an allocation of power came from the center earlier this year when Gorbachev negotiated the one-plus-nine agreement--Gorbachev plus nine republic leaders--that was to lead to the new union treaty. Indeed, it was the prospect of signing that treaty in late August that probably led the coup plotters to act when they did. But in the aftermath of the coup, Popov concluded, only what he labels a "nine- plus-one arrangement" is possible. By this he means it is up to the independent republics to determine what authorities they will cede to a new center. ..........Another Russian reformer was even more explicit about the loss of central authority, at least in economic matters. The concept of one-plus-others is gone, he said. The question now is whether they'll even have a zero-plus-nine or -twelve or some other number. Thus, he believes that any common economic authority will have to be newly created by the republics.
2. A Crisis of Legitimacy
I suspect that the underlying problem of fragmentation runs even deeper than a shift of power to the republics. We are already seeing signs that subordinate groups or regions within the republics are questioning republican authority as well. ..........In testimony I gave to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February of this year, I stated that the fundamental problem confronting all leaders and governments in the Soviet Union is to overcome a crisis of legitimacy. As perestroika and glasnost gave people the freedom to question, as the grip of fear loosened, people would not follow a leadership that had no right to govern. That is still a primary problem today. It is true for both the center and many republics. ..........During the winter and early spring, the Soviet leadership tried to cope with the crisis of legitimacy by restoring order. They falsely equated order with political legitimacy. And for them, order depended on authority. ..........But equating legitimacy with order and authority turned out to be a backward formula. The heavy hand of authority could not restore order in the Baltics, at least not at a price the leadership was willing to pay. Nor could authority reorder a broken down economy or currency. The leadership failed to reestablish the power of the center through national institutions like the Army, the KGB, and the Communist Party. Then when Gorbachev tried to reestablish political legitimacy based on a new Union Treaty linked to the development of a new constitution and elections, the old Communist boyars made their last gasp through the coup. The brave and successful resistance mobilized by President Yeltsin around the Russian Republic doomed the old center that Gorbachev had sought to maintain through a new union treaty. ..........So we are now in a period when the republics are seeking to establish their legitimacy. They have declared independence. Now they must determine what independence means for their people and the relation of republics to one another. ..........We have also seen that one cannot necessarily equate republics with reform. After decades of a Cold War waged against the totalitarian center, some assumed that those within the Soviet Union who opposed this center must also stand for the democratic principles the center crushed. And in fact, as the old central authorities delayed or retreated, many republics had become the driving forces for reform. But we have already seen, in a relatively short time, that the republics also have a mixed record. Some leaders are using the disintegration of central authority to maximize their own power at home. Others use violence and intimidation against those who challenge them and to threaten minorities within their republics. ..........We need to be careful not to examine the development of republican independence solely through the lens of our conceptions of the nation-state. Nationalism, one of the momentous movements of the 19th and 20th Centuries in the rest of the world, has followed a somewhat different course in the Soviet Union. Russian nationalism has existed for some time, but it had been harnessed to serve the ends of Soviet Communism. Russian chauvinism had antagonized many other peoples in the USSR. Now the national movements in the border republics have been freed to define their own national characters and their origins in culture, literature, language, territory, and history; they are still evolving and still exploring how they relate to one another. While many of the nationalisms have old and distinguished lineages, the relation between nationalism and the state is frequently not yet well defined. ..........Moreover, the national movements do not fit neatly within republic boundaries. One in five Soviet citizens lives outside his or her ethnic republic or area. So there is substantial potential for friction and conflict between republic governments and national movements. ..........Ultimately, political legitimacy, and the stability that it offers, must be based on consent of the governed. That's one reason why President Yeltsin, one of the few leaders elected by his people, has a particularly important role to play. Republican independence must be complemented by democracy. ..........Yet the rule of the majority must respect the rights of the minority. As Thomas Jefferson stated in his First Inaugural Address: "Though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; the minority possess their equal right, which equal laws must protect, and to violate which would be oppression."
3. Cooperation Among Independent Republics
The newly independent republics also need to recognize the benefits of integrating or coordinating structures. This is not the same as seeking a recentralization of power. As former Secretary of State Kissinger pointed out recently in a thoughtful op-ed piece, the highly centralized Russian state --through different leaders, ideologies, and centuries--has relied on hegemonic armed forces and outward expansion to try to dominate at least two continents. But autarkic republics, suspicious and perhaps even hostile to one another, pose dangers, too. ..........In particular, cooperation among republics may be important in: -- Avoiding ethnic discord and even civil war; -- Enhancing security, particularly through the central command and control of nuclear weapons; and -- Strengthening the prospects for a successful economic reform program. ..........Given the ethnic patchwork of the Soviet Union, some basic cohesion may be important to stave off disintegration. The importance of some cooperation among the republics was driven home to us by our conversations a few weeks ago with Aleksandr Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, and other reform leaders. They were particularly anxious about the Ukraine. Of the 52 million people in the Ukraine, an estimated 11 million are Russian; many have intermarried. While Yakovlev and Shevardnadze acknowledged the fact of the Ukraine's independence, they also pointed out the danger that if the Ukraine totally disassociates itself from Russia, large Russian minorities in places like Kharkov, the Donbas, Odessa, and the Crimea may try to secede. If the Russians in the Ukraine leave, they continued, the Russians that comprise 38 percent of the population in Kazakhstan may decide they, too, wish to restore ties with Russia. A divided Kazakhstan could spur the rise of a new Islamic tide across the southern reaches of the Soviet Union. The two reformers concluded this could have far-reaching spillover effects--not only on the Islamic neighbors, but also in nearby multi-ethnic nations like India. ..........This may well be an overly fearful picture. But these men are serious observers, and their warnings bear careful reflection on the part of all sides. It will be particularly important for Russian leaders to demonstrate to non-Russians that they will be able to receive fair treatment and can exert equitable influence in any arrangements that are struck. ..........Some cohesion is important for security and stability, too. Central control of nuclear forces is critical to preventing proliferation. Eurasian stability also will not be served by the creation of large, independent republican armies. Nor can economic reform be pursued by small states striving to build military establishments. ..........Finally, there are significant economic reasons for some common policies among republics. As the United States has demonstrated for over 200 years and as the Western Europeans have also learned, there are substantial economic benefits to a large internal market unhindered by trade barriers. Indeed, it is vital that the reform leaders finally move ahead with a serious, comprehensive program for a market economy, and that effort will be far harder if the republics cannot agree on common economic policies. ..........Robert Hormats elucidated this point in his recent testimony before the Senate. One of the legacies of Stalin and his successors is a highly interdependent structure of production. Hormats reported that one recent Soviet study examining 6000 different products determined that about three quarters were supplied by just one producer. Soviet industrialists told him that single factory monopolies tend to be the rule, not the exception, and that they account for an estimated 30-40 percent of industrial output. The CIA has pointed out that "the Soviet Union's entire output of potato, corn and cotton harvesting equipment comes from single factories--all in different republics." ..........This extraordinary economic monopolization already makes price decontrol exceedingly difficult; if the republics do not maintain open trade and agree to instituting reforms at a roughly similar pace, the already substantial dislocations will intensify. Similarly, the development of a macro-economic stabilization program--to establish some steady value for a currency--depends on sound monetary and fiscal policies. These policies depend, in turn, on agreements to cut spending, collect revenues, and control the money supply. Therefore, one of the critical challenges facing the people of the Soviet Union is how to strike the appropriate balance between smaller, independent political units and cohesion that recognizes economic and political interdependencies. This is not a new question, and the leaders of the republics can draw from the experiences of others as they search for answers.
4. Balancing the Devolution and Evolution of Sovereignty
As Secretary Baker pointed out in a speech in Berlin this June, one of the most striking phenomena across all of Europe today is the combined and simultaneous devolution and evolution of the nation- state. While the nation-state remains by far the most significant political unit, its political role is being increasingly supplemented by both supranational and subnational units. ..........In Western Europe, an intense and comprehensive voluntary evolution of governing authority above the national level has been accompanied by the devolution of power to state and local governments, to regions that sometimes cross national borders, and to the private sector. In Central and Eastern Europe, and now clearly in the Soviet Union as well, devolution is certainly the more prominent phenomenon. The collapse of Communism has freed ethnicity to re-emerge as a powerful political force, threatening to erect new divisions between countries and, even more acutely, within multinational states. ..........Evolution and devolution need not be alternatives, but instead can be complementary, and indeed interdependent developments. The foundation must be democracy and grassroots involvement in political processes. The challenge for democracy is to encompass, to represent, but also to transcend, ethnic ties on the basis of common values. ..........The United States balances democracy and diversity through federalism. The architects of a united Europe have adopted the principal of "subsidiarity"--the devolution of responsibility to the lowest level of government capable of performing it effectively. By the same token, it makes sense for the various parts of the Soviet Union to consider balancing devolution of authority with the voluntary common delegation of powers for basic matters such as defense, trade, monetary systems, and the protection of basic human rights--particularly equal treatment of minorities. Given the strength of the drive for independence, it may take time before the citizens of the republics are willing to consider such combinations--but the need will not go away. ..........In 1945, much of Western Europe was broken, hungry, and hostile. But the integration of Western Europe within the EC and NATO has virtually transcended all the old territorial disputes, irredentist claims, and ethnic grievances among and within their member states. Euro-Atlantic integration has made it literally inconceivable that localized disputes could become a source for serious conflict among these states. The incentives for cooperation within these multi- and supranational frameworks are overwhelmingly high compared to with the remaining areas of discord. ..........Eventually, similar structures will have to develop to shape interdependence with and among the lands of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union if they are to ever share in comparable levels of peace and prosperity. The processes of evolution and devolution need to be kept in constructive equilibrium. Only by achieving balanced progress in both directions can the individual be assured a voice in a democratic and interdependent world.
5. In Sum
In sum, although power has now shifted to the republics, the crisis of political legitimacy remains acute. The fragmentation of authority could continue--down to still smaller units--if the new leaders fail to establish legitimacy through democracy with respect for minority rights. A preoccupation with republican independence is yesterday's battle, a conflict waged and won against totalitarian central authority. Decentralized power in the republics will not necessarily overcome ethnic strife or economic autarchy. At this point in time, an ongoing reform effort needs to turn to these new challenges. We need only look as far as Yugoslavia to see the costs of devolution that slides into disintegration.
An Opportunity for Democracy
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Aleksandr Yakovlev told us that he and his fellow democrats owed a great debt of thanks to the coup plotters. Those eight men, he explained, had opened the way for the democrats to propel reform five or ten years ahead. Old apparatchiks could be moved to the side. The confrontation had produced a real revolution in the minds of the people. Power was now with the democrats. But Yakovlev still asked, "Can we cope?" ..........There is now a great opportunity to launch true, far-reaching reforms in the Soviet Union and its republics. Conditions at home remain extraordinarily difficult. The old command economy has broken down, but no market system exists to succeed it. The traditional system of authority has collapsed, but the forces of the new, roughedged pluralism have yet to work out cooperative arrangements so that they can design and implement a program. ..........The democrats recognize that they must build a stronger base of support. One reform leader told us that during the coup the democrats drew vital support from the "oppositionists". These people are not necessarily the same as democrats. They have rejected the old Communist ways, but as of yet they do not have a deep commitment to any successor system. ..........Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Popov, Sobchak, Stankevich and others launched in July 1991 a new Movement for Democratic Reform. At present, it is an umbrella organization that draws from the various fledgling democratic parties that had already been forming, as well as from new participants. They are working to avoid the traditional Russian reform problem of failing to link the intelligentsia with other groups. Interestingly, Shervardnadze told us that two core groups of support were young people and some leaders in the defense industrial sector. The latter--intelligent, technologically sophisticated leaders--recognize that the old system does not work, and they believe there is an opportunity to put their skills to use in a market economy. ..........The greatest danger the reformers now face is the discrediting of democracy. The average man or woman on the street seems sullen, tired of talk. The new parliaments, like the old Dumas of 1905-17, seem to offer high drama, but no change for the better. One person summarized the situation with an anecdote: The first person who puts vodka on the shelves, she said, will carry the day. Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who seem to be working in concert, both told us: We need to help people. ..........Gorbachev also told us that the coup removed the head of the serpent, but a large body of traditionalists remains. He pointed to two significant risks. First, indifference and apathy would weigh down efforts to stimulate a new political and economic system. Alternatively, frustrations might build into an acute response, a demand for action, any action. ..........Authoritarian strains run deep in Russian and Soviet society. At some point, desperate people may turn back to the autocrat who claims a firm hand is needed to pull people back up. Yet the coup demonstrated that an organized resistance, assembled around newly elected leaders, could defeat authoritarians. Moreover, important groups--including the Army and parts of the KGB--would not intervene against the democrats. Frankly, the big unknown variable is the legendary ability of the Russian people to endure. ..........A visitor to Moscow or St. Petersburg knows that winter is coming. Perhaps because winter has played such a major role in Russian history, defeating invaders and leaders alike, the encroaching winter appears to be taking on a symbolic feature of challenge. While the task ahead for the democrats will of course extend much beyond the next six months, the new democratic mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg are mobilizing to meet the needs of their publics over this period. ..........For Mayor Sobchak of St. Petersburg and other new, dynamic leaders, these preparations are part of a larger strategy: They understand people need confidence in the future; they need hope; they need some examples of success. Sobchak also recognizes that the spirit of the people needs to be invigorated by their own sense of what they can accomplish, not by what others can give to them. ..........These are proud people. They want their accomplishments and potential--which are great--to be recognized. They want our support and cooperation. But they prefer investments or loans to handouts. Perhaps the most encouraging sign is that the type of leaders who will need to step forward if Russia and the other republics are going to be successful--people like Sobchak and Nazarbayev of Kazahkstan--recognize that the great opportunities to be seized and the dangers to be avoided ultimately depend on tapping the creativity and energy of the people they represent.
A Policy of Active US Engagement With the Soviet Union and the Republics
Throughout four decades of Cold War, America's relations with the Soviet Union were the primary preoccupation of our foreign policy. Although the old Communist regime is now gone, it would be a tremendous mistake to disengage just as the Soviet Union and its republics are moving into a critical stage of transition. The United States continues to have strong national interests in the course of events in that country. US policy towards the Soviet Union and the republics must continue to adapt to meet changed and changing circumstances. ..........One strong national interest draws from a strain of our foreign policy that dates back to our earliest days as a nation. The United States has always viewed itself as a practical experiment in liberty and democracy. And we have welcomed, encouraged and, when possible, even protected those who aspire to these same values. This is the important element of idealism in American foreign policy. Today's events in the Soviet Union and its republics offer one of our greatest historical opportunities to promote those values, and through doing so, to foster a democratic partner that can help us address other challenges around the world. ..........But America's statecraft has also sought to blend realism with this idealism. In this situation, our realistic national self- interests also dictate serious engagement. There is the potential for a democratic and market-oriented Soviet Union to contribute to global peace, stability, and prosperity. ..........But even if this potential fails to be fulfilled, we have an interest in precluding a return to an authoritarian state or states that may threaten neighbors. Within the past two centuries, the armies of Russia and the Soviet Union have marched from the shores of the Pacific to Paris and Berlin. Today, the borders of the Soviet Union mark an arc of other lands in transition: from the aspiring democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, through the Islamic lands of the Mideast, on to South Asian countries struggling with their own religious and national conflicts, and extending to the Communists of Eastern and Northern Asia who are trying to bolster bankrupt regimes. A large share of the world's nuclear weapons remains in the Soviet Union. Various republics have great factories for producing advanced conventional weapons, and some may be already looking for new markets in the world's troublespots. Upheaval in the heart of Eurasia could threaten the very countries that are our primary allies and economic partners. ..........In sum, because of both our ideals and our self-interest, our foreign policy must continue to direct considerable energy and creativity to the Soviet Union and its republics. ..........Let me briefly highlight our thinking on three topics: (1) political evolution; (2) economic reform; and (3) foreign and security policy.
1. Political Evolution
Our policy towards the political evolution of the Soviet Union needs to respect the fluidity of the situation. And we must acknowledge the limits of any outsider's ability to affect the future course of events. ..........This is a key point: The fundamental need to establish political legitimacy can only be accomplished by the people of the Soviet Union and its republics. It's up to them to determine the outcome, not us. ..........But we are not disinterested bystanders. Many Soviet reformers, people of great reputation at home and abroad, have told us that the opinions of the Western democracies, and in particular the United States, are important. And although it is not our place to delineate the final outcome of the new political arrangements, we can speak to the process by which the decisions are reached. ..........Therefore, we have informed the leaders of the Soviet Union and its republics that our policies towards them will be guided by five principles set out by Secretary Baker on September 4: ..........First, they should determine the future of the country peacefully, consistent with democratic values and practices, and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. ..........Second, we urge respect for existing borders, internal and external; any change of borders should only occur by peaceful and consensual means, consistent with CSCE principles. ..........Third, all levels of government should be based on democracy and the rule of law, especially through elections. ..........Fourth, all parties should safeguard human rights, based on full respect for the individual and including equal treatment of minorities. ..........Fifth, we urge respect for international law and existing international obligations. ..........These principles are of course not only applicable to the Soviet Union. They are drawn from the core principles of CSCE, the Helsinki Process, including the Charter of Paris. They have been adopted by 38 countries reaching from North America throughout Europe. ..........These principles are not mere guidelines. They are also standards of accountability. Those Soviet leaders and peoples who adhere to these principles should know they are building the only sure basis for our support and assistance. ..........That's the message Secretary Baker conveyed to all Soviet and republic leaders when he went to the Soviet Union last month. That's a message we've asked our allies to reinforce. And that's a message we ask the Congress to support, too. ..........I would also draw special attention to the fact that human rights remains at the heart of our policy toward the USSR and the republics. It is as important now as ever before, as the republics gain authority over such issues as emigration and other fundamental human liberties. Some of the republics are potential abusers of human rights. So we're making very clear to all of them that human rights, including equal rights for minorities, must be respected and that their behavior in this regard will be a major factor in determining our engagement with them. ..........As I pointed out in February, we also need to try to manage uncertainty by multiplying our points of access within a society that is transforming itself. We have been working for some time to expand our contacts with republic and local leaders. This has included a program of "circuit riders"--regular visits by US Embassy officials to republics where they can develop special ties. These contacts need to be strengthened further through opening new American consulates or "small posts" in various republics. We have sought ways to support democrats, free trade unions, the development of a free media, and market reformers. We have recently proposed Peace Corps programs. ..........We also believe that it's time for the Soviet Union and the US to eliminate the impediments to human contacts that are among the most pernicious legacies of the Cold War. We urge Soviet agreement to our "Open Lands" proposal that would open all closed areas in both countries to travel by each others' citizens. We are also eager to work to lift onerous travel controls, visa restrictions, and other barriers to regular contacts between our citizens. ..........Our efforts are designed to expand our contacts with the full range of important groups in the newly pluralistic Soviet Union. Indeed, the need may be greatest with "swing groups", such as the Soviet military and the defense industrial complex. These remain powerful institutions or groups, and they reflect the anxiety that troubles much of the society. No Soviet leader will be able to ignore the military's concern about housing and jobs for the troops withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics. No economic reform program will be politically successful if it does not address the fears of the skilled and influential workers in the defense industrial sector.
2. Economic Reforms
Market economic reforms also must catch up with the new political freedom. ..........The most obvious need is to offer humanitarian support to ensure that basic needs are met during the winter. We have already sent two high-level missions to evaluate needs and distribution problems throughout the Soviet Union. This week Secretary Madigan is leading another team, including a number of private business executives. Since a significant dimension of the food problem is the failure to acquire, transport, store, and distribute foodstuffs effectively, an important part of USDA's work is to identify ways to help the Soviets and the republics introduce markets, thus fully utilizing what they produce. We are also sharing our assessments with the other G-7 countries, and our experts will meet within about a week to strengthen our cooperation. ..........In the meantime, we have decided to accelerate the availability of the $1.5 billion of CCC credit guarantees that the President announced this June, and increased the coverage, so the Soviets can secure credit to buy large quantities of American grain and other basic foodstuffs. (This $1.5 billion is in addition to $1 billion of CCC credit guarantees we provided in December 1990.) And we are examining other possibilities to meet emergency food needs. ..........Since early this year, we have worked with Project Hope to deliver urgently needed medical supplies directly to target locations. A number of US pharmaceutical firms have made generous in-kind donations to this effort. So far, we have sent shipments to the Ukraine, the Aral Sea region of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and Moscow, and we have others planned for the Urals industrial region and elsewhere. AID is working with Project Hope to extend and expand this program. ..........The second element of our economic effort is to work with the Soviet Union and its republics to develop expeditiously a serious and comprehensive market economic reform plan. The new Special Association with the IMF and World Bank, first proposed by President Bush last December, enables the reformers to start working right away with Western experts to develop a reform program that meets the standards of the international economic community. It is very important that the reforms meet these standards--not because Western governments want to establish hurdles, but because these reforms are the key to tapping the Soviet Union's own considerable resources and talents. Private capital will only invest where businesses determine the mix of return and risk to be worthwhile. The critical fact is that given the size of the Soviet economy, even large infusions of funds from Western governments would be insufficient to make a difference on the fundamental question of economic growth. We don't do the new reform leaders any favor by obscuring the fact that only private capital flows will enable them to create growth and jobs. ..........Most economists could probably agree on the components of a suitable market economic reform plan for the Soviet Union. That's not the problem. The plan will need to include the clear establishment of property and contract rights, privatization, competition among producers, macroeconomic stabilization, price decontrol, and some narrowly delineated system to ensure that the general public receives necessities in the aftermath of price decontrol and before producers respond to price signals by increasing supplies. The difficult task is the sequencing of these actions. ..........There is no doubt that the implementation of such a plan would be difficult. But as we have told the Soviets for years now, the situation will not get better while they wait. Indeed, I believe it is imperative to act promptly so as to draw upon public support in the aftermath of the coup. I believe leading reform economists, such as Grigory Yavlinskiy, share this perspective. But they are struggling at present to secure a new economic treaty among republics that might enable them to have the authority to implement such a plan. ..........The third component of our economic engagement is an enhanced program of technical cooperation. We began this effort in the autumn of 1989; now we need to expand it. As you are aware, the Administration is seeking authorization from Congress to spend a limited sum of foreign assistance monies for technical assistance to the Soviet Union and the republics. ..........Our political assistance will concentrate on helping to build democratic institutions. ..........Our present economic priorities are: ..........-- Improvements in the food distribution system, so the Soviets can use their own resources to help meet basic needs. ..........-- Promotion of private investment in the energy sector, which could help the Soviets and the republics increase their hard currency earnings in the medium term. ..........-- Support for defense conversion, which, while extraordinarily difficult, is obviously highly significant politically and economically. ..........-- Finally, we need to expand our efforts to train people in the basics of business and to improve the understanding of how a market economy works. ..........President Bush sought to lend high visibility to the priority of helping to build a private sector by hosting a large breakfast for business entrepreneurs when he visited Moscow. The Commerce Department has begun an internship program with American businesses, which we would like to expand. The Peace Corps has proven helpful in Central and Eastern Europe at a low cost, and we are examining whether we might draw on its skills in this area in the Soviet Union. In addition, as Secretary Brady has suggested, we are working on ways to draw on the capabilities of our private sector, including through groups like the Citizen Democracy Corps. ..........We hope the Congress will be able to support our efforts by authorizing expenditures for enhanced technical assistance to help build democracy and a market economy, by repealing the Stevenson and Byrd limitations on our credit programs, and by ratifying the Trade Agreement.
3. Foreign and Security Policy
Our third area of engagement is through our foreign policy agenda. We are pleased with the accomplishments in this realm to date, but we have much more to do. Our strategy since 1989 has been to explore and develop possible "points of mutual advantage" for both the United States and the Soviet Union. We probed the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, seeking to shape and, where possible, to alter Soviet policy calculations so that they might face up to the contradictions between the new thinking and old habits. This strategy required us to broaden and deepen our agenda with the Soviets. ..........Our first objective was to work with the Soviets to overcome the division of Europe, the original cause of the Cold War. Our cooperative approach avoided singularizing or isolating any party that respected moves towards freedom. The Iron Curtain was scrapped, and we achieved German unification peacefully and democratically. The Baltics have been freed. Although many Soviet troops still need to return home from Germany, Poland, the Baltics and Cuba, we are close to achieving some of the key goals of US foreign policy for over 45 years. ..........Second, we stressed our common interest in resolving regional conflicts peacefully, often seeking to rely on elections as a means of establishing legitimacy and the local popular will. To create an appropriate context for elections, we sought to use our respective influence to persuade conflicting parties that the use of arms would not produce an enduring solution. This has been the approximate formula for our cooperative efforts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan. The experience provided the basis for the immediate, joint US-Soviet denunciation of Iraq's attack on Kuwait, which in turn provided the basis for unprecedented UN and multinational action. ..........Since the failed August coup, the pathways of cooperation that we established have multiplied. We have agreed with the Soviets to cut off all arms to the antagonists in Afghanistan by the end of the year. The Soviet Union has agreed to withdraw its troops from Cuba and put its economic relationship with Cuba on a commercial basis. We hope the increasing isolation of Castro will eventually persuade him that the people of Cuba can only prosper if they are given the freedom that more and more people around the world now enjoy. There also now is a chance that the rebels in El Salvador recognize there is no future in killing, and that both sides of that deeply wounded society have decided to try to leave hatred behind for peaceful reconciliation. There may be possibilities for returning the Northern Territories to Japan, ending one of the last territorial disputes of World War II. Finally, we are working with the Soviets to launch a Mideast peace conference. ..........Third, over the past two years, we have deepened and expanded the arms control agenda. This led to landmark agreements on conventional forces, strategic arms, and chemical weapons destruction. We still must focus on the ratification and complete implementation of such agreements. ..........But now we can also move to a different threshold of accomplishment. President Bush pointed the way to a whole new attitude toward nuclear weapons, stability, and security in his Friday address. ..........Indeed, inherent in the President's message was an important theme: The dangers that we, and the Soviets, will face in the future are more likely to come from rogue third parties than from one another. So it makes sense that our arms control thinking shift increasingly to the risks of proliferation and regional conflicts. ..........Our fourth objective was to launch joint efforts to solve transnational problems of common interest, such as narcotics, terrorism, and the environment. Now this work must increasingly involve republic leadership. ..........In sum, our foreign policy agenda remains rich in potential. As we sweep away the items on the old agenda, it is our intention to move to a new agenda, one where we hope the changing Soviet Union can act increasingly as a partner in addressing future problems.
Defining Policy Success
I would like to conclude by raising a point that might seem somewhat unusual, but which I believe is important as the United States considers its future relations with the Soviet Union and the republics. We are likely to be working through a transitional period for what could be a considerable period of time. So we need to reflect carefully on what we would consider to be the results of a successful policy. ..........I suspect we would generally share a sense of the objectives on the foreign policy agenda I outlined. But what constitutes success in the other dimensions of our policy--especially those related to political evolution and economic reform? ..........Frankly, we should not be surprised if the Soviet Union and its republics are not able to completely transform themselves into a stable, prosperous democracy or democracies on the Western European model within the next few years. ..........Nevertheless, there are numerous results short of that goal that might be possible. These intermediate results could prove beneficial to the United States and the world at large. And they could be steps on a pathway to a tremendous achievement. ..........I suggest that we direct our efforts at maintaining the conditions in which democratic and market economic reformers can continue to strive to bring the Soviet Union within the larger Euro- Atlantic community. We should expect that there will be setbacks. We should expect that some republics will go through periods of struggle, violence, factionalism, and even a return to the old tools of repression. But these twists and turns should not dissuade us from continuing to encourage and support those who continue the effort to embrace the five political principles I outlined above. ..........For 45 years, other Americans held fast so that freedom and liberty could finally light the lives of hundreds of millions of people frozen in a backward and frightening age. These people will need the leadership, spirit, and example that only America can supply. And subsequent generations of Americans will be better off for our continued effort. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

Crisis in Yugoslavia

Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Deputy Secretary Eagleburger met yesterday afternoon with Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Kosutic. ..........The Deputy Secretary referred to the Secretary's statement on Yugoslavia at the September 25 meeting of the UN Security Council. He reiterated to Mr. Kosutic that the United States assesses actions by the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav military aimed at redrawing by force the internal borders of Yugoslavia as a grave challenge to the basic values and principles which underlie the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). ..........The Deputy Secretary emphasized to Mr. Kosutic that while the United States appreciates the concerns of Serbs inside and outside Serbia in the present context, the United States does not and will not accept repression and aggression in the name of those concerns. ..........The Deputy Secretary underscored to Mr. Kosutic that the United States, like the European Community (EC), is determined never to recognize any outcome of the Yugoslav crisis that would be based on the use of force to change Yugoslavia's internal borders. ..........The Deputy Secretary underscored to Mr. Kosutic that continued use of aggressive force by the Serbian leadership in tandem with the Yugoslav military will only ensure their exile from the new Europe. ..........He urged that the Serbian Government take clear and concrete steps to demonstrate its commitment to the EC-sponsored peace conference chaired by Lord Carrington and to renounce any intention of seeking internal border changes through the use of force. ..........We have repeatedly called upon all republics in Yugoslavia to respect the rights of all national groups living within their boundaries. In this regard, we note that Serbian violations of the human rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo continue to be a major concern in the CSCE context. ..........The United States will accept any future political arrangements that are decided on peacefully and democratically by the peoples of Yugoslavia through dialogue and negotiation. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

Attack on Democracy in Haiti

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address before the Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, DC Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, OAS [TEXT] Today, the international community and this Organization of American States are being tested. A small group of willful, violent men have betrayed their uniform and their nation; they have seized power in Haiti, usurping the government elected by a clear mandate of the Haitian people just 9 months ago. ..........Two centuries ago, the people of Haiti led this hemisphere in the struggle for independence. This year, with struggle and sacrifice and the support of the international community, they won their democratic rights. Today, with their democracy under attack, the people of Haiti look for our reaction. ..........The test we face is clear: to defend democracy; to stand united as a community of democracies; to make clear that the assault on Haiti's constitutional government has no legitimacy and will not succeed. I commend the Secretary General for the speed with which he has acted, first to convene the Permanent Council, then to convene this meeting. The elections in Haiti were held with unprecedented international support. The OAS, the United Nations, and the democratic community helped oversee and verify that this electoral process was open, free, and fair. Jean-Bertrand Aristide is the democratically elected President of Haiti. He and his government have and deserve our support. ..........This organization, more than any other, has a legitimate claim to speak to this crisis. The OAS election observer mission in Haiti did more than help in the conduct of the elections; the OAS mission was a strong symbol of this hemisphere's commitment to the path of democratic development the Haitian people have chosen. Thousands of citizens of this hemisphere struggled and died, were exiled and jailed, to establish democracy. Indeed, many of you sitting at this table are veterans of that struggle. Let the coup plotters in Haiti--and any who dream of copying them--know this: This hemisphere is united to defend democracy. ..........Last June, the General Assembly took the historic step of guaranteeing that this body would convene to respond to any "sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic order in any member state." Today, that mechanism faces its first test, and it is imperative that we agree--for the sake of Haitian democracy and the cause of democracy throughout the hemisphere--to act collectively to defend the legitimate government of President Aristide. Words alone will not suffice. ..........This is a time for collective action. Let no one doubt where the United States stands as a member of this proud organization. The United States condemns this assault on Haiti's democratically elected government and the violence committed against innocent Haitians. We demand the immediate restoration of President Aristide's constitutional rule. We have suspended all foreign assistance to Haiti. We do not and we will not recognize this outlaw regime. ..........My government also calls on all the people of Haiti--in uniform or in civilian life, regardless of political persuasion--to desist from all violent actions. Surely this week's events show that violence only begets more violence, and the way to justice lies in the rule of law, not in recourse to violence. ..........Now is the time for us to act. There are a number of draft resolutions in circulation. We urge the drafting committee to take the best elements in each to produce the strongest possible draft. We must not settle for the lowest common denominator if we are to keep faith with the people of Haiti. By sending a mission from this body to Haiti, led by the Secretary General, we will send an important message to those who have taken power in Haiti and to the Haitian people: This junta is illegitimate. It has no standing in the democratic community. Until President Aristide's government is restored, this junta will be treated as a pariah throughout this hemisphere--without assistance, without friends, and without a future. ..........Multilateral assistance must also be suspended to reinforce the message already sent by the United States, Canada, Venezuela, France, and the European Community. And this meeting must remain open in order to show that this hemisphere will not lose interest or forget the suffering of Haiti's people. ..........If these steps do not succeed, we must consider additional steps. Those who pretend to govern Haiti should know: The path they have chosen leads nowhere. But once democracy is restored, Haiti will again receive the generous cooperation of the international community in promoting development and alleviating poverty. ..........My colleagues, our immediate purpose today is to defend the rights and noble aspirations of the people of Haiti, but our interests do not stop there. This is the hemisphere that stands poised to achieve what the world has never seen before: the fulfillment of democratic rights across two continents. This is the hemisphere that is building a future of free trade from Alaska to Argentina. This is the hemisphere whose nations are cooperating to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. We are fulfilling the promise of the New World, enshrined in the OAS Charter, "to offer to man a land of liberty." That is the future we are defending, and the people of Haiti are and must continue to be part of that community. This is a moment of darkness, but this coup must not and will not succeed. I believe the people of Haiti will regain their liberty. I believe this hemisphere will meet its test. ..........This Organization of American States must not and will not rest until the people of Haiti regain their democracy.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

Attack on Democracy in Haiti

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement by President Bush released by the White House, Washington, DC Date: Oct 1, 199110/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, OAS [TEXT] Today, I met with President Aristide's designated ambassador to the White House, Jean Casimir, to receive his credentials. I told him that despite events of the last 2 days, the United States continues to recognize President Aristide as the duly elected President of Haiti and that we fully support last night's Organization of American States resolution calling for the restoration of his government. ..........We condemn those who have attacked the legally constituted, democratically elected government of Haiti and call for an immediate halt to violence and the restoration of democracy in Haiti. We will be working closely with the OAS to bring this about. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

OAS Permanent Council Resolution 567 on Haiti

Description: Resolution released by the OAS in Washington, DC Date: Sep 30, 19919/30/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, OAS [TEXT] Permanent Council Resolution 567 (September 30, 1991) The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, ..........Bearing in mind that representative democracy is the form of government of the region and that its effective exercise, consolidation, and enhancement are shared priorities; ..........Reaffirming that the principles enshrined in the OAS Charter and the ideals of peace, democracy, social justice, comprehensive development, and solidarity constitute permanent underpinnings of the inter-American system; ..........Taking into account the grave events that have taken place in Haiti and which constitute an abrupt, violent, and irregular interruption of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratic government of that country; ..........Having heard the statements of the Secretary General of the Organization and the Permanent Representative of Haiti; Resolves: ..........1. To issue its most vigorous condemnation of those events and of their perpetrators, and to demand adherence to the Constitution and respect for the government, which was legitimately established through the free expression of the will of that country's people. ..........2. In keeping with the principles of the OAS Charter and of the Santiago Commitment to democracy, to reaffirm its solidarity with the Haitian people in their struggle to strengthen their democratic system without foreign interference and in the exercise of their inalienable sovereign will. ..........3. To deplore the loss of human lives; to demand that those responsible be punished; and to demand that, in strict observance of international law, those parties put an end to the violation of the Haitian people's rights, respect the life and physical safety of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and restore the President's exercise of his constitutional authority. ..........4. Considering the graveness of the events that have occurred in Haiti, to convene an ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs pursuant to resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91) [see box] and to instruct the Secretary General to that effect. VOTE: Unanimous 34-0.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

OAS General Assembly Resolution 1080

Date: Jun 5, 19916/5/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, South America, Central America, Caribbean Subject: OAS, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Approved at the June 5, 1991 OAS General Assembly creating a new mechanism for convening foreign ministers in response to a coup d'etat or interruption of a legitimate, elected government. Whereas: ..........The Preamble of the Charter of the OAS establishes that representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region; ..........Under the provisions of the Charter, one of the basic purposes of the Organization of American States is to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention ..........Due respect must be observed for the policies of each member country in regard to the recognition of states and governments; ..........Bearing in mind the widespread existence of democratic governments in the hemisphere, the principle enshrined in the Charter, namely, that the solidarity of the American States and the high aims which it pursues require the political organization of those States to be based on effective exercise of representative democracy--must be made operative; the region faces serious political, social and economic problems that may threaten the stability of democratic governments, The General Assembly Resolves: ..........1. To instruct the Secretary General to call for the immediate convocation of a meeting of the Permanent Council in the case of any event giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states, in order, within the framework of the Charter, to examine the situation, decide on and convene an ad hoc meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs, or a special session of the General Assembly, all of which must take place within a ten-day period. ..........2. To determine that the purpose of the ad hoc meeting of ministers of foreign affairs or the special session of the General Assembly shall be to look into the events collectively and adopt any measures deemed appropriate, in accordance with the Charter and international law. ..........3. To instruct the Permanent Council to devise a set of proposals that will serve as incentives to preserve and strengthen democratic systems, based on international solidarity and cooperation, and to apprise the General Assembly thereof at its twenty-second regular session. ..........VOTE: Unanimous 34-0 (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

Amir of Kuwait Visits Washington, DC

Bush, Al-Sabah Source: President Bush, Amir Al-Sabah Description: Remarks at the White House, Washington, Dc Date: Oct 1, 199110/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations, Democratization, Science/Technology [TEXT] President Bush: We've just had a very successful meeting with the Amir. And we stand together in our resolve that Iraq comply fully with all the UN Security Council resolutions so that it can never again pose a threat to Kuwait and all the nations of the region. ..........In particular, the Amir and I strongly condemn Iraq's refusal to free the many Kuwaitis that are still held in Iraq. We call again for their immediate and unconditional release. And we reaffirm our view that UN sanctions must remain in place against Iraq until a new leadership emerges in Baghdad, a leadership willing to live in peace with its neighbors and its own people. ..........We also reviewed Kuwait's great progress in reconstruction, physical and political, since liberation 7 months ago. Considerably more than half of the oil fires are out, oil exports have resumed, and schools have reopened. I applaud all that has been accomplished. I was heartened to hear that elections for restoring parliamentary government are on track for October next year. And I fully endorse Kuwait's endeavors to expand political participation and look forward to watching this process developed in the freest possible atmosphere. ..........So all in all, it was a good visit with a country to whom we feel very close. Your Royal Highness, welcome, sir. ..........Amir Al-Sabah: Mr. President, I was standing with you right here last year, and now I'm standing with you at the same place. But what a difference between the two occasions. When you, Mr. President, expressed the conscience of your people, you positively demonstrated the nobility of your roots and the sincerity of your commitment. When you expressed the conscience of mankind, it was a testimony of your outstanding leadership and your nation's superiority. ..........Such is the behavior and ethics of nations that have deep- rooted and civilized principles. The people of the United States of America and their leadership have vividly epitomized their principles during the period of aggression on my country. In an ominous moment, evil inclinations erupted, stirred up by false ambition, brutish greed, and profound envy. The free world responded by denouncing and rejecting this aggression. ..........Your reaction to the rapid rhythm of events was combined with the voice of reason, principles, and values, which you, Mr. President, were determined to promote and emphasize. And, therefore, your speeches and statements were directed to all peoples, reviving the confidence in them that the world is truly directed to all people in a search for a new destination where security prevails, the weak safe, and humanity is primarily dedicated to the achievement of man's well-being. ..........The free world rallied around these values and diffused a fervent spirit to shield rights against violation, justice against grievances, and man against indignity. It was the greatest global demonstration in which honorable voices of the world's leader were raised to defend rightness and human dignity. ..........The people of Kuwait will remain in debt to this noble human position and will always remember it with gratefulness and appreciation. Those who sacrificed their blessed lives and pure blood in the war to liberate Kuwait will remain models for heroism and for defending righteousness. ..........It pleases me on this occasion of our meeting to convey to you the feelings of the Kuwaiti people toward you and toward the people of the United States of America. It is the strong desire of the Kuwaitis to strengthen relations between our peoples and our two countries in such a manner so as to serve our mutual interests and achieve adherence to human values and benefit all mankind. ..........Finally, I wish to express to the American people, to your Administration, and to you personally, Mr. President, the appreciation and gratitude of the people of Kuwait for the backing and the support you continue to extend to us.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

Meeting with Iraqi Kurdistan Front

Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Sep 30, 19919/30/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Human Rights, United Nations, Democratization [TEXT] This afternoon, NEA [Bureau of Near East and Asian Affairs] Assistant Secretary [Edward] Djerejian met with a delegation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, including Jalal Talabani, one of the two principal Kurdish leaders. The group, which also had meetings last week at the State Department and the Pentagon, included representatives of Iraq's Assyrian and Turcoman communities. ..........Our meetings with the Iraqi Kurdistan Front delegation took place within the context of broadening US Government contacts with a wide range of groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and the present Iraqi regime. We do not back any particular opposition faction, nor is it our aim to shape a government to succeed Saddam Hussein. That is a matter for the Iraqi people. Similarly, the United States supports peaceful political reform within Iraq, not Iraq's breakup. ..........In talks with the Iraqi Kurdistan Front delegation, US officials stressed our strong support for greater human rights and political participation for all the people of Iraq. We support a pluralistic, democratic Iraq in which no ethnic or religious group is denied full rights of citizenship, full participation in the institutions of government, and the right to honor its distinctive religious and cultural heritage. ..........Our government is committed to humanitarian assistance for the Iraqi people under the aegis of UN Security Council Resolution 688 and the mechanism created by UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712. We will insist that Iraq meet its UN-mandated obligations, including the requirement that international relief agencies receive unimpeded access to civilians in need of help in all parts of the country. ..........We also discussed the residual coalition military force in southeastern Turkey, which will act to preserve peace and stability in northern Iraq and deter Iraqi repression. ..........We welcome the improvement in relations between the Iraqi Kurdish leadership and the Government of Turkey. We appreciate the clear Iraqi Kurdistan Front statements supporting Turkish sovereignty and denouncing the terrorist tactics of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), a terrorist group based in Turkey. ..........Contact with the Iraqi opposition improves mutual understanding and strengthens our long-term relationship with the Iraqi people. We look forward to a continuing dialogue with the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, as well as other Iraqi opposition groups. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

US Export Control Policy Adapts To a Changing World

Hankin Source: Christopher G. Hankin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Trade Controls Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Sep 24, 19919/24/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, E/C Europe Country: USSR (former), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (former) Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Trade/Economics [TEXT] This Administration has recognized and responded to the need for US export control policy to adapt to changes in the world. This has been true both in the context of our strategic controls and our foreign policy controls. We have been in the fortunate situation where statute has been flexible and has permitted us to act and adapt as appropriate to these changes. We have been able to provide world leadership in strengthening export controls on countries of proliferation concern. And we have been able to provide leadership in COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] in responding to the welcome changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union and in East/Central Europe. ..........There is no reason to believe that further changes, and the need for further responsive US leadership in the multilateral forums, will not continue. The Administration, therefore, strongly supports re-authorization of an export administration act that would continue this flexibility in statute. ..........As the subcommittee is aware, we committed ourselves 2 weeks ago to a dialogue with the committee's staff in hopes that a bill could be written and reported with Administration support. We entered those discussions in good faith, and those discussions continue. ..........Perhaps as we proceed we should consider a two-track approach: a fairly simple extension of the Export Administration Act for now, and a commitment to work together from a clean slate on a new, forward-looking statute. We need a less cumbersome and less complicated statute. What we write should be responsive to the challenges ahead. It must allow us flexibility to adapt to changes in the world, some of which we will like and others which we will not. ..........Even, as is often the case, our views on policy coincide, it is probably best that statutory micro-management be avoided. A provision that appears harmless today may not be so next spring. The Trade Act of 1988, for instance, mandated US decontrol of items within 4 months of a US submittal to COCOM, regardless of COCOM's determination. It apparently was inconceivable back then that our COCOM partners would wish more time than this to consider a US decontrol proposal. Yet, in 1990, this is exactly what transpired, and, as a result, the United States was forced to violate COCOM rules. We should ensure against a recurrence. International cooperation with our allies is the only means of effectively enforcing our strategic and non-proliferation trade controls. Care should be taken to ensure that statute will not possibly: (a) force the United States to violate any of its international export control obligations; or (b) impede the United States from reacting quickly to world events. ..........Your letter of invitation raised several issues.
Soviet Union
The new core list of dual-use items controlled by COCOM constitutes a vast liberalization of strategic trade restrictions. The new list, which we implemented September 1, contains only those goods and technologies that we judge essential to maintaining the technological lead that is critical to our national security. It is noteworthy that the United States and our COCOM partners have also greatly liberalized in practice our treatment of requests for licenses of controlled items to the Soviet Union. Currently, we are approving, subject to safeguards when appropriate, nearly all requests for licenses to the USSR. Last year, for example, only 3 out of 261 (1.15%) General Exceptions Requests and 3 of 601 (0.05%) De Minimis applications were formally denied in COCOM. Particularly noteworthy, none of the 174 favorable consideration cases was denied. ..........The Administration is committed to supporting the Soviet Union's integration into the world economy and Soviet market reform. While we still have national security concerns, which cannot be prudently ignored given Soviet military capabilities, COCOM's remaining high-technology restrictions will not impede the modernization and restructuring of the Soviet economy. COCOM restrictions are really very peripheral to the problems affecting Soviet economic progress. Frankly, the problems are caused by the lack of markets, not COCOM controls; it will be the introduction of markets, not the import of sophisticated, expensive high technology that will solve those problems. ..........In the energy sector, which is key to the Soviet Union's ability to generate foreign exchange, few restrictions remain on equipment used in production, refining, or transporting of oil and gas. Advanced computers, work stations, and seismic equipment for exploration remain controlled, but licenses for their export to the USSR are being approved under the general exceptions procedures. These procedures aim to ensure that the sophisticated technology shipped will not be diverted to military end-uses. It should be noted that US oil and gas firms have a much larger presence in the Soviet Union than do firms from our COCOM allies. In power generation, COCOM has decontrolled industrial diesel generators and most of the technology involved in their production. ..........In the computer industry, most personal computers, some mini-computers, and nearly all mass market software have been decontrolled by COCOM. As I have already noted, even more sophisticated mainframes that are still subject to control have been licensed for oil and gas projects. They have also been approved for projects aimed at enhancing the safety of Soviet nuclear power plants. The relaxation on computer sales, coupled with newly available telecommunications equipment, will enable the Soviets to develop a sophisticated banking and financial sector that is crucial to doing business with the West. ..........In transportation, commercial aircraft are now free from control. We expect that this will enhance the prospects for sales into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where the United States has already successfully marketed aircraft. The decontrol of FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]-certified jet engines and avionics used on commercial aircraft will allow the development of new aircraft using Soviet airframes and Western high-technology products. ..........In the marine field, hovercraft and surface effect ships that can be used as ferries were decontrolled. This will aid in the movement of goods and people across the Baltic Sea and similar bodies of water. ..........Also in transportation, the restrictions on air traffic control (ATC) systems were eased, thereby making modern civil ATC systems available to the Soviets. Such systems will significantly improve the safety of air travel within as well as to and from the USSR. ..........In the manufacturing sector, COCOM has relaxed restrictions on machine tools, electronics, and industrial process controls, which are critical to producing high-quality products in quantity. As a result, the marketability of Soviet manufactures in the West can improve, thereby increasing exports and generating badly needed hard currency. The primary difficulties for the Soviet civil manufacturing sector, however, have nothing to do with technology availability. ..........In telecommunications, political control from the center used to be one of the principal obstacles to development of Soviet telecommunications links with the West. With that major obstacle overcome, the USSR will be able to undertake a vast improvement in communications with the West, fostering growth in business as well as personal ties. ..........In connection with an international telecommunications gateway project, COCOM allows the installation of sophisticated, modern systems. The Soviets will have excess capacity in international links well into the 21st century. ..........As for domestic systems, we still have serious national security concerns with allowing the export of state-of-art fiber optics. Nevertheless, telecommunications equipment which now can be exported to the USSR, such as digital circuit and packet switching systems, medium-data-rate transmission systems, and cellular telephone systems, would allow the Soviets to develop and install more modern domestic civil telecommunications systems (public digital voice and data networks) with features and functionality comparable to what is still in widespread use in the West. Soviet citizens could have access to such services as facsimile, cellular telephone, electronic mail, and voice mail, with all the features enjoyed by most users in the West. ..........We recognize that our commitments to assist the development of markets and democratic institutions in the Soviet Union can be greatly enhanced by improvements in their telephone infrastructure. Balancing our fundamental security needs against these goals is a challenge that COCOM faced prior to the events in August and will review as necessary. As the dust continues to settle in the Soviet Union, our security needs may change, and we will consult with industry and our allies as to whether further adjustments to the telecommunications controls may be warranted. However, we will vehemently oppose any effort by the committee to force liberalization through statute.
Eastern Europe
Since the revolutionary changes that swept through Eastern Europe beginning in late 1989, the United States has been at the forefront of COCOM efforts to liberalize COCOM controls for the newly emerging democracies in that region. Our goal is to remove Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia from the COCOM-proscribed destinations list and to enlist their cooperation in controlling high technology and items of proliferation concern. We are also eager for other East European democracies, particularly the Baltic states, to benefit from liberalized treatment in COCOM. ..........In the spring of 1990, the United States held three rounds of export control discussions with officials of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. As a result of these meetings, the governments of the three countries made written commitments to establish safeguards to protect COCOM-controlled technology. By February 1991, the three countries had each implemented an adequate system of safeguards. As the safeguards were being implemented, the United States pushed forcefully in COCOM for liberalized treatment of the three countries. By the end of February, a COCOM special procedure was in effect for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Under the COCOM Special Procedure for Eastern Europe, export licenses for most technology on the COCOM dual-use list are processed in COCOM under favorable consideration procedures. ..........As a further step toward liberalization, COCOM agreed in May 1991 to allow virtually all telecommunications equipment and technology, including fiber optics, to be exported to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia at national discretion. The United States strongly supported this measure designed to address the need for rapid development of advanced telecommunications networks in the three countries. ..........The United States has now proposed specific criteria for removing Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia from the COCOM- proscribed list. The governments of these countries have indicated a willingness to take the necessary steps, including establishment of export controls and enforcement capabilities on indigenously produced high technology and munitions, to meet these criteria. We believe that if the three countries were to meet the conditions set forth in the US proposal, they would not only qualify for removal from the proscribed list but also become eligible for valuable 5(k) trade benefits as COCOM cooperating countries. This outcome is in the interests of these countries as much as it is in our interests. ..........We believe that continuing to link liberalization of COCOM controls to concrete actions taken by East European governments to build effective export control systems is the best way to achieve this result. In this regard, a provision in [Senate Bill 320] that we have strongly supported would remove the restriction on permitting special licenses to East European countries constituting a lesser strategic threat. Again, a case where micro-management proves a roadblock.
Baltic States
We seek to proceed with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as we have with the other newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. The COCOM Special Procedure, which has proved useful in our effort to liberalize controls for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, should also be applied to the Baltic states. ..........The US position in COCOM is to urge members to coordinate an approach to Baltic governments at the earliest opportunity to discuss steps they could take to attain liberalized treatment and eventual removal from the proscribed destinations list. The United States is prepared to send an export control delegation to engage the Baltics on this issue at the earliest opportunity.
Intra-COCOM Trade
The United States and its COCOM partners have agreed to eliminate dual-use export licenses among COCOM members by January 1, 1992, except for a short list of items contained in a common "exclusion list." This is concurrent with the timetable by which all members have committed to implementation of the COCOM common standard. The vast majority of COCOM dual-use items will be exported and re- exported without requirement for an individual license among the COCOM member countries. This "license-free zone" may also be extended to cooperating countries, though this will require a separate consultation within COCOM. ..........We are currently in the process of preparing for October negotiations on the exclusion list. Assuming that all COCOM member countries have met the common standard and share the same international obligations (e.g., adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime), the items that are placed on the exclusion list will be expected to fall within certain limited categories; e.g., items that have met the requirements of the COCOM targeted technology procedure. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

Loan Guarantees To Israel

Tutwiler Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Washington, DC Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] We are pleased that Congress has agreed to delay consideration of the question of absorption loan guarantees for Israel. This step is a welcome affirmation of the President's judgment that a pause in considering absorption assistance is in the best interests of the historic opportunity for peace that lies before us. ..........The Administration reaffirms its support for the principle of absorption aid to Israel and will support loan guarantees for that purpose, provided terms and conditions acceptable to the Administration are worked out when Congress takes the matter up next year. Immigration of Soviet Jews is a humanitarian issue of great importance. The United States has long encouraged the Soviet Union to permit free emigration and has supported Israel's efforts to absorb those immigrants who have left the Soviet Union and other countries. ..........The Administration agrees that scoring by OMB [Office for Management and Budget] for loan guarantees will be at the most reasonable rate possible consistent with legal requirements. The Administration will begin now an effort to solicit international support for the principle of absorption aid. If there is cost to Israel associated with deferral, the Administration will agree that such cost be offset in the ultimate package.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991 Title:

Focus on Central and Eastern Europe Summary of Initiatives

Date: Oct 7, 199110/7/91 Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies Region: E/C Europe Country: Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Albania, Czechoslovakia (former), Romania, Yugoslavia (former) Subject: Trade/Economics, Media/Telecommunications, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT]
Baltic Independence
Speaking at a September 11 reception for heads of the diplomatic missions of Estonia, Lativia, and Lithuania and for Americans who had championed their cause, President Bush said: .........."...As the United States was true to the Baltic States in captivity, we will continue to be true to them as democratic partners in the years ahead." ..........The President also remarked that it has now become America's responsibility "to help the Baltics integrate fully into the West, to nurture these young democracies; to transform...their economies toward a free market."
Assistance Expands
In September 1991, US assistance to Central and Eastern Europe increased when the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania achieved independence from the Soviet Union. The United States began sending urgent humanitarian aid, technical assistance, and direct economic aid in 1989 to Poland and Hungary, where progress toward democracy and a market economy was most advanced. Assistance has expanded to include Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Baltic states. ..........The United States committed about $1.5 billion in 1990 and 1991 in grants and other assistance to Eastern Europe according to guidelines set by President Bush in April 1989. During his September 14 visit to Toompea Castle in Tallinn, Estonia, Secretary Baker announced that "for the balance of this year, we will be making available roughly $14 million for the three Baltic states, which we would expect to divide up one-third, one-third, one-third."
Housing Guaranty Program
On September 11, President Bush announced a new Housing Guaranty Program for Central and Eastern Europe. Funding for fiscal year (FY) 1991 will provide $35 million, of which up to $25 million is for Poland. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) will administer the program and seek to stimulate entrepreneurship in the housing industry. A second objective is to encourage banks to develop lending programs to serve the housing industry in their localities.
Sister Law School Program
Eighteen deans from seven Central and East European law school faculties are participating in the American Bar Association's Sister Law School exchange program. The month-long program began on September 4 with visits to Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr, the Library of Congress, and Capitol Hill. The jurists were particularly interested in the confirmation process for Supreme Court justices and found the Senate hearings for Clarence Thomas timely. After the orientation, each law school dean spent an intensive week at each of three law schools in his or her consortium, giving active participation in the program to 54 American law schools in 27 states.
Law Program Begins at GWU
Six students (three from Czechoslovakia, two from Romania, and one from Hungary) have entered a law program at George Washington University under the co-sponsorship of the university and the US Information Agency (USIA).
Council of Governors' Policy Advisors Host City Officials
Nine mayors and city council members from Poland and Hungary studied how US states finance major projects under a special internship program of the Council of Governors' Policy Advisors (CGPA) from August 29 to September 24. The intern program was funded in part by a USIA grant. The interns' major interests were in finding ways to finance the design and construction of highway systems and intercity airports. Additional interests included the need for training and education in marketing, business, and computer technology.
Teaching English in Eastern Europe
Thirty-three USIA fellows are training English instructors in Central and Eastern Europe to teach business-specific English. An additional 13 fellows will join the program after pre-departure orientation in Washington, DC.
USIA Grants Announced
The United States Information Agency recently announced the following grants: -- International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX)--$2 million for FY 1991 administrative and program expenses to conduct US academic exchanges with Central and Eastern Europe and the USSR; ..........-- University of Tennessee--$100,000 for exchange programs in management and economics that enhance the role of education in promoting democratic institution-building in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania; ..........-- American Council of Learned Societies--$122,000 from USIA in addition to funding from the Ford and Mellon Foundations for research fellowships to be used by Central and East European scholars in American studies at US universities; ..........-- National Forum Foundations--$195,000 from USIA to train Central and East Europeans through an intensive, hands-on internship program in government, business, and media; ..........-- Portland State University--$200,000 for the first year of a long-term project assisting the development of market societies in Wroclaw, Poland, and Pecs, Hungary; ..........-- Johns Hopkins University--$200,000 for its Institute for Policy Studies to support an integrated training program for newly emerging urban experts in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and Hungary; ..........-- University of Missouri at Columbia--$198,000 to provide a series of workshops in Central and Eastern Europe and internships in the United States for journalists as well as seminars in the United States for journalism educators; and ..........-- Ohio University--$11,000 to conduct a 1-week workshop on privatization that concentrated on issues in the sale of public sector and government assets to private investors.
Country By Country
USIA Academic Exchange Specialist Paul Hiemstra has met with Albanian Government and academic officials to discuss establishing a Fulbright program, and USIA's East European Initiative Coordinator Walt Raymond is developing a program in advance of the projected opening of a US Information Service (USIS) post in Tirana. ..........Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry will recruit new diplomats according to ideas formed during the May 1991 visit of 11 Bulgarian diplomats to the Department of State and the Foreign Service Institute. .........."Environmental Action in America," an exhibit prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency and USIA, will be open in Sofia from November 9 to December 8. This is part of a comprehensive public program and will feature environmental problems and solutions, using specific US examples, such as Cleveland's environmental and economic renewal on the Cuyahoga River and air pollution reduction strategies in Los Angeles. The program will include visits to the exhibit by school groups, teacher training workshops, and a lecture series about environmental law, energy conservation, renewable sources of energy, and effective citizens' action group processes. Specific US examples include Cleveland's environmental and economic renewal on the Cuyahoga River, Los Angeles air pollution reduction strategies, and Pacific Northwest forest management and conservation efforts.
: The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, UN Development Program (UNDP), and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) will sponsor an investment forum in Prague, November 4-6. It is designed to encourage business and investment cooperation between Czechoslovak and foreign entrepreneurs. The forum provides an opportunity for foreign investors to discuss with Czechoslovak industrialists more than 200 projects in such areas as agro-food processing, wood products and furniture, paper and printing/publishing, chemicals and plastics, machinery and equipment manufacturing, construction, wholesaling, disposal services, and real estate and business services. .........."Economics USA" will begin regular broadcasts in September on Prague's OK-3 TV. Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus will introduce the series. ..........John Carroll University received $87,000 to conduct a 3-week management institute for business managers, representatives of union organizations, and faculty from Charles University in Czechoslovakia. The institute will study managerial problems in companies converting to become market-driven enterprises. USAID has allocated $1.8 million for a 4-year, post-graduate economics school in Prague to provide Czechoslovak economists with Western training and to instruct managers, teachers, and journalists. It will be located at Prague's Charles University. ..........Carl Duisberg Society International received $69,000 to develop the administrative and legislative skills of Czech and Slovak provincial council members.
Through a $420,000 grant from USAID, Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade, America's two largest futures markets, will assist the Budapest commodities exchange in selecting and acquiring US equipment, services, and technology that would enable American companies to trade on the Hungarian market.
. Riga's sister city, Dallas, Texas, sent a delegation to Riga to discuss closer cultural, educational, and medical cooperation between the two. Dallas Mayor Annette Straus has proposed an international conference in 1992 to explore additional ways of fostering sister-city cooperation.
. Rutgers University received $100,000 to train Polish local leaders in municipal government by holding workshops in Poland and developing videotapes. ..........Oregon State University received $134,000 to assist the Krakow Industrial Society (KIS) in Poland to establish a training and economic development center along the lines of the Linn-Benton Community College Training and Economic Development Center in Oregon. ..........KIS presented its second summer business school, covering basics of the free market to nearly 70 would-be entrepreneurs. USIS Krakow, the East European Initiative Office, and representatives of the Polish Institute of Science and Culture organized the program, in which nine American professors took part. ..........DePaul University received $150,000 to develop, establish, and implement a business administration program with Lublin Business School in Poland for selected middle managers in Polish firms. The format is 12 intensive week-long classes that include economic, financial, and marketing modules.
President Bush waived the emigration provisions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, thereby making Romania eligible to apply for credit guarantees for commercial imports of US agricultural products. ..........Six US federal judges participated in a recent seminar on the rule of law with 60 Romanian judges and prosecutors, emphasizing judicial conduct, due process, criminal procedure, and protection of the accused, as well as rules of evidence and judicial review.
. Yutel-TV Belgrade carried a 20-minute interview with Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger filmed during a US tour by a Yugoslavian crew researching American policy toward Yugoslavia. The Appeal of Conscience Foundation received $52,000 to support travel of eight Yugoslav religious leaders to the United States in September for a 3-week tour of New York, Boston, and Washington, DC. They will meet with religious counterparts and governmental leaders as well as visit educational, cultural, and religious institutions.
US Assistance To Baltic States
President Bush's pledge to Baltic integration included the following measures: ..........-- Sponsorship of the Baltics for UN membership; ..........-- Repatriation of Baltic financial assets held in safekeeping since 1940; ..........-- Offer of most-favored-nation treatment to provide Generalized System of Preferences and Overseas Private Investment Corporation benefits and to include the Baltic states under the Trade Enhancement Initiative; ..........-- Support for membership of the Baltics in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as for participation in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development center for economies in transition; ..........-- Technical assistance and other programs under US assistance programs for East European democracies; ..........-- Peace Corps programs for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. (###)