US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: Presidential Mission To Assess Soviet Food Situation
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement at the White House, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 1, 199110/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Resource Management
[TEXT]
I am very pleased that Secretary of Agriculture Ed Madigan will
depart this afternoon for Moscow as head of a presidential mission
to assess the food situation in the Soviet Union. Secretary Madigan
will lead a delegation of senior private-sector officials and
government experts to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev over the
next 9 days. I have just met with this distinguished group and have
every confidence they will be a credit to the United States on this
important mission. Their expertise in US agriculture, the world's
most productive and efficient, covers the spectrum from on-farm
production to consumer retailing.
Their mandate is two-fold.
First, Secretary Madigan and his team will work intensively
with union and republic leaders to develop ways by which the United
States and its allies can help institute needed improvements in the
country's systems of transportation, distribution, storage, and
marketing of agricultural goods. This follows the excellent
preparatory work done by Under Secretary Richard Crowder's expert
mission last month. The ultimate answer, of course, is for the
union and republics to effect a rapid transition to a free market
economy. Second, they will work closely with union and republic
leaders to identify likely food shortage areas in that vast country
this winter and will discuss with them ways US farmers can help
reduce their needs.
..........In the meantime, I have decided to take another step to ensure
that the United States does everything possible to help with the
food situation. The Administration will, therefore, make available
today $585 million in credit guarantees for private sales of US
agricultural commodities to the USSR. This makes immediately
available all remaining credit guarantees originally scheduled to be
offered through February 1992. This action will put more American
grain and other food into the pipeline now so that it will arrive at
its destination in time to be of assistance during the hard winter
facing the Soviet people. So far this calendar year, US agricultural
export credit guarantees will total $2.5 billion for the Soviet Union.
The millions of tons of grain and other agricultural products
shipped under these credit guarantees have kept American farm
exports moving while making possible badly needed food imports
into the Soviet Union.
..........These are exciting days, and we are at a historic juncture in
US-Soviet relations. I am proud that America's agricultural
abundance and expertise can play a crucial role in supporting the
leaders--[Soviet] President Gorbachev, [Russian Republic] President
Yeltsin, [Ukrainian] President [Leonid] Nazarbaev, and [Kazakhstan]
Chairman [Nusulutan] Kravchuk--and others who are transforming
their country and its relations with the rest of the world. We are
with them, and working with them we strive to remake US-Soviet
relations for a brighter and more peaceful future.
Presidential Mission Delegation
Government
Edward R. Madigan, Secretary of Agriculture
Richard T. Crowder, Under Secretary of Agriculture
Private Sector
Eddie L. Moyer, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Illinois
Central Railroad
Robert H. Peyton, President, Conagra Eastern Europe and USSR
Russell Bragg, Pillsbury
Howard S. Gochberg, Land O' Lakes
Maurice Gordon, Farmer
Majeed Gheissari, FMC
Mark Kuechler, Division Manager, The Southland Distribution Centers
Chester McCorkle, University of California
Gary Ray, Group Vice President for Operations, Hormel
Wayne A. Showers, President, Griffin ∧ Bran, Incorporated (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: US-German Joint Statement on the Transatlantic Community
Baker, Genscher
Source: Secretary Baker, Foreign Minister Genscher
Description: Text of joint statement by Secretary Baker and German
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, North America
Country: United States, Germany
Subject: Democratization, CSCE, NATO
[TEXT]
Meeting today in Washington, Foreign Minister Genscher and
Secretary Baker reviewed the next steps in strengthening and
extending the transatlantic community.
..........They did so in the context of the dramatic changes brought
about by two momentous developments: the ascendancy of the
forces of reform in the Soviet Union and the initiative by President
Bush to put behind us the balance of nuclear terror that
characterized the Cold War and to achieve the goal of a just and
lasting order of peace in Europe. They look forward to the NATO
summit in Rome, the European Community summit in Maastricht, and
the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Review
Conference next year in Helsinki as key opportunities to help build a
new system of cooperative security in Europe based on democracy
and respect for the Helsinki principles which would complement and
not detract from NATO and its indispensable role. On the first
anniversary of German unification, Secretary Baker congratulated
the Minister on the success of the German people and leaders in
meeting the difficult challenge that it posed. Minister Genscher
expressed appreciation for the strong and continuing support of the
United States throughout the process of unification.
..........On behalf of the Government and people of Germany, Minister
Genscher welcomed the President's initiative of September 27,
which clearly signals to the leaders and peoples of the Soviet Union
that the course that NATO is embarked on will enhance their
security and build stability. It sends the same message to all the
peoples of the transatlantic community and around the globe. It
opens the door to an era of cooperation, peace, and common
responsibility for the whole world. This initiative clearly
demonstrates the enduring value of the close consultations which
are the lifeblood of the NATO alliance and of the US-German
relationship. They call on the Soviet Union to respond with equal
boldness and imagination to President Bush's initiative.
..........Minister Genscher and Secretary Baker agreed that the
President's initiative does even more than transform the European
security landscape. It also helps immeasurably in the construction
of the new Euro-Atlantic Commonwealth of free nations we are
working to bring into being. In that context, the ministers today
reviewed the successful implementation of many of the ideas in
their May 10 statement and discussed their long-range political
goals for this Euro-Atlantic community. They also surveyed
progress made under the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 and
considered future prospects.
..........The ministers agreed that the success of the forthcoming
summit meetings of NATO and of the EC will be critical to this
objective. Both institutions--as well as CSCE, WEU [Western
European Union] , and the Council of Europe--are of fundamental
importance to the stability and prosperity of Europe and of the
wider Euro-Atlantic community. They are in the process of
fundamental transformations which will ensure that they maintain
their vitality. These processes are complementary and
interdependent, and the ministers reiterated their commitment to
work together with their counterparts to ensure the full success of
both summits.
..........They agreed that, as Secretary Baker stated this June in
Berlin, their common objective is a Euro-Atlantic community that
extends east from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The Atlantic link,
European integration, and cooperation with our Eastern neighbors
are the linchpins of this community. Recent events have
demonstrated once again the strength of this vision. Now, the
Western allies, recognizing their common responsibility to help the
reform efforts to succeed, must focus on the practical
relationships that will help promote and secure for countries of
Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the institutions of
democracy, free economies, and respect for human rights to which
they have committed themselves.
..........Secretary Baker and Minister Genscher see a special place for
CSCE in their vision of the future of Europe. They agreed that the
CSCE has a unique role in both widening and deepening the reach of
democracy throughout Europe, and that the NATO summit must,
therefore, contribute to the further evolution of the CSCE process
and its new institutions. The Rome summit should look to the 1992
Helsinki Review Conference, in the spirit of the contributions to the
development of the CSCE made by NATO's London summit and
Copenhagen declaration, to take major steps toward these goals.
..........NATO itself can directly contribute to the establishment of a
strong democratic Europe, as it has done since its founding 42 years
ago. NATO will work to adapt its structures to encompass European
desires for a distinct security identity within the alliance and will
encourage greater European responsibility for European defense. The
development of a European security identity and defense role,
reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the
alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the
Atlantic Alliance.
..........The ministers also agreed to work with their allied partners
to develop NATO's new institutional relationship with the new
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
They believe that promoting democratic institutions and reform in
the East complements the maintenance of a common defense in
ensuring our security. In addition to moving ahead with the ideas
they set forth in May, they believe that NATO should give serious
consideration at its Rome summit to:
..........-- Formalizing the liaison relationship by establishing a more
routine set of meetings among the Sixteen and the liaison countries,
perhaps as a "North Atlantic Cooperation Council;"
..........-- Having such a council meet regularly at the ambassadorial
level, and periodically at the ministerial level, and at other times
as the NAC [North Atlantic Council] agrees that circumstances
warrant;
..........-- Welcoming periodic liaison participation in meetings of
NATO's Political and Economic Committees and policy planning
sessions of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, as well as routine
participation in NATO's Civilian Emergency Planning sessions and
the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society;
..........-- Encouraging new civilian and military exchanges designed
to promote Western concepts of civil-military relations;
..........-- Considering the dedication of NATO resources as available
to the opening of NATO information offices in Eastern capitals;
..........-- Offering to commence planning with liaison countries for
joint action on disaster relief and refugee programs, and pledging
NATO's support for CSCE in dealing with these and other new
security challenges in Europe; and
..........-- Examining on a priority basis the contribution that NATO
can make to support efforts to convert defense industries in the
emerging democracies to civilian production.
..........The ministers also noted the diversity of the ties that bind
the members of the Atlantic community. In particular, they stressed
that the successful completion of the Uruguay Round [of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] is imperative if we are to be able
successfully to pursue our common goals of economic growth,
support for reform in the East and assistance to the poorer
countries of the world.
..........In this connection, they expressed strong support for the
efforts underway by President Gorbachev, President Yeltsin, and
other union and republic leaders in the Soviet Union, together with
the international financial institutions, to develop a new economic
reform program. They expressed their readiness, together with
other members of the international community, to provide
humanitarian assistance to the Soviet Union to help meet the needs
of the winter. They also pledged their continuing support for the
efforts, undertaken in the context of the Group of 24, to provide
assistance to the reforming economies of Central and Eastern
Europe. They invite the new democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe to join in the effort to promote democracy in the Soviet
Union.
..........They noted that the situation in Yugoslavia poses a serious
threat to peace and security in Europe. Secretary Baker expressed
continued US support for the efforts of the European Community, in
the context of the CSCE, to bring this crisis to a peaceful and
democratic solution.
..........Finally, they called on their partners to join with them in
seizing the extraordinary opportunity the end of Cold War has
opened for the members of the Euro-Atlantic Community, and,
indeed, for the entire world. Rarely have prospects been so bright,
thanks in large part to the cooperation between Europe and North
America to which both ministers re-dedicated their support. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: Engagement vs. Withdrawal: US Foreign Policy After the
Cold War
Eagleburger
Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Remarks at a Business Week Symposium, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 3, 199110/3/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: State Department, Democratization
The recent collapse of the post-war international order has
recently given rise to a vigorous debate within this country over
American foreign policy and American purpose in a vastly changed
and changing world. In a democracy such as ours, a debate of this
kind is healthy and necessary. It enables us to examine old policies
in order to determine their relevance to new circumstances--in
Abraham Lincoln's words, it enables us to "think anew."
..........This debate has really only begun, and it is unlikely to produce
a consensus until a new international order has taken shape--a
seemingly elusive goal, at least for the foreseeable future. There is
one aspect of the debate, however, which I find worrisome and
which I would like to discuss today in view of its particular
relevance to this distinguished group of corporate executives
assembled here under the auspices of Business Week.
..........I am referring to a body of opinion which holds that the
elements which made for American success in the Cold War are a
liability in a post-Cold War world characterized by an entirely
different set of challenges. To be precise, it is being said in some
quarters that our military and diplomatic prowess will be, at best,
irrelevant and, at worst, a handicap to us in the coming struggle to
be waged largely on new issues and new challenges--most of which
will be of an economic character. As a result, we are being urged to
cut military spending drastically, and to cut back on overseas
commitments, in order to gird ourselves for the remorseless
economic combat which lies ahead.
..........At present this argument, at least in its extreme form, is
coming mostly from the margins of the political spectrum.
However, it is fairly clear that fertile ground exists within the
body politic at large upon which such sentiments could grow. The
fact is that the American people have a well-founded desire to see
our domestic challenges addressed and to see our allies assume a
greater and fairer share of international responsibilities. The
danger is that these legitimate concerns may be exploited to
undermine the public's support for the kind of US global leadership
role which continues to be important--even in terms of the
narrowest definition of our national interests.
US Well-Being and a Stable International Order
I do not intend to discuss the merits of particular foreign policy
programs or commitments, and, as the person responsible for the
State Department budget, I will be the first to admit that we need
above all to prioritize in light of changing realities and constrained
resources. But I do submit to you that fundamentally the United
States is not overextended internationally, and I also submit that
our domestic problems do not result from our engagements overseas
or from the activist foreign policy we have pursued for the past 45
years. On the contrary, it is my belief that our national well-being,
including the health of our economy, is dependent upon a stable
international order--an order which will not exist if we do not
shape and lead it.
..........And so, I would like to make the case today that what we did
to win the Cold War is in fact very much relevant to the challenges
we are now facing at home and abroad, and that we must ignore the
siren song of those who urge us to "come home" and set aside the
burden of world leadership which was thrust upon us 50 years ago
this December. I suspect, or at least hope, that I am preaching to
the converted here in this room, where there are many who are on
the frontlines battling to keep America competitive in an intensely
competitive global market. But the public as a whole will have to
be persuaded that, having won the Cold War, we must now eschew
disengagement and instead be willing to deal with the confusion and
instability that inevitably will follow in the wake of that victory.
..........A wise man has said that those who do not learn from history
are doomed to repeat it. We need to understand just how appalling
the first half of the 20th century was--perhaps the most tragic 50-
year period in recorded history--and how American disengagement
helped contribute to the disasters of that time. We need to
understand, as well, that American engagement and leadership
helped make the Cold War which followed an era of stability and
prosperity for ourselves and our Western partners.
..........History thus presents us with the example of two widely
contrasting US foreign policy approaches in this century, with
widely contrasting results. Now that we are entering a new era, it
goes without saying that we must rethink our approach and make
whatever changes are necessary to meet new challenges. But if we
do not want the post-Cold War era to resemble the first half of this
century --which it is already beginning to do in some ways--then
we must identify what it is we did right during the Cold War and
think long and hard before we jettison those policies. In short, we
must take especial care not to throw the baby out with the
bathwater.
Past Reluctance To Assume Responsibility
The story of our Cold War accomplishments is rooted in the failure
of European and American diplomacy to convert victory in World War
I into a stable and durable peace. We entered that conflict to
prevent an imperial power from bringing the European continent
under its control. But having achieved that end with the military
defeat of the Kaiser's Germany, we failed to render it secure
because of our unwillingness to assume responsibilities
commensurate with the global power we had come to possess. The
result was a resurgence of a German threat to the European order,
and a second world conflagration into which we were inevitably
drawn.
..........As powerful as that lesson was, we very nearly succumbed
once again to the temptation to disengage at the close of World War
II. But with the Red Army at the gates and Western Europe lying in
ruins, it became clear either that we would fashion a new
international order ourselves or there would be no international
order at all. Thus, for the first time in our history, we determined
to assume risks, incur obligations, and make sacrifices on behalf of
and in conjunction with other nations. In short, we contracted an
entangling alliance, linking our destiny to that of distant peoples on
a more or less permanent basis.
A Revolution in US Foreign Policy
This represented nothing less than a revolution in American foreign
policy, completely at variance with our traditions and with our
deepest inclination as a people. The architects of this revolution
were men of vision and courage--Harry Truman, George Marshall,
Dwight Eisenhower, Dean Acheson, Arthur Vandenberg, and others,
Republicans and Democrats--and they gave birth to a whole new
world in which sovereign nations would coordinate their economic
policies and collaborate on behalf of a common defense. Moreover,
they institutionalized these novel patterns of international
cooperation by creating multilateral bodies such as the IMF
[International Monetary Fund], World Bank, OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development], and NATO.
..........It is inconceivable, in my view, that democratic movements in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union would have emerged were it not
for the legacy of those pioneers. In the confrontation between a
totalitarian colossus with seemingly limitless military resources
and an alliance of parliamentary democracies, the line drawn
against Soviet expansion held for 45 years. On our side of that line,
behind NATO's shield, the West Europeans, fortified by the Marshall
Plan, consolidated their democratic institutions, integrated their
economies, and achieved phenomenal growth and prosperity.
Meanwhile, those who lived behind the Iron Curtain drew inspiration
from both the West Europeans' success and their impunity from
Soviet intimidation and aggression. In the long run, the totalitarian
system simply could not abide the example of freedom and
prosperity on its doorstep. Unable to destroy that example, the
system withered and died of its own internal contradictions.
..........Today as we contemplate our victory in the Cold War, it is
sobering to realize that we have been this way before. Twice in the
first half of this century we sacrificed greatly to defeat a foe
which threatened to overwhelm our democratic friends and
establish hegemony in Europe, only to see those victories either
squandered or threatened in peacetime. Now, with the collapse of
communism, we face yet again the temptation to disengage from
involvement in world affairs and to turn in upon ourselves.
..........There are two ways of looking at the choice we now face. To
my mind, it is axiomatic that we should maintain the basic approach
which brought us not only victory, but peace and prosperity during
the Cold War. To others, the end of the Cold War means, ipso facto,
that a new era requires a new approach.
..........As before in this century, the way we resolve our dilemma of
engagement versus withdrawal will go a long way toward
determining, for better or worse, the shape of the world to come.
We are simply too large for it to be otherwise. Meanwhile, the
post-Cold War world is poised to go in one of
two widely divergent directions. On the one hand it could go the
way of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union these past 45 years,
where repression did nothing to attenuate ethnic hatreds and
national rivalries now coming out of the woodwork. History, there,
could return with a vengeance, threatening the consolidation of
democracy, and presaging a new disorder in the wake of the Cold
War.
..........On the other hand, there is the example of what the Western
nations have accomplished between and among themselves since
World War II. In that brief period of time, ancient enmities have
been buried, patterns of cooperation institutionalized, and armies
integrated into a unified command instead of being arrayed against
each other. History, there, has been transcended, and a model
established which points the way to what the new world order could
be like.
..........Clearly, then, we must try to build upon that model by
continuing to link our destiny to that of our democratic partners.
We must strengthen the institutions which have fostered
multilateral cooperation and at the same time widen the democratic
circle to include our former foes to the east. This was how we
turned enemies into allies following World War II.
No Illusions of Easy Success
We should be under no illusion that maintaining, not to mention
expanding, the legacy of post-war cooperation will be easy. Such
cooperation was unprecedented in history, and it was imposed by
circumstances which themselves were unprecedented and which
exist no more--namely the rigidly bipolar logic of the Cold War
system. Gone is the crusade against communism which reconciled
Americans to their international responsibilities and made foreign
policy what we often thought was a simple matter of choosing
between good and evil. Gone, too, is a Soviet threat of such a
magnitude as to force the Western democracies to compromise their
differences and accommodate each other's interests on a continuing
basis.
..........And yet, if we do not summon the will to learn from history,
we may become victims of history once again. The fact is that we
are dealing with a fragmenting world. The breakdown of the Cold
War structure has translated into a loss of control of sovereign
states over their internal affairs and of the international system
over the behavior of its constituent members. The multipolar world
to which we are returning is one in which nations will be tempted
to go their own way with little regard for the common good or for
the international order. Saddam Hussein, with his unchecked
ambitions and his weapons of mass destruction, has given us a
glimpse of what that world could look like.
..........Those who preach American disengagement do not have much
to say about how we should deal with a fragmenting world, except
to assert that what happens beyond our borders is of little
significance. In truth, however, we cannot possibly shield
ourselves from a host of international problems or their
consequences, from debt to overpopulation, pollution to drug
trafficking, terrorism to weapons proliferation. Perhaps most
important of all, we cannot isolate ourselves from the fast-
integrating global market, upon which we depend increasingly for
jobs, technology, raw materials, and capital. That is why the
maintenance of the world's free trading order ought to be our
highest priority in foreign policy. Our economy depends upon it, and
so does the peace and prosperity of a world that may begin to look
like the 1930s in more ways than one unless we avoid a slide into
protectionism.
US Foreign Policy Needs
In short, the United States requires a foreign policy which promotes
a stable, though by no means static, international order. We have a
stake, for example, in the success of the democratic and free
market experiment underway in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
which is measured in political, security and, ultimately, economic
terms. Similarly, we are pursuing a vision of a hemispheric free
trading zone which could energize US exports and strengthen
democracy throughout the hemisphere for decades to come.
..........Thus in the final analysis the "America First" argument fails
on its own terms--it fails to serve America's national interests by
defining them too narrowly. We are very much a part of a world
which cannot afford to do without the leadership role exercised by
the United States over the past 50 years. We remain the only
candidate with the wisdom, the experience, and the global reach
needed for the job. Even our narrowest interests will suffer unless
we continue to do our part to keep the forces of global anarchy at
bay.
..........By the same token, it is absolutely true that our ability to
exercise global leadership requires that we put our economic house
in order here at home. And it is inevitable that we will come down
from the Cold War high-water mark of overseas engagement and
expenditure, and that we will look to our prosperous friends and
allies to assume their proper share of global responsibilities. We
did so after World War II; they must do so now.
..........We had better get used, however, to sharing with them, as
well, decision-making on a host of issues where our views do not
necessarily coincide. It is simply a fact of life in the post-Cold
War era that "getting our way" will require compromise and
engagement. If Saddam Hussein pointed to the path of global
anarchy ahead, George Bush defined the only alternative: a world in
which the United States serves as a leading and galvanizing force
behind international cooperation and collective action.
..........We are, without doubt, entering a new and different world.
The bad old days of potential nuclear holocaust are, hopefully,
behind us forever. But poverty, hunger, competition for markets,
rampant nationalism, and instability are with us still. If the 21st
century is to be a time of hope rather than a replay of the first half
of the 20th century, it will only be so because the United States
was prepared to lead the way in making it so. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: Relations of the United States With The Soviet Union and
the Republics
Zoellick
Source: Robert B. Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs and Counselor
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, State Department
[TEXT]
I am pleased to have this opportunity to report on recent events in
the Soviet Union and the republics. I will stress five points:
..........First, the events of August 1991 in the Soviet Union
constitute one of the undeniable watersheds of our age. As
President Bush stated last week, "[t]his revival of history ushers in
a new era, teeming with opportunities and perils." And the
President took a major initiative in setting the course for this new
age last Friday through his announcement of bold steps and
proposals to reduce the nuclear threat.
..........Second, power has shifted almost completely to the republics
of the Soviet Union; the fundamental question now is whether a new
form of cohesion among them is possible or desirable.
..........Third, democratic reformers are now in key positions, but
myriad threats lurk around them. Their success is by no means
assured.
..........Fourth, in this new post-Cold War era, the US must continue to
be deeply engaged with the Soviet Union and the republics--on
matters of internal political evolution, economic reform, and
foreign and security policy.
..........Fifth, we need a sensible and realistic basis for assessing
what constitutes successful policy in this time of transition.
A New Era of History
Government officials are frequently accused, fairly I suppose, of
over-dramatizing changes in policy or events. Not this time. We
have leapt into a new era of history.
..........Consider the situation in the wake of the failed Apparatchik
Counterrevolution. The Russian Empire, and then the Communist
Empire that succeeded it, have been among the great forces that
determined the history of Europe, Asia, and indeed the world, for
the past three centuries. That empire is now shattered. The
Communist Party that ran it is banned or suspended in its homeland,
its assets have been taken away, and it is under investigation. A
country that reaches across 11 time zones is in the throes of
political, economic, and social upheaval.
..........It may be many years before this new age settles into its own
pattern. Even the first label in common usage--the post-Cold War
era--reflects the fact that to date its single most dominant
characteristic is the abandonment of the Cold War that came before.
(Indeed, a former colleague recalled the story of the Chinese
historian who, when asked recently to comment on the historical
consequences of the French Revolution, responded, "It is too soon to
tell.")
..........In grasping for historical analogies, it is natural to seize on
other lost, multinational empires--for example, the Austro-
Hungarian or the Ottoman. Like earlier multinational empires that
fragmented, our long-standing antagonist is struggling to determine
how the pieces might relate to one another. But I would also like to
draw attention to another point of comparison: the dangers and
opportunities that the United States faced in the aftermath of
World War II, when we reached out to former enemies, Germany and
Japan, helping to establish them as democratic market economies
and allies. Now the Cold War has ended. Many of the new leaders in
the Soviet Union and the republics are looking to the United States
to help guide them into becoming contributors in the democratic
community of nations.
..........Last week at the United Nations, President Bush referred to
the challenges of building peace and prosperity as we face this
"resumption of history." Last Friday, the President outlined steps
we will take, and others that we propose, to stand down from the
tense nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union--a state of
imminent danger that my generation had etched onto its early
consciousness in 1962 and had expected to have persist through its
existence.
..........The new security environment that President Bush hopes to
establish also has enormous political implications for the future.
As Secretary Baker stated this June in Berlin, "The door to the Euro-
Atlantic community is open. But only the Soviets can decide to step
over the threshold."
..........The agents of the old Soviet regime did not want to take that
step. But ironically, their actions in August to backtrack ended up
toppling them and sending the Soviet Union and its republics
stumbling ahead. The direction is right, but there are serious
questions as to whether new leaders of reform can keep their
footing.
..........The reformers are attempting to transform the traditional
institutions of repression in the Soviet Union. Their effort with the
KGB and the Army may offer one of the most startling examples of
the Soviet Union's metamorphosis.
..........Vadim Bakatin, the new head of the KGB, told us in September
that he intended to cut back many of the KGB's activities and
establish those that remain on a legal foundation. Bakatin was
particularly interested in learning more about the legal and
oversight systems that Western countries have developed for their
intelligence services. Nor were these just musings; he
demonstrated the detailed knowledge he had already obtained about
Western legislation on wiretaps. Bakatin also seemed eager to
strengthen exchanges with the CIA. While our anti-terrorism
discussions with the KGB have already broken new and potentially
beneficial ground, Bakatin's interest clearly extended further. He
wanted to draw from the experience of Western intelligence
agencies to establish the KGB as a responsible institution in the
new Soviet society.
..........One important element of Bakatin's strategy is to bring in new
people and then build up new leaders who are committed to reform.
The new democrats were deeply troubled by the quiescence of many
officials during the August coup.
..........The new ways have dangers of their own, of course. One
Russian told us that when the new head of the KGB for a large city
asked what he was supposed to do, he was told that one task alone
would ensure success: He was to make sure his democratic bosses
were alerted in advance of any other coup attempt.
..........The new Minister of Defense, Air Marshal Shaposhnikov, also
outlined his intention to redirect a defense establishment that for
decades had been a pillar of the totalitarian state. He is seeking to
build upon the military's pride in being an army of the people. At
critical moments in Russian and Soviet history, the military became
the embodiment of the Motherland. Shaposhnikov is proud that
during the critical moments of August, this army of the people
would not fire on them.
..........But Shaposhnikov is not content with an army guided by its
heart; he wants to support these impulses by winning over the
minds of soldiers and civilians alike. His strategy, like Bakatin's,
is to establish a Defense Ministry and military subject to civilians
and the rule of law.
..........Shaposhnikov intends to reduce the size of his forces and to
increase the role of volunteers. He plans to transform the military
to reflect a new state of center-republic relations. He speculated
about working out legal arrangements with each republic,
establishing clearly that the military's role would be to defend, and
not to interfere, in the republics. Indeed, his questions about US
stationing and status of forces arrangements abroad appeared to be
a search for appropriate models.
..........I was struck particularly by Shaposhnikov's interest in the US
code of military justice and our military police. He wants to build
public legitimacy for the Soviet Army. And he believes that to do
so, the civilian public must trust that the military adheres to the
rule of law in its own internal affairs as well as toward the society
at large. Given all the demands on Shaposh-Shaposhnikov's time, his
attention to this means of building the military's place in a civilian
society suggested to me that a very new man is in charge.
..........The democrats hope to transform the old institutions of
repression into what they describe as a "safety net" for democracy.
They can build on the fact that during the August coup many people
in the security apparat simply refused to act against democratic
leaders or, just as important, against the people in the streets.
Nevertheless, it will take time for the new thinking to be accepted
by all the old rank and file.
..........It is too early to know whether these courageous leaders will
succeed. If this is indeed a second Russian revolution, we must also
face up to the fact that the furies of revolutions have frequently
created consequences that were impossible to foresee or control.
The forces now unleashed in the Soviet Union could lead to
disintegration and conflict that could plague Eurasia and the world
for decades to come. One or more autocrats may seek to impose
dominating authority at a terrible price, as Lenin was able to do
after the Civil War period. Whatever the course of the future, we
can shape it only if we recognize that the policy framework that we
have used for the Soviet Union over the past 40 years is now
history.
The Great Power Shift: The Dominance of the
Republics
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the post-coup
environment is the dramatic shift of power from the center to the
republics. Almost overnight, the key question about the political
compact has been transformed: Before August, we asked what
would be the division of political power between the center and the
republics; today the question is whether cohesion among republics
is possible.
1. From the Center to the Republics to...
Mayor Popov of Moscow placed this dramatic development within a
context. He outlined three different stages of political contract and
related them to the reform impulse. In the first, Gorbachev had
tried to reform Soviet society from the center. Like Peter the Great
or Alexander II, the other great Russian modernizers who preceded
him, Gorbachev had launched an era of reform from above.
..........But as the reforms met resistance from the established order,
an order based on the entrenched power of highly centralized
institutions, some Soviets--Russians and non-Russians--speculated
that the route to reform would have to run through the individual
republics. But this second alternative, while theoretically possible,
also confronted many obstacles. It divided the combined force of
reformers. Nationalism, and old animosities, at times superseded
the drive for democracy and market reforms. Moreover, the
republics were linked by a highly centralized industrial structure,
and even if the old economic structure could be overcome, autarkic
republics would forgo the potential benefits from higher degrees of
integration.
..........Popov's third stage was a division of labor between the center
and the republics. The first effort to legally establish such an
allocation of power came from the center earlier this year when
Gorbachev negotiated the one-plus-nine agreement--Gorbachev plus
nine republic leaders--that was to lead to the new union treaty.
Indeed, it was the prospect of signing that treaty in late August
that probably led the coup plotters to act when they did. But in the
aftermath of the coup, Popov concluded, only what he labels a "nine-
plus-one arrangement" is possible. By this he means it is up to the
independent republics to determine what authorities they will cede
to a new center.
..........Another Russian reformer was even more explicit about the
loss of central authority, at least in economic matters. The concept
of one-plus-others is gone, he said. The question now is whether
they'll even have a zero-plus-nine or -twelve or some other number.
Thus, he believes that any common economic authority will have to
be newly created by the republics.
2. A Crisis of Legitimacy
I suspect that the underlying problem of fragmentation runs even
deeper than a shift of power to the republics. We are already seeing
signs that subordinate groups or regions within the republics are
questioning republican authority as well.
..........In testimony I gave to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in February of this year, I stated that the fundamental problem
confronting all leaders and governments in the Soviet Union is to
overcome a crisis of legitimacy. As perestroika and glasnost gave
people the freedom to question, as the grip of fear loosened, people
would not follow a leadership that had no right to govern. That is
still a primary problem today. It is true for both the center and
many republics.
..........During the winter and early spring, the Soviet leadership tried
to cope with the crisis of legitimacy by restoring order. They
falsely equated order with political legitimacy. And for them, order
depended on authority.
..........But equating legitimacy with order and authority turned out to
be a backward formula. The heavy hand of authority could not
restore order in the Baltics, at least not at a price the leadership
was willing to pay. Nor could authority reorder a broken down
economy or currency. The leadership failed to reestablish the
power of the center through national institutions like the Army, the
KGB, and the Communist Party. Then when Gorbachev tried to
reestablish political legitimacy based on a new Union Treaty linked
to the development of a new constitution and elections, the old
Communist boyars made their last gasp through the coup. The brave
and successful resistance mobilized by President Yeltsin around the
Russian Republic doomed the old center that Gorbachev had sought
to maintain through a new union treaty.
..........So we are now in a period when the republics are seeking to
establish their legitimacy. They have declared independence. Now
they must determine what independence means for their people and
the relation of republics to one another.
..........We have also seen that one cannot necessarily equate
republics with reform. After decades of a Cold War waged against
the totalitarian center, some assumed that those within the Soviet
Union who opposed this center must also stand for the democratic
principles the center crushed. And in fact, as the old central
authorities delayed or retreated, many republics had become the
driving forces for reform. But we have already seen, in a relatively
short time, that the republics also have a mixed record. Some
leaders are using the disintegration of central authority to
maximize their own power at home. Others use violence and
intimidation against those who challenge them and to threaten
minorities within their republics.
..........We need to be careful not to examine the development of
republican independence solely through the lens of our conceptions
of the nation-state. Nationalism, one of the momentous movements
of the 19th and 20th Centuries in the rest of the world, has
followed a somewhat different course in the Soviet Union. Russian
nationalism has existed for some time, but it had been harnessed to
serve the ends of Soviet Communism. Russian chauvinism had
antagonized many other peoples in the USSR. Now the national
movements in the border republics have been freed to define their
own national characters and their origins in culture, literature,
language, territory, and history; they are still evolving and still
exploring how they relate to one another. While many of the
nationalisms have old and distinguished lineages, the relation
between nationalism and the state is frequently not yet well
defined.
..........Moreover, the national movements do not fit neatly within
republic boundaries. One in five Soviet citizens lives outside his or
her ethnic republic or area. So there is substantial potential for
friction and conflict between republic governments and national
movements.
..........Ultimately, political legitimacy, and the stability that it
offers, must be based on consent of the governed. That's one reason
why President Yeltsin, one of the few leaders elected by his people,
has a particularly important role to play. Republican independence
must be complemented by democracy.
..........Yet the rule of the majority must respect the rights of the
minority. As Thomas Jefferson stated in his First Inaugural
Address: "Though the will of the majority is in all cases to
prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; the minority
possess their equal right, which equal laws must protect, and to
violate which would be oppression."
3. Cooperation Among Independent Republics
The newly independent republics also need to recognize the benefits
of integrating or coordinating structures. This is not the same as
seeking a recentralization of power. As former Secretary of State
Kissinger pointed out recently in a thoughtful op-ed piece, the
highly centralized Russian state --through different leaders,
ideologies, and centuries--has relied on hegemonic armed forces
and outward expansion to try to dominate at least two continents.
But autarkic republics, suspicious and perhaps even hostile to one
another, pose dangers, too.
..........In particular, cooperation among republics may be important
in:
-- Avoiding ethnic discord and even civil war;
-- Enhancing security, particularly through the central
command and control of nuclear weapons; and
-- Strengthening the prospects for a successful economic
reform program.
..........Given the ethnic patchwork of the Soviet Union, some basic
cohesion may be important to stave off disintegration. The
importance of some cooperation among the republics was driven
home to us by our conversations a few weeks ago with Aleksandr
Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, and other reform leaders. They
were particularly anxious about the Ukraine. Of the 52 million
people in the Ukraine, an estimated 11 million are Russian; many
have intermarried. While Yakovlev and Shevardnadze acknowledged
the fact of the Ukraine's independence, they also pointed out the
danger that if the Ukraine totally disassociates itself from Russia,
large Russian minorities in places like Kharkov, the Donbas, Odessa,
and the Crimea may try to secede. If the Russians in the Ukraine
leave, they continued, the Russians that comprise 38 percent of the
population in Kazakhstan may decide they, too, wish to restore ties
with Russia. A divided Kazakhstan could spur the rise of a new
Islamic tide across the southern reaches of the Soviet Union. The
two reformers concluded this could have far-reaching spillover
effects--not only on the Islamic neighbors, but also in nearby
multi-ethnic nations like India.
..........This may well be an overly fearful picture. But these men are
serious observers, and their warnings bear careful reflection on the
part of all sides. It will be particularly important for Russian
leaders to demonstrate to non-Russians that they will be able to
receive fair treatment and can exert equitable influence in any
arrangements that are struck.
..........Some cohesion is important for security and stability, too.
Central control of nuclear forces is critical to preventing
proliferation. Eurasian stability also will not be served by the
creation of large, independent republican armies. Nor can economic
reform be pursued by small states striving to build military
establishments.
..........Finally, there are significant economic reasons for some
common policies among republics. As the United States has
demonstrated for over 200 years and as the Western Europeans have
also learned, there are substantial economic benefits to a large
internal market unhindered by trade barriers. Indeed, it is vital
that the reform leaders finally move ahead with a serious,
comprehensive program for a market economy, and that effort will
be far harder if the republics cannot agree on common economic
policies.
..........Robert Hormats elucidated this point in his recent testimony
before the Senate. One of the legacies of Stalin and his successors
is a highly interdependent structure of production. Hormats
reported that one recent Soviet study examining 6000 different
products determined that about three quarters were supplied by
just one producer. Soviet industrialists told him that single
factory monopolies tend to be the rule, not the exception, and that
they account for an estimated 30-40 percent of industrial output.
The CIA has pointed out that "the Soviet Union's entire output of
potato, corn and cotton harvesting equipment comes from single
factories--all in different republics."
..........This extraordinary economic monopolization already makes
price decontrol exceedingly difficult; if the republics do not
maintain open trade and agree to instituting reforms at a roughly
similar pace, the already substantial dislocations will intensify.
Similarly, the development of a macro-economic stabilization
program--to establish some steady value for a currency--depends
on sound monetary and fiscal policies. These policies depend, in
turn, on agreements to cut spending, collect revenues, and control
the money supply. Therefore, one of the critical challenges facing
the people of the Soviet Union is how to strike the appropriate
balance between smaller, independent political units and cohesion
that recognizes economic and political interdependencies. This is
not a new question, and the leaders of the republics can draw from
the experiences of others as they search for answers.
4. Balancing the Devolution and Evolution of
Sovereignty
As Secretary Baker pointed out in a speech in Berlin this June, one
of the most striking phenomena across all of Europe today is the
combined and simultaneous devolution and evolution of the nation-
state. While the nation-state remains by far the most significant
political unit, its political role is being increasingly supplemented
by both supranational and subnational units.
..........In Western Europe, an intense and comprehensive voluntary
evolution of governing authority above the national level has been
accompanied by the devolution of power to state and local
governments, to regions that sometimes cross national borders, and
to the private sector. In Central and Eastern Europe, and now
clearly in the Soviet Union as well, devolution is certainly the more
prominent phenomenon. The collapse of Communism has freed
ethnicity to re-emerge as a powerful political force, threatening to
erect new divisions between countries and, even more acutely,
within multinational states.
..........Evolution and devolution need not be alternatives, but instead
can be complementary, and indeed interdependent developments.
The foundation must be democracy and grassroots involvement in
political processes. The challenge for democracy is to encompass,
to represent, but also to transcend, ethnic ties on the basis of
common values.
..........The United States balances democracy and diversity through
federalism. The architects of a united Europe have adopted the
principal of "subsidiarity"--the devolution of responsibility to the
lowest level of government capable of performing it effectively. By
the same token, it makes sense for the various parts of the Soviet
Union to consider balancing devolution of authority with the
voluntary common delegation of powers for basic matters such as
defense, trade, monetary systems, and the protection of basic
human rights--particularly equal treatment of minorities. Given
the strength of the drive for independence, it may take time before
the citizens of the republics are willing to consider such
combinations--but the need will not go away.
..........In 1945, much of Western Europe was broken, hungry, and
hostile. But the integration of Western Europe within the EC and
NATO has virtually transcended all the old territorial disputes,
irredentist claims, and ethnic grievances among and within their
member states. Euro-Atlantic integration has made it literally
inconceivable that localized disputes could become a source for
serious conflict among these states. The incentives for cooperation
within these multi- and supranational frameworks are
overwhelmingly high compared to with the remaining areas of
discord.
..........Eventually, similar structures will have to develop to shape
interdependence with and among the lands of Central and Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union if they are to ever share in comparable
levels of peace and prosperity. The processes of evolution and
devolution need to be kept in constructive equilibrium. Only by
achieving balanced progress in both directions can the individual be
assured a voice in a democratic and interdependent world.
5. In Sum
In sum, although power has now shifted to the republics, the crisis
of political legitimacy remains acute. The fragmentation of
authority could continue--down to still smaller units--if the new
leaders fail to establish legitimacy through democracy with respect
for minority rights. A preoccupation with republican independence
is yesterday's battle, a conflict waged and won against totalitarian
central authority. Decentralized power in the republics will not
necessarily overcome ethnic strife or economic autarchy. At this
point in time, an ongoing reform effort needs to turn to these new
challenges. We need only look as far as Yugoslavia to see the costs
of devolution that slides into disintegration.
An Opportunity for Democracy
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Aleksandr Yakovlev told us
that he and his fellow democrats owed a great debt of thanks to the
coup plotters. Those eight men, he explained, had opened the way
for the democrats to propel reform five or ten years ahead. Old
apparatchiks could be moved to the side. The confrontation had
produced a real revolution in the minds of the people. Power was
now with the democrats. But Yakovlev still asked, "Can we cope?"
..........There is now a great opportunity to launch true, far-reaching
reforms in the Soviet Union and its republics. Conditions at home
remain extraordinarily difficult. The old command economy has
broken down, but no market system exists to succeed it. The
traditional system of authority has collapsed, but the forces of the
new, roughedged pluralism have yet to work out cooperative
arrangements so that they can design and implement a program.
..........The democrats recognize that they must build a stronger base
of support. One reform leader told us that during the coup the
democrats drew vital support from the "oppositionists". These
people are not necessarily the same as democrats. They have
rejected the old Communist ways, but as of yet they do not have a
deep commitment to any successor system.
..........Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Popov, Sobchak, Stankevich and
others launched in July 1991 a new Movement for Democratic
Reform. At present, it is an umbrella organization that draws from
the various fledgling democratic parties that had already been
forming, as well as from new participants. They are working to
avoid the traditional Russian reform problem of failing to link the
intelligentsia with other groups. Interestingly, Shervardnadze told
us that two core groups of support were young people and some
leaders in the defense industrial sector. The latter--intelligent,
technologically sophisticated leaders--recognize that the old
system does not work, and they believe there is an opportunity to
put their skills to use in a market economy.
..........The greatest danger the reformers now face is the
discrediting of democracy. The average man or woman on the street
seems sullen, tired of talk. The new parliaments, like the old
Dumas of 1905-17, seem to offer high drama, but no change for the
better. One person summarized the situation with an anecdote: The
first person who puts vodka on the shelves, she said, will carry the
day. Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who seem to be working in
concert, both told us: We need to help people.
..........Gorbachev also told us that the coup removed the head of the
serpent, but a large body of traditionalists remains. He pointed to
two significant risks. First, indifference and apathy would weigh
down efforts to stimulate a new political and economic system.
Alternatively, frustrations might build into an acute response, a
demand for action, any action.
..........Authoritarian strains run deep in Russian and Soviet society.
At some point, desperate people may turn back to the autocrat who
claims a firm hand is needed to pull people back up. Yet the coup
demonstrated that an organized resistance, assembled around newly
elected leaders, could defeat authoritarians. Moreover, important
groups--including the Army and parts of the KGB--would not
intervene against the democrats. Frankly, the big unknown variable
is the legendary ability of the Russian people to endure.
..........A visitor to Moscow or St. Petersburg knows that winter is
coming. Perhaps because winter has played such a major role in
Russian history, defeating invaders and leaders alike, the
encroaching winter appears to be taking on a symbolic feature of
challenge. While the task ahead for the democrats will of course
extend much beyond the next six months, the new democratic
mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg are mobilizing to meet the
needs of their publics over this period.
..........For Mayor Sobchak of St. Petersburg and other new, dynamic
leaders, these preparations are part of a larger strategy: They
understand people need confidence in the future; they need hope;
they need some examples of success. Sobchak also recognizes that
the spirit of the people needs to be invigorated by their own sense
of what they can accomplish, not by what others can give to them.
..........These are proud people. They want their accomplishments and
potential--which are great--to be recognized. They want our
support and cooperation. But they prefer investments or loans to
handouts. Perhaps the most encouraging sign is that the type of
leaders who will need to step forward if Russia and the other
republics are going to be successful--people like Sobchak and
Nazarbayev of Kazahkstan--recognize that the great opportunities
to be seized and the dangers to be avoided ultimately depend on
tapping the creativity and energy of the people they represent.
A Policy of Active US Engagement With the Soviet Union and
the Republics
Throughout four decades of Cold War, America's relations with the
Soviet Union were the primary preoccupation of our foreign policy.
Although the old Communist regime is now gone, it would be a
tremendous mistake to disengage just as the Soviet Union and its
republics are moving into a critical stage of transition. The United
States continues to have strong national interests in the course of
events in that country. US policy towards the Soviet Union and the
republics must continue to adapt to meet changed and changing
circumstances.
..........One strong national interest draws from a strain of our
foreign policy that dates back to our earliest days as a nation. The
United States has always viewed itself as a practical experiment in
liberty and democracy. And we have welcomed, encouraged and,
when possible, even protected those who aspire to these same
values. This is the important element of idealism in American
foreign policy. Today's events in the Soviet Union and its republics
offer one of our greatest historical opportunities to promote those
values, and through doing so, to foster a democratic partner that
can help us address other challenges around the world.
..........But America's statecraft has also sought to blend realism
with this idealism. In this situation, our realistic national self-
interests also dictate serious engagement. There is the potential
for a democratic and market-oriented Soviet Union to contribute to
global peace, stability, and prosperity.
..........But even if this potential fails to be fulfilled, we have an
interest in precluding a return to an authoritarian state or states
that may threaten neighbors. Within the past two centuries, the
armies of Russia and the Soviet Union have marched from the shores
of the Pacific to Paris and Berlin. Today, the borders of the Soviet
Union mark an arc of other lands in transition: from the aspiring
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, through the Islamic
lands of the Mideast, on to South Asian countries struggling with
their own religious and national conflicts, and extending to the
Communists of Eastern and Northern Asia who are trying to bolster
bankrupt regimes. A large share of the world's nuclear weapons
remains in the Soviet Union. Various republics have great factories
for producing advanced conventional weapons, and some may be
already looking for new markets in the world's troublespots.
Upheaval in the heart of Eurasia could threaten the very countries
that are our primary allies and economic partners.
..........In sum, because of both our ideals and our self-interest, our
foreign policy must continue to direct considerable energy and
creativity to the Soviet Union and its republics.
..........Let me briefly highlight our thinking on three topics: (1)
political evolution; (2) economic reform; and (3) foreign and
security policy.
1. Political Evolution
Our policy towards the political evolution of the Soviet Union needs
to respect the fluidity of the situation. And we must acknowledge
the limits of any outsider's ability to affect the future course of
events.
..........This is a key point: The fundamental need to establish
political legitimacy can only be accomplished by the people of the
Soviet Union and its republics. It's up to them to determine the
outcome, not us.
..........But we are not disinterested bystanders. Many Soviet
reformers, people of great reputation at home and abroad, have told
us that the opinions of the Western democracies, and in particular
the United States, are important. And although it is not our place to
delineate the final outcome of the new political arrangements, we
can speak to the process by which the decisions are reached.
..........Therefore, we have informed the leaders of the Soviet Union
and its republics that our policies towards them will be guided by
five principles set out by Secretary Baker on September 4:
..........First, they should determine the future of the country
peacefully, consistent with democratic values and practices, and
the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.
..........Second, we urge respect for existing borders, internal and
external; any change of borders should only occur by peaceful and
consensual means, consistent with CSCE principles.
..........Third, all levels of government should be based on democracy
and the rule of law, especially through elections.
..........Fourth, all parties should safeguard human rights, based on
full respect for the individual and including equal treatment of
minorities.
..........Fifth, we urge respect for international law and existing
international obligations.
..........These principles are of course not only applicable to the
Soviet Union. They are drawn from the core principles of CSCE, the
Helsinki Process, including the Charter of Paris. They have been
adopted by 38 countries reaching from North America throughout
Europe.
..........These principles are not mere guidelines. They are also
standards of accountability. Those Soviet leaders and peoples who
adhere to these principles should know they are building the only
sure basis for our support and assistance.
..........That's the message Secretary Baker conveyed to all Soviet and
republic leaders when he went to the Soviet Union last month.
That's a message we've asked our allies to reinforce. And that's a
message we ask the Congress to support, too.
..........I would also draw special attention to the fact that human
rights remains at the heart of our policy toward the USSR and the
republics. It is as important now as ever before, as the republics
gain authority over such issues as emigration and other fundamental
human liberties. Some of the republics are potential abusers of
human rights. So we're making very clear to all of them that human
rights, including equal rights for minorities, must be respected and
that their behavior in this regard will be a major factor in
determining our engagement with them.
..........As I pointed out in February, we also need to try to manage
uncertainty by multiplying our points of access within a society
that is transforming itself. We have been working for some time to
expand our contacts with republic and local leaders. This has
included a program of "circuit riders"--regular visits by US
Embassy officials to republics where they can develop special ties.
These contacts need to be strengthened further through opening new
American consulates or "small posts" in various republics. We have
sought ways to support democrats, free trade unions, the
development of a free media, and market reformers. We have
recently proposed Peace Corps programs.
..........We also believe that it's time for the Soviet Union and the US
to eliminate the impediments to human contacts that are among the
most pernicious legacies of the Cold War. We urge Soviet
agreement to our "Open Lands" proposal that would open all closed
areas in both countries to travel by each others' citizens. We are
also eager to work to lift onerous travel controls, visa restrictions,
and other barriers to regular contacts between our citizens.
..........Our efforts are designed to expand our contacts with the full
range of important groups in the newly pluralistic Soviet Union.
Indeed, the need may be greatest with "swing groups", such as the
Soviet military and the defense industrial complex. These remain
powerful institutions or groups, and they reflect the anxiety that
troubles much of the society. No Soviet leader will be able to
ignore the military's concern about housing and jobs for the troops
withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics. No
economic reform program will be politically successful if it does
not address the fears of the skilled and influential workers in the
defense industrial sector.
2. Economic Reforms
Market economic reforms also must catch up with the new political
freedom.
..........The most obvious need is to offer humanitarian support to
ensure that basic needs are met during the winter. We have already
sent two high-level missions to evaluate needs and distribution
problems throughout the Soviet Union. This week Secretary Madigan
is leading another team, including a number of private business
executives. Since a significant dimension of the food problem is
the failure to acquire, transport, store, and distribute foodstuffs
effectively, an important part of USDA's work is to identify ways to
help the Soviets and the republics introduce markets, thus fully
utilizing what they produce. We are also sharing our assessments
with the other G-7 countries, and our experts will meet within
about a week to strengthen our cooperation.
..........In the meantime, we have decided to accelerate the
availability of the $1.5 billion of CCC credit guarantees that the
President announced this June, and increased the coverage, so the
Soviets can secure credit to buy large quantities of American grain
and other basic foodstuffs. (This $1.5 billion is in addition to $1
billion of CCC credit guarantees we provided in December 1990.)
And we are examining other possibilities to meet emergency food
needs.
..........Since early this year, we have worked with Project Hope to
deliver urgently needed medical supplies directly to target
locations. A number of US pharmaceutical firms have made
generous in-kind donations to this effort. So far, we have sent
shipments to the Ukraine, the Aral Sea region of Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, and Moscow, and we have others planned for the Urals
industrial region and elsewhere. AID is working with Project Hope
to extend and expand this program.
..........The second element of our economic effort is to work with the
Soviet Union and its republics to develop expeditiously a serious
and comprehensive market economic reform plan. The new Special
Association with the IMF and World Bank, first proposed by
President Bush last December, enables the reformers to start
working right away with Western experts to develop a reform
program that meets the standards of the international economic
community. It is very important that the reforms meet these
standards--not because Western governments want to establish
hurdles, but because these reforms are the key to tapping the Soviet
Union's own considerable resources and talents. Private capital
will only invest where businesses determine the mix of return and
risk to be worthwhile. The critical fact is that given the size of
the Soviet economy, even large infusions of funds from Western
governments would be insufficient to make a difference on the
fundamental question of economic growth. We don't do the new
reform leaders any favor by obscuring the fact that only private
capital flows will enable them to create growth and jobs.
..........Most economists could probably agree on the components of a
suitable market economic reform plan for the Soviet Union. That's
not the problem. The plan will need to include the clear
establishment of property and contract rights, privatization,
competition among producers, macroeconomic stabilization, price
decontrol, and some narrowly delineated system to ensure that the
general public receives necessities in the aftermath of price
decontrol and before producers respond to price signals by
increasing supplies. The difficult task is the sequencing of these
actions.
..........There is no doubt that the implementation of such a plan
would be difficult. But as we have told the Soviets for years now,
the situation will not get better while they wait. Indeed, I believe
it is imperative to act promptly so as to draw upon public support
in the aftermath of the coup. I believe leading reform economists,
such as Grigory Yavlinskiy, share this perspective. But they are
struggling at present to secure a new economic treaty among
republics that might enable them to have the authority to
implement such a plan.
..........The third component of our economic engagement is an
enhanced program of technical cooperation. We began this effort in
the autumn of 1989; now we need to expand it. As you are aware,
the Administration is seeking authorization from Congress to spend
a limited sum of foreign assistance monies for technical assistance
to the Soviet Union and the republics.
..........Our political assistance will concentrate on helping to build
democratic institutions.
..........Our present economic priorities are:
..........-- Improvements in the food distribution system, so the
Soviets can use their own resources to help meet basic needs.
..........-- Promotion of private investment in the energy sector,
which could help the Soviets and the republics increase their hard
currency earnings in the medium term.
..........-- Support for defense conversion, which, while
extraordinarily difficult, is obviously highly significant politically
and economically.
..........-- Finally, we need to expand our efforts to train people in
the basics of business and to improve the understanding of how a
market economy works.
..........President Bush sought to lend high visibility to the priority of
helping to build a private sector by hosting a large breakfast for
business entrepreneurs when he visited Moscow. The Commerce
Department has begun an internship program with American
businesses, which we would like to expand. The Peace Corps has
proven helpful in Central and Eastern Europe at a low cost, and we
are examining whether we might draw on its skills in this area in
the Soviet Union. In addition, as Secretary Brady has suggested, we
are working on ways to draw on the capabilities of our private
sector, including through groups like the Citizen Democracy Corps.
..........We hope the Congress will be able to support our efforts by
authorizing expenditures for enhanced technical assistance to help
build democracy and a market economy, by repealing the Stevenson
and Byrd limitations on our credit programs, and by ratifying the
Trade Agreement.
3. Foreign and Security Policy
Our third area of engagement is through our foreign policy agenda.
We are pleased with the accomplishments in this realm to date, but
we have much more to do. Our strategy since 1989 has been to
explore and develop possible "points of mutual advantage" for both
the United States and the Soviet Union. We probed the "new
thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, seeking to shape and, where
possible, to alter Soviet policy calculations so that they might face
up to the contradictions between the new thinking and old habits.
This strategy required us to broaden and deepen our agenda with the
Soviets.
..........Our first objective was to work with the Soviets to overcome
the division of Europe, the original cause of the Cold War. Our
cooperative approach avoided singularizing or isolating any party
that respected moves towards freedom. The Iron Curtain was
scrapped, and we achieved German unification peacefully and
democratically. The Baltics have been freed. Although many Soviet
troops still need to return home from Germany, Poland, the Baltics
and Cuba, we are close to achieving some of the key goals of US
foreign policy for over 45 years.
..........Second, we stressed our common interest in resolving
regional conflicts peacefully, often seeking to rely on elections as a
means of establishing legitimacy and the local popular will. To
create an appropriate context for elections, we sought to use our
respective influence to persuade conflicting parties that the use of
arms would not produce an enduring solution. This has been the
approximate formula for our cooperative efforts in Nicaragua, El
Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan. The experience
provided the basis for the immediate, joint US-Soviet denunciation
of Iraq's attack on Kuwait, which in turn provided the basis for
unprecedented UN and multinational action.
..........Since the failed August coup, the pathways of cooperation
that we established have multiplied. We have agreed with the
Soviets to cut off all arms to the antagonists in Afghanistan by the
end of the year. The Soviet Union has agreed to withdraw its troops
from Cuba and put its economic relationship with Cuba on a
commercial basis. We hope the increasing isolation of Castro will
eventually persuade him that the people of Cuba can only prosper if
they are given the freedom that more and more people around the
world now enjoy. There also now is a chance that the rebels in El
Salvador recognize there is no future in killing, and that both sides
of that deeply wounded society have decided to try to leave hatred
behind for peaceful reconciliation. There may be possibilities for
returning the Northern Territories to Japan, ending one of the last
territorial disputes of World
War II. Finally, we are working with the Soviets to launch a Mideast
peace conference.
..........Third, over the past two years, we have deepened and expanded
the arms control agenda. This led to landmark agreements on
conventional forces, strategic arms, and chemical weapons
destruction. We still must focus on the ratification and complete
implementation of such agreements.
..........But now we can also move to a different threshold of
accomplishment. President Bush pointed the way to a whole new
attitude toward nuclear weapons, stability, and security in his
Friday address.
..........Indeed, inherent in the President's message was an important
theme: The dangers that we, and the Soviets, will face in the future
are more likely to come from rogue third parties than from one
another. So it makes sense that our arms control thinking shift
increasingly to the risks of proliferation and regional conflicts.
..........Our fourth objective was to launch joint efforts to solve
transnational problems of common interest, such as narcotics,
terrorism, and the environment. Now this work must increasingly
involve republic leadership.
..........In sum, our foreign policy agenda remains rich in potential.
As we sweep away the items on the old agenda, it is our intention
to move to a new agenda, one where we hope the changing Soviet
Union can act increasingly as a partner in addressing future
problems.
Defining Policy Success
I would like to conclude by raising a point that might seem
somewhat unusual, but which I believe is important as the United
States considers its future relations with the Soviet Union and the
republics. We are likely to be working through a transitional period
for what could be a considerable period of time. So we need to
reflect carefully on what we would consider to be the results of a
successful policy.
..........I suspect we would generally share a sense of the objectives
on the foreign policy agenda I outlined. But what constitutes
success in the other dimensions of our policy--especially those
related to political evolution and economic reform?
..........Frankly, we should not be surprised if the Soviet Union and its
republics are not able to completely transform themselves into a
stable, prosperous democracy or democracies on the Western
European model within the next few years.
..........Nevertheless, there are numerous results short of that goal
that might be possible. These intermediate results could prove
beneficial to the United States and the world at large. And they
could be steps on a pathway to a tremendous achievement.
..........I suggest that we direct our efforts at maintaining the
conditions in which democratic and market economic reformers can
continue to strive to bring the Soviet Union within the larger Euro-
Atlantic community. We should expect that there will be setbacks.
We should expect that some republics will go through periods of
struggle, violence, factionalism, and even a return to the old tools
of repression. But these twists and turns should not dissuade us
from continuing to encourage and support those who continue the
effort to embrace the five political principles I outlined above.
..........For 45 years, other Americans held fast so that freedom and
liberty could finally light the lives of hundreds of millions of
people frozen in a backward and frightening age. These people will
need the leadership, spirit, and example that only America can
supply. And subsequent generations of Americans will be better off
for our continued effort. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: Crisis in Yugoslavia
Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Deputy Secretary Eagleburger met yesterday afternoon with Serbian
Deputy Prime Minister Kosutic.
..........The Deputy Secretary referred to the Secretary's statement on
Yugoslavia at the September 25 meeting of the UN Security Council.
He reiterated to Mr. Kosutic that the United States assesses actions
by the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav military aimed at
redrawing by force the internal borders of Yugoslavia as a grave
challenge to the basic values and principles which underlie the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
..........The Deputy Secretary emphasized to Mr. Kosutic that while the
United States appreciates the concerns of Serbs inside and outside
Serbia in the present context, the United States does not and will
not accept repression and aggression in the name of those concerns.
..........The Deputy Secretary underscored to Mr. Kosutic that the
United States, like the European Community (EC), is determined
never to recognize any outcome of the Yugoslav crisis that would be
based on the use of force to change Yugoslavia's internal borders.
..........The Deputy Secretary underscored to Mr. Kosutic that
continued use of aggressive force by the Serbian leadership in
tandem with the Yugoslav military will only ensure their exile from
the new Europe.
..........He urged that the Serbian Government take clear and concrete
steps to demonstrate its commitment to the EC-sponsored peace
conference chaired by Lord Carrington and to renounce any intention
of seeking internal border changes through the use of force.
..........We have repeatedly called upon all republics in Yugoslavia to
respect the rights of all national groups living within their
boundaries. In this regard, we note that Serbian violations of the
human rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo continue to be a major
concern in the CSCE context.
..........The United States will accept any future political
arrangements that are decided on peacefully and democratically by
the peoples of Yugoslavia through dialogue and negotiation. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: Attack on Democracy in Haiti
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Address before the Organization of American States
(OAS), Washington, DC
Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, OAS
[TEXT]
Today, the international community and this Organization of
American States are being tested. A small group of willful, violent
men have betrayed their uniform and their nation; they have seized
power in Haiti, usurping the government elected by a clear mandate
of the Haitian people just 9 months ago.
..........Two centuries ago, the people of Haiti led this hemisphere in
the struggle for independence. This year, with struggle and
sacrifice and the support of the international community, they won
their democratic rights. Today, with their democracy under attack,
the people of Haiti look for our reaction.
..........The test we face is clear: to defend democracy; to stand
united as a community of democracies; to make clear that the
assault on Haiti's constitutional government has no legitimacy and
will not succeed. I commend the Secretary General for the speed
with which he has acted, first to convene the Permanent Council,
then to convene this meeting. The elections in Haiti were held with
unprecedented international support. The OAS, the United Nations,
and the democratic community helped oversee and verify that this
electoral process was open, free, and fair. Jean-Bertrand Aristide
is the democratically elected President of Haiti. He and his
government have and deserve our support.
..........This organization, more than any other, has a legitimate claim
to speak to this crisis. The OAS election observer mission in Haiti
did more than help in the conduct of the elections; the OAS mission
was a strong symbol of this hemisphere's commitment to the path
of democratic development the Haitian people have chosen.
Thousands of citizens of this hemisphere struggled and died, were
exiled and jailed, to establish democracy. Indeed, many of you
sitting at this table are veterans of that struggle. Let the coup
plotters in Haiti--and any who dream of copying them--know this:
This hemisphere is united to defend democracy.
..........Last June, the General Assembly took the historic step of
guaranteeing that this body would convene to respond to any "sudden
or irregular interruption of the democratic order in any member
state." Today, that mechanism faces its first test, and it is
imperative that we agree--for the sake of Haitian democracy and
the cause of democracy throughout the hemisphere--to act
collectively to defend the legitimate government of President
Aristide. Words alone will not suffice.
..........This is a time for collective action. Let no one doubt where
the United States stands as a member of this proud organization.
The United States condemns this assault on Haiti's democratically
elected government and the violence committed against innocent
Haitians. We demand the immediate restoration of President
Aristide's constitutional rule. We have suspended all foreign
assistance to Haiti. We do not and we will not recognize this
outlaw regime.
..........My government also calls on all the people of Haiti--in
uniform or in civilian life, regardless of political persuasion--to
desist from all violent actions. Surely this week's events show
that violence only begets more violence, and the way to justice lies
in the rule of law, not in recourse to violence.
..........Now is the time for us to act. There are a number of draft
resolutions in circulation. We urge the drafting committee to take
the best elements in each to produce the strongest possible draft.
We must not settle for the lowest common denominator if we are to
keep faith with the people of Haiti. By sending a mission from this
body to Haiti, led by the Secretary General, we will send an
important message to those who have taken power in Haiti and to
the Haitian people: This junta is illegitimate. It has no standing in
the democratic community. Until President Aristide's government
is restored, this junta will be treated as a pariah throughout this
hemisphere--without assistance, without friends, and without a
future.
..........Multilateral assistance must also be suspended to reinforce
the message already sent by the United States, Canada, Venezuela,
France, and the European Community. And this meeting must remain
open in order to show that this hemisphere will not lose interest or
forget the suffering of Haiti's people.
..........If these steps do not succeed, we must consider additional
steps. Those who pretend to govern Haiti should know: The path
they have chosen leads nowhere. But once democracy is restored,
Haiti will again receive the generous cooperation of the
international community in promoting development and alleviating
poverty.
..........My colleagues, our immediate purpose today is to defend the
rights and noble aspirations of the people of Haiti, but our interests
do not stop there. This is the hemisphere that stands poised to
achieve what the world has never seen before: the fulfillment of
democratic rights across two continents. This is the hemisphere
that is building a future of free trade from Alaska to Argentina.
This is the hemisphere whose nations are cooperating to eliminate
weapons of mass destruction. We are fulfilling the promise of the
New World, enshrined in the OAS Charter, "to offer to man a land of
liberty." That is the future we are defending, and the people of
Haiti are and must continue to be part of that community. This is a
moment of darkness, but this coup must not and will not succeed. I
believe the people of Haiti will regain their liberty. I believe this
hemisphere will meet its test.
..........This Organization of American States must not and will not
rest until the people of Haiti regain their democracy.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: Attack on Democracy in Haiti
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement by President Bush released by the White
House, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 1, 199110/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, OAS
[TEXT]
Today, I met with President Aristide's designated ambassador to
the White House, Jean Casimir, to receive his credentials. I told
him that despite events of the last 2 days, the United States
continues to recognize President Aristide as the duly elected
President of Haiti and that we fully support last night's
Organization of American States resolution calling for the
restoration of his government.
..........We condemn those who have attacked the legally constituted,
democratically elected government of Haiti and call for an
immediate halt to violence and the restoration of democracy in
Haiti. We will be working closely with the OAS to bring this about.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: OAS Permanent Council Resolution 567 on Haiti
Description: Resolution released by the OAS in Washington, DC
Date: Sep 30, 19919/30/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Haiti
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, OAS
[TEXT]
Permanent Council Resolution 567 (September 30, 1991)
The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,
..........Bearing in mind that representative democracy is the form of
government of the region and that its effective exercise,
consolidation, and enhancement are shared priorities;
..........Reaffirming that the principles enshrined in the OAS Charter
and the ideals of peace, democracy, social justice, comprehensive
development, and solidarity constitute permanent underpinnings of
the inter-American system;
..........Taking into account the grave events that have taken place in
Haiti and which constitute an abrupt, violent, and irregular
interruption of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratic
government of that country;
..........Having heard the statements of the Secretary General of the
Organization and the Permanent Representative of Haiti;
Resolves:
..........1. To issue its most vigorous condemnation of those events
and of their perpetrators, and to demand adherence to the
Constitution and respect for the government, which was
legitimately established through the free expression of the will of
that country's people.
..........2. In keeping with the principles of the OAS Charter and of
the Santiago Commitment to democracy, to reaffirm its solidarity
with the Haitian people in their struggle to strengthen their
democratic system without foreign interference and in the exercise
of their inalienable sovereign will.
..........3. To deplore the loss of human lives; to demand that those
responsible be punished; and to demand that, in strict observance of
international law, those parties put an end to the violation of the
Haitian people's rights, respect the life and physical safety of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and restore the President's
exercise of his constitutional authority.
..........4. Considering the graveness of the events that have occurred
in Haiti, to convene an ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs pursuant to resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91) [see box]
and to instruct the Secretary General to that effect.
VOTE: Unanimous 34-0.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: OAS General Assembly Resolution 1080
Date: Jun 5, 19916/5/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America, South America, Central America,
Caribbean
Subject: OAS, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Approved at the June 5, 1991 OAS General Assembly creating a new
mechanism for convening foreign ministers in response to a coup
d'etat or interruption of a legitimate, elected government.
Whereas:
..........The Preamble of the Charter of the OAS establishes that
representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the
stability, peace and development of the region;
..........Under the provisions of the Charter, one of the basic purposes
of the Organization of American States is to promote and
consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the
principle of nonintervention
..........Due respect must be observed for the policies of each member
country in regard to the recognition of states and governments;
..........Bearing in mind the widespread existence of democratic
governments in the hemisphere, the principle enshrined in the
Charter, namely, that the solidarity of the American States and the
high aims which it pursues require the political organization of
those States to be based on effective exercise of representative
democracy--must be made operative; the region faces serious
political, social and economic problems that may threaten the
stability of democratic governments,
The General Assembly Resolves:
..........1. To instruct the Secretary General to call for the immediate
convocation of a meeting of the Permanent Council in the case of
any event giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the
democratic political institutional process of the legitimate
exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any
of the Organization's member states, in order, within the
framework of the Charter, to examine the situation, decide on and
convene an ad hoc meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs, or a
special session of the General Assembly, all of which must take
place within a ten-day period.
..........2. To determine that the purpose of the ad hoc meeting of
ministers of foreign affairs or the special session of the General
Assembly shall be to look into the events collectively and adopt any
measures deemed appropriate, in accordance with the Charter and
international law.
..........3. To instruct the Permanent Council to devise a set of
proposals that will serve as incentives to preserve and strengthen
democratic systems, based on international solidarity and
cooperation, and to apprise the General Assembly thereof at its
twenty-second regular session.
..........VOTE: Unanimous 34-0 (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: Amir of Kuwait Visits Washington, DC
Bush, Al-Sabah
Source: President Bush, Amir Al-Sabah
Description: Remarks at the White House, Washington, Dc
Date: Oct 1, 199110/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations,
Democratization, Science/Technology
[TEXT]
President Bush: We've just had a very successful meeting with the
Amir. And we stand together in our resolve that Iraq comply fully
with all the UN Security Council resolutions so that it can never
again pose a threat to Kuwait and all the nations of the region.
..........In particular, the Amir and I strongly condemn Iraq's refusal
to free the many Kuwaitis that are still held in Iraq. We call again
for their immediate and unconditional release. And we reaffirm our
view that UN sanctions must remain in place against Iraq until a
new leadership emerges in Baghdad, a leadership willing to live in
peace with its neighbors and its own people.
..........We also reviewed Kuwait's great progress in reconstruction,
physical and political, since liberation 7 months ago. Considerably
more than half of the oil fires are out, oil exports have resumed,
and schools have reopened. I applaud all that has been
accomplished. I was heartened to hear that elections for restoring
parliamentary government are on track for October next year. And I
fully endorse Kuwait's endeavors to expand political participation
and look forward to watching this process developed in the freest
possible atmosphere.
..........So all in all, it was a good visit with a country to whom we
feel very close. Your Royal Highness, welcome, sir.
..........Amir Al-Sabah: Mr. President, I was standing with you right
here last year, and now I'm standing with you at the same place.
But what a difference between the two occasions. When you, Mr.
President, expressed the conscience of your people, you positively
demonstrated the nobility of your roots and the sincerity of your
commitment. When you expressed the conscience of mankind, it was
a testimony of your outstanding leadership and your nation's
superiority.
..........Such is the behavior and ethics of nations that have deep-
rooted and civilized principles. The people of the United States of
America and their leadership have vividly epitomized their
principles during the period of aggression on my country. In an
ominous moment, evil inclinations erupted, stirred up by false
ambition, brutish greed, and profound envy. The free world
responded by denouncing and rejecting this aggression.
..........Your reaction to the rapid rhythm of events was combined
with the voice of reason, principles, and values, which you, Mr.
President, were determined to promote and emphasize. And,
therefore, your speeches and statements were directed to all
peoples, reviving the confidence in them that the world is truly
directed to all people in a search for a new destination where
security prevails, the weak safe, and humanity is primarily
dedicated to the achievement of man's well-being.
..........The free world rallied around these values and diffused a
fervent spirit to shield rights against violation, justice against
grievances, and man against indignity. It was the greatest global
demonstration in which honorable voices of the world's leader were
raised to defend rightness and human dignity.
..........The people of Kuwait will remain in debt to this noble human
position and will always remember it with gratefulness and
appreciation. Those who sacrificed their blessed lives and pure
blood in the war to liberate Kuwait will remain models for heroism
and for defending righteousness.
..........It pleases me on this occasion of our meeting to convey to you
the feelings of the Kuwaiti people toward you and toward the people
of the United States of America. It is the strong desire of the
Kuwaitis to strengthen relations between our peoples and our two
countries in such a manner so as to serve our mutual interests and
achieve adherence to human values and benefit all mankind.
..........Finally, I wish to express to the American people, to your
Administration, and to you personally, Mr. President, the
appreciation and gratitude of the people of Kuwait for the backing
and the support you continue to extend to us.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: Meeting with Iraqi Kurdistan Front
Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs/Department Spokesman,
Washington, DC
Date: Sep 30, 19919/30/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Human Rights, United Nations, Democratization
[TEXT]
This afternoon, NEA [Bureau of Near East and Asian Affairs]
Assistant Secretary [Edward] Djerejian met with a delegation of the
Iraqi Kurdistan Front, including Jalal Talabani, one of the two
principal Kurdish leaders. The group, which also had meetings last
week at the State Department and the Pentagon, included
representatives of Iraq's Assyrian and Turcoman communities.
..........Our meetings with the Iraqi Kurdistan Front delegation took
place within the context of broadening US Government contacts
with a wide range of groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and the
present Iraqi regime. We do not back any particular opposition
faction, nor is it our aim to shape a government to succeed Saddam
Hussein. That is a matter for the Iraqi people. Similarly, the United
States supports peaceful political reform within Iraq, not Iraq's
breakup.
..........In talks with the Iraqi Kurdistan Front delegation, US officials
stressed our strong support for greater human rights and political
participation for all the people of Iraq. We support a pluralistic,
democratic Iraq in which no ethnic or religious group is denied full
rights of citizenship, full participation in the institutions of
government, and the right to honor its distinctive religious and
cultural heritage.
..........Our government is committed to humanitarian assistance for
the Iraqi people under the aegis of UN Security Council Resolution
688 and the mechanism created by UN Security Council Resolutions
706 and 712. We will insist that Iraq meet its UN-mandated
obligations, including the requirement that international relief
agencies receive unimpeded access to civilians in need of help in all
parts of the country.
..........We also discussed the residual coalition military force in
southeastern Turkey, which will act to preserve peace and stability
in northern Iraq and deter Iraqi repression.
..........We welcome the improvement in relations between the Iraqi
Kurdish leadership and the Government of Turkey. We appreciate the
clear Iraqi Kurdistan Front statements supporting Turkish
sovereignty and denouncing the terrorist tactics of the Kurdish
Workers Party (PKK), a terrorist group based in Turkey.
..........Contact with the Iraqi opposition improves mutual
understanding and strengthens our long-term relationship with the
Iraqi people. We look forward to a continuing dialogue with the
Iraqi Kurdistan Front, as well as other Iraqi opposition groups.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: US Export Control Policy Adapts To a Changing World
Hankin
Source: Christopher G. Hankin, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Trade Controls
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Sep 24, 19919/24/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, E/C Europe
Country: USSR (former), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (former)
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
This Administration has recognized and responded to the need for
US export control policy to adapt to changes in the world. This has
been true both in the context of our strategic controls and our
foreign policy controls. We have been in the fortunate situation
where statute has been flexible and has permitted us to act and
adapt as appropriate to these changes. We have been able to provide
world leadership in strengthening export controls on countries of
proliferation concern. And we have been able to provide leadership
in COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls]
in responding to the welcome changes that have occurred in the
Soviet Union and in East/Central Europe.
..........There is no reason to believe that further changes, and the
need for further responsive US leadership in the multilateral
forums, will not continue. The Administration, therefore, strongly
supports re-authorization of an export administration act that
would continue this flexibility in statute.
..........As the subcommittee is aware, we committed ourselves 2
weeks ago to a dialogue with the committee's staff in hopes that a
bill could be written and reported with Administration support. We
entered those discussions in good faith, and those discussions
continue.
..........Perhaps as we proceed we should consider a two-track
approach: a fairly simple extension of the Export Administration
Act for now, and a commitment to work together from a clean slate
on a new, forward-looking statute. We need a less cumbersome and
less complicated statute. What we write should be responsive to
the challenges ahead. It must allow us flexibility to adapt to
changes in the world, some of which we will like and others which
we will not.
..........Even, as is often the case, our views on policy coincide, it is
probably best that statutory micro-management be avoided. A
provision that appears harmless today may not be so next spring.
The Trade Act of 1988, for instance, mandated US decontrol of
items within 4 months of a US submittal to COCOM, regardless of
COCOM's determination. It apparently was inconceivable back then
that our COCOM partners would wish more time than this to
consider a US decontrol proposal. Yet, in 1990, this is exactly what
transpired, and, as a result, the United States was forced to violate
COCOM rules. We should ensure against a recurrence. International
cooperation with our allies is the only means of effectively
enforcing our strategic and non-proliferation trade controls. Care
should be taken to ensure that statute will not possibly: (a) force
the United States to violate any of its international export control
obligations; or (b) impede the United States from reacting quickly
to world events.
..........Your letter of invitation raised several issues.
Soviet Union
The new core list of dual-use items controlled by COCOM
constitutes a vast liberalization of strategic trade restrictions.
The new list, which we implemented September 1, contains only
those goods and technologies that we judge essential to maintaining
the technological lead that is critical to our national security. It is
noteworthy that the United States and our COCOM partners have also
greatly liberalized in practice our treatment of requests for
licenses of controlled items to the Soviet Union. Currently, we are
approving, subject to safeguards when appropriate, nearly all
requests for licenses to the USSR. Last year, for example, only 3
out of 261 (1.15%) General Exceptions Requests and 3 of 601
(0.05%) De Minimis applications were formally denied in COCOM.
Particularly noteworthy, none of the 174 favorable consideration
cases was denied.
..........The Administration is committed to supporting the Soviet
Union's integration into the world economy and Soviet market
reform. While we still have national security concerns, which
cannot be prudently ignored given Soviet military capabilities,
COCOM's remaining high-technology restrictions will not impede the
modernization and restructuring of the Soviet economy. COCOM
restrictions are really very peripheral to the problems affecting
Soviet economic progress. Frankly, the problems are caused by the
lack of markets, not COCOM controls; it will be the introduction of
markets, not the import of sophisticated, expensive high technology
that will solve those problems.
..........In the energy sector, which is key to the Soviet Union's ability
to generate foreign exchange, few restrictions remain on equipment
used in production, refining, or transporting of oil and gas.
Advanced computers, work stations, and seismic equipment for
exploration remain controlled, but licenses for their export to the
USSR are being approved under the general exceptions procedures.
These procedures aim to ensure that the sophisticated technology
shipped will not be diverted to military end-uses. It should be
noted that US oil and gas firms have a much larger presence in the
Soviet Union than do firms from our COCOM allies. In power
generation, COCOM has decontrolled industrial diesel generators and
most of the technology involved in their production.
..........In the computer industry, most personal computers, some
mini-computers, and nearly all mass market software have been
decontrolled by COCOM. As I have already noted, even more
sophisticated mainframes that are still subject to control have
been licensed for oil and gas projects. They have also been approved
for projects aimed at enhancing the safety of Soviet nuclear power
plants. The relaxation on computer sales, coupled with newly
available telecommunications equipment, will enable the Soviets to
develop a sophisticated banking and financial sector that is crucial
to doing business with the West.
..........In transportation, commercial aircraft are now free from
control. We expect that this will enhance the prospects for sales
into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where the United States
has already successfully marketed aircraft. The decontrol of FAA
[Federal Aviation Administration]-certified jet engines and avionics
used on commercial aircraft will allow the development of new
aircraft using Soviet airframes and Western high-technology
products.
..........In the marine field, hovercraft and surface effect ships that
can be used as ferries were decontrolled. This will aid in the
movement of goods and people across the Baltic Sea and similar
bodies of water.
..........Also in transportation, the restrictions on air traffic control
(ATC) systems were eased, thereby making modern civil ATC
systems available to the Soviets. Such systems will significantly
improve the safety of air travel within as well as to and from the
USSR.
..........In the manufacturing sector, COCOM has relaxed restrictions
on machine tools, electronics, and industrial process controls,
which are critical to producing high-quality products in quantity.
As a result, the marketability of Soviet manufactures in the West
can improve, thereby increasing exports and generating badly needed
hard currency. The primary difficulties for the Soviet civil
manufacturing sector, however, have nothing to do with technology
availability.
..........In telecommunications, political control from the center used
to be one of the principal obstacles to development of Soviet
telecommunications links with the West. With that major obstacle
overcome, the USSR will be able to undertake a vast improvement in
communications with the West, fostering growth in business as
well as personal ties.
..........In connection with an international telecommunications
gateway project, COCOM allows the installation of sophisticated,
modern systems. The Soviets will have excess capacity in
international links well into the 21st century.
..........As for domestic systems, we still have serious national
security concerns with allowing the export of state-of-art fiber
optics. Nevertheless, telecommunications equipment which now can
be exported to the USSR, such as digital circuit and packet
switching systems, medium-data-rate transmission systems, and
cellular telephone systems, would allow the Soviets to develop and
install more modern domestic civil telecommunications systems
(public digital voice and data networks) with features and
functionality comparable to what is still in widespread use in the
West. Soviet citizens could have access to such services as
facsimile, cellular telephone, electronic mail, and voice mail, with
all the features enjoyed by most users in the West.
..........We recognize that our commitments to assist the development
of markets and democratic institutions in the Soviet Union can be
greatly enhanced by improvements in their telephone infrastructure.
Balancing our fundamental security needs against these goals is a
challenge that COCOM faced prior to the events in August and will
review as necessary. As the dust continues to settle in the Soviet
Union, our security needs may change, and we will consult with
industry and our allies as to whether further adjustments to the
telecommunications controls may be warranted. However, we will
vehemently oppose any effort by the committee to force
liberalization through statute.
Eastern Europe
Since the revolutionary changes that swept through Eastern Europe
beginning in late 1989, the United States has been at the forefront
of COCOM efforts to liberalize COCOM controls for the newly
emerging democracies in that region. Our goal is to remove Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia from the COCOM-proscribed
destinations list and to enlist their cooperation in controlling high
technology and items of proliferation concern. We are also eager
for other East European democracies, particularly the Baltic states,
to benefit from liberalized treatment in COCOM.
..........In the spring of 1990, the United States held three rounds of
export control discussions with officials of Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia. As a result of these meetings, the governments of
the three countries made written commitments to establish
safeguards to protect COCOM-controlled technology. By February
1991, the three countries had each implemented an adequate system
of safeguards. As the safeguards were being implemented, the
United States pushed forcefully in COCOM for liberalized treatment
of the three countries. By the end of February, a COCOM special
procedure was in effect for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
Under the COCOM Special Procedure for Eastern Europe, export
licenses for most technology on the COCOM dual-use list are
processed in COCOM under favorable consideration procedures.
..........As a further step toward liberalization, COCOM agreed in May
1991 to allow virtually all telecommunications equipment and
technology, including fiber optics, to be exported to Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia at national discretion. The United
States strongly supported this measure designed to address the
need for rapid development of advanced telecommunications
networks in the three countries.
..........The United States has now proposed specific criteria for
removing Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia from the COCOM-
proscribed list. The governments of these countries have indicated
a willingness to take the necessary steps, including establishment
of export controls and enforcement capabilities on indigenously
produced high technology and munitions, to meet these criteria. We
believe that if the three countries were to meet the conditions set
forth in the US proposal, they would not only qualify for removal
from the proscribed list but also become eligible for valuable 5(k)
trade benefits as COCOM cooperating countries. This outcome is in
the interests of these countries as much as it is in our interests.
..........We believe that continuing to link liberalization of COCOM
controls to concrete actions taken by East European governments to
build effective export control systems is the best way to achieve
this result. In this regard, a provision in [Senate Bill 320] that we
have strongly supported would remove the restriction on permitting
special licenses to East European countries constituting a lesser
strategic threat. Again, a case where micro-management proves a
roadblock.
Baltic States
We seek to proceed with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as we have
with the other newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. The
COCOM Special Procedure, which has proved useful in our effort to
liberalize controls for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, should
also be applied to the Baltic states.
..........The US position in COCOM is to urge members to coordinate an
approach to Baltic governments at the earliest opportunity to
discuss steps they could take to attain liberalized treatment and
eventual removal from the proscribed destinations list. The United
States is prepared to send an export control delegation to engage
the Baltics on this issue at the earliest opportunity.
Intra-COCOM Trade
The United States and its COCOM partners have agreed to eliminate
dual-use export licenses among COCOM members by January 1, 1992,
except for a short list of items contained in a common "exclusion
list." This is concurrent with the timetable by which all members
have committed to implementation of the COCOM common standard.
The vast majority of COCOM dual-use items will be exported and re-
exported without requirement for an individual license among the
COCOM member countries. This "license-free zone" may also be
extended to cooperating countries, though this will require a
separate consultation within COCOM.
..........We are currently in the process of preparing for October
negotiations on the exclusion list. Assuming that all COCOM
member countries have met the common standard and share the
same international obligations (e.g., adherence to the Missile
Technology Control Regime), the items that are placed on the
exclusion list will be expected to fall within certain limited
categories; e.g., items that have met the requirements of the COCOM
targeted technology procedure. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: Loan Guarantees To Israel
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Oct 2, 199110/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel
Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
We are pleased that Congress has agreed to delay consideration of
the question of absorption loan guarantees for Israel. This step is a
welcome affirmation of the President's judgment that a pause in
considering absorption assistance is in the best interests of the
historic opportunity for peace that lies before us.
..........The Administration reaffirms its support for the principle of
absorption aid to Israel and will support loan guarantees for that
purpose, provided terms and conditions acceptable to the
Administration are worked out when Congress takes the matter up
next year. Immigration of Soviet Jews is a humanitarian issue of
great importance. The United States has long encouraged the Soviet
Union to permit free emigration and has supported Israel's efforts
to absorb those immigrants who have left the Soviet Union and
other countries.
..........The Administration agrees that scoring by OMB [Office for
Management and Budget] for loan guarantees will be at the most
reasonable rate possible consistent with legal requirements. The
Administration will begin now an effort to solicit international
support for the principle of absorption aid. If there is cost to Israel
associated with deferral, the Administration will agree that such
cost be offset in the ultimate
package.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 40, October 7, 1991
Title: Focus on Central and Eastern Europe Summary of
Initiatives
Date: Oct 7, 199110/7/91
Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Albania,
Czechoslovakia (former), Romania, Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: Trade/Economics, Media/Telecommunications,
Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
Baltic Independence
Speaking at a September 11 reception for heads of the diplomatic
missions of Estonia, Lativia, and Lithuania and for Americans who
had championed their cause, President Bush said:
.........."...As the United States was true to the Baltic States in
captivity, we will continue to be true to them as democratic
partners in the years ahead."
..........The President also remarked that it has now become
America's responsibility "to help the Baltics integrate fully into the
West, to nurture these young democracies; to transform...their
economies toward a free market."
Assistance Expands
In September 1991, US assistance to Central and Eastern Europe
increased when the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
achieved independence from the Soviet Union. The United States
began sending urgent humanitarian aid, technical assistance, and
direct economic aid in 1989 to Poland and Hungary, where progress
toward democracy and a market economy was most advanced.
Assistance has expanded to include Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Baltic states.
..........The United States committed about $1.5 billion in 1990 and
1991 in grants and other assistance to Eastern Europe according to
guidelines set by President Bush in April 1989. During his
September 14 visit to Toompea Castle in Tallinn, Estonia, Secretary
Baker announced that "for the balance of this year, we will be
making available roughly $14 million for the three Baltic states,
which we would expect to divide up one-third, one-third, one-third."
Housing Guaranty Program
On September 11, President Bush announced a new Housing Guaranty
Program for Central and Eastern Europe. Funding for fiscal year (FY)
1991 will provide $35 million, of which up to $25 million is for
Poland. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) will
administer the program and seek to stimulate entrepreneurship in
the housing industry. A second objective is to encourage banks to
develop lending programs to serve the housing industry in their
localities.
Sister Law School Program
Eighteen deans from seven Central and East European law school
faculties are participating in the American Bar Association's Sister
Law School exchange program. The month-long program began on
September 4 with visits to Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr, the Library of
Congress, and Capitol Hill. The jurists were particularly interested
in the confirmation process for Supreme Court justices and found
the Senate hearings for Clarence Thomas timely. After the
orientation, each law school dean spent an intensive week at each
of three law schools in his or her consortium, giving active
participation in the program to 54 American law schools in 27
states.
Law Program Begins at GWU
Six students (three from Czechoslovakia, two from Romania, and
one from Hungary) have entered a law program at George Washington
University under the co-sponsorship of the university and the US
Information Agency (USIA).
Council of Governors' Policy Advisors Host City
Officials
Nine mayors and city council members from Poland and Hungary
studied how US states finance major projects under a special
internship program of the Council of Governors' Policy Advisors
(CGPA) from August 29 to September 24. The intern program was
funded in part by a USIA grant. The interns' major interests were in
finding ways to finance the design and construction of highway
systems and intercity airports. Additional interests included the
need for training and education in marketing, business, and
computer technology.
Teaching English in Eastern Europe
Thirty-three USIA fellows are training English instructors in
Central and Eastern Europe to teach business-specific English. An
additional 13 fellows will join the program after pre-departure
orientation in Washington, DC.
USIA Grants Announced
The United States Information Agency recently announced the
following grants:
-- International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX)--$2
million for FY 1991 administrative and program expenses to conduct
US academic exchanges with Central and Eastern Europe and the
USSR;
..........-- University of Tennessee--$100,000 for exchange programs
in management and economics that enhance the role of education in
promoting democratic institution-building in Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, and Romania;
..........-- American Council of Learned Societies--$122,000 from
USIA in addition to funding from the Ford and Mellon Foundations for
research fellowships to be used by Central and East European
scholars in American studies at US universities;
..........-- National Forum Foundations--$195,000 from USIA to train
Central and East Europeans through an intensive, hands-on
internship program in government, business, and media;
..........-- Portland State University--$200,000 for the first year of
a long-term project assisting the development of market societies
in Wroclaw, Poland, and Pecs, Hungary;
..........-- Johns Hopkins University--$200,000 for its Institute for
Policy Studies to support an integrated training program for newly
emerging urban experts in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and
Hungary;
..........-- University of Missouri at Columbia--$198,000 to provide a
series
of workshops in Central and Eastern Europe and internships in the
United States for journalists as well as seminars in the United
States for journalism educators; and
..........-- Ohio University--$11,000 to conduct a 1-week workshop
on privatization that concentrated on issues in the sale of public
sector and government assets to private investors.
Country By Country
..........Albania.
USIA Academic Exchange Specialist
Paul Hiemstra has met with Albanian Government and academic
officials to discuss establishing a Fulbright program, and U